The Soviet Union and Its Southern Neighbours: Iran and Afghanistan 1917-1933 [1 ed.] 0714634859, 9780714634852

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The Soviet Union and Its Southern Neighbours: Iran and Afghanistan 1917-1933 [1 ed.]
 0714634859, 9780714634852

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Russian–Iranian and Russian–Afghan Relations before October 1917
2. Soviet–Iranian Relations, 1917–21
3. From Slogans to Reality, 1921–25
4. Pyrrhic Victory: The Trade Agreement and the Guarantee and Neutrality Pact, 1925–28
5. The World Crisis and the Crisis of Trust, 1929–33
6. First Steps in Soviet Diplomacy towards Afghanistan, 1917–21
7. From Moscow to Pagman, 1921–26, and the Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression Pact, 1931
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Appendices
Index

Citation preview

THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURS IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, 1917-1933

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THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURS IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, 1917-1933

Mikhail Volodarsky

First published in 1994 by

FRANK CASS & CO. LTD This edition published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 0X 14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 1994 Mikhail Volodarsky British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Volodarskii, M. I. Soviet Union and Its Southern Neighbours: Iran and Afghanistan, 1917-33, I. Title 327.47 ISBN 0-7146-3485-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data Volodarskii, M. I. (Mikhail I.) [Sovety i ikh iuzhnye sosedi Iran i Afganistan, 1917-1933. English] The Soviet Union and its southern neighbours : Iran and Afghanistan, 1917-1933 / M.I. Volodarsky, p. cm. Translated from Russian. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146 3485-9 1. Soviet Union—Foreign relations-Iran. 2. Iran—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 3. Soviet Union—Foreign relations— —Afghanistan. 4. Afghanistan—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 5. Soviet Union—Foreign relations— 1917-1945.1. Title. DK68.7.I7V6513 1994 327.47055—dc20 93-22806 CIP A ll rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission o f the publisher.

Typeset by Regent Typesetting, London

TO MY WIFE, LUDMILLA

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Contents Introduction

ix

1. Russian-Iranian and Russian-Afghan Relations before October 1917

1

2. Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

12

3. From Slogans to Reality, 1921-25

53

4. Pyrrhic Victory: The Trade Agreement and the Guarantee and Neutrality Pact, 1925-28

82

5. The World Crisis and the Crisis of Trust, 1929-33

100

6. First Steps in Soviet Diplomacy towards Afghanistan, 1917-21 7. From Moscow to Pagman, 1921-26, and the Neutrality

121

and Mutual Non-aggression Pact, 1931

133

Conclusion

152

Notes

155

Bibliography

175

Appendices

179

Index

190

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Introduction This monograph is intended to investigate the very earliest period of Soviet Middle East policy. The study of this period makes it possible to trace the way in which the Bolsheviks altered their foreign-policy tactics in accordance with circumstances which developed inside and outside the country, while maintaining inviolable strategic objectives - the inspiration and provocation of 'global revolution'. In the first years after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, Lenin and his inner circle were convinced that within a short time all Europe would be overcome by the proletarian revolution. Lenin considered the October Revolution to be only the beginning of the international uprising of the proletariat. What was happening at that time in Germany and Hungary appeared to confirm those prognoses. Where the atmosphere was conducive to such influence, Moscow extended its 'assistance' and encouragement, especially in such countries as Poland, Finland and the Baltic states. Moscow also undertook to create a military and political base on part of Iranian territory. However, the changing situation in Europe was unfavourable for the revolutionary 'romantics'. The dreams of a global revolution and a global Soviet Republic were shattered one after another. The political situation within the Soviet Union was also taking a different turn from what was expected. Lenin's belief that he could introduce socialism simply by declaring 'military communism' was dashed. That policy, which smacked of purely political adventurism, had to be abandoned and replaced by the New Economic Policy (NEP), yet this did not mean that the 'guard' headed by Lenin had given up its ultra-revolutionary illusions. The theoreticians of perestroïka assert that Lenin really intended to create in Russia a society of efficient and civilized co-operative members. Were it so, he would have aspired to a mutually profitable and honest co-operation with the West. The preconditions should have been to cease playing at world revolution and to liquidate the Comintern. But in reality the NEP was part of a manoeuvre leading to that very revolution. In practice, the introduction of the NEP created a bipolarity in

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Moscow's foreign policy - a fact which has been noted by a number of investigators, among them George Kennan (Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, 1960), who pointed out that in the years 1921-34 there were two centres of power in the foreign policy activity of the USSR: on the one hand there was the Comintern, and on the other the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel). The revision of history which began with perestroïka and glasnost has also dealt with that aspect of Soviet foreign policy. Professor V. Sirotkin, an active supporter of perestroïka, pointed out in an article entitled 'From Civil War to Civil Peace'1 that in the first half of the 1920s the subject of bipolarity in Soviet foreign policy was not yet taboo and was openly discussed in the Soviet press. Thus, for instance the Narkomindel Herald (Vestnik NKID) quoted in detail Poland's reaction to the Riga Treaty as expressed in the Warsaw newspaper Courier Polsky on 4 October 1921. It contained the following item: The hard work done by Poland in order to preserve and strengthen peaceful relations with Bolshevik Russia must be properly recognized abroad. It signifies an effort to remain at peace with a state which does not acknowledge any norms of the civilized world; which despises the political organization of the rest of Europe, wishes to see it succumb to conflagration and rebellion. It also means having dealings with a Janus-faced people, whose one face says: 'I am a member of the Government, and I know nothing of the Third International' while the other face says: 'I am a member of the Third International and I am not interested in any obligations undertaken by the Government'. This bipolarity of foreign policy found expression in constant mutual attacks by the head of the Narkomindel, Gheorgii Chicherin, and the President of the Comintern, Grigorii Zinovyev. The former was constantly accusing the latter of making thoughtless declarations which impaired the possibility of normalizing diplomatic relations with the West. For the same reason Chicherin often complained about the activities of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze in Kirov in the Transcaucasus, and their negative influence on the situation in Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan. In 1921 Lenin acted on Chicherin's repeated requests, and the Politburo issued a special decree forbidding government members and those of the Russian section of the Comintern to make any public declarations concerning foreign-policy problems or the international situation without

Introduction

xi

Chicherin's sanction. However, Chicherin's proposal to remove Soviet leaders from the Executive Committee of the Comintern was resolutely rejected by Lenin.2 Nevertheless, Lenin's collaborators paid scant attention to that decision as they believed, to an even greater degree than Lenin himself, in a rapidly approaching socialist revolution that would result in the creation of a 'global' Soviet Union. That dual approach was causing difficulties in the day-to-day work of Soviet diplomats not only in Paris, London and Berlin but also in Tehran, Kabul and Ankara. As Stalin progressively fortified his position as dictator, his view on foreign policy became more visible and dominant. Until the end of the 1920s, Stalin's personal interference in matters of the Narkomindel and in foreign policy in general was not particularly felt by Chicherin and his staff. Stalin was too busy with problems of the Party's internecine struggle. Thus Chicherin remained relatively independent. Paradoxical as it may seem, the weakening positions within the party of Trotsky, Zinovyev, Radek and others worked temporarily in Chicherin's favour. With their gradual disappearance from the scene, the influence of the Comintern as one of the two power-centres of Soviet foreign policy vanished. Stalin's participation in foreign affairs was, until then, minimal and insignificant. He took no part in negotiations, did not receive foreign government officials or ambassadors and confined himself to making occasional analyses of the international situation. At the beginning of the 1930s the situation shifted drastically. Chicherin was replaced by M.M. Litvinov. The character of Stalin's relations with both prominent diplomats changed. If Chicherin had managed to preserve his relative independence during the era of Stalin's non-interference in foreign affairs, Litvinov, as People's Commissar, was wholly dependent on Stalin. In the 1930s the actual foreign-policy decisions began to come from Stalin, and from that time the term 'global revolution' disappeared from the battery of Soviet propaganda. Foreign policy was gradually re-acquiring many elements of the imperial doctrine, which was so close to Stalin's outlook. That doctrine, dressed in new terminology, was also in the interests of a new class - the partokratia or nomenklatura - created and endowed with power by Stalin. No one dared any longer to say that once the world revolution succeeded, a victorious Soviet Union would concede the leading role to the more developed states of the

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West. Stalin demanded that the international communist movement work for the USSR and not the other way round. The Comintern, having lost the last vestiges of relative independence which it enjoyed in itsfirstyears of existence, succumbed to the new situation. By the mid-1930s the bipolarity of Soviet foreign policy had completely disappeared, and there was unity in word and deed. Something else disappeared for ever from foreign-policy practice: the symbols, illusions and terminology of revolutionary romanticism. The normalization of Soviet-Iranian and Soviet-Afghan relations in 1921 coincided with the transition to NEP and the increasing bipolarity in Soviet foreign policy. As far as Iran and Afghanistan were concerned, this dualism took the form of diametric opposition between principles and objectives. The principles formulated by the Narkomindel included equal rights, mutual non-interference in internal affairs and mutually beneficial co-operation. However, turning Iran and Afghanistan into bridgeheads for a breakthrough to India, undermining the power of the British Empire and establishing Soviet control over Asia were the objectives defined by the Party, which was increasingly personified by Stalin. Notes 1. Yu. Afanasyer (éd.), Inogo ne dano (Moscow: Progress, 1988), p. 384. 2. V.I. Lenin, Polnoyesobrantesochinenii, Vol. 53, pp. 273,435. Chicherin insisted that 'the predominance of Party over governmental activity signifies the paralysis of governmental activity' (AVPRF, f.04, op.52, pap.344a, d.55405, p.26).

1 RUSSIAN-IRANIAN AND RUSSIAN-AFGHAN RELATIONS BEFORE OCTOBER 1917

The beginning of Russian-Iranian diplomatic relations dates from 1586. In that year Tsar Feodor Ivanovich (1584-98), son and successor to Ivan IV, sent an embassy to Iran, with Prince Tyufyakin at its head. His successors, Tsar Boris Godunov and Tsar Vasili Shuysky, carried on these lively contacts with Iran despite the unfavourable conditions of those troubled times. The contact continued during the reign of Tsar Mikhail Feodorovich Romanov (1613-45). Russia and Iran were, at that time, united by their mutual interest in putting an end to Turkish aggression. The Sefevi dynasty came to power in Iran at the beginning of the sixteenth century and towards the end of that century had attained enough power to stand up to the Ottoman Empire. It was for that reason that the Russian Tsars sought to conclude an alliance with Shah Abbas I (1587-1629), and were met with a positive response.1 After his death the power of the dynasty declined and the switching of Russia's interest from Turkish affairs to relations with Poland and Sweden put a prolonged stop to Russian-Iranian relations. However, they were renewed under the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) when the Sefevi dynasty came to an end and the Afghan tribes invaded Iran. The disappearance of the Sefevi Empire from the political map of the Middle East disturbed the balance of that region and led to a new wave of Turkish aggression. Sultan Akhmed I considered that a weaker Iran might be a signal for extending his control over the whole of the Transcaucasus, which greatly worried Russia. It was for that reason that the Russian government decided to extend military aid to Iran against the Turks, who had already invaded western Iran. A Russian army was

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sent to that country gaining control along the coast of the Caspian Sea between the estuary of the River Terek and that of the River Atrek. Russia's decisive measures stopped Turkey's ambitious designs on Iran. Russian forces remained there for 12 years (172436) until a new, centralized power emerged in Iran - the Empire of Nadir Shah (1736-47) - when the balance of power was once more restored in the Middle East. The second half of the eighteenth century was not marked by any outstanding events in Russian-Iranian relations. However, towards the end of the century some noteworthy events took place in connection with Russia's renewed activity in the Transcaucasus, giving those relations an altogether new character. The strengthening of Russian influence in Transcaucasia and the decision of Georgia to become part of the Russian Empire met with harsh opposition on the part of the already established Iranian Qajar dynasty (1796-1825). Russia and Iran entered into a series of wars, which lasted throughout the first third of the nineteenth century. Now a new political factor emerged in that region - Great Britain which viewed Russia's movement toward the south as a threat to its possessions in India and its interests in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. During the first (1804-13) and second (1826-28) RussoPersian wars, Britain backed Iran with arms and money. Despite this Iran was defeated on both occasions. Consequently Iran had to sign two peace treaties with Russia - Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828) - by which it gave up all claims to the Transcaucasus and recognized the annexation by Russia of Georgia, Armenia and northern Azerbaijan. The Turkmanchai Treaty gave Russia the right to keep a naval force in the Caspian Sea and Iran had to agree to pay a large indemnity and give Russia the right to establish in Iran the so-called regime of Capitulations: Russian subjects enjoyed special privileges and facilities (consular jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, and the right to own property). Russian diplomatic representatives, consuls and trading agents also had the right to protect those Iranian subjects employed by them. The Turkmanchai Treaty was the foundation of Russian influence in Iran for almost a century until October 1917. Russian victories over Iran resulted in a change in Iran's foreign policy: instead of relying totally on Great Britain it now manipulated a double-edged policy of manoeuvring between the two, though sometimes with an obvious leaning towards Russia.

Relations before October 1917

3

Russian Ministers to Tehran (Count I.O. Simonich (1832-38), General A.O. Duhamel (1839-41) and Count A.I. Medem (184146) were defacto advisers to Prince Abbas, who was the actual ruler of Iran during the reign or the very old Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834) and during the rule of his son, Muhammed Shah (1834-48). Muhammed's son, Naser ed-Din Shah (1848-96) - according to a report from N.A. Anichkov, Russian Consul General in Tabriz (1838-54), later Minister to Tehran (1854-57) - had 'demonstrated a very obvious desire not to withdraw from our influence'.2 London had no alternative but to acknowledge the situation and admit that Russia had acquired a strong foothold in the Middle East. In the 1840s both great powers came to a mutual agreement on policy towards Iran.3 Russia's influence in Iran and Iran's attachment to Russia were the ruling policies of the Iranian court and it was the Shah's wish to conclude a treaty with Russia at the beginning of the Crimean War. But under pressure from London he was obliged to remain neutral. However British diplomacy could not prevent a Russian-Iranian neutrality treaty being signed on 28 September 1854, which stipulated a 'friendly neutrality' towards Russia throughout the Crimean War. Therefore Iran had a fairly restrained policy with regard to the Russian presence in Central Asia in the 1860s and 1870s. Strong pressure from London did not change Iran's friendly attitude towards Russia.4 Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran during the 1870s and 1890s, created a particular atmosphere in Russian-Iranian relations in as much as Tehran, wishing to avoid repressive measures by Great Britain, was compelled to try to maintain a certain equilibrium, and keep an equal distance between itself and both rivals. However, there were other objectives that determined Iran to strengthen connections with Russia, especially after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, when Russia entered a period of rapid economic and political development. Thus it was that economic factors determined Russian-Iranian relations during the last decades of the nineteenth century. The first concessions were made, and a Russian Discount and Loan Bank was opened in Tehran to finance Russian-Iranian trade. The northern provinces of Iran - the richest and economically best-developed - embarked on an ever-increasing trade with Russia. The Russian railway network reached the very borders of Iran, and the Caspian Sea became a lively trading route.

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Russia's position - that of dominance in northern Iran - was acknowledged and accepted by Great Britain, which agreed to consider that region as a monopolistic sphere of Russian influence (Anglo-Russian Agreement of 31 August 1907). This influence originated in 1878 when, at the request of Naser ed-Din Shah, Russian officers organized and trained the Cossack Regiment, the only existing real fighting force in the Iranian Army. This subsequently grew into a brigade, and later into a division. This force played an important role in destroying the main centres of the radical movement during the Iranian revolution in 1905-11, and also during the uprising of 1921. During the First World War, Iranian neutrality was grossly violated by the aggressive acts of both Turkey and Germany. Russia and Great Britain were obliged to send their forces into Iran in order to prevent its occupation by the Turkish Army, and cut off the eventual movement of Turkish and German forces into Afghanistan, India and Russian Turkestan. Russian-Iranian relations between 1828 and 1917 were not based on equality of rights, nor could their respective economic potentials be compared. Neither could the levels of their social, cultural and political development be compared. Russia aimed at achieving the maximum benefit from the situation and took full advantage of its geographical position - close to the most economically developed part of northern Iran, which gave Russia easy access to that market. However, St Petersburg respected Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in the 1830s defined its own position concerning the demarcation line between the Shah's possessions and the Turkmen areas which the Shah was claiming for himself. During the following decades the Russian government continued to repudiate Iran's claims to that area, until the Turkmen lands were incorporated into the Russian Empire. Russia repeatedly and firmly reminded Iran that the River Atrek forms the border between Iran and Turkmenia. Tehran could not fail to acknowledge the logic and justice of Russia's policy in this, and the Russian-Iranian demarcation line was confirmed in 1881 on the basis of Russia's position. Thus from the 1830s to the 1890s the border between Russia and Iran was the must peaceful of Iran's borders. The incorporation of Turkmen lands into the Russian Empire put an end to invasions by Turkmen tribes into the rich Iranian provinces of Khorassan and Astrabad.

Relations before October 1917

5

The Russian February Revolution of 1917 created in Iran an atmosphere of great expectation. The Iranian public did not hide its hopes for a speedy abolition of unjust agreements, liquidation of the Capitulations regime and the withdrawal from Iranian territory of all foreign military forces. It became known in Tehran that the Minister appointed to Iran by the Provisional Government - V. Minorsky - had advised his government to withdraw Russian forces from Iran, that is the 1st Caucasian Cavalry Corps commanded by General Baratov, consisting of 60,000 men. He also recommended that Russia give up its sphere of influence there, as defined by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.56 Minorsky's statement - that owing to the Russian revolution not only Russian but also British policy would favour greater liberalization, and that Russia would thus play a more active and progressive role in Iran - made him a popular figure in Tehran. Russia's political status began to soar.7 The paper Jangel, published in Fumen (in the province of Gilan), with strong pan-Islamic tendencies, wrote in the editorial of its first issue (23 May 1917): The victory of the Russians over Tsarism has strengthened the Iranian people's hopes for a better future and made us believe that Russian democracy will extend bothfiscaland moral aid to the Iranian people.' How well those hopes and expectations were founded was confirmed by the contradictory instructions dispatched by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Minorsky. On the one hand, the instructions stressed that 'Russia's policy will not undergo any changes'.8 On the other, they contained the following important message: 'We may not act openly against the liberal tendencies in Iran. Owing to our new regime we should not do anything against Iran's liberal ideas.'9 And further: 'Nor must we take a position against the convening of the Majlis, since that may cause discontent in Iran as well as amongst our democratic circles.'10 The result was, of course, that criticism of Russia in the Iranian press virtually disappeared. In return a campaign of anti-British feeling attained enormous dimensions. Typical of that campaign was an article which appeared in the newspaper Setareye Sorh (Red Star): 'AH the misfortunes that Iran had suffered from the time of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 were the result of the intrigues and machinations of British diplomacy.'11 Anti-British feeling was further fostered in the spring of 1917 when a group of Iranian nationalist extremists set up an under-

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ground organization called 'Komiteye Modjazat' (Retribution Committee). The Shah himself, his Prime Minister, Vossuq edDowleh, members of the government and other prominent politicians received letters containing death threats against anyone who collaborated with the British. Then began a series of terrorist acts which claimed many victims including a well-known religious personality, Agha Mirza Mohsen, who had praised the pro-British cabinet of Vossuq ed-Dowleh in his sermons; the Vice-Minister of Finance, Montahad ed-Dowleh, known for his close ties with the British ministers in Tehran, Barclay and Marling; the Governor General of Tabriz, Sardar Rashid; and the director of Tehran's granaries, Mirza Ismail Khan.12 The death threat against the Prime Minister was never carried out, but he was forced to leave his post in May 1917. The new Prime Minister, Ala os Saltaneh, informed Marling on 12 July 1917, that his government 'was forced, under pressure of public opinion, to declare null and void the decision taken by Vossuq ed-Dowleh's cabinet, by which General Sir Percy Sykes was given the right to form a corps of South Persian Rifles'. He also informed the British minister that the Iranian government considered the continuing presence of British forces on Iranian territory and the recruiting of armed units under the command of British officers as infringements of that country's sovereignty.13 No such declarations, however, were made to the Russian minister, Minorsky, although Russian forces continued to remain on Iranian territory. Moreover, Russian-Iranian meetings, organized by Iranian leftist groups together with Soviet soldiers' deputies, were taking place in Tehran, Kermanshah, Rasht and other cities. The orators were shouting declarations: 'Long live Free Russia and Free Iran' and 'We shall go hand in hand with the Russians'.14 In the meantime, relations between Russia and Afghanistan were taking on a different character. Little was known in Russia about that remote mountainous country. Information about 'Kabulia' had begun to reach St Petersburg more or less regularly only at the end of the eighteenth century, through Bokharan merchants who brought Afghan artefacts for sale in Russia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Russian government decided to gather information on Afghanistan and establish contact with its ruler.

Relations before October 1917

7

With that aim in mind, a special group of diplomats was included in the Russian delegation headed by Count Yu. A. Golovkin which was sent to China in 1805. However, Count Golovkin never got to China, nor did the diplomats who were to go to Kabul get there either. In 1823, one of the officials of the Russian Ministry of Finance, who was in charge of trade with the Central Asian countries, had written in his yearly report that 'Afghanistan is hardly worth the attention of the [Russian] Government',15 although some ten years later the word 'Afghanistan' was often mentioned in Russian diplomatic and interministerial correspondence. At that time, Russia's growing influence in the Middle East (after its victories in the Russian-Iranian and Russian-Turkish wars) caused Britain to take its own steps in that area. Numerous British agents infiltrated Central Asia with the purpose of preparing the ground for turning this vast region, bordering Russia and presenting a natural market for Russian goods, into a market for British goods. Britain also wanted a base for direct anti-Russian political and military activity. The Russian government, wanting to set up an obstacle to Britain's thrust into Central Asia, began to pay attention to Afghanistan, whose geopolitical situation was ideal as a natural barrier between India and Central Asia. Count I.O. Simonich, the Russian minister to Tehran, was ordered to send to St Petersburg as much detailed information about Afghanistan as possible. Simultaneously the Russian government began receiving important information from the Orenburg Governor General, Count V. A. Perovsky, provided by Bokharan and Khivan merchants travelling to Russian fairs. Knowledge of Afghanistan began to widen. It became clear that the strong Afghan power - the Durrani Empire - created in 1747 by the outstanding military commander, Ahmad Shah Abdali, had crumbled in 1818. By the 1830s there existed merely four medium-sized principalities with the cities Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Peshawar as their capitals. The first two were ruled by members of the aristocratic Barakzai clan of the Abdali tribe. Herat was ruled by the descendants of Ahmad Shah (Sadozai clan). Peshawar was seized in 183334, with the silent approval of the British Indian government, by its ally, a Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh. Count Simonich's dispatches home advised that the British should not hide their intention of turning the whole of Afghanistan

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into a British protectorate. He wrote that in April 1836 his British colleague in Tehran, Sir G. Ellis, had declared that Great Britain considered Afghanistan as 'the border of our Indian Empire'. He also said that his government insisted on 'no other European state having any trade or political dealings with Afghanistan'. Simonich rejected the doctrine of 'limited sovereignty of Afghanistan' and declared that Russia considered all the Afghan principalities as independent states, with Russia having the right to normal relations with them.16 In the 1830s the ruler of Kabul, Dost Muhammad Khan, initiated the idea of unifying the four principalities into one state. The idea met with strong opposition from the British government, and Dost Muhammad Khan turned to Russia for help. An Afghan mission was sent to St Petersburg, arriving there in the spring of 1837. Negotiations began with the Vice-Chancellor, Count K.V. Nesselrode, and the Director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, K.K. Radofinikin. The result of these talks was that a Russian diplomatic mission would be sent to Afghanistan to help Dost Muhammad Khan reach an agreement with his brothers, the rulers of Kandahar. After that, steps would be taken to work out an alliance for Iran, Kabul and Kandahar against the pro-British ruler of Herat, Kamran Mirza. Russia promised Dost Muhammad and his Kandahar brothers help in their struggle for the unification of Afghan lands. The Russian diplomatic mission, sent to Afghanistan in May 1837, was headed by a young diplomat and orientalist, Lieutenant I.V. Vitkevich, who was an adjutant to Count Perovsky. The joint efforts of Count Simonich and Vitkevich bore fruit. The rulers of Kabul and Kandahar succeeded in overcoming their feud and signed, together with Iran, a treaty guaranteed by Count Simonich in the name of Tsar Nicholas I. This was immediately and forcefully opposed by the British government. For them the presence of a Russian diplomatic agent in Kabul was worse than a blockade of the Thames estuary by an enemy squadron. London exerted such pressure on St Petersburg that Nicholas I had to give in. It should be borne in mind that in the 1830s Russia's foreign policy was almost exclusively centred on the notorious 'Eastern question', and to a much lesser extent on Central Asia. Simonich and Vitkevich, who had provoked the wrath of London, were recalled and their pet project - the Iran-Kabul-Kandahar alliance - was not ratified by

Relations before October 1917

9

the Tsar. (On arrival in St Petersburg, in May 1839, Vitkevich shot himself in circumstances that remain unclear to this day.) Kabul was left to face Great Britain - which declared war in 1838.17 The British Army invaded Afghanistan in the spring of 1839 and occupied the entire country, but in 1840-41 was completely routed by the Afghans, who had rebelled against the invaders under the leadership of Dost Muhammad Khan's son, Prince Akbar. The link between Russia and Afghanistan was not restored for a long time. Dost Muhammad, remembering Russia's unfulfilled promises, refused to admit to Kabul a Russian 'scientific expedition' headed by the diplomat and orientalist, N.V. Khanykov. The expedition should have left for Afghanistan in 1858 shortly before a new Russian diplomatic offensive in Central Asia. Russian-Afghan contacts were not renewed until 1879 when the ruler of Afghanistan, Emir Sher Ali Khan, who had assumed power after the death of his father (Dost Muhammad Khan) in 1863, contacted Tsar Alexander II with a request for help against London which had decided to turn Afghanistan into a British protectorate at any cost. The Emir was subjected to the strongest possible pressure by Britain, but now the political map of Afghanistan greatly differed from that of the 1830s. The country had been united around Kabul. Great Britain itself had assisted Dost Muhammad Khan in the realization of his plans, taking into consideration his enormous authority and influence in Afghanistan and appreciating his faithfulness to the Anglo-Afghan treaties signed in the 1840s and 1850s. These treaties were based on assurances that Dost Muhammad Khan would continue his policy of friendly neutrality under any circumstances. At that time practically the whole of Central Asia (or, according to Russian terminology, Middle Asia- Srednyaya Aziya, Turkestan or Russian Turkestan) was already part of the Russian Empire, and Russia's southern border was very close to the northern border of Afghanistan. Emir Sher Ali Khan's request for help was very welcome in St Petersburg. The Russian government was in need of a foothold there in order to reduce Great Britain's interference in Balkan affairs. The war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was being fought and, more importantly, the British fleet remained in the Sea of Marmara, not far from Istanbul. While the Afghan request was being discussed in Russian government circles, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 was won by Russia.

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

Nevertheless, the Western powers insisted on having the San Stefano peace treaty revised. This made it even more necessary to have a Russian embassy in Kabul, to offset Great Britain's possible aggressiveness at the international congress which took place shortly afterwards in Berlin. The Russian embassy arrived in Kabul in July 1878, headed by General Stoletov, and discussed with the Emir the creation of a defence system in the event of a war with the British. London, greatly disturbed, informed the Emir that a British mission was on its way to Kabul, but it was refused entry into Afghanistan by the Emir. There followed very hectic activity in London and St Petersburg, the British government demanding that Russia recall its mission from Kabul. Tsar Alexander II agreed to satisfy this demand only in part: Stoletov was recalled to St Petersburg to report to the Tsar while the rest of the embassy staff remained in Kabul and carried on with their duties. On 20 November 1878 the British Indian government declared war on Afghanistan. On 9 December 1878 St Petersburg peremptorily demanded that Great Britain 'respect the independence of Afghanistan'; should it fail to do so, the Russian embassy would not leave. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, agreed to this, and on 15 December 1878 the Russian embassy left Kabul. Emir Sher Ali Khan accompanied them, in order to make an official complaint to Alexander II and other Western powers, about Great Britain's aggressive behaviour. On the way, just before reaching the Russian border, the Emir died. Russia, weakened by the war with Turkey, was unable to give Afghanistan any military assistance. The Afghan people, as four decades before, had to fight without any outside help against the greatest and mightiest power in the world. British intervention in Afghanistan gave Russia a free hand in Central Asia. In February 1879, Prince Alexander Gorchakov warned London that since Great Britain had broken its undertaking to respect Afghanistan's independence, Russia considered itself free to act in Central Asia (that is, Turkmenia, which had not yet been completely annexed by Russia, and the Pamir area).18 In the meantime, the British Army was routed, as 40 years earlier, by the Afghan people rebelling against foreign rule. However, Afghanistan's victory had not been easy. The new Emir, Abdurrahman Khan, grandson of Dost Muhammad and nephew of Sher Ali, was forced to give up Voluntarily' all independent foreign

Relations before October 1917

11

policy and agree to place it under Britain's control. As a result, Russian-Afghan relations deteriorated considerably. The Emir, acting under British pressure, opposed the setting-up of Russian control over the Pendeh oasis and the Kushka area, both populated by Turkmens. In 1885 a clash occurred between Afghan forces and a Russian unit under the command of General Komarov. Despite the fact that British officers had acted as instructors to the Afghan Army, this did not prevent their utter defeat and the final take-over of the territories by Russia. In fact, the Emir had had no rights whatsoever over these territories, and later regretted allowing the British to involve him in an adventure which spoiled his relations with Russia.19 However, the Emir misguidedly continued to see Russia and Great Britain in the same light as far as their attitude to Afghanistan was concerned. Thus, he liked to say, Afghanistan was like a swan swimming in the middle of a lake, being threatened from the south by a red-haired dog and from the north by a white dog. Tsarist Russia had in fact never threatened the independence of Afghanistan. Quite the contrary, throughout the nineteenth century it was in Russia's interest to see an independent, centralized and friendly Afghanistan stand at the centre of Asia between Russian Central Asia and British India. Russia's wish to help Dost Muhammad Khan and his son, Sher Ali Khan, to unify their country and provide a basis for its sovereignty met with the strongest British opposition. Russia was forced to back down and sign an agreement (the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 31 August 1907) declaring that Afghanistan was not within the sphere of Russia's interests.

2 SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS, 1917-21

It is clear why the Bolsheviks attitude, after they assumed power, met with an enthusiastic response in Iran. Lenin's promise to nullify the British-Russian Agreement of 1907, as it appeared in the Decree on Peace and in the appeal to the 'working Muslims in Russia and the East' ('the Agreement of 1907 has been torn up and destroyed') 1 was the first step in the new government's policy towards Iran. Their policy was intended to renounce any former imperialist privileges enjoyed by Tsarist Russia and to support unswervingly the independence of Iran. The policy was the result of three distinct aims of the Bolsheviks: first, for ideological as much as political reasons, they wanted to dissociate themselves completely from the obligations and rights of the former Russian regime; second, they hoped that an appeal, backed by meaningful deeds, to the nationalist feelings of the Iranians and other Muslim nations would open the way for greater co-operation and prepare the ground for future revolutionary activities; and third, they used their uncompromising demand for the right of self-determination in the negotiations for a truce and later for the peace treaty with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. The friendly Soviet attitude towards Iran was at first well received in Tehran. The cabinet of Ain ed-Dowleh officially recognized the Soviet government on 14 December 1917.2 Mostoufi ol-Mamalek's cabinet which replaced it confirmed this decision without undue delay. The Soviet government also took practical steps towards the development of Soviet-Iranian ties. On 1 January 1918, the Iranian minister to Petrograd, Assad-Khan, was invited to the NKID (Narodnyi Komissariat Inostrannykh Del - People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs), where the head of the Department of Oriental Countries, E.D. Polivanov, handed him a note which informed the

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

13

Iranian government of articles 9 and 10 of the Brest-Litovsk Agreement of 15 December 1917. These articles included the parties' mutual commitment to withdraw their armies from Iranian territory and guaranteed Iran independence and territorial integrity. The Soviet hope that this would earn Lenin's government recognition and gratitude was not completely fulfilled. The Iranians gave most of the credit for the inclusion of articles 9 and 10 in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty to the Germans. Nevertheless, Polivanov asked Assad-Khan to inform his government that 'the Soviet of People's Commissars has agreed to start negotiations immediately with Persia on the withdrawal of Russian forces from her territory on condition that the Turkish government do the same, as specified in the articles of the Agreement. The Soviet government expects Persia to take appropiate steps in this direction'.3 On 5 January 1918 Assad-Khan was again invited to the NKID, where he was presented with a programme for the Russian withdrawal from Iran. This programme was a response to Assad-Khan's statement that Tehran had authorized him to 'enter into negotiations with the legitimate Russian government on the withdrawal of the Russian army from Persia and that the Persian ambassador to Constantinople has received similar instructions concerning the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Persia.'4 The programme specified the following: an immediate withdrawal of those army units 'whose presence in Persia is not important from a military point of view and which have only served as an instrument of occupation'; the recall of all officers of the Cossack brigades; and the sending of commissars to all units to explain to the soldiers the political situation in Russia and 'our foreign policy based on respect of the rights of all peoples, be they strong or weak'. In addition, the commissars had 'to take measures to prevent the outburst of violence and insults to the population which certain irresponsible elements in the army are liable to commit'. Finally, the programme stated that 'measures should be taken to ensure that the supply of provisions to the Russian army while it still remains in Persia be as small a burden as possible on the poor Persian masses.'5 The Iranian government expressed full satisfaction with this programme and asked Assad-Khan 'to express the gratitude of the Persian people for this act of justice as well as for the decision of the Soviet of People's Commissars to withdraw the Russian army from

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

14 6

Persia.' The Iranian government also received with satisfaction the NKID note of 27 January 1918 which once more declared the British-Russian Agreement of 1907 'to be dissolved for ever as directed against the freedom and sovereignty of the Persian people'. Leon Trotsky, who had signed this note, said that it was necessary 'to dispel any doubts on the part of the Persian people as regards the future of the British-Russian Agreement of 1907'. Trotsky assured the Iranian government that the Soviet government intended to put an end to the oppression that the Iranian population had suffered 'against our will' from irresponsible soldiers who obeyed 'certain counter-revolutionary commanders'. Trotsky stressed that the new Russian government wanted to have 'relations with Persia which are based on mutual agreement and mutual respect'.7 In reply, Assad-Khan said that his government was willing 'to start negotiations in order to make new treaties, consular conventions and other actions, based on mutual understanding and respect'.8 The Iranian minister was then informed by the NKID that the former Tsarist minister to Tehran, von Etter, had been replaced by the former vice-consul to Khoi, N.Z. Bravin, who was one of the few Tsarist diplomats willing to serve the Soviet government. Assad-Khan assured the NKID that he would inform Tehran of these changes.9 Bravin soon arrived in Tehran where he placed his diplomatic work on a broad footing. He spoke at many meetings and gatherings to inform the Iranian public about Soviet Russia and its new policy which he naturally presented in the most favourable light. These actions by the Soviet government helped to reinforce the pro-Soviet and pro-Russian sentiments in Iran. Bravin in one of his first reports to the NKID wrote: It is hard to describe the Persians' reaction to this information [the annulment of the British-Russian Agreement of 1907]. Tehran is swept by a wave of happiness. All my time is taken up with meetings with the deputations and persons who come to express their feelings. Even in the streets the crowds applaud me.10 One of the meetings in which Bravin took part adopted a resolution demanding that a treaty of friendship with Russia be concluded as soon as possible.11 The Soviet government thus managed to achieve, at least temporarily, important political gains in Iran - by relinquishing what

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

15

they were unable to keep anyway, and by taking advantage of Britain's unwillingness to use the same methods to attain their aims.12 Bravin played no small part in this. From the beginning, the Iranian government had official contact with Bravin. On 1 February 1918, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshaver ol-Molk, even paid him an official visit and discussed with him a number of problems of interest to Iran. However, the Iranian government also maintained official contact with von Etter who remained in Tehran. Referring to this peculiar situation, Bravin informed the NKID: The Shah's government, on the one hand, has apparently recognized the new Russian diplomatic envoy. But on the other hand, it continues its contact with von Etter. Because of this, the Persian democratic press is conducting a protest campaign against the [Iranian] government.13 Bravin soon learned the true reason for the Iranian government's contradictory policy. The British legation in Iran', he wrote, 'is involved in this matter. They are demanding that the government not only refuse me recognition, but even expel me from the country immediately.'14 The Iranian government was indeed faced with a complicated problem. It did not want to terminate its contacts with a friendly Soviet Russia which had expressed willingness to withdraw its forces from Iran and to annul the British-Russian Agreement of 1907. The Prime Minister, Mostoufi ol-Mamalek, and his cabinet were aware how hard it would be to explain to the Iranian people the expulsion from the country of a diplomatic representative of a friendly government. But British pressure was increasing and, finally, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forced to state that it was unaware of Bravin's nomination as Soviet Russia's diplomatic envoy and that it was waiting for official confirmation of this nomination. Bravin was therefore in a highly ambiguous position, although Iran had not formally refused to continue diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. In reply to this statement the NKID immediately handed a note to Assad-Khan in which it expressed surprise that the Iranian government had not yet been informed, despite Assad-Khan's statements to the contrary, that von Etter had been replaced by Bravin. Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Lev Karakhan, who signed this note, demanded from the Iranian government an unambiguous answer as to whether it was willing to assist the Soviet diplomatic envoy in his work and whether it

16

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

intended to give him the buildings which belonged to the Russian legation in Tehran and to assist him 'if necessary by force in order to get rid of the imposter Etter'. 15 This note received no reply but the Iranian press close to government circles began writing that the internal situation in Russia was still highly unstable and that the Soviet Republic had actually not yet been formed.16 All this caused tension in Soviet-Iranian relations. On 13 April 1918 the new head of NKID, G.V. Chicherin, asked Assad-Khan to inform his government that 'all [former] consuls and other diplomats in Persia as well as border commissars have been removed by us and are viewed by us as political criminals. That is why we will regard any ties between them and the Persian government as support of our enemies and as a hostile move directed against the Soviet Republic'.17 Simultaneously, Bravin received instructions not to cease his activities, but to make a stronger appeal to Iranian public opinion. In March-April 1918 Bravin transmitted to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs several notes specifying the practical steps the Soviet government intended to take to implement the renunciation of rights and privileges the Tsarist regime had enjoyed in Iran. Bravin took care to inform the Iranian public of the content of these notes by sending copies to the newspaper Iran, and the issues in which they were published sold like hot cakes. The notes said, among other things: Since the predatory agreements between Tsarist Russia and Persia have been annulled and new treaties so far have not been made between her and the government of the new Russian Republic, we request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform through its agents all Russian citizens and all Russian officers in Persia that for the time being they must obey local Persian laws Since nobody in Persia should enjoy more rights than the Persian citizens themselves, taxes should be imposed equally upon Russians and Persians. From now on, no prince, aristocrat, tribal chief, Christian, etc., who was or is a native Persian citizen can enjoy the protection of the new Russian government.18 Should he present a safeguard or Russian passport, they must be considered as invalid. [The Iranian government] need not recognize the actions and statements of the former Russian government's representatives. If there are complaints against them, it has the right to punish them according to Persian laws If certain Russian army units or detachments act jointly with other foreign forces, the Persian government need not recognize those persons officially and can regard them as rebels.19

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

17

In other words, the Soviets renounced Russia's capitulatory rights in Iran which had provided the Tsarist regime with one of its most important means of power. Thus the Soviets met a central demand of the Iranian nationalists, who saw the capitulatory rights and privileges as one of the greatest evils of the imperialistic presence. Political and public response to Bravin's activities was significant; as N.S. Fatemi wrote 'they meant much more than an army.'20 Von Etter opposed this move fervently and even tried to convince the Soviets that their action was unwise. In a telegram of 4 July 1918 to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Turkestan Autonomous Republic (part of the RSFSR) he complained: The Legation is of the opinion that after you get more information about Mr Bravin's activities and his decrees, you will have to admit that no desire to gain popularity and to maintain our position in Persia can justify such an unscrupulous appeal to Persian sentiments and the infringements on our historical, political and juridical rights in Persia, ensured by treaties and customs.21 Von Etter obviously sensed that Russia's interest in Persia stood above the Bolshevik-Tsarist struggle. The British regarded the Soviet renunciation of their capitulatory rights as a threat. The Soviet step was an important precedent which gave the Iranian government an opportune occasion and the moral justification to renounce capitulatory rights in general. The situation was particularly grave for Britain as its capitulatory rights were only based on the 'most favoured nation' clause, and on Britain's own explicit rights. The renunciation of the capitulatory rights of other nations was therefore enough to cancel Britain's rights. Sir Percy Cox, the new British minister to Tehran, stated, Tn spite of everything, the Russian legation with which we have contacts here still hopes that Russia will regain her rights in Persia'.22 The Iranian government tried to take as much advantage as possible of Moscow's move in order to weaken Britain's position in Iran. Mostoufi ol-Mamalek asked Britain formally to join Russia in the decision to annul the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, to reconsider the customs convention of 1903, to withdraw British forces from Iranian territory and to give formal guarantees that an Iranian delegation would take part in a future peace conference. Samsam os-Saltaneh, who replaced Mostoufi ol-Mamalek as Prime Minister, was even bolder than the latter. On 27 July 1918 he announced that all the humiliating treaties, agreements and con-

18

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

ventions imposed on Iran by Russia were annulled. This naturally was a serious blow to British interests in Iran and induced Samsam os-Saltaneh to make several unsuccessful attempts to put an end to the regime of capitulations in Iran.23 The new Prime Minister did not formally recognize the Soviet government but left the matter open. Nevertheless, he considered it highly important to declare from time to time that his cabinet had recognized the new Russian government de facto, explaining this decision by saying that 'the new Russian state wants freedom and independence for all nations and especially the annulment of Russian treaties and privileges in Iran' .24 This statement could be seen as an unequivocal recognition of the Soviet government at a time when civil war had broken out in Russia. In as much as the acts of Samsam os-Saltaneh were touching upon Britain's interests, the Foreign Office reacted immediately. Addressing the House of Commons, its representative declared that Great Britain did not object in principle to the annulment of the agreement of 1907, but considered that it could be implemented only after the end of the war.25 Marling, the British minister in Tehran, reacted in a less restrained manner. He demanded to be received by the Shah and informed him that 'the implementation of the Persian government's decision was tantamount to a declaration of war against Great Britain'.26 This greatly alarmed the Shah and at the beginning of August 1918 Samsam os-Saltaneh was dismissed. The Soviet policies seemed to gain not only the desired responses from the government in Tehran, but also effectively challenged Britain's position in Iran. Under their new tactics the Soviets did not speak about spheres of influence and concessions but about putting an end to 'imperialist' and 'colonialist' oppression. They said to the Asian peoples: expel all foreigners and destroy your own oppressors. The traditional rivalry of two powers of the same type was replaced, as R.K. Ramazani has pointed out, by 'capitalist-socialist antagonism',27 with all its consequences. Moscow did not recognize the old rules of the game and did not even want to hear of any kind of compromise. Any traditional solution for the Iranian problem, now one had to deal with Soviet Russia, was therefore out of the question. More modern and less orthodox means were necessary. Lenin, for his own reasons, had decided to withdraw from Iran and to try to force Britain to do to the same. While physically leaving Iran, the Soviets tried to continue

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

19

the struggle against Britain with slogans which were simple and easy to memorize. In this context Soviet official K. Troy ano vsky has written: The best friend of the Persian people is proletarian Russia, the Russia of Bolshevism Revolutionary Russia is the sincere and disinterested inspiration of Persia, a precious counsellor, a guide worthy of confidence to steer her towards democracy India is our principal objective Persia is only the path to India. The Persian revolution is the key to the revolution of all the Orient, just as Egypt and the Suez Canal are the key to the British domination of the Orient. Persia is the Suez Canal of the revolution. For the success of the Oriental revolution Persia is the first nation that must be conquered by the Soviets. The precious key to the uprising of the Orient must be in the hands of Bolshevism; cost what it may, Persia must be ours, Persia must belong to the revolution.28 The Bolshevik rulers dreamt of world revolution, hoping to achieve it very quickly, and they did not even deem it necessary to conceal that the undermining of British influence in Iran was a first condition for achieving this aim. It is clear that the unorthodox methods of the Kremlin proved an important advantage over the British, who followed a most conservative and inflexible power policy. Given the circumstances - the exhaustion of the British troops and their limited capacity for action, the opposition of the British treasury to paying for any adventurous policy and the rising opposition from the emerging Asian national movements Britain's traditional policy was doomed to failure. On 12 August 1918, Vossuq ed-Dowleh had again been appointed Prime Minister. His return to power at last gave the British a chance to put into action the plan that had been prepared in their GHQ back in December 1917. It was a plan for the complete occupation of Iran after the evacuation of Russian troops. The last Russian soldier left Iranian territory in March 1918, and in the summer of that year the British Army forced the Turkish troops to leave Iran as well. The occupation of Iran was much discussed in government circles in London and New Delhi. At the time when GHQ had submitted to Lloyd George its plan of action, the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, in a letter to the government dated 26 December 1917, warned that a widespread British military occupation of the whole of Iran would be understood in India and in the entire Muslim world to be 'further and unprovoked aggression against a Muslim state'. 29 When London began to implement that plan, Lord Chelmsford again warned his government, reminding it

20

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

of the unavoidable consequences. He considered that the main effort should be directed at trying to resolve the problem on a political level: There are many in Persia who believe that the Bolshevik practice is so contradictory to their own ways of thinking, that they may easily change their attitude to our advantage; especially when they become convinced of the real worth of the Bolsheviks protestations of friendship.'30 For that, however, it was necessary to change the very essence of British policy. Replying to Lord Chelmsford, the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, wrote: Fearing the Bolshevik threat to Persia, our Government committed anti-Moslem mistakes, especially when Indian units were thrown into action in this region. We could have made the panIslamists into England's friends. Instead we made them into enemies.31 Chelmsford replied that it was not military cordons but support everywhere in the East for the 'spirit of nationalism, which is the enemy of bolshevism that will actually block for the Bolsheviks the road to India'.32 The British occupation of Iran ('a deliberate occupation') in the opinion of many British politicians and diplomats was a mistake. Moreover the British-Iranian Agreement, which had 'bound Iran to Great Britain bothfinanciallyand militarily and was directed at limiting the political independence of the Persains,'33 could 'hardly be called an agreement between two free and independent States'.34 In the light of these evaluations it is impossible not to conclude that Britain's short-sighted policy had effectively cleared the way for the swift return of the Soviets into Iran.

THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO TEHRAN OF LO. KOLOMYTSEV, 1918-19

Mistakenly concluding that Soviet rule was about to end and that therefore the Soviets should not be taken into account in Iranian politics, Vossuq ed-Dowleh took a number of wrong steps: the British were allowed on Iranian territory for the invasion of the Transcaucasian and Transcaspian areas (Turkmenia), which made Iran into a base for the British Army; Iran had claims on Russian territory and refused to recognize the RSFSR; and the Iranian government's attitude towards the Soviet legation, now headed by Ivan Osipovich Kolomytsev, was extremely negative.

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

21

In June 1918, N.Z. Bravin was recalled from Tehran and appointed to Kabul. He was replaced by I.O. Kolomytsev (born in 1892), a former Russian ensign and a Bolshevik from before the October Revolution. He had been in Iran in General Baratov's expeditionary corps and after the February revolution was elected by the soldiers to the Soviet of Soldier's Deputies and as commissar of the Enzeli Revvoensovet (revolutionary military committee) which led the evacuation of Russian troops from Iran. As civil war had broken out in Russia in the summer of 1918, his appointment to Tehran could not be properly legalized and his credentials were signed on behalf of the RSFSR Central Executive Committee by Stefan G. Shaumian, a member of the CEC and extraordinary commissar of the Soviet government for Caucasian affairs. Around the time when Kolomytsev arrived in Tehran, the situation in the Transcaucasus changed radically. The Baku Commune fell, the Baku commissars were arrested and 26 of them, including Shaumian, were shot. As a result, Vossuq ed-Dowleh absolutely refused to recognize Kolomytsev's authority, noting that his credentials were signed by Shaumian, of whose fate the Iranian government 'knows nothing'. Commenting on the position of Iran, Kolomytsev wrote, The Persian government, submitting to the will of the British, who give orders in Persia with a greater lack of ceremony than at home in England, had refused to recognize us.'35 Despite the unfriendly attitude of the Iranian government, Kolomytsev tried to do everything possible to carry out his task properly. Using his old connections and friends in certain quarters of Tehran, he worked hard to establish contacts with official bodies. Soon after his arrival in Tehran he managed to meet the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The meeting took place at the apartment of a Bakhtiar Khan who was a Soviet sympathizer. Kolomytsev tried to explain to the deputy minister that the hostile Iranian attitude towards the Russian Soviet Republic hurt Iran more than anybody else because 'you cannot ignore the government of a great country as if it did not exist... and whose foreign policy is based upon principles of friendship and co-operation and not oppression'. During this meeting Kolomytsev displayed his talents as a capable diplomat and flexible politician. He did not propose to touch on the question of recognition of the RSFSR de jure for the time being but to start negotiations immediately to solve current

22

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

problems important to both parties. The Iranian official assured Kolomytsev that Iran did have a friendly attitude towards Soviet Russia, but was afraid to express its friendship openly for fear of British anger. He warned Kolomytsev that it was not safe for him to stay in Tehran and advised him to leave the country. Kolomytsev refused to follow this friendly advice and instead asked his Iranian colleague to inform his government of the following proposals: 1. Kolomytsev agreed for the time being not to demand official recognition of his legation. In lieu of this, the Iranian government would allow his legation to act defacto and would ensure favourable conditions for this. 2. Kolomytsev, although regarding himself as the only legitimate Russian representative, would not object to the Iranian government's contacts with von Etter. However, the government had to consult only him on all matters concerning Russian-Iranian relations. 3. The evacuation and repatriation of Russian citizens must be arranged through the Soviet legation alone. 4. The Iranian government must guarantee the security of the Soviet legation and its uninterrupted communication with Moscow.36 Concluding this talk Kolomytsev said that although the Iranian government did not want to recognize him, 'the Persian people represented by many important public figures' had already recognized him.37 He was not exaggerating. He had established close links with many people in various walks of life in Tehran and other cities and he even corresponded with a number of anti-British leaders in India. The British in Iran were especially worried about the latter. They insisted that the Iranian Foreign Ministry send a warning to Kolomytsev that he should 'refrain from corresponding with persons who, not being informed that he lives in Tehran as a private person, address him as the new Russian Minister.38 Kolomytsev ignored these warnings and continued his activities with even greater fervour. He started negotiations with a group of Iranian merchants to renew trade with Russia. He protested in strong terms against the invasion of the Russian border at Serahs by an Iranian Army subunit. The note of protest which Kolomytsev sent to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this connection read: T h e Russian Soviet Mission, being assured of the sincere

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

23

friendship to Russia of the whole Persian people, fosters hopes that the Persian government will not go against the will of Persian democracy and will immediately recall its troops from Serahs.'39 Kolomytsev made many new friends in Tehran who were impressed by his courage and diligence. As we have seen, anti-British feelings were very strong in Iran, the Iranians loathed their country's dependence on Britain and in the eyes of susceptible people Kolomytsev became a real hero in the war against British imperialism. There were many people in Iran (some of whom even genuinely disliked the Soviets) who considered Vossuq's attitude towards the Soviet legation to be humiliating to the dignity of the Iranian people and state. Reflecting these feelings, an Iranian historian, Ali Aze ri, wrote that no other attitude could be expected towards the Soviet ambassador and his proposals at a period when 'Vosuq od-Douleh was absolute ruler and the country was totally under British control'.40 Even government officials did not bother to mask the government's impotence41 and this naturally hurt Iranian national feelings. On 3 November, 1918 the Soviet legation was attacked by the Iranian Cossack brigade under the command of Russian officers. The counsellor of the Tsarist legation, H. von Hildebrand, was in charge of the operation. The legation officials and their families were arrested and later expelled to Iraq and India, but Kolomytsev himself managed to escape arrest. For a long time he hid in the house of a friend, Sheikh Mehdi, from where he bombarded the Iranian government with notes of protest. At the same time he sent a note to the British embassy in Tehran warning that one day the British government would have to deal with Moscow and that then Moscow and all the Russian people would force the British to answer for what had happened to his legation in Tehran.42 At great risk to his life, Kolomytsevfinallymanaged to leave Iran and, on reaching the Transcaucasus, he informed Moscow in April 1919 of the fate of his legation. On 16 April 1919, Chicherin sent a strongly worded note by radio to the British government in which he stressed that it was 'largely responsible for the acts of violence against official Soviet representatives' in Iran. Chicherin termed the actions of the British embassy in Tehran 'outrageous' and 'barbaric' and demanded the immediate release of the Soviet citizens. The note also pointed out that British Army forces in Iran had dealt cruelly with Iranians who had protested 'against these uncalled for

24

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

actions . . . and expressed their sympathy for Russian representatives'. Finally, Chicherin protested 'against the infringement upon the freedom and sovereignty of Persia committed by the agents of the British government'.43 In June 1919 Kolomytsev arrived in Moscow where he handed Chicherin a detailed report on his legation's activities and the general situation in Iran. On 17 July the Narkomindel appointed him its representative in Iran but, on arriving on Iranian soil in August, Kolomytsev was arrested and killed by officers of the former Tsarist Army who still remained in Iran.

THE ANGLO-IRANIAN TREATY OF 1919

Meanwhile Iran was increasingly being dragged into the orbit of British politics. The British virtually ruled the country: British troops under General Wilson occupied the south, the north-east of Iran was controlled by the troops of General Malleson, and the north-west by troops of General Dunsterville. The South Persian Rifles (SPR), a Persian corps with British command, and the Persian Cossack Division with Tsarist Russian command were financed by the British.44 The Shah received a monthly allowance from the British, and the activities of the Persian government were financed by the British-owned Shahinshah (Imperial) Bank of Persia. Being aware of their position of almost unlimited power, the British demanded direct rewards, although, considering the general atmosphere in the country and the whole region, they ought to have been more sensitive to the growth of nationalist feelings. London should also have taken into consideration the changes in the political and military situation that had taken place in Russia by the summer of 1919. The uprising of the Orenburg Cossack Ataman Dutov had been put down and Soviet rule was restored in Turkestan. Thus the barrier between Iran and Soviet Russia had been removed. These events increased anti-British sentiment in the country. The requisition of foodstuffs, widely practised by the British Army, which caused entire regions to starve, also did not endear the British to the population. Moreover, these requisitions took place in violation of an edict issued by Vossuq ed-Dowleh as early as 1916 which prohibited anyone taking corn and rice out of Khorassan.

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

25

When Vossuq ed-Dowleh again assumed power in the summer of 1918 he took no action against this violation of his own edict. The Iranian public were also infuriated by the fact that the British army of occupation made no effort to eliminate the bandits who plagued the countryside. Indeed, it even patronized some of them, such as Prince Ismail-Zadeh, the son of the well-known Prince Zill osSaltaneh, who organized a gang of robbers in Isfahan Province.45 The Iranian opposition blamed Vossuq ed-Dowleh and his 'British masters' for all these crimes.46 Vossuq ed-Dowleh was naturally not blind to the situation but continued to lean on Britain which he considered the only force able to save his country from disintegration under the joint pressure of the separatists and the Bolsheviks. At the same time he tried tofindsupport within the country as well. He managed, not without effort, to restore the right wing of the old Democratic Party whose name he changed to 'Tashkili' (Organization). In addition to Tashkili he was supported by the 'Enjumen-e Kargeran' (workers' society) and by the Tsteklal-e Iran' Party whose leaders, like Vossuq, thought that 'only England can save Iran from loss of independence'.47 In December 1918, Vossuq, supported by these forces who were sure that London was interested in a strong Iran as a buffer between Communist Russia and India, proposed to conclude a comprehensive treaty with Britain.48 At this time such a treaty would have won support in many influential circles in addition to the above-mentioned parties. Soviet economic policy and the chaos in Russia had alarmed the business circles of northern Iran who in the past had always opposed the severance of Russian-Iranian economic ties. The start of the negotiations for an Anglo-Iranian treaty therefore caused no protest from landowners, merchants, and the like, although religious circles and the city poor who were under their influence did oppose the treaty. But the poor, according to the US ambassador to Iran, were afraid to protest openly for fear of reprisals.49 Against all expectations, however, the negotiations turned out to be difficult. Vossuq ed-Dowleh was not, as he was usually assumed to be, the 'paid agent of British imperialism'. The fact that he was more British- and Western-orientated than any of his contemporaries and colleagues in Iran turned him in the eyes of his suspicious and distrustful compatriots into a 'lackey of London'. This impression was reinforced by rumours that he had received a

26

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

£1,200,000 bribe from the British. Although this accusation has been verified, Vossuq's conduct at the negotiations shows that he still acted in accordance with his political opinions. Vossuq ed-Dowleh understood that the British military occupation of Iran, on the one hand, and the lack of Soviet power and influence - owing to the civil war, the existence of the Transcaucasian republics and the chaotic economic conditions - on the other, forced Iran to lean towards Britain. However, he also understood that the inevitable limitations of British involvement offered Iran the chance to assert pressure. Accordingly, Vossuq demanded at the outset of his negotiations with the British the annulment of the Agreement of 1907, the end of the British regime of occupation and the annulment of all concessions. The British rejected these demands, but Vossuq continued to insist on them. Moreover, he also proposed to annul the customs tariff stipulated in the British-Iranian Agreement of 1903. The Iranians, he proposed, would determine a new tariff themselves.50 The new head of the Foreign Office, Lord Curzon, strongly objected to these proposals. 'We cannot', he wrote to Sir Percy Cox, British Minister to Tehran, 'accept the proposals of the Prime Minister. Their acceptance would mean that Persia has the right to make changes in the Treaty on her own initiative without consulting the other side'.51 In his own way Lord Curzon behaved honestly. He sincerely believed that his approach to Iranian problems best served both British and Iranian interests. Unfortunately, he failed to see that the new factors which had been operating in the world arena for two years demanded a new approach to the whole problem. In particular, he did not realize that the only way to neutralize Soviet influence in Iran was to strengthen Iran's sovereignty, not only in word, but in deed, for example, by accepting Vossuq's proposals. Instead, Lord Curzon stubbornly attempted to achieve the old British aim: to bring Iran once and for all into the orbit of the British Empire, to make her a link 'in the system of vassal states from the Mediterranean to the Pamirs'.52 The stubborn attitude of Curzon was even more inexcusable since the British government was receiving comprehensive information not only from British sources about the mood in Iran. The General Staff of the French Army had earlier supplied London with a copy of a report from its old-established informer, the Qajar Prince Parviz-Mirza. The report said that indignation with the British had

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

27

reached its utmost limit. The forced agreement was extremely unpopular and had the effect of exciting the masses. The entire Near and Middle East', wrote Parviz-Mirza, 'is in the grip of Anglophobia, which unites the Muslims from India to Turkey, from Turkestan to the Persian Gulf. That, of which Germany could only dream, namely a Pan-Islamic Union, Britain has achieved. But it has turned out to be against herself.' It is interesting to note that the author of the above report, a man doubtlessly well informed and observant, did not see that this situation was a result of events in Russia. 'Bolshevism', he wrote 'will not be imported into Iran nor into other countries. It is now a great national liberation movement that unites all of Western Asia.'53 At about this time, the French chargé d'affaires in Berne informed his Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a conversation he had had with an uncle of the Shah, Prince Salar ed-Dowleh, who was living in Switzerland. Prince Salar was at that time the head of the anti-British organization 'Iran and Turan', and saw the situation from a different angle to his relative, Prince Parviz-Mirza. In his opinion, the agreement was 'pushing Iran into the arms of the Bolsheviks and making that country of peasants and small merchants an easy prey for Bolshevik propaganda'.54 Vossuq ed-Dowleh, nevertheless, somehow managed to push through most of his demands and the treaty of 9 August 1919 contained only a modest compromise. Iran had not become an absolute vassal of Britain: formally, it had all the appearance of a sovereign state and had even managed to extract permission from the British to join the League of Nations. On the surface, relations between Iran and Britain were regulated by a bilateral treaty still to be ratified by the Majlis. However, without waiting for this ratification, London forced the Iranian government to permit its most important clauses to be implemented. British advisers arrived in Iran to work in its ministries of finance, internal affairs, public works, defence and security. The British also began to implement the terms stipulated in the treaty about co-operation in road construction. This haste antagonized Iranians even more and gave rise to new suspicions that the treaty 'aimed to legalize British rule in the country'.55 Soon the differences in the parties' interpretation of a number of the treaty's articles become apparent. As early as September 1919 disagreement arose over the treaty's provision for the revision of

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

existing treaties. The Iranians claimed that it meant the termination of the consular courts and the end of the regime of capitulations in Iran,56 while the British gave it quite a different and limited meaning: Curzon thought it sufficient to make a statement about the annulment of the Agreement of 1907, which had lost all practical meaning anyway. Finally, as a concession to Vossuq, Curzon sent him a memorandum which described the 1907 Agreement as 'unfortunate' and as a document 'used as an instrument for tightening the Russian grip on the northern part of the country'.57 On 19 September 1919 The Times published the text of a speech given at a banquet in honour of his Iranian counterpart, Prince Firouz, in which Lord Curzon declared the 1907 Agreement to be 'dead'. However, the London representative of the Siberian ruler, Admiral Kolchak, immediately protested against this statement. The head of Kolchak's Legation, M. Sabline (a former Minister to Tehran), demanded an explanation from the Foreign Office. The memorandum by M. Oliphant of the Foreign Office after his talk with Sabline was reassuring: M. Sabline called today saying that he had been instructed from Irkutsk to ascertain whether His Majesty's Government had ever denounced the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, either officially to any Russian Government or through any Military Mission to Denikin or otherwise. I replied that more than a year ago now it had been decided that it was impossible to denounce this instrument while there was no government in Russia which His Majesty's Government recognized, but that the Persian Government had been told that it regarded it as 'in suspense'.58 The memorandum served as additional proof that Lord Curzon did not exclude the possibility of restoring this agreement and had left himself a loophole for retreat. In this way he lost one more game to the Soviets. This stubborn clinging to an obviously imperialistic treaty could only make the worst impression on nationalistically minded Iranians. Many leaders who supported Vossuq ed-Dowleh were very much embarrassed by Curzon's position and began to realize that the Prime Minister's calculations, which they had considered to be quite realistic, were actually built on sand. Even convinced Anglophiles began to see that Curzon was continuing to treat Iran as a vassal state. The landlords, merchants and artisans of northern Iran, who suffered most from the severance of trade with Russia, were especially disappointed. They had supported the Prime Minister only because he had assured them that Britain was

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29

going to make substantial consessions to Iran and to compensate it for the loss of the Russian market.59 The assumptions of the government coalition that Britain was interested in a strong buffer between India and Soviet Russia and therefore intended to strengthen Iran were not without logic. Unfortunately, Curzon's actions were anything but logical. He, as shown by his correspondence with Percy Cox, had still not grasped the change in Iranian national consciousness. Percy Cox also continued to live in the previous century when he, as Britain's general resident in the Persian Gulf living in Bushir, had been able to solve all problems with the help of a squadron of the British fleet constantly cruising in the Persian Gulf.60 His letter to Curzon of 9 October 1919 is a good example of his political thinking: The Persians have come to the conclusion that Persia must fully surrender herself to a certain power in order to put an end to a rivalry which led to the ruin of Persia in the past. There are differences of opinion whether the choice of Britain as a friend is the best possible choice, but in my opinion, the majority has agreed that no decision other than looking to Great Britain for help is practical.61 As a result of this attitude the government coalition in Tehran began slowly to disintegrate, and in these circumstances Vossuq edDowleh did not dare (and possibly no longer wanted) to present the treaty to the Majlis. Cox, however, was not at all embarrassed by this. He continued to exert pressure on the Iranian government to sign the customs convention which would leave low taxes on British goods while taxes imposed on traditional Russian imports were to increase significantly. The British aims were very simple: to strengthen British imports to Iran and to destroy its historical and important ties with the Russian market. At the very least, this programme would have been hard to implement in view of Iran's extremely poor means of communication at that time. Moreover, in this case, British policy contradicted the natural processes in the Iranian economy. If the programme had been carried out, the Iranian economy would have had to undergo severe trials, as the Tehran press pointed out during these months. The newspaper Iran wrote on 14 December 1919: All the border regions with Russia have adapted their produce to Russian demand. They have been selling their produce to merchants who traded

30

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

with Russia. Now, because of lack of demand, the price of cotton in these regions does not justify the expenses of sowing and picking. The same is true of other agricultural products and of cattle-breeding. If the situation continues, the cultivated regions will turn into ruin and wilderness. The termination of Russian imports, in its turn, caused a sharp rise in prices because Britain was not able to compensate for the loss of Russian goods. As a result, the price of sugar increased 12 times, of textiles, 5.5 times, and of kerosene, 5 times.62 The termination of trade with Russia also affected Iranian exports: the share of exports in Iranian foreign trade decreased by 22 per cent in the financial year 1920-21 (in 1913-14 their share had been 40 per cent). In addition, the deficit in the balance of payments had increased from 209 million crans in 1913 to 344 million crans in 1920. All this, of course, was caused by the reduction in Iranian exports to Russia by 30 times in the same period.63 The Iranian economy was obviously in a critical situation but the British continued to insist on the conclusion of the customs agreement which would only further aggravate the political and economic situation in the country. Nevertheless, British pressure succeeded and on 21 March 1920 the agreement was signed; fortunately for Iran, however, Britain was prevented from taking advantage of it. Since September 1919 the Iranian press had shown a certain resentment towards and disappointment in British policy. The publisher and editor of the semi-official newspaper Raad, Seyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, who shortly before had been described by Percy Cox as a 'loyal supporter of Vossuq ed-Dowleh and the Treaty', asked him to answer 14 questions relating to British help in strengthening Iranian sovereignty and the increase in British financial and technological aid. The questions were formulated in such a way that the answers would actually constitute specific commitments on his part (no matter whether Cox wanted this or not). Cox asked Curzon for instructions. Curzon told him to avoid answering the questions and strongly objected to participation in any public discussion relating to British-Iranian affairs. In this he was supported by Prince Firouz who disapproved of Seyid Zia edDin's initiative, saying that his questions to Cox would 'not serve Iranian interests and should not have been asked at all'.64 More and more articles against the Curzon-Vossuq treaty were appearing at this time in the Iranian press. On 3 October 1919, the newspaper Tadjeddad wrote that 'for those who signed the treaty

Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917-21

31

. . . selling out the honour and the independence of their country . . . has for long been a familiar occupation'. On 6 November 1919, the newspaper Aftab warned that 'the treaty is a national disaster and a prelude to turning Iran into a British dominion'.65 The government found itself in deep water and even the Prime Minister started to doubt whether he should continue to rely on Britain. He wrote to Prince Firouz in December of that year: The assurance given from every quarter and on all occasions, especially as regards the restoration of Persia to her former greatness and the important position due to her in Asia, should leave no room for doubt. It is vitally important now to interpret the treaty correctly and to implement it properly, as we understand it, and as we presented it to the people. ... But if the British government is reluctant to accept obligations as regards Persia, then, we might say, the treaty has to be interpreted in a more limited sense and in a spirit quite different from that in which we have explained it to the people. I consider it necessary that you should openly and candidly tell this to Lord Curzon.66 The tone of this letter reveals Vossuq ed-Dowleh's disappointment and his awareness that he had to gain support from Iranian nationalist circles in order to weaken the regime of Capitulations. It might have been similarly advantageous for him to improve relations with Soviet Russia in order to demonstrate his independence. However, the Soviets did not regard him as a desirable partner because of his many anti-Soviet actions: the destruction of Kolomytsev's legation in November 1918; Kolomytsev's assassination in August 1919 on arrival in Iran as a representative of the Narkomindel; and his attempts (which became publicly known) to reach an agreement with the anti-Soviet Mussavatist government of Baku on the inclusion of northern (Russian) Azerbaijan in Iranian territory as an autonomous province - a plan so ridiculous that even Curzon would not send his representative to participate in the Iranian-Mussavatist negotiations.67 Moscow was therefore convinced that Vossuq ed-Dowleh was the main obstacle to normalization of relations with Iran and clearly expressed its position in the Appeal of the Narkomindel of the RSFSR dated 26 August 1919 to the Iranian workers and peasants, which declared that 'the Soviet government of Russia regards the infamous British-Iranian Treaty as a mere piece of paper having no validity. By making this treaty your rulers sold themselves and you out to the British plunderer.' The Narkomindel reiterated the

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

Soviet programme for Soviet-Iranian relations which, Moscow alleged, had 'been concealed by the corrupt Persian government from the Persian people'. The Appeal also showed that Moscow was sure that Soviet-Iranian relations would quickly be normalized because 'soon our heroic Red Army will reach, via Red Turkestan, the border of still-enslaved Persia'. The Appeal concluded with the assurance that 'the Russian working class stretches out its hand to you, the enslaved masses of Persia. Soon the time will be ripe for us to join you in a common struggle against big and small robbers and exploiters, the cause of your innumerable sufferings.'68 In contrast to British politics, this direct appeal to 'workers and peasants' made a tremendous impression which Curzon, Cox and Vossuq edDowleh could not weaken.

THE FIRST SIGNS OF CHANGE: JANUARY-MAY 1920

When this document became known in Iran, the response to it was unequivocal: no support should be given to the Curzon-Vossuq treaty and Soviet-Iranian relations should be immediately normalized. The newspaper Iran wrote: 'Either the speediest renewal of our relations with Russia or immediate bankruptcy. No third solution is possible.'69 Seyid Zia ed-Din, now Iranian ambassador to independent Georgia and Azerbaijan, was also in favour of normalization.70 Cox was alarmed by these developments and informed Curzon that Some seek to find common ground between Bolshevism and Islam; some use Bolshevism as a peg for attacking the Anglo-Persian Agreement; all are unanimous in asserting that our troops are the immediate objective of the Bolsheviks in Persia and demand or appeal for their withdrawal. Even Raad which has always been strongly in favour of the AngloPersian Agreement and the policy of the present Cabinet now remains silent and has not the courage to publish the counterblast proffered by the Times correspondent and myself. Their attitude is that it is all very well for us to be optimistic but they are faced with the fact that there is a large Bolshevik army at Baku and only 3000 troops in Kazvin and Enzeli and that in the absence of definite reassurances as to Bolshevik intentions they cannot take the risk of publishing the necessary counter article.71 At the beginning of April 1920 Prince Firouz in an interview for The Times said that Moscow's attitude to Iran was friendly and

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33

explained that Soviet-Iranian relations had not yet been normalized only because the internal situation in Soviet Russia had until recently been rather unstable.72 On 8 April Prince Firouz brought up the question of normalization of Soviet-Iranian relations in a talk with Lord Curzon. The latter described this conversation and his own position in a letter to Cox: His Highness then proceeded somewhat to startle me again by asking me whether I favoured the idea of the Persian Government entering into direct relations with the Soviet Government of Russia and concluding a treaty with them. He replied that as every Government and State on the outskirts of Russia appeared to be entering into such negotiations, Persia thought that she might do so as well, and he did not imagine that we should raise any objection. I said ... that if his suggestion meant that the Persian Government should send representatives to Moscow or elsewhere to enter into formal relations with the Soviet Government, this was a matter on which I could not possibly give any favourable advice to the Persian Government and which I could not recommend them to pursue except on their own responsibility.73 Vossuq ed-Dowleh was alarmed by his Foreign Minister's bluntness and hastened to repudiate his statement. In a telegram to Curzon on 14 April he assured him that 'there was never any idea of concluding a treaty with the Soviet Government'. But, wrote Cox, Meanwhile he states that he has received a further telegram from the Persian Commissioner in the Caucasus, in which the latter observes that at present the attitude of the Bolshevik elements towards Persia is hostile, and they think that Persia is hostile to them, and he emphasizes the urgent expediency in issuing a communiqué which will reach the Bolshevik leaders by wireless, explaining the attitude of Persia.74 Vossuq ed-Dowleh, too, decided to join the double game. As the British New Statesman of 22 May 1920 wrote: Only 18 months ago everything Russian was cursed in Persia. Now everything has changed there: many of our former friends are willing to join the Bolsheviks against us. We have managed to make enemies of the Persians, as we did of the Egyptians. The British-Persian Agreement may have dangerous consequences for us.75 Exactly one month after he repudiated Prince Firouz's statement, Vossuq took a step in the direction he had spoken about in his interview for The Times at the beginning of April. He sent to the captain of the cruiser Rosa Luxemburg in the port of Baku a

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

radiogram to be delivered to Moscow saying that Iran was willing to renew postal and telegraphic communications with Russia, to restore and to increase trade with Russia and to conclude a treaty with the governments of the RSFSR and the Azerbaijanian SSR. For this purpose, continued the note, two delegations would be sent immediately from Tehran to Moscow and Baku. Moscow replied that the NKID welcomed the decision of the Iranian government and that 'the Soviet government would like to have your commitment that the new Russian legation to Tehran and our consular representatives will be strongly protected against any acts of violence by foreign troops still remaining on Persian soil'.76 The situation thus became favourable for the normalization of Soviet-Iranian relations, without which Iran's position in the international arena would have remained unstable. It is clear that no matter what Moscow's real intentions were, its official decision to annul all its privileges in Iran and inequitable treaties with this country weakened the British position there and enabled Iran, for a time, to restore and strengthen its sovereignty. But the process of normalization of relations with Russia was suddenly interrupted by a piece of Soviet military action which forced many Iranians to see Moscow's designs in the Middle East in a new light. This was the Red Army's Operation Enzeli and the consequent events in Gilan.

THE DOCTRINE OF 'GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS' IN ACTION: THE GILAN EXPERIMENT, JUNE-JULY 1920

On the night of 18 May 1920 the units of the 9th Red Army and the warships of the Caspian Fleet suddenly attacked the Iranian port of Enzeli where the remnants of General Anton Denikin's White Army that had retreated from Russia were also concentrated. The attack was sudden and fierce, the British and Denikin's soldiers fled, and within a few hours the town and the port of Enzeli had been seized by the Reds. Moscow then informed Tehran that this action had no anti-Iranian aims and was directed exclusively against the 'British invaders' and their 'accomplices', Denikin's forces, who allegedly wanted to turn Gilan province into a springboard for renewed aggression against Soviet Russia. To prove its point, Moscow cited reports in the British press that such anti-Soviet action was under preparation. The Soviet note also pointed out

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35

that, during their retreat from Russia, the British and Denikin's troops had seized and brought to Iran many valuables which were the 'property of the Russian people' and had also stolen and brought to Enzeli warships of the Caspian Fleet. Chicherin simultaneously cabled Raskol'nikov, who was in charge of the Enzeli operation, and asked him 'to announce immediately that in spite of the presence of Russian military units, Enzeli would remain under the sovereignty of Persia'. Chicherin warned Raskol'nikov that Soviet troops 'must on no account go beyond the borders of Enzeli'.77 At the same time, Chicherin sent a cable to Prince Firouz, in which he insisted that the Enzeli military operation was due exclusively to a decision made by the Caucasian Front Command 'without any order to that effect being given by the Russian Soviet government, which had been informed of the facts that had occurred in Enzeli only after the designated operation had been brought to a conclusion'.78 In reality, the plan and its staging had been prepared by Trotsky a month before the operation. In a cable to Lenin and Chicherin, dated 20 April 1920, he wrote: With reference to Raskol'nikov's enquiry N: 46/s as to how to deal with the White fleet at Enzeli, I propose sending the following instruction: The Caspian must be cleared of the White fleet at all costs. If a landing on Persian territory is required, it must be carried out, and the nearest Persian authorities notified of it and told that the landing is being undertaken by the officer in command with the exclusive objective of carrying out a military assignment, which had arisen only because it was beyond the power of Persia to disarm the ships of the White Guards in her harbour, and that Persian territory remains inviolable for us and will be evacuated immediately on completion of the military assignment.' A personal note signed by Lenin was on the cable form: 'To Trotsky and Chicherin. I fully agree.'79 Thus the version in the cable by Chicherin to his colleague, Prince Firouz, does not stand comparison with the facts; Trotsky's cable very obviously signified that Raskol'nikov was not acting on his own. He had requested instructions beforehand from Moscow and had received them. Trotsky's cable and Lenin's agreement to it are clear indications that the Soviet leadership had no doubts or misgivings when it gave the order to the Red Army to invade the territory of a neighbouring state.

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

The Iranian government strongly protested against the Soviet invasion of Iran. Vossuq ed-Dowleh pointed out that nothing could justify such a blatantly aggressive act, especially as it was committed by the state which publicly condemned the use of force in international relations and declared that its relations with Iran should be based on the principles of equality and justice. The Prime Minister announced that he was repudiating his own messages to Moscow in which he had spoken of his willingness to start talks on the normalization of relations.80 At the same time he decided to lodge a complaint against Soviet aggression at the League of Nations. He made this decision because he knew that he could not rely on British military aid.81 As early as March 1920 Lord Curzon officially warned Vossuq ed-Dowleh that certain members of the British government would oppose Britain's open confrontation with the Bolsheviks over Iran and that the 1919 Agreement did not commit Britain to defend Iran from 'external enemies'.82 Iran, however, was to be disappointed also by the League of Nations. Because of increased British-French tension (France was alarmed among other things by Britain's total control over Iran), the French delegation took a negative position over the Iranian complaint and determined the League's refusal to interfere in the Soviet-Iranian conflict. Iran was told that the League of Nations did not have its own troops to help it to expel the Red Army and was advised to solve the problem by direct talks with Moscow.83 Prince Firouz, who was at that time in London, sent a note to the French government in which he drew attention to the suspicious co-ordination of movements by the soviets and Kemalists. At the moment the Soviet troops were invading a Turkish Army Corps under the command of General Kazim-Pasha was concentrating in Erzerum. According to Prince Firouz, the Soviet forces in Gilan Province and the Turkish forces in eastern Anatolia were both aiming to encircle Iranian Azerbaijan.84 The French government gave no reply to that note. The French, according to the recommendations of the French Minister in Tehran, Bonin, had decided to revert, in so far as the British-Russian conflicts in the Middle East were concerned, to the position they had taken before 1914.85 Meanwhile, on 6 June 1920, Soviet Russian troops left Enzeli. The Soviet government in Moscow claimed that the matter was closed,86 but the situation in Iran, as a result of the Enzeli operation, became even more complicated - as was pointed out repeatedly by

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37

Prince Firouz in numerous notes to Chicherin.87 It was in these exacerbated and complex domestic circumstances in Iran that the real significance of the entire operation was revealed. Although purely military objectives played no role in the operation, they were assiduously emphasized in the Soviet version. This was reaffirmed by such recognized authorities on the progress of the 'export' of revolution as Karl Radek, who wrote in Izvestiya on 10 June 1920: 'There are no Russian troops in Persia ... there are no Soviet troops on Persian soil. But "Russian" ideas, Communist ideas have invaded Persia.'88 Despite protestations to the contrary, one immediate aim of the invasion was to establish Soviet control over a part of Iranian territory. After that the Soviets intended to create a puppet regime there which could be used to exert pressure on Tehran and force the government to accept Soviet conditions for the normalization of Soviet-Iranian relations, and to punish it for 'a short-sighted, onesided, senseless, illogical and in some ways provocative policy towards Moscow'.89 The Soviet government did not exclude the possibility that, if everything went smoothly, Gilan would become the nucleus of a future Soviet Iranian republic. The landing of Soviet troops in Enzeli and the flight of British troops from the city radically changed the military and political situation in Gilan where for several years the so-called Jangeli guerrilla detachments had been fighting against the Iranian army and British occupation forces. The guerrillas were led by Kuchuk Khan, a politically unreliable figure. After the withdrawal of Russian forces from Iran, his attitude toward Britain and Vossuq ed-Dowleh had become very negative, to Moscow's great pleasure. As early as February 1919 Kolomytsev had called his government's attention to the Jangeli and their chief and had even proposed that Chicherin should send him to Rasht to negotiate with Kuchuk Khan and other guerrilla commanders, claiming that he knew most of them personally. Consequently, the Narkomindel sent a message of goodwill to Kuchuk Khan in 'his struggle for independence against the British'.90 After the capture of Enzeli the Soviet military command immediately sent a letter to Kuchuk Khan informing him that the population of the city had requested them not to leave Enzeli and to prevent the return of the Persian government's administration and British troops. Raskol'nikov and Ordzhonikidze (the military com-

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

missar of the 9th Red Army) had already received strict orders from Chicherin, but were still seeking some excuse to continue the invasion. They wrote to Kuchuk Khan asking for his opinion on this question, and saying that they wished to meet him urgently to discuss the problem. The meeting apparently took place on 23 May, and the following day a telegram signed by Kuchuk Khan was sent to Moscow which congratulated Lenin and the new Russia 'on your brilliant and successful struggle against the enemies of the Socialist system', and was signed 'Mirza Kuchuk, the President of the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic, proclaimed on the road to Rasht'.91 While the Soviet troops remained in Gilan, Kuchuk hastened to shape the institutions of his 'Soviet' republic: a government Sovnarkom (Soviet of People's Commissars), a 'Revolutionary Military Soviet' (Revvoensovet), a military force (the Iranian Red Army); and a programme was adopted: war against the monarchy and for the establishment of a republic in Iran, the protection of the individual and private property, the annulment of all treaties and agreements which the Iranian government had concluded with other states, the equality of all nations, the protection of Islam, and the establishment of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. News from Gilan exhilarated Moscow. Trotsky, for instance, cabled Kuchuk Khan saying that 'we were happy to learn about the formation of the Persian Red Army'.92 A short while later he sent another telegram to Kuchuk Khan describing the Gilan revolution as 'part of the global revolutionary process'.93 Thus, the documents at our disposal prove beyond any doubt that the pro-Soviet government in Gilan was nothing more than a puppet regime, although Soviet authors stubbornly deny that 'Soviet rule was forced upon Gilan and accuse those who maintain this, ('the bourgeois falsifiers of history') of slander against Soviet foreign policy. However, in this period when the Soviet leaders had not yet bothered to conceal the 'revolutionary' aims of Soviet foreign policy and the slogan 'World Revolution Now' was highly popular, they did not deny but, on the contrary, claimed that the events in Gilan had been possible only thanks to the Soviet invasion. Raskolnikov, for example, said in an interview for Petrogradskaya Pravda: 'Operation Enzeli enabled Kuchuk Khan to seize Rasht and to form a revolutionary government of Persia there.'94

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39

The late Professor A.N. Kheifets of the Moscow V.I. Lenin Pedagogical Institute, tried to play down the negative impression produced on world public opinion by Kuchuk Khan's ultrarevolutionary verbiage borrowed from the arsenal of Soviet propaganda: The use of such names, created by the October Revolution, as 'the Soviet of People's Commissars', 'the Revolutionary Military Soviet,' 'the Red Army', merely reflected the enormous attractiveness of the ideas of peace and friendship of peoples whose standard-bearer Soviet Russia had become. But the programme of the Gilan revolutionary government was actually a bourgeois-nationalist programme. .. .95 The Soviet leaders, however, had no illusions about Kuchuk Khan. Ordzhonikidze, for instance, cabled Lenin in June 1920: There is no such thing as Soviet rule in Persia.'96 A. Voznesensky, head of the Eastern Department in the Narkomindel, was of the same opinion: We do not conceal the fact that the composition of the new government is far from Communist. At the present time it unites those who have risen under the slogans of 'Away with England' and 'Away with the Tehran government which has sold itself out to England'. The Cabinet consists of the democratic petit-bourgeois of Northern Persia.97 Trotsky warned in a cable of 4 June 1920 to Chicherin (copies to Lenin, Kamenev, Krestinsky and Bukharin): All the information about the situation in Khiva, Persia, Bokhara and Afghanistan testifies to the fact that a Soviet revolution in these countries would at the present moment cause us the greatest possible difficulties. Even in Azerbaijan, the Soviet republic is not capable of standing on its own feet, in spite of the oil industry and its long-standing connection with Russia. Until the situation in the West has been stabilized and that of our industry and transport improved, a Soviet expedition to the East may prove to be no less dangerous than war in the West.98 None the less, the Bolsheviks continued to stake their hopes on Gilan for winning their shrewd game. Operation Gilan was a totally unjustifiable violation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Article 7 of which specified that the parties promised to respect the territorial integrity of Iran. Soviet agression turned Lenin's famous 'Appeal to the working Muslims of Russia and the East', which, among other things, proclaimed Iran's indisputable right to decide its own future, into a mere piece of paper." Moscow was perfectly aware that the Jangeli movement was

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

separatist and, what is more, imbued with Islam and that its programme was primitive to the point of absurdity. Nevertheless, Moscow deemed it necessary to support Kuchuk Khan and was even inclined formally to acknowledge his 'government'. In order to achieve a gradual turn to the left in Gilan, Moscow strongly recommended to the Iranian Communist Party (formed in Enzeli in June 1920) that it overcome its 'separatist mistakes', create a 'united front' with Kuchuk Khan and accept him temporarily as the leader of such a united front. This stratagem had a well-concealed aim: gradually to oust Kuchuk Khan's supporters from all key positions and to replace them with Communists. But the Iranian Communists were not yet such experienced tacticians as their Moscow advisers and immediately gave Moscow's carefully guarded secret away. The Resolution of their Central Committee adopted in July 1920 stated: In order to achieve the unity of all active anti-British forces, the Party supports the present leaders of the Persian movement. It currently tolerates them with the aim of gradually undermining their personal influence, isolating them and increasing the Party's influence on the masses which follow them today.100 Moscow was outraged when its intention became known. After this statement Kuchuk Khan ceased to trust the Communists and the united front in Gilan disintegrated. It should be pointed out in this connection that the Soviet leadership had never agreed on a strategy regarding the Gilan events. There was a continual struggle between the supporters of a more prudent, Tehran-oriented policy (Chicherin) and the supporters of unlimited interference in the internal affairs of Iran with a view to securing Gilan as a base at all costs (Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Raskol'nikov).101 Although Chicherin could not (perhaps, would not) prevent the aggression against Iran, after the operation was completed he apparently managed to persuade Lenin that the Soviet invasion could have grave consequences and might even lead to a direct confrontation with Britain.102 It seems that Lenin accepted his arguments and approved of the contents of the telegram which Chicherin sent to Ordzhonikidze and Raskol'nikov in Enzeli: The reaction of Kuchuk Khan to the establishment of the Soviet system in Iran must be carefully ascertained. ... The toilers and the bourgeois

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41

democrats should be united in the name of Persia's liberty and be incited to rise up against the British. I will not oppose the establishment of the Soviets But I believe the principles should be changed, for I fear any haste in establishing Soviet principles there could result in class antagonism and weaken the struggle in Persia.103 Stalin's group chose to pursue a policy aimed at separating Gilan from Iran by formally recognizing a Gilan 'Soviet' republic and by turning it into a springboard for spreading Bolshevik influence to the whole of Iran. In reply to the objections of Chicherin and his supporters that Iran was not ripe for socialist revolution, Stalin and his group quite logically answered that Chicherin had not objected to the sovietization of Turkestan which was not much different from Iran. As for international law, so respected by the refined Chicherin, Stalin felt nothing but contempt for it. As his mouthpiece, the journal Zhizri NatsionaVnostei (Life of Nations), wrote ten days before the Enzeli Operation: 'now Soviet Azerbaijan with its old-established and experienced revolutionary proletariat and its sufficiently consolidated Communist party will become a revolutionary beacon to Persia, Arabia and Turkey.'104 The struggle between the two group intensified. Chicherin was sarcastic, Stalin rude. Chicherin, for example, invariably called the Gilan republic 'Stalin's Gilan republic'.105 Thanks to his efforts, the Soviet Russian troops were withdrawn from Gilan (he persuaded Lenin that this was necessary),106 but Lenin never fully shared his views. This was reflected in Lenin's speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern (July 1920), when, referring to the Gilan case, he said: 'It gave birth to a Soviet movement in the whole of the East, in the whole of Asia, among all colonial peoples.'107 Moreover, Lenin did not object to assisting Kuchuk Khan via Baku. While agreeing with Chicherin that Soviet Russia should not officially recognize the government of the 'Gilan Soviet Republic' as being independent from Tehran, Lenin none the less instructed Chicherin to accept that government's request to establish certain semi-official contacts, which immediately provoked strong protests from the legitimate Iranian government.108 Lenin pressed Chicherin into agreeing to receive Kuchuk Khan's official legation. This legation arrived in Moscow on 5 August 1920 and was duly received by Chicherin, Lev Karakhan and the Central Executive Committee member, S.Z. Eliava. The legation handed to the Soviet leaders a memorandum specifying the questions to be discussed at the

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

negotiations: trade, technical assistance in building industrial enterprises and railways, and military assistance.

FAILURE OF THE GILAN ADVENTURE

While Kuchuk Khan's legation was on its way to Moscow, important events were taking place in Gilan, putting an end to the united front from which Lenin expected so much. Kuchuk Khan refused to co-operate with the Iranian Communists for the reasons mentioned above, and several leaders of the pro-Communist groups who had joined Kuchuk Khan were killed on his orders. All this forced Lenin to see the Gilan case in a different light and he decided that from now on it would be wiser to pin his hopes on Tehran. By this time, the number of Chicherin's supporters had increased: among them now were important Party, Soviet and army officials. One of these, Petr Baranov, a member of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the 1st Red Army of the Turkestan Front, sent a telegram to Lenin sharply criticizing the Gilan leaders, calling them political ignoramuses and adventurists. Baranov urged that the Soviet Russian governments 'should immediately accept Tehran's proposals to renew diplomatic relations and stop playing its dangerous games in Gilan.'109 Faced with such opposition, Lenin decided to support Chicherin and approved the negotiations with the Iranian government. But before analysing the complicated history of these negotiations, concluded by the treaty of 26 February 1921, something must be said about 'the export of revolution'. While it certainly cannot be claimed that the agents of one country are capable of inducing the people of another country to rebel against their government and the existing regime, unless there are deep internal (national) causes for such revolt, no one should be blind to the fact that it is quite possible to train and encourage anti-government elements of one country on the territory of and with the help of another country. In Soviet-Iranian relations, the problems involved in training Iranian left-wing radicals on Soviet territory had never been purely academic. Although the Bolshevik leadership expected much from the Gilan events, these expectations were not entirely without foundation. The Soviets were perfectly well aware that thousands of

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Iranian citizens who opposed the government were being trained on Soviet territory, so that when they returned to Iran they would spread Soviet influence there. The Bolsheviks, of course, were violating their declared principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of their neighbours, as well as their declared refusal to lend support on their territory to groups or parties aiming to overthrow their legitimate governments. But the Soviet leadership was never too squeamish in such matters. Various groups of Asian 'revolutionaries' were being organized and trained with its approval, and all of them were controlled by local Soviet and Party organs. Turkestan became a major centre for training pro-Soviet agents, the agents for Iran being recruited from among the tens of thousands of Iranians who were living permanently in Turkestan at that time. In Turkestan, the first Iranian 'Communist cells' were formed in Kokand in May 1918, and later they appeared in Merv, Ashkhabad and Tashkent. By the end of 1918 the Central Bureau of Muslim Communist Organizations in Moscow and the Muslim Bureau of the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party in Tashkent were organized to direct the activities of numerous 'Communist cells' whose members were exiles from various Asian countries.110 In 1919 two regional conferences of 'Muslim communist organizations' were convened. The conferences appealed to 'the oppressed brothers, the workers of India, Afghanistan, Persia, China, Bokhara, Asia Minor and Eastern Asia' to revolt against the imperialists and against their own governments. In a telegram to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the participants declared that they were 'convinced supporters' of the Communist party and that Soviet Turkestan was 'a revolutionary school for the entire East.'111 Soon after (on 1 April 1920) a regional conference of Iranian Communists was convened in Tashkent. It decided to form the 'Persian Communist Party "Adalyat" in Turkestan'. The conference published an appeal 'To the working people of Persia' which stressed the enormous importance of the Russian October Revolution in the revolutionary struggle of the Iranian people and adopted a resolution saying that the Russian Revolution had created favourable preconditions for the growth of national-liberation movements in Asia, and that the party would 'have to make use of all the leftist elements in Persia in the struggle against British occupation and the Shah's tyranny'.112

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

Soviet authors admit that the activities of the Iranian Communist organizations in Turkestan and Soviet Azerbaijan 'helped to form the Communist Party in Iran',113 confirming Lincoln Landis' conclusion that the establishment of Soviet control over Turkestan and Azerbaijan was a decisive precondition for a Soviet offensive against Iran.114 From then on, writes the historian S. Zabih, 'Moscow was in a direct line of control over the Communist offensive south of its Asian borders.'115

SOVIET-IRANIAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1920-21: THE TREATY OF 26 FEBRUARY 1921

Such was Iran's partner and it was in such circumstances that the Iranian government prepared to start talks on the normalization of relations with Soviet Russia and to negotiate a treaty which was expected somehow to commit the Soviets to respect the norms of international law in their relations with Iran. The negotiations started at the end of July-beginning of August 1920, at a time when the cabinet of Moshir ed-Dowleh had already replaced that of Vossuq ed-Dowleh, who was forced to resign on 25 June 1920 because of the events in Gilan and because Britain was not prepared to come to his aid and help him defeat the Soviet invaders.116 Moshir ed-Dowleh's assumption of power was regarded in Iran as a sign of an obvious change in Iranian politics. The new Prime Minister was determined to normalize relations with Soviet Russia as the only way to end the crisis caused by the Gilan episode. However, he was equally determined that the normalization would 'in principle exclude any appeasement with Iran after the Soviet fashion'. In his government statement Moshir ed-Dowleh announced that 'Iranians want to be friends with Russia but will not tolerate any attempts to use Iran as a springboard for their world revolution'.117 Moscow immediately sensed that Moshir ed-Dowleh was a strong man and no puppet, a real statesman who was able to accept responsibility and would put an end to the manoeuvring between Britain and Russia. It also understood that his refusal to restore the Curzon-Vossuq agreement of 1919 served Iran's own interests by decreasing British influence there. Moshir told Curzon that to

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45

restore the Agreement would contradict his government's programme, which stated that the Agreement would 'be submitted to the Majlis for discussion and therefore it is temporarily out of force'.118 The Iranian legation in London was instructed to explore the possibility of renewing direct contacts with Moscow. On 18 August 1920 the Iranian chargé d'affaires in London, Gafaran, received an answer from Chicherin (to his telegram of 25 July) assuring him that the Soviet government had not changed its friendly attitude towards Iran. Also on 18 August Moscow had received a note from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent via London and dated 2 August 1920, stressing that Iran was interested in establishing friendly relations with Soviet Russia and was appointing its ambassador to Istanbul, Moshaver ol-Mamalek, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Moscow to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Russian Republic. On 28 August Chicherin cabled the Iranian chargé d'affaires in London that Moscow was willing to receive Moshaver ol-Mamalek as ambassador and to have official talks with him on the normalization of relations.119 While Moshaver's legation was getting ready to leave Istanbul and then waiting in Tiflis for those members of the legation who were bringing the cabinet's instructions from Tehran, one more crisis broke out in Iran. Moshir's cabinet was forced to resign at the end of October 1920 because it had the misfortune to displease Britain. London was infuriated by Moshir's refusal to submit the Curzon-Vossuq treaty to the Majlis, by his demand for the expulsion of British advisers from Iran and by the reappointment of Russian officers as commanders of the Cossack division. Moshir also refused a British request to grant the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company the rights (earlier granted to a Russian citizen, Khoshtaria) to exploit the oil resources of northern Iran. The British Mission in Tehran took advantage of the defeat of the government troops in Gilan in September-October 1920 and persuaded the Shah to dismiss Moshir ed-Dowleh and appoint Sepahdar Azem (a Bakhtiari leader), who was more acceptable to Britain, as the new Prime Minister.120 While Tehran was coping with the governmental crisis, the Iranian delegation headed by Moshaver ol-Mamalek arrived in Moscow. The new cabinet did not send any new instructions and the Soviet-Iranian talks started at the beginning of November 1920.

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

Suddenly, rumours began to spread in Tehran that 'the government is concealing from the public the telegrams it has received from Moshaver ol-Mamalek and is not treating them with due attention'. The government was forced to publish an official statement denying these rumours and expressing 'determination to carry the negotiations through to a successful conclusion'.121 However, those rumours were not unfounded. The French chargé d'affaires in Tehran, Hoppenot, informed his government in a cable dated 26 November 1920 that the Iranian government had discussed in a closed session one of the first telegrams sent by Moshaver ol-Mamalek in which he had warned that 'the Soviet leadership is determined to achieve the withdrawal of British forces from northern Iran even if that meant the use of force'. Hoppenot's cable said that Moshaver ol-Mamalek had trustworthy information that a big military operation was being planned for that purpose for spring 1921. As a result, Moshaver ol-Mamalek had recommended that an agreement with Moscow be signed without delay, so as to prevent a new Soviet military intervention. Hoppenot strongly recommended to his government that it do its utmost to make the British pull their forces out of northern Iran as soon as possible.122 The British government approved of Sepahdar Azem's appointment as Prime Minister, hoping that with him installed in office the Curzon-Vossuq treaty would soon be ratified. However, Sepahdar realized that he had no chance of success. He did not submit the treaty to the Majlis but instead convened in the Shah's palace a special meeting of the Imperial Supreme Council whose members were the Shah, princes of the royal family, high officials, former prime ministers and the mullahs. He asked them for their opinion on the treaty and the overhelming majority of those present replied that the council was not empowered to deal with this question, as only the Majlis had the right to solve it. The council's members advised the government to postpone any decision for the time being and to continue Soviet-Iranian talks. One of the notables read out to the audience a letter he had recently received, signed by many citizens, calling on the government 'to maintain neutrality between England and the Bolsheviks'.123 Nevertheless, Sepahdar Azem decided to make a friendly gesture to Britain. The presence of Soviet (Azerbaijanian) troops in Gilan convinced him, and not him alone, that it was too early to be neutral

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47

and he therefore proposed that British officers be appointed as commanders of the Cossack division and that they receive a loan of 1 million from the 2 million loan specified in the 1919 Treaty. Sepahdar Azem did not doubt that Lord Curzon would comply with this request because he had recently offered this loan to Moshir edDowleh. But to Sepahdar's great disappointment Curzon refused, saying that financial aid to Iran was unthinkable without 'the constitutional action of the Majlis'.124 By the beginning of December 1920 the foundations of the Russian-Iranian treaty had been worked out, and on 7 December Chicherin reported on this to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. The plenum resolved to approve the draft of the treaty. On 19 December Moshaver ol-Mamalek was received by Lenin who informed him that the Soviet government had decided to appoint Feodor Aronovich Rotstein as Representative Plenipotentiary (polpred) to Iran and asked the Iranian ambassador to inquire what his government's opinion was in this matter. On 10 January 1921 Moshaver ol-Mamalek informed Chicherin that Tehran approved of the appointment.125 During the talks, Moshaver ol-Mamalek repeatedly spoke about the withdrawal of Soviet Azerbaijanian troops from Iran. By way of reply, the Soviet side began a devious game. Lev Karakhan told him that Moscow 'could not decide on this matter alone, that it was necessary to consult Baku and that this would take time'. This of course was a ploy since, as everybody knew, all political and military decisions were made by Moscow alone, or with its permission, and all the 'independent' Soviet republics had long ago accepted the socalled 'party-condition' - that they could not take any step in the field of foreign policy, such as concluding treaties with foreigners, without the approval of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.126 The Kremlin had all the information and all the power to comply with the Iranian request to withdraw the Soviet 'Azerbaijanian' troops from Gilan, but prefered to manoeuvre. Karakhan 'consulted' Baku, Baku 'answered' that 'the Azerbaijanian Soviet government itself is distressed that it is compelled to keep its troops on foreign territory' and that 'the presence of Azerbaijanian forces on Persian soil could be misinterpreted'. Baku concluded that it was willing to withdraw its troops 'as soon as the British troops do the same'.127 Moshaver ol-Mamalek had to admit that the Soviet position was

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

not totally unreasonable. He advised his government that it should not regard the presence of Soviet troops in Gilan as an impediment to signing the treaty. Having received a full report from Moshaver ol-Mamalek, the session of the Imperial Supreme Council took place in Tehran. It studied in detail the draft of the Soviet-Iranian treaty and 'the majority spoke for accepting all the conditions'.128 Obviously, Iran was interested in signing this treaty as soon as possible in order to prevent a new Soviet invasion, but while the Soviets could have been satisfied by the attitude of the Iranian government and of Moshaver ol-Mamelek too, they were not so easy to please. Seeing that Iran was willing to meet its demands, Moscow raised a question relating to the internal situation in Iran, in view of a recent statement by the Iranian government about the legalization of political parties and an amnesty for members of anti-government movements. On 22 January 1921 Karakhan officially asked Moshaver olMamalek for information on political parties, trade unions and other political and public organizations in Iran and 'expressed the hope' that all of them 'should enjoy freedom, enabling the Persian people to work for the achievement of Persian independence and to struggle against hostile foreign influence within Persia.129 This was obviously a Soviet attempt to obtain permission to carry out Communist agitation in Iran after a military withdrawal. The Soviets were probably also looking for an excuse to prevent the liquidation of the Gilan hotbed. Moshaver ol-Mamalek said that he would transmit Karakhan's enquiry to Tehran. Moscow received an answer on the day the Soviet-Iranian treaty was signed. It said that the Iranian government had decided to pardon all participants in the anti-government movements in Gilan, but not before they had announced the dissolution of the Gilan 'government' - a restrained and dignified reaction by Iran to the somewhat high-handed Soviet enquiry. Tehran had decided, for the time being, not to touch on sensitive problems and to sign the treaty as soon as possible, which was expected to lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. On 21 February 1921,fivedays before the treaty was to be signed, yet another political crisis broke out in Tehran. This time it was not the usual change of cabinet but a coup d'état, which some writers have viewed as a step towards reinforcing the revolutionary changes which had been started but not completed during the Iranian

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revolution of 1906-11. The Iranian Cossacks, led by their commander, Colonel Reza Khan, entered Tehran and took control. The new Prime Minister, who had played a decisive role in the coup, Seyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, did not introduce any changes to the Soviet-Iranian treaty. He was aware how important it was for his cabinet to sign the treaty because this act would lead to wider and earlier international recognition of his government. The Soviet-Iranian Treaty was signed on 26 February 1921. It was the first treaty signed between the Bolshevik government of Russia and an Asian state. It has a number of features which make it different from all previous international treaties: it came into force 'immediately after being signed' (Article 26); it did not foresee circumstances in which it could be denounced or broken in any way; and it had no time limit. The first treaty of Soviet Russia with an Asian state is of particular interest as an example of the diametrically opposed principles and purposes it contains. In the first item of the treaty, the Soviets made a 'solemn declaration to repudiate completely and absolutely Russia's former violent and coercive policy towards Persia. That used to be the policy of the imperialist governments of Russia, now overthrown by the will of her workers and peasants.' There followed a declaration on the 'right of all nations to decide freely and without constraint their own fate'. Both sides undertook to adhere strictly to the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and the Soviet side declared its wish to see the Iranian people free, independent, thriving and disposing freely of their natural resources. For that reason they declared that 'all the treaties, agreements, conventions and undertakings made by the former Tsarist government with Iran, which demean the Persian people are from now on no longer in force'. All other agreements and treaties concluded by the former Russian government with other powers to the detriment of Iran were simultaneously declared null and void. Moscow also declared that it would not be party to any activity that might weaken and violate Iranian sovereignty. According to Article 11, the Turkmanchai peace treaty of 1828 was annulled and Iran's right to have its own fleet on the Caspian Sea, which was limited by Article 8 of this earlier treaty, was reinstated. Both sides agreed to equal rights of navigation on the Caspian, each under its own flag. Articles 19 and 20 dealt with trade. The sides agreed to begin

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

setting up again, in the shortest possible time, their trading arrangements, for which purpose a mixed commission was to be created to work out a special trade agreement. Both sides gave each other the right of transit for goods destined for other countries. The goods in transit should not be taxed higher than those of the most-favoured nation. It was also agreed to restore telegraphic and postal communications between the two countries as soon as possible. The treaty stipulated the establishment of mutual diplomatic and consular representation enjoying equal rights. Parts of Iranian territory, annexed at different times by Tsarist Russia, were restored to Iran. These were the island of Ashur-Ada and a number of other islands along the coast of Iran's Astrabad province. The treaty gave both sides equal rights of water usage from the River Atrek and other rivers bordering both countries. The property rights of Iranians to those territories that were excluded from Iranian ownership by inequitable concessional agreements were restored. Article 8 contained a 'complete renunciation of the financial policies practised in Eastern countries by the Tsarist government of Russia, which was extending financial help to the Persian government not for the purposes of assisting with the economic development and well being of the Persian people, but with the intention of politically enslaving Persia'. The treaty contained Moscow's renunciation of all its rights in connection with the loans given to Iran by the Tsarist government, and a declaration that they were no longer due to be repaid. The following were returned 'to the ownership of the Persian people: All the cash, the valuables together with the assets and liabilities of the Persian Discount and Loan Bank as well as the immovable property of the above bank on Persian territory'. Article 10 contained Moscow's agreement to turn the following Russian installations and constructions over to the full ownership of the Iranian people, without claiming compensation: the paved highways from Enzeli to Tabriz and Kazvin to Hamadan, 600 km long; the railway lines from Djuifa to Tabriz and Sufyan to Lake Urmiya, 200 km long; wharves, warehouses, ships, barges and all other holdings on Lake Urmiya; all telegraph and telephone lines owned by Tsarist Russia within Persia's borders; the port of Enzeli with its warehouses, electrical installations and other buildings. According to Soviet reckoning, the value of property turned over to Iran by the treaty was valued at 582 million gold roubles. Having

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renounced all claims to the loans given to Iran by the old regime, Moscow returned to the Iranian government the sum of 62.2 million gold roubles (although according to other data, that sum should have been 67.5 million gold roubles). All these clauses formed the positive part of the treaty and were used by the Kremlin for propaganda purposes. There were several other clauses, which the Soviets prefer not to write or talk about, or if they do, they avoid giving any details, limiting themselves to generalities. For example, Article 13, which completely negates all the previous pages of the treaty, says that: 'Persia undertakes neither to lease nor give concessions nor transfer to any third Power or to the citizens of any third party any of those concessions or holdings that were restored to her by Russia.' The words 'any third Power' mean, in the circumstances of that time, that all the enormous natural resources of northern Iran were doomed to remain undeveloped because the country was not in a position to develop them alone - a situation of which the Soviet government was well aware. The only other possibility for Iran was to turn to Soviet Russia (renamed, from 30 December 1922, the Soviet Union) with a request to undertake the development of the rich natural resources of its northern provinces. Moscow expected to do just that but the Iranian government was in no hurry to meet those expectations. Even during the Second World War when Moscow tried to force Iran into doing precisely that, the government in Tehran did not give in to Soviet blackmail. This, in fact, was the true meaning and value of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty and the 'noble gestures' by Russia included in it. The unique character of the treaty has other interesting points. Articles 5,6 and 7 deserve special attention. At a time when various Iranian anti-government émigré bodies and organizations and many groups of so-called Marxist persuasion were active in Soviet Russia and the other Soviet republics, and when the Comintern was guiding and directing the activities of the Iranian Communist Party, and the Red Profintern was directing the activities of left-wing trade unions in Iran, Soviet diplomats insisted on the inclusion in the treaty of the following: 1. The parties undertake a mutual obligation not to tolerate on their territories the setting up or stay of any organizations or groups no matter what names they assume; nor of individuals whose purpose is to struggle against Persia and Russia ..., nor to tolerate on her territory any mobiliza-

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

tion or recruitment into the ranks of an army or armed force belonging to those organizations. 2. To forbid those countries or organizations ... whose purpose is the struggle against either of the sides ... to import onto either territory ... or to transport (or smuggle) through either territory anything which may be used against the [other] side. 3. To use all the means at the disposal of either side to prevent the presence of armies or armed forces of any third government, whose presence could constitute a threat to the borders, interests or security of the other At the very time when the conditions of these clauses had been formulated, Moscow was already unashamedly contravening them. Arms were being hurriedly imported from Soviet Azerbaijan to Gilan, where the united front of the Iranian Communist party and Kuchuk Khan had once again been created. In fact, soldiers and officers of the Azerbaijan Red Army were also sent to Gilan with false Iranian passports. Yet, most odious of all the clauses of the treaty was Article 6 which said: Should a third government attempt to invade Persian territory by force of arms, or to convert Persian territory into an armed base for use against Russia, and if such a situation should endanger the borders of the RSFSR or her allies, and should the Persian Government be unable to prevent it even after having been warned by the Soviet Russian Government, the Soviet Russian Government would have the right to send her armed forces into Persian territory in order to take immediate steps for her self-defence. This clause also obliged Moscow to recall its armed forces as soon as the causes mentioned were removed. All the world knows how 'ready' Moscow was to fulfil its obligations after the fall of fascist Germany and how much energy and effort it cost the Iranian government to achieve at last the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran in 1946.

3 FROM SLOGANS TO REALITY, 1921-25

The Soviet-Iranian agreement was signed at a turning point in Iran's history. The coup d'état of 21 February 1921 was not a shortlived event and had a lasting influence on many facets of the country's life. One of its results was that the hitherto ruling class found itself, to a great extent, removed from government affairs and also deprived of many of its important prerogatives. This former ruling class consisted of the ancient feudal nobility and, of particular importance, the leaders of Iran's nomadic population. These men were far too conservative and reactionary to be permitted to remain at the helm of the country in the complex situation that arose after the First World War and the Russian Revolution. There were only very few among the old ruling élite who understood that Iran had precipitately stepped into an era of nationalism - men like Moshir ed-Dowleh and Moshaver ol-Mamalek who viewed it not as a threat to government institutions and the historic traditions of the country, but as a new and promising beginning. The great majority of the feudal aristocratic leaders, on the other hand, continued to seek a solution to the new situation in the concepts of the past. The British establishment, unfortunately, was also unable to grasp the new situation and failed to oppose Soviet propaganda effectively in Iran. The initiators of the coup d'état were not in principle Britain's enemies, but considered that the unpopular 1919 Treaty should be annulled and that the British government should, in its own interest, renounce the demand to have it ratified. This was also the opinion of the 55 deputies of the Majlis, whom the British minister, Herman Norman had described as 'well disposed to Great Britain' in his cable of 11 February 1921 to the Foreign Office.1

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

The same request was made by 30 Majlis deputies when they met Norman at the residence of Abdul Hussein Khan Teymurtash, an influential member of the Majlis and a proponent of political change. They assured Norman that if Britain were to give up the 1919 Agreement and adopt a positive attitude to the normalization of Iran's relations with Soviet Russia, this would, in their opinion, help the Iranian government take care of the revolutionary unrest in the country. They assured the British minister that with the opening of the Majlis session they would endeavour to 'defend Britain's political interests' and do everything they could to prevent 'Communism from ever finding its way to Iran'. 2 Officers of the Cossack Division, who were the main active force of the coup d'état of 21 February 1921, had the same aim. This was expressed in a telegram sent to the head of the British Foreign Office on 2 February 1921 by the Director of the Indo-European Telegraph, saying that the Cossack commander in Tehran wished to inform the members of the British mission, that they 'knew the Bolsheviks, and were thus irrevocably committed to putting an end to the pro-Bolshevik tendencies in the present Persian government. The Cossacks intended to set up a stable government, organize a military power capable of replacing the British forces and stand up to Bolshevik claims.'3 The parliamentarians who had taken that initiative were supporters of Seyid Zia ed-Din, who was one of the chief initiators of the coup. This was confirmed by the fact that on the day after their meeting with Norman they published an open letter in Ra'ad, the newspaper published by Seyid Zia ed-Din, demanding the annulment of the 1919 Agreement. In their view, the situation necessitated an immediate normalization of Soviet-Iranian relations and the annulment of the British-Iranian Agreement, and that the future course of the Iranian Government with regard to communism was in harmony with Seyid's attitude. A secret declaration which Seyid made to Norman on 25 February 1921 did not contradict the position adopted by these Iranian nationalistic parliamentarians: The British-Iranian Agreement must be denounced. Without doing so, the Government cannot begin working It is very important that the proBritish orientation of the new administration should at present be disguised. That will help reduce the animosity of Russia's Soviet government. If Great Britain wishes to retain its position, she should sacrifice a shadow

From Slogans to Reality, 1921-25

55

for the sake of substance, stay in the background and assist Iran effectively yet unobtrusively.4

On 26 February 1921 Seyid Zia ed-Din published his government's declaration, the same day that the Soviet-Iranian treaty was signed by Moshaver ol-Mamalek in Moscow. The new Iranian government did not want to make use of any formal pretext to delay signing,5 nor did they adopt a foot-dragging policy. Seyid Zia edDin was convinced that normalization of relations with his country's northern neighbour was the only way to neutralize Moscow's influence and reduce its interference in Iran's internal affairs. That was the main consideration in favour of an immediate signing of the treaty. The Iranian Prime Minister's main aims were to evict Soviet forces from Iranian territory and to quieten the Gilan unrest. In that situation, all other considerations were insignificant and one cannot but disagree with the opinion of those writers who are convinced that Seyid Zia ed-Din intended to use the Soviet-Iranian treaty only as an instrument to obtain international recognition for his government.6 All this may possibly contain the answer to the question put by many writers: how could Seyid Zia ed-Din's government, which came to power with the express purpose of combating foreign predominance in Iran,7 have agreed to sign a treaty containing, among others, paragraphs 5 and 6 which were directed against Iran's interests, without even attempting to have them excluded or at least amended? The Gilan operation of the Red Army and the occupation of Iranian territory by the Soviets made such a strong impression on Iranian political circles and instilled such fear that the new administration hurried to make overtures which were intended to placate and reassure Moscow. Soviet soldiers and officers, who had been taken prisoner by the British in Turkmenia and interned in Iran, were freed and returned to Soviet Russia; the new government assisted in the re-establishment of trade relations between Khorassan and Soviet Turkestan. Despite such seeming contraditions, the cabinet set up by Seyid Zia ed-Din was precisely that instrument which was endeavouring, not merely by words but also by deeds, to preserve Iran's territorial integrity and national independence. It never lost an opportunity to make some progress in that direction. Norman and Balfour, both influential in their sphere, tried to convince Lord Curzon that the

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

new Iranian Prime Minister was bent on 'real reforms' and was 'the first ever to have agreed to enact reforms and make Iran independent of outside help'.8 One proof of Seyid Zia ed-Din's intentions was his attempt to pressurize Moscow on the matter of taking the 'Azerbaijanian' Soviet forces out of Iran. He made the acceptance in Tehran of the Soviet ambassador, F. A. Rotstein, and his entire embassy staff conditional on the retreat of these forces to their own territory. Correspondence on this subject lasted until 6 April 1921, and Rotstein together with all his colleagues had to remain in Poltoratsk (now Ashkhabad) while awaiting permission to cross the Iranian border. The Prime Minister expected, as a matter of course, to receive support from the British government, but all Norman's efforts to persuade Lord Curzon to back up the Iranian cabinet were in vain. His argument that Seyid Zia ed-Din was the right leader for his people, offering them a real chance of salvation, without which 'nothing could help save that country from bolshevism',9 fell on deaf ears. Curzon's stubborn refusal to give up the 1919 Agreement gave the Soviets a pretext to affirm that they were threatened by Iran and must insist on the inclusion of paragraphs 5 and 6 in the SovietIranian Treaty as well as the continued Soviet occupation of Iranian territory. At long last Seyid Zia ed-Din gave in, and on 6 April 1921 Rotstein crossed the Iranian border, but was compelled to promise that the question of the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Iran would be given considerable attention upon his arrival in Tehran. The Soviet government insisted on the immediate accreditation of its ambassador not so much for reasons of prestige but because it wanted to have an active influence on Iran's political life and keep an eye on preparations for the ratification of the 1921 Treaty. The date for this was fixed for 26 June 1921. It could hardly have been possible to find a person better suited for the Soviet purpose that Fyodor Aronovich Rotstein. During the many years he had spent in Britain as a political émigré (1895-1920), he had acquired considerable experience in liaising with the press and organizing campaigns in favour of Lenin and Bolshevism. On his arrival in Tehran, Rotstein, to show good will, inaugurated his ambassadorship with an official speech announcing that the Soviet embassy would be 'open to the workers of the capital on Fridays' and that Sovietfilmswould be shown free to all comers at the embassy's club. As was to be expected, he soon formed close

From Slogans to Reality, 1921-25

57

relationships with the Tehran and the provincial press, and within three or four months no fewer than a dozen newspapers were already publishing material and press releases supplied by his embassy. Among those newspapers were: Iran - the government semi-official publication, Setareye Iran - an anti-British daily, Ittihad - a conservative paper which nevertheless published the Soviet releases, Vatan - an old anti-British paper, Khaladj - an extremist 'anti-imperialist' weekly, Tufan - the mouthpiece of the Iranian Communist Party, Haqiqat-a publication fully subsidized by Rotstein and directed against the Prime Minister, and Ingilabe Sorh - a newspaper subsidized by the Soviet consulate general in Rasht.10 The new Soviet ambassador quickly familiarized himself with the various factions within the Iranian government, and understood that Seyid Zia ed-Din was indeed a powerful obstacle to Moscow's aims. He did not believe that there was any sense in putting faith in Seyid Zia ed-Din nor in backing him. His attention was drawn to Colonel Reza Khan, a newcomer to politics and an ardent nationalist. His nationalism, since his entire life had been closely connected with the Cossack Division, was inspired by a rather primitive concept: hatred and envy of the British officers who had taken over the command of that unit. There is no evidence that ideology ever played a discernible part in Reza Khan's outlook. The situation was now as follows: the intellectual, circumspect and moderate reformer Seyid Zia ed-Din was facing an opponent who was an ardent, even rabid, though rather primitive nationalist Colonel Reza Khan. That prompted the Soviet ambassador to play on the incompatibility of these two prominent personalities in the Iranian government. Soon, close contact was established between Rotstein and Reza Khan. He become a frequent visitor to the Soviet ambassador's residence, where the two men spent long hours in conversation.11 Rotstein, aided by Reza Khan, began a campaign in the sympathetic local publications of rumour spreading against the Prime Minister, accusing him of actually carrying on the same old proBritish policy. Reza Khan willingly fell in with Rotstein's plans for subversive activities, which, if successful, promised him the removal of a hated rival and the prospect of seizing power. Three weeks after Rotstein's arrival in Tehran Reza Khan began to act in such a way as to sharpen his disagreement with the Prime Minister.

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The conflict between them came to a head on a matter of principle. Seyid Zia ed-Din decided to put off temporarily the handing over of the Iranian Gendarmerie to the Ministry of War, a matter which had been decided upon before the coup d'état, and also tried to retain British military and financial advisers in the service of the Iranian government. These measures were intended to neutralize to some extent the influence of Reza Khan's followers - the so-called 'Cossack party'. By the time the Prime Minister realized the danger of his situation, it was already too late.12 The first open conflict between the Prime Minister and his Minister of War occurred on 6 May 1921 and the second on 21 May; this was followed by a major political crisis, with Reza Khan emerging as an astute and experienced political manipulator, Rotstein's gifted student. He succeeded in convincing the monarch (Sultan Ahmed Shah) that the Prime Minister was planning to overthrow the monarchy, and thus gained the Shah's support. Now Reza Khan could be certain that in a struggle for power, his position was assured. Seyid Zia ed-Din's political weakness - the fact that he did not enjoy really influential popular support - was further undermined by the British government's indifference to Iranian affairs after the February coup. After Lord Curzon's denunciation of the 1919 Anglo-Iranian agreement in March 1921 his interest in Iran ceased.13 Against the background of such short-sighted and unjustified indifference, Rotstein's policy was particularly dangerous. On 25 May 1921 the Shah, following Reza Khan's advice, dismissed Seyid Zia ed-Din, who immediately left the country.14 From 25 May to 4 June, when a new government was formed, Iran was ruled by Reza Khan. This, in effect, was a dress rehearsal for him in assuming power, which actually happened two years later. During those ten days Reza Khan took a number of steps which could not have failed to make Moscow rejoice. He dismissed a large group of British officers, advisers to military units, posted in Rasht; annulled the Lynch Concession on the basis of which the Anglo-Iranian Transport Company functioned; set up consulates on Soviet territory; officially recognized the government of the Soviet Azerbaijanian Republic; and dispatched an Iranian mission to Baku.15 It was now obvious in London that Lord Curzon had miscalculated. On 1 June 1921 a number of members of the House of Commons openly accused Rotstein of direct involvement in Seyid

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Zia ed-Din's dismissal. The Foreign Office spokesman, M. Harmsforth, confirmed Parliament's suspicions.16 Rotstein, however, was not able to implement his plan fully since the task of forming a new cabinet was not given to Reza Khan but to Kavam os-Saltaneh, Vossuq ed-Dowleh's brother and a man known for his pro-Western sympathies. The Soviet-Iranian treaty was not proposed for discussion by the new government and the date of its ratification was postponed indefinitely. The only thing Reza Khan could do to show his gratitude for the support given to him by Rotstein was to publish on 26 June an article full of praise for Soviet Russia in the newspaper Golshan. Reza Khan wrote: This is the policy of free Russia having toppled the despotic regime of monarchy. She has freed not only herself from the oppression of arbitrariness, but is also saving her neighbouring countries from it. It is the same Russia who had revoked all the rapacious concessions of the Tsarist government and returned everything to Iran without remuneration. It is the same Russia who stretched out to us a brotherly helping hand and wishes to live with us in peace and friendship.17 Reza Khan's position in Kavam os-Saltaneh's cabinet had visibly deteriorated despite retaining the Minister of War portfolio. The new Prime Minister, unlike his predecessor, had many influential connections and enjoyed the support of powerful circles in Iranian society as well as of the old feudal nobility, to which he belonged. He was also popular in business due to his own connections with the American business world. Kavam os-Saltaneh was not only in no hurry to see the SovietIranian treaty ratified, he even endeavoured to limit the extent of its terms. This was confirmed by the Prime Minister's attitude to the question of the Khoshtaria (petroleum) Concession. The Soviet government insisted that this concession was subject to paragraph 13 of the Soviet-Iranian treaty which said that Soviet Russia would hand over to 'Persia all other concessions obtained under the Tsarist regime'. Kavam os-Saltaneh, however, insisted that since the Khoshtaria Concession had never been ratified by the Majlis, it could not be considered as existing either defacto or de jure and that paragraph 13 did not apply to it. The controversy on the subject worsened with Kavam os-Saltaneh's decision to award all the rights of Khoshtaria to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. On 12 November 1921 the Majlis approved, enacting the law so that the concession to Standard Oil was fully legalized.

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The decision of the Majlis met with the approval of the influential political, business and other circles of Iranian society, as it aroused the hope of at last achieving an 'equilibrium in foreign policy'.18 The nationalist press (Iran, for example, which not long before had published pro-Soviet material) saw the decision as a 'declaration of independence from Russia and Great Britain'.19 This opinion is especially interesting as it reveals the widespread and generally accepted view that Soviet Russia was carrying on the traditional role of Russian Tsarist policies in Iran, refuting the assertion of those Soviet authors who believed that Iranian public opinion and the establishment saw Soviet Russia as the complete opposite of Tsarist Russia. Hussein Ala, the Iranian minister in Washington, in a memorandum addressed to the US State Department at this time pointed out that the signing of the Soviet-Iranian treaty 'does not mean that our country wishes to come under Moscow's influence or accept Bolshevik doctrines. We were obliged to reach a modus vivendi with a powerful neighbour because of territorial closeness; and the conditions offered to us were reasonably favourable'.20 The decision made by the Majlis on 12 November brought Soviet-Iranian relations close to breaking point. On 23 November 1921 Rotstein sent the Iranian government a very terse note, in which he stressed that as long as the treaty of 26 February 1921 was not ratified, such behaviour on the part of the Iranian government was an 'act of usurpation of property' which does not belong to it. The note added that, should the treaty be ratified, the handing over of the Khoshtaria Concession to the Americans would be illegal since it was in contradiction of paragraph 13 of the treaty. Rotstein threatened to annul the treaty if it were not ratified in the shortest possible time. Any delay, he said, would be considered 'as the wish of the Majlis not to ratify it, and in such a case my Government will see no other alternative but to facilitate for your Government the unpleasant duty of drawing its own conclusions and declaring the treaty annulled'.21 Rotstein's threats, however, made no impression on the Iranian government. In fact, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Assadullah Khan, informed him (in a note dated 12 December 1921) that the Iranian side would continue to insist on the removal of paragraphs 5 and 6 from the text of the treaty and on having paragraphs 13 and 20 formulated differently. By now Rotstein apparently understood that he had overstepped the mark and that

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his position was becoming untenable. The Iranian press published articles drawing very clearly a parallel between the present attitude of Moscow concerning the Khoshtaria Concession and that of Tsarist Russia. To this was added another element: the negative attitude of the British government to Iran's position in this matter. That, in conjunction with Rotstein's stand, reminded Iranians only too clearly of the quite recent past when Russian and British ministers in Tehran had joined forces against any attempt by a third power to gain a foothold in Iran.22 Not wishing to recall such undesirable associations, Rotstein was forced to make concessions. He agreed to changes being made in paragraphs 13 and 20, but was adamant in his refusal to discuss changes suggested by the Iranian side in paragraphs 5 and 6. Nevertheless, Rotstein thought it necessary to ease Iranian government fears regarding paragraph 13. The Iranian government was troubled by the Soviet attitude, fearing that it might use these paragraphs as a pretext for declaring that the security of the Soviet republics was threatened by the hostile attitude of the Iranian press towards Soviet Russia and other Soviet republics. Rotstein, in a letter addressed to the new Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshar os-Saltaneh, explained that paragraphs 5 and 6 of the treaty foresaw nothing but preparation for an active and armed struggle with Russia and her allied Soviet republics by supporters of the old regime and their supporters among foreign powers who, besides extending assistance to the enemies of workers' and peasants' Republics, could also occupy part of Persian territory under some pretext or other and there set up a base for direct aggression, on their own or with counter-revolutionary forces, against the Soviet republics or even Russia herself. But no struggle, either oral or written, against the Soviet regime by Persian newspapers, or even by groups of Russian émigrés, as long as they kept within limits usually defined under conditions of friendship between two neighbouring states, was meant or considered here.23 On receiving these explanations, Kavam came to the conclusion that to insist on annulment of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the treaty would be senseless, especially since both Great Britain and France were greatly concerned about the prospect of giving the Khoshtaria Concession to an American company but, at the same time, expressed little concern over the potential Soviet threat to Iran implied in these paragraphs. Kavam os-Saltaneh gave in when discussion on the two paragraphs was shelved. On 15 December

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1921 the Soviet-Iranian Treaty was ratified by the Majlis, and on 24 January 1922 it was signed by the Shah, with the exchange of the ratification documents taking place on 22 February 1922.24 Simultaneously with the ratification of the treaty, the Majlis decided that the Khoshtaria Concession was not subject to paragraph 13. In his letters of 12 and 19 December 1921 Rotstein agreed to that, at the same time informing the Iranian government that Moscow was prepared to 'go into the matter of the Khoshtaria Concession, together with the Persian Government, in a spirit of friendship'.25 That declaration was intended by Rotstein to warn Tehran that his government did not intend to protest against the Majlis' resolution concerning the Khoshtaria Concession but did not consider the matter closed. The problem of the Khoshtaria Concession was also discussed by the Revvoensovet Respubliki (Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR - a body, which during the Civil War was given control over the Red Army and Navy) which decided that the concession could be given to the American company on condition that it would not be allowed to keep a fleet or bases on the Caspian Sea nor armed forces in Iran.26 Whereas Rotstein's position with regard to the ratification of the treaty had been openly aggressive, his attitude toward's the Gilan events was markedly more moderate. At the beginning of 1921 Moscow felt that it would be in its own interests to quieten the anti-government unrest in Gilan. It was already clear that the Jangeli movement had grown out of internal unrest and held no promise of dividends for the 'world revolution'. It later became clear that the activists of the Gilan 'revolution' no longer had either influence or authority, and that this 'revolution' had lost its attraction. The problems connected with the events in Gilan were discussed in detail during a meeting between Rotstein and Lenin on 12 February 1921. Four days later, Chicherin pointed out in a letter to Ordzhonikidze that Soviet policy was striving to put an end to the war in northern Iran. He also mentioned that the decision of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party was to aim for friendship with the Iranian government with a view to freeing Iran from the British. Chicherin did not miss the opportunity to remind Ordzhonikidze, who was an enthusiastic proponent of the creation on Iranian territory of a centre for 'world revolution', that the Gilan enterprise had been unsound from the very beginning, and that both Stalin and Ordzhonikidze had played invidious roles in it.27

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After the treaty was signed, Chicherin again demanded that Ordzhonikidze and Narimanov (Prime Minister of the Azerbaijanian SSR) speed up the preparation of a plan to establish the order of withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iranian territory and also to ensure the self-dissolution of the Gilan 'Soviet government'. At the same time Chicherin stressed that not only was this the aim of the Central Committee of the Party but also that of Lenin. On 5 April 1921 Chicherin cabled to Ordzhonikidze: 'We absolutely insist that you put down with an iron hand any attempt to undermine our policy in Persia Take strong measures to keep our people away from such undertakings. '28 These terse words show that Chicherin's realistic policy, which was then supported by Lenin, continued to be opposed by other influential Soviet politicians, particularly Ordzhonikidze and Stalin. By June 1921 the last units of Russian Soviet and British forces had left Iranian territory. This did not mean, however, that the atmosphere in the country improved or became more stable. Official documents provide sufficient proof of continued Soviet interference in the Gilan crisis. None of the official representatives of Moscow in Baku had ever seriously considered doing anything to stop the anti-government activities in northern Iran, although Chicherin had written (16 February) that this was obligatory for all Party members, especially Central Committee members. Quite the contrary, at the time that Chicherin, on Lenin's orders, was taking steps to put a stop to Soviet contacts with the Gilan activists, the Comintern leaders, with the active participation of Lenin, were working energetically to do everything in their power to consolidate the anti-government groups in Gilan and concentrate them around the Iranian Communist Party. In January 1921 the Central Committee of the ICP accepted a document called Theses of Haydar Khan Amuogly', which had been thoroughly prepared by the Soviet Communist Party's emissaries and contained an appeal 'for unification of all classes from the proletariat to the middle classes, in the struggle against the Qafars and foreign imperialists'.29 On 6 May 1921 the endeavours of the Comintern's agents brought about the re-establishment of a 'united front', headed by Kuchuk Khan, and a new government of the 'Gilan Republic', which expressed a desire to develop friendly relations with the governments of Soviet Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Once again 'Soviets' were set up and the whole scheme could have had disas-

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trous consequences for Iran, for there were influential and energetic persons in Moscow who had already shown support for the 'Gilan variant'. However, the 'united front' was short-lived, its members divided by strife and quarrels, lack of confidence in each other and especially in the Communists, who could barely contain their thirst for power and their readiness to sell out their country to a foreign power. This episode terminated in a coup organized by Kuchuk Khan on 29 September 1921, in which many members of the ICP were killed, among them Khaydar Khan Amuogly. After that the days of the 'Gilan Soviet Republic' were numbered. Rotstein was a supporter of Chicherin's policy, agreeing with his chief that the Gilan affair was no more than a mere adventure. However, even he did not escape the temptation to fish in Gilan's troubled waters. Throughout the summer of 1921 he repeatedly offered his 'good services' to Kavam es-Saltaneh as a mediator but always met with a cold refusal. On 18 August 1921 Rotstein wrote a letter to Kuchuk Khan in which he insisted on the necessity of seeking a compromise with the government in Tehran, with a proviso that the 'Autonomous District Jangel' would be preserved under his (Kuchuk Khan's) control. On 6 September Rotstein addressed Kavam es-Saltaneh with the same suggestion - which the Iranian government ignored. There is no need to stress that the Soviet ambassador's activities were in flagrant contradiction of the spirit and letter of the SovietIranian treaty and provoked strong indignation, not only from the Iranian government but also from public opinion throughout the country. Lenin was, on the whole, inclined to support Chicherin's position, although he had some doubts. He was, apparently, subjected to strong pressure from the Stalin-Ordzhonikidze extremist group, as confirmed in his letter of 13 August 1921 to Rotstein: 'It seems that I have agreed with your careful policy in Persia. Have not heard any "other side", but do think that your basic considerations cannot be rejected.'30 Lenin's definition of Rotstein's policy was that it was 'careful' but not necessarily negative. As for the words 'it seems', they appear to camouflage an acknowledgement of the fact that he was indeed subjected to pressure from the other group. On 20 September 1921 Chicherin wrote an indignant letter to Husseinov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan: 'Some elements in Baku, unknown to

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us, continue giving support to the insurgents in northern Persia. The Central Persian Government needs absolutely all its forces which are now diverted by the struggle against the absurd Kuchuk and the even more absurd Ehsanullah.' Chicherin warned that those who did not toe the line taken by the Central Committee 'were guilty of a serious crime against the general interests of Soviet power'.31 The general situation in Gilan, however, favoured the attitude adopted by Chicherin. After the leadership of the ICP came to an end, sharp conflict arose between Kuchuk Khan and Ehsanullah, the leader of the Iranian anarchists who had taken part in the 'united front'. That conflict degenerated into an armed clash between their supporters, with the result that Kuchuk's champions were beaten and Kuchuk Khan himself fled into the mountains, where he eventually died. Ehsanullah later emigrated to Baku. The Gilan drama, stage-managed by persons close to Lenin, ceased to interest Moscow. That was the reason why Chicherin succeeded on 29 September 1921 in pushing through a decision by the Politburo of the Central Committee of RKP(b) forbidding the Baku party functionaries to participate in any activity which might contradict Soviet government policy in Iran. S. Kirov, then secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijanian Communist Party, was given the task of implementing the decision.32 Chicherin's line had triumphed, not because it followed the best possible principle of Soviet foreign policy, but because of circumstances which made it unprofitable for Soviet Russia to continue with the Gilan adventure. On 5 October 1921 Chicherin wrote to Rotstein: 'Our policy in Persia must be based on a scrupulous neutrality where the struggle between the Shah and anti-Shah elements are concerned, and on the strictest non-interference in internal affairs.'33 In light of the facts already presented, a request made by the Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, L. Karakhan in November 1921 has a cynical ring: 'Soviet Russia's policy in Persia, directed at strengthening the political and economic power of the Persian State, cannot in principle sympathize with any kind of Persian separatist aspirations, let alone their struggle against the central government.'34 The suppression of tension in Gilan cleared the way for the ratification of the Soviet-Iranian treaty, although everybody in Iran realized that the cessation of the Gilan anti-government insurrections was due not to Moscow's efforts but in spite of them, which

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was why the tension between Tehran and Moscow still continued. In addition, in the autumn of 1921 the smouldering animosity between Kavam es-Saltaneh and Rotstein came to a head. Kavam es-Saltaneh, to use an understatement, was slightly annoyed about Rotstein's relationship with the Iranian press which in obedience to his dictates, was systematically undermining Iran's relations with the West, and inciting the people to overthrow the existing regime. The task of the pro-Soviet Iranian press was to lead a campaign of protest against 'the policy of imperialism in Iran' and, more importantly, against British imperialism. The result was great indignation not only in London but also in Tehran. On 15 September 1921, the British government handed a note to the Soviet government containing strongly worded criticism of Rotstein's behaviour. Simultaneously with this, three notes were sent by the Iranian government to the Soviet embassy in Tehran. These contained a detailed analysis of Rotstein's energetic activities and a protest against the Soviet ambassador's interference in the various spheres of Iran's internal political life. Indeed, Rotstein was later recalled and was replaced by Boris Zakharovich Shumyatsky. This indicates that, despite the ratification of the Soviet-Iranian treaty, relations between the two countries could by no means be termed normal. There was no doubt that by the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty, Soviet popularity in Iran had gone down considerably, and the internal political situation in Iran was clearly favouring closer ties with the West.35 Nevertheless, the West (and Britain more than most) failed at this point to show any political wisdom or acumen in relation to Iran. To use Soviet terminology, the West did not see its own international class interests. Instead of acting in concert with Washington, whose political shares stood rather high in Iran, London began to counteract American efforts, and also Iranian efforts, to meet the British half-way in order to stabilize the Iranian economy. The British line of action happened to agree with that of the Soviets. Interestingly, it was not Curzon but Chicherin who was the first to understand this paradoxical situation. Realizing the implications of a London-Moscow 'united front' against the offering of the Khoshtaria Concession to America, Iran retreated. But it was too late. Teymurtash addressed the Majlis, with devastating sarcasm, on the strange 'harmony between revolutionary Russia and reactionary Britain'.36

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In the meantime, the similar stance on the problem taken by the two 'strong' men of the Iranian cabinet, Kavam es-Saltaneh and Reza Khan,37 failed to gain support and their rivalry soon flared up again with renewed force. Reza Khan in his struggle to obtain power viewed the Prime Minister as a dangerous enemy. Coexistence for these two personalities was out of the question and on, 20 January 1922, Reza Khan brought about a government crisis. Knowing that the Shah had total confidence in him and saw him as the saviour of the throne and dynasty (to which attitude Rotstein had also contributed), Reza Khan informed the Shah that he was unable to work with the Prime Minister. That decided the cabinet's fate. The new cabinet was formed by Moshir ed-Dowleh. Reza Khan retained his post as Minister of War. The new Prime Minister attached greater importance to relations with the Soviets than his predecessor, Kavam es-Saltaneh, yet he also was wary of too close a relationship with them, understanding the dangers. For that reason Moshir ed-Dowleh decided on a course of all-out co-operation with the United States and Great Britain. However, taking into consideration Britain's unpopularity in Iran, he thought that Britain should leave the scene for a time, remain in the shadow and let the US play the dominant role. That, in Moshir ed-Dowleh's opinion, would serve as a sufficient guarantee of an independent future for Iran, which by a quirk of circumstance found itself in the front line of a confrontation that divided East and West. Had London accepted the chance offered by Kavam es-Saltaneh and Moshir ed-Dowleh, an immediate improvement in BritishIranian relations could have followed. The financial situation of Iran would have improved owing to considerable capital investment by the US and Britain, as a result of which Iran would no longer have needed a hurried normalization of relations with Soviet Russia, based on unfavourable conditions. As things stood, Iran's economic stagnation forced Moshir ed-Dowleh to send a trade mission to Moscow to conduct negotiations for a trade agreement. Soviet-Iranian trade had actually been renewed in the spring of 1921 despite the absence of a trade agreement. The Soviet government at that time was particularly interested in renewing trade with Iran as famine was threatening Russia and it needed to be able to purchase Iranian grain and other agricultural produce. At the end of August 1921, a trade mission of the RSFSR, headed by V.

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Belgov, was opened in Tehran. The first steps in this direction were taken with enthusiasm in Tehran, Tabriz and Meshed, but this soon turned to pessimism when Soviet-Iranian trade met a serious obstacle in the form of the foreign trade monopoly declared by the Soviet government. Iranian businessmen protested noisily against the conditions that the Foreign Trade Commissariat of the RSFSR was forcing them to accept. They refused to submit to the dictates of Soviet foreign trade institutions in Iran and could not understand that this was not the fault of individual employees. It was to be expected that Iranian protests against the 'unbearable way of doing things' by Soviet foreign trade experts in Iran38 made no impression whatsoever on the Soviet government. Rotstein in a note (7 May 1922) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Hakim ol-Molk, pointed out that it is quite impossible to treat the existing order of trade relations with the Persian merchants as if it were some high-handed or arbitrary behaviour on the part of the representatives of the Foreign Trade Commissariat. The Foreign Trade Commissariat of the RSFSR is guided exclusively by conditions laid down by my Government for conducting foreign trade.39 Rotstein did not miss any opportunity to stress that only after the beginning of trade negotiations in Moscow would the way be clear to find a solution to all controversial or unclear matters. Meanwhile, wishing to soothe the unrest in Iranian business circles and their discontent with the activities of the Soviet trade representation in Tehran, Moscow gave the Iranian merchants, on Rotstein's advice, the right of unlimited import, export and trade at the Nizhny Novgorod Fair. At the same time, however, Moscow made Iran accept trade conditions in accordance with the Soviet monopolistic policy of foreign trade and also insisted that its trade representation in Tehran be given such rights and privileges as are normally reserved for diplomatic representations. This came into force even before the Soviet-Iranian trade agreement was signed. The insistence by the Soviets on obtaining these privileges caused Iranian patriotic circles to accuse Moscow of trying to reinstate defacto the Capitulations. In reply to Moscow's importunate demands, the Iranian government, endeavouring to defend the interests of its own businessmen, applied to trade with the RSFSR those customs tariffs that had been

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worked out in 1920 for the British-Iranian agreement of 1919, which was very unfavourable to Soviet Russia. Thus, just as SovietIranian trade negotiations were about to begin an accumulation of difficulties and snags had to be overcome by both sides. During 1922 Soviet-Iranian trade relations were at the centre of Iranian political life. At the beginning of the year a National Bloc was formed in the Majlis. Such well-known politicians as Mostoufi ol-Mamalek, Suleiman Mirza and Teymurtash were members. The bloc constantly criticized the government for being insufficiently active in pushing through the complete normalization of SovietIranian relations. Reza Khan was closely connected with this group, although he was not a member - and it was with their help that he succeeded (22 May 1922) in overthrowing Moshir od-Dowleh's cabinet. Nevertheless, the candidature of Mostoufi ol-Mamalek for the post of Prime Minister, put forward by Reza Khan, was not approved by the Majlis or by the court. Reza Khan's dictatorial manner had been viewed with serious suspicion both by the Shah and a number of parliamentarians for some time and, to spite him, a personal enemy, Kavam os-Saltaneh, was appointed Prime Minister. Reza Khan however, relying on the only real power in the country, the army, managed to retain the post of War Minister in this cabinet, making him its most influential member. In the period between 23 May and 17 June 1922, Reza Khan was defacto head of the government and took advantage of the situation to solve the deadlock in the Soviet-Iranian trade agreement. Negotiations on this began in Moscow on 15 June but Kavam osSaltaneh, having again come to power, renewed his objections to the application of monopolistic conditions by the Soviets in trade between the two countries. Kavam os-Saltaneh, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, sent a note (16 July 1922) to the new Soviet ambassador, Shumyatsky, demanding that he take 'immediate and energetic steps for the cessation of arbitrary behaviour' by the Soviet trade representatives towards those Iranian merchants and businesmen who wished to import Soviet goods to Iran and export Iranian goods to Soviet Russia. During the summer of 1922 Iranian business circles started an energetic campaign to boycott trade with Soviet Russia. Moscow showed no inclination to meet the perfectly legitimate demands of the Iranian government, as a result of which negotiations were broken off in August 1922. Replying to a demand made by Kavam

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os-Saltaneh, Karakhan repeated once more (on 16 August 1922) that the monopoly of foreign trade is one of the basic principles of Soviet Russia and the Russian Government considers that not only negotiations for a trade agreement between Russia and Persia, but also the continuation of trade relations at the same level as presently exist are endangered by the attitude of the Central Persian Government as well as its local institutions to the institutions of foreign trade of the RSFSR.40 Moshaver ol-Mamalek, the Iranian ambassador in Moscow, replied (29 August 1922) that Iran 'has the right not to recognize the privilege of monopoly claimed by the representatives of Vneshtorg [Narkomvneshtorg - the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the RSFSR] to trade in the various places of Persia'.41 Kavam os-Saltaneh's stance caused serious alarm in Moscow, resulting in a decision to take steps that clearly showed the degree of respect in which the Soviet government held the elemental norms of interstate relations. Profiting from the absence of any Iranian laws on foreign trade monopoly and from the basic political freedoms inscribed in its constitution, Soviet representatives there started an active campaign directly sabotaging the Prime Minister's policy. Ignoring Iranian officials, the Soviet embassy in August 1922 addressed itself directly to Iranian businessmen and merchants, suggesting that they send to Soviet Russia a special, unofficial trade delegation in order to acquire direct knowledge of the trade situation and trading organizations in the RSFSR. The invitation stressed the Soviet government's wish to 'strengthen trade relations between Soviet Russia and Persian merchants'. 42 In September 1922 the Chamber of Commerce of the RSFSR and Narkomvneshtorg organized a trade fair in Baku, to which Iranian merchants were invited, and permitted the unlicensed export of Iranian goods there. Meanwhile, Shumyatsky repeatedly invited representatives of Iranian merchants and businessmen to his embassy and attempted to persuade them to disobey their government.43 This was not all. Kavam os-Saltaneh was constantly attacked by his own country's pro-Soviet press, and in the Majlis by the National Bloc, whose membership had grown in the second half of 1922 from 12 to 48. At the end of the year, the deputies of that bloc staged an attack on the Prime Minister for his refusal to participate in the Lausanne Conference despite the persistent non-official advice given by Moscow.

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Kavam os-Saltaneh had a rather cool attitude towards the Kemalist revolution in Turkey and only recognized the government of the Great National Assembly there as late as 26 July 1922. Reza Khan's stance, on the other hand, was in glaring contrast to that of the Prime Minister. He openly expressed his sympathy for Mustafa Kemal and made it quite obvious that he envied him his fame and glory. This must have been one of the reasons for Kavam osSaltaneh's coolness towards the Turkish national leader. Moscow, intending to compromise the Iranian Prime Minister in the eyes of the 'national forces' of Iran, sent an official note in October 1922 to the Iranian government asking what their attitude was towards participation in the Lausanne Conference. Kavam os-Saltaneh replied that his government did not intend to participate because the question of the Black Sea Straits did not infringe on Iranian interests. There followed a rabid persecution campaign against the Prime Minister, whom the National Bloc accused of indifference to the national problems of Iran and to the international authority of the country. In fact, the Lausanne Conference was not concerned with Iran's problems but Moscow's manoeuvre had succeeded in compromising the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the Soviets had hoped that Iran's participation in the conference might bring about a rapprochement between Iran and Turkey and thus facilitate the creation of a 'united anti-imperialist front' in the Middle East. But Soviet plans were doomed to failure. The Iranian press published the exchange of notes on that subject and there was great indignation in the Majlis. On 18 January 1923, the National Bloc carried the discussion from Parliament into the streets of Tehran. Members of the bloc publicly accused the Prime Minister of pro-imperialist and pro-British policies.44 Extremist circles in the Majlis, with the backing of the Soviet embassy, finally achieved their purpose: on 25 January 1923, Kavam os-Saltaneh handed in his resignation. Reza Khan succeeded in having his own man, Mostoufi ol-Mamalek, nominated as Prime Minister. Reza Khan took a daring step during this political crisis - provoked, as were the preceding ones, largely by him - in blatant defiance of the Iranian constitution in that he did not resign with the rest of the outgoing cabinet and retained his post of Minister of War in the new cabinet. The new government's declaration, read aloud by Mostoufi ol-

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Mamalek, listed as one of its important tasks the signing of a trade agreement with Soviet Russia. On 27 February 1923, a joint communiqué was issued by the new Prime Minister and Shumyatsky, announcing the renewal of Soviet-Iranian trade negotiations. The parties undertook 'to reach within a month . . . mutually favourable decisions leading to the preparation and signing of this agreement' and also, pending the working out of the conditions of a customs convention, to introduce immediately and by both sides the customs tariffs of 1903 for a period of three months.45 On 9 March Moscow renewed negotiations with a view to signing the trade agreement. On 27 March Karakhan dispatched a note to Moshaver ol-Mamalek, which said: The Soviet Government, striving to achieve the closest possible economic relations between the Russian Republic and Persia, and taking various steps towards the creation of conditions facilitating the exchange of trade between the two countries, today gave orders to the border customs institutions to allow unhindered passage of goods from Persia to Russia and vice versa without demanding licence certificates ... and without levying licence taxes.46 The Soviet government had made a generous gesture, though not without an ulterior motive. Applying to Soviet-Iranian trade the 1903 customs tariffs, and not those of 1920 which were unfavourable to Soviet Russia, Iran succeeded, thanks to the unlicensed trade with its northern neighbour which compensated for some of the losses it had to bear through Russia's foreign trade monopoly. It was without doubt, a concession to Iran but, as mentioned in the note, with the hope that the trade agreement would be signed within the next few days'.47 Negotiations on a postal and telegraph convention were being conducted at the same time as the trade negotiations. The trade agreement was signed on 25 April 1923, the postal and telegraph convention on 27 April 1923. Thanks to the concerted efforts of Mostoufi ol-Mamalek and Reza Khan Moscow's popularity had risen sharply in Iran. Reza Khan's political character had by now emerged quite clearly. No great perspicacity was needed to realize that his aim was to grasp power and rule over the whole country, but he had not yet decided what kind of government and regime he preferred. In 1922-23 he was apparently attracted by the Kemalist way of Turkey and was in great awe of General Mustafa Kemal. Having complete control over the army and enjoying its unreserved help and support, Reza Khan became a defacto dictator. He made

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the army into the most privileged force in the country and the main guarantor of Iran's unity and independence, successfully quelling unrest in the country. The Soviet government, after thefiascoof the Gilan 'experiment', began to re-evaluate the basic parameters of its Iranian policy and concluded that the 'careful' course advocated by Chicherin was indeed best. Chicherin had repeatedly advised 'orientation to a strong central government' which, owing to Curzon's tough and uncompromising policy, was logically bound to become dependent on the Soviet Union and would almost certainly lead to a confrontation with London.48 With soviet patronage, Reza Khan successfully suppressed the nuclei of separatism and that of feudal opposition in northern Iran, but put off dealing with similar problems in the south until things became easier. He also crushed the semi-autonomous feudal khanates (principalities) of Talysh and Khalkhal and hanged their rulers, Hussein Ali Khan Talyshly and Emir Ashaer Khan Khalkhaly. Such activities were fully approved of by the Soviet government and its press. The short period of estrangement had long ago turned into flirtation and close harmony. The Soviet press referred to Reza Khan as the 'son of the people',49 while his enemies and the anti-Soviet Iranian press called him 'Moscow's agent'.50 Neither term was altogether correct. Reza Khan preferred, for the time being, to have a foot in both camps, thus ensuring the creation of a favourable international situation that would not oppose his policy of centralization in the north. Thanks to his flirtation with Moscow he was able to suppress separatist movements both of the right and the left, like the anti-government insurrection of Colonel Muhammad Tagi Khan in Khorassan province and that of Lakhuti Khan in Iranian Azerbaijan. Both movements were later referred to by Soviet authors as 'democratic and progressive'. Lakhutifledto the USSR and lived there until his death, enjoying some popularity as a Tadjik Soviet poet. At the end of 1923 Reza Khan was in full control of the north of the country and was 'honestly' paying the USSR for its services. Under his untiring supervision, the extent of Soviet-Iranian trade was constantly growing and British positions on the Iranian market and in Iranian policy were ceaselessly under attack. Over the period March 1922 to March 1923, the trade exchange between Iran and the Soviet Union had increased from 68 to 240 million kran, while Soviet trade with Iran increased form 8.6 to 25.4 per cent of the total

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trade figure.51 The Soviet weekly Vneshnyaya torgovlya (Foreign Trade) frankly admitted that the purpose of Soviet foreign trade policy in Iran lay in 'deflecting to the north the goods that were hitherto directed to the south'.52 As a result Britain's and British India's trade with Iran were continually declining and the prices for their goods were falling. For instance, on the khorassan market prices for British sugar fell by 18 per cent, for textiles by more than 11 per cent, for benzene by more than 17 per cent and for silicate by 5 per cent. London reacted clumsily by sending the note of 8 May 1923 which became known as 'Curzon's ultimatum'. In this note Curzon accused the Soviet Union of a policy of deliberate anti-British activity in the Middle East and India and demanded that Soviet ambassadors Shumyatsky in Iran and Raskolnikov in Afghanistan be recalled. The facts contained in the note were doubtlessly correct, but the tone and method used by Curzon to exert pressure on the Soviets were not only ineffective but were open to ridicule. Moscow reacted by immediately organizing a powerful protest movement in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. At the Comintern's command, Communist parties and other left-wing elements in the West started a vocal campaign in defence of the USSR, in which the British Labour Party considered that it 'would not look good' if it failed to participate.53 All this, of course, could have been foreseen. The British government should have taken a closer look at its own policy and re-evaluated it as far as Iran and Afghanistan were concerned. It should have understood the positive aspect of the changes occurring in those countries and could and should have taken constructive steps to limit Soviet influence there. Most of the influential political forces in Iran and Afghanistan would have warmly welcomed such a departure from the old British dogma and position. Thefirstthing Britain ought to have done was to have changed its attitude regarding the must urgent and difficult problem Iran was trying to solve then - that of achieving centralization of power. However, instead of understanding, Reza Khan only met opposition from the British which naturally served to increase his anglophobia and pushed him ever further into closer relations with the Soviet Union, even more than he himself would have thought reasonable and secure. But the situation was such that there was no other way since southern Iran, owing to British support in 1923, had

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become a serious obstacle to Reza Khan's efforts to bring about centralization. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was giving Reza Khan its unreserved support, its primary aims being to weaken the British position and finally to push Britain out of Iran; its secondary, to acquire the goodwill of Iranian public opinion so as to have the trade agreement signed. In 1923, under the aegis of Britain, the creation of a Federation of Southern Tribes, headed by Sheikh Khaz'al of Muhammara, began in the southern provinces of Iran. This included Arab, Lur, Lakhtiar, Kashkay and several other tribes from the provinces of Khuzistan, Fars, Luristan and Bakhtiaria.54 The Soviet press immediately started an intensive campaign against this federation, asserting that the plan for its creation was actually camouflaging the intention of 'severing' that strategically important and oil-rich area from Iran.55 Shumyatsky assured Reza Khan of his full support in scuttling the plan. The idea of a federation was, however, inevitably doomed to failure, a fact that was understood by both Moscow and London. London's duplicity in manipulating the formation of such a federation and its members did not enhance the prestige of British policy in Iran. The Soviet government, moreover, saw here a chance to exploit to the full this unsuccessful move in British diplomacy in order to further its own popularity which 'was growing in proportion to British unpopularity'.56 The Soviet press strenuously advertised Reza Khan as a 'fiery patriot' and a 'unifier of his country'. Moscow was prepared to side with anyone who would help it push Britain out of Iran and promote its own popularity. The Soviet press began, for instance, an intensive 'solidarity campaign' in favour of the Shia preacher Sheikh Khalessi from Nedjef, who had been exiled from Iraq for antiBritish propaganda. This rabid and obscurantist fanatic was described in the Soviet press as a 'progressive religious leader and fighter against British imperialism'. The newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya published Khalessi's appeal to the Iranian government urging it to create its own naval force in the Persian Gulf in order to limit Britain's freedom of action there. They also published his sermon given in the main mosque of Tehran in which he declared: If believing that Iran must rid itself of the influence of Britain - the enemy of Islam and fiend in human guise - is Bolshevism, then I am a Bolshevik— If it is Bolshevism to affirm that Iran must in every way stand up for its rights and defend itself against the interference of any foreign

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government, or that Britain must stop mischief-making and intrigues in Iranian cities and provinces among the tribes and nomads, in the center and on the borders, and leave the sorely tried people alone at last - then I am a Bolshevik.57 Moscow, however, did not react to Reza Khan's intrigues which resulted in the fall of the 'pro-Russian' government of Mostoufi olMamalek and the coming to power of Moshir ed-Dowleh (June 1923), who was very cool towards the Soviet Union and refused to sign the already negotiated and agreed upon trade agreement. The argument he used was that 'the problem of guarantee in respect of continuing free trade ... had not been satisfactorily solved'.58 The Soviet government was prepared to approve the new turn of events, provided it strengthened the position of its favourite, Reza Khan. Although Chicherin considered Mostoufi to be of greater stature than Reza Shah, whom he regarded as a reactionary, Stalin and the OGPU, were firmly behind Reza Khan. Reza Khan himself, being assured of the unreserved support of the 'powerful northern neighbour' and the just as influential Shi'ite circles in Iran, who had awarded him an honorary sword and the title of 'Defender of the Faith',59 was moving at full speed towards the realization of his dream, the post of Prime Minister. That dream was fulfilled on 19 October 1923. As a result of one of the frequently recurring crises, Moshir ed-Dowleh had to resign and Reza Khan was given the task of forming a new cabinet. With his advent to power, Soviet-Iranian relations received fresh impetus and were raised to a higher level, with a new aspect added to the traditionally accepted forms of co-operation. From then on, there was also military co-operation between the two countries. A treaty was immediately signed by which the Soviet Union agreed to supply the Iranian Army with military equipment, including communication installations, to the sum of over 400,000 gold roubles.60 Having become Prime Minister, Reza Khan also became defacto head of state. At the beginning of January 1924, he forced the Shah to leave for Europe and compelled the heir to the throne to sign an undertaking to stay out of state affairs. These events coincided with the establishment of a republican regime in Turkey. Making use of the goodwill of Iranian national-liberal circles towards Kemalism and cleverly playing on the Soviet's favourable attitude to the Turkish Republic (which was proclaimed on 29 October 1923), Reza Khan, with the help of his supporters in various sectors of

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Iranian society, succeeded in launching a campaign for the overthrow of Iran's monarchy and the proclamation of a republic. His first cabinet included such well-known republicans as Suleiman Mirza, Sure Israfil, Mossadeq es-Saltaneh and Zoka ol-Mulk. In Moscow, Reza Khan's republican tendencies were greeted with approval. The Soviet press emphasized the anti-monarchist views of the new Prime Minister and stressed his republican leanings. Within Iran, however, his plan met with strong and very determined opposition from influential groups, who had the backing of the Shi'ite clergy headed by Ayatollah Muddaris. On 19 March 1924, when the form of government and the regime came up for discussion in the Majlis, only 17 deputies declared themselves in favour of a republic. Reza Khan, making an abrupt volte face, declared that he had actually never contemplated a republic. When the vote of confidence in the government took place on 8 April 1924, he received 96 votes, with 10 against. In the subsequent reorganization of the cabinet, the most ardent republicans, Mossadeq es-Saltaneh and Suleiman Mirza, were ousted and Reza Khan co-opted into his cabinet the Bakhtiar leader Sardar Mirza. There followed almost immediately repression of the Iranian communists, the trade unions, the republicans and the separatists. Such repression of left-wing elements did not find favour in the Soviet Union, but because Reza Khan was also energetically furthering the signing of the Soviet-Iranian trade agreement, in the end Moscow was satisfied. The agreement was at last signed on 3 July 1924. In a cable sent on 4 July, Chicherin stressed not only the importance of the agreement for the 'economic development and progress of Persia', but also pointed out the 'achievements of Persian statehood' which had taken place under Reza Khan's government.61 From this cable Reza Khan concluded that it was not his attitude to the left-wing forces of Iran but his centralizing activities that had decided the Soviet Union's attitude to him. He was now therefore able to throw all his forces against the south, without having to worry about the north. In the autumn of 1924, he launched an attack against the southern separatists and on 6 December of that year he accepted the surrender of Sheikh Khaz'al. As might have been expected, Britain did nothing practical to support the south.62 This can be explained not so much by military considerations as by the new policy of 'changes in

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orientation' (smena vekh) with respect to Iran. Sir Percy Loraine, the initiator of these changes, aptly defended them as a 'policy of benevolent inaction' and as a 'last choice'.63 The Soviet authorities viewed this new course of British policy towards Iran with undisguised misgiving. Chicherin, a perspicacious statesman, understood that Iran's influential circles remained pro-Western, and that whatever anti-British feeling still existed was due exclusively to Lord Curzon's inflexible policy.64 In a letter to the new Soviet ambassador in Tehran, K.K. Yurenev (Krotovsky), Chicherin pointed out: In Persia one has nowadays to deal with that intensification of British activity which altogether characterizes the present British-Soviet relations. That general phenomenon acquires in Persia a specific character due to the new course recently adopted by Loraine with Chamberlain's approval.65 According to Chicherin, this approach consisted of 'persuading some circles in Persian society to side with Britain' and helping Iran to overcome the recent pro-Soviet bias in foreign policy.66 It was fairly obvious that the change in British policy was seen in Tehran with satisfaction. The newspaper Kushesh clearly hinted that should Britain decide to display goodwill it could create out of Iran and Afghanistan a 'dam' to separate India from the Soviet Union and, at the same time, help Iran and Afghanistan avoid the danger of Bolshevism.67 Owing to these changes in British policy towards Iran, the Iranian press began, for the first time since the Russian Revolution of October 1917, to show a more objective evaluation of Soviet foreign policy. In the first half of 1925, the newspapers Iran, Tadjeddad and Setareye Iran openly accused the Soviet Union of pursuing imperialist aims in the East.68 Setareye Iran went as far as to say that Moscow had taken over and continued the pursuit of aims and the methods employed by Tsarist Russia: 'Basically Russia has not changed at all, and the present rulers in the north are carrying on the same policy as that practised by Izvolsky and Sazonov They want to attract the people of Asia so as to pave their way to the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and India.'69 (Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky (1856-1919) was Russian Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1906-10, and Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov (1860-1927) held the same post from 1910-16.) London, meanwhile, was still dubious about and could not completely accept the changes that were taking place in the Middle East. Through its

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hesitancy Britain missed the opportunity to restore its undermined authority by supporting the process of Iranian-Turkish-Afghan rapprochement that was already in the offing. Thus, it was not Britain but the Soviet Union which made good use of anti-imperialist propaganda and brought about the desired rapprochement by means of bilateral neutrality and initiating friendship treaties. The doctrine of 'benevolent laissez-faire' adopted by London was the reason for Britain's uncertain position regarding the regime change in Tehran. Moscow, however, left no doubt in Reza Khan's mind that it was giving full support to his struggle for the throne. On 20 October 1925, TASS published a declaration that, despite assertions in the Western press that the Soviet Union was giving its support to Ahmad Shah, the Soviet government 'is continuing its policy of strict non-interference in Persian internal affairs, and has friendly relations with Persia's national government headed by Prime Minister Reza Khan'.70 London, however, still continued to vacillate and avoided giving answers to questions put by the representatives of Reza Khan who wanted to know what would Britain's attitude be to a change of dynasty in Iran. One of the reasons for the indecision was that, while Sir Percy Loraine held a positive opinion of Reza Khan's attitude to Britain, he was not certain that, having ascended the throne, the new Shah would continue the process of dismantling the anti-British strategy.71 It was only on 28 October 1925, after repeated and insistent questions from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that Sir Percy Loraine handed to the minister, Mirza Hassan Khan Moshar, a personal missive from Chamberlain. It said that Britain 'did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of another friendly State'72 thus clearing the way to the throne for Reza Khan. On 31 October 1925, the Majlis adopted a decision to depose the Qajar dynasty and to entrust temporary government of the country to Reza Khan. A final decision as to the form of future government was to be taken by the Constituent Assembly, due to begin its deliberations on 12 December 1925. During the intervening six weeks the British press was full of praise for Reza Khan's activities, stressing his singlemindedness, willpower and strength of character. On 12 December 1925, the Constituent Assembly made Reza Khan the hereditary Shah of Iran. The new dynasty took the ancient name of Pahlavi. Such friendly relations between Tehran and London were not to

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Moscow's liking. The Soviet embassy brought hitherto unprecedented pressure to bear on Reza Shah and forced him to dismiss Mirza Hassan Khan Moshar who was known for his cool and reserved attitude towards the Soviet Union and for 'his friendliness and common sense towards Britain'.73 In addition, the Soviet Ambassador, Yurenev, demanded, in a rather truculent manner, an answer to his question as to whether the new Shah intended to do something about the treaty on neutrality and guarantee which had been shelved for such a long time. Reza Shah showed no great desire to tie himself to the Soviet Union, but was forced to bow to pressure and declared, on 14 January 1926, that he was ready to begin negotiations on the basis of the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 17 December 1925,74 which obliged the parties to refrain from aggression and maintain neutrality should one party to the treaty be attacked. Simultaneously, Reza Shah, fearing a 'strong Russian reaction',75 was obliged to put off indefinitely the resolution of a number of problems pertaining to British-Iranian relations: recognition of Iraq, granting British Imperial Airways the right to fly over Iranian territory and so on. This was bound to puzzle the British, but Reza Shah hastened to dispel their suspicions. Sir Percy Loraine had several meetings with the Shah in January 1926, after which he sent a telegram to Chamberlain saying: The Shah says that for reasons of state and because Persia has somehow got to live with Russia, he and his government would have to toy with them, yielding as little as possible to Russian pressure and leaving the nation, through its parliament, free to decide where limits of national security and essential interest lie.76 The following day in another telegram to London, Sir Percy Loraine analysed Soviet policy as follows: Moscow's policy here is rank imperialism: they are acting as Russians not as Bolsheviks and their primary object is to make trouble for us and between us and Persia. For that purpose they are reverting to the time honoured method of bullying the Persian government Now that Russia has begun this bullying I am certain that the right thing is to show Persia that our sympathy and moral support are with her.77 In the light of these statements, one has to agree with the French chargé d'affaires in Tehran, Wildren, who, in analysing the first steps of Reza Shah as head of state, came to the conclusion that he 'embodies a political tendency hostile to Bolshevism'.78

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Although forced to manoeuvre, Reza Shah had not always acceded to Soviet demands despite threats and pressure, so that many problems of great interest to Moscow remained unsolved when he ascended the throne. One of them was the neutrality and guarantee pact, another the agreement on fishing in the Caspian Sea. An analysis of the atmosphere that prevailed in Soviet-Iranian relations over the period 1921-25 shows that the decisive element was the fear Iran felt for its northern neighbour, which had already demonstrated its readiness to use brute force to achieve its own purposes. That constant fear must be taken into consideration when reading the declaration Reza Shah made to Yurenev in February 1926: Soviet-Iranian friendship has many enemies who are trying to disrupt it by creating endless obstacles in all matters and problems which are mutually solved between friendly states— It can be said that almost all European Powers are presently striving to block Soviet-Iranian friendship. Iran's interest however consists precisely in strengthening that friendship.79

4 PYRRHIC VICTORY: THE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE GUARANTEE AND NEUTRALITY PACT, 1925-28

In the mid-1920s, the Soviet Union opened a new diplomatic offensive against its southern neighbours. During thefiveyears that had elapsed since the treaties with Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey were signed, the international position of the USSR had been strengthened in the West (the 'period of recognition') and in the East (normalization of relations with China and Japan). From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, the time was ripe for better relations between the USSR and its neighbours, relations that would be bound by undertakings not to participate in any coalition against the Soviet Union. The most likely participants in such agreements were Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey, who were already involved in similar obligations. Moreover, none of these countries had any serious political or territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. Their anti-imperialist, or rather anti-Western, attitude drew them, to a certain extent, closer to Moscow, who constantly fomented their fear of Great Britain and the 'Imperialist West'. The disputes and discord that did exist among these southern neighbours of the USSR were mainly centred on territorial matters, and that encouraged them to look for an arbiter. Since at that time Britain's prestige and authority was considerably diminished in the Middle East, they felt the Soviet Union was better suited for this role. Also, the Soviet leadership lived in perpetual fear of antiSoviet coalitions, constantly dreading some new intervention, so it was of vital importance to them to create a system of guarantee pacts that would encompass, if possible, all their neighbours.

Trade Agreement and Guarantee and Neutrality Pact, 1925-28 It is interesting to note that Turkey was the country which originally showed initiative in the matter of concluding pacts among the Soviet Union and its three southern neighbours. The Turkish ambassador in Tehran, Mamduh Shevket Bey, informed the Iranian government in the summer of 1925, that his government considered it desirable that guarantee pacts be signed simultaneously between the USSR and Turkey, between the USSR and Iran, and between Turkey and Iran. They were to guarantee nonaggression among the three neighbours and the mutual respect of government-recognized frontiers. Reza Shah's reply was encouraging, but he asked for time to find out what Britain's reaction would be and to forestall any aggressive action that might follow in the Persian Gulf.1 Behind Turkey stood Moscow. This was confirmed by the fact that Ankara2 did not take part in any activity at this time and all problems concerning negotiations over Soviet-Iranian and Turkish-Iranian pacts were handled by Soviet diplomats. In January 1926, a few weeks before his coronation, Reza Shah was told by Yurenev in no uncertain terms that it was time to begin negotiations on the guarantee and neutrality pact and the trade agreement. The Shah, however, would have preferred not to acquire any obligations towards the Soviets, especially in consideration of previous experiences when talks on the same subject between Moscow and Kabul had forced him to yield to Soviet pressure. But, in the disputes between Iran, on the one hand, and Turkey and Afghanistan, on the other, regarding territorial problems, the Shah feared that Moscow, having concluded guarantee pacts with Turkey and Afghanistan, would give its support to them to the detriment of Iran. Therefore, in his interview with Yurenev on 24 January 1926, the Shah showed agreement for a Soviet-Iranian neutrality and guarantee pact. However, it was not until late August that Court Minister Teymurtash went to Moscow with a 'personal and secret mission from the Shah'. Moreover, he was not given the authority to sign any documents, and the purpose of his mission was kept so secret that no Iranian minister was informed of it. The Moscow meetings were restricted to a very small circle, but with the Turkish ambassador also participating. Harold Nicolson, the British chargé d'affaires, concluded that the subject matter of the meetings must be a tripartite Iranian-Turkish-Soviet pact.3

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The Soviet-Iranian talks were concluded by the beginning of November 1926. Mutually agreed texts dealing with the pact on guarantee and neutrality and the trade agreement, were finally worked out. The trade agreement took the form of an exchange of notes. On 24 August Teymurtash had a lengthy conversation with Jean Herbette, the French ambassador in Moscow, during which he gave a very full evaluation of Soviet-Iranian relations. He stressed that Soviet-Iranian trade was the decisive factor in the entire complex of those relations, and admitted that Moscow had reason to be dissatisfied with its trade balance with Iran.4 Teymurtash also pointed out that Moscow must understand that Iranian importers could not find in Russia machines or other kinds of goods needed in Iran. He also spoke of how Tehran was concerned about the reforms introduced in the Soviet republics of Central Asia. Herbette came to the conclusion that Teymurtash had misgivings about the attraction of Soviet theories, which were strong influences in the Iranian provinces bordering the Soviet Central Asian republics. Herbette wrote in his report: 'What he meant was that the agrarian reforms introduced by the Soviets in the Asian republics are the reason for the Persian government's concern and apprehension.' Returning to the subject four weeks later, he wrote again that 'agrarian reform in Central Asia is merely a show put on for the benefit of the outside observer. A performance intended to upset Persia and to incite the peasantry, since the slogan "Land for the peasants" is very infectious.'5 At the beginning of November the neutrality and guarantee pact and the trade agreement as approved by both sides were dispatched to Tehran, and Teymurtash informed the Soviet negotiators that he would be given the authority to sign when they were returned. In the meantime, making good use of the interim period, he decided to go to Europe 'on personal business'.6 While the Iranian government was in no hurry to approve the texts formulated in Moscow, and played for time, Reza Shah feared that signing a guarantee pact with the USSR would infringe on the basic principle of Iranian foreign policy and remove any possibility of keeping a balance between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. This would explain the 'secret' and 'personal' character of Teymurtash's mission, for it encouraged Iranian officials in Tehran and diplomats in London to assert light-heartedly that Teymurtash's

Trade Agreement and Guarantee and Neutrality Pact, 1925-28 mission could not be considered political since it was 'purely commercial'. This is what the Iranian ambassador in Moscow told his British colleague.7 The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Kholi Khan Ansari, went as far as giving an official assurance to Harold Nicolson that 'Teymurtash would not sign the agreement he had worked out with Chicherin'. To corroborate this Ansari quoted 'persons in very high places'.8 Later, in conversation with Sir Robert Clive, the British ambassador in Tehran, Reza Shah expressed the hope that Teymurtash's mission to Moscow 'would not be misunderstood in London'.9 Reza Shah's policy of shelving the problems that were worrying Moscow forced the Soviets to take 'measures' in response. The Shah's worst apprehensions were soon realized. Revolts by nationals and various tribes flared up one after another along Iran's borders with the Soviet Union. It was obvious that Soviet agents in the area were instigating them.10 The situation become so tense that an official protest by the Soviet embassy in London, on the instructions of Rotstein, a member of the board of the Narkomindel, was insufficient. Chicherin had to take a hand and personally denied the validity of publications from the Iranian and European press which accused the Soviets of involvement in Iranian affairs and of being responsible for the unrest along the border areas. While Chicherin was in Berlin (6 December 1926) he made a declaration to the press accusing Great Britain of causing the disturbances in northern Iran and ascribing the unrest there to the intrigues of the British embassy in Tehran, whose local agents were at work in Iran. 'The British press and British agents', he said, 'have been trying to dump mounds of slander on us, and have been instilling the Persian Government with the idea that the Soviet Union is behind all the tribal protest.'11 There was some truth in the declaration that the invasion of Soviet troops into Iran in May 1920 occurred without the knowledge of the Soviet government. To those with an elementary knowledge of Iranian affairs such accusations were nothing short of ridiculous as it was common knowledge that the Iranian northern provinces were the playground only of Soviet spies. The British, as was well known, had never had any influence there.12 Although Reza Shah viewed the events in the north seriously and knew who was inspiring them, he considered it inadvisable to surrender to Soviet pressure too easily. Teymurtash was ordered to return to Tehran. Trying to delay the signature of the documents,

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he suggested that the negotiations be transferred to Tehran. Ansari told Yurenev quite frankly that Iran had promised London not to sign any documents in Moscow.13 Such a promise was not unusual and there was nothing deceitful about it. Still Moscow declared itself 'extremely sorry'. The Soviets understood that negotiations conducted in Moscow were handicapped by the difficulty the Iranian delegation had in communicating with its government. But it did provide the Soviets with the right conditions for putting pressure on the Iranian delegation. There could be no doubt as to what constituted pressure, be it political or psychological, but it was not by chance that Teymurtash had come to Moscow without the authority to sign the agreements. There can be no other explanation for this situation since Teymurtash was at that time the second most influential man in Iran and wielded considerable power.14 Moscow's reply to the suggestion of transferring the negotiations to Tehran was: The Government of the Soviet Union considers the negotiations terminated and therefore sees no need for starting a fresh round of negotiations in Tehran. At the same time the Soviet Union expresses its agreement to sign in Tehran the texts that were prepared in Moscow, but without any further discussions. Should the Government of Persia wish for further discussions of the texts, the Government of the Soviet Union is prepared to do that, and to sign the agreement in Moscow.15 The stubborn Soviet refusal to continue negotiations in Tehran was giving the Iranian government food for thought, especially since Moscow had admitted that the Iranian government was right in considering that the documents worked out in Moscow needed to be discussed at greater length. Reza Shah was obliged to agree to the suggested compromise, and negotiations were resumed in Moscow in March 1927. Had Reza Shah been absolutely certain of London's effective support, he might have been more resolute and stubborn in his dealings with Moscow, unwilling as he was to commit himself to the Soviet-Iranian treaty of neutrality and guarantee. The British government was making him nervous with its demands not to sign the documents in Moscow without, however, promising support.16 The Shah's hopes for British backing were somewhat revived when Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations broke down in May 1927. In the Majlis, voices began to be heard advocating the slowing down of

Trade Agreement and Guarantee and Neutrality Pact, 1925-28 Soviet-Iranian negotiations as well as the introduction of changes into paragraphs favouring Iran, thus diminishing its obligations to the Soviet Union. Speeches to this effect were made by deputies Vossuq ed-Dowleh, Mossadeq es-Saltaneh and Shirvani. By now it was clear to the Shah that London was not prepared to go very far in its support of Iran, and that the change of government in Tehran (which was to a great extent a consequence of the AngloSoviet break) was not producing any decisive results. The new Prime Minister, Mehdi Kholi Khan Hedayat, declared on 7 June 1927 that his government's main task was to bring order to SovietIranian relations.17 The new cabinet, however, had the same Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ansari, who was against the neutrality and guarantee pact,18 and therefore the policy of drawing out negotiations was continued. Understanding that it would be difficult to have the neutrality pact revised, the Iranian government decided to concentrate its efforts on the trade agreement, since the political agreement could not be signed without it. However, in March 1927, while speaking of the difficulties of Soviet-Iranian economic relations, Ansari told the correspondent of the newspaper Kushesh that the main obstacle was the Soviet refusal to pay for Iranian goods in hard currency, of which Iran was in dire need. He also said that a net-balance system and a Soviet foreign trade monopoly were incompatible with the principles of free trade as practised in the rest of the world.19 The struggle for the revision of the trade agreement with the USSR was begun by Iranian merchants, who in February 1927 formed the Society for Economic Action whose aim was to prevent the signing of a trade agreement with the Soviet Union and to boycott Soviet goods and trade organizations in Iran. Moscow was concerned about the announcement that at a meeting of the representatives of Tehran merchants a resolution was adopted containing a demand that the government should not sign the trade agreement with the USSR, as it was contrary to Iran's interests. The Soviet embassy in Tehran then began to receive information regarding a boycott of Soviet goods which had begun in many cities in Iran.20 This was the response to assertions in the Soviet press that the strengthening of sovereignty and the revitalization of the economy of Iran were unthinkable without an orientation towards the Soviet Union in the political and economic spheres. On 7 March 1927, a note was sent from Yurenev to the Iranian

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Foreign Minister, Ansari, stating that the negative attitude of Iranian commercial organizations to the Soviet-Iranian trade agreement was anti-Soviet. Yurenev also openly accused the Iranian government of permissiveness in the face of such activities. He demanded that the government take 'urgent and energetic steps to protect the interests of Soviet merchants and trading establishments'. The Soviet ambassador also pointed out that the 'activities taking place in Persia are directed at undermining trade relations between the USSR and Persia, relations based on a community of interests as expressed in the friendship treaty of 1921'. Such activities, he said, contradicted this treaty.21 Wrapped up in all these forceful declarations, the reference to the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 sounded like a threat, especially since it also included an assertion that the attitude of Iranian business circles was a result of foreign pressure.22 The Iranian government felt obliged to react. On 17 March 1927, the Prime Minister issued a declaration saying that the difficulties that had arisen in connection with Soviet-Iranian trade relations were having a destructive influence on the economic situation in northern Iran. The declaration contained an appeal to businessmen to show restraint and to refrain from doing anything rash.23 Not all members of the Iranian cabinet, however, were in agreement with this attitude, which they saw as a readiness to capitulate. Ansari took the opposite view, which he expressed in an interview given to Kushesh, declaring that stagnation in Soviet-Iranian economic relations was far less damaging to the Iranian economy than had been depicted by the Prime Minister, and that Iran could easily find other markets for its produce even more profitable and promising than the Soviet Union.24 All the members of the cabinet openly sympathized with the attitude of the merchants, realizing that trade and business circles were only protecting their own interests without being influenced by foreign dictates. The Soviet Union, however, continued to describe this negative attitude as a result of 'intrigues of the world imperialist forces'. Moscow asserted, against all logical and obvious facts, that 'imperialists' were out to sabotage the 'mutually profitable' co-operation of Iran with the Soviet Union.25 Soviet pressure obtained the desired result, for towards the summer of 1927 the boycott of Soviet goods in the Iranian market gradually began to weaken. The Soviet-Iranian negotiations for the

Trade Agreement and Guarantee and Neutrality Pact, 1925-28 conclusion of a trade agreement were by now at the final stage. The Soviets, taking into consideration the attitude of Iranian business circles, decided to make some concessions, which also helped to end the boycott. The Soviet side had to agree to 10 per cent hard currency being included in its payment for Iranian goods and to raising the quota of Iranian exports to the USSR from 35 to 50 million roubles.26 At the same time, negotiations on the neutrality and guarantee pact continued. The Soviet delegation (Chicherin, Karakhan and Rotstein) unexpectedly raised the question of 'activities on Persian territory of various White Russian groups supported by imperialist circles'.27 In reality, only a few of the many refugees and émigrés who had fled Russia were involved in anti-Soviet activities; the majority of them were simply victims of the Bolshevik revolution and the Russian civil war. The Iranian government helped them as far as it could: they were permitted to set up a 'Committee for Assistance to Russian Refugees in Persia', and many former Russian subjects were employed in Iranian private enterprises and government offices. Of course, those émigrés who were involved in political activities did not hide their anti-Soviet attitude, yet those activities presented no serious danger to the Soviet Union and did not contravene Iranian legislation, which Rotstein, in his note of 12 December 1921, acknowledged. In no way could they be compared to the vast range of subversive activities of the Iranian communists and other left-wingers residing in the Soviet Union as representatives of the Iranian Communist Party and the Iranian trade unions within the Comintern, Profintern and other such organizations. While the Soviet government refused to see this as an infringement of the 1921 Treaty, it insisted that the existence of the Committee for Assistance to Russian Refugees in Persia was a 'blatant' infringement of the treaty and demanded its disbandment.28 This was done at the end of July 1927, and Russian émigrés were obliged to sign an undertaking promising to refrain from political activities.29 After protracted negotiation a decision was taken to create frontier commissars who would act to prevent border disputes, problems and incidents. Iran and the Soviet Union exchanged notes to that effect on 14 August 1927.^ An urgent meeting of the Iranian government, which took place at the end of September 1927, resulted in a decision to sign the trade agreement with the Soviet Union and also the agreement on

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neutrality and guarantee.31 The trade agreement included Iran's acknowledgement of the Soviet Trade Representation in Tehran as part of the Soviet embassy. Similar privileges would also be granted to the Iranian side should the Iranian government wish to open a Trade Representation in Moscow. The Soviet Trade representation in Iran would, however, be subject to Iranian laws.32 Simultaneously, a decision was taken to sign a customs covention establishing new and higher tariffs for Soviet goods imported into Iran. The Soviet government also expressed its approval of the idea to create an autonomous customs regime in Iran, which had been discussed in Iranian political and business circles. The Iranian government decided to sign yet another agreement to create a Soviet-Iranian company for the exploitation of fishing in the southern (Iranian) part of the Caspian Sea, and one more permitting the Soviet Union to lease for a period of 25 years stores, piers, landings and other facilities in the port of Pehlevi (formerly Enzeli),33 which until 1917 had belonged to Russia and which Lenin had ceremoniously relinquished to the Iranian people. All the above documents were signed on 1 October 1927. On the same day, the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Neutrality and Guarantee was signed; its terms were to operate for a period of three years and the signatories declared that neither had any contradictory international obligations.34 The Soviet Union had every reason to consider this series of agreements as a diplomatic victory. During the six years which had elapsed since the signing of the first SovietIranian treaty, Soviet diplomacy had never ceased to exercise pressure on Iran in its efforts to dominate and legalize its penetration of the Iranian market by foisting on Iran its own conditions following from the Soviet doctrine of foreign trade monopoly. This had been achieved, despite Moscow having agreed to a number of concessions. The same applied to the neutrality and guarantee treaty in so far as it elaborated and ratified the principles of the 1921 Treaty, to which the Soviet government attached great importance. Careful and far-sighted politicians in Tehran understood all this. No declarations or mutual congratulations on the occasion of the signing of these agreements, and no apologetic articles appearing in some pro-Soviet papers such as Tufan, could drown the sober voices of such prominent statesmen as Mossadeq, Tagi Zadeh and Vossuq ed-Dowleh. They claimed that the agreements signed between Iran and the Soviet Union on 1 October were incompatible with Iranian

Trade Agreement and Guarantee and Neutrality Pact, 1925-28 interests, and insisted that they be discussed in the Majlis in greater detail, the purpose being to obtain a delay in their ratification.35 The government, however, having secured a majority in the Majlis, insisted on speedy ratification which was indeed achieved, on 23 October 1927. Yet, its opponents were justified in saying that the treaty of neutrality and guarantee deprived Iran of all freedom of action not only in the Middle East but also in world affairs. This was confirmed by a declaration made by the new Soviet ambassador, Ya. Kh. Davtyan (appointed to Tehran in September 1927), to Ali Goli Khan Ansari soon after the signing. The Soviet Union, he said, did not object to Iran developing good relations with other countries, including Great Britain; 'we only want one thing, that these relations should not be directed against us'.36 Of course, the Soviet Union claimed the right to decide whether, and to what extent relations between Iran and any third party were directed against it. Bearing in mind paragraph 6 of the 1921 Treaty, the outlook for Iran was indeed gloomy, and it was precisely against this situation that Mossadeq and some of his colleagues had warned their government. The signing of the neutrality and guarantee treaty resulted in the inclusion of Iran in a system of similar pacts, intended to tie together the three southern neighbours of the Soviet Union (Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan) and at the same time link each of them with the Soviet Union. The creation of such a system of pacts was a step towards a quadripartite military bloc, created under the aegis of the Soviet Union and directed against Great Britain.37 However, these individual agreements were by no means foolproof. For example, at this time Iran was already allied to Turkey by the friendship and security treaty of 22 April 1926, achieved with the active mediation of the Soviet Union. The ineffectiveness of this treaty was repeatedly demonstrated by constant, almost monthly, incidents along the Iranian-Turkish border. A conflict that erupted in the summer of 1927 was particularly serious and prolonged, and had still not been settled by January of the following year. The Turkish ambassador in Tehran, Mamduh Shevket Bey, was recalled to Ankara for consultations. Turkey then threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Iran. In spite of efforts made by both sides, including Turkish President Mustafa Kemal, to reduce the tension, mutual suspicion was not eradicated - Turkey continued to suspect Iran of inciting Iranian Kurds to attack Turkish

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territory, and Iran to suspect Turkey of trying to move the border further east. A declaration by Karakhan, then Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the TASS correspondent soon after the neutrality and guarantee treaty was signed, however, gave a clear indication that the Soviet Union favoured a system of pacts. He said that the Soviet Union was continuing the 'policy of pacts so happily begun in December 1925 with the Soviet-Turkish pact, which became a model for the Eastern States'.38 By 28 November 1927 the efforts of Soviet diplomacy to mediate in a rapprochement between Iran and Afghanistan were crowned with success, and Kabul signed the Afghan-Iranian friendship and security treaty which was similar to the Iranian-Turkish treaty of 1926. The signatories undertook to refrain from aggression against one another, remain neutral in case of aggression by any third party on one of the signatories and to be on guard against infringements of their neutrality. Six months had barely elapsed, however, before it became clear that the entire Soviet policy of pacts was built on shaky foundations. An Afghan-Turkish treaty on political and economic co-operation was signed (25 May 1928) as a result of Moscow's mediation. Iran, having previously signed friendship and non-aggression treaties with Turkey and Afghanistan, suddenly decided that the AfghanTurkish treaty contained a threat to its own territorial integrity.39 Indeed, some nuances in the Turkish-Afghan treaty might have given the Shah reason to suspect that Ankara and Kabul were supporting each other's territorial claims against Iran: the Turkish claim to a part of Iranian Kurdistan (Turkey was dissatisfied with the border with Iran set, through Anglo-Russian mediation, largely by the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 and the Protocol of 1880, and several armed conflicts had occurred) and the Afghan claim to Iranian Baluchistan (with the purpose of obtaining a passage to the Indian Ocean). Teymurtash had frankly stated in conversation with Davtyan that the Turkish-Afghan treaty 'confirmed the suspicious of the Persian government that the Soviet Union could drop Persia any moment in favour of Turkish ambitions. Should that happen, he [Teymurtash] said, Persia would have no other alternative than to seek British support.'40 The Iranian government's suspicions threatened to destroy the entire system of pacts created so laboriously in the Middle East by

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Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet Foreign Office (Narkomindel) started trying feverishly to save the policy of pacts. On 1 June 1928, Chicherin cabled Davtyan ordering him to spare no effort in trying to dispel the doubts and suspicions of the Shah and Teymurtash: T h e anxiety of Teymurtash is unfounded', he wrote, 'the rapprochement of the Eastern nations strengthens them against Great Britain.'41 While Chicherin continued talking about what he called British pressure, Reza Shah was anxiously eyeing the north. According to his words, 'danger is threatening Persia from the north'. 42 The Kremlin was disappointed by the Shah's obvious mistrust, and decided to embark on a psychological attack. On 2 June 1928, Karakhan ordered Davtyan to 'make Teymurtash see that the purpose of his démarche was understood in Moscow'. He continued: It is hard to understand whether the greater part of his 'declaration' is hysteria or blackmail. It looks as if the Persians are spreading panic deliberately, so as to make us believe that the situation is hopeless and thus to justify their agreement with Great Britain.43 Neither Moscow's efforts nor anger had any success. On 15 August 1928, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Tehran, M.A. Loganovsky, informed the Narkomindel that the Iranian Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pakrevan, had asserted that the King of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, speaking in the Djirga (the Afghan parliament) had attacked the Iranian government.44 Thus a new conflict began, for which the Soviet ambassador in Kabul, Leonid Stark, blamed his Iranian colleague, Farroh Khan, who was known for his pro-Western sympathies. Stark was affirming in dispatches that Farroh Khan was intentionally misinforming his own government. Moscow again intervened to try to defuse the tension but without success. Farroh Khan was recalled from Kabul, leaving the Second Secretary to act in his place until summer 1929.45 The real cause of the Iranian-Afghan dispute was not Farroh Khan. It had much deeper roots. King Amanullah had been guilty of an unfriendly gesture towards Iran by meeting in Kandahar the Iranian separatist Dost Muhammad, who had recently been removed by Reza Shah from his post as governor of the province of Iranian Baluchistan. Reza Shah, in turn, was avoiding setting up the corps of frontier commissars stipulated in the Afghan-Iranian treaty on political and economic co-operation (25 June 1928), and

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was turning a blind eye to infringements on the Afghan-Iranian border by anti-government Afghan elements who had found asylum in British Baluchistan.46 Iran continued to view the Soviet Union with distrust and suspicion and had constantly objected to its partnership in the secret Persian-Afghan-Turkish agreement signed in May 1928, opposing Afghan and Turkish pressure to include the Soviet Union as a partner. This agreement contained obligations concerning the 'mutual political co-operation of three Governments in the Middle East, sharing information, mutual agreement on treaties with other countries and co-ordination of any concerted political action'. Owing to Iran's opposition to Soviet participation, Moscow was not informed of the agreement until November 1928.47 However, the Soviet Union had no intention of joining any agreement that would limit its freedom in the international arena or put it under any obligation to share its political plans and secrets with three notably unreliable partners. Iran, which was not keen on that prospect either, was not worried when 'due to a number of reasons' the Soviet Union did not enter this agreement.48 Iran's objections regarding the Soviet Union and the tripartite secret agreement can be explained by the following: first, Iran, unlike Turkey and Afghanistan, enjoyed greater freedom of action in international affairs owing to a less forceful anti-Western policy; and second, Iran's situation was more complicated than that of Turkey and Afghanistan since Iran felt Soviet pressure more strongly because the Soviet Union had at its disposal the powerful force of the Iranian Communist Party. In Turkey, the Communist Party had been destroyed by the authorities in 1920 and had never recovered from that decisive blow, while in Afghanistan, Communist activity and propaganda were excluded merely because of the economic and political backwardness there. Moreover, the Iranian Communist Party was a fairly active member of the Comintern. In September 1927 in Urmiya (Rezayeh), the second congress of the Iranian Communist Party took place. It adopted a resolution to overthrow the monarchy and install an independent revolutionary federal republic.49 The Iranian trade unions were very active and were controlled by the communists. Their activities took particularly extremist forms in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's area, where they had set up the Union of South Iranian Oil Workers, and

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in Tehran. Local organizations of the Iranian Communist Party and the trade unions operated in close contact with Soviet agents. Thus, mistrust of the USSR grew in Iran from day to day, as N. Palgunov, TASS correspondent in Tehran (later head of TASS), reported both frankly and in detail.51 As strong as the traditional feelings of mistrust towards Britain were, the Shah understood that it was not Britain, but the Soviet Union which threatened the independence of Iran and the stability of his regime, while the economic life of his country naturally gravitated towards the free economy of the West. The Shah greatly feared the subversive activity of the Soviet secret service in Iran: 'the main purpose of Persia's foreign policy', he said, 'is to be free from the danger threatening it from the north; the next task is to oppose any kind of pressure that could come from that direction'.52 The strengthening of mistrust with respect to the USSR in Iran took place in the light of improving British-Iranian relations. This, to a certain degree, was made possible by a new course in Britain's policy towards Iran. One of the proofs of improved British-Iranian relations was Tehran's agreement to permit part of British Imperial Airways London-Cairo-Karachi air route (then at the planning stage) to pass over Iranian territory. The British government had been trying to achieve this since 1925, but Reza Khan had until then been forced by increased internal pressures to refrain from any British-Iranian rapprochement or agreement. These pressure groups had, over the past three years, received the backing of the Soviet embassy in Tehran, as was confirmed when their arguments were later repeated word for word by Soviet representatives in Iran and by Moscow, when opposition to the agreement came out into the open. The newspaper Tufan, whose editor, the poet Farroukhi Yazdi, was known for his pro-Soviet leanings, wrote a leading article (15 May 1927) saying that giving British planes the right to fly over Iranian territory would lead to British strategic control over western and southern Iran. Owing to this well-organized campaign in the press and other spheres, Britain and Iran were only able to reach an agreement to begin talks on the essence of the problem in February 1928. Both the Narkomindel and the Soviet embassy intervened openly. On 12 May 1928, a meeting took place between Davtyan and the Iranian Prime Minister Hedayat. According to Davtyan's report, Hedayat was opposed to a rapprochement between Iran and Great Britain

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and was strenuously intriguing against it. Davtyan tried to convince Hedayat that the concessions to which Iran was agreeing were bound to have serious consequences, and would encourage the British to make further claims and demands. There can be no doubt that Great Britain will now begin intriguing for the solution of other problems as well.' Davtyan also said in his report to the Narkomindel that Hedayat 'agreed with all those arguments but tried to convince me that afirmerpolicy with Great Britain was at that time impossible'. Thus, concluded Davtyan, 'Persia's zig-zagging policy had won'.53 On 20 May 1928, Chicherin called Nurzadeh, the Iranian chargé d'affaires in Moscow, to his office and warned him that, in the Soviet government's opinion, 'in the case of war that innocuous postal airline would immediately lead to British occupation of southern Persia by the British Air Force, starting out from British military airfields'. Chicherin expressed the Soviet government's desire that the Iranian should find a way of avoiding further negotiations with British Imperial Airways.54 On 23 May, Davtyan succeeded in obtaining an audience with Reza Shah, to whom he reiterated his government's arguments against giving Great Britain the right toflyover Iranian territory. 'I was very frank with the Shah', he wrote in his report, 'yet at the same time tried not to offend his sensibilities.' Reza Shah, in turn, was just as 'frank' and repeated what his Prime Minister had previously said, adding that he saw no possibility of eventually avoiding the need to make concessions to Great Britain because 'until now the British are masters in Persia'. Davtyan argued that the 'British wanted to reinforce even further their military and strategic position in Persia and would, no doubt, make use of this for attacking us'. To that Reza Shah replied: 'In such a case, Persian soldiers will be fighting together with Soviet soldiers.'55 It was obvious that the Soviet government was deliberately twisting both the meaning and the purpose of the Anglo-Iranian agreement on air communications. The Soviet Union was well aware that under no circumstances would the British be able to use their right toflycivilian planes over Iranian territory if such planes constituted a threat to the USSR. The final text of the agreement, which was signed on 8 December 1928, gave landing rights to British planes at the airports of Bushir, Djask and Lingueh for a period of three years. The area involved was in the extreme south of Iran,

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separated from northern regions contiguous to the Soviet-Iranian border by a huge stretch of desert and mountain ranges where no airport, or even a single landing ground, existed. With the current level of military-aviation technology, the border areas of the Soviet Union remained inaccessible to British military aviation, even with landing rights in southern Iranian airfields. The number of landings at Iranian airports was limited to 104 per year, for both directions, with a stay limited to 24 hours. The quantity of British fuel reserves was also limited, and the Iranian authorities had rights over customs, sanitary facilities, police and passport control on British planes. Severe sanctions were included in the agreement in case of any infringement of international or national law or of other points in the agreement. These sanctions applied even if only one employee of British Imperial Airways should be found guilty of some infringement. Finally, on the expiration of the stipulated three years, the agreement was not to be extended.56 The Soviet Union's interference succeeded only in demonstrating the duplicity of its policy towards Iran. Previous Soviet declarations conveyed by Yurenev and Davtyan said that it had no objection to Iran having good relations with other countries - including Great Britain. But this was pure hypocrisy. Moscow's efforts to prevent the air agreement were, in essence, not directed at anything except her own political interests. Nor were they concerned with Iran's security, since neither Russia nor Iran was endangered by the agreement. The real purpose of Soviet intrigue was the prevention of a rapprochement between Iran and Great Britain on the threshold of the abolition of the Capitulations which had greatly hindered Iran's economic and social development and progress during the past 100 years.

The tenth of February 1928 marked the 100th anniversary of the introduction of the system of Capitulations into Iran. Lenin's repudiation of the unequal agreements concluded by Iran with the Russian Empire created an important precedent for the abolition of this system which the Iranian people considered degrading. None the less, the Soviet Union in subsequent years, as has already been noted, strove to impose economic restrictions on Iran which differed little from those of the Capitulations. Unfortunately, Great

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Britain, whose economic interests in Iran were considerable, did not hurry to take up the challenge thrown down by the Bolsheviks, and delayed its agreement to abolish the Capitulations. Thus Great Britain clearly lost favour in the eyes of the nationalistically inclined Iranians and allowed Moscow to conduct a neo-colonialist economic policy there under cover of propaganda campaigns. However, using the formal repudiation by the Soviet Union of the unequal agreements of Tsarist Russia with Iran, the Iranian government moved one step further towards its designated goal elimination of the system of Capitulations. In 1921-27 numerous equal trade agreements and customs conventions were concluded between Iran and various foreign governments of Western Europe, Asia and Latin America. Finally, in December 1927 even the British government agreed to begin talks on the abolition of the Capitulations and the creation of a new customs convention. Both sides agreed to proclaim the system of Capitulations annulled as from 10 May 1928. The Iranian government could now introduce into the Majlis (10 March 1928) legislation for an autonomous customs regime. The Majlis approved the project on 3 May 1928, and one week later the Capitulations were abolished. Agreements were signed on 10 May 1928 between Iran and France and between Iran and Great Britain, this time on the basis of Iran's full autonomy in customs policy and of their acquiescence in the abolition of Capitulations. The same day Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet embassy exchanged notes: the Soviet Union gave its agreement to annul the 1927 Soviet-Iranian customs convention and to begin negotiations with a view to concluding a new one.57 Also on that day Davtyan dispatched to Teymurtash 'an official letter with a request to convey to the Shah the congratulations of the Soviet government ... on the abolition of Capitulations'. Much was said in this letter about Soviet sympathy for and solidarity with the struggle Iran 'was conducting against inequitable treaties and with the aim of strengthening its independence'.58 The Soviet press now began a campaign to draw attention to the 'decisive' role the Soviet Union had allegedly played in the abolition of Capitulations. Also stressed was the help the Soviet Union had given to Iran to manifest 'courage and highly skilled manoeuvring, which assured the success of that effective struggle against imperialist states'.59 Soviet propaganda, however, was silent in one particular area - for every concession or rejection of privileges, the

Trade Agreement and Guarantee and Neutrality Pact, 1925-28 Soviets had demanded payment from Iran. This was severely to undermine Iran's sovereignty. Summing up the events of Soviet-Iranian relations analysed here, one arrives at the conclusion that the Soviet policy of pacts did not bring the expected results. Despite the neutrality and guarantee treaty as well as the trade agreement, Iran remained, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Golam Sadeq, said, 'the weakest link in the general line of rapprochement between the four states the USSR, Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran'.60 However, the Soviet Union did not benefit from its feigned benevolence towards Iran's aspirations to establish independence, nor did it succeed in winning Iran's trust.

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5 THE WORLD CRISIS AND THE CRISIS OF TRUST, 1929-33

The world economic crisis of 1929-33 severely tested SovietIranian relations, a test which failed through no fault of Iran. Soviet diplomats in Tehran and members of the central staff of the Narkomindel tried in vain to make Iran appear to be the guilty party. But, in fact, the fault lay entirely with the Soviet Union, whose economic foreign policy principles were in complete contradiction to Iran's economic interests. At the same time it was extremely important to Moscow to create an impression that its relations with Iran (as well as with Turkey and Afghanistan) were developing smoothly, normally and serenely. Indeed SovietIranian relations (as well as Soviet-Afghan and Soviet-Turkish relations) served as a showpiece for Soviet propaganda to advertise Soviet policy and influence in Asian and African countries which, for various reasons, did not have such strong ties with the USSR as did Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey. First and foremost the propaganda was aimed at India.1 Soviet means of communication and mass information (its propaganda and the entire pro-Soviet press abroad) spared no effort to present Soviet policy in Iran in a favourable light. Every move made by the Iranian government to defend its country's interests was presented by the Soviets as the result of exceptionally favourable Soviet influence or of the 'friendly and disinterested support' of the Soviet Union. But whenever such steps were not in Moscow's interest, the Soviet propaganda machine immediately declared they were not in Iran's interest. For instance, the annulment of Capitulations, the newly introduced monopoly of foreign trade, the closing of the British Shahinshah Bank and Iran's adoption of the gold standard - all these steps had been taken by the Iranian government at the end of the 1920s and early 1930s - were all attributed by the

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Soviet propaganda to the beneficial influence of the Soviet Union on Iran. Soviet propaganda kept stressing that all the positive changes that had occurred in Asia and Africa were due to friendly Soviet guidance since the October Revolution of 1917. Soviet propaganda kept repeating that the West, and primarily London, had at all times been strenuously opposed to such reforms, and that it was only with the Soviet of the Union that Iran had succeeded in overcoming this opposition. Nevertheless, Iranian officials, including Reza Shah, kept pointing out that these measures (despite their apparently anti-Western character) were in reality directed not just at strengthening Iran's economic independence but at reducing Iran's economic dependence on the Soviet Union. This was confirmed by the Shah as early as 3 February 1926, in a conversation with the British ambassador, Sir Percy Loraine, 2 and repeated four years later in an interview given to the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, in which the Shah said that one of the main aims of his policy was to 'free his country from its extraordinary dependence on Russia'. 3 The full meaning of the Shah's economic policy was explained by the specialist in Iranian studies, R. Ramazani, who said that Iran had to resolve simultaneously two formidable foreign policy problems, both closely connected. One was how to achieve political and economic emancipation, and the other, how to resist the drive of its northern neighbour who was trying to return to Iran under a new guise.4 It should be noted that when Reza Shah finally did decide on a solution, his economic conception was rather naive, and was explained thus by the German ambassador to Tehran, Walter von Blücher: The economic reforms of the Shah were aimed at making the Persian economy as far as possible independent of foreign countries. The Shah's own politico-economic credo was expressed by the following simple formula: 'Persia has all the raw materials it needs, and everything its population requires can be produced in our own country. For that it is necessary to import from Europe only the required machinery.' Apparently the Shah was one of those people who, according to his Prime Minister, Mohber es-Saltaneh, was a believer in the mystic power of machines. It is possible that the Shah's military mentality made him believe that machines were a kind of wonder-weapon. He was firmly convinced that the more machines that were brought into the country and the more factories that were set up, the richer and happier would be its population.5 Soviet authors and Soviet propaganda published only those facts

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which demonstrated the allegedly excellent condition of SovietIranian trade in this period. These facts were presented against a background of the allegedly unsatisfactory state of Iran's relations with the West. Western powers, wrote Soviet authors, because of their imperialist nature were trying to emerge from their own critical situation at the expense of countries such as Iran by means of inequitable trade. It is true that during the years 1929-33 Iran's foreign trade was reduced by 70 per cent, exports by 63 per cent, imports by 72 per cent and the foreign deficit rose owing to the higher prices of imported goods, but trade between Iran and the Soviet Union remained stable and well balanced. The Soviet share of Iranian foreign trade was about 35 per cent: it had a monopoly on the purchase of certain traditional Iranian export goods. The Soviet Union imported 100 per cent of Iran's fisheries produce, 97 per cent of rice and cattle, 90 per cent of cotton, 86 per cent of wool, 68 per cent of silk, 47 per cent of lamb (astrakhan) and raw hides, etc. Although world prices for those goods had since dropped, the Soviet Union continued to pay 1928 prices.6 These facts are undeniable, yet the good impression created by them is dissipated as soon as one looks closely at what is hidden behind this parade of figures. Then one realizes the paradox. With such an ostensibly benevolent and even self-sacrificing attitude to Iran, one might assume that the Soviet Union had the right to count on some elementary gratitude from its southern neighbour; Iranian exporters ought ceaselessly to implore Allah to bestow every kind of success on Moscow. However, this was not the case. If and when Iranian merchants prayed to Allah it was to ask to be rid of Soviet 'favours'. Instead of gratitude, Iranian trading circles stopped trading with the Soviet Union in 1929 and began boycotting Soviet foreign trade institutions in Iran. What was the reason for this seemingly ungrateful behaviour? The huge figures and impressive per centages were, in reality, merely a screen - behind which there was absolutely nothing. The final result of this massive trade between the Soviet Union and Iran was barely discernible because, as already mentioned, 90 per cent of the entire volume of goods exported to the Soviet Union were paid for with Soviet goods. The Soviet Union imported from Iran firstrate raw materials and agricultural produce for which it paid with its own products (mainly industrial and half-finished goods), 7 which

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were of lower quality and of less variety than similar goods produced in the West. Iranian exporters needed foreign currency in order to trade on the free market, but from the Soviet Union, which absorbed over one-third of Iran's exports, they received only 10 per cent in foreign currency. It is this 'negligible' aspect which escapes the attention of Soviet authors, and the behaviour of the Iranians, while appearing illogical and ungrateful, was, in fact, not only logical but justifiable. Iranian businessmen were fully aware that the Soviet Union, by dumping goods on Iran which it could not hope to sell on the European market because of their low quality, was solving its own marketing problems through inequitable trade conditions with Iran. This leads to the conclusion that the Soviet accusation that Western countries sought to solve their crises at the expense of underdeveloped countries was also applicable to itself. This was, I feel, the explanation for the decision in Iranian business circles (with government support) to declare a boycott on trade with the Soviet Union. This action followed an offer from the Soviet embassy to the Iranian government to begin negotiations for a new trade agreement, in view of the approaching end of the 1927 agreement, as had been stipulated in notes exchanged between Iran and the USSR on 1 October 1927. On 14 October 1929 the Soviet embassy in Tehran submitted a proposal containing suggestions for 'easing trade between the Soviet Union and Iran and making it more attractive to Iranian businessmen'. It was proposed to exclude 'gobetweens' such as 'speculator-commissioners' who were not directly connected with the producers of Iranian export goods or with the buyers of Soviet products.8 In addition to this, the Soviets suggested that Iranian exporters and importers should conduct trade operations through Soviet organizations in Iran, and not on Soviet territory, in order to save time, transport expenses, etc.9 It was, however, perfectly clear that the Soviet government was not really concerned about advantages for Iranian exporters and importers, but actually wanted foreign citizens to leave Soviet territory in order to stop their contact with Soviet citizens, and also to be rid of undesirable witnesses to the Soviet 'victories' on the economic front. For only through them was the world informed of the true price paid for these 'successes', achieved by millions of people slaving to build the 'great constructions of the first five-year plan'. Only through them did the rest of the world come to know of the tragedy of peasants being driven to the Kolkhozes, of the labour

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camps and other aspects of 'socialists building activities' in the first socialist country. Another important reason for this policy, was the desire to make Soviet foreign trade organizations in Iran look more genuine and legitimate, as organizations such as 'Ruspersbank', 'Rupeto', 'Rusperssholk', 'Rusperskhlopok' and 'Shark' were engaged in activities not altogether compatible with their official purposes. (This was frequently revealed by the fact that many functionaries of these organizations were unable, no matter how they tried, to conceal their military bearing.) The Iranian authorities would have preferred to see the personnel of these organizations reduced to a minimum, since it was impossible to close them down completely. However, they were kept under permanent surveillance by the Iranian secret police, and by the forces of the intelligence service chief, General Airom.10 The Iranian government assessed the Soviet offers on the new trade agreement as unacceptable and responded accordingly. Orders were given to stop all Soviet goods being transported by train to Iran at border stations and disembarkation ports. Moscow immediately reacted by ordering the interim chargé d'affaires, Loganovsky, to address a sharp protest to Teymurtash, who was apparently of the opinion that the desired effect had already been achieved and therefore replied to Loganovsky that the Iranian border authorities had acted without his knowledge, for which he apologized and expressed his regret. He promised to give immediate orders to let goods pass freely.11 Nevertheless several days elapsed before the order reached those directly responsible, and the end result was that goods remained at a standstill for more than a month. Negotiations for a permanent trade treaty were renewed seven months later in April 1930, but even then no progress was made. The Soviet delegation suggested that negotiations on the regulation of trade be postponed as both sides were at variance and that problems of customs taxation be dealt with instead. The Iranian delegation agreed to this and declared that Iran intended to increase import duties in order to raise its foreign currency income.12 A commission formed at that meeting, whose task was to work out a compromise formula regarding trade regulations, actually remained idle. The Iranians were completely indifferent to it, and repeated reminders remained unanswered.13

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It was then that the Soviets decided to exert pressure: Iranian procrastination in the matter of negotiations and the resulting absence of economic ties between the sides was followed by various incidents arising from that', wrote the Soviet researcher S.L. Agaev,14 without, however, indicating the kind of incidents that were taking place. In the meantime, new pretexts were constantly being invented, quite obviously with the purpose of interfering with trade. The absence of a trade treaty, however, could have been easily overcome by applying temporary regulations, but this time Tehran refused to surrender to blackmail. On 24 May 1930 the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Forugi, sent a note to Loganovsky, saying with quiet restraint that the many 'incidents' were indeed 'proving the need for a trade agreement'. Nevertheless, he said, the Iranian government could not agree that the lack of progress in Soviet-Iranian negotiations was the responsibility of the Iranian side. Forugi pointed out that his government must still insist that the 'counter-proposal of the trade treaty suggested by the Persian side on 14 January 1930 be accepted as soon as possible as a basis for the mutual relations of both nations'. He concluded by giving Moscow a clear warning that should the incidents continue and should the Soviet Union continue to insist on its own conditions, 'the Persian government, anxious to defend its economic interests, will feel itself obliged to apply other measures and take other steps'.15 The Iranian government, wishing to defend the legitimate desire of its exporters and importers to be free to choose their partners on Soviet territory, submitted a proposal to the Majlis for a law stipulating reciprocity in trade. The government also drew the attention of the Majlis to the fact that there were no trade treaties but only customs conventions in force with a number of countries - a fact which was causing Iran serious economic damage - and that therefore the principle of trade reciprocity should be adhered to only with those countries with existing trade treaties. On 8 July 1930, the Majlis approved the law on reciprocity of trade,16 which had a sobering effect on Moscow. When Soviet-Iranian negotiations were resumed on 5 June 1930, they proceeded more rapidly. Between 5 June and 23 July there were six plenary sessions. During the last session a text of a permanent trade treaty was adopted, incorporating points on which agreement had been reached, as well as suggestions on which no

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agreement had been reached. At the beginning of November 1930 the treaty was discussed at a meeting between Forugi and Loganovsky and the final disagreements were resolved. Loganovsky reported to Moscow that 'the Persians place the main emphasis on the final net balance, transferring the problem to a political plane'.17 The Iranian government kept hoping that its hard struggle for the basic principles of free trade would meet with the understanding of the West and that the free world would demonstrate its solidarity with Iran's struggle. But the Western powers, preoccupied with their own problems, were unable to give Iran support against the overt economic and political pressure of the Soviet Union. The West only reluctantly accepted Iranian protectionism, especially the import limitations, and this doubtlessly weakened Tehran's position in negotiations with the USSR. Yet, even under these circumstances, a Soviet-Iranian trade, settlement and navigation convention was signed just one year after the Forugi-Loganovsky meeting of 27 October 1931.18 This convention, quite understandably, did not satisfy the Shah who was openly displeased by the impossibility of limiting the activity of Soviet foreign trade organizations on Iranian territory. He had much information about the role they were playing. He also had details from Agabekov, a former OGPU resident in Iran, who had defected to the West.1920 The Shah therefore had not the slightest doubt as to the real work of the Soviet organizations, and this played a considerable part in his delay in ratifying the convention. The Shah insisted on changes in those paragraphs which dealt with the framework of the Soviet trade mission and other trade organizations and with the residential status of their functionaries on Iranian territory.21 At that time Reza Shah ordered some of his ministers to introduce sweeping changes into the country's agricultural policy, changes which were of radical importance to the northern provinces of Iran: crops which had been mainly in demand in the Soviet Union (such as rice and sugar-beet) were to be replaced by those in demand on the Western market. This was a revolution in matters of economic regional orientation, since the northern provinces of Iran had for over a century been completely geared to the requirements of the Russian market.22 The Soviet-Iranian trade convention was finally ratified in

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October 1932, but before two months had elapsed the recurring campaign for boycotting trade with the Soviet Union had begun. Iranian merchants decided to deprive the Soviet side of its privileges because the centralized Soviet trade organizations were in contact with individual Iranian partners, which put them at a disadvantage. In consequence, Tehran merchants had decided to set up an association which would be the only one entitled to have centralized business dealings with Soviet foreign trade organizations. This association appealed to merchants to refrain from concluding any deals with Soviet representatives from January 1933 and demanded that the government denounce the Soviet-Iranian trade convention. In February 1933 trade between Iran and the USSR ceased completely.23 In April 1933 a conference of the Iranian chambers of commerce was held in Tehran at which Yassai, Director of the Central Trade Department, declared that the government viewed the position of the merchants and businessmen with sympathy and understanding, knowing that they were suffering serious losses because of a matter of principle. He also told his audience that the government considered it an urgent necessity to amend the convention by adding a number of new points, without which it would be impossible to settle the controversial aspects that had arisen.24 The Soviets, as was to be expected, had paid no attention to Iranian complaints. The attitude of the Iranian side was ascribed by Moscow propaganda to the anti-Soviet intrigues of 'reactionary forces' determined to interfere with the normal development of mutually advantageous relations between the two countries. Litvinov, on 14 March 1933, had declared the Iranian government responsible for all the setbacks. Two months later his deputy, Lev Karakhan, reiterated this accusation to the Iranian ambassador, Pakrevan.25 The Soviet embassy in Tehran also misrepresented the facts, stating that everybody in Iran was responsible for the situation that had arisen. One ought to praise the strength and steadfastness of Reza Shah as the drama of the Soviet-Iranian trade conflict unfolded against the background of another sharp conflict - that between Iran and Great Britain (the Anglo-Iranian oil conflict of 1932-33) - making it extremely difficult for the Iranian government and business circles to carry on their struggle for equitable and mutually advantageous trade with the Soviet Union. On 30 July 1933, the Shah

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ordered the cabinet to cease boycotting the Soviet foreign trade organizations. On 4 August the Iranian merchants' association announced the renewal of trade with the Soviet Union.26 The absence of outside foreign support did not allow Iran to obtain any positive results at this stage in the trade conflict, which made Reza Shah a sadder and a wiser man, no longer prepared to believe in the support of Western democracies in his struggle against totalitarianism.

Iran's stand against Soviet 'pressure and infiltration, plus communist propaganda and subversive activities'27 coincided with the critical Anglo-Iranian oil conflict which had been brewing for a long time.28 The British government, which as a shareholder owned a controlling interest in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), failed to show any understanding of the unfavourable situation, or even to extend goodwill to Iran. It even failed to understand its own interests, which should have meant giving support to Iran, for London's benevolent policy of laissez-faire was replaced by a hardline one. MacDonald's cabinet refused to recognize that Reza Shah's measures were justified and legitimate although they were directed at achieving his country's political and economic emancipation, in particular from Soviet pressure and encroachment. The British press was full of accusations against Iran, denouncing the Shah and his government for infringing the rights of foreign powers and even the private property of foreign subjects. As a result, the Iranian press, especially that of the nationalists, retaliated by accusing Great Britain of interference in Iran's internal affairs, shameless blackmail and, as was traditional, pressure by the strong on the weak. The contact between Tehran and London at that time would hardly qualify as diplomatic correspondence. It was rather a war of nerves conducted on paper, an exchange of caustic remarks and harsh accusations. Some British dailies and periodicals even went so far as to make direct threats against Iran. The Near East and India wrote on 2 July 1931 : Tt looks as if the Persians believe that the lion can no longer wave its tail.' On 16 July 1931 the same magazine called on the British government 'to take a braver political line in defending its own interests in Persia'. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was taking up a

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demonstrably pro-Iranian attitude. Although understanding its devious motives, Iranian public opinion could not help comparing it with the policies of Great Britain. The Iranian daily Setareye Djehan appealed to London to 'follow the example of the Soviet Union and show us the same good will'.30 Great Britain, the US and other Western countries continued to insist that the law on monopoly of foreign trade of 25 February 1931, and the limitations on Iranian imports connected with it, should not apply to their own trade with Iran. Strange as it may seem, specialists in the West were unable to evaluate correctly the character and meaning of the law on foreign trade monopoly and saw in it the result of Soviet ideological influence. Moreover, although the free world was already in possession of sufficiently convincing facts demonstrating the belief that the Shah was pro-Soviet to be a fallacy, a question was asked in the London Times of 5 July 1931 : 'We would like to know how long the Soviet state system of trade in Persia will remain successful.' In the Soviet Union, however, there were no illusions about the real meaning of the trade monopoly introduced by the Shah. Palgunov, who discussed it with Teymurtash, never breathed a word about the influence of Soviet experience on Iranian leaders. Moreover, he did not react when Teymurtash mentioned the Soviet experience. Later, Professor M.S. Ivanov, whose views are considered by Soviet specialists in Iranian history as semi-official, wrote: It is of course, understood that the foreign trade monopoly that was introduced by the Shah in Iran had nothing in common with the socialist foreign trade monopoly that exists in the USSR It must also be mentioned that Reza Shah intended to use the foreign trade monopoly law 31 in order to limit trade relations with the USSR. The incorrect evaluation of the orientation and character of Reza Shah's policy exerted a negative influence on all decisions taken in respect of Iran by the West. This mistake continues to influence the outlook of British writers even today.32 The political problems of Iran and many aspects of SovietIranian relations were not just limited to intergovernmental activity, as was the case with Britain, the US and other countries of the free world. The Shah was aware that he had to consider the Iranian Communist Party in his relations with the Soviet Union; he correctly estimated the Party to be nothing but a Moscow agency. This indeed was public knowledge, and every reasonable and realistic

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Western politician ought to have come to the same conclusion, that is, that a pro-Soviet course was fundamentally impossible for the Shah. On the contrary, although the Shah was at times obliged to look to the Soviet Union for support in order to enable him to exercise some pressure on Great Britain, he nevertheless did not permit himself to cross that invisible line beyond which would be the beginning of a flirtation. Any flirtation with Moscow was out of the question for the Shah since he knew the dangers that it could bring. He had not forgotten the cynical declaration made by the Iranian communists at the height of the Gilan disturbances, referring to their tactics concerning Kuchuk Khan.33 Cynicism and treachery were, in his opinion, the most despicable human qualities but were the basic traits of communism. Reza Shah was not just a fierce nationalist, he was, to a far greater extent, an anti-communist. In his opinion, Iranian communists were no longer members of the national family of Iran, but merely traitors serving foreign interests. R.K. Ramazani was right when he wrote that no matter how unfavourable were Iran's relations with the West, relations with Moscow always remained the Shah's most serious problem.34 These considerations must always be kept in mind when analysing Iran's position in relation to the Soviet Union and Great Britain during the oil conflict. This is not the place to deal with the study or analysis of the Anglo-Iranian oil conflict. Rather, we are concerned with one particular aspect of that problem - the Soviet position and Iran's behaviour in the light of that position. Moscow was, understandably, delighted with the dramatic developments which resulted in the annulment of the d'Arcy concession of 1901, on the basis of which AIOC had functioned. During the year preceding the Shah's decree of 27 November 1932 annulling this concession, the Soviet press was assiduously commenting on the development of the Anglo-Iranian negotiations, including the minutest details and stressing the justified stance of Iran in its struggle against British imperialism. When the controversy had reached such a critical point, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Tehran, Zukerman, declared in a conversation with a representative of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Persian government while taking the necessary steps need not worry about its northern borders as nothing threatens it.'35 The annulment of the d'Arcy concession and the events that followed were widely discussed in the Soviet press. Izvestiya

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published commentaries on Iranian intentions, which it never had in the past. Simultaneously, Soviet newspapers started a forceful campaign against London, which reached its culmination between 6 and 9 December 1932, when the threat of British military intervention in Iran became known. On 13 December Zukerman informed the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Forugi, that the Soviet Union was firmly convinced that 'in this conflict all political and moral arguments are on the side of Persia'.36 On 28 December 1932, the Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Pakravan, thanked the Soviet government on behalf of the Shah for the support shown to him.37 At the same time Iranian officials hurried to distance themselves from the views of the Soviet press, as Iran was anxious not to be suspected of acting in Moscow's interests either. Therefore, during the above mentioned Forugi-Zukerman conversation, the former expressed his gratitude to the Soviet Union for its support of Iran, yet did not omit to stress that in differences with Great Britain, as in all other cases without exception, his country was 'guided exclusively by her own interests'.38 Yet there were reasons for such suspicions after the sudden visit of Teymurtash to Moscow, where he made a very friendly speech at a session of the Ail-Union Central Executive Committee. During his stay in Moscow, Teymurtash negotiated with Litvinov and Karakhan on the expanding of Soviet rights in the Soviet-Iranian oil company, 'Kevir-Khurian'. It is possible that Teymurtash exceeded his authority in Moscow, for he was not just content with speeches but also signed an agreement which gave greater rights to the Soviets in the joint oil enterprise. That, considering the AngloIranian oil conflict, is difficult to understand. Indeed, soon after his return from Moscow, Teymurtash was retired from all the posts he occupied and was arrested (he was later murdered). In spring 1933 the Anglo-Iranian oil conflict came to an end with the signing of a new concession treaty which was somewhat more advantageous to Iran, although still far from satisfactory to the Shah. He gave in to some of the British demands but not necessarily because he feared British military intervention in southern Iran, which was the version presented in the Soviet press. There was no certainty that the Soviet Union, in taking advantage of AngloIranian tension, would not bring its forces into Iran as a preventative measure. This would have led to a dangerous repetition of the 1920-21 events. Should this have happened, a pro-Soviet pup-

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pet government would doubtless have immediately sprung up in Iranian Azerbaijan. And, taking into account the very tense social situation in Iran during those years of world economic crisis, it is clear that the Shah was right to have been doubly careful about the possibility of a Soviet invasion, and to have made haste to settle the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. Where problems of a general political character were concerned, Tehran viewed Soviet initiatives and measures with a wariness, and even suspicion, bordering on undisguised enmity. The constantly repeated statements of Soviet officials and the Soviet press on the unity of interests and aims between the two countries were weighing heavily on Tehran, and obliged the Iranian government to manoeuvre very carefully between the West and its feared northern neighbour and constantly 'to play Moscow at her own game'. This forced the Shah to support the Soviet Union at times when things looked completely hopeless, as in the matter of the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 concerning the East China railway. Iran could in no circumstances join the three Western powers (Great Britain, France and the US) in censuring Moscow's activities without risking the wrath of the Kremlin, with resultant repressive measures. When, on 20 December 1929, the American ambassador to Tehran, Williamson, suggested to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the three Western powers, that Iran join them, the minister, Farzin, replied: We are convinced that the Soviet government, which adheres to the principles of a peaceful policy, which it has repeatedly declared both in general terms as well as specifically in connection with the Eastern States, is not anxious to begin aggressive moves against China nor has it any intention to infringe upon its territorial unity. Quite the contrary; it is quite obvious that if the Soviet Union were obliged to act in self-defence, no anxiety need arise where those two powers are concerned.39 However, on the same day Farzin sent a letter to Williamson informing him that his previous declaration did not reflect the true position of his government. He expressed 'the deepest regret that his country could not join the protest of the Powers, as it was seriously worried about world peace'. 40 Who would dare accuse the Iranian government and the Shah of hypocrisy? Facing the cold indifference of the Western powers,

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which at times verged on animosity, and becoming more and more convinced with the passage of time about the inability of the West to defend underdeveloped countries against Soviet pressure, Iran could count only on itself. Since strength was indeed in short supply, there was need for much astuteness and resourcefulness in order to survive the constant threat hanging over it. Thus one can appreciate that Soviet-Iranian relations were very far from that state of affairs constantly portrayed by Soviet propaganda to the Soviet people. Iran was also forced into a similar position by the disarmament problem, in which Moscow was particulary interested and active. The Iranian government did not deny the importance of certain Soviet suggestions concerning general and complete disarmament. It was prepared to particitate in the preparatory commission of the International Disarmament Conference in collaboration with the Soviet Union, but declared very clearly that the Iranian Army 'needed for the time being to increase its strength, not to reduce it' .41 No attempts at persuasion by Litvinov and Davtyan had any effect on the Iranian government in that respect.42 It refused to accept a Soviet proposal of even partial disarmament. Although Teymurtash had promised Litvinov that the Iranian delegate would vote for it, when it was put to the vote, Iran's representative, Hussein Alah, declared that 'although the final aims of Iran and the deals of the Soviet Union coincided, Iran, in face of a well-armed Turkey, is unable at the present stage to share the Soviet view of disarmament'.43 This declaration was a blow to the Soviet pact policy in the Middle East, and a sign of its defeat. Hussein Alah signalled, on the other hand, his complete agreement with his Western colleagues at the conference. He voted for the French proposal to create an international armed force and for the British proposals to prohibit aggressive arms and to internationalize armament production. He spoke quite openly against the Soviet proposal for complete disarmament which was discussed at the conference in February 1932.u At the 1933 Disarmament Conference the Iranian delegation supported a British proposal for bombing, in exceptional cases, certain remote regions as a policing measure.45 The Soviet researcher S.L. Agaev accused Iran of having 'objectively' contributed to the scuttling of the Soviet disarmament plan by the Western powers.46 Iran's position on the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in September 1931 was not in accord with that of the Soviet Union

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either. Moscow had declared that Japan's act of aggression was the first stepping stone to a second World War. Western powers, however, viewed events differently - they believed that both parties were equally responsible for the situation. Tehran largely agreed with this point of view which had been reflected in comments published in the Iranian press about events in Manchuria. In January 1932, when the League of Nations Council was discussing Manchuria, the nationalist daily Iran had published several articles pointing out that Japan had acted with the aims of limiting Soviet penetration in the Far East and striking a blow against the Comintern's intrigues in the region; Iran unreservedly justified Japan's actions.47 Iran's position was complicated and difficult. Although distrusting the Soviets, it nevertheless strove to make the best possible use of Moscow's support, as long as it did not pose a threat to make Iran give in on important matters or push it towards a dangerous rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Thus Tehran did not hesitate to express its gratitude to and solidarity with the Soviet Union while declaring itself in agreement with the West. In the light of this situation, the declaration by the Iranian ambassador to Rome that 'only the Soviet Union can contribute to Persia's independence',48 could hardly be taken seriously - neither could the declaration by Teymurtash in January 1932 that 'Persia will never take part in any political activities directed against the Soviet Union'.49 The extent to which these statements did not reflect the true state of affairs or the intentions of the Iranian government and the overall character of Iranian-Soviet relations can be judged by the following incident. Reza Shah refused to approve the protocol dealing with the extension of the treaty of neutrality and guarantee by five years, although it had been sanctioned by Teymurtash in Moscow. The treaty was due to end in 1932 and the protocol simply stated that neither side should subsequently undertake alliances or sign treaties directed against the political, economic and financial interests of the other. Iran's suspicions of Soviet policies were also manifested in its reluctance to conclude the agreement concerning their common border. Tehran was claiming from the Soviet Union territory in the Mugan Steppe (in the Azerbaijan SSR) and also along the lower reaches of the river Attrek (in the Turkmenian SSR)50 which Moscow refused to hand over. Moscow, for its part, objected to the

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crossing of the Soviet-Iranian border by 'Basmachi' elements. By assuming an unyielding stance on this Reza Shah hoped to bring pressure on the Soviet Union to cease supporting anti-government communist forces in Iran. Geographical proximity to the Soviet Union has always been one of the most important factors influencing the behaviour of the states sharing common borders with the Russian state. This was one of the main considerations on which they built their foreign policies. The Iranian government constantly kept this in mind and, aware of its own security, was obliged from time to time to make conciliatory and even obviously friendly overtures in Moscow's direction. It would have been unwise to appear always as a hard and unyielding neighbour. The visit of Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Forugi, to the Soviet Union in September 1932 should be seen in this light, as also Karakhan's visit to Iran in September-October 1933, at Forugi's invitation. Karakhan, then the Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was received by the Shah and had a conversation with him lasting one and a half hours, during which the Shah took the opportunity to stress that he 'has always been, is now and will remain an adherent of friendship with the USSR'.51 M.M. Litvinov in his report on Soviet foreign policy in 1933 at the fifth session of the All-Unional Central Executive Committee on 29 December 1933 considered this declaration by the Shah to be very important: The visit of the Deputy People's Commissar Comrade Karakhan to Persia and the heartfelt reception accorded him serve to affirm our relations with Persia and emphasize their constant, friendly character.'52 Nevertheless it was common knowledge to all the Soviet leaders, including Litvinov and Karakhan, that the Forugi-Karakhan exchange of visits was particularly fruitless. Iran was now aspiring to shake off completely even that limited and lukewarm pseudo-pro-Sovietism which had caused the disgrace of Teymurtash. After his removal from power there was no one in Tehran who would have had the slightest wish to continue the Soviet-Iranian flirtation. 'Anti-Soviet tendencies were growing in Iran's foreign policy', wrote S.L. Agaev, 'and it was obvious to everyone that there was increased mistrust and suspicion of Soviet government policies'.53 A negative attitude and the ensuing changes in Soviet-Iranian relations in that period had also influenced Iran's relations with Turkey and Afghanistan, for the main factor governing relations

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between these three countries was no longer the Soviet Union. Moscow now had to admit that its policy of creating a secure area along its southern borders to resist Great Britain was a fiasco. At the beginning of 1930, the governments of Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey continued, from inertia, to turn to Moscow for mediation in their disputes. The Soviet government, out of a similar inertia, continued to oblige, as, for instance, in the matter of the Iran-Turkish border demarcation (23 January 1932).54 But, gradually and ever more frequently, relations between Iran and Turkey revealed a tendency that in no way served Soviet purposes. The Turkish-Iranian negotiations of 1930-32 and their results, the 1932 demarcation agreement and the new treaty of friendship, neutrality and political and economic co-operation of 5 November 1932, provoked displeasure and disappointment in Moscow while they were welcomed in London.55 S.L. Agaev has pointed out that 'Great Britain and other imperialist powers, who had hitherto tried to prevent a TurkishIranian rapprochement, now supported it in order to strengthen their influence over both governments and make use of them for their own anti-Soviet purposes.'56 Meanwhile, in London the government began to take a more realistic view of the evolution occurring in Iran and Turkey which had begun as an explicit and emphatic anti-Europeanism, caused to a great extent by Western policies, and finally arrived at a more sober analysis of Western intentions, on the one hand, and the political aims of the Soviet Union, on the other. Moscow did not fail to express its displeasure that the TurkishIranian border settlement 'had been reached at the expense of the national rights of the Kurdish people in Turkey and Iran' .57 The real reason for Moscow's dissatisfaction was not so much the sad fate of the Kurds as the fact that the 'pacification ofThe Kurds' had turned Kurdistan, in the words of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rüshtü, 'from the apple of discord between two nations into a bridge that unites them', owing to the building of the TrebizondTabriz railway which, according to Rüshtü, provided the possibility of freeing the northern provinces of Iran 'from Russian monopoly over transport'.58 Moscow had good reason to be pessimistic. Its junior partners had not only ceased to obey, but were openly mocking. For example, Ankara had requested Moscow's aid to reach a border

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agreement with Iran; Moscow had agreed and Iran and Turkey reached an understanding, but on an anti-Soviet basis. This Turkish-Iranian border agreement was strengthened by an IranIraq settlement of border issues, which also decreased the economic dependence of Iran's northern provinces on transit routes through Soviet territory. The settlement of controversial problems between Iran and Iraq permitted Reza Shah to come closer to the realization of his long-cherished dream - the building of the trans-Iranian railway. The good relations between Iran and Afghanistan, however, could not withstand the strains which the Soviet Union spared no effort to bring about. In the summer of 1928 a large peasant insurrection erupted in the province of Kukhistan, one of the northern areas of Afghanistan. The rebellion reached such dimensions as to threaten King Amanullah's power, and he was obliged to leave the country. It was then in Tehran that the long dead and buried dream of seizing Herat suddenly came to life.59 Reza Shah dispatched officers from his headquarters to King AmanuUah, offering help against the insurgents in exchange for Herat. Amanullah emphatically rejected the offer. The Soviet Union viewed Iran's action to enhance its power with great displeasure. This definitely did not suit Soviet plans and the leadership was seriously discussing what attitude it should adopt towards the Afghan crisis. Discussions on the matter were prolonged since Soviet leaders could not decide whom they should support - King AmanuUah or his adversary, Bâchai Sakao, a fugitive soldier from the Afghan army. OGPU was of the opinion that help should be given to Bâchai Sakao on 'class principle' as the rebellion was led by peasants. They considered that a victory for the peasant rebellion, obtained with Soviet help, would be an excellent opportunity for sovietizing Afghanistan. But the Narkomindel took a more cautious position. Neither Chicherin nor Karakhan were under any misconception about the peasant character of the rebellion. They did not exclude the possibility that Bâchai Sakao, who, unlike AmanuUah, relied on the loyalty of the northern provinces of Afghanistan bordering the USSR, might attempt to extend his influence to Soviet Tadzhikistan. On the other hand, said the Narkomindel leaders, AmanuUah was already known as being moderately pro-Soviet and if he were helped to suppress the rebellion, it would strengthen his anti-British attitude. Towards the

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end of 1928, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), it was decided to give support to Amanullah. The Command of the Turkestan military district was given orders to form a military contingent under the command of the Soviet military attaché in Afghanistan, V.M. Primakov, who was instructed to cross the Soviet-Afghan border and attack the rebels. At the beginning of January 1929, Soviet forces entered Afghan territory and began a successful military operation against the forces of Bâchai Sakao. Primakov was accompanied by the Afghan ambassador to Moscow, Gulam Nabi Khan, who enjoyed great authority in the northern areas of Afghanistan. Events were unfolding very satisfactorily when suddenly Amanullah decided to abdicate and left Kabul. On 18 January 1929 Bâchai Sakao declared himself King of Afghanistan, and Primakov was ordered to return to Soviet territory.60 The Soviet military action in Afghanistan provoked much criticism in Tehran and Ankara. Soviet interference in Afghan affairs provided Iran with a reason to continue its own interference there, especially since the situation was far from stable after Amanullah's abdication. The Iranian press paid a great deal of attention to what it called 'Afghan banditry' on the Iran-Afghan border, stressing that this view was held by Iranian officials, especially Teymurtash who, in his talks with Davtyan, kept 'loudly complaining about the banditry'.61 Tehran's actions on the Afghan question provoked irritation and suspicion in Moscow, particularly since some political circles in London were inclined to support Iran's claim to Herat. The newspaper the Sunday Worker wrote: 'Persia had been striving to take possession of Herat for almost a century. Great Britain had twice prevented it from doing so. But today London might prefer to see Herat in Persian hands rather than in those of pro-Soviet Afghans.'62 To make matters worse, Iran began concentrating large military contingents on her border with Afghanistan, which infuriated Moscow. Davtyan, at a meeting with Teymurtash, warned Iran most emphatically against taking any steps that would threaten Afghan integrity, while Teymurtash absolutely denied any military movement on the Afghan border; but in this he failed to convince the Soviet ambassador. In his report to the Narkomindel Davtyan stressed the Iranian minister's 'insincerity'.63 Karakhan's reply expressed the wish that Davtyan should spare no effort in keeping Iran

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from committing 'that act of folly' and informed him that the Soviet government had approached Turkey to suggest a joint, simultaneous warning to Tehran.64 On 15 April 1929 Karakhan informed the Iranian ambassador in Moscow, Ansari, that 'the USSR cannot remain indifferent to an attempt... to infringe the inviolability of Afghanistan, and deems it necessary to make known to the Persian government its own negative attitude to such an attempt, to warn the Persian government against this, and also to request the Persian government to take the necessary steps to prevent irresponsible circles from breaking up the peace between states'.65 On 18 April 1929 the Turkish ambassador in Tehran, Mamduh Shevket Bey, made a similar declaration to the Iranian Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Farzin,66 and Iran was forced to back down. Nevertheless, a further rift occurred between Tehran and Moscow despite Davtyan's report to Moscow saying that he and Teymurtash 'have both reached the conclusion that the incident must have no effect whatsoever on our friendly relations'.67 An analysis of the evolution of Soviet-Iranian relations during the world economic crisis of 1929-33 leads one to believe that a weakening had occurred in the Iranian sector of the defence zone which Moscow had been so persistently building up along its southern borders. Soviet diplomacy publicly acknowledged the failure of its efforts, yet ascribed this not to its own actions, but to 'the British', who 'still carry considerable weight in Persia'.68

The five-year-period reviewed in this chapter shows an obviously increasing movement of the Iranian political barometer towards the West. One cannot disagree with G. Lenczowsky's opinion that, notwithstanding the crises that were occurring between Iran and Britain, Iran 'had nevertheless been closer to [Britain] than to any other power'.69 The whole concept of Iranian foreign policy was expressed with great clarity by the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Forugi, in a confidential conversation with the German ambassador, Walter von Blücher: The aim of Persian foreign policy consists of retaining full independence, and of ensuring that neither Russia nor Great Britain resume the same position that they occupied before the War. Therefore Persia must show no preference for either side. As for Russia, the difference between them and

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the Persians is so great that co-operation between the two is extremely70 difficult. In the case of Great Britain, the situation is somewhat different. Tehran understood that London, having lost hope of subjugating Iran, was now interested in seeing it strengthened as a frontier post against Bolshevism in the Middle East. But the bitter experience of the last 15 years had made Tehran realize that it could not rely on Britain where Iran's struggle against Soviet expansion was concerned. Iran had to seek a more reliable ally. Thus began the search for a new 'third power', and thus was formed the doctrine that became the pivot of Iran's foreign policy in the pre-war years.

6 FIRST STEPS IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN, 1917-21

The Bolshevik propaganda campaign against their worst enemy, British imperialism, was so vociferous and fierce that it reached as far as Kabul. Everywhere in Asia, it found fertile soil. The Afghan historian, M.R. Shivan, who witnessed the unfolding of events at that time, described the mood and atmosphere that prevailed in Kabul and elsewhere in the country: When the news of a Bolshevik upheaval in Russia reached Afghanistan it spread like wildfire. The newspapers were writing about it and teachers were speaking of it in schools. The revolution in Russia made a great impression in Afghanistan, especially on those who desired Afghan independence - the circles of young intelligentsia. Rumours and talk were heard everywhere, the gist of which was: 'Lenin will help us win our independence from the British.'1 There was increasing dissatisfaction with Emir Habibullah's (190119) foreign policy, best expressed by the party of 'Young Afghans', one of whose members was Crown Prince Amanullah. On 21 February 1919 Emir Habibullah was murdered, in circumstances unknown to this day. A week later, on 28 February, the new Emir, Amanullah Khan (1919-28), declared all the agreements and undertakings between Afghanistan and Britain null and void because they limited Afghanistan's sovereignty and had been forced on his country by the British government. Amanullah Khan declared that 'from now on Afghanistan is a free and independent state, which does not acknowledge any kind of foreign domination'. 2 The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahmud Tarzi (ideologist and leader of the 'Young Afghans'), declared that his government dissociated itself from the position adopted by Afghanistan's former govern-

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ment, which had approved British intervention in Russian Turkestan in 1918 and had even joined in British plans for 'expanding Afghan territory up to the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea', using the 'prevention of a Soviet threat to India and Afghanistan' as a pretext for those plans.3 On 3 March 1919 the new Emir sent a message to the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, in which he offered to establish a new kind of relationship between Afghanistan and Britain. Lord Chelmsford only replied to this letter six weeks later, having had to wait for instructions from London. The substance of his reply was that Britain refused to recognize the independence of the state of Afghanistan and insisted on its adherence to all obligations formulated in previous treaties. When Lord Chelmsford's reply reached Kabul, it was already known that the Soviet Russian government had officially recognized the unlimited sovereignty of Afghanistan (27 March 1919), as a result of which Kabul and Moscow had entered into lively diplomatic correspondence at the highest level. On 7 April 1919 Emir Amanullah Khan wrote a letter to Lenin in which he pointed out that throughout the entire later period of Afghan history his country had been 'prevented from having any kind of relations with other states and nations'. He thanked Lenin and his comrades, whom he called 'friends of humanity', for having declared the 'principles of liberty and equal rights for all countries and nations of the entire world'. They had created a new reality, he wrote, which gave the Afghan people confidence in a successful outcome to their struggle for their country's independence.4 Amanullah's letter reached Tashkent after many difficulties, and was relayed to Moscow by radio. The letter itself reached Moscow only on 21 May 1919. Simultaneously, a letter from Tarzi to Chicherin reached Moscow. Tarzi offered on behalf of the Afghan government to establish friendly relations between Afghanistan and the RSFSR.5 On 21 April 1919 Amanullah Khan sent another message to Lenin, informing him that he was sending a diplomatic mission, headed by General Muhammed Vali Khan, to Europe. Moscow was to be the first capital visited by the mission. Vali Khan was given the authority to 'conduct personal negotiations for preparing the ground for the establishment of an indispensable friendship between both states and the protection of their mutual interests'.6

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When that letter finally reached its destination, an AngloAfghan war was already in progress - the third of its kind. This war had been started by Britain on 3 May 1919, but was officially declared on 6 May. The British government could find no better or more dignified way of replying to Afghanistan's demand for recognition of its independence. The third Anglo-Afghan war lasted only a month and ended, as had the two former wars, in the rout of British forces. In the preliminary agreement signed on 8 August 1919 in Rawalpindi (British India) between Britain and Afghanistan, the former recognized Afghanistan's full independence. London's animosity had pushed Amanullah into the arms of the Soviets, but the Afghan nation, which had struggled so long for independence, found itself, when the dream at last became reality, facing a much greater and deadlier danger than that of Britain. Britain, it must be admitted, only wanted to deny Afghanistan political independence in foreign affairs, and did not attempt to control (or destroy) its traditions and religious and national heritage. The Soviets, on the other hand, were by the nature of their convictions unable to refrain from intruding into the sanctum sanctorum of the nation's life, not to mention its foreign policy. This is seen clearly from instructions given by the Narkomindel to the newly appointed ambassador to Afghanistan, F.F. Raskol'nikov, dated 3 June 1921: We say to the Afghan government: we have one regime while you have another; we have our ideals, you have yours. We are not thinking even for a moment of foisting on your people a programme that is foreign to it at the present stage of its development.7 Half a century later the Soviet leadership was to come to the conclusion that its own 'programme' was no longer 'foreign' to the Afghan people and began to introduce it into Afghanistan by its own methods of 'persuasion'. During this period Afghanistan was playing a different though no less important role in Moscow's plans: (a) it was expected to become the 'Suez Canal of the World revolution',8 leading towards India; (b) it was to serve as a future springboard for a Soviet attack on India after Lenin's ideas had achieved their subversive aims; and (c) the Afghan government had to undertake not to give any support to the peoples of Russian Central Asia in their struggle against sovietization. The aim was for Afghanistan to help the

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Soviets with their plan to begin the sovietization of Afghanistan in the future. One of the early Soviet 'world revolution' strategists had defined the dynamics and gradual development of that process: sovietization of Russian Central Asia's Muslims; then the next step was to be sovietization, with their help, of their Muslim brothers in Afghanistan, Iran and India.9 In the meantime, on 27 May 1919, Lenin replied to Amanullah that 'the Afghan people's desire to follow the Russian example will be the best guarantee of the strength and independence of the Afghan state'. With that Lenin offered to establish permanent diplomatic relations with the RSFSR which 'would enhance the possibility of mutual help against the encroachment of foreign predatory forces bent on depriving them of their freedom and robbing them of their lawful possessions'.10 Kabul replied positively, as was to be expected. Afghanistan had until then never been the object of a great power's kindness, let alone its advances. Besides, Amanullah could not overlook the fact that his own military successes in the third Anglo-Afghan war were to a certain extent due to the Red Army, which, having successfully attacked the White Guard forces in Turkestan in the spring of 1919, had forced the British command to give up its intention of opening yet another front against the Afghan Army in the north, from Kushka. By the end of the third Anglo-Afghan war Soviet forces were already in full control of former Russian Central Asia and were close to the Russian-Afghan border. This greatly facilitated Soviet-Afghan contact. At the end of May 1919 a diplomatic mission from the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Republic left Tashkent and, on orders from Moscow, proceeded to Kabul. It was headed by N.Z. Bravin and was, temporarily, to represent Soviet Russia in Kabul.11 On 28 May 1919 an extraordinary Afghan mission arrived in Tashkent.12 On 23 June 1919 the Soviet government (Sovnarkom RSFSR) appointed an old Bolshevik, Yakov Zakharovich Surits, 'Representative Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Central Asia, with residence in Kabul'. The letter of credentials given to Surits said, that having appointed him Representative Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary in Central Asia, the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR had given him the task of maintaining diplomatic relations with the peoples of independent Afghanistan, with the independent tribes of Baluchistan, Khiva and Bokhara, and with the peoples of India, Kashmir and Tibet, who are

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striving for their independence. Comrade Surits is empowered by the Workers' and Peasants' Government to make direct contact with the existing governments of those countries and with those governments which might spring up in the region during his term of office; also with all revolutionary organizations whose aim is to free the peoples of Central Asia from foreign domination; he is also empowered to appoint his own representatives and agents, to conduct negotiations either directly or with their help, to conclude agreements in the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government, and to sign relevant documents approved by the Central Government in Moscow.13 It is obvious from this text that the extent of Surits' obligations both in the political and geographic sense was rather wide. It actually meant that he was entrusted with conducting the co-ordination of subversive activities in territories which were part of British India, and China. It also meant that subversive activities were given the status of a state policy and included in the canons of international law. The Afghan mission headed by General Muhammad Vali Khan arrived in Moscow during the first days of October 1919. His first meeting with Lenin took place on 14 October, and the second and final meeting took place six weeks later. During their conversations Lenin stressed particularly the fact that Afghanistan was the only independent Muslim state in all of Asia and in the entire world and thus was honoured with the 'great historical task of uniting around itself all the enslaved Muslim nations, and leading them along the path of freedom and indepedence'. 14 Lenin was very obviously playing on Amanullah's pan-Islamic feelings, which made him, unlike his grandfather, Emir Abdurrahman, and his father, susceptible to such blandishments. The real purpose was to draw Afghanistan into Moscow's anti-British plans and activities in the Muslim world. Lenin candidly told the Afghan ambassador that it was 'absolutely necessary that the Muslim East help Soviet Russia in her great war of liberation'. Muhammad Vali Khan replied: T h e Moslem East had understood that . . . the time will soon come when the world will see that there will be no place for European imperialism in the East.'15 On 14 December 1919 Surits, the first Soviet ambassador, arrived in Kabul and at once initiated much activity. The character of his activities can be appreciated in the article written by Maxim Gorky under the heading 'V.I. Lenin' and published in the journal Kommunisticheskii Intematsional, in which he said:

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Coming from the remotest villages of India, walking hundreds of versts [miles] through forests and along mountains paths, andriskingtheir lives, the tortured and oppressed Indians who have suffered from centuries of oppression by British officials are secretly arriving in Kabul and coming to the Russian Mission.16 It is not difficult to imagine what kinds of conversation took place in that mission and what type of advice and instructions were being given. What conclusions did London draw from this 'red menace that had appeared so close to the most important Gate of India'?17 The British government and the authorities in Delhi made no attempt during this time to conduct a serious dialogue with Amanullah Khan. Instead they were content to make contacts with conservative statesmen, such as Prince Nasrullah, Amanullah's uncle, whose influence was negligible. London and Delhi deliberately ignored the Emir and wounded his pride by referring to him as a 'political infant'.18 In the autumn of 1919 the British authorities in India decided to close the mountain passes leading to Afghanistan. This was tantamount to the declaration of an economic blockade - which helped to push Amanullah even further into the ever-open Soviet arms. However, unbeknown to the British, there were some major differences on matters of principle between Amanullah and Moscow - for example, his pan-Islamic tendencies, which Lenin was trying to use against Britain in Moscow's interests but which were actually directed against Bolshevism. Indeed, Amanullah was dreaming of a Central Asian Federation (which would also include Russian Turkestan) under the aegis of Kabul, a plan of which Lenin was aware. But this contrary interest quite naturally produced another; Amanullah could not ignore the struggle of the Russian Central Asian nations (with whom he sympathized) against the regime forcibly grafted upon them by Moscow. London, instead of making a thorough and realistic analysis of the situation, continued to ignore Afghanistan's interests and was busy looking for a substitute for Amanullah, a policy that was doomed to failure. London wanted to find a man who 'would understand the advantages of an alliance with Great Britain'.19 It was, therefore, not surprising that the Anglo-Afghan negotiations, renewed on 17 April 1920 on the subject of concluding a permanent treaty to replace the preliminary agreement concluded

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on 18 August 1919 in Rawalpindi, soon reached an impasse. The Afghan side did not fail to understand that Great Britain was not taking seriously its recognition of Afghanistan's independence, in either its internal affairs or its foreign relations. The situation left no other way open to AmanuUah Khan but to request Moscow for assistance, with an offer to conclude a trade and a military treaty (8 May 1920). Negotiations between Tarzi on one side and Surits on the other progressed rapidly, and on 13 September 1920 both parties initialled the preliminary text of the treaty, to which news London reacted with alarm. In British government circles there were protracted discussions about a cable by Lord Chelmsford in which he had demanded that the 'Bolsheviks and Afghans be separated' by a British-Afghan agreement 'that would forestall an AfghanSoviet one'.20 At long last it was decided to send a British diplomatic mission to Kabul, headed by an 'extraordinary representative', Sir Henry Dobbs. At his very first meeting on 7 January 1921 he disappointed Tarzi by advising him bluntly to refuse to sign the Soviet-Afghan treaty and to dismiss the Soviet embassy in Kabul. In exchange, he promised to give Afghanistan British military aid, to renew the Emir's annual personal pension and to guarantee taxfree trade via India. However, this would mean that Kabul's foreign relations would in effect be taken over by Great Britain. Quite obviously, the British were completely out of touch with reality and were living in the past. In the months of April and May 1920 they seriously discussed the 'desirability to reach an agreement with the Bolsheviks concerning Afghanistan'21 and even considered a political agreement reminiscent of the agreements made in 1873 and 1907.22 In 1921 the British government tried once again to force on Afghanistan a treaty similar to that of Gandamak in 1879.23 Kabul's reply was not merely a refusal but an obvious snub; on 28 February 1921 a friendship treaty was signed in Moscow between the RSFSR and Afghanistan. The treaty was to come into force after its ratification by both sides and the exchange of ratification documents. In its preamble it stated that it was concluded 'with the aim of strengthening the friendly relations between Russia and Afghanistan and of preserving the real independence of Afghanistan'. The signatories recognized each other's independence, agreed to establish normal diplomatic relations and undertook 'not to enter into a military or

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political covenant that could be detrimental to either side'. The Soviet side accorded to Afghanistan 'free and tax-free transit through its territory of all kinds of cargo purchased in Soviet Russia as well as that brought directly from abroad'. Soviet Russia agreed to assist Afghanistan financially and to provide it with other material help. It also undertook to lend Afghanistan the sum of one million gold roubles; to establish a training school for pilots; to provide aircraft as well as five thousand rifles and an adequate quantity of cartridges; and to hand over a radio station to Afghanistan. The treaty also included the installing of a telegraph line from Kushka via Herat and Kandahar to Kabul.24 However, several months before the signing of this treaty, an intense struggle began in Kabul government circles over international policy problems. Tarzi, one of the initiators of the SovietAfghan rapprochement began, towards the end of 1920, to voice his concern about the evident inclination of Afghan policy towards Soviet Russia. He began to insist on a more balanced course in foreign policy. Tarzi's misgivings were closely connected with Kabul's attitude to events in Russian Central Asia, where sovietization was already in full swing. As a result, the Afghan government began to object very strongly to everything that Moscow's emissaries were doing in the region, especially in Bokhara where a socalled people's revolution took place in September 1920, instigated from Tashkent. Amanullah Khan and Tarzi considered this to be not merely an act of treachery by the Bolsheviks towards the nations on the periphery of the former Russian Empire, to whom Lenin had solemnly promised the right of self-determination, but a danger to Afghanistan's own independence. The Afghan government took a number of precautionary measures; for instance, a large number of officers, soldiers and also civilians were allowed to join the army of the deposed Emir of Bokhara, who had fought against the Red Army. The Afghan ambassador to Bokhara, Abdul Khadi Khan, spoke out openly against Bolshevik activity there and was arrested by the pro-Soviet government of the Bokharan People's Republic, which had come to power as a result of the revolution of September 1920. Kabul did not recognize the puppet Bokharan People's Republic until January 1921 and only then under extreme pressure from Moscow, during which time London remained silent. Obvious

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opposition to Soviet policy in Bokhara is also expressed in the Soviet-Afghan treaty, where in paragraph 8 it is stated that 'the sides agree to the real independence of Bokhara and Khiva - no matter what form of government might be in power, according to the people's wish'. The inclusion of that paragraph, with reference to a third state, was a concession to Afghanistan that the Soviets recognized the right of the peoples of Bokhara and Khiva to selfdetermination. It contained acknowledgement of their independence at the moment when the treaty was signed. However, the second part of the paragraph is rather ambiguous, obviously formulated by Moscow's hand, for the Soviets had by that time acquired sufficient experience in manipulating facts to be able to falsify the 'wish of the people'. Realizing the, perfidy of the Bolsheviks, Amanullah Khan continued to extend help to the deposed Emir of Bokhara, Seyid Alim Khan, even after the Soviet-Afghan treaty was signed. In March 1921 he was given asylum in Afghanistan together with the remnants of his army. Just to spite the Soviets, he was received as an honoured guest. The new Bokharan authorities reacted with a very terse note, in reply to which the Afghan government proposed that the government of the Bokharan People's Republic should conclude a bilateral agreement 'not to allow the presence of military forces who are not part of the Bokharan people or the Afghan people'. In other words, it suggested that Bokhara remove Soviet military forces from its territory. That suggestion was, of course, rejected, but it clearly shows Amanullah's attitude towards the Soviets.25 Another aspect of Afghanistan's wariness towards the Soviets was expressed in its refusal to ratify the Soviet-Afghan treaty at the time agreed, although this was also due to the Afghans' suspicion of Soviet aims and of their machinations in former Russian Central Asia. By this time Lenin's slogans had lost their attraction for the straightforward and freedom-loving Afghans, and their former admiration turned to wariness. What particularly worried the Afghans was Soviet insistence on opening consulates not only in Herat, Mazari-Sherif and Meymen, situated in the vicinity of the Afghan-Russian borders, but also in Ghazni and Kandahar, which are close to the Afghan-Indian border. The situation, as discussed in Kabul bazaars, was summed up by the question: 'Don't you think we should also demand the right to open consulates somewhere in Vladivostok and Chita?'

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The British mission in Kabul protested strongly against the Soviet requests to open two consulates in such close proximity to India's north-west frontiers, and Tarzi admitted that British apprehensions were well-founded. He informed Surits that the opening of Soviet consulates in Ghazni and Kandahar was firmly opposed by many members of his cabinet. In answer, Surits informed Tarzi (28 June 1921) that he was prepared 'immediately after the ratification of our treaty' to let his government know of the 'difficulties encountered with the opening of consulates in Kandahar and Ghazni', and expressed the hope that the Soviet government would, for the time being, not open these consulates.26 That was already a 'direct swindle' (this expression from Lenin's lexicon is very appropriate for describing the actions of the 'diplomat of Lenin's school', Y.Z. Surits) and the Afghan government rejected the blatant horse-trading with disgust and indignation. It actually meant that in exchange for the immediate ratification of the treaty Moscow would give Kabul the hope that it would not open those consulates 'for the time being'. Correspondence on this subject coincided with the arrival in Kabul of the new Soviet ambassador, Raskol'nikov, who had two meetings with Tarzi, during which he repeated the offer made by Surits. The Afghan government continued to insist that the Soviets retract their intention to open consulates in Kandahar and Ghazni as a preliminary condition to permitting the Afghan parliament (Djirga) to study the text of the treaty. Meanwhile, the presentation of his credentials by Raskol'nikov was delayed by Kabul. Suddenly rumours began to circulate that were 'provocative as they spoke of the Soviet government's intention to change its policy towards Afghanistan'.27 Raskol'nikov lost no time in 'disclosing' where the rumours originated, leaving no doubt as to their source: he declared that 'in obedience to the directives of my Government', he would remain 'uninvolved in any activities directed against the Government of the Independent State of Afghanistan' and that 'difference in forms of government cannot be an obstacle to the rapprochement of states having identical aims in their world policies'.28 It was precisely this statement that now caused the Afghan government to have even more serious doubts. Amanullah Khan and Tarzi knew by this time that Moscow had something to hide. For nearly a year activities directed at the setting up of various organizations and groups hostile to Amanullah Khan

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were progressing speedily in the territories of the Turkestan ASSR and Bokharan PSR, whose 'programmes and ideas were close to those of Marxism-Leninism'.29 At the end of 1920 some of the groups in Bokhara had formed a 'Central Committee of Young Afghan Revolutionaries', whose programme contained frankly anti-monarchist aims. It openly declared that 'the purpose of the Committee is to topple the existing capitalist regime, to establish a republican government according to the people's will and thus to free the Afghan people from the despotism of the Emir and beys.'30 Being aware of this, Amanullah knew that the Bolsheviks could easily invent a pretext for invading Afghanistan, with thefirstattack occurring somewhere in the region of Herat or Mazari-Sherif, and would bring in their wake a ready-made puppet government, which, on that tiny piece of Afghan territory, would declare a Soviet regime and would then ask for Moscow's assistance. Amanullah Khan took these rumours, as well as Raskol'nikov's declarations and denials, as very serious warnings. It was Raskol'nikov who, in 1920, had declared Moscow's puppet, Kuchuk Khan, President of the 'Sovnarkom' of the Gilan Soviet Republic. It is, therefore, understandable that on 7 August 1921 a meeting was called at the royal palace in Kabul and after four days of long deliberations it was decided to ratify the Soviet-Afghan treaty. This was done on 13 August, but the presentation of credentials by Raskol'nikov was postponed until a formal declaration arrived from Moscow to inform Kabul officially of the withdrawal of their intention to open consulates in Ghazni and Kandahar. This assurance arrived early in November 1921, but a new obstacle was invented! Raskol'nikov insisted on presenting his credentials before the presentation of Moscow's answer to the Afghan government, while the Afghans insisted on having the reply from Moscow before the Soviet ambassador presented his credentials. Amanullah Khan had completely lost any trust he may have had in his Soviet 'friends'. But this time Raskol'nikov had his way. On 17 November 1921 he presented his credentials, and on 21 November he sent a letter to Tarzi officially informing the Afghan government that the Soviet government 'in view of the present difficulties that the friendly Government of Afghanistan is having, would not open consulates in Kandahar and Ghazni'.31 This opened up the way for the signing of an Anglo-Afghan treaty, which had been previously co-ordinated and agreed,

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whereby Great Britain recognized Afghanistan as a fully and unconditionally independent state; a provision for the establishment of full diplomatic relations between London and Kabul was included in the treaty, which was signed on 22 November 1921. On the following day an official government communiqué was published in Delhi saying that the treaty with Afghanistan was signed 'by His Majesty's Government only after receiving satisfactory assurances from the Afghan Government that no Russian consulates would be permitted in the regions of Jalalabad, Kandahar and Ghazni'.32 Raskol'nikov, having read the Anglo-Indian government communiqué, immediately contacted the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reminded them that the Soviet agreement not to open these consulates should in no way be considered as an agreement in principle to have the text of paragraph 5 of the Soviet-Afghan treaty changed. Raskol'nikov went on to say that if the AngloIndian communiqué was true, his government would draw the conclusion that the Afghan side had unilaterally changed the text of paragraph 5 of the treaty.33 His note, dated 5 December 1921, was not answered. On 22 December Raskol'nikov sent a second note to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the same content. This also went unanswered. The matter remained open, but the Soviets did not establish their consulates in Kandahar and Ghazni. Thus, owing to a number of favourable circumstances, Soviet diplomacy achieved some of its aims but did not attain its principal goals. Afghanistan was not turned into a 'Suez Canal' for exporting ideas of world revolution to India. Its territory remained for more than a decade a refuge for the forces of national resistance to the Soviets in Central Asia. Neither had Afghanistan been turned into an armed arsenal and springboard for Soviet military provocation against India. Yet, it must be acknowledged that during those very years the Bolsheviks did acquire important positions there, without which a pro-Soviet regime could not have been set up in Afghanistan in 1978.

7 FROM MOSCOW TO PAGMAN, 1921-26, AND THE NEUTRALITY AND MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION PACT, 1931

The Soviet-Afghan treaty of 'friendship' was ratified by the Afghan side only after intense pressure from Moscow which almost openly threatened Amanullah Khan with the overthrow of his regime. It looked as if Moscow had succeeded in subduing Amanullah Khan and in making him relinquish the idea of creating a Central Asian Federation. Yet all was not as it appeared. The problem of Bokhara still existed, and by the beginning of 1922 had become the cause of an even greater crisis in Soviet-Afghan relations. This crisis was closely connected with Moscow's speculations concerning one of the main pillars of pan-Turkism, Enver Pasha. Enver Pasha - one of the leaders of the 'Young Turks' Revolution of 1908 in Turkey, later one of the ruling triumvirate (Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha, Tala'at Pasha), Turkey's War Minister during the First World War, and 'son-in-law of the Sultan, Sovereign of the Believers' - fled to Germany after Turkey had capitulated. There he contacted the Soviet ambassador, Yoffe, and in December 1920 went to Moscow, together with Jemal Pasha. They were provided with a splendid mansion in Spiridonovka street in the vicinity of the Narkomindel. Enver Pasha strenuously declared his sympathy for the Bolsheviks and for Lenin's idea of the fight for freedom by peoples of the East against British imperialism. At first the Soviet government tried to use Enver Pasha as a counterbalance to the leader of the Turkish national revolution, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who was steadily uprooting the seeds of Marxism in Anatolia despite Bolshevik endeavours to sow and nurture them. Enver

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Pasha succeeded in creating a 'Soviet' government in Adzharia, but the governments of the then independent Georgia and Armenia protested strongly against such acts. As a result, Enver Pasha was recalled from the Transcaucasus. In the autumn of 1921 he appeared in Tashkent together with Jemal Pasha, who had arrived in Afghanistan and become Amanullah's military and economic adviser. Jemal collaborated closely with Raskol'nikov, which earned him Chicherin's praise, the latter writing about him to Stalin on 19 October 1921. ' Enver, on the other hand, was to participate in the Bolsheviks' military and political activities in Central Asia. The Soviet High Command there hoped that it would be able to make use of Enver's influence with the Muslim masses to create a change in the political and military situation in their favour. At first Enver did his best to play the part, but he had his own plans. His intention was to create, with Soviet help, a Muslim 'Red Army' in Turkestan, which could be used to eradicate all Soviet power in the region. His aim was to create the foundations for a vast empire of the Turkic peoples of Russia, which would later encompass part of the territories of Iran, Afghanistan, India and China.2 In March 1921 Enver sided openly with the Bokharan Emir, who made him commander of his military forces. Soon after Enver assumed the title 'Commander-in-chief of the Islamic Forces, Sonin-Law of the Khalif, Representative of the Prophet'. Enver's appearance as commander-in-chief of the military forces of the Emir of Bokhara revived Amanullah's hopes of restoring the regime of the deposed Emir, thus creating a buffer between Afghanistan and Soviet Russia. The Afghan government permitted its soldiers and officers to join this 'Islamic Army' and did not prevent its citizens from doing the same. The yearljTreport of the Narkomindel for the year 1922 contained a reference to 'Afghan army units who were crossing the Afghan-Bokharan border and actively helping the Basmachi'. The Afghan government in Kabul continued to assure the Russian plenipotentiary, comrade Raskol'nikov, that it had 'no part whatsoever in these activities'.3 However, having 'no part' was not exactly true. Amanullah's brother and heir, Prince Ahmed, had been officially appointed as the Emir's representative to Enver and had arrived at his headquarters with a caravan of 27 camels carrying arms and military equipment, and another of four camels carrying Indian silver

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rupees. At that time Enver also had a representative in Kabul.4 Amanullah Khan officially approached the newly appointed British ambassador, Colonel Humphreys (who had arrived in Kabul in March 1922), with a request to inform London that Afghanistan would welcome Great Britain's recognition of Bokharan and Khivan independence, which, in turn, would provide Amanullah with the necessary argument to demand the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Bokharan territory.5 A month later, Tarzi requested that the British ambassador transmit to London an offer by the Afghan government to organize military assistance for Enver, which would pass through Afghan territory. However, the British government considered that Enver's defeat was inevitable and that it was not worth while supporting him.6 Britain's refusal to assist forces of anti-Soviet resistance in Bokhara discouraged Amanullah but did not make him give up his activities. Prominent politicians and military commanders were sent to the northern regions of Afghanistan, including War Minister Nadir Khan, Minister of Justice Muhammad Ibrahim and General Shudzha od-Dowleh. They were instructed to establish contact with anti-Soviet forces in the Fergana, Kushka and Shakhrisiabz areas. In the Baisun area, in Bokharan territory, an Afghan Colonel, Gulam Rassul Khan, led a brigade of the Afghan regular army. War Minister, General Nadir Khan, who later (1929) became King of Afghanistan, arrived at the Fergana border area and took oyer direct command of the Afghan and Bokharan forces. At the beginning of July 1922 Nadir Khan sent a note to the Narkomindel, the tone and content of which left no doubt about the real situation in Afghan-Soviet relations. He wrote: I have the honour to give warning to your Excellency that if the hostile activity of the Bolsheviks against Bokhara does not cease, the Government of Afghanistan will be forced to annexe Bokhara. This is the only way to assist a Muslim state situated in the centre of Asia to stand up against Bolshevik intrigues.7 Moscow replied with an ultimatum demanding that Afghanistan stop all help to the 'mutineers' and make a public announcement that it would cease to interfere in the struggle in eastern Bokhara (now the territory of the Tadzhik SSR and the Fergana area of the Uzbek SSR), and would not permit any Afghan citizens to take part in that struggle. The Emir was also to recall his officers from Enver's military headquarters.8 Amanullah refused to comply. However,

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his ambassador to Moscow, Muhammad Vali Khan, declared that Afghanistan had no intention of creating difficulties with its friendly neighbours, Bokhara and Soviet Russia. The Afghan government', he said, 'views the present disturbances in Bokhara as a purely internal matter, in which neither the Russian nor the Afghan government have the right to intervene.'9 At the same time, Enver instructed Bedri Bey, his representative in Kabul, to publish a declaration in the Afghan press explaining the motives behind Enver's activities in Central Asia, and stressing that they were in response to 'Russian colonial aims pursued by the Bolsheviks in Bokhara and Turkestan, which he [Enver] considers to be a threat to both Afghanistan's and Turkey's interests'. Enver also instructed Bedri Bey to contact Raskol'nikov to clarify 'on what conditions the Bolsheviks would be prepared to begin negotiations with independent Bokhara and independent Turkestan'. Raskol'nikov replied: 'Enver may not be recognized as a representative of those states which either have friendly relations with Russia or are members of the same federations. Negotiations with Enver would be possible only after his capitulation.'10 Moscow's steps taken in reply to Enver's 'treachery' were unequivocal. On 18 May 1922 the Central Committee of RCP(b) discussed the 'Turkestan-Bokharan affairs' and decided to dispatch one of their members, Ordzhonikidze, to Central Asia. Ordzhonikidze was highly experienced in punitive expeditions, having become an 'expert' through suppressing the attempts at independence of the populations of the Russian Empire's outlying districts. With his arrival, the war with Enver became murderous rivers of blood ran in Central Asia. Punitive measures by 'Checkists' consisted of destroying crops, blocking wells, sabotaging irrigation systems, uprooting orchards, etc. By terrorizing or even annihilating the local inhabitants, they deprived Enver of his supply bases. On 4 August 1922 Enver was killed during the fighting. Since Britain had refused to help, Amanullah was forced to give up his stand and, on 25 July 1922, he published a declaration ordering all Afghan subjects serving in the 'Islam Army' to resign from it, under threat of losing their Afghan citizenship and confiscation of property. Moscow, however, still postponed execution of the clauses of the Soviet-Afghan treaty until 15 November 1922, after ten months of interruption. Amanullah's attitude was also dictated by the situation in the

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'Frontier Tribes Belt', otherwise known as Pushtunistan, a region of British India inhabited by Afghan tribes. The problem of Pushtunistan was still an open wound for Afghans despite their goverment's official renunciation of all further claims on this area. During the last Anglo-Afghan war the tribes of the Frontier Belt had taken an active part in the battles and had continued to fight against the British army even after the signing of the Rawalpindi preliminary treaty of 8 August 1919. The tribes refused to lay down their arms and continued their struggle for unification with Afghanistan. Towards the autumn of 1922 this struggle was intensified by Britain sending its air force to destroy the villages. This new phase in the warfare provoked another Anglo-Afghan crisis, which made Amanullah keen to normalize relations with Soviet Russia. The tension now was extreme, as can be seen from a letter that Raskol'nikov's wife, a well-known journalist and writer, Larisa Reisner, wrote on 29 January 1923 to her parents in Moscow, in which she said: Please convey to Karakhan, in any way you can, that at this moment when Afghanistan is actually at war with Great Britain, when the blood of tribes is gushing along the borders and when the Emir has put his trust in us, when everything is at stake, Labour Russia must not dare to refuse help to tribes that have been exterminated and besieged for more than a hundred years. If we miss this moment, there will be nothing left for us to do here. Then it will be time to close up shop. And yet, after Lausanne, how opportune it would be to remind Great Britain of her tender spot in the East.11 'Labour Russia' made haste to help, especially as this provided an opportunity to antagonize London. Additional arms were dispatched to Afghanistan and permission was given for transit through Soviet territory of a hundred tons of arms purchased by the Afghans in Italy. By January 1923 Soviet specialists were in Kabul to set up a radio station. Soviet personnel also worked throughout the summer of 1923 to construct the Kushka-Herat-KandaharKabul telegraph line. At the same time preparations began for the transfer of eleven Soviet aircraft, plus crews, to the Afghan Army, which was viewed in London as a Bolshevik attempt to create an 'advanced military air base' on the Indian border and as a 'hostile Russian move'. The British ambassador, Sir Francis Humphreys, was instructed to make it clear to the Afghan government that London and Delhi considered it provocative that Soviet pilots were in Afghanistan and that the air force of the Emir was under the

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control of Soviet specialists, that this would seriously damage relations between the two states and that Kabul had taken on itself a grave responsibility. Britain also considered these moves a threat to India's security. Above all, the Soviet air base on Afghan territory would also constitute 'a more than serious threat to Afghanistan itself, since in the case of a serious anti-government riot it is doubtful whether Soviet pilots would extend help to the central government'.12 However, Kabul felt it had no alternative. Towards the end of 1923 Anglo-Afghan relations had reached crisis point. Sir Francis openly threatened war, and was trying with the help of his Italian colleague to establish what the position of the Soviet Union would be should the British Air Force attack Kabul.13 It did not take long for Moscow to realize that while Britain was uncertain of Russia's reaction, it would not dare to make such an attack. In fact, the situation played right into the hands of the Soviets, as it provided them with an opportunity to play the role of brave, selfless defenders of Afghan independence. An anti-government rebellion by tribes living in the Khost area offered Moscow another opportunity to show itself as an honest and disinterested champion of AmanuUah. The cause of the rebellion was the tribes' dissatisfaction with the policy of the central government which had curtailed their liberty. Moscow immediately declared that 'the rebels enjoyed support from India, whence they were receiving arms and equipment'.14 AmanuUah was by then in a critical situation for the rebels were routing government forces and had already advanced to within 80 kilometres of Kabul. Moscow quickly decided to come to their assistance. Soviet pilots, 'in eagles' flight over the Hindu Kush', managed to defeat the rebels, after which they remained in the Emir's service.15 Amanullah's regime was saved and Soviet influence in Afghanistan greatly increased, and Moscow at once demanded payment in kind. This was to be a decision on the controversy concerning the Urta-Tugai, an island formed by two channels of the Amu Darya River. This island according to the Soviet version, was once the property of the Bokhara Emirate but during the civil war had been taken over by Afghan frontier forces. The island, an area of no more than 160 square miles, was populated by several hundred Tadzhiks and Uzbeks, who had fled Bolshevik rule and were living there under Afghan protection. According to the Soviet version, the Afghan

From Moscow to Pagman, 1921-26, and the 1931 Pact frontier guards had been unexpectedly disarmed in November 1925 by Tadzhik émigrés, who had fled to Afghanistan after the 'revolution' in Bokhara and now wanted to return to their own country. It was then that, in order to prevent further clashes, Soviet frontier guards had occupied the island.16 Even more intriguing was the fact that, also according to the Soviet version, this operation had been undertaken without Moscow's knowledge.17 The Afghan government's reaction was unexpectedly swift. Extremely tense conversations took place between Tanzi and the Soviet ambassador, Leonid Stark. (Raskol'nikov had been recalled to Moscow in November 1923; Stark arrived in Kabul in July 1924 and remained there as ambassador until 1936.) Unexpectedly for Moscow, Amanullah showed greatfirmnessand began to take steps to liberate this tiny strip of land, calling it 'holy Afghan territory'. The matter was further discussed in December 1925 in Paris by Nadir Khan and Zukerman, Director of the Eastern Department of the Narkomindel, but they failed to reach any agreement. Kabul then requested the Hejaz mission in Moscow to act as intermediary and the Afghan ambassador and his He jazi colleague had three meetings with Chicherin, but also without any result.18 On 25 December 1925 Amanullah declared that a state of war between Afghanistan and the USSR was imminent and that Afghans must be prepared to fight for their country. Moscow's behaviour had demonstrated to Amanullah the true extent of his country's sovereignty as viewed by the Soviet government, and how insecure Afghanistan was along its northern borders. Tarzi discussed with Sir Francis and his military attaché the situation concerning arms supplies and military equipment from India, should there be armed conflict with the Soviet Union.19 Not until 4 February 1926 did Moscow inform the Afghan government that it was prepared to withdraw its forces from the island and to return it to Afghanistan. The protocol, signed on August 1926, contained Soviet recognition of Urta-Tugai as the inalienable property of Afghanistan. As a face-saving device, Moscow insisted on including a paragraph stating that the matter should have been decided on the principles of international law and historical fact, but since the Afghan side attached great economic importance to the matter of ownership of the island and considered that this outcome was preferable to all others, the Soviet side was prepared to act accordingly.20

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Many Western observers, including Western diplomats in Kabul, were at loss to understand the real motives of the Soviet Union. Why, with unchallenged influence in Afghanistan, should it suddenly be interested in one tiny island?21 It had become clear that the Soviet frontier guards who had occupied Urta-Tugai 'without their government's knowledge' had actually carried out the operation after being well prepared by the Soviet government. The reason in fact, was that Soviet diplomacy had begun to sound out the possibility of a Soviet-Afghan neutrality pact. On 4 July 1926, Stark had handed to Tarzi a Soviet proposal for such a pact, which was signed on 31 August 1926 at Pagman, the Emir's summer residence near Kabul. The relinquishing of Urta-Tugai was made to look as if it were payment by the Soviets for a neutrality pact. The Pagman pact imposed strict neutrality on both sides should either party declare war on a third or any other power; each was bound not to attack the other and not to take part in any military or political coalitions, economic or financial, directed against one of the signatories. Paragraph 2 of the Pagman pact stated: Should the attitude or behaviour of a third party or parties prove to be hostile to one of the signatories, the other is compelled not only to refrain from taking a hostile attitude, but also to oppose it, as well as all kinds of hostile activity on its own territory.22 Even a fleeting look at this document is enough to appreciate that, notwithstanding its apparent aspect of mutual preservation of interests, it actually only reflected the interests of the Soviet Union. After signature of the Soviet-Turkish non-aggression and neutrality pact of 17 December 1925 and of the Turkish-Iranian guarantee pact of 22 April 1926 the Pagman pact was yet another achievement for Soviet diplomacy which was aiming to create a secure zone in the region known as Russia's 'soft underbelly'. However, in reality there was never any threat to the Soviet Union from this direction. Its efforts were directed at the formation of a coalition that would be hostile to Britain and a threat to India. In order to bring that about, Moscow exploited the situation when Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan were greatly alarmed by the fact that in October 1925, at Locarno, London and Paris had temporarily put aside their differences and were now in a position to put pressure upon them. Soviet diplomacy did everything to increase the anxiety of Mustafa Kemal, Reza Shah and Amanullah Khan. Litvinov tried

From Moscow to Pagman, 1921-26, and the 1931 Pact to persuade the Turkish ambassador in Moscow that 'Locarno is dictating rapprochement between those countries against which it is directed.'23 Soviet tactics had been successful at the beginning. Its southern neighbours had concluded guarantee, neutrality and non-aggression pacts among themselves, and were now turning to Moscow with requests to act as arbitrator, which permitted the Soviet government to assume the role of peacemaker.24 But disappointment followed soon afterwards when there was no offensive by London or Paris either in the Near or Middle East. Ankara, Tehran and, somewhat later, Kabul began to understand where Soviet diplomacy had been leading. After this the Soviet 'pacts policy' met with defeat. However, the Pagman pact and the Soviet agreement to withdraw from Urta-Tugai made it possible for the Soviet Union to return to the matter of a Soviet-Afghan trade treaty. Negotiations began in 1925 but were interrupted by the Afghans for Afghanistan, making its first diffident steps to discard feudalism, met resistance from the Soviet Union on the principle of foreign trade monopoly. The Afghan government would not agree to the proposal by Soviet representatives that all trade operations between the two countries should be concentrated on Afghan territory, for which purpose they wished to open trade missions and set up foreign trade establishments in various Afghan cities. Afghan government circles knew quite well what the real task of the Soviet consulates was.25 Soviet trade missions and other establishments, covering the entire Afghan territory, would be setting up a dense network of espionage centres there. However, Afghanistan also needed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, and was greatly disappointed when Moscow, in spite of all its declarations of friendship, was not prepared to meet an Afghan desire to obtain transit rights through Soviet territory, unless the Soviet Union was awarded the status of most-favoured nation. Afghanistan could not agree to this as it did not want to bring ruin on its weak merchants and businessmen, who would be unable to withstand foreign competition. Having met with an absolute refusal from Kabul, Soviet diplomacy retreated, though only temporarily, concentrating its endeavours on political matters, which proved more successful though not without resort to pressure.

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In the meantime Soviet-Afghan trade was growing. In the summer of 1927 there was renewed talk of a trade agreement. Ambassador Stark was then in Moscow preparing to return to his post in Kabul after home leave. His main task was to bring about a trade agreement. On his way to Kabul, passing through Tashkent on 4 September, he gave an interview to the correspondent of the newspaper Pravda Vostoka, in which he stressed that the matter of a Soviet-Afghan trade treaty was of primary importance, and that it would be dealt with upon his arrival in Kabul. He added that the negotiations would begin immediately as both sides considered this to be top priority. It would, he said, 'build a strong foundation for mutual relations. This is especially needed since trade turnover between Afghanistan and the USSR is almost approaching its prewar volume. It would be reasonable to expect that eventually it will develop even further.'26 Nevertheless, the Soviet-Afghan trade treaty was not signed in 1927, and there is nothing to indicate that there were any contacts between Afghan government officials and Stark after his return to Kabul. This could be explained by the fact that in the autumn of 1927 the Afghan government was fully occupied with preparations of a hitherto unknown (in that country) event: the proposed visit of its ruler, King Amanullah Khan, to Europe. The king and his suite intended to spend about six months visiting India, Egypt, Italy, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran. The Soviet government wanted Amanullah Khan to visit the USSR first, but the Afghan ambassador in Moscow declined that offer, with the excuse that the winter weather made travel almost impossible along the Afghan-Soviet border and, to sweeten the refusal, said that last impressions were usually the best remembered.27 Amanullah Khan and his retinue left Kabul on 29 November 1927, arriving in Italy on 8 January 1928 - thefirstAfghan monarch to visit Europe. On his arrival in the Soviet Union (where he stayed from 3-18 May 1928) he was received with exceptional warmth and friendliness. He visited Leningrad and the Transcaucasian republics and was even permitted to visit the main Baltic naval base at Kronstadt - a sign of very special trust. A military parade and manoeuvres were held in his honour, and he also made the mandatory visits to industrial establishments and Kolkhozes. In addition, Amanullah was received by the President, Mikhail Kalinin,

From Moscow to Pagman, 1921-26, and the 1931 Pact the Defence Minister (Narkomvoenmor), Klim Voroshilov, and by Chicherin, Litvinov and Karakhan. In the course of these meetings and intensive negotiations, the stranger viewpoints of the Afghan monarch became clear. He ignored all attempts to discuss a trade treaty, merely saying that it would be desirable for both sides. But he was very insistent that a quadripartite pact between the USSR, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey was necessary and ought to be concluded. The Soviet leadership was obviously embarrassed since it had no intention of going any further in its relations with its southern neighbours, nor was it prepared to undertake any more serious obligations. For Amanullah Khan their refusal was not so much a disappointment as a confirmation of his apprehensions, which he had discussed with President Hindenburg during his stay in Berlin.28 Seen against the background of these differences, Amanullah's assurances of love and friendship for the Soviet Union were hardly convincing (T love Soviet Russia, and from the very beginning I felt it was a friend. I wish to keep that friendship. Please be assured of that', he told Chicherin).29 Thus Amanullah's visit to the USSR was quite unproductive. While he was still there, Chicherin had written to Stark in Kabul: The discussions about a trade treaty had reached an impasse concerning the matter of transit.'30 In the course of his tour through Western Europe, Amanullah had become more and more convinced of the necessity to modernize and to Westernize Afghanistan. He was of the opinion that, as his country's external situation was now stable, he could introduce a series of progressive reforms. Having given Afghanistan a constitution (1923) and introduced agrarian, taxation and administrative reforms, and having taken care to remedy the situation and settlement of tribes, Amanullah decided to turn to the problems of education and the condition of women in Afghanistan. On his return to Afghanistan (1 June 1928), he delivered a number of speeches to the local authorities and clergy, the local merchants and citizens of Herat, telling them about what he had seen in Western Europe and of the need to introduce European methods and lifestyle. He exposed the conservatism and reactionary thinking of the clergy, and the need for expanding the general educational system and establishing a network of professional and technical schools.

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He also advocated the overall emancipation of women and the setting up of a number of schools for girls. Amanullah kept repeating: 'I am a revolutionary King and I hope to bring about a revolution in all aspects of my country's life.' Yet the few social groups in Afghanistan with any interest in reform were weak and unable to stand up to the powerful forces of conservatism which werefiercelyopposed to any kind of innovation or progress. These conservative forces feared the loss of their power and privileges but had been weakened by the 1924 events in Khost. When Amanullah Khan declared his intention to set up a parliament on the European model and to limit severely the prerogatives of the traditional representative Afghan institutions, including the Jirga, to abolish altogether the traditional titles of nobility and to begin building theatres and cinemas in provincial centres, their hatred of him knew no bounds. Amanullah Khan had attached no importance to the opposition to his regime which had been growing over the previous four years and was now behind the head of the Afghan clergy, Fazli Umara, who since 1924 had been living in exile in India. Umara's two brothers, who had remained in Afghanistan, had taken advantage of Amanullah's absence abroad to spread anti-government agitation. They had organized meetings and conventions between mullahs and tribal chiefs where the consequences of Amanullah's reforms and their repercussions on the social classes were discussed. One such meeting took place on Indian territory, at Dera-IsmailKhan, in which representatives of the clergy participated together with the tribal nobility from the southern province of Paktia. There a decision was taken to organize a putsch to deprive the Young Afghans of power and force the king to give up his far-reaching programme of reforms. In September 1928, Fazli Umara's brothers began to collect signatures from members of the clergy on an appeal to all Muslims which declared that Amanullah's reforms were contrary to Islamic principles. Fazli Umara's agents again incited the Shinvari tribes from the Khost area to rebel, which they did on 14 November 1928. Amanullah Khan dispatched two ministers, Gulam Siddik Sharki and Shir Ahmed, to negotiate with the Shinvari chiefs. The Shinvari demanded the abrogation of all reforms: women and young girls studying abroad should return, public schools should be closed down and persecution of the clergy should be stopped immediately.

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They also demanded the expulsion of all foreign embassies and missions, except the British. The negotiations of Amanullah's envoys with the Shinvari produced no satisfactory results. When a peasant uprising began in Afghan Turkestan (populated by Uzbeks and Tadzhiks), Amanullah's position became hopeless. Their protests against crippling taxation were closely interwoven with protests against discrimination. The rebel army was led by a defector from the Afghan army, a Tadzhik named Bachai-Sakao (the water-carrier's son). The peasant rebellion soon spilled over into Kuhistan province where the tribal nobility and clergy immediately organized themselves in support of Bachai-Sakao in order to topple AmanuUah. In this they succeeded, and on 14 January 1929 AmanuUah relinquished his power in favour of his brother, Inayatullah, who was also forced to abdicate after only three days. On 17 January 1929, Bachai-Sakao was proclaimed King of Aghanistan and took the name Habibullah Gazi.

Moscow's activities at this time (in connection with Iran's attempts to violate Afghanistan's territorial integrity) have been described in the previous chapter. It should also be mentioned that Stark had done nothing to inform AmanuUah about the intrigues of the opposition. It was only on 9 November 1928 that he requested an audience with AmanuUah to receive the king's true appraisal of the situation. AmanuUah declared 'at once and very categorically' that he felt that 'the rebellion against him personally was inspired by the British'. Stark also noted: When speaking about the causes of the rebellion, Padishah said that the main reason for discontent had been the refusal to accept reforms, and that the British had used the situation for their own ends; but another reason was the distortion of the reforms themselves and the absurd and clumsy way they had been introduced. As to the Shinvari tribe, according to Padishah, the direct and immediate reason for rebellion was the opening of new schools I thought it necessary to tell him towards the end of our interview that the Soviet government will in the future, as in the past, give him support.31 However, there was no stopping the course of events and Soviet help arrived too late. The British Indian authorities had known about the planned rebellion and their intelligence had followed closely every move-

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ment of Fazli Umara: they knew about the conference in DeraIsmail-Khan and about the transfer of arms across the border, but did nothing to prevent it.32 Moreover, Colonel Lawrence was seen, according to the Afghan newspapers, near the Indo-Afghan border during the crisis - causing great anxiety in Moscow.33 After Amanullah's abdication, the British ambassador had suggested that all foreign representatives should leave Kabul and transfer their offices to India, but Stark and his Turkish and Iranian colleagues refused to go. The Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran also refused to acknowledge the new regime. On 23 January 1929, Stark informed the Narkomindel that 'the British Habibullah intrigue is turning more and more into a farce'.34 The new regime's treatment of the Soviet embassy was openly hostile. On 9 February 1929, Stark wrote to Moscow that the Afghan authorities were accusing him of 'hostile propaganda and subversive activity against BachaiSakao's government'.35 A telegram soon arrived with instructions from the Narkomindel, indicating a clear line on the Afghan question: We are to observe strictest neutrality in matters concerning Afghanistan and non-interference in its internal affairs. Your relations with the new authorities who have come to power as a result of the coup d'état must be correct and loyal, yet remain within the limits of business contacts; the same applies to the present de facto ruling authority.36 In other words, the Soviet Union recognized, de facto, BachaiSakao's regime, but otherwise adopted a wait-and-see attitude. This position remained unchanged for the next five months. On 16 June 1929 Karakhan informed Stark that the Soviet Union would assume responsibility for looking after German interests on Afghan territory after the German embassy personnel had left Kabul. Karakhan drew Stark's attention, and that of his colleagues, Davtyan in Tehran and Surits in Ankara, to the following 'reservation': We assume responsibility for German interests only as far as the general atmosphere and our actual relations with the authorities permit us to defend our own interests and in places where our own consular personnel and institutions are active. You are informed that this reservation is intended to prevent an interpretation of this step as a recognition of Habibullah.37 The situation in Afghanistan in the summer of 1929 was indeed ill-defined for Soviet diplomats there. Among Party leaders in

From Moscow to Pagman, 1921-26, and the 1931 Pact Moscow there was much talk about the 'closeness of the social attitude' of Bachai-Sakao to the Soviet ideal. It was stressed that he was the leader of a peasants' revolt, having come to power 'on the crest of that wave'. However, the absence at that time of a unified position on the Afghan question among Soviet ruling circles is reflected by an editorial, entitled 'Lessons of a Peasant Uprising', published in the organ of the Central Asian Bureau (Sredazbiuro) of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), Biulleteri Pressy Srednego Vostoka.38 This article was written on 26 October 1929, when Bachai-Sakao had already fallen from power, and this makes it all the more interesting. In this article regret is expressed that BachaiSakao had disappointed the peasants by surrounding himself with landlords and the tribal nobility. Under the influence of the clergy and clever officials, who took advantage of the ignorance and backwardness of the peasantry, everything had been returned to the old ways dictated by Islam, with all its reactionary rules. On the other hand, the author of the article points out, there was a positive aspect to Habibullah's government since there was not a single cleric among its members. Moreover, the new government had emphasized its desire to find a solution to the national enmity between the Afghan ethnic elements and the Tadzhik-Uzbek population of northern Afghanistan. According to the article, by stressing the fact that there were at least some 'democratic elements' in his programme, the 'leader of peasants', who had already lost his democratic ideas, gave the impression that he nevertheless wanted to gain favour in the eyes of certain ruling circles in Moscow. Thus, Party circles in Moscow and Tashkent did not agree with Stark's evaluation when he described the situation as a farce. In the same article, Amanullah Khan is bitterly criticized, an opinion which did tally with those of elitist Party circles in the Soviet Union. It should also be mentioned that during his visit to Moscow the king could not meet with Stalin or any senior members of the party. In fact, the deposed king was accused of having actively inflamed national enmity in his country and of fanning it for his own purposes. Rumours were spread that Amanullah Khan had 'fled to fascist Rome' taking with him 20 bags of gold coins. However, two interesting facts were not mentioned. The first is that Amanullah Khan had continuedfightingagainst Bachai-Sakao on Afghan territory until May 1929 and only gave up his campaign

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when he failed to reach Kabul, having started out from Kandahar; and the second, and more important, is that the former War Minister of Afghanistan, Nadir Khan, having returned from abroad, had declared war on Bachai-Sakao on 22 March 1929. These points are not referred to in the exchange of letters and telegrams between Stark and the Narkomindel until October 1929, by which time Nadir Khan had completely routed Bachai-Sakao and had been proclaimed king of Afghanistan. No mention was made of what Nadir Khan had done until later. It is understandable that the prospect of Nadir Khan becoming king of Afghanistan was not welcome in Moscow, where his attitude concerning Soviet policy in Bokhara was well remembered. His retirement and departure abroad, together with his four brothers, was largely because of his disagreement with the then pro-Soviet tendency in Afghan foreign policy. Nadir Khan's sympathies were with Germany which, unlike Britain and the Soviet Union, did not threaten Afghanistan's independence. On 15 October 1929, according to a communiqué from the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nadir Khan was unanimously acknowledged as Afghanistan's national leader. This information was acknowledged four days later by the Narkomindel to the Afghan government.39 But the hostile tone of Soviet publications did not change. The quasi-official article referred to above emphasized that 'Nadir Khan was fanning national enmity, stressing the national aspirations of Afghanistan's ethnic groups and trying to make capital out of the fact that the Afghans had lost the status of a ruling nation. m It was pointed out that in the cabinet set up by Nadir Khan the posts of Minister of Justice and President of the National Council had been given to Fazli Umara and his brother Gul Agha, who had led the uprising against Amanullah, and that a mullah had been appointed Minister of Court Affairs. Enumerating the problems which Afghanistan would be facing, the author of the article stressed that: The problem of Basmachi emigration is of no small importance. Nadir Khan's endeavours to pacify the country will not bring any positive results unless he takes concrete and decisive steps to control the discontented elements living in the border strip who are trying to foment trouble. If Nadir Khan pays no attention to this area, all the talk about his friendly feelings toward the USSR will remain just words.41 In fact, it was impossible for the new king to ignore the problem

From Moscow to Pagman, 1921-26, and the 1931 Pact of 'Basmachi emigration' as one of their leaders, Ibrahim Bek, had openly declared himself to be on the side of Amanullah, had concluded an armistice with the Soviet Command in Central Asia, and was soon receiving arms from them.42 Nadir Khan therefore gave strict orders to the Herat authorities to take decisive steps to stop Basmachi attacks in Soviet border areas, and ordered their transfer from the border areas to central Afghanistan. The local authorities in Herat tried to ignore these orders but soon learned that the new king had a strong hand.43 The internecine war in Afghanistan was at its fiercest when the three-year term of the Pagman pact came to an end (31 August 1929). Since neither side had declared that it wanted the pact annulled, it was, in accordance with paragraph 6 of the pact, automatically extended for another year - until 31 August 1930. However, as this automatic extension was for only one year after its original termination date, it would no longer be in force after 31 August 1930 and so both sides agreed to begin negotiations on future neutrality and non-aggression. The new Afghan leadership was fully aware that neither the Pagman pact nor any other agreement with the Soviet Union would provide Afghanistan with a real guarantee against Soviet aggression or intervention, but made the best of the situation by agreeing to sign a similar agreement, in order not to provide Moscow with any additional pretext to exacerbate the serious difficulties already being faced by the new regime.44 The Soviet-Afghan negotations resulted in a new treaty on neutrality and mutual non-aggression, which was signed on 24 June 1931. The document consisted of nine clauses. The first three clauses were the same as the first three of the Pagman pact, containing: an obligation by both sides to observe neutrality should one of the sides enter a war or become involved in an armed conflict with a third power or powers; an undertaking not to attack the other side and not to participate in any alliance or agreement of a political or military character which might be directed against the other side; an agreement not to take part in any economic or financial boycott or blockade directed against the other side; and agreements not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, and not to tolerate or permit any activity on its territory by groups or organizations hostile to the other side. Clauses 4 and 5 declared that neither signatory was bound by any kind of secret or open undertaking contradicting clauses 1,2 and 3.

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Clause 6 stated that, outside the limitations of clauses 1 to 5, each side would be free to conclude alliances or agreements with third parties. Clause 7 contained an obligation to solve by peaceful means any disagreement or conflict that might arise between the signatories. The treaty was to remain in force for five years and could be prolonged yearly if neither side declared a wish to have the treaty annulled during, but not later than, the first six months of each year.45 In April 1932, Afghanistan and the USSR signed the postal convention which had been awaiting ratification for a long time during the reign of Amanullah Khan. During that time, in 1928, Afghanistan had joined the International Postal Union and was thus obliged by IPU statutes to conclude further postal conventions, first with its immediate neighbours. In September 1932, a SovietAfghan agreement was signed concerning their borders and the creation of a corps of border commissars. The need for such an agreement was urgent, owing to the crossing of the Soviet-Afghan border by many refugees from the Soviet Union. The stream of refugees had grown immensely during the years of collectivization in the USSR and of the first five-year plan.46 In all other aspects, however the Afghan government endeavoured to minimize its relations with the Soviet Union. It was decided not to prolong the Soviet-Afghan air communication convention which had lapsed in January 1929. The Afghan government also looked unfavourably on a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Nadir Khan was in accord with Amanullah's policy concerning the establishment of Soviet foreign trade organizations on Afghan territory and continued to oppose the Soviet demand. He was also against giving the Soviet Union most-favoured-nation status. On 19 September 1932 Stark informed the Narkomindel that the Afghan ambassador to Moscow, Muhammed Aziz, who had just returned to Kabul, had 'forcefully requested his government not to enter into any more agreements with the USSR, not even a trade treaty'. Stark said that his trade negotiations with the Afghan government had reached an impasse and that Muhammed Aziz was very influential in Afghan ruling circles. After due consideration, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Faiz Muhammed Khan, officially informed Stark that the Afghans suggested that the signing of any new treaty be postponed for two to three years.47 It was not

From Moscow to Pagman, 1921-26, and the 1931 Pact until May 1936 that a trade agreement was concluded between the Soviet foreign trade organization, 'Sovafghantorg', and the Afghan trading company, 'Ashami', but no trade agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. On the whole, Soviet-Afghan relations at the beginning of the 1930s were correct but not as warm or trusting as they had been during the rule of Amanullah Khan. There was a tendency to coolness between the two countries, owing to Nadir Khan's mistrust of Soviet policy aims. Contemporary foreign observers in Afghanistan also give this evaluation of the situation and believed that Soviet influence was rapidly diminishing. By 1933 there remained little trace of that successful Soviet diplomacy that had been so evident in the 1920s.

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Conclusion Iran and Afghanistan both entered thefiveyears (1934-39) leading up to the Second World War with attitudes diametrically opposed to those described in this book. Reza Shah had a 'fanatical hatred' of the Soviet Union, based on the 'fear of Bolshevism and the spreading of communist propaganda in Iran'.1 His Afghan colleague, King Muhammad Zaher Shah, who for understandable reasons was subjected to less pressure from the north, also viewed the situation with concern and mistrust. Although relations between Moscow, on one hand, and Tehran and Kabul, on the other, could not be considered 'frozen', this tendency to diminish and weaken was quite noticeable, especially in Soviet-Iranian relations and where trade was concerned. Until 1937 the Soviet Union headed the list of Iran's foreign trade partners, the Soviet share amounting to 35 per cent. However, that indicator was already down to 11.5 per cent in 1938, and by 1939 had dropped to 0.5 per cent. Between 1934 and 1937 Soviet-Iranian trade was defined by the three-year Trade Agreement of 1934. Soviet-Iranian negotiations concerning a new trade agreement took place in Moscow in 1938 but were fruitless. The rapid diminution in trade was in itself an indication of an obvious deterioration in political relations. The Shah's mistrust, hostility and fear of the Soviet Union were growing as the latter became an ever greater military power. It finally reached culmination when Moscow, after being accepted into the League of Nations, refused to delete clauses 5 and 6^of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. The Iranian government, in view of the status granted by the League of Nations to the Soviet Union, together with all the necessary guarantees for its security, immediately requested the annulment of these clauses which limited Iran's sovereignty, but was refused. By that refusal Moscow virtually admitted that the clauses were not directed against 'a third party' but against Iran itself. In 1938 the staff of the Soviet embassy in Tehran, and that of Soviet consulates in other cities, was considerably reduced. The exposure by Iran's secret police of a Marxist group headed by Tagi

Conclusion

153

Erani was also a serious blow to Moscow's prestige. Erani was arrested in April 1937 and in November 1938 was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. His case, together with that of his colleagues, became known as the 'case of the 53'. Erani died in the prison hospital in February 1940. During the investigations and hearings both the Iranian and the world press referred to the Erani group as a Moscow Comintern agency. Soviet-Afghan relations were not as sharply and dramatically hostile as those between Iran and the Soviet Union. Nevertherless, the Afghan government was very conscious of growing aggressive tendencies in Moscow's foreign policy. For Afghanistan, the situation was complicated by its geopolitical position, causing a lack of free access to the outside world. Its most militarily vulnerable regions were bordered on one side by British India and on the other by the Soviet Union. Moscow's foreign policy was clearly antiBritish (until the Nazi aggression committed against the USSR on 22 June 1941) and in an Anglo-Soviet conflict Afghan territory could be in the firing line between its two mighty neighbours. Afghan's geopolitical situation had yet another drawback; it limited the possibilities of seeking friendship with a third-world power which would lessen its dependence on Britain and the Soviet Union..Other southern neighbours of the Soviet Union were also at that time in search of such a friendship. No one had yet found what they really wanted, but in mid-1937 Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan decided to form a defensive alliance. A pact was signed between them on 8 July 1937 in the Sa'adabad Palace in Tehran which became known as the Sa'adabad pact. Its signatories did not specify from which country they feared an attempt on their security, leaving it to the rest of the world to guess. Some named Italy, which at that time had invaded Ethiopia; others still saw Britain as the traditional threat to their independence. However, all were increasingly beginning to feel that the greatest threat to the entire Near and Middle East region was being posed by Stalin's Soviet Union. When the third power for which the states of that region were looking finally came to the fore, the Sa'adabad pact rapidly began to lose its raison d'être. Iran, in particular, strove to achieve the closest and widest possible collaboration with Nazi Germany, but a proGerman orientation also became obvious in the behaviour of the three other signatories of the Sa'adabad pact. Soviet historiography presented this development as follows:

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Reza Shah in the 1930s became extremely nationalistically minded, which led to a paranoid dream of a 'Greater Iran', which in turn led him to a bitter confrontation with the Soviet Union. This obliged Moscow at the end of August 1941 to send forces into Iran. Agreeing with the Soviet version of events would mean turning the problem upside-down. In fact, the main factor which influenced Iran's new foreign policy was fear of the ever-growing threat from the north. As Engert, the US envoy in Tehran, wrote on 29 September 1940: The fear of the Soviets is the main factor behind the rapprochementwith Germany. Fear of communism brought the Shah to the decision that only Hitler could at that time defend Iran from a Bolshevik invasion.'2

NOTES Chapter 1, pp. 1-11 1. P.P. Bushev, Istoriya PosoVstv i Diplomaticheskikh Otnoshenii Russkogo i Iranskogo Gosudarstv v 1586-1612 godakh (Moscow: Nauka, 1976). 2. Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossii (henceforth AVPR), fond 'Glavny Arkhiv 1-9', opis' 8, 184&-49, delo 14, p. 51. 3. AVPR, fond 'Kantselyariya Ministerstva inostrannykh del(MID)', Perepiska s Tegeranom, 1846, delo 183, tom 1, pp. 5-8. Correspondence between the Russian and British Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary in Tehran, Count A.I. Medem and Lt.-Col. Sir J. Sheil, 16 Jan. 1846. 4. M. Volodarsky, 'Persia's Foreign Policy between Two Herat Crises, 1831-1856', in Middle Eastern Studies (MES), Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 1985), pp. 111-51; ibid., 'Persia and the Great Powers, 1856-69', in MES, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan. 1983), pp. 75-99. 5. AVPR, fond 'Kantselyariya MID', Perepiska's Tegeranom', 1917, delo 52, p. 135. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., pp. 137, 140. 8. Ibid., delo 97, t. 1, p. 176. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., delo 97, t. 2, p. 543 11. Setareye sorh, 28 April 1917. 12. AVPR, fond 'Persidskii stol B', 1917, delo 48, pp. 116-17. It is interesting that among the founders of this terrorist organization was a certain Ehsanulla who three years later became a member of the government of the so-called Gilan Soviet Republic. 13. AVPR, fond 'Kantselyariya MID', Perepiska s Tegeranom, 1917, delo 52, p. 641. 14. Ibid., p. 640. 15. Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv v Leningrade (TsDIAL), fond Osobennoi kantselyarii Ministrafinansovpo secretnoi chasti, opis' 1,1823, delo 3/3, p. 22. 16. AVPR, fond 'Missiya v Persii', 1836, delo 14, pp. 52-4. Count I.O. Simonich to the ambassador in Constantinople, A.P. Butenev, 28 April 1936. 17. M. Volodarsky, 'The Russians in Afghanistan in the 1830s', in Central Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1984), pp. 63-86. 18. AVPR, fond 'Kantselyariya MID', Perepiska s Londonom, 1879, delo 80, p. 40. Prince Gorchakov's confidential dispatch, 12 Feb. 1879. 19. Abdurrakhman Khan: Avtobiografiya Abdurrakhman Khana, Emira Afghanistana (St Petersburg, 1901), p. 237 (translation in Russian). Chapter 2, pp. 12-52 1. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (henceforth DVP SSSR), I (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957), p. 35.

156 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours Ibid., Ill, p. 536. Ibid., I, p. 72. Ibid., pp. 72-3. Ibid., p. 73. Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., p. 92. Ibid. Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., p. 713, note 18. Izvestiya, 16 April 1918. Lenin explained the reasons for this generosity with his usual frankness: 'While we are the weaker, we have to manoeuvre.' (V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, V. XXXV, p. 244). Izvestiya, 16 April 1918. The Gilan Committee for Islamic Unity, for example, published a statement saying that 'the government has no right not to recognize the representatives of Bolshevik Russia' (M.N. Ivanova, Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie v Irane v 1918-1922 godakh (Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoi literatury, 1961), p. 63). DVP SSSR, I, p. 714, note 20. Ibid., p. 104. M.N. Ivanova, p. 63. DVP SSSR, I, p. 243. It is symbolic that Bravin prudently did not include among those who henceforth would not enjoy the Soviet government's patronage the Soviet Russiaorientated Iranian revolutionaries and members of anti-government movements and organizations. Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (henceforth NAVPRF), fond 'Obzory persidskoi pechati', 1918. N.S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Iran, 1917-1923 (New York: Russell F. Moore, 1964), p. 139. Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Uzbekskoi SSR, fond R-25, delo 118, p. 38 (quoted in I. A. Yusupov, Ustanovlenie i razvitie sovetsko-iranskikh otnoshenii, 1917-1927 (Tashkent, FAN, 1969), p. 29). Documents on British Foreign Policy (henceforth DBFP), First Series (London: HMSO, 1952), V. IV, p. 1189. Ahmed Ali Sepehr, Iran in the First World War (Tehran, 1958), pp. 490-91 (in Persian); L. Miroshnikov, Angliiskaya ekspansiya v Irane, 1914-1920 (Moscow: IVL, 1961), pp. 81-5. AMID SSSR, fond 'Obzory persidskoi pechati', 1918. The Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords (henceforth PDL), V. XXVII (London: HMSO, 1918), p. 825. Ibid. R.K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 1500-1941 (Charlottesville: Virginia University Press, 1966), p. 174. K. Troyanovskii, Vostok i revolyutsiya (Petrograd, 1918), p. 9. Arkhiv Instituía Vostokovedeniya Akademii Nauk SSSR, National Archives of India (henceforth AIVAN SSSR, NAI), Persia Series, Part XVI, Notes, doc. 68, p. 42. DBFP, First Series, XIII, p. 705. Ibid., p. 706. Ibid., p. 675. AIVAN SSSR, NAI, Persia Series, Part XXV, Notes, p. 10, 'Commentary of the Political Department of the Indian Government about the Agreement of 1919'.

Notes to Chapter 2

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34. J.M. Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia (London: Blackwood, 1922), pp. 122-3. 35. Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktyabrskoi revolyutsii i sotsialisticheskogo stroitelstva (henceforth TsGAORiSS), fond 130, delo 178, p. 2. 36. B.Z. Shumyatskii, Napostu sovetskoi diplomatii. (Moscow: GPI, 1960) pp. 335. The Iranian government did not reply to these proposals. 37. TsGAORiSS, f. 130, delo 178, p. 2. 38. B.Z. Shumyatskii, p. 33. 39. TsGAORiSS, fond 130, delo 178, pp. 6-7. 40. Ali Azéri, The Revolt of Colonel Mohammed Tagi Khan Passian in Khorassan, Tehran (1951), p. 215 (in Persian). 41. In reply to the protest made by Kolomytsev against the arrest of members of the Enzeli Revolutionary Military Committee, an official representative of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: 'But what can we do if they [the British] arrest Persians too?' (TsGAORiSS, fond 130, delo 178, p. 3). He was referring to the arrest by the British occupation troops in Kermanshah of a deputy to the Majlis, Suleiman Mirza Eskandari, which was viewed by Iranian public opinion as 'a most severe insult to the entire Iranian people and a violation of its sovereignity'. In response, partisans, who were active in mountainous areas of Gilan, arrested the British consul in Rasht, McLaren, a British Army Captain, Noel, and Mr Oakshot, manager of the Rasht branch of the Shahinshah Bank (AVPR, fond Konsul'stvo v Kermanshakhe, 1917-1918 gody, delo 47, pp. 19,42). Kolomytsev recommended that his government, in response to the arrest of Soviet citizens in Iran, should arrest members of the Iranian mission in Moscow and demand their exchange for the arrested Soviet citizens. On 20 September 1918 Assad Khan was arrested (AIVAN SSSR, NAI, Experts from the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, 1922, doc. 123). A similar recommendation to the government in Moscow was received from the Narkomindel (Foreign Ministry) of Turkestan ASSR in connection with the arrest in Meshed of the entire diplomatic mission headed by E. A. Babushkin, which had gone to Iran on 25 September 1918. The purpose of that mission was to establish diplomatic relations and to re-establish economic relations between Soviet Turkestan and Iran. In November 1918, the representatives of the Turkestan ASSR in Moscow, Troitsky and Yusupov, informed Tashkent that at the request of the TASSR government 'the Persian ambassador was arrested in Petrograd, and was taken to Moscow where he received the demand that our diplomatic agents be freed' (TsGA UzbSSR, fond 25, delo 68, p. 62, quoted by M.V. Popov, Missiya E.A. Babushkina v Irane (Moscow: Nauka, 1974) p. 66). 42. B.Z. Shumyatskii, pp. 46-47. 43. DVP SSSR, II, pp. 130-31. Chicherin was referring to force with which the Iranian police dealt with the participants in a protest meeting against the destruction of the Soviet mission in Tehran. Thirteen of them were arrested and exiled from the capital and four were shot. (M.V. Popov, p. 20). 44. P. Sykes, A History of Persia (London: Macmillan, 1921), Vol. II, pp. 452-74; W.E.R. Dickson, East Persia: A Backwater of the Great War (London: Hutchinson, 1924). 45. AVPR, fond Konsul'stvo v Kermanshakhe, 1917-1918 gody, delo 42, pp. 46, 47,97; AVPR, fond Missiya v Persii, 1917-1920, delo 10, pp. 16,41,56. Prince Mas'ud Zill es-Saltaneh was the eldest and favourite son of Nasr ed-Din Shah (1848-96). However, as his mother was not a Qajar princess, he could not inherit the throne. During his father's life he was given several provinces, which he governed. Towards the end of the 19th century he was in control of one-third

158

46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours of Iran's territory, with Isfahan as its centre. He had under his command a force equalling several regiments, well-armed and trained by British-Indian officers. His forces were the best in Iran, inferior only to the Cossack brigade commanded by Russian officers. Prince Mas'ud Zill es-Saltaneh was totally Britishorientated. During the years of the Iranian Revolution 1905-11, London was upholding his claim to the throne, which did not succeed, owing to Russia's objections, when his nephew, Mohammad-Ali Shah, was forced in 1909 to abdicate and leave Iran. Major Gen. Sir Percy Sykes (Vol. II, p. 503) wrote that the population of Shiraz, 'aroused by the mullahs who were calling them to a holy war, was filled with hatred for the British'. The Iranian historian, Abu al-Fazl Kasemi, writes that in Iran at that time a saying became popular that reliance on British aid was like 'kissing a snake or expecting love from a scorpion' (A.F. Kasemi, The Black History of the Families (Tehran: n.d.), Vol. I, p. 184 (in Persian)). AVPR, fond Missiya v Persii, 1917-1920, delo 10, pp. 41-4. Malek osh-Shoara Bahar, A Short History of the Political Parties of Iran (Tehran, 1944), pp. 118-19 (in Persian). Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States, Vol. II, 1919 (Washington, DC, 1932), p. 701. DBFP, XIII, pp. 429, 454. Ibid., p. 436. H. Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925 (London: Constable, 1937), pp. 121-2. Archives Diplomatiques Françaises (henceforth ADF), Série E, Asie, 19181929, Perse, Vol. 33, p. 103. Ibid., p. 226. C. Serine, World War in Iran (London: Constable, 1962), p. 59. AVPR, fond 'Missiya v Persii, 1917-1920', delo 10, pp. 102-3. DPFP, IV, p. 119. Ibid., pp. 1261-2. M. Bahar, pp. 113-19. G.L. Bondarevskii, Angliiskaya politika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v basseine Persidskogo zaliva (konets XIX - nachalo XX vekov) (Moscow: Nauka, 1968). DBFP, IV, p. 1199. N. Bobynin, Persiya, eyo economicheskoe polozhenie i vneshnyaya torgovlya (1901-1923 gody) (Tiflis, 1923), p. 358. Tableau générale du commerce avec les étrangers pendant Vannée 1302 (19231924) (Tehran, 1925), p. 17. DBFP, IV, pp. 1173-4, 1201-3, 1206-7. Quoted by Yusupov, p. 34. DBFP, IV, pp. 1271-3. DBFP, III, p. 734. DVP SSSR, II, pp. 241-2. Iran (newspaper), 12 May 1920. M. Pavlovich and S. Iranskii, Persiya v bor'be za nezavisimost' (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1925), p. 168. DBFP, IV, p. 481. The Times, 6 April 1920. DBFP, XIII, p. 467. Ibid., p. 470. Ibid., pp. 470-1. DVP SSSR, II, pp. 535-8.

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77. A.N. Kheifets, Sovetskaya Rossiya i sopredeVnye strany Vostoka, 1918-1920 gody (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), p. 235. 78. DVP SSSR, II, p. 543. 79. The Trotsky Papers 1917-1922, Vol. II (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1971). pp. 146-7. 80. Ramazani, p. 151. 81. The British attitude was formulated in an extremely concise and unambiguous manner by War Minister Winston Churchill in a letter to Lord Curzon: 'I must absolutely decline to continue to share responsibility for a policy of mere bluff. I do not see how anything we can do within the present limits of our policy can possibly avert the complete loss of British influence throughout the Caucasus, Transcaspia, and Persia' (quoted in Serine, p. 62). An indignant Lord Curzon wrote on this matter to his friend Lord Harding: 'We have surely realised by now that W.O. does not care a brass button about Persia. Of course the retreat from Enzeli and Rasht was an idiotic blunder. But once done we shall never get W.O. to retract it. They are much more likely to propose withdrawal from Kazvin' (DBFP, XIII, p. 567). 82. DBFP, XIII, pp. 458, 542. 83. Ramazani, p. 151. 84. ADF, Série E, Asie, 1918-1929, Perse, Vol. 35, p. 141. 85. Ibid., Vol. 38, p. 126. 86. DVP SSSR, II, pp. 559, 580, 585. 87. Ibid., pp. 580-81, 585-6. 88. It is impossible to accept that the Soviet government decided to invade Iran because it wanted to return stolen property to 'the Russian people', property which consisted of several old Volga and Caspian Sea ships, hastily converted into warships during the Civil War. It is equally impossible to believe that the Soviet command planned a limited military action merely aiming to put an end to the provocations of the remnants of the White Army that had fled to Iran. These are the only reasons put forward by Soviet authors for Operation Enzeli, although that it was certain to lead to unpleasant repercussions was not predictable. Apparently, Moscow expected so much from this action that it decided to attack Iran even though this might have undermined its influence in Asia. No less a person than Lenin repeatedly begged his colleagues: 'It is highly important for our Weltpolitik to earn the trust of the natives... to prove that we are not imperialists and will not tolerate a deviation in this direction. This is a question of global significance. I am not exaggerating. Here one has to be super strict. It will have an impact on India, on the whole East. It is not a joking matter. One has to be a thousand times prudent' (V.I. Lenin, Polnoesobraniye sochnenii, Vol. LIII, p. 190). 89. Ramazani, p. 154. 90. TsGAORiSS, fond 130, delo 178, p. 8. 91. Ibid., delo 464, 99, 102a. Kuchuk Khan's striking political and cultural ignorance and primitive thinking were not something out of the ordinary. This was the level of most of the 'leaders' who rode the wave of anti-government and anti-foreigner movements in Asia and whom Moscow immediately canonized as progressive and advanced forces. 92. Izvestiya, 16 June 1920. 93. Izvestiya, 13 July 1920. 94. Petrogradskaya pravda, 16 July 1920. 95. Kheifets, p. 244. 96. TsGAORiSS, fond 130, delo 464, 103. 97. Izvestiya, 10 June 1920.

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98. The Trotsky Papers, II, p. 209. 99. 'In Gilan the Muslims of other Eastern countries saw a spectacle played by the Soviet "workers and peasants" government which had carried out direct aggression against a Muslim state that had not previously been a part of Tsarist Russia. Here for the first time Bolshevism demonstrated a tendency to selfaggrandizement' (G. Nollau and W.J. Wiehe, Russia's South Flank: Soviet Operations in Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 19). 100. RTsKhlDNI, fond 85, opis' 8, delo 23, p.120. 101. The view of an authority such as George Kennan is noteworthy. In his Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (Princeton University Press, 1960) he wrote: 'In 1920 an unsuccessful attempt was made by Stalin, in his capacity of Commissar of Nationalities, to bring a portion of northern Iran under direct Soviet control' (p. 67). 102. Trotsky also considered that it was dangerous to aggravate the situation in Iran and that it was necessary 'to come to an understanding with England with regard to the East' (The Trotsky Papers, II, p. 209). 103. Sepehr Zabin, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 53; Muhammed Ali Mansur, The Soviet Government's Policy in Iran, 1917-1927 (Tehran, 1948), p. 17 (in Persian). 104. Zhizn' natsional'nostei, 9 May 1920, p. 1. 105. P. Pirayech, Persisch-Russische Beziehungen zwischen zwei Weltkriegen. (Munich, 1964), p. 72. 106. Part of the invading Soviet troops remained, nevertheless, on Iranian territory. The Narkomindel stated that these were not Russian Soviet troops, but units of the Azerbaijan Red Army, which were brought into the Enzeli region at the request of the Gilan Soviet government in order to prevent armed attacks by the White Guards on Soviet Azerbaijan territory (DVP SSSR, II, pp. 580,585; TsGAORiSS, f. 130, delo 464, p. 88). 107. V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, Vol. XXXI (4th edition), p. 209. 108. In June 1920, Prince Firouz sent Chicherin a note in which he justly accused Moscow of having, by its actions, set into motion separatist and anti-government elements in Iran who, not long before Soviet troops invaded Gilan, had been defeated by government troops and were on the verge of capitulation. Having revived these elements, Moscow had begun to support the Gilan puppet government it had created, flagrantly flouting the principles it had proclaimed and formulated (AVPRF, fond 94, delo 4/2, p. 50). In an answering note, Chicherin denied Moscow's interference in Iran's internal affairs, but the note was composed in such a way that it implied that Chicherin acknowledged interference. Chicherin did not conceal with which side his government's sympathies lay, but, he stated, the Soviet government strictly upheld the principles of non-interference in Iran's internal affairs and applied it 'to both sides' and therefore 'does not lend' support to the government in Tehran 'rather than that in Rasht, or to the latter rather than the former' (ibid., delo 4/ 2, pp. 52-3). It would seem impossible to express more frankly, in diplomatic language, the Bolshevik attitude to the Gilan episode. There are grounds to suppose that it was not by accident that Chicherin, a convinced opponent of the Gilan adventure, was so frank. 109. TsGAORiSS, fond 130, delo 464, pp. 108-9. 110. Revolyutsiya v SredneiAzii (sbornik materialov) (Tashkent, 1929), pp. 16-17; Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsii SredneiAzii (Tashkent 1967), p. 14. 111. Kommunisticheskii internatsional 1919, No. 5, p. 702.

Notes to Chapter 2

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112. V.N. Plastun, 'Uchastie iranskikh trudyashchikhsya v grazhdanskoi voine v Rossii', Narody Azii i Afriki (henceforth NAA), 1972, No. 5, p. 59. 113. A.M. Matveev, 'Deyatel'nost' 'Soveta InternatsionaPnoi Propagandy na Vostoke' v Srednei Azii v 191^-1920 godakh', NAA, 1978, No. 5, p. 50. 114. L. Landis, Politics and Oil: Moscow in the Middle East (New York-London: Dunellen, 1973), p. 32. 115. S. Zabih, p. 10. 116. The Gilan episode had seriously undermined Curzon's position and forced Vossuq's resignation. Norman, who had replaced Cox, as well as other British advisers such as Gen. Dixon, Armitage-Smith and Balfour, insisted on this. But Curzon hesitated, aware that the Iranian premier's resignation would be a blow both to his authority and to the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919. Acting essentially at his own risk, Norman insisted on a change of cabinet in Tehran and the appointment of Moshir, with whom he concluded a preliminary agreement: implementation of the treaty would be temporarily halted in order to prepare public opinion to accept it; new elections to the Majlis would be held as soon as possible; and a mission would be sent ot Moscow to negotiate the normalization of relations between Iran and the RSFSR. Curzon finally agreed to these conditions, except the last. His letter to Norman (DBFP, XIII, pp. 553-4) shows that he persisted in his negative attitude to the establishment of Soviet-Iranian relations: The dispatch of a mission to Moscow in the present circimstances would appear doomed to failure. Representations made by Firuz Mirza to M. Krasin and his telegrams to Tchicherin have hitherto had small success and there is no reason to suppose that a personal delegation would be less unsuccessful H.M. Government are far from desiring to abandon the general line of policy which they have consistently followed towards Persia throughout the administration of Vossuq-ed-Dowleh.

117. R. Ramazani, p. 152. 118. Hossein Makki The Twenty- Year History of Iran, Vol. I (Tehran, 1945), p. 9 (in Persian); H.J. Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia, p. 131, evaluated Mishir's position as follows: 'Since the Bolshevik siege the agreement can be considered dead, and British military prestige has been dealt such a blow that I do not think that after this any Persian minister could guarantee the ratification of the Anglo-Iranian agreement.' 119. DVP SSSR, III, p. 153. 120. N.S. Fatemi, p. 111. In Iran, Moshir's enforced resignation made an unfavourable impression. 'Many perceived it as capitulation to Britain and a sign that the 1919 Agreement was beginning to be implemented' (H. Makki, p. 47). 121. N.S. Fatemi, p. 61. 122. ADF, Série E, Asie, 1918-1929, Perse, Vol. 34, p. 93. 123. DBFP, XIII, pp. 646-7. 124. Ibid., p. 658. In general, London was undertaking a radical review of its Iranian policy. On 15 December 1920, War Minister Winston Churchill stated in the House of Commons that the government intended to withdraw all troops from Iran (PDC, 1920, CXXXVI, p. 537). On 4 January 1921 the cabinet decided to complete the withdrawal of British troops by 1 April. Some people in London had at last begun to understand that the presence of British troops on Iranian soil was not of benefit to Britain but merely served as a pretext for the occupation of Gilan by Soviet troops and for other Soviet provocations. But many influential British politicians, including Curzon, feared that the withdrawal of British forces would create a vacuum in Tehran which the Bolsheviks would not take long in filling. Some were even haunted by the danger of revolution in Iran and the establishment in northern Iran of a Soviet dictator-

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

162

125. 126. 127. 128.

129.

ship headed by the Bolsheviks (DBFP, XIII, p. 700). In this connection government circles in London did not exclude the possibility that Britain would still be obliged to interfere again in Iran's affairs and perhaps, establish a dictatorial regime there, transfer the capital to Isfahan, arm the tribes, maintain a corps of the South Persianriflemen,and create on the Persian Gulf litoral a Federation of Southern Tribes which, under the aegis of the British crown, would become 'a very formidable bulwark against Bolshevik aggression' (ibid., p. 712). According to the author of this plan, Lord Curzon, all this was 'to save at least central and southern Iran from Bolshevism and to preserve AIOC (ibid., pp. 666-9). However, Curzon's fears were groundless. The Soviets did not have a real opportunity to carry out any active military steps in Iran. The situation in Soviet Russia was very complicated - famine and ruin throughout the country, an uprising of the working class against the Bolshevik dictatorship in Petrograd and other towns, an armed uprising in Kronstadt - and the Bolshevik leadership was feverishly seeking a way out of the crises and elaborating its new economic policy. In short, the Soviets were in no mood for adventures, and they hastened to conclude as quickly as possible the negotiations with Iran, and with Afghanistan and Turkey. DVP SSSR, IV, p. 661. Istoriya SSSR (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), Vol. VII, second series, p. 102. DVP SSSR, III, p. 491. H. Navai, Les relations économiques irano-russes (Paris, 1935), p. 110. An exchange of views also took place between Sepehdar Azem and Norman. The Iranian Prime Minister defended the agreement inasmuch as it 'guaranteed that Iran would no longer have to fear a Bolshevik revenge' (DBFP, XIII, p. 697). AVPRF, fond 94, delo Oil, portfel' I, papka 9, 1.10.

Chapter 3, pp 53-81 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 11.

DBFP, XIII, pp. 720-1. M. Bahar, p. 57. Public Records Office, Foreign Office (henceforth PRO FO), 371/6510, p. 124. DBFP, XIII, p. 731-2. N.S. Fatemi, for instance, is of the opinion that the new government, had ft wanted to, could have refused the agreement with Soviet Russia (op. cit., p. 99). J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record. Vol. II (1914-1956) (Princeton, 1956), p. 90. Army representatives leading the coup and Cossack officers Reza Khan, Massoud Khan and Kazem Khan did not hide their readiness to support Seyid Zia ed-Din only if he were to agree with their demand to end the rule of 'traitors and foreigners' in the country (H. Makki, pp. 107-8). DBFP, XIII, p. 735; H.J. Balfour, p. 228. Only one member of the British cabinet, Winston Churchill, showed sufficient political wisdom and insisted on accepting Norman's recommendation, but his voice was like 'the voice of him that crieth in the wilderness' (DBFP, XIII, p. 737). AVPRF, fond 'Obzory persidskoi pecati', 1921 god; ADF, Série E, Asie, 19181929, Perse, Vol. 37, pp. 137-8. L. Fisher, p. 430.

Notes to Chapter 3

163

12. Seyid Zia ed-Din admitted later that his rapprochement with Reza Khan was his main mistake (AH Nasiri (éd.), Reza Shah Diary (Tehran, 1956), p. 30). 13. H.J. Balfour (Recent Happenings in Persia) wrote: 'The fact, that the new government was wholeheartedly pro-British caused it to be hated. It was striving to bring about a policy of agreement in reality even if not in outward form, but that was not taken into consideration. Significance was attached only to words, and the result was that support was always given unwillingly and unenthusiastically' (pp. 251-2). 14. Ahmad Shahrivar (Our History, Tehran, 1942) wrote that the Shah feared Seyid Zia ed-Din more than he did Reza Khan. He disliked Seyid's programme and was afraid of the rumours that Seyid was preparing a coup d'état in order to dethrone him and put his brother and heir, Prince Hassan, on the throne. These rumours were spread and vigorously supported by the devotees of Reza Khan (p. 105). 15. DVP SSSR, IV, p. 713; P. Avery, Modern Iran (London: Benn, 1965), p. 249. 16. PDC, LXIII, p. 1028. 17. AVPRF, fond 'Obzory persidskoi pechati', 1921 god. 18. H. Makki, p. 345. 19. AVPRF, fond 'Obzory persidskoi pechati', 1921 god. 20. R. Ramazani, p. 204. 21. AVPRF, fond 94, delo 3, papka 3, p. 102. 22. Those associations took on a fairly definite form when the British Mission in Tehran, whether on its own initiative or by order of the Foreign Office, began to sound out whether it were possible to revive the 1907 Agreement. Sir Percy Loraine, who had succeeded Norman, had repeatedly hinted to Rotstein that it was necessary to return to that agreement. Rotstein, however, 'ignored that suggestion' (L. Fisher, p. 429). One must note that those doing the sounding out demonstrated the lack of understanding in London of the realities of the Middle Eastern situation at that time. Nothing more absurd and unnatural could be imagined than Anglo-Soviet co-operation in Iran, and on the basis of the 1907 Agreement, to boot. 23. DVP SSSR, IV, pp. 798-9. 24. Ibid., p. 798. 25. Ibid., V, p. 726. 26. AVPRF, fond 94, korobka 106, delo 1, p. 394. 27. Tsentral'nyi partiinyi arkhiv ínstituta marksizma-leninizma pri TsK KPSS (henceforth TsPA TsK KPSS), fond 85, delo 12, p. 14 (quoted by A.N. Kheifets, Sovetskaya diplomatiya i narody Vostoka, 1921-1927 gody (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), p. 62). 28. Ibid. 29. Zhizri natsional'nostei, 17 March 1921. 30. V.I. Lenin, Polnoye sobranie sochinenii (henceforth PSS), torn 53, p. 119. 31. Kheifets, Sovetskaya diplomatiya, p. 60. 32. Leninskii sbornik, torn 36, p. 338; DVP SSSR, IV, p. 790. 33. DVP SSSR, IV, p. 394. 34. Kheifets, Sovetskaya diplomatiya . . . , p. 61. 35. That also resulted in an improvement in relations between Kavam and Reza Khan even though they had opposing beliefs. Both agreed that the Khoshtaria Concession should be given to Standard Oil Co., although Kavam was antiSoviet and Reza Khan anti-British. 36. N.S. Fatemi, p. 115. 37. The proof of that complete agreement is contained in a letter to the State Department from Engert, the US Minister in Tehran, dated 28 November 1921:

164

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

'The Prime Minister informed me in a personal letter saying "I wish to repeat once again that the Government together with the Parliament have decided to stand on their decision". The Minister of Defence, who is defacto a dictator, expressed even greater decisiveness by word of mouth' (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, Vol. //(Washington, 1936, p. 650)). Reza Khan's position made Moscow react immediately. Rotstein, during one of his meetings with the Shah, drew his attention to the dictatorial behaviour of his War Minister and offered the Shah his help in removing Reza Khan from his position. For that, said Rotstein, one could 'invoke the article of the Treaty of Turkmanchai', in which Russia had guaranteed protection of the Qajar dynasty (A. Ghoreishi, Soviet Policy in Iran, 1917-1960 (University of Colorado Press, 1965), p. 59). DVP SSSR, V, pp. 292-3, 738-9. Ibid., p. 292. Ibid., p. 552-3. Ibid., p. 553. Ibid., pp. 549-50. Ibid., p. 577. Izvestiya, 25 Jan. 1923. DVP SSSR, VI, pp. 208-9. Ibid., p. 238. Ibid. R. Ramazani, p. 191. A. Chervonnyi, 'Chto proiskhodit v Persii?' in Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, 1925, No. 11(48), p. 106; Izvestiya, 1 May 1924. (A. Chervonnyi is the pseudonym of B. Shumyatsky.) Ismail Nurzadeh Bushehri, Political Secrets of Iranian Oil (Tehran, 1959), p. 16 (in Persian). DVP SSSR, VI, pp. 690-1. Vneshnyaya torgovlya, No. 26, 1923, p. 19. DVP SSSR, VI, pp. 303, 618-19. M.I. Volodarskii, 'Podryvnaya deyatel'nost' Anglo-iranskoi neftyanoi kompanii v Irane v 1918-1924 godakh', Uchenye zapiski Kishinevskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Vol. 64 (Kishinev, 1963), pp. 127-41. Izvestiya, 13 March and 1 May 1923. L. Fisher, p. 432. Izvestiya, 23 and 24 October 1923. DVP SSSR, VI, pp. 378-9, 386, 398, 623. Ya.D. Azadi, The History of our Times (Tehran, 1952), p. 288 (in Persian). DVP SSSR, VI, pp. 461, 626. Ibid., VII, p. 393. The following was said in a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office with reference to the fact that Britain had abandoned its allies to their own devices: The Sheikh of Mohammera was forced by the Persian Government to acknowledge being the Shah's subject. His former semi-autonomous position was denied and he was given to understand that His Majesty's Government would not support him by force of arms if he refused to obey the Persian Government. (DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. 1, p. 865)

Even Reza Khan was shocked by such cynical treachery. He noted in his diary that the British were concerned with their own interests only, and that Khazal, the same as any other Iranian, was of little value to them (Ali Sabri, The Reza Shah's Diary, p. 83). 63. This change in political course began to be felt at the beginning of 1924 when,

Notes to Chapter 4

165

with the coming to power of the Labour Party, a number of members in the House of Commons subjected the 'imperialist policy' in Iran to sharp criticism. The Labourites were convinced that only a radical revision of their predecessors' policies would restore British prestige, which, as they said, had been 'trampled into the mud' (PDC, 170, pp. 155-68). Following this, Reza Khan received assurance, from MPs as well as from government personalities, that his republican leanings were looked on with approval in London (PDC, Vol. 171, pp. 661-2). 64. In May 1924 Lord Curzon made a declaration which called the British public to accept the 'spirit of nationalistic revolt and to adapt to it' (D.N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (London: Thames and Hudson, 1963), p. 71). 65. Quoted by S.V. Nikonova, Antisovetskaya vneshnyaya politika anglüskikh konservatorov, 1924-1927 (Moscow: Nauka, 1963), p. 153. 66. The Foreign Office, though, in a secret 'Memorandum on the Foreign Policy of His Majesty's Government..., April 1926' characterized British policy in Iran quite differently: British policy in Persia aims at affording moral support to the Persian Government in resisting the encroachments and unjust pressure of Soviet Russia, without, however, undertaking to give Persia any form of military assistance in the regrettable event of hostilities with that country. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has made it clear to the Persian Prime Minister that Persia cannot expect armed intervention by Great Britain on her behalf. His Majesty's Government wishes to see Persia strong and independent, able to stand on her own two feet and to provide an element of stability in the Middle East and bar the road to India against Russia. (DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. 1, p. 861) 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

Kushesh, 29 June 1925. AVPRF, fond 'Obzory persidskoi pechati', 1925. Setareye Iran, 5 Feb. 1925. DVP SSSR, VIII, pp. 634-5. DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. 1, p. 805. Ibid., pp. 764-5. The importance attached in Tehran to Britain's attitude concerning the events in Iran is clearly demonstrated by the following: Moshar received Sir Percy Loraine immediately after the Majlis session and expressed the wish that Britain should be the first foreign power to recognize the new provisional government of Iran (DBFP, Séries IA, Vol. I, p. 775). This wish was taken into consideration, and on 3 November 1925 Sir Percy handed a note to the Iranian government which contained his government's recognition. The Soviet Union recognized the new Iranian Government the next day (DVP SSSR, VIII, p. 701). PRO FO 371/11494/E4821/34. DVP SSSR, IX, pp. 7,28. DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. 1, p. 823. Ibid., p. 812. Ibid., pp. 812-13. ADF, Série E, Asie, 1918-1929, Perse, Vol. 38, p. 177. AVPRF, fond 94, opis' 10, papka 190, delo 13, p. 161.

Chapter 4, pp 82-99 1. DVP SSSR, VIII, p. 402; IX, p. 7. 2. It is true that before Teymurtash's departure for Moscow a secret conference with the Shah had taken place, about which the members of the government

166

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

were not informed, but, on the other hand, the Soviet and the Turkish ambassadors were present (PRO FO 371/11494/E4821/644/34 No. 378, 30 July 1926). DVP SSSR, IX, p. 28; PRO FO 371/11494/E45000/644/34 No. 184 and 371/ 11494/E4821/644/34 No. 378. To the British ambassador for Turkey, Sir Reginald Hoare, Teymurtash, during his visit to Ankara, said that he had openly expressed to Chicherin his dissatisfaction with the state of Soviet-Iranian trade. He said that it suffered from the fact that the USSR had no money with which to buy Iranian goods. In response to this Chicherin had said that in such a case it would be necessary either to close the border and halt Soviet-Iranian trade or to adopt a barter principle (PRO FO 371/11494/E6324/644/34 No. 601, Sir Reginald Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 Nov. 1926). ADF, Série E, Asie, 1919-1929, Perse, Vol. 38, pp. 19-23,26-9, Herbette to A. Briand, 25 Aug. and 21 Sept. 1926. DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. II, p. 833. PRO FO 371/11494/E4500/644/34 No. 378. DVP SSSR, IX, pp. 297, 475-7; X, p. 10. Ibid.,X, p. 712. Having closely observed how shamelessly and unceremoniously the OGPU operated in Iran, an American journalist, Vincent Sheean, wrote: In Persia the Soviet Union interferes to an extent which would not be credible in Western Europe or America. Russian agents are everywhere; Russian money pays for the most incongruous assortment of political movements, popular upheavals, dynastic flurries, tribal agitations. Most of the crop of rebellions which have been harvested by Reza Shah's seizure of the imperial crown have had legitimate and natural bases, of course ; but in some of them, particularly those which have been occurring in the north, in Gilan and Mazanderan, and in the north-west, toward Turkestan, Russian influence is so obvious that it would be silly to disregard it. (V. Sheean, The New Persia (New York-London, 1927), p. 212)

11. Rotstein denied any Soviet involvement in Iranian internal affairs in the following manner: The rebellions in Persia are wrought by the hands of the British. This is not the first nor the last time such things have happened. Local British agents have been inciting the governors and the khans to revolt, promising them money and weapons; and they then unload all the responsibility for this onto the Bolsheviks. Afterwards, they offer the Persian government a chance to mediate in the conflict themselves, for some appropriate compensation. But all the while they would be instructing the rebels how to wave red flags and to shout Soviet slogans and watchwords, all decidedly aimed at compromising us. You are to repudiate all these hostile insinuations and accusations with which we have been falsely charged, and we shall do the same before the authorities in Tehran. (DVP SSSR, IX, p. 338)

12. DVP SSSR, IX, p. 568. The same V. Sheean (op. cit., pp. 212-13) characterized the activity of the British secret service in Iran thus: At the present time in Persia there are no British secret agents, paid as such and working on a regular basis. The British mission in Tehran is very large (larger than some of the embassies in Europe), and British businessmen and merchants all over the country can be regarded as 'agents'. But the old system of espionage and bribery is finished; the bribery which exists in our era has been enrobed in far more civilized forms.

13. DVP SSSR, IX, p. 712. The Shah's manoeuvring, in thefinalanalysis, infuriated Moscow. On 4 January 1927, K.K. Yurenev declared to the Shah that in Moscow they had been very surprised by the assurances of Ansari given to G. Nicolson. In response to this the Shah, 'in a friendly manner', told Yurenev that he himself was surprised by his minister's declaration and that Ansari was empowered to declare to the British only that 'in Moscow no agreements hostile to Great

Notes to Chapter 4

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

167

Britain would be concluded'. The Iranian Prime Minister, Mostoufi, told Yurenev that Ansari should have said that 'Teymurtash would not sign anything in Moscow without preliminary dealings with Tehran'. In his excitement Ansari said something completely different. Ansari, on finding out that he had been repudiated, was infuriated. Abdul Hossein Teymurtash was a very colourful personality. He was born of a noble family and was close to the court of the Qajars. As many other Iranian young men of his class, he was sent for his military education to Russia, where he graduated from the Nikolai Cavalry School in St Petersburg, and later from the Officers Classes of the Corps of Pages. He completed his education in Europe, where he studied history and political science, and improved his knowledge of foreign languages. His return to his own country coincided with the 1905-11 Iranian Revolution, and he took an active part in the country's political life. At the age of 26 he was elected as a deputy to the Majlis. Subsequently, he occupied ministerial and governor-general's posts. After the coup d'état of 1921, he joined Reza Khan and became one of his closest collaborators. After becoming Shah, Reza Khan made Teymurtash head of the specially created Ministry of the Court, which was not part of the cabinet. In fact, it was Teymurtash who controlled the cabinet of ministers. With his keen mind and perspicacity, his ability to grasp situations and his knowledge of languages, he correctly evaluated the importance and consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. He energetically opposed Soviet penetration of Iran. He made no secret of his hostile attitude to, or his distrust of, the Soviet Union, and endeavoured to keep the Soviet-Iranian border as hermetically sealed as possible. N.G. Pal'gunov, who worked as the TASS correspondent in Tehran, wrote that Teymurtash 'did everything he could to keep back from Iran any information about life in the Soviet Union, and was against the growth of Soviet power, which he feared'. (Pal'gunov, p. 51). Teymurtash fully understood the nature of the Soviet regime and the threat to his country from Moscow. During one of his confidential talks with the German ambassador, Walter von Blucher, he told him that 'Iran cannot tolerate that the minds of her young intelligentsia be politically poisoned' (W. von Blücher, p. 227). DVP SSSR, X, pp. 9-10. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizri, No. 7, 1927, p. 76. Ibid. ADF, Série E, Asie, 1918-1929, Perse, Vol. 38, p. 156. Kushesh, 18 March 1927. Shefage sorhy 13 March 1927. DVP SSSR, X, pp. 74-5. Ibid., pp. 589-90. Ettela'at, 17 March 1927. Manchester Guardian, 17 March 1927. DVP SSSR, X, pp. 171-2. Ibid., pp. 329-30, 591. Ibid. Ettela'at, 5 Sept. 1927. DVP SSSR, X, pp. 249-51, 357-64, 591. Ettela'at, 30 Sept. 1927. DVP SSSR, X, pp. 402-28. Ibid., pp. 428-34. Ibid., pp. 396-401. H. Makki, Doctor Mossadeq (Tehran, 1945), p. 215. On 7 October 1927 the newspaper wrote: 'The elimination of poverty and

168

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

wretchedness, the activization of industry and agriculture and the overcoming of the economic instability both at the centre and in the north of Iran are all entirely dependent on the Irano-Russian agreements'. AVPRF, fond 094, opis' II, papka 193, delo 705, p. 60. For more details see Near East and India, 1 Jan. 1928; Iran, 12,14,19 Oct. and 22 Dec. 1927; Shefage sorh, 6 Oct. 1927; Ettela'at, 8 Dec. 1927. 'Recueil de traités, conventions et accords conclus entre le gouvernment impérial de Perse et les puissances étrangères', 1-ère série (Tehran, 1933), pp. 20915. Morning Post, 10 March 1926. DVP SSSR, X, p. 437. Ibid., XI, pp. 309, 388. Ibid., p. 347. Ibid., p. 362. DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. II, p. 832. DVP SSSR, XI, p. 367. M. Farrah, The Political Memoirs (Tehran, 1968), p. 235 (in Persian). DVP SSSR, XI, p. 518. Ibid., p. 592-3. Donya, No. 4, 1969, p. 113 (in Persian). S.L. Agaev, Iran: Vneshnyaya politika i problema nezavisimosti, 1925-1941 gody (Moscow: Nauka, GRVL, 1971), p. 81; DVP SSSR, XI, pp. 592-3. N.G. Pal'gunov, 30 let., p. 72. DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. II, p. 832. Ibid. DVP SSSR, XI, pp. 314-15. Ibid., pp. 317-18, 322-3. Ibid., pp. 331-2. 'Recueil de traités, . . . ' , pp. 131-42. DVP SSSR, XI, pp. 310-12; PDC, Vol. 217, 1928, pp. 650-1. DVP SSSR, XI, pp. 312-13, 722. Izvestiya, 15 May 1928.

Chapter 5, pp. 10O-120 1. G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959). 2. DBFP, Series 1A, Vol. I, p. 812. 3. M. Sendzabi, Persia v krizise (Moscow, 1932) p. 52. 4. R.K. Ramazani, p. 217. 5. W. von Blucher, p. 220. 6. S.L. Agaev, p. 157. 7. Among the goods imported by Iran from the USSR were: cars, sugar, industrial equipment and cotton textiles (D. S. Zavriev, Torgovo-politicheskii kurs Persii. (Tiflis, 1931), pp. 118-19). 8. S.L. Agaev, p. 157. 9. DVP SSSR, XII, pp. 503-4, 512. 10. N.G. Pal'gunov, 30 let Vospominaniya jurnalista i diplomata (Moscow: GPI, 1964). 11. DVP SSSR, XII, pp. 567, 589, 767.

Notes to Chapter 5

169

12. DVP SSSR, XIII, pp. 229-31. 13. Ibid., pp. 229-31, 330, 661. 14. S.L. Agaev, p. 159. Some facts on the various Soviet methods of coercion are given by R.K. Ramazani: the Soviet Rusperbank, for instance, ceased to change Iranian rials into roubles, and Iranian transit through USSR territory was stopped (p. 278). 15. DVP SSSR, XIII, p. 331. 16. V. Connoly, Soviet Economic Policy in the East (London, 1933), pp. 65-6. 17. DVP SSSR, XIII, p. 622. 18. DVP SSSR, XIV, pp. 595-616. 19. G.S. Agabekov, GPU: Zapiski chekista (Berlin: Strela, 1930). 20. Ibid. 21. DVP SSSR, XV, pp. 281-3, 766. 22. M.K. Rozhkova, Ekonomicheskaya politika tsarskogo praviteVstva na Srednem Vostoke vo vtoroi chetverti XIX veka i russkaya burzhuaziya (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1949), Chap. V. 23. DVP SSSR, XVI, p. 820. 24. Ettela'at, 17-18 April 1933. 25. DVP SSSR, XVI, pp. 167-8. 26. Ibid., p. 746. 27. R.K. Ramazani, p. 223. 28. N.S. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran (New York, 1954). 29. R.K. Ramazani, p. 223. 30. AVPRF, fond 'Obzory persidskoi pechati', 1931 god. 31. M.S. Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana (Moscow: GPI, 1952), p. 316. 32. P. Avery, Modern Iran (London: Benn, 1965), pp. 235-41. 33. See Chapter 2 of that book. 34. R.K. Ramazani, p. 242. 35. DVP SSSR, XV, pp. 687-8; AVPRF, fond 08, opis' 16, delo 9, papka 160, pp. 38-41. 36. Ibid., p. 688. 37. Ibid., p. 815. 38. Ibid., p. 688. The Times (3 Jan. 1933) states that Iranian official circles were displeased with the noise raised by the Soviet press in connection with the Anglo-Iranian controversy and 'take a negative attitude to the way Izvestiya describes measures taken by the Iranian government as "a brave step taken against the crumbling Empire". The truth is that new Persia's strong nationalism views Russian influence with even greater suspicion than that of Britain.' 39. DVP SSSR, XII, pp. 769-70. 40. Ibid., pp. 771-2. 41. Ibid., p. 35. 42. Ibid., pp. 53-4, 735. 43. Ibid., XIV, p. 37. 44. Survey of International Affairs, 1932 (London, 1933), p. 309; AVPRF, fond 94, opis' 14, delo 4, papka 25, pp. 93-8. 45. Survey of International Affairs, 1933 (London, 1934), pp. 285-6. 46. S.L. Agaev, p. 200. 47. AVPRF, fond 'Obzory persidskoi pechati', 1932 god. 48. DVP SSSR, XII, p. 268. 49. Ibid., XV, pp. 29, 62. 50. Ibid., XIII, pp. 320-1. 51. Ibid., XVI, p. 553. 52. M.M. Litvinov, Vneshnyaya politika SSSR: Rechi i zayavleniya, 1927-1935 (Moscow, 1935), p. 66.

170

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

53. S.L. Agaev, p. 217. 54. DVP SSSR, XV, pp. 12, 94-5, 720, 738. 55. Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London. 1965), p. 46; H. Arfa, Under Five Shahs (New York, 1965), pp. 229-37. 56. S.L. Agaev, p. 221. 57. Ibid. 58. W. von Blücher, pp. 196-7. 59. M. Volodarsky, MES, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 1985. 60. G.S. Agabekov, pp. 173-81. 61. DVP SSSR, XII, p. 132. 62. 'Byuleten' Pressy Srednego Vostoka',No. 2(10) (Tashkent, 1929), p. 41. 63. DVP SSSR, XII, pp. 135, 745. 64. Ibid., pp. 138-9. 65. Ibid., pp. 167-8. 66. Ibid., pp. 205, 745. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid., XV, p. 62. 69. G. Lenczowsky, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, 1963), p. 166. 70. W. von Blücher, p. 191.

Chapter 6, pp 121-132 1. M.R. Shivan, Memoirs (Moscow, 1967), p. 43 (the manuscript fund of the Library of AIVAN SSSR). 2. Papers Regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919 (London, 1919), pp. 4-5. 3. AIVAN SSSR, NAI, 'Frontier A. December 1920', doc. 14, p. 6. 4. DVP SSSR, II, p. 175. 5. TsGAORiSS, fond 130, opis' 3, delo 601, pp. 59^61. 6. MNKP, No. 7(22), 1934, pp. 72-3. 7. AVPRF, fond 04, opis' 6, papka 43, delo 594, pp. 3-4. 8. K. Troyanovskii, Vostok i revolyutsiya (Petrograd, 1918), p. 9. 9. S.M. Dimanshtein, 'Nashi protivorechiya i Vostok' in Zhizn' natsionaVnostei, No. 36, 1919, p. 1. 10. DVP SSSR, II, p. 174. 11. The fate of Nikolai Zakharovich Bravin is open to question. He took up his post as ambassador of the Turkestan ASSR to Afghanistan with heavy responsibilities. When, in the winter of 1919, the ambassador of the RSFSR, Ya.Z. Surits, arrived in Kabul he found that Bravin was trying to play an independent hand. Bravin was prevented by Surits from participating in the Soviet-Afghan negotiations and was even removed from day-to-day diplomatic work, because Surits could not trust a former Tsarist diplomat. Bravin, greatly insulted by this treatment, decided to ask for Afghan citizenship, which he received in 1920. He was killed in January 1921 in 'unknown circumstances' in the city of Ghazni as he was going to India en route to Europe (L.W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Policy in the Mid-Twentieth Century (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. 56). 12. TsGAORiSS, fond 130, opis' 3, delo 601, pp. 62-3. 13. Druzhba narodov^o. 11, 1957, p. 17. 14. MNKP, No. 7(22), 1934, p. 72. 15. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol. 39, p. 227. 16. Kommunisticheskii internatsional, 1922, No. 12, p. 1933.

Notes to Chapter 6

171

17. D.C. Boulger, p. 54. 18. 'The Afghan Trouble', The Indian Review, Vol. XX, No. 5, (Madras, 1919), p. 336. 19. The National Review, July 1919, p. 67. 20. AIVAN SSSR, NAI, 'Frontier A. December 1920', docs. 16 and 17, pp. 7, 8. 21. Ibid., doc. 14, p. 6. 22. The reference is to the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 31 Jan. 1873 (GorchakovGrenville) concerning the northern frontier of Afghanistan. It took more than three years to reach that agreement. Russia acknowledged the northern frontier of Afghanistan to be the River Amu-Darya, from its source to the point Khodzha Salen in the middle of its course in the Turkoman Steppe. 23. The Gandamak Anglo-Afghan Agreement, signed on 26 May 1879, deprived Afghanistan of its independence in foreign policy, and gave the British ambassador the right to control Afghanistan's internal policy. Afghanistan conceded to Britain the city and region of Kandahar as well as the areas of Kurram, Sibi and Pishin. 24. DVP SSSR, III, pp. 550-3. 25. The Afghan reply to the Bokharan note is kept in the Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the CPSU (see A.N. Kheifets, Sovetskaya diplomatiya . . . , p. 76). 26. AVPRF, fond 70, opis' 4, delo 8, papka 1, 3, 6. 27. A.N. Kheifets, Sovetskaya diplomatiya. ... p. 76. 28. DVP SSSR, IV. 29. A.N. Kheifets, Uzy dohrososedstva i bratstva nerastorzhimy, Aziya i Afrika segodnya, No. 2, 1981, p. 18. 30. Professor N.A. Kheifets, who mentions these facts, apparently realizes that those groups violently opposed to Amanullah's regime and acting on Soviet territory were a flagrant violation of the spirit of the Soviet-Afghan treaty, and that it was nothing other than pure treachery on Moscow's part against a friendly, neighbouring state. This is the reason why Professor Kheifets, by means of a somewhat clumsy argument, tries to create the impression that these groups came into being while Emir Habibullah was still alive. It is a well-known fact that in Soviet historical literature Emir Habibullah is constantly called a traitor and an accomplice of British colonialism. In Professor Kheifets' argument, having quoted the published documents of the groups, which are 'close to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism', the text of a resume is given, covering the events of 7-14 November 1920 in Bokhara. That report was sent to Moscow and Tashkent by V.V. Kuibyshev, 'plenipotentiary representative' of the RSFSR in the Bokharan PSR. After this Kheifets makes an unexpected move by saying: 'Important events had taken place in that time. On 21 February 1919, the Emir Habibullah Khan was killed, in the vicinity of Jalalabad, and the circumstances of his death remain unknown.' It is interesting to note, that the facts mentioned by Kheifets and the documents quoted by him, which refer to the activities of anti-government organizations of the Afghan 'revolutionaries' that were taking place on Soviet territory and under the patronage of Bolshevik organizations, had never been previously published in the Soviet Union. It is sufficiently convincing proof that the Soviet leadership and its 'competent organs' were fully aware of the ugliness of that 'Leninist policy of good neighbourly relations' towards Afghanistan. After a pro-Soviet regime had been established in Afghanistan the publication of those facts, from the Soviet leadership's point of view, could no longer do any harm. 31. AVPRF, fond 70, opis' 4, delo 8, papka 1, p. 4.

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

32. A.N. Kheifets, Sovetskaya diplomatiya . . . , p. 79. 33. AVPRF, fond 70, opis' 4, delo 8, papka 1, pp. 3, 12.

Chapter 7, pp. 133-151 1. Chicherin in a letter written to Stalin on 19 December 1921 referred with approval to the contacts between D jemal Pasha and the Soviet embassy in Kabul. The letter is kept in the CPA of the MLI at the CC CPSU and was published by A.N. Kheifets in his article 'Leninskaya vneshnyaya politika i natsional' no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie' (Narody Azii iAfriki, No. 2,1970, pp. 53-4). 2. G. Macmun, Maj.-Gen., Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah (London, 1933), p. 288. 3. Mezhdunarodnay a politika RSFSR za 1922 god. OtchyotNKID (Moscow 1923), p. 68. 4. A.Kh. Babakhodzhaev, Afghano-bukharskie otnosheniya iproiski britanskogo imperializma v Srednei Azii, thesis p. 188. 5. India Office, L/D & S/10/1049, Report, 22 April 1922. 6. AIVAN SSSR, NAI, file 788 (2), MID-Asie, 1923, No. 17, p. 12. 7. ADF, Série E, Asie, 1918-1929, Afghanistan, Vol. 13, p. 1. 8. AIVAN SSSR, NAI, file 788 (2) MID-Asie, 1923, No. 17, p. 12. 9. Ibid., p. 16. 10. ADF, Série E, Asie, 1918-1929, Afghanistan, Vol. 13, p. 18. 11. Novy mir, Moscow, No. 10, 1963, p. 224. 12. R.R. Maconachie, A Précis on Afghan Affairs, 1919-1927: Secret Document. (Delhi: Government of India Press. 1928), pp. 293-8. 13. DVP SSSR, VI. 14. Godovoi otchyot NKID za 1924 god IH-mu s'ezdu Sovetov (Moscow, 1925), p. 94. 15. Ibid. 16. A.N. Kheifets, Sovetskaya diplomatiya . . . , p. 274. 17. SSSR. God raboty praviteVstva (materialy k otchyotu za 1924-5 god) (Moscow, 1925), p. 16. 18. ADF, Série E, Asie, 1918-1929, Afghanistan, Vol. 13, pp. 29-32; L.W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Policy in the Mid-Twentieth Century (University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. 110. 19. AIVAN SSSR, NAI, file 33-F, 1926, N.N. 1-59, Affairs of Badakhshan. 20. DVP SSSR, IX, 46. 21. L.W. Adamec, p. 110. 22. DVP SSSR, IX, 406-10. 23. DVP SSSR, VIII, 676. 24. AVPRF, f. 0132, op. 8, papka 152, d. 422, p. 44. 25. This was confirmed by facts known about the activity of the Soviet Consul General, Postnikov, in the Afghan part of Turkestan. Afghan government circles knew that Postnikov led a ramified intelligence service in his district, and could provoke an anti-government uprising at any moment. Such an uprising would result in the invasion of Afghanistan by Turkmenian and Tadzhik units marching under the red flag. That invasion from outside the borders of Afghanistan would have meant the establishment in the north of a new Soviet Socialist Republic. In the meantime the consulate was almost openly conducting, among the local population, a policy of pro-Soviet agitation of unprece-

Notes to Chapter 7 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46.

173

dented magnitude. The local authorities reported this in panicky tones to Kabul (ADF, Série E, Asie, 1919-1929, Afghanistan, Vol. 13, pp. 43-6). DVP SSSR, X, 466. Ibid. During his visit to Germany (20 Feb.-7 March 1928), in his conversations with President Hindenburg and other German officials, Amanullah had mentioned the danger that threatened Afghanistan because of its close proximity to the Soviet Union. Afghanistan's Vice-Minister of War, during a meeting with the Head of the Political Department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, von Schubert, spoke of the desirability of an alliance between Germany, Afghanistan and Iran which would weaken Soviet influence in that region. Von Schubert replied that Germany could not activate such a policy while the Rhine area remained under foreign occupation (L.W. Adamec, p. 112). DVP SSSR, XI, 303. Ibid., 309. Ibid., 591-2. AIVAN SSSR, NAI, file 51-F, 1928, Nos 1-55, Intelligence Report from Baluchistan, 27 Jan. 1928. DVP SSSR, XI, 611. DVP SSSR, XII, 43. Ibid., 58. Ibid., 93-4. Ibid., 386. BPSV, No. 2 (10), Oct. 1929, pp. 62-6. DVP SSSR, XII, 563-4. BPSV, No. 2 (10), Oct. 1929, p. 65. Ibid., p. 66. AIVAN SSSR, NAI, 331(3)F, 1931, Nos 1-300, N. 51. DVP SSSR, XIV, 17-18, 582. Nadir Khan did not doubt that the USSR was the source of all those difficulties. Soviet agents, including Ibrahim Bek, were spreading rumours that the king was a 'servant of the British' and was helping to reinstate British control over his country. According to Albert Bodard, the French Minister in Kabul, the Soviet embassy in Kabul 'deployed great activity' and had in its service a large personnel, consisting mainly of 'specialist orientalists'. It would not be wrong to assume that those 'orientalists' were the kind of 'specialists' who served in the Intelligence Department at the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District. They were indeed well briefed in matters concerning Afghanistan, India and Iran, but their knowledge was somewhat one-sided. On one occasion one of them happened to say to Bodard in a frank moment: 'It would be a pity if all our knowledge of this country, which borders my motherland, should be lost for my government' (ADF, Série E, Asie 1930-1940, Afghanistan, Vol. 43, pp. 145-6). The head of that team of 'specialists', Leonid Stark, son and grandson of admirals of the Russian Imperial Navy, became a Bolshevik and a 'fiery propagandist'. This was the description of him given by the French Consul in Bombay, Daniel Levy (ADF, Série E, Asie, 1919-1929, Afghanistan, Vol. 13, p. 11). Sovetsko-afganskie otnosheniya, 1919-1960. Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), pp. 81-4. According to information obtained in Beirut from Lebanese officials, who had visited Afghanistan, by 1933 the number of refugees from the USSR had reached 60,000. They were well received by the Afghan government. The Muslims were spread around the country, were given land and were freed from

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

taxes the next three years. Refugees from the European part of the USSR and Bokharan Jews were helped to reach India, whence the Jews tried to reach Palestine (ADF, Série E, Asie, 1930-1940, Afghanistan, Vol. 43, pp. 161-4). 47. DVP SSSR, XV, 389-91, 541.

Conclusion pp. 152-154 1. W.S. Haas, Iran (New York, 1946), pp. 222-3. 2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States, 1940, Vol. HI (Washington, 1957), p. 637.

Bibliography SOURCES

Unpublished Material Archives Diplomatiques Françaises (Paris): Série E, Asie 1918-1929; Asie-Oceanie 1930-1940. Sous-séries; Afghanistan; Perse (Iran). Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow): Fondy 04, 08, 070, 094, 0132, 'Obzory persidskoi pechati'. Arkhiv Instituta Vostokovedeniya Akademii Nauk SSSR, National Archives of India (Moscow): Persia Series; MID-Asie; Frontier A; Affairs of Badakhshan. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossii (Moscow): Fondy Kantselyariya MID; Perepiska s Tegeranom i Londonom; Glavnyi Arkhiv; Persidskii stol; Missiya v Persii; Konsul'stvo v Kermanshakhe. British Public Record Office: Foreign Office Papers of the Eastern Department (Persia, Iran), FO 371. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv v Leningrade: Fond Osobennoi kantselyarii Ministra po secretnoi chasti. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii i sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva (Moscow): Fond 130. Official, Unojfical and Semi-official Publications Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office): First Series: 1919-1923, Vols. Ill, IV, XIII, 1948, 1950, 1963; Series 1A: 1925-1928, Vols. I, IV, 1966, 1972. Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, Vols. II-XVI (Moscow 1957- ). Mezhdunarodnaya politika RSFSR za 1922 god, Otchyot NKID (Moscow, 1923). Papers Regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919 (London, 1919). Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States (Washington, 1921-27). Survey of International Affairs, 1932 and 1933 (London, 1933, 1934). The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1922, J.M. Meijer (ed.) Vol. II (1920-1922) (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1971). Memoirs Abdurrakhman Khan, Avtobiografiya Abdurrakhman Khana, emira Afganistana (SPb., 1901) (translated into Russian). Arfa, Hassan, Under Five Shahs. (London, John Murray), 1954.

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Blücher, W. von, Zeitenwende in Iran: Erlebnisse und Beobachtungen (Biberach an der Riss, 1949). PaFgunov, N.G., Tridtsaf let. Vospominaniya zhurnalista i diplomata (Moscow: IPL, 1960). Shumyatskii, B.Z., Na postu sovetskoi diplomatii (Moscow: MGIMO, 1960).

Books Agaev, S.L. Iran v period politicheskogo krizisa 1920-1925 godov (Voprosy vneshney politiki) (Moscow: IVL, 1970). — Iran: vneshnyaya politika i problemy bezopasnosti, 1925-1941 gody (Moscow: IVL, 1971). Adamec, L.W., Afghanistan's Foreign Policy in the Mid-Twentieth Century (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974). Assadulaev, K., Sverzhenie dinastii Kadzharov v Irane (1920-1925 gody) (Dushanbe, 1966). Azadi, A, Colonel Muhammad Tagi Khan's Rebellion in Khorassan (Tehran, 1950. (in Persian). — The History of Our Times (Tehran, 1952) (in Persian). Balfour, H.J., Recent Happenings in Persia (Edinburgh and London, 1922). Banani, A., The Modernization of Iran (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961). Behar, Malek osh-Shoara, A Short History of the Iranian Political Parties (Tehran, 1944) (in Persian). Bobynin, H., Persiya, eyo economicheskoe polozhenie i vneshnyaya torgovlya (1901-1923 gody) (Tiflis, 1923). Bushuev, P.P., IstoriyaposoVstv i diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii Russkogo i Iranskogo gosudarstv v 1586-1612 godakh (Moscow: Nauka, 1976). Connoly, V., Soviet Economic Policy in the East: Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Tana Tova and Sinkiang (London: Oxford University Press, 1933). Fatemi, N.S., Diplomatic History of Iran, 1917-1923 (New York: Russel F. Moore, 1964). Fischer I., The Soviets in World Affairs: A history of relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930) (2 Vols). Ghoreichi, A., Soviet Foreign Policy in Iran, 1917-1960 (University of Colorado, unpublished PhD thesis, 1965). Glukhoded, V.S., Problemy economicheskogo razvitiya Irana (20-e-30-e gody) (Moscow: IVL, 1968). Iran: Ocherki noveishei istorii (Moscow: Nauka, 1976). Istoriya diplomatii, Vols. II, III (Moscow: IPL, 1963, 1965). Istoriya SSSR, Second Series, Vol.VIII (Moscow: Nauka, 1967). Ivanov, M.S. Ocherk istorii Irana (Moscow: GPI, 1952). — Noveishaya istoriya Irana (Moscow: Mysl', 1965).

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Kheifets, N.A., Sovetskaya Rossiya i sopredeVnye strany Vostoka, 19181920 (Moscow, Nauka, 1964). — Sovetskaya diplomatiya i narody Vostoka, 1921-1927 (Moscow: Nauka, 1968). Kinross, Lord, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London, 1965). Landis, L., Politics and Oil: Moscow in the Middle East (New York/ London: Dunellen, 1973). Lenczowski, G., Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1948. A Study in Big Power Rivalry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949). — The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963). Macmun, G., Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah (London, 1933). Makki, Kh., The Twenty-Year History of Iran (Tehran: 1945) (in Persian). — Doctor Mossadeq (Tehran, 1945). Mansur, M.A, The Soviet Government's Policy in Iran, 1917-1927 (Tehran, 1948) (in Persian). Melikov, O.S., Ustanovleniediktatury Reza-shakha vIrane (Moscow: IVL, 1961). Miroshnikov, L.I., Angliiskaya ekspansiya v Irane (1914-1920) (Moscow: IVL, 1961). Navoi, H., Les relations économiques irano-russes (Paris: DomatMontchrestien, 1935). Nicolson, H., Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy (London: Harcourt, Brace, 1937). Nikonova, S.V., Antisovetskaya vneshnyaya politika angliiskikh konservatorov, 1924-1927 (Moscow: Mysl', 1963). Nollau, G. and Wiehe, H.J., Russia's South Flank: Soviet Operations in Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963). North, G. and Joukoff Eudin, X., Soviet Russia and the East: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). Nur-zadeh Boushehri, I., The Political Secrets of Iranian Oil (Tehran, 1956) (in Persian). Pavlovich, M. and Iranskii, S., Persiya v bofbe za nezavisimost' (Moscow, 1925). Pirayech, P., Persisch-Russische Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (Munich, 1964). Ramazani, R.K., The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966). Rezun, M., The Soviet Union and Iran from the beginning of the Pahlavi Dynasty until the Soviet Invasion in 1941 (Geneva: Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Collection de Relations Internationales, Vol. 8, PhD. thesis No. 326, 1981). Serine, C , World War in Iran (London: Constable, 1962). Shahrivar, A., Our History (Tehran: 1942) (in Persian). Sheean, V., The New Persia (New York: Century, 1927). Spector, I., The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959).

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Sykes, P., A History of Persia (London: Macmillan, 1930) (2 vols). Tabatabai, Seyid Zia ed-Din, Novaya epokha v istorii Persii i anglopersidskii dogovor (Baku, 1921). Tagi-zadeh, S.Kh., The History of the First Period of the Revolution and Constitutional Movement in Iran (Tehran, 1958) (in Persian). Troyanovskii, K., Vostok i Revolyutsiya (Petrograd, 1918). Tuzmukhamedov, R.A., Sovetsko-Iranskie otnosheniya (1917-1927gody) (Moscow: IMO, 1960). Ulmann, R.H., The Anglo-Soviet Accord: Anglo-Soviet Relations, 19171921. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). Wilber, D.N., Contemporary Iran (London: Thames and Hudson, 1963). Yussupov, I.A., Ustanovlenie irazvitiesovetsko-iranskikh otnoshenii 19171927 (Tashkent: FAN, 1969). Zabih, S., The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). Selected Articles Boulger, D.C., 'Our Relations with Afghanistan', Contemporary Review No. 116, July 1919. Castagne, J.A., 'Notes sur la politique extérieure de l'Afghanistan depuis 1919 (mission et traités)', Revue du Monde Musulman, XLVIII, 1921. Chervonny, A. 'Chto proiskhodit v Persii?', Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, 11(48), 1925. Ducrocq, G., 'La politique du gouvernement des Soviets en Perse', Revue du Monde Musulman, LU, Dec. 1922. Irandust, 'Zametki o smene rezhima v Persii', Novy Vostok, 15, 1926. Iranskii, S., 'Cherez voennuyu diktaturu k natsional'nomu gosudarstvu', Novy Vostok, 5, 1924. Ivanova, M.N., 'Germanskaya agressiya v Irane v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny', Kratkie soobshcheniya Instituía Vostokovedeniya AN SSSR, Vol. XIX, 1956. Kheifets, N.A., 'Leninskaya vneshnyaya politika i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie', Narody Azii i Afriki, 2, 1970. — 'Uzy dobrososedstva i bratstva nerastorzhimy', Aziya i Afrika segodnya, 2, 1970. Matveev, A.M., 'Deyatel'nost' "Soveta internatsional'noi propagandy na Vostoke" v Srednei Azii v 1919-1920 godakh', Narody Azii i Afriki, 5, 1978. Persits, M.A., 'V.I. Lenin o levosektantskikh oshibkakh pervykh kommunistov Vostoka', Narody Azii i Afriki, 2, 1970. Plastun, V.N., 'Uchastie iranskikh trudyashchikhsya v grazhdanskoi voine v Rossii', Narody Azii i Afriki, 5, 1973. Yuzhny, K., 'Anglo-persidskie treniya v Persidskom zalive', Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn\ 1, 1928.

Appendices APPENDIX I

Message from the Emir of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, to V.I. Lenin (translated from Persian) 21 April 1919

To His Excellency, the President of the Great Russian Republic. To assure your Excellency of my respect and boundless feelings of friendship, I am writing to you as follows: In view of the fact that human relations aiming at the elimination of each others' needs and problems are a natural need of the human race, particularly in our time, when the blessings of civilization presage happiness and call out to the nations to unite and establish friendly relationships, it is understood that the principles involved in the course and achievement of the above-mentioned union must be reached, to begin with, between two neighbours, and only then between other nations. Unfortunately, the noble people of Afghanistan, notwithstanding the complete freedom and independence they enjoyed previously and enjoy at present, were for some time deprived of the possibility of reaching that happiness owing to the intrigues of some interested persons and as is known, were removed from their closest and most noble neighbours. Nevertheless, thanks be to Allah the Great and Exalted, they [the Afghan people] succeeded in eliminating the intrigues of the above-mentioned persons and in re-establishing their own innate dignity. In dispatching my envoy extraordinary, the greatly esteemed General Muhammed Vali-Khan, with a special mission from my Government to Europe, as he will be travelling through the flourishing country of your great and friendly neighbouring State, I have commissioned him to draw the attention of the leaders of Your Great State to the establishment of friendly ties and sincere relations between our two great states. He is authorized by me to conduct negotiations and to prepare the ground for the establishment of the necessary friendship between both our States and to guarantee their mutual interests. I have the honour to assure you of my heartfelt and sincere feelings towards your High Government. The 20th of Rajab, 1337th year of Hijra - 21 April 1919 (of the Christian era). Your friend, AMANULLAH

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Source: 'Materialy po natsional'no-Kolonial'nym problemam. Sbornik nauchnoissledovatel'skoi assotsiatsii po izucheniyu natsional'nykh i kolonial'nykh problem', No. 7(22) (Moscow, 1934), pp. 72-3. APPENDIX 2 Excepts from the Message of the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, V.I. Lenin, to the Emir of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan 27 November 1919 Having received Your Majesty's highly appreciated letter through the good offices of Your ambassador, respected Muhammed Vali-Khan, I am hurrying to thank you for your greetings and for your initiative in establishing friendship between two great nations - the Russian and the Afghan peoples. From the very first days of the glorious struggle by the Afghan people for their independence, the workers'-and-peasants' government of Russia was quick to recognize the new order in Afghanistan; it has solemnly acknowledged its full independence, and despatched its own embassy in order to create a lasting and never-failing link between Moscow and Kabul. At the present time, flourishing Afghanistan is the only independent Muslim state in the world, and fate has assigned to the Afghan people the great historical task of uniting around themselves all the enslaved Muslim nations and of leading them on the path to freedom and independence. The workers'-and-peasants' government of Russia is entrusting its embassy in Afghanistan with the task of beginning negotiations with the government of the Afghan people with the purpose of working out trade and other friendly agreements At the request of your Ambassador our government contacted by radio the governments of the neighbouring states of Russia so as to ensure the further progress of the Afghan Embassy to Europe and America; however, the intrigues of the same power, to which You referred in Your highly appreciated letter, prevented the realization of Your Majesty's plan, and Your Embassy was forced to choose a different route. Parting from You with every kind of good wish from the Russian people, I am sending to you herewith in the name of the workers'-and-peasants' government our heartfelt greetings to Yourself and to the Afghan people. President of the Sovnarkom, LENIN Source: Ibid., pp. 74-5. APPENDIX 3 Excerpts from the Instructions of the Narkomindel to the Representative Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Afghanistan 3 July 1921 . . . Our policy is that of peace and co-operation between nations. At the

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present time, when the Eastern nations, being economically backward, painfully suffer foreign economic oppression, Socialist Soviet Russia is for them a natural friend. Our policy in the East is not aggressive, it is the policy of peace and friendship. During all your work you must stress systematically this basic point, and in particular in Kabul keep this main aim in view the development of our friendship with Afghanistan. Friendship presupposes mutual assistance and, since it is our desire to help the friendly state of Afghanistan to develop and flourish, we are prepared to assist it in that peaceful pursuit in every way possible to us. You must learn the needs and requirements of Afghanistan and find out what the wishes of its government are, so that by development and by fulfilment of the Russian-Afghan treaty we should be able to extend whatever help is in our power, in order to assist in its development and well-being. You are to pay particular attention to the reformist programme of the Emir. In the present stage of Afghanistan's development - an enlightened absolutism of a type similar to ours in the 18th century appears to him to be a strongly progressive phenomenon. We cannot and must not apply to Afghanistan the standards of economically developed countries. . . . We say to the Afghan government: we have one regime while you have another; we have our ideals while you have yours; nevertheless what links us together is an identical striving for the complete self-reliance, independence and self-sufficiency of our nations. We are not interfering in your internal affairs, we are not interfering with the self-reliance of your people; we are assisting every phenomenon that has a progressive role in the development of your nation. We do not intend even for a moment to obtrude with a programme that is foreign to your people in its present stage of development. Source: Arkhiv Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, fond 094, opis' 6, papka 43, delo 594, pp. 3-4.

APPENDIX 4 Letter of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, to the Central Committee of RCP(B) 19 November 1921

G.V.

To Comrade Stalin. Respected Comrade, It has often occurred to me that, in order to be more successful, our policy in Turkey, which at present suffers from a narrowly political approach, ought to be supplemented by a more active economic policy The mere struggle for national liberation is not sufficient to counteract the world's

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economic laws. In Afghanistan, with the co-operation of Jemal, a whole system of measures have been introduced for the economic development of the country. In Mongolia, where comrade Shumyatsky is successfully working at a purely political level, an economic policy is also being carried out intended to be useful to Mongolia and to ourselves. Thus, in order to prevent Turkey from eventually falling under the system of World Capital, we ought to help it to create a basis for resistance. Comrade Yelsky points to a number of factories which are not used by us and which could be transferred to Turkish ownership, together with a small number of specialists for the development of independent industries in Turkey. One should also reach an agreement with the Turkish government whereby they send their young men to Russia to acquire an agricultural and technical education. I would request You to make Your opinion known on that subject, as I wish to know whether it is worth while developing this project any further and gathering material towards its furtherance. Similar conjectures have already been made by us concerning Persia. Simultaneously, yet independently, Comrade Rotstein in Tehran and the Narkomvnetorg [People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade] in Moscow put forward plans for creating our own bank in Tehran for financing our own trade and for assisting the economic activity of the Persians Steps are already being taken to attract German capital into Persia, which under the present circumstances does not present the same dangers as would that of the Entente. The line of action presently being carried out in Persia, and of which you have fully approved, also aims to modernize the Persian economy as a whole, instead of supporting the old centrifugal tendencies. A precondition for the development of the workers' revolutionary movement in Persia must be the economic unification and economic development of the country. If we wish to be successful in preventing such economic development from falling into the hands of World Capital, we must also offer Persia a basis for independent economic development. I am requesting you to make your opinion in these matters known. With communist greetings,

CHICHERIN.

Source: Narody Azii i Afriki, No. 2, 1970, pp. 53-4.

APPENDIX 5

Agreement on Guarantee and Neutrality between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Persia 1 October 1927 The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, recognizing that the definition of precise conditions responding to the interests of both

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183

Contracting Parties contributes to the strengthening of stable and normal relations and their sincere friendship, have appointed for that purpose Plenipotentiary Representatives: The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Chicherin Gheorghy Vassilievich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Karakhan Lev Mikhailovich, Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia; Mr Ali Goli Khan Ansari, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Persia, who, after having presented their credentials which were found to have been drawn up in the acceptable and prescribed form, have agreed on the following: Article 1 The Treaty of 26 February 1921 remains the basis of relations between Persia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, all the articles and decisions of this Treaty remain in force and cover the entire territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Article 2 Each of the Contracting Sides undertakes to refrain from attacking and from any kind of aggressive actions against the other Side, or from introducing their respective military forces within the borders of the other Side. In the case of attack by a third party or parties on one of the Contracting Sides, the other Contracting Side obligates itself to remain strictly neutral throughout such a conflict; and the Side that has been attacked must also maintain a neutral attitude even if its infringement could represent strategic, tactical or political advantages or gains that might have derived from that. Article 3 Each of the Contracting Sides undertakes not to be a part, be it either de facto or formally, of political pacts or agreements directed against the security of the other Contracting Side, be it on land or sea; nor against its entirety, independence or sovereignty. In addition, both Contracting Sides undertake to take no part in any economic boycotts and blockades organized by third powers against one of the Contracting Sides.

184

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours Article 4

In view of the obligations taken by both Contracting Sides in Articles 4 and 5 of the 26 February 1921 Treaty, each of the Contracting Sides expressed the intention not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other Side nor to conduct any propaganda orfightagainst the Government of the other Side, and will absolutely forbid its own officials to conduct any such activities on the territory of the other Contracting Side. Should, however, citizens of one of the Contracting Sides dwelling on the territory of the other Side indulge in such activities as propaganda or conflict forbidden them by the authorities of that other Side the Government of the affected territory will exercise its right to stop the activity of those citizens and apply to them punishments existing in the law of that Side. Equally, based on the above articles of the 26 February 1921 Treaty, both Sides undertake neither to support nor to tolerate on their respective territories the setting up of activities of: (1) organizations or groups no matter what they call themselves who aim tofightagainst the Government of the Contracting Side by violent means such as uprisings or attempts on the lives of individuals; (2) nor of organizations or groups claiming to be from the Government of the other Side or from part of its territory who aim also to struggle against the Government of the other Contracting Side by the above-mentioned methods, or who aim to unsettle its peace or security or territorial integrity. Based on the above principles both Contracting Sides undertake to forbid the recruiting as well as the introduction onto its territory of military forces, arms, ammunition and any kind of the above-mentioned military supplies intended for the above organizations. Article 5 Both Contracting Sides undertake to resolve all kinds of differences which may arise between them and which could not be resolved by ordinary diplomatic means, in a peaceful manner according to the moment. Article 6 Apart from the obligations undertaken by both Contracting Sides on the basis of the present Agreement, both Sides preserve their complete freedom of action in their international relations. Article 7 The present Agreement is contracted for a period of three years, and has to be approved and ratified in the shortest possible term by the legislative authorities of both Sides before it comes into force. The exchange of ratification documents will take place in Tehran within one month of ratification.

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After the first term has elapsed, the Agreement will be considered as automatically renewed each time for a term of one year until one of the Sides informs the other that it has decided to denounce it. In such a case the Agreement will remain in force for a period of six months from the date of the announced denunciation by one of the Contracting Sides. Article 8 The present Agreement is prepared in three languages - Russian, Persian and French, in three original texts for the use of each of the Contracting Sides. For purposes of interpretation all the texts are to be considered as original. In case of disagreement, the basis for interpretation will be the French text. In confirmation of all this, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed this agreement and apposed to it their seals. Prepared in Moscow City, 1 October 1927. Signatures:

GHEORGHY CHICHERIN

ALI GOLI-KHAN ANSARI

L. KARAKHAN

Protocol No. 1 Chicherin, Gheorghy Vasilyevich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovich, Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, declare that they are commissioned by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to confirm in the name of the above Government at the moment of signing of the Agreement, the guarantee and neutrality between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Persia at the present date, that the Government of the Union is not bound by any obligations that are contradictory to the above Agreement and will not undertake any such obligations throughout the period of validity of the Agreement. Mr Ali Goli-Khan Ansari, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Persia, declares that he is commissioned by the Persian Government to confirm, in the name of this Government at the moment of the signature of the Agreement on guarantee and neutrality between Persia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the present date, that the Persian Government has no international obligations contradicting the above Agreement, and equally, that it will not undertake any such obligations throughout the period of validity of the Agreement. Prepared in Moscow City on 1 October 1927. Signed:

GHEORGHY CHICHERIN L. KARAKHAN

ALI GOLI-KHAN ANSARI

186

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

Protocol No. 2 In conformity with the arrangements of the Treaty of 26 February 1921, which remains in force in its entirety as well as in all its parts, the obligations, foreseen in Article 2 of the Agreement on guarantee and neutrality signed on today's date between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Persia, concerning the undertaking not to introduce military forces beyond the borders of the other Side, do not apply to cases foreseen in article 6 of the Treaty of 26 February 1921 nor to the explanations given for the above article. Prepared in Moscow City, 1 October 1927. Signed:

GHEORGHY CHICHERIN L. KARAKHAN

ALI GOLI-KHAN ANSARI

Note by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Persia to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, G.V. Chicherin Moscow, 1 October 1927 Mr People's Commissar, At the moment of signing the Agreement on guarantee and neutrality, which was signed on today's date between Persia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honour to inform you of the following: Taking into consideration that the Persian Government always strives to implement punctually all the obligations it has taken voluntarily, that it signs the present Agreement with the intention of sincerely respecting all the obligations enclosed in it, and inasmuch as the Persian Government considers that the above-mentioned obligations are not incompatible with its obligations to the League of Nations, the Persian Government declares to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that it will also respect and implement all its obligations as a member of the League of Nations. Please accept the assurances of my highest respect, ALI GOLI-KHAN ANSARI

Note by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Persia, Ali Goli-Khan Ansari Moscow, 1 October 1927 Mr Minister, I have the honour to confirm in the name of my Government the receipt and the taking into consideration of Your following note of today's date: 4 At the moment of signing the Agreement on guarantee and neutrality, which was signed on today's date between Persia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

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187

Taking into consideration that the Persian Government always strives to implement punctually all the obligations taken voluntarily, that it signs the present Agreement with the intention of respecting all the obligations enclosed in it, and inasmuch as the Persian Government considers that the above-mentioned obligations are not incompatible with its obligations to the League of Nations. the Persian Government declares to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that it will also respect and implement all its obligations as a member of the League of Nations'. Please accept the assurance of my high respect. GHEORGHY CHICHERIN

Source: 'Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR', Vol. X, pp. 396-401.

APPENDIX 6 From the Letter by the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Persia Addressed to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR 4 October 1927 I am, of course, unable to write a detailed letter to you about the conditions here. In the last few days I have been very busy with visits and return visits. Besides, I have not yet had time to become acquainted with everything. In the last few days the whole of Tehran and the entire press have been occupied almost exclusively with us and with the agreement that has been signed. The impression everywhere is excellent. Some twenty persons whom I have already managed to meet during this short period, have all, without exception, repeated to me that our agreements form a new historical date in our relations and that they will greatly contribute to the strengthening of the bond between the USSR and Persia. It can be said with certainty that these agreements greatly please everybody, from persons in high positions to merchants. Conversations I have had with the Prime Minister and the President of the Majlis have convinced me that, apparently, there will be no delays in the ratification of the agreements. Today, 4 October, Deputy Prime Minister Rakhnema and Minister of Education Tedayoun informed me, without any special enquiry on my part and in most positive terms, that they would quickly and energetically push the agreements through the Majlis. But time will show to what extent these optimistic declarations will be realized and how long the present enthusiasm will last. The presentation of my credentials took place on the same day as the news about the signing of the agreements was received here. It is certain that this coincidence has to some extent contributed to the particularly graceful reception given me by the Shah and by Teymurtash. I consider the

188

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

speech made by the Shah as exceptionally friendly, especially the passage where he spoke of a 'new era' in our relations. That passage was repeatedly stressed and commented upon by Teymurtash and other officials during the talks that followed. Even discounting the usual oriental compliments and assurances which it is the habit to lavish here, I must still stress that I have been extremely graciously received by all those I have met until now. It looks as if many people were indeed greatly pleased that the signing of the agreements might indeed do away with all obstacles to the further strengthening of Soviet-Persian friendship. Without drawing hasty conclusions in that respect, I nevertheless wish to bring to your notice that many people have shown sincerity in their conversations and declarations on this subject YA. DAVTYAN

Source: 'Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR', Vol. X, p. 440. APPENDIX 7 From G. Chicherin to G. Zinoviev 19 May 1923. Dear Comrade, I was immensely astonished by the following reports from Tiflis: The Kurdish leader Kiamil-Bei informed our representative, according to Kiazim-Khan - a member of the Iranian Communist Party - that an uprising is about to take place in a Persian Azerbaidzhán, and that the support of the Turkish Kurds will be necessary. Kiamil-Bei is asking for further instructions. This is a return to former stupidity, when, due to a complete misunderstanding, our comrades supported highway robbers and feudais in northern Persia. Don't our comrades understand that state centralization and bourgeois parliamentarism have yet to be implemented in Persia, and the support of medieval feudais and primitive predatory tribes is a most reactionary act? This absurdity, moreover, alienates from us Persian bourgeois democracy which is thus pushed into British hands. An uprising in the Persian Azerbaidzhán means an uprising of primeval predatory tribes which embody and represent a danger for the establishment of a democratic state in Persia. One cannot imagine anything more reactionary. At the same time this can also entirely undermine our policy in Persia, which already faces millions of difficulties created by the British agents. I am addressing you because I cannot count on our influence over comrade Ordzhonikidze, all the more with the 'Uklonists' [deviators M.V.] who have recently raised their heads. They have always acted

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189

regardless of the Narkomindel and at one time, as you undoubtedly remember, conducted in Persia a most dangerous separatist policy. I am, therefore, appealing to you with a request to put serious pressure upon our Transcaucasian comrades in order to put an end to these completely unforgivable adventures such as organizing some sort of uprising among the tribes of Persian Azerbaidzhán in alliance with the Kurds. With Communist greetings, G. CHICHERIN

Source: Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (Russian Centre for Preservation and Study of Documents on Contemporary History), fond 495, opis' 1, delo 90, p. 1.

Index Abbas, Prince, 3 Abbas, Shah (1587-1629), 1 Abdurrahman, Emir, 125 Abdurrahman Khan, 10 Afghan-Iranian Friendship and Security Treaty (1927), 92 Afghan-Turkish Treaty (1928), 92 Afghanistan: artefacts for sale in Russia, 6; Britain declares war against (1878), 10; British army and, 9,10; general information about, 78; independence of, 122,123; problems over Soviet consulates, 129,130,132,141; rebellion in Khost area, 138,144

Aftab, 31

Agaev,S.L.,105,113,115,116 Agha, Gul, 148 Agha Mirza Mohsen, 6 Ahmad Shah, 79 Ahmad Shah Abdali, 7 Ahmed, Prince, 134 Ain ed-Dowleh, recognizes Soviet Government (December 1917), 12 Airom, General, 104 Akbar, Prince, 9 Akhmedl. Sultan, 1 AlaosSaltaneh, 6 Alexander II, Tsar, 9,10 Amanullah, Crown Prince, 121 Amanullah Khan: attitude to Iran, 93, 117; Britain and relations with, 121, 122,123; help and kindness from Russia, 124,125,126; interest from Russia leads to treaty, 127,128,129; instructs people of Afghanistan to leave Islam army, 135; rebellion in Khost area, 138; relinquishes power, 145,146,150; remains firm over Urta-Tugai, 139,140; rumours about, 147; visit to Europe, 142-4; wants buffer between Afghanistan and Russia, 133,134; wants normalization of relations with Russia, 137; wonders about Russian

friends, 130,131 Anglo-Afghan treaties (1840s and 1850s), 9 Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1921), 132 Anglo-Afghan war (1919), 123,124 Anglo-Iranian Agreement (1928), and landing rights for British planes, 96, 97 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 45,94, 108,110 Anglo-Iranian oil conflict (1932-33), 107,108,110,111,112 Anglo-Iranian Transport Company, 58 Anglo-Russian Agreement (1907), 4, 11,28 Anglo-Soviet relations, breakdown of, 86 anglophobia, 5,6,27,74 Anichkov,N.A.,3 Ansari, AH Kholi Khan, 85,86, 87, 88, 119 Ashaer Khan Khalkhaly, Emir, 73 Assad-Khan (Iranian Minister to Petrograd), 12,13,14,16 Assadullah Khan (Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs), 60 Atrek (river), 2,4,114; water usage from, 50 Ayatollah Muddaris, 77 Bâchai Sakao,117,118,145,146,147, 148, see also Habibullah Gazi BakhtiarKhan,21 Balfour, H J . , 55 Baranov, Petr, 42 Baratov, General, 5,21 Barclay (British Minister in Tehran), 6 Basmachi emigration, problem of, 148, 149 Bedri Bey, 136 Black Sea Straits, 71 Bokhara: problems of, 133,136,139, 148; and Urta-Tugai dispute, 138 Bokhara, Emir of, 128,129,134 bolsheviks, aims of, 12

Index Bonin (French minister in Tehran), 36 boycott of trade with Russia (1927), 87, 88,89;(1929), 102,103;(1932), 107, 108 Bravin, N.Z., 14,15,17,21,124 Brest-Litovsk Agreement (1917), 12, 13,39 Britain: aims re trade with Iran, 29; and influence in Iran (1919), 44; and plan to occupy Iran, 19,20 British Imperial Airways, 61,95,96; restrictions on, 97 British Imperialism: Bolshevik propaganda and, 121; campaigns against, 66,110,133 British Shahinshah Bank, 100 British-Iranian Agreement: denunciation of, 54; nature of, 20, 69 British-Iranian relations, improvement in, 95,96 British-Russian Agreement (1907): attitude of Lenin to, 12; demands for annulment of, 26; dissolution of, 14, 15 Capitaluations: definition of regime of, 2,28,31; Moscow accused of trying to reinstate, 68; steps in abolition of, 97,98,100 capitulatory rights, renunciation by Soviet of, 17 Caspian Sea, 2, 3,122; America and conditions about, 62; fleet attacks Enzeli, 34; navigation rights on, 49; rights to fishing in, 81,90 Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 78,79,80 Chelmsford, Lord, 19,20,122,127 Chicherin, G.V.: attitude to Britain and Iran, 23,24; Enzeli operation and, 35,37-9,40-1,62; and foundation of Russian-Iranian Treaty, 47,63-6; offers advice on Iranian policy, 73; options about Iranian government and, 76,77; Persian territory and, 85, 89; ponders about whom to support in Iran, 117; talk about British pressure and, 93, 96; Tarzi writes to re Afghanistan, 122; Urta-Tugai dispute and, 139; visit of Amanullah Khan and, 142 Clive, Sir Robert, 85 Cossack Regiment, 4,47,54 Cox, Sir Percy, 26,30, 32, 33

191 Curzon, Lord: disagrees with Iran over Capitulations, 26, 28, 31; Moshir edDowleh and, 44; Seyid Zia ed-Din and, 55, 56,58; tough policy towards Iran and, 66, 73, 74, 76 Curzon-Vossuq Agreement (1919), 44, 45,46 Daily Telegraph, 101 d'Arcy concession (1901), 110 Davtyan, Ya. Kh.: attitude to RussianIranian relations, 91,92,93; audience with Hedayat, 95, 96; and meeting with Reza Shah, 96; policies of Russia towards Iran and, 97,98; refusal of Iran to disarm and, 113; Teymurtash and, 118,119; told of Soviet responsibility for German interest in Afghanistan, 146 demarcation agreement, Turkey and Iran (1932), 116 Denikin, General Anton, 34,35 Disarmament Conference (1933), 113 Djirga (Afghan Parliament), 130 Dobbs, Sir Henry, 127 Dost Muhammad Khan, 8,11,93 Duhamel, General A.O., 3 Dunsterville, General, 24 East China railway, 112 Ehsanullah (Iranian anarchist), 65 Eliava, S.Z.,41 Ellis, Sir G., 8 Engert (US envoy in Tehran), 154 Enver Pasha,133,134,135,136 Enzeli: army strength of, 32; Red Army operation in, 34, 35,36; results of Soviet landing, 37,38 Enzeli Communist Party, 40,90 Enzeli Revvoensovet (revolutionary military committee), 21 Erani, Tagi, 153 Faiz Muhammed Khan, 150 Farroh Khan, 93 Farroukhi Yazdi, 95 Farzin (Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs), 112,119 Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834), 3 Federation of Southern Tribes (1923), 75 Firouz, Prince, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36,37

192

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

Foreign Trade Commissariat, 68 foreign trade monopoly, Soviet government and, 68,70,87,109 Forugi (Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs), 105,106, 111, 115,119 free trade, 106 Friendship Treaty (1921) between RSFSR and Afghanistan, 88,127; details of treaty, 127-9 Garfaran (Iranian chargé d'affaires in London), 45 Gilan: and Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 39; dissolution of government in, 48; experiment in, 34-42; as a puppet regime, 38; and Red Army officers, 52,55; republic of, 63,110; Rotstein's attitude to, 62,65; Russian troops withdraw from, 41,47; Soviet interference in, 63; Soviet Republic of, 41,64,131 Godunov, Tsar Boris, 1 Golam Sadeq (Minister of Foreign Affairs for Afghanistan), 99 gold standard, adoption by Iran, 100 Golovkin, Count Yu. A., 7 Gorchakov, Prince Alexander, 10 Gorky, Maxim, 125 Great Britain: attitude to Afghanistan, 8; attitude to Iran, 3; attitude to Russia, 2; feelings against in Iran, 5, 6; opposed Russian treaty with Afghanistan, 8; and Russia's position, 4 Great National Assembly (Turkey), 71 GulamNabi Khan, 118 Gulam Siddik Sharki, 144 Gulistan Peace Treaty (1813), 2 Habibullah, Emir (1901-19), 121 Habibullah Gazi, 145,146,147 Hakim ol-Molk, 68 Haqiqat, 57 Harmsforth,M.,59 Hedayat, Mehdi Kholi, 87,95,96 Herat, dispute over, 117,118 Herbett, Jean, 84 Hindenburg, President, 143 Hitler, Adolf, 154 Humphreys, Sir Francis, 135,137,138, 139 Hussein Ala (Iranian Minister in Washington), 60

Hussein, Alah, 113 Hussein Ali Khan Talyshly, 73 Ibrahim Bek, 149 Imperial Supreme Council, 48 Inayatullah (brother of Amanullah), 145 IngilabeSorh, 57 International Disarmament Conference (1933), 113 International Postal Union, 150 Iran (newspaper), 16,29,57,60,78, 114 Iran: anti-British feeling in, 5,6,24; campaign to boycott trade with Russia, 69, 87-9,102-3,107-8; fear of British anger, 22; foreign policy and trade problems, 101,102; how it saw Russian Revolution, 5,12; neutrality in First World War, 4; position on Japanese occupation of Manchuria and, 113,114; problem of centralization of power, 74,75; protest against Soviet invasion, 36; and relations with Russia, 4; and rule by British advisers, 27; Russian soldiers leave, 19; Soviet goods boycotted, 87,88, 89; stance over Japanese occupation of Manchuria, 113,114; trade difficulties with Russia, 30,104,105,106; wants renewal of postal and telegraphic communications with Russia, 34 Iran-Turkish border demarcation (1932), 116 Iranian Communist Party, 40,44,63, 94, 95,109 Iranian-Afghan dispute, 93,94 Iranian-Turkish Treaty (1926), 92 Islamic forces, 134,136 Ismail-Zadeh, Prince, 25 Ittihad, 57 Ivanov,M.S.,109 Ivanovich, Tsar Feodor (1584-98), 1 Izvestiya,37,75,110 Izvolsky, Alexander Petrovich, 78,79 Jangel, 5 Jangeli, guerrillas in Gilan, 37, 39,40, 62 Jemal Pasha, 133,134 Kalinin, Mikhail, 142

Index Karakhan, Lev: general attitude to Iranian questions, 15,41,47,48,65; question of White Russians in Iran, 89; and Soviet-Iran oil company, 111; and Soviet-Iran trade convention, 107; and system of pacts with Iran, 92, 93; visit to Iran (1933), 115; warning about Anglo-Afghan crisis, 137; warns Iran about Afghanistan, 119; welcomes Amanullah to Russia, 142-3; will look after German interest in Afghan territory, 146 Kavam os-Saltaneh, 59, 61, 64,66, 67, 69,70,71 Kazim-Pasha, General, 36 Kemal, Mustafa, 71,72, 91 Kemalism, 76 Kevir-Khurian, 111 Khadi Khan, Abdul, 128 Khaladj, 57 Khanykov,N.V.,9 Khaydar Khan Amuogly, 64 Kheifets,A.N.,39 Khoshtaria Concession, 59,60,61,62, 66 Khost, events in (1924), 144 Kirov, S., 65 Kolchak, Admiral, 28 Kolomytsev, I.O., 20,21,22,23,24, 31,37 Komarov, General, 11 Komiteye Modjazat, 6 Kronstadt, naval base, 142 Kuchuk Khan, 37, 38,39,40,41; and communists, 40,42,52,110; desire for friendly relations with Russia, 63; organises coup, 64; flees to mountains, 65 Kushesh, 87, 88 Kushka-Herat-Kandahar-Kabul telegraph line, 137 Lakhuti Khan, 73 Landis, Lincoln, 44 Lausanne Conference, 70, 71,137 League of Nations, 27,36,114,152 Lenczowsky, G., 119 Lenin, V.I.: Gilan drama and, 41, 42, 65; Rotstein and, 47,56; young Afghans and, 121,122,124,125; Young Turks and, 133 Litvinov, M.M., 107, 111, 113,115,

193 140,143 Lloyd George, David, 19 Locarno Treaty (1925), 140,141 Loganovsky, M.A., 93,104,105 Loraine, Sir Percy, 77,78,79, 80,101 Lynch Concession, the, 58 MacDonald, Ramsay, 108 Majlis (Iranian Parliament): British relations with, 27,29,45,53,54; and the National Bloc, 69,70,71; and republicanism, 77; and rights of Khoshtaria, 59; and Soviet-Iranian relationships, 60, 62,91; temporary government given to Reza Khan by, 79; Teymurtash's address to, 66; wants abolition of Capitulations, 98; wants reciprocity in trade, 105 Malleson, General, 24 Mamduh Shevket Bey (Turkish ambassador), 83,91,119 Marling, Charles, 6,18 Medem, Count A.I., 3 Minorsky, V . , 5 , 6 Mirza Hassan Khan Moshar, 79,80 Mirza Ismail Khan, 6 Mohber es-Saltaneh, 101 Montagu, Edwin, 20 Montahad ed-Dowleh, 6 Moshar os-Saltaneh, 61 Moshaver ol-Mamalek, 45,46; indicates Russian troops should leave Iran, 47; Karakhan wants information from, 48; and nationalism, 53; and trade relations with Russia, 70, 72 Moshaver ol-Molk, 15 Moshir ed-Dowleh, 44,45,53,67,76 Mossadeq es-Saltaneh, 77,90,91 Mostoufi ol-Mamalek, 12,15; and Britain, 77; and National Bloc, 69; as Prime Minister, 71,72 Muhammad Ibrahim (Minister of Justice), 135 Muhammad Tagi Khan, Colonel, 73 Muhammad Zaher Shah, King, 152 Muhammed Aziz (Afghan ambassador to Tehran), 150 Muhammed Shah (1834^-48), 3 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 133,140 Nadir Khan, General, 135,139,148, 150

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The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

Nadir Shah (1736-47), 2 Narimanov (Prime Minister of Azerbaijanian SSR), 63 Narkomindel, the: Appeal of (1919), 31,32; and protests about Iran's policies, 85, 93,95,100; and revolt in Afghanistan, 117,118,123; and Stark, 146,148,150; and steps to reach agreement with Afghanistan, 134,135,139 Narodnyi Komissariat Inostrannykh DeAseeNXID Naser ed-Din Shah (184&-96), 3,4 Nasrullah, Prince, 126 National Bloc, formation and membership of, 69,70,71 Near East and India, 108 Nesselrode, Count K.V., 8 New Statesman, 33 Nicolson, Harold, 83, 85 Nizhny Novgorod Fair, 68 NKID, 12,13,14,15,16,34 normalization of Soviet-Iranian relations: main obstacles to, 31,32, 33,34,37; and the National Bloc in Iran, 69; talks about, 44,54,67 Norman, Herman, 53,54,55 Nurzadeh (Iranian chargé d'affaires in Moscow), 96 OGPU, 117 Oliphant, M., 28 Ordzhonikidze, 37,39,40,62,63,136 Orenburg Cossack Atman Dutov, uprising of, 24 Ottoman Empire, 1 pacification of the Kurds, results of, 116 Padishah, 145 Pagman Pact, 140,141,149 Pahlavi see Reza Shah Pakrevan (Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs), 93,107, 111 Palgunov,N.,95,109 Parviz-Mirza (Qajar Prince), 26,27 Pehlevi (formerly Enzeli), conditions in, 90 Perovsky, Count V.A., 7,8 Peter the Great (1682-1725), 1 Petrogradskaya Pravda, 38 Polivanov,E.D.,12,13 Postal and Telegraph Convention (1923), 72

Pravda, 75 Pravda Vostoka, 142 Primakov, V.M., 118 Profintern, 89 Qajar dynasty (1796-1825), 2,79 Raad, 30, 32 Radofinikin, K.K.,8 Ramazani, R.K., 18,101,110 Raskol'nikov, F.F., 74,139; Enzeli operation and, 35,37,38,40; instructions from the Narkomindel to, 123,130,131; and Soviet agreement with Afghanistan, 132; Turkish affairs and, 134,136 Rawalpindi preliminary agreement (1919), 123,127,137 Reisner, Larisa, 137 Reza Khan, 49; his ideas and friendship with Rotstein, 57,58,59; as Minister of War, 67,69; patronage of Russia, 73,74,75,76; praise for Mustafa Kemal, 71,72; as Prime Minister of Iran, 76,77,79; Soviet embassy puts pressure on, 80,81,84, 85, 86,93; strengthening mistrust of Russia, 95, 112,114,115,140; talks with Davtyan about Britain, 96; thoughts about Communists, 110,152,154; wants Iranian independence, 101; western markets and, 106,107,108, 109; would like Herat, 117 Romanov, Tsar Mikhail Feodorovich (1613-45), 1 Rosa Luxemburg (a cruiser), 33 Rotstein, Feodor Aronovich; friendship with Reza Khan, 57,58, 59; Iran and Soviet relationships and, 60, 61,62,64,65, 85, 89; relations with Iran's press, 66; trade with Iran and,68 RSFSR: Iran refuses to recognise, 20, 21; Kabul (Afghanistan) and, 124; Khoshtaria Concession and, 62; relations with Iran and, 31,34,52; trade with Iran and, 67,68,70 RSFSR-Afghanistan friendship treaty (1921), 127,128 Rushtu (Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs), 116 Russia: influence in Iran, 3; withdrawal of army from Iran, 13

Index Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic see RSFSR Russian-Iranian diplomatic relations: beginnings of, 1-3; competition from Britain over, 3; inequalities in, 4 Sa'adabad Pact (1937), 153 Sabline,M.,28 Sadar Mirza, 77 Salisbury, Lord, 10 Samsam os-Saltaneh, 17,18 San Stefano peace treaty, 10 Sardar Rashid, 6 Sazonov, Sergei Dmitrievich, 78,79 Sefevi dynasty, 1 Sepahdar Azem, 45,46,47 Setareye Djehan, 109 Setareyelran,78 Setareye Sorh, 5, 57,78 Seyid Alim Khan (Emir of Bokhara), 129 Seyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai: British dealings with, 30,32; as Prime Minister of Iran, 49,54,55,56; Reza Khan dismisses, 58,59; Rotstein and, 56,57,58 Shahinshah (Imperial) Bank of Persia, 24 Shaumian, Stefan G., 31 Sheikh Khalessi (from Nedjef), 75 Sheikh Khaz'al of Muhammara, 75,77 Sheikh Mehdi, 23 Sher Ali Khan, Emir, 9,10,11 Shir Ahmed, 144 Shivan,M.R.,121 Shudzha od-Dowleh, General, 135 Shumyatsky (Soviet ambassador), 69, 70,71,74 Shuysky, Tsar Vasili, 1 Simonich,I.O.,3,7,8 Society for Economic Action, 87 South Persian Rifles, 6 Soviet Trade Representation in Tehran, 90 Soviet-Afghan trade, growth of, 142, 153 Soviet-Afghan trade treaty, 141,142 Soviet-Afghan Treaty (1921), difficulties with, 129,131,132,133 Soviet-Afghan Treaty on Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression (1931), 149 Soviet-Iranian oil company, 111

195 Soviet-Iranian relations (1929-33), 119,120; normalization of, 32, 33, 34, 37, 44, 54; problems in training Iranians, 42; world economic crisis and,100-8 Soviet-Iranian trade: delegation to Moscow, 67-9; increase in, 73-4,77; problems with and boycotts of, 88-9, 102-3; resumption of trade negotiations and, 105-7; settlement and navigation convention (October 1931), 106; Treaty (1921) and, 152-3 Soviet-Iranian trade convention (1932), 106,107 Soviet-Iranian Treaty (1921), 49-52, 53,60,65 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Neutrality and Guarantee (1927), 86,90,91,99 Soviets: setting up of, 63; slogans against Britain in Iran, 19; and unrest on Iranian borders, 85 Stalin, J., 40,41,62,76 Stalin-Ordzhonikidze extremist group, 64 Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), 59 Stark, Leonid: Afghan conflict and, 93, 139; Pagman Pact and, 140,142,143; trouble in Afghanistan again and, 146,147,150 Stoletov, General, 10 Suleiman Mirza, 69,77 Sultan Ahmed Shah, 58 Sunday Worker, 118 Sure Israfil, 77 Surits, Yakov Zakharovich: obligations in Kabul and, 124,125; relationship with Afghanistan and, 127; Soviet consulates and, 130; in Turkey (Ankara), 146 Sykes, Sir Percy, 6 Tadjeddad, 30, 78 Tagi Zadeh, 90 Tala'at Pasha, 133 Tarzi, Mahmud, 121,122; and concern about Russian policy, 128,130,131; request to British re military help, 135; and Urta-Tugai dispute, 139, 140 TASS, 79,92,95 Terek (river), 2 Teymurtash, Abdul Hussein Khan, 118; disarmament of Iran and, 113;

196

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours

the Majlis and, 54,66, 69; Moscow visits and, 83, 84,85, 111; reservations about Russian policy, 92,93,118; trade affairs with Russia and, 98,104,109,114; uprooted from government (1932), 111, 115 The Times, 28, 32, 33,109 trans-Iranian railway, building of, 117 Treaty of Erzerum, 92 Trebizond-Tabriz railway, 116 Trotsky, Leon, 35,39 Troyanovsky, K., 19 Tufan, 51,90,95 Turkish-Iranian border settlement, attitude of Moscow to, 116,117 Turkish-Iranian negotiations (193032), 116 Turkmanchai Peace Treaty (1828), 2, 49 Tyufyakin, Prince, 1 Umara, Fazli, 144,146,148 Union of South Iranian Oil Workers, 94 Urta-Tugai, controversy over, 138,139, 140,141 Vali Khan, General Muhammed, 122, 125,136 Vatan, 57 Vitkevich,I.V.,8,9 Von Blücher, Walter, 101,119 VonEtter, 14,15,16,17,22 VonHildebrand,H.,23

Voroshilov, Klim, 143 Vossuq ed-Dowleh: Kolomytsev affair and, 21,23,24; requisition of food by British army and, 24; and still leaning towards Britain, 25,26; takes steps to renew communications with Russia, 33,34; treaty with Britain, 27,28,29, 30; the treaty and Russian view of it, 31, 32; unseated from government (1920), 44; upset by Russian invasion, 36, 37 Voznesensky, A., 39 Wildren (French chargé d'affaires in Tehran), 80 Williamson (American ambassador to Tehran), 112 Yassai (Director of Iran's Central Trade Department), 107 Yoffe (Soviet ambassador), 133 Young Turks revolution (1908), 133 Yurenev, K.K. (Krotovsky): berates Reza Shah over treaty, 80, 81, 83; Iran delay in signing treaty, 86, 87, 88; result of Soviet Union interference and, 97 Zabih,S.,44 Zill os-Saltaneh, Prince, 25 Zokaol-Mulk,77 Zukerman (Soviet chargé d'affaires in Tehran), 110,139