The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities (Synthese Library, 455) 3030924068, 9783030924065

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
Abbreviations
Part I: On the Apraxia Argument
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Skepticism as a Nihilistic Thought in Modern Times
1.2 Hume and Apraxia Revisited
Chapter 2: Apraxia and the Development of Ancient Skepticisms
2.1 Preliminary Considerations
2.2 Proto-Skepticisms
2.3 The Life of Pyrrho
2.4 Pyrrho´s Messamates
2.5 From Timon to Arcesilaus?
Chapter 3: Academics X Stoics
3.1 Arcesilaus Attacks
3.2 Carneades
3.3 Clitomachus
Chapter 4: Sextus Empiricus
4.1 The Legacy of Skepticisms up to Sextus
4.2 The Rustic and the Urban Interpretations
4.3 The Urbans and Their Beliefs
4.4 The Rustics and Their Beliefs
4.5 Urbans and Rustics in Diaphonia
4.6 Paving the Suburban Terrain
4.7 Testing H1
4.8 Summarizing
4.9 Testing H2
4.10 A Twillight Zone
4.11 The Second Formulation of Speech Acts and Skepticism
4.12 A Provisional Conclusion
Part II: The Skeptic and the Crafts
Chapter 5: Sextus Empiricus and the Elements
5.1 An Interlude on Skepticism and Medicine
5.2 The Refutation to the Elements in General
5.3 The Refutation of the Grammatical Notion of Letters as Specific Elements of Words
5.4 Back to the Feasibility
Chapter 6: Sextus Against the Rhetoricians
6.1 General Scheme of the Argument of Adv. Rhet.
6.2 Adv. Rhet. Walkthrough (the Search for the Definition of Rhetoric)
6.3 The Refutations to the Available Definitions (Rhetoric Definition as Techne)
6.4 The Refutations to the Definitions of Rhetoric as Science of Discourse and Producer of Persuasion
6.5 Adv. Rhet. 73-113
Chapter 7: Sextus and a Positive Conception of Techne
7.1 Galen Again
Chapter 8: Final Remarks: On the Reception of Skeptical Arguments and Their Transmission
Appendices
Appendix 1: General Introduction to the Stoic Philosophy
1 Early and Middle Stoa
2 Stoicism as a System
3 Stoic Physics
4 Stoic Ethics
5 Stoic Theory of Knowledge
6 Conceptual Table of the Stoic Philosophy
Appendix 2: Conceptual Tables of the Skepticism Before Sextus Empiricus
Appendix 3: Chronological Table of the Philosophers and Schools Mentioned
Appendix 4: The Three Medical Sects and Their Main Heads, According to Pseudo-Galen, Introd.14.683.5-14.684.5
References
1. Primary Sources (Texts and Translations)
2. Papers and Books
3. Dictionaries, Lexica and Grammars

Citation preview

Synthese Library 455 Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science

Rodrigo Pinto de Brito

The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities

Synthese Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Volume 455

Editor-in-Chief Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA Editorial Board Members Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA Anjan Chakravartty, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA Steven French, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Catarina Dutilh Novaes, VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Darrell P. Rowbottom, Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong Emma Ruttkamp, Department of Philosophy, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa Kristie Miller, Department of Philosophy, Centre for Time, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia

The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology, all broadly understood. A wide variety of different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effort is made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science and related disciplines. Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science. In addition to monographs Synthese Library publishes thematically unified anthologies and edited volumes with a well-defined topical focus inside the aim and scope of the book series. The contributions in the volumes are expected to be focused and structurally organized in accordance with the central theme(s), and should be tied together by an extensive editorial introduction or set of introductions if the volume is divided into parts. An extensive bibliography and index are mandatory.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/6607

Rodrigo Pinto de Brito

The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities

Rodrigo Pinto de Brito Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro Seropédica, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

ISSN 0166-6991 ISSN 2542-8292 (electronic) Synthese Library ISBN 978-3-030-92406-5 ISBN 978-3-030-92407-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92407-2 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

In memory of Albina and of the more than 600, 000 people who died in Brazil by the time I was finishing this book, especially in the suburbs and cities’ peripheries and slums.

Preface

The main aim of this book is to display a few features of the problem of the “practicability of the Skepticism,” offering some considerations on the Skeptical way of being active in the crafts performance and finishing with a small chapter, as an essay on the reception of the Skeptical arguments. So, on the first block, at the Introduction, I am going to show how the criticisms against the viability of the Skepticism arise in Modern philosophy, which is a context closer to us and with primary sources widely more available than the primary sources for comprehending the criticisms in Ancient philosophy. Because of its peculiar and close context and the availability of the sources, I think that the present charge that Skepticism leads to a kind of way of life that cannot be fully lived in practice is born in Modern philosophy. But as Modern philosophy is not my main scope in this book, the quotations and the argument I tried to build are just an illustration – although dramatic – of the highness the problem achieved in Modern times. I could say that it is by observing the top of the mountain by afar that one can have the impact of the scenery, but it is not a mountain and that is not its top, it is an iceberg and that is just its tip. Surely, it awakens our curiosity and our admiration, but we want to know what lies under the water, how deep it can be, and where the streams can take us, further and deeper, so even if I tacitly assume one or another position while interpreting some Modern philosopher, I am not going to spend time with the 10% of the total volume of the iceberg which is on the surface. Although I believe that in-depth researches on the links between variations of Skepticism in Modern times and its details are always very welcome, nevertheless Modern philosophers were not the pioneers in arguing against the practicability of Skepticism. Actually, this argument started appearing at the very beginning of the history of Skepticism, both Pyrrhonism and the thought of the Middle Academics. But, as I am going to show, the argument was present as a seed even before the existence of more organized forms of Skepticism. With this in mind, we must take a look at Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV to see how the criticism arises, but against thinkers who were lately adopted by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laërtius as kind of “Proto-skeptics.” Now if the latter vii

viii

Preface

Skeptics thought themselves as, in some ways, heirs of these Proto-skeptics, on the other hand, they also inherited the Aristotelian criticism aimed against those Protoskeptics. After having traced the general lines of this first outline of the criticism against the practicability of the Skepticism (for now on “apraxia”) driven by Aristotle against the so-called Proto-skeptics, we are going to investigate the variations and occurrences of the criticism against Pyrrho in his Life (D.L. IX, 61–71), where he is described as oddly behaving. Accomplishing that, we can examine how the successors of Pyrrho have absorbed and transformed his philosophy, and then to the possible contact and influences of Timon of Phlius on Arcesilaus and the Middle Academics, since it was in the quarrels of the Academics against the Stoics that we see the rise of a more robust version of the apraxia argument against Skepticism which would endure for centuries. Moreover, if we are able to comprehend the details of the quarrels between Academics and Stoics, we are going to be also able to understand the motivations for Aenesidemus of Knossos’ rupture from the Academy and his revival (or maybe invention) of Pyrrhonism, erecting Pyrrho as the father of this modality of Skepticism. But if Aenesidemus was willing to revive or invent Pyrrhonism, adopting the name of Pyrrho, he also had to take the consequences to the variations of the apraxia argument, developed to slander Pyrrho’s way of life as exotic, bizarre, or unpredictable, summed to the Stoic version of the argument driven against the Academics. This legacy of the apraxia argument, which followed the progress of Skepticism as a shadow, was not only inherited by Aenesidemus but passed on to new generations of Skeptics, such as Agrippa, the Skeptical Doctors, and Sextus Empiricus, and while we investigate it, we are going to have the opportunity to see how the Skeptics argued for the coherence of their philosophy/way of life. When we think about the coherence of Skepticism, we must take a look at some of the most prominent exegetical positions on this issue: the Rustic one and the Urban one. I do not think that these two interpretations of Skepticism, which were in their summit at the 1980s, are satisfactory anymore. So, I am going to suggest another interpretation, some kind of “middle way” between the Rustics and the Urbans. So, conceding that the apraxia argument was not a problem anymore, at the second part of the book we can take a look at the possibilities of there existing a Skeptical way of being active in the crafts (technai). Thus, we are going to go deeper on the analysis of two of Sextus’ works on the crafts: Against the Grammarians and Against the Rhetoricians, especially important because they deal with the problem of ordinary uses of language against the specialized uses, an important topic linked with my way of interpreting the viability of Sextan Skepticism as a whole. The book concludes with some remarks on the fortuna of Skeptical arguments. We then have the opportunity to tie up some loose ends, by revisiting the reception of Skepticism in Renaissance and Modern philosophy, as well as by dogmatic thinkers, mainly those linked with a religious agenda, for example, astrology.

Preface

ix

It must also be observed that, at the footnotes, I am going to make the primary sources explicit, I will explain them, suggest some comparisons between different texts, and try to better elucidate philosophical, historical, or literary issues which revolve around the main text. Secondly, I use a system of abbreviations for primary sources, the one which appears after this text. Finally, after the bibliographic references, there is a general introduction of Stoic philosophy, followed by conceptual tables of Stoicism, of Skepticism before Sextus Empiricus, as well as chronological tables of the main thinkers and schools mentioned and of the medical sects. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Rodrigo Pinto de Brito

Homem! Por mais que a Idéia desintegres, Nessas perquisições que não têm pausa, Jamais, magro homem, saberás a causa De todos os fenômenos alegres! Augusto dos Anjos – As cismas do destino

Acknowledgments

I am thankful to lots of people and any space is not enough. But I must mention: Danilo Marcondes, Otávio Bueno, Plínio Smith, Roberto Bolzani, and Waldomiro Silva; Gabriele Cornelli, Rodolfo Lopes, Silvio Marino, and Renato Matoso; David Sedley, Emidio Spinelli, Richard Bett, and Karla Pollmann; Robinson Guitarrari, Markos Klemz, Alessandro Duarte, and Walter Valdevino; Rafael Huguenin, Cesar Kiraly, Alexandre Skvirsky, Ana Paula El-Jaick, and Fábio Fortes; Marcos Balieiro, William Piauí, and Alexandre Cabeceiras; and Karina Nunes, Marcos Roberto, and the students of UFS, as well as those of UFRRJ, UFJF, and UnB. Last but not least, I would like to thank the reviewers of the book, for the suggestions and criticism, as well as the editors. Even if the ideas expressed here were developed in deep contact and cooperation with lots of researchers and students, and even if for this reason I am indebted to them, all the mistakes and lack of clarity are my own responsibility. I dedicate this work to Átila, Raquel, and Carol, with whom I’ve been isolated because of COVID-19. Special thanks to Isabela Bernard for the reading and to my family and friends for their support.

xiii

Contents

Part I

On the Apraxia Argument

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Skepticism as a Nihilistic Thought in Modern Times . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Hume and Apraxia Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 3 6

2

Apraxia and the Development of Ancient Skepticisms . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Proto-Skepticisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Life of Pyrrho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Pyrrho’s Messamates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 From Timon to Arcesilaus? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

9 9 10 15 26 34

3

Academics X Stoics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Arcesilaus Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Carneades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Clitomachus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

39 39 44 48

4

Sextus Empiricus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Legacy of Skepticisms up to Sextus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Rustic and the Urban Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 The Urbans and Their Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 The Rustics and Their Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Urbans and Rustics in Diaphonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Paving the Suburban Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Testing H1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 Summarizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 Testing H2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10 A Twillight Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11 The Second Formulation of Speech Acts and Skepticism . . . . . . 4.12 A Provisional Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

51 51 53 54 57 57 58 60 60 62 63 64 65

xv

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Contents

Part II

The Skeptic and the Crafts

Sextus Empiricus and the Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 An Interlude on Skepticism and Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Refutation to the Elements in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Refutation of the Grammatical Notion of Letters as Specific Elements of Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Back to the Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

69 69 71

. .

72 77

Sextus Against the Rhetoricians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 General Scheme of the Argument of Adv. Rhet. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Adv. Rhet. Walkthrough (the Search for the Definition of Rhetoric) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Refutations to the Available Definitions (Rhetoric Definition as Techne) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 The Refutations to the Definitions of Rhetoric as Science of Discourse and Producer of Persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Adv. Rhet. 73–113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .

79 79

.

80

.

81

. .

84 88

7

Sextus and a Positive Conception of Techne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Galen Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91 91

8

Final Remarks: On the Reception of Skeptical Arguments and Their Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

5

6

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 1: General Introduction to the Stoic Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . 1 Early and Middle Stoa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Stoicism as a System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stoic Physics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Stoic Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Stoic Theory of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conceptual Table of the Stoic Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 2: Conceptual Tables of the Skepticism Before Sextus Empiricus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 3: Chronological Table of the Philosophers and Schools Mentioned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 4: The Three Medical Sects and Their Main Heads, According to Pseudo-Galen, Introd.14.683.5–14.684.5 . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Primary Sources (Texts and Translations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Papers and Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Dictionaries, Lexica and Grammars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

109 109 109 113 115 119 123 126

. 127 . 139 . 146 147 147 150 157

Abbreviations

*Aeschines Aeschin.1

Against Timarchus

* Aetius Plac.

De Placita Philosophorum

* Appian App. BC Hisp. App. Hisp.

Civil Wars Wars in Spain

* Aristophanes Aristoph. Cl.

Clouds

* Aristotle Met. Phys. Rhet. Top. Aristot. Nic. Eth.

Metaphysics Physics Rhetoric Topics Nicomachean Ethics

* Cicero Cic. Ac. Pr. Cic. Acad. Pos. Cic. Off. Cic. de Orat. Cic. Fin. Cic. Luc. Cic. N.D.

Academica I Academica II De Officiis De Oratore De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum Lucullus De Natura Deorum xvii

xviii

Abbreviations

Cic. Tusc.

Tusculanae Disputationes

* Clement of Alexandria Strom.

Miscellanies

* Demosthenes Dem.19 Dem.21

On the False Embassy Against Midias

* Diogenes Laërtius D.L.

Vitae philosophorum

* Diogenes of Oenoanda Dio. Oen. Phy.

Fragments on Physics by Diogenes of Oenoanda

* Epictetus Diss. Ench.

Discourses Manual

* Euripides Eur. Orest.

Orestes

* Eusebius of Caesarea PE.

Praeparatio Evangelica

*Flavius Josephus J. AJ J. Ap.

Jewish Antiquities Against Apion

* Galen De Sec. De constitutione Gal. Nat. Fac. Hip. Pror. Com. Med. Exp. Subf. Empir. Lib. Prop.

On the Medical Sects for Beginners De constitutione artis medicae ad Patrophilum On the Natural Faculties In Hippocratis Prognosticum Commentaria De Experientia Medica De Subfiguratione Empirica De Libris Proprii Liber

* Hermann Diels – Walther Kranz DK

Presocratic Fragments

* Herodotus Hdt.

The Histories

Abbreviations

xix

* Hippocrates Hp. Off. Hp. Int.

De Officina Medici De Affectionibus Interioribus

* Hippolytus of Rome Refutatio.

Refutatio Omnium Haeresium

* Isocrates Isoc.9

Evagoras

* Lucian Luc. Peregr. Luc. Herm. Luc. Vit. Auct.

De Morte Peregrini Hermotimus Vitarum auction

* Lysias Lys.12

Against Eratosthenes

*Marcus Aurelius Medit.

Meditations

* Metrodorus Metrod. Herc.

Herculaneum papyri 1005, col. IX

* Philo of Alexandria De Fuga

De Fuga et Inventione

* Philodemus of Gadara Ind. St. Herc.

Index Stoicorum Herculanensis

* Photius Bib.

Bibliotheca

* Plato Plat. Apol. Plat. Crat. Plat. Phaedo Plat. Phaedr. Plat. Gorg. Plat. Parm. Plat. Rep. Plat. Soph.

Apology Cratylus Phaedo Phaedrus Gorgias Parmenides Republic Sophist

xx

Abbreviations

Plat. Theaet. Plat. Tim.

Theaetetus Timaeus

* Plutarch Plut. Adv. Col. Plut. Cic. Plut. Per. Plut. Cat. Ma. Plut. Cat. Mi. Plut. De Comm. Plut. De Stoic. Plut. De Iside

Adversus Colotem Cicero Pericles Marcus Cato Cato, the Younger De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos De Stoicorum repugnantiis De Iside et Osiride

* Polybius Plb

Histories

* Pseudo-Galen Intro.

Introductio seu medicus

* Ryle PRyl.

Papyrus of Ryle

* Seneca Ep. Quaest. Natu.

Letters Natural Questions

* Sextus Empiricus P.H. Adv. Log. Adv. Phy. Adv. Eth. Adv. Gram. Adv. Rhet. Adv. Ast. Adv. Mus.

Outlines of Pyrrhonism Against the Logicians Against the Physicists Against the Ethicists Against the Grammarians Against the Rhetoricians Against the Astrologers Against the Musicians

* Simplicius in Phys.

On Aristotle’s Physics

* Sophocles Soph. Trach.

Trachiniae

Abbreviations

xxi

* Stobaeus Ecl. Flori.

Eclogues Florilegium

* Thucydides Thuc.

History of the Peloponnesian War

* Von Arnim SVF I, II, III

Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vols. I, II and III

* Xenophon Xen. Mem.

Memorabilia

Part I

On the Apraxia Argument

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract It shows how the criticisms against the viability of the Skepticism arise in Modern philosophy, which is a context closer to us and with primary sources widely more available than the primary sources for comprehending the criticisms in Ancient philosophy. Because of its peculiar and close context and the availability of the sources, I think that the present charge that the Skepticism leads to a kind of way of life that cannot be fully lived in practice is born in Modern philosophy. Hence the necessity to track the apraxia argument in Modernity.

1.1

Skepticism as a Nihilistic Thought in Modern Times

La Flèche, the famous Jesuit School at Anjou where Descartes and Marín Mersenne have studied before, was also frequented by David Hume, who there started to elaborate his Treatise of Human Nature, which had its first two books (Of the Understanding; Of the Passions) published in 1739 (the last book, Of Morals was published only in 1740). But his book was not well-succeed, actually Hume thought that “Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the zealots”.1 However, the few zealotes who read it called Hume of heretic and skeptic, and even atheist. Consequently, the ghost of ostracism was around him and in 1745 the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh was denied to him. Hume’s Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh2 can illustrate the impact of his Treatise, since there we can find some replies to the accusations made

Cf.: HUME, D. My own life, §6’, in: http://jacklynch.net/Texts/humelife.html Cf.: HUME, D. Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, in: http://www.infomotions. com/etexts/philosophy/1700-1799/hume-letter-741.txt

1 2

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 R. Pinto de Brito, The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities, Synthese Library 455, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92407-2_1

3

4

1 Introduction

on him, as if he was incurring in some kind of “Universal Scepticism”, “Atheism” and of “sapping the Foundations of Morality”.3 But that is not all. . . It talks by itself the fact that even the editor who so hardly worked to publish Hume’s complete works – i.e. Thomas Hill Green, to whom one of Hume’s standard editions is attributed – he himself thought that Hume deliberately had led the already unconceivable notions of Locke and Berkeley on the human mind and its possibility of knowledge to paradoxical results.4 Actually, at the ending of the first book of his Treatise, Hume glimpsed one insuperable conflict between the requirements of reason and of faith, and that made him ask: Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable

Cf. the “Sum of the Charge” made against Hume and probably written by William Wishart. Hume reproduces these charges in his ‘Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, pp. 17, 18’, and I quote: 3

From the preceeding Specimen it will appear, that the Authormaintains, 1. Universal Scepticism. See his Assertions, p. 458,
470.Where he doubts of every Thing (his own Existence excepted) and maintains the Folly of pretending to believe any Thing with Certainty. 2. Principles leading to downright Atheism, by denying the Doctrine of Causes and Effects, p. 321, 138, 298, 300, 301, 303, 430, 434, 284. Where he maintains, that the Necessity of a Cause to every Beginning of Existence is not founded on any Arguments demonstrative or intuitive. 3. Errors concerning the very Being and Existence of a God. For Instance, Marginal Note, p. 172. as to that Proposition, God is, he says (or indeed as to any other Thing which regards Existence) “The Idea of Existence is no distinct Idea which we unite with that of the Object, and which is capable of forming a compound Idea by Union.” 4. Errors concerning God’s being the first Cause, and prime Mover of the Universe: For as to this Principle, That the Deity first created Matter, and gave it its original Impulse, and likewise supports its Existence, he says, “This Opinion is certainly very curious, but it will appear superfluous to examine it in this Place, &c.” 5. He is chargable with denying the Immateriality of the Soul, and the Consequences flowing from this Denial, p. 431, 4, 418, 419, 423. 6. With sapping the Foundations of Morality, by denying the natural and essential Difference betwixt Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, Justice and Injustice; making the Difference only artificial, and to arise from human Conventions and Compacts, Vol. 2. p. 5, 19, 128, 41, 43, 48, 69, 70, 73, 4, 44. 4 Take a look at the first volume of Green’s Philosophical Works. Almost entirely dedicated to analyse Hume’s Treatise. In: https://archive.org/details/worksthomashill03greegoog/mode/2up For more, cf. STROUD, B. (2011). Hume’s Scepticism: natural instincts and philosophical reflexion. In: STROUD, B. Philosophers Past and Present. Oxford: Carendon Press,, pp. 144–166’.

1.1 Skepticism as a Nihilistic Thought in Modern Times

5

condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty.5

Because Hume’s reason led him to the skeptic conclusion that he did not know anything further than his own impressions. But the conflict between philosophy and life is not restricted to Hume, actually it is going to reverberate until at least the last decades of the eighteenth century, and Kant, as well as other philosophers of his time, tried to deal with the issue of the authority of a reason which was able to question the very foundations of itself. In general, “Enlightenment” thinkers gave a special authority to reason, their paramount standard of truth, impartial and with self-evident principles able to justify the moral, the state and the religion, as well as able to criticize all believes and to know the human nature. However, all these powers of reason came to be employed to question the same things they were destined to justify before: the moral, the religion and the state, shaking their foundations and potentially encouraging the emergence of atheism, fatalism and anarchism, perhaps as consequences of the mechanistic model of science and of the models of knowledge advanced by Hume and Spinoza, among other thinkers and other factors. In his Theological-Political Treatise, anonymously published in 1670, Spinoza criticized the revealed religion and the kind of knowledge employed by prophecy – which actually is fantasy and is related to imagination –, so he employed the Cartesian method for studying and interpreting the Scriptures. As an outcome, he “changed the locus of truth from religion to rational knowledge in mathematics and metaphysics”.6 Moreover, while rationally investigating the occurrences of miracles, Spinoza went further than Hume would advance latter, because Spinoza asserted their impossibility, since, for him, in nature the phenomena succeed each other accordingly to a fixed and unchangeable other, thus the so-called miracles would be events on which we do not know the causal chains. The application of a rational method to investigating the Scriptures made Spinoza’s Treatise to be considered as a “pernicious and detestable book”.7 If there is a necessary and natural link between causes and effects, on the other hand, the reason, able to know, also works through necessary links intrinsic to the ideas, as Spinoza asserted: Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.8 Thus, for each event B must be an earlier event A, in a way that, given A, B necessarily happens. But once this principle is universal, it leads to atheism and

5

HUME, Treatise 1.4.7.8 (¼ SB 269). POPKIN, R. (2003). The History of Scepticism: from Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 240. 7 Cf.: Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, beginning of the article “Spinoza”, apud. POPKIN, 2003, p. 246. 8 I.e.: “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things”. In: SPINOZA, B. Ethics. II. Proposition 7. In: SPINOZA. Complete Works. MORGAN, M. (ed.). SHIRLEY, S. (trans.). (2002). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 6

6

1 Introduction

fatalism, for God and freedom must be self-engendered causes, which act without existing earlier causes than them. Even Kant’s conception of knowledge explained the reason as a priori activity e asserted that it could only know a priori the things that it creates, or the things that fit in the laws of its own activity. But, if we generalize this above-mentioned Kantian principle, the only things we could have knowledge about are the products of our own mental activity, and it would lead us to solipsism. This consequence of the Kantian theory of knowledge was pointed out by Hamann, Jacobi, Wizenmann, Schulze, Platner and Salomon ben Joshua,9 the first ones who criticized Kant and who defended Spinoza or Hume against him. Jacobi asserted that reason and skepticism lead to nihilism, because they are employed to erect doubts on the external world, other minds and God, for instance. And these doubts would make impossible to ground the moral rules for right actions, the states and the justice. In short, all reality would be under suspicious and then the life itself could not be lived. Now, back to Hume, the fragility of life face to the skeptical questions was afflicting him since 1730.

1.2

Hume and Apraxia Revisited

There is a lot to be said about the literary sources of the Ancient Skepticisms available in Hume’s time, but it is not our goal here. However, we know that Sextan Pyrrhonism starts to impact in Europe after the fifteen century, culminating in the Latin version of Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism, published in 1562.10 Even though the wide diffusion of Sextus’ works and of primary sources for the Ancient Skepticisms in general in the eighteen century, Hume does not show a deep knowledge of the Pyrrhonian Skepticism, whether in the Treatise or in the Enquiry. Actually, Hume hardly shows that he knows how to distinguish between Pyrrhoniam Skepticism and the thought of the Middle Academics. Despite of quoting Sextus in Greek (in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, section IV, footnote 15) – indicating that maybe Hume had access to one version of Sextus’ works but not the Latin ones – and despite of some (weird) quotations present at the above mentioned Enquiry and at the Natural History of Religion, Hume’s sources for Ancient Skepticism look like indirect and perhaps available through Huet ou Bayle,11 or maybe through Diogenes Laërtius.

9

Cf.: BEISER, F. C. (1987) The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Ficht. Londres: Harvard University Press. 10 Cf: FLORIDI, L. (2002). Sextus Empiricus, the Recovery and Transmission of Pyrrhonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11 See: ANNAS, J. (2007). Hume e o Ceticismo Antigo. In: Sképsis, n 2.

1.2 Hume and Apraxia Revisited

7

Although I do not want to dwell on Hume anymore, I cannot follow without quoting one of the most noticeable passages which argue that the Skepticism leads to a kind of life that cannot be lived:12 We need only ask such a sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays principles, which may not only be durable, but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them.13

But Hume was not the first one to criticize the Skepticism in this way. Actually, this style of criticism was already present even centuries before Sextus Empiricus and it is our main concern, as the 90% of the iceberg which lies submerged in cold water. 12 Inspired by Burnyeat (BURNYEAT, M. (1980). Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism? In: SCHO FIELD, M; BURNYEAT, M; BARNES, J (eds.). Doubt and Dogmatism. Oxford: Clarendon Press). One of the reasons for my preference for this passage is that it is part of the Enquire Concerning Human Understanding, and not of the Treatise. As Hume himself says in his Advertisement on the Enquire, for “not finding it [i.e. the Treatise] successful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected”. Because “several writers, who have honoured the Author’s Philosophy with answers, have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work, which the Author never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it (. . .) Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles.” Thus, preventing myself against someone who could try to argue against my point saying that Hume abandoned his own adverse early interpretation of the Skepticism presented in his Treatise, preferring the latter (also adverse) interpretation presented in his Enquire, I would say that if it is true, then Hume’s position on Skepticism not only is adverse in both works, and in this feature it does not change, but also that Hume’s position in the Enquire (the work which “may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles”) is even more adverse than before. Maybe because the reception of his Treatise was so bad that he intended to emphatically show, in his Enquire, that he really and no doubtly rejected the Skepticism because its very negative consequences for practical life. 13 HUME, D. (2008). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 12.2.23. MILLICAN, P. (ed.). Oxford: Oxford World Classics. Compare with Hume’s position on Skepticism in Treatise 1.4.1.1.

Chapter 2

Apraxia and the Development of Ancient Skepticisms

Abstract As the Modern philosophers were not the pioneers in arguing against the practicability of Skepticism, since this argument started appearing at the very beginning of the history of the Skepticisms, both the Pyrrhonism and the thought of the Middle Academics. I am going to show that the argument is present as a seed even before the existence of more organized forms of Skepticism. With this in mind, we must take a look at Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV to see how the criticism arises, but against thinkers who were lately adopted by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laërtius as kind of “Proto-skeptics”. Now if the latter Skeptics thought themselves as, in some ways, heirs of these Proto-skeptics, on the other hand, they also inherited the Aristotelian criticism aimed against those Proto-skeptics. After having traced the general lines of this first outline of the criticism against the practicability of the Skepticism (for now on “apraxia”) driven by Aristotle against the so-called Proto-skeptics, we investigate the variations and occurrences of the criticism against Pyrrho in his Life (D.L. IX, 61–71), where he is described as oddly behaving.

2.1

Preliminary Considerations

Even not agreeing that there is a strict continuity in the history of Ancient Skepticisms, from the early Proto-skeptics to Sextus Empiricus, there is some appropriation made by latter thinkers of the thoughts of the early ones. So it is possible to see how, for instance, Pyrrho uses and shares some philosophical trends as the thoughts of the Atomists, or how Timon of Phlius uses the works of Xenophanes or some features of the Cynical approach on Ethics. From now on, my aim is to tell this history of the Ancient Skepticisms, emphasizing their intellectual legacy and speculating on how this legacy could be transmitted. But, as I told before, I am also going to emphasize the emergence and changes of the apraxia argument. I assume that the evolution of Ancient Skepticism is closed linked to the way that Skeptics tried to give coherence to their way of life and of thinking against the challenge proposed by their opponents. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 R. Pinto de Brito, The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities, Synthese Library 455, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92407-2_2

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2.2

Proto-Skepticisms

As a whole, Skepticism can be seen as a kind of philosophical attitude present even in Dogmatic philosophers or philosophies – i.e. philosophers or philosophies which utter positive or negative assertions on knowledge, moral, physics and etc.1 Thus, in ancient times, even before Pyrrho, there were philosophers or arguments which were skeptics in some ways, and because they precede Pyrrho in time, they are going to be called Proto-skeptics. So Of this school some say that Homer was the founder, since on the same subjects, more than anyone, he gives now one answer, now another, and never affirms any answer categorically. Then, too, the sayings of the Seven Sages are said to be skeptical, for example, “Nothing in excess,” and “A pledge is a curse,” which means that anyone who reposes his trust firmly and confidently invites his own ruin. (D.L IX, 71).2

Because of the same reason as Homer – i.e. the perception of the dubiety of the senses and the general conflict in the very “Man’s soul, Glaucus, son of Leptines, Resembles nothing so much as a day sent by Zeus”3 – Archilochus and Euripides are interpreted as having some kind of skepticism as well. In the philosophical field, Xenophanes is considered as skeptic, since he rejected the myths and denied the possibility of knowledge, as well as Heraclitus and Empedocles. Zeno of Elea is thought as skeptic because he denied the movement, Democritus for denying that the things have qualities in themselves.4 But even if these thinkers had made utterances which can (and could be) interpreted as skeptics in some way – and maybe wrongly interpreted, since this utterances look more like samples of negative dogmatism – on the other hand they have also made assertions which are samples of the kind of positive dogmatism that the very Skepticisms go against. For Xenophanes, for instance, was the first to postulate the One when he said that, in the myths, those things which are seen as multiple are only one and the same,5 God.6 Zeno of Elea, as well as Xenophanes, postulated the One and said that if there were multiple things, they would be subjected to aporiae what leads him to introduce his famous paradoxes Zeno of Elea.7 Democritus and Leucippus asserted that the primary elements were the atoms and the void.8 Furthermore, they believed that the atoms move in the void because of

1

In this way, we can see for instance in Modern philosophy a kind of Skepticism which is propaedeutic to one kind of Dogmatism, which, on its turn, is erected latter after Skepticism had banished other theories, rival to the one about to be erected. 2 All translations of Diogenes Laërtius are by Mensch (2018). 3 Archilochus’ Frag. 115 L-B in D.L. IX, 71. 4 D.L. IX, 71–74. 5 Cf. Met. A5, 986b 18; Plat. Soph. 242 D ¼ DK 21 A 29; 6 Met. A5, 986b 21. 7 Cf. Plat. Parm. 127D-128a; Phys. Z9, 239 b9 ¼ DK 29 A 25. 8 Met. A4, 985b 4 ¼ DK 67 A 6.

2.2 Proto-Skepticisms

11

their weight, with no resistance.9 Heraclitus thought that even if the true constitution of the things is hidden, on the other hand the world order was not created at all, but exists since ever, being the sempiternal fire;10 Finally, Empedocles was the first one to assert that there were four primary elements, thought as four roots which sometimes converge, under the power of Love, and sometimes diverge, under the power of Strife.11 So, again, even if the above-mentioned thinkers could be mistakenly considered skeptic, actually they are dogmatists, since their assertions on cosmology, for instance. Still on the Proto-skeptics, Sextus gives us some clues about them in P.H. I, 210–220, passage where he compares his own Pyrrhonism with the philosophies of Heraclitus and Democritus (as Diogenes Laërtius does) and with the Cyrenaism and the “Protagorean way” as well.12 So, on Heraclitus, Sextus thinks that the similarities are due to the view of the dualities of the things, but, on the other hand, Heraclitus “makes dogmatic statements about many non-evident things”.13 And facing the oppositions, instead of uttering that “all things are inaprehensible”14 and that he does not “determine anything”,15 Heraclitus declares something (the fire) as subsisting to the dualities and oppositions.16 On Democritus’ philosophy, as in the case of Heraclitus, the similarities are due to the view of the dualities of the things – as for instance, the honey, which tastes sweet to the healthy and bitter to the sick – as well as to the use of the formula “not more”.17 However, for Sextus this utterance should be used as an assumption of ignorance and as signal of unpretentiousness. But for Democritus the same formula indicated that the truth was not in the macro world, but in the micro one, in the atoms.18 On the Cyrenaic philosophy, it postulates that the external objects have an inner nature which is inapprehensive and declares that the moral finality of human life is pleasure. For Sextus, both are dogmatic assertions, the first one negative, and the second one positive. The similarity with Skepticism is about the sensationalism, since for Cyrenaics, as well as for Sextus, one is able only to apprehend his own affections.19

in Phys. 1318, 35 ¼ DK 68 A 58. Strom. V, 104, 1 ¼ Fr. 30. 11 Met. A4, 985a 31–3 ¼ DK 31 A 37; in Phys. 158, 1 ¼ Fr. 17, 1–13. 12 “Πρωταγoρείoυ ἀγωγῆς”, translated by Bury as “Protagorean Doctrine” and by Annas and Barnes as “Protagorean persuasion” (P.H. I, 216). 13 The translations of P.H. are by Bury (2006) or by Annas and Barnes (2000), sometimes with modifications. 14 “πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα” (P.H. I, 211.7). 15 “oὐδὲν ὁρίζω” (P.H. I, 211.7). 16 P.H. I, 210. 17 “oὐ μᾶλλoν” (P.H. I, 213.6). 18 P.H. I, 213–215. 19 “ἐπειδὴ κἀκείνη τὰ πάθη μóνα φησὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι” (P.H. I, 215.2–3). 9

10

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2 Apraxia and the Development of Ancient Skepticisms

On Protagoras, by assuming that “man is the measure of all things”, he stablished each human as his own criterion, and then Protagoras had “introduced the relativity”, and Sextus agrees with that in some way, as we can see by the Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus. But Protagoras’ relativism is a consequence of his personalist criterion, and it is non-evident, hence dogmatic.20 The relativism present at the Ten Tropes, differently, is originated by the absence of criteria, or precisely by the view of the insuperable conflicts about the very existence of a single criterion for the perceptions and the knowledge.21 Now, before Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laërtius, Aristotle also considered (in Metaphysics IV) some arguments of the so-called Proto-skeptics, not because they were full-blood Skeptics, since in Aristotle’s time there were not a philosophical Skepticism minimally organized, but because these arguments embraced assertions which checked the principle of non-contradiction. Thus for the Stagirite, “there must be among them [i.e. the many divisions of philosophy] a First Philosophy and one which follows upon it”,22 and “it is the province of one science to study opposites, and the opposite of unity is plurality, and it is the province of one science to study the negation and privation of Unity”,23 since “the term “one” is used in various senses, so too will these terms be used”.24 “Thus clearly it pertains to one science to give an account both of these concepts and of substance (this was one of the questions raised in the “Difficulties”), and it is the function of the philosopher to be able to study all subjects”,25 “since these are the essential modifications of Unity qua Unity and of Being qua Being, and not qua numbers or lines or fire, clearly it a pertains to that science to discover both the essence and the attributes of these concepts.”26 Having so defended the necessity of a science which deals with the “Being qua Being”, Aristotle delimitates the scope of this Science by saying that Clearly, then, it pertains to one science to study Being qua Being, and the attributes inherent in it qua Being; and the same science investigates, besides the concepts mentioned above, Priority and Posteriority, Genus and Species, Whole and Part, and all other such concepts. (Met. IV 2, 1005a 12–15).

And also that

20

Sextus’ relationship with Protagoras is dubious. On the one hand, he considers the sofista as dogmatist for adhering to a criterium: the famous man measure (P.H. I, 219.4–5); on the other hand, Sextus considers Protagoras as one of those who “abolished the criterium” (Adv. Log. I, 60.2). The translations of Adv. Log. are by Bury (2006) or by Bett (2006), sometimes with modifications. 21 P.H. I 216–220. 22 Met. IV 2, 1004a 5. All translations of Met. are by Tredennick (1933, 1989). 23 Met. IV 2, 1004a 10. 24 Met. IV 2, 1004a 20. 25 Met. IV 2, 1004b 1. 26 Met. IV 2, 1004b 5. Possibly criticizing Pythagoras, Philolaus of Croton and Heraclitus, respectively.

2.2 Proto-Skepticisms

13

We must pronounce whether it pertains to the same science to study both the so-called axioms in mathematics and substance, or to different sciences. It is obvious that the investigation of these axioms too pertains to one science, namely the science of the philosopher; for they apply to all existing things, and not to a particular class separate and distinct from the rest. Moreover all thinkers employ them—because they are axioms of Being qua Being, and every genus possesses Being. . . (Met. IV 3, 1005a 22–25); . . . he who understands the modes of Being qua Being should be able to state the most certain principles of all things. Now this person is the philosopher, and the most certain principle of all is that about which one cannot be mistaken; for such a principle must be both the most familiar (for it is about the unfamiliar that errors are always made), and not based on hypothesis. For the principle which the student of any form of Being must grasp is no hypothesis; and that which a man must know if he knows anything he must bring with him to his task. Clearly, then, it is a principle of this kind that is the most certain of all principles. Let us next state what this principle is. “It is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same relation”; and we must add any further qualifications that may be necessary to meet logical objections. This is the most certain of all principles, since it possesses the required definition; for it is impossible for anyone to suppose that the same thing is and is not, as some imagine that Heraclitus says. . . (Met. IV 3, 1005b 10–22).

So, even if Aristotle does not criticize the relativistic philosophers (whose base is Protagoras) or those who assert that everything either is or is not (whose base is Heraclitus) for them being Proto-skeptics, he still criticizes them for rejecting the principle of non-contradiction, which is the ground of philosophy and valid for all beings, because it belongs to the Being qua Being, in the sense that “it is the most certain of all principles”, making it “impossible for anyone to suppose that the same thing is and is not”. And in Aristotle’s criticism, which starts from what he considers to be this rejection of the principle of non-contradiction by Protagoras and Heraclitus, Aristotle, “by refutation”,27 claims that those who violate this principle run into a kind of “impossibility (. . .), if only our opponent makes some statement”. The logos of those who avoid the principle becomes adynatos, word that means powerless, weak, uncapable of accomplishing something (in this case, the discourse). In this sense, Aristotle’s rebuttal to the denial of the principle of non-contradiction is grounded on pointing out that those who reject this principle reject the possibility of discourse itself, which can only be intelligible because of this principle, because without it some sort of discursive apraxia occurs (some sort of inability, adynamia, using Aristotle’s vocabulary) that, furthermore, sets another trap, the selfrefutability, having in mind that those who defend themselves from the accusation of discursive adynamia have to utilize the discourse that, in its turn, can only be consistent if it is compliant with the very principle. It is impossible not to think in Gorgias’ On the Non-Existent, relating with this discussion.28 As if it were not enough, Aristotle’s criticisms surpass the linguistic scope, since those who deny the principle of non-contradiction incur in a paradoxical and inconsistent way of life: 27 28

Met. IV 4, 1006a 12. Cf. Adv. Log. I, 65–88.

14

2 Apraxia and the Development of Ancient Skepticisms Again, is the man wrong who supposes that a thing is so or not so, and he who supposes both right? If he is right, what is the meaning of saying that "such is the nature of reality"? And if he is not right, but is more right than the holder of the first view, reality will at once have a definite nature, and this will be true, and not at the same time not-true. And if all men are equally right and wrong, an exponent of this view can neither speak nor mean anything, since at the same time he says both "yes" and "no." And if he forms no judgement, but "thinks" and "thinks not" indifferently, what difference will there be between him and the vegetables? Hence it is quite evident that no one, either of those who profess this theory or of any other school, is really in this position. Otherwise, why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to make the journey? Why does he not walk early one morning into a well or ravine, if he comes to it, instead of clearly guarding against doing so, thus showing that he does not think that it is equally good and not good to fall in? Obviously then he judges that the one course is better and the other worse. And if this is so, he must judge that one thing is man and another not man, and that one thing is sweet and another not sweet. For when, thinking that it is desirable to drink water and see a man, he goes to look for them, he does not look for and judge all things indifferently; and yet he should, if the same thing were equally man and not-man. But as we have said, there is no one who does not evidently avoid some things and not others. (Met. IV 4, 1008b 7–25).

As we can see at the above quoted passage, denying the principle of non-contradiction means lacking truth criterium, henceforth those who deny it would be as wrong as right in all issues. It would mean that the denyers would say “yes” at the same time as they say “no”, as well as they would be unable to judge in all matters, and that would be the same as living like plants. It would be the same as being incapable of doing everyday and ordinary duties, no matter how simple they can be.29 Therefore, if the Skepticism inherits from the literary tradition, represented by Homer, Archilochus and Euripides, the warnings about the fickleness of Being itself; from Xenophanes of Colophon the critique of myths; from Zeno of Elea the aporiae about ordinary stuff, like space and time; from Gorgias the aporiae about Being itself, against the Eleatics; from Heraclitus the observation of the duality of perceptions according to the circumstances; from Empedocles and the Cyrenaics a sensationalist approach of knowledge and existence (in which men, indeed, lives coerced by their emotions and gives in to them, involuntarily); from the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus the notion that much of which people give opinions, they do arbitrarily, without knowledge; from Socrates a philosophizing which is investigative, existential, and that assumes the aporiae and the ignorance; and from Protagoras the perception that one can be subject to as many criteria as there are men, each of them valid to the people who agree with them, but not to someone else; on the other hand, the ones who attacked Skepticism inherited the critiques of apraxia (or adynamia) from Aristotle,  primarily the ones regarding the discourse, followed by the ones in relation to life itself – and of self-refutability, which accompanies the critique of apraxia, as the hook is accompanied by the bait. For detailed analyzes, see: ‘BERTI, E. (1981). La critica allo scetticismo nel IV libro dela Metafisica. In: GIANANTONI, G (org.). Lo Scetticismo Antico, Vol. 1. Naples: Bibliopolis’ and ‘LONG, A. A. (1981). Aristotle and the History of Greek Scepticism. In: O’MEARA, D. (org.). Studies in Aristotle. Washington: Catholic University of America Press. 29

2.3 The Life of Pyrrho

2.3

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The Life of Pyrrho

Let us now analyze the steps 61–71 of the Life of Pyrrho (in Diogenes Laërtius), important because I think that if the revival of the Pyrrhonism really was Aenesidemus’ responsibility, he had to be willing to face the consequences of choosing Pyrrho as a founder hero, among which there is the critique of apraxia. Furthermore, in D.L. IX there are occurrences of concepts proper to the skeptic conduct, linked to the practical life of Pyrrho. Before that, though, conscious of the critiques commonly done to D.L. – that it (i) presents more than one anecdotage about the philosophies than the philosophies themselves (ii) exactly because Diogenes Laërtius is a writer that does not compromise to the sources or the dates, (iii) in short, with the veracity – I wish to defend this important source, even if shortly. Thus: 1. There was not, in Diogenes Laërtius’ time (third century AD) a rigor of quotations for a systematization of biographies, in fact, it is not strange that he did not care about that, it would be strange and anachronic, thus, that he should care about it, because, in general, the Ancient biographies mix history, legend and myths. And they have agendas which do not correspond to the veracity which we require from a Modern biography, such as being encomiastic or depreciative.30 Therefore, even though we should not intend to have a real biography, we can intend to hear, in the compiled accounts in each of the “Lives”, the echoing of the motivations of the original sources, whatever they may be. 2. If there really are countless anecdotes amongst the accounts of the “Lives”, as well as mythical and fantastic elements, this should not be seen as demerit, actually, one of the most favorable points is that, reading D.L. we can have a glance of the way that ordinary people saw the philosophers.31 3. If, nonetheless, the critiques to D.L. persists, we should despise all its content and assume the impossibility of knowing the many details of the philosophies of the Milesians, Pythagoreans, Eleatics and of the so-called “Minor Socratics”, for example, something that anyone would hardly concede, 4. (4.) because D.L. in many cases, as in the Life of Pyrrho itself, mentions his sources, many of them contemporary and companions of the biographed. Sources that, furthermore, can be compared with other, generating rather satisfactory interpretations, albeit far from unequivocal, indeed, as everything seems to be in philosophy. Moreover, as Anthony Long indicates to us,32 if “Diogenes Laërtius’s anedoctical style is generally an impediment to philosophical informativeness”, on the other 30

Cf. GAZZINELLI, G. G. (2009). A Vida Cética de Pirro. São Paulo: Edições Loyola. See Kury’s introduction to his Portuguese translation of D.L. (2009), second edition, pp. 09. 32 All quotations in this paragraph are from: LONG, A. A. (1996). The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates and Hellenistic Ethics. In: GOULET-CAZÉ, M-O; BRANHAM, R. B. (orgs.). 31

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hand, in some cases, “aphorisms should be constructed as the essential vehicles of his thought”. Anthony Long refers specifically to the dog-philosopher Diogenes of Sinope, who inaugurates the Cynic tradition of “maxims”,33 that were transmitted in compilations and that served as raw material for compilers as Diogenes Laërtius. But, after Diogenes of Sinope, we have the great diffusion of the “sentences”,34 and the compilations even become a literary fad, that we, sadly, only know secondly, but that arrived to Epictetus and Lucianus,35 for example. Thus, it is possible that there also was “maxims” on Pyrrho, since they started applying to every philosopher that was inserted in a post-Socratic and Hellenistic tradition, “as anything other than a philosopher in a recognizably Greek tradition – a walking and talking philosopher” and that should be comprehended by its practical action, registered in anecdotes that narrate his supposed attitudes in face of ordinary obstacles. But let us not stretch much more in this altercation and move on to undertake a step by step analysis of D.L. IX 61–71. Thus: Pyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter. He studied with Bryson, son of Stilpo, according to Alexander in his Successions, and then with Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied everywhere, so that he even associated with the Naked Sages in India and with the Magi. (D.L. IX, 61)

A passage with no major problems. Let us pay attention to the supposed atomistic affiliation of Pyrrho, under Anaxarchus – with whom he would have visited the gymnosophists (probably Jains) in India36 –, and also to the sources, the Cynical biographer of philosophers, Diocles of Magnesia (circa 75 B.C.) that only provides the name of Pyrrho’s father, something important for census reasons, because that way we would be able to confirm Pyrrho’s citizenship in Elis; and Apollodorus who or was the Athenian grammarian disciple of the Stoics Diogenes of Babylon and Panaetius of Rhodes, and of the grammarian Aristarchus of Samothrace, or maybe was the Epicurean philosopher (circa 150 B.C.) leader in his school in Athens and nicknamed Kepotyrannos (Tyrant of the Garden), given the supremacy of Epicureanism under his leadership. But if we consider the fact that our Apollodorus in D.L. IX 61 wrote ‘Chronicles’, he probably is the Epicurean one, besides, it is known that Epicurus admired Pyrrho to some degree, what would justify the fact that what Apollodorus tells us here about Pyrrho is linked to the hypothesis that Pyrrho had a perfectly normal life, performing, moreover, the exercise of a techne: the animal’s painting. Whereas if the source were not this one, instead it was Stoic or maybe

The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 31’. 33 “ἀπoφθεγματα”. 34 “γνωμoλoγίαι”. 35 Ver: GRIFFIN, M. (1996). Cynicism and the Romans: Attraction and Repulsion. In: GOULETCAZÉ, M-O; BRANHAM, R. B. (orgs.). The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy. Berkeley: University of California Press. 36 Cf.: FLINTOFF, E. (1980). Pyrrho and India. In: Phronesis, 25(1), pp. 88–108.

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Academic, for example, it would probably not miss the opportunity of saying that Pyrrho lived a strange way of life because of his living/philosophizing. The third source is Alexander Polyhistor, author of the first century B.C. We should observe that the three sources cited here are at least a hundred and twenty years subsequent to Pyrrho. Let us continue with the step D.L. IX 61: As a result, he seems to have adopted a profoundly noble philosophy, having introduced the notion of inability to attain conviction and that of suspension of judgment (τὸ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας καὶ ἐπoχῆς εἶδoς εἰσαγαγω  ν), as Ascanius of Abdera reports. For he said that nothing is beautiful or ugly, or just or unjust, and that likewise in all instances nothing exists in truth (ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ), but men do everything by custom and by habit; for each thing is no more this than that (oὐ γὰρ μᾶλλoν τóδε ἢ τóδε εἶναι ἕκαστoν).

Here we can highlight the first source: Ascanius of Abdera, direct disciple of Pyrrho who attributes to him two concepts linked to his way of life – in other words, two concepts linked to the way Pyrrho performed his life, practically, not theoretically, the akatalepsia and the epoche. Both concepts are problematic here because they are linked to Stoicism, whose founder, Zeno of Citium (circa 334–260 B.C), is probably around thirty years younger than Pyrrho. Therefore, of the four alternatives one has to be true: either Ascanius is introjecting the Stoic vocabulary in his own interpretation of his master’s philosophy, although unaware; or he is deliberately assuming this vocabulary; or he is intending the precedence of Pyrrho in the usage of the vocabulary and, therefore, the antecedence of Pyrrho to Zeno and to the Stoicism; or Pyrrho really used this vocabulary because maybe it was already available, or maybe because he could even be its creator. I wish I could discover a way into this so far aporetic discussion, thus I verified some occurrences of katalepsis (apprehension) and of epoche. Starting by katalepsis, it is a common usage word, and not exclusive of the philosophical jargon. Thus, according to Diogenes database,37 starting by the uses in the military métier, some of the occurrences are: one in Thuc. 3.33, meaning “to take by assault”; one in Aristoph. Cl. 318 with the same meaning; one in Isoc. 9.69, referring to the right of a king to “take possession” of something; in Plat. Gorg. 455c, and Plat. Rep. 526d, both talking about the same task of the warriors of breaking camp and “occupying” places; the same military use appears in Dem. 19.21 and in App. BC 4.14. Now, the usage in the medical métier: in Hp. Off. 9 and 11, it means “to hold” bandings to make bandages, and also “to hold” the medical tools; in Gal. Nat. Fac. 6. 152; 17. 423, it refers to the “containment” of breathing and sperm, respectively. There is also a musical occurrence in which it refers to the pause that is done when someone “holds” the chords in a lyre, in Aristoph. Cl. 317. In the strict philosophical métier, where katalepsis is a concept that refers to the apprehension and is used, thus, as an epistemological criterium (because it provides the adhesion to the truth) and as an ethical criterium (because it provides the

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Diogenes © P. J. Heslin.

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adhesion to the correct action, which is in accordance to the truth), we have the following occurrences: Luc. Peregr. 4, referring to the mental “apprehension” of the celestial objects; in Luc. Herm. 81, referring to the “certainty” that stems from the correct use of sensations; in Plut. Cic. 40, referring to the introduction of the concept to the Latin language by Cicero. In the majority of the philosophical usages, we are sent back to the Stoic philosophy, there is no occurrence that treats katalepsis or akatalepsia as concepts of Pyrrho, except for the citation of Ascanius of Abdera by Diogenes in D.L. IX 61. Thus, we have enough reasons to question the attribution of the concept of akatalepsia to Pyrrho. On the other hand, maybe Ascanius mistook himself by having introjected an originally Stoic concept, letting it appear in a comment about Pyrrho; or voluntarily affirmed the precedence of Pyrrho in the usage of the concept, even before Zeno. In any case, it is a mistake. Regarding the epoche, also present in common discourse, but of much broader usage than katalepsis, the occurrences extracted from the Diogenes database go from the “withholding” of sperm in the medical usage (Gal. Nat. Fac. 8. 420), through the “cessation” of payment in the financial usage (PRyl. 214. 34), and through the “cessation” of alliances in the scope of diplomacy and military strategy (Plb. 10.23.4, and 38.11.2), to the philosophical usage that interests us in here and the only one I am going to talk about, the most significant occurrences of whom, beyond Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laërtius, are: Metrod.Herc. 831.6, SVF II. i. 2. 71–81, Cic. Ac. Pr. 2.18.59. Excepting Ascanius of Abdera in D.L., none of them attributes epoche to Pyrrho, thus, I think that this attribution also derives from a mistake of Ascanius. I will return to the question of the appropriation of these concepts by philosophy later. Let us get to the assertions, now, also from Ascanius, that Pyrrho asserted (1) “that likewise in all instances nothing exists in truth”,38 (2) “for each thing is no more this than that”.39 Starting from the second assertion (2), there are no major problems in it, it is a sample of the usage of an expression (“no more”) established in Ancient Skepticism (specially in the Pyrrhonic one) and that occurs not only in D.L. IX 75, but also in P.H. I, 188–192, for example. We will come back to the expression later, in this moment it is worth noting that Ascanius is either, once again, attributing retroactively a subsequent Skeptical vocabulary to Pyrrho, or Pyrrho indeed already had this vocabulary in hands. I opt for the second hypothesis, considering that Pyrrho probably was originally an Atomist (see D.L. IX, 61) and that he may have spent some time in Abdera, homeland of Leucippus and Democritus – the two ‘founding fathers’ of this doctrine –, as well as homeland of Ascanius himself, and host city of the Atomists, that already disposed of this expression in their vocabulary, as we can see in a doxographic fragment on the Atomists, curiously in P.H. I 213–215. In this passage, Sextus Empiricus is elucidating the differences and similarities between

38 39

“ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ” (D.L. IX, 61). “oὐ γὰρ μᾶλλoν τóδε ἢ τóδε εἶναι ἕκαστoν” (D.L. IX, 61).

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Pyrrhonism and Atomism: “. . .Democritus, as they say, infers that it (i.e. honey) really is neither sweet nor bitter, and pronounces in consequence the formula ‘not more’, which is a Sceptic formula”. The Skeptics, however, Sextus proceeds, use the expression differently than the Atomistic usage, because they use it to express their ignorance on whether the things which appear to us are more in one way than the other, it a comparative connotation.40 Whereas the Atomists use the expression to denote that the truth is not in the big, the makros, because the macro world, as perceived by the senses, is only a result of atomic arrangements, and only the atoms themselves are true (as well as voyd). Therefore, the truth is not in the macro, but in the mikros, in the tiny indivisible particles (atomoi) that compose the cosmos and that cannot be perceived by the senses, but are intelligible. Considering this, we can return to the negative dogmatic assertion, that Ascanius of Abdera ascribes to Pyrrho, (1) “that likewise in all instances nothing exists in truth”. Once more, considering Pyrrho’s possible Atomistic filiation, it is perfectly plausible that he had dogmatized, even more so if we consider Democritus fragments41 about the knowledge where he, just as Pyrrho, asserts its impossibility: Frag. D15 (D.L. IX, 72): In reality we know nothing; for truth is in the depths. Frag. D16 (Adv. Log. I, 135): By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; but in reality atoms and void Frag. D17 (Adv. Log. I, 136): In fact we know nothing firm, but what changes according to the condition of the body and of the things that enter it and come up against it. Frag. D18 (Adv. Log. I, 136): That in reality we do not know what kind of thing each thing is or is not has been shown many times. Frag. D19 (Adv. Log. I, 137): By this principle man must know that he is removed from reality. Frag. D20 (Adv. Log. I, 137): This argument too shows that in reality we know nothing about anything, but each person’s opinion is something which flows in. Frag. D21 (Adv. Log. I, 137): Yet it will be clear that to know what kind of thing each thing is inreality is impossible.

Let us now check the step D.L. IX 62: He lived a life consistent with these doctrines, avoiding nothing, taking no precautions, facing everything as it came, whether wagons, cliffs, or dogs, and in general judging nothing by the evidence of his senses (αἰσθήσεσιν). But he was kept safe, as Antigonus of Carystus says, by the friends who accompanied him. Aenesidemus, however, says that though in his

If we use the version of pseudo-Aristotle to the ‘Treatise of Not-Being, from Gorgias (in: ‘On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias’) we will see there also the use of the oὐ μᾶλλoν formula (ὥστε oὐδὲν μᾶλλoν ἢ εἶναι ἢ oὐκ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα). But here we cannot reclaim some antecedence to a Sextan Pyrrhonic theme, once it was this way Sextus Empiricus would not hesitate on using the pseudo-Aristotle’s version, but he does not. Most likely is that Sextus did not even knew this version. Despite that, considering that the formula is constant in the oratory which was contemporary to Gorgias, it is possible that Pyrrho, in using it was referring to the Atomistic usage of the formula and to the Sophistic usage simultaneously, but at the same time this interpretation is fragile if we take the doxographic reports that narrate that Pyrrho had an aversion to the Sophistic disputes. 41 For more, check the compilation of the Atomists fragments: TAYLOR, C. C. W. (org. & trans.). (2010). The atomists: Leuccipus and Democritus, fragments. In: The Phoenix Presocratics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 40

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2 Apraxia and the Development of Ancient Skepticisms philosophy Pyrrho embraced the principle of suspension of judgment (ἐπoχῆς λóγoν), he nevertheless exercised forethought in his daily life. He lived to be nearly ninety.

This part of the step D.L. IX, 62 is very emblematic of what I formerly said about the ancient biographies: more than reporting the life of the people described, they served to praise or depreciate their doctrines, be it by praising their practical attitude, be it by disapproving of affirming the unfeasibility of the same practical attitude, even more so if the person described was a philosopher that, as Socrates or Pyrrho, thought that philosophy and life are the same. In this way, we have here two clearly antagonistic versions of the Life of Pyrrho, one by Antigonus of Carystus and another of Aenesidemus of Knossos. But Antigonus, even though a contemporary of Pyrrho, was much younger than him and let himself captivate by Arcesilaus and by the Academic Skepticism, having been his disciple. Thus, the Antigonus’ version is very far from disinterested, and, if his interest is being derogatory, the opposition between the Academics and the immediate disciples of Pyrrho begins earlier than we expected before, i.e. earlier than the quarrels about the Academic dogmatic criterium (pithanos) that involved the contemporaries of Clitomachus (Philo of Larissa and Aenesidemus of Knossos) that culminated with the desertion of Aenesidemus and the revival of Pyrrhonism. On the other hand, Aenesidemus, some three centuries later than Pyrrho, could not meet him and, just as Antigonus, had no good reason to be impartial, having asserted that Pyrrho lived the life of an ordinary man, that his philosophy/life is possible in practice, because he intended to revive it in opposition to the eclectic dogmatism (half Stoic and half Peripatetic) installed in Academia by Philo. In short, the discussion here between Antigonus and Aenesidemus is aporetic, not because their reports are equally persuasive and probable, on the contrary, both are dissuasive and unlikely. Thus, I have to disregard here the pretension to the truth, rejecting both reports. However, the only one to assert Pyrrho’s apraxia is Antigonus, rejected, but Aenesidemus, even though also rejected, is not the only one to assert the possibility of Pyrrho’s life. Thereby, if I exclude Antigonus and Aenesidemus, I am left with the sources that alleged that Pyrrho lived an ordinary life. Moreover, if I reject Aenesidemus as too late and impartial, I must also reject him with respect to the attribution of epoches logon to Pyrrho, what indeed is in accord to what I have done previously in Ascanius of Abdera’s quotation by Diogenes Laërtius in D.L. IX 61. Let us continue with the step D.L. IX, 63: Antigonus of Carystus, in his work On Pyrrho, reports about him as follows. At first he was a poor and unknown painter. And some of his middling portraits of torch runners may still be seen in the gymnasium at Elis. He used to go off by himself and live in solitude, showing himself rarely to his relatives. He did this because he had heard an Indian reproach Anaxarchus, saying that he would never teach anyone to be good while he himself frequented the courts of kings. He remained always in the same state—to the point where, if someone left him in the middle of a conversation, he would complete the conversation by himself—though he was excitable in his youth. Often, says Antigonus, he would go abroad without telling anyone, and would roam about with whomever he met. One day, when Anaxarchus fell into a muddy pool, Pyrrho walked by without helping him; and when

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others reproached him, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference (ἀδιάφoρoν) and lack of attachment (ἄστoργoν).

This report is still from Antigonus of Carystus, who persists arguing for the unpredictable way of life (aprooratos) that Pyrrho was induced by his philosophizing. We must reinforce that there is not at any time the accusation of apraxia about Pyrrho, but actually of unpredictability (correlative to apraxia in D.L. IX 61–71) which is made evident by his isolation and the solitary wandering and talking. But we already argued that Antigonus is not trustworthy, on the other hand, even if it is argued in the favor of this source, it is worth noticing that Antigonus himself says that the unpredictability of Pyrrho’s behaviour arises from the exacerbation of the ethical consequences of Atomism, expressed by the originally Atomistic ethical vocabulary: adiaphoria and astorgia (even though this vocabulary is later recurring in Skepticism), after Pyrrho’s supposed departure to India with Anaxarchus. We cannot leave out something that is possibly implicit in Antigonus’ accusation of unpredictability. The word that I translate as unpredictability (aprooratos) serves to denote something unprecedented, uncommon, never seen before, and it is not used very much. But, a word that is more usual and that can have the same meaning and could be translated almost in the same way in this case is aphrosyne, that can also be understood as madness, contrary to soprhosyne (caution or wisdom). Thus, if Pyrrho, according to Antigonus, learned the unpredictable behaviour in India, maybe the implicit affirmation here is that the “barbaric” way of life learnt is insane, or leads to insanity, anyway, something that might not be considered good living, but that, I highlight, originates not in a Skeptical attitude, but in an exacerbation of the ethical consequences of the Hellenistic Atomism, which is a kind of negative dogmatism in theory of knowledge. Let us check D.L. IX 64: One day he was discovered talking to himself; when asked the reason, he said that he was training to be good. In dialectical investigations (ζητήσεσιν) he was despised by no one, since he could speak at length and respond to questioning. This was how he captivated Nausiphanes when the latter was still a young man. In any case, Nausiphanes used to say that a man should emulate the character of Pyrrho, but adopt his own doctrines. And he often said that Epicurus, who admired Pyrrho’s way of life, was constantly asking for information about him. He also said that Pyrrho was so honored by his native city that they named him chief priest, and that it was on his account that they voted to exempt all philosophers from taxation.

A passage without major problems, I highlight another report in which Pyrrho speaks to himself, but now training speeches aiming to become a good man through the right use of oratory. Then, I emphasize the occurrence of the word zetesis, perfectly plausible, having in mind that it was already used in the same sense as it appears here, as investigation, in history (see: Hdt. 2.44, 6.118; Thuc. 1.20, 8.66), tragedy (see: Soph. Trach. 55), jurisprudence (see: Lys. 12.30, Aeschin. 1.43), and, finally, philosophy (Plat. Theaet. 196d; Plat. Crat. 406a; Plat. Apol. 29c; Plat. Tim. 47a; Plat. Phaedr. 244c; Plat. Phaedo 66d), word that qualifies the dynamis of Pyrrho’s philosophy, to the point of having captivated Nausiphanes, his direct disciple and source here, that was also Epicurus’ master, who constantly asked

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Nausiphanes about Pyrrho. Furthermore, Nausiphanes also attests Pyrrho’s ordinary life and mercy. Now let us turn to the topic of the “indiference from public life/ freedom from politics”, or apragmosyne, that we will see at the end of D.L. IX 64 e 65–66: In fact, there were many who emulated his indifference to public life (ἀπραγμoσύνης). Hence Timon speaks of him thus in his Python and in his Lampoons: Pyrrho, old fellow, how and where did you find a means of escape From servitude to sophists and their vain opinions? How did you free yourself (ἀπαθής) of the bonds of all deceit and persuasion (πειθoῦς)? You did not care to inquire about what delusions prevail in Greece, Whence and whither each unfolds. And again in his Conceits: This, O Pyrrho, my heart longs to hear, How you proceed so easily and calmly (ἡσυχίης), Alone among men, leading the way like a god. The Athenians awarded him citizenship, as Diocles says, for having slain Cotys of Thrace. He lived piously with his sister, a midwife, as Eratosthenes says in his work On Wealth and Poverty, and there were times when he took birds to the market to sell, if any were to be found, and piglets, and he would clean and dust at home, not minding any task (ἀδιαφóρως). He is even reported to have washed a pig, so indifferent (ἀδιαφoρίας) was he to what he did. Once when he was angered on behalf of his sister, who was called Philista, and someone took him to task for it, he said that where a little woman was concerned it was not appropriate to display indifference (ἀδιαφoρίας). Once when a dog attacked him and he was scared away, he said to someone who criticized him that it was difficult entirely to strip away human nature; but one should struggle against adversity, by deeds if at all possible, and if not, by word.

At the end of D.L. IX 64 we cannot know certainly who might be the source, Nausiphanes or Timon – but, considering that both were Pyrrho’s fellows, the uncertainty does not bring major problems – there is a report of the political behaviour of Pyrrho in which he would have lived indifferent from public life (apragmosyne), an important topic that demands our attention. According to LSJ,42 the apragmosyne consists in the freedom from politics, a kind of abstention from public affairs; the oldest occurrence of the word is Aristoph. Cl. 1007. In Thuc. 1.32, the Corcyraean, in requesting assistance from Athens, apologize for their lengthy distancing from public affairs, the apragmosyne that distanced them from their neighbors. In Xen. Mem. 3.11.16, Socrates mocks himself, being ironic about those who accuse him of apragmosyne, saying that he cannot participate in the public affairs because he has a very busy life. Those are all pejorative uses of the word and denote some sort of social irresponsibility. There is also a use that appears in Dem. 21.141 as a legal term originally from Athens,43

42

LIDELL, H. G.; SCOTT, R. (1940). A Greek-English Lexicon. Revised and augmented throughout by. Sir Henry Stuart Jones. with the assistance of. Roderick McKenzie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. From now on, always mentioned by the abbreviation: LSJ. 43 Cf.: TODD, S.C. A Glossary of Athenian Legal Terms. In: LANNI, A (ed.), Athenian Law in its Democratic Context (Center for Hellenic Studies On-line Discussion Series). Republished in

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being able to have a positive connotation that would indicate the isolation of the subject that seeks for philosophical reflection, opposed to the disquiet of a life with polypragmosyne (excessive curiosity, but that can also be officiousness; intromission in many scopes, Plat. Rep. 444b, for example: the interventions of Athens in other cities, in its Imperialistic period in the fifth century, Plb 5.75.6). In the context of the Peloponnesian war, Socrates’ friend, Alcibiades, headed toward the Assembly and urged for the people to support an intervention (that would become a resounding failure) after the help request from the city of Segesta to Athens, against Selinunte that counted on the support of Syracuse, in 415–413 B.C., because it would be an opportunity for Athenian interference in Syracusean politics and for expanding the Athenian Empire, according with the ideal of polypragmosyne that characterized the relations of Athens with their neighbors. Nicias, on the other hand, against Alcibiades, advised caution, but he was accused by Alcibiades of inciting the apragmosyne.44 However, even though the apragmosyne is an accusation, the accuser Alcibiades – after being incriminated for profaning the busts of Hermes, being defeated by the Sicilian fleet, his treason in fleeing to Sparta and, most of all, the verification that, in the end, the predictions of Nicias were right – becomes a bad example, and the Athenians seemed to have opted abstaining of the decisions increasingly, maybe because they were disappointed on the public affairs, and thus, the ever increasingly apragmosyne became a more usual political posture among the population, but as a synonym of sophrosyne that characterize the political placidity, against the hybris of the polypragmon Alcibiades.45 Besides that, maybe remembering themselves of the representations that Aristophanes and Xenophon had made of Socrates and his relationship with city issues, Athenian people started evoking him as a defendant of the apragmosyne, that became a Cynical trademark,46 an allegedly Socratic posture, thus, and largely

BLACKWELL, C.W (ed.). Dēmos: Classical Athenian Democracy (A. Mahoney and R. Scaife, ed., The Stoa: a consortium for electronic publication in the humanities [www.stoa.org]), march 2003. 44 Cf.: JONES, P. V. (org.). (1997). O mundo de Atenas, uma introdução à cultura clássica ateniense. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, specially the chapter I; and CARTER, B. L. (1986). The quiet Athenian. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 45 Cf: SCHOFIELD, M.; ROWE, C. (2000). The Cambridge history of Greek and Roman political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 46 In the case of the Cynics, the ἀπραγμoσύνη appears in a more extreme version like αὐτάρκεια. On the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope’s αὐτάρκεια, see: D.L. VI 38, quoting an anonymous tragedy, Fr. 984 Nauck. For more, see: NAVIA. L. E. (2009). Diógenes, o cínico. São Paulo: Odysseus, 2009. It is possible that the Dog from Sinope has inherited his version of the ἀπραγμoσύνη from a Socratic source, intermediate between him and Socrates himself, maybe Antisthenes, who probably started undertaking the transformation of the ἀπραγμoσύνη into αὐτάρκεια, the Cynic pattern of virtue (Cf.: Antisthène, in: Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, ed. A. Frank. Paris: Librarie Hachette, 1885, p.76.). The philosophical predecessor of all those who defend the abandonment of city stuff, in a more moderate way – as the ἀπραγμoσύνη from Socrates, Nicias or Pyrrho – or more extreme – as the αὐτάρκεια from Diogenes of Sinope –was Heraclitus, characterized as μισάνθρωπoς in D.L. IX, 3. Again, even though it is alleged that in D.L. there is not the

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spread afterwards, in the turbulent Hellenistic period, without any derogatory connotations.47 In regard to Pyrrho, it is only due to his apragmosyne that he could, according to Timon, his direct disciple, in his Python and Lampoons, “find a means of escape from servitude to sophists and their vain opinions”. Sophists were abundant in the Agorae, but Pyrrho could free himself from “the bonds of all deceit and persuasion”. In his turn, there is a wordplay in this same passage of Timon’s poem (Fr. 48, Diels), evident in the choice of the verb apatheo, meaning “to be free from” according to LSJ, verb that, if read as a noun literally means “without pathos”, that is, immune to that which occurs, in the case, the sophistic debates, not letting himself be persuaded, in concentrating himself in the instance of his private everyday tasks, avoiding disquieting himself with civic problems (another meaning of the apragmosyne). Thus, Pyrrho did not bother with the rumors whispered through the Hellas, leading a quiet and silent life (esukhia), similar to the life of the gods (Fr. 67, Diels). It is interesting to notice that Timon did not use the word ataraxia to refer to the quietness of Pyrrho, his master, but actually esukhia, because the ataraxia was not used by Pyrrho himself, actually it is an originally Epicurean vocabulary, retroactively attributed by Stobaeus (Flori. 7.31) to Democritus. On the affirmation that the Athenians gave Pyrrho the citizenship, that appears at the end of D.L. IX 65, it is a mistake that Diogenes makes with the episode of the murdering of the tyrant Cotys by the hands of Python, a disciple of Plato, and not by Pyrrho. According to D.L. IX 66, the source of which being Eratosthenes, Pyrrho “lived piously with his sister”, and also executed the household tasks without feeling ashamed of it, because he was indifferent (adiaphoros). The excerpt has, moreover, three occurrences of the word adiaphoria: in an episode in which Pyrrho was cleaning the house indifferently; in an anecdote in which he washes a pig, such was his indifference; and in the report that he was not able to be indifferent against an insult that his sister would have suffered. But Eratosthenes adds that the fails that occur in the performing of the adiaphoria are due to the difficulty “to strip away human nature”. Even so, an adiaphoria that is so noticeable can only be minimally performed exactly due to the distancing of the public affairs, through the apragmosyne. And just because there is the refusal of public action, there is not a refusal of the action in itself by Pyrrho, since he performed his everyday private tasks, cleaned the house, went to the market, helped his sister, and was for some time active in an art, zoographia. In the last steps on the Life of Pyrrho in D.L. IX 67–71 (the steps 71–108 refer to other themes concerning Skepticism), there are no major problems – at 67, 68 and 69 there are anecdotes about Pyrrho; in 67 there is his predilection for Democritus and Homer, from whom he cited verses, according to Philo of Athens; in 69 and

preoccupation with truth, yet, there is the expression of a common sense that, indeed, thought that the distinctive mark of a possible Heraclitic “life” would be the μισανθρωπία. 47 Ver: REEVE, C. D. C. (1989). Socrates in the Apology: an essay on Plato’s Apology of Socrates. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

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70 there are his legacy and the subsequent divisions amongst his immediate followers, that are called Pyrrhonians after their teacher, but are also known as Aporetics, Skeptics, and even Ephectics and Zetetics, from their doctrines, if we may thus refer to them. The Zetetics were so called because they were constantly seeking the truth; the Skeptics because they were always researching and never discovering; the Ephectics because of the state of mind that attended their search (I mean their suspension of judgment); and the Aporetics because . The Pyrrhonians derived their name from Pyrrho.

This account of the divisions amongst Pyrrho’s followers is not completely plausible, since it would be necessary to date the formation of the skeptike agoge as preceding Aenesidemus, when it is more likely that there would have been a dissent between Pyrrho’s fellows, that would have divided themselves in groups after his death, something that can be presumed by the refusal of Theodosius in being treated as a Pyrrhonist (at the end of step D.L. IX, 70). It is also worth noticing that at D.L. X, 68 there is the imputation, by the Stoic Posidonius of Rhodes (c. 135–51 B.C.), of the imperturbability (ataraxia) to the life of Pyrrho as a consequence of his philosophizing. We have already argued above against it, it is necessary to say here, in our favor, that Posidonius is a rather late source when compared to Timon, contemporary of Pyrrho that attributed him esukhia, not speaking of ataraxia. Now, if we are correct in our analysis, we should end this section with the following remarks: 1. The Life of Pyrrho is composed by a mishmash of sources, not necessarily contemporary to the biographed, more or less interested in a sort of portrait, apologetic or depreciative. 2. Pyrrho, like other Atomistic philosophers, asserted the impossibility of knowledge, some sort of negative dogmatism, as attested also by PE. 14.18.1 – 5 and Adv. Eth. 140 (speaking of Timon, that would have shared some of Pyrrho’s theses). 3. Possibly, Pyrrho exacerbated even more the ethical consequences extracted from the Atomistic physics and epistemology after having gone to India with Anaxarchus. 4. However, he did not incur in any sort of unheard-of and unpredictable behavior. 5. In addition, we rejected the attributions of akatalepsia and epoche to the vocabulary of Pyrrho, as well as ataraxia. 6. On the other hand, Pyrrho’s philosophy can be comprehended as a lifeform qualified by the concepts of adiaphoria (indifference) and astorgia (impassibility), resulting in the perception of its own agnoesis (ignorance, see Cic. Tusc. 5.85) expressed by the formula ou mallon, because after the zetesis (investigation),48 he could not find answers. Thus, Pyrrho abstains from participating in

48

We will consider the scope of the investigation later, when we talk about the object of the Skeptical judgement suspension according to Sextus Empiricus.

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public affairs (apragmosyne), not letting them affect him, making himself apathes before them, what makes him feel peaceful. In short, Pyrrho was able to extract positive ethical consequences from the negative assertions about the limits of human cognition.

2.4

Pyrrho’s Messamates

The issue on the succession of Pyrrho is problematic and, as we have already seen, it is not possible to trust in D.L. IX 69 and 70 because we would have to make the formation of a skeptike agoge go back to before Aenesidemus of Knossos. However, we can be certain that at least Timon (c. 330–220 B.C), Nausiphanes (c. 360 B.C.), Eurylochus (third century B.C.), Philon of Athens (third century B.C.), Numenius (third century B.C.), Hecataeus and Ascanius of Abdera (both in the third century B. C.) were indeed Pyrrho’s messmates49 and were influenced by his personality and philosophy/life, even thought we can suppose that they maybe have diverged, if we take the report about the late positioning (third century A.D.) of Theodosius, the doctor, seriously. Timon of Phlius probably was the most notorious of Pyrrho’s messmates and the circle that he was part of, the one of the “first Pyrrhonians”, maybe was more of a group of admirers of Pyrrho’s way of life than actual formal disciples disposed in a succession under a school doctrine,50 as they were represented by D.L. and also by Eusebius in the passage that we will analyse latter (PE. 14. 18. 1–5) where Eusebius calls Timon “mathetes”.51 Actually, there was, on the Hellenistic philosopher’s side, as well as by the historians and biographers of the time, a necessity of erecting successions among philosophers, making them go back to predecessors that served as “authorities” from behind the foundation of the philosophies, aggrandizing the genealogies of the schools, this can be identified in the first phases of Stoicism and of Epicureanism, and also in Cynicism and Pyrrhonism. The cases of Cynicism and Pyrrhonism are similar: both are more correctly characterized as dynamis or agoge than skole, and instead of being understood as school, as D.L. and PE wanted, they must be seen as ways of life to which the practical viability of achieving the final purpose of human existence – arete, eudaimonia, apatheia, autarkeia or ataraxia, for instance – is more present in the performance of a lifestyle than in theoretical cohesion. However, going back to Timon, if he is not a disciple, like PE. wants us to think, he was the closest of Pyrrho’s messmates. He maybe have lived for ninety years, having abandoned his profession of dancer to dedicate to philosophy when he was around twenty-five, 49

It is possible that the name Ascanius is a corruption of Hecataeus of Abdera. See: DECLEVA CAIZZI, F. (org.). (1981). Pirrone testimonianze. Naples: Bibliopolis. 50 BROCHARD, V. (2010). Os Céticos Gregos. São Paulo: Editora Odysseus, pp. 90. 51 “μαθητής”.

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firstly becoming disciple of Stilpon of Megara and then, moving to Elis, companion of Pyrrho, whose philosophy/life inspired him in his polemic and satiric writings. Beyond his proximity with Pyrrho, Timon is considered the greatest spokesman and promoter of Pyrrho’s philosophy/life52 because the other people that were close to Pyrrho – i.e. Philon of Athens, Nausiphanes, Eurylochus, Hecataeus and/or Ascanius of Abdera and Numenius – seem to have absorbed exclusively the moral character of Pyrrho’s life, whereas Timon also absorbed the whole philosophy. On the other hand, they must be excused if we remember that it was exactly in the practical aspect that Pyrrho focused more. In this way, before we abide to Timon’s fragments, we have to go through the other messmates of Pyrrho. Starting by Philon of Athens (who must not be confused with the Academic that disputed with Aenesidemus), he “cares nothing for fame or quarrels” (D.L. IX, 69); just like Pyrrho, he spoke alone to practice his discourse, but he ran away of men and preferred being alone to being with someone else, and, more importantly, he studied on his own, as he wasn’t a member of any school.53 Nausiphanes was more properly an Atomist than a Pyrrhonist; he “used to say that a man should emulate the character (diathesis) of Pyrrho, but adopt his own doctrines” (D.L. IX, 64). In other words, nausiphanes thought that only Pyrrho’s practical conduct should be followed but on the reasoning, one should follow him. Thus Nausiphanes makes a distinction between his own way of thinking, influenced by Atomism, and his way of life, influenced by Pyrrho, what illustrates the almost exclusively performative character of “Pyrrhonism”, and the more theoretical character of the Atomistic physics, as well as the inexistence of a school system that would define the first Pyrrhonism. Eurylochus was not fond of intellectual disputes and Sophistic debates, he would rather cross a river by swimming than exhaust himself with conflicts, and “was exceedingly hostile to the sophists”.54 Hecataeus of Abdera lived among the Lagid court and wrote treatises on the Egyptians and on the Jewish and Abraham;55 he also thought that philosophy was something practical, and not theoretical.56 If Ascanius is another, and not a corruption of Hecataeus, nothing conclusive is known about him. Numenius is equally obscure and must not be mistaken by the Neoplatonist homonym of Apameia (second century A.D.).

See, for example, Adv. Gram. 53: “ὁ πρoφήτης τῶν Πύρρωνoς. . . Τίμων”. πρoφήτης ¼ interpreter or exhibitor, see: LSJ. 53 See D.L. IX, 69. 54 See D.L. IX, 69. 55 Plut. De Iside., 9; J. AJ, I, vii, 2. 56 See: J. Ap., 1,22. 52

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Thus, among Pyrrho’s messmates, it is with Timon that the establishment of what we can call “first Pyrrhonism”57 begins, with its peculiar idiosyncrasies and conceptual ‘gains’: It is supremely necessary to investigate our own capacity for knowledge (διασκεψασθαι περὶ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν γνω  σεως). For if we are so constituted that we know nothing (μηδὲν γνωρίζειν), there is no need to continue enquiry (σκoπεῖν) into other things. Among the ancients too there have been people who made this pronouncement, and Aristotle has argued against them. Pyrrho of Elis was also a powerful spokesman of such a position. He himself has left nothing in writing, but his pupil (μαθητὴς) Timon says that whoever wants to be happy (εὐδαιμoνήσειν) must consider these three questions: first, how are things by nature (πρῶτoν με ν ὁπoῖα πε φυκε τὰ πράγματα)? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards them (δεύτερoν δε  τίνα χρὴ τρóπoν ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθα)? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude (τελευταῖoν δε τί περιεσται τoῖς oὕτως ἔχoυσι)? According to Timon, Pyrrho declared that things are equally indifferent (ἀδιάφoρα), immeasurable (ἀστάθμητά) and inarbitrable (ἀνεπίκριτα). For this reason neither our sensations nor our opinions tell us truths or falsehoods (διὰ τoῦτo μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δóξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι). Therefore for this reason we should not put our trust in them one bit, but we should be unopinionated, uncommitted and unwavering (ἀλλ ἀδoξάστoυς καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντoυς εἶναι), saying concerning each individual thing that it no more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not (περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστoυ λεγoντας ὅτι oὐ μᾶλλoν ἔστιν ἢ oὐκ ἔστιν ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ oὐκ ἔστιν ἢ oὔτε ἔστιν oὔτε oὐκ ἔστιν). The outcome for those who actually adopt this attitude, says Timon, will be first speechlessness (ἀφασίαν), and then freedom from disturbance (ἀταραξίαν); and Aenesidemus says pleasure (ἡδoνήν). These are the main points of what they say. (PE. 14. 18. 1–5).58

The excerpt above is the Eusebius’ transcription of a fragment of Aristocles (peripatetic philosopher of the first century A.D.) who, in his turn, initially makes a general introduction on the philosophers that asserted the need of investigating our own capacity of knowledge (diaskepsasthai peri tes emon auton gnoseos) for, later on, inserting a doxographic fragment of Timon. I emphasize here the verb “diaskeptomai” (conjugated in aoristic infinitive middle-passive ¼ “diaskepsasthai”), that means “to investigate thoroughly”, composed by the preposition “dia” (¼ through, in the middle of, in, from a distance, after, above, over, completely) summed to the verb “skeptomai” (¼ a clever way of looking, a inspection or exam59), the same as “skopao” that, by nominalization, gives “skepsis”, investigation, the proper task of the Skeptic, “skeptikos”.

“Early Pyrrhonism”, in the words of Anthony Long and David Sedley, see: LONG, A.A.; SEDLEY, D.N. (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers: translation of the principal sources, with philosophical commentary, Vols. 1 e 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 58 Translated by Long and Sedley (opus cit), with a few modifications. For a much more detailed analysis of this passage, see: BETT, R. (2000). Pyrrho, his antecedentes and his legacy. Oxford, Oxford University Press. I will revisit the relations between Eusebius and Skepticism at the Conclusion, but, for the present occasion, the most interesting topic related to the passage is the way that Pyrrho’s philosophy was approached by his messmates and adversaries. 59 See: SNELL, B. (2005). A cultura grega e as origens do pensamento europeu. São Paulo: Perspectiva. 57

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According to Aristocles, apud. Eusebius, we have to investigate our own capability of knowing, thus, the scope of investigation is epistemological, the objective is to know if the man is indeed constituted in such a way that he knows nothing, whence we can infer that the target of the usage of the investigative method is the verification of the truthfulness of an assertion that could only be made by those who defended that we could know nothing, that is, some Proto-skeptic and negative dogmatic philosopher, maybe Atomistic. The confirmation of this interpretation comes in the following lines, when Aristocles says that “Aristotle has argued against them”. Therefore, “they” are those that Aristotle thought that had violated the principle of non-contradiction, exactly the Proto-skeptics, as we have seen. Next, there is a mention to Pyrrho as “a powerful spokesman of such a position”. But, considering that there are three positions being described – 1- the one of those who defended that we are “constituted that we know nothing”, that are the Protoskeptics in a classical negative dogmatic assertion; 2- the position of Aristotle, who debated against the previous; 3- and the position of those who defended that it is “supremely necessary to investigate our own capacity for knowledge”, who are the Skeptics, as we have deduced by Aristocles’ choice of the aoristic infinitive middlepassive of the verb diaskeptomai – thus, Pyrrho’s defense is the one of the position of those who investigate,60 for this reason, for the primacy of the investigation, that he “himself has left nothing in writing”, even though Timon makes it clear that the telos of the investigation was not the investigation in itself, but the obtention of happiness, for which one must consider three things: the ontological status of things, in their nature; the way one must act upon those things; and what results from this action. In the lines that follow immediately to the report of Timon of the three questions quoted above, there is the report of the answers to these questions, in a way that we can schematize the argument as follows: (a) First question: “how are things by nature?” Answer: “things are equally indifferent (adiaphora), immeasurable (astathmeta ¼ unstable) and inarbitrable (anepikrita ¼ indeterminable)”. Provisory conclusion: “For this reason neither our sensations nor our opinions tell us truths or falsehoods” (b) Second question: “what attitude should we adopt towards them [the things that are equally indifferent, unstable and indeterminable]?” Answer: “we should not put our trust in them one bit, but we should be unopinionated (adoxastous), uncommitted (aklineis) and unwavering (akradantous), saying concerning each individual thing that it no more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not”.

60

Even though Pyrrho did, at times, negative dogmatic assertions, there is no textual contradiction here, suffice to remember ourselves that here it is Timon that provides us the report transmitted by Aristocles, therefore, we should consider that there had already, on Timon’s side, the preoccupation of giving more cohesion to the investigative stance (Skeptical) that he himself seem to have adopted.

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(c) Third question: “what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude [unopinionated, uncommitted and unwavering, and that does not assert that something is (more than it is not), or that it is as much as it is not, or that it neither is nor it is not]?” Answer: “the outcome for those who actually adopt this attitude, says Timon, will be first speechlessness (aphasian ¼ non-assertion), and then freedom from disturbance (ataraxian ¼ unperturbability); and Aenesidemus says pleasure (hedonen)”. At every moment, Aristocles, speaking through Eusebius’ mouth, refers to Timon as spokesman of Pyrrho, that way, it is Timon who proposes the three questions, and the three answers as well. However, as he was a messmate of Pyrrho, Timon’s formulation results from the contact that he had with Pyrrho, thus, even without knowing for sure to what degree we are right in our argumentation about the “Life of Pyrrho”, we must agree that for him the finality of the investigative method is moral. In the same way, if we remember that Pyrrho was a negative dogmatic, of a Atomistic inspiration in theory of knowledge, we can conclude that he could think that things were by nature indifferent, immeasurable and inarbitrable, a dogmatic assertion (since he affirms how objects are by nature) that does not have to be spurious; also, the necessity of the investigation, which is the position that Pyrrho defends, emerges rightly from the perception of the dubiousness of things, that for him is inherent to the constitution of these things (as it also was for Heraclitus, Protagoras and the Atomists). And it is precisely for the indifference, immeasurability and impossibility of being arbitrable of the things in themselves that the sensations and opinions are unable of speaking truths or lies about them, because they do not touch the objects, naturally inscrutable. And thus, considering such inscrutability, we cannot trust the things, we must conserve ourselves far from opinions, far from inclinations or from being shaken, avoiding uttering anything about the reality of things. As a result, we reach a non-assertive, unperturbable and pleasurable lifestyle. Well, having said that, we still must consider some problems that emerge: 1. Clearly, there is a contradiction between: (a) asserting that things are by nature inscrutable; and (b) prescribing a non-assertive lifestyle. 2. As we have already seen, we have reasons to reject the attribution of the word ataraxia to Pyrrho’s vocabulary, but it appears here. For both problems above, we have the following responses: R1- Actually, there is a contradiction between (a) and (b) above, and it looks like it had endured, on the one hand, until the Academy in its Skeptical turn – that tried to solve the contradiction by recurring to the criterium of the ‘probable’, i.e. appealing to a dogmatic notion as moral solution and for pragmatical behavior, gradually leaving the Skepticism – and on the other hand, until Sextus Empiricus, who opted for characterizing the Skeptical discourse as non assertive, then reducing its compromise with truth/falsehood, or with the nature of the objects, and emphasizing the way the things appear to be, as we shall see latter;

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R2- in any moment there is the pretention to attribute the word ataraxia to Pyrro here, actually Aristocles clearly says that it was Timon who said that the Pyrrhonian approach leads to ataraxia, as well as Aenesidemus says that it leads to hedone. So, both words can be resulted in the developments and centuries of interpretations on Pyrrho’s life/philosophy, but not necessarialy need to be proferred by Pyrrho himself. Thus, maybe the use of the word ataraxia can be traced back to Timon. Or maybe it was widely used by the messmates of Pyrrho, amongst them, Nausiphanes, master of Epicurus, and that would explain the Epicurean use of the concept, transmitted by Nausiphanes himself. Moreover, other adaptations derive from Timon, like the interpretation of the expression “ou mallon” (“not more”) as “to meden horizein all’ aprosthetein” (“affirm/define nothing, but suspend judgment”).61 It is important to note the usage, by Timon, of a word that means “suspension of judgement”, or “retention of assent”, but that is not epoche. On the other hand, epoche appears in the same step D.L. IX 76, but some lines below, linked to some medical metaphors. If we consider that the infiltration of Pyrrhonism in the medical discussions only occurs around the first century A.D.,62 by the time Agrippa wrote his modes, thus the passage where the word epoche appears relates to a Pyrrhonism that would have conceptual gains chronologically posterior to Timon, as the epoche. Therefore, it is more likely that Timon used the word “aprostheteo” in referring to the act of suspending the judgement or the assent. The establishment of the figure of a Skeptic that was an ordinary citizen, instead of behaving in an unpredictable manner, someone who did not confront the customs and was coerced by the phenomena, letting himself be driven by appearances is also derived from Timon: Again, the dogmatic philosophers declare that the Skeptics reject life, since they reject everything of which life consists (Πάλιν oἱ δoγματικoί φασιν καὶ τὸν βίoν αὐτoὺς ἀναιρεῖν ἐν ᾧ πάντ ἐκβάλλoυσιν ἐξ ὧν ὁ βίoς συνεστηκεν). The Skeptics reply that this is false; for they do not deny that we see; they maintain only that they do not know how we see. “Indeed, we admit a given object’s appearance, without admitting that the object really is as it appears. We perceive that fire burns; but as to whether it has a flammable nature, we suspend our judgment (ἐπε χoμεν). We see that a man moves and that he perishes. How these things happen we do not know.” “We only take issue,” they say, “with the nonapparent things that underlie appearances (ἀνθιστάμεθα πρὸς τὰ παρυφιστάμενα τoῖς φαινoμε νoις ἄδηλα). For when we say that a picture has depth, we are describing its appearance; but when we say that it has no depth, we are no longer speaking of its appearance, but of something else.” That is why Timon, in his Python, says that he has not transgressed the limits of ordinary usage (συνήθειαν). And in the Conceits he says: But the apparent holds sway wherever it goes (ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινóμενoν πάντῃ σθενει oὗπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ). And in his treatise On Sensations he says, “That honey is sweet I do not affirm, though I concede that it appears so.” (D.L. IX, 105–106).

61 62

See: D.L. IX 76. For this assumption, see our Appendices III and IV.

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In the excerpt above it is clear the appearance of a critique to the Skepticism that affirms that it destroys life itself, as it rejects all in which it consists. This allegation is neither, on the one hand, like that of Aristotle – for whom the rejection, through discourse, of the principle of non-contradiction is self-contradictory – nor, on the other hand, like that which says that the behavior of the Skeptic is unpredictable. In the same passage (D.L. IX, 105) there is a defense that defines the scope of the suspension of judgement, but some lines below of the critique: [the Skeptics] maintain only that they do not know how we see. “Indeed, we admit a given object’s appearance, without admitting that the object really is as it appears. We perceive that fire burns; but as to whether it has a flammable nature, we suspend our judgment (ἐπε χoμεν).

But here is the allegation that it is not known how things (i.e. fire) are by nature, however, when we analyzed PE. 14. 18. 1–5, we saw that Timon said that things are, by nature, inscrutable. Moreover, we also saw that there is not yet the acquisition of the word epoche by Timon, but in the excerpt above there is the verb epechomen. Nonetheless, it is not a contradiction: once again, D.L. overlays different reports and conceptual gains from Skepticism in an anachronous way, so that the excerpt selected above, that narrates a anti-skeptic critique posterior to Timon, suits D.L. as an introduction to the citation of three fragments of Timon himself: one in which he “says that he has not transgressed the limits of ordinary usage”; another in which he says that “the apparent holds sway wherever it goes”; and another in which he notes that “honey is sweet I do not affirm, though I concede that it appears so.” Now, if it is plausible that the anti-skeptic critiques that appear in D.L. IX 105–106 as well as the Skeptical defense that follows it immediately and that defines the scope of the epoche are posterior to Timon and serve as introduction to three fragments from him inserted in the text, then we must consider the reply and the rejoinder in their due moments, when we discuss the debate between the Academics and the Stoics. For now, we will recapitulate the conceptual developments of the investigative activity of Timon so that we can focus in his bellicosity next: 1. Timon, according to Pyrrho’s possible Atomism, was a negative dogmatic in theory of knowledge. 2. However, he thought that, even so, one must investigate how things are by nature. But Timon introduces the matchings of the word “skepsis” (i.e. “diaskepsasthai”) to refer to the investigative activity, instead of Pyrrho’s zetesis. 3. As a result of the investigation there does not appear the aporia or Sextan crosstalk, but the dogmatic certainty that the things are naturally indifferent, unstable and indeterminable. 4. In the face of that, we must abandon the pretension to truth, suspending judgement – the verb “aprostheteo”, and not “epoche”, we point – and we become without opinion, without inclination and we do not let ourselves shake, (ceasing the assertion ¼ aphasia). 5. Only then can we consummate the finality of the skepsis, the eudaimonia, that gains its classical negative definition: ataraxia. 6. Finally, there is the transformation of the formula “ou mallon” in an expression of the impossibility of defining (meden horizein).

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Furthermore, it was with Timon that the investigative dynamis, in addition to abiding to their own task, gained the combative character, giving Skepticism one of its most distinctive marks: the agonistic. Indeed, one of the Timon’s goals was, with Cynic literary inspiration63 (satiric iambus and meliambus that, in their turn, have their invention attributed to Xenophanes of Colophon, in one of his parodies to Homer and Hesiod),64 and with a equally Cynic philosophical inspiration, to demonstrate the dogmatic typhos,65 an atrocious fever (Hp. Int. 39–43) that immerses the dogmatic in smoke,66 in the fog of their own vanity (Plb. 3.22.4), that is the cause of delusions and of the affected behavior of those who think they are wise (Plut. Per. 5). The only way to avoid this typhos is through living with simplicity (¼ atyphia, see: Medit. 2.17.1, 6.13.1, 12.24.1, 12.27.1) and without arrogance, moderately (¼ “hypatyphos”, see Sextus Empiricus talking about Xenofanes in: P.H. I, 224). Therefore, Timon does not hesitate in attacking the Dogmatists, sufferers of typhomania (according to Galen, a disease, see: Hip. Pror. Com. 16, 497, 11): There are three books of Lampoons, in which, from his Skeptic’s point of view, he abuses everyone and lampoons the dogmatic philosophers by parodying them. The first book has a first-person narration; the second and third are in dialogue form. Timon represents himself, at any rate, as questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about each of the philosophers, and Xenophanes describes them to him; in the second he deals with the more ancient philosophers, and in the third, the later ones, which is why some have entitled it Epilogue. The first deals with the same subjects, except that the poem is a monologue. It begins as follows: Tell me now, all you busybody (πoλυπράγμoνε ς) sophists. . . (D.L. IX, 111).

In the passage above, we must notice primarily the dialogical way of two out of the three Lampoons, in which Xenophanes is the one who talks with Timon, being, therefore, immune to the controversy that will collapse over the other philosophers, as much the Ancient as the recent ones,67 treated generically like Sophists and accused of polypragmosyne, the diametrically opposed vice to the Pyrrhonic virtue of apragmosyne, like we have seen in our comment on the Life of Pyrrho. Actually, the main targets of Timon were Epicurus – “The last and most shameless of the natural philosophers, hailing from Samos // A schoolmaster, and the most ill-bred of

63 See: LONG, A. A. (1996). The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates and Hellenistic Ethics. In: GOULET-CAZÉ, M-O; BRANHAM, R. B. (orgs.). The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy. Berkeley: University of California Press. 64 It is worth noting that Timon dedicates his “Σίλλoι” to Xenophanes, who is also an author of “Σίλλoι”, see: D.L. IX 18 (Fr DK 21 A). 65 See: DECLEVA CAIZZI, F. (1980). τῦφoς: Contributo allá storia di un concetto. In: Sandalion 3, pp. 53–66. And: BRANCACCI , A. (1981). La filosofia di Pirrone e le sue relazioni com il cinismo. In: GIANNANTONI, G. (org.). Lo scetticismo ântico. Roma. 66 The verb to smoke: “τύφω”. 67 Not only Xenophanes was immune to the viral attacks of Timon, all the Eleatic circle was admired by him, see D.L. IX, 23 and D.L. IX, 25. As well as the Atomists, see D.L. IX, 40. Protagoras was also admired, see Adv. Phy. I, 57.

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animals” (D.L. X, 3) –, Socrates and the Socratic tradition, including the Academics, the Stoics and excepting the Cynics: From them the stone-chiseler, blatherer on the lawful, turned away. . . (Adv. Log. I, 8). Hence Timon blames Plato for embellishing Socrates in this way with multiple disciplines: “Indeed,” he says, “the one who was not willing for him to remain a character-depicter.” (Adv. Log. I, 10). But I care not for these babblers, nor for anyone else, nor for Phaedo, whoever he is, nor [the wrangler Euclides, who has infected the Megarians with a rage for disputation. (D.L. II, 107). No, not even the painful thoughtlessness of Aristotle. . . (D.L. V, 11). I saw [the Stoic Zeno of Citium] as well an old Phoenician woman greedily longing, In her darksome pride, for everything; but her basket, being small, [overflowed with stuff, And she had no more sense than a kindapsos (D.L. VII, 15).

Now, we finish up this study of the “successors of Pyrrho” with two problems: the succession of Timon and the beginning of the debate against the Stoics, two intertwined topics that we will analyze in the next section.

2.5

From Timon to Arcesilaus?

Apparently, there had been some contact between Timon and the academic Arcesilaus, at least in the critical sense, as we can see by the following fragment of Timon, quoted by D.L.: So saying, he plunged into the surrounding throng. And they marveled at him, like chaffinches around an owl, Pointing him out as vain, because he flattered the mob. You’re no big deal, wretch. Why plume yourself like a simpleton? (D.L. IV, 42).

Or, in the same way, by the anecdote: When asked one day by Arcesilaus why he had come there from Thebes he said, “To have you all in plain view and enjoy a good laugh.” (D.L. IX, 115).

On the other hand, “though he attacked Arcesilaus in his Lampoons, he praised him in his work The Funeral Feast of Arcesilaus” (D.L. IX, 115). However, it is not certain whether such Funeral Feast of Arcesilaus ever existed or whether it is an invention through which it was intended to evidence, or maybe forge, the continuity of Pyrrho’s philosophy/life, passing by Timon and getting to Arcesilaus. Even so, in spite of the aporiae on this issue, it is possible that Timon attacked Arcesilaus all his life and, facing the death of his adversary, backs down and praises him, especially if we take into consideration the fragment in which Timon assumes that Arcesilaus really acted as a Pyrrhonist:

2.5 From Timon to Arcesilaus?

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Having Menedemus as a lead weight, under his chest, He will run either to Pyrrho, that mountain of flesh, Or to Diodorus. (D.L. IV, 33).

Furthermore, in addition to Timon, Aristo of Chios, the half Stoic and half Cynic philosopher nicknamed Siren, commented on the Pyrrhonic stance of a chimeric Arcesilaus: “He’s Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle” (D.L. IV, 33). And, even after centuries, the Stoic Seneca was led to think that the Academics, starting by Arcesilaus, were legitimate successors of Pyrrho.68 Also Numenius (in: PE. 14.6.4–6) and Sextus Empiricus69 thought that: Arcesilaus (. . .) certainly seems to me to have shared the discourse of Pyrrho (Πυρρωνείoις . . . λóγoις), so that his way of thought (ἀγωγὴν) is almost identical with ours. For we do not find him making any assertions about the reality or unreality of anything, nor probability or improbability, but suspends judgement about all (ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπε χει). He also says that the end is suspension – which is accompanied, as we have said, by “quietude” (καὶ τελoς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐπoχήν ᾗ συνεισερχεσθαι τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἡμεῖς ἐφάσκoμεν). (P.H. I, 232).

However Sextus, having in mind all the conceptual gains that Skepticism already had acquired in his time (second or third century A.D.), did not consider Arcesilaus as a full-blood Pyrrhonist, because Sextus thought that Arcesilaus attributed some value to the suspension of judgement (good) and to the assent (bad) and used the dialectic as a method to raise aporiae and to verify the adhesion of others to Plato’s dogmas (see P.H. I, 234). But, before we proceed in our investigation, let us make a brief biographical report from the limited knowledge available about Arcesilaus (c. 315–241 BC.). Firstly, his itinerary of studies: . . .before he sailed for Athens, he studied with the mathematician Autolycus, his countryman, with whom he also traveled to Sardis. Next he studied with Xanthus, the Athenian musician; then he became a student of Theophrastus. Leaving Theophrastus, he came to the Academy to join Crantor. (D.L. IV, 29).

Arcesilaus was a polymath that, according to a rather ordinary version of paideia (composed by training in music, maths and traditional poem recitation), searched for erudition. Finally, he also trained himself in sophistic refutations and argumentation, as we notice by the allegations that he had been a pupil of Diodorus Cronus – a notorious dialectician – and by the quotations below: . . .Theophrastus, provoked at his loss, is said to have remarked, “What a clever and courageous lad has left my school!” For besides being highly adept in argument and a lover of books, Arcesilaus also took up poetry. (D.L. IV, 30).

68

See Quaest. Natu. 7.32.2. To Sextus the attribution of a Pyrrhonic stance to the Academics is mistaken, except for Arcesilaus.

69

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2 Apraxia and the Development of Ancient Skepticisms He appreciated Homer beyond all poets and would always read a passage from him before going to sleep. And in the morning, whenever he wanted to read him, he would say he was going off to visit his beloved. He also considered Pindar remarkable for the fullness of his diction and his vast store of words and expressions. (D.L. IV, 31).

Indeed, to Arcesilaus the reading of poets and speakers consisted in a scholarly exercise and training (askesis) in memorization techniques and argumentation, perfected to the extent that the distinctive mark of his way of philosophizing was exactly his argumentative stamina, at times extremely sarcastic70 (maybe influenced by Timon, who was also sarcastic): He was also exceptionally adept at countering objections or bringing the course of the discussion back around to its starting point, and adapting it to every occasion. His powers of persuasion were unsurpassed. This drew even more students to his school, though they were terrified by his sharpness. (D.L. IV, 37).

But, also in Academy, under Crantor (c. 340–275 BC.) – in his turn, disciple of Polemon (acme 314 BC.), who also was, as we will see, master of the Stoic Zeno of Citium and disciple of Xenocrates (circa 396–314 BC.), in his turn, disciple of Speusippus (circa 407–339 B.C.), successor of Plato in the leadership of his school – Arcesilaus could have instilled in himself hist taste in debating, once Plato himself gave him his “consent” to divergence71 and affirmed that one cannot be coerced into learning (Plat.Rep. 536e-f). Thus, if we remember that Plato died in 347 B.C. (about thirty years before Arcesilaus’ birth), then probably there was not, at Arcesilaus’ time, even one Academic philosopher who had met Plato directly. Besides, there was not any formalized method or curriculum either, in a way that whoever wanted to understand Plato’s or Socrates’ philosophy should read the Plato’s dialogues which were available. Now, those who had adventured themselves in an attempt to understand the dialogues, or the positioning and doctrine of Plato in them, know that the philosophies of Plato and his character Socrates are dialectical, and this is indicated by the preference of writing in dialogical form, which is the picture of an investigative method.72 And Arcesilaus joined exactly to the Socratic way of philosophizing as shown in Plato’s dialogues: the dialectic (developed even more by Diodorus Cronus), giving to it a negative dogmatic interpretation (possibly coming from Timon’s transmission of Pyrrho’s philosophy) – in rejecting the possibility of learning the truth, be it by the mind or by the senses – and Skeptical – in perceiving the dialectical possibility of defending, for each argument, an opposite: Arcesilas, who had been a hearer of Polemo, was the first who eagerly embraced the doctrine drawn from the various writings of Plato and the discourses of Socrates, that ‘there is nothing certain to be known, either by the senses or the understanding (nihil esse certi quod aut

70

See D.L. IV, 43. See Aristotle’s interpretation about it in Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1.6, 1096a12–17; and the objections that Plato raises against his own theory of forms in the whole of Plat. Parm. 72 Cf.: GOLDSCHMIDT , V. (2010). Os diálogos de Platão: estrutura e método dialético. São Paulo: Loyola. 71

2.5 From Timon to Arcesilaus?

37

sensibus aut animo percipi possit);’ he is reported to have adopted an eminently graceful manner of speaking, to have rejected all judgment of the mind and the senses, and to have established first the practice (quem ferunt eximio quodam usum lepore dicendi aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque iudicium primumque instituisse) – though it was indeed greatly adopted by Socrates – of not declaring what he himself thought, but of disputing against whatever any other person said that he thought. (Cic. de Orat. 3.67).73

Cicero, in Acad. Pr. 44–46 advances even more the interpretation that Arcesilaus’ Skepticism was directly linked with a Socratic philosophical instance which led them both (i.e. Arcesilaus and Socrates) to confess their ignorance, following the steps of Democritus, Anaxagoras and Empedocles, . . .and virtually all the early philosophers to say that nothing could be cognized, apprehended, or known, because the senses were limited, our minds weak, and the course of our lives brief, while the truth had been submerged in an abyss (as Democritus said), everything was subject to opinion and custom, no room was left for truth, and consequently everything was shrouded by darkness. (Acad. Pr. 44).

So, Arcesilaus motivation for quarreling against Zeno of Citium was not a spirit of rivalry, but the knowledge of the only thing that can be know with relative certainty: that he did not know anything in a way that he could assent or assent. This is the reason why Arcesilaus considered it particularly rash to approve something false or unknown, because nothing was more shameful than for one’s assent or approval to outrun knowledge or apprehension. His practice was consistent with this theory, so that by arguing against everyone’s views he led most of them away from their own: when arguments of equal weight were found for the opposite sides of the same subject, it was easier to withhold assent from either side. (Acad. Pr. 45)

Now, if Arcesilaus really was an eminent arguer and debater, the favorite target of his antithetikos logos was the Stoic philosophy, as it was known to Timon and, after him, to the Academics Carneades (circa 213–129 B.C.) and Clitomachus (acme 129 B.C.), following Arcesilaus’ example. In this way, [Carneades,] After carefully studying the writings of the Stoics, Chrysippus, he challenged them reasonably and with such success that he would often say, Had Chrysippus not existed, I would not have existed (D.L. IV, 62). Clitomachus was from Carthage. He was originally called Hasdrubal, and he taught philosophy in Carthage in his native language. Coming to Athens at the age of forty, he became a student of Carneades. Appreciating Clitomachus’ diligence, Carneades had him educated and took part in training him. Clitomachus was so industrious that he wrote more than forty treatises. He succeeded Carneades, and by his own writings shed considerable light on his predecessor’s doctrines. The man became eminent in three schools of thought: the Academic, the Peripatetic, and the Stoic. (D.L. IV, 67).

If, on the one hand, the Academics’ attacks on the Stoics were really scathing, detailed and studied and could shake some structures of the Stoic system, on the

73

Translated by J. S. Watson, with a few modifications.

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other hand, the Academics themselves did not escape unharmed from the counterattacks of the Stoics, and Cleanthes of Assos (circa 331–232 B.C.) severely accused Arcesilaus of not acting according to what he said one should act (D.L. VII, 171), and Chrysippus of Soli (circa 282–206 B.C.) defended his school so ingeniously that it became common to say that “had there been no Chrysippus, there would have been no Stoa” (D.L. VII, 183).

Chapter 3

Academics X Stoics

Abstract In this chapter we turn to the way that the successors of Pyrrho have absorbed and transformed his philosophy, and then to the possible contact and influences of Timon of Phlius on Arcesilaus and the Middle Academics, since it was in the quarrels of the Academics against the Stoics that we see the arise of a more robust version of the apraxia argument against Skepticism which would endure for centuries. Moreover, if we are able to comprehend the details of the quarrels between Academics and Stoics, we are going to be also able to understand the motivations for Aenesidemus of Knossos’ rupture from the Academy and his revival (or maybe invention) of the Pyrrhonism, erecting Pyrrho as the father of this modality of Skepticism. But if Aenesidemus was willing to revive or invent the Pyrrhonism, adopting the name of Pyrrho, he also had to take the consequences to the variations of the apraxia argument which were developed to slander Pyrrho’s way of life as exotic, bizarre or unpredictable, summed to the Stoic version of the argument driven against the Academics.

3.1

Arcesilaus Attacks

As is well known, the Stoic criterion of truth and correct action is the adhesion to the kataleptikai phantasiai, acting according to them provides the way through which gradually one can escape the vile ignorance in direction to the excellent wisdom, avoiding the falsehood of the akataleptos phantasia. To do that, there are three super-criteria that indicate when an impression is cataleptic (1- the derivation of an existing object; 2- the accurate representation of such object; 3- the impression of the object in the mind through the sensory organs), but, according to these super-criteria, for the Stoics, the majority of impressions is cataleptic and thus even ordinary people act according to them. However, common people act according to opinions that verify true, and their actions are not appraisable, since there is no calculation as in the case of the Stoic wise, who assents to the cataleptic impressions because he knows

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 R. Pinto de Brito, The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities, Synthese Library 455, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92407-2_3

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that these impressions indicate the truth and the correct. This way, the knowledge of the Stoic is irrefutable and his action is unshakable: (. . .) the wise man will not hold mere opinions, that is, he will assent to nothing that is false. (. . .) He alone is a free man, whereas the base are slaves. For freedom is the power to act independently, and servitude is the deprivation of one’s power to do so. (. . .) They hold that the wise are not only free, but are also kings, kingship being authority that is not held accountable, which only the wise are qualified to wield (. . .) Similarly, only the wise are fit to be magistrates, judges, and orators, whereas none of the base are. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, since they are not likely to make mistakes. They cause no harm, for they harm neither others nor themselves. They are not merciful, nor do they forgive anyone; for they do not mitigate the penalties imposed by the laws, since leniency and pity and even fairness itself are the vapidity of a soul that would substitute kindness for punishment. Nor do they consider punishments too severe. (D.L. VII, 121–123).

Thus, considering that such wise man presently did not exist, Arcesilaus turned his argumentative and investigative capabilities to analysing the philosophy of those who could defend its possibility, the first Stoics, notedly Zeno of Citium. His motivation seems to have been double and complementary: on the one hand, he wanted, in refuting the core of the Stoic philosophy, make himself even more famous in Athens, reestablishing the Academy’s former glory (PE. 14.4.8; Cic. Acad. Pos.15–16); on the other hand, he wanted to verify the possibility of the Stoic philosophy really offering a sufficiently effective way of obtaining the truth and the attainment of wisdom (Cic. Acad. Pos. 76). This is the reconstruction of the debate by Cicero: None of Zeno’s predecessors had ever explicitly formulated, or even suggested, the view that a person could hold no opinions (hominem nihil opinari) —and not just that they could, but that doing so was necessary for the wise person (nec solum posse sed ita necesse esse sapienti). Arcesilaus thought that this view was both true and honourable, as well as right for the wise person. So he asked Zeno, we may suppose, what would happen if the wise person couldn’t apprehend anything, but it was a mark of wisdom not to hold opinions. Zeno replied, no doubt, that the wise person wouldn’t hold any opinions because there was something apprehensible (Zenone fortasse quid futurum esset si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari sapientis esset. Ille credo nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset quod percipi posset). So what was that? An impression (visum), I suppose. Well, what kind of impression? Then Zeno defined it thus: an impression from what is, stamped, impressed, and molded just as it is (ex eo quod esset sicut esset inpressum et signatum et effictum). After that, Arcesilaus went on to ask what would happen if a true impression was just like a false one. At this point, Zeno was sharp enough to see that no impression would be apprehensible if one that came from what is was such that there could be one just like it from what is not (Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo quod est cuiús modi ab eo quod non est posset esse). Arcesilaus agreed that this was a good addition to the definition, since neither a false impression, nor a true impression just like a false one, was apprehensible. So then he set to work with his arguments, to show that there is no impression from something true such that there could not be one just like it from something false. (Cic. Acad. Pos. 77).1

1

All the quotations of this work are translated by Brittain (2006). Compare with Adv. Log. I, 157.

3.1 Arcesilaus Attacks

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Maybe rhetorically, Arcesilaus conceded to Zeno that the wise does not assent to opinions, he is infallible, but in the case there is nothing one can be certain about, because there is no cataleptic impression, one can only be as infallible as the ideal wise man by avoiding assenting, since there is nothing that prevents errors and mistakes. Zeno had to agree that the wise will refrain his assent when he is not sure and, though this is a typical (in)action of a presently non-existent wise person, his acts are example to the action of ordinary people. Thus, the ordinary people, in face of the impossibility of knowing what is right, must refrain their assent, and this retention will be even greater than that of the wise person, since the majority of the actions of the ordinary people are conducted through opions, even though they are pragmatically correct. Thus, the person can be in circumstances in which it is not possible to distinguish between the truthfulness and the falsehood of perceptions, because (1) the things that they represent are objectively indiscernible from one another: . . . someone looking at Publius Servilius Geminus who thought he was looking at his twin Quintus had an inapprehensible impression (visum quod percipi non posset), because his true and false impressions weren’t distinguished by any mark (. . .) Still, if there can’t be such similarity between people, what about between statues? Are you saying that Lysippus couldn’t have made a hundred Alexanders just like one another, if he used the same bronze, the same process, the same tool, etc.? Tell me what marking you would have used to differentiate them! How about if I stamp a hundred seals into wax of the same type with this ring? Are you really going to be able to find a means of distinguishing them? (Cic. Acad. Pos. 84–86).

Or (2) because the person that perceives is with his capacity of discerning affected, as in the very recurrent examples of illusions, of madness and of dreams (Cic. Acad. Pos. 88–91). Consequently, if, according to the Stoic super-criteria, an impression is cataleptic when it indicates with clarity how the object actually is, and to this impression one must assent; on the other hand, one must suspend judgement (or refrain the assent) when faced with impressions in which their discernment is unclear. Thus, if there is a twilight zone in which even the differences between a cataleptic impression and a non-cataleptic one is unclear, one must, according to the very Stoic argument, suspend judgement over the possibility of distinguishing between every cataleptic and non-cataleptic impressions. One must dispense the need of distinction between the impressions as a criterion of truth and correct action. The Stoic answer (by Zeno) comes in three interlinked ways: 1 – if ordinary people can really be confounded in countless situations, the Stoic wise, in his turn, is capable of discerning between two or more kinds of impression (Cic. Acad. Pos. 20, 56–58); 2 – making the metaphysical and non evident assertion that two things cannot be identical (aparallaxia) (Cic. Acad. Pos. 50, 54–56);

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3 – accusing that the Academics, in intending to suspend judgement over the possibility of distinction, intend to suspend judgement over everything and incur in apraxia, so they cannot live. The Academics (i.e. Arcesilaus) answer as follows: 1. if the Stoic wise is capable of discerning between the false and the true, despite of the dubieties, he is the ultimate super-criterion, beyond the three last ones. And, if it is so, then the criterion of wisdom of the wise person is himself, and this is an unacceptable circularity (SVF III, 138 onwards); 2. if it is necessary to have a non-evident distinction, how can the ordinary person have knowledge of its existence? Maybe the wise Stoic, being wise, knows, but since he is the criterion of his own wisdom, we go back to 1 (and the SVF III, 138 onwards). Now, let us hold with more details to the argument of Arcesilaus against the accusation of apraxia, according to which the suspension of judgement about everything makes life impossible. For the Stoics, the human beings differentiate from animals because we have a rational soul (logike psyche). Our self-preservation (oikeiosis), differently from the other animals, embraces the conservation of our own reasoning, it is the maintenance of our commanding faculty (hegemonikon) that makes us capable of assenting (synkatathesis) and, since the cataleptic impressions are not coercive by themselves, we must judge to assent to them, making our actions appraisable and wise. But, if, according to Arcesilaus, we must dispense the synkatathesis, we must, to the Stoics: (1) give up on the hegemonikon, intrinsic to our logike psyche, that defines us as humans, thus, this is the same as dispensing our human nature itself and, once we cannot live in another manner, according to other nature (animal, for example), we are led to the apraxia, violating the principle of the oikeiosis. Or, in a better scenario, dispensing the synkatathesis is the same as giving up on happiness, having in mind that it is only attainable if we act according to the cataleptic impressions that, for which, need to be distinguished and known. Arcesilaus’ escape to both aspects of the accusation of apraxia recurs once more to argumentation and concepts of the Stoic philosophy itself. So, to him, if we retain the assent, nonetheless, we will have a rule for action, the eulogon (¼ reasonable, according to LSJ). A consensual criterion that, even if it does not have any compromise with truth, can raise appropriate (kathekonta) or correct (katorthomata) actions, considering the repetition of phenomena and the probability, making happiness available (Adv. Log. I, 158). So, to those who questioned . . . that he who is thus doubtful and withholds his assent hastens not away to the mountain, instead of going to the bath? Or that, rising up to go forth into the market-place, he runs not

3.1 Arcesilaus Attacks

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his head against the wall, but takes his way directly to the door? (Plut. Adv. Col. 1122E;2 compare with Cic. Acad. Pos. 37–38).

Arcesilaus (using the Stoic concepts, I emphasize) answered that Now as for the retention of assent and the doubting of all things (περὶ πάντων ἐπoχὴν), not even those who have much labored in the matter, and strained themselves to compose great books and large treatises concerning it, were ever able to stir it; but bringing at last out of the Stoa itself the cessation from all actions (ἀπραξίαν), as the Gorgon to frighten away the objections that came against them, they were at last quite tired and gave over. For they could not, what attempts and stirs soever they made, obtain so much from the instinct by which the appetite is moved to act, as to suffer itself to be called an assent, or to acknowledge sense for the origin and principle of its propension, but it appeared of its own accord to present itself to act, as having no need to be joined with any thing else (. . .) But to those who can give ear and conceive, it is said that there are in the soul three sorts of motions,—the imaginative, the appetitive, and the consenting (ὅτι τριῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κινημάτων ὄντων, φανταστικoῦ καὶ ὁρμητικoῦ καὶ συγκαταθετικoῦ). As to the imaginative or the apprehension, it cannot be taken away (τὸ μὲν φανταστικὸν oὐδὲ βoυλoμε νoις ἀνελεῖν ἔστιν), though one would. For one cannot, when things approach, avoid being informed and (as it were) moulded by them, and receiving an impression from them. The appetite (ὁρμητικὸν), being stirred up by the imaginative (φανταστικoῦ), effectually moves man to that which is proper and agreeable to his nature (πρὸς τὰ oἰκεῖα πρακτικῶς κινεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπoν), just as when there is made a propension and inclination in the principal and reasonable part. Now those who withhold their assent and doubt of all things take not away this (oὐδὲ τoῦτ’ oὖν ἀναιρoῦσιν oἱ περὶ πάντων ἐπε χoντες), but make use of the appetition or instinct naturally conducting every man to that which seems convenient for him (ἀλλὰ χρῶνται τῇ ὁρμῇ φυσικῶς ἀγoύσῃ πρὸς τὸ φαινóμενoν oἰκεῖoν). What then is the only thing that they shun? That in which is bred falsehood and deceit,—that is, opining, and precipitation in giving consent (. . .) For action stands in need of two things, to wit, the apprehension or imagination of what is agreeable to Nature, and the instinct or appetition driving to that which is so imagined; of which, neither the one nor the other is repugnant to the retention of assent. (Plut. Adv. Col. 1122A-F).

Finally, it remains the question on whether Arcesilaus was really committed to his way of thinking Skepticism or was arguing just for dialectical purposes.3 Following Brittain (2008): The drawback to this interpretation (i.e. the dialectical one) is that it involves the rejection of a central claim about him in all but one of our major sources: Cicero, Numenius, Sextus, Diogenes and Plutarch ascribe some degree of commitment to at least one of these doctrines, the doctrine of universal epochê. The exception is Philodemus. Rejecting this evidence might be justified by the lateness of these sources and their associations with later Academic developments; but this seems hard to maintain when we learn that Arcesilaus’ contemporary opponents, including Chrysippus, also ascribed universal epochê to him (see Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1036a with 1037a, and Against Colotes 1122a).4

2

All translations of this work are by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. (1874). 3 See: ‘STRIKER, G. (1980). Sceptical Strategies. In: BARNES, J; SCHOFIELD, M; BURNYEAT, M. (orgs.). Doubt and Dogmatism, Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press’, and ‘COUSSIN, Pierre. (1929). L’origine e L’évolution de L’EPOXH. In: Revue des Etudes Grecques, n 42’. 4 Brittain, Charles, “Arcesilaus”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL ¼ https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arcesilaus/.

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Enough of Arcesilaus for now, let us move on and see how Carneades behaved himself in the debates.

3.2

Carneades

Firstly, we must remember that it was Carneades who, together with two other philosophers (the peripatetic Critolaus and the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon), was sent as an ambassador of Athens to Rome, and one day he defended aspects of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle at length, another day he refuted them, causing horror to Marcus Cato (great grandfather of Cato the Younger) and other Roman men that imagined that with this the Academic belittled justice, dangerously making it appears merely conventional. Now, Carneades’ capacity of arguing for and against any subject must be seen as an improvement of the dialectical ability of Arcesilaus, in such a way that even his pupil Clitomachus “affirmed that he never could work out which view had Carneades’ approval” (Cic. Acad. Pos. 139).5 Marcus Cato was also scandalized by the theological arguments of Carneades,6 that shook the beliefs in existence of god as living, eternal and charitable. Thus, going back to the Stoic physics (or theology),7 if we consider that god and nature confound themselves and that the nature is alive, then god is equally a living being, and sensitive,8 but, according to the Stoic definition of sensation as some sort of alteration: Then again, sense-perception is a kind of alteration; for it is impossible for what apprehends through some sense not to be altered, but to be in the same condition as it was before the apprehension. If, then, god has sense-perception, he is altered; but if he is altered, he is liable to alteration and change; but if he is liable to change, he is definitely also liable to change for the worse. But if so, he is also perishable. But it is absurd to say that god is perishable; therefore it is also absurd to maintain that he is. (Adv. Phy. I, 146–147).9

Thus, if we adopt the dogma that god is a sensitive being, we will have to reject the dogma of his eternity, given that both dogmas are mutually excluding when interpreted in the light of the Stoic system. The only way to solve this aporia is to opt: 1. Either god is eternal – and he is not sensitive, because: (a) he cannot be altered, neither for better nor for worse; or (b) he is sensitive, but the reception of affections does not imply in alteration (heteroiosis), and this, in its turn, goes See: ‘BICCA, L. Carnéades em Roma: ceticismo e dialética. In: Revista Sképsis, ano IV, n 05, 2009.’ 6 See Plut. Cat. Ma. 7 Cf. our appendix on the Stoic philosophy. 8 Take a look at Chrysippus’ arguments that appear in our section on the physics of the Stoa in the appendix on Stoicism: D.L. VII 142–143; and Cic. N.D. II 21–22. 9 All quotations of this work are by Bury (2006), or Bett (2012), sometimes with alterations. 5

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against the Stoic concept of phantasia (¼ impression ¼ alteration in the soul), step that must be avoided at all costs by the Stoics, considering that it leads to the rejection of one of their most important concepts. 2. Or god is sensitive – and he is not eternal, and consequently there is no eternal recurrence of the cosmic cycles. On the other hand, the second physical/ethical dogma of the infinite divine virtue (which generated the assumption of the absolute virtue of nature, and consequently the assertion that to be totally virtuous and wise was to act in accordance with the nature and to god), the virtue of god would be qualified by human dispositions: benevolence, for example, and would also be a parameter for the virtue of the wise person, in a way that the rejection of the divine benevolence would imply in the rejection of the Stoic ethical telos. Carneades’ argument works as follows: (. . .) if there is the divine (Εἴγε μὴν ἔστι τὸ θεῖoν), it is definitely an animal [according to the Stoics]. And if it is an animal, it is definitely both entirely virtuous and happy (πάντως καὶ πανάρετóν ἐστι καὶ εὐδαῖμoν) (and without virtue happiness cannot subsist); and if it is entirely virtuous, it has all the virtues. But it does not have all the virtues; it does not have continence (ἐγκράτειαν) and endurance (καρτερίαν). But it does not have these virtues; there are not any things that are difficult for god to abstain from and difficult for him to endure (. . .) There will, then, be certain things that are difficult for god to withstand and difficult to abstain from. For if there are not, he will not have these virtues, namely continence and endurance. But if he does not have these virtues, since there is nothing between virtue and vice (ἐπεὶ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας oὐδὲν ἔστι), he will have the vices opposite to these virtues, such as softness (μαλακίαν) and incontinence (ἀκρασίαν); for just as the person who does not have health has illness, so the person who does not have continence and endurance is in the opposite vices, which is absurd to say in the case of god. (Adv. Phy. I, 152–157).10

In addition, the creative Carneades makes up the paradox of sorites, once applied to any indeterminate quantity (few or much, for example), now be applied to the indeterminate number of gods in the Greek polytheism: (. . .) if Zeus is a god, Poseidon too, being his brother, will also be a god. But if Poseidon is a god, Achelous too will be a god; and if Achelous, the Nile too; and if the Nile, every river; and if every river, streams too would be gods; and if streams, mountain run-offs. But streams are not; therefore neither is Zeus a god. But if there were gods, Zeus would be a god. Therefore there are not gods. (Adv. Phy. I, 182–183).

Now, those arguments against the beliefs in god are not only directed to the Stoics, but also to the Epicureans, since Elsewhere he [i.e. Epicurus] says that the gods are discernible by reason, being on the one hand numerically distinct, but on the other hand similar in form, because of a continuous flow of similar images to the same place; and that they are human in form. (D.L. X, 139).

10

For the complete argument of Sextus Empiricus about the attribution of moral values to god, see: Adv. Phy. I, 151–171. Compare with Cic. ND III 38.

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But they are also directed to the ordinary people, polytheists in the Greek religious context (and in the Roman, Celtic, Macedonian, Egyptian and Phoenician contexts; Hellenistic, in short). In an attack directly against the main ethical theories of the Hellenistic period, Carneades pointed the inconsistency of the Epicurean moral telos – because Epicurus sometimes conceived pleasure (hedone) as an active stimulus of the sense, another times as the absence of pain, and a form of pleasure is not necessarily complementary to the other, actually, they can be incompatible11 –, but, once more, his favorite target were the Stoics, mainly Chrysippus of Soli. Thus, against the Stoic ethics, Carneades concentrated his attention in the fragile Stoic distinction between the indifferents (adiaphoroi) and the excellence and the vices. Thus, according to the most traditional approach of the Stoic ethics, that endured at least until Posidonius, the indifferent are considered as such because they can be advantageous to both facilitate the reach of excellence or vice, and also for not being desirable (or avoidable) by themselves. In this way, the vitality can be so worthy to an assassin (optimizing his vice), as for a wise person (optimizing his excellence). But, for the wise, the external goods are not moral targets, only knowledge must be, then, once (and only when) the excellence is reached, the wise person becomes happy. And this wise person can be happy poor and dying, since he is simply wise. Nonetheless, if vitality, for example, is as worthwhile for the assassin as it is for the wise person, why not say that it is valuable in itself, as well as wealth, health and all external corporeal goods? The dilemma, as proposed by Carneades is: or the Stoics either (1) assume once and for all that all external corporeal goods are truly good, and desirable for themselves; or (2) they reject them peremptorily. But, if they act according to (1), they would result in Peripatetics, and, if they act according to (2), they would end up as Cynics, at least in the point of view of the pragmatic results of their ethical theory.12 Now, in regards to the discussion of the Stoic theory of the indifferent, Carneades’ objective is not merely to throw aporiae, but to demonstrate that what matters in actions are not the theories that justify them, but their pragmatic result, and for the correct actions, there is a criterion that is practical, consensual and extracted from the life of ordinary people: the pithanos (LSJ ¼ the persuasive, plausible). According to the Diogenes database, between the occurrences for the words pithanon (neutral form of pithanos) and its antonym apithanon, the majority are cases in which the responsibility of persuasion lands on the speaker (see: Thuc. 6.35; Plat. Gorg.. 458e, 479c; Poet. 1455a; Eur. Orest. 906; App. Hisp. 15), or on the discourse itself (see: Plat. Phaedo 88d; Plat. Theaet. 178e; Rhet. 1356b26, 1403b20), with sights to raise the victory in debates (see: Xen. Mem. 3.10.3). In every case, it is about some notion initially adopted by sophistry and oratory, and then assimilated by other fields of knowledge. 11 12

See: D.L. X, 128–129; compare com Cic. Fin. 1. See: Cic.Tusc. 5.120; Cic. Fin. 3.41.

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But, in addition, the arrival to the plausible (or persuasive) as a criterion of action recurs to an epistemological argument, thrown by Carneades Carneades positioned himself on the criterion not only against the Stoics but also against everyone before him. In fact his first argument, which is directed against all of them together, is one according to which he establishes that nothing is without qualification a criterion of truth – not reason, not senseperception, not appearance, not anything else that there is; for all of these as a group deceive us. (Adv. Log. I, 159).

Nonetheless which considerations may be done about a criterion, or whatever it may be (senses or reasoning, for example), it must always serve as a frontier between the true and the false, both in an epistemological scope as in an ethical one. Now, we know that the Stoic criterion of truth is the kataleptike phantasia, and consequently, also criterion of correct action in the ethical scope, the way through which man can go from the fool’s life to the wise’s one. Thus, following and deepening Arcesilaus’ attack, Carneades distinguishes two aspects in the impression: its relation with the object that it represents and its relation with the subject that perceives it. Thus, if the impression represents the object accurately, it is true; on the other hand, if it convinces the subject that it is really true, making him assent, it is persuasive (and plausible). Furthermore, if an impression is true, this does not depend totally on the subject that perceives it, once its truth is given by its conformity with the object that generates it; and also, if it is persuasive, that does not depend totally on the object, once the impression persuades the subject, both of truthfulness and of falsehood. If we really are, while subjects, mainly submitted to the persuasive character of the impressions and, in addition, if we do not have a criterion to discern truth, considering that truth and falsehood are known and asserted from conformity of the impressions with their corresponding objects, and not according to any subjective criterion (for the Stoics), thus we must dispense the category of “truth” to guide our actions and our knowledge, persuasion and plausibility would suffice. On the other hand, if the Stoics retroceded and argued that the “truth” was located in the impression/subject axis, Carneades was prepared to reuse the arguments that were already used by Arcesilaus that showed the dubiety of reason and the senses of human beings, fragile, volatile and inconstant, despite the monolithic solidity of the alleged knowledge of the idealized wise.13 As one would already expect, in the face of such a devastating confutation, the Stoics reacted, responding that the mind must be duly trained through logic in order to eliminate the interferences that by any chance could affect one’s judgement. Once that was done and the obstacles to knowledge were removed, the correct impressions would impel to assent, as if pulled by the hairs (Adv. Log. I, 257). In this way, the wise person would be capable of proficiently discerning the cataleptic impressions from the rest, utilizing his logical and epistemological training so that the action would never be hasted, and he would never be tempted to assent to falsehood.

13

See: Cic. Acad. Pos. 47–49.

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Even adding more one criterion for the verification of the truthfulness of an impression, that did not satisfy Carneades who continued to reject the cataleptic impression and persisted in the sufficiency of the persuasive as a pragmatic criterion for action. In their turn, the Stoics also kept arguing that without the cataleptic impression there was no criterion for the correct action, since all would be uncertain (Cic. Acad. Pos. 32), and consequently life would be impossible (apraxia in PE. 14.7.15.5–6). But Carneades argued that there is difference between something being uncertain and being non evident, and if, on the one hand, all is uncertain, on the other hand, not everything is non evident (PE. 14.7.15.7). In other words, even if things are evident, they are uncertain, once we can be fooled and even so assent erroneously, then we must suspend judgement and act exclusively according to the persuasion caused by phenomena, the ultimate criterion of action is now laid down (PE. 14.7.15.5). Consequently, if the persuasive is sufficiently efficient in the scope of practical action, on the other hand, in epistemology, it represents a rupture with the traditional Hellenistic requirement for knowledge and for truth. In this sense, we can understand Carneades’ position as an ask for people to abandon moral theories and attain themselves to the pragmatism, where persuasive impressions are a criterion that now only does not lead into inactivity, but, in addition, makes life possible: ‘Carneades’ view is that there are two categories of impressions, the first subdivided on the principle that some impressions are apprehensible, some aren’t, the second on the principle that some impressions are persuasive, some aren’t. Now the Academic arguments against the senses and against perspicuity pertain to the first category, and shouldn’t be directed at the second. So his view’, Clitomachus says, ‘is that while there are no impressions allowing for apprehension, there are many allowing for approval. It would be contrary to nature were there no persuasive impressions’— and the result would be the complete overturning of life (. . .) (Cic. Acad. Pos. 99).

According to Sextus Empiricus (P.H. I, 230), Carneades deliberately chose to adhere to determinate impressions, making them his criterion for practical action, differently from Arcesilaus who avoided the assent and the adhesion to some specific sort of impression at the expense of other. Then, with Carneades starts the hardening of a dogmatic criterion, and not of a Skeptical one.

3.3

Clitomachus

As my objective is to show the arisal of the arguments against Skepticism before Sextus Empiricus, as well as the arisal of the Skeptical formulae and concepts, both from a dialectic perspective, we must not stretch ourselves too much in the phase that goes from Clitomachus to Agrippa, that, on the other hand, for historical reasons, cannot be omitted. After Carneades’ death (c. 128 B.C.), Clitomachus, a prolific writer to whom are attributed about 400 books, became leader of the Academy. His writings are largely

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inspired by his Carneades’ philosophy, and also by his pragmatic criterion for actions (as well as theoretical, therefore dogmatic): the persuasive. This criterion influenced Clitomachus’ pupil, Philo of Larissa who also became leader of the Academy. Initially, Philo was a follower of Clitomachus’ teachings and intended to give them some more internal cohesion, but, in a second moment, he started to reject the epoche (PE. 14.9.1–2) affirming that, as an existential condition, objects must be naturally apprehensibles (P.H. I, 220), though he did not necessarily agree with the Stoic epistemology. Antiochus of Ascalon (c.130–68 B.C.) disagreed from Philo’s assertions, which were received as treason of Plato’s philosophy (Cic. Acad. Pr. 17–18). Thus, in retaliation, Antiochus broke with the Academy under Philo and aligned himself to Stoicism, intending to eliminate the divergences between philosophies through eclecticism (Cic. Acad. Pos. 18–31). Marcus Tullius Cicero (103–46 B.C.), one of our best sources to reconstruct the main doctrines and debates between Academics and Stoics, went through the Academy at the same epoch as Philo and Antiochus (and through the Stoa at the epoch of Panaetius and Posidonius, both from Rhodes, hometown of the rhetorician Apollonius Molon who also was one of Cicero’s teachers). Cicero’s seminal and prolific work in Latin presents us with an eclectic positioning, but the remnants of the Academic philosophy that remain are result from his adhesion to the likely and credible (respectively, probabile and ueri simile). In addition, Cicero is the main responsible for presenting Modern Europe to the Latin version of crucial steps of the Skeptical dynamis (like the aporia and the epoche), understood and translated as dubitare, raising many misconceptions (like the interpretation of Skepticism as an artificial dubitative procedure that compromises the existence of the external world itself, and that serves as a starting point to erect dogmatisms). When the rejection of epoche by Philo and the retaliations of Antiochus occurred, another one that deserted the Academy was Aenesidemus, who thought that the debate between these contenders consisted in “Stoics fighting with Stoics” (Bib. 170a14–17), and, instead of aligning to any other school of his time, he intended to revive (or maybe create) Pyrrhonism. At the same time, he is controversial, since he thought that the Pyrrhonism was a step for Heraclitism, Aenesidemus is also obscure, because little is known about him. He lived at the first century B.C. and wrote at least one book (‘Pyrrhonian Discourses,’), sadly, almost all of it is lost, except for some preserved fragments mainly in the aforesaid work from Photios. In addition to making Pyrrhonism (re)arises, maybe Aenesidemus’ biggest contributions are the development or creation of the Ten Tropes (or ten ways that lead to the suspension of judgement) that demonstrated that there are situations in which the judgement is impossible, either because the individual is not fit to judge, or because the object does not have the conditions for being judged, or both simultaneously (P.H. I, 38; see P.H. I, 36–164, compare with D.L. IX, 79–88); and also the proposal of the Eight Tropes, through which one can refute the notion of causality (P.H. I, 180–187, compare with D.L. IX, 98–99).

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Even more obscure than Aenesidemus, Agrippa (c. first century A.D.) was, according to D.L. IX, 88–90 (compare with P.H. I, 164–178, in which there is no reference to the name of the author of the tropoi), the author of other Five Tropes that, except for one, are directed against formal aspects of the dogmatic arguments, and not to their content. Even though all Tropes are crucial to the Skeptics in their debates with the Dogmatists, our objective here is another and as they deserve to be studied on their own, we must pass besides them and only cite them when it is interesting. Finally, after Aenesidemus and Agrippa the Pyrrhonism infiltrates itself in the medic discussions and sects, with Zeuxippus, Zeuxis, Antiochus of Laodicea, Menodotus of Nicomedia, Theodas of Laodicea, Herodotus of Tarsus, Sextus Empiricus and Saturninus (see: D.L. IX, 116). Except for Sextus Empiricus, who will be our concern further on and whose works survived, all others are virtually unknown, but, as we are going to see, approaching Sextus to the medical discussions contemporary to him can be usefull for comprehending some features of his own philosophy. Thus, I believe to have covered the main features of the history of Ancient Skepticisms before Sextus Empiricus, and also (and mainly) (1) the acquisitions of their concepts, (2) the occurrences of the anti-Skeptical attacks and (3) the replies to the attacks.

Chapter 4

Sextus Empiricus

Abstract The legacy of the apraxia argument, which followed as a shadow the progress of the Skepticism, not only was inherited by Aenesidemus but passed on to new generations of Skeptics, as Agrippa, the Skeptical Doctors and Sextus Empiricus, and while we investigate it, we are going to have the opportunity to see how the Skeptics argued for the coherence of their philosophy/way of life. When we think on the coherence of the Skepticism, we must take a look at some of the most prominent exegetical positions on this issue: the Rustic one and the Urban one. I do not think that these two interpretations of the Skepticism, which were in their summit at the 80’s, are satisfactory anymore. So, I am going to suggest another interpretation, some kind of “middle way” between the Rustics and the Urbans.

4.1

The Legacy of Skepticisms up to Sextus

If our investigation regarding the contexts of the arisal of the Skeptical vocabulary was successful, we can say that Sextus Empiricus, the main source of the Pyrrhonean Skepticism, could have inherited:1 (a) from the Proto-skeptics: the perception of the ambivalence of senses and of human conduct; the aporiai regarding the myths, the possibilities of knowledge and of movement; the relativism; the ou mallon formula; and the perception that human life is guided by conventions and that we are coerced by sensitive affections. (b) From Pyrrho: the need of attesting that the Skeptic is an ordinary man, making him active in a techne; a constant mistrust of the ‘truths’; moderate indifference and impassivity; a life that is unaware of the public matters (at least within the

1

Actually, from the list below, we can be sure only on the inheritance regarding the itens (a), (b), (g), (h) and (i). Although I think that my arguments for the inheritance of the itens (c), (d), (e) and (f) are persuasive, I cannot prove them now. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 R. Pinto de Brito, The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities, Synthese Library 455, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92407-2_4

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(c)

(d) (e)

(f) (g)

(h) (i)

4 Sextus Empiricus

possibilities of the techne in which one is active); and the rejection of the rethoric. From Pyrrho’ successors: the exhortation that the Pyrrhonism is a practical conduct; the bellicosity and the sarcasm against the Dogmatists; the rejection of certain school disciplines (as much as permitted by the techne in which one keeps active); the investigation of different cultures; and the submission of the investigations to a moral telos. From Arcesilaus: the understating that for each perception and argument there are others equal and contrary (equipollent); and the retention of assent. From Carneades: the definitive election of the Stoics as favorite targets; the more specific attacks to the Physics and Ethics; the calculated employment of the logic tools used by the Dogmatists themselves; and the notion that what matters in actions are their pragmatic results. From Clitomachus: the encouragement to the deeper knowledge of the dogmatic doctrines. From Aenesidemus: the adhesion to the Pyrrhonean dynamis; the necessity of raising the coherence of the skeptike agoge; the writing of texts that thematize this dynamis; and the use of the Ten Tropes that point that there are situations in which the judgement is impossible, and of the Eight Tropes against causality. From Agrippa: the use of the Five Tropes directed against formal features of the dogmatic arguments. Of the infiltration of the medic sects: the subjugation of Pyrrhonism to a discursive therapy form and all the recurring medic and purgative metaphors, as well as the use of an empiricist methodology for dealing with the crafts.

But, on the other hand, Sextus Empiricus also inherited a built-up of critiques stubbornly recursive that attack different points of what came to be know as the skeptike agoge and that accuse the Skepticism of impracticability (or inactivity ¼ anenergesia),2 affirming that the Skepticism deposes against life. As well as of discursive impracticability (obviously, another aspect of the general argument of impracticability, but directed against the communicative practice), for the Skeptic, in communicating, (1) refutes himself, because a discourse presupposes some truth, and thus, (2) the emitter speaks what he considers to be true, and, if it is not this way, (3) instead of communicating, the Skeptic should keep quiet. In addition to these problems, considering that Sextus was a doctor and that he prescribed Skepticism as a therapy, wouldn’t he be dogmatic in doing it? Doesn’t the act of prescribing something mean to certify the belief that this something is the best, or the most efficient? In addition, doesn’t the occupation of himself in a whole

In Sextus Empiricus there are no occurrences of the word ἀπραξία for referring to the inactivity, instead of it the recurring word is ἀνενεργησία (Adv. Eth. 162). I emphasize yet that in this passage Sextus is quoting a fragment of Chrysippus (Chrysippus Phil., Fragmenta logica et physica, Fr.119), in this way, the argument raised here against the practical viability of the Skepticism remounts to Chrysippus, and it is him that Sextus intends to refute in the steps Adv. Eth. 162–168.

2

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corpus filosoficus of a theme denote some adhesion to the theme as a sort of philosophical chain? Let us also see the case of the searcher, in the face of the disquiet caused by the search, is the choice of Skepticism as a means of obtaining imperturbability a dogmatic option? Would it also be dogmatism to consult a argumentative guide that demonstrates the weakness of the dogmatic propositions in constituting the reasonings that intend to understand the ‘workings’ of phenomena and of their apparent laws (causality, for example)? Once more, even though (to the extent we can know) the critiques immediately above have not been done in Sextus’ time and directly against him, they are indeed problems today to those who want to interpret the Sextian writings, and must be refuted by those who intend to defend the pragmatic possibility of the Pyrrhonean Skepticism. Thus, in the search for the comprehension of the meaning of Pyrrhonism and of its practical viability, commentators, historians of ideas and philosophers tried to interpret him. Richard Popkin indicated us the great weight of the Skeptical arguments in the history of ideas, to him the Skepticism was one of the main constituents of Modern thinking. But, the Modern Skepticism possesses distinctive and thematic features that were absent in the Ancient Skepticism: the doubt as a positive procedure (and that hets to direct itself to the totality of the external world), the Fideism, the character almost exclusively epistemological, and also the insulation are the most expressive examples. Nonetheless the Skepticism was already a constant theme of research from the nineteenth century (see Brochard, for example), it was after Popkin that an even larger variety of interpretations of the Ancient and Modern Skepticisms began to prevail. However, from the 70’s onwards these diverse interpretations started liningup, appearing thus two interpretative chains that came to be known as ‘rustic’ and ‘urban’ and that began disputing hegemony as ways of better comprehending the Sextan Skepticism and of offering responses for the apraxia argument.

4.2

The Rustic and the Urban Interpretations

Since before the (re)formulation of Pyrrhonism under Aenesidemus of Knossos, Stoics and other detractors of Skepticism criticized it for incurring in practical unfeasibility. In Sextus Empiricus’ case, there is the aggravating factor that he had also inherit the different facets of this criticism. The argument of the practical unviability, or apraxia, asserts that Skepticism deposes against life, making it unfeasible. A Skeptic, by not having a criterium, could not know whether something is true or false, good or bad, natural or conventional, and so on. The suspension of judgment would cripple the three parts in which the Hellenistic philosophies would, traditionally, divide their doctrines: epistemology/logic, ethics and physics, also affecting the theoretical foundations of the technai (or crafts), and perhaps beyond, affecting even ordinary life. . .

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Here, despite the different nuances, naming, and the historical details of the apraxia problem, I will concentrate on the critique as made to the Sextan conception of Pyrrhonic Skepticism, by which coherence I will try to argue, but offering an interpretation that is neither Rustic nor Urban. To this end, first of all, let us make a quick recap of the meanings of the Rustic and Urban stances.3

4.3

The Urbans and Their Beliefs

According to Barnes (1998),4 someone who sees the Rustic stance5 of Skepticism in Sextus and emphasizes that arguments against causality, the time or the Tropes of Agrippa do not seem to be aimed solely to propositions of a philosophical or scientific nature, and instead, these arguments would reach the scope of ordinary life. Moreover, notoriously, the detractors of Skepticism, by accusing it of apraxia, apparently imagined it as reaching dynamics that belong to everyday life. On the other hand, those who interpret Sextan Skepticism in an Urban manner6 refer to the philosopher’s statement that the Skeptic intends to cure the dogmatists (and only the dogmatists) of their typical pathologies: pretension and precipitation (P.H. III, 280). Then, in this case, Skepticism would not compromise ordinary life. Finally, the Urbans evoke the Sextan exhortation to the observance of instances of that same life: to be active in a techne, to adhere to the nomos and the ethos proper to one’s locations, for example. Frede,7 a paradigmatic Urban, thought that the Skeptical approach did not result in apraxia or aphasia and that, either one of the following had to be true: either the “dogmatists” were naive, in supposing that the Skeptics themselves were naïfs because they intended an impractical way of life; or the Skeptics were, in fact, naïfs, for even though they alleged otherwise, they could not help but know many things (with the important and problematic addition that there would the implicit 3

For more, see: MARCONDES, D. (2008). Rústicos X Urbanos: O Problema do Insulamento e a Possibilidade de uma Filosofia Cética. In: O que nos faz pensar, n 24, 2008. 4 BARNES, J. (1998). The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist. In: BURNYEAT, M. F.; FREDE, M. (orgs.). The Original Sceptics. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 5 The term “Rustic Pyrrhonism” originates in Galen, see: De differentia pulsuum 8.711.3; De praenotione ad Posthumum 14.628.18. The modern naming (“Urbans”) arises as antithesis. On the Rustic stance, see: BURNYEAT, M. F. (1998). Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism? In: BURNYEAT, M. F.; FREDE, M. (orgs.). The Original Sceptics. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. BURNYEAT, M. F. (1998). The Sceptic in His Place and Time. In: BURNYEAT, M. F.; FREDE, M. (orgs.). The Original Sceptics. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 6 See: FREDE, M. (1998). The Skeptic’s Beliefs. In: BURNYEAT, M.; FREDE, M. (orgs.). The Original Sceptics. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. FREDE, M. (1998b). The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge. In: BURNYEAT, M.; FREDE, M. (orgs.). The Original Sceptics. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 7 See note above.

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requirement that one must believe to know, and I will come back to that later). But it is strange that, the Skeptics, being familiar with the recurring facets of the critics of apraxia, despite that, seem to have gone on, philosophizing, without giving a satisfactory answer to it, as if it were innocuous criticism that had nothing to say. To the Urbans, the innocuity renders itself to the fact that the epoche of the Skeptic non-naïfs would not reach normal life. Therefore, there is no apraxia, the gullible dogmatists were wrong. Urbans and Rustics correctly agree that there is a relationship of direct proportionality between the suspension of judgments and beliefs. That is: the greater the scope of the epoche, the more embracing the concept of dogma. However, they disagree precisely on the limits of this scope, and, consequently, on the breadth of the dogmata. Thus, the Urbans think that the dogmata are strictly philosophical or scientific propositions and, thus, evoking direct proportionality, the Skeptic epoche would reach only these types of propositions, but not assertions made in the scope of ordinary life, which would be unperturbed. Behold, Skepticism is possible, as in an argumentative abracadabra! But, put in that way, does it make sense? Being more precise: is the restriction of the dogmata to philosophical or scientific assertions a correct procedure? No! To better answer this question, let us analyze some sources close to Sextus both in terms of his time and of his conceptual horizon and philosophical interests. First of all, Galen. And then Epictetus.8 The physician from Pergamon left us a very rich work, in which he presents the dispute amongst three medic sects (Empiricists, Rationalists and Methodists): De Sec.9 Indeed, it is the first narrative of a dispute between Empiricists X Rationalists conducted in these terms, evoking, in a certain way, the Modern dispute, also as a recurring source of consultation.10 Reading De Sec. side by side with pseudo-Galen (Intro.) we have an overview of the methodological approach from the Rationalist sect, also known as Dogmatists so that we can understand why they answered to those names. To begin with, they are rationalists because they thought that the strictly rational investigation, with minimal use of empiricism, was the right way to understand the processes related to the medical art, namely: maintenance of health, when possible, and recovery, when not. Not only that, but they also used a deductive process for that investigation. Finally, while investigating, they wanted to learn the causes of disease/health, and above all else, they yearned to understand the so-called “first cause” of the physiological 8

See this procedure in BARNES, J. (1998). The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist. In: BURNYEAT, M. F.; FREDE, M. (orgs.). The Original Sceptics. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 9 See: BRITO, R. P. (2016). Por que o estudo de Galeno pode contribuir para a compreensão de Sexto Empírico? (Tradução de Galeno, Das Seitas Médicas Para os Iniciantes, 1.64.1–1.69.5, bilíngue, com introdução). In: Revista Prometeus, janeiro-junho/2016, vol. 09, ano 09, n 19. 10 For example, see the usage of Galen employed by Francisco Sanches, to defend an empiricist method against the Aristotelian rationalism that took place during his time: FRANCISCO SANCHES (2008). That Nothing is Known. LIMBICK, E (ed.); THOMSON, D. F. S. (trad.). Cambridge: CUP. pp. 12–88.

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processes under examination. Thus, they conceived their method of turning medicine into an episteme, capable of offering the truth and being, therefore, Dogmatist.11 If in the case of Galen (supported by pseudo-Galen), dogmata refer to the knowledge obtained in the scope of science, but on the other hand, in the case of Epictetus, minimal and ordinary acts, such as bathing or eating breakfast, depend on dogmata. And the philosopher of Hierapolis also adds that there are correct and incorrect dogmata from which daily actions are conducted, which are correct or not12 in the same manner. Thus, using these sources, we can verify that if the Urbans are right for wanting that the epoche reaches scientific or philosophical propositions (because they are dogmata in a Galenian sense), on the other hand, they are mistaken for not noticing that the concept also covers ordinary beliefs, parameters both for making simple decisions and for the judging the excellence of the same decisions (in an Epictetian sense). That, in turn, leads to another mistake, that I consider graver and that I describe below: to confuse believing and knowing. In short, in the Epictetian sense – i.e. within the Stoic conceptual framework (and not only inside the so-called “imperial” Stoicism) – for an action to be right it requires an alliance between knowledge and belief. But if this alliance serves as an interpretative key for Stoicism in general, on the other hand, it does not serve for Skepticism. Indeed, in terms of conceptions of knowledge, this is one of the sensitive points of divergence between these two philosophies, for if the Skeptic knows some things, it is the kind of provisional and instrumental knowledge for the action at the necessary moment (P.H. I, 16–18, 21–25). However, Frede seems to apply, to the Skeptical analysis, categories that are absent of it, forgetting what the Sextan argumentation itself alleges: that it is possible to act and believe without knowing; after all the Sextan Pyrrhonism does not operate with notions of knowledge that orbit around values of truth. As a corollary of this, Frede ignores the definition of the Skeptical utterance as a mere account of appearances, without onto/epistemological commitments (P.H. I, 187–210). There is still another relevant criticism, presented by the Rustics against the Urbans. It is about a question of “historicity of philosophy”, for in wanting to study any ancient philosophy to make it feasible – however restricting its reach in such a way to not be one applicable askesis in a broad sense, but instead, transforming it into a mere philosophical theoretics – Urbans would be admitting into the Ancient philosophies an intellectual device that is absent from them, and that is recognized exclusively since Modernity: the insulation.13 Thus, if the Urban interpretation about Sextan Skepticism is that it is feasible by not being a practical stance since it does not touch ordinary lives, on the other hand, this interpretation would be anachronistic.

11

See: De Sec. 1.69.7–1.72.5. See: Diss. 3.10.1; 4.8.1–7. 13 See: BRITO, R. P. (2011). A recepção do ceticismo na modernidade e o problema do insulamento. In: Theoria - Revista Eletrônica de Filosofia, vol. 03, n 08, 2011. 12

4.5 Urbans and Rustics in Diaphonia

4.4

57

The Rustics and Their Beliefs

Going back to the Rustics, in opposition to the Urbans, they do not propose an anachronistic interpretation, for their version of the Sextan Skepticism does not restrict them to a theoretical attitude. The design of Skepticism proposed by the Rustics does not have the device of insulation, precisely because the epoche that the Rustics detect in Sextus is more embracing than that of the Urbans, and ends up reaching the common life, bios. Remembering, thus, the direct proportionality between the epoche and the dogmata, we can affirm that, given that the Rustic epoche is more extensive, so are the dogmata. Here, there would be ordinary – or the common life’s – dogmata and that is exactly the interpretation that we saw before, exemplified by Epictetus. And if Sextus is, largely – in a reactive and dialectical way – arguing against the Stoics, it would be natural to suppose that his argumentative steps must, at least in principle, take the Stoic concepts as a starting point, although antithetically. Therefore, it would be natural to suppose that Sextus starts from the Stoic notion of dogma, exerting a dialogical procedure that had already been well-established as a component of “Skeptical conduct” and that is operative much before Sextus himself writes anything.14 Now, if Sextus reactivates and uses the Stoic concept of dogma antithetically, then there would be dogmata about bathing or breakfast that would be suspended in an extensive epoche. In this case, even though that Rustic interpretation is successful in defining the scope of the Skeptical suspension of judgment and its Stoic contemporary, the suspension of belief, and in elucidating the motives for which there would be centuries of accusations of apraxia, nevertheless, the Sextan Skepticism remains as a problematic horizon, for if there is a suspension on all beliefs, how could the Skeptic act? And, if one argues that action is possible if it does not require beliefs, even so, how could the Skeptic act well? Meaning, if the Rustic interpretation has the merit to be chronologically and conceptually impeccable, the flank of the Skeptic lies exposed, defenseless before apraxia.

4.5

Urbans and Rustics in Diaphonia

Summing up the state of affairs, A- Urbans: (a) they have the anachronistic device of insulation; (b) they reduce the range of the epoche (and of the dogmata);

14

See the academic procedure in untranque partem. See: VEZZOLI, S. (2016). Arcesilao di Pitane: l’origine del platonismo neoaccademico. Analisi e fonti. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, pp. 17–47.

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(c) they immunize ordinary life; (d) they protect Skepticism from apraxia. B- Rustics: (a) (b) (c) (d)

they interpret in a chronologically impeccable manner; they correctly expand the reach of the epoche (and of the dogmata); they do not preserve ordinary life; they do not free Skepticism of the apraxia.

Thus, in wishing to understand the Sextan Skepticism, we began by investigating the most common among the current exegeses in force and noticed the conflict between the arguments presented by each side in litigation (mache); indeed, the conflict derives from the equipollence between the Rustic and Urban arguments (isostheneia), which in turn takes us to an aporia. Faced with this aporia, the dissent supervenes to a proposition or another (ephexis) and the suspension of judgment (epoche). But having suspended the judgment over the quarrel between Rustics vs. Urbans, I do not see myself incapable of writing or lecturing about the very quarrel that led me to this suspension. Indeed, having suspended judgment on that, I stick to appearances, and by announcing them I am capable, as a chronicler, of describing a Skepticism that maybe (tacha) works and that I will call as “Suburban”.

4.6

Paving the Suburban Terrain15

The Suburban interpretation (formerly known as “Middle Way”16) does not operate with categories such as “truth/falsity”, and thus, it is not intended to be exclusive, it is just a possible account, among many others, of inconstant looks. It is eclectic as well, admitting aspects of both Rustics and Urbans, being at the fringe of both, belonging definitively to neither. Therefore, in our hybrid space, we agree with the Urbans: (a) thus Skepticism leads to ordinary life; (b) and this life is immune to the philosophical theoretics. 15

I would like to thank the reviewer for suggesting that the suburban interpretation, as a middle way between rustic and urban, should be better described as a “new point of view to address the problem”. In this sense, this new point of view (not so new) would depart from the perception that the main attacks against Skepticism, as well as the main sdefenses developed in the 1980’s, lack an emphasis on language, because one of the main differences between Ancient Pyrrhonism and Dogmatisms is the way they used the language, and, consequently, the way they interpreted the possibilities of speech. So, the suburban interpretation would be a way of approaching the problem through the speech acts theory. 16 See: BRITO, R. P. (2014). Uma ‘via média’ interpretativa para o Ceticismo Sextiano e sua aplicação na análise de ‘Contra os retóricos’. In: Sképsis, ano 07, n 11.

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But we also agree with the Rustics, because: (a) there is no insulation in Ancient philosophy; (b) the epoche also reaches ordinary life. How? Let’s go back to the definition of dogmata. . . Now, if we agree with the Rustics that the epoche is comprehensive and we know that there is a relation of direct proportionality between epoche and dogmata, then the dogmata must be equally embracing, including not only philosophical, scientific, or “technical” utterances but also those present in the realm of ordinary life, provided they operate as assertions. That is, given any utterance, no matter from which instance it is emitted (ordinary life, or science, for example), it is a dogma if it is a discourse that purports to sustain (tithetai) something as existing concretely, or to affirm (diabebaiousthai) something as real.17 Fair enough, this definition of dogma is exactly the definition of “assertion”, and to utter an assertion is to express a belief. Bearing that in mind, returning to the Sextan Skeptic, we note that he does not operate with values of truth/falsity, he does not utter assertions, negative or positive. Instead, he puts it in aporia and notices diaphoniai among the theses of the dogmatists (Adv. Log. I, 38–46), those are, in fact, assertions. Indeed, the mechanism of disposing of diaphoniai only makes sense in the case of the utterances that we would call “assertoric”. The Skeptic does their utmost to avoid negating or affirming something, and ends up dispensing truth, he does not seek clauses, criteria or conditions to it, he only investigates (P.H. I, 21–23; Adv. Log. I, 27–38, 46–446). However, to construct/enhance/compile a way of philosophizing that is intimately linked to the avoidance of assent and assertion – and that operates antithetically in regards to dogmatic ways of philosophizing – Sextus needs to comprehend the implications of the act of asserting, its illocutionary force. And precisely for this reason, the Skeptic does not assert, not adhering to the operator “it’s true that. . .”, reacting to the assertion not with another assertion, but through another speech act. Now, from that (at least) two hypotheses emerge, the consequences of which we need to test: H1- assuming that we are correct in relating the Greek noun dogma with “assertion” – so that they are identical – and once an assertion is a constative utterance (from the first formulation of the speech acts theory by J. L. Austin18),

17

For the Sextan use of the Greek nouns transcribed here and their relationship with the dogmata, see: P.H. I, 13–16. However, this passage reinserts a puzzle, because Sextus explicitly says that the Skeptic doesn’t have a dogma if we understand dogma as a “consent to the objects that aren’t clear under scientific enquiry (epistemas)” (P.H. I, 13). But we can provisionally answer the puzzle by pointing out passages, such as the Tropes of Agrippa, in which that which is aimed by the epoche doesn’t restrict to the sciences. 18 AUSTIN, J. L. (1956). “Performative Utterances”, corrected transcript of an unscripted radio talk delivered in the Third Programme of the BBC. In: AUSTIN (1979). Philosophical Papers. URMSON, J. O.; WARNOCK, G. J. (eds.). Oxford: OUP.

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then we could say that the dogmata are constative utterances. I.e.: dogma ¼ assertion ¼ constative. H2- In the case that the hypothesis above makes sense,19 if we keep the Skeptic active, and linguistically active, he would not utter constative utterances, but others. However, since at least here we are dealing with the conceptualization of the first formulation (I stress) of the theory of J. L. Austin’s speech acts, this means that the Skeptic utters performatives. Maybe both hypotheses above could be summarized in a single question: to what extent J. L. Austin’s philosophy could help us comprehend Sextan Skepticism, avoiding the weaknesses of the Rustics and Urbans and taking advantage of their strengths? Consequently, to test H1 and H2 is to test the possibility of using Austin’s theory of speech acts as an interpretative key to the philosophy of Sextus.

4.7

Testing H1

Well, if we want to test the dogmata as Austin’s constatives, consequently that would allow us to find this kind of utterance in the sciences, philosophies, crafts and also in ordinary life. Therefore, by direct proportionality, the Sextan epoche would reach these scopes as the Rustics require, and there would be no insulation. But they would not always reach, only when there was an assertion. Thus, when there are other non-assertive speech acts, rare among Hellenistic and late Ancient scientists and philosophers qua scientists and philosophers, but frequent in ordinary life, then there would be no epoche. Then, at least as far as language is concerned, common life would be conserved, without insulation, but with aphasia, understood as non-assertion. And it is from aphasia that we should understand the very utterance of the Skeptic, that announces appearances, declares how things look, reports, but does not assert how they are. That takes us to H2, which brings us some more puzzles, so first we should do a recap.

4.8

Summarizing

Summarizing, the argument of apraxia, in its various forms, has been the main answer to Skepticism, in its numerous phases, and can even be traced back to Aristotle, when he stated that whoever denies the principle of non-contradiction

19

Furthermore, supposing that I am correct in interpreting the Sextan Skepticism as an approach that avoids dogmata in a broad sense, present even in common life, but that the argument of apraxia does not reach the Skeptic.

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incurs in adynamia. And, in consolidating itself, the Skeptic tradition incorporated as their thought predecessors, thinkers that were probably targeted by this Aristotelian criticism: Protagoras, Gorgias, Heraclitus and the Abderite Atomists. In its long history, versions of the argument have already been directed against Pyrrho, against the Academics Arcesilaus, Carneades and Clitomachus, against Aenesidemus of Knossos and Agrippa, the Empiricist medics and Sextus himself, who saw himself having to deal with the anenergesia (Adv. Eth. 162). In its multiple apparitions, the general argument of apraxia is directed against proto-Skeptics and Skeptics because the Dogmatists who utter it think that actions require a prior foundation that cannot be cast in aporia or suspension. Thus, to communicate, one needs to adhere to the principle of non-contradiction or to bathe one must have beliefs, for example. To the Urbans, like Frede, on the contrary, a Skeptic who suspends his judgment on everything still keeps some instance of life unscathed, the ordinary one, to which he adheres, because in this instance the epoche does not fit, and there are no ordinary beliefs to be suspended. This interpretation, the Urban, would be feasible, perfect for defending the Sextan Skepticism and, at the same time, rejoinder the Dogmatists, for they would be ignorant about what Skepticism truly meant: a philosophy that proposed aporiai and obstacles to the philosophies and sciences of the time, but without damaging the proponent’s life, once that he would be sheltered in ordinary life. However, for the Rustics, this refuge, this insulation, is an anachronistic trick, not available in antiquity, and they are right on it. Furthermore, reconstructing the use of the concept of dogmata through the examples of Galen and Epictetus, we could notice that if there is a relationship between dogmata and the scientific and philosophical propositions, on the other hand, we also saw that there is the relationship between this word and some basic beliefs for daily actions. Thus, considering the conceptual and philosophical background of Sextus, very likely, the beliefs to be suspended, the dogmata to which one does not assent, belong as much to the theoretical realm (philosophy, crafts, sciences) as to the ordinary sphere. In this case, the suspension – a therapeutic tool with its sharpness proportional to the depth of the dogmatic suppuration – reaches common life, when contaminated by presumption and hastiness, symptoms of the disease. Nevertheless, however reasonable and synchronic the Rustic interpretation, it brings back the old problem of apraxia. As if it were not enough, there is no way to adhere to an interpretation or another, Rustic or Urban, without incurring in at least one Trope of Agrippa,20 once they are mutually exclusive and are in diaphonia. That is why I opt for a middle interpretation, in-between the countryside and the city, in a hybrid area, Suburban. Therefore, with Rustics, I agree that the epoche is extensive and also reaches ordinary life. With Urbans, I agree that there must be an instance that is immune to

20 See: P.H. I, 164–177. Notably, the Trope of Hypothesis, which wraps an ad hoc assumption of a doctrine amongst many others in diaphonia.

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the Skeptical suspension of judgment, but without incurring in insulation. How? The secret would be to interpret the dogmata as assertions, or as Austin’s constatives. Having defined the constatives, we can then notice that they are all around us in our daily lives, when we affirm stuff, and they are almost ubiquitous as components of what we know about the Hellenistic and late Ancient philosophies, crafts, and sciences. Consequently, if the dogmata are constative, the epoche hits them bullseye and simultaneously hits the claims of the truth of the theoreticians and of ordinary people who utter them. As the Rustics think, the suspension is not restricted to mere theoretical propositions. However far-reaching the suspension might be, if there are still utterances that are immune to it then all language games relating to these utterances – which are not meant as observations – are equally immune to it. And although ordinary life as a whole is not exempt from the epoche, at least an aspect of it is, that which concerns the accounts of appearances, without assertory commitments, as the Urbans intended, but without insulation. Now, if I am correct in our Suburban interpretation – which simply would be nothing more than to interpret Sextan Skepticism through J. L. Austin’s conceptual frameworks and as a non-constative speech act – then, does that mean that this Skepticism, which behaves as an account, is a performative? The question above leads us back to H2.

4.9

Testing H2

If J. L. Austin’s first formulation of the speech acts theory serves to help us to understand the dogmata as constatives, and the Skeptic issues some utterance other than dogmata (i.e. not constatives), then we must be able to state that the Skeptic issues performatives, speech acts that, whenever uttered, perform an action, such as “to promise” or “to baptize”. But performatives are also characterized by an asymmetry between the first and the third person, so that saying “Socrates promises” is a constative; whereas saying “I promise” is a performative. But not all verbs conjugated in the first person present of the indicative are performative, after all, I can say that “I write now”, and that is a constatation. As such, it is possible to assess the truthfulness or falseness of the constatives: whether I am writing or not, that is, by verifying the compatibility between the utterance and the state of affairs described by it. Performatives, on the other hand, do not verify states of affairs, cannot be true or false, for in being utterances that are equivalent to the execution of acts themselves, they can only be “happy” when the action is carried out as expected (and according to certain conditions, as the “sincerity” of the utterer), or “unhappy” when they are not.

4.10

A Twillight Zone

63

Finally, performatives aren not expressions of inner acts, they take place in the public and dialogical sphere of language.21

4.10

A Twillight Zone

Considering the aforementioned definitions of “constatives” and “performatives” provided by J. L. Austin’s first speech acts theory (1956), we could imagine that the typical dogmatic speech act is a constative. And, if so, then the typical Skeptic speech act, by opposition, would be a performative. After all, the utterances of Sextus fulfills the following requirements for this: they are expressed in the first person (usually in the plural); they reject restricted, assertory uses, imposed on the very dogmatic techniques of discourse, favoring ordinary uses, such as informal conversation (cf. Adv. Rhet. e Adv. Gram.). But a “public usage” of language, that is, a usage that does not express internal states, is also a requirement of the performatives. However, to Sextus, the discourse of the Skeptic is a manifestation of a pathos, a word that refers to the sensorial stimuli and the mental state aroused by affections (P.H. I, 187), in other words, it refers to states that could be interpreted as internal and that are expressed as accounts: the Skeptic announces (apangellei)22 how things appear to him in a given moment. Then, we have two contiguous problems, for (1) no matter how much the mechanism of announcing affections without meaning them to be observations about the state of affairs reduces the assertive strength of the Skeptical utterance, this announcement would be of internal states, and could not be interpreted as performative. And (2), if the very act of reporting or announcing is such that it only happens when one reports or announces – making it sounds as performative, an act that is carried out when one says it, like “baptizing” – nevertheless, it is also constative, insofar as the emitter of the report observes another, even if they are appearances. There is, therefore, in the case of the Skeptical utterance, a twilight zone between performatives and constatives, which is not due to a conceptual failure of Skepticism, rather, it originates from a limitation of the first formulation of J. L. Austin’s speech acts theory (1956) that he, himself, came to realize since there would be constative aspects in performatives and vice-versa.23 21 See: ALMEIDA, G. A. (1986). Aspectos da filosofia da linguagem. In: MARCONDES, D. (org.). Significado, verdade e ação. Niterói: EdUFF. 22 See P.H. I, 4, where the verb apangello occurs in the first-person plural form of the present indicative active (¼ apangellomen). 23 After noticing the inconsistences of the first speech act theories, it seems a hard task to try to solve them, and unnecessary, since it is not our scope here to defend or “save” Austin from the very toils created by himself while proposing the theories. He himself had partially given up of some features of his first theory, and instead of emphasizing twon ways of classifying the utterances, his second

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The Second Formulation of Speech Acts and Skepticism

Having noticed this twilight zone, Austin restructured his theory of speech acts (AUSTIN, 1962) in such a way to not classify utterances by excluding types of usages any longer, but instead, he proposed the use of three distinct structural levels of acts: 1. the locutionary, which concerns the usual meaning of articulated words, the intonation and the syntactic structure of utterances, having meaning and reference; 2. the illocutionary, which is the very act of uttering or carrying out a locutionary act and can be expressed either by a performative verb or by a constative verb, i.e. this category encompasses both kinds of utterance J. L. Austin defines in his first formulation of the speech acts; 3. the perlocutionary, which corresponds to an effect caused on the listener when performing a locutionary and an illocutionary act simultaneously. Now, in having addressed the Dogmatists, Skeptics used the same language as them (Greek or Latin), with predetermined syntactic structure, therefore, their locutionary acts were the same, allowing mutual understanding. But the illocutionary acts performed by Skeptics and Dogmatists are far from being similar, for the Dogmatist illocution carries out an assertion, affirms how things are (and/or how they are not, by extension). In their turn, the Skeptical illocution does not assert, it only reports, it does not jeopardize itself with the truth/falsity axis and does not mean for the language to mirror itself on any state of things.24 More precisely, the dogmatic illocution behaves as an apophansis, thus it is understood as having the structure S is P (or another form, reducible to this one), and it also seeks to mirror the situation described by the illocution, it seems that the apophansis intends to assert how the things are. So, we are generically dealing here with the Aristotelian notion of predication – which can also be called by the term kategoria25 – according to which the language, in its constative or apophantic use, works as a way of objectively describe the state of affairs. Then the apophansis or

theory proposes to analyze three different levels present at every speech acts. So, although I think that the application of the first theory to the Skeptical utterances actually offers good insights for thinking the way these utterances work, on the other hand, as Austin abandoned the first theory, I think we would better advance following his steps. 24 See: MARCONDES , D. (1994). A “Felicidade” do Discurso Cético: o Problema da Autorefutação do Ceticismo. In: O Que Nos Faz Pensar, n 8. 25 On this issue, one could be driven to think on Aristotle’s Categories or On Interpretation, but take a look and at Top. I and Met. IV and VII to have a more complete overview on the Aristotelian ontological semantics.

4.12

A Provisional Conclusion

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kategoria embraces a semantic theory as well, by stablishing rules through which the terms combined in an illocution mirror the world, in such a way that the theory of predication is overlapped by an ontology.26 As for the perlocutionary level of the Skeptical discourse – or as for the effects caused by this discourse on the interlocutors of Skepticism – we leave that for them to say, for, to speak about it is to narrate a good portion of the very History of Philosophy. . .

4.12

A Provisional Conclusion

I am going to recapitulate this final step of the argumentation. We though that the Sextian Skepticism did not suspend judgement only in regards to the philosophical or scientific theories, but also in regards to the assertions present even in ordinary life, and the amplitude of the epoche does not make it incur in apraxia or anenergesia, and also does not make our interpretation be anachronical. For such, we needed to identify what is common among the assertions of ordinary life and the philosophical or scientific ones that make they be all treated as dogmata. Who offered us the clues was Epictetus, to whom there would be ordinary beliefs, a philosopher who is particularly relevant if we take into account that the Stoics and their terminology and concepts were Sextus’ main targets. We could propose, thus, an alternative way of interpretation that would escape the aporia among Frede’s and Burnyeat’s interpretations, recurring to the speech acts theory. Thus, the goal of the Skeptical suspension of judgement are the assertions, because they are mutually exclusive and unhappy in trying, all of them, to assert the truth. On the other hand, to the Skeptic remain other non-assertory ways of pronouncement, he can communicate himself, live an ordinary life and even be active in a techne to the point of indicating the Skepticism as a therapy that seems best (even though it is not known whether it truly is) against the Dogmatic presumption and precipitation. Thus, considering that the main features of the apraxia argument were dully approached, in the next section I am going to deal with another important aspect of not only the Skeptic life, but of the ordinary one as well: the crafts performance.

26

See: ANGIONI, L (2009, pp. 20–21).

Part II

The Skeptic and the Crafts

Chapter 5

Sextus Empiricus and the Elements

Abstract We aim to show how Sextus Empiricus develops his attack on the technai in Against the Professors (M I-VI). First of all, we will outline the concept of stoicheion (plural: stoicheia) in Aristotle, for we think that the wide use of the concept by the Hellenistic Philosophers addresses itself to Aristotle’s employment of it. Thus, Sextus Empiricus approaches the technai through a paradigm internal to their own systematization, from their “elements” (stoicheia). Secondly, we will take into consideration Sextus’ approach to grammar, and we link this discussion on grammar to the other technai. Finally, we aim to identify the political and pedagogical consequences of Sextus’ approach.

5.1

An Interlude on Skepticism and Medicine

From now on and in the following pages, I am not going to be directly concerned with the problem of the feasibility of Skepticism, regardless of how Skepticism is understood, either in its Pyrrhonean or Academic varieties. My main goal here is to think about other possible results of Sextus Empiricus’ line of attack on the technai (arts, or crafts) as it appears mainly in his Against the Professors, where Sextus methodically attacks the disciplines that form part of the cyclical studies: grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology and music.1 Sextus’ method for destroying the technai is to criticize the elements (stoicheia) which constitute these technai. As far as we can see from the extant evidence, Aristotle is the first to develop a philosophical conception of techne as a kind of craft in which the quality of the performance is related to the handling of certain constitutive elements (stoicheia). Although in Aristotle’s works the majority of the occurrences of the term stoicheia refers to the constitutive elements of nature (cf. De Anima, 404a5; 405b8; 410a2, 17–19; 410b11; 423b28; Met.985a25, 32; 986a2, 18; 986b7–9; 987b19; etc.), there is a famous passage in the Rhet. in which Aristotle exhorts one to discover first the various types of rhetoric in order to define them, so

1

Respectively as treated by Sextus in M I-VI. The Dialectic is generally treated in Adv. Log.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 R. Pinto de Brito, The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities, Synthese Library 455, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92407-2_5

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one can investigate what the constitutive elements (stoicheia) of each kind are (Rhet.1358a35). Thus, for Aristotle there are three kinds of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic and demonstrative. For instance, the deliberative kind is aimed to exhort or dissuade about things to do – for its special time is the future (Rhet. 1358b14) – and the stoicheia which compound this kind of rhetoric are e.g. the specific kinds of arguments used to encourage or discourage a course of action in the face of a matter which needs a deliberation, as war, so the specific arguments to be employed are always inductive. We could add more examples of Aristotelian usages of stoicheion and stoicheia. But let us cite only Top.120b12: “Next we must go on to examine questions relating to genus and property. These are [the] elements (stoicheia) in the question that relate to definitions. . .”;2 and Top.163b24: . . .just as [with] geometry it is useful to be practised in the elements, and in arithmetic having the multiplication table up to ten at one’s fingers’ ends makes a great difference to one’s knowledge of the multiples of other numbers too, likewise also in arguments it is a great advantage to be well up in regard to first principles, and to have a thorough knowledge of propositions by heart.

And we must not forget the treatment given to the letters qua elements (stoicheia) of the syllables (Met. 993a4–10. . . .) and qua principles (archai) of the words (Met. 998a23–25). In short, the Aristotelian concept of stoicheion as “. . . the primary immanent thing, formally indivisible into another form, of which something is composed. . .” (Met.1014a25) was central to the foundation and development of sciences and crafts in Hellenistic age. This enabled Sextus Empiricus to use this Aristotelian concept in order to philosophically approach the sciences and crafts and to deal with the technai by starting with their constitutive elements. This was something also done by other physicians of his time, as for instance Galen, who argues in his work addressed to Patrophilus that the iatrike techne is grounded on some elements (stoicheia), namely health, illness, the physician (De constitutione I.247.7). But there is also a procedure or methodology of approaching the diseases by searching and trying to discover the elements (now understood as symptoms) which compound these diseases (De constitutione I.249.2).3 However, instead of trying to justify the crafts by starting by its constitutive elements, Sextus emphasizes that he adopts “a method of attack by approximation, and once we have overthrown its [i.e. the astrological] principles and elements, we

2

All the cited passages from Topics are translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in: Barnes (1991). One could raise the question: what is the specific role of stoicheîon for Galen? Does the word have a pedagogical or a scientific role? When Galen presents the medicine to Patrophilus the word is used for displaying the most basic parts which compound and structure the science. So we can say that in De constitutione artis medicae ad Patrophilum the purpose of using stoicheîon is mainly pedagogical, but on the other hand, since Galen is displaying a science which was already structured, we can also say that he is not using stoicheion merely by pedagogical purpose. Actually we can think that Galen is displaying it in the way he does because it is structured in this precise way. 3

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shall find that along with them also the structure of the rest of [the astrologers’] theories has been demolished.” (Adv. Ast. 49–53). Furthermore, according to Sextus Empiricus, “of the Skeptical philosophy one argument is called ‘general’, the other ‘special’” (PH I, 5), and this drives us to a methodological paradigm similar to the one used by the physicians, for: . . . just as the physicians who cure bodily ailments have remedies which differ in strength, and apply the severe ones to those whose ailments are severe and the milder to those mildly affected, – so too the Sceptic propounds arguments which differ in strength. . . (PH III, 280).

So like Sextus would do, we are going to start by outlining how the Skeptic attacks the elements in general, and later we will turn to the art of grammar (techne grammatike) in particular.

5.2

The Refutation to the Elements in General

The words stoicheia and stoicheion have many occurrences in Sextus Empiricus’ works.4 But, in general, in PH the words are used to refer to physics, e.g. the atoms are the elements which compose nature (PH I, 147). Later, in PH II, 111, the word stoicheia occurs four more times and it is employed in an altercation aimed at putting the atomistic physics in aporia. In PH III, 30, taking the pre-Socratic conception of arche (principle) as a starting point, Sextus goes against everyone who postulated material principles (hylikai archai) in their physics, from Pherecydes of Syros – who stated the earth as the first principle – to Pythagoras – who stated the numbers. Sextus also mentions famous “physicists”, as Thales and the Milesian school, Xenophanes, Empedocles, Democritus, Aristotle and Epicurus. But he does not forget the more obscure ones: Hippasus of Metapontum, Oenopides of Chios, Hippo of Rhegium, Onomacritus, Heracleides Ponticus and Asclepiades the Bithynian. Albeit in the steps PH III, 30–33 Sextus never uses the words stoicheion or stoicheia, rather he mentions arche or archai, he considers that arche and stoicheion are both kinds of “primary immanent thing[s], formally indivisible[s] into another form, of which something is composed. . .” as defined by Aristotle (Met.1014a25). So it makes arche and stoicheion share the common feature of being material principles (hylikai archai). I shall emphasize that for searching and scanning the occurrences of the words “element/elements” in Sextus’ works, we selected only the plural and the singular of the nominative, vocative and accusative forms of the neuter stoicheîon, so this is not a complete scan. In a more exhaustive search (i.e. including datives, genitives in both singular and plural) someone can find at least 95 occurrences. Sure, our partial scan ignores some important occurrences, but as nominative, accusative or vocative, plural and singular, stoicheîon/stoicheîa can embrace the word as being the subject of the phrase or as being the object. So we have the opportunity to scan the word “element/elements” when Sextus employs it for saying something like: “Element(s) work(s). . .”; and also for saying: “Y work (s) as element(s)”, for instance. 4

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But, since there is a great divergence amongst the physicists about the real constitution of the material principles, no matter how one calls them – arche or stoicheion – and no matter what one thinks they are – earth, water, wind, fire or atoms – the Skeptic does not give assent to any of the theories, because they cannot be proved (PH III, 33–36). And the theories cannot be proved because: 1. 2. 3. 4.

If there is a proof, it must be true. But for obtaining a true proof one needs a true criterion. And for having a true criterion one needs first a proof that this criterion is true . This proof must be true (¼ step 1).

So, the argument is circular, and it does not allow the development of reasoning (PH III, 35). Furthermore, if there is not a proof and a criterion for judging and giving assent to material principles, it makes the material principles – both archai and stoicheia – impossible to be apprehended, no matter what one thinks they are (PH III, 37). And it is in this train of thought that some other important occurrences of stoicheia appear: PH III, 55.6; 62.6; 152.1,4 (with two occurrences); 153.1,4. But the quarrel shown above can deceive us, making us think that only physicists had theories concerning stoicheion are embraced. And in this case we will forget that the word stoicheion is much more overarching, since it can embrace letters – understood as elements of words – and also phrases – understood as elements of reasoning and of discourse (logos). So, the word stoicheia occurs in Adv. Log. II, 99,5 for instance, in an argument against the assertion that the propositions become more basic while they become simpler, which makes them become in discourse similar to the elements in physics. This theory is attributed to the Dialectical School. The Sextan argumentation employed leading to aporia here has the same features of the argument against the physicists mentioned above,6 i.e., the demonstration of the disagreements (diaphoniai) about what the primary elements should be, about their behavior and function, and mainly their inapprehensibility (Adv. Log. II, 319.4; 336.1,3).

5.3

The Refutation of the Grammatical Notion of Letters as Specific Elements of Words

Let us first present a few clarifying thoughts about the chronological order and sequence of Sextus’ works, as this is directly relevant for an appropriate contextualization of his arguments in Against the Grammarians. The usual organization of

5

I will show in the next section the reasons why I leave the notation based in the M family (M I-XI). And this agenda is expanded in Adv. Phy. I, 212.6; 359.3; II, 248.8; 249.5; 253.4; 254.5; 258.3, 260.2; 312.4.

6

5.3 The Refutation of the Grammatical Notion of Letters as Specific Elements. . .

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Sextus Empiricus’ works divides them into three blocks: the first being composed of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH), subdivided into three books; the second is composed of six works organized and named as Against the Professors (or Mathematicians), usually referred to as M I to M VI (Against the Grammarians; Against the Rhetoricians; Against the Geometers; Against the Arithmeticians; Against the Astrologers; Against the Musicians); and the third is called Against the Dogmatists, usually referred to as M VII to M XI, and composed by three works (Against the Logicians, in two books; Against the Physicists, in two books; and Against the Ethicists). But I prefer to leave this usual subdivision, since it implies that the block Against the Dogmatists would be a later work than the block Against the Professors. It appears to me that the contrary is true, i.e. the block Against the Dogmatists precedes the block Against the Professors. This assumption seems to be justified because the last book of Against the Dogmatists – Against the Ethicists, usually referred to as M XI – is the only book in its block which has as one of its themes the performance of the technai, among other things. And this performance is treated according to Sextus’ methodological agenda, i.e. beginning with the most general – where philosophy appears as the art of living (Adv. Eth. 168) – towards the most particular – where Sextus introduces the arguments which are going to be developed in the block Against the Professors, considered by me to be posterior. And the problems about the stoicheia arise in Adv. Eth., precisely preceding and maybe introducing the discussions which appear in Adv. Gram., where these “elements” (stoicheia) are understood as elements of grammar, i.e. the letters. Thus, Sextus begins Adv. Gram. by clarifying the methodology to be employed, emphasizing that he will use some arguments that are more general and others that are more specific. So, on the one hand, for attacking the usefulness of the technai, general arguments are employed in order to weaken those stoicheia which are inherent parts of the process of teaching and learning all the crafts, for example: the studies, the content to be taught, as well as the nature and function of discourse, the teacher and the student. These topics make up the first steps of Adv. Gram. On the other hand, a specific argument is one which attacks the specific elements of each techne. But if the letters are the specific grammatical elements, how can the Skeptic write against the art of grammar without contradicting himself? This requires special care from Sextus, and he tells us: And in any case even if we wished we should not be able to abolish it without upsetting ourselves; for if the arguments which show that grammatistic7 is useless are themselves useful but can neither be remembered nor passed on to posterity without it, then grammatistic is useful. Yet it might be thought by some that Timon, the expounder of Pyrrho’s views, is of the contrary opinion when he says: “Grammar’s an art that a man need neither heed nor consider When he is still being taught the Punic symbols of Cadmus”.

“Grammatistic” is a neologism usually employed to translate the Greek word γραμματιστική, meaning the teaching and learning of the “first letters”.

7

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5 Sextus Empiricus and the Elements This, however, does not appear to be the case. For the phrase he uses, “he need neither heed nor consider,” is not aimed against the actual grammatistic by which the Punic symbols of Cadmus are taught; for if a man is being taught it, how can he have paid no attention to it? What he means is rather this: “when a man has been taught the Punic symbols of Cadmus he need pay no attention to any further art of letters”; and this does not refer to the uselessness of the art which is found to deal with the elements and with employing them in writing and reading, but of that which is boastful and needlessly inquisitive. For while the handling of the elements contributes to the conduct of life, not to be contented with what is given by the observation of the elements and attempting further to show that some of them are naturally vowels, others consonants, and that of the vowels some are naturally short, others long, others doubtful and indifferently long or short, and in general all the other rules that are taught by the conceived Grammarians . (Adv. Gram. 53–55).

This long passage speaks for itself: Sextus knows that he would be contradicting himself if he intended to put the utility of grammar in aporia, so he divides the genus of grammar into two species: grammatistic and grammar. The first one is responsible for teaching how to deal with letters, i.e. Cadmus’ Punic symbols, and it is useful and should not be despised, otherwise one would be unlettered. The second kind of grammar has its specialists – headed by the grammarians of Alexandria and Pergamum – who dedicate themselves to problems about the natural origin of utterances, sounds, etymology and the correct tones. And these grammarians are especially worried about the elements of grammar. If the elements of grammar are the letters, we have twenty-four elements that have to compose something (the words) and which have to be indivisible into another form, they are seven vowels (α, ε, η, ι, o, υ, ω) and seventeen consonants. However there are some consonants which are double: ζ, ξ, ψ; for ζ is composed by σ and δ, ξ is composed by κ and σ, ψ is composed by π and σ. But if they are double or composed by two other consonants, how can they be indivisible? In addition, if they cannot be indivisible, how can they be elements? And what about the vowels? For α, ι, υ have double times (they are dichrona), and as such they have a double intrinsic nature which can be expressed and proffered sometimes as long and sometimes as short, sometimes as smooth and sometimes as rough, so how can they have the oneness required for an element (Adv. Gram. 100–116)? It briefly shows the kinds of quarrels in which the grammarians were involved, quarrels generated by their own peculiar projects of orthographic reform. And they also engage themselves in arguments that reveal the inutility, the vanity and the incoherence of the techne grammatike. For in a time of wide usage of the Greek language, spoken in various ways by people mostly unlettered, what would be the utility of systematizing an artificial Greek language, by creating and imposing spirits and tones for letters, genders and declensions for names, and new conjugations for verbs, if the absolute majority of people would not even know these modifications? What would be the parameter used to systematize the Hellenistic or the late-Ancient Greek, the old language of Homer? Must everyone speak as Homer did? These are samples of questions asked by Sextus in Adv. Gram., but if according to Sextus an art like the rhetoric does not have an aim, the grammar on the other hand,

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albeit it has an aim, is not useful. According to the grammarians themselves, the aim of grammar is to give rise to a good and beautiful Greek language, or the good and beautiful usage of Greek language (hellenismos), serving as a preventive measure against solecisms and barbarisms, considered by grammarians as being linguistic mistakes. But if as we saw, the great majority of Greek speakers would not even know the grammatical parameters developed by the grammarians, it makes the purpose of systematizing the Greek language useless and vain. Then Sextus makes the opposite argument by postulating the common use of language as the criterion for good and beautiful Greek. Thus, Sextus reformulates the aesthetic aspect by taking it away from the domain of the experts, and instead claims that something is called beautiful if it is in accordance with the standards of beauty engendered by the communities themselves. Moreover, Sextus emphasizes the common use of language as pragmatic criterion, since one who speaks right speaks according to linguistic conventions that are also engendered by the communities and are not creations of experts. Thus, the project of the grammarians to promote themselves as the ultimate owners of criteria for the useful, good and beautiful speech is undermined by Sextus’ argument. We shall illustrate this point of Sextus pleading for a communal criterion of aesthetic beauty with the following passage of Adv. Mus. (29–34), as it emphasizes the theme of pleasure and it is related to the discussions proposed in general about the arts and specifically to those which appear in Adv. Gram.: . . . the principal argument against music is that if it is useful it is alleged to be useful on the ground that he who has practiced music compared with ordinary people gets more pleasure from hearing musical performances; or because the elements of music are the same as those of the science of the subject-matter of philosophy, (which is much like what we previously said about grammar); or because the Universe is ordered according to harmony, as the Pythagorean fraternity declare, and we need the theorems of Music in order to understand the Whole of things; or because tunes of a certain kind affect the character of the soul. But it will not be stated that music is useful because musicians as compared with ordinary people get more pleasure from listening to performances. For, firstly, the pleasure felt by ordinary people is not inevitable as are those caused by food, drink and warmth after hunger, thirst and cold; and secondly, even if they are inevitable we can enjoy them without musical skill; infants, certainly, are lulled to sleep by listening to a tuneful cradle-song, and irrational animals are charmed by the sound of the flute and pipe, seeing that dolphins, as we are told, swim up to ships as they are being rowed along because of the pleasure they take in the tunes played by flutes; yet neither the infants nor the animals are likely to have skill in music or understanding of it (. . .) just as we enjoy tasting food or wine though without the art of cooking food or that of wine-tasting. . . (Adv. Mus. 29–34).

We are now going to say a few words about the reception of Sextus’ arguments against the grammarians and against their project of systematizing the Greek language through strictly theoretical paradigms, like the concept of “element”. First of all, since Sextus makes the common usage be the ultimate criterion for handling the Greek language, considering that there are lots of usages, one must have a methodology for approaching these usages. And, as we saw above, Sextus is against the theoretical approach used by grammarians, so his approach needs to be

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strictly based on something non-theoretical. It makes the experience (empeiria) be the methodology to be employed. So, we could say that the block to which Adv. Gram. belongs – Against the Professors – is not a strictly destructive work, even if it radically undermines any project of building theories linked to the cyclical studies. Alternatively, Sextus employs the Skeptic destructive dynamis in order to find a new, constructive way (poros) among the aporetic discussions of the theorists and professors. But this poros is not self-evident or explicitly developed, but needs to be buildup. And it is through experience that one shall recognize this poros, as well as its limits. So, the block named Against the Professors can be considered as containing a conception of knowledge which we can call empiricist and pragmatic, since it seeks the truth only by approximation and adequacy. Turning now to the point of practicability, or the pragmatic feasibility of the Sextan Skepticism, I consider Sextus to be able to say that this praise of an empiricist model of approximated knowledge is conducted as a description, or a chronicle. He simply narrates what appears to him, and since appearances are not open to discussions, the only thing that can be discussed about them is whether they are such as the objects that generate them, or not. But the Skeptical cognition is not located in the knowledge/world axis, around which the concepts of true and false revolve. Instead, the Skeptic ignores this axis, and appearances are all that matters to him, for appearances are coercive. So, the Skeptic is not worried about the relation and adequacy of any perceptions regarding to any state of affairs. The Skeptic is compelled by affections, and these affections cannot be refuted because they lack true or false value. So, if here the defense of a Skeptical empiricism is the defense of Sextus’ personal experience, Sextus cannot be accused of dogmatizing, because he acts exclusively in conformity with his own experience. In the Skeptical point of view, ignoring experience in favor of an abstract truth linked to the beauty and the good would be a kind of aesthetic, epistemic, or ethical dogmatism. Finally, this drives us back to the point of the appreciation of the personal experience, a theme which can make us think about other dimensions of the reception of Sextus’ works: politics and anthropology. For in “defending” the experience of the plain human being and making it a sufficient possibility for understanding the world, the Skepticism can not only be understood as an exhortation of the phaulos (ordinary person) against arrogant and pretentious epistemologies, but also as an admonition against the subordination and control of communities of plain people by elitist political bodies that judge themselves to be better, or by dominant power structures that treat ordinary people as vain and inferior. Furthermore, this defense of the phaulos can become a defense of the idiotes (the private human being) in the face of hegemonic power. But of course, reducing the scope of experience to the dimension of the strictly private and personal could be a snare here, and one could imagine that the Skeptic is a kind of radical empiricist and solipsist, who only accepts his own and peculiar impressions. And this Skeptic could (and why not?) act mistakenly during his entire life. But in order to avoid such mistakes there is a parameter for correction: one

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should perform actions according to one’s own experiences in the arena of the communal life, the arena of the habit (ethos), and of the convention or law (nomos), and also the arena of the communal (koinos), all of which the Skeptic participates in (PH I 237.7). So Sextus’ Pyrrhonean Skepticism can be interpreted as a defense of the community (koinonia). Additionally, even when the Greek habits are compared with the habits of other peoples there are no reasons for thinking that the Greek habits are better than the barbarian ones. Thus, all the habits are considered to be of equal standing, especially if we keep in mind the tenth mode of Aenesidemus (PH I, 145–163) and the Sextan observations on the plurality of habits and conducts. So, Sextus says: . . . amongst us sodomy is regarded as shameful or rather illegal, but by the Germani, they say, it is not looked on as shameful, but as a customary thing (. . .) having intercourse with a woman, too, in public, although deemed by us to be shameful, is not thought to be shameful by some of the Indians (. . .) with us tattooing is held to be shameful and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and Sarmatians tattoo their offspring. . .(PH III, 199–203)

And what about the Skeptic? What does he do in the face of the plurality of habits? Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diversity of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness of dogmatism; and he follows undogmatically the ordinary rules of life, and because of this he remains impassive in respect of matters of opinion, while in conditions that are necessitated his emotions are moderate; for thought, as a human being, he suffers emotion through his senses, yet because he does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion that there exists by nature something good or bad or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted in various ways. (PH III, 235–237).

5.4

Back to the Feasibility

As I said in the beginning of this chapter, I was not directly concerned either with problems about the feasibility of Skepticism or about the reception of Sextus’ arguments. We were mainly concerned with the Sextan approach to the technai which appears in Against the Professors, and especially with the methodology employed by him in his destructive arguments, for instance: his method of arguing first against general aspects of all issues, and arguing later against the particular aspects. And this method, once used against the concept of stoicheîon, made Sextus argue first against the own concept and later against the specific stoicheîa of grammar. But how can someone not be worried about the practical consequences of Skepticism if against the grammarians Sextus employs arguments grammatically structured in Greek language? It looks like a very evident paradox, and it can be even

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more serious if we remember that Skepticism is often accused of inconsistence. But Sextus is not a naïve thinker, thus we tried to show that in Against the Professors he is against a conception of knowledge which is strictly theoretical. Therefore he argues against the grammarians who tried to advance theories on the structure of Greek language without paying due attention to a crucial feature of any languages: the usages. On the other hand, Sextus’ attacks do not go against the usages, and is precisely guided by these usages that he is able to write, because he handles the philosophical usage of language by not needing grammar skills (in a theoretical sense), except those learnt through grammatistic. So the Sextan Skepticism is not inconsistent if we keep in mind that the Skeptic does have a practical criterion – the local habits – and a scientific method – the empirical observation. Both the criterion and the method, once conjoined as an “empirical observation of habits”, are important steps toward the development of a conception of knowledge as approximate and can be interpreted as a kind of defense of the plurality of habits.

Chapter 6

Sextus Against the Rhetoricians

Abstract It shows the Sextan argument in Adv. Rhet., an attack to those who profess the possibility of teaching this craft which begins with the search of the definition of Rhetoric, that shows itself as aporetic, because the Dogmatic philosophers themselves are uncapable of offering a unanimous definition for it (1–10); after that, Sextus goes through Aristotelian and Platonic definitions of Rhetoric (10–20) until he gets to the Academic positioning on this craft, that provisionally offers the necessary arguments to the refutation of the Stoic notion of Rhetoric (20–43). Next, the defenses of Stoic character are presented (43–48), from where one concludes the inconsistency of Rhetoric. After that, Sextus follows an accurate analysis about the specific parts of this art (48–60), culminating with his purpose, where the attacks that will be launched begin to be drawn, now, the Academic and Stoic (60–112) criteria themselves, for such the Skeptical medic has to distinguish between the Skeptical language and the Dogmatic language (in the case, of the Rhetorician), as well as the manner that the Skeptic is active in the technai and the manner that the Dogmatic also is.

6.1

General Scheme of the Argument of Adv. Rhet.

In a general manner, Against the Professors is an attack to the crafts, techniques or arts (technai) that begins with a controversy against the arts in general and proceeds deepening the dispute, making it focus, afterwards, on each individual art. Thus, Sextus Empiricus aligns himself primarily to the Epicureans (Adv. Gram. 1–7), for whom the arts could not lead to wisdom or perfection. However, next, Sextus claims that this same refutation to the arts in the Epicurean mold is Dogmatic. Sextus attack, on the other hand, has the same motivation as all of his other attacks to the Dogmatic philosophies, the rejection of the inherent presumption to the assumption of wisdom and knowledge, the aporiae, controversies and disputes around truth and, finally, the pretension of having the best or ultimate criterion for knowledge of this truth, that leads to wisdom (or, conversely, an attack against the radical denial of the possibility of knowledge, that is some sort of negative Dogmatism).

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 R. Pinto de Brito, The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities, Synthese Library 455, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92407-2_6

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Thus, in Against the Professors, Sextus Empiricus uses Dogmatic arguments to refute themselves, without compromising himself with the theoretical foundations internal to the systems to which they belong. His reading is selective, but profound; his immediate purpose is to make emerge aporiae that lead the reader to retain the assent in regard to the conflicting questions, leading them by occasion to ataraxia. In this manner, the argument of Adv. Rhet., an attack to those who profess the possibility of teaching this craft, begins with the search of the definition of Rhetoric, that shows itself as aporetic, because the Dogmatic philosophers themselves are uncapable of offering a unanimous definition for it (1–10); after that, Sextus goes through Aristotelian and Platonic definitions of Rhetoric (10–20) until he gets to the Academic positioning on this craft, that provisionally offers the necessary arguments to the refutation of the Stoic notion of Rhetoric (20–43). Next, the defenses of Stoic character are presented (43–48), from where one concludes the inconsistency of Rhetoric. After that, Sextus follows an accurate analysis about the specific parts of this art (48–60), culminating with his purpose, where the attacks that will be launched begin to be drawn, now, the Academic and Stoic (60–112) criteria themselves, for such the Skeptical medic has to distinguish between the Skeptical language and the Dogmatic language (in the case, of the Rhetorician), as well as the manner that the Skeptic is active in the technai and the manner that the Dogmatic also is. But let us walk through Sextus Empiricus’ words.

6.2

Adv. Rhet. Walkthrough (the Search for the Definition of Rhetoric)

Adv. Rhet. continues the discussions already started in Adv. Gram., but Sextus Empiricus considers it more important, because the discussions about the grammar are more theoretical, while the Rhetoric techne has its own effectiveness tested in practice.1 Like in all his works, with the exception of P.H., the Sextan discussions usually start by the attempt of defining the object under examination, for the Rhetoric he initially adopts a definition laid out by Plato2 that appears in Plat. Gorg., notedly in 453a. However, even though it appears in a dialogue from Plato, the definition is not his, but Gorgias’, but seems that, to Sextus Empiricus, if the definition appears in a Platonic dialogue, considering that one cannot know certainly Plato’s positioning on any subject, it suffices that Plato is the author of the dialogues for him to be also treated as the author of whichever definitions are contained in those dialogues.

1 2

Adv. Rhet. 1. Adv. Rhet. 2.

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But not only Rhetoric produces persuasion, beauty also does it,3 therefore, Rhetoric must also be the producer of persuasion through words,4 even though other technai also produce the same objective with the same means.5 Therefore, the Rhetoric must not only raise persuasion through discourse, but must induce to it,6 using the discourse for such. If, thus, the discourse is primordial for the kind of persuasion induced by Rhetoric, then one must try to think of a definition of Rhetoric that observes the kind or the quality of the discourse of Rhetoricians, what leads us to the definitions of the Stoics and of Xenocrates7 to the Rhetoric as “the science (episteme) of good discourse”. But the Stoics and Xenocrates do not have the same definition for episteme; for the former it is katalepsis while for the other it is techne. Moreover, they also distinguish between the Rhetoricians’ discourse and that of the ordinary men. The logoi of the speakers are flowered and ornated through many stylistic resources, while that of common people does not have these characteristics, but both differ from Dialectics.8 Going back now to the definition of Rhetoric as a form of episteme, there are the Stoics that have it as katalepsis and, for whom, furthermore, the katalepsis is inherent to the wise man, what means that the episteme is also inherent to the wise man, then the science of good discourse is as well. There is also Xenocrates that considers it techne logon, to whom Sextus Empiricus unites Aristotle and cites Rhet. I9 highlighting that there are also other Aristotelian definitions. But Sextus does not intend to discuss the descriptions of Rhetoric, his objective is to make a refutation that will attack precisely its definitions as (1) craft/art (techne); (2) science of discourse (“epistemen logon”); (3) producer of the uttering and of persuasion (“tou legein kai peithous peripoietiken”).10

6.3

The Refutations to the Available Definitions (Rhetoric Definition as Techne)

Let us analyse the refutations thrown by Sextus Empiricus to the three definitions cited above (techne; “epistemen logon”; “tou legein kai peithous peripoietiken”). We will begin by the Rhetoric defined as techne.

3

Adv. Rhet. 3–4. Adv. Rhet. 5. 5 Adv. Rhet. 5. 6 Adv. Rhet. 5. 7 Xenocrates lived in the period between circa 396–314 B.C. and succeeded Speusippus as the Scholarch of Academia in the period between c. 339–314 B.C. See: Adv. Rhet. 6. 8 Adv. Rhet. 6–7. 9 Adv. Rhet. 8. 10 Adv. Rhet. 9. 4

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If the definition of Rhetoric recurs to the craft, then there must also be a definition of craft, starting by the Stoic definition in which craft/art “is a system of apprehensions organized together and making reference to an end useful in life” (Ad. Rhet. 10). Now, this Stoic definition of art, in its turn, also occurs in P.H. III, 188, but related to its Dogmatic psychology and leading to an aporia: The Stoics, again, say that goods in the soul are certain kinds of expertise (τε
χνας), namely the virtues (ἀρετάς). They say that an expertise is a compound of apprehensions (καταλήψεων) which have been exercised, and that apprehensions come about in the ruling part (τὰς δὲ καταλήψεις γίγνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμoνικóν). But how there might come about in the ruling part (which, according to them is breath) a deposit or accumulation of enough apprehensions for an expertise to develop it is impossible to conceive; for each succeeding imprinting eraeses the previous one, since breath is fluid and is said to be affected as a whole by each imprinting. (P.H. III, 188)

Here Sextus Empiricus refers to the quarrel glossed over in the chapter on the Stoic epistemology, about the impressions being either changes or imprints on the soul. Well, if the quarrel persisted, then there was no agreement on the subject, there were neither harmonia nor symphonia, but actually diaphonia, urging the suspension of judgement regarding the apprehensions’ modus operandi. Moreover, the katalepsis does not relate with the false, be it in the ethical scope (the bad, or the vice) or in the epistemic, but the Rhetoric does, when the speaker defends the cause of the adulterer or of the impious and fools the judges,11 there is not, therefore, katalepsis in Rhetoric, then Rhetoric is not an art, from the viewpoint of the Stoic conception itself, something that is even more worsened by the aporia that Sextus brings about among, on the one hand, those from the Stoa and, on the other hand, Plato’s disciples and the peripatetic Critolaus, who rejected the Rhetoric alleging that it was a mere trick.12 In addition, the technai have teloi, even philosophy itself, understood by the Stoics as “art of living”13 must have an end. But the Rhetoric does not have a stable and precise end, for at times the Rhetorician is insulted, other times they do not get the expected result and often they fail.14 There are also many people who are capable of arguing efficiently, even in court or assemblies, without any training in specific Rhetoric techniques, these people enjoy the oratory skill merely by its practical experience, and not by obeying some theoretical program established by teachers that, in their turn, even though they have studied Rhetoric exhaustively, are uncapable of speaking well in public.15 In here

11

Adv. Rhet. 10. Adv. Rhet. 11–13. 13 See: Adv. Eth. 168. 14 Adv. Rhet. 14–17. 15 Adv. Rhet. 17–19. 12

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Sextus begins tracing a clear opposition between the Rhetorician’s oratory and the discourse of the ordinary men, and also between the abilities of the ordinary men, resulting from practical experience, and the abilities that the teachers intend to teach, based on theories. In short, the opposition between the ordinary man, active in the technai – but from his ordinary life –, and the Dogmatic, equally active, but from his dogmata, is drawn. Now, the knowledge of the dogmata that compose the theories about the technai do not make one a good speaker, for example – meaning, the domain of the dogmatic theories about a certain craft is not of great help for the performance of this craft –, but the practical experience is indispensable for this performance, and the Skeptic, in meaning to adhere to the maxims extracted from common life is much closer to acquiring this experience, while the Dogmatic risks himself to a bad execution of a technique for not disposing of the same experience, despite having a theoretical framework. Deepening the rejection of Rhetoric as an art, Sextus Empiricus presents another argument also originated from Critolaus and the Academy: that the arts are useful and the men do not expel them from the cities, but the Rhetoric is banished for its hostility, as occurred in Crete (under the lawmaker Thales) and Sparta (under Lycurgus), because it subverted the laws and committed more with screed than with clarity.16 The Rhetoric is not useful for the Rhetorician himself: he must waste his time going to assemblies, courts and registries; he involves himself with criminals; he must speech aggressively; and cultivate many enemies. Let alone being useful to the cities: he makes laws voluble, at times advising the obedience to some decree, at other times the repeal of the same decree; linking oneself to the city’s and the people’s parasitism; inciting flattery; alleges to serve the public benefit, but does not; and disfavors the people. The Rhetoric is not only useless, it is harmful.17 If Skepticism “advocates” for the return to ordinary life, the criterion for the actions are the actions of ordinary men, that exert the technai learned with practical experiences and communicate through the ordinary use of language, without adhering to theories about the discourse. Contrarily, the Rhetoric is a special use of language, constructed from the obedience to discursive techniques, and often opposed to the ordinary use of language and to the parameters for the actions cultivated in the midst of ordinary life, thus, the Rhetoric harms the people and shakes their covenants, it is averse to common life. Add to it that Sextus Empiricus attributes this argument (that Rhetoric is harmful to the polis) to the Academics18 that, in their turn, raised the reasonable (eulogos)

16

Adv. Rhet. 19–26. Adv. Rhet. 26–43. 18 Adv. Rhet. 43. 17

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and the likely (pithanos) as pragmatical criteria for all actions, which are consensual criteria of which the effectiveness is attested in the scope of collectivity. Against the openly Skeptical Academic argumentation, there arises the openly Stoic rejoinder that asserts that Rhetoric is bad only when used by someone bad, it is not bad by itself, but when used by someone good and wise, it delivers good as a result. However, the wise Stoic, if he is not completely inexistent, is rare, in the same manner, the wise use of Rhetoric, if not completely inexistent, will be rare,19 Sextus ironizes.

6.4

The Refutations to the Definitions of Rhetoric as Science of Discourse and Producer of Persuasion

The first refutation of Rhetoric as science of discourse sends itself back to an aporia raised in Adv. Gram.131 about the definition of discourse, where there is no harmonia or symphonia amongst the Dogmatics, but diaphonia, once more urging for the suspension of judgment, now about the meaning of lexis.20 Despite the indetermination of the concept of lexis, Sextus proceeds in analysing the possibility of Rhetoric being the science of discourse, the purpose of which is to propitiate the good oratory.21 But it does not teach that, instead, it teaches tricks (for example: metalepsis of the expressions;22 periodical sentences;23 epiphonema;24

19

Adv. Rhet. 44–47. Adv. Rhet. 48–49. Next, over the steps Adv. Rhet. 49–51 Sextus Empiricus makes an outline of his argumentation against the definition of Rhetoric as techne. 21 Adv. Rhet. 52. 22 Adv. Rhet. 54 ¼ “μεταλήψεις τῶν λε
ξεων”. The metalepsis, while Rhetoric trick, consists of attributing an effect present to a remote cause. Meaning, it’s about a procedure through which one makes a reference to an object by means of something that only has a remote relation with this same object. In many cases, the expression is used to express simply the “substitution of meaning” or “use of one word in exchange of another”. 23 Adv. Rhet. 57 ¼ “περίoδoν”. It is about a kind of complex sentence that puts the main clause of a sentence in its end. Meaning, the subordinate clauses and other modifiers are put before the main clause, in such a way that the full meaning gets hung and incomplete until the end of the period. In many cases, this procedure can even damage the prompt understanding of the phrase. See, in this respect: ‘BALDWIN, C. S. Composition, Oral and Written. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1922’. 24 Adv. Rhet. 57 ¼ “ἐπιφω
νημα”. As a technical term of Rhetoric, designates the final phrase of a discourse, generally elaborated in a sententious and ornamental tone, by means of which the Rhetorician prepares of conducts the listener to some reception of the message. 20

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vowel collision25 and “similar endings”26) to ornate language, frequently to the point of deliberately confusing listeners, and going thus once more against ordinary language, which is erected by Sextus as a pragmatic criterion for good discourse.27 In the previous steps of Adv. Rhet., Sextus Empiricus employed an argumentation that was largely inspired in the Academics against the definition of Rhetoric as techne, but, as to Sextus the Academics are Dogmatics, one must investigate their own arguing that was previously adopted, verifying if there is the possibility of raising aporias in regards to it and to the philosophy of Academia. In this way, if before Sextus investigated the purpose of Rhetoric defined as art, now he jumps into the investigation regarding its purpose, but in a case in which it is defined as a science. Being more precise, Sextus examines the possibility that the Rhetoric, considered a science, has a purpose, the persuasion (or the likely ¼ pithanos), that is the Academic criterion for action and knowledge.28 For such it is needed to define persuasion, in three different ways: . . . a thing is called “persuasive” in three ways: in one way it is what is plainly true and by producing in us an appearance of truth draws us to assent (καθ' ἕνα μὲν τρóπoν ὅπερ ἐναργῶς τε ἀληθε
ς ἐστι καὶ ἀληθoῦς ἐμπoιoῦν φαντασίαν ἐπισπᾶται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν); in another it is what is false and by producing in us an appearance of truth draws us to assent (καθ' ἕτερoν δὲ ὅπερ ψεῦδóς ἐστι καὶ ἀληθoῦς ἐμπoιoῦν φαντασίαν ἐπισπᾶται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν) (which orators are in the habit of calling “likely”, from being like what is true); and in the third way it is what is common to the true and the false (κατὰ δὲ τὸν τρίτoν τρóπoν τὸ κoινὸν τoῦ τε ἀληθoῦς καὶ ψεύδoυς). (Adv. Rhet. 63-64).29

In its turn, the passage quoted above relates directly with another passage (Adv. Log. I, 174; which I quote below) in which the criterion of truth is discussed, thus, in

25

Adv. Rhet. 57. In the name of euphony, the Greeks implemented many kinds of phonetic alterations. The vocal alterations, cited here by Sextus Empiricus, are, basically, the elision (from the Greek ἔκθλιψις – to squeeze of tighten) and the crasis (from the Greek κρᾶσις – mixing). The first consists in the disappearance of a brief final vowel against the next word’s initial vowel or diphthong, being the apostrophe the sign of elision, for example: ἐπὶ ἐμoί -> ἐπ’ ἐμoί (“about me”); μετὰ ἡμῶν -> μεθ᾿ ἡμῶν (“with us”); ἐπὶ ὑμῖν -> ἐφ’ ὑμῖν. The second consists in the fusion of two vowels, one at the end and the other at the beginning, mainly between nouns, conjunctions and pronouns. When it occurs, usually the crasis sign (κoρωνίς – “little hook” with the same shape of the weak spirit) in the interior of the word, marking, thus, the two syllables in which the crasis occurred. Examples: καὶ ἐγω
-> κἀγω
(“and I”); ἐγὼ oἶδα -> ἐγᾦδα (“I know”); καὶ ἔστιν -> κἄστιν (“and there is”). 26 Adv. Rhet. 57 ¼ “ὁμoιoτε
λευτoν”. Can be translated as “similar endings”. In Rhetorical contexts, it expresses the deliberate use of similar endings in words’, phrases’ or paragraphs’ ends. Meaning, already providing an example, it occurs when phrases are ended with the same ending, “making them rhyme, as if poetry time”. 27 Adv. Rhet. 53–59. 28 Adv. Rhet. 60–63. 29 All translations of texts which compose Against the Professors are by Bury (2006) or by Bett (2018).

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the passage above, more than just discussing the definition of Rhetoric as science of discourse, it is also discussed the criterion: The persuasive, for the present purpose, is spoken of in three ways: in one way, applying to what both is true and is apparently true (καθ' ἕνα μὲν τρóπoν τὸ ἀληθε
ς τε ὂν καὶ φαινóμενoν ἀληθε
ς); in another way, to what is false but is apparently true (καθ' ἕτερoν δὲ τὸ ψευδὲς μὲν καθεστὼς φαινóμενoν δὲ ἀληθε
ς); and in the third way, to what is true, common to both (κατὰ δὲ τρίτoν τὸ [ἀληθὲς] κoινὸν ἀμφoτε
ρων). (Adv. Log. I, 174).

Comparing Adv. Rhet. 63–64 with Adv. Log. I, 174 we notice some discrepancies. In regard to the former definition of persuasion or of likely (pithanos), as indicative of truth, in Adv. Rhet. 63–64 the likely, from the truth, produces a “vision of truth”;30 while in Adv. Log. I, 174 there is the appearance of truth.31 As to the latter definition, as a lie or falsehood that produces an indication of truth, in Adv. Rhet. 63–64 the likely produces, from the false, a “impression of truth”32 that, furthermore, leads to assent; on the other hand, in Adv. Log. I, 174 there is the opposition between being false and seeming true.33 The third definition is similar in both passages: there can be something that participates simultaneously of truth and falsehood. In Adv. Rhet. 63–64 Sextus Empiricus constantly uses the word phatasia regarding truthfulness, therefore, the likely is that which persuades of truth because the impression that the object generates is truthful, or the likely persuades of a truth that does not exist, because the impression is false, and leads us to assent erroneously. In the case of Adv. Log. I, 174 the appearances (what appears ¼ phainomenon) are at play, and can present a truth, in consonance with the object, or can look like a truth, even though they are false. Now, phainomenon and phantasia are not synonyms, despite the distinction being subtle. The first refers to the appearances of objects to the sense, but even though there is not anyone to observe them, the object would still generate appearances, though one cannot know that for certain once for such it would be needed to observe its behavior when it is not being observed, a paradox. The last word refers to the phainomenon when perceived, and only when that occurs. Meaning, phainomenon would refer here to the appearance of the object even though independently from an observer, while phatasia would be the object from the moment in which it causes an impression to an observer. Furthermore, phantasia becomes a Stoic concept, nonetheless it was seized by the Academic starting on Arcesilaus 30 “ἀληθoῦς ἐμπoιoῦν φαντασίαν”. Compare with the Latin version of Herveti: “veri procreans visionem”, meaning, “that produces true vision”. We highlight that, in Cicero (Acad.) “visio”, “visum” and “visionem” are the Latin terms for the Stoic ϕαντασία. In the same manner, “quod videri visum comprehendible” is a Ciceronian expression that refers to the Stoic καταληπτικὴ ϕαντασία. Thus, we can say: “in some sense, what is clearly true and that, producing the impression of truthfulness”, that is, in its turn, cataleptic, justly for producing such impression of truthfulness. 31 “φαινóμενoν ἀληθε
ς”. 32 “ἀληθoῦς ἐμπoιoῦν φαντασίαν”. 33 “καθ’ ἕτερoν δὲ τὸ ψευδὲς μὲν καθεστὼς φαινóμενoν δὲ ἀληθε
ς”.

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himself at the time of the discussion against the Stoic about the criterion for truth. In its turn, against the Stoic terminology of the impressions (and Dogmatic, that generated numberless disputes, over which there is no unanimity, only aporias), the Pyrrhonean Skeptics intended to adhere to the phainomenon, which seems to exist from before the theories, both the ones that intended to define what is an impression, and those that intended to define their content. Being clearer, the Pyrrhonean Skeptics intended to live in accordance with a kind of perception that is not target to theories and cannot be discussed. In this way, the discussion about the criterion that overarches the whole Adv. Log. I enter the consideration of the question by Plato (Adv. Log. I, 141–145), after by the Platonists Speusippus and Xenocrates (Adv. Log. I, 145–150) and by the Academy in the Skeptical turn (Adv. Log. I, 150–174) when Sextus Empiricus introduces the super-criterion of phainomenon as a support to the pithanos, Arcesilaus’ criterion. Next, Sextus scrutinizes the Academic defense of the pithanos (Adv. Log. I, 174–190), but if the phainomenon is the ultimate criterion behind the pithanos, why is it not enough? The answer is given by the example of the Cyrenaics, for whom the phainomenon would suffice as a criterion (Adv. Log. I, 190–201). In contraposing Academics and Cyrenaics in Adv. Log. I, Sextus objective is to show the aporia between two schools of Socratic origin about the same subject, however, in P.H. I, 215, Sextus Empiricus clearly states that the Cyrenaics are similar to the Pyrrhoneans in regard to the criterion: both adhere to appearances. Going back to Adv. Rhet. 63–64, the relation stablished between the concepts of pithanos and of phantasia also conducts to an aporia, having in sight that they are mutually excluding, thus urging the suspension of judgment both about the Stoic concept as to the Academic. But let us follow the Sextan argument. Recurring to an irony, Sextus Empiricus asks that the Dogmatics persuade him of which is the best definition of persuasive (Adv. Rhet. 64): if (1) the persuasion is of truth, then, “the persuasion applied to it from rhetoric is redundant” (Adv. Rhet. 65), because there is no need of an art that persuades that the assassin that was nabbed is really guilty of his deeds, this is so evident as “it’s daytime”, or “I’m speaking now”. In addition, if Rhetoric is so persuasive, it is also dissuasive, in a way that concerns then both truth and false; if (2) it establishes an impression of truthfulness from falsehood, the argumentation employed will be the same as that of the case (1), thus, the Rhetoric will have to involve a knowledge of both false and truthful and will be equally dissuasive and persuasive of both, then it will not persuade exclusively of the false; (3) if it, finally, persuades or dissuades equally of truth or false, then it is not a science, because it does not relate exclusively with truth, there is not, therefore, a Rhetoric that is a science of discourse of which the purpose is to persuade (Adv. Rhet. 65–72). We said previously that pithanos is the word that Sextus uses and that I have translated here as persuasive, and also that, employed in the discussion about the criterion, the pithanos (translated as likely) and the Academic criterion (from Carneades and Clitomachus) for the practical action and the knowledge. If in Adv. Rhet. 65–72 the Sextan argumentation refers to the Rhetoric, defined as science, and if we are led to suspend the judgment in regards to the usage of pithanos specifically

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with the purpose of Rhetoric, on the other hand we can exacerbate the epoche and make it focus over the pithanos in general, reaching the Academic criterion for action and knowledge, and not exclusively in their Rhetoric theory, through the usage of the methodology advocated in P.H. I, 5 (that reports that there are specific and general Skeptical arguments) and in P.H. III, 280 (that reports that the Skeptical arguments differ in power, according to the power of the Dogmatic pathologies, being as strong as the diseases ask for). Moreover, in Adv. Rhet. 65–72 an argumentation that contraposed persuasion and impression was drawn and, if we are led to the suspension regarding the persuasion, as we demonstrated above, we must also demonstrate how we are led to the suspension about the impressions. Thus, if (1) the persuasion is of the true impression, the same way as an art that persuades truly is not needed, once it is self-evident, nor is there a need to assent to an impression of truth, because if it is self-evident it does not need consent, it is declarative, it is not, therefore, a phantasia, but a phainomenon, and independent of the receiver’s interpretation. If (2) the persuasion deploys an impression of truth from the false, how is it possible that the persuaded makes out such thing? Meaning, in the case that the person is deceived by the ability of a malicious speaker, he does not know whether he is being deceived when he is being deceived. If it is thus, then this person has an erroneous impression, but that he takes as being truthful, because he was persuaded, now, persuasion and impression get mistaken here, but, considering that the criteria are mutually excluding such a confusion is not possible. If (3) the impression can either be of truth as of false, just like the persuasion, and if the discernibility between truth and false is impossible, because the impression participates from either false as of truth, then it does not serve as a criterion of truth. From the three argumentations we are led to the epoche. But, if still as in the case of the pithanos, also with the phantasia we can extrapolate specific arguments (in the case, specifically concerning to the Rhetoric) for general arguments, we can thus suspend judgment about the Stoic theories about impressions in general.

6.5

Adv. Rhet. 73–113

In the steps Adv. Rhet. 73–113, the last forty steps of the work, the argumentation of Sextus Empiricus does not raise much aporias about the Dogmatic criteria, they are steps that are maybe more interesting for the literate or historians. The steps Adv. Rhet. 73–85 persist in the discussion of the purpose or Rhetoric. Sextus, recurring to an already thrown argumentation, refutes that the Rhetoric’s purpose is victory – because the Rhetoricians are defeated more often than they are successful –, or its utility, once that they have to involve with criminals. In regards to the discussion with respect to the result of the Skeptical therapy: the return to ordinary life – against the accusations of apraxia or anenergesia – it is worth quoting the steps Adv. Rhet. 76–79, in which Sextus considers that even those

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who persist affirming that Rhetoric’s purpose is persuasion must agree that it is inadequate to produce such end: And it is speech that creates goodwill in the judges that is persuasive; but what creates goodwill is not rhetorical speech, but the kind that is simple and displays the ordinary person’s manner of expression. For that of the orator is opposed by all those who have a hard time with excess; for even if the orator constructs a case for what is just, they feel as if it is not due to the nature of the things, but due to the orator’s stopping at nothing, that just things seem to them so; but the ordinary person’s manner of expression comes across as weak, and so everyone is on his side, and attributes more justice to what is less just because the case is constructed by someone straightforward and ordinary. This is the reason why in ancient Athens there was not the option of an advocate to defend those undergoing judgement at the council of the Areopagus, but each person made speeches on his own behalf to the best of his ability—no twisting and turning and no going to any lengths. Then again, if the orators trusted themselves about having a power of persuasion, they shouldn’t be arousing pity or compassion or anger or other things of this kind, which in no way persuade, but lead astray the judges’ good sense and put justice in the dark. (Adv. Rhet. 76–78).

The steps Adv. Rhet. 85–113 seek to refute that Rhetoric has a matter that it deals with, and also that it has parts, something that does not occur because for such it would need to have a specific content, but it does not. Now, in regards to our more previous defense that the scope of the Skeptic suspension of judgement does not restrict to theoretical philosophic or science, I quote the interesting steps Adv. Rhet. 97–99 in which, faced with a dispute taken to court, about a debt, the judges suspend their judgement: A young man gripped by the desire for rhetoric approached him [i.e. Corax] promising to pay the fee he would specify, if he won his first case. They came to an agreement, and at the point when the youth was exhibiting sufficient skill, Corax asked for the fee, but he refused. They both went over to the court and there was a trial, which is when, they say, Corax first used a line of attack like this: he said that whether he won or not, he ought to take the fee; if he won, because he had won, and if he failed, according to the terms of the agreement; for his opponent had agreed to pay the fee if he won his first case — and he had won it, so he ought right away to pay the debt as promised. The judges cheered him for saying what was just, but then it was the young man’s turn to speak, and he used the same line of attack, not changing a thing: “Whether I win”, he said, “or I am defeated, I shouldn’t pay Corax the fee; if I win, because I won, and if I fail, according to the terms of the agreement; for I promised to pay the fee if I win my first case, and if I fail I will not pay”. Owing to the equal strength of the rhetorical arguments, the judges came to suspension of judgement and impasse (εἰς ἐπoχὴν δὴ καὶ ἀπoρίαν ἐλθóντες oἱ δικασταὶ διὰ τὴν ἰσoσθε
νειαν τῶν ῥητoρικῶν λóγων); they threw them both out of the court, shouting “a bad egg from a bad crow!” (Adv. Rhet. 97–99).

Finally, I think that Adv. Rhet. Shows us: (1) that the Skeptic conserves himself active in a techne, disposing of the experience acquired with practice, and not with theories; (2) that the Skeptic is capable of communicating, disposing of the use of the language of ordinary men, without flowerings; (3) that the criterion for action, knowledge and performance of the technai are not beliefs, but the coercion by the phenomena; (4) that the epoche does not reach only the scientific of philosophical assertions, but also those present in other areas.

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Now, what about trying to cover some other features of Skepticism and its possibility of being not just lived, but of being an efficient and feasible way of approaching the technai?

Chapter 7

Sextus and a Positive Conception of Techne

Abstract In this chapter we analyze issue on the utility of using Galen’s De Sec. for comprehending the Sextan Skepticism, so we display some problems about this hypothesis and how they can be overcame.

7.1

Galen Again

Born in Pergamus, the philosopher/physician Galen (c. 129 d.C.) was one of the most prominent and influent thinkers who wrote in Greek Language, for he structured the foundations of a medicine which survived about 1500 years. Galen also was a prolific writer with about 150 extant works. His thematic interests were very diverse, since he wrote on history of sciences and of philosophy, logics, epistemology, ethics and metaphysics, as well as, obviously, on medicine, from anatomy to physiology, diagnostics, nosology, therapeutics, pharmacology etc. In his De Sec., Galen displays the quarrels between the members of the main three medical sects of his time: the Empiricists, the Rationalists and the Methodists. And Galen also displays the epistemic backgrounds and the practical approaches of each sect. Thus, my aim is to use the Galenic presentation of the Empiricist sect (which appears also in Subf. Empir. and Med. Exp.) to try to illuminate the thoughts of another thinker, Sextus Empiricus, since even if the majority of Sextus’ own works have survived, these works lack information on Sextus himself. Shortly, even if Galen’s works deserve a research by themselves, the aim of this section is to use them for piecing together another puzzle: is there some kind of Skeptical techne in Sextus Empiricus? And, if yes, what are the implications of it? With this question in mind, we should take a look at the doxography the concerning the Empiricist sect of medicine and compare them with the methodological steps given by Sextus Empiricus in his approach on knowledge, crafts and ordinary life. Now, to argue for this, I would like to start by saying a few words on Galen’s De Sec.

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As I said above, De Sec. displays a quarrel between three medical sects (Empiricists, Rationalists and Methodists), but for illustrating even better the history of this dispute we can also include the account provided by pseudoGalen’s Intro. 14.683.5–14.684.5. In this text we read that the disagreements between Rationalists and Empiricists started about III B.C., and by reading Galen’s De Sec. we notice that these disagreements were alive even 500 years later.1 The main issues under discussion were the nature of medical knowledge, i.e.: whether the medicine was a science (episteme) – which would define it as some kind of theoretical approach – or whether medicine was a craft (techne) – which would define it as some kind of practical approach2–; consequently, the discussions and disagreements were about how the doctor should behave in diagnosing an illness or prescribing a therapy, according to the nature of the medical knowledge and approach which each sect defends and adheres. To be sure, from III B.C. to Galen’s and Sextus’ time the debate became more detailed and the arguments more sophisticated because the sects recurred even more constantly to another very promising field: philosophy, which was also producing its own quarrels, between Skeptics, Stoics, Epicureans, Platonists and Aristotelians, from IV-III B.C. to late-Ancient times. And as well as we see in philosophy the appearance of eclecticism, we see the arise of the same intellectual phenomenon in medicine, as exemplified by Galen himself (see Lib. Prop. I). Thus, back to the issue on the utility of using Galen’s De Sec. for comprehending the Sextan Skepticism, it is necessary to display some problems about this hypothesis and how they can be overcame. First, primary sources as external cross-references for comprehending the Sextan Skepticism are useful because, since there is a great gap about Sextus himself, by using these primary sources we could shed some light on the impact caused by Sextus’ works in his own time, as well as on the philosophical motivations which underlie his writings.

1

Cf: De Sec. 1.64.1–1.65.5 It echoes the discussion mentioned by Aristotle, cf. Met. 981a.1–983a.23. Actually, there were discussions on medical topics happening amongst the Peripatetics, since Aristotle’s pupil Menon probably is the author of a book on medicine now known as Anonymus Londinensis, however, the authorship of this papyrus is still disputed (JONES, W. H. S. (ed. & trans.) (1947). The Medical Writings of Anonymous Londinensis. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). 2

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For such, as external primary sources we could use the above-mentioned pseudoGalen’s Intro.,3 the Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen,4 or Diogenes Laërtius,5 for these three explicitly mention Sextus Empiricus, unlike Galen. However, as an unknown author who does not have a large or important literary corpus, pseudo-Galen can be very hard or maybe impossible to locate in time, place or philosophical motivation, so it can improve even more our aporiae on Sextus’ works. On the other hand, being a kind of abstract for medical purposes which was written in Arabic language by the Christian epitomist Hunayn ibn Ishaq (809–873), the Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen juxtaposes two sources: 1- Galen’s De Sec.; 2pseudo-Galen’s Intro. And if it was argued that pseudo-Galen is not so useful, again one needs to restrict himself to Galen, the other source used by Hunayn. Finally, there is the doubtful “chronology” displayed by Diogenes Laertius (D.L. IX, 116). But the internal literary context of D.L. is almost totally dependent on philosophical and biographical data, rarely medical. But although the three above mentioned sources (i.e.: Intrd.; The Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen; D. L. IX, 116) are useless as external sources for comprehending the Sextan Skepticism, they have the specific detail – and yet not fully observed – of mentioning Sextus Empiricus in connection with the Empiricist sect of medicine. So, these three sources confirm that link between Sextus and the Empiricists, and additionally Galen’s De Sec. explain how the Empiricists’ methodology and approach on epistemology was, and how they figured out their own craft.6 Second, now specifically on the links between Sextus Empiricus and the Empiricists, Sextus explicitly reject them, so evidences in the very Sextan works assert that he was not a member of the Empiricist sect (PH I, 236–241). Actually, according to Sextus, because of its philosophical position of non-assenting to some statements, the Methodist sect would be much more closer to the Pyrrhonism than the Empiricist sect, since Empiricists gave assent to some

3

See: Introd. 14.683.5–14.684.5. Written by Hunayn ibn Ishaq (809–873), The Alexandrian Epitomes started by the Arabic epitome of De Sec., but Hunayn – as well as the Alexandrian doctors and translators and epitomists before him and even of his time – could not note or evaluate the authenticity of some primary sources which were used as if they were minor Galenic works, as Intro., for instance. So Hunayn overlaps De Sec. and Intro. In one only epitome which mentions Sextus: “There are three sects of medicine: first, the sect of Empiricists, whose adherents employ experience alone; second, the sect of Rationalists, whose adherents employ both experience and inference; and, third, the sect of the Methodists, who employ neither experience nor inference. The prominent adherents of the Empiricist sect were Acron of Agrigentum, Philinus of Cos, Serapion of Alexandria, Sextus [Empiricus] (), and Apollonius [Empiricus].” (The Alexadrian Epitomes of Galen, De Sectis, 4. WALBRIDGE, J. (ed. & trans.) (2014). Hunayn ibn Ishaq. The Alexadrian Epitomes of Galen, volume I. Utah, Brigham Young University Press.). On the range of translations and epitomes written by Hunayn, he himself tells us about it in Hunayn ibn Ishaq On His Galen Translations (LAMOREAUX, J. C. (ed. & trans.) (2016). Hunayn ibn Ishaq on His Galen Translations. Utah, Brigham Young University Press). 5 See D.L. IX, 116. 6 See: De Sec.1.66.1–1.69.5. 4

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statements on the impossibility of apprehending things which are non-evident. So, the Empiricists are criticized with the same arguments that Sextus displayed against the Academics: while the dogmatists assert that they actually discovered the truth on a particular issue, Academics assert that the truth cannot be discovered at all, the Skeptics keep on searching.7 But maybe the criticism made by Sextus towards the Empiricist sect can be much more than an unfathomable puzzle, since we can face the parts of the criticism as elucidatory clues, in this way: 1. Sextus criticizes the Empiricist sect because of its negative dogmatism, this is the very reason why the Empiricists look like Academics, instead of Pyrrhonists. This criticism would not be so problematic if this approximation between the Empiricist sect and the philosophy of the Academics was not some kind of “desertion”, for the Empiricists – since Aenesidemus and the very revival of the Pyrrhonism – developed their arguments in a symbiotic way with the arguments of the Pyrrhonist philosophy. 2. It is precisely because of this symbiotic development with the Empiricist sect that the Pyrrhonic approach on epistemology was misinterpreted as if it was parallel to the Empiricist one, in a moment when the Empiricist doctors were starting to turn to negative dogmatists. This misinterpretation is the reason why Sextus Empiricus endeavors to establish a dividing line between Pyrrhonists, on the one hand, and Academics and Empiricists, on the other hand. 3. The constant debates between Empiricists and Rationalists lead the first ones to a radical non-theoretical approach on medicine which started to become a selfcontradictory obstacle to their own science. Meanwhile, Pyrrhonism kept on developing itself till it turned to one coherent possibility for approaching the philosophy. 4. Even if Sextus was trained as an Empiricist doctor by Menodotus, it is because of his Skeptical behavior that Sextus was able to develop his criticism against his own Empiricist sect. And after following Menodotus as the head of the sect, Sextus could link it more with Pyrrhonism, avoiding the negative dogmatic assertions made his master. It is with this in mind that we should interpret the pseudo-Galen’s statement that Sextus lead the Empiricist sect of medicine to perfection, for Sextus gave to it the coherence that it was missing under Menodotus’ leadership. 5. As well as Sextus did with the Empiricist sect, he also tried to lead the Pyrrhonists to a more coherent approach on philosophy, linking it with the threefold way by which the Empiricists conceived their medical epistemology.8 Now, by the five arguments above we can rebuild the links between the Skeptic attitude and the Empiricist sect, and we can also think them as two kinds of approaches on philosophy and crafts, respectively, that can be performed together

7 8

See: PH I,1–3. Cf: De Sec.1.66.1–1.69.5.

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and without contradictions. But if I am right in this hypothesis, so the Sextan Skepticism is a kind of therapy, a medicine for the soul, and it would lead us to another issue: on the possibility of prescribing a Skeptic attitude without being or behaving like a dogmatist, i.e. without giving assent to assertive propositions, without intending to claim that the things really are (or really are not) this (or that) way. This attitude of not claiming, of a non-assertive way of speaking, can be interpreted as an aphasic behavior (PH I, 192) and this is the underlying reason why the Skeptics use expressions such as “no more” (ou mallon), “maybe” (tacha), “possibly” (exesthi), “I determine nothing” (ouden orizo), making their utterances sound like accounts about how the things appear to them.9 So, (1) if the Skeptics do not make utterances compromised with asserting how the things really are (or are not), (2) instead they just utter their own affections, using some formulae which reduce the assertive weight of their speeches and (3) linking their discourse with the way they perceive the world (and not aiming to describe the reality by itself), hence a Skeptical approach on medicine should be grounded on a procedure which obeys the clauses (1), (2) and (3). By reading Galen’s De Sec., we can see that the Empiricist sect was characterized by a procedure grounded on a threefold method: (a) observation/observance (teresis), (b) self-observation (autopsia) and (c) transition to the similar.10 On this threefold method, first the doctor should be a very skilled observer, since she/he needs to be attentive to the way people usually deal with diseases, to the way the diseases evolve and how patients are affected by them, and also to the way the diseases and patients are affected by the drugs, surgery and medical intervention (a). Second, the doctor starts to compile her/his own observations, gathering them in a notebook which is going to be useful as a constant reference and consulting material not only for her/himself, but also for others (b). Third, as in practice it is impossible to compile notes on each and every disease, doctors should use colleague’s notebooks, seeking out useful information, and if this procedure does not help, they should compare diseases with diseases, drugs with drugs, looking for those who are similar to others which were never observed before (c). I think that this threefold Empiricist method does not exclude the Sextan approach on philosophy and crafts, moreover, they can complement each other, i.e. the clauses (1), (2) and (3) can be related to the parts (a), (b) and (c) of the Empiricist method. So, without asserting that the truth has already been discovered – or that it is undiscoverable – (1), someone can keep on observing local habits for dealing with diseases, for instance (a). This procedure encourages the doctor to be aware On the Skeptical phonai, Sextus dedicates part of the final paragraphs of PH I to show how the Skeptical utterances, all with at least one of these phonai, are expressions of the Skeptical non assertion (aphasia), which is one of the results of the ataraxia. These phonai have the effect of annihilating the pretention of saying how the things really are (or are not), uttering them, the Skeptic can only relate how the things appear to her/him. Cf. PH I, 192–209. 10 Cf: De Sec.1.66.1–1.69.5. 9

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of not thinking that there is only one possibility of cure or treatment for a disease, she/he is open minded for gathering information coming from different sources. As they do not have a closed view to any new data, since they do not think that they have some stable and definitive knowledge of something – they instead think that the collected data is just the result of observations which can be compromised by particular circumstances (2) – they need to constantly examine their own approach and skills as doctors, but not only theirs, also that of other’s (b). As there are many ways of describing something, according to the ways someone interprets the collected data (3) and as the amount of data is never exhaustible, there must be a procedure for comparing data (c). In short, I could say that: 1. Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Professors, work which is especially concerned with the technai, is not merely destructive, since if one characterizes the specific kind of approach which is refused by Sextus, by elimination, Sextus leaves untouched another way of approaching the crafts. 2. Mainly reading Adv. Gram., Adv. Rhet. and Adv. Ast., one can find a procedure, one way of approaching the crafts, whose name is teresis (and the vocabulary correlated to it, as parateresis).11 3. In Sextus’ works teresis has a twofold meaning: 3.a observation; 3.b observance. 4. On 3.b, observance is directly related to the exhortation to follow the ordinary life12 and to follow the circumstantial uses of language. 5. On 3.a, observation is related to one part of the threefold procedure of the Empiricist doctors as narrated by Galen (De Sec.; Med. Exp.) and pseudo-Galen (Intro.) 6. Hence, on teresis as observation, we can picture Sextus as an Empiricist doctor. 7. But we can also find the other two parts of the threefold Empiricists’ procedure: historia (as related to autopsia) and the “transition to the similar”.

“And in general, since they declare that it is not the stars that inform them of the differences in men’s lives but they themselves observe them together with the positions of the stars, I affirm that if the prediction is to be reliable, the same position of the stars ought not to be observed once only in connexion with the life of some one person, but a second time with a second life, and a third time with a third, so that from the equality of the resultant effects in all the cases we might learn that when the stars have assumed a certain configuration the result will certainly be of one particular kind; and just as in medicine we have observed that a puncture of the heart is the cause of death, after having observed together with it not only the death of Dion but also of Theon and Socrates and many others, so also in astrology, if it is credible that this particular configuration of the stars is indicative of that particular kind of life, then it certainly has been observed not once only in one single case, but many times in many cases.” (Ad. Ast. 103–104). 12 “Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts.” (PH I, 23). 11

Chapter 8

Final Remarks: On the Reception of Skeptical Arguments and Their Transmission

Abstract The book finishes with some remarks on the fortuna of the Skeptical arguments. Then we will have the opportunity to tie up some loose ends, by revisiting the reception of Skepticism in Renaissance and Modern philosophy, as well as by dogmatic thinkers, mainly those linked with a religious agenda, ending up with the example of the Astrology.

In the following lines I would like to tie up some loose ends as well as to go back to the reception of Skepticisms. I think that this way I could better elucidate the arrival of Skeptical literature in Modern times (an issue related to the Introduction); the appropriation of Skeptical thought by dogmatic thinkers in Hellenistic Age (an issue related to the first block of the book, in general); and the impact of the Skeptical approach on one specific craft, Astrology (an issue related to the second block of the book). I emphasize that this time my own approach is more “essayistic”. So, I am going to start by the intricate web of relations between Skepticism and Christianism, an issue impossible to avoid and which is far from being self-evident. This intricacy is due, in part, to the multifaceted characters of Skepticism and Christianism, which in both cases becomes exacerbated over time. But, furthermore, precisely in these versatile characters there are concepts, attributions, or assertions embedded, that make their respective semantic fields seem mutually exclusive, and even radically opposed. For example: in the case of Skepticism, the doubt and the disbelief, introductory to atheism; in the case of Christianism, the faith and the dogma, introductory to fanaticism. So I am going to offer a kick-starter to the exciting problem of the relations between Skepticism and Christianism (or the Christian Skepticism) by trying to eliminate the perspective of a frontier drawn between two poles, which are illusory in many cases, as I will demonstrate here through the brief exposition of the similarities between the philosophical doctrinal approaches made by Sextus Empiricus and, for example, by Hippolytus of Rome in Late Antiquity.1

1 See: SIMON, M. (1973). Early Christianity and Pagan Thought: Confluences and Conflicts. In: Religious Studies, Vol. 9, n 04, dezembro de 1973, págs. 385–399. Cambridge, Cambridge

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Before that, let us go back to the Renaissance, without going into the problem of its historical boundary or its conceptual landmark. Let us deal with the particular case of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499). Ficino, an Italian scholar whose patron was primarily Cosimo de’ Medici, after his son Lorenzo de’ Medici, of whom he had been tutor, was the head of the project of establishing the Platonic Academy of Florence, previously conceived by Georgius Gemistus Plethon (c. 1360–1452), to whom, in turn, the reintroduction of Plato’s texts in the West is attributed.2 In turn, this reintroduction, inaugurated by Plethon, continued and nurtured by Ficino and supported by the de’ Medici and by the already stable Florentine bourgeoisie, inserts itself in the context of the intellectual, institutional, political, economic, and aesthetic unruliness of the Renaissance Humanism. This, first of all, in the intellectual aspect, proposed to revive Platonic thought against the dominant Aristotelian majority in the Catholic church, after the process of assimilation of Aristotle via Arab commentators, notably Avicenna, by Thomas Aquinas.3 Institutionally, the Catholic scholar (or rather, scholastic) project was largely centered around copying or making meditations on the manuscripts, or making defenses, expositions and refutations of theses and writing treatises or booklets. The Humanist project, by antithesis, intended to revive the Ancient and pagan “Schools”,4 in which they would frankly debate, without the typically Scholastic expository formalities, the arguments of pagan thinkers, without judging them, at least in principle, for their very ways of life, that were so different from those of Medieval Europe. To this end, aesthetically, the new Italian Humanist schools would also resort to teachings on topics related to the Greco-Roman education: rhetoric, music, geometry, oratory, physics, astronomy/logy, amongst others, capable of forming a whole man, human and ascending man, instead of a decaying and sinful creature.5 From the political and economic point of view, Humanism would be a first strategy of economical liberation: from the yoke of the Church and their high taxes, from the subservience that was owed to the priests and, mainly, from the formal ban on the collection of interests.6 Now, these five aspects cited earlier – intellectual, institutional, political, economic and aesthetic – I must emphasize, were not separate from one another, not

University Press. And LONGENECKER, R. N. (2001). The Christology of Early Jewish Christianity. Vancouver, Regent College Publishing. 2 See: HLADKY, V. (2014). The Philosophy of Gemistos Plethon: Platonism in Late Byzantium, Between Hellenism and Orthodoxy. Vermont, Ashgate Pub. Co. 3 See: KRETZMANN, N.; et al. (eds.) (1988). The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 4 See: LEPAGE, J. (2012). The Revival of Antique Philosophy in the Renaissance. Palgrave Macmillan. 5 See: WELCH, E. (2001). Art in Renaissance Italy: 1350–1500. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 6 KRAYE, J. (ed.). (1997). Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts: Moral and Political Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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even artificially, as it is done nowadays. Therefore, Humanism was a great project, although it was incohesive.7 Now, going back to Ficino, both for completing in 1477 the translation of Plato’s complete works and also for leading the Platonic Academy of Florence, he became heir to an important impulse of proliferation and establishing other ‘Academies’, like the one from the aforementioned Plethon, in Mystras, in the Peloponnese. A common point between Ficino and Plethon is that both of them thought, according to a Humanistic agenda or project, that the new dawn of Plato in the West would dusk Aristotle and, consequently, the Thomistic theology and the Church of the time, debtor of this theology. Thus, by rejecting the theological consequences of Thomas’ thought, Plethon and Ficino intended to revive the true church, the primitive one, from the Platonic, or Neoplatonic, Patristic and, along with this, both Pagan and Christian thinkers, such as Socrates, Plato, Plotinus, Hippolytus of Rome, Eusebius of Caesarea, as well as Zoroaster and the Zoroastrianism (whom Plethon openly admired) and the Chaldean astrologers (whom Ficino openly admired).8 Ficino’s neopagan project and, mainly, Plethon’s – who said that instead of Christ or Muhammad, a new pagan religion was bound to emerge, resolving disagreements9 – advocating for the Humanistic agenda, would not pass unscathed, and so we see a great traditionalist and Thomistic counter movement, too apologetic of the Humanistic erudition and education not to be, in fact, Renaissance, from George of Trebizond, a Byzantine religious man who read and translated copiously from Greek to Latin. Against Trebizond, and in favor of Plato and of Ficino and Plethon, once his teacher at the Mystras Academy, the logos of the most erudite Bessarion appears, who wrote treatises and commentaries to Plato’s works, but also refutations to the ‘pro-Aristotelians’. Indeed, the influence of the equally Constantinopolitan Bessarion, Roman Catholic cardinal and Latin Patriarch of Constantinople, Greek-speaking from birth and multilingual by practice, on Latin or Byzantine intellectuals, Aristotelians or Platonists, is important, and, amongst the influenced, let us mention, for example, Ficino and Trebizond, Lorenzo Valla (great Italian Humanist, reader of Cicero and the letters of Epicurus), Theodorus Gaza (translator and commentator of Aristotle), Michael Apostolius (Constantinopolitan theologian

7

KRAYE, J. (ed.). (1996). The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 8 For this paragraph, see: SIMON (opus cit.) and HLADKY (opus cit.). 9 On the programmed dusk of scholasticism and Aristotelianism, see: (KRETZMANN, opus cit.). On the dispute between Trebizond’s and Bessarion’s ‘projects’, see: (CASSIRER, 2001). On the subject of the impact to Bessarion’s private library and to the Byzantine librarians in general in the Italian renaissance intellectuals, see: STAIKOS, K. (2007). The History of the Library in Western Civilization: the Byzantine World: from Constantine the Great to Cardinal Bessarion. Delaware, Oak Knoll Pr. MONFASANI , J. (1995). Byzantine Scholars in Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Bessarion and Other Emigres: Selected Essays. Vermont, Variorum. VAST, H. (2013). Le Cardinal Bessarion (1403–1472) Étude Sur Le Chrétienté Et La Renaissance Vers Le Milieu Du Xve Siècle. Carolina do Sul, Nabu Press. MONFASANI, J. (2012). Bessarion Scholasticus: A Study of Cardinal Bessarion’s Latin Library. Turnhout, Brepols Publishers.

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who oscillated between Plato and Aristotle), the theologian and cosmologist Nicholas of Cusa and Francesco Filelfo (cousin of Leonardo Da Vinci).10 Now, leaving aside this Renaissance quarrel between Platonists and Aristotelians, but still conforming to the Humanists, let us recall that the Italian poet Francesco Petrarca had already discovered, in 1345, at the Capitular Library of Verona, a manuscript with Cicero’s epistles (with the woks ‘Epistulae ad Atticum’, ‘ad Quintum fratrem’ and ‘ad Brutum’). In turn, Trebizond’s circle is responsible for translations into Latin and commentaries of Diogenes Laërtius’ Lives, and Da Vinci’s cousin, Filelfo, the rediscovery (in c. 1427) of Sextus Empiricus’ works and their insertion in the aforementioned circle of scholars and guests, diners and correspondents of Ficino. In this sense, it is exactly around Ficino and his colleagues that the primary sources for the Ancient Skepticisms reappear, both the Pyrrhonean and the Academic. Therefore, it is not strange to read in the works of Nicholas of Cusa, an important member of this group, the statement that “the opinion of authority hath perverted thee, and made thee like an horse” (CUSA, [1450], apud. CASSIRER [2001] p. 85). However, Diogenes Laërtius and Sextus Empiricus were treated as more important for conserving the thoughts of others than for reasons related to their thinking. Furthermore, in regards to Skepticism, in general, if we remember that the same circle that should have received him was also engaged in the resumption of Augustinism, we would have the reason why the initial impact of Skepticism was dampened: Augustine’s supposed refutation of the Academic Skeptics in ‘Against the Academics’. But that would soon change, and, by the end of the fifteenth century, it would be the Skepticism itself which would play the role of defender of Christianity against the chimeric neopagan and primitive Christian agenda of the circle of Ficino, notably with Giovanni Pico della Mirandola – whose Disputes on Astrology is mirrored in Adv. Ast.11 – and Girolamo Savonarola, a Dominican friar who thought Skepticism was a preparation for faith. Savonarola’s political and religious actuation would still be paradigmatic of the new times that were to come: times of Protestant Reformation.12 For Savonarola, to whom the gift of prophecy was attributed, saw in Florence a New Jerusalem that would awaken, but only after the city’s liberation from political submission to the de’ Medici family and the bourgeois oligarchy, fostering the establishment of a Popular Republic with universal voting, a democracy of free artisans. For such an ideal or political prophecy to be completed, it would be needed that Savonarola’s 10 See: CASSIRER, E. (2001). Indivíduo e cosmos na filosofia do Renascimento. São Paulo, Martins Fontes. BLUM, P. R. (ed.). (2010). Philosophers of the Renaissance. Michigan, Catholic University of America Press. 11 See: GARIN, E. (1988). Astrology in the Renaissance: The Zodiac of Life. Londres, Penguin Books. DOOLEY, B. (2014). A Companion to Astrology in the Renaissance. Amsterdam, Brill Academic Pub. 12 See: ESTEP, W. (1986). Renaissance and Reformation. Miami, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

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party, the Frateschi, allied to the imperialist project of Charles VIII of France, who wanted to dominate the Italian city-states, advancing the expulsion of the bourgeois oligarchy pro-de’ Medici, which indeed happened, and the Frateschi seized power. Once their party had, then, taken over the command of Florence, Savonarola could begin his religious reform to complete that which he thought would be the New Jerusalem: homosexualism, adultery, public inebriation were forbidden, and a militia of the youth was set up to detect, expose and punish those who incurred in these crimes, even if they were friars. But, in the face of the ever more consistent threat of Charles VIII to the Italian city-states and also to the Spanish burgs, the then Pope Alexandre VI, summoned a military joint to contain the progress of the French hosts. Since the Florentine Republic of the Frateschi depended on the isolation of the rich bourgeoisie, and this isolation, in turn, depended on the support, even if implied, from Charles VIII, Savonarola did not support Alexandre VI’s joint in the ‘Italic war’. He was summoned by the Pope to give an account of his unsubmissive attitude, but he did not show up. Finally, such was his unruliness, that he got condemned to death by burning on May, 23 of 1498.13 Nevertheless, even if the first to assume an intrinsic relation between Skepticism and Christianism were to be silenced, it had already echoed sufficiently for some Skeptical arguments to be used by both Luther and Erasmus, in their debate on the Reformation.14 And Montaigne, in the face of stemming civil wars resulting of reformism and also of the tenacious undecidability that only made the conflicts worse, he could Pyrrhonically and acataleptically question who was able to judge the differences.15 Therefore, a Pyrrhonic general crisis is consolidated, and Pyrrhonism is being used to argue against the old science, from Aristotle, verifiably wrong as of the discovery of the New World, of the sphericity of Earth, of the existence of life in the tropics and of the true heliocentrism,16 or to point out the fallibility of reason in general, to demonstrate the strictly conventional character of laws and customs, to constitute, in the scope of religion, a Skeptical defense of faith, because, if one cannot – using only reasoning, as Montaigne pointed out – decide between Catholicism or Protestantism, be it Lutheran, Calvinist or Anabaptist, on the other hand, precisely by demonstrating and even provoking the failure of reason through Skeptical arguments of truth, one could make the necessary leap of faith, through

13

See: WEINSTEIN, D. (2011). Savonarola: The Rise and Fall of a Renaissance Prophet. Yale, Yale University Press. SAVONAROLA, G. (2006). Selected Writings of Girolamo Savonarola: Religion and Politics, 1490–1498. Yale, Yale University Press. 14 POPKIN, R. (2000). História do Ceticismo: de Erasmo a Spinoza. Rio de Janeiro, Francisco Alves, 2000. 15 See: LOQUE, F. F. (2012). Ceticismo e religião no início da Modernidade: a ambivalência do ceticismo cristão. São Paulo, Loyola. 16 See: MARCONDES , D. Skepticism and the New World. In: https://pucrj.academia.edu/ DaniloMarcondesFilho.

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revelation, still according to Michel de Montaigne (Apology of Raymond Sebond), the core of the message of Paul in the First Letter to Corinthians: For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel: not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect. For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved it is the power of God. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness (I Corinthians 1: 17-23).17

But the priors in the Scriptures to the sayings of the Pauline Skeptics were already, for example, in Ecclesiastes: (. . .) I am come to great estate, and have gotten more wisdom than all they that have been before me in Jerusalem: yea, my heart had great experience of wisdom and knowledge. And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly: I perceived that this also is vexation of spirit. For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. (Ecclesiastes 1:16-18).

And: The wise man’s eyes are in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness: and I myself perceived also that one event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it happeneth to the fool, so it happeneth even to me; and why was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also is vanity. For there is no remembrance of the wise more than of the fool for ever; seeing that which now is in the days to come shall all be forgotten. And how dieth the wise man? as the fool. (Ecclesiastes 2:14-16).

Or: “(. . .) further, by these, my son, be admonished: of making many books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh.” (Ecclesiastes 12: 12). The Skeptical arguments and the defense of faith became so interwoven that, even two hundred years after Montaigne, Hume, in the conclusion of his (perhaps) most heretical treatise, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (§ 228), asserts that: “To be philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian.” And Hamman, at the end of the eighteenth century, a reader of Hume and obstinate adversary of all Kantianism, translated the Humean Dialogues into German precisely to make Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers abandon reason, which is for Hamman inefficient to enlighten or clarify, because light of truth emanates from faith.18 And Hamman’s argument emanated, for example, on Kierkegaard, whom, in the words of Richard Popkin19 would dramatically develop a new All biblical quotations are translations from ‘King James Bible’, In: http://biblehub.com. See: BEISER, F. C. (1987). The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Ficht. Londres, Harvard University Press. 19 POPKIN, R. (1996). Kierkegaard e o ceticismo. In: Ceticismo. EIGENHEER , E. M. (org.). Niterói, EdUFF, 1996. P. 19–43. My translation. 17 18

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interpretation on the relations of philosophical Skepticism with the Religious beliefs and a new Skptic attack against his time’s view, “thus iniciating a new Age of Faith”. Also in the nineteenth century, for the first time, to name the Skeptical attack on reason and the defense of irrationalism and of faith, the term fideism was coined, by L. Bautain (‘Philosophy of Christianism 1835), and thirty-five years later, in 1870, it was forbidden as heresy by the First Vaticani Council, as recalled by Fontenelle Loque20 and ratified by the Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius: The same mother church asserts and teaches that God, beginning and end of all things, can be known for sure by the light of human natural reason, through the things created (. . .) And not only cannot be disagreement between faith and reason, but they help each other, since the reason shows the foundations of the faith. (LOQUE, opus cit., pp. 26, n. 7).

But what is typically Modern in this which came to be called fideism, or, in the use of Skepticism in favor of religion, is to make Skepticism introductory to faith specifically by removing the obstacles of reason in general. However, in the following lines, I want to show, through the paradigmatic examples of Philo of Alexandria, Hippolytus of Rome and Eusebius of Caesarea (some of the favorite authors of that circle of Ficino, from whom some texts of Sextus Empiricus also departed to literate Europe21) that Skepticism as a means of introductory argumentation to faith was nothing new and was already present in the ancient theologians. Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea, (c. 265–339) in his Praeparatio Evangelica sought to unveil the pagan principles that underpinned the heretical interpretations of Christianity and, once exposed, these principles are recursively demonstrated as inconsistent through the Skeptical method of equipollence and mutual exclusion of theses, precisely because these interpretations did not align with that of Origen of Alexandria – a Christian (c. 185–253) of the circle of the Catechetical School of Alexandria’s (Didaskaleion) – to which they belonged –, which was a Neoplatonic interpretation. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the absorption of Skepticism by the Alexandrian theologians had only started with Eusebius between the third and fourth centuries of our era. On the contrary, Eusebius is exemplary for demonstrating the maturity of such absorption, which would have begun with the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (20 BC.–50 AD.), so let us start with Philo. Amongst the forty or so manuscripts of Philo that got to us, there are not noticeable occurrences of the consecrated Skeptic concepts (and also Epicureanist, and still Stoic, even though to a lesser extent) of ataraxia. And even the word epoche, that, according to Sextus Empiricus (P.H. I, 8–9), consists in one of the moments that define the very Skeptical dynamis, only happens once in the

20

LOQUE, F. F. (2012). Ceticismo e religião no início da Modernidade: a ambivalência do ceticismo cristão. São Paulo, Loyola. 21 See: FLORIDI, L. (1995) The Diffusion of Sextus Empiricus’s Works in the Renaissance. In: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 56, n 1. Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995. P. 63–85. FLORIDI, L. (2002). Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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nominative case (in: ‘De fuga. 136.2).22 The context of the occurrence of the noun is a fictitious dialogue of Philo with “the one who looks for aporiae” (De fuga.133.1–2) primarily on metaphysical issues, that have a vocabulary of peripatetic origin (e.g. hyle). Following, the zetetic or aporetic interlocutor23 asks Philo for guarantees to trust the senses, and Philo answers that one must trust in the divine providence, for God providently “ordered the things in sucha a way that the mind comprehends, the eyes see and all the senses work” (De fuga. 135.4–5), and at this very moment, for Philo, the fictitious interlocutor is himself led into silence (hesychia)24 and to the “suspension on all that is not trustworth” (De fuga. 136–2). Thus, in short, to Philo, the zetetic was caught in his trap, for in his inquiry he demanded some warranties for sensory knowledge, and that these warranties were given by divine providence, and also for rational knowledge so that the zetetic had to adopt a Skeptical attitude (expressed by the words hesychia and epoche) in regards to his Skepticism. Although short, this reference to a fictitious Skeptic in De fuga. is very significant of three things: the widespread notion that Skepticism refutes itself; the notion, this one without priors, that if conducted efficiently, the Skeptical argumentation, instead of turning the faith in God into an obstacle, serves to prove it; and that mental states of silence and suspension, propaedeutic to the Skeptic’s ataraxia, would also be propaedeutic to the faith of the believer. Now in the Alexandrian Christian circle, the first significant references to Skepticism are those made by Clement of Alexandria, with three important occurrences of the word ataraxia (in: Paed. II.7.58.3,6; Strom.IV.7.55.4,4; VI.2.24.10, 1). From Clement, I quote: And for those who are aiming at perfection there is proposed the rational gnosis, the foundation of which is “the sacred Triad.” “Faith, hope, love; but the greatest of these is love.” Truly, “all things are lawful, but all things are not expedient,” says the apostle: “all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not.” (. . .) “For though we walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh; for the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the demolition of fortifications, demolishing thoughts, and every high thing which exalteth itself against the knowledge of Christ.” Equipped with these weapons, the Gnostic says: O Lord, give opportunity, and receive demonstration; let this dread event pass; I contemn dangers for the love I bear to Thee. “Because alone of human things Virtue Methodologically, I’ll use the occurrences of ἀταραξία and ἐπoχή as a means of detecting passages in which there are significant references of the Alexandrian theologians to the Skeptical dynamis. The reason for this is that these nouns, from Aenesidemus of Knossos (and perhaps even before that), came to be considered as inalienable to Skepticism, even though not exclusively, even if the matter of whether there was ordinary use of ἀταραξία and ἐπoχή amongst Pyrrho and his first disciples is contentious. Furthermore, by mapping the citations in which these nouns appear, we avoid using doxographic material that would not collaborate with the objective that we provisionally intend to achieve: to demonstrate the hypothesis still in its grounding phase that, not only were there references to Skepticism made by the Alexandrian theologians, but that they absorbed elements of Skepticism in their theologies. 23 Zetetic and aporetic, as well as ephectic, are, in their turns, alternative definitions of the Skeptic or the Pyrrhonic, see: P.H. I, 7–8. 24 For ἡσυχία as a Skeptical jargon from Timon of Phlius, disciple of Pyrrho, see: D.L. IX, 65. 22

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receives not a recompense from without, But has itself as the reward of its toils.” “Put on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness, meekness, long-suffering. And above all these, love, which is the bond of perfection. And let the peace of God reign in your hearts, to which also ye are called in one body; and be thankful,” ye who, while still in the body, like the just men of old, enjoy impassibility and tranquillity of soul. (καθάπερ oἱ παλαιoὶ δίκαιoι ἀπάθειαν ψυχῆς καὶ ἀταραξίαν καρπoύμενoι)”. (Strom. IV.7.54.1, 1 – IV.7.55.4, 4).

Unlike the hesychia of Philo of Alexandria, arising through the perception that reason refutes itself, Clement of Alexandria’s impassibility (apatheia) and imperturbability (ataraxia) are the results of rational gnosis that demonstrates that in pain and suffering, in flesh, they are not the biggest obstacles for good-fortune, but, on the contrary, it is exactly in them that the possibility of ascension to virtue lies, and the greatest example of this is the Martyrdom of Christ itself, to whom is attributed the impassibility and imperturbability, similar to the justs of the past. But although the apatheia and the ataraxia are currently used to express Skeptical states of mind, the “just people from the past” that exemplified impassible and tranquil attitudes are the Macedonians, the Lacedemonians and the Zeno of Elea, author of the paradoxes (Strom. IV.8.56.1,1–3). Therefore, the reference here is not to the Skeptics, let alone to the two other occurrences of the ataraxia (in: Paed. II.7.58.3, 6; Strom.VI.2.24.10, 1). In regards to epoche, there are nine significant occurrences of it in Clement,25 the first (Strom. II.21.129.9, 1) advances the discussion on rational gnosis that starts at the step II.20 and that comes to include, in the book IV (as I have already demonstrated in the citation above), the characterization of Christ as impassible and imperturbable. In this way, if for Clement the most adequate means of approaching God is through knowledge, the section II.21 of Strom. seeks to inventory the most diverse “opinions of the philosophers about God” (a later title attributed to the section), since Epicurus, through the Cyrenaics – both despised by their hedonistic doctrines, put here on an equal footing – by the Peripatetics – despised by their eudemonic ethics, that excluded the poor, the sick and the slaves, once they can not be happy in adversities – and ending with Stoics like Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes of Assos, Antipater, Panaetius, Posidonius, and Herillus of Carthage. Clement’s appreciation is directed to Stoic ethics amongst all others that are cited, for if to him, to live in accordance to God one needs to know Him, then Stoicism, by placing knowledge and wisdom as guiding morals, tailors itself to this principle in perfect compliance to Clement’s approach of virtue as a life lived in the peace of Christ, and conquered through the knowledge that it is in adversity that one can overcome the woes of the body, making the spirit rise over it, the divine portion of man, fortified and stiffened before the mishaps of flesh. An apology to martyrdom. The partial defense of Stoicism is crowned with a doxographic citation from Herillus of Carthage (in: Strom. II.21.129.7, 1). Herillus is identified, in this passage, as one of the main defendants that “the goal is to live in accordance to knowledge”, 25

Strom. II.21.129.9, 1; VIII.5.15.2, 1; VIII.5.15.5, 1; VIII.5.15.6, 3; VIII.5.15.9, 3; VIII.5.16.1, 4; VIII.7.22.1, 1; VIII.7.22.3, 1; VIII.7.22.3, 2.

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to whom “the recent disciples of Academy” contrapose, to them, the goal is the epoche, but Clement does not undertake any comment on the posture that he attributes to Academics. It is in the VIII book of the Strom. that Clement intends to demonstrate the true faith to the Greek philosophers, accused of being futile for wanting to refute everything and to investigate everything motivated by the vain love of fame, on the other hand, “the Barbarian philosophy, expelling all contention, said, ‘Seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you; ask, and it shall be given you’” (Strom. VIII.1.1.2, 5). Thus, because they knock on his door, Clement opens it, defining Christianity based on the Greek modes of investigation and exposition, remaining, as a final challenge to be overcome, the “Application of demonstration to sceptical suspense of judgmen” (a title is given later to the section VIII.5). All the passages following VIII.5 in which there are occurrences of epoche can be summarized as different Clementine invectives that accuse the Skeptics of refuting themselves, as the topic of self-refutability of Skepticism does not concern us now, few words should be said about it: Clement’s argument has nothing new, but is one of the best available sources of a systematic anti-Skeptic attack. Now, concerning our attempt to demonstrate that there was a circulation of ideas and arguments between Skeptics and theologians, Clement’s text is paradigmatic, for it shows that Skepticism was a present, living, and real problem to the foundations of Christian faith. Now, as for the Martyr of Hippolytus of Rome (c. 170–236), in his Refutatio, notedly in chapters 3 to 11, in which one intends to refute the knowledge of the Chaldeans, i.e. astrology, he employs a Skeptical method which appears in Adv. Ast. of Sextus Empiricus. From Hippolytus, as an example, I quote: Whence, if the horoscope be removed, it necessarily follows that neither any celestial object is recognisable in the meridian, or at the horizon, or in the point of the heavens opposite the meridian; but if these be not comprehended, the entire system of the Chaldeans vanishes along with (them). (Refutatio IV.3).

Now, by way of comparison, I cite Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Ast. 49–53: Well, most people try to do away with the Chaldean method by means of these kinds of potshots; but we, true to the close-up style of attack, once we have shaken its principles and, as it were, elements, will have the ensemble of their remaining theories, too, along with these, devoid of standing. So, the principle and, as it were, the foundation of the Chaldean method is the ascendant’s being set; for from this the rest of the centers are grasped, and the declinations and after-risings, the triangles and quadrangles and the configurations of the stars in accordance with them, and from all these come the predictions. Hence if the ascendant is done away with, necessarily neither is the one in the mid-heaven or the one setting or the one in the anti-mid-heaven known; but if these are not apprehended, at the same time the whole Chaldean method disappears. And that the zodiac sign in the ascendant is not discovered by them it is possible to teach in a variety of ways. For in order for this to be apprehended, first the birth of the person undergoing the inquiry must have been firmly apprehended, and second, the time-teller that signifies this must be unerring, and third, the rising of the zodiac sign must have been seen precisely.

Finishing, it is not possible to know much about Sextus Empiricus’ life, but certainly, he was contemporary to the Catechetical School of Alexandria, which had been attended by Eusebius, and also by Hippolytus of Rome, and also, very

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likely he spent part of his life both in Alexandria and in Rome. But it would be foolhardy to try to weave and apprehend the Ariadne’s thread that could unveil the direction of the influences Pyrrhonism on other thinkers by the labyrinthic streets of the Alexandria, Rome, Athens, Cyrenaica. . .Therefore, without a path, a poros, the discussion becomes aporetic. Thus, it urges that we suspend judgment and silence ourselves.

Appendices

Appendix 1: General Introduction to the Stoic Philosophy1 Abstract By considering aspects of the lives and works of the Stoic thinkers, we hope that one can comprehend how, when and by whom were created/developed what are, to us, the most relevant contributions to the philosophy of the Stoa as a system.

1 Early and Middle Stoa So, suppose we take D.L.’s anecdotes seriously, that would imply we believe that Zeno (c. 333–261 B.C.) of Citium, Cyprus, was a merchant, the stereotype of the Phoenician man, in the Greeks’ view, and we would also believe that Zeno got shipwrecked near de Piraeus. Then, he headed to Athens and went into a bookstore, where he got pretty involved reading Xenophon’s Memorabilia and, in the exact moment that Crates, a Cynic, was passing by, Zeno asked the bookseller where he could find men like Socrates, to which the bookseller responded by pointing his finger at Crates and saying: “follow him”.2 Thus, Zeno’s first teacher was the Cynic Crates of Thebes (c. 365–285 B.C.). If we bear in mind that the Cynics rejected all social conventions as superfluous, for to them the excellence of the wise is self-sufficient, that is what may have interested 1

A more detailed analysis of all the issues embraced by this chapter III can be found in: SEDLEY, D. (1999). The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus. In: INWOOD, B (org.). The Cambridge Companion to The Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. SEDLEY, D. (1980). The protagonists. In: BARNES, J; SCHOFIELD, M; BURNYEAT, M. (orgs.). Doubt and Dogmatism, Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. And: SELLARS, J. (2006). Stoicism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2 D.L. VII, 3. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 R. Pinto de Brito, The Skeptical Dynamis and Its Pragmatic Possibilities, Synthese Library 455, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92407-2

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Zeno in Cynicism. Actually, the influence of the Cynical ethical doctrine of the arete as the self-sufficiency on the Hellenistic schools cannot be underestimated, however, it fits like a glove in Stoicism. And possibly this massive Cynic influence on Stoicism, and even more on Zeno of Citium, would explain the authorship of one of the most controversial of the books attributed to him: Zeno’s Republic. A project of redesigning the city in which most civic institutions and conventions should be abolished.3 Yet, Zeno would never propose an entirely Cynical way of life, as they often had shocking behaviors, thus, he ended up seeing the Cynic disdain to institutions and conventions as austerity. Another thing that sets Zeno’s philosophy apart from Cynicism is that, for the Cynics, all that was located between the excellence and the deficiency – the conventions, for instance – was bad. While to Zeno there were external physical things that could help or hinder the attainment of wisdom and happiness, even though they were not desirable or moral goals by themselves, since they are indifferent. Probably Zeno’s adhesion to this conception on the external physical things and his partial rejection of the more radical Cynical ethical conception on this issue was instilled in him by the Academic and Peripatetic conceptions. But Zeno also attended the lectures given by Stilpo of Megara (circa 360–280 B. C.). Compared to Cynicism, Megarians thought that excellence is self-sufficiency, though in a less radical way than for the Cynics. Furthermore, different from the Cynics, the Megarian school encouraged the acquisition of broad theoretical support, trying to increase the dialectical ability of its adepts by the management of discursive techniques. Zeno’s intellectual path in Athens was intense, as he tried to acquire a solid philosophic foundation. That is why he attended the most prominent schools of his time, such as the Dialectic school, under Diodorus Cronus. Well, now that we have the required knowledge about Zeno’s filiations, let us analyze the foundation of the first Stoicism and the contents of its main doctrines, as well as the first developments done by some of the scholarchs of the middle phase. As it was said before, when Zeno arrived in Athens, from Citium, around 312 B. C., he looked for some philosophical orientation in the Socratic matrix, largely available, and after years attending to the Cynic, Megarian, Dialectical and Academic schools,4 he started giving his lectures at the painted colonnade of the Athenian agora – the city where he lived until he died in 262 B.C. Therefore, the foundation of the Stoic school is primarily attributed to him.

3

See SVF I. Maybe he also went through the Lyceum, the Peripatetic influence over Zeno remains polemic. See: SEDLEY, D. (1999). The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus. In: INWOOD, B (org.). The Cambridge Companion to The Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and SEDLEY, D. (1980). The protagonists. In: BARNES, J; SCHOFIELD, M; BURNYEAT, M. (orgs.). Doubt and Dogmatism, Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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But the internal cohesion of the Stoic system would be built in the next generations after Zeno. So, as the first group of Stoics was developing their ideas, and verifying those which would fit better in the whole philosophy, some of the conceptions of the thinkers who composed the first group – Zeno’s group – were diverging and the debates were quite constant. Thus, if we pay attention to the divergences born inside the first Stoa, we can see the gradual solidification of the nucleus of the Stoic philosophy. For instance: 1. From the divergence with Herillus – who said that there was no unique supreme end – we can conclude that Zeno defended that there was just one moral goal, the excellence (¼ wisdom). 2. From the divergence with Aristo – who defended the rigorous indifference of all external corporal goods and only one form of excellence, and who also exalted the ethics in detriment of logic and physics – we can conclude that Zeno, in his turn, would give some importance to external corporal goods. Also, he thought that philosophy was composed of three parts, namely, physics, logic, and ethics.

But, despite the disagreements there were hawkish defenders of Zeno’s philosophy, the most notable was his disciple Cleanthes of Assos who, when his master passed away, took the lead of the group of the first Stoics, a happening which coincides with Aristo’s rebound and expulsion to the Cynosarges – the Cynics’ reunion place. Therefore, Cleanthes needed to build the doctrinal rigidity around Zeno’s philosophy and the rejection of the philosophies which opposed it or did not resemble it while Zeno was still alive. Likewise, if we remember Zeno’s intellectual path and how the schools which he went through came to influence him – the austere Cynicism, with the notion that the supreme moral end is exclusively the excellence; the Megarian school, with the apology to the theoretical support; the Academy, with the conception that there are external corporal goods and evils; and the Dialecticians, with the basics of propositional logic – we can rebuild the doctrines of the first Stoa, in which philosophy was thought of as a tripartite system. Even if Stoicism replaced readily the worry with a theme that was partially marginalized by Socrates and the Socratism, but surely not by Aristotle (the Physics), still, the Stoics continued agreeing with the Socratic predecessors when they understood that the most important philosophical reflections are those concerning the moral. So, to live well and be happy is to live virtuously and in conformity with nature, and that is how one attains the excellence. Thus, it would urge the need of knowing nature to act in line with its designs. This is the fundamental importance of knowledge: it is responsible for uniting the moral objective of the Stoic system – the happy life, which is the virtuous and excellent life lived by nature – with nature itself, which needs to be interpreted through some physics. In their turn, the criteria and parameters that validate or repudiate ways of knowing the real and the truth are thrown and based on a logic that embraces epistemological theses. Before, though, we concentrate in the theses that compose the Stoic system, we must review the life and works of some other prominent Stoic philosophers.

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Thus, after Zeno, we have Cleanthes as the head of the Stoa (circa 260 B.C.), maybe the responsible for the development of theological consequences of Stoic physics, inspired by Heraclitus. The third head of the school in Athens was Chrysippus of Soli, who succeeded Cleanthes around 230 B.C. and lead the school until his death, around 200 B.C. Chrysippus devised solid arguments to defend the school against the robust Skeptical attacks of the Middle-Academy – without which the inconsistency of Stoicism would have been attested, hurrying its ruin – and to which Diogenes Laërtius commented: “had there been no Chrysippus, there would have been no Stoa” (D.L. VII, 183). Thus, Chrysippus was responsible for nothing more and nothing less than the survival of the Stoa. In addition to that, the audacity and capstones in the Stoic conceptions about language, including its disciplines, like Grammar, Logic, and Etymology are due to him. Diogenes of Babylon is our next focus in the history of the Stoic school. His master, Zeno of Tarsos, led the school after Chrysippus, and Diogenes became scholarch of the Stoa in Athens (circa 155 B.C.). We attribute many writings to Diogenes, such as manuals on Stoic ethics and dialectics, as well as treaties containing defenses of the complicated syllogisms of Zeno of Citium in the light of the logic developments raised by Chrysippus. He developed two important syncretisms in Stoicism: (1) with ancient Pythagorean theories on the subject on music theory and (2) with the Aristotelian theory on rhetoric,5 which turned the focus of the school to those areas. The music and rhetoric would become, thus, thanks to Diogenes, liberal sciences incorporated by the system of the Stoa,6 but maybe his greatest contribution is that of introducing the Stoa to Rome, when from the famous episode of the departure of the Greek philosophers to the Roman senate. After Diogenes of Babylon, we have Antipater of Tarsus7 (c. 152 B.C.), who was the first to try to align the doctrine of the Stoa to the doctrine of the Academy to avoid, or at least dilute, the caustic attacks of Carneades, arguing for the affinity between the Stoic and Academic moral goals. Native from Rhodes, a disciple of Antipater and scholarch of the Stoa between 129 and 110 B.C., Panaetius read and commented writings of Plato and Aristotle in the light of the Stoic philosophy. He tried to review some doctrines of the school, like the dogma of the universal deflagration. Deepening the syncretism with Platonism and Aristotelianism, we have Posidonius, born in Apamea in Syria in circa 135 B.C. An interesting aspect that the philosophy of the Stoa acquires under Panaetius and that accentuates itself with Posidonius is the appreciation of the polymathia, a topic genuinely peripatetic that comes to be reread by the Stoics and that makes various disciplines that were 5

For a demonstration of how the Stoicism came to absorb certain Pythagorean terms and theories see Adv. Log. I. For more about the music theory and its development with the system of the school see Adv. Mus. About the incorporation of the rhetoric to the system see Adv. Rhet. 6 About the treatment of Diogenes of the music theory and the rhetoric see Ind. St. Herc. and also SVF III pages 221–235 (Περὶ μoυσικῆς) and SVF III pages 235–244 (Περὶ ῥητoρικῆς). 7 The fragments of Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon and Atipater of Tarsus, as well as those from other disciples of Chrysippus appear compiled in SVF III.

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otherwise excluded from the scope of investigations of the school relevant. Thus, under physics, the following disciplines would be added: Cosmology, Astronomy, Theology, Metaphysics, Medicine, and Psychology. Under logic: Epistemology, Rhetoric, Grammar, the propositional logic, the proof theory, the geometry, the arithmetic, and the music would be added. And in the ethical part (. . .) virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in three properties: the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to restrain the passions (which the Greeks call πάθη) and make the impulses (ὁρμαί) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order that we may through their co-operation have our natural wants supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward off any impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity will permit. (Cic. Off. 2, 18)

Moreover, Posidonius was also Cicero’s master. So, by considering these aspects of the lives and works of these thinkers, we hope that one can comprehend how, when and by whom were created/developed what are, to us, the most relevant contributions to the philosophy of the Stoa as a system. Concerning the Stoic philosophers of the Roman phase, except for Epictetus, they are going to be mentioned only when necessary.

2 Stoicism as a System Since Zeno, the Stoic philosophy was defined as a system composed by the physical, logical and ethical parts. However, there was never an agreement among the philosophers of the school about what is the main part, neither there was any agreement about which part should be taught first.8 Thus, They say that philosophical doctrine has three parts: the physical, the ethical, and the logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to divide it this way in his work On Reason; Chrysippus did the same in the first book of his work On Reason and in the first book of his Physics, as did Apollodorus Ephelus in the first books of his Introductions to the Doctrines, Eudromus in his Elements of Ethics, Diogenes of Babylon, and Posidonius. These parts Apollodorus calls “topics”; Chrysippus and Eudromus call them “species”; others call them “genera.” They compare philosophy to an animal, likening logic to the bones and sinews, ethics to the fleshier parts, and physics to the soul. Or again, they liken it to an egg: the outer parts are logic, the next parts are ethics, and the inmost parts are physics; or to a fertile field, of which logic is the surrounding fence, ethics the fruit, and physics the land or the trees. Or to a city that is well fortified and governed according to reason. No part is separate from another, as some of the Stoics say; instead, the parts are blended together. And they used to teach them in combination. Others present logic first, physics

8

Chrysippus, for instance, thought that the teaching of the parts of the system should work beginning by Logics, going later to Ethics and finally to Physics. Cf. Plut. De Stoic. 1035 A.

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second, and ethics third. Among these are Zeno in his work On Reason, as well as Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Eudromus. (D.L. VII 39–41)

By the above-quoted passage, we can see that despite the divergences, there are similarities that can indicate to us something about the mechanism of the Stoic system, such as the similarities between a living being and an egg, that can reveal the organic interdependence9 among the parts. Now, it is exactly for this organicity that these similarities become preferable for some members of the school: (. . .) the approach of those who say that one part of philosophy is physics, another ethics, and another logic seems to have been more omplete. Of this group Plato is in effect the founder, since he engaged in discussion on many matters in physics, many in ethics, and not a few in logic. But the most explicit adherents of this division are Xenocrates, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics. Hence they implausibly compare philosophy with a garden covered in fruit, so that the physical part can be likened to the height of the plants, the ethical part to the succulence of the fruits, and the logical part to the strength of the walls. Others say that it is like an egg; for ethics is like the yolk, which some people say is the chick, physics is like the white, which is food for the yolk, and logic is like the outside shell. But since the parts of philosophy are inseparable from one another, whereas plants are considered distinct from their fruit and walls are separate from plants, Posidonius thought it more appropriate to liken philosophy to an animal, the physical part being likened to blood and flesh, the logical part to bones and sinews, and the ethical part to soul. (Adv. Log. I 16–19)

In its turn, the comparison with the fertile field reveals the role of logic (external fence) of defending the conceptions of the school, the essential base of the doctrines in the comprehension of nature, given that nature is represented as the soil and the trees that, if properly cultivated, produce that which can, finally, be harvested by man: the fruits. The comparison with the fortified and rationally administered city shows the claim of the possibility of defending oneself through the vigorous use of reason, justifying the characterization of the Stoic philosophy as an intellectualist one. However, if we consider that the objective of Stoicism is Ethical: the excellence or virtue, that, once achieved, turns the man into a sage, and we also accept that Stoic sages never make mistakes, because they are secured from the providential structure of the world (physical) that is equal to the destiny and that is the same as the will of Zeus, we will, then, conclude that the guarantee of the serenity of the sage comes from the ordination of life through the knowledge of nature. Thus, to be a sage it is necessary to own a strong epistemology (logic) that reliably indicates the truth, even if one approximates the truth gradually. The importance of logic as an element that interlinks the physics and the ethics could also serve to justify the treatment of the parts that compose the Stoic system from it,10 but I opt not to. I think that if physics and ethics are in any way

9

The argumentative interdependence (and not only organic) of the parts of the philosophy of the Stoa can also be deduced from Cic. Fin. III 74. 10 As does Sextus Empiricus, cf.: Adv. Log. I 24.

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corresponding, bearing in mind that the rule for life is extracted from the workings of the physis itself, then let us begin by the physical theses.

3 Stoic Physics To Zeno, there are things which can be real, but that are not bodies and, therefore, do not exist according to the Stoic materialistic ontology, but which, nonetheless, can be real. These incorporeals are four entities: the empty, the time, the place, and the “utterable” or “expressable” (lekta). They are real, despite being non-existent, they are thought objects11 and as such, instead of existing, they subsist. They are real entities but are part of a non-existent reality. So, if there are the incorporeals, they are opposed, obviously, to the corporeals, which embrace things which have the capacity of acting or suffering action,12 such as the soul. With this in mind, we can understand some traditional points about the Stoics’ cosmology, to whom there were two principles, one active and another passive: They hold that there are two principles of the universe: the active and the passive. The passive principle is unqualified substance, namely matter, while the active principle is the reasoning power in it, namely god. For the latter, being eternal, fabricates every single thing throughout the entirety of matter. This doctrine is posited by Zeno of Citium in his work On Substance, Cleanthes in his work On Atoms, Chrysippus near the end of the first book of his Natural Philosophy, Archedemus in his work On Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his Account of Nature. They say that there is a difference between principles and elements; for the former are neither generated nor destroyed, whereas the elements are destroyed in the conflagration. What is more, the principles are bodies and without form, whereas the elements are endowed with form. (D.L. VII 134)13

Strangely enough, despite having two types of corporeals that performed two distinct cosmogonic roles, one active (god) and another passive (matter), all that is corporeal stems from one same thing, the physis. But that which could be seen as an additional problem, actually, only comes to add to the idea that, indeed, all that is part of the set of corporeals is the same, even though, for clarification effects, there is an active and another passive corporeal that propitiate the creation of the kosmos itself in an incorporeal initial moment. Nonetheless, all corporeals are defined as either active

11

See Adv. Gram. 19. This kind of criterion for the corporeity appears as a postulate emitted by the mouth of Zeno himself in Cic. Ac. Pr. 39 in a discussion on physics. 13 There are many Ancient fragments about the two principles of the Stoic physics, I quote but one: ‘Heraclitus of Ephesus identified fire as elemental, Thales of Miletus water, Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaximenes air, Empedocles of Acragas fire and air and water and earth, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae the homoeomeries of each thing, and the Stoics matter and God’ (Dio. Oen. Phy. 6 I 10-II 9). 12

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or passive, and there is not, on the Stoics’ side, a rigidity that points us which corporeals are always active and, therefore, are always casually prior to the corporeals that are always passive, that is because there are no “always active” nor “always passive” corporeals: all corporeals experience actions originated in other corporeals and act on other corporeals, in a way that the causal relations among them are extremely interwoven.14 Given that the physis is identified as Zeus, it is possible to understand the Stoa’s physical doctrine as some sort of pantheism, where god is conceived as a providential directive force. The physical/theological bias was deepened by some philosophers of the school like Cleanthes of Assos, as one can see in his ‘Hymn to Zeus’. Despite one’s initial surprise to the approximation between a naturalistic physics and theology, this surprise is anachronistic, thus, the Stoic god is a god in nature and both are living beings (D.L. VII 142), in a way that, where one reads “god”, in the Stoic fragments, they can read “nature”. Besides, the god (that is the cosmos itself) is aware, as Cicero reports to us: Zeno used to compress into this form: ‘That which has the faculty of reason is superior to that which has not the faculty of reason; but nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world has the faculty of reason.’ A similar argument can be used to prove that the world is wise, and happy, and eternal; for things possessed of each of these attributes are superior to things devoid of them, and nothing is superior to the world. (Cic. N.D. II. viii, 21)15

In an excerpt immediately ensuing the one quoted above, Cicero advances his exposition of the Stoic physics, attributed to Zeno himself, in which the god/cosmos, in addition to being corporeal, alive, wise, blessed and eternal is a sensitive being: “Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation” (Cic. N.D. II. viii, 22)16

And, as a living being, the cosmos is spherical and surrounded by an infinite void.17 Thus, the cosmos would expand and retract in a cyclical process in the following manner: (a) First, there is the action of the divine active principle (that is an igneous pneuma) on the passive matter, which comes from the corporeal division in two fundamental principles (archai). (b) After this initial creative moment, the formation of the cosmos would be complete. Then it is exceedingly difficult to insightfully discern what is active and what is passive, bearing in mind that all corporeals act and experience actions from one another simultaneously. Nevertheless the intense causal overlapping there is amongst all corporeal elements, it is possible to detect

14

The unpredictable causal interwovenness between the corporeals propitiates the fruitful Skeptical attack from Aenesidemus (against the etiologists) that appears in P.H. I 180–185. 15 All translations of this work are by Mayor. 16 Compare with D.L. VII, 142–143. 17 See D.L. VII, 140.

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those subtle causal currents, but only if one comprehends the mind of Zeus, which watches over the totality of corporeals that is the cosmos and that is god itself. (c) Despite the apparent cosmic stability, Zeus would be passing from the initial igneous pneuma form to the form of pure fire and propitiating the consumption of the whole cosmos, from which nothing would remain except god itself, who became fire. (d) The creative fire (pyr technikon), that became everything there is, is the same as a shapeless cosmic animal, it is pure soul.18 By scarcity, the fire would become air (active principle) that engineers the moist from which water, soil, and fire (passive elements) would all arise, each of which from the liquid, the thick and the subtle parts of moist, respectively.19 (e) Again, we would have a divine corporeal cosmos that is igneous pneuma and that, despite the apparent commonness, once again walks to deflagration (ekpyrosis).20 As it was once said, there is a direct relationship between the physics and the ethics of the Stoa, but before we abide specifically the ethical part, we must consider some important concepts to the physical part, that demonstrate how interwoven physics and ethics are: destiny, providence, and soul. If the whole cosmos is governed by the mind of Zeus, then there is a strict causal determinism that is the divine providence itself. The causal chains between events propitiate an inescapable order raised by its connections; it is what the Stoics called destiny (heimarmene): That all things happen by fate is asserted by Chrysippus in his treatise On Fate, by Posidonius in the second book of his work On Fate, by Zeno, and by Boethus in the first book of his work On Fate. Fate is the causal chain of the universe or a rational principle according to which the cosmos is administered. (D.L. VII 149)21

18

See Plut. De Stoic. 1053 b. See D.L. VII 142. 20 There are obvious complications in regards to the Stoic cosmology, the first of them is timely: how to temporally discern between the creative fire and the igneous pneuma, having in mind that if the fire is creative it should be the active principle instead of the igneous pneuma, and thus that should, at creation, precede the other that, in its turn, is habitually known as merely a non-creative fuel (Ecl. 213,17–19)? And also the problem already presented of the distinction between the active god and the passive matter. The other complication is spatial and needs a conceptual upgrade, for it there is the real that includes the corporeal and the incorporeal and there is also the existent that includes only the corporeal, then there should be a totality of everything that exists (ὅλoς), that is a smaller set than the whole (πᾶς) that, in its turn, also includes what does not exist, but is real. Thus, the ὅλoς is everything that composes the corporeal cosmos that, when it expands or retracts, occupies space inside of the bigger sphere of everything that, in including the incorporeal, includes the infinite void that involves the finite corporeal existent. See Adv. Phy. I, 332. 21 In sequence, Diogenes Laërtius presents the Stoic argument for divination, having in sight that if all is part of one causal chain, and then it is possible to foresee future events. 19

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The Stoic cosmos, conceived as a mechanism in which every event is intermediary to others – one which caused it and another that follows from it – does not admit accidents or changes, so, all that appears to occur by choice or by luck was determined previously by whatever cause that we perhaps missed, for example. God, the mind that administers everything, moves all causal chains. Thus, considering that the Stoic universe is animated and, in this way, some sort of living being, and also that its soul is characterized as pneuma – the soul of the god/cosmos –, hence the souls of others smaller living beings that are part of the cosmos’ set are, in the same way, pneuma and fragments of the pneuma. So, also in the soul aspect (beyond the causal aspect), the lives of every one of the beings that compose the universe are interwoven, because they originate in a single greater life – god’s life. Finally, there are different degrees of tension of the igneous pneuma that permeates everything when the cosmos ceases from being creative fire, and then there are three tensions levels: cohesion (hexis), nature (physis) and soul (psyche) – cohesion sustains the aggregate that forms the objects; the nature is responsible for the vegetative life, as in the plants; and the soul is the power of the conscious life present in animals. To these three there must still be added the fourth degree of tension of the pneuma, the rational soul (logike psyche) which is present in humans and confers the rational power of judging that is what propitiates some interposition between passive reception of impressions and conscious action. Thus, human beings have the four degrees of tonoi of the pneuma: the cohesion, given that they are objects that compose the cosmos; nature, that is the principle that makes us grow and that makes itself present from when we are fetuses; the soul, that makes us capable of the sensitively perceiving, of moving and of reproducing; and the rational soul, that gives us the capability of judging. In short, to the Stoics, human beings have both manifestations of the soul, whereas other beings have only the strictly sensitive part. Besides, this “double” human soul, compared to an octopus (Plac. 4.21.2) has eight divisions (D.L. VII 157): the five senses, the faculties of reproduction, of language and the “commanding faculty” (hegemonikon). The latter, in its turn, can be divided into three other faculties: impression, impulse, and assent, of which only the first two are shared with the irrational animals, the faculty of assent, however, only exists in human beings and it is what defines us as rational, differentiating us from other beings, being the actual core of our being.22

22

I highlight that, as we will see later, in rejecting the faculty of assent, in proposing its retention (ἐπoχή), the Skeptics, according to the dogmas of the Stoic psychology, took from men their own humanity, rendering human life impossible.

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4 Stoic Ethics Having presented the main theses of the Stoic physics, and considering that the ethics ground itself on physics, we must now address the matter of the Stoic conception of morals. But we cannot proceed without considering a crucial aspect of the discussion. At first glance, one might be surprised by the sheer number of quarrels amongst the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period, so one might imagine that opting for eclecticism would be an exit. Then, why not select the most suitable position for each debate, from whichever school one desires? Indeed, some philosophers did just this. However, for the most part, they had cling to the totality of dogmas and theses of some school that disputed for its hegemony as a single paideia. So, as a parameter for comparison, I propose that one should think the moral principles of schools according to the Kantian concept of the maxim, following Bittner’s interpretation23 (cited below), that shows us that there are three definitions of maxims expressed in Kant’s works: 1-“A maxim is the subjective principle of the volition; the objective principle (i.e., that which would serve all rational beings also subjectively as a practical principle if reason had full control over the faculty of desire) is the practical law.” (Kant, ‘Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals’, Ak 4:401])24 2-“A maxim is the subjective principle for action, and must be distinguished from the objective principle, namely the practical law. The former contains the practical rule that reason determines in accord with the conditions of the subject (often its ignorance or also its inclinations), and is thus the principle in accordance with which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle, valid for every rational being, and the principle in accordance with which it ought to act, i.e., an imperative.” (Kant, ‘Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals’, Ak4:421) 3-“Practical principles are propositions that contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, if the condition [under which they apply] is regarded by the subject as valid only for his will; but they are objective, or practical laws, if the condition is cognized as objective, i.e., as valid for the will of every rational being. (Kant, ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ chapter 1, §1)25

Thus, the sayings of the philosophy of the Stoa (apophthegmata), once understood as maxims are (following the criteria that define a maxim in the Kantian sense, according to Bittner): 1. 2. 3. 4.

Principles of fundamental propositions that, qua principles must determine the want and the act. Determine the want and the act in a strictly subjective scope. One must not only want to act in a certain way but, indeed, act in that way.

See: BITTNER, R. (2003). Máximas. In: Studia Kantiana, n 5, November. All translations of this work are by Wood. 25 Translated by Pluhar. 23 24

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5. On the other hand, despite the subjectivity of the maxim, it must be able to be generalized, and its generality must reside in the fact that they must orient the life of the individual in its totality. 6. Nonetheless, the apophthegmata cannot be maxims if they are too universal because they would not include under themselves the diverse and contradictory ways of life. 7. The corollary of this is that the maxims are fed and feed the individual’s life experience itself. Moreover, to have good character means to truly follow one’s maxims and to consciously and subjectively submit one’s comprehension of their life experiences to the light of the adopted apophthegmata. In its turn, “the first subjective basis for the adoption of maxims” (Kant, ‘Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason’, pp. 25),26 chosen freely, even though one cannot know the reason. Thus, the character of the Stoic (and also the Epicurean, the Academic, the Cynic, the Peripatetic, the Pythagorean. . .) man is attested by the unrestricted observance of apophthegmata that determine his will, in a practical sense, but the apophthegmata must also be able to be generalized, turning them into lenses for the subjective assessment of one’s whole life experience, feeding it and excluding other apophthegmata that go against this one life experience.27 The forcefulness of the disputes in which “man of talent, who were perturbed by the contradictions in things and in aporia as to which of the alternatives they ought to accept” (P.H. I, 12) became target of the satirist Lucian,28 for example. As such, an aspiring Stoic would study the three parts of philosophy and practice the typical exercises of his school, which are deployments of their conception of ethics, to achieve happiness, despite the adversity of circumstances. For that, they would dispose of a set of moral maxims that revolve around a conception of nature, the most difficult core concept of which being the oikeiosis: They say that an animal’s first impulse (πρω  την ὁρμήν) is to preserve itself, because nature from the start makes the animal attached to itself (oἰκειoύσης αὐτὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀπ ἀρχῆς), as Chrysippus states in the first book of his work On Goals, where he says that “for every animal the first thing that belongs to it (πρῶτoν oἰκεῖoν) is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof”. (D.L. VII, 85)29

26

Translated by Pluhar. The possible approximation between Stoicism and the moral philosophy of Kant is a fruitful theme, but my aim here is just use the Kantian motion o ‘maxims’ to try to explain some reasons why the eclectic position, although available, was not so attractive, since the adhesion to it would imply one filtration of the dogmata of lots of schools, oftenly rivals, and it would go against the notion of ‘maxims’ (or apophthegmata). Furthermore, the different and opposed dogmatic corpus which composed the schools and the necessity to fully adhere justify the jokes made by Lucian (see the footnote below). For more, see: ‘BECK, L. W. (1960). A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press’, and ‘BRITO, R. P. (2012). O estoicismo e suas máximas: Epiteto. In: Breviário de filosofia pública – 78’. 28 See: Luc.Herm. and Luc. Vit. Auct. 29 Compare with: Ep. 121.6–15; Plut. De Stoic. 1038B; Cic. Fin. 3.62–8. 27

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To the Stoics, all animals, including humans, act by impulse (horme). The first of which is that of self-preservation, the most important and that sets us up to look after our offspring, to search for food and water, for example. In this way, we owe the continuity and success of our existence to the impulse of self-preservation. But, if self-preservation is our most basic impulse, then, our most primitive choices and actions are tailored by it, in such a way that it determines that we choose what is best capable of fitting our vital needs, always. There would be, consequently, an instinctive rule to the correct action (that which does not impose itself against the very life it should preserve, or against the life of another intimately linked to ours, such as our offspring) that is, in its turn, dictated by our animal nature: self-preservation. Now, if (1) good is that which preserves our animal life and bad is that which harms it – and, as for other animals, we “know” this, instinctively –, also, if this is (2) a first substrate over which humans and other animals attribute value to things, then, (3) to the irrational animals (alogoi ¼ those animals that do not have, in the Stoic terminology, logike psyche, but which have psyche), it is good to drink when one is thirsty and to eat when one is hungry. On the other hand, to humans, even though drinking and eating are also good because they satisfy our strictly animal nature, we also have a rational human nature, and thus, (4) we must preserve ourselves not only as physical beings, but also, and mainly, as rational beings, such that, when in a situation where the death of the body is preferable to the irrational life, or a situation that goes against the rational and freely chosen maxims, one can opt for the death of the body, so that the logos can survive. To the Stoics, therefore, there is not a contradiction between the principle of self-preservation and suicide, in such a way that the condemned men that rise against tyrants, even causing the loss of their own lives,30 as did Cato, who opposed himself strongly to Julius Caesar and suicided himself after he won the battle in Tapso, in 46 B.C.,31 and Seneca who, like his wife (who survived), resignedly accepted the suicide imposed on him without judgment by Nero, and cut his wrists in 65 A.D. as inspired by Socrates. To Cato and Seneca, the existence of the body was indifferent when compared to excellence that, indeed, is the only thing desirable by itself, just like a vice is the only thing avoidable by itself. Thus, we can divide things that exist in three groups according to their moral appeal: 1-. The excellence, that is the wisdom, that is the knowledge of the causal chains and the mind of god and that, in its turn, is the logos in the physis, and the action according to this logos is the action according to the will of god. 2-. The bad, the vice resulting from the actions executed by the ignorant and the bad, without knowledge of the divine/natural designs. 3-. The indifferent, external corporal goods and evils that, like social relationships, food, or water, even though they can facilitate the reach of virtue, can just as

30 31

Cf: Diss. 1.2. See Plut. Cat. Mi.

122

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easily facilitate the vice, that is why they are indifferent, they have the potential to the good and the evil, indistinctly and, if they are not desirable by themselves, they are also not avoidable by themselves. Once grasping this terminological distinction, we can go back to the example of the tyrant and analyze the reasoning behind the action of the Stoic philosopher. The tyrant obliges him to commit an evil deed in exchange for the continuity of his life; the individual then realizes that the execution of the act would take him to the vice and would counter the maxims that he chooses voluntarily and rationally, and it is the capacity of rationally choosing (through the exclusively human organ of hegemonikon) that defines him as a human; and, as a human and owner of logike psyche, the individual knows that he possesses the self-preservation instinct, but that he must preserve, as a rational being, his rationality while he is still rationally capable of choosing; thus, considering that the excellence is the wisdom, the full use of reasoning, against the impossibility of acting in accordance to the rationally chosen apophthegmata and then reaching excellence, he opts for death, because physical life is indifferent. This positioning is attributed to Zeno of Citium himself and must be understood as a means of conciliating the Cynic conception of excellence, that is exclusively the autarkeia (everything else is indifferent or vice), with the Platonic conception, of the Academic Polemon, who attributed value to the external corporeal goods.32 Thus, to Zeno, even though he considered, like the Cynics, that only excellence is desirable and only vice is avoidable, on the other hand, he attributed value to the external corporeal goods that could facilitate the achievement of the excellence in a case by case basis: emphasizing that those goods were not desirable by themselves. Maybe this flexibilization of the original Cynical approach has appeared after the severe critiques that emerged against the Dogs, possibly Zeno has fully stuck to the Cynical maxims in his youth, when he wrote his Republic, and exactly for taking it seriously and pondering about the limits of Cynicism he opted for a less controversial solution,33 in any way, his softened theory, that admits the importance of external corporeal goods (though it rejects them as goals), was further softened by posterior Stoics.34 On the other hand, the Zenonian distinction (between indifferent, virtue and vice) won, with Epictetus, the important and subtle conceptual and practical differentiation between what depends on us and what does not: Some things are under our control (ἐφ ἡμῖν), while others are not under our control (oὐκ ἐφ ἡμῖν). Under our control are conception (ὑπóληψις), choice (ὁρμή), desire (ὄρεξις), aversion (ἔκκλισις), and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing.

32 Compare with Aristot. Nic. Eth. 9.9. As we’d said previously, we don’t endorse the hypothesis that Zeno would have been influenced by the Peripatos, but we also do not reject it, we are coerced to suspend judgment to it, given the aporia amongst the researchers and historians of ideas in this subject. 33 See: Cic. Ac. Pr. 36–37. 34 See: Cic. Fin. 3.10, 3.41.

Appendices

123

Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free (φύσει ἐλεύθερα), unhindered (ἀκω  λυτα), and unimpeded (ἀπαραπóδιστα); while the things not under our control are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our own. (Ench. 1. 1–3)35

In Epictetus, all the indifferents, it does not matter how powerful they are to facilitate the achievement of virtue, belong to the category of that which does not depend on us, thus we must not worry about them, only the excellence must be our target, since only it is submitted to our power of choice. This way, to live in a way that will yield excellence is something that must be chosen, thus, it is exactly this admirable choice that must be heightened, because it is under it that the correct (katorthomata) and appropriate (kathekonta) actions happen, the fruit of a strictly rational decisive calculation. That is why, to the Stoics, the correct actions that come from opinion have no value, because even though they are correct they are the fruit of ignorance, the vilest of vices and if regarding results, they differ from bad, they do not differ from it in regards to their sources. In the face of the happenings, we must be attentive to that which depends on us and, if on the one hand, the happenings themselves do not depend on us, on the other hand, it is under our power, through the commanding part of our soul (hegemonikon), the choice (proairesis) of assenting (synkatathesis) to the impressions (phatasiai) that are clear (kataleptikai). Acting in accordance with those clear impressions, we take the rational and appropriate actions that, if in accordance with the totality of the maxims and with the Stoic conception of virtue, are perfect actions (katorthomata), in complete synchrony with the natural/divine designs, without disquiet. In this case, the man becomes virtuous, excellent, and lives happily. But, if it is necessary to act unfailingly it is necessary to assent to the correct impressions, and it is necessary to know what these impressions are, and thus we enter the field of the Stoic theory of knowledge.

5 Stoic Theory of Knowledge As it was already seen, the objective of the Stoic philosophy is ethical: the excellence, that is the wisdom, that brings serenity or quietude to the wise man. But wise Stoics are infallible because they are safe in regards to their knowledge of the providential structure of the world (physics) – destiny and will of Zeus36 – they wisely arrange their lives fitting this will and live in accordance to nature, this grants them serenity.37 But, to be wise it is necessary to be provided with a strong epistemology that safely indicates the truth, even if it approaches the truth gradually, and the mainspring of the Stoic epistemology is the concept of kataleptike phantasia:

35

All quotations of Epictetus were translated by Oldfather. See: D.L. VII, 135; Plut. De Stoic. 1049f. 37 See: D.L. VII, 87; Cic. Fin. III 31, IV 14–15. 36

124

Appendices

An impression is an imprint on the soul, its name appropriately borrowed from the imprints made in wax by a seal ring. Some impressions involve comprehension (καταληπτικήν), others do not (ἀκατάληπτoν). The comprehending impression, which they say is the criterion (κριτήριoν) of reality, is that which arises from an existing object and is imprinted and stamped in accordance with it. The uncomprehending impression is that which does not arise from an existing object, or, if it does, does not accord with it; it is neither clear nor distinct.38 (D.L. VII, 46)

It is worth noting, before we move on, that even if the notion of kataleptike phantasia is central in every phase of Stoicism, there was, in the initial phase, a quarrel around it. To Zeno, the cataleptic impressions were imprinted on the soul, and Cleanthes of Assos, his disciple, agreed. However, Chrysippus saw contradictions in the idea that the cataleptic impressions were imprinted on the soul because, to the Stoics, the soul was corporeal and, therefore, it would not be possible to imprint something in it multiple times, because the technai are understood by the Stoics as “a system made up of apprehensions” (Adv. Log. I, 109), and those impressions would become distorted, incapable of being preserved, then there would be no memories or abilities, and thus, there would not be experiences (empeiria) either. Another problem is that, to Chrysippus, if there were multiple presentations occurring to the mind simultaneously, in the way it was thought by Cleanthes, the soul would not be able to be accurately imprinted, thus the person would not have a clear impression of the objects or facts. Then Chrysippus “suspected that the term ‘impression’ was used by Zeno in the sense of ‘alteration’, so that the definition runs like this – presentation is an alteration of the soul”.39 Despite the quarrels and small discrepancies, it is worth noting that, to the Stoics (contrary to the Epicureans), the impressions are not all truthful and the ones that are must obey the following conditions (according to D.L. VII, 46): (a) they must derive from existing objects; (b) they must accurately represent these objects; (c) they must be stamped in the sense organs. In spite from the primordial role of the sensible impressions – what justifies the idea that Stoicism be considered an empiricist system – it must be highlighted that there are not only sensible impressions, but also intellectuals ones, such that the sensible impressions come first (they are prior conceptions) and occur without a conscious effort and naturally – and, if truthful or cataleptic, meaning, in concert with nature, they allow for structuring the knowledge of the mind of Zeus itself and the obedience to its designs, though they are not the knowledge in itself. However, in a second moment there occur impressions that are originated in the cultivation of the mind and

38 39

Note here the link between clarity and distinction as criteria of truth, compare with Descartes. “phantasia estin heteroiosis psyches”. Adv. Log. I, 229–230.

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125

in attention. These intellectual impressions are concepts that are images in the mind of a rational animal and create scientific understanding (episteme40). We can, thus, propose the following scheme to the Stoic theory of knowledge: 1st – There are impressions that affect us and before which we are passive: (a) some are not cataleptic (they do not obey to the criteria of clarity and distinction) and are not safe; (b) others are cataleptic and safe; they obey the criteria of clarity and distinction and occur naturally and in accordance with nature. 2nd – But we must choose to assent to those cataleptic impressions, avoiding the non-cataleptic ones. 3rd – The build-up of cataleptic impressions, used in conjunction, generates the different abilities. E.g. woodworking is an ability that arises from a set of a whole range of impressions. 4th – This same build-up generates memory, which allows us to acquire experiences. 5th – The memorized experiences and the actual memories caused by the impressions, that become objects of mental thought, creating intellectual impressions (concepts).41 6th – The coordination of concepts through discursive and logical mechanisms allows for scientific understanding. We cannot proceed without mentioning that, beyond knowledge and ignorance, there is the opinion, that can either be wrong and resemble ignorance, or it can be right and resemble knowledge. However, the action based on ignorance must be coordinated just as the action based on the incorrect opinion, because to act according to incorrect opinions is typical of ignorant people. But the actions that occur according to the correct opinions, though they resemble knowledge, are also originated from ignorance because they do not originate in knowledge nonetheless, they generate correct actions, and every action that is not executed according to knowledge is a executed according to ignorance. In addition, an action can only be appraisable when it is correct knowingly because there was a decisive calculation. Any incorrect action, on the other hand, is reprehensible, because there was an incorrect decisive calculation, and the correct or incorrect actions originated in opinions because there was no decisive calculation. We must still understand how to act in the face of non-cataleptic impressions, those which are not clear nor have distinction. The answer is given by Arcesilaus in a debate between him and Zeno himself: one must suspend judgment, concepts

40

See: Plac. IV 11.1–6; Cic. Ac. Pr. 41; Acad. pos. 20–22, 30–31; Plut. De Comm.47, 1084f– 1085a. 41 There are yet conceptual distinctions regarding the way, through the absorption of impressions, that mental impressions are created, see: Adv. Log. II, 58–60; and: D.L. VII, 53.

126

Appendices

respectively equal to the Greek synkatathesis and epoche, in Cicero’s terminology “adsensionis retention” (see: Cic. Luc.59, 6).

6 Conceptual Table of the Stoic Philosophy

Afection Impressions

Accepting destiny nature Excellence

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127

Appendix 2: Conceptual Tables of the Skepticism Before Sextus Empiricus Abstract In these conceptual tables, we try to correlate the historical moments and the main concepts of the Skepticism before Sextus Empiricus, including topics as the historical context, primary sources, criticisms and problems. In the conceptual tables below, I try to correlate the historical moments and the main concepts of the Skepticism before Sextus Empiricus. Thus in “stage” I make the phase explicit, following the chapters of the book (i.e. “Proto-Skepticism”; “Life of Pyrrho” in D.L.; “Pyrrho’s followers”; “Arcesilaus”, “Carneades”, “Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Aenesidemus and Agrippa”, as well as the penetration in medicine); in “sources” I indicate the sources that I’ve used; “who” referes to the subjects quoted by the sources; “scope” denotes the ways the subjects mentioned can be thought as Skeptics; after that, there are the “criticisms” done to these scopes, as well as their sources; I also show, whenever there are, the “sources’ problems”, due to the way they are/were interpreted. Furthermore, whenever the arguments which appear in the “criticisms” or “problems” are preceded by (*), that means that the arguments are contemporary to us, and not to those against whom these arguments are driven.

Stage: 1. Proto-Skepticism (Skepticism as an attitude partially present even in dogmatic philosophers): Idem Idem Idem

Idem

Sources: D.L. IX, 71.

Who: Homer:

Scopes: Perception of the ambiguity of the senses and of the human behavior

Criticisms: X

Idem Idem D.L. IX, 71–74.

Archilochus: Euripides: Xenophanes:

X X X

Idem + P. H. I, 210– 220.

Heraclitus:

Idem Idem ἀπoρία on the myths and on the possibility of knowledge ἀπoρία on the possibility of knowledge + perception of the dubiety of the things

Positive dogmatism: there is something which underlies the dualities and oppositions: τὸ πῦρ. (P.H. I, 210–213) + violates the principle of non-contradiction and incurs in discursive ἀδυναμία (continued)

128 Stage:

Appendices Sources:

Who:

Scopes:

ἀπoρία on the movement ἀπoρία on the possibility of knowledge Conventionalism + perception of the dubiety of the sensations + oὐ μᾶλλoν formula

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem + P. H. I, 210– 220.

Democritus:

Idem

P.H. I, 210–220.

Protagoras (and Gorgias?):

Relativism

Idem

Idem

Cyrenaism:

Action and knowledge as resulting from sensitive affections (ἐπειδὴ κἀκείνη τὰ πάθη μóνα φησὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι; in: P.H. I 215–216)

Zeno of Elea: Empedocles:

Criticisms: (Met. IV 4, 1006a 12). X X Positive dogmatism: Dogmatismo positivo: Use of the oὐ μᾶλλoν formula to indicate that the truth is in the atoms (P.H. I, 213–215) The “human” as a dogmatic criterium (Protagoras: P.H. I, 219) + violates the principle of non-contradiction and incurs in discursive ἀδυναμία (Met. IV 4, 1006a 12) Claim of the total impossibility of apprehending the truth; moral τελoς as ἡδoνή (P.H. I, 215–216)

Idem

Antigonus of Carystus (in: D.L. IX, 62) Idem (in: D.L. IX, 62–63)

Idem

Idem

Nausiphanes (in all D.L. IX, 64?) Timon of Phlius (at the end of D.L. IX, 64? And in D.L. IX, 65–66) Eratosthenes (in: D. L. IX, 65–66) Posidonius of Rhodes (in: D.L. IX, 68)

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Aenesidemus of Knossos (in: D.L. IX, 62)

Idem

Idem

Sources: Apollodorus (in: D. L. IX, 61) Ascanius of Abdera (in: D.L. IX, 61)

Stage: Life of Pyrrho: Idem

ἀκαταληψία + ἐπoχή

Assertions: (1)- ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ + (2) oὐ γὰρ μᾶλλoν τóδε ἢ τóδε εἶναι ἕκαστoν. Cf.: D.L. IX, 75; and P.H. I, 188–192: expression of ignorance (ἀγνóησις) X

Idem

Idem

Ordinary life: Pyrrho’s philosophy would not lead him to an unpredictable behavior (ἀπρoóρατoς) + ἐπoχή

Spoke alone as a way of training + investigation (ζήτησις) + lived an ordinary life Freedom from politics (ἀπραγμoσύνη) + freedom from the sophistry (ἀπαθής¼ pun with the word “without πάθoς”) + quiet life (ἡσυχίης) Indifference (ἀδιαφoρία)

Imperturbability ἀταραξία

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Indifference (ἀδιαφoρία) + impassibility (ἀστoργία)

Idem

Idem

Scopes: Ordinary life: Pyrrho active in one τεχνη

Who: Pyrrho:

Excessive indifference, impossible in practice X

X

X

ἀταραξία ¼ ἀπρoóρατoς (Pyrrho used to speak and walk alone): weird results of his travel to India X

ἀταραξία ¼ ἀπρoóρατoς

*Negative dogmatism inspired by atomism

X

Criticisms: X

*Retroactive addition of vocabulary to Pyrrho

X

X

*Too late + interested in praising Pyrrho + addition of a vocabulary (ἐπoχή) acquired in the debate academy X Stoa X

*Interested in depreciating the practical viability of Pyrrho’s philosophy *Idem

Sources’ problems: *Too late (about 120 years after Pyrrho) *Stoic vocabulary, or at least emerged in the debates Academy X Stoa X

Appendices 129

130

Appendices

Stage: Pyrrho’s followers:

Sources: D.L. IX, 69–70

Who: X

Scopes: Creation of the σκεπτικὴ ἀγωγή, even before Aenesidemus of Knossos (?)

Criticisms: X

Idem

PE. 14.18.1–5

X

Skepticism as a kind of school

X

Idem

D.L. IX, 64

Nausiphanes:

X

Idem Idem

D.L. IX, 68 D.L. IX, 67

Eurylochus: Philo of Athens:

X X

X X

Idem Idem

D.L. IX, 68 D.L. IX, 61, 69; Isi. et Osi., 9; Antiq. Jud., I, vii,2; Contr. Apion., 1,22.

? X

? X

Idem

Aristocles, apud. PE. 14.18.1–5;

Numenius Hecataeus of Abdera/ Ascanius same person?, see: ‘DECLEVA CAIZZI, F. (org.). Pirrone testimonianze. Nápoles: Bibliopolis, 1981): Timon of Phlius:

Pyrrho’s philosophy as practice + ἀταραξία (?) Bellicosity Indifference + speaking alone as a discursive exercise + freedom from politics + studying alone (αὐτóσχoλoν) because rejected schooling ? Studying foreign cultures + philosophy as practice

Sources’ problems: *(1) Anachronism; (2) There was not homogenization between Pyrrho’s followers (Theodosius, in: D.L. IX, 70) *The Skepticism, as well as the Cynicism, is much more a δύναμις than a αἵρεσις or a σχoλή (confirmed by Philo of Athens’ narrative, in: D.L. IX, 69) X

(1) Development of the “First Pyrrhonism”

D.L. IX, 104–105: Skepticism

*There is a contradiction between asserting (continued)

Appendices

Stage:

131

Sources: D.L. IX, 64–65, 67, 69, 72, 76, 102, 104– 105, 107; Adv. Gram. 53

Who:

Scopes:

Criticisms:

(LONG, A.A.; SEDLEY, D.N. The Hellenistic Philosophers: translation of the principal sources, with philosophical commentary, Vols. 1 e 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); (2) Pyrrho’s πρoφήτης; (3) asserted the necessity of investigating our own possibility of knowledge + the aim of this investigation is happiness + it is also necessary to investigate: (Qa) how the things are in their own nature; (Qb) how one should act about these things; (Qc) the results of these actions + answers: (Aa) the things are equally indifferent; (Ab) we should not trust the things; (Ac) the person starts to not assert, attaining ἀταραξία + oὐδὲν μᾶλλoν, interpreted as “define nothing”, i.e., suspend the judgement + the

makes life impossible to be lived

Sources’ problems: and prescribing a non assertive way of life; *To keep on active investigating and philosophically battling can hardly be thought as living a happy life

(continued)

Appendices

132

Stage:

Sources:

Who:

Scopes:

Criticisms:

Sources’ problems:

Skeptic acts coerced by passions and his life is preserved, albeit the investigations and the suspension of judgement; (4) philosophy as a battle

Stage: Middle academy:

Sources: Timon, in: D. L. IV, 33

Who: Arcesilaus:

Scopes: Pyrrhonism as an attitude

Idem

Quaest. Natu. 7.32.2

Idem

Academics as true Pyrrhonists

Idem

D.L. IV, 31

Idem

Constantly exercising argumentation

Idem

Numenius, in: PE. 14.6.4-6; P.H. I, 232

Idem

Arcesilaus shared Pyrrho’s discourse

Idem

D.L. IV, 37; IV, 43 De Or. 3.67

Idem

Sarcasm and bellicosity Used to argue for and against anything

Idem

Idem

Criticisms: Chimeric philosophy: Platonism + Pyrrhonism + dialectics (Aristo of Chios, in: D.L. IV, 33). Arcesilaus did not act the way he said (Cleanthes of Assos, in: D.L. VII, 171) Flatterer of the mobs (Timon, in: D.L. IV, 42; IX, 115) Arcesilaus positively evaluated the suspension of judgement and used dialectics as a method for verifying Plato’s dogmata (P.H. I, 234) X X

Source’s problems: X

X

X

X

X *It is not possible to know if he really defended his own point of views, or if they arose as rhetorical (continued)

Appendices

Stage:

133

Sources:

Who:

Scopes:

Criticisms:

Idem

Acad. pos. 77

Idem

Asserted that there was not a true impression in a way that there was not a false impression of something similar #

X

Idem

Acad. pos. 84– 86; 91

Idem

Zeno: the Stoic sage is able to discern (Acad. pos. 20, 56–58); but he is not criterium for himself and this is a circularity (SVF III, 138); two things are not identical: non-evident assertion (Acad. pos. 50, 54–56)

Idem

Adv. Log. I, 157

Idem

# The impressions are indiscernible because (1) the objects which originate them are indiscernible; or (2) because the person who perceives them has no conditions for discerning If it is not possible to distinguish between impressions, since the Stoic sage does not act according

But if one must hold (ἐπεχειν) the assentment (συγκατάθεσις), one must suspend the use of the ἡγεμoνικóν. But

Source’s problems: results of debates *Dogmatic assertion, but only if it is expression. Of Arcesilaus’ own point of view. On the other hand, if it is the result of ad hominem debate, this assertion (1) comes from Stoic dogmatism, (2) has dialectics purposes and (3) does not need ultimate adhesion, but only provisorily Idem

X

(continued)

134

Stage:

Appendices

Sources:

Who:

Idem

Adv. Log. I, 158; Adv. Col. 1122A-F

Stage: Middle academy:

Sources: Acad. pos. 139

Idem

Who: Carneades:

Source’s problems:

Scopes:

Criticisms:

to opinions, he must refuse to assente, i.e. he must suspend the judgement

it is the very use of the ἡγεμoνικóν that make us be humans, so, stopping using it would be the same as leaving our own humanity aside, and leaving our rational soul (λoγικὴ ψυχή). This violates the principle of selfpreservation (oἰκείωσις) and puts our lives at risk (ἀπραξία) (Adv. Col. 1122E; Acad. pos. 37–38) X

Despite the Stoic criticisms, the life would not be compromised since there would be a criterium for action: εὔλoγoν. It is able to engender appropriate (καqῆκoν) or correct (κατóρθωμα) actions

Scopes: Used to defend any positions, because they were all equally persuasive

Criticisms: X

*As a criterium, the eὔλoγoν is a kind of positive dogmatism

Source’s problems: *It is not possible if the theses he defended were his own point of views or if they were provisory, built to be used in debates and adopted ad hominem (continued)

Appendices

135

Stage: Idem

Sources: D.L. IV, 62

Who: Idem

Idem

Adv. Phy. I, 146–147, 151–171

Idem

Idem

Adv. Phy. I, 182–184

Idem

Idem

D.L. X, 128–129; De Fin. 1; Tusc. 5.120; De Fin. 3.41; Adv. Log. I, 159

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Adv. Log. I, 159; PE. 14.7.15.5

Idem

Idem

Idem

Scopes: Bellicosity mainly against the Stoics, under Chrysippus Attacks against the Stoic physics, e.g., the theses of God as living being, eternal and benevolent Sorites paradox against the undeterminated amount of gods in polytheism Inconsistences in Epicurean ethics about the τελoς Inconsistences in Stoic ethics about the distinction between ἀδιάφoρoι, ἀρετή and κακία # Thus, or the Stoics give up the external corporal goods (then he becomes Cynic), or adhere to these goods (then he becomes Peripatetic) The pragmatic results are what matter in actions, and not their theoretical presuppositions Rejecting the criteria, the Stoic one as well as others + things are uncertain, we

Criticisms: X

Source’s problems: X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Stoics: true impressions compel to assenting (Adv. Log. I, 257) + if

*The actions are impossible only under the Stoic point of view on (continued)

136

Stage:

Idem

Appendices

Sources:

PE. 14.7.15.5; Acad. pos. 47– 49

Who:

Idem

Scopes:

Criticisms:

can be deluded and then wrongly assent. So we shall suspend the judgement #

there is no criterium, everything will be uncertain (Acad. pos. 32); life would be impossible (ἀδυναμία, in: PE. 14.7.15.5–6) Even being strictly pragmatical, this criterium is dogmatic, as well as all criteria when they are exposed in an assertive way (P.H. I, 230)

The persuasive (πιθανóς) is effective enough as pragmatical criterium

Stage: Middle academy:

Sources: D.L. IV, 67

Who: Clitomachus:

New academy:

PE. 14.9.1– 2

Philo of Larissa:

Idem

P.H. I, 220

Schism (alignment with Stoicism):

Acad. pr. 17– 18

Source’s problems: what matters in actions

X

Scopes: Broad knowledge of doctrines of the academics, Stoics and Peripatetics + adhesion to Carneades’ crietrium: πιθανóν X

Criticisms: Very prolix (Timon, in: D. L. IV, 67); despite being pragmatical, this is a dogmatic criterium (P.H. I, 230) Avoidance of ἐπoχή

Idem

X

Antiochus of Ascalon:

X

Things must be naturally aprehensible, even if not according to stoic criterium Treason to Plato’s philosophy

Source’s problems: X

*The avoidance of the suspension can be signal of the adhesion to some dogmatism # *Positive dogmatism

*Positive dogmatism: adhesion to Stoicism (continued)

Appendices

137

Stage: Idem

Sources: Acad. pos. 18– 31

Who: Idem

Scopes: X

Schism (Pyrrhonist revival):

Bib. 170a14– 17

Aenesidemus of Knossos:

Idem

D.L. IX, 116

Idem

Rupture with the new academy’s dogmatism and says that the debates between Philo, Antiochus and Stoics were actually Stoics against Stoics Wrote ‘Pyrrhonian Discourses’. #

Idem

P.H. I, 36–164, 180– 187; D. L. IX, 79–88, 98–99

Idem

Idem

D.L. IX, 88–90; P.H. I, 164– 178

Agrippa:

Creation (development or organization?) of the 10 modes which point out that there are moments when the judgement is impossible, because: (a) the one who judges has no conditions to do that; (b) the object has no conditions to be judged; (c) both simultaneously +8 modes against causality 5 modes driven against the scheme of the dogmatic arguments, and not to their content

Criticisms: Eclecticism as a way of solving the disagreements X

Source’s problems: X

X

Aenesidemus was dogmatic since he considered Skepticism as a way to Heraclitism (Adv. Log. I, 349; Adv. Phy. I, 337, and II 216, 233; P. H. I, 210.) X

X

X

X

X

(continued)

138

Stage: Infiltration in medical debates:

Appendices

Sources: D.L. IX, 116

Who: Zeuxippus, Zeuxis, Antiochus of Laodicea, Herodotus of Tarsus and Saturninus:

Scopes: The Sceptic, being a lover of his kind (φιλάνθρωπoς), desires to cure by speech (κατὰ δύναμιν ἰᾶσθαι λóγῳ βoύλεται), The best he can, the self-conceit and the rashness of the Dogmatists (oἴησίν τε καὶ πρoπετειαν, in: P.H. III, 280). On the other hand, self-conceit, rashness and in quietude (in: P.H. I, 27) are the Dogmatists’ anomalies (in: P.H. I, 12). Thus, Skepticism is a purgative therapy which has its power increased or decreased according to the disease (P.H. III, 281; compare with: I, 237)

Criticisms: X

Source’s problems: X

Appendices

139

Appendix 3: Chronological Table of the Philosophers and Schools Mentioned42 Abstract Timetable of the most important philosophers and schools mentioned in the book.

Academy 387: Plato founds the academy

Peripatetics

Pyrrhonists

Stoics

Epicureans B. C.

c. 365: Pyrrho is born 347: Plato dies and is succeeded by Speusippus 341: Epicurus is born 339: Speusippus dies and is succeeded by Xenocrates 335: Aristotle founds the Lyceum c. 334–324: Pyrrho and Anaxarchus with Alexander in East

334: Zeno is born

c. 328: Epicurus studies with Pamphilus of Samos

322: Aristotle dies and is succeeded by Theophrastus

c. 325: Timon is born (?): Eurylochus, Hecataeus/ Ascanius, Numenius, Nausiphanes and Philo of (continued)

42

Based on: SEDLEY, D. (1980). The Protagonists. In: BARNES, J; SCHOFIELD, M; BURNYEAT, M. (orgs.). Doubt and Dogmatism, Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

140 Academy

Appendices Peripatetics

Pyrrhonists

Stoics

Epicureans

Athens study with Pyrrho c. 321: Epicurus studies with Nausiphanes 317: Demetrius of Phalerum, Theophrastus’ pupil becomes tyrant of Athens 314: Xenocrates dies and is succeeded by Polemon 312: Zeno arrives in Athens

c. 295: Arcesilaus arrives in Athens

307 Demetrius of Phalerum is exiled from Athens 297: Ptolemy I Soter makes Demetrius of Phalerum be the first librarian in Alexandria (?): Arcesilaus studies with Theophrastus

311–310: Epicurus opens schools in Mitilene and Lampsacus 307: Epicurus opens the garden in Athens

c. 287: Theophrastus dies and is succeeded by Straton c. 276: Polemon dies and is succeeded by por Crates c. 273: Crates dies and is succeeded by Arcesilaus

fl.c. 310–260: Colotes

(continued)

Appendices Academy

141 Peripatetics

Pyrrhonists

Stoics

c. 270: Pyrrho dies

fl. c. 270–250: Aristo of Chios; fl. c. 280–243: Persaeus; (?): Herillus of Carthage

Epicureans 271: Epicurus dies and is succeeded by Hemarchus

c. 269: Straton dies and is succeeded by Lycon 262: Zeno dies and is succeeded by Cleanthes 242: Arcesilaus dies and is succeeded by Lacydes fl. c. 240–210: Sphaerus c. 235 Timon of Phlius dies (?): Timon’s followers

c. 232: Cleanthes dies and is succeeded by Chrysippus

225: Lycon dies and is succeeded by Aristo of Ceos c. 219 Carneades is born c. 206: Chrysippus dies and is succeeded by Zeno of Tarsus (?): Carneades becomes head of academy

c. 181–(?): Satyrus becomes head of the Lyceum (continued)

142 Academy 155: Carneades, Critolaus and Diogenes of Babylon in Rome as ambassadors

Appendices Peripatetics 155: Critolaus is the head of the Lyceum

Pyrrhonists

Stoics 155: Diogenes of Babylon in Rome

Epicureans

(?): Zeno of Tarsus dies and is succeeded by Diogenes of Babylon c. 152: Diogenes dies and is succeeded by Antipater of Tarsus fl. c. 150: Apollodorus makes the Epicurean school be the most prominent in Athens 137: Carneades retires 129: Carneades dies

c. 128: Clitomachus becomes head of the academy c. 110: Clitomachus dies and is succeeded by Philo of Larissa

c. 129: Antipater dies and is succeeded by Panaetius

c. 110: Diodorus of Tyre is the head of the Lyceum and tries to align the Aristotelianism with Stoicism and Epicureanism 109: Panaetius dies (?): Cratippus od Pergamon is the head of the Lyceum (continued)

Appendices Academy

143 Peripatetics

Pyrrhonists

Stoics Posidonius, 135–51

Epicureans Zeno of Sidon, c. 155–c. 75

(?): Aenesidemus of Knossos studies with Herakleides c. 90–80: (probably) Aenesidemo breaks and revives the Pyrrhonism

95–c. 46: Antipater of Tyre, contemporary of Cato the Younger

Demetrius Lacon, younger contemporary of Zeno of Sidon

c. 100: revival of the Aristotelianism

c. 90: Antiochus of Ascalon breaks and founds the so-called old academy c. 89: Philo leaves Athens due to political instability

fl. c. 80–45: Philodemus of Gadara c. 79: Philo dies

(?): Zeuxippus of Knossos studies with Aenesidemus c. 75: Boethus of Sidon is born 78: Cicero attends to Posidonius lectures

c. 67: Antiochus dies fl. c. 60: Andronicus of Rhodes heads the Lyceum

(?): Zeuxis studies with Zeuxippus e and joins to the Pyrrhonean dynamis

(?): Boethus of Sidon comments Aristotle’s ‘Categories’

c. 55: Lucretius writes the ‘De rerum natura’ 46: Cato’s suicide (continued)

144 Academy 45–44: great of part of Cicero’s works is written 43: Cicero dies

Appendices Peripatetics (?):Aristocles of Messene

Pyrrhonists

Stoics

Epicureans

10: Boethus of Sidon dies 4: Seneca is born

A. D.

(?): Antiochus of Laodicea studies with Zeuxis (?): Agrippa 50: Cornutus teaches in Rome 65: Seneca’s suicide 66: Musonius Rufus is expelled from Rome by Nero 71: Vespasian expels the philosophers from Rome, but exempt Musonius Rufus 95: Domitian expels the philosophers from Rome, including Epictetus fl. c. 80: Menodotus of Nicomedia, Epiricist Doctor and Pyrrhonist

c. 100- c. 150: Aspasius comments Aristotle’s

fl. c. 120: Theodas of Laodicea

c. 108: Arrian takes notes of Epictetus’ lectures fl. c. 120: Hierocles of Magnesia (continued)

Appendices Academy

145 Peripatetics

Pyrrhonists

Stoics

Epicureans

‘De Interpretatione’, ‘Physics’, ‘Metaphysics’, ‘Categories’ and the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ 130: Epictetus dies (?): Adrastus of Aphrodisias

(?): Theodosius writes his ‘Skeptical Chapters’ fl. c. 150–180: Herodotus of Tarsus, Sextus Empiricus’ tutor

161: Marcus Aurelius becomes Emperor 176: Marcus Aurelius founds four philosophy chairs in Athens 180: Marcus Aurelius dies c. end of II A. D.: Diogenes of Oenoanda engraves Epicurus’ doctrines in the walls of his city

fl. c. 200: Alexander of Aphrodisias

fl. c. 200: Sextus Empiricus

146

Appendices

Appendix 4: The Three Medical Sects and Their Main Heads, According to Pseudo-Galen, Introd.14.683.5–14.684.543 Abstract Timetable of the most important physicians and medical schools mentioned in the book.

B.C.: 460– 370 375– 295 c. 340 335– 255 c. 300 304– c.250 c. 250 c.150 c.130– 40 c. 50 A.D.: c. 70 “ “ “ c. 110 “ “ “ c. 150 c. 160 c. 200 “

Rationalists

Empiricists

Hippocrates of Cos Diocles of Carystus Praxagoras of Cos Herophilus of Chalcedon Mnesitheus of Athens Erasistratus of Chios

Acron of Agrigentum

Asclepiades of Bithynia

Methodists

Philinus of Cos

Serapion of Alexandria Apollonius of Antioch (father) Apollonius of Antioch (son), so-called empiricist Themison of Laodicea Thessalus of Tralles Mnaseas of Tralles Dionysius Proclus Antipatrus Olympiacus of Milesia Menemachus of Aphrodisias Soranus of de Ephesus Menodotus Sextus, so-called Empiricist Archigenes of Apamea (beginning of the Eclectics?) Leonidas of Alexandria (Eclectic?)

43 Based on: WALBRIDGE, J. (ed. & trans.) (2014). Hunayn ibn Ishaq. The Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen, volume I. Utah, Brigham Young University Press.

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