The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957 (Volume 2) 9781487599607

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
1. Illusion and Disillusion
2. The Cold War
3. Development of a Middle Power, 1946-50
4. Collective Action: North America
5. Collective Action: North Atlantic
6. The Communist 'Monolith'
7. The Challenge of Korea
8. The New Commonwealth
9. The Asian Dimension
10. The Meaning of Alliance
11. The Continental Relationship
12. The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament
13. The United Nations in the Fifties
14. The Search for Equilibrium
Notes
Index

Citation preview

THE SHAPING OF PEACE The establishment of the United Nations system at the conclusion of the Second World War was followed by a period of disillusion in the late 40s about the prospects for world order. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 there came a regrouping offerees and revised calculations of what was possible. The first volume of The Shaping of Peace described Canadian attitudes and policies towards international institutions as the Second World War ended. This volume is concerned with the developments in the decade after the war, with the changing Canadian concepts as they were shaped by events and challenges. Although principal attention is paid to the organs of the United Nations, other themes such as the establishment of NATO, the progress of the new Commonwealth, and the changing concepts of the North American relationship are analysed as essential elements in the Canadian search for equilibrium. The author was himself involved in many of the activities described in these volumes; this is not a personal memoir, however, but a third-person account based on recollections tempered by research of the records. JOHN w. HOLMES, o.c., was an officer in the Department of External Affairs from 1943 to 1960 and now is professor of International Relations at the University of Toronto and Counsellor of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In 1980-81 he was Claude T. Bissell Professor of Canadian-American Relations at the University of Toronto. He is author of The Better Part of Valour, Canada: a middle-aged power, and Life with Uncle.

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JOHN W. HOLMES

The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world order 1943-1957

Volume 2

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press 1982 Toronto Buffalo London ISBN 0-8020-5541-9

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Holmes, John W., 1910The shaping of peace Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8020-5541-9 (v. 2) 1. Canada - Foreign relations - 1945-1970.1. Title. FC602.H64 327.71 C79-094558-4 F1034.2.H64

This book has been published with the help of grants from the Social Science Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and from the Publications Fund of the University of Toronto Press.

Contents

Preface / vii Abbreviations / ix 1 Illusion and Disillusion / 3 2 The Cold War/ 12 3 Development of a Middle Power, 1946-50 / 37 4 Collective Action: North America / 76 5 Collective Action: North Atlantic / 98 6 The Communist 'Monolith' / 123 7 The Challenge of Korea / 143 8 The New Commonwealth / 165 9 The Asian Dimension / 188 10 The Meaning of Alliance / 221 11 The Continental Relationship / 251

vi Contents 12 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament / 292 13 The United Nations in the Fifties / 323 14 The Search for Equilibrium / 377 Notes / 395 Index / 427

Preface

The first volume of this study was concerned largely with the vision. This volume is devoted to the re-vision. The end of the war seemed like 'The Creation,' as a former United States secretary of state, Dean Acheson, called it. Because there was a war on, the Creation had begun with ideas - prevision. Much of the new structure was in place, at least tentatively, before the fighting stopped, but the broader framework could not be tested until there was peace-or at least only sporadic fighting. Conditions changed rapidly, and the patterns did not always fit. It was not just because of factors unforeseen that the visions would have to be revised or adapted or recreated. The United Nations Charter had provided for new organs, and these had to be delineated and established in the real world. Procedures had to be worked out, and procedures were as much a part of the Creation as the devising of blueprints. This second volume covers a decade, more or less, during which the international institutions in which Canada was encased went through their second growth. Of course, they did not stop growing then or at any time since, but by the mid fifties they had acquired a basic shape. The year 1957 seems a suitable date to end this review because the government of Canada was changing and so also was the economic, strategic, and technological environment in which our postwar planners contemplated the future. Although it is more chronological in form than volume 1, ranging over ten years with the Korean War as a watershed, this volume is not intended to be a definitive history of the period. The subject is a set of political ideas seen in time and space. The book is concerned with shapes and structures as Canadian officials perceived and helped conceive them. It is not about foreign policy in general and only incidentally about public opinion. Policy is described in detail in cases when it seems to illuminate the way in which

viii Preface Canadians thought the institutions should work or the way in which they discovered that institutions might work. Most of the moulding was in the performance, a by-product of dealing with cases. Economic factors are analysed but not economic policy, which has been the subject of other more authoritative studies. Some subjects and some details are included simply because they have not been described before, and others are foreshortened because they are well treated elsewhere. The subject is broad, and the selection is idiosyncratic. The bias of a foreign service officer of the times described cannot be avoided. My part in some of the activities is confessed in detail in the preface to volume 1 and, where necessary, explained here in footnotes. Because the subjects treated are broader than my own experience, this is not a memoir, and, as in volume 1, only the preface and the conclusion are cast in the first person. I look forward to the definitive histories of these years by the professional historians with their impeccable footnotes. In the meantime, I apologize to those few readers who require scholarly sources. This is a personal account put together from sources as varied as scraps of paper and scraps of memory to formal despatches. When I began this study it was not my intention to track down archival references, and time and budgetary constraints have forced me to stick to this resolve. My thanks to those who helped get this manuscript in print are contained in volume 1, and the debt to them is now even greater. In addition I would like to thank some of those whose contributions came later and particularly to this volume. That includes my former colleagues Robert Ford, Jack McCordick, and Arthur Menzies. In putting this volume together I have benefited greatly from the critical comments of such leading scholars in the field as James Eayrs, John English, J.L. Granatstein, and Anthony Miller. Again I have made great use of the research and advice of graduate students whose work I have had the pleasure and profit of guiding. In addition to those mentioned in the first preface and the footnotes I would like to thank Patricia Appavoo, Frank Hayes, Clarence Redekop, Paul Robertson, and Douglas Ross. I am grateful also to the School of History of the University of Leeds where, as a visiting professor in 1979, I was able to revise and contemplate the manuscript in tranquillity. Again I am indebted to the University of Toronto Press and to R.I.K. Davidson and Rosemary Shipton for shrewd editorial guidance and to Gayle Fraser, who put it all together, including the index, and made sure that the text was a good deal less peccable than it would have been if I were the last resort.

Abbreviations

AEC CCA CCF CIPO DDP DEA DND DPS ECOSOC EDC FAO FEC FO

Atomic Energy Commission (UN) Commission for Conventional Armaments Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Department of Defence Production Department of External Affairs Department of National Defence defence production sharing Economic and Social Council European Defence Community Food and Agriculture Organization Far Eastern Commission foreign office

GATT ICC ICJ ICREB IFC IJC JCS MCC MFN NATO NORAD OAS OEEC

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade International Control Commissions International Court of Justice International Columbia River Engineering Board International Finance Corporation International Joint Commission joint chiefs of staff Military Co-operation Committee most-favoured-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization North American Air Defence Organization of American States Organization for European Economic Co-operation

FRUS

Foreign Relations of the United States

x Abbreviations PHP PJBD PRC SAC SEATO SHAPE SSEA SUNFED TCC UNAEC UNCi UNCIP UNCOK UNEF UNGA UNICEF UNRRA UNSCOP UNTSO USSEA

Post-Hostilities Problems Permanent Joint Board on Defence People's Republic of China Strategic Air Command South-East Asia Treaty Organization Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe secretary of state for external affairs Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development Temporary Council Committee United Nations Atomic Energy Commission United Nations Commission for Indonesia United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan United Nations Commission on Korea United Nations Emergency Force United Nations General Assembly United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration United Nations Special Commission on Palestine United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization under-secretary of state for external affairs

THE SHAPING OF PEACE

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1 Illusion and Disillusion

Those who have lived through the terrors and glories of two great wars are bound to be disillusioned. Disillusionment, in its literal sense of the absence of illusions, is a good thing. It should mean that we see more clearly, not that we have lost hope. HUME WRONG to the final session of the League of Nations, 10 April 1946

Whether the structures for the maintenance of peace composed at the conclusion of the Second World War were based on illusion is disputable. When the United Nations framework was tested against the reality of international politics it was found wanting or at least in need of rapid adjustment to circumstances. The provision for security based on a perpetuation of the wartime alliance was undermined by the fracture of that alliance. The economic and social functions envisaged for the international body were misdirected and miscalculated. The structures were nevertheless pliant. The Canadian mood as this situation became evident was reflected by F.H. Soward, who wrote in April 1948 that the country now found itself standing between two powers and it was difficult to know what to do. We haven't thought much about the problem yet, largely because this post-war world is so different from the one expected. When World War u came to an end, we had a picture in our heads of Wendell Willkie's 'One World.' We were inclined to feel that the Big Three had completed arrangements for peaceful reconstruction, the establishing of the great peace. We seemed on the threshold of the 'century of the common man.' But the exact opposite is the fact. We may as well face these 'facts of life' now, in every public forum in the country. The two giants have not been able to agree.1

4 The Shaping of Peace In Ottawa and other Western capitals there had always been grave doubts whether the required minimum of great-power unity would be maintained. An international organization based on any other assumption, however, would not have been universal. The fact that the League was not universal had proved fatal. The Western powers could have leaped a step to create the 'free world' security organization that came with NATO in 1949, but there were critical advantages in doing so later, if it proved necessary, and in accordance with the Charter of a universal institution already in existence. That institution stood the strain, and it survived. The architects of 1945 had to seize the fleeting opportunity to create a universal organization because it would slip away when the spirit of alliance diminished. The best proof of their foresight is that they recognized that necessity. From a later perspective, the United Nations framework having held much longer than the League, the assumption of a basic common interest among the major powers looks less naïve than it may have appeared in 1948. What the powers have in common is less than hoped for in 1945, but it is basic. The need to maintain nuclear discipline and avoid a breakdown of the 'system' into a level of anarchy unsustainable by any country in the light of modern technology has induced the powers, large and small, to impose some institutionalized restraint on their competition. Disillusionment in Ottawa in the decade after the war is explained in part by the gaps between the bureaucrats' vision of how peace might be shaped and what the political leaders had in mind. It is inadvisable to regard this time of Creation as a simple struggle between idealists and pragmatists, either in the wide world itself or in the East Block, Ottawa. A certain amount of utopianism was inescapable. At the same time new institutions were being shaped to cope urgently with relief, rehabilitation, refugees, the control of epidemics, or the restoration of civilian air services. The East Block was stretched between the compulsion to make the frameworks ideal and the need to get on with what had to be done in the most effective possible way. The gospel was 'functionalism,' the concept of institutions which grow from the ground up out of necessity, rather than the philosopher's dream of a world community into which men and nations must be strait-laced. Public statements, however, were cast too often in the Utopian mould and misled. This conflict was not essentially between particular officials of the government, although there were differences of emphasis among them. Rather, the tension, the ambivalence that is intrinsic to the diplomat's craft, was often found in individuals themselves. In no one was this healthy contradiction more clearly seen than in Lester Pearson, whose genius was in reconciling the ideal and the possible. Hume Wrong, whose acerbic style seemed to cast

5 Illusion and Disillusion him in the role of cynic, was, like C.S. Lewis, an optimist because he believed in the fall of man. Retaining a healthy scepticism about the kind of heaven immediately attainable on earth, he was inclined to think that man's reach should exceed his grasp, but not by too much. His assessment of disillusionment permits an interpretation of the disgruntling experience of international institutions in the postwar decade that is more creative than that of the Utopians who can only lament. It was an interpretation that, with rising and falling conviction, sustained Canadian policy-makers in the period under review. The major challenge was to the concept of'collective security,' the prevailing philosophy in 1945. One might describe it as more a slogan than a precise theory, as the term was indiscriminately used to imply a system of universal commitment to the use of force at the disposal of the United Nations and also - particularly after 1947-to describe collective defence arrangements like NATO. A 'collective security' system is designed to preserve peace among its members. A 'collective defence' arrangement is a pact among associates to defend together the group against an outsider. This imprecision reflected imprecision in the thinking of politicians and officials as well as the general public. What the Canadians and their associates had in mind by 'collective security' about 1945 can best be described historically. It was what had not happened in the 1930s. The prevalent assumption was that there might well have been no war if the Germans, Italians, and Japanese had known in advance they would face a world-wide coalition. The failure of nations to stand together to impose League sanctions against Italy and Japan, the last act of appeasement at Munich, the lack of a common front with military strength - these were the things everyone wanted to avoid. When people talked about collective security under the United Nations, often using the phrase 'with teeth,' sometimes speaking of an 'international police force,' they had in mind that the United Nations would be a more nearly universal organization than the League and that the Security Council would be able to call on members to form a grand coalition against any country they declared an aggressor. In the early planning stages there was even contemplation of a standing international military force.2 The harder the planners probed the logistics of any international force, the more difficult it seemed. Pearson and others retained an interest in the concept, nevertheless, and it reappeared in a highly modified form in 1950 when he devised the formula for a Canadian brigade available for service to the United Nations or NATO and again in 1956 in the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East. The concept of the delegation or contracting of national forces to the United Nations, which

6 The Shaping of Peace the great powers finally proposed in 1945, was, with certain provisions, acceptable to Canada. According to this plan a military staff committee of the Security Council would negotiate with the member states the size and type of forces they would be willing to provide when called upon by the Security Council. It was less than the standing world army Utopians had dreamed of, but at least it made possible belief in the principle of collective security universally applied by the United Nations, having at its command a force on call. It was not very realistic, but it was logical. The plan for collective security was less than universal of course, because the great powers could exercise the veto. Canada accepted the veto as a fact of life but tried to reduce its application. According to Canada's functionalist theory it was appropriate for the major military powers to take on special responsibilities with special privileges in a Council dedicated to security, but they were not thereby entitled to form a directorate to manage all United Nations affairs and bodies. Canada had accepted as legitimately functional3 the principle of collective security administered by the Security Council with delegated forces and concentrated its attention at San Francisco on aspects of particular importance to Canada. In the first place, Canadian representatives had insisted that a special category be recognized, informally if not formally, of those states which, although not great powers, were in a position to make special contributions to the security provisions of the Charter and who, therefore, should be preferred for election to the Security Council. Secondly, in accordance with the long tradition of demanding a voice in any decisions, imperial or international, that would commit or deploy Canadian forces, they insisted on the right of countries to sit in the Security Council when consideration was being given to using their troops. King had assured the House that states would not be called on for 'serious enforcement duties' without having participated in discussions in the Council or without having negotiated an agreement to co-operate in enforcing Security Council decisions that had been approved by parliament.4 Although they argued also for strengthening the functions of the Assembly in this area, they emphasized the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of peace and the obligation, therefore, on the great powers to take collective preventive measures. They did not look with favour on proposals for the regionalization of security provisions. Although there might be a place for regional organizations in the settlement of disputes, Canadians were not disposed to allow an organization such as the Pan-American Union to take action of a security nature in the western hemisphere. For the most part, however, their campaign to adjust the rules of the Security Council to fit the needs of middle

7 Illusion and Disillusion powers was wasted because the Council was never able to fulfil the kind of security role they had in mind. Canada's attitude to collective security, ostensibly at least, differed considerably from its policies of the twenties and thirties. After the first war, Canada had loudly opposed Article 10 of the League Charter and any other efforts to establish a system of automatic commitments to sanctions against 'aggressors.' The Canadian attitude in 1945 seemed a simple belief that policy towards the United Nations should be the opposite of what it had been to the League, that the whole idea of Canada as a 'fire-proof house' was an illusion and that, as Canada's safety depended on the security of all states against aggression, this time Canadians should not sit back but should take their rightful place in the creation of a strong international security organization. Even Mackenzie King seemed a convert in 1945, although he lapsed soon enough. Whereas in the early days of the League Canada had been sceptical of it as an attempt to bind peaceful Canadians to rush to the defence of a dubious European status quo, this time there was less inclination to blame European or other powers for getting Canada into a mess. Canada seemed prepared to change its own ways. Whereas it had sought to strike from the League Covenant the security provisions which the small European countries held dear but which did not suit Canada, this time it sought provisions by which lesser powers would not be committed to fight without the right to be heard. There was no disposition, as in the twenties, to abolish the whole security system to suit Canada. So seriously did Canadians take the provisions under Article 43 of the Charter for the delegation of forces that the government shaped - or professed to shape - its postwar defence policy around this expectation. One might argue whether this was an excuse or a cause; it was probably both. Canada withdrew its occupation forces from Europe, demobilized and reduced its defence budget as fast as possible, for domestic reasons. When questions were asked about defence policy the reply was that the government could make no long-range decisions until Canada had had its negotiations with the Military Staff Committee. Impatience was expressed over the slowness of the great powers to reach agreement with this committee, but long after such agreement had proved impossible it was still being said that Canada was counting on this system of 'collective security' within the United Nations. It was the politicians rather than the military who envisaged Canada's role in a collective security system so narrowly. An idea of the latter's thinking, which was far from extravagant, may be seen in a review in March 1945 by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the

8 The Shaping of Peace military implications of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Its first concern was with the development of Canada's 'alliance potential.' That was a term popular at the time of post-hostilities planning, indicating the recognition that Canada could never go it alone and that its defence and foreign policies should be based on a continuing and possibly shifting calculation of the allies and friends it could count on in any foreseeable circumstances. It was an effort to move thinking about Canada's unique defence requirements from the universalist and borrowed concepts which have always clouded thought on defence policy to calculations more precise and native. The sub-committee envisaged, not surprisingly, the maintenance of a larger defence establishment than before the war. Canada might be expected to provide not armed forces but 'facilities and assistance' for the proposed world organization. In any case, Canada should be prepared to accept military commitments. They foresaw the possibility of UN naval and air bases in Canada, 'maintenance of an effective force fully equipped and available at short notice, for peace enforcement action,' and 'provision of small forces for international policing and supervision.' In fact, however, defence policy reverted to the old pattern, a small establishment capable of organizing another expedition to Europe if required, but with a greater emphasis than previously on the defence of the home base and the continent. Apart from all the fancy language about collective security, the Second World War confirmed the view of most, although not all, Canadians that they could not possibly defend their vast territory by themselves and must join with others in one or more kind of collective defence. Any lingering idea that the British could do it was removed. The significance of the American part in effective defence of Canada was obvious but disconcerting. Those who opposed a defence policy of consequence argued not that Canada could in fact defend itself but that it had inadequate need to do so. Fewer people than in the past, however, regarded Canada as invulnerable. Whether or not they regarded the Soviet Union as a likely aggressor, there was the undeniable fact in the abstract that an attack from another continent was now technically feasible in one form or another. The adaptation of defence policy to fit this new awareness was slow and tentative. The reason was partly an unwillingness to face the ugly dilemmas - the financial burden and the challenges to sovereignty. But the way was by no means clear and there were sound arguments for not rushing into big plans when the world strategic situation was cloudy. Canada had become a considerable military power during the war, but it was the power of an ally fitting into a comprehensive plan. In peacetime, without an identifiable enemy and a designated set of allies, a country is reduced to general preparations. For a country in Canada's pre-

9 Illusion and Disillusion dicament this could be wildly expensive or too rudimentary to count at all. Imperial defence within the Commonwealth framework made little strategic sense. Continental defence with the United States had been accepted at Ogdensburg in 1940 as a permanent feature, but it did not answer the problem of Canada's contribution to the broader community it was espousing. The service chiefs naturally made a bid for a much larger peacetime establishment than they had had before the war. They proposed a navy of 20,000 men, an air force of 30,000, and an army of 55,000. However, the Cabinet Committee on Defence changed these proposals to a navy of 10,000, an air force between 15,000 and 20,000, and an army between 20,000 and 25,000. They quickly ended the army's tactless bid for compulsory military service. The role of the army was, in the words of the Annual Report of the Department of National Defence in 1946, 'to provide the staff, administration and training for an organized citizens part-time reserve force which would form the source for which a field force would be found in the event of war.' The air force likewise was to be 'a highly trained nucleus around which the RCAF can be expanded in time of national emergency.' The role of the navy was to be similar to that played in the last war - convoy protection in the Atlantic. In 1947 the proposed force was further reduced. It was announced that only 75 per cent of the projected troop levels would be recruited and the reserves were to be cut from 180,000 to 50,000. In that year the total number of men in the forces was 32,610. In the meantime, Canadian forces had been withdrawn from Europe, and Canada had refused to take part in further occupation duties. Proposals from the United States for more active continental defence in the North were being held at bay. Because the need for and the nature of a permanent peacetime military establishment were unclear, the government, with popular support, reverted to the concept of the core force with reserves, a small professional establishment capable of quickly training reserves or recruits in emergency. In spite of the alarming division of Europe, cautious strategists argued that there was little likelihood of war in the immediate future and a provisional arrangement made better sense than a big establishment which might prove to be designed for the wrong purposes. The reversion to traditional policy was not simply backward looking; it could be justified by genuine uncertainty as to the effects on Canadian strategy of bombers and missiles and more particularly the atom bomb. During the postwar decade Canadians were groping for new formulas for security. So were other countries. It is misleading to see the Canadian search in isolation from the international community or to see it as simply a matter of readjusting the defence perspective to the new role of the United States.

10 The Shaping of Peace The search for patterns was interwoven with events at home and abroad. To say that the answers were responses to events is not to admit a lack of foresight. The extent to which Canadian action can control the destiny of mankind is sometimes exaggerated by domestic critics of foreign policy. That there could be a satisfactory element of Canadian initiative in the responses was to be shown in the creation of NATO. During this period, however, Canadian actors on the world scene saw themselves as acting collectively, as loyal and responsible allies and associates in good causes. To emphasize unduly the home-grown element is to distort Canadian policy. The economic and social provisions of 1945 were to prove grossly inadequate as well, but that was not the main cause of disillusionment as the postwar decade began. The Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies and commissions were getting down to work. The rehabilitation of Europe was under way. It was not going as fast as hoped, but it was being coped with by improvised agencies and especially by the United States and Canada. The expectations of the United Nations were longer range. The needs of the world beyond the West were mentioned in speeches. It was hoped that benefits from the freeing of trade and money and the revival of Europe would trickle down or over to other continents. Beyond that the task was too stupendous to contemplate when there were such urgent problems in more familiar territory. It was not until the middle or latter half of the decade, partly as a result of the expanding membership of the Commonwealth and the United Nations, that Canadians began to realize the need to contemplate institutions and policies with mandates far beyond the regulatory, intermediary, and interventionary bodies they had helped set up. For the time being the worry was over security, over the capacity of the main organs to keep the peace.5 It was assumed furthermore, and with some justification, that the achievement of peace and stability was an essential prerequisite to economic and social action and the release of funds for aid and development. The uncertainties about the Canadian economy after the wartime expansion and demobilization of manpower kept Canadian policy cautious - except for its contribution to reviving Britain and the old triangular economy. It was, as suggested earlier, a matter of working a way through illusion to some fresh conclusions. Partly it was a matter of reluctantly accepting certain facts of life and seeing what could be built on the basis of that acceptance. The more obvious methods of keeping the peace were not working. In the spring of 1946 Pearson, exasperated by the frustrations in the UN, said there should be a Big Three Conference at which the major partners would all put their cards on the table. Wrong suggested to him, however, that the meta-

11 Illusion and Disillusion phor was misleading. It implied that the issues could be clearly defined and that if each could get a satisfactory hand the game would continue in amity according to the book of rules. 'I cannot conceive a conference really facing the issues honestly at present because the issues are not clearly enough defined and because, like most international problems, really serious issues cannot be solved but only changed in form and urgency.'6 Such a conference, he feared, would create a balance of power which would have less stability than the balances achieved during the nineteenth century. An international system was required that would recognize the permanence of uncertainty.

2 The Cold War

The cold war... seems to me due to a dialectic of history more potent, probably, than anything willed by diplomats.

RAYMOND ARON, The Imperial Republic^

THE COLD WAR AS A P H E N O M E N O N

The 'Cold War' was an apt term which served a purpose in clarifying an intangible but recognizable element in international politics. Its most useful contribution was to indicate how such a 'war' stoked itself. Fear begat fear. It was a reverberatory phenomenon. For historians and commentators, however, metaphors often provide formulas which deflect analysis. To attribute certain attitudes and actions to 'Cold War thinking' is sometimes accurate but often fails to reveal the true nature of the situation. The 'Cold War,' although it had a life of its own, was not divorced from the real world. Fears on each side were provoked, in the first place at least, not by 'Cold War thinking' but by specific events which should be identified, whether one has in mind the refusal of the United States to share the bomb or the Prague coup of 1948. It is the historian's obligation to try to determine the validity of the perceptions of such events, recognizing at the same time that misperceptions are historic facts. His analysis can be distorted by an anxiety to establish guilt or innocence, a weakness of much Cold War history on all sides. In the West the paranoiac simplifications of the anti-communists of the fifties provoked a new breed of Cold Warriors for whom the American conspiracy replaced the Soviet conspiracy. These revisionist historians, mostly Americans, are paradoxically guilty of megalomaniac Americanism. They see no other actor on the world scene of any consequence. The Soviet Union has only a dream-like

13 The Cold War existence, its policies all being fantasies of American conspirators. Allies of the United States, it is assumed, had neither will nor eyes of their own. Fearful of United States displeasure, expressed economically, they dumbly accepted a view of Soviet policy fabricated in Washington. Raymond Aron has defined the problem: 'In saddling the United States with causal responsibility for the cold war, or to put it differently, in accusing it of taking, unilaterally or first, the decisions that made the cold war probable or inevitable, the revisionists once more succumb to the national myth of American omnipotence. To postulate that Roosevelt or Truman would have managed to persuade Stalin by some other form of diplomacy to take some other attitude and to account for that attitude by the words or deeds of American presidents rather than by the interests of the USSR and the Communist philosophy is to attribute disproportionate power to the United States.'2 Now the revelation, from hindsight, of the extent to which the Russians acted out of fear has been healthy. This would be no great revelation to the best Soviet specialists of early Cold War days; their problem was that they could not be sure and political leaders feared taking chances. There is a danger, however, of another kind of false history, based on an assumed requirement to put equal blame on both sides. That might better be left to St Peter or a new generation of computers. The historian's role is to try to find out why people acted as they did. A critical problem here is that while Western archives for the period are now opening, we do not know what went on in the chanceries of Moscow or its associated powers. There are revelations by defectors and others which cannot be ignored but must be sceptically filtered. Critical looks at United States policy predominate partly because they are subject to scholarly research rather than uncertain speculation. No historian, of course, escapes the temptation to correct the record as he sees it. There is no definitive version. The Cold War was, as often stated, a struggle for the hearts and minds of men. Political leaders tended, therefore, to speak like crusaders. Policy planners were cooler in their appraisals, and there was often a gap between politicians as orators and as cautious devisers of policy. The historian can be misled by the rhetoric, which often implied a dedication to drastic conclusions and rash measures which were not reflected in actions taken. The two leading State Department specialists on Soviet policy, Charles Bohlen and George Kennan, approved of the 'Truman Doctrine' in 1947, but they have both recorded their dismay - and that of General Marshall - at the 'flamboyant anti-Communism' and the implied universal commitment of the speech announcing it.3 When Marshall and Bohlen tried to have it changed, they were told it was necessary to get Senate approval. Bohlen regretted to Hume

14 The Shaping of Peace Wrong that they did not have cabinet government in the States, admitting that 'the need for building up public and congressional sentiment in support of action to give effect to Marshall's speech of June 5th involved some distortion of the real aims of the Administration.'4 In Canada there was not the same compulsion, but political leaders felt a need to warn the public of the threat from Soviet policy so that they would accept the burdens of taxation and defence. An evangelical tone was required, and the phrases about sin and danger came trippingly to the tongue of many speakers and drafters of speeches. It is hard to find in the speeches of responsible leaders deliberate fabrications to incite public feeling. It was necessary only to dwell on the revealed brutality of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. The sincerity of the ministers, their genuine revulsion against what seemed clear violation of the Yalta agreement on 'liberated territories,' was undeniable. In retrospect they may be accused of an unbalanced perspective rather than calculated prevarication. It is legitimate to judge critically the strong language about Soviet 'aggression' on the grounds that it served to induce the panic mentality which, in the United States and to a much more limited extent in Canada, became McCarthyism. However, if one's purpose is analysis rather than judgment, it is wise to look elsewhere than the speeches to understand actual Canadian policy. There was not, of course, one uniform 'Cold War' attitude. It is necessary to discriminate carefully in assessing the various degrees of antagonism to the Soviet Union and quite wrong to brand them all together as 'anti-communism.' Those, including most of Ottawa's policy-planners, who believed that it was necessary to assist European countries in a firm resistance to Soviet pressures, ought not to be lumped with the supporters of a pre-emptive war or the forcible 'liberation' of Eastern Europe. Those who recognized that American economic and military strength were an essential element in the former purpose ought not to be confused with those who have assumed an American moral right to intervene on the side of good government as they saw it anywhere. Those (including most of the world, and even many Russians, in 1945) who were obsessed with the need to keep the United States constructively involved in building a world community were not giving a blanket approval for the bombing of North Vietnam some two decades later. Canadian policy cannot merely be dismissed as anti-communist and proAmerican, although it was both. If the chips were down, Canadian governments and, the evidence suggests, the Canadian public had no doubt which side they were on. It wasn't so much their being on the United States side; rather the United States was on their side, a side which included many other friends as well. Canada's policy was dedicated, insofar as possible, to seeing

15 The Cold War that the chips did not come down, and in that essential exercise it was often necessary to differ with the Americans - even if, as was usually the case, the Americans did not pay very much attention. In the play of such forces Canada's role was bound to be supplementary rather than decisive. There was enough evidence that it could be significant, as in the creation of NATO or preparing for an armistice in Korea, to make the effort worth while. One might note here a dimension of the policy dilemma for a country like Canada which is different from that of greater powers. As it cannot expect to be decisive on its own, what should it do when a course is taken other than that Canada had advocated? Accepting such a course is often regarded as 'capitulation' to the Americans. Frequently, however, it meant accepting the decision of a majority of allies. Not to do so could be regarded as either morally arrogant or unsportsmanlike. There are bound to be situations in which a country, either in its national interest or out of moral conviction, must refuse to go along. The world, however, will proceed on its course regardless. Jumping off a ship can be a grand gesture, but one is apt either to drown or end up permanently on an atoll. When the decision was taken by forces larger than Canada's to oppose the North Koreans with a United Nations force, there were doubts in Ottawa. That was the way it was going to be, however, and there is no doubt that going along with it gave Canada some chance to influence events. Splendid isolation can look like copping out. It would have been justified only if the Canadian government regarded the course of UN resistance as either morally wrong or strategically suicidal. It did neither. It is necessary to differentiate also between the historical periods of the Cold War, which can only be understood sequentially. There is, first of all, the war and immediate postwar period when attitudes were conditioned by the hope of postwar collaboration. Then came the rapid shift to fear and suspicion, provoked in Canada partly by the Gouzenko revelations but more by Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and Soviet frustration of the United Nations, as Canadians conceived it. The establishment of NATO in the last two years of the forties marked another phase, during which Canada committed itself to what seemed an inescapable confrontation although not an inevitable war. The darkest period of the Cold War was ushered in by the Korean invasion in June 1950, when the more limited concept of'Soviet aggression' was broadened incalculably, resistance to 'communist aggression' took a more military significance in Europe as well as elsewhere, attitudes towards communism grew less discriminating, and the role of the United States inevitably became more hegemonial. By the mid-fifties, however, after the death of Stalin and the armistice in Korea and Indochina, chances for

16 The Shaping of Peace détente opened up, based not on mutual conversion but an acknowledgment of the need of equilibrium. By that time, however, policy-makers who were anxious to exploit the opportunities for negotiation were inhibited by the extent to which simple anti-communism had become popular. The difference between the political pressures and the policy perceptions in Washington and Ottawa were wider than they had been, and divergence over Cold War issues became disputes, sometimes serious, between Canada and the United States.5 There was truth, however, in Escott Reid's comment that while on the face of it there would be a conflict between the United States and Canada, 'actually in view of the similarities between the people of the United States and Canada it will be a conflict between certain groups of Canadians and Americans who will support United States policy, and other groups of Canadians and Americans who will support Canadian policy.'6 The Americans who supported Canadian policy tended, alas, to be an 'élite group.' It is not possible to write of this period and ignore the work of the so-called 'revisionist historians' in spite of the serious questions which have been raised about certain of their scholarly methods.7 A problem is to know at which level to incorporate their arguments. One ought, furthermore, to be discriminating about the 'revisionists' in all their variety. A few make things simple by stating what is easily recognizable as the Soviet argument of the time. Most of them, however, agree - at least when pressed - that the Soviet record was not unblemished, although the critical attitude of Western leaders at the time to these 'blemishes' seems to be regarded as unwarranted. The problem of levels is that the charge against the United States and its 'allies' is most often made in Marxist abstractions which are at least worthy of debate, whereas the analysis of policy decisions is based on a conspiratorial interpretation of policy-making much harder to take seriously. Were the officials unconscious or conscious agents? That United States policy, and that of its associate, Canada, represent the inevitable working out of capitalist dynamics in the age of imperialism is a serious argument. It is not hard to prove that the emphasis on freeing the channels of trade and reviving the economies of Europe or developing the less developed, as strongly advocated by both the United States and Canada, were orthodox prescriptions of capitalist economists which fitted the needs of both North American countries. Where the revisionists lose credibility, however, is when they interpret American and Canadian - policy-making as a double game, politicians, civil servants, and pressure groups calculating plausible gambits which would lead to domination of the European economy. The abstractions tend to be imposed on situations in which the real policy alternatives of the time and place were otherwise.

17 The Cold War As far as Canadian policy-makers were concerned, they can certainly be faulted for an ingenuous confidence in the liberating effects of removing barriers to trade (especially in the postwar circumstances), but it is clear both from confidential memoranda and from public speeches that what they wanted was the revived prosperity of Europe in the interest of the Europeans themselves, of peace, and Canadian commerce. They also saw in this revived prosperity the best assurance against the spread of communism in Western Europe. For all these reasons they strongly supported the Marshall Plan. They certainly did not want the British and European economy revived for the private benefit of the Americans. Canadian thinking on all this was straightforward.8 There was so little difference between the public proclamations and the private planning - except, of course, that the former was tenderer on the feelings of other countries - that it is hard to relate it to the Byzantine politics of the revised version. The question Arthur Schlesinger put to the critics of United States policy is applicable also in the Canadian case. Admitting that indiscriminate multilateralism was in the interest of North Americans, he asks: 'But if a freely trading world is really so terrible as a long-term goal, should not those committed to the demonology of the Open Door state frankly a preference for bilateralism, economic nationalism, managed trading, or autarchy [sic] ? Should they not at least provide us with a sketch of the economic arrangements they would deem so greatly preferable to those set forth, however imperfectly, at Bretton Woods?'9 It could be argued, of course, that the Canadian economists were too dumb to see where the Yankees were leading them, but such a conclusion would not accord with the reputation they had acquired at such international conferences as Bretton Woods.10 C A N A D A - U S S R RELATIONS

Canadians were perhaps a little more disposed than their allies to give the Russians the benefit of the doubt. They had themselves suffered the arrogance of the British and Americans enough to have some fellow-feeling for Russian sensitivities and at the end of the war they were more directly preoccupied with the struggle to get justice from the Western powers than bearding the Russians. They had not, of course, had the same experience of negotiating with Russians as had the British and Americans during the war. Their optimism was, to some extent at least, a product of their remoteness. Their willingness to negotiate with the Russians remained in 1945 fresher than it was among those whose nerves were frayed from long trying. From the sidelines, furthermore, it was easier to see that the faults were not always on one side.

18 The Shaping of Peace Canadian estimates of Soviet policy and the causes of the Cold War were based primarily on Canadian sources, but these Canadian sources were, of course, by no means in isolation." In London, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Chungking, and elsewhere Canadian diplomats were constantly exchanging views, bits of information, and experiences with their colleagues. They were influenced by good journalists as well as by other diplomats, and they cast their nets as wide as possible. By Russian custom the diplomatic community in Moscow was isolated, thereby nourishing a sense of fellowship among Western and non-Western representatives they would not otherwise have felt. The British and Americans shared their secrets and impressions with the Canadians and listened as well, particularly to Canadians like L. Dana Wilgress, who knew the country and the language. With its broad international contacts the Department of External Affairs was less under the influence of American thinking than was the public back home. The primary source of intelligence information was still the British and this could be cross-checked with the Americans. The assessments made towards the end of the war in Ottawa by the Post-Hostilities Problems Committee12 were decidedly independent. American views on postwar relations among the great powers were subjected to cool appraisal. An attitude which would continue to be characteristic of the Canadian view of American intelligence was displayed at that time in a memorandum for the committee by General Maurice Pope: 'You will find yourselves opposing the American technique of assessing enemy capabilities as against our view of what the enemy will probably do. You will find people saying that the enemy is quite capable of despatching a hundred, or a thousand, planes against Gander or White Horse. That is true, but my counter to that is "Will he?", i.e., are there reasonable grounds for assuming that he will?' 13 Churchill's views were regarded both with respect and scepticism. King found himself more readily in agreement with the British Labour government on Soviet policies. Attlee and Bevin were strong for patience and sympathy but also firmness. The British Foreign Office agreed, especially on the firmness, although some of the old hands, weary of innocence, specialized in dark interpretations of Soviet moves. Others, like Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in Moscow, were closer to the more hopeful Canadian view.14 The views of the Foreign Office mattered more than those of the State Department because copies of their telegrams were provided to the dominions. In the absence of Canadian missions in most of Europe, Africa, and Asia, and Canada's non-participation in the negotiations of the great powers, officials in Ottawa had British documents as their daily source of information on the principal world events. It does not follow that they were indoctrinated by Churchill. They were

19 The Cold War exposed by this system not just to a predigested British line but to the varied views of many able and widely experienced reporters and the lively internal debates of the FO. For the professionals at least it was not so much a question of adopting a British or American position as being part of a continuing debate among the officials of all the Western chanceries, in each of which hawks and doves cohabited. Whether or not a Canadian embassy exerts influence on government policy depends on the quality of the particular ambassador and/or his staff and the respect with which his views are held by his colleagues and the cabinet. What came out of the embassy in Moscow in the war and immediate postwar years was taken very seriously, largely because of the regard for Wilgress, the head of mission from 1944 to 1947. As a former member of the trade commissioner service, stationed in Omsk at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, ministers thought him a practical man. External Affairs officers respected him for his experience of and sympathy for the Russians, his knowledge of the language, and his wartime contacts with Soviet leaders. His despatches were carefully scanned and often referred to or summarized for the prime minister and the cabinet. As the mission in the USSR had been opened for the first time in 1942, there was a dearth of Soviet expertise in the department, and policy memoranda of these years reflected the extent to which Wilgress's views were accepted and incorporated. In 1943 Wilgress's view was that 'Stalin hopes the Soviet Union may play a leading part, equal to the United Kingdom and the United States in the postwar world. He longs for a long period of external security in which he can rebuild the country and give the people more of the promised blessings of socialism. He will only give up this ambition if he finds the Soviet Union frustrated by the other great powers in playing the equal role to which he thinks he is entitled.'15 Although Wilgress warned against 'the discredited policy of appeasement,' he thought that in relations with the Soviet Union 'a large measure of appeasement can be shown to be justified. Here we have a country wavering between a policy of close co-operation with other countries in maintaining a peaceful and stable world and a policy of isolationism backed up by armed strength. All signs have hitherto pointed to the rulers of the Soviet Union favouring the former policy and they are likely only to adopt the latter policy through mistrust and suspicion of the intentions of other countries.'16 The hopes - not necessarily expectations - that the Soviet Union, although inevitably difficult to get along with, would be basically co-operative gave way reluctantly, as the war in Europe ended, to increasing fear that it was going to be actively malevolent. Wilgress had believed that there were internationalists and isolationists in the hierarchy and Moscow

20 The Shaping of Peace could go either way; that is why he was always worried both about provoking Soviet suspicion and also making concessions without a quid pro quo. Before VE Day, however, he went off to San Francisco and was absent until September 1945. Reporting in the meantime came largely from Arnold Smith who immediately presented a more disillusioned view of Soviet policy. Smith saw evidence of a recent change in Soviet policy in the direction of isolationism, although 'this switch may always have been the Soviet longterm intention to be put into effect only when the military threat of Germany is removed.' He was less inclined to see Soviet actions as a response to Western behaviour than as the inevitable policy, given the dynamics of Russian communism. He foresaw the virtual impossibility of the USSR'S contemplating the meshing of the economies of'their' zone with those of the rest of the world. In spite of the danger of creating a bloc in resistance, he thought it was time for a firm diplomatic line and the building up of those areas in Europe and elsewhere where Western influence was or could be dominant. Thereby the Russians might well be induced to be more co-operative. Smith struck a note here which was picked up and repeated in successive External Affairs memoranda. This was not just a military contest. The West must play an energetic part in the economic, social, and political development of backward populations, because they must demonstrate that the democracies were concerned. He did not in April 1945 think the Russians would be aggressive in the foreseeable future, but his subsequent reports sounded increasingly alarming. He said that the British and American ambassadors, who had shared Wilgress's optimism, had reached similar conclusions about a change in Soviet policy.17 What was particularly disturbing, in the view of the embassy, was the Soviet emphasis on the need for further military preparations. Although he left Moscow in December 1945 Smith wrote in late 1947 a memorandum entitled 'The Russians and the Rest of Us' which was the subject of considerable controversy. He advocated even more strongly than in 1945 the creation of a strong counterforce, and as Ottawa officials were at that stage moving towards the NATO solution, he was more in tune with departmental thinking. On one essential point, however, he held a minority view. He considered that the disadvantages of keeping the USSR in the United Nations outweighed the advantages. Because he had always seen the Western 'mission' as one which had to prove its virtue by tackling the world's economic and social problems he wanted the United Nations to be its instrument, freed from the Soviet dead hand which had prevented not only collective security but forward movement on economic issues. The view that prevailed among officials and political leaders in Ottawa, after some consid-

21 The Cold War érable doubt, was that it was essential to preserve the United Nations as a universal framework and the necessary security provisions could be organized by those willing to undertake them within the provisions of the Charter.18 When Wilgress had returned to Moscow in September 1945 he reported a situation different from that he had left. He still thought the Anglo-Saxon powers were 'a long way from finding the proper method of dealing with the Soviet Government.' The United States was showing 'a refreshing readiness' to assume its responsibility but he feared that 'toughness for the sake of being tough' might replace 'that policy of being "firm but fair" which I would like to see applied to dealings with the Soviet Government.' It seemed to him that the Russians were at that point defensive in the West and quiescent in the East but on the offensive in the South. As British interests were greater in the South he saw a deliberate effort to attack the weaker partner and divide 'the Anglo-Saxons.' The offensives towards Turkey and Iran worried him, particularly as the latter had 'the earmark of frank aggression.' He thought the Soviet leaders still planned to make the UN Charter work but were out to take as much advantage as they could of a fluid situation. 'Everything would have been easier if we could have removed that atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion that so long has permeated relations between the Soviet Union and the Western world. As things are now I fear we may lose the substance of genuine Soviet cooperation for the shadow of elections in the politically immature countries of Eastern Europe.'19 If Wilgress and General Pope in Berlin, who shared this view, seemed almost callous in discussing what was happening in Eastern Europe it was not approval of Soviet policy but a recognition from where they sat of the illusions involved in the West's faith in the free election formula for countries in which democracy had never been pure and which had suffered the anarchy of invasion and 'liberation.' Wilgress continued to believe, however, that the privileged group which ran the Soviet Union felt their country was desperately in need of a period of peace to rebuild the country and were anxious to make their borders secure against attack by taking as many strategic precautions as possible.20 By the spring of 1946 Wilgress was even more worried. The Soviet Union could not launch a war in its present state but he feared the ruling clique had glimpsed a 'vista of inevitable fulfilment of their expansionist dreams.' They wanted stability in their own sphere but instability elsewhere. They feared Western unity above all else and were 'delighted to see the rapid demobilisation of the United States military power.' Having seen the concessions he got with impunity at Yalta and Potsdam, Stalin would try for more. 'He must

22 The Shaping of Peace contrast the debate over whether or not to divulge the secret of the atomic bomb with the manner in which he would have exploited this advantage if the position had been reversed.' Wilgress's interpretation of Soviet policy as 'opportunist' differed, however, from that which held that the Soviet government was working to a definite plan and knew just what it wanted. As for what to do: 'To this irresponsible opportunism there is only one possible rejoinder. Not that policy of toughness which in the minds of its advocates means treating the Soviet Union as an inferior or as a pariah, but a policy of firmness based on a coalescence of American and British policies on a high moral plane.'21 This need for the West to strike 'a high moral note' was a feature of Canadian thinking as they moved now into the stage of constructing a Western alliance to dissuade the Soviet leaders. While Canadian officials were aware of the requirements of propaganda, there was strong conviction involved. They were anti-imperialists in the Commonwealth tradition and believed that the British empire must be at least partially liquidated and the UN trusteeship system applied unequivocally. As Wilgress put it: 'All this is necessary not only to bring British policy in tune with United States political philosophy but also to accord recognition of the legitimacy of the striving of coloured peoples for racial equality and for freedom from white domination.'22 They were anxious to dissociate themselves from the 'reactionaries,' those who in Europe and elsewhere wanted to fight the communists simply to preserve their vested interests or feudal political systems. In his memoirs George Kennan has reproduced a famous despatch from Moscow which had a great influence on Western thinking at the end of the war.23 It combined a sympathetic grasp of the Soviet plight with a rejection of the view of the USSR as an ally which would drop its fundamentalist antagonism in response to friendly treatment. The Russians, he argued, should be bargained with firmly but fairly and not allowed to feel they could get away with an expansionist policy. Above all, Kennan's was an argument for precise rather than apocalyptic analysis of Soviet intentions and capabilities, together with precise application of power against them, emphasizing the non-military factors. In the bitter controversies over American policy which followed, the despatch was misinterpreted and forgotten. Although Wilgress thought State Department attitudes to the Russians, including those of Kennan, were too tough and rude, in fact his approach was similar in many ways to that in Kennan's despatch. Unlike Kennan, however, he was inclined to see Soviet policy as Russian rather than the instrument of a crusading ideology. The Canadian embassy insisted on the need for infinite patience and rarely identified itself with the more inflammatory interpretations of Soviet

23 The Cold War intentions held by some Western diplomats. In neither case, however, did patience mean what was known as 'appeasement.' It was Wilgress's belief that the Russians were out to get all they could short of war but that they always drew back when confronted with determined resistance. As for the long-term future, he hoped that 'once equilibrium between the two worlds has been obtained, a base will be found for the coexistence of these two worlds.' Within the delegation at San Francisco he opposed compromise over the veto.24 It was important, he argued, to learn the proper technique for dealing with the USSR. It would be a mistake to be 'tough' all down the line, but it was necessary to stand very firm on important issues that could be well defended.25 Evidence that this was sound advice appears in Charles Bohlen's account of how Hopkins in Moscow got Stalin to reverse Molotov's position on the veto.26 Out of a sense of realism Wilgress was prepared to go further in accepting the situation in Eastern Europe than political leaders in the West would contemplate for some years to come. He thought they simply had to recognize a Russian zone of security in Eastern Europe and recommended a 'mild tolerance' towards governments like those of Poland and Romania - a recognition that these governments had made the only choice open to them. He thought they should be given some economic help but argued against subsidizing the countries, as that would be as fatal as the past policy of ostracizing them. General Pope in Berlin agreed on the grounds that nothing had been gained by concern for the future of representative government in Poland and Bulgaria. He thought they would be better advised to 'reduce the points of friction between East and West to those, of which there are quite enough, at which we have essential interests to defend and where we have some means of doing so.'27 As a basis of calculating future policy this was good advice, and it made Canadian policy-makers cautious about what came to be known as the American doctrine of liberation. It was Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe which, as much as anything else, turned Canadian attitudes towards the USSR from good will in 1945 to fear and hostility within a year. They shared the prevalent view in Western chanceries that the best hope of stability in these countries was in coalitions slightly left of centre, and it was the brutal treatment by the Russians of social democrats, workers in the resistance, and especially of Jews which alienated the policy-makers in Ottawa whose political philosophy was deeply liberal. If they were struck by parallels between the Soviet treatment of 'puppet governments' and what the Nazis had been doing some five years earlier, it was with great reluctance. The Russians surrounded everything they did in mystery, no doubt for defensive reasons, but how was anyone at the time to know? 28 Out of fear, diplomats in

24 The Shaping of Peace Moscow were isolated, and ignorance begat fear. Within the Soviet Union itself there set in, shortly after the war, one of the blackest periods of Stalinist rule. It was Khrushchev himself who later revealed that those horrors were in fact even worse than suspected at the time by Western diplomats. THE GOUZENKO AFFAIR

In September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, defected and turned over to the Canadian authorities evidence of the organization by intelligence agents in the embassy of information-collecting networks in Canada, with clear implications of similar arrangements in the United States and other countries. There was no doubt that the Gouzenko revelations provided excellent material for those in all Western countries who wanted or felt obliged to warn their governments against putting their trust in Soviet good intentions. The facts themselves, however, seriously affected the thinking of millions of people who wanted to believe in the possibility of continuing a wartime spirit of alliance. The story was a sensation when it ultimately broke, although somewhat less so abroad than Canadian officials had expected. Although the impact was strong throughout Canada, it was devastating in Ottawa. Ottawa was a cosy town in which a lot of dedicated people from across the country had been working long and hard for five years in a common cause. The revelation that people working with them had done such a drastic thing as neglect their oath and provide information to the Soviet embassy was deeply upsetting, particularly as it confirmed some of the things the anti-communists had been saying. Because there were clear implications in the evidence that still more people had been involved, there was an inevitable atmosphere of suspicion of one's neighbour which good liberals found the most hateful aspect of it all. That this did not develop into the miasma which inflicted Washington in the McCarthy era is attributable to the cool nerves of cabinet ministers and civil servants and to a determination to allow a Royal Commission by reputable methods to examine the evidence. The ghastly affair29 made it easier for planners to accept the policy of firmness to the Russians now being advocated. It did not, however, extinguish the disposition to patience which was the other part of the formula. Any honest suspicion that the Canadian government welcomed the Gouzenko revelations - let alone that they were engineered or fabricated - could hardly survive a reading of the Mackenzie King Record or the report of the Royal Commission.30 It was the immediate policy of Mackenzie King and his advisers to inform and consult both the British and Americans. This had to be done if for no other reason than the evidence that the same thing was

25 The Cold War happening, and probably on a larger scale, in their countries. At any rate Mackenzie King felt lonely, he believed devoutly in Anglo-AmericanCanadian collaboration, and he probably exaggerated the extent to which Gouzenko's news would surprise and shock leaders in other countries. There was no doubt, however, that although King accepted advice and co-ordinated his actions with the larger partners, the direction of policy over the Gouzenko affair was retained in Ottawa. There was acute awareness in Ottawa, particularly on the part of the few senior officials in External Affairs who knew what had happened, of the damage an immediate revelation could do to the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the autumn of 1945 over Germany. Far from having been welcomed, Gouzenko was turned away when he arrived with his story at a newspaper office and at the Department of Justice. Only when it was realized that his life was in danger was he given protection. Fear of the consequences on international politics at this crucial moment even led the few ministers and civil servants who were in the know to consider suppressing or even ignoring the story. They realized, however, that it would be worse for the news to leak, as it probably would. Most important was the realization that, however unpleasant the task, they had to face up to the prosecution of civil servants who had violated their oaths. Reluctance to explode the bombshell was evident in the postponement of action for some months. There were sound reasons for delay. Gouzenko brought documentary evidence which seemed irrefutable, but the motives of the government would be highly suspect if they impetuously made charges simply on the basis of material provided by a Soviet defector. Even later when the evidence from Canadian sources was beyond dispute, there was a cautious realization in External Affairs that the Canadian government could be accused of fabrication. The fear was well based, for this was a widespread reaction abroad to the revelation when it eventually was made in February. Mackenzie King may have thought that the world at large knew his heart was pure, but Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong realized that the majority of people abroad knew nothing about him at all. The attitude to the case in External Affairs is well set out in a letter from Hume Wrong in March 1946, commenting on a report from Canada House that concern over civil liberties and suspicion of spy scares had induced a good deal of scepticism. One criticism had been that, instead of making a public scandal, the Canadian government should have approached the Soviet government through diplomatic channels. In the first place, the Commission's report should show... why this matter could not be handled through diplomatic channels. It was obvious to us from the first that,

26 The Shaping of Peace unless we were to pretend that we had not received the information which we had, there would have to be an enquiry involving publicity in order to enable the removal of those involved from their positions in Government Service. Consideration was given to a prior diplomatic approach to the Soviet Government but it was apparent that such an approach might well entail the failure of our domestic house-cleaning through warning in advance the Canadians concerned in the conspiracy ... Secondly, I think that many people's judgments are distorted by the overwhelming anxiety which now prevails, particularly in the United Kingdom, about the course of Soviet foreign policy. They probably feel that matters were going sourly enough without adding a new complication of this sort. They presumably do not realize that what we have stumbled on here is only a small sample of the practices going on in other countries and that while the Soviet Government follows these methods there is a very serious obstacle to the maintenance of harmonious relations. Public exposure here may well lead the Soviet authorities eventually to change their methods on the ground that they do not pay, and this would be an all round advantage in achieving a better working relationship with the Soviet Government. Thirdly, quite apart from the normal ethics of espionage, this case ... involves a subversive technique analogous to that used by the Nazis through the Bund organizations in various countries. This technique is to create, and employ for subversive purposes, divided loyalties among elements in democratic states ... Fourthly, with regard to the argument that the Canadian Government is kicking up too much fuss, it is not the Government but the press eager for sensations that has created the real fuss. I entirely agree that most of the press stories have been misleading... We cannot give a great deal of guidance to the press at this stage because to do so effectively in the actual conditions involves indicating the line which the investigation is taking ... Such guidance as we have given to the press has been to emphasize the domestic house-cleaning aspect, and so far we have not felt inclined to reply to the Soviet statement and its elaborations in Pravda and Izvestia. Finally, I have felt from the first that it was very important in the long-run to show that we were not afraid of the Soviet Union. They must have been quite certain that we had the information at least as long ago as when they recalled the Military Attache. Those who maintain that the affair should have been hushed up seem to be playing right into Soviet hands. Such a course would surely create an impression in Moscow that they could get away with nearly anything. P.S. One of the more distressing aspects is the narrowness of the line which divides the genuine revolutionary idealists on the margin of the case from those who consciously allowed themselves to become agents of a foreign power. Some of this latter guilty group started from motives which, though mistaken, were idealistic and one is afraid that there may be a lack of discrimination in the outcome between foreign agents in particular and Communists in general. We shall do our best to see that a

27 The Cold War proper distinction is observed but, as I have said, the dividing line is at times pretty obscure.31

There were differences on timing with the British and Americans, but these were based on practical considerations. The Americans favoured delay because they wanted to make their own investigations of the leads provided by Gouzenko into Washington. The British had a different problem. One of those named, Alan Nunn May, a British scientist working on atomic projects in Canada, had returned to England, and it was feared he might flee the country or at any rate continue to provide vital scientific material to Soviet agents. They wished to arrest him quickly, but this could hardly be done without revealing the whole story. Some members of the British Foreign Office wanted quick publicity to make clear to the Russians that the West was now taking a hard line, but Attlee and Bevin seemed more concerned over the risks involving Nunn May. It should be borne in mind, of course, that the secret of Gouzenko remained closely guarded among a very few people in the three capitals and was not considered by the full Canadian cabinet until the eve of the arrest. The whole thing gave Mackenzie King nightmares. In his diary he leaps from the direst predictions of Soviet intentions to comforting illusions about the innocence of nice Russians which included not only the Soviet ambassador in Ottawa, Zaroubin, but also Stalin. He considered withdrawing from the USSR the veto in the Security Council, and feared some Canadians, particularly in the west, might now demand annexation to the United States for protection. As was so often the case» however, in spite of the instability of his conclusions as recorded in his diary,32 his recommendations on policy, or at least the policy recommendations with which he went along, were sober. One cannot avoid the suspicion in reading the diary that he got a certain excitement out of being at the centre of such an earth-shattering mystery. As the months passed, there was increasing fear of disclosure. King was anxious to have a meeting with Truman and Attlee to discuss procedure and there was much debate on how to do this without attracting attention. There was a perfectly appropriate and honest reason for the three to get together to consider what would be done about the secret of atomic power in which the three countries had been involved. The tripartite conference took place in Washington. It was the same one which produced the declaration of 15 November 1945 on the intentions of the three 'atomic powers.' It is not surprising that the discussions on the subject were based on an assumption made explicit in Canadian draft memoranda that the secret of atomic power would not remain a secret long and the Soviet Union would have it in a few

28 The Shaping of Peace years.33 The declaration was directed towards finding a system of international control. It has been criticized by some historians34 as finally closing the door to the Russians on the possibility of four-power collaboration on atomic energy. It is doubtful if in different circumstances that decision by the Americans would have been otherwise, but King's item on the agenda certainly did not make the situation propitious. Although it seemed essential for Mackenzie King to clear matters on the Gouzenko case at this level, close collaboration continued among officials of the three powers until the decision was finally taken in Ottawa to act, suspects were arrested, and a statement was issued on 15 February 1946. The timetable was speeded up by a disclosure in the American press. Public opinion, however, was so sceptical at the time that the columnist, Drew Pearson, published two stories a week apart about a 'sensational spy case in Ottawa' without being taken very seriously. In the ensuing disclosure care was taken to minimize the damage in relations with the Soviet Union. If it had happened a year or so later when hope of close collaboration in the United Nations with the USSR had been all but abandoned, the handling might well have been different. In the statement issued by the Department of External Affairs in the prime minister's name, there was reference only to 'a foreign mission.' Between the time of the defection and the announcement, the Soviet ambassador had returned to Moscow and it was considered likely in Ottawa that the Russians would break diplomatic relations. No such initiative was planned on the Canadian side. The Soviet chargé d'affairs was called in and politely informed of what had happened. According to King's own account: 'The young men were about to arise when I stopped them for a moment to say how sorry Robertson and I were that it was necessary to speak of these matters at all; that we were all close friends, and that nothing should destroy the relationship.'35 Considering the fact that one young man was Pavlov, the second secretary whom the Gouzenko documents had revealed to be the NKVD representative in the embassy, this was going pretty far. Inflammatory statements were avoided and the government was content to let the interim reports from the Royal Commission speak for themselves. Zaroubin did not return to Ottawa, but Wilgress remained for some time in Moscow. There were routine articles in the Soviet press accusing the Canadians of provocation, but there was no flat denial. The Russians recalled their military attaché but insisted that he had despatched only information that was publicly available.36 The Russians may well have been puzzled by the failure of the Canadians to exploit the affair more loudly.37

29 The Cold War CANADA AND THE PAX AMERICANA

It takes two to make a war, hot or cold. An examination of Canada and the Cold War requires also a perspective on Canadian attitudes to the United States. This subject in general is dealt with in chapter 11 and pops up almost everywhere. In this context, therefore, an effort will be made to pull threads together and look at the Canadian view of the place of the United States in the strategy of peace. In their examination of Canadian images of the Cold War Page and Munton note some readily apparent differences from American images. They question the 'revisionist' assumption that Canadians simply acquired their images from their United States counterparts38 and point out that there is little if any reference to United States military intelligence or State Department appreciation in a major DEA assessment undertaken in 1947. The principal sources were one classified British study and for the most part Wilgress's despatches. The latter were circulated on the highest level and even passed to the State Department at their request by officers who wanted to compare them with what Kennan was saying. In the view of these scholars Wilgress's approach, carried on by his successors, was the principal formative influence on Canadian official thinking, although they note that Canada's foreign policy orientation must be attributed to certain political, economic, historical, and geographical realities rather than to 'the images of a few key policy-makers' - a point with which Aron would no doubt agree. The Canadian image was attributable, furthermore, to the position from which they viewed the action. 'Lesser power status led to a set of images which gave greater emphasis to systemic, as opposed to bipolar, conditions and which, though they highlighted the role of the two great powers, reflected a concern for the problems on both sides that might lead to another war.'39 A Pax Americana was not at all what Canadians had in mind when they designed a world organization. However, as Norman Robertson used to say, 'A Pax Americana is better than no Pax at all.' Canadians were concerned with the dangers of international communism largely because it posed a threat to 'world order,' to a pax, preferably more solidly based than the old one. For the time being the United States alone could provide the sinews for a pax and must, therefore, remain strong. This should be an interim situation, however. The ambivalent Canadian policy was to avoid weakening the United States while assisting in the weaving of a web to control the behaviour of states including the United States.

30 The Shaping of Peace The hope was in co-existence, not the subjugation of the USSR. Although the concept of co-existence was not consciously defined as such until later, that was clearly the position towards which the External Affairs planners were groping in the uncertain years. Wilgress, in his doubts about Western policy in Eastern Europe, argued that 'Not only did the balance of power situation make it impracticable for us to exert any real influence ... but also we were leading the Soviet Government to think that we wished to gain a foothold in the very security belt which they had been able to establish as a result of the War.'40 General Pope, from the Military Mission in Berlin, wrote: 'Attempts at political penetration we may always expect but granted we more or less accept the presently defined lines of demarcation and stand firmly on those areas on which we are on good ground, it seems to me quite possible that we might see a welcome détente.'41 Wilgress had no doubt that the Soviet Union must be 'contained' but he continued to point out how the Russians viewed what they saw as the Anglo-Saxon powers excluding them from 'the club' and not allowing too much Soviet interference in the world outside the Soviet sphere which 'they regard as predestined for the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon race.' The policy of firmness he recommended was 'in frank recognition that the attempt to prevent the world being divided into two camps has failed.' It was 'a new attempt to find an equilibrium between the two camps on the basis of relative power.' The difference was not merely that one was communistic and the other capitalistic but that one was dynamic and the other static. 'This makes it essential that firmness should be tempered with fairness in order that the Soviet Union may never be able to pose as a martyr state.' Co-existence was best encouraged by maintaining Western, which largely meant American, power sufficient to deter the USSR. A departmental memorandum concluded that the Russians were realists and unlikely to precipitate a war but they might do so if they saw their power contracting. 'If this analysis is correct, the danger of war diminishes if the forces on the United States side of the balance are much greater than the forces on the Soviet side, provided that the Soviet leaders are not driven by too relentless an increase of United States power to risk a desperate gamble.'42 Soviet intentions might or might not be limited, but they must not be tempted by weakness. In the postwar period American power was a fact. American possession of the atomic bomb was also a fact. It had not been acquired for the specific purpose of resisting the Russians in the postwar world. At no time were Canadians faced with a judgment as to whether the United States should develop the bomb for that purpose. If the Russians were cowed by the American monopoly of the bomb, that was not regarded as entirely a bad

31 The Cold War thing, given the evidence of their ground force strength in Europe. It was neither desirable nor possible for one country to retain the monopoly, but as proliferation was the gravest danger, nothing was to be gained from sharing the secret at this stage. It was not a question of creating an international atomic control system from scratch. The war had determined the circumstances from which a start must be made. The United States government was neither using nor brandishing the bomb to force concessions from the Russians, although many American voices sounded as if they were. It did not need to, of course. The fact was sufficiently intimidating. In spite of it, however, the Russians were not making the concessions. There was no requirement, therefore, for Canada to oppose United States use of the bomb for crude extortion. It is curious how few references there were to the bomb in the various memoranda and despatches on United States and Soviet policy during the 1945-7 period, although it was obviously a large factor in any calculation. When Wilgress returned to his post in the autumn of 1945 after some months' absence during which East-West relations had seriously deteriorated he discussed the question of the atom bomb and East-West relations in terms which clearly influenced Ottawa's thinking. He disagreed with the view that the withholding of the secret of the bomb was the principal factor dividing the Soviet Union from the Anglo-Saxon powers. He agreed with the British chargé d'affaires, Frank Roberts, who had asked the Foreign Office to imagine what the situation would be if there had been no bomb. 'Did they think that if the secret of the atomic bomb was disclosed to the Soviet Union all the present difficulties would vanish? He himself [ie Roberts] answered the last question by stating that there might be a honeymoon period of about a week and then the difficulties with which we are now faced would reappear.' What worried Wilgress was that 'the inept handling of the question by American public comment and by the United States government had served greatly to strengthen Soviet convictions about the mistrust and suspicions pervading the international scene.' If the Russophobes and the tough school had not been in the ascendency in the United States the atomic bomb would never have become the factor that it was in the current situation. He thought Truman was correct in distinguishing between atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the secret of the bomb. 'The latter is a military secret differing greatly in degree but not in kind from the military secrets which the Russians themselves would never think of divulging to anyone.' He concluded that 'in this allaying of Soviet mistrust and suspicion the handling of the atomic bomb secret must play the leading part. I am not one of those in favour of disclosing the actual process of manufacturing the

32 The Shaping of Peace bomb to the Soviet Union unless proper safeguards are given in return, which I doubt if the Soviet Government are in a position to give. I am all in favour, however, of the secret being brought some way into the United Nations Organization in order to bolster up that body and inspire new trust in international cooperation for peace and security.'43 That was in fact the approach King and Pearson had taken at the tripartite Washington discussions shortly before Wilgress's despatch was written. The Gouzenko affair had changed King's mind on sharing with the Russians. 'Churchill was right when he said it would not do to let the Russians have the secret of the atomic bomb. I thought Roosevelt was right when he said he felt an ally should know what we are doing in that regard. I can see that Churchill had the sounder judgment; had keener perceptions of what was at stake, what was going on.'44 It was not surprising that Canadians saw a considerable difference between American and Soviet policy in liberated territories. The right of the Russians to friendly governments on their border was constantly acknowledged in Ottawa, and they were somewhat slow to recognize that no social democrat or anyone without the appropriate communist subservience to Moscow would be regarded by the Russians as friendly. In the abstractions of a later day the right of Russians to do in Eastern Europe what Americans did in Western Europe is easily acknowledged. But it was obvious at the time that what was being done in Brussels or Paris or Rome or even Athens - and certainly Ottawa - was not at all what was happening in Warsaw and Bucharest. Soviet right to security was all very well, but the blood in Poland and Romania was real, and it was not all the blood of fascists. It can be argued, of course, that the Americans had no need to act in Western capitals as the Russians did in the East, as they were supporting majorities in resisting the efforts of minorities to take over power, just the opposite of what the Russians were doing in the East. But that was an important difference. The West Europeans were putting their own houses in order. The Americans, and the British, were throwing their weight about, doing what they could to weaken the communist appeal - regrettable intervention, no doubt, but very different from arresting opposition leaders and causing them to disappear. Wilgress and others were often very critical of American tactics vis-à-vis the Russians, and American inability to see how their own actions appeared in Russian eyes, but they could see the difference between subsidizing moderate parties in Italy or France and exterminating those right of the far Left in Eastern Europe. The part which the United States was to play in Canada's design was summed up succinctly in a speech St Laurent gave on 14 October 1949 at

33 The Cold War Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York. 'In the establishment of security and peace, in the restoration of devastated regions, in the expansion of world trade, in the development of the resources of backward areas, in the conservation of the soil of the earth, of its forest resources and its waterpower, and in the industrialization and diversification of the economies of other continents, there is only one nation with the wealth and the energy and the knowledge and the skill to give real leadership, and that nation is the United States.'45 The Pax Americana, although no one would have called it that in those days, was emerging as a new form of the Anglo-American condominium in which Canadians had long rested their hopes. There was, nevertheless, a more international consciousness now in the East Block and a healthy scepticism about some earlier assumptions. Even if Anglo-Saxony did still seem to be the most reliable and responsible (a favourite word) part of mankind, the perspective was broadening. Hume Wrong had noted in August 1942 that '...we must weigh our civilization critically in making the peace. Hitler's Germany is the occasion of the war but not the cause. That all would be well if the world were to adopt the political and economic principles of the English-speaking countries - and that other countries will be glad to do so if given a chance - is no more than a superstition. The defects in our own principles are one of the causes of the war.'46 By the time the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed in 1947 External Affairs observers were recognizing that Britain was not going to be able to maintain the role in the Triangle they would have liked and that they would have to work out a Canadian position in a less favourable situation. Wilgress, although he was always uneasy about those in the United States who were bent on humiliating the Soviet Union, thought there was little to fear from the doctrine 'provided it is not pushed to too great an extent and provided we do not lose our heads.' He added: 'Undoubtedly the "Truman Doctrine" will bring us into still greater dependence upon the United States and to this extent away from the United Kingdom. It is really the coming into being of that "Atlantic Community" envisaged by Walter Lippmann in his book on "United States War Aims" ... In other words the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century is to be replaced in the later twentieth century by a Pax Americana. On account of our proximity to the United States this gives rise to all sorts of problems for us and makes it necessary for us to subscribe to the main lines of United States policy. Hence, in our relations with the Soviet Union, we have no alternatives other than to accept and follow the "Truman Doctrine." '47 In Chungking, Major General Odium, the Canadian ambassador, had reached that conclusion even earlier as he watched the super-power conflict, as he thought, emerging in China: '... the United States

34 The Shaping of Peace is committing itself to "all out" help for China, and taking on its shoulders the task of maintaining peace in the Far East. The "Pax Americana" is about to be set up ... Canada's role will be as clear-cut as it was vis-à-vis England when the Pax Britannica was the dominant single thing in human affairs. Canada will have to be a friendly self-supporter of the major American policy.'48 For Odium, roles were always clear-cut. Wrong thought 'there would be no quarrel in the State Department about the general lines of Wilgress's appreciation of Soviet policy and SovietUnited States relations.'49 He had in mind, of course, Bohlen and Kennan who shared Wilgress's preference for firmness but not aggressiveness. Wilgress's views were the basis of the memorandum for discussion entitled 'The United States and the Soviet Union,' prepared in Ottawa by Escott Reid. His tentative conclusion was: 'In the event of war we shall have no freedom of action in any matter which the United States considers essential. We shall be all-out belligerents from the day the war starts. In peacetime our freedom of action will be limited but it will not be non-existent. It will still be open to us to oppose the United States on certain issues in United States-Soviet relations. Indeed the fact that we are in the same boat with the United States makes it wholly proper for us to tell the United States to stop rocking the boat or driving holes in its bottom.' Reid thought that Canada could pursue a more consistent policy than the United States because of the latter's size and constitutional structure and, 'If we play our cards well we can exert an influence at Washington out of all proportion to the relative importance of our strength in war...' He saw Canada's policy not so much as one of supporting the United States as of calculating all aspects of it in the light of whether or not any step contributed to increasing or lessening the chances of war with the Soviet Union.50 Few, if any, contemplated neutrality. There was no doubt for Canadians, as for the British, to which side they belonged. Pope thought it better to say not that it would be open to Canada to oppose the United States but 'that it would still be open to us to endeavour to restrain the United States. If I know anything of that country, it is that when they rightly, or wrongly, feel that their security is threatened or that their interests may suffer, they brook no opposition.'51 R.A. MacKay, who had been much involved in defence issues, did not question the conclusion but was uneasy about it. He doubted whether Canada's influence on United States policy could be great and suggested a 'buffer state policy.' 'We are so much within the United States orbit for defence purposes and ideologically that an out-and-out buffer state policy is impossible. On the other hand, I do not think that we should be content with mere formal autonomy in defence relations with the United States.' He

35 The Cold War argued for manning northern stations as quickly as possible and insisting on full information of activities of United States forces in Canada. The world, he thought, would have been safer if Britain and the West European countries could play a more effective role and he wondered if Canada might not take another look at the policy of no-commitment to Britain to see if there wasn't some element of balance in an effective Commonwealth.52 To make these analyses as cool-headed as possible, an effort was made to see both the Soviet Union and the United States as 'expanding powers,' but a conclusion that they were comparable was resisted. Marcel Cadieux in particular questioned any such implication in Reid's memorandum. 'My own view is that essentially, the USSR alone is an expanding power and that such attempts as have been made by the United States to extend its defence areas have been warranted by the aggressive policies of the USSR.'53 There was, as befits a good foreign office, no unanimity, although one could identify a common approach. Interestingly enough, the most critical attack on United States policy came in a 1947 memorandum prepared by the Canadian embassy in Washington. 'While it is fantastic to assert that the people of the United States or their leaders wish to dominate the world, or to start a preventive war, it would be dishonest to ignore both the existence of influences in the United States which work towards some United States domination of the lives of alien peoples, and also an attitude which might result in dangerously noisy and provocative methods in the task of stemming the flow of Soviet influence. The incipient risk of putting the Soviet Government in the position where it would feel bound to go to war is contained in these trends, but perhaps a greater danger is that the confidence and support of other nations in the intentions of the United States may be weakened to the extent where the broad aims of U.S. policy would be gravely undermined.' The embassy continued to identify itself with the 'firm but fair' attitude, and to see Congress as the menace. They expressed serious concern in detail about 'the unstable and irresponsible side of the United States,' 'the blinding unbalanced fear and hatred of Russia and Communism,' the inability to see themselves as the rich nation and to comprehend the European outlook, and the posture taken at times by United States officials 'that the only criterion that governs their attitude, regardless of the merits of the issues involved, is that it should be rigidly anti-Soviet at every turn.' The ambassador [Hume Wrong] noted that 'the consciousness of the people of the United States of their responsibilities in the world community depends too greatly for comfort on their dislike and fear of the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology' and this increased the difficulty of achieving 'a negotiated settlement between the U.S. and the USSR.' That assumption, that

36 The Shaping of Peace what was required was 'a negotiated settlement,' was perhaps what continued throughout the Cold War to distinguish the Canadian approach from that of the United States, where the idea of negotiating with the devil rather than making him behave was unpopular. Wrong, however, did point out that these excesses, dangerous as they were, were the price paid for engaging the United States in full involvement in world affairs and routing the isolationists. 'For example, they are part of the price to be paid for the Marshall Plan.' The Soviet leaders had been ignorant and short-sighted. 'The masters of Russia might by different tactics have attained all, or nearly all, their immediate purposes without arousing the hatred and suspicion of the people of the United States, who might have slipped back towards the mood of the fool's paradise of the Kellogg Pact.'54 In conclusion it is worth noting the view of two scholars who examined the views of DEA officers in the 1947 discussion of Soviet policy: 'The point, however, is that where Canada stood in the very broadest sense can hardly be attributed to the images of a few key policy-makers. Canada's postwar foreign-policy orientation as a Western ally was virtually determined by a number of realities - the rigid bipolar structure of the postwar system, geographical fact, its wartime and earlier historical linkages, its political and economic structure - and by public attitudes. Any other orientation, either that of Soviet ally or of strict neutral, would have run counter to these realities.'55

3 Development of a Middle Power, 1946-50

THE H I E R A R C H Y OF POWERS

Because of the significance attached to the term 'middle power' in Canadian diplomacy, it is well to recall what was in the minds of Canadian planners when the UN was being established. Although in the concept as used then there was an implication of appropriate responsibility as well as appropriate right, the emphasis was on the latter. There was no intention of claiming for middle powers a status as clearly identifiable as that of the great powers, which was specifically authorized in the Charter's provisions for the Security Council. They were identified usually as intermediate, secondary, or middle powers, but the last term was not a Canadian invention. It had been used in a natural way for many years and has been traced to Jan Smuts in his book, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, published in 1918.' Mackenzie King's attitude was shown in a statement in the House of Commons in 1945: 'There is also a good deal of talk, much of it critical, of an alleged desire on the part of the Canadian Government to see Canada enrolled among the middle powers. I was careful... to say nothing to support this unfounded assumption.'2 Sometimes he liked to emphasize Canada's incapacity for heavy burdens, but he resented having Canada classified with Mexico, for example.3 Canada did not always consider itself a middle power. In matters such as relief, civil aviation, and trade, in accordance with functionalist principles, the government thought of itself as a major power. Canada acted as such in UNRRA, and before the civil aviation conference in Chicago in 1944 C.D. Howe rejected the idea that Canada should organize and lead a block of small countries, asserting afterwards that Canada had been accepted as 'one of the "Big Three" of the Conference.'4 In the immediate postwar period Canada

38 The Shaping of Peace was the world's third largest trader and, therefore, in drafts for the proposed International Trade Organization Canadian delegates regarded themselves as among the elect. Howe told the House of Commons that 'There is an outstanding Big Three in the field today, and Canada is one of the three.'5 There was no definitive list of middle powers, and the term was usually used in the lower case while great powers was capitalized. R.G. Riddell, one of the principal United Nations planners in External Affairs, referred to states that could not be ranked with the mightiest but 'by reason of their size, their material resources, their willingness to accept responsibility, their influence and their stability, are close to being great powers.'6 In a CBC broadcast of 1 July 1945 Pearson had mentioned six UN members who qualified: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the Netherlands. G.P. deT. Glazebrook, in an article in International Organization, added Argentina, India, and Poland to that list.7 Canada opposed misconceptions about the equality of sovereign states. Lester Pearson said about 'sovereign equality': 'It is one of those phrases, the facile and unthinking acceptance and use of which can be almost as great a handicap to international cooperation as the arbitrary concentration of power in the hands of a few states at the expense of the rest. Power in the conduct of international relations must be related in some way to responsibility.'8 He said absolute equality would probably mean absolute futility. The functional principle was calculated to allay the fear of the great powers that if they shared any of their power with the smaller states they would eventually be forced to surrender all control. The Canadian crusade for the rights of middle or lesser powers, as described in volume 1, was concerned to a considerable extent with the securing of seats on various United Nations councils and other institutions. In its major battle on the Security Council Canada was reasonably successful in form but quite unsuccessful in practice. In the specialized agencies and in economic and social bodies it is hard to document specific successes, but it could be said that the tireless and tiresome insistence, not only by the Canadians but by Australians and others, was one of the factors that had prevented the emergence of an international organization with a council of great powers acting as a cabinet. In all this Canada was putting the case for the functionalist principle rather than specifically for the rights of middle powers in the abstract. In its criteria of functional qualification Canada showed a bias in favour of industrial strength, economic development, and military potential, a position that was challenged by the Asians in particular. Canada generally opposed the idea of permanent seats on the councils of specialized agencies and usually managed to suggest a formula that would favour Canada for

39 Development of a Middle Power election. On the other hand, Canada was interested in efficiency and for this reason constantly opposed large councils and committees, a principle that often made representation for middle powers difficult to achieve. On the matter of voting procedures Canadians were torn between their opposition to the liberum veto which had strangled the League and their dislike of the great-power veto. When they looked at the veto as a principle by which the great powers accepted responsibility jointly to keep the peace, Canadians approved, but they did not like its practical expression when the UN was launched-the right to veto decisions. One reason Canada acquiesced in the veto was that it expected the Council would rarely resort to formal votes. They thought the great powers would seek agreement by negotiations as they had during the war and at the San Francisco conference and that there would be a kind of government by consensus. Whenever possible Canada opposed voting. Brooke Claxton said: 'Peace can't be made by votes.'9 The Canadians at San Francisco had regarded the veto as a transitional arrangement that would be eroded or amended away when the international climate had improved. In any case, Canadians were not overly worried when the veto was possessed by their closest friends, among others. Furthermore, it could, if necessary, be frustrated by measures of collective defence provided under Article 51 or, in the case of measures of pacific settlement, by resort to action by the General Assembly under Article 10. A certain Canadian weakness for drafting and rules of procedure was illustrated in forlorn efforts to clarify in writing the procedural matters on which the veto would not apply. The attack, however, was on the misuse of the veto. They refused to join in perennial Latin American proposals to eliminate the veto by amending the Charter. In November 1946 a Canadian 'Memorandum on Pacific Settlement by the Security Council' was put forward to clarify matters of procedure, placing restrictions on the use of the veto and establishing rules to avoid unnecessary resort to it. This culminated in the Report of the Interim Committee on the Problem of Voting in the Security Council, adopted at the Third Session of the General Assembly, but which came to nought as it was rejected by the Soviet Union. Canadians then joined with other countries to find a way around the veto by establishing such bodies as the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, NATO, and, eventually, the Uniting for Peace procedures of 1950. In the planning stages for the UN, Canada had looked at the possibilities of weighted voting but on the whole preferred to achieve its ends by functional representation. Canada would not necessarily gain from systems of weighted voting, particularly if, as was inevitable, attention were given to population. When Canadians became experienced in Assembly diplomacy they realized

40 The Shaping of Peace they were not dealing with a parliamentary system in which a majority of votes was necessary to secure legislation. The Assembly made gestures and even a minority vote could have its effect as a statement. The votes of some countries carried more weight than those of others, even if they were all single and equal. The votes of major powers were important because their willingness to pay for or otherwise support a resolution was often crucial. The votes of other countries, such as Yugoslavia or India for example, carried weight because they could be swung. The way to weight the Canadian vote was to establish a good reputation and avoid rigid bloc voting. These were some of the realities Canadian diplomats were grasping as they prepared for an active role in the United Nations somewhat different from what had been contemplated. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: BEGINNINGS

In the calculations of Canadians at San Francisco little if any part was played by the atomic bomb. King knew about it, but he could hardly be called an architect of the United Nations, in which he decidedly lacked faith. The effect of the revelations of August 1945 was to make Canadian views on world government more radical. By October 1945 when parliament came to debate the Charter of the United Nations this new mood was clear. Congress had already endorsed American participation, and scarcely an isolationist note was struck in Ottawa. The most remarkable change of position can be noted in the views of the prime minister, who told the House of Commons on 17 December 1945 that the more deeply one pondered the terrible problems and the implications of the development of atomic energy the harder it was to see a solution in anything short of some surrender of national sovereignty. 'With a limited surrender of national sovereignty, there must be instituted some form of world government restricted, at least at the outset, to matters pertaining to the prevention of war, and the maintenance of international security.'10 Both Conservative and CCF spokesmen agreed with these sentiments. It is interesting, however, to compare King's statement about supranational government with the last speech he made to the General Assembly in Paris in September 1948 when he asserted that the United Nations had attempted to do too much in too short a time and had overlooked the fact that institutional growth had outstripped the development of world community of interest on which international organization must rest. An even greater contrast is with the statement of the new secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, to the General Assembly of September 1949 in

41 Development of a Middle Power which he outlined three principles for Security Council action at which the Canadians had arrived after some experience on the Council. These were that the Council should not initiate action it could not complete; that it should leave the responsibility largely to the people immediately affected; and it should concentrate its influence on ending hostilities wherever they occurred. In all the intense concentration on the United Nations and Canada's part in it there is little to suggest a preconceived idea of that moderate, mediating, middle-power role which was later to be identified with Canada. In fact, there was little, if any, talk about a role at all. Canadian diplomacy was making headway but it was not yet self-conscious. Canadian diplomats were impatient of the reins put on them by Mackenzie King. They were bursting with ideas and they were desperately concerned with the creation of a world order which was important for Canadians. They were considerable actors in postwar diplomacy and there was enough satisfaction for them in being involved in the Creation. In Washington, London, and Paris their views were not always accepted, but on the whole the Canadians were considered helpful. In the concept of middle power there was not that ambiguity which later emerged. The idea that the diplomatic function of middle-powered states was that of mediators or go-betweens was a response to the need of the international community at that time. The Canadians had found themselves playing the role to some extent in UNRRA," although more as a country with important and special interests, too much a functional great power to be a mediator. The notion of Canada as linch-pin or interpreter between the United States and Britain was popular with after-dinner speakers, but in the age of Roosevelt and Churchill had little real significance except perhaps on the level of committees and sub-committees where Canadians often found that they could speak both British and American. The tone of Canadian memoranda on the UN was often too peremptory to suggest that of a compromiser. At Bretton Woods, Atlantic City, and more particularly in San Francisco, however, they were moderators, accepting the special position of the great powers more understandingly than other lesser powers but nevertheless on the side of curbing it. In the end, perhaps, it was a matter of personality and the disposition of people like Pearson, Wrong, Robertson, or Wilgress to accept contradiction, to recognize the limits to which any party could be satisfied, and to see what might be done about situations as they existed. Being the kind of country it was, ideologically towards the middle of the road and geographically on the periphery of contested areas, Canada turned into a middle power by doing what came naturally. Sitting on the sidelines

42 The Shaping of Peace was made impossible by the act of joining the United Nations. As a member of the United Nations, permanently in the Assembly and from time to time in the Security Council, a country can hardly avoid taking positions on international issues near and remote. Even abstention is a position. Given the convictions of the Ottawa bureaucracy and the younger ministers, supported by the press and parliamentarians, about the building of a new world and the impossibility of escaping back into a fire-proof house, not even the caution of Mackenzie King could hold them back. Canadians were deeply involved in the politics of UN councils and committees. By the time the General Assembly met in New York in the autumn of 1946 patterns were established which continued to characterize Canadian foreign policy for a long time. The delegation to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, held for the first time in New York, began in a mood of pessimism induced by frustration in the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission, and by the political state of Europe. 'Moderation and restraint' were, however, the watch words. 'Realizing harsh words were of no avail,' the Canadian delegation in its report found satisfaction in that the Assembly had avoided stirring up more trouble by denouncing the culprits and had constructively suggested rules of better behaviour to the Security Council. The General Assembly, it was noted with satisfaction, had realized the limitations of its powers. It had not acceded to the South African proposal for the incorporation of Southwest Africa into the Union, but it had refused nicely and had not been 'unnecessarily offensive.' The delegation shook its head, however, over the way in which a moderate resolution on relations with Spain had been frustrated by extremist elements at both ends. A resolution on India's complaint against South Africa had carried by a two-thirds vote but 'many remained unconvinced that the Assembly would not have done more to improve the condition of the Indians in South Africa if it had passed unanimously, as it could have done, a resolution suspending a vote of censure on South Africa until the International Court of Justice had ... decided the preliminary question of the jurisdiction of the Assembly to deal with the substance of India's complaint.'12 The Canadian position on Spain was to deplore the Franco régime but to avoid encouraging intervention or civil war on the grounds that these would do no good to anyone. In accordance with its British tradition it opposed the severing of diplomatic relations in principle as self-defeating but accepted the withdrawal of ambassadors as a compromise. It opposed economic sanctions and keeping Spain out of the specialized agencies as futile because, in the Canadian view, these were not privileged clubs but institutions for regulating and disciplining the behaviour

43 Development of a Middle Power of states. There was no hesitation, however, in condemning General Franco and all his works. The Indian complaint about the treatment of Indians in South Africa posed an embarrassment to Canada as a Commonwealth associate of both countries which persisted until South Africa left the Commonwealth some fifteen years later. As for Article 2(7) protecting domestic jurisdiction, Canada was already finding its place in the middle. The delegation indicated that it did not favour too restrictive an interpretation of the Article, but so long as it was in the Charter it could not be disregarded. The way out on Southwest Africa was to be found in a reference to the International Court of Justice to see whether the holder of a League mandate was obliged to transfer the mandate to the United Nations. Primarily an escape from an embarrassing situation, this solution also represented the over-estimation at the time by Canada and like-minded countries of the function which the rule of law could play in the settlement of international disputes, along with some wishful thinking about the apolitical nature of the court itself. The approach to the first debate on disarmament was also interesting. To begin with there was the functional disclaimer. The delegation did not consider it appropriate that a country without armed forces capable of threatening others should put forth its own resolution. It preferred to have one put forward by the United States. Needless to say, however, the zealous drafters in the delegation had worked out something of their own and when the United States did not have a draft ready this was submitted. Some at least of the items in this draft survived a long argument. In retrospect one might think that the satisfaction taken in the delegation's report from achieving a unanimous vote was illusory. Canadians had been in the thick of political negotiations seeking compromise after compromise, on the grounds that if the Assembly resolution 'was to have practical results, it had to be concurred in by all the heavily armed powers and by the great majority of all other powers.' Perhaps a motherhood resolution was better than nothing to begin with. Even later on there were often good ad hoc reasons for getting a watered down resolution on this and other topics because a gesture was called for or because failure to produce a resolution would exacerbate the situation. Nevertheless, it remained a constant temptation to Canadians, as to other constructive participants, to view a UN resolution as an end in itself. Being a middle power in the early days of the Assembly was hard work, but it was also good sport. Canadians from the beginning developed expertise at this kind of negotiation. The end result was often useful and often a waste of effort. There was an attraction, however, in the sheer fascination of

44 The Shaping of Peace the game, and for a middle-powerman an extraordinary suppleness as he moved among blocs to which great powers often had less easy access, manipulated diplomats of lesser calibre, and enjoyed the triumph of putting together a winning team. The game did to some extent shift Canadian attitudes on blocs. The report of the 1946 session expressed traditional satisfaction that there had been much less bloc voting, even by the Latin Americans, than had been expected. But the middle-power game in the Assembly is essentially a game of putting together winning coalitions and in this kind of game blocs have a role to play - as the diplomats began to realize. Two other minor points are worth noting about the Canadian position at this first Assembly. On human rights the report said 'there was no convenient opportunity in New York for a statement by the Canadian delegation on the substance of the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms.' Federal-provincial relations being what they were at home and human rights being largely a matter for the provinces, the less often there was an opportunity for speech on such a subject the better. On the question of finance Canadians also struck another familiar note. They of course made an appropriate speech about good housekeeping and cutting down expenses. In the Fifth Committee, however, Canadians were disposed, unlike in other committees, to play down their status. They began protesting an allocation of fees which would mean that the individual Canadian would pay more than the individual American. The reason for this was the belief of the Americans, shared by others, that with allocations made on the basis of capacity to pay in those distressed times, the United States would be footing a proportion of the bill that would be politically unhealthy. The Department of Finance and the Canadian politicians saw this, however, as an injustice to the individual Canadian. They were still unduly worried about maintaining a political consensus at home in support of the United Nations. At this point it is necessary to turn to events in the UN Atomic Energy Commission which, more than any other exercise, shaped the policies and aspirations of Canada in the United Nations. Because of the priority given to the commission in the eyes of the world and the widely admired role of the Canadian representatives, this brief and futile endeavour to establish an international contro1 of atomic energy created also expectations of Canada in the international community and a unique niche in the hierarchy of powers. Canada was propelled into a special status in all disarmament bodies for a decade, a status that certainly strengthened the Canadian voice in UN councils but which, given Canada's modest military power, was hardly in accord with the functional theory and may have left some disturbing illusions. After

45 Development of a Middle Power such an exciting entry on the world scene, a sense of decline was almost inevitable. UNITED N A T I O N S ATOMIC E N E R G Y COMMISSION

When the atomic bomb exploded at Hiroshima policy-planners in Ottawa, aware of it for the first time, started considering urgently what could be done to control it. They had given intense thought to the international security organization, and the United Nations had already been established at San Francisco. They had supported a much greater commitment to collective security than had been acceptable to Canadians during the days of the League, but it was still far from the transfer of sovereignty to a supranational authority. The release of this terrible new force drove most thinkers to reconsider the more drastic forms of international control or world government which they had rejected at San Francisco. How far the conversion went is a question. Mackenzie King after the Washington declaration of 1945 spoke to the House of the necessity of some form of world government, but in the same speech he reverted to form by opposing any scheme that would control 'the use of atomic energy in commodity and police terms, as if atomic energy were some new and dangerous drug.'13 In the meantime, however, everyone, including even the Russians, seemed to want some kind of international control and was willing to set up the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission [UNAEC] to establish it. The central problem was how to get there from the present situation in which one country, with two not very essential collaborators, was in full possession of the secret and a store of bombs. Would this be achieved best by making the deadly secret available or hanging on to it? Canadian planners from the beginning accepted, or rather shared, the predominant British and American view that the so-called ABC atomic powers should regard themselves as custodians until a suitable international organization could be set up to take control. Fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union and ideological antipathy were certainly involved in the reluctance to pass the secret to the Russians. There was no inclination, however, to pass it to anyone. The panicky conviction of the time was that the genie had to be put back in the bottle, that some deadly poison had been unleashed, and that the worst possible consequences would come from making 'the secret' widely known. An alternative proposal by which the secret would have been divulged only to the Russians, or perhaps to the Russians, French, and Chinese as fellow great powers in the Security Council, would not have appeared prudent in this climate. The idea that the ABC powers should hold the secret and act as a trustee can be

46 The Shaping of Peace regarded as swaggering Anglo-American imperialism, or just plain American imperialism, a threat to hold the world in fee and use the bomb as blackmail to establish a world order in which Anglo-American capitalism could flourish. There were no doubt people thinking and talking like that. At the same time it was the dedicated believers in genuine international control who firmly believed that the United States should hang on to the secret and use it as a bargaining counter to establish genuine international control. The establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission by the United Nations, recommended in the Truman-Attlee-King communiqué from Washington in November 1945,14 was endorsed by the foreign ministers of the four great powers in Moscow in December, and at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in London in January 1946 the UNAEC was set up by unanimous resolution. Canada had indicated in advance that it would expect to be a member and achieved this position with surprisingly little opposition. What was accorded was a position unique for any middle power, a permanent membership along with the great powers. The composition of the UNAEC was to be the same as that of the Security Council but Canada was to be a member whether or not it sat on the Council. It was the one great triumph of the functionalist theory as far as Canada was concerned. The justification for this special position was, of course, the role Canada had played in developing atomic energy and also its position as a major supplier of the raw material. It was a military man and a scientist who made this contribution to Canadian diplomacy. General A.G.L. McNaughton was an ideal choice as the Canadian representative for reasons of both intellect and personality. He grasped the scientific issues better than his diplomatic colleagues, and possessed in a remarkable degree zeal, dedication, fair-mindedness, and an ability to be sincere and crafty at the same time. An American on the commission, Frederick Osborn, later said that McNaughton 'by common consent, became the leader of the group' and 'carried more weight than anyone else on the Commission.'15 Most important of all was his belief in what he was doing. Perhaps it was just as well at this stage that he was a better scientist than a politician. His only failure in life had been as a politician. It was the scientific community in the United States, Britain, Canada, and possibly even in the Soviet Union who could believe in the cleverly designed plan for international control. The diplomats were for the most part sceptical of the political possibilities. In Canada, at least, they were sceptical against their will. They wanted to believe but found it hard to do so. At any rate, they were prepared to go as far as possible to prove their scepticism wrong. Some years later McNaughton spoke to his biographer of the great effort at this time 'to

47 Development of a Middle Power lift the people from an environment of fear into one of plenty' and made the revealing comment: 'That may seem naive today but it seemed worth working for at the time.'16 His infinite patience during the frustrating negotiations required faith. The commission did not meet until June 1946 and in the meantime Ottawa had to prepare position papers. As the United States offer to share its secrets was the subject of the exercise, the proposals the United States put forward were bound to be central. It was not easy to find out what these were going to be. The American representative was not one of the familiar figures Canadians had dealt with but Bernard Baruch, a tough and elderly conservative who, the administration thought, would have the best chance of gaining confidence from the nationalists who dominated congressional thinking. Baruch secured his own nationalist terms from the president, one of them being that the United States should show no preference to the United Kingdom and Canada on the grounds that negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission required treating every country alike.17 The State Department, however, was used to acting differently and James Byrnes, the secretary of state, did call in the British and Canadian ambassadors to tell them about the United States plan. Canada had acquired the right kind of intimate relations with the State Department, but that department was largely excluded from United States policy over atomic energy. Like the Department of External Affairs, the State Department had been late in knowing about the atomic bomb. It was never able to get its hands on the issue, whereas in Canada, where there was much less at stake politically and the requirement was for astute diplomacy, a good co-operative relationship was established between the scientists, C.D. Howe and his men, and External Affairs. The fact that McNaughton, although he was now an External Affairs officer, had good credentials with the scientists and the military helped greatly. Baruch, in contrast, had his own men around him whose bullying habits made them hard to deal with. He provoked confrontation rather than collaboration. Acheson told the Canadian minister in Washington that 'he personally washed his hands of atomic matters and that he would accept no responsibility for policies put forward by Mr. Baruch.'18 It was never quite clear in fact just what the United States plan was. There was the so-called Acheson-Lilienthal plan, a conscientiously constructed scheme for an International Atomic Development Authority that would foster beneficial uses of atomic energy and control atomic activities in all countries either by direct ownership, management, or supervision in the case of activities potentially dangerous to world security or by licensing an

48 The Shaping of Peace inspection system in the case of other activities. The system of control would be set up by stages and after it was in operation the manufacture of atomic bombs would cease. Baruch himself was somewhat ambiguous about the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, but the proposals he put forward to the UNAEC were along similar lines. The Advisory Panel (Atomic Energy) in Canada was impressed with the Lilienthal report 'as being the most constructive and imaginative approach yet made towards the long-term policy with regard to international control of atomic energy' and the instructions to the Canadian representative19 said that if this was to be put forward as a basis for discussion in the commission it should have the support of Canadian representatives. Although each country had some reservations, the British, French, Australian, and other members of the commission, except the Soviet Union and Poland, favoured this approach. In the light of history it is difficult to understand how diplomatists and politicians at this time could have taken seriously a scheme which, although scientifically designed and logical, proposed a supranational authority more closely related to science fiction than the real world. Not surprisingly the assumption has grown that it was not intended to be taken seriously, its sole intention having been to unmask the Russians as opponents of internationalism and justify United States monopoly. There were probably some people in Washington who thought that way. It was certainly not the prevailing view of the scientists and diplomats who worked on the plan. In the months after Hiroshima people thought apocalyptically. Even so they believed that international authority was something to be achieved step by step, with increasing confidence justifying increasing boldness. The Western attitude on tactics was also open to cynical interpretation. It was that the 'atomic powers' should go as far as possible in offering an international régime which would not threaten their own security and would make due allowance for the security of the Soviet Union. If the prospects of success were not promising, then it was important to make clear to the world that the fault lay with the Russians. The test of sincerity in this policy, of course, is the extent to which the secondary purpose remained secondary. Among Canadian policy-makers the less sanguine may have seen the latter aim as the only practical one, but even they recognized that a dogged effort to meet the needs of the Russians was essential in the first place. The insistence on inspection was based on blind faith that it must be possible. Few people really understood what was involved in atomic energy. After a visit to Chalk River a member of the Canadian delegation estimated that that establishment alone would require a minimum of twenty or thirty full-time inspectors and even with them it would be easy to falsify the records of the plant's output.20

49 Development of a Middle Power The record of Canadian policy in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission indicates the exhausting effort to avoid closing doors. McNaughton got himself into difficulties with the Americans by his efforts to avoid putting the Russians on the spot. He told the Advisory Panel in Ottawa on 23 September 1946 that his delegation's efforts had been directed for the most part to seeking a rapprochement between the United States and the USSR delegations and in getting the Americans to agree to a moderate and patient approach. Wrong indicated to the panel an even broader reason for Canadian tactics when he said that although the problems before the AEC were among the most important facing the world they were not the most immediate. It was important to avoid a deadlock in the AEC as this might well lead to a deadlock all along the line. The instructions to General McNaughton made clear that Canada supported the American proposal, at least as a basis for discussion. 'It is not suggested that we should slavishly follow United States policies. It is to be hoped that we have constructive suggestions to make of our own, but we shall not wish to go further or faster than the United States and United Kingdom Governments are preparing to go on advocating international control.' Every effort would be made not only to attract the Russians into participation but also to understand their difficulties - as for example over the use of the veto. McNaughton successfully established a relationship of some confidence with Gromyko who clearly saw him as a man of independent will and intelligence. As for the basic Soviet position, nevertheless, it was always regarded as unacceptable. The Ottawa internationalists were unalterably opposed to a purely declaratory banishment of the atom bomb, which seemed to them like the discredited Briand-Kellogg approach to peace. And in the state of uncertainty over Soviet strength and Soviet intentions at that time it was hard not to see the Soviet proposal as a too obvious means of disarming the Americans and leaving the Russians with their natural military advantage in Europe. Several decades later it is easier to understand that the Russians were unable to accept any system of international control because it was impractical, because the UN would be dominated by the United States and its friends, and because it ran completely counter to their paranoiac views on sovereignty. Caught as they were, they had little alternative except to stall in the international negotiations until they could complete the process of making their own nuclear weapons and then perhaps consider negotiation from a basis of strength. What is hard to believe is that they would have acted otherwise even if the Americans and the other 'atomic powers' had made more generous or imaginative offers to share the secret.

50 The Shaping of Peace The Canadian tactic was to avoid a premature break-up in the commission over basic issues, to get to work on the details of a control system in the hope that agreements on detail might lead to agreement on larger issues and a habit of working together could be established. It was a classic functionalist approach. McNaughton set it out in his first statement. He paid tribute to Baruch's proposals but as a basis for study rather than as something to be accepted on the spot.21 He hinted at difficulties over the veto and suggested that the commission not concern itself over this matter but concentrate on the many other aspects of the proposals on which agreement must be reached before the authority could be brought into being. The question of establishing mutual confidence he saw as 'a vital aspect.' A specific proposal to which they could address their attention was the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends. Instead of dwelling on the security aspects of the question, he drew attention to what Canada had done. The Canadian government had established control over its supplies of raw materials, developed an experimental uranium fission plant whose capacity was in no way significant for war purposes but which was being developed as a research centre and a source of radioactive products for laboratories and hospitals. These would be available to scientists from other countries on a reciprocal basis. McNaughton did in fact play a considerable part in diverting the commission from divisive issues so that by September there was some optimism over signs of a co-operative spirit by the Russians in the work of the Scientific and Technical Committee. Baruch himself was reasonably patient during this period, but for various reasons, personal and political, he started to force the issue in the autumn. Although Canadian spokesmen tended to be a little impatient of other countries' devotion to sovereignty, the delegation was expected to guard Canada's where it mattered. McNaughton's offer of the fruits of Canadian research was carefully hedged, as the government was nervous that Chalk River would be regarded as a research centre over which it did not have full control. Ottawa had been anxious from the beginning over the position of Canada when recommendations of the UNAEC were being considered in the Security Council. Unless Canada happened to be a member of the Council it could not make its voice heard in the final stage. Canada recognized its role as protector of the secondary powers. In the instructions the delegation was warned to bear in mind the possible effect of a world monopoly on the position of secondary powers, particularly if the big powers maintained the right of veto on security matters and if they concentrated the location of atomic piles in their own respective territories. Long before the commission met, Canada lobbied its friends, the British and the Americans, to get their sup-

51 Development of a Middle Power port for Canada's right to participate in the Security Council discussion under the terms of Article 31 of the Charter, which provides for interested parties to be seated. The Russians were somewhat less amenable. When in July a concrete situation arose, Gromyko attempted to veto the admission of Canada, but he was overruled by the chairman, Herbert Evatt of Australia, who saw this as an issue of principle involving the rights of lesser powers. The delegation expected that there would be further trouble from Gromyko, but in fact this proved to be an unreal issue as the proposals for an International Authority never advanced far enough for the Canadian interest to be put to the test. When the first report of the AEC was considered by the Security Council on 13 February 1947, McNaughton was called upon to participate. Canada's concern for the national interest was indicated also by the close attention paid to the relationship of the authority to raw materials. The American proposals were nobly conceived but inevitably woolly at this stage. The Lilienthal report proposed an international authority owning thorium and uranium wherever they were found in useful quantities. In his opening speech before the AEC, Baruch referred to the necessity for the authority to have 'dominion' over world supplies of uranium and thorium. Official opinion in Ottawa increasingly disliked that word in its more familiar context, and they did not know what was meant by it here. The Advisory Panel decided that they should not consider, at any rate at that stage, the acceptance of any plan that would permit the international authority to conduct mining operations in Canada. One reason that seemed particularly compelling was that such a plan would enable the international body by majority vote to decide the rate at which a very scarce and valuable national resource would be used up.22 McNaughton believed 'that our best interests would be served if it could be arranged that international controls, other than inspection, were not exercised before the material had been mined and concentrated.' In the AEC's second report there was no proposal that an international authority should own ore in the ground and from then on the whole question became more and more academic. If the Russians had not been intransigent, however, the Western powers would have found it difficult to accept a scheme like Baruch's. Others as well as Canada were worried about the reduction in national sovereignty that such a scheme would have involved. The discussions in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission reached a climax in December 1946 when the Canadian delegation, along with the British, French, and others, came close to a break with the Americans but drew back at the brink. Baruch's patience had given way earlier in the autumn and he was pressing for a decision. The commission had set a deadline for the end of the year to present its first report to the Security Council.

52 The Shaping of Peace Filled with foreboding over the consequences of a breach with the Soviet Union at this point, for reasons which went far beyond the specific question of atomic energy, the Canadians had struggled, along with the Dutch, the British, and others, to find some formula which would make possible a unanimous recommendation of the commission. Louis St Laurent, secretary of state for external affairs, was in New York during a good deal of the session of the United Nations Assembly that autumn and when in October Molotov, after an otherwise combative speech, made an appeal for the general reduction of both nuclear and conventional armaments, St Laurent shook his hand 'and assured him that there was no reason why Canada could not live on as amicable terms with her neighbour across the Arctic as with her neighbour to the south.'23 In retrospect the December crisis seems academic. It had to do with the use of the veto, a word which the Canadians and their associates were anxious to eliminate from the draft report in the hope of getting agreement, even though they had no intention of eventually approving a system of international control which the superpowers would be free to violate. The Australian representative compared the efforts of the committee to avoid the four-letter word to 'that of children in a song where, at a certain word, they nod their head and keep silent rather than pronounce the word.' Canada was in the peculiar position of seeming to defend the veto. Baruch, both because of his own convictions and because of the strong pressure of the nationalists in Congress, insisted that it be spelled out clearly that the veto would not apply in the case of a violation of an atomic agreement. He insisted, moreover, on talking explicitly of punishment of a violator by the United Nations. The view of the Canadians and others was that although the AEC might administer a control and inspection agency, the commission had to report to the Security Council and the Security Council was irrevocably committed to the use of the veto by the great powers. This was a principle to which the Russians understandably clung, and any effort by the Western powers to go back on this agreement might well drive the Soviet Union out of the United Nations. Although the Canadians were as alarmed as others by Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe and elsewhere which seemed to threaten the basis of the United Nations, they continued to insist throughout this debate, and even throughout the preparations for a security alliance of the Atlantic powers, that somehow or other the United Nations must be maintained as an institution in which the Soviet Union and its friends participated. It was this overruling anxiety which explained the desperate effort to find a formula that might prevent a break, even though, it is clear now, none of these formulas

53 Development of a Middle Power would have provided an international control mechanism that the Russians could have accepted. The Russians never did leave the United Nations, even though Baruch achieved an apparent success on the atomic issue. One can only speculate as to whether they were dissuaded from this catastrophic step by the evidence that there were elements within the Western community, and in the United States also, that did recognize a commitment to the veto. Although at one point McNaughton did get the Americans, after long haggling, to agree to something in the nature of a compromise, eventually Baruch pressed through a report24 which said 'there shall be no legal right, by veto or otherwise, whereby a willful violator of the terms of the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms.' It was passed on 30 December 1946 by a vote of 10 to 2, with Poland abstaining and the Soviet Union taking no part. Canada was not alone in changing its position to go along with the Americans in the end. It was not the last time Canadian representatives would try to dissuade the Americans from tactics they considered unwise but would decide in the end to support a Western common front. As the instructions to McNaughton had indicated, while there was no need for a slavish following of the Americans, the basic Canadian interest remained in a powerful United States leading what was still an informal alliance of the Western powers in resistance against the unpredictable pretensions of the Soviet Union. Canadian diplomats were well aware of the fact that the credibility of their resistance was undermined each time they came round in the end, but even this consideration had to be subordinated. Mackenzie King had not been following closely the events in New York, although he had placed great faith in General McNaughton. It is clear from a reference to the issue in his diary that he did not understand precisely what was at stake in December. He said that Pearson would go to New York to be with McNaughton and the others and he was to let them know that both he and St Laurent wished to have the American position supported. He said to St Laurent that 'Canada of all countries concerned had the strongest reason for not allowing information concerning the bomb to be disclosed to Russia, unless she would agree not to apply the veto in the case of herself or some friend of Russia's being responsible for starting a conflict against other countries which might lead to a world war.'25 That was not the issue at stake. Nevertheless, the will of the prime minister and the minister, however reluctantly St Laurent might have given in, was decisive. On the other hand, there were misgivings on the part of Pearson and the External Affairs officers at home which had to do more with the position the delegation wanted to take.

54 The Shaping of Peace This position was not sustained, but it is of some historic interest. It might well have alarmed the Russians more than what Baruch was saying, although that was certainly not the intention. It accepted the fact that the veto would apply in the finding of a violation. Reliance, however, would then be placed on Article 51 of the Charter, which spoke of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence before the Security Council had taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. As explained in a telegram from Escott Reid to St Laurent on 18 December 1946, if a permanent member of the Security Council violated its solemn undertaking to refrain from the threat or use efforce it would have violated the most important provision of the Charter and any such violation would release all the other members of the UN from their obligation under the Charter not to threaten or use force against the delinquent state. They would, however, remain bound to take collective action. As he saw the scenario: 'The meeting of the Security Council would be adjourned and the members of the Security Council, other than the culprit State, could then meet immediately as the Supreme War Council of an ad hoc coalition against the culprit State. This Supreme War Council would have at its disposal the machinery of the Military Staff Committee from which the members of the culprit State would either have seceded or have been ejected.' They could also call a special session of the Assembly where the culprit state would have no veto. The Assembly could immediately constitute itself 'the legislative body of the world coalition.' This was pretty strong stuff and seemed to the head of the United Nations Division, R.G. Riddell, 'an expansion in the meaning of the Charter which will not be accepted without argument.' Pearson accepted Riddell's advice. He thought that the proposal 'enters unnecessarily into the jurisprudence of the Charter, and lays down an interpretation of the relations of that Charter to the imposition of sanctions "collectively" outside the Charter which will cause a good deal of questioning.'26 He was reluctant to interfere because the people on the spot should be the best judge, but he was worried about the tense condition of his colleagues in New York. The theorizing of the delegation about the way in which the veto might be frustrated was premature and it was proposed to state it in highly provocative language. It did, however, foreshadow the reasoning which justified the creation of NATO and of the United Nations force in Korea a few years later. NATO was not exactly 'the Supreme War Council' envisaged, but it was a defensive coalition, justified by Article 51 of the Charter, of those countries which would not accept the Soviet veto over their right to defend them-

55 Development of a Middle Power selves. When the Korean challenge came along, the great powers and others in the UN who wanted to resist did organize a kind of 'Supreme War Council,' but they were saved from having to use the risky theories of the Canadian delegation in 1946 because the Soviet representative was not present in the Security Council to cast his veto. When he did appear, however, the direction of the Korean operation shifted to a considerable extent to the General Assembly as suggested in 1946, and this procedure was shortly confirmed by the Uniting for Peace proposal. McNaughton's infinite patience was not exhausted by the struggle at the end of 1946. Early in January Baruch resigned and the debate moved on in the UNAEC less spectacularly.27 The spotlight had been on the events of December 1946. Leaks to the press kept Canadians well informed of the differences of their representatives with the United States. This bold posture undoubtedly pleased many Canadians, although it made Mackenzie King nervous. McNaughton continued to work for a system of international control which he believed was possible and he continued to hope that progress would be made if they would postpone facing the political issues until they had achieved some constructive understandings on the technical questions. The times were against any agreement, however. By May 1948 the general was recommending to the Atomic Energy Commission that it suspend its negotiations and simply transmit to the Security Council documents recording the work of the commission. When the General Assembly met in Paris in the autumn of that year the Berlin Blockade had been established and the Canadian delegation took a lead in confrontation with the Russians. At the beginning of the debate Canada introduced a resolution to approve the findings and recommendations of the commission as the necessary basis for a system of international control. Vyshinksy introduced a proposal according to which the commission would prepare two conventions, one prohibiting atomic weapons, the other establishing international control, both of which would be signed and brought into operation simultaneously. Some of the delegates saw hope in the Soviet position, but McNaughton was not inclined to see in it much value if it evaded principles that had been worked out in the AEC. The Indians and other lesser powers were reluctant to have the work of the commission abandoned. McNaughton had not lost his will to compromise, however, and eventually he put together in association with other countries a proposal which, although it was not the original Canadian resolution, continued to be known as such. It called upon the AEC to resume meetings and pursue work it deemed 'practicable and useful.'28 Not unexpectedly in the circumstances this resolution

56 The Shaping of Peace gained approval by a vote of 40 in favour, 6 against, and 4 abstentions. The commission continued in being for another year or so until after the Russians had made their atomic explosion. The failure to reach any kind of agreement with the Soviet Union on international control of atomic energy was one of the major factors leading to the Canadian re-examination of its views on collective security between the time of the launching of the United Nations and the establishment of NATO. When the hope of international control had to be abandoned, the use of the atomic bomb as the main Western deterrent to Soviet expansion became the principal concern. Canadian strategic thinking of the time accepted the conventional Western view that it was only the tacit threat of the atom bomb which could persuade the Russians with their enormous supremacy in surface force in Europe. There was still no disposition whatsoever for the Canadians to want a bomb for themselves and, under the circumstances, there was less for them to do in the international field on this subject. Nevertheless they continued pressing the cause of international control of atomic energy in the United Nations no matter how futile the pursuit. It seemed essential not to abandon the hope that eventually a universal system could be created and at any rate it was desirable to see that if a final break came it would be on an issue in which the Soviet Union was in the wrong. In those nervy postwar years, when it was believed that the West was on the defensive, there was less disposition than later to oppose nuclear weapons as such. The 'Ban the Bomb' opposition to nuclear weapons, calling for unilateral disarmament if necessary, did not become an important political force until after the hydrogen bombs had been developed and escalation set in. The majority view remained, nevertheless, that if bombs could not be controlled by the United Nations, then it was best for Canada that the United States retain atomic superiority. As might be expected, however, Canada was against over-kill, and not very sympathetic to the intentions of the British and French to provide themselves with their own equipment. THE UNITED NATIONS 'ON T R I A L '

At San Francisco King had warned against 'the development of a new type of isolationism, a feeling that the task of preserving the peace could be left exclusively to Great Powers.'29 What he, or more probably his speech writers, had in mind was the disposition of Canadians to slip back into this comfortable illusion. But such was the depth of disappointment in 1946 that even the East Block was tempted to revert to prewar concepts. The confidential

57 Development of a Middle Power introduction to the commentary for the delegation to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946 noted that the United Nations was 'very much on trial.' As for policy, 'the most that can be done at meetings of the United Nations is to try to make the machinery work as smoothly as possible without expecting quick results or seeking ideal solutions.' In his speech to the General Assembly that year St Laurent, when regretting the failures of the Security Council, also deplored the impression the Security Council had given to the world by not taking 'positive action to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.'30 A year later the gloom was even deeper. Guidance for the delegation to the 1947 session of the General Assembly as approved by cabinet expressed a fear that issues might emerge that would destroy the United Nations in the form in which it was conceived and established. Some major states might force the Assembly to take decisions on the veto, for example, that would cause other states to withdraw. Furthermore, proceedings of the Assembly could be impeded to the extent that nothing would be accomplished and the United Nations would fall into disrepute. The advice, however, was to face the realities of the situation, not to give in. Canada did not think the time had been reached 'when any of the issues dividing members of the United Nations should be pressed to a conclusion which would destroy the organization as it is at present constituted.' It was to that Assembly St Laurent gave the first warning that, if forced, certain members might seek greater safety in an association willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for greater national security.31 It was in a mood of doubt that the government had to face the inescapable challenge of membership on the Security Council. The Australian term would end in December 1947 and everyone expected that, given its stress on the fitness of middle powers for non-permanent seats and its only barely unsuccessful candidature in 1945, Canada would stand. On 30 August 1946 Wrong noted in a memorandum to Reid that St Laurent was 'opposed to our standing for the Security Council as he thought that we could do nothing to make it less impotent than it is now.' In April 1947, however, serious consideration had to be given to all sides of the question. Pearson, in a memorandum on 26 April to Reid, said he was afraid lest 'abstention at this time might be misinterpreted ... and might also mean far more than abstention for a year.' He recognized valid arguments against running but thought Canada should stand if its candidature appeared to have a good chance for success. Wrong agreed on balance but said 'it would not take a great deal of pressure to argue [him] out of that position.' After consultation with Wrong in

58 The Shaping of Peace Washington, Ignatieff in New York, and Robertson in London, as well as the interested divisions in the department, Reid emerged with a memorandum dated 30 May which listed the arguments pro and con. The arguments against were that the achievements of the Council had been so poor that membership was not considered as important from the point of view of influence and prestige as had once been thought; the work of the department would be considerably increased and the delegation in New York would require instructions to vote on matters concerning which Canadian interests were not directly involved; as Canada was due to go off the Economic and Social Council at the end of 1948 the chances of re-election to that body might be prejudiced. The last argument is the only one that rings true. There had always been a strong inclination in the department to regard the economic and social functions as ultimately the most important, even though the headlines went to the security issues, and to consider that membership on a successful Ecosoc would matter most to a country which was a more important economic than military power. The other arguments sound like a curious caricature of traditional Canadian attitudes, the very attitudes that had been so firmly rejected in the rhetoric of San Francisco. They were, however, more likely to appeal to cabinet than to the department. It was risky offering the cabinet such bait, but it was the obligation of the civil servant to present pros and cons. A final argument against membership in the memorandum was that a second defeat after the experience in London in January 1946 would be 'distasteful.' That is true, but it seems unlikely that the department could have expected defeat. When they did put out feelers in the autumn of 1947 the response was widely favourable. Intentionally or not, the arguments in favour of standing were more cogent. In the first place it was stated that a refusal to accept membership in one of the principal organs of the United Nations would be inconsistent with a basic principal of Canadian foreign policy, which had been to strengthen the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining international peace and security. To refuse, furthermore, would be inconsistent with the functional principle, as Canada of all the states which had not yet served most fully met the tests of Paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Charter. There was a general expectation abroad and also at home that Canada would stand and it would be difficult to explain that the reason for not being a candidate was that the government considered the Council to be ineffective. The growing tension was revealed also in the argument that if Canada did not stand, its place might be taken by some other state more susceptible to the USSR. Finally the Security Council would be dealing with a number of questions such as disarmament and atomic energy in which Canada had a special interest. Cana-

59 Development of a Middle Power dian delegations had been urging reforms in the practices and procedures of the Security Council, and the Canadian representative would have an opportunity to press for their adoption. This memorandum was prepared as a draft memorandum for cabinet but, contrary to the usual procedure, contained no recommendation. St Laurent indicated he wanted to consult King, who received the memorandum early in June. By August King had apparently agreed with the favourable recommendation from St Laurent. The subject was not discussed in cabinet although at a meeting on 11 September cabinet was informed of the decision and 'noted with approval.' Then followed the procedure of asking Canada's representatives abroad to request the governments to which they were accredited to give the question of Canada's candidature 'sympathetic consideration.' True to its custom at the time, the telegram made clear that Canada was not asking for a 'pledge of support since in similar circumstances our policy is not to give any pledge in advance of an election.' This practice was continued many years, not necessarily because of the principles but because it gave departmental officials a way out of the embarrassing situation in which they were placed when diplomats in Ottawa arrived at the East Block by the dozens to ask for pledges of support for their country's candidature to UN councils and committees. That the government had rejected the arguments against membership was made clear by St Laurent in a typically candid statement to the United Nations Society in Ottawa on 12 September 1947. He said the decision had been made only after the most careful consideration, with the realization that if elected the people of Canada would be confronted with new and onerous responsibilities. 'We realize also that we shall have the weaknesses and difficulties from which the United Nations suffers brought home to us in an urgent and direct manner that will test to the utmost our confidence in that organization... we shall be forced, as never before in Canada in times of peace, to make decisions on major questions of policy arising from situations which exist far from our shores and which some may feel do not directly affect us.' Canada, in spite of the weaknesses of the Council, still believed 'that the best hope for mankind lies in the establishment of a world organization for the maintenance of peace' and if Canadians wished to enjoy the benefits of such an organization they must also accept its responsibilities.32 At the beginning of the General Assembly on 30 September 1947 Canada was elected on the first ballot, obtaining the same number of votes as Argentina, 41, the only two candidates having more than the requisite two-thirds. It was the country's good fortune that an able and experienced Canadian representative on the Council was already available in New York. General

60 The Shaping of Peace McNaughton had acquired his reputation in the UNAEC by forceful and subtle argument, by an extraordinary grasp of his subject along with a political sensitivity and a disposition for constructive compromise all the more impressive coming as it did from a general. His availability may well have influenced King to agree, because he had more confidence in him than he had in the compulsive internationalists in the Department of External Affairs. The statement of principles to guide McNaughton which cabinet approved on 12 February 1948 showed little awareness of the mediatory diplomacy which was about to become a 'role.' It was noted that the general's ability to influence discussions and decisions would not be made easier by Canada's status as a middle power and in particular its special relations with two of the permanent members, the United States and the United Kingdom. Although it was desirable for Canada to follow a policy of its own it would 'not be easy to secure credit for independence of argument and decision.' This worthy aim of independence had to be reconciled with the hard fact that questions before the Council 'will necessarily have to be judged not only on their merits but also with reference to the way in which the present distribution of power in the world will be affected by a decision one way or the other' and that 'on fundamental questions which may involve peace and war, we cannot afford to be on the opposite side from the United States and the United Kingdom when they are in agreement.' On the eve of NATO External Affairs was still preoccupied with the incapacity of the Security Council to cope with collective security. In examining the weaknesses of the Council, the final part of the guidance for McNaughton noted that it ought not to be asked to accept commitments it could not fulfil because, in the 'absence of military agreements under Article 43 of the Charter or alternative arrangements for similar purposes, the Security Council is not in a position to enforce its decisions or to give military support to commissions or other agencies which it may appoint.' The note of guidance commented on a tendency on the part of the great powers to expect smaller powers on the Council to 'accept responsibilities which they themselves were anxious to avoid.' The reason given by the great powers was that they were too directly concerned with the dispute under consideration, but, as the Canadian statement noted, this was not wholly valid since in theory at least every member of the Security Council should act in the interests of the United Nations as a whole. In practice if it were 'impossible for the members of the Security Council to detach themselves from their national interests sufficiently... it is doubtful if the Council can go far towards the solution of major problems.' What was not yet adequately realized was that the role of a middle power was primarily tactical. Were they hypnotized by so much analysis of power?

61 Development of a Middle Power If the Council and the Assembly were not to be frozen in confrontation, then somebody had to do something. It was the country without direct commitment which, unless it wanted to keep out of trouble entirely, was almost bound to come up with some compromise ideas or at any rate to accept procedural offices, such as that of chairman. On basic policy Canada could in this first rush of the Atlantic spirit take its position with the British and Americans but it could not help also having tactical differences, with the Americans in particular, that arose from some considerable differences as to what could be done about East-West divisions in an atomic age. The Americans were divided and distracted by strong public opinion. It was easier for Canadians to adhere clearly to their fundamental belief that, whatever else had to be done, the United Nations must be maintained as a universal organization and that it was worth a good deal of compromise to avoid provoking the Russians into withdrawal. Pursuing this policy would sometimes bring them to seek a compromise between United States and USSR positions, but there need be no pretence of neutrality. At the same time it was becoming apparent that a mediatory function by Canada based on ad hoc neutrality was possible and useful when the issue was not directly between Cold War antagonists. At San Francisco Pearson had acquired his reputation as conciliator to some extent by mediating between the Australians and the British. Over Palestine he played a role of conciliator in 1947, as in 1956, when the British and the Americans were divided and the Russians were aligned, though not allied, with the Americans. In practice Canadians had been exploring this function during the sessions of the General Assembly in 1947, even before Canada took its position on the Security Council. For the role of the General Assembly itself there was some revived enthusiasm in the departmental report on the 1947 Assembly which noted 'an encouraging willingness to perform the functions of an international legislature.' It was seen as a legislature, however, in a very limited way. The Assembly was a body 'in which laws governing the relations among states will be written.' In such a legislature Canada could see now for itself a kind of political diplomatic role, a parliamentary situation where it had scope of a different kind from that it had envisaged. In this spirit Canada strongly supported the American proposals for an Interim Committee to meet when the General Assembly was not in session. This, they thought, would provide the Assembly with a 'second line of defence' and make sure that issues vetoed out of the Security Council would be dealt with some place. On practical grounds, furthermore, it was desirable that the Assembly or some form of it meet all year round in New York to be ready for emergencies and deal with the long agenda. In the Interim Committee the delegation report saw 'the beginnings of a process of constitutional develop-

62 The Shaping of Peace ment which may in time greatly alter the relationships between the various organs of the United Nations.'33 These views, especially the will to see the Assembly acting as a legislature, reflect the enthusiasm of some of the professionals and should not be regarded as serious convictions of the cabinet. The British and French were much more cautious about the Interim Committee. They felt less confident about Assembly majorities than the serene Americans. In spite of its enthusiasm, however, Canada did not want to provoke the Soviet Union into withdrawing over this measure. It stuck clear to its early convictions about the Security Council, which was not to be superseded by the Interim Committee in any way. And so a drafting committee chaired, needless to say, by Lester Pearson was skilfully steered to a compromise which meant that the Interim Committee would be worth while but would not challenge the authority of the Council or the Assembly. On two other major issues of this Assembly, Greece and Korea, Canada showed a greater disposition to get involved than in 1946 and to come up with procedural suggestions. In the light of later stands on peacekeeping as the exclusive role of the middle powers, it is interesting to note that on the Greek issue, which was perhaps the UN'S first experiment of this kind, Canada was still busy making sure that the great powers could not shirk their duty. It put forward a proposal for a committee to go to Salonika that would include the great powers as well as six smaller powers and even insisted that there should be a vacant chair for the unwilling Russians in order to make this point clear. It was not a view enthusiastically supported by other middle powers. On Korea Canada was active enough to get itself nominated by the Americans as a member of the temporary UN Commission on Korea, but, as will be explained later, the Americans were nursing illusions about Canada's role. Perhaps the most notable accomplishment as a conciliator came at this session in the debate over 'war mongering.' The Russians put forward a resolution denouncing 'war mongering' and requesting member governments to prohibit war propaganda in any form. It was accompanied by such slashing allegations against the major Western powers that it was unacceptable to most delegations as it stood. The intention of the Americans and the British to take a strongly negative stand was challenged by the Canadians who argued that a positive approach would be better. Although they rejected most of the Soviet allegations, they did concede that they had a point about war mongering. The Canadian delegation, basing itself on the obligations in the Charter to practice tolerance, observe fundamental freedoms, and promote friendly relations among states, put forward a resolution. The French

63 Development of a Middle Power and Australians were more or less in agreement and submitted alternative resolutions. After some fast and vigorous diplomacy which won George Ignatieff of the Canadian delegation the sobriquet of the 'Peacemonger,' a resolution by these three powers was unanimously accepted. Whether it achieved anything might be questioned, but at that stage in the history of the United Nations there was something to be said in principle for a unanimous resolution. Tension was reduced somewhat and the cold warriors on both sides frustrated. It was, however, the Canadian performance, or more particularly Lester Pearson's performance, over Palestine in 1947 that might be regarded as the beginning of 'Canada's role as a middle power.' There was no escaping involvement when the question of Palestine was referred on 2 April 1947 to the General Assembly by the United Kingdom, which had reached complete stalemate in its administration of the mandate and was determined to hand it over to the United Nations. Canada followed a calculated policy of keeping its mouth shut on the issues, but this time its discretion was not in the interest of escaping but of establishing a position from which to try to be helpful. For classic reasons it was concerned over an issue that had provoked so much popular antagonism between Britons and Americans. British fumbling over Palestine provoked in Canada a good deal of sympathy but not much admiration. There was even less admiration, however, for American policy which seemed to be dictated by political opportunism. At this time the Russians supported the Jews because the Arabs seemed to be in the British, or imperialist, camp. The apparently reasonable Soviet position might well have been supported by Canada except for the deep suspicion that its one motive was to get British troops out of the Middle East regardless. There was, of course, considerable sympathy in Canada for the Jews, but the Canadian Zionists on the whole were more moderate than the Americans and the malevolence of American Zionist attacks on Britain had been widely resented. As was to happen so often thereafter a chairman was required who was above the battle. Canada was the obvious choice and Pearson was the obvious man. He became chairman of the First Committee of the Special Session of the-Assembly that gathered in April. When the special committee of the Assembly was set up to prepare recommendations Canada was to nominate a member and it nominated Mr Justice Rand. In choosing a jurist St Laurent made clear that they wanted a Canadian with a judicious mind who would not be regarded as an official spokesman. The Canadian approach in 1947, as later in 1956, was first of all to look at the positions of the great powers and see what might be accomplished in the framework provided by their attitudes, recognizing that these attitudes were

64 The Shaping of Peace facts of life Canada was unlikely to change. Judge Rand had played an important part in the majority proposals of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine [UNSCOP] which accepted the necessity of partition but within the framework of an economic union. In hindsight one might well question the wisdom of the checker-board arrangement proposed, but none of the alternatives seemed to have much promise. The Canadian delegation did not consider itself bound to Judge Rand and adopted no position until the debate was well advanced. Finally it came to the reluctant conclusion that partition in some form would probably be adopted and it would be best to make it as effective as possible. The Canadians were, however, in close touch with the British and, unlike the Americans, they took seriously the British insistence that they were not prepared to maintain order in Palestine during an interim period. The Canadians judged that even if partition was the lesser evil it would be certain to provoke disorder. There was no point in just expecting that the British would deal with the disorder. The Canadian representative in the sub-committee analysed all the plans and pointed out the weaknesses in all of them. Consequently Canada found itself in a working group along with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Guatemala. At this stage Canadians were still leery of peacekeeping forces. At first they had thought a trusteeship agreement might be established for Palestine but reluctantly concluded that the UN ought not to take over the mandate or provide for the administration of the territory without the support of some kind of international military force. There were various proposals for such a force under consideration. One delegation suggested that the United Kingdom troops be replaced by an international army controlled by a United Nations Commission (an interesting foreshadowing of thinking in the Canadian delegation in 1956). This force would be made up of contingents provided by non-permanent members of the Security Council and paid for by the permanent members. In the end Canada reluctantly supported the Assembly resolution of 29 November which provided for the division of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and the city of Jerusalem, with provision for an economic union. They did so fully aware of the fact that this was not likely to be accepted peacefully, but in the absence of any likely alternative. Among the reasons mentioned in the report was that they wanted to avoid the discredit that would have come upon the United Nations if no proposal had emerged from the discussion. 'It was equally intended that the plan evolved should not be one that made unrealistic demands upon the United Kingdom or which left Canada or other smaller states involved in the operation of a plan to which the permanent members of the Security Council did not give united

65 Development of a Middle Power support.'34 It was hardly the attitude of a government straining at the leash to assume a role in middle-power peacekeeping. The results were certainly not happy and whether Canada should have given in is a matter of doubt. There remains the harsh judgment of Professor Robert Spencer: 'But for Canada to assist in securing acceptance by a slim majority of a resolution which had no real hope of being fulfilled, was a dangerous example of reaching an agreement for agreement's sake, and was both a betrayal of the role of a middle Power and in defiance of the repeated declarations on the need for keeping UN action within the realm of the practicable.'35 During the autumn 1947 session of the General Assembly a United Nations commission to observe free elections in Korea and arrange for the withdrawal of foreign troops was established. Over this nomination flared a controversy in Ottawa between the prime minister and the secretary of state for external affairs in which may be seen the transition from the foreign policy of Mackenzie King to that of St Laurent and Pearson. Members of the Canadian delegation in New York, believing this to be the kind of work for which the United Nations was established, strongly supported the creation of the commission. Not surprisingly, Canada was asked to be a member and J.L. Ilsley, then minister of justice, who was in New York at the time the decision had to be taken, agreed that the invitation should be accepted, assuming that Canada had meant what had so often been said about supporting the United Nations. The matter was not considered sufficient of an issue to be submitted to cabinet at this point. St Laurent supported Ilsley, and so did Brooke Claxton. However, when the prime minister returned from England and learned what had been done, he flew into a tantrum. He insisted that the Canadian acceptance be withdrawn. St Laurent pointed out that, as in the case of the candidature for the Security Council, a refusal would be interpreted as a gesture of non-confidence. According to King's own version St Laurent said in cabinet that Canada could of course withdraw from the United Nations if they wished but that being a member of it they were now going to take a seat on the Security Council and had to assume other obligations. King replied that the United Nations counted for nothing so far as any help in the world was concerned and had served mostly the purpose of the Russians who used it for propaganda. He suspected 'that Pearson with his youth and inexperience and influenced by the persuasion of others around him, had been anxious to have Canada's External Affairs figure prominently in world affairs and has really directed affairs in New York when he should have been in Ottawa, and without any real control by Ministers of the Crown and proper consideration of these questions.'36

66 The Shaping of Peace King was supported by such other unconverted members of the cabinet as Humphrey Mitchell and the very parochial Jimmy Gardiner. When the United States ambassador came to plead with King that the commission was a weak one and needed a strong country like Canada, King, turning on the Americans all the arguments he had once used against the British for pushing Canada around, said that the ambassador had given him the one reason why he did not want Canadians on the commission. 'I felt we would become the spearhead of all the attack against the Commission, and I would never be forgiven by Parliament for allowing us to be placed in that position as long as it was possible to prevent it.'37 King's argument was a gut reaction, hard to identify with any of the more logical schools of thought, but not to be described as un-Canadian. He still saw in the United Nations, as he had in the League, a recreation of the imperial structure to which he had so long accused Britain of trying to commit Canada. The United Nations, like the League, was not an instrument for preventing war but for causing wars. Here he was close to an argument used by many serious students of international politics - that a doctrine of universal collective security, far from preventing war, tends to make every crisis a world-wide conflict. He constantly insisted that Canadians were getting mixed up in an area they knew nothing whatsoever about. 'This United Nations is going to destroy us yet. Just imagine, Bradette making speeches about Korea!'38 he commented to Pickersgill when he heard that the member for Cochrane had been discoursing in the General Assembly. This was a discouraging position for the Department of External Affairs, which was trying to assemble adequate expertise to deal with a very large agenda in the Assembly and Security Council on the basis of knowledge rather than assumption. However illogical and unfashionable King's views, they no doubt represented some deep instincts in Canada. They were instincts that were to surface in 1950 and 1956 and again later after the view of Canada's high role in international politics had turned sour. For the time being, however, King was defeated. Ilsley and St Laurent made clear that they would feel obliged to resign if the policies for which they accepted responsibility were countermanded. Claxton would have resigned also.39 That was a more serious consideration for King than any of the arguments President Truman could put to him - and the affair did reach that level.40 He backed down in the most ironic way. He was obviously groping for a formula on which to justify a change of position, but he picked on an argument which, although it seemed to square with his rather hazy approach to the issues, was a position which projected Canada into the forefront of a highly unpleasant division among the powers and in the end contributed to the growing repu-

67 Development of a Middle Power tation of Canada, which he so much deplored, as a forceful and independent actor on the world scene. The Americans wanted free elections in the American zone of Korea alone, after the Russians had made it impossible to have elections throughout Korea. King fell for St Laurent's argument that the Canadian position ought to be that the commission should concern itself only with elections for the whole of Korea. That being the case, King said to himself, Canada would not be antagonizing the Russians and thrusting itself into the middle of the Cold War. The Americans would, therefore, not be using Canada as their instrument. His remoteness from the new realities of world politics could hardly have been demonstrated more clearly. He did agree to Canada's joining the commission, and when the Canadian representative argued in this way a public row with the Americans was precipitated. The Canadian stand, of course, attracted far more attention than the Canadian hesitation over joining the commission. Canada and Australia all alone voted against a resolution in the Interim Committee of the General Assembly which endorsed the American position. Canada's action in withdrawing its member from the commission, then letting him return on the grounds that the election in the South was being held on the legal authority of the occupying power, the United States, rather than the General Assembly, seemed to confirm King's view that this was a mess External Affairs might better have avoided.41 Looked at from abroad it was a somewhat undisciplined performance, and it set the stage for further rancorous relations with the United States over Korea. Still Canada had acquired a reputation for standing up to the Americans in their own imperium, and it was this reputation which thrust Canada into further exposed positions in Asia in the fifties. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

When Canada next had to consider the question of Palestine it was in February 1948 as a member of the Security Council. Fighting broke out between Jews and Arabs very shortly after the Assembly resolution. In the Security Council as well as in the Assembly, in both of which chambers the question of Palestine continued to appear for the next few years, the Canadian delegation rarely took strong initiatives but emphasized the need for candour and realism, adjusting to circumstances on the spot and above all placing the burden of responsibility on the parties themselves and on the great powers. In his first statement on the subject in the Council, on 24 March 1948, McNaughton set the tone effacing facts. There was no denying the fact that the partition plan was unenforceable, he pointed out, because certain assump-

68 The Shaping of Peace tions had not been realized. The two communities in Palestine would not co-operate, the mandatory power would not co-operate, and the Arab states would not accept the plan. It had been expected that the role of the United Nations would be no greater than to assist in the transfer of authority from the mandatory power to independent Arab and Jewish states and this was clearly an illusion. He recognized in the circumstances some advantages to the United States proposal for a temporary trusteeship as it would allow an opportunity for moderate Jewish and Arab leaders to work out a settlement. The argument against it, however, was that it meant a disconcerting switch from one policy to another on the part of the United Nations, and the Canadian delegation was not going to accept this until there was some evidence of the views of the parties concerned. When the mandatory power ended, there was an administrative vacuum. The Canadian delegation was aware of the inability of the United Nations to impose and maintain an administration and the necessity therefore to face the harsh alternative of allowing the parties to create something for themselves. This was not to say that the fighting was welcomed. Canadian support was given to efforts of the Palestine Commission and the United Nations mediator to stop the fighting. Eventually, as it became clear that a Jewish state was emerging, although by no means in accordance with the Assembly's original resolution on partition, Canada realized that it would have to be recognized. What was to happen to the rest of Palestine would be up to the inhabitants to decide, with the United Nations providing good offices as far as possible. In spite of the decision in principle to recognize the existence of a Jewish state Canada did not rush into approving prematurely the admission of Israel to membership in the UN, considering that this application, submitted on 29 November 1948, ought to be judged in relation to the resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly on Palestine. De jure recognition of Israel came indirectly on 11 May 1949 when Canada voted in the General Assembly for Israel's application for admission to the United Nations. Two other aspects of the Palestine question did concern Canadians. There was a recommendation for the internationalization of Jerusalem. In the East Block there were those who welcomed these projects for internationalization, not only as a means to a particular end but as an end in themselves. Without experiments of this kind in international administration the UN would find it hard to move on to the functions envisaged for some uncertain future. This yearning, however, was always checked by a sense of practicality and in particular by the doctrine now being espoused, that the UN should never take on things it was incapable of carrying out. However attractive had also been the idea of Palestine as a great UN trusteeship, Canadians recognized the utter

69 Development of a Middle Power incapacity of the organization as it was to cope with the historic problem, 'two nations warring within the bosom of a single state.' Although the Assembly in general favoured full internationalization, Canada, along with a couple of other wary middle powers, the Netherlands and Sweden, favoured a proposal which would have put a UN commission in charge simply of the holy places in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine in order to ensure protection and access. This proposal would leave secular business to the occupying authorities. Canada did recognize, however, an international obligation towards the unfortunate refugees and responded to the appeal for help. It is true that this assistance in the early stages came, as so often it did, in the form of canned fish which the minister of agriculture was always hoping to get rid of, but in due course more sacrificial contributions were made and Canada remained for many years one of the major contributors to the relief of Arab refugees. The Canadian contribution in the Security Council on Palestine during its two-year term in 1948-9 was less notable than on certain other issues but it was nevertheless typical. It was one of the most productive periods in the whole life of the Security Council, a time when a policy of diligent pragmatism, such as that practised by Canada, could be peculiarly productive. As a result of this experience Canada came out at the end with a transformed philosophy of the United Nations and a new enthusiasm and commitment. It is particularly notable that during the very years when Canada was most active in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization it was creating for itself in the UN, and particularly in the Security Council through the instrumentality of a Canadian general, the foundations for its reputation as a moderate mediatory middle power that was to last for several decades. This was accomplished without feigning neutrality in the Cold War. When the coup in Czechoslovakia was raised in the Council in the spring of 1948 Canada, along with Argentina, took the initiative in proposing investigation by the Security Council - without of course any great expectation of success. Most of the issues, however, in which it was effectively involved, such as Kashmir, Indonesia, and Palestine, did not involve direct confrontations between the communist and non-communist powers but were rather opening stages in the decolonization process which occupied much of the attention of the United Nations in the years that followed. During this term, however, there was one dangerous issue at the very heart of the Cold War in which the Security Council became involved - the Berlin Blockade. The effort could hardly have been called an unquestioned success, but the treatment of the issue was nevertheless adjudged in the report, Canada and the United Nations 1949, to have been significant.42 A

70 The Shaping of Peace frontal clash between permanent members was a situation which the framers of the Charter had not expected the Security Council to meet. Nevertheless, the Department of External Affairs found that the United Nations response had been encouraging. What had happened was roughly as follows. During the summer of 1948 the Western powers and the Soviet Union had failed to get agreement on the blockade of the city of Berlin which had been imposed by the Soviet Union in June. Consequently, the three Western powers brought the subject to the attention of the Security Council. The Soviet Union failed to keep the item off the agenda but refused to take part in the discussion. Into this breach moved the non-permanent members of the Security Council under the leadership of the foreign minister of Argentina, Señor Bramuglia. The Ukrainian representative did not take part as he had, along with his master, judged that Berlin was no affair of the United Nations. The recognition that there might be a special role for members who were not a direct party to a dispute was significant. The Canadians and Belgians were hardly neutral, but Canada at least was not taking part in the airlift. By sheer force of personality McNaughton was bound to be a leader in these discussions. After meeting for about three weeks the non-permanent members produced on 22 October a draft resolution for the Security Council which called on the Soviet Union to raise the blockade and suggested that the four powers meet to discuss arrangements for the unification of the currency in Berlin on the basis of an agreement which had in fact been reached by the great powers themselves in Moscow on 30 October. The one legitimate reason the Russians were considered to have for the blockade was connected with the currency, and the Western powers had shown some willingness to make concessions on this point. In a sense, however, the six, after diligent consultation with all the parties, had come up with nothing more than a request to the great powers to get on with what they had already agreed to get on with but failed to achieve. The resolution was accepted by nine members but rejected by the Soviet Union and the Ukraine. The Soviet Union was not willing to call off the blockade unless Soviet currency was accepted in all Berlin, but the Western powers were unwilling to agree to this currency reform under the duress of the blockade. Nothing daunted, Señor Bramuglia, who was chairman of the Security Council that session, got his six to work on conditions for simultaneous action by the Eastern and Western powers. It was recognized that there might be a need for some technical expertise and the same six countries brought their experts to Paris to sit as a committee and work out some proposals. The chairman was the Canadian high commissioner in London, Norman Robertson. The committee eventually produced a draft paper on currency and trade problems of

71 Development of a Middle Power Berlin and submitted this to the experts of the four powers, including the Soviet Union. However, on 11 February 1949 the technical committee decided that the positions of the experts of the four powers were so far apart that no further work at that stage appeared useful. It was about that time, however, that Messrs Jessup and Malik were establishing contacts behind the scenes at the UN in New York and on 12 May agreement was reached by which the blockade was lifted. What was the significance of this little flurry of Canada into a mediatory position on one of the most dangerous of all issues between East and West? The initiative for the exercise came somewhat spontaneously from the nonpermanent members but not particularly from Canada. It would have been embarrassing to refuse to take part and there was a feeling also that some well-meaning lesser powers could unwittingly play the Soviet hand by producing a formula which only seemed reasonable. The intentions of an unknown Peronist politician were suspect, but in fact Señor Bramuglia acted responsibly although somewhat over-enthusiastically throughout. The three Western powers viewed the whole operation with considerable suspicion. British and American officials in Paris kept in close touch with the Canadian participants. Undoubtedly they felt a little safer having Canada involved. The Canadians made it quite clear at the same time that they were not to be regarded as Western agents and they would do their best to help their fellows find a solution even though they realized from the beginning the chances of doing so were not great. The highly suspicious attitude of the British and American officials was somewhat resented, although it was fully realized in the Canadian delegation that a trial of wills was going on over the airlift and a compromise could weaken the Western determination to resist and provide the Russians with a saw-off that might lead them to conclude that a blockade was a useful weapon. There is no doubt that it was the Western determination to resist, demonstrated by the airlift, which led the Russians to back down eventually. As the 1949 report, Canada and the United Nations, concluded, the importance of the UN in this affair ought not to be exaggerated but at the same time it ought not to be underestimated. In this unprecedented situation the United Nations had 'offered facilities for negotiation, conciliation and, if necessary, mediation.'43 This was regarded as an interesting use of the non-permanent members to probe for common ground and significant in that although the Soviet Union denied the competence of the United Nations on Berlin, Vyshinsky was willing to negotiate with the six and Soviet experts joined the currency talks. It could prove a precedent and be a demonstration that in a time of acute crisis like this the United Nations might be able to reduce

72 The Shaping of Peace tensions and find ways out of dilemmas that otherwise might lead to war. The department rejected the idea, however, that there should be established a permanent committee of non-permanent members. Every such effort would be ad hoc. It was just a precedent that might be recalled on some other occasion. The report noted also that UN headquarters in New York had provided the 'unique atmosphere' for Malik and Jessup to talk. It was drawing attention to a function of the United Nations in the settlement of disputes in the corridors rather than in the councils - which was to become of much greater importance in the history of the UN than has usually been acknowledged. There were more solid grounds for satisfaction over Kashmir and Indonesia, particularly the latter. Fortunately for Canada it was not a member of the Security Council in 1947 when the embarrassing dispute between two Commonwealth countries over Kashmir erupted. The preference of Canadians to avoid denunciation as unproductive, to accept disputes as inexorable and see what could be done about them, was encouraged by an acute anxiety to say nothing that would offend either India or Pakistan. This muteness proved advantageous and became something of a habit. It was not too difficult over Kashmir because most of the Council was trying its best to promote agreement between the parties, cessation of the fighting, conciliation, and determination by plebiscite of the future of the disputed territory. The Canadian delegation supported the work of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [UNCIP] but did not become involved as one of the five members. King refused to let Pearson accept an invitation to mediate in Kashmir on the grounds that it was not appropriate for a dominion to investigate the affairs of two others. Pearson reported King's views on the subject to Robertson in London: 'We are to play as minor a role as possible in this affair, and, in fact, in all Security Council questions. That will be difficult, especially during February, when Andy McNaughton is in the chair.'44 During several monthly stints as chairman of the Security Council McNaughton was involved in the endless manoeuvres and negotiations to bring the parties together. He was most notably involved at the very end of his term of office in December 1949 when, as chairman for that month, he was asked by the Security Council to assist the parties in finding a solution. This was a single-handed effort after the commission had got nowhere. He produced a set of very practical proposals for demilitarization as preliminaries to a plebiscite. They seemed realistic as they were based firmly on recognition that confidence and agreement had to go stage by stage with procedures of demilitarization. It was not until 29 December that his proposals were

73 Development of a Middle Power presented and he asked for time for India and Pakistan to study them. The Norwegian representative suggested that he carry on his mediatory role after 31 December when Canada went off the Security Council but this was opposed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet representatives had always demonstrated personal regard and respect for McNaughton, recognizing his integrity and his independence. Nevertheless, men like him were turning the Security Council into a more supple body than they wanted. He did in fact keep on working at his personal effort at mediation and felt himself that he had come very close to success. Eventually, however, in February he had to report that he had failed to get agreement. Nevertheless, on 14 March the Security Council adopted a resolution which embodied in the main his proposals and which set up a mediator in place of UNCIP. The mediator was a distinguished Australian jurist, Sir Owen Dixon, and when he passed through New York on his way to the sub-continent at the urging of the British and American permanent representatives McNaughton returned to New York to pass on to the new mediator the fruits of his experience. By that time this experience was being used to good purpose in the disputes over rivers which crossed the Canada-United States border.45 McNaughton's most solid achievement was over Indonesia. In this case agreement was reached between the parties and it did prove the basis of a peaceful settlement. Kashmir was a gallant effort. Again in the case of Indonesia Canada missed the beginning, and again it was saved taking sides. There was a particularly close association with its ally, the Netherlands, to be balanced against sympathy for a people seeking self-government. Two fellow Commonwealth members, Australia and India, were at that time the principal advocates of the Indonesian cause at the UN. They put a lot of pressure on Canada. The Canadian delegation did not have to face the issue until December 1948 when the so-called police action by the Dutch ended the uneasy truce established with the help of the Security Council in the previous year. By 28 January 1949 a resolution had been passed by the Security Council calling for a cessation of hostilities, providing a timetable for the transfer of sovereignty, and a new United Nations Commission for Indonesia.46 Canada contributed some helpful textual amendments in this case. Trouble erupted, however, in a couple of months. The Indonesians and their friends were insisting on the procedures laid down by the 28 January resolution whereas the Dutch were proposing a round-table conference in The Hague. The friends of the Indonesians were suspicious of Dutch motives but the Canadians believed that the Dutch were coping here with internal political difficulties. They argued that the round-table conference would offer an opportunity for progress and they came up with a compromise suggestion by

74 The Shaping of Peace which the UNCÍ would be used for preliminary discussions to determine the times and conditions for holding the proposed conference. To avoid confrontation McNaughton suggested that there was no need to pass a new resolution. What he had in mind was just 'a practicable course of action.' His authority on the Council was considerable and it adopted his proposal with only three abstentions. From then on all went reasonably well. The conference was held in August, agreements satisfactory to both sides were reached, and the UNCÍ was designated to observe implementation. The results of the conference were put into a Canadian resolution on 12 December, but these were vetoed by the Soviet Union. After the vote McNaughton deplored Soviet action but in his capacity as president ruled on a point-of-order that the rejection had no effect on the previous decisions and resolutions. In this way, therefore, he made it possible for UNCÍ to proceed under its original terms of the 28 January resolution. This was considered to be the first instance in which the veto had been circumvented so successfully. With such successes in the final month it is no wonder that the report, Canada and the United Nations 1949, was enthusiastic. The whole history of the UN'S dealing with Indonesia illustrated methods now being used to deal with threats to the maintenance of peace. 'Lacking the power to bring force to bear upon parties to a dispute, the Council has gradually devised less dramatic but more flexible means of exercising its responsibilities. The unobtrusive but timely activities of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia have been recognized and commended as an illustration of the new techniques which the United Nations is developing.' There was no illusion, however, that this was the answer to the frustrated provisions for collective security of a few years previously. The Indonesian question, the report added, could not have been settled without the willingness of both sides. This was not like the Berlin issue. Nevertheless, there were great advantages in this kind of solution. For one thing, it avoided 'pressure on the Netherlands of a kind which almost certainly would have poisoned relations between the Netherlands and the new Republic' and 'stimulated increased suspicion among underdeveloped countries of the motives of administrating powers' which Canada among other countries was hoping to discourage. The kind of pressure they had in mind was probably an inclination in Washington to threaten the Dutch with a suspension of Marshall Aid if they did not make concessions. Whether such extramural exercise of power negates the whole purpose of the UN or whether it is a function of the Security Council to seek to manipulate the real balances of power and forces in the world towards productive ends is a question the answer to which depends on the way one looks at the institution itself. The Canadian view was swinging from the first to the second conclusion.

75 Development of a Middle Power When the term in the Security Council ended it was expected that Canada's UN policy would be less important. Although the temporary delegation to the AEC had grown into a permanent mission before Canada went on the Security Council-and a small office had also been opened in Geneva in 1948 - evidence of Ottawa's attitude to the UN was to be found in that when McNaughton returned to Ottawa at the beginning of 1950 there was a question as to whether a full-scale office would be maintained in New York. Expectations were placed, however, on the fact that Canada in 1950 would be resuming its place on the Economic and Social Council and this was where the main emphasis would lie. It did not seem a time of great UN activity outside the Security Council and the head of the United Nations Division was sent to hold the fort in New York until a decision could be made about a permanent appointment. The tranquillity of the office was shattered in June by the invasion of South Korea. A permanent representative was appointed in August, and there was never again any question that the permanent mission to the United Nations was to be large and important.

4 Collective Action: North America

The universalist hopes of 1945 had been hard to sustain. The formulas for peace and prosperity by universal collective security and free trade were looking threadbare. Canadians had a weakness for formulas, possibly because the development of Canada and the Commonwealth it spawned was attributable to the successive invention of constructive and imaginative formulas. When it came to defence, a nasty subject, there was a tendency to mistake a neat formula for the substance of a policy. Mackenzie King, for example, had once said: 'I think at last we have got our defence programme in good shape. Good neighbour on one side; partners within the Empire on the other. Obligations to both in return for their assistance. Readiness to meet all joint emergencies.'1 That was in 1938. The problem after 1945 was to put or maintain substantial flesh on the bones of new formulas. Between the idea and the reality fell the gap. Still the right idea had to be worked out, and it was not easy. The country is unusual, to say the least. It never has been easy to figure out a rational scheme for the protection of the largest amount of territory owned by the fewest number of people on earth. Persistent critics of the inadequacy of Canadian defence policies might ask themselves whether they ought not to be criticising their glamorous forefathers who, with more hope than calculation, extravagantly extended the sovereignty of a few million people, leaving their descendants with persistently baffling problems of 'national defence.' In 1945 the government clutched after a universalist formula that was somewhat unreal, and in the remaining years of that decade it was trying to adapt, adjust, or replace it with something that would work without ruining the country in the process. In defence as in economics, it was better to have extracontinental ballast, but with or without it the continent could not be ignored. The defence of North America and the swelling vol-

77 Collective Action: North America urne of Canada-United States commerce and investment had to be organized and controlled whether or not world security and a world economy came to pass. It would be best, essential perhaps, that they be fitted into wider schemes, but they had to be coped with in any case. CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

Although the war had begun to create for North America a new shape, based on the exigencies of war and war economies, it was largely dismantled when the war ended. The putative North American defence community had little in the way of constitutional structure and it could melt away without being formally rejected. It had been an energetic act of will, and the will subsided. The memory, however, lingered on, and that was important. It did not have to linger long, for in a few years came the new challenge. In the Canadian government's policies on continental defence and defence production the structures towards which Canadians were groping may be at least dimly discerned. It was not only a question of policies, of course, but also of facts. Government policies were not just a matter of moulding shapely forms but of seeking to control powerful forces. The Northern Prospect When the war was over the politicians in Ottawa and Washington wanted to relax. Although they were disturbed, particularly in Washington, over what seemed like ominous indications of Soviet policy, they wanted to get the troops home and hoped for the best. The Canadian government was successfully concentrating on buying out the wartime United States bases in Canada and graciously getting American troops out of the country. Facts, however, stood in the way of ideal policy. Canada did not have the manpower to operate the weather and radar stations, as well as some air bases, which they wanted to retain, and these remained in United States hands until Canadians had been trained to take over. In fact the Americans were pressing Canadians in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence [PJBD] to let them go home as it was costing money to keep them there.2 The military and the PJBD had to go on considering hypothetical dangers, and they not unnaturally concentrated on what was called 'the undefended roof of North America.' The United States army member raised the question even before the end of the war with Japan when on 20 June 1945 he opened a discussion on 'The Continental Defence Value of the Canadian NorthWest.' At the September meeting General Pope, on the Canadian side, in a statement cleared with the prime minister, suggested both sides seek to

78 The Shaping of Peace agree on the relationship of 'the international picture' to North American defence and then revise ABC-22, the joint plan drawn up before Pearl Harbor. The Canadian view was revealed in his estimate that for one or two decades the threat to the North was unlikely to require complete uniformity of forces and equipment. At the November meeting the United States army and navy representatives presented a formal proposal for continued collaboration; a State Department official challenged Pope's assumption that in the next war, as in the past, Canada would be at war before the United States and offered betting odds of four to one '... that in any future world conflict, war would be brought to us here rather than we would again be allowed to defend our continent in Europe or Asia.'3 He asked the Canadians to reflect on this prospect and consider the standardization of equipment in the light of it. Future Canada-United States defence relationships had been considered in Ottawa even before the end of the war. On 28 February 1945 the Cabinet War Committee approved a memorandum entitled 'Post-War Canadian Defence Relationship with the United States: General Considerations,' prepared in the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems.4 The memorandum recognized Canada's greater vulnerability, especially from the North, the likelihood of an active United States interest in Canadian defence policy, and the danger for Canada of a deterioration in relations between the United States and the USSR. The best hope for Canada to avoid embarrassment was the existence of an effective world security organization, but in any case Canada would have to co-ordinate its defences with the United States and this would be a regional defence system within the world organization. For this the PJBD was a suitable body. Canada should accept its responsibility 'for all such defence measures within Canadian territory as the moderate risk to which we are exposed may indicate to be necessary,' and 'a fair share of responsibility' in an international security organization. It was clear that there would have to be a revision of ABC-22. The government was in no hurry but in December 1945 the cabinet did agree that a new planning body, the Canadian section of the joint Military Co-operation Committee [MCC], might work on joint plans for submission to cabinet. By July 1946 plans that had been worked out in the MCC were submitted to the Cabinet Defence Committee. The appreciation of the international situation came largely from American sources but was generally concurred in by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff,5 with one important difference in that the Canadians did not think North America would be a primary target. The American experts thought it unsafe to assume that North America would be free from attack for more than five years and air or submarine raids and sabotage were possible before then. Needless to say, this appreciation was

79 Collective Action: North America pointed towards the need for an early warning system, although the United States military were not being very successful themselves in getting congressional appropriations for a radar line. It was recognized by officials in Ottawa as, in the words of the secretary of the cabinet, Arnold Heeney, 'one of the most difficult and serious problems with which the Government will have to deal.'6 He forecast that 'the government will probably have to accept the United States thesis in general terms, though we may be able to moderate the pace at which plans are to be implemented and to some extent the nature of the projects which are to be undertaken.' The views of the Americans put forward in the MCC were not, of course, shared by all branches of the United States government. In External Affairs, Hume Wrong doubted that the Soviet Union would deliberately seek involvement in another great trial of arms within fifteen or twenty years but, given the mentality of the Soviet leaders, he anticipated 'recurrent crises, no sense of security and the risk of uncontrollable local methods.' He was disturbed by the sense of urgency and overemphasis on potential danger that seemed to colour American policy.7 Pearson in Washington expressed the hope to the State Department that 'the War Department would not press us too hard with urgent requests for quick action in the field of defence in the north.'8 The Cabinet Defence Committee would not be pushed. The prime minister did not want too prompt a decision and emphasized the importance of keeping the United Kingdom chief of staff informed.9 On 24 July the Defence Committee cleverly approved the continuance of basic planning without approving the basic documents. Urgings to move ahead came from the Americans in the PJBD and the United States ambassador in Ottawa. Heeney had anticipated an approach on the highest level. A summit meeting had been under discussion, and in October 1946 the prime minister and, 'if possible,' St Laurent were invited to visit the president. In a memorandum Hume Wrong prepared for the visit, concern was expressed at the elaborateness of the American proposals. If Canada undertook complete responsibility, it would concentrate almost all military activities on the protection of North America from sporadic bombardment. He hoped there might be a compromise through provision of equipment by the United States or joint operation under Canadian control. He suggested a general discussion and the deferring of proposals of substance. It was significant, he noted, that 'the deterioration of the hopes which attended the founding of the United Nations is illustrated by the fact that I have not felt it necessary to mention hitherto our obligations under the United Nations.' He believed, however, that whatever was done in regional defence with the United States could be

80 The Shaping of Peace brought within the scope of the Charter. Finally, he urged the prime minister to express the hope that Canada be fully taken into the confidence of the United States authorities. Although they had recently been more forthcoming, 'they still, however, have some way to go before we can ourselves assess the basis on which they are doing their own planning and seeking our active co-operation with them.'10 Mackenzie King was a good man for that purpose. His own account" of the discussions with Truman suggests a successful smudging of details and enough agreement in general terms to make the president reasonably happy. Truman had obviously been briefed by some anxious people,12 and he made the right points. When Truman mentioned meteorological stations, King said what had to be considered was the way in which the public became informed. Publicity should be agreed to in advance, 'steps to be taken very slowly and surely,' and care should be taken 'not to give the Russians a chance to say we were trying to fight them.' King tactfully talked about sovereignty, enormous expenditures of the armed forces, and agreed with the president that 'further steps should be taken up through Ministers and on a diplomatic level rather than by the services.' According to the official Canadian reports of the interview, Truman expressed the desire to maintain the same friendly relations with Canada that had characterized the Roosevelt régime and agreement was reached on the closest possible co-operation in the defence of North America (with specific reference to the Arctic) based on the fullest exchange of information between the two countries and also with the United Kingdom. The president assured King there would be no infringement on Canadian sovereignty in any joint undertaking. Recognizing that the president was not likely to tie things down, the State Department gave him an 'oral message,' copies of which were later given to Wrong and Pearson. It referred to 'the extreme importance in an unsettled world of continuing and reinforcing measures of joint defence.'13 The view of the American military perception of the strategic situation was logical enough. Planners could not ignore the direct threat to North America posed by the development of long-range aircraft and missiles. They had direct responsibilities in Alaska and they had acquired others in Greenland and Iceland; they were concerned with 'the Canadian gap.' At first they thought of incorporating Canada into a hemispheric defence system, now being shaped by the Inter-American Defence Board.14 When Truman on 6 May 1946 sent to Congress a bill entitled 'The Inter-American Military Cooperation Act,' he said: 'The collaboration authorized by the bill could be extended also to Canada, whose cooperation with the United States in matters affecting their common defense is of particular importance.'15 Canadians

81 Collective Action: North America were shy of this alignment. When the possibility of participating in the Rio de Janeiro conference on hemispheric defence came before cabinet on 1 April 1947 the under-secretary, Lester Pearson, advised against it on the grounds that Canadian defence planning was more concerned with the Northern than the Western Hemisphere and that it would be difficult 'to formalize participation in United States Inter-American Defence Arrangements while we have been unwilling to formalize those within the Commonwealth.'16 It was most unlikely that the Americans would really have wanted to link the Canadian dimension of their defence strategy with the Latin Americans, where the political problems were so very different. The Americans were constantly being briefed on the need to respect Canadian sovereignty, but their job was to press for an effective and efficient continental defence system. If they were to get the funds from Congress and the co-operation of Canada, they were not likely to underestimate the size and urgency of the Soviet threat - a motive quite obvious to the sceptics in Ottawa. Official Canadians were of the opinion that an attack on North America would be a diversionary feint and that Europe remained central. They were anxious not to reveal anything the Russians would regard as provocative. The ambassador in Moscow, Dana Wilgress, thought that 'considering the little we have done towards strengthening our defences in the north, there has been too much explaining and our attitude has been too apologetic,' a posture that would encourage the Russians to think they were feared.17 The Americans felt, however, that there would have to be some protection, and public opinion would insist on guarding the home front. This difference was perhaps between the relentless logic of the great power, capable of doing something when confronted with a challenge, and that of a smaller power which knew it could not on its own cope with so devastating a threat, for whom co-operative measures of defence posed baffling problems concerning sovereignty, and for whom therefore the temptation was great to count on the threat going away. Insofar as historical recollection affects strategic perspectives, a certain difference was to be expected between a country that had entered the war as a result of a surprise attack and one that had been able to take a calculated decision as a response to events in Europe. Of course there was not at this time or afterwards a fixed Canadian and a fixed American position. There were wide variations on both sides as well as a good deal in common in the estimates of the State Department and the Department of External Affairs, and of the military in both countries. Nevertheless, when the American campaign got going, it was conducted on all levels, even the highest. A minor storm blew up in the Canadian press in June 1946 over American plans for weather stations and a Coast Guard

82 The Shaping of Peace cruiser in the Canadian Arctic. It turned out that the cause of the rumours had been the zeal of one branch of the United States Defense Department to take advantage of unappropriated funds at its disposal.18 As the Canadian embassy was well aware, there were rival empires within the United States government which extended their competition into international fields and another country's interest was more likely to be ignored in this way than by a concerted government policy - if and when that ever existed. When stories appeared in the Financial Post and elsewhere about American pressure on Canada to engage in a very extensive programme of Arctic defence, St Laurent and King denied that pressure was being applied by the United States to establish bases in Canadian territory. The Canadian public did not clearly distinguish between weather and radar stations on the one hand and air bases, which the American JCS were not interested in, on the other. The only threats were in those fears in the back of the Canadian mind about unilateral actions the Americans might be tempted to take if Canada did not play along. The Americans were not demanding bases, they were making all sorts of different requests, including the opening of new weather stations in the Arctic, the maintenance of northern air fields, and the provision of facilities for exercises and training programmes in Canadian territory. There was a great difference between what the MCC planned without regard for expenditure and with specific responsibilities for northern North America, and the intentions of the JCS which had other priorities. As they were spending very little on defence within the US at that time, it is unlikely that they would press hard for works in Canada. Their attention was directed overseas. What the Americans in political charge had in mind was indicated in a sober but obviously well-informed article by James Reston in the New York Times of 18 May 1946 about 'an unprecedented defense agreement' proposed to Canada by the United States 'under which the two countries would coordinate certain branches of their armed forces for the protection of North America and particularly for the defense of this American Arctic frontier.' He said it was emphasized in Washington that it 'would not be a military alliance' and would involve no political commitments in either direction. He recognized Canadian sensitivities but drew attention to a couple of sensitivities in Congress also - that Canadians should protect their own territory and finance it, that a military tie to a member of the Commonwealth would drag the United States into British wars, and that a matter so important should not be handled by an Executive Order. He saw the proposal as an 'outcome' of the Roosevelt pledge of 1938, the Ogdensburg Agreement, and a proposal along these lines the Canadian ambassador, Lester Pearson, had just made at Princeton. Reston was and remained very close to Pearson with whom he had undoubtedly discussed his story.

83 Collective Action: North America United Nations and Commonwealth Factors The Canadian government was constantly reaching for broad political arguments to slow down the pressure for Northern defence: the danger of frightening the Russians away from a negotiating position; the primary obligation to and dependence on the United Nations for security; and the ties with the Commonwealth. These arguments frequently look like excuses, but they were more than tactical concoctions. Canada was deeply committed to a United Nations approach and, having resisted regionalism, Ottawa officials were concerned about the appearance of disloyalty, the bad example that would be set by bilateral security agreements, and gestures indicating lack of faith in the implementation of the security features of the UN. A multilateral security framework was for Canadians a good thing in itself, and it seemed also a protection against the perils of unequal bilateralism. With the great effort being made to establish United Nations control of atomic energy and to negotiate the military articles of the Charter, this was no time to be deserting the cause. As a strategy through 1946, this was soundly based. It sounds less than convincing, however, as a military argument used against proposals for concrete defence measures. The mystical trust in security through the United Nations served to justify an exceedingly modest defence effort, but the doctrine of collective security was not pacifist: it required countries to be militarily prepared. There was always a strong case for seeing that defence arrangements with the Americans were in accordance with the articles of the Charter that provided for regional and self-defence (Articles 51 and 52). The PHP Committee had seen 'that by taking the obvious steps to make Canada defensively secure' its function as a member of the Commonwealth or any world security system would be enhanced.19 The argument that Canada-US defence cooperation was a legitimate regional activity within a worldwide system was constantly made in internal memoranda, both Canadian and American. In this volatile climate, however, it was the gesture that seemed to matter. Canadian officials complained that the American drafts for a revised CanadaUnited States defence plan did not put them in the context of the United Nations system. The Cabinet Defence Committee held up publication of a joint statement until the rules for the registration of regional agreements with the UN were known.20 While noting this in the working papers prepared for Canada-United States meetings in Ottawa on 16 December 1946 Wrong commented, however, that what was proposed was not inconsistent with the Charter. Although it was still necessary to express hope that the military provisions of Article 43 of the Charter would be successfully negotiated, it was obvious to the clear-headed that this was most unlikely and continental arrangements ought not to be ruled out on that account. Pearson, who was

84 The Shaping of Peace always most concerned with the due regard to be paid the United Nations, wrote in a memorandum to the prime minister of 12 November 1946 that Canada should continue to work for a strong United Nations but should have no illusions about its being in a position for some years to preserve peace and punish the big aggressor. This meant the need to organize effective national strength, in combination with others, primarily the United States, and defence plans that fitted into a combined effort. When the prime minister was preparing to announce on 12 February 1947 the agreement eventually reached with the United States on defence cooperation, the Americans were shown his words in advance and they asked that the United States as well as Canada be associated with the statement that 'defence co-operation between Canada and the United States is intended to support and strengthen the United Nations.' Cabinet had asked on 5 February 1947 that in his announcement Mackenzie King emphasize the fact that the new agreement was parallel with Commonwealth defence arrangements and that civil development in the north went hand in hand with defence measures, while denying charges about United States demands for bases and threats to Canadian sovereignty. The Americans, having in mind the prejudice of their own electorate, asked for and got the deletion of a sentence referring to these defence arrangements as being 'supplementary' to those with the Commonwealth.21 The two governments sent similar letters to the secretary-general of the United Nations with a copy of the joint statement 'for the information of the United Nations.' Another argument, used by the prime minister in particular, was the need to involve the British. In view of his opposition to defence ties with Britain, his ploy sounds unconvincing - a way perhaps of leaving Canada unsaddled with any commitments on defence. At the same time it was a genuine reflection of King's, and his colleagues', triangular orientation. On the initiative of the chief of the imperial general staff, Field Marshal Montgomery, tripartite arrangements had been set up at the end of the war for discussion on intelligence, strategy, tactics, research, and weapon development and, according to the Canadian chief of staff, Ueneral Foulkes, '... much was accomplished in the next few years.'22 It was typical of the times and the varying political sensibilities that this arrangement was to remain secret. It was revealed by Monty in 1960 when he wrote his memoirs. On matters pertaining to Newfoundland, especially Goose Bay, the British had to be brought in as they were still in charge. King was emphasizing the importance of the historic Commonwealth link as an argument against moving too fast bilaterally, somewhat as he had used the North American association as an argument against Commonwealth defence measures.23 He was also worried

85 Collective Action: North America about conservative opinion in Canada, including some opinion in the forces, if there seemed to be indecent haste in casting off the old ties when the gallant British were on their knees, and linking up with the aggressive Americans. The Americans were well aware of the sensitivity of the Commonwealth issue in Ottawa, but one sensed on the part of the political officers specifically charged with Canadian affairs some disposition to woo the Canadians away from the British. Graham Parsons, assistant chief of the Division of Commonwealth Affairs in the State Department, could be mischievous. He seized, for example, on irritation in Canada over a peremptory request from General Montgomery to rubber-stamp an 'alleged agreement' with General Eisenhower on standardization of arms, which, he told General Norstad, 'had created a situation favorable to the United States as was evidenced by the fact that Prime Minister King had now accepted the President's oral message of October 28 as a basis for further consideration of joint defense.'24 Parsons and his colleagues were aware, of course, that the Canadians were insistent on dealing directly with the Americans on matters of continental defence and he encouraged General Norstad to say: 'We deal with Canada on a basis of equality and that when any question of concern to Canada came up in u.s.-u.K. talks we invited Canada to participate.' This disposition to alienate affection was much more notable in a self-confessed hemisphericist like Adolph Berle,25 and reflected American ignorance of rather than any carefully calculated designs upon Canada. The Joint Statement on Defence Co-operation, 1947

Before King visited Washington in the autumn of 1946 President Truman was briefed by Dean Acheson. 'Our military authorities,' he said, 'are naturally insistent on closing the gap between Alaska and Greenland ... For this we are dependent on the cooperation of the Canadian Government.'26 Later, in a memo of 26 October, he told the president: 'Mr. King is reluctant to reach any decision until events have made it imperative to do so.' The State Department understood that some Canadians thought the American military were proposing more extensive plans than were necessary and it would be helpful therefore if the president would assure Mr King 'our non-military authorities are convinced that the program is necessary.'27 He should also suggest that the president and the State Department were keeping watch to prevent over-extension. In the end it was not American insistence but world events that wore down Canadian resistance. Financial reasons also played a part, as well, for, as Canadians realized, they had to do something about the North for their

86 The Shaping of Peace own sake and they knew how much it would cost if they could not share expenses. After President Truman made his pitch to King, cabinet agreed to endorse in general the principle of joint defence planning with the United States but postponed concurrence in the joint appreciation of the PJBD until there could be further diplomatic talks. External Affairs was still sensitive about provoking further tension with the Russians and the cabinet was concerned with avoiding expenditure, preserving sovereignty, and with not frightening Canadians. Much effort was put into giving a civilian cover to Arctic developments - as in the expansion of international civil aviation. Lester Pearson wrote in Foreign Affairs, Canada did not 'relish the necessity of digging, or having dug for her, any Maginot Line in her Arctic ice.'28 It wanted co-ordination of research and experiment with all the Arctic countries, including the Soviet Union, leading to peaceful development of the North and deplored the concentration on strategic aspects. But while he was inviting co-operation with the USSR, Pearson was increasingly dubious of the prospects. In his memorandum for the prime minister of 12 November 1946 he said that 'without some fundamental change in the Soviet state system and in the policies and views of the leaders, the USSR is ultimately bound to come into open conflict with western democracy.' It would be realistic to limit thought of peace to a short period, and organize national strength in the most effective possible way. This would require 'combination and co-operation with others, primarily with the United States of America.' By careful action now, they could forestall 'unreasonable requests from Washington and London later.' A meeting held in the Château Laurier on 16-17 December 1946 among Canadian and American diplomatic and military personnel was reassuring, particularly as the leading American spokesman was George Kennan. He argued firmness and patience in dealing with the Russians. They were not planning a direct attack, but he emphasized the danger of miscalculation and the desirability of helping the moderates in Moscow. What the Canadians noted this time was that the American spokesmen were not unduly 'continental defence-minded' and did not favour the enormous diversion of resources that would be needed to provide complete protection for North America. One American said that in any war which might develop in the next five or six years the threat to the continent would be so slight as to tie down relatively little of Canada's strength. It had been wise of Truman to suggest that the diplomats rather than the service men do the talking. Their kind of argument was more congenial to the Canadians than the calculations of the soldiery, though Wrong did want to hear the military assessments.29 Pearson was worried lest in the eyes of the British, North American defence seemed to be over-emphasized to the detriment of their overseas potential.

87 Collective Action: North America The American ambassador shrewdly argued that Canada and the United States could not go to anyone's help unless the Arctic was secure. American voters would not allow it. The difficult question of cost sharing was discussed but without definite agreement.30 Reassured by this discussion, the Canadian government agreed to make a public announcement. The joint statement by the two governments on defence co-operation of 12 February 1947 was a basic document.31 It called for collaboration between the two national defence establishments 'in the interest of efficiency and economy.' The collaboration would be limited and would be based on five principles which included the interchange of selected individuals, general co-operation and exchange of observers, encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, etc., mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval, and air facilities in each country, 'this principle to be applied as may be agreed in specific instances.' And finally, 'as an underlying principle all co-operative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory.' Attention was drawn to the fact that this conclusion was reached by independent decisions because of an identity of view and interest 'in continuation of the practice developed since the establishment of the permanent joint board on defence in 1940.' No treaty, executive agreement, or contractual obligation had been entered into, it was noted, and each country would determine the extent of its practical collaboration. Even this underlining was not enough, and in the next few days the Canadian minister in Washington was requested to seek and he secured confirmation that principle number 4 of the agreement 'in no way infringes on the complete jurisdiction which each country maintains over its territorial and boundary waters.'32 This renewed dedication to collaborate on continental defence was as informal as the first at Ogdensburg. It was, as General McNaughton told the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in a speech on the PJBD, 'a permanent and sensible arrangement' and not an alliance.33 The emphasis of the text and the preparatory steps suggest that the Canadians saw it as a means of placing careful limitations on an association which they could no longer and no longer wanted to resist entirely. It was not until both countries willingly committed themselves to the North Atlantic Treaty that Canada and the United States became allies, with the broader implications that term implies. The idea of continental defence collaboration had been accepted before the war ended as a sensible working arrangement. It was not simply a product of the postwar ideological confrontation. Joint defence survived because Canada could not detach itself from the continent on which it was nourished. The border being a fact of life to be accepted, there was no way Canada could remain unaffected by an active

88 The Shaping of Peace American defence policy. In that case it was wise to establish some rules and regulations. What Canada could have done if Canadians had then been thoroughly opposed to American policies and what the Americans would have done to Canada in those circumstances we shall never know. The Canada, however, that might have resisted continental defence co-operation in 1947 is a mythical nation, not the product of heredity and environment which actually emerged from that particular war in 1945. As Reston has described it: 'The proposal is simply that the two countries accept the geographical fact that they are part of the North American land mass, which is now within range of long-distance aircraft from all parts of the earth and that they take technical steps in planning the future of their armed forces to deal with this fact.'34 King said in the House, 12 February 1947, 'The ultimate objective is not joint or regional defence, but collective international defence.'35 DEFENCE AND ECONOMICS 3 6

Inseparable from the question of continental defence were the issues of continental defence production. In any effort to sense the shape Canadians were discerning for their international life it is necessary to look for patterns here. The subject is of particular interest in that it concerns both security and economics. For the Americans, security was all important. The economic impact was minor. For Canada the security aspect was by no means unimportant but the economic factor was crucial. If there was to be rearmament, Canadians would have to have a reasonable share of production and sales or quickly go bankrupt. That had been their situation in 1941 when Roosevelt agreed at Hyde Park to allow Canadians to sell defence materials in the United States. As a result Canada ended the war with a surplus and purchased the American installations in Canada. Defence Production in Transition, 1945-7

Although the rhetoric used about the Hyde Park agreement on both sides implied that this was to be only the beginning of a new era,37 the defence production arrangements disintegrated quickly when the fighting stopped. In May 1945 there was an exchange of notes 'Providing for the Continuation of the Principles of the Hyde Park Declaration into the Post-War Transitional Period with Special Reference to the Problem of the Reconversion of Industry.' The United States was primarily interested in the security quid pro quo, making certain that Canada would fight on in the Pacific. Canada was more worried about transforming wartime into peacetime industry if the defence production agreements ceased abruptly. When the war ended in the Pacific

89 Collective Action: North America in August, there was a rush to disband all controls and regulations, and the temporary bureaucrats who had been the real operators of the programme went home. Once the strong political argument for a common front was gone, the will to sacrifice special interests or to seek accommodation was gone also. In Ottawa and Washington attention was directed to broader multilateral solutions.38 Still Hyde Park was an experience not quickly forgotten. When Canadians were in the same kind of trouble again, in 1947 and 1957, they wanted something comparable. Getting to know the Americans and their market intimately undoubtedly helped change the pattern of Canadian trade after the war, or perhaps prepared Canadian industry to adjust to the inevitable. On the other hand, the effort at 'integration' had revealed the magnitude of the changes that would be required if economic union were to be seriously undertaken as a peacetime project. The dismantling of the wartime structure of production co-ordination meant that there would be no continuity of an 'integrated' defence economy. However, the belief in co-ordinated continental defence was not abandoned. It was accepted, in principle, that the two countries should remain ready to fight again if necessary, and this meant 'industrial preparedness,' the co-ordination of the industrial defence production efforts of the two countries with special attention to standardization, specialization, and reciprocal defence procurement.39 All that was required now was that these principles be placed on a more lasting basis to meet the strategic requirements of an age of more or less permanent threat. In two years strategic perceptions changed drastically. Canadian attitudes on the need for preparedness altered considerably. So also did their economic situation. By 1947 Canada was again in financial difficulties, to a considerable extent because of the need to help the other member of the triangle.40 When the government contemplated some re-equipment of its own modest forces, it was faced with its dependence on American supplies and with the large United States dollar component in material for shipment to Europe. Again there was the possibility of balancing accounts by providing the United States with defence supplies it required. This time, however, there would be much greater difficulty with Congress. The 'Buy American' Act was back in force, and the special Hyde Park relationship with Canada was not looked upon with universal favour. However, the Commonwealth Affairs Division of the State Department 'urged that Hyde Park represents a spirit which should be preserved and that it is the foundation for consultation in those many economic problems of mutual concern to the two countries.'41 When Canadian leaders began a crusade in 1947 for a new Hyde Park type agreement, what they wanted essentially was a scheme which enabled Can-

90 The Shaping of Peace ada to produce for an undefended American market and secure strategic materials it needed. 'If this close integration of the economies was good in war - good for both countries and good for our allies - why should we not with profit continue the same principle through this period of what I hesitate yet to call peace, and indeed indefinitely?' asked Hume Wrong to the Canadian Society in New York in 1948.42 The minister of finance and others argued for a return to the common sense of Hyde Park, without seeming to realize that the wartime analogy did not entirely apply - not even in a Cold War because the economies had reverted to their natural competition without a common cause. In the stress of the acute Canadian deficits of 1947 and the disillusion with the prospects of British revival, there were Canadians who thought Canada might have no alternative to finding a place in a 'continental economy,' but they were vague about what that meant, and the Hyde Park analogy seemed relevant. The United States ambassador in Ottawa, Ray Atherton, reported exultantly to his secretary of state on 29 October 1947 that Canadian public opinion had reached an all-time high in favouring closer integration of the two economies. 'Economic union between the two countries is taken as a natural parallel development with intimate military ties existing since early in the late war and close political collaboration as now manifest at the UN.' He attributed this to a realization that the prewar triangular exchange was no longer possible and talked of 'Canada's secession from the Empire trading unit.'43 But what he was talking about, as his evidence reveals, was the great interest in Ottawa in developing the American market and in planning Canadian production directed to that market, which would obviously present much greater opportunities than that of Britain. That is hardly what he calls 'virtual economic union' with the United States. Like most American observers he over-dramatized the Canadian shift because he exaggerated the extent to which Canada had been part of an 'Empire trading unit' before the war and ignored the increase of American trade and investment notable many years previously. There were certainly some leading Canadians thinking quite radically about one form or another of 'economic union,' but Atherton, who was one of the most senior diplomats ever sent to Canada, probably misled the Washington establishment by his oversimplification of the Canadian paradox. 'Free Trade'Discussions, 1948 Canadian attitudes to 'continental union' puzzled the Americans. They also puzzled Canadians. The conflict between reason and what one could call unreason or a higher reason is well illustrated by a concrete effort to explore

91 Collective Action: North America at least a tentative experiment in 'continental union.' Planners were well aware of the paradox of 'dependence' as described by Robert Gilpin: 'The periphery is dependent in that it gains economically from the relationship; the severing of economic ties would cause severe economic damage to the periphery's economy. In short, it is not because the periphery is exploited by the relationship but precisely because it benefits from it that the periphery feels dependent upon the core.'44 In 1948 there were secret discussions between American and Canadian officials concerning the establishment of some form of free trade or customs union. Nothing came of them, but the case is of interest because it illustrates the contradictory impulses in Ottawa when the state of the relationship with the United States was perforce under consideration.45 A form of reciprocity between the United States and Canada had been a theme for a century, and it remained always for Canadians a tantalizing if dangerous idea, a possibility in extremis at least. It was almost inevitable that, in the light of the serious financial position in which Canada found itself at the end of 1947, the increasing dependence on trade with the United States, and the disillusionment with the triangle, people who saw a good deal of each other would explore the subject, if not in formal meetings at least with brandy or golf. Late in 1947 John Deutsch, director of the international economic relations division of the Department of Finance, and Hector McKinnon, chairman of the Canadian Tariff Board, began talks with officials of the United States Department of State about a comprehensive trade agreement. They had been Canadian negotiators for GATT in Geneva and saw this as a move in the context of the removal of trade restrictions. The Americans came up with the idea of a modified customs union. Douglas Abbott, the minister of finance, reported to King in January that on his last visit to Washington he had met Harriman, Lovett, and several others and the Americans had brought up the question of complete reciprocity with Canada. King was opposed to a commercial union as it would lead to political discussion about union with the United States. However, he thought back to the treaty of reciprocity as proposed in Sir Wilfrid's day and thought that the country, having learned that it made a mistake in not accepting that treaty, would give this one a different kind of reception. He urged Abbott to continue the discussion on the official level. Abbott emphasized that the proposal was not his, that it had come from the Americans, but it could be the answer to 'all our present restrictions.' There were interdepartmental meetings on the subject and a cabinet decision was taken to send Deutsch and McKinnon without delay to follow up what seemed like an invitation to talks on the possibility of creating under GATT a free-trade area.

92 The Shaping of Peace Although the greatest care was taken to keep talk of the negotiations secret, the general subject was much discussed in the press. On 1 November 1947 the Financial Post had considered the pros and cons of a customs union. On 15 March 1948 Life magazine tackled the subject in a typically heavyhanded way.46 Canada was in serious economic trouble, said Life, and required less apathy from the United States. 'More than that they need complete and permanent economic union with the us. The us needs this too, and so does the future of a healthy world...' There was talk about the logic of history and Canada's inability to operate fiscally in today's world. Mackenzie King drew this to Abbott's attention. He was relieved to hear Abbott make clear that what they had agreed to in previous talks was not any immediate complete free trade but rather 'trade so arranged as to make possible the gradual integrating of our systems along lines of the Hyde Park Agreement.'47 McKinnon and Deutsch returned with the skeleton of what could become the 'schedule to a treaty' between Canada and the United States. The proposals called for immediate removal of all duties by both countries and prohibition of all quantitative restrictions on imports after five years, with further details to be worked out. Then King began to have doubts. He was worried by the resurgence of the fear that political union would follow economic union which had been provoked in Canada by the Life article. He realized his own vulnerability. 'So far as I was concerned, I would be a liability rather than an asset in the picture inasmuch as the Tories would say this is Mr. King's toy. He has always wanted annexation with the States.'48 King was coming to the end of his long period in office and he said that he did not want this as his crowning achievement. At first he thought of linking it to the larger Atlantic pact which was then under discussion.49 If this were passed by Parliament, they might immediately follow with a trade agreement as something which still further helped the object of the pact - that is the removal of restrictions to trade. Other countries might be brought into a larger freetrade area. Once King had turned against the idea, he began to see the whole thing as sinister. 'I said I thought I ought to say that I believed the Americans in their attitude were carrying out what I felt was really their policy and had been so over many years, of seeking to make this Continent one.'50 He personally would rather keep Canada within the orbit of the British Commonwealth than come within that of the United States. St Laurent, who had been interested in the economic possibilities and worried, like others, about the political implications, did not think the Liberals needed this issue to win the election. Howe and Abbott were somewhat more reluctant to give it up,

93 Collective Action: North America Abbott no doubt because it seemed an answer to his desperate problems, although they were already beginning to ease, and Howe because he was more confident than others of Canada's capacity to hold its own. In Washington the prime minister discussed the matter with both Pearson and Wrong, and Wrong stressed that conditions in the United States would probably never be as favourable as they were at that moment. In his memoirs Pearson says the explorations showed a strong economic case for continental free trade, but he thinks King was right in his conclusion that the political risks were too great. In any case, the clinching argument for the prime minister was what he regarded as 'a perfect evidence of guidance from Beyond.' He happened to read a book by Richard Jebb called Studies in Colonial Nationalism which concerned the fuller independence of the Commonwealth and it convinced him that he did not want his last act to be one which would confirm the view that he was anti-British.51 Pickersgill, he said, was opposed to the plan for the same reason - but presumably without extraterrestrial assistance. Wrong explained in a personal letter to Jack Hickerson, director of the Office of European Affairs, that the ministers had decided the government was not in a position to take immediately a favourable stance on the proposals and thought therefore the official talks should be suspended. Moreover, the proposal for a North Atlantic security pact would probably be made public within a few weeks52 and that was a matter of such great importance that to confront the Canadian people at the same time with this issue would be of doubtful wisdom. They did not want in Ottawa, however, to forget the importance of trade relations and the necessity for continuing to work towards the freest possible trade between the two countries along the lines already begun. He added: 'It would be natural for the trade discussions to be related to the pact, since they are concerned with measures for economic defence against aggression. It might also turn out to be desirable later to add the United Kingdom to such discussions. If, in fact, the discussions could be somewhat widened in this way, it would remove one of the political obstacles to bilateral arrangements at the present time for free trade between the two countries.'53 As far as External Affairs was concerned, the discussions about an Atlantic pact were uppermost, and already they were pressing for economic understandings within this broader area. Pearson, as under-secretary, told King on 26 March that he had spoken to Hickerson about the trade question and 'about including a paragraph in the proposed Atlantic Security Pact to make clear they were aiming at economic, social and moral mutual advantages which would of course make it possible to develop out of the larger treaty,

94 The Shaping of Peace matters relating to Trade.' King was pleased as 'It leaves the door open for further developments in the right way.'54 The judgment of Professors Cuff and Granatstein on this episode is sound: 'The free trade idea had held understandable appeal for Ottawa. Largely consistent with the multilateral spirit of Geneva, it had promised an escape from the permanence of restrictions at home and the rush to bilateralism abroad while guaranteeing permanent access to American markets. But in the end, the Prime Minister had determined that the political costs of a customs union would far outweigh the potential economic benefits - an understandable response.'55 The idea that it had been the constant objective of the United States, as King suggested, to make the continent one economic unit would be greeted with some scepticism by those who had fought United States protectionism for many years.56 Nevertheless, as Senator Hartke many years later said bluntly, he would take a very tough protectionist line against Canada as a competitor but would be prepared to welcome Canada into a free-trade area.57 The Americans could not have been expected to worry, of course, about the effect on Canadian sovereignty. That some officials were interested, for both political and economic reasons, in seeing Canada swing from the British to the American orbit is a reasonable supposition. Everybody likes friends and customers. They were probably more interested in having a reliable and, they would fondly hope, somewhat subservient ally in international councils than nine more states of the union. Congress was, however, above - or below - conspiracies; they did not think about Canada enough. It was Pearson's shrewd conclusion that if the question of the customs union had reached higher political levels on the American side it would have been rejected.58 Meanwhile, there was a dramatic improvement in the Canadian financial position in 1948. The most important immediate factor in this upswing was the provision by which Marshall Plan aid to European countries could be used for the purchase of Canadian materials.59 The American officials who fought to get this concession saw Canada as almost the sole partner in the great scheme to restore the European economy, a small partner but one whose policies were of some significance in the eyes of Congress. Some of them recognized also that Canada had almost bankrupted itself by providing postwar aid to Europe and especially Britain while Washington was making up its mind. They saw advantages and disadvantages in the free-trade scheme. Because of their preoccupation with the extracontinental issues, they seemed to value most of all the elimination of empire preferences. They were aware, nevertheless, that Canada would be able simultaneously to make similar

95 Collective Action: North America offers of free trade to the United Kingdom. An advantage was that Canada would give up the unilateral right to impose restrictions for balance-ofpayments reasons. Some of King's foreboding might have been encouraged, however, if he had seen a memorandum of the assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, Willard Thorp: 'The present may offer a unique opportunity of promoting the most efficient utilization of the resources of the North American Continent and knitting the two countries together - an objective of United States foreign policy since the founding of the Republic.'60 It was officials like Atherton and Thorp who would take up the cudgels for Canada against Congressional prejudice and who also had respect for the Canadian contribution to multilateral institutions. They may, of course, have posed a greater threat to Canadian independence than the more hostile Americans who wanted no such arrangements with a foreign power. They had the assumptions of their time, that barriers between peoples should be removed and in particular that barriers to free flow in the North American economy were 'artificial.' It was the same kind of motherhood language talked by the Canadian officials, but it concealed the latter's instinctive reservations about the free flow of Canada into the United States. After several centuries' concentration on the problem, Canadians recognized the paradoxes more acutely than the benevolent Americans. They knew that no arrangements such as Hyde Park could be on a basis of complete reciprocity, as if they were two equal powers. Canada would always require 'safeguards,' as it did years later in the Auto Pact, because the Canadian economy could be inadvertently swallowed or destroyed by an American decision. Return to Hyde Park Ottawa officials were generally prejudiced in favour of quiet diplomacy. It was not only in External Affairs that they liked their diplomacy quiet. A strong argument for this tactic was made by Howe: 'From time to time the Canadian Government is urged by our people to get tough with the Americans when some new trade restriction is threatened or imposed. The Canadian Government, I think, always makes its representation vigorously but we have never thought that threats would really do very much to advance Canadian interests. After all, could the President of the United States ever appear to have succumbed to threats from Canada in deciding not to take action that had been recommended to him? If the time comes that Canada has to retaliate against the United States - and I hope it never comes - in my opinion, the wise course will be to act first and let the action speak for itself.'61 There were often, however, reasons for loud diplomacy, and 1948 was a time when the Canadian government was practising diplomacy out loud to an unusual

96 The Shaping of Peace extent. Canadian officials had set out both in Canada and in the United States to rouse support for the North Atlantic enterprise, and speeches were also made in favour of a revived Hyde Park. It did not escape Canadian planners that they might fulfil their obligations to the new alliance by a generous contribution from an expanded defence production rather than with armed forces, the raising of which was always a touchy issue for Canada. In their minds the cause of freer defence production in North America was linked to the cause of North Atlantic defence. They had to lead Canadians to see things in these terms instead of the old triangle. In the United States it was Congress and the public rather than the State Department that had to be convinced. The Hyde Park Agreement had been informal and open-ended and this time Canada wanted something firmer and more specific. The need was not only for a new assurance that the Americans would play the game according to Hyde Park rules, but also to spell them out in such a way that Canadian sovereignty could not be disregarded as it had sometimes been when a war was on. It was the diplomats who were concerned over principles, as was proper. The trade and finance people wanted a larger share of United States defence contracts. The defence production men were not much concerned with sovereignty as an abstraction, but they were determined and skilful about getting business for their country. What Canada wanted was set forth in important speeches by the Canadian ambassador in New York, the minister of National Defence in Detroit, and notably by the prime minister at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute on 14 October 1949. The language used was that of 'economic co-operation,' not integration. St Laurent said pragmatically: 'Without some arrangement for reciprocal defence purchasings with the United States, Canada cannot make the most effective contribution to the security of this continent and the North Atlantic area.'62 In April 1949 the Joint United States-Canada Industrial Mobilization Committee was set up to co-operate with the PJBD. In December 1949 Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom reached a new agreement on standardization, a project King had seen as avoiding too narrow a commitment to either partner. The agreement went further than mere standardization and talked about economy and the use of combined resources and effort. However, under a tripartite cloak Canada was involved in a relationship which was bound to be more meaningful bilaterally. Canada was moving from British-type to American-type equipment because of the problems of supply. As for the 'Buy American' Act, well-disposed Americans were doing what they could informally to mitigate its impact. The USAF exempted Canadian suppliers from these provisions in their purchasing prac-

97 Collective Action: North America tices. In May 1950 an off-set purchase agreement was reached with the United States secretary of defense according to which each nation would purchase $15 to $25 million from the other annually. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the revival of Hyde Park spirit and Hyde Park practices was considerably easier. The two countries were back in a wartime situation that strengthened the argument for regarding sovereignty and tariff barriers as 'petty' -and even the conviction in some quarters that North America must build itself as a strong fortress. Out of this spirit came the exchange of notes of 26 October 1950 endorsing a 'statement of principles for economic co-operation.' The high-minded but unreliable declarations which had been the habit previously were being replaced now by formal exchanges of notes at the urging of the Department of External Affairs. The purpose of the principles was 'that our two governments shall co-operate in all respects practicable, and to the extent of their respective executive powers, to the end that the economic efforts of the two countries be co-ordinated for the common defence and that the production and resources of both countries be used for the best combined results.' It called in utilitarian language for the development of a co-ordinated programme of requirements, production, and procurement. Because the threat was regarded to be of indefinite duration there was no termination date. The reception of the agreement by parliamentarians and the press was affirmative but matter of fact. A good many Canadians seemed to approve it largely because they thought of it simply as a scheme for selling Canadian products, including aircraft, in the States. Although there was a good deal of loose language about developing the continent, those who knew what they had in mind spoke more precisely about co-operation and restricted the adjective, common, to nouns like interest, enemy, and sense. The functionalists were having their way and there were not many people issuing warnings about the logic of pursuing common sense too far within what was clearly a geographical if not a political unit. Some Americans, however, had never failed to take this logic for granted. The financial editor of the Wall Street Journal wrote '... the arbitrary division of the continent is beginning to hurt both countries in two fundamental ways: (1) it is serving to hold back the development of Canada's wealth; and, as our natural resources are gradually exhausted it is also restricting United States economic welfare; (2) it is weakening the ability of the two countries to ensure the military security of the continent in an age of new intercontinental weapons. The time has come to think seriously of making the United States and Canada one country or, to start with, at least one economic unit.'63

5 Collective Action: North Atlantic

Let us not forget that the provisions of the Charter are a floor under, rather than a ceiling over, the responsibilities of Member States. If some prefer to go even below that floor, others need not be prevented from moving upwards. Two or more apartments in the structure of peace are undoubtedly less desirable than one family of nations dwelling together in amity, undivided by curtains or even more substantial pieces of political furniture. They are, however, to be preferred to the alternative of wholly separate structures. LOUIS ST LAURENT,

United Nations General Assembly, ¡8Sept. 7947 1 ANTICIPATION

By 1947 attitudes in Ottawa towards the Soviet Union were hardening, but they were far from reckless. A memorandum of 30 August 1947 recommended that 'The Western Powers maintain an overwhelming balance of force relative to that of the Soviet Union, that they use the threat of this force to hold back any further extension of Soviet power, but that they do not provoke the Soviet Union into any desperate gamble.'2 It was this conclusion about the necessity of counterforce that led to the active Canadian role in the formation of NATO. The establishment of NATO was not based on simple presumptions about a Soviet march to the Channel. That was not the way the threat appeared in the Canadian memoranda of the time. To understand the fear in Ottawa, it is necessary to recognize that policy-makers had lived through the thirties when all good intentions were paralyzed by a lack of security. Democratic governments had collapsed from fear of rather than actual invasion and from an increasing suspicion that fascism was the wave of

99 Collective Action: North Atlantic the future. Countries behaved immorally because they lacked the power to do otherwise. The French in the late forties were obsessed by a fear of Soviet occupation, and a particular concern of Canada was to persuade them that this time a common stand, backed by the North Americans, was possible.3 50 long as Europeans, haunted by fears of another occupation, were terrified of the advance of the Russian armies, it seemed essential to persuade them that the West, standing together, could dissuade the Russians from moving. There was enough uncertainty in Western chanceries about what the mysterious Reds did have in mind that the possibility of an expansion could not be ruled out.4 The Prague coup in 1948, however, illustrated how democrats could be intimidated by Soviet armed strength standing on the border. Canadian officials were particularly anguished because they had given their loyalty to the United Nations.5 The experience of Soviet hostility at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 and what seemed rude unwillingness to continue in any way the spirit of wartime collaboration - such as it was - undermined what hope there had been for an international security system based on great-power consensus in the UN. 6 In Ottawa the same conviction was growing as in Washington and the European capitals that some provision would have to be made for collective military preparations by those countries who were willing to stand together and do something. There could be no question of abandoning the UN, but a closer look was being taken at Article 51 of the Charter which provided for collective self-defence.7 That seemed a better basis than Article 53 which foresaw regional arrangements. Canada still was leary of regionalism, and security actions under Article 53 were subject to review, and veto, by the Security Council. Furthermore, the countries willing and able to take collective action were not confined to one region. Many Canadian officials reacted sceptically to the revival by Churchill in his Fulton speech in March 1946 of proposals for a new Anglo-American alliance.8 Such an appeal may have been closer to the visceral reaction of political Canadians at that time, but officiai circles were uncomfortable about old cries of race or empire. A suspicion that the British would really prefer the old Anglo-American or a Commonwealth base to something which included Western Europe pervaded Canadian official thinking during the gestation of the North Atlantic Treaty. An important initial approach from Attlee to King in January 1948, seeking Canadian support for the proposed British-West European security agreement, nearly went astray because Attlee had unwisely, or rather unwittingly, referred to the Western European system evolving in Brussels as being 'backed by the power and the resources of the Commonwealth.' Officials like Pearson were not disposed to allow old

100 The Shaping of Peace ghosts to stand in the way of the forward movement they saw in the British initiative. Commonwealth defence was impractical. An Anglo-American alliance was too narrow. They were beginning to see an Atlantic system which would rise above the old Anglo-Saxon racism. The triangular special relationship remained basic and a last resort, of course. What is more, Canadians were not above exploiting it if that was their means of getting in on the ground floor - as it was in this case. There was a feeling of urgency in the East Block, and, contrary to the usual Canadian tradition, the campaign for something new was led by officials speaking publicly. Pearson, who was then under-secretary and a civil servant, stressed the idea that within the circle of the UN those who had the same tradition and ideals of democracy could develop and strengthen their relationships, thereby speeding the progress of all to the establishment and acceptance of an organization of those who would really keep the peace.9 In the functionalist tradition, it was asserted that a way could be found for special security agreements within the framework of the Charter. Even before the UN was established, the post-hostilities planners in Ottawa had thought in terms of a transitional stage before the UN could cope with security during which the urgent problems expected at the end of the fighting would be the responsibility of the great powers.10 The creation of a special security grouping within the UN was regarded as the best way to head off those isolationists or cold warriors in Washington and cynics in Europe who wanted to abandon the United Nations or transform it into an agency of the 'free world.' St Laurent's statement to the House of Commons of 4 July 1947 took a public stand for closer associations within the world organization and not inconsistent with its ideals. The public was, nevertheless, left with a somewhat ambiguous impression." The limited alliance proposed was sometimes regarded as an unfortunate necessity for a transitional period; at other times there was the enthusiastic emphasis by Pearson and colleagues on a structured, strong, and permanent community of Atlantic peoples. The advocates could reconcile these diverse goals, but the shifting stress was and remains confusing. In the early stages there was some discussion over whether the new security alliance would remain as an entity within the United Nations or eventually take it over. In March 1946 Pearson contemplated a three-power conference at which all the cards would be placed on the table, but if that was not a real success the United States and the United Kingdom 'should convert the United Nations into a really effective agent to preserve the peace and prevent aggression.' If the Russians vetoed it, then 'a new organization must be created which, as the guardian of the peace of all nations, and not merely the

101 Collective Action: North Atlantic English-speaking ones, can function without the Russians and, as a last resort, against them.'12 As late as 26 January 1948 he proposed that no state be excluded which did not exclude itself so that the new organization 'might hope eventually to attract to its membership all states in the United Nations. We would, then, in fact, have secured a new United Nations with both universality and effectiveness.'13 Soon, however, Pearson and his colleagues were arguing that the new organization could and should be established without altering or dissolving the United Nations structure. It was better to hope for and advocate maintenance of the universal UN in order to make it as easy as possible for the Soviet Union to stay in. What came next would depend essentially on whether the Russians did so. The Canadian way of shaping the peace - and it was not unique - was to mould the forms in experience, having in mind various possible goals, testing constantly to see what was acceptable, exploiting opportunities and shifting alternatives. For a medium power, in particular, it is a mistake to become too much attached to a pre-conceived blue-print. It is difficult, therefore, to state with confidence what exactly Canada had in mind from the beginning and the extent to which it was successful in achieving its aims. In one important respect it was successful. A collective defence system was established without driving the communist members out of the UN. The differences in emphasis did, of course, reflect some considerable differences among officials. The influence of Escott Reid was notable in the opinions coming out of Ottawa. He talked of proposals for pooling economic resources, 'setting up revolutionary new political instruments for the alliance, a parliament, president, chancellor and a chief of staff, a new society of the free nations.'14 He was closer to the throne than Hume Wrong, but the latter was in Washington where the decisions would be shaped. Wrong was sceptical of a collective defence agreement of all the free states of the world. His own conception was, he thought, more modest but more practical: 'It envisaged perhaps four or five agreements covering different areas, with the connecting link between them the participation of the United States ... If the fear of war were to diminish greatly, a general superstructure might be erected. In the present state of affairs I would prefer to limit the participating countries in each case, because the larger the alliance, the more unmanageable and ineffective it tends to become.'15 B E R L I N BLOCKADE

There was always a gap, or at least a lag, between Canadian vision and Canadian action, and this was the case with NATO, in spite of the large role Canada

102 The Shaping of Peace played in its creation. The apparent inconsistency was well illustrated, just as NATO was being established, by the episode of the Berlin Blockade. As described in the chapter on peacemaking (volume 1), Canadian officials had shown great zeal in pressing for a voice in the German settlement and in devising proposals, only to be snubbed by the great powers. There was little doubt that the politicians went along with the official insistence on the Canadian right to a voice in the German settlement, although they rejected a Canadian role in the occupation. Many of them shared King's misgivings over the implications of the activist role sought by the officials. These officials were now taking a lead in the development of a North Atlantic association, plans for which were already well under way by the time the Russians proceeded to blockade Berlin in April 1948. The politicians had by no means shaken off old fears. They were more disposed to leave the political and security issues of Europe for the Europeans to worry about and, of course, to justify their unwillingness to participate militarily by the argument that they were excluded from influence. The British and Americans proceeded to defy the blockade by organizing an air lift into the besieged city. In June 1948 the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, asked the Canadian high commissioner if he would enquire what stocks of dehydrated foodstuffs Canada might have on hand; he added that the United Kingdom and the United States would be grateful for any assistance which other countries could give in making additional transport aircraft available for the Berlin operation.16 There were other less official enquiries from RAF sources about help. Both Robertson in London and Pope in Berlin17 sent on the enquiries and indicated a hope that they could be given serious consideration. These developments were reported to St Laurent in a memorandum which supported Robertson's view that the request be given prompt and serious consideration.18 It was the department view that the trial of strength going on was of crucial importance and that successful resistance 'might well have a very considerable effect in strengthening the determination of Western Europe to resist Soviet pressure.' Although Canada was not directly party to the dispute and had no responsibility for the developments in Berlin, there was no escaping the fact that Canada would be implicated in any conflict that might result. At this point, however, there was an inaccurate press report in London, later formally disavowed, that the foreign secretary had asked the 'Old Dominions' to lend the United Kingdom all available transport aircraft. Shades of Chanak! On 30 June cabinet, irritated by the press report, decided to inform the British about the foodstuffs available and explain confidentially the difficulties involved in any request for transport aircraft. On the same day St Laurent told the Commons about

103 Collective Action: North Atlantic the requests in London but curiously denied that any request had been made for food or air transport. Not only King but even one of the nationalist-internationalists, Brooke Claxton, reacted to what was regarded more as an effort by London to have a centralized Commonwealth effort than to combat the Soviet Union. This extreme sensitivity about Commonwealth pressures was expressed in an insistence that if any requests were to be made to Canada they should be made collectively by the three Western powers and made also to all the states that were in a position to help. An unidentified Canadian cabinet minister, who was probably Brooke Claxton,l9 told the Canadian press there were two good reasons why Canada was not taking similar action - the fact that Canada had no part in the German occupation, no say in German developments, and 'no desire to take part in a situation which could easily explode into war.' Just how this attitude was squared with the Canadian activity over the North Atlantic Treaty at the same time is hard to determine. Then the department tried a typical ploy. It pointed out that the question had now gone to the United Nations. Canada was in 1948 a member of the Security Council. If a majority of the Security Council expressed agreement with the position taken by the Western powers in the Berlin dispute and if the powers principally concerned wanted assistance, could not the Canadian government then assume its share of such a responsibility?20 Before this idea could go very far, however, a tactical problem was revealed. There was the danger that the Soviet Union might intercept planes engaged in the airlift carrying the flag of a country which was not one of the occupying powers with their special privileges.21 The department did point out to the acting prime minister, St Laurent, that this would not apply for air and ground crew and furthermore the Canadian transport squadron could help out in the North Atlantic by relieving the USAF of some of its duties.22 In the meantime, the us State Department made clear that they would like to have help. They did not pick up a Canadian suggestion that a request to Canada might come more appropriately from the United States and the United Kingdom jointly. St Laurent told a press conference that action by the United Nations might alter the Canadian position.23 Membership in the United Nations Security Council provided the Canadian government with another excuse for stalling. During the Berlin Blockade they became involved, as related in chapter 3, in the effort of the six non-permanent members of the Security Council, then meeting in Paris, to seek a compromise to end the blockade. While engaged in this 'mediation,' it could be argued that participation in the airlift would be inappropriate. That excuse petered out. It was expected that when the North

104 The Shaping of Peace Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April the United Kingdom and the United States might make a formal request for Canadian participation. By this time the cabinet had to take the prospect seriously. They were, however, saved by the success of the United States-Soviet negotiations which brought agreement on the lifting of the blockade on 12 May. An interesting aspect of this affair was that Canada was not willing to go along with a policy pressed by both the United Kingdom and the United States. The government was far from impressive in the presentation of its excuses. The anachronistic sensitivity about British intentions was noticeable also in discussions concerning the Canadian association with new European institutions such as the Council of Europe. Ottawa, particularly the officials in this case, were keen to be involved as observers or in some significant capacity. However, they were resentful of all implications from London that their right to some part in the European scheme was a consequence of their Commonwealth association with a major European power, Britain, rather than in their own right as an Atlantic country. Here they were on sound enough ground, but there is evidence of neurosis in the reactions to British statements and the unwillingness to consider the British problem of having to think of the other dominions as well. It was a time of confusion and illusion before Canada had to face up to the obligations inescapably associated with its new stance in the world and shed the inhibitions of a previous existence. T R I P A R T I T E DISCUSSION

St Laurent established an international position by his speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 September 194724 which was the clearest statement to date by a Western spokesman of the view that nations, if forced, 'may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peaceloving States willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security.' The statement did not attract wide public attention at the time, though Bevin referred to it in the British House of Commons as 'a remarkable speech' and historians have seen it as an important step on the way to NATO.25 He was still saying 'might' rather than 'will,' but he was noted by diplomats and statesmen, particularly those whose minds were moving in this direction and were looking for leadership to move them a step further. That autumn there were exchanges by External Affairs officers in Washington and London playing with this new idea, which had been broached also in an article in Foreign Affairs by its

105 Collective Action: North Atlantic editor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong.26 In the State Department it was still regarded as an idea they might turn to if things went badly with the Russians. R.G. Riddell, after talks in Washington on 2 December, thought the United States authorities 'were already casting about to see if proposals for a Mutual Defence Treaty could not be brought forward from some source other than themselves.' The British needed no prodding. Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office had been talking to Canadians about various plans. The Foreign Office was dubious of schemes for a European grouping unless it was backed by the United Nations Charter which authorized self-defence, rather than under provisions for regional organizations, which would be too limited.27 In December Bevin stimulated the Americans into active steps by suggesting, after the Council of Foreign Ministers broke up for the last time, the creation of a union in Western Europe backed by the United States and the dominions. In January Attlee and King exchanged views privately, and King expressed his support for British leadership through the United Kingdom high commission in Ottawa. He hailed the Brussels Treaty in March. A new phase was launched in which diplomats and their masters would argue over the relative advantages of a United States guarantee of European security, expansion of the Brussels pact, or other means of coping with what in the spring of 1948, after the coup in Prague, created a mood close to panic. From the beginning St Laurent and his officials, Lester Pearson and Escott Reid in Ottawa, Hume Wrong and Tommy Stone in Washington, were among the most zealous and constructive contributors to discussions to which very few people were privy. The extent to which these articulate Canadians were parents of NATO has perhaps been exaggerated in Canadian accounts and underestimated in the accounts of others. Both the personal and national Canadian contributions were considerable although not easily measurable. By reason of the zeal of officials from the beginning, Canadian participation in the ultimate treaty was thereby virtually guaranteed. Or, one could complain, they got Canada morally pre-committed.28 This active Canadian involvement was no doubt one reason King was invited by Attlee in March 1948 to take part urgently in highly secret discussions with the British and Americans. The department was relieved when the prime minister agreed that officials might take part. Already there had been a good deal of thinking about an Atlantic organization, particularly by Escott Reid. Ottawa showed a friendly interest in the Brussels Treaty of 17 March, creating the Western Union, and in that same month, the month of the Prague coup, the project shot ahead rapidly on the wider Atlantic front as

106 The Shaping of Peace well. Canadian diplomats continued discussions with the British and Americans leading up to a very confidential tripartite conference in Washington from 22 March to 1 April. Canadian officials had hoped the negotiations, which in fact took a year, could be completed in a month. There were many matters of detail to be worked out, but the basic dilemma was whether to work for a strong Brussels pact of West European countries with a guarantee by the United States and possibly Canada or to work for a broad Atlantic compact. In the eyes of Canadian officials the essential thing was to get a United States commitment. Not surprisingly, they strongly preferred an Atlantic pact of ten or more countries with mutual guarantees. In spite of a certain doctrinaire conviction about the desirability of European unification, it was realized that an Atlantic pact with a solid European unit and a couple of disparate North American attachments was a structure not particularly happy from the Canadian point of view. They were not attracted by the 'dumbbell' concept of George Kennan of the State Department combining 'a unit at the European end based on the Brussels pact, and another unit at the North American end' with the United States-Canadian unit guaranteeing and pledging support to the European unit.29 Most important of all, the Canadians insisted that there should be something more than a North American guarantee to Europe. The guarantee must be reciprocal. Although the idea of Europeans rushing to the assistance of North America under attack may have seemed unlikely, there was an increasing consciousness at that point of the vulnerability of North America to the long-range bomber. In 1947 agreement had been reached with the United States on defence co-operation.30 There was the important consideration of counter-weight. This was not excessively stressed in public pronouncements as it could be construed in Congress as anti-American, but politicians and officials saw in the Atlantic link a balancing of the commitments which they had just made, after much heart-searching, for joint continental defence. The planners thought also that the military planning which would follow a North Atlantic Treaty would modify the concentration of the United States-Canada planners on the defence of North America. As Hume Wrong stated it: 'If the North Atlantic is bridged by a new defensive alliance, the problems of North American defence would become a small part of the larger plan, the purpose of which would be the means of defeating the larger enemy.' He also thought that the political difficulties arising from the role of United States forces on Canadian territory would be substantially diminished 'if such activities could be seen as a fraction of a larger scheme.'31 It was a

107 Collective Action: North Atlantic hope of the Atlantic connection which continued to spring in the minds of Canadian diplomats for many years. The secret Washington negotiations were strictly tripartite - United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. The justification was that these talks were to be on 'Atlantic security,' and the British, who were largely responsible for Canada's being invited, were at that time contemplating a kind of two-ring association of the continental Europeans on the one hand and the Atlantic powers, the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada on the other. The Canadians indicated, nevertheless, that they would welcome France's participation from the very beginning if that could be arranged satisfactorily to the United States and the United Kingdom.32 In this attitude there was no doubt some concern for the feelings of French Canadians, who, although they did not want to be committed to France any more than to Great Britain, were sometimes sensitive about the exclusion of France by the AngloSaxons. It was a result also of the strong support of Canadian officials for the Free French during the war. The Americans, however, were obsessed with fear of French security, and the French were not included. In Washington Pearson was being cautious about suggestions that Canada might offer a parallel guarantee. He may have been unduly worried about the attitude of the prime minister. St Laurent telephoned him in Washington to say that in the view of Mackenzie King and himself the essential thing was for the United Kingdom and the United States to underwrite the security of the signatories of the Brussels Treaty and the Scandinavian countries. They would, therefore, accept anything which the British and Americans jointly agreed was required to defend 'our common interests.' They would even be prepared to recommend to Parliament if need be accession by Canada to a pact of which the United Kingdom, the United States, and France were members even if no other Atlantic nations were signatories. On the other hand, they too would prefer an Atlantic pact which would include other Atlantic nations as well as the signatories of the Brussels Treaty.33 There was no doubt that Canada was in on the ground floor - if not the basement. At the time of the tripartite discussions in Washington it was estimated in Ottawa that only seven or eight people in Washington and an equal number in London knew anything about the developments. Canadians in the know were limited to a few officials in Ottawa, Washington, and London,34 and the lack of wider consultation, particularly outside External Affairs, was, although unavoidable, to have unfortunate consequences.35 What emerged from the tripartite meetings was a paper in the form of a United States proposal so that if it leaked it would not appear to other gov-

108 The Shaping of Peace ernments as having been discussed already with Britons and Canadians. More important, however, was the anxiety to present the proposals to Congressional leaders, notably Senator Vandenberg, in the most attractive form possible, untainted by foreign advice. Satisfaction was expressed in DEA that by this arrangement Canada could arrive at the proposed North Atlantic conference without any commitments but would in fact have had an opportunity to influence the character of the recommendations before other governments, including that of the United States, had decided on them.36 It was the ideal situation they would rarely achieve again. Perhaps this early success left unfortunate illusions. In the end invitations were issued by the United States to some fourteen European countries and Canada for a conference intended to conclude a security pact for the North Atlantic area based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter - a position very much in line with that Canadians had favoured from the beginning. In other respects the agreed document embodied most of the ideas Canada favoured. The reasons for satisfaction noted by Pearson in his report to the prime minister indicate the issues of special concern to the Canadians: 'The area of the agreement is now territorially limited; it is more closely connected with the Charter; it has been made clear that the obligation of mutual assistance does not necessarily mean sending forces to the point of aggression but in helping to defeat the aggressor by the best means available. This last point is an important one, both for the United States and ourselves.'37 In the light of arguments several decades later about the Canadian obligation to place troops in Europe, it is well to note that at the very beginning Canadians were insisting on the reciprocal guarantee. What was more, it was emphasized at these Washington discussions that each state would judge how to implement its obligation for the provision of economic, military, and other aid. Specifically it was noted that if, for example, there were an attack on Belgium, Canada's assistance to Belgium might well take the form of moving troops to Fort Churchill in the first instance and in the long run could take the form of industrial production.38 The stationing of Canadian forces in Europe was not contemplated. In a memorandum for the prime minister after the Washington discussions Pearson laid particular emphasis on this element of mutual assistance. 'Why,' he asked, 'should the United States and Canada come to the assistance of European countries if those countries are not willing to accept similar obligations to us?' He was concerned also that a unilateral guarantee would smell of charity in the worst sense of the word. The Western European democracies were not beggars asking for charity but potential allies whose assistance we would need in

109 Collective Action: North Atlantic order to be able to defend ourselves. He saw this as an essential truth and also important in presenting the agreement to the people of the United States and Canada.39 He took great satisfaction also in the apparent acceptance of the view that a multilateral treaty was more than merely a military guarantee, that it was instead something along the lines of the Brussels Treaty which contained provisions for closer political, economic, and cultural co-operation and set forth the principles of Western society which they were trying not only to defend but to make the basis of an eventual united world. It is worthy of note, in the light of subsequent discussions on Article 2, that Pearson and Wrong in the Washington tripartite talks had stressed the desirability of including in the preamble a promise for economic and social co-operation, for defence against aggression both direct and indirect, and there seemed to be general agreement with the proposals.40 Subsequently, however, Pearson was to be discouraged by what seemed an American lapse into the argument for a simple unilateral guarantee and a strictly military alliance.41 M U L T I L A T E R A L NEGOTIATIONS

During the summer of 1948 official discussions got under way in Washington between the United States and the Brussels powers. Another presence was the United States Congress whose wishes were the constant concern of all the diplomats. The cause had moved ahead fast when the so-called Vandenberg Resolution was passed by the Senate on 11 June authorizing United States participation in this kind of enterprise. Then on 23 June the United States put the proposals to the Brussels powers and Pearson and Wrong joined these discussions on 6 July. The fact that the proposals had been predigested by the 'Anglo-Saxons' was not mentioned in public statements not even in the prime minister's review in the House on 28 March 1949 of negotiations leading to the treaty. There were also military talks in London at which Canada was represented, but Canada was less assertive about its participation on the military side. It was made clear that Canada's relationship to any European organization must be similar to that of the United States and not as part of a Commonwealth bloc,42 thereby eschewing any idea of imperial defence.43 The central dilemma was the shape of an alliance or guarantee. The Canadian representative opposed the idea that all European members of the new alliance would have to be members of the Brussels pact first. Stone told Pearson the State Department thought the best arrangement they could put before the Senate would be 'a security pact to which the three parties would

110 The Shaping of Peace be the United States of America, Canada and the United States of Western Europe.'44 This was recognized by Wrong as a means by which the Americans could force the Europeans into unification. With customary foresight he noted that 'Canada does not fit easily into the scheme of establishing a European and a North American group inside the Atlantic system. I think that our position would be easier if there were other countries besides ourselves and the United States which were full members of the North Atlantic agreement but not parties to the Brussels pact.'45 This particular battle was won, although the idea of NATO as a dumbbell was not exorcized. In the middle of these negotiations, in September 1948, Pearson ceased being a civil servant and became the secretary of state for external affairs. He was, therefore, in a stronger position to lead Canadian public opinion in the direction of new obligations. In Kingston on 21 September, in his first public speech after joining the government, he struck a familiar Canadian theme. He emphasized that the kind of commitments envisaged meant a sharing of risks, resources, and obligations. These, however, must be accompanied by and flow from a share in the control of policy. 'If obligations and resources are to be shared, it is obvious that some sort of constitutional machinery must be established under which each participating country will have a fair share in determining the policies of all which affect it. Otherwise, without their consent, the policy of one or two or three may increase the risks and therefore the obligations of all.' In line with functionalist thinking he rejected the membership of all parties in all organs of the organization. Every organ of a regional security organization, however, would derive its powers from a constitutional grant of those powers to it by all the members. The way in which the three great powers in the war had arrogated unto themselves responsibility for policy was not good enough in peacetime. He hoped the North Atlantic system for security and progress would soon be formed so that within its framework the decisions that affected all would be taken by all. Only then would the common responsibility for carrying out those decisions be clear and unequivocal. The Americans and the British, who welcomed so warmly Canadian initiatives on North Atlantic security, may not have appreciated the extent to which Canadian officials were motivated by anxiety to undermine the kind of great-power hegemony they had suffered in the last war. In a memorandum to cabinet of 6 October 1948 Pearson said the proposed alliance would establish 'a constitutional basis for a devolution of power in peace and war from the Grand Alliance to its organs and agents, as compared with the arrogation of power by the Big Two or the Big Three in the last war.' The concept of a framework which transcends national sovereignty is hinted at here, although in general Pearson's views were poised between

I l l Collective Action: North Atlantic those among his colleagues who seemed to envisage an Atlantic federation and those who thought in terms of an alliance, albeit an alliance with more than military responsibility. Escott Reid prepared a series of papers with elaborate institutional provisions, but DEA as a whole was inclined to agree with Norman Robertson on the 'wisdom of starting modestly and creating specific agencies to do specific jobs as the need for them becomes clear to the partner governments.'46 There was no question in Pearson's mind of abandoning the due constitutional processes of the Canadian government in deciding what kind of assistance it might offer to any other member of the group which had been attacked. Whether he liked this limitation or not, he realized that he was a member of a government still presided over in spirit by Mackenzie King. In the memorandum to cabinet of 6 October, however, he did say: 'The North Atlantic Community is today a real commonwealth of nations which share the same democratic and cultural traditions. If a movement towards its political and economic unification can be started this year, no one can forecast the extent of the unity which may exist five, ten or fifteen years from now.' Cabinet debated this for some time before agreeing. Nevertheless, the memorandum to cabinet of 1 December 1948 covering instructions to Wrong said any treaty should be approved by parliament and the Canadian government should retain ultimate control of 'any measures recommended by the Council [of foreign ministers] which may entail military or economic contributions by Canada.' Problems arose over the definition of the countries to be included and the area to be covered. Canada was less than enthusiastic about Italy because, as a Mediterranean country, it would set a bad geographical precedent; also Portugal, because its form of government would contradict Canadian aspirations for a community which would be a moral and not just a military demonstration of the strength of democracy. In the end, however, bases in the Azores proved attractive to the American military strategists, and the issue became whether Portugal's inclusion was important enough to cause Canada to withdraw from the edifice in which it so urgently believed. On 1 December 1948 cabinet disagreed with the External Affairs view on Portugal by accepting the argument for its inclusion on strategic grounds and instructed the Canadian representative that if this question arose to indicate 'that the Canadian government did not wish to oppose Portuguese membership on purely ideological grounds.' The French, moreover, were determined to include their territories in North Africa in the area to be covered by the treaty. Canadian scepticism about defending European empires was strongly held by the new prime minister, St Laurent. The Canadian objective was to make clear that the far northern area and the islands in the Atlantic were included in the security zone but to exclude the Mediterranean area, includ-

112 The Shaping of Peace ing North Africa.47 Eventually, however, the Canadians had to give in to the inclusion of Algeria. While Canada expressed strong reservations about extending the guarantee to Greece and Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, they welcomed the Scandinavians, but the Swedish ambassador in Ottawa indicated that his government did not want to abandon its traditional neutrality.48 Pearson opposed inviting Switzerland, not because he disapproved of their neutrality but because he recognized the value of the neutrality of this unique country and did not think NATO would be enhanced by courting a certain refusal from the Swiss. Canada warmly supported the inclusion of Ireland, but its efforts were the cause of some embarrassment, as the Irish tried to use the opportunity to get support from the prospective members for action to end partition.49 Another point on which St Laurent had firm views was the time limit for the treaty. On 8 December, after the cabinet discussion of 5 December, he told Pearson and Wrong that a firm term of twelve years should be adequate for the duration of the treaty. Obviously, he said, the treaty was directed towards the USSR and while the present situation continued the treaty could be defended. The world situation, however, could change drastically in a decade, and if the treaty was for a period of twenty years, the signatories might meet at the end of the ten years to decide whether it required revision. Such a provision was agreed upon and was incorporated into Article 11. ARTICLE 2

In the last stages of negotiation, which began in January 1949, Canadian attention was particularly directed to the arguments over Article 2. Article 2, known thereafter as 'the Canadian article,' states: 'The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.' A considerable mythology has developed concerning what Canada in fact urged. There were several issues which tended to become confused. In the first place there was the basic Canadian view that the gravest danger of a split between the Atlantic countries was over economic questions. This had been a nightmare for Canadians since the latter years of the war, and they were at this very time having traumatic problems on trade and payments with the United States and the

113 Collective Action: North Atlantic United Kingdom. The atmosphere in the economic discussions was very different from the atmosphere in the political and security discussions, but they were taking place at the same time. In April 1948 Canadian officials were conducting highly secret but completely separate talks in Washington on an Atlantic security organization and on a free-trade agreement with the United States.50 The Canadian intention in the North Atlantic negotiations was to persuade those agreeing to fight together to recognize that the consideration for each other's interests which was essential to a military and political alliance must apply also to economic questions. There was not much difference of opinion among Canadians on that, and in the early stages it seemed as if this point was easily acceptable to the allies as well. The trouble in Washington intensified when Acheson became secretary of state in January 1949. The problem was, however, that the question was thereby raised whether NATO should have economic institutions designed to conciliate, co-ordinate, or even perhaps to determine the economic policies of member states. The British and Europeans were anxious to preserve OEEC and the framework of European organization which had been set in motion by the Marshall Plan. So were the Americans. There was also considerable resistance in American political quarters to the idea of an economic association which, given the relative states of prosperity at that time, would look like a permanent obligation of the United States to its poverty-stricken allies. Many Canadian politicians and officials felt this way also, but they could not at that time envisage Canadian prosperity without a prosperous Europe. In the negotiations Canadians pressed for at least a declaration of economic and social good intentions to be included in the preamble. It is hard to describe Canadian intentions without recognizing the difference of emphasis among Canadian officials on the kind of community to be created. Hume Wrong emphasized to Escott Reid: 'We are creating not a federation but an alliance.' Wrong was a functionalist and he faced every day the realities of American politics which made any supranational conception out of the question. The more federalist - or institution-minded - officials, like Reid, certainly did not expect to create a new confederation of the North Atlantic immediately, but, like the signatories of the Treaty of Rome somewhat later, they had in mind setting in motion certain trends which would lead to supra-governmental authority as soon as possible. So long as this intention was wrapped in suitably ambiguous rhetoric, politicians could applaud and use it. In the consideration, however, of practical questions there is little evidence that Canadian political leaders were disposed to concede much to an international economic authority.

114 The Shaping of Peace The opposition, both American and European, was largely to the duplication of existing international institutions, while the Canadians were arguing for a principle. The opposition either had a persistent misunderstanding of the Canadian position, deliberately misrepresented it, or had grounds for suspicion that the declaration of principle was the thin edge of a wedge. There were some grounds for suspicion perhaps in the drafts submitted by Canada which said, for example, 'Such efforts [ie, cultural, economic, and social collaboration] shall, to the greatest possible extent, be undertaken through and assist the work of existing international organizations.' The implication is clearly that there would be new NATO organizations in addition to those existing, and it is not surprising that the Americans pounced on the phrase 'to the greatest possible extent.'51 A persistent view is that Canada emphasized Article 2 because it was only by disguising a military alliance that political support could be secured in Canada, particularly in Quebec. There is truth in this assumption, but it is not the only truth. Wrong said he used this argument because American senators would be more susceptible to this line of reasoning than to arguments about closer economic collaboration between Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.52 In reply to Acheson's objection that the senators were fed up with treaties for the improvement of the general welfare, Wrong said that 'he wanted to tell them about the government's political difficulties in Canada.' He pointed out 'that it would be difficult to secure support in Quebec for a purely military pact and that some article along the lines of Article 2 was important to get the support of that Province and of other political elements.'53 St Laurent used it as an argument with Truman and Acheson in Washington, and they were more inclined to regard his political problems sympathetically than to accept the Canadian views on their merits. Robertson reported from London also that the British would support Canada 'because they wanted to meet our wishes and not because they had any special interest themselves in having such a provision in the treaty.'54 Certainly the support in Canada for NATO, which came from the CCF as well, was wider because it was presented as something of broader moral and practical significance, but Canadian policy was from deep conviction rather than window-dressing. It was not simply a matter of economics. Some officials attached even more importance to the emphasis in Article 2 on free institutions and were mortified by the membership of Portugal. Those who opposed them did not value free institutions less but preferred to avoid hypocrisy; if military necessities were going to determine the participants, it was better not to pretend otherwise. Such a position seems so modest and sensible it is hard to understand the antagonism. Some of the answers are to be found in personalities. Canadian

115 Collective Action: North Atlantic officials got stubborn, and a somewhat doctrinaire presentation was at times counter-productive. Dean Acheson was caught. On the one hand he had to keep Senators Vandenberg and Connally in line, and, as he told Wrong, the proposed reference to promoting the general welfare 'seems to rouse in the Senatorial minds a vision of endless hand-outs.'55 The Europeans wavered back and forth on this issue, but on the whole were prepared to go along with what the Canadians wanted if duplication of institutions could be avoided. The Canadian problem in the final stages was to hold on to what had been conceded. When Wrong was told by Pearson on 7 February to press for something a good deal stronger, he replied: 'We are now the only party to the negotiations that really favours the inclusion of anything in the Treaty about social and economic collaboration outside a general reference in the preamble.'56 Wrong, in spite of his own doubts of the policy pressed by Ottawa, loyally kept producing compromise drafts, and his ultimate success with Acheson and company was due to his thorough understanding of their problems and their prejudices - and he shared Acheson's aversion to platitude. He had admiration and affection for Pearson and Acheson, both old and close friends, but in his position, and with his temperament, he could not fail to share some of Acheson's irritation at the high moral principles being delivered from Ottawa. Wrong and Reid were at odds on substance and tactics. Wrong countered Reid's ambitious proposals for a coalition of all the free states of the world by arguing: 'Certainly it is essential that we should be ready to approach the establishment of a real North Atlantic community by stages and not expect to get there at a rush. I believe that the central thing to concentrate on now is to secure a military undertaking ... with some simple general article which would cover economic collaboration and set up some sort of consultative organ or organs.'57 Pearson was closer to Reid in his dedication to Article 2. It was central to his view of NATO providing 'the dynamic counter-attraction to totalitarian communism.'58 Nevertheless, he had great confidence in Wrong's judgment and his timing. Robertson's approach to diplomacy was closer to Wrong's, but no one anguished more than he did from London over the dangers of a trans-Atlantic divorce on economic issues. External Affairs was split on the subject. The Departments of Finance and of Trade and Commerce, as well as the Bank of Canada, were sceptical over Article 2, but they had been inadequately consulted.59 Wrong was pressed hard from the East Block to insist and demand, but he knew best how to get results. He indicated privately to Hickerson of the State Department, the man most keen on the Canadian connection, that if the treaty did not contain an article of this kind, 'the Canadian Government would have to review its position towards the whole project.'60

116 The Shaping of Peace Any Canadian threat to pull out if they did not get their way on this or other issues would have been unwise. Canada was regarded as a significant if not crucial participant. Concessions were made to Canada to retain its enthusiastic participation and because the Canadians were deserving. It was not a situation in which a posture of ultimatum would have been productive. Few in the other capitals would have regarded it as other than a justifiable bluff, which is what it would have been. There was little likelihood that Canada would withdraw from an enterprise to which its leaders were so deeply committed and so keenly aware of the danger of causing a rift in Western ranks at that juncture in history. Perhaps the more successful threat was Wrong's pointing out to Hickerson, on instructions, that if Canada accepted a treaty without such an article 'we shall have to make it clear publicly that the omission of any pledge on these lines has been caused by the resistance of the United States alone, since we have received assurances of support for our position from nearly all the other governments concerned.' That was on 22 February in the final in-fighting. By that time the Europeans, under strong Canadian pressure, had come round, and the French were quite positive in their support. After listening to the Canadian ambassador, the French foreign minister undertook to tell his representative in Washington to support the Canadian proposal 'to the hilt.' On 18 February the ambassador in Paris told Pearson that Stikker, the Dutch foreign minister, would support Article 2 'on your lines.'61 In the end an Article 2 was accepted about the end of February 1949 which was somewhat stronger than the one being peddled earlier. In his book written many years later Acheson claimed that he had 'defused' the Canadian draft by bringing it in line with the objections of the United States Senate. In his dealings with the Canadians at the time he always gave the impression that he was being pressed by the Senate, but he may well have been using the Senate to support objections which were basically his own. Pearson's comment on this in his own memoirs was: 'In diplomacy, it is a good result when your victory is also felt by the other side to be a success. I was happy that Dean Acheson could report to the President that he had successfully dealt with the rather tiresome Canadians. In my turn I could report on 9 March to the Cabinet that "As a result of representations by the Canadian Government Article 2 has been substantially strengthened" over the first draft.'62 In his apparent flippancies he often came close to the heart of Pearsonian diplomacy. The revision of the article which was finally agreed upon had an American first sentence while the rest was Canadian. At the ambassadors' meeting on 25 February Acheson admitted his surprise at the success in getting some of the Senate to accept it and that the president had been

117 Collective Action: North Atlantic very helpful 'in getting the Canadian position across.'63 In this case cabinet was happy. St Laurent would have liked the treaty for a somewhat shorter period, but there were no strong political objections to what had been negotiated in Washington, and there is no evidence that cabinet objected to the provisions as drafted. ARTICLE 5

The most crucial issue was Article 5, the 'Pledge.' Everyone agreed that the effectiveness of the treaty would be its power to deter and the American commitment was the fundamental deterrent. However, the United States constitution left with Congress the power to declare war, and there was no committing it in advance. What had to be found was a formula that would come as close as possible to committing the United States to go to the aid of its allies while leaving the decision to Congress. While Canada was not troubled as was the United States by the constitutional issue, its position was comparable because of the constant insistence by Canadian prime ministers that 'Parliament will decide.' Nevertheless, the department was so convinced of the essentiality of a credible pledge by the Americans that they joined the Europeans in pressing the State Department not to dilute Article 5.64 The formula used was that of the Rio Treaty: 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them ... shall be considered an attack against them all.' The Canadians contributed a number of suggestions on drafting and regarded the result as a partial victory. The Canadian government was not very helpful in setting a good example to the United States Senate, as the State Department hoped. It was not going to commit itself to sending troops before the fact. When Senator Pepper enquired about Canadian willingness to provide military equipment or key minerals to the Europeans, Wrong had to say that Canada could take no action until the treaty was in force and consultations had taken place. He suggested to the State Department that the good senator be answered 'by pointing to the Canadian record of living up to international obligations and saying that they had no doubt that the Canadian Government would give proper effect to the principle of mutual aid.'65 C A N A D I A N ACCESSION

There had been hope in DEA that when the foreign ministers met to consider the proposed treaty there would be a chance to change the text, but the United States froze the text by publishing it. Acheson later admitted that

118 The Shaping of Peace although publication was ostensibly for public discussion before final acceptance by governments, the purpose was 'in reality, to force it.'66 The debate on the resolution approving the draft terms of NATO in the House of Commons was held on 28 March 1949. Strong speeches in favour and in explanation were made by St Laurent and Pearson. There was full support from the leader of the opposition as well as from the leaders of the CCF and Social Credit. Only two dissenting votes were cast. Given the attitude of Coldwell at that time, it seems unlikely that even the elimination of Article 2 would have meant a defection of CCF support. This unusual political consensus in support of an unparalleled breach in traditional Canadian foreign policy was important for the next decade or two. The compatibility of the proposed treaty with the United Nations was strongly emphasized by St Laurent and Pearson. In the debate on 28 March Pearson pledged 'not to take part in any activity under the North Atlantic Treaty which contravenes the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, or which is provocative and aggressive of character.' There was some room for ambiguity as to which article of the Charter covered the treaty. Spokesmen had been in the habit of referring to it as a regional agreement. Pearson had done so as recently as 4 February67 and St Laurent on 28 January. Regional agreements were covered in the Charter by Article 53. However, it was made clear at the time of ratification that the North Atlantic Treaty was authorized under Article 51, which recognizes the right of members to take action in self-defence. The reason for preferring Article 51 was that under Article 53 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.' A deterrent which was subject to a Soviet veto would be of little value. Canadians had at the beginning envisioned a pact to which all 'freedom-loving' countries might subscribe. That idea persisted in the oratory although it changed when the negotiating started and the practical people in DEA wanted to restrict its geographical limits. NATO has never been without its inconsistencies, attributable to the fuzzing of some irreconcilable contradictions and a considerable variation in emphasis. Some apparent inconsistencies were differences between what was proposed in the inventive phase and what was shaped later as the politically possible model. It is not clear from Canadian statements whether they saw NATO as the nucleus of a collective defence organization open to all who would join, or as a leading example of a 'regional' defence grouping that would establish a pattern for others, decentralizing thereby the security function of the United Nations. At the tripartite talks the Americans set the course in the latter direction.68

119 Collective Action: North Atlantic FROM KING TO ST L A U R E N T Canada's zealous participation in the establishment of NATO and its acceptance of a peacetime military alliance are properly regarded as the key point in the great conversion of Canadian foreign policy. Inevitably, however, the transition has been over-simplified. The shift in rhetoric was only gradually matched by a shift in policy, and old inhibitions persisted: Canada's right to dispose of its own forces, to have a voice in congregational decisions, to float as freely as possible without losing essential backers, and to be only as warlike as good household financing allowed. It did not mean acceptance of the principle of collective security but rather a shift of emphasis to the principle of collective defence, seen nevertheless, at least until after the Korean experiment, as a powerful element in a more sophisticated approach to collective security. Finally, it was not a simple shift from Mackenzie King 'isolationism' to Louis St Laurent 'internationalism' because King, although he was reverting by 1947 to many of his prewar attitudes to international organization, approved of NATO. There was, nevertheless, considerable difference in the attitude of the two prime ministers to Canada's place in the world and a reordering of priorities. NATO certainly marked a change in Canadian attitudes towards Europe as compared with those after the First World War. The difference is not to be found in the fact that the peace settlement at the end of the Second World War was one in which Canadians felt they had had a proper voice. They had in fact more reason to be disgruntled than in 1919 on that score. The threat perceived from the Soviet Union loomed much more quickly than had that from Nazi Germany. The principal cause of the difference, however, was the involvement of the United States. This enormous fact changed the prospects for world order. It strengthened Canadian internationalism and discouraged continental isolation. 'Internationalism' was almost a religion in the decade after the Second World War. Nationalism was strong but it would be expressed not in the right to independence of commitments but in proving Canadians to be the most zealous and reliable of allies - a legacy of the wartime experience. Canadians had a more self-confident policy and status in world affairs which they wished to express more by assertion than by exercising the right of withdrawal. A new body of Canadian professionals - foreign service officers and students of foreign policy - were feeling their oats, aspiring to a place nearer the seats of power, more diversified in their foreign interests. For them, NATO was a good club to belong to. The association was new, but the members for the

120 The Shaping of Peace most part had breeding and tradition. They included the inner directorate of the world balance of power, and the advantages of dining with them were considerably more than social. King did not turn over the reins of prime minister to St Laurent until the negotiations for NATO were reaching the final stage and Canada was well committed, in November 1948. He did not oppose this involvement, although one wonders whether he might have done so if he had maintained a closer interest in the details of the project under discussion. Or if he had been kept better informed? St Laurent and the External Affairs officials were fearful of his attitude and did not go out of their way to keep him or cabinet regularly posted on the discussions which went on in Washington. In the summer of 1948 King told St Laurent on one occasion that he himself would read the despatches to cabinet: 'I did this because I have noticed right along that St Laurent seeks to avoid reading out communications and indeed has frequently said to me he did not think that we could get along, telling the Cabinet as a whole this and that. That is very much Pearson's way of acting. I know that Pearson ... equally dislikes having the Cabinet as a whole have too much of a say, discuss foreign affairs more than is necessary.'69 It was an attitude to cabinet King had himself maintained when he held the portfolio of External Affairs, and the officials in turn had not referred to him their operations in as much detail as was the normal practice later when there was a full-time minister. There was an inevitable temptation in the department to avoid insofar as possible the exposure of their carefully crafted policies to the capricious views of Mackenzie King. One never knew which bias would determine his response - although in retrospect one can often see considered policy rather than caprice beneath the temperamental outbursts. He became more suspicious of External Affairs when Robertson left for London and Pearson became under-secretary. His diary in 1948 is filled with doubts of the Department which at one point he calls 'a dangerous institution.'70 Over plans for NATO he had, as prime minister, grounds for complaint, but he gave his general blessing to the idea of Canadian participation in some kind of defensive arrangement, provided both the British and Americans supported it. His dislike of peacetime alliances was overcome by his certainty throughout that year that war was coming any moment and it would not be a peacetime commitment at all. Unlike the others he was attracted to the proposed arrangement because it seemed to bypass the United Nations 'with its fiddling and fussing and interfering in everything.'71 Pearson's estimate of King's attitude was: 'While the Prime Minister favoured in principle the idea of a North Atlantic coalition, he thought that Canada should keep in the background.'72 King seemed more concerned over Palestine and the sugges-

121 Collective Action: North Atlantic tion for Canadian involvement in frustrating the Berlin Blockade. On Palestine he supported the British as if he were Arthur Meighen, and on Berlin he was obsessed by analogies with British perfidy over Chanak.73 The views of an old man on his way out may not seem important, but they illustrate the nature of the transition. Once the arrangements were made for his departure his hold over ministers lost its grip. They and the officials were still nervous of his reactions, but they could ignore him now with less risk than previously. When he went to Paris in the autumn of 1948 for the United Nations General Assembly the Canadian delegation was on its own at the Hotel Raphael while he was ensconced in the familiar surroundings of the Crillon with Pickersgill, Norman and Gordon Robertson - 'the prisoners of Crillon,' they were called. He paid little attention to the delegation, or they to him, while his high-powered staff at the Crillon spent all their time preparing unsatisfactory drafts for his great swan song to the Assembly. He was so little interested in the substance of policy that he did not notice that he had omitted, in reading his speech, a whole page dealing with the critical issue of atomic energy. Canadian foreign policy was already out of control and there was little a man of his vintage could have done at that stage to put reins on it. McNaughton, on whom he had counted to check the impetuous officials in DEA, was right out in front in the Security Council making proposals about Kashmir and Indonesia and atom bombs.74 King was much too negative, but he was not all wrong. His fears were based on long experience and reflected, at the very least, some grass roots Canadian concerns with which the activists were in danger of losing touch. St Laurent and External Affairs, he was convinced, were devoting too much time to other countries. When St Laurent addressed a Toronto gathering on the United Nations, King commented: 'He would have been much wiser to have explained our determination regarding prices, or necessity to save dollars with the United States. Something that our own people were more immediately interested in. It is a sort of escapist position to be continuing taking up matters relating to other countries than our own ...'75 His wisdom on Palestine is impressive in retrospect. He saw the danger of the United Nations assuming to impose partition when it could not enforce it and strongly opposed the Americans on this. As for Canada, 'If we were not prepared to send troops, we should not support any measure which would logically place us in the position where we would have no escape from so doing.'76 In the negotiations for NATO, External Affairs perhaps devoted too much attention to Article 2, which embodied their own idealism about an Atlantic community, instead of concentrating on Article 5, which had to do with the nature of the commitment to go to war, a matter much closer to the

122 The Shaping of Peace hearts of the political leaders. King, however, liked Article 2, which was close to his idea of the proper agenda for an international organization. King did comprehend the dangers of the United Nations and Canada acting as if universal collective security was a feasible proposition when, as he knew, political leaders were not willing to commit the troops. In June 1950 when returning together from his funeral, cabinet decided to raise a force for the United Nations and for NATO. After the Korean effort, however, the view of the United Nations in External Affairs and other foreign offices would return to something closer to King's scepticism of open-ended security commitments of universal application. He realized that responsibility had to be fixed on those who had the power. He had seen the triangle as a reliable base, and now he could approve of an alliance firmly anchored in Anglo-American power and authority. He felt the great powers, not the UN, should accept responsibility, and he was less interested than his successors in sharing it - even though he had stated with feeling that 'the peoples of all free countries may be assured that Canada will play her full part in every movement to give substance to the conception of an effective system of collective security by the development of regional pacts under the charter of the united nations.'77 Neither King nor the government had in fact been converted to the practice of universal collective security. What was done in NATO was, in a sense, the fulfilment of a design Hume Wrong had outlined ten years earlier. From Geneva on the eve of the war he had argued that while there was nothing .the League could do about the threat of aggression in Europe, something could and should be done collectively by the European powers and their associates. In September 1939 the Canadian government had proved its willingness to join in this endeavour of collective defence, but it was still reluctant to make firm commitments in advance. What had changed was that it had been convinced of the value of deterrence to keep the peace and was willing to make pledges the fulfilment of which would still be determined by parliament. This seemed also the sensible answer to the dilemma about consultation and commitment. Wrong expressed to the Working Group on NATO in Washington his 'firm conviction that if a pact along the lines of that currently under discussion had existed in the later 1930's, there would have been no war in 1939, and that a similar pact probably would have prevented the outbreak of the war that began in 1914.'78

6 The Communist 'Monolith'

EUROPE

A central issue in the shaping of peace was the shape that the expanding communist world was assuming. In the absence of reliable evidence to the contrary, it seemed prudent to assume that the communist and fellowtravelling partnership in Eastern Europe was monolithic, with central direction from Moscow. The prospect of a world divided thus was far from attractive, as it challenged hope for the kind of international institutions Canada had favoured. For some of the more devout cold warriors all evidence of communist solidarity was seized upon to prove convictions and warn of dangers. They regarded those who doubted the almighty power of Moscow as weak and susceptible. In Ottawa, as in other capitals, wishful thinking was discouraged, but evidence of communist disunity was welcomed. If the communist powers were going to operate in slick synchronization, that fact would have to be faced. Unreal hopes could undermine belief in the necessity of NATO. It would be bad strategy, however, to assume that all non-Russian communist states were in total subjection, forcing them thereby into greater dependence and discouraging heresy. The break with Yugoslavia in 1948 did not come as a complete surprise, as Canadian diplomats had sensed that there was something wrong between Moscow and Belgrade. There was reluctance, however, in Ottawa to exploit this situation. The hands of the government were tied by the unpopularity of Marshal Tito in Canada, largely because of his treatment of Archbishop Stepinac. He was a villain not only for many Yugoslavs in Canada but also for the whole Catholic community. His break with Stalin had no effect on his treatment of Roman Catholics. The Yugoslav government, more than other East European governments, had irritated Canadians by organizing with con-

124 The Shaping of Peace siderable fanfare the transportation of a number of Yugoslav Canadians back to their motherland, accompanied by critical references to Canada and enthusiasm for the new socialist Yugoslavia. Among other problems, Canadian officials had to deal with the disillusioned who wanted to return. Yugoslavia was the last of the countries with which Canada had agreed in wartime to exchange representatives actually to receive a Canadian minister. Emile Vaillancourt arrived in February 1948. External Affairs planners, including the Canadian chargé in Belgrade, pointed out the advantages for the West of helping to maintain a strong Yugoslavia, even though there were no illusions that a more liberal régime had taken over in that country. However, the government was reluctant to enter into trade negotiations or extend aid even when, in 1950, the survival of the Belgrade government was threatened by an economic crisis. There was some inclination in Ottawa to put strings on the aid, suggestions, for example, that 'a more cooperative attitude about the return of Greek children or the release of Msgr. Stepinac would create a healthier atmosphere.'1 The embassy in Belgrade did not think much of that kind of blackmail. Even the United States government, when it decided that it would be in its interest to extend aid, found the Canadians reluctant. When the Yugoslav government made a direct request for assistance, External Affairs advisers recommended at least a token, but the cabinet thought it might be better to extend aid through FAO. Then the NATO Council of Deputies argued for economic assistance. In the end, however, the anxiety of the Fisheries Supply Board to get rid of a surplus of Labrador salt codfish persuaded the government to grant assistance through UNICEF. In doing so they contradicted their own firm policy that UNICEF should not accept contributions ear-marked for a specific country. When the under-secretary was to inform the Yugoslav minister of this action, he was told by cabinet to express the hope that Archbishop Stepinac would be released. He was not. Diplomatic relations had already been established with Poland and Czechoslovakia during the war. Canada maintained a single mission in London to the allied governments, and Poland and Czechoslovakia each had legations in Ottawa. Although the Czech and Polish ministers in Ottawa resigned to live in Canada rather than serve communist governments, representation of these countries continued. In 1947 Canadian legations under chargés d'affaires were established in Warsaw and Prague, but their scope was limited. C.M. Drury, who was later to become a Canadian cabinet minister, headed the UNRRA mission to Poland at the end of the war and established warm relations with Poles, but official contacts were neither easy nor cordial. As in the case of Yugoslavia, government policy was affected by strong

125 The Communist'Monolith' Catholic dislike of the new régimes in these Catholic countries, as well as by the vigorous anti-communism of the Czech- and Polish-Canadian communities. In any case, the attitude in Ottawa was not very sympathetic towards people who were regarded as Soviet agents, sharing the guilt for maltreatment of democratic leaders. The Czech régime did merit some sympathetic understanding until after the coup of March 1948 when it came under complete communist control. It was not until the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Gomulka revolt against the Stalinists in the same year that there was much recognition of the fact that some of the leaders in this country might be seeking what they regarded as the best way out for their country in the position in which it found itself. By that time associations had been established within the United Nations, particularly with the Poles, which led to a better understanding and the resolution of some of the outstanding problems. In the case of Poland, the most notable difficulty was over the national art treasures which had been placed in safekeeping in Canada. They reached Canada in July 1940 and the Polish consul on 1 August requested their entry free of customs inspection as state property. The Canadian government agreed on the clear understanding that it assumed no responsibility for their safekeeping. No inventory was therefore taken, and only officials of the Polish government-in-exile in London had access to them, with the representative of the Polish government accepting full responsibility. The Department of Public Works provided space in the records storage building at the Dominion Experimental Farm. Two Polish custodians later placed some of the articles in two locked steamer trunks in the Bank of Montreal in Ottawa from which they could not be released without the joint signatures of the two depositors. Others were placed in an Ottawa convent where they could be claimed only by a special password. When Canada recognized the new Polish government in Warsaw in July 1945 the latter requested return of the treasures. The Canadian government was willing to see them returned and gave the Polish legation the keys to the storage room. However, the major part of the treasures had been removed, without the knowledge of the Canadian government, by the representatives of the previous Polish government from the Ottawa convent to a convent in Quebec City. When the Polish government requested legal action, the RCMP searched the convent, whereupon Premier Duplessis removed them to the vaults of the provincial museum. Obviously defiance of the Quebec government on behalf of a communist régime was an unattractive position for the federal government. As for the treasures in the Ottawa bank, the government had no legal authority to touch them, and the Polish custodians who

126 The Shaping of Peace remained in Canada would not agree on their release. Although the Canadian authorities would have happily seen the treasures on their way to Krakow where most of them belonged in the Wawel Castle, they were legally powerless.2 The Poles held the Canadian government responsible and strongly attacked it. In November 1949 they tried to have the subject discussed in the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. The Canadian government circulated to the members of the United Nations a note quoting the letter of 1940 in which the representative of the Polish government specifically excluded the Canadian government from responsibility. The argument of the Canadian government with the Poles was that they should have resorted to the Canadian courts, but the Polish government refused to do this, partly no doubt because it was sceptical of the Canadian assurances that there would be a fair hearing and partly because it considered it beneath its dignity to sue in a Canadian court. In protest, the Polish minister was withdrawn from Ottawa in May 1950 and the missions in the respective capitals remained under chargés d'affaires until the matter of the treasures had been satisfactorily settled almost ten years later.3 As for those communist countries which had been enemy rather than allied states during the war - Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria - diplomatic relations were not established until very much later and communications were carried through the British embassies. Looking after Canadian affairs, principally consular, became an increasing strain for the British missions, especially in Budapest, largely because of the considerable number of Canadians with families or financial claims in these countries. The settlement of wartime claims was complex, and particularly so in the case of Bulgaria as the Canadian government had neglected to declare war on that country. Although Finland had been an enemy state, there was every disposition in Ottawa to regard the Finns as unfortunate victims of circumstances and to establish as friendly and helpful relations as possible without embarrassing the Finns in their delicate position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Use of the United Nations forum by Canada for attacks on communist governments had a calculated purpose related to the government's concept of an important function of the United Nations. Canadian zeal was particularly notable in connection with the charges of religious persecution by Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria in 1949 and 1950. The arrest of religious leaders and extension of state control over religion in those countries aroused considerable indignation in Canada, and there was pressure from church and other groups in Ottawa to do something. In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had been allies in the war and were members of the United Nations, it was recognized that Article 2(7) of the Charter, which

127 The Communist 'Monolith' prevented intervention in domestic affairs - an article about which Canada was sensitive on other issues-stood in the way. However, the former enemy states, Hungary and Bulgaria, were bound by the peace treaties to observe fundamental freedoms, and that was an international obligation. The case was pressed in the Assembly and taken to the International Court, with Canada and its Commonwealth colleagues in the vanguard. The government admitted from the beginning that there was little hope that this action would lead to any substantial modification of the policies of the governments concerned. However, the decision to keep the issue alive in the United Nations 'may have some useful effect by bringing the moral force of nonCommunist public opinion to bear' and demonstrating to their governments 'the degree of international disapproval which their policies have generated.'4 On the subject of forced labour in the USSR, the Canadian position was more cautious. The matter was discussed in the Economic and Social Council, General Assembly, and in the International Labour Organization during the late forties and early fifties, and a report was issued highly critical of Soviet practice. It was the British and Americans who took the lead, but as the Canadian representative at ECOSOC in 1950 said, while abhorring the barbarous practices and endorsing any action which might bring nearer its elimination, 'it must be recognized that the problem was an extremely difficult one with which the Council had tried repeatedly to come to grips.'5 Perhaps there was somewhat less political pressure than in the case of religion. There was also a greater awareness that this was a tit-for-tat game, and the defiance of Article 2(7) by the West could weaken their position in the face of the constant Soviet effort to condemn their internal disorders. The question of relations, especially diplomatic relations, with communist states was linked in public debate with the question of diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Spain. A mission to the Holy See was pressed hard by Roman Catholic leaders on the new Catholic secretary of state for external affairs. Louis St Laurent clearly thought it made sense, but he was conscious of the deep-seated objections of Protestants to this recognition of the church as state. As he told the bishop of Charlotte town in a letter of August 1949, religious tolerance had made great progress in Canada and he feared the Vatican issue would be explosive. He hoped, however, that the opponents would come to see the 'strictly political advantages in the international field.' He was embarrassed by the issue, and pointed out in July 1949 that there would be objections to having representatives in Israel and not at the Vatican. In January 1950, when recognition of the Peking government was under

128 The Shaping of Peace consideration, he commented that 'some would be inclined to relate the question of recognition and dealings with other Communist Governments to lack of Canadian representation at the Vatican.'6 On relations with Spain attitudes in the cabinet and the bureaucracy were divided. The same Catholic pressures were exerted to argue for a more amiable disposition towards a staunch Christian power. However, the Canadian position as stated by Ilsley, when the resolution on Spain came up in the General Assembly in December 1946, was blunt: We abhor the record and the present policies of Franco dictatorship. We earnestly hope that the Spanish people may be able to rid themselves of Franco by peaceful means and establish a democratic responsible and enlightened administration. We are not prepared to support at this time outside intervention in Spain which might impede European recovery, or revive in Spain the horrors and sufferings of civil war.7

There was the additional consideration that the General Assembly had passed a resolution opposing diplomatic relations with Franco. Canada, although it had abstained on the resolution because it went too far in barring Spain from the specialized agencies and contemplating the possibility of measures by the Security Council, nevertheless believed that a good United Nations member must abide by a majority decision. As attitudes hardened towards Soviet policy and the question of religious restrictions in Eastern Europe became a major issue, this matter of Canada's being represented in Warsaw but not in Madrid became politically sensitive. Stubborn dislike of Franco persisted, however, in high places. Rarely is a Canadian diplomat reprimanded, but when Dr Laureys, the Canadian minister in Denmark, reported (on 2 April 1948) that the Danish foreign minister had agreed with him that 'now, in the presence of the Communist programme in Europe, we should all be more lenient towards Franco and not exclude Spain ... which, in all Europe, is the only one to have really barred the way to the Communists,' he received a personal letter from Pearson indicating that these 'did not in any way represent the views of the Government.'8 It was a time when Pearson and the senior officials were hardening their resolution against the communist powers, but they were sensitive about being pushed into the right-wing company they had always regarded with abhorrence. The strategic demands of NATO did have their effect, however. On purely military grounds the defence advisers saw advantages in having Spain on the Western side. The Assembly's sanctions policy was having no success, and

129 The Communist 'Monolith' the Canadian functionalists were always uneasy about excluding countries from the responsibilities and discipline of membership, at least in the specialized agencies. Portugal had been swallowed reluctantly for strategic reasons but, as Pearson made clear in an interview in Maclean's, 15 October 1949, Franco's relations with the fascists during the war remained too fresh and the authority of the régime was doubtful. In the early fifties when fear of Soviet military advantage in Europe was most acute, the question of associating Spain with NATO became a hot issue. Partly because of differences in Ottawa on the subject, the official direction was to leave it to the Europeans and Americans, who were more concerned, and hope that the subject would not divide the Big Three. The eventual decision that the Americans should have their own bilateral defence agreements with the Spaniards was accepted with relief in Ottawa. Notable in these issues was the staunchness of St Laurent. As a devout Catholic and a devout liberal, he was appalled at what was happening in Eastern Europe and his indignation boiled over in some very strong language about 'the aggressive and imperialistic policies of communism and on outside sponsorship of subversive communist fifth columns.' That was not rabble-rousing. It was his honest perception, one shared at that time by many leaders further Left in the spectrum. His antipathy was to totalitarianism, and he had no respect for the fascist version. The pressure on him by the bishops was counter-productive. He knew that many French Canadians would see in him their chance at last to make Canada's foreign policy less Protestant. He was prepared to do that within reason, but he knew also that he must resist a situation in which he would, or would seem to, be the representative of one rather than all elements of the population. His was the role of the moderator in these highly charged issues. He took, furthermore, the pragmatic view of diplomatic relations - that one established them if they served one's need for negotiation and communication and not as a gesture of approval. That position was, however, seriously tested by the special circumstances of China. ASIA By the end of the forties Canada was aligned in a common front against the Soviet Union and its associates. Leaders still sought to maintain a distinction between communism and aggression by communist countries, but the edges became blurred. The revolt in Belgrade had encouraged those who were sceptical of the Communist International as a monolithic force. It was not so much that they doubted Soviet presumptions of dictatorial leadership; they doubted that such disparate peoples, whatever their ideology,

130 The Shaping of Peace could long march in step. So far the concentration had been on Europe. Attitudes to communism had been shaped and hardened by events in that continent. Asia, except for the Commonwealth South, was regarded as largely beyond Canada's range. Events in China were bewildering, and the dénouement, the unexpectedly swift victory of the communists in 1949, came when eyes were directed towards building the new North Atlantic Treaty. Given Canadians' unawareness about Asia and China, it was inevitable that they should see events there, to a considerable extent, with attitudes predisposed by the recent European experience. Communists tended to be communists, and their Chinese leaders, who had not been very accessible, were easily assumed to be counterparts of the 'agents of Moscow' who ran Poland or Romania. The confrontation with the Soviet Union dominated strategic thinking to such an extent that the revolution of this enormous and venerable civilization was seen too often as an aspect of a European cold war. In hindsight it is obvious that the communist monolith was never a fact, although it was probably closer to being a working arrangement in 1950 than at any other time. Western diplomats, however, could only speculate. What went on in the party hierarchy was a mystery, and the evidence of co-ordination in Eastern Europe and in Asia suggested a master strategy. In External Affairs despatches and memoranda there were many doubts that the communist empire could hold together and in particular that the Chinese communists would be 'satellites.' Policy-makers, however, tended to think one should, for safety's sake, assume the worst - a kind of indisputable wisdom which sometimes leads to gross error. Several months before the break with Tito was revealed, the Canadian embassy in Moscow had scented a difference but had been discouraged by the experts in the major embassies. Well before the communist victory in China the chargé d'affaires in Moscow had written: 'If... as seems much more likely, the dispute between Moscow and Belgrade is primarily for nationalist reasons, then it seems to me just as likely there will be trouble between the Russian and Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists are the only other Communist Party besides the Yugoslavs who can be said to have fought for the liberation of their own countries ... The Foreign Office [UK] memorandum emphasized the fact that Mao was "Moscow-trained," but so was Tito... Tito has apparently been quite as orthodox in his Leninism as Mao, but he pursued in the first place the interests of Yugoslavia rather than the interests of the Soviet Union.'9 Canada-China Relations Before 1941 Canadian involvement in Asian questions had been largely in encouraging trade and discouraging immigration. Diplomatic relations were

131 The Communist'Monolith' established with Japan in 1929 but a movement in the Department of External Affairs in 1931 to establish a legation in Peking had been vetoed by Prime Minister Bennett under pressure from the British who were not very keen on Canada's splitting the imperial front in China in critical times. It was not until the Japanese had made the Chinese and Canadians allies, in 1943, that diplomatic missions were exchanged. The principal Canadian ties with China had been through missionaries who, during the war and afterwards, had some considerable influence in attracting Canadian sympathy for the plight of the Chinese. During the war Canadians nourished the appropriate sentiments towards an ally which was suffering terribly, but contacts were few. For not only historic but also sound strategic reasons. Canadian forces were not switched to the Pacific after Pearl Harbor. Those that were already in Hong Kong suffered a disaster no one wanted to risk repeating. In any case Canadians would have had minimum contact with the Chinese fighting in the remote parts of their country. In March 1944 Canada and China signed a Mutual Aid agreement of very modest proportions. Madame Chiang Kai-shek had an effusive reception in Ottawa in June 1943 and the warmth of feeling for the heroic Chinese did something to thaw Canadian racial attitudes. In actions similar to those previously taken by the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada relinquished its extraterritorial rights in China, and the prime minister announced a new immigration treaty and some modifications of the harsh laws which had long governed the movements of Chinese into and out of Canada. The Chinese Immigration Act was not repealed until 1947, and although the position of Chinese was improved, the regulations remained very exclusive. As an acknowledgment of the wartime partnership, however, they were less exclusive than the treatment meted out to the Japanese. Mackenzie King had a sentimental feeling about the Chinese cause, acquired from Roosevelt and Canadian missionaries and stimulated by Madame Chiang's charms, but it did not overcome his caution over immigration or financial aid. External Affairs officers were anxious to establish Canada's good name with the Chinese and pressed for concrete steps, but they shared British doubts about China's status as a great power. In a memorandum of 23 February 1944, on the possibility of an international police force, China was included, but Hume Wrong noted: 'While we must admit the political need for saving China's face, this is unrealistic in a paper dealing with the organization of power.' However, it was not worth while defying the United States and irritating the Chinese by standing out against a sure thing. Furthermore, the need for a stable China was recognized as essential if there was to be peace in Asia.

132 The Shaping of Peace Even before the war ended the question of Canadian assistance in China's postwar reconstruction had been raised. Canada's total Mutual Aid shipments to China amounted to about $40 million out of a total Mutual Aid bill of over $2 billion. In 1944 the Chinese requested a loan of $50 million. The response to these requests among officials was somewhat different from those to similar and considerably larger requests from the European allies. Reconstruction in Europe was considered not only essential in the Canadian interest but also possible. The deputy minister of finance put the issue as follows: 'The political advantages of assisting China to become a strong and democratic nation are so great as to make it worth while taking some considerable risk. On the other hand, the dangers of a divided and unstable China appear to me at the present time so impressive that I find it very difficult to recommend the granting of credits to the present Government. The events of the past year in particular, while showing some seeds of promise in China, have also appeared to me to show very grave evidence of basic weakness.'10 There was also the dismaying realization that the project and the requirements were so vast the Canadian pittance, even if a very generous pittance, was inconsequential. Early in 1945 there were consultations in Washington to see what the Americans thought of the prospect. The report was that officers of both the State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration were sceptical and critical of Chinese reconstruction and financing plans. Dean Acheson typically said that even the so-called Chinese experts were living in a shadowy land of make-believe. Within the Department of External Affairs doubts were expressed about the wisdom of credits for military supplies when China seemed to be on the eve of a civil war." The Chinese premier, T.V. Soong, was in Canada twice in 1945 and, as a result of studies of Chinese needs undertaken by Canadian and Chinese engineers, sent a detailed request to Howe for aid totalling $242,370,000. In September 1945, after the end of hostilities with Japan, the government agreed to extend credit of $60 million to help finance a programme totalling $75 million. This was done with a full realization that it was risky but that '...it was in Canada's long-run political and economic interest that China be strong and prosperous and that Canada should recognize some obligation to assist in the postwar development of the country, provided, however, that the United States extended substantial credits.'12 Howe had wanted to give $75 million and Ilsley only $25 to $50 million. King intervened in cabinet to say that China had been fighting for fourteen years, saving Canadian lives and dollars, and it was not the time 'to economise, beginning with China.'13 An irony of the Canadian policy on aid to China at the end of the war was that it was inhibited by American and British scepticism of the Nationalist

133 The Communist'Monolith' government. They questioned the use to which Chiang was putting military aid, were disillusioned about his part in fighting the Japanese, and had more respect for the communist armies. The Chinese Nationalists, in their efforts to evade American restrictions, sought to deal directly with Canada, ordering heavy supplies which they knew the Americans would not approve. Because matériel had to be flown precariously over the 'Hump' there were strategic arguments for calculating carefully what should and should not be sent. The Americans and British had a strong case, a case which was supported by the China 'desk' in External because of their grave suspicion that what the Chinese wanted from Canada would be diverted to the internal struggle. That was why it was to be landed at Karachi rather than Calcutta - to be sent off to the Northeast to blockade the communists.14 Still, no one liked the idea that Canada could not deal direct on aid with one of its allies, particularly as the Americans gave the impression that aid to China was their prerogative and Canada should keep out.15 Howe and the economic departments were, of course, anxious to make sales, particularly after the war when they had a huge accumulation of war assets to dispose of. On 7 February 1946 Canada and China signed an agreement incorporating the decision of the previous September. Under the Exports Credit Insurance Act loans were provided to the Ming Sung Industrial Company for the purchase of six small and three larger passenger cargo vessels. All of these ships had been delivered by the end of 1949, but they fell into the hands of the communist authorities and the subject of payment for them plagued ChineseCanadian relations for some time.16 In spite of the hesitations in External Affairs about selling military equipment in a civil war situation, some was sold. The requests from a government which had been a wartime ally were hard to resist and the commercial argument for such sales was pressed. By January 1949 China had purchased on credit 200 Mosquito aircraft, arms and ammunition to the total value of $11,261,000, and 200 Harvard trainers for $140,000 cash. By the beginning of 1949, however, the military situation was such that cabinet decided no more strategic or military matériel was to be delivered to China - a decision which was reversed several times in the next few months on minor items. There was doubt that the arms would in fact reach the Nationalist army and fear that providing arms to the Nationalists might at that time seriously embarrass the position of the Canadian ambassador in Nanking which the communists occupied in the spring of 1949. By that time, of course, arms shipped to China might well end up in the hands of the communists. On this question of military supplies for China there was a running argument between the Department of External Affairs and the

134 The Shaping of Peace Department of Trade and Commerce, with the External Affairs opposition winning out only when the military situation of the Nationalist government had become quite hopeless. The External Affairs doubts were based on an anxiety not to become involved in the civil war as the Americans were. After the failure of General Marshall to mediate, the United States repudiated its diplomats who had opposed all-out aid to the Nationalists and ceased dissuading Canada from sending matériel. DEA thought that a communist victory was quite possible and Canadian relations would be more comfortable if Canada were not identified as a last ditch military supporter of Chiang Kai-shek. The motives of the whole aid policy for Chinese 'reconstruction' were, as usual, mixed commercial, strategic, and idealistic. There was nothing sinister about the anxiety to sell off war surpluses and promote future trade possibilities. By the time the few military supplies reached China, they did assist the Nationalists in a civil war situation, although the motive had been to sell goods rather than to give military aid to one side. While the Nationalists seemed to have a chance, there was certainly some feeling in Ottawa that, with all their faults, it would be better if they, rather than the unknown communists, were successful. And there was also a strong desire of many Canadians to develop a positive Asia policy, to help in the reconstruction of a great Asian country. That aim would probably have prevailed - although not on as generous a level as aid to Europe - if there had not been the complication of 'two Chinas.' The Embassy in Chungking and Nanking The reporting from the embassy in China provides an interesting contrast with what was coming from the Soviet Union. Major-General Victor Odium was a devoted soldier diverted into diplomacy as a means of removing him at the age of sixty from an active command in Britain. His views were strong and inflexible but he was master of his own perspective. The opinions of his able and more knowledgeable staff were smothered by his own convictions, but whereas his reporting undoubtedly affected the views of the prime minister and political leaders, it was less persuasive in the Department of External Affairs than the interpretations of the Canadian staff and of other diplomats in China, including those able Americans who were later purged for their critical views of the Kuomintang.17 Odium was by no means unaware of the corruption of the Chinese government and of the fact that they could not be trusted to use military supplies against the Japanese rather than the communists, but he was blinded by his admiration for Chiang Kai-shek as a man. He was not hostile to the communists and, like other members of the

135 The Communist'Monolith' embassy, had pleasant social contacts with Chou En-lai and the other representatives in Peking. He regarded them as agrarian reformers good only at guerrilla warfare and incapable, therefore, of being a serious force in China. This tolerant attitude was altered, however, by the behaviour of the Soviet forces in Manchuria and in Eastern Europe. By mid-1946 he had been forced by reports from 'Japan, Korea, Iran, Palestine and Europe' to the conviction 'that the world struggle which I had been hoping might be avoided, and which I had always believed ... must be fought out largely in China, was a fact of today, and not a possibility of tomorrow ... I am convinced that this has become an all-out, not civil, but international war; that the Communists are an advance army for the Russians, and that their purpose is ... to seize control of all China.'18 He did, however, favour the efforts of General Marshall to get a working relationship between the Nationalists and the communists, provided, of course, Chiang's position was supreme, and he did make an important distinction between 'giving sympathetic support to a political movement operating under the name of Communism, and striving by democratic methods to win the adherence of the Chinese peoples; and ... giving practical aid to an armed group of insurrectionists trying to overthrow the National Government by force, and to divide China.' His precise mind led him to the conclusion that 'to help either the National Government or the "Communists" is logical; to help both in the preparation of mutually hostile armed force is illogical.'19 In External Affairs, however, and in the Canadian staff in Chungking and later Nanking, other than Odium, there was a good deal more scepticism about the relations between the Chinese and the Soviet communists and the parallels with Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, Odium's reports reinforced the trend towards seeing a communist monolith - if not as a certainty then as the safest working assumption. Attitudes to any people who called themselves communists were hardened by the increasingly brutal policies of Soviet communists and their comrades in Eastern Europe. Pearson, like his officials, opposed the sale of arms to the Chinese government, but late in 1947 on the question whether 'to send arms to the National Government of China to be used against the Communists' he said: 'Six months ago I would myself have argued strongly against this, but now I am not sure.'20 At issue then was the sale of Mosquito aircraft, and that was the last military supply of consequence authorized. The Question of Recognition By 1949 as the communists extended their control the question of recognition was becoming urgent. Neither then nor at any time during the twenty

136 The Shaping of Peace succeeding years when the Canadian government wrestled with the question was the issue seen as clear-cut. Policy-making always consisted of adding up arguments in favour of recognizing Peking and arguments against doing so and in the light of the political requirements of the time reaching a decision or, for the most part, putting off a decision. In 1949 the new régime in Peking was a virtually unknown quantity to everybody. There was intense and continuous consultation with other countries. The initial concerns were pragmatic - how to protect Canadians and maintain consular activities in areas which came under communist control. At least until early 1950 there were grounds for thinking that the Americans would move slowly to recognition.21 By the spring of 1950 Britain and the Asian members of the Commonwealth had recognized, along with some of the northwest European allies, and the position of Canada became somewhat more significant. With Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, France, and other countries still holding off, a Canadian decision for recognition might have had a catalytic effect. The embassy staff remained in Nanking after the Nationalist government moved to Canton and were on hand when the communists took over. The Canadian ambassador, T.C. Davis, left for Ottawa and the chargé d'affaires was Chester Ronning whose long experience of China and knowledge of the language gave him a special position as liaison between the Western diplomats remaining in Nanking and the communist officials. The consul-general in Shanghai, George Patterson, remained also. Ronning argued persistently for the quick establishment of relations with the new régime on the grounds that China at long last had an honest and efficient administration. The United States, he said, had been consistently incorrect on China because they viewed it as a factor in Soviet-American relations. There were still Chinese favourable to the United States but if the Western powers who could offer economic assistance refused to recognize the new régime, the communists would seek even closer relations with the USSR.22 Although he insisted that the Chinese communists were not satellites and had won their victory without Soviet help, he did, to frighten Ottawa into action, report later that 'China is falling into the embrace of Russia more rapidly than I had anticipated.'23 In Ottawa Davis argued for speedy recognition without seeking to attach conditions because the Chinese would not accept them and the effort would only create enmity. He favoured common action by Western nations, but if the United States could not make up its mind in reasonable time, others should co-ordinate their action. 'Successive recognition may give United States time to formulate policy and not put United States on spot as only nation withholding recognition.'24 These views were reflected in a DEA

137 The Communist'Monolith' memorandum of 15 November 1949 which concluded that the communist government had 'pretty well fulfilled the usual requirements in international law for de jure recognition' and the 'political arguments in favour of recognition without too great delay appear to outweigh those against recognition.' The Canadian observers had considerable respect for the toughness not only of the People's Republic's fighting capacity but also of its ideology and discouraged the idea that they were crypto-Christian reformers. If the Americans erred, as Ronning said, in seeing China as an aspect of Soviet-American relations, it could be said that the Department of External Affairs did also, but they reached different conclusions. DEA preferred to strengthen the position of non-communist elements in the new Chinese government, keep open channels for democratic propaganda, and exploit points of conflict between China and Russia by keeping China dependent on imports from the West 'for her economic well being and progress.'25 The calculating strategy of the language used to convince ministers somewhat unfairly represents the thinking of the China specialists whose views on policy towards China were primarily based on Chinese conditions. Given the state of alarm in Ottawa at this time when NATO was being established to cope with the Soviet threat, they were anxious to divert this hostility from China. By making the Soviet Union the villain they were seeking not to exacerbate the Cold War but to undermine the concept of the communist monolith. On both the professional and political levels in Ottawa, thinking was on the whole closer to that of other Commonwealth capitals than to that of the United States. The detachment from the China scene meant that Canadians did not feel that they had 'lost China.' A recognized difference from the British position, however, was the greater British economic involvement in China as well as the stigma of 'imperialist intervention' from which Canadians hoped to be exempted. The views of the Indians, a people with presumably better understanding of Asia, were taken seriously. Ottawa wanted to work in association with friends on this issue. The first conference of Commonwealth foreign ministers was held at Colombo in December 1949 and the Canadian government hoped that there could be an approach after that. (King was firmly in retirement.) The Commonwealth was split. The Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans favoured delay while the UK, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon were in favour of early recognition. Canadian thinking was closer to that of the latter. Ironically, given Canada's traditional aversion to a united Commonwealth foreign policy, there was some disappointment when the British and the Asians would not wait for a common front.

138 The Shaping of Peace In the earlier stages of the issue there was no reason to believe that a Canadian move would stir anger in Washington of the proportions which had to be taken into consideration after the Korean War. On 15 November 1949 the embassy in Washington reported State Department anxiety lest Canada move too quickly towards recognition, fearing that the communists might be encouraged by gestures made without securing assurances in return. It was on the following day that cabinet approved recognition in principle but deferred consideration of the timing. In January the director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the State Department, according to Wrong's report, 'suggested to us officially on behalf of the State Department that if our timetable has not yet been definitely determined, we might wish to consider the advisability of delaying any decision until it is seen what finally develops in connection with the recognition already extended by the United Kingdom, India, and others.'26 The British and Indian difficulties rather than American anger were the main reason for delay. It was Wrong's view that 'An early decision by Canada would certainly come as no surprise to the State Department, and should have no appreciable effect on our official relations, although we must naturally expect an adverse reaction in some sections of both Congress and the press in so far as any notice is taken of the event. Actually, beyond the suggestion that we might wish to await the outcome of the current negotiations ... there has been little or no effort on the part of the State Department to take the initiative in dissuading us from our course.'27 The Canadian government had decided in November not to move until after the completion of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. That was the first of a number of good enough reasons for postponement. When the Indian government informed Ottawa that it would recognize the People's Republic of China in late December after the General Assembly, they were told there would be no Canadian move until after the Colombo Conference. This position was reiterated to the British when they spoke of their intention to recognize in January. Ronning was informed, however, that no action would be taken until parliament reassembled in midFebruary. By mid-January it was clear that both India and the United Kingdom were encountering problems in their negotiations with the PRC. The inability of the British to get from the Chinese concrete agreements on the exchange of diplomats discouraged Canadian political leaders while the professionals were realizing that the PRC was not going to allow the kind of de facto relationships for which they had hoped while the government was making up its mind. Ronning was becoming importunate. Although he was fluent in Chinese and had many lines of contact to the new régime, he was

139 The Communist 'Monolith' making no progress with the communist officials on urgent matters of supplies and the security of Canadian citizens. His pleas, however, were less influential with the cabinet than were those of T.C. Davis, who was a politician and a former colleague of the government and therefore considered more practical. The dilemma over China had been candidly stated to the public by Pearson on 25 October and again on 16 November 1949. He spoke of the requirements of international law for recognition - that the government must be shown to be independent of external control and that it must exercise effective control over the territory which it claimed. The government must be acceptable to the people. He reiterated the fact that diplomatic recognition did not imply approval, but, he said, 'we cannot reject the fact of China and its 450 million people.'28 In the second speech Pearson emphasized the political uncertainties, urging understanding of the causes of the communist revolution while at the same time stating bluntly that 'A small revolutionary party there, espousing an alien philosophy, looking to the Soviet union as the author and interpreter of that philosophy and as a guide in international relations, has seized military and governmental power throughout the greater part of China.' That was more a NATO-oriented view than the view of the department's specialists on China. There is some inconsistency in Pearson's interpretations at various times of the new Chinese régime which reflect his own uncertainties and perhaps also a felt need as minister to reflect the sourer interpretations of his colleagues. On 18 November 1949 he told the Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs that 'if we are to get any advantage out of recognition, I think we should avoid being last to do so.' St Laurent agreed with Pearson but eventually decided on postponement because of the British and Indian difficulties with the Chinese, the attitude of the Americans, and the attitude in Canada of people like Duplessis.29 A major element of concern was the effect on various fledgeling international bodies of representation from communist China and, on the other hand, the consequences of the real rulers of China not being represented. One of the young Old China hands in the department, Arthur Menzies, pointed out to the Commons Committee on External Affairs on 24 November that general recognition of the PRC would put a different government, a communist one, on a number of international bodies, including the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied Council on Japan, and, of course, in the Security Council of the United Nations.30 At one point a Canadian switch towards Peking would have given the recognizers a majority in the Far Eastern Commission - sufficient grounds for sobriety. Wrong worried about the tim-

140 The Shaping of Peace ing when the FEC was in a critical stage and said the Americans were making a good deal out of this argument.31 The department was anxious to make clear that the communist presence would undoubtedly cause trouble, if not disruption, but on the whole they leaned towards the argument that the absence of the real rulers of China would place too great limits on the effectiveness of international agencies. With a government disposed to procrastinate, the views of the opposition assumed importance and copies of a departmental memorandum of pros and cons were given to Drew and Coldwell. Although recognition was strongly supported by the CCF, the leader of the Progressive Conservative party spoke strongly against it on general anti-communist lines. It is significant, however, that the argument for standing side by side with the Americans, which was later to become an important aspect of the debate, was not offered as a major reason for Canadian action. It was not until the Korean War that the argument was clearly made for deference to the views of the leader of the Western coalition whether or not one agreed with them. By March the government was obviously prepared to move towards recognition if that reflected a clear consensus in the country. Sticking their necks out, however, on an issue not central to the Canadian political interest and thereby stirring up partisan trouble was less attractive to the more conservative members of the cabinet who still shared much of Mackenzie King's view of world affairs. Drew's speech seems to have stopped any precipitate move towards recognition. Negotiating Recognition

Pearson and his department, however, persisted stubbornly. Another tack was suggested. To avoid the difficulties the British and Indians had had, might there not be understanding reached in advance with the Chinese? At the end of April 1950 Ronning was told that he might approach the PRC authorities to discuss possible procedures for recognition.32 He reported that the director of the Foreign Nationals bureau in Nanking had seemed favourably disposed to the idea of negotiating before the announcement of recognition and later that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would welcome him to Peking if the Canadian government would formally indicate its desire to recognize the PRC.33 Pearson, however, was in Europe and there were further delays. Cabinet was clearly worried about getting in the embarrassing position in which the British found themselves. Canada was prepared to withdraw recognition from the Nationalists, support the seating of Peking representatives in international bodies (a policy on which the British had hedged), accept a diplomatic mission in Ottawa and a consulate general in Vancouver. In return they would expect facilities for the transfer of the

141 The Communist 'Monolith' Canadian embassy in Nanking to Peking and the usual diplomatic and consular privileges in China. It became clear that the Chinese were not going to discuss anything but preliminary and procedural matters before relations had been established.34 External Affairs urged the minister not to reject Peking's gesture of partial acceptance. Officials argued that Canada would thereby 'do its part in resolving the dangerous deadlock existing in the United Nations over the question of Chinese representation.' If action were not taken soon, the Canadian example would not have effect before the next General Assembly. The minister agreed.35 Cabinet continued to vacillate on the question of recognition and Ronning reported that he was 'considerably embarrassed' since he had initiated discussions and Peking had responded favourably. The need to do something was dramatized when police several times invaded the embassy premises, cross-examined the staff, and otherwise behaved in ways not in accordance with diplomatic customs.36 In expectation of a favourable cabinet decision late in June two draft telegrams of instruction to Ronning were prepared in External Affairs. Ronning was to 'deliver a confidential oral message to the head of the Foreign Nationals Bureau in Nanking stating that "the Canadian Government is prepared to announce recognition of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China if and when a satisfactory agreement has been reached on the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the Canadian Government is willing to instruct you to proceed to Peking to negotiate such agreement." ' However, Ronning was not to proceed to Peking until he had told Ottawa of Peking's reply to his oral message. This information was to be passed confidentially to Commonwealth governments, and also the us, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy, giving them advance notice of Canada's decision. The draft telegrams were dated 23 June, a Friday. They were seen by the minister but not sent. On Sunday North Korean forces entered South Korea and the situation changed completely. The instructions represented a compromise between the department's anxiety to find a formula for making progress and the disposition of members of the cabinet to stall. It seems likely, however, that a formula for recognition would have been agreed upon shortly, although with some members of the cabinet looking for an excuse to procrastinate it is by no means impossible that some demand or other from Peking would have put the move off the rails.37 It was clearly recognized in DEA that public opinion would not be favourable to negotiations with Peking after the Korean attack. The alternatives seen were to defer a decision until issues of the Korean crisis had become clarified or decide that recognition was now impossible and withdraw Cana-

142 The Shaping of Peace dian officials from China. They recommended against withdrawal because of the need to protect Canadians in China, to avoid confiscation of the property in Nanking, and make it easier to return. Furthermore they considered that 'there is as yet no evidence of China's complicity in the North Korean action.' North Korea was 'a closely integrated puppet state, apparently subject to direct Soviet orders, which China ostensibly is not.' Nehru's counsel was cited for not 'placing the Korean action in faulty perspective and allowing the issues in other parts of the East to become obscured as a consequence.' Furthermore, 'the only apparent solution to the deadlock in the United Nations is for Communist China to be seated,' and the responsibility for making this impossible should not be taken by the Western powers. Pearson agreed with the recommendation to delay a decision until the immediate crisis in Korea was over and until Peking's attitudes to it became clearer.38 On 5 July cabinet agreed that Ronning should remain in Nanking for the time being. Ronning was thereupon told that in view of 'the unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea by North Korean Communists and the firm action by the United Nations which the Canadian Government has supported,' it would not be appropriate to open negotiations with Peking.39 The 'Korean crisis,' as it was called, did not pass off but became a longterm affair. The opportunity to establish normal working relations was narrowly missed. There was at the time, of course, no realization that the time for action was short. Although Ronning in Nanking, Patterson in Shanghai, and DEA had considered the issue urgent, there were successive reasons for postponement, each of which made sense when there were arguments for caution as well as for action and when Canadian direct interests were not great - first the advisability of not upsetting the General Assembly by shifting Chinese representation in midstream, second the desirability of acting with other Commonwealth governments after the Colombo Conference, then the wisdom of avoiding the problems India and the UK had encountered by seeking diplomatic relations with a revolutionary government which might very well not want to conform to un-socialist protocol, and finally in the crucial weeks the minister's absence from the country. There was a hope that the Western powers might act together and a reluctance to isolate the United States. The factor of American disapproval was, quite properly, an important consideration. The officials, including the Canadian ambassador in Washington, were prepared to ride that out. It undoubtedly bothered some cabinet ministers, but they were more worried by opposition to communist China in their own constituencies - some of it no doubt fanned by the American media. American 'pressure' was probably exerted more effectively on the public than the government.

7

The Challenge of Korea'

JUNE 1950

In the years following the bloody war, attention was directed, in Canada as elsewhere, to the United Nations as an agency for preventing war. Whether the Charter did in fact provide for a system of universal collective security is debatable - a system, that is, in which all members pledge to use force, economic or military, against an aggressor anywhere who has been so designated by the international organization. This pure principle was certainly hedged with limitations, most notable of which was the great power veto. It was based ingeniously on a system by which members could pledge forces on which the United Nations could call, but the effort by the United Nations Military Staff Committee to organize the force was an early failure. As described in chapters 4 and 5, the powerful nations of the North Atlantic took refuge in the principle of collective self-defence. They insisted, however, in regarding it as compatible with Article 51 of the Charter and a contribution to universal collective security. It was not assumed, therefore, in 1949 that collective security to be enforced by the United Nations had been replaced, although the expectations of 1945 had been drastically curbed. There was grave doubt about the prospects of unanimity in the United Nations necessary to name aggressors and organize a response, but that function of the United Nations had not been renounced. Nor were members relieved of their pledge, on subscription to the purposes of the United Nations, 'to take effective collective measures ... for the suppression of acts of aggression.' The function of peaceful settlement, heavily emphasized by Canada at the League, had received less attention when the United Nations was set up. In their active work at San Francisco the Canadians had seen the Security

144 The Shaping of Peace Council primarily as the agent of enforcement action rather than of mediation. However, as described in chapter 3, a notable term on the Security Council in 1948-9 encouraged faith in the intermediary role of the United Nations, and, in particular, in the Canadian skill at that game. World events moved Canadian thinking in a pattern that might roughly be described as passing from collective security to collective defence and peaceful settlement and then, in 1950, by reason of the Korean invasion, to another look at collective security. On 25 June 1950, when forces from North Korea moved into South Korea, the framework of ideas about peace and security that had evolved in Canada and among other members of the United Nations was bluntly challenged. The ideas were never the same again. The challenge for Canada was not only to its theories but also to its practices. In the summer of 1950 the country which had offered the firmest oral support to the United Nations was found wanting in military capacity to back up its words with contributions. The attitude of the planners in Ottawa had undergone rapid change before the Korean War. By 1949 they were acknowledging realistically that, for the time being at least, the United Nations could not be regarded as an agency for the enforcement of universal collective security. In 1950, however, they were jerked by the formidable leadership of the United States into the first and last effort of the United Nations to act in what purported to be this capacity.2 By 1954, however, after the Geneva Conference had failed to find a way towards the reunification of Korea and the situation settled into stalemate, Canadian thinking returned to assumptions not very different from those of 1949. When the invasion took place Canada was not faced with any immediate decision because its term on the Security Council had ended in December. The Security Council met promptly, called for a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of North Korean forces, and urged members to render every assistance to the United Nations. Acting in accordance with that recommendation President Truman within two days ordered American air and sea forces to give cover and support to the Republic of Korea troops, who were in full flight and could be saved only by prompt action. Several hours after this unilateral decision the Security Council met and, noting the ignoring by the North Koreans of its resolution, now recommended that 'Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.'3 The British, French, Thais, Turks, Australians, New Zealanders, and Nationalist Chinese all offered forces. Fifty-three members declared their willingness to comply in accordance with their capacities. On 28 June the Canadian government's approval of United Nations action was

145 The Challenge of Korea recorded in the Commons and on 30 June the prime minister said cautiously that if 'a Canadian contribution... under a United Nations commander, would be important to achieve the ends of peace... then the government wishes parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution.'4 The statement was received with restrained enthusiasm at the United Nations headquarters where it had been expected that the Canadians would be among the promptest to support a UN effort. THE REQUIREMENT OF FORCES

Canada had few forces to send and the Canadian government was by no means certain that it wanted to do so. It was quite certain, in fact, that it did not. The problem was how to get away with gestures that would not leave them open to too much embarrassment at the United Nations and from the opposition at home. Above all it was necessary to avoid using ground forces.5 All army forces were much under-strength and if additional troops were to be recruited it was estimated that it would take at least four to six months to equip and train them. No formations could be raised without using the Mobile Striking Force which was intended for the defence of North America. Canada was not in a strong bargaining position with the United States or the United Nations, but pressure was brought to bear on both to avoid any public call on members for ground forces. Canadian political sensitivities, however, were not foremost among the considerations those days either in Washington or at Lake Success. On 14 July the secretary-general announced at a press conference that he was sending messages to all states that had replied favourably to the general request for assistance asking if they would have a look at their capacity to provide ground forces. There was cause for irritation at the secretary-general's announcement before the communications had been received, but the Canadian government put on a tantrum which suggested an uneasy conscience. Trygve Lie later apologized to Pearson, saying that he was acting under severe pressure from the Americans and that the Americans had failed, as promised, to let their allies know this.6 The Americans had no desire to embarrass the Canadians, but on the other hand they were not feeling unduly considerate. American public opinion was becoming resentful over the lack of support from allies. On 12 July the Canadian government made available three destroyers to stand by in Far Eastern waters and on 21 July an air transport squadron. When Pearson said in Toronto the destroyers were 'no mere token' assistance, a United States embassy official was reported as saying, 'Okay, let's call it three tokens.'7

146 The Shaping of Peace On 29 July Pearson and Robertson made a secret visit to Washington and New York to talk with Dean Acheson and Trygve Lie. The need for secrecy was to avoid the old Canadian suspicion of being ordered around by the Americans or even by the United Nations. During that visit Pearson and Robertson came up with a proposal which has had a lasting significance in Canadian defence planning: that Canada raise a special contingent to be available for the United Nations force in Korea and to be permanently available for collective missions. As there was at the same time pressure to provide troops for NATO, this special force would be available for it or the UN, the priorities to be decided by the Canadian government. This idea of a specially enlisted force had been put forward by General Foulkes to his minister after receipt of the UN request for ground forces, but Claxton doubted at that time it could be raised soon enough.8 Acheson impressed on Pearson the importance of making the crusade for collective security in Korea a truly United Nations affair rather than just a campaign of the United States. He very much wanted at least a token Canadian force in Korea as soon as possible to help deflect those in Washington who were pressing for abandoning the UN and going it alone.9 The idea of the force especially designated for the UN was well received at UN headquarters. General Gruenther wrote from Washington to General Foulkes expressing his pleasure over the Canadian plan, for the 'subject is becoming a sensitive one in this country.'10 On 7 August St Laurent made an announcement11 pointing out that there had been no provision in Canada's military policy for a fully trained expeditionary force available for immediate action outside Canada. The Canadian concept had been that of maintaining the basic training establishment to expand the army quickly in the event of war and the provision of an airborne brigade trained for operations in the North and designed to share in the immediate protection of the continent. It was considered unwise to send the existing brigade group to Korea and therefore the government was going to recruit an additional brigade to be called the Canadian Army Special Force. Parliament was recalled and ratified this decision by the Canadian Forces Act on 8 September. As another 'token' during the summer Canada made available to the unified command all accommodation on Canadian Pacific Airline flights to Tokyo. An advance unit of the special force reached Korea in October and the battalion arrived in December. It is difficult to avoid the impression that Canadian governments had up to this point regarded collective security less as a rational way of organizing their own forces for valid purposes than as an alternative to having Canadian forces. That collective action of one kind or another was the most reliable

147 The Challenge of Korea way of providing for the defence of a country like Canada was a logical conclusion following the experience of victory in an allied coalition. It was also the cheapest. There was a comfortable hope that, when the United States possessed the only atomic bombs, the gesture of solidarity provided adequate deterrence to aggressors and gestures might suffice until Canada could see its way more clearly. It was hard, furthermore, to shake the tradition of two world wars in which Canada had been free to make up its mind after the war started whether it would contribute and then to start work on the contribution. In the debate on the Special Force in August 1950 Pearson defended the government's record by saying that only great powers could maintain ground forces in being which they were able to move without endangering the homeland.12 While the political leaders procrastinated, the military were not exactly straining at the leash to get to Korea. This did not look like their kind of war, and they did not want to divert the few trained forces they had. Even after the secretary-general had made his request for ground forces, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, at a meeting on 18 July, showed a strong disinclination to send them. General Foulkes curiously took the view that no request had been received for ground forces because it had not come from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were in charge of the operation. The secretary-general's appeal was not authoritative insofar as the Chiefs of Staff were concerned.13 External Affairs was concerned over these arguments. The embassy in Washington14 asked where General Foulkes had got the idea the United States military were not interested in the immediate provision of ground forces, and Pearson told the prime minister that Acheson, although he shared the view that Korea was just a 'phase' in a world-wide situation, thought it would not be dangerous to divert six or seven divisions there, that Canadian ground forces would be helpful and of even greater political value.'5 Pearson was worried about cabinet's decision until it was announced.16 From External's perspective a failure to contribute adequately would have cut the ground out from under their policy and probably cut short a rising career for Canada in the UN. In the climate of international gatherings of that time, caught up in the mood of construction, it was easy for the diplomats to ignore the gap between the ideal Canadian role in the world security system and the realities of the Canadian Armed Forces.17 Whether the officials or the politicians were more out of touch with the public would be hard to say. In retrospect the government seems to have been unduly timid. Claxton had real problems. Other ministers were haunted by old scars - the disasters of Hong Kong and Dieppe, for example, and a traditional antipathy to putting Canadian forces under American command.

148 The Shaping of Peace Contrary to a widespread opinion, this reluctance could not be attributed simply to Quebec. The government was in a strong political position after the 1949 elections. The economic situation had swung upward after the postwar difficulties. There seemed to be an unusual consensus in press opinion and there was little opposition in the House of Commons to the actions eventually taken. A French-Canadian prime minister was confident of Quebec support, especially as it was made clear that there was no question of conscription. During the summer there was a rising tide of criticism against the government for its failure to act. The Conservatives wanted Canada to stand up and be counted. The CCF believed in the United Nations. Canadians could not help being affected by the swelling resentment in the United States against the United Nations and the failure of allies to help in the crusade. The Canadian public and its government needed about six weeks experience of the Korean challenge before they saw what they had to do. That was a luxury a middle power, but not a great power, could still enjoy. Canada's eventual action cannot be attributed simply to American pressure. In fact, the predominant role played by the United States in the Korean operation was the cause of political difficulty. Canadians, it was suggested, had in 1914 and 1939 waited two years for the Americans to join their war and now it was time for the Americans to wait. Canadian sensitivity at any suggestion of Americans pushing them about even reached a point where, in a moment of exasperation, the Canadian ambassador in Washington was instructed to let the secretary of state know they did not want any orders given to countries which had fought throughout the full period of the previous war. What seem to have been decisive in the end were the decisions of the British, Australian, and New Zealand governments on 25 and 26 July to send ground forces. THE DIPLOMATIC PERSPECTIVE

From the beginning the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs and Canadian diplomats plunged into the diplomacy of the Korean struggle, seeing themselves both as defenders of Canadian interests and as founding members of the United Nations. Their efforts were mainly directed towards putting as much reality as possible into the concept of a 'United Nations Command' and making sure that the United States did not associate the UN effort with dubious American attitudes on China. Stressing the United Nations authority was not seen as a means by which the United States could use the UN to cloak its imperial purposes but rather as a means of establishing some control over United States policy. A United Nations effort com-

149 The Challenge of Korea posed largely of United States forces under the strategic control of the United States military was not what Canadians had hoped for. The only alternative in 1950, however, was to spank the North Koreans with harsh words, the kind of fatuous action Canadian diplomats deplored. Allied opinion was asked by the Americans, but because the decision involved such a tremendous gamble by the Americans before their allies could help, the latter were tongue-tied. Canadian officials realized the consequences for any concept of collective security if what looked like a calculated defiance of the UN was not challenged. If the United States were prepared to take this risk, with or without allied support, Canada could hardly oppose them. They believed in the cause even if they had many doubts about the strategic calculation. In Ottawa they felt some resemblance to 1914 and 1939 when the British had plunged into war and Canadians, who had had little or no hand in the decision, saw their interest nevertheless involved in the struggle. The moral obligation to the United Nations was, however, less divisive internally. Although Canadians were in the process of transferring to the United States that jealous concern for their independence formerly demonstrated towards Britain, they did not see the United States as the 'imperialist' power it came to look like to some Canadians - and Americans-in the 1960s. It was realized - if perhaps dimly - that converting what might have been a purely United States campaign in Korea into a United Nations crusade would encourage the conversion of the UN into the purely Western institution they did not want it to be. Some Canadians talked as if that was the goal, but on the whole officials recognized it as a risk that had to be run, one which they would try to mitigate. UN action had been authorized by far more than a Western bloc, and was supported by virtually the entire membership. When Pearson phoned St Laurent to tell him of the North Korean attack, they agreed that any effective military action would have to originate with the United States but it was important it be done through the UN because of the 'serious danger that if the Americans acted unilaterally, the conflict might be turned into a global struggle between the Communists and the non-Communists.'18 The Canadian government, as described in chapter 6, had been on the point of recognizing the Peking government when the Korean War started. A telegram as early as 5 July 1950 to New York expressed worry about the phrase 'in the area of Korea' in the Council resolution because of an American tendency to broad interpretation. They wanted to be sure nothing would imply involvement in a United States policy of defending Formosa, as it was then called. A telegram of 6 July to Washington worried about MacArthur's control of the navy which would include Canadian ships, and on 12 July at a press conference Pearson said Canadian

150 The Shaping of Peace ships would be used only for the defence of the Republic of Korea in accordance with Security Council resolution S/1588 of 7 July. In reply to a question, he said Canada had nothing to do with the defence of Formosa. The concern about China continued in private messages and public statements throughout this period. The State Department heard about it incessantly. A problem for Canadian diplomats was that their influence was inevitably concern about China continued in private messages and public statements ambassador brought a copy of President Truman's declaration of 27 June for Pearson to see, Pearson questioned the advisability of the declaration before the Security Council had met. The Americans pleaded urgency and there was not very much time to argue that point. The troops were theirs. When Canadians in Ottawa, New York, and Washington vigorously supported all moves to make the UN Command effective and provide opportunities for the allies to haVe their say in policy, it was pointed out that the best way for Canada to make clear that this was a UN operation was to contribute forces. In any case Acheson and senior policy-makers of the State Department agreed with them. When this doughty band of Americans were doing all they could to thwart the hawks in their own camp, they appreciated the emphasis which their allies, particularly the British, placed on this theme. However, being human, they were not always happy about persistent Canadian representations insisting they do what they were already trying their damnedest to do. The iron eventually entered Acheson's soul and some years later he entitled an essay 'Canada: "Stern Daughter of the Voice of God.'"19 By September the Canadian position had been strengthened. In the first place the return of the Soviet representative to the Security Council in August had paralyzed that body, and when the Assembly met in late September the effective discussion of the Korean issue took place there. Pearson was on hand. By the decision in August to contribute a brigade Canada had established its credentials, and although there were few Canadians in combat until after the North Koreans had been driven back, Canadians had a better right to speak for the company of those who were fighting.20 The first major issue of policy came when, after the Inchon landing, the North Koreans retreated and the question arose as to whether UN forces should pursue them into North Korea. The Americans pleaded military necessity, an argument hard to reject. Canadians made a distinction between the function of the Security Council which was, or could be interpreted as, liquidating the aggression of June 1950 and that of the General Assembly which was the earlier mandate to assist in the unification of Korea. The former was essential for the prestige of the UN, but the UN had not considered that unification should be imposed by force.21

151 The Challenge of Korea The patience of Acheson with Canada was growing thin, one reason being the concern shown for the attitude of Asians, and particularly of India. By this time the Indians, who were in good contact with Peking, were expressing concern over the reaction expected from the Chinese if UN forces, chiefly from the United States, went too close to the Chinese border. Canada tried to persuade the Americans of the advantage of getting Indian support for what they were doing and listening to the Indian warnings. Nothing could bring Acheson and company to a favourable view of Nehru, and the result was only to discredit Pearson. Swami Pearson they called him in certain quarters in Washington. They were not even reconciled when Nehru was proved right about Chinese intentions. SEEKING AN ARMISTICE

The Canadians realized they could not easily frustrate the determination of the American military to push north of the 38th parallel, supported as they were by many of the other allies, but they tried. The embassy in Washington had been instructed as early as July to speak with Acheson about the dangers of pursuit beyond the 38th parallel. The decision in September to march north was taken by the United States Joint Chiefs and approved by the president without much reference to what other people thought. At that stage Canada urged that at least an offer should be made to the North Koreans for a ceasefire before the parallel was crossed. Early in October the General Assembly passed a so-called 8-power resolution establishing principles governing United Nations policy in the new situation. The Canadians were not happy with it. St Laurent tried to prevail on the Americans to delay the resolution for a last effort to persuade the North Koreans, but the Americans objected to any delay in military operations. A new United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was set up on which Canada did not choose to serve.22 Some time later Pearson explained to the House of Commons the military and political reasons for crossing the 38th parallel. They had been aware of the risks involved and efforts were made to reduce those risks as '... we felt that very great care should be taken to avoid offering any unnecessary provocation to the Chinese government at Peking. At the same time we realized ... that the unified command was responsible for the operations of a force which was very largely composed of soldiers of the United States ... and they had the full right to make the military decisions within the limits of the authority given them by the United Nations.' On the other hand, '... all of us who supported the action of the United Nations in Korea had not only the right but the duty to make our views known.'23

152 The Shaping of Peace During September the function of the United Nations shifted. It had become one of the belligerents on 27 June, but once the North Koreans had been driven back the UN'S more familiar role as a peacemaker revived. At the opening of the Assembly on 27 September Pearson said: 'Events ... are rapidly demonstrating in Korea that aggression does not pay. It will soon be necessary for the United Nations to show with equal vigour and resourcefulness that it can deal with the problems of the post-aggression period in Korea.'24 Anxiety to get an armistice intensified as fear grew in Ottawa of Chinese intentions. Warnings had been coming since July from the Indians, who were in contact with the Chinese in Peking, that the Chinese believed the American intentions were directed against them, and by October they were giving specific information about Chinese preparations to intervene. General MacArthur and the authorities in Washington refused to take them seriously. The fear that he would provoke an attack so that he might finish off the Chinese communists was strong in Ottawa and in European capitals. A problem was that United States military intelligence out of Tokyo was highly suspect, but reports from other sources were hard to come by. Whereas the American view was that Chinese intervention would be deliberate aggression, Pearson said that the motives of Peking were hard to decipher but one likely reason for their fear was that the hydro-electric installations on the Yalu River, upon which Manchurian industry was dependent, might be destroyed. He pressed hard for assurance from the United States authorities that those installations would not be damaged.25 The Canadian view, as bluntly stated at the time, was that the purpose of resistance to North Korea was to demonstrate that aggression did not pay. Aggression, however, would pay substantial dividends to the Russians if it led to a war between the United States and China. The interest of the Western powers was to limit hostilities in the Korea area and end them as soon as possible so that stability might be restored and troops withdrawn. It would be in the interest of the Chinese to limit hostilities so that they could get ahead with reconstruction. The only country, in Ottawa's view, which would have its interest served by an extension of hostilities was the Soviet Union. The Western democratic powers were weak in land forces and they must play for time in which to get stronger. The main front was Western Europe and they must resist efforts of the Russians to get them committed to a theatre of secondary importance. In dealing with the Chinese, full account should be taken of the possibility that their suspicions of the intent of the United States to encircle them had genuinely arisen because of such actions as those of General MacArthur in Formosa and the refusal to admit them to the United Nations.26

153 The Challenge of Korea Canadian opinion was veering further away from that of Washington. When the Chinese did finally pour across the border in November, even moderate Americans such as Dean Acheson regarded the Chinese communists as perfidious enemies. The Canadian warning was not acknowledged as having been justified by events but looked upon as all the more galling. Pearson's diplomacy was far from quiet. He made a frank speech in Windsor on 15 November in which he said, '...we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that some genuine fear does play a considerable part in the formulation of the policy of the Soviet Union and its satellites. This possibility should be especially borne in mind... on any occasion when it is necessary to conduct defensive military operations close to the borders of Communist states.'27 During the fatal days of late November the Canadians desperately tried to get the UN to take such measures as establishing a neutralized zone south of the Yalu. They even proposed that Ralph Bunche go to Peking. Both the British and the French shared their point of view. Aside from the fact that there were British and French but no Canadian soldiers being slaughtered at this point by the 'defensive' actions of the Chinese, it was the great powers who mattered for the great powers.28 On the floor of the UN, however, Canadian diplomacy was more widely respected. Ironically, of course, when the Chinese began driving the United Nations forces back in disorder, the Canadian position was considerably strengthened. The American attitude towards a ceasefire altered drastically and the Canadians sought to exert pressure, by whatever means they could, on the Chinese. The only way of doing this was through Nehru who was urged to appeal to Peking to settle for a ceasefire. When he was reluctant to do this in the light of American attitudes, Pearson made a public appeal himself, saying 'when the military position is stabilized, we should try to begin negotiations with the Chinese Communists by every means possible.' He even hinted that if there could be such a ceasefire, negotiations might cover more subjects than Korea. To forestall accusations of appeasement, he said this was 'an attempt through diplomacy to reach a modus vivendi with the Asian Communist world.'29 Another occasion on which he resorted to a loud public appeal was when there was talk in the United States in December of using atomic bombs or the threat of them to stop the advancing Chinese. His role here was to swell the chorus of opposition by the British and other allies and help the cause of those in Washington who opposed any such action. Pearson was then drawn more formally into the quiet diplomatic effort to get a ceasefire when he was appointed, along with Sir Benegal Rau of India and Nazrollah Entezam of Iran, who was president of the General Assembly, to a Committee of Three of the Assembly for this purpose. At this point

154 The Shaping of Peace Pearson might be said to have begun operating as an officer of the United Nations rather than as the Canadian foreign minister.30 The Chinese, however, so long as they seemed to be winning, were not accommodating. Pearson sought to provide a link in a communications chain between Washington and Peking via Delhi - a manoeuvre he tried again with clearer evidence of success over the offshore islands in 1955.31 He sought from the Americans assurances about their intentions which might be passed on by the Indians to Peking in the hope of encouraging a Chinese will to compromise. These efforts probably puzzled the Chinese, but no doubt they influenced the thinking about Canada of so shrewd a man as Chou En-lai. In his book, Acheson says of the American efforts to obtain an armistice in the spring of 1951 that the State Department was unanimous in one view: 'that exploration through the public procedures of the United Nations or through leaky foreign offices like the Indian would be fatal.'32 He may have had in mind this episode in January 1951. When the Americans interpreted a Chinese reply to the Committee of Three as a flat negative, the Canadians, along with the Indians, were not sure that was the Chinese intention. St Laurent therefore suggested to Nehru that the Indian ambassador in Peking make enquiries about certain parts of the Peking reply. The interpretation from Peking was even more favourable to the Canadian point of view than the original message. What surprised Ottawa was that the message through the Indians had come from Chou En-lai and he had asked the Indians to pass it to St Laurent specifically. The message came to the Indians in New York via British communications and the British permanent representative, Gladwyn Jebb, took it upon himself to show the message to the Americans. Needless to say, the State Department was upset by the reference to St Laurent and protested vigorously against Canada's acting in this way 'behind our backs.' The Americans said they had not heard of the Chinese message until Rau had presented it publicly in the Assembly - which was not true. Pearson apologized in no way. He insisted on the right of Canadians to conduct discussions as they saw fit with a Commonwealth colleague and, unlike Jebb, he did not feel authorized to pass to the Americans an Indian message. What was more, there was no point in consulting the Americans because they had made their views on the subject perfectly clear. It was not the last time Ottawa sought to get Peking's views through this channel, but to the Americans this was very devious behaviour on the part of an ally.33 The American disposition to conciliation changed, however, when the fighting was stabilized again and because the Chinese replies were not at all conciliatory. The next Canadian effort was to persuade the Americans not to proceed with a resolution declaring the Chinese guilty of aggression. Cana-

155 The Challenge of Korea dians admitted to genuine doubts about the Chinese motive. Their principal argument, however, was a practical one. Such a declaration would alienate important Asian countries who could help achieve a ceasefire. What was more important, it would make virtually impossible the effort to get the Chinese to accept any mediatory role by the UN. The United States wanted to call for collective measures against China, to establish principles which would induce the Chinese to negotiate. At this point, when OttawaWashington relations were already strained, the Americans insisted on a resolution condemning China as an aggressor. The Americans did consult Canadians and other allies but made clear they would accept no watering down of their resolution. Pearson expressed concern that formal condemnation 'was the initial step on a line of new commitments leading possibly to a full-scale conflict with China.' Although the Canadian position had support within other delegations it was contrary not only to the official position of the United States but also of a UN majority. Pearson made a prolonged effort, publicly and privately, to get the resolution withdrawn or amended. When he lost the struggle, the Canadian delegation was instructed to vote for the resolution. A candid explanation was given by Pearson publicly. He said that the Canadian government had honestly differed with the government of the United States, made its position clear, and would continue to press for those policies which in their judgment would be most conducive to a peaceful settlement in the Far East. 'We consider, however, that, though holding these views, we should support the United States resolution as a whole.'34 The reasons for this 'knuckling under' are complex. There was no doubt that the United States would be exceedingly angry if Canada voted against the resolution or even abstained. On the other hand, Washington was not likely to be very pleased by the manner of Canadian assent. The Canadian position had been made. It was understood in Delhi and probably in Peking. The government showed in the final round a reluctance to dissociate Canada not just from the United States but from the larger company of its allies in the United Nations. They would probably have had to go it alone, and there was always the higher tactical consideration that the West or the 'free world' or whatever it was ought not to be divided. It was clear from Pearson's qualifying statements that he had every intention of carrying on the struggle for a ceasefire. In order to do so he had to maintain in Washington enough confidence in his intentions and his judgment to get and hold their ears. He had almost forfeited that already. It is a very serious thing for a Canadian foreign minister to jeopardize his chances of a hearing in Washington, especially if he does so on a subject not specifically related to the kind of Cana-

156 The Shaping of Peace dian national interest that was closer to the hearts of his more political colleagues. In the end, an agreement to begin negotiations for peace came in the summer of 1951, not through the efforts of the tripartite UN truce commission but by direct, though informal, American approaches to the Russians. Whether Pearson's efforts served a useful purpose in an eventual ceasefire is a matter for speculation. Dean Acheson in his account, Present at the Creation, regarded his efforts as mischievous and useless. His contempt for the Indians, with whom Pearson was associated, seems to explain his bitterness. Although he heaps scorn on the peacemakers, it is difficult to distinguish great differences between the views of Pearson on the political realities of this phase of the Korean affair and his own. Acheson was conducting a strong battle against the 'primitives,' as he called them, who were being rallied behind the extravagant views of General MacArthur. As he saw it, however, the efforts of the peacemakers in the Assembly to 'appease' the communists made more difficult his struggle with the right wing at home. There were certain, however, to be strong peace movements in the Assembly, and Acheson should have been grateful that someone as steady as Pearson was involved in them. It was not until a clear stalemate had been reached near the 38th parallel that the two sides were ready to sit down - but they might not have made it to the table if there had not been all that armistice diplomacy going on at the same time as the fighting. There is a case to be made that the cause of 'the West' and also the cause of détente throughout the late forties and fifties required both the threat of American power and the offer of middle-power diplomacy, that what Washington and Ottawa were doing was complementary. The dislike and suspicion of each other's tactics, however, had to be genuine lest it took too much like collusion. The Chinese probably thought, but were not sure, that it was collusion. Some time after Chou En-lai's message to St Laurent, he told the Indian ambassador he thought Canada had altered its original position because of United States pressure and that, by weakly yielding to this pressure, the Canadians were endeavouring to trap the Chinese as well as appease the United States.35 Pearson went to considerable length to correct the Chinese interpretation via Indian channels. Chou had at least assumed that the puppet sometimes got off the string. GENEVA CONFERENCE 3 6

The last serious effort to achieve the reunification of Korea in this period was the Geneva Conference of 1954 at which there was again difference between

157 The Challenge of Korea Ottawa and Washington on the way to achieve the common purpose. In the United Nations the Canadians, along with the British and others, had continued to press for a conference on the reunification of Korea. Among the problems in the way were the intransigent demands of both Korean governments and the ambiguous role of the United Nations. It was clear that the Peking government would have to take part, as well as the government of North Korea, neither of which was accepted in the United Nations. Furthermore, in their eyes the United Nations had been a belligerent, their enemy in the recent war, and not fit therefore to act as the peacemaking institution. The majority of countries in the UN, having supported the organization of the United Nations Command in accordance with the Charter to defeat what they considered 'aggression,' nevertheless believed that the United Nations retained its authority as the international arbiter. There were differences of approach, however. The Americans took a holy view of the right of the United Nations to impose its will, whereas Canadians, no less devoted to the authority of the UN, recognized a paradox and were prepared to compromise in the interest of settlement. The very holding of such a conference was a compromise. Although it was held on UN territory in Geneva and serviced by the UN, it was not a UN conference because if it had been, Peking would not have participated. It was the product of an agreement reached in February 1954 in Berlin among the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. It was a double conference to deal with Korean unification and the perilous confrontation in Indochina. In the Korean sessions the participants were the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and, on what was known as 'the United Nations side,' the countries which had contributed armed forces in the Korean conflict. Canada participated, of course, only in the consideration of Korea. A not surprising difference between Canadians and Americans over the Geneva Conference was the strong Canadian belief that India should be invited as a major Asian power. Paul Martin argued to the Political Committee of the Assembly on 19 August 1953 that India should be present because of its important role in Asia and its help in getting the armistice.37 Not only the Canadians, but also the British at this time felt strongly that India, in particular, and other Asian powers as well would take a more responsible role in security in that area if the Western powers indicated a will to leave Asia to the Asians. In Washington, however, the suspicion of the Indians was, if anything, stronger than it had been in Acheson's time, and the emergence on to the scene of the militant and cantankerous Indian minister, Krishna Menon, only exacerbated the hostility.38

158 The Shaping of Peace Few participants in the Korean Conference expected it would achieve reunification, but there were varying attitudes to the position the conference should adopt. The principal Canadian anxiety was that, at the very least, the truce should be maintained, and a modus vivendi established which would discourage the inclinations in both Pyongyang and Seoul to have another go at the use of force. If the conference failed, the Canadians wanted it to be clear that communist intransigence was responsible. Canadian views, as was usual on Far Eastern matters, were closer to those of the British and the New Zealanders, as well as the French, but the French, desperate for American help in their losing battle in Indochina, were not going to take issue with the Americans over a hopeless conference on Korea, and the British, gravely offending the Americans over Indochina, were not anxious to add fuel. Only the Canadians and New Zealanders had no special reason to be docile, and they were not. The conference broke off after about six weeks during which it was evident that the two sides could not agree on a formula for uniting Korea by free elections. Although the conference seemed a failure, one might date from this period the cooling off of the Korean issue and the gradual acceptance of the status quo. That was, in fact, about the most Canadians had hoped for. An opportunity was required for both sides to make clear to each other there could be no reunification by the electoral method, and this was a fact everybody had to live with, even though, for many years, each side would have to go on proclaiming its original intentions. In Canadian position papers prepared for the conference it was suggested that the most likely prospect for reunification in the very long run was by the two sides eventually making contact with each other and setting up joint arrangements. The significance of the Canadian role at the Geneva Conference ought not to be exaggerated, but it is interesting because it illustrates the perspectives of the time. The Canadian delegation in Geneva was perhaps more consequential than Canadian policy or the Canadian stake would justify because it included for most of the time Lester Pearson, whose role as a major UN statesman gave importance to whatever he did. With Canada very much the observer in the Indochina discussions, Pearson played behind the scenes his useful part as an idea man and a soother of wounds. He and Eden were old friends and got on well. At the beginning of the conference the British and the Americans were hardly communicating. He played his part also in getting the Americans on speaking terms with Krishna Menon, who turned up. When Bedell Smith, whom Dulles had left in charge of the United States delegation, asked Pearson how to get along with the redoubtable Indian, Pearson suggested a policy of'Tea and Sympathy.' Menon's two weaknesses

159 The Challenge of Korea were tea and young ladies and Pearson recommended a succession of attractive secretaries bringing him cups at frequent intervals. Also on the Canadian delegation was Chester Ronning, whose mastery of the Chinese language and old friendship with Chou En-lai and other Chinese in Geneva gave him a special place as an interpreter of Chinese attitudes. In the formal sessions of the conference there were long and useless debates over impossible demands by the North and South Koreans. Most of the negotiating, as far as Canada was concerned, took place within the meetings of the United Nations group. The big issue was the nature of the machinery for free elections. The Canadian position was to call for free elections throughout Korea for a national assembly in which the population would be equitably represented. These elections should be internationally supervised by an agency acceptable to the United Nations and consisting of nations which neither belonged to the communist bloc nor participated in the Korean military operations. The Americans insisted with holy dedication that the will of the United Nations must be upheld and that the elections must be supervised by the United Nations. The Canadian difference from this position might not seem great, but it was indicative of a different general approach. The Canadian argument was roughly as follows: of course the United Nations should be able to assert its authority in this way over all Korea, but those present were faced with the blunt fact that this was totally unacceptable to the other side, there could be no movement towards elections and unification without the voluntary agreement of the other side, and in the interests both of the goal and of presenting an image of reasonableness to the millions of Asians who were watching, some acceptable formula could be found. The Americans seemed incapable of thinking in terms other than unconditional surrender, although the North Koreans were not in the position of the Germans or the Japanese in 1945. In the mood of 1954 they did not want, or were for political reasons afraid, to strike bargains with the devil. It was a losing battle, even within the United Nations side, because of the unwillingness of major countries to break with the United States on an issue which, in the context of the Indochina conference, seemed peripheral. The Canadians and New Zealanders were faced with the decision whether to take an independent stand in the main conference and split the United Nations side. As they were participating in a 'side,' there was a strong argument for accepting the majority decision after having argued the case. The Canadian delegation used a formula resembling the explanation Pearson had given after the vote in the General Assembly declaring China an aggressor. It made known in a meeting of the United Nations group that it would accept the hardline formula because it was submitting to the will of

160 The Shaping of Peace the majority, but its opinion had not changed. Canadian spokesmen did in fact continue to take that position in the General Assembly although the annual debate on the 'reunification of Korea' attracted increasingly less serious attention. On 4 January 1957, for example, the Canadian permanent representative made a plea for recognizing inescapable factors of the situation: 'The United Nations ... did not fight in Korea to achieve unification by force; it fought there for the declared purpose of repelling aggression. We are not, therefore, faced with a situation in which we can impose a settlement. The settlement will have to be negotiated just as an armistice was negotiated ... If there is to be any hope of success, we must make it clear to all concerned that we shall seize any honorable opportunity of seeking a solution and that we are not forever bound by formulas which have been established in the past.'39 COLLECTIVE SECURITY REVISITED

When the fighting subsided and the issue reached the negotiation stage, consideration was given in External Affairs to the implications of the Korean operations for the security function of the United Nations.40 The fact that the UN had, although in ways not foreseen, organized a military operation to resist aggression could not be ignored. It had altered the expectations of peoples, and the prestige of the United Nations was set at a higher stake. It was too early to determine the long-range effects on the country which had been the casus belli. There were grounds for satisfaction in that the UN had achieved what, in the opinion of moderates like the Canadians, had been its purpose - the driving back of the invaders and re-establishment of the status quo - although many Americans were inclined to regard as failure the United Nations inability to establish the authority of the government of the Republic of Korea throughout the land. In the enthusiasm generated by the ability of a UN majority to create an instrument for 'collective security' which looked more like the dreams of 1945, certain steps had been taken and instruments created heading in that direction. The 'Uniting for Peace' resolution provided for action in the General Assembly when the Security Council was blocked by the veto. A Collective Measures Committee was established to organize plans for both economic and military sanctions. Not surprisingly many people were anxious that the United Nations not be caught again unprepared for military action, and Americans understandably wanted to create United Nations machinery which would share the burden more equitably among the member states in any new crusade.

161 The Challenge of Korea The Collective Measures Committee was in full steam by the time the fighting subsided. Before deciding what policy to adopt towards its work Ottawa had to take a chastened look at how far it wanted the United Nations to go in organizing military operations and economic sanctions. In a reply to an enquiry of 29 September 1952 by the secretary-general on behalf of the committee, the Canadian government's tone was decidedly restrained. In view of the Korean commitment and the collective effort of NATO, the government 'does not at present contemplate the recruiting and organization of further units of its armed forces for service with the United Nations.' Furthermore, it was added that any future use of the brigade, which had been designated with fanfare for collective action, would be for the Canadian government to decide with the approval of parliament. Canadian planners, like their colleagues in other Western countries, were faced with a paradox. It was hard, in the light of the recent experience, not to look upon collective security through the UN as a preparation of the 'free world' against further aggression inspired by 'international communism.' The struggle against 'international communism' in Korea, because the challenge was met by a coalition blessed by the United Nations, attracted much wider support than would otherwise have been the case. On the other hand, the military operation had been almost entirely organized by the United States, and even when it became more international, by far the largest contribution, aside from that of the Republic of Korea itself, came from the NATO countries. In spite of the advantages in principle of organizing military action and economic sanctions through UN institutions, sober second thought suggested that this was not a very practical proposition. The UN might inspire a coalition, but it was far from creating its own chiefs of staff or ministry of defence. In the Korean War, as in the Second World War, the hard realities of fighting required the veritable dictation of strategy by the major powers or by one of them. In Ottawa there was considerable caution over the pretensions of the Collective Measures Committee and some concern lest there be conflict with NATO procedures. As far as the Americans were concerned, the left hand did not seem to be quite sure what the right hand was doing. Its UN arm, inspired, no doubt, by a conviction that any UN military action in the future would be on behalf of the 'free world,' was making some far-reaching proposals for setting up an 'executive military authority.' In the State Department, however, there were hard-headed people saying that the entire responsibility for the operational conduct of a general war would have to be in the hands of NATO, and the UN should not be allowed to get in the way. While

162 The Shaping of Peace Ottawa recognized that it might come to this, and that if the Western powers did have to get into another war there would be great advantages in gaining the sanction of the United Nations, such a defeatist position ought not to be formalized in advance. Too determined an effort to set up such a military authority at the UN would drive not only the Russians out of the organization but probably also India and the other non-aligned states. It was again the paradox that, in order to save the UN, the Canadians were rejecting the proposals to strengthen the function of the world body and fortify the concept of universal collective security. It can be argued in retrospect that NATO and the Warsaw pact saved the UN from disruption by removing from it a military role it could never fulfil while providing the Eastern and Western camps with the sense of security they required to allow the UN to enter into a productive decade of conflict resolution. Another possibility considered was that the UN might renounce any role in a war and remain in 'cold storage' in order to play its more appropriate role in bringing about a peace. This calculation was based on the recognition that, as far as Korea was concerned, the UN had sought to fulfil both roles and the second had been jeopardized by the first. However, just after the fighting had ceased and in the light of the Uniting for Peace resolution, it was believed that such a policy would not be acceptable. Recent activities of the United Nations had created expectations and if it sat on the sidelines when a war broke out, the institution would suffer such a loss of prestige it would not be able to play an effective peacemaking role. On balance, therefore, Ottawa came down on the side of what seemed the more practical alternative - the theory that the United Nations and NATO would have complementary roles to play in the event of a general war. If there was a general war originating in the NATO area, then the actual operational direction of activities would be in the hands of NATO. If such a war originated outside NATO territory, it would be in the hands of some other executive authority established under the auspices of the United Nations. This would mean that while the United Nations would not concern itself with the actual direction of the economic and military measures, it would be a useful mechanism for obtaining the greatest possible co-operation from member states that were not actually participating. Even in wartime it was considered important to preserve this symbol of the world community.41 As a tacit operating principle this made sense. It was in a way a rationalization of what had happened in Korea. It was not, however, a philosophy which could be proclaimed. The position the government was prepared to take publicly was that any general war in which Canada might be engaged would be one against an aggressor and in accordance with obligations under

163 The Challenge of Korea the United Nations. It was not considered wise to suggest in advance that some members of the United Nations would have less responsibility in war and fewer obligations than others. As a private argument, however, for going slow about creating an executive military authority in the UN and working on the assumption that Canada's kind of war would have to be run by NATO, the rationalization prevailed. This policy may be regarded, as it has been by critics of a subsequent generation, as a cynical exploitation of the UN as a Cold War instrument of the West, but the statesmen of the time saw it rather as the Western members accepting their responsibilities as the only military powers on whom the UN could rely to carry out its purposes of maintaining world order. It was an arrogant assumption no doubt, but it must be said that it was encouraged by political leaders of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, even in private by many who were publicly non-aligned. They were not at all certain about the way in which the Western powers might use their force, but they did not want the UN to be without any strength to call upon. There was some concern in Ottawa over the risks involved in the impetus given to the idea of universal collective security. The UN had now taken a step in Korea which seemed to suggest that aggression anywhere must be met in the same way. In the perception of the day, the age of containment, there was an enormous communist empire stretching from the centre of Europe to the Sea of Japan which could break out in various weak spots. It was obvious to any serious strategist that the 'free world' had not the military resources to stage elsewhere the kind of desperate resistance that had been organized in Korea, close to a major American base. Certainly, it could not do this if, as was feared, there were deliberately staged aggressions in various places at the same time. There was great reluctance to abandon the principle of universal collective security lest a failure to respond to any cry for help destroy the authority of the UN and the credibility of'the West.' On the other hand, nothing would be more fatal to the organization than to make a desperate military effort and be defeated. There was no escaping this paradox; it had to be lived with. It was a paradox Pearson worried about greatly. He told Max Freedman of the Winnipeg Free Press in January 1951 that he wanted 'Selective collective security - with Canada deciding where and when and if we will do anything under the Charter.'42 Dulles sought to deal crudely with the paradox by threatening massive retaliation at any spot where the aggressor broke out. The allies, especially the Canadians, shuddered at his lack of finesse, but a mutual fear of the incalculable consequences of rash action made the superpowers careful enough to allow the UN to work in its fashion. The efforts to organize military strength in the UN petered out. Canada and its allies concentrated on the development of their military power in

164 The Shaping of Peace NATO and it came to be assumed that the Korean situation had been unique. When, in the mid-fifties, the membership of the United Nations expanded rapidly, the idea that it could be the basis of a military coalition became even more unreal. Although the term collective security remained in the vocabulary of United Nations oratory to beguile the public and, by setting up false expectations, undermine the credibility of the United Nations, thinking about security became more realistic and more sophisticated.

8

The New Commonwealth

In the unfolding design of a world order congenial for Canada the new Commonwealth had its part. It took care nicely of a traditional association to which a majority of Canadians were attached and attracted as well the support of many who had not been keen on old-fashioned empires. It offered some counterbalance to the great republic and eventually a relationship to the Third World which alleviated the association with the rich world of NATO. What is more, this new kind of Commonwealth was essentially the Canadian model. Mackenzie King helped make it possible by opposing the idea of the Commonwealth as a single force. He was not ready to make very much of the new association he had brought into being. St Laurent and Pearson and their officials, however, began to see the association as the instrument of a more dynamic Canadian foreign policy and a valuable institution to help maintain the world in equilibrium. CONSULTATION

The new Commonwealth, it was agreed, would be a consultative association, but consultation, as Canadians well knew, had varied implications. Did agreement mean commitment? When is a bloc not a bloc? Some of the old Canadian concerns persisted until they became irrelevant. The growing maturity of the Canadian attitude - as well as the declining influence of King - might be noted in the changing attitude adopted towards group meetings of the high commissioners in London with British ministers.1 Before the war King and the under-secretary of state for external affairs, O.D. Skelton, had become obsessively preoccupied with this question as they saw, with perhaps some justification, a British effort to regard regular high commissioners' meetings in London as something in the nature of a

166 The Shaping of Peace Commonwealth policy-making body. During the war and postwar period the issue was complicated by a suspicion in Ottawa that Vincent Massey, the high commissioner, was too much inclined to go along with such imperial schemes. Massey had pointed out that such meetings with the foreign secretary were a valuable way of getting confidential information and that it was unfair to insist under wartime pressures that ministers give separate audiences to the Canadian high commissioner. After the war it should not have been a serious issue, but the Canadian attitude remained dogmatic. There were the inevitable ambivalences because whatever the British tried to do to consult their colleagues - something on which the lusty Antipodeans insisted - could be regarded as an effort to create a common front. When, after 1947, the circle of high commissioners in London widened beyond the cosy group of palefaces, joint sessions tended to be less confidential and less rewarding and the Foreign Office hinted to the Canadian high commissioner that he could do better talking to them direct.2 By the early 1950s high commissioners meetings as an institution ceased to be of any significance. It was not only the British interest in Commonwealth solidarity which bothered Canadians, but also the Australian. Dr Herbert Evatt supported Canada in resistance to British efforts to speak for the Commonwealth, but he was always happy to line up the empire behind an Australian position. In 1947 Evatt insisted on calling a conference in Canberra where Commonwealth countries would discuss their views on a possible peace treaty with Japan before they were faced with an unchangeable draft by the great powers. Although Brooke Claxton, the minister of national defence, did go to the Canberra meeting, Canada was represented with some misgiving. Misgivings were expressed by the United Kingdom as well and they, like Canada, were nervous about reaching a 'common policy' on an Asian issue which the Americans might regard as 'ganging up.' The Canadian ambassador was instructed to inform the State Department of the talks and say that the conference would 'result in no commitments on policy and that the Canadian Government will certainly not formulate its position without giving full consideration to the views of the United States.'3 Consultation, however, was proving to be useful. Formal, but usually informal, meetings of Commonwealth members at various international conferences were frequent and more or less regular sessions to exchange ideas among Commonwealth representatives were established in various places, including the United Nations and in Moscow. The success of such gatherings depended greatly on personality. At the United Nations Commonwealth officials were in constant touch even when not in consensus, but the formal gatherings too often failed to be useful because of a shyness to

167 The New Commonwealth come to grips with issues which might cause division.4 The larger members had less need of these meetings as their own resources grew, but the sharing of Foreign Office information remained valuable while their diplomatic networks were limited. The newer and weaker members found them essential. Of particular help to them also was the assistance provided by the widespread institutions of the British foreign service and, to a lesser extent, by those of Canada and Australia. Even Canada was enabled to avoid rushing unprepared into a large foreign establishment appropriate to its status in the world community. It could move much more slowly than countries outside the Commonwealth because the British embassies and consulates continued to serve Canadians in all places where the Canadian flag had not been unfurled. For many years the Canadian foreign service remained dependent on British communications, including couriers. The British may have provided these services in the earlier stages out of some vague sense of obligation to maintain an imperial citizenship, but as the problems of Canadians occupied an increasingly larger proportion of the work of the British offices, they pressed Ottawa to do its own work. This happy evolution is somewhat at odds with the myth of Canada's 'struggle' to wrest control of its foreign policy from Westminster. IRELAND AND INDIA

By the end of the forties there was an accumulation of issues of constitutional relationships that had to be discussed. The clamour in London for imperial conferences had not died away. The wedding of Princess Elizabeth in 1947 was seen by some as a great opportunity for a session in full panoply. To Canada's relief, plans miscarried5 because of the problem of attendance - a problem which grew greater every time a new prime minister was added. However disinclined the Canadian government was to get involved in post-imperial affairs, it could not escape the special position it had acquired through its leadership in the evolution of the Commonwealth and avoid questions which could not be left to the United Kingdom alone. Britain's relations with Ireland and India were so imbedded in historic animosities that Canada, and the other dominions as well, could be helpful - not so much as intermediaries but as lightning conductors when the Labour government set out to find better bases of relationship with Dublin and Delhi. As the Irish were trying to decide in the years after the war whether or not to pick up the Commonwealth association which, although it formally continued, had been suspended in practice during the war, the Commonwealth countries tried to help. Canadians were particularly anxious to preserve the

168 The Shaping of Peace link, not only out of an old association with the Irish in the cause of liberalizing the Commonwealth but also because it was the mother country of many Canadians. Canadian politicians and diplomats sought quietly to persuade the Irish of the advantages of remaining in the association, but it was on a visit to Ottawa in September 1948 that Prime Minister Costello unexpectedly announced that Ireland was going to sever all links with the crown. The Irish did not appear at the Commonwealth conference in London in October of that year and the subject was not on the agenda. However, there were informal discussions about Ireland at Chequers where two Irish ministers, the British prime minister, St Laurent, the prime minister of New Zealand, and Evatt of Australia were present. St Laurent stressed the Canadian view that they had no right to interfere in Ireland's domestic affairs but he was prepared to go a long way in accepting Irish membership even if they regarded the crown only as head of state for external purposes.6 As the British and Irish sought to settle their relationships, paradoxes about the new Commonwealth appeared. With India, Ceylon, Burma, and others Britain had certain special defence and economic interests, but these were not relevant to Canada's relationships with the countries concerned. In the case of Ceylon, for example, there seemed at one time a possibility that Britain would make self-government for Ceylon dependent upon the conclusion of a satisfactory defence agreement. It would have been contradictory to the Canadian view of the Commonwealth relationship to allow any such bilateral question to be integral to the status of a member, and yet Canada did not want to interfere in Britain's dealings with its dependencies. In the case of Ireland the British were told specifically that Canada would not want to be associated with a statement the British were preparing defining their relations. Canada would define its own relations with Ireland. When the Irish did decide for total independence they were told that Canada had no desire to treat Ireland as a foreign country or to treat Irish citizens as foreigners. Although they were reluctant to see the Irish resign they were not prepared to twist their elbows by promising or threatening. Canada did, in fact, create a special category of Irish citizens who were not, for purposes of immigration or otherwise, to be regarded either as foreigners or as Commonwealth citizens.7 On the question of India Canada was equally active and more successful than with Ireland.8 There was first the question of India's and Pakistan's admission to Commonwealth status in 1947 and the more troublesome question of India's remaining a member with republican status in 1949. Canada's part was again not that of an intermediary. It was rather that of supporting a disposition of the British Labour government to make concessions which

169 The New Commonwealth met with some strong resistance within the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. It was fortunate that the Conservatives were not in charge in Whitehall, and it was fortunate also that St Laurent and Pearson were in the process of establishing their views over those of King in his last stage in office. Although King had written to Nehru in 1942 sympathizing with his prison experience and referring, needless to say, to his own grandfather's imprisonment,9 he resisted all pressure to play a helpful role vis-à-vis India during the war. He was a sentimental anti-colonialist, but he was not interested in a multiracial Commonwealth. The changing perceptions in Ottawa are illustrated in the differences between King on the one hand and St Laurent and Pearson on the other over the proper attitude to adopt when the British in 1947 notified Canada of the intention to create India and Pakistan as separate members of the Commonwealth. While the External Affairs people liked the plan well enough they were concerned over the implications of the British notification that India and Pakistan would 'remain' in the Commonwealth. They did not want to interfere in Indian internal affairs by commenting on them and they did not want to share the responsibility of the UK for the policy leading to dual independence. 'If we do not comment,' Pearson said to King, 'we appear to give the right to the United Kingdom to invite other states to join the Commonwealth association.'10 The Commonwealth was regarded not as something in which India remained but a new club into which it would enter with approval of all members. King, however, insisted in ill temper on a reply that could in no way be construed as giving advice or being consulted. Unlike his advisers, he was not interested in the admission of any new members. He told St Laurent he was horrified at the thought of an Asian majority dominating the Commonwealth." The old man was fortunately unaware that when the secretary of the British cabinet was in Ottawa to discuss plans for India, Canadian officials helped draft a set of possible instructions from Prime Minister Attlee as a basis for British talks with Nehru. 12 As far as King was concerned this dawn of a new Commonwealth was 'part of an effort on Britain's part to get rid of her burdens and to throw them on to the Dominions.' Perhaps the most useful Canadian contribution was in moving the Commonwealth in directions that made it an acceptable club for the new India. Canada rejected the single voice concept, dropped the term dominion, and removed other symbols that would have posed difficulties for the Congress party. On the other hand, the Indians had made clear to the Canadian high commissioner in Delhi that Canada's immigration restrictions, despite the Citizenship Act of 1 January 1947, were being used by the Indian National Congress as an argument against membership.13 The high commissioner

170 The Shaping of Peace argued in favour of admission of at least a token number of Indians, but it was not until 1951 that provision was made for a specified quota from India and from Pakistan. Canada was by no means alone in its disposition to go far in concessions to Indian republicanism in order to give the Commonwealth the inestimable advantage of Indian participation. The Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand and the South Africans were all similarly disposed, although in the case of Australia and New Zealand they had to take into consideration even stronger monarchical views than existed in Canada. There was a practical side to Canada's anxiety to maintain, if at all possible, the crown as the link. The direct relationship to the King was, after all, the formula which had enabled the dominion governments to free themselves from any authority of the United Kingdom government. Furthermore, Canada was preparing new legislation destined to clarify the position of the monarch as 'King of Canada.' There was also worry over the implications of one doctrine under consideration which would find the link not in the crown but in a common citizenship. The British might be prepared then and for some time afterwards to admit any British subject to the United Kingdom, but Canada was not. So St Laurent in a message to Prime Minister Nehru of 31 March 1949 made a strong argument for retaining some link between the 'Sovereign Republic of India and the Crown.' As an example of what consultation in the new spirit should be, the discussion of India's republican status was a classic case. The British were anxious to please and take advice. Sir Norman Brook, the secretary to the cabinet, spent days in Delhi, Ottawa, and elsewhere, and all concerned sought assiduously and constructively to find a formula all could accept. Nehru was exceedingly reasonable, and even the King displayed remarkable forbearance as his servants played about with his powers and status. Canadian concern was to preserve the institution and to keep India in the fold because of all that its presence meant to the new and more attractive Commonwealth they foresaw. This meant finding some new basis of membership other than a common allegiance. The view was functional. Canada did not want to alter its own relationship to the crown, but if others did, so be it. That was no reason to break up a useful association. After much negotiation and the exploration of various formulas, agreement was reached at a conference in London in April 1947 on a common recognition of the King as 'Head of the Commonwealth.' It begged many questions, but it was accepted because everyone wanted it to work. There was no doubt that a particular and a lasting rapport was established between St Laurent and Pearson and the Indians. J.D. Kearney, the Cana-

171 The New Commonwealth dian high commissioner in New Delhi, was a particular contributor to a good start by his constructive discussions with the Indians on the spot. It would be unfair, however, to see Canada as the go-between, as the British and Indians worked hard themselves to find common ground. As usual, however, Pearson, who attended the London meetings to settle the question in place of St Laurent, was in the thick of the drafting. There were many issues to work out, including that of whether to retain the word British before Commonwealth. 'This was,' as Pearson noted in his record, 'another fight which I found we could skip ...' Nevertheless, he did 'suggest that we could use the words "British Commonwealth of Nations" to refer to the present situation and "Commonwealth of Nations" when referring to the new state of affairs. At first this did not get much support but, as it happened, it was finally adopted.'14 Such is the gentle art of helpful fixing! Not surprisingly, Attlee, who had put Sir Stafford Cripps and Brook to work on the first draft when all were exhausted, privately asked Pearson to assist. They worked swiftly while the others were at a cocktail party and came up with the wording which, with a few minor changes, was accepted. Indicative of the remarkable spirit of the occasion was that although the Indians involved were in no doubt about the Canadian concerns over citizenship and immigration, they seemed to have recognized that St Laurent and Pearson were not trying to justify racial discrimination but to avoid inevitable difficulties if false assumptions were made. There was adopted an 'agreed minute' of the conference which the Canadian delegation had had a good hand in formulating, according to which Commonwealth countries would not regard themselves as foreign to one another and would take whatever steps were necessary to enable them '...to maintain the right to accord preferential treatment, as has been customary, to the citizens and trade of other Commonwealth countries but that each government should remain free to determine the extent of that preferential treatment and the precise method of according it.' 15 It was a formula that met not only the Canadian desire to safeguard its immigration policy but also its freedom in trade negotiations with the United States. The impact of the Commonwealth on Canada's racial policies and attitudes was more evident at first in speech than in practice. Nevertheless for this and other reasons policy began moving in a reverse direction so that within a decade Canadian immigration policies had been transformed in ways that the liberal reformers of the early years of the new Commonwealth could hardly have anticipated. It is difficult for Canadians of a later generation to recognize that an exchange of notes between India and Canada which provided for admission into Canada during each calendar year beginning 1 Janu-

172 The Shaping of Peace ary 1951 of 150 citizens of India for permanent residence was anything but a restrictive measure. Similar agreements were reached with Pakistan and Ceylon, the quotas in those cases being 100 and 50 persons, respectively. In fact, it was another achievement of the External Affairs community and of a long battle of Pearson with his cabinet colleagues to begin liberalizing Canadian policies towards Asians. Effective advocacy came also from some members of parliament, M.J. Coldwell in particular. The Canadian high commissioner in Delhi had reported in 1948 that Sir Girja Bajpai, secretary-general of the Indian ministry of external affairs, said that in better informed circles in his country it was conceded that Australia and Canada were justified, in their own interests, in reducing the influx of Indian nationals in significant numbers. He had added, however, that if Canada could allow a token number of Indians to migrate yearly 'it would not only remove the remaining cause of friction between his country and mine but would deprive the anti-Commonwealth element in this country of an effective weapon.'16 THE COLOMBO P L A N

The 1949 conference cleared away many of the pressing constitutional problems of the Commonwealth and during its course the Canadians were able to fend off one final effort to define and regularize the terms of Commonwealth consultation. They wanted it flexible and more functional. From then on, the Commonwealth settled down to its golden age of consultation. The Commonwealth finance ministers met in July 1949, the foreign ministers met in January 1950, the defence ministers in 1951, and so on. The conference of foreign ministers in Colombo in January 1950 was a landmark. There was the habitual Canadian reluctance to attend, but finally Pearson was sent, on the grounds that it would be unwise to let the Asian members think Canada was uninterested in their problems and that it would be all to the good to have a 'North American' view heard, especially on economic matters.17 In the discussions Canada was still somewhat selfconsciously reminding those present of American positions and interests although the British at least were quite as conscious of these. The State Department was obviously worried about a Commonwealth position on relations with the new Chinese government. Dean Acheson said to the Canadian ambassador that he hoped the conference would agree on some division of responsibilities in the Far East between the United States and the British Commonwealth. He thought, for example, the Commonwealth should treat Burma and Malaya as its special responsibility. Wrong tried to explain to the Americans that the Commonwealth did not act collectively in this way and

173 The New Commonwealth that 'Burma was very remote from the interests of the Canadian people,' but there was evident at any rate some movement in Washington to see the Commonwealth not just as a set of hostile trade preferences but as an institution with a complementary function to its own in maintaining world stability. 18 The Canadian impact on the conference was probably less notable than the impact on the Canadians of the viewpoints on Asian affairs expressed by their Asian colleagues. Although the Canadians felt obliged to stress - on the China issue for example - the importance they must attach to the American position, they were more inclined to agree with the Indians and Pakistanis as well as the British on the substance. The view expressed in a paper prepared on China for the conference was '...we should make no move towards recognition before India and the United Kingdom, but we should be prepared to consider recognizing the Communist Government in China shortly after the United Kingdom has done so.'19 It was a salutary influence in giving Canada a Far Eastern orientation at a time when, in the height of its NATO enthusiasm, it was inclined to stress the heaviness of the Atlantic burden. On regional grounds Canada was prepared to sit back and let the British, Australians, and New Zealanders take the lead in discussions of Asian questions, even relations with Japan-thereby, of course, manoeuvring for disengagement from a proposal to make a Commonwealth loan to Burma. Having accepted a dangerous commitment to try to get the Europeans on their feet, the Canadian government was nervous about any comparable commitments in so vast and so distant a continent. There were in fact two meetings being held in Colombo at the same time, as a group of Commonwealth economic officials was seeking solutions to the problems of the sterling balances. The more the foreign ministers considered the problem of Asia the more they realized that a lack of capital was at the heart of it. And so inevitably these 'upstairs and downstairs' sessions, as Douglas LePan, who was present, has called them, 20 came together in recommendations that formed the basis of what was later to be known as the Colombo Plan. It called for governments to give a high priority to making credits available to the countries of South and Southeast Asia for productive purposes and the establishment of a Consultative Committee for South and South-East Asia to plan and co-ordinate such actions. It was to a considerable extent an Australian-Ceylonese initiative, with the British giving cautious support and the Canadians trying to be as helpful as the extreme caution of Ottawa would permit. In spite of its anxieties, and the scepticism of ministers and of the Department of Finance, the government could not escape membership in the Con-

174 The Shaping of Peace sultative Committee which was to meet in Sydney in May 1950 and out of which blossomed the actual Colombo Plan. Although it was a considerable venture for Canada to get involved at all in an aid programme for Asia, the acceptance of the invitation and the instructions to the delegations were hedged with all the usual qualifications. Grandiose schemes were to be avoided, technical assistance stressed, and, above all, merger with broader United Nations programmes was to be advocated and the way left open for participation of non-Commonwealth countries, the United States in particular. The new Australian external affairs minister, Percy Spender, did not help, as he stressed the desirability of a Commonwealth secretariat and council to administer the scheme which might thereby provide a model for Commonwealth action in other spheres. He was less than suave when he expressed the hope that Canada would approach the problem 'with the same sense of urgency as you approach the Atlantic pact.' His grandiose proposals got scant support, and a tumultuous session ended with scaled down recommendations which seem unduly modest in face of the problems but which recognized the need to work out a farsighted programme of economic development based on realistic calculations of needs and capacities. It recommended also a Commonwealth technical assistance programme - a kind of development Ottawa found more attractive than capital assistance as it cost much less and was more tangible. Instead of setting up a large Commonwealth administrative organization, an Indian proposal was accepted by which assistance would be provided through bilateral arrangements between governments and co-ordination achieved through a bureau in Colombo. It was agreed, furthermore, that India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and the British colonies in the area should begin with realistic and comprehensive statements of their economic situation and an estimate of the aid they would need. These national programmes would be fitted into a six-year plan to be discussed at a meeting in London to which other governments should be invited. Although the aid would largely flow in one direction, the machinery was designed to stress the element of mutual collaboration in projects. It so happened that the government was at the same time being called upon to contribute to the United Nations expanded technical assistance programme. Among other things it was also trying to decide whether to establish relations with the People's Republic of China. The Korean War was less than a fortnight off when, on 12 June 1950, after much haggling, cabinet agreed to give $750,000 to the United Nations programme and $400,000 to the Colombo scheme. In an examination of the contesting forces of what one might call 'isolationist nationalism' and 'internationalist nationalism' in Canada the struggle

175 The New Commonwealth over the Colombo Plan matches in importance the argument over articipation in the United Nations Commission in Korea in 1947-8 and over participation in the UN force in Korea. This is not to suggest that the argument was solely between nationalists and internationalists. Much of the hesitation about the Colombo Plan was attributable to a realization of the enormous scope of the problem being opened up, a concern for sound foundations, and an awareness of the danger in great expectations. The agonizing reappraisal over the UN force in Korea was going on at the same time as the later stage of the debate over the Colombo Plan and very much affected political ideas on the subject not only in Ottawa but in Washington as well. At meetings held in London in the autumn of 1950 and the intensive diplomatic negotiations that accompanied the effort to get the plan on its feet, the British and Canadians shared the dilemma of assuming a positive posture in a good cause while being as careful as they could over commitments. Both were convinced of the crucial importance of associating the United States with the plan if the resources available were to give it any significance at all. On this issue, as on so many others of this phase of 'the Creation,' there was intense collaboration (a hostile critic might call it a conspiracy) of the internationally-minded bureaucracies in London, Washington, Ottawa, Canberra, and Wellington to overcome the doubts and hesitations of their political masters. The Indian, Pakistani, and Ceylonese bureaucrats were tuned in to this network and understood the kind of restraints to impose on their own political leaders if they were to get the aid they desired. Canadian officials realized that in the effort to persuade the American Congress to contribute to the Colombo projects the example of Canada would be important, but they resisted pressures from other Commonwealth countries to take any initiative vis-à-vis Washington. The embassy in Washington was told that Canada should not appear in Washington as a leader in matters relating to the Commonwealth Consultative Committee.21 American officials were probably more worried about Canadian reticence. They saw in the Commonwealth initiatives in the Colombo Plan a disposition of Commonwealth countries to share responsibilities that assisted their arguments - provided, of course, Canada and the United Kingdom were sufficiently generous.22 In the end, Canada, as usual, got the kind of organization it wanted. The United States and foreign countries in the area were associated with the Colombo Plan. There was no Commonwealth council to set a bad precedent and Canada was free to determine the nature and quantity of its aid in bilateral negotiations with India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. Officials in Ottawa were roughly divided into two camps. On one side stood the Department of External Affairs and, in the cabinet, Pearson, Clax-

176 The Shaping of Peace ton, and fisheries minister, Robert Mayhew; on the other, the Department of Finance and the old guard in the cabinet. Prominent among the old guard was the minister of agriculture, Jimmy Gardiner, who never hesitated to make known his view that the problem of Indian poverty could be solved by a sale of the pooled jewelry of the Maharajahs. There were more serious worries on the part of the critics. In particular, the Department of Finance had austere views about the amount of the national income of Pakistan and India being spent on their domestic quarrel over Kashmir. Cabinet was at this same time considering the implications of the very heavy increases in defence expenditures required by participation in Korea. For those who had assumed that participation in international institutions was going to be cheap, 1950 was a bad year. Some of the questions raised by the critics in Ottawa were valid enough, as for example the anxieties over the relationship of the Colombo Plan to the United Nations programme, but they could also be used as excuses. Mayhew argued strongly against any decision based on concern over the defence measures of India and Pakistan, urging that 'we should view the problems and dangers in Asia with the same foresight and generosity as we do those of Europe.'23 In spite of the excited nature of opinion during this crucial phase of the Korean War, the argument for aid in Asia was free of cruder ideological arguments.24 Mayhew tried to convince his cabinet colleagues that by making sure of friends in the Asian region risks everywhere would be lessened and the North Atlantic pact thereby strengthened. The emphasis was on positive assistance to those who were trying to make democracy work. Pearson put his central argument in a letter to the prime minister: 'It does seem to me that here is one situation where the countries of the Commonwealth can play an important part in bridging the gap between the poverty and therefore the neutrality and indifference of Asia, and the wealth and therefore, at times, the interventionist and impatient tactics of the United States.'25 The letter was written at the same time he was struggling hard in New York to curb any disposition to extend the war in Korea. In the effort to get an armistice in Korea the Indians were most helpful, and in the hectic UN diplomacy of those years gaining Indian support came to be a matter of critical importance. Relations between Washington and Delhi could hardly have been worse, whereas relations between Delhi and Ottawa were good. In Canadian eyes this was not a struggle to keep India out of the communist camp, because they knew Nehru well enough to know that that was not where he was leading his country. What they feared was the alienation of Indian leaders to such an extent that Nehru could not act as the all important bridge between Asia and the West. One senior official wrote in a memorandum: 'What is really at

177 The New Commonwealth issue is whether the Canadian Government wishes to continue to play a respected role of leadership in international affairs, paying its way as it goes along, or whether it is willing to become a satellite of the United States, pushed from time to time into grudging gifts.'26 For various conflicting reasons and because they were trapped by the posture in world affairs that Canada had acquired, on 7 February 1951 cabinet finally authorized its representative to the Consultative Committee to say that the government was willing to offer $25,000,000 for the fiscal year 1951-2 with the proviso that 'this amount would be made available only if other contributing countries were providing enough to give reasonable hope that the broad objectives of the Plan would be achieved.' There was a new stipulation which had originated in the Department of Finance requiring discussions with the Indian government on the desirability of providing from $10 to $15 million for the purchase of wheat, the grant to be charged against the $25 million. India would be asked to undertake to use an equivalent amount in local currency 'for the financing of development projects called for by the Colombo Plan.' It was not the last time recalcitrant ministers would be persuaded by the prospect of getting rid of wheat or dried fish in aid projects. The decision to participate was certainly not made by the cabinet in the prospect of great commercial advantage. However, the Department of Trade and Commerce was showing a more positive interest in aid programmes and went so far as to provide accommodation and an establishment for a bureau in Ottawa, which was becoming increasingly necessary to handle the considerable administrative problems involved in technical assistance. It was a very modest beginning, and it cannot be said that aid contributions within the Colombo Plan ever got out of hand. The Colombo Plan started something much larger than itself. It soon merged into broader frameworks of international aid and development. The Commonwealth provided the initiative and the continuing core, the kind of role it would be working out as a force within the United Nations. The Colombo meetings diverted the attention of the Commonwealth in seance to economics, forced its leaders to look at basics. If consultation was to be the raison d'être of the Commonwealth it had to be about things more important than its own architecture. For Canada one consequence was that the European orientation of policy had been challenged. The active period of Canadian diplomacy that ensued was in fact very much concerned with Asia. Obligations within the United Nations would almost certainly have pushed Canadian attention in that direction under any circumstances, but the fact that the entrée had been largely under Commonwealth auspices had a considerable effect on the Canadian perspective and on the role it was to play. It was as if Canada entered Asia

178 The Shaping of Peace through India, Pakistan, and Ceylon rather than through the Philippines, Formosa, and South Korea as did the Americans. When Americans and Canadians talked about the 'free countries of Asia' they had in mind a different set of people. During the years when the new concepts of consultation were being tried out in the Commonwealth there was a considerable degree of consensus on questions like China and on communism and nationalism in Asia. The extent of that consensus ought not to be exaggerated, but in moments of crisis Commonwealth leaders tended to congeal on questions of tactics, and their ideas of tactics tended also to be considerably different from those of Washington. A Commonwealth consensus in direct confrontation with the views of the United States would hardly have been acceptable - not only to Ottawa but perhaps even more so to London and Canberra. A responsible or constructive effort, however, to persuade the Americans to assist, in quasi-mediatory ways, to reduce East-West confrontations was not only acceptable, it gave Commonwealth leaders a sense of purpose. In Canada, furthermore, it attracted support for a Commonwealth policy from elements that had been critical of the empire tie. C H A N G I N G CONCEPTS

It was the prospect of useful contacts with the Asian Commonwealth representatives that helped persuade the Canadian government to swallow its old reticence about prime ministers' meetings and send St Laurent to a session in London in January 1951.27 The new consultative Commonwealth was launched. From now on there were only minor items at the end of the agenda tidying up constitutional issues or defining the relationship. At the January 1951 session Korea naturally took up most of the time. The anxiety of the Commonwealth prime ministers to assist Pearson and Sir Senegal Rau, the Indian representative at the United Nations, who were at that time involved in New York in trying to secure a ceasefire, led them to act somewhat precipitately. St Laurent persuaded them not to start off with a joint approach to the United States. He did so not because of old prejudices against common Commonwealth positions but because he thought there were more tactful ways of persuading the Americans. It was agreed that each of the Commonwealth governments should make its views known individually through its representatives in Washington and New York. However, a single telegram embodying the views of all the prime ministers was later sent to Washington and Lake Success. There it was discussed by Commonwealth representatives who suggested some revisions and, as a result, the prime ministers returned to the principle of sending individual instructions to their

179 The New Commonwealth representatives. Whatever the form, this activity of the Commonwealth attracted the attention and anxiety of Washington and was used by those in the State Department and elsewhere who needed support for their own arguments against rash action.28 One of the indications that Canada was looking more functionally and less fearfully at the Commonwealth was the willingness to participate in Korea as part of a Commonwealth division. There were sound logistic and other reasons for working in this way, and the prospect of being a very small unit in an engulfing American operation was much less attractive. There were still occasions on which British defence officials started the alarms ringing by reviving long-dead schemes for imperial defence co-operation. St Laurent was less nervous than King had been about being present at defence discussions, and he allowed Canadian observers to sit in on talks about the Commonwealth role in the Middle East. That clearly interested some members of the Commonwealth, and Canada now used its regional argument about defence with stronger effect. Just as Australia and New Zealand had their regional arrangements, not only between themselves but with the United States, so Canada and Britain were contributing to the security of the whole Commonwealth by their part in the North Atlantic. Canadians, furthermore, took it upon themselves in consultations to explain NATO as well as us policies, feeling the need to do so particularly because the other members, except Britain, seemed lamentably uninterested and somewhat biased. With a new sense of confidence, the Department of External Affairs set out in 1950 to take a new look at an old institution. After intensive re-examination both at home and abroad a policy paper emerged which is a useful indication of the new directions in the fifties.29 The basic assumption was that the old battles had been won. It was now time to strengthen and make something of the institution. It was important to look at Commonwealth issues free of the old fears of British domination. While the position against a single policy was maintained, it was argued that on an ad hoc basis there might be occasions on which 'a unison of harmonizing voices' could be more influential than individual stands and the joint approach on Korea of January 1950 was cited as an example. 'It would be a mistake to assume that the existing flexible and informal machinery has reached a stage of unchanging perfection.' While there should be resistance to too many prime ministers' meetings because of the large number of international gatherings to be attended, nevertheless Canada should approach them more positively, with a full recognition that they were useful and helpful to the Canadian national interest. The idea of the Commonwealth as a bridge between the West and Asia was supported, but it was necessary for Canada to play its part in keep-

180 The Shaping of Peace ing the bridge in operation by 'conscientious efforts to consult the Eastern members.' The British were handicapped by memories of the raj, the South Africans by their racial policies, and the Australians, with their proclaimed White Australia policy, had a different image. For Canada the Commonwealth was also a counter-weight. It gave Canada an alternate association that provided leverage, and introduced a modification or shading between the United States and the rest of the non-communist world. 'United States policy at times displays a disturbing tendency to try to break down all links throughout the non-communist world except those that have their head and centre in Washington; the United States attitude, on various occasions in the past, towards the sterling area might be taken as an example of this. It is useful to maintain the Commonwealth connection as a check on such tendencies.' The counterweight theory, deeply ingrained in traditional Canadian thinking, was a part of Canadian dogma rarely questioned and rarely spelled out. There were no doubt occasions on which Canada, by combination with Commonwealth countries, was able to have more diplomatic impact on the Americans, and the association with India in particular undoubtedly strengthened the Canadian hand in UN diplomacy. Perhaps, however, the value of the counterweight theory was more psychological than otherwise, giving Canadians a feeling that they were not alone in resisting the powerful forces of continentalism. Finally, this memorandum argued strongly for Canadians getting rid of their old inhibitions vis-à-vis Britain and the Commonwealth and looking at Commonwealth issues in terms of the national interests of Canada rather than assuming that anything they did in the Commonwealth way was in some sense serving the interests of the United Kingdom. This attitude, it was argued, might be easier to achieve if Canada could get rid of some of the continuing vestiges of the old colonial status by, among other things, appointing a Canadian as governor general, patriating the British North America Act, altering the King's title, and doing something about a national flag and a national anthem. Steps were taken by the government to fulfil some of these recommendations. They were not designed to weaken the Commonwealth; rather they made it more acceptable by emphasizing in symbol as well as in practice the independence and equality of all members. It was still regarded as important, however, to assert the priority of the United Nations, to see the Commonwealth not as a rival association in any way but rather as a kind of ginger group, a force for good within the broader system. Canadian officials had never been comfortable with the inter se doctrine which asserted that intra-Commonwealth relations were to be distinguished from international relations. The struggle for an internationally

181 The New Commonwealth recognized personality had been the purpose of acquiring dominion status. Canada had moved forward by its separate declaration of war, a position later adopted by other dominions vis-à-vis Japan and the Nazi satellites. The Canadian government dropped the formal references to 'the diplomatic unity of the Empire' - for example in the agreement with Mexico in 1944 for the exchange of ambassadors. Appeals to the Privy Council in London were ended in 1949. In 1949 new letters patent constituting the office of governor general clarified the existing practice by removing the last vestiges of imperial control over the executive arm. The Canadian Citizenship Act of 1947 defined Canadian citizenship for the first time. It also provided for the status of British subject or Commonwealth citizen, but that status was acquired by having the status of Canadian citizen. The achievement of 'dominion status' had been a phase in Canadian evolution in the Commonwealth which had now passed. Although the arguments for abandoning the term 'dominion' were constitutional, they were stimulated by the irritating habit of British politicians in referring, usually with pride, to 'our dominions.' The British had never learned to think of themselves as a dominion. They usually referred to 'Britain and the Commonwealth' and never questioned their continuing practice of referring to Westminster as 'His Majesty's Government.' In 1945 Professor Frank Scott of McGill published in the Canadian Bar Review a notable article entitled 'The End of Dominion Status.' It outlined a programme of action and understanding which was regarded at the time as going a bit far, but which was in fact realized within a few years - and largely accepted by other members of the Commonwealth as well, even the British. The term 'dominions' was discouraged in Ottawa and eventually passed out of usage. By 1955 another distinguished authority at McGill, Professor Maxwell Cohen, could write in the same Canadian Bar Review: 'The inter se doctrine no more meets the practical needs of inter-Commonwealth relations and it is doubtful whether the rule now should be considered as in force ...' There were, however, areas where Canada did not press the logic too far. Canada did not want to abandon Commonwealth preferences without compensation. If these were to be compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] , the Commonwealth relationship would have to be regarded as something not quite international. So Canada supported the writing into GATT of the acceptance of the Commonwealth preference system. Another issue was whether disputes among Commonwealth countries were subject to the International Court of Justice. In accepting the Optional Clause of the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1930, Canada had excluded disputes with other Commonwealth members,

182 The Shaping of Peace and this continued under the ICJ. In its internationalist enthusiasm of 1945 Canada tried to persuade the British that this reservation should be dropped, but the other members were not willing and Canada reluctantly went along. Nevertheless, formal relations among Commonwealth countries increasingly came to resemble those between foreign countries, allowing nevertheless for that celebrated special degree of intimacy which did not depend on legalities. High commissioners did not become ambassadors although they were assimilated in rank, and non-diplomatic representatives were called by such names as trade commissioners rather than 'consuls.' During the fifties officials in Ottawa were constantly assessing Commonwealth trade without making any drastic changes. Just as the Commonwealth itself had a lower priority in Canada's foreign policy, so too the Commonwealth preferential system was of diminishing significance. Still, they were both useful and the argument of declining priority did not mean that it was in the Canadian interest to abandon them. In the thirties when tariffs had been the main obstacle to trade the preferential system had expanded trade within the Commonwealth. Since the Second World War, however, the other Commonwealth countries had been unable to balance their trade with the dollar countries without quantitative restrictions as well as loans and gifts from Canada and the United States. As a result, Canadian exports to Commonwealth markets were limited mainly to essentials, with some token imports allowed of traditional commodities. However, the other Commonwealth countries had had unimpeded access to the Canadian market during this period at preferential rates. This lack of reciprocity was not limited to Commonwealth countries; a similar situation obtained with most other countries with which Canada had most-favoured-nation [MFN] agreements. Canadians might not like the Commonwealth preference system very much but they were not going to hand it over for nothing. Their philosophy was universalist, based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which envisaged the gradual reduction of quantitative and tariff barriers and the extension of the MFN principle. This was Canada's first choice, but they avoided a doctrinaire attitude and agreed to participate in GATT in the first place only if existing Commonwealth preferences could be maintained. Participation in GATT enabled Canada to take advantage of MFN privileges in the United States, and as a result there was a large increase in exports to that country along with a proportional reduction of exports to the Commonwealth area, especially the United Kingdom. This reorientation of Canadian trade certainly helped the balance-of-payments problem, but it increased a dangerous dependence upon what one memorandum referred to as 'a historically unstable market.'30 In spite of their relative decline, exports to the

183 The New Commonwealth Commonwealth remained substantial in the fifties, amounting to about one-fifth of total trade. Fear was expressed in Ottawa that the decline in trade to Commonwealth countries had decreased Canada's political and economic bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States. To avoid this situation, emphasis continued to be placed on both export and import trade with the Commonwealth. It was a view more strongly held in the Department of External Affairs than in the Departments of Finance or Trade and Commerce where there was less disposition to see any disadvantages whatsoever in increasing trade with the United States. THE 1956 PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

St Laurent's last Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London in June 1956 might be regarded as the final justification of this phase of the Commonwealth, a phase with which he had personally been closely identified.31 He had not been, himself, so much a formulator of Commonwealth policies as one who gave his blessing to new directions in Canadian and Commonwealth policy. Most of all he had reversed the negativism of his predecessor. It was the fact that a Franco-Irish-Canadian prime minister saw the new Commonwealth as a constructive force in world affairs that perhaps counted most. In 1954 he toured the Commonwealth in Asia and had a notable meeting with Nehru. His affinity with Nehru and his role as a spiritual leader of the Commonwealth might have been somewhat exaggerated for the sake of the cause by those who appreciated the importance of such symbolism for the new directions in Canadian policy. There was nothing false, however, in his views of the Commonwealth, although he sometimes seemed uncomfortable in the expectations of him. If he had been less sincere, his disillusionment over British policy at the time of Suez would have been less acute. Perhaps the greatest gesture of good will he made to the Commonwealth was by attending the 1956 conference. He was suffering severe nervous depression at the time and his participation in discussion was considerably less than it would otherwise have been. He left many of the interventions to Pearson. It was an extraordinary gathering of distinguished men and it is doubtful if the purpose of consultation had up to then been so well fulfilled. The one constitutional issue, the question of the admission of the Gold Coast (Ghana) and the possible South African attitude to the first black member, was not brought up in the formal sessions but understandings were reached extramurally with the South Africans. The meetings were devoted to reasonably frank discussion of the major issues of the day, including relations with

184 The Shaping of Peace China and Japan, the situation in the Middle East, nuclear weapons, and broad security issues. Both Nehru and Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, as well as the newcomer, Bandaranaike of Ceylon, spoke their minds with candour, as did Eden and Menzies and Holland. In spite of some insensitivity on the part of Menzies,32 Nehru remained mellow. Nehru, Eden, and Pearson gave their impressions of recent contacts with the Russians and Soviet intentions were frankly explored. Nehru combated strongly the idea that the Chinese were Russian satellites and he and Bandaranaike made strong cases for acceptance of Peking in the United Nations. When St Laurent had first welcomed Eden's proposals for this meeting he had sent a message saying that he particularly wanted to talk about ways of getting China into the United Nations. In the meetings when they finally took place, however, he stressed the American obstacle. Without abandoning his views on the need eventually to recognize Peking, he warned about the very strong views of President Eisenhower and the danger that the Americans might withdraw from the United Nations if the Chinese were admitted. It was still not thought wise to bring the more controversial issues into open sessions. 'Some of the mellowness and the generally good atmosphere,' one observer wrote, 'were attributable to a considerable extent to the fact that the discussions did avoid the more controversial issues. There was nothing about Kashmir and, aside from some talk on Algeria, there was very little that was directly on colonial questions... Sir Anthony Eden might have guided the discussion into a somewhat more thorough examination of the Baghdad and other pacts when both Mr Nehru and Mr Mohamad [sic] Ali had approached the subject with a certain amount of candour, but perhaps it was just as well to leave it. I do not think that Mr Menzies could be counted on to discuss any of these subjects with much tact.'33 In view of the arguments arising out of the Suez crisis a few months after the conference as to whether there had been adequate consultation in advance, it is important to note that the Middle East was the subject of full and intense discussion among all the participants. There was, of course, no question of the British having shared their intentions to use force because in June the events which led them to that conclusion had not yet been set in motion. Eden and Lloyd displayed the same ambivalence towards Nasser they had shown when they visited Ottawa during the winter. They were still insisting also on the necessity of working with the Russians towards a settlement and it was Pearson, as usual, who sought to explain, if not necessarily to defend, the Israeli position. He also emphasized the desirability of working through the secretary-general of the United Nations. Lloyd also talked about the necessity of working through the Security Council with the Soviet

185 The New Commonwealth Union in order to increase the possibility of acceptance by both sides. However, in the light of what happened later, more attention at the time might have been paid to Lloyd's statement that in case of clear aggression the United Nations would have to take action and the United Kingdom was bound not only by this fact but by the three-power understanding as well. He spoke of the necessity of using the Assembly provision of 1950 calling on both sides to retire, with the provision that whichever side did not would be deemed the aggressor. The Suez crisis raised serious doubts about the validity of the theory on which the Commonwealth had been restructured. Whether the crisis proved its fragility or its remarkable resilience is a conclusion which depends on the disposition of the concluder. The extent to which an anxiety to maintain the Commonwealth affected the British decision to withdraw from the Suez commitment is hard to assess. It was undoubtedly less important than American pressure or general pressure in the United Nations, not to mention Soviet threats, but it was a factor which probably affected members of the British government differently. Certainly it was an important factor in setting Canada on a bold policy of rescue. How it rated in the Canadian priorities with the need to save the Anglo-American entente and to justify the UN would be the subject of idle speculation. All arguments led in the same direction. Certainly in Canadian justifications of their policy a heavy emphasis was put upon the need to save the Commonwealth but this was, of course, induced to some extent by opposition criticism that the policy was anti-British. Up until 1957 the Commonwealth was still in what might be called its Asian phase. The African phase, which was to raise so many complex issues in the late fifties and sixties, was foreseen but not yet faced. As the Gold Coast approached independence, thought was given in Ottawa and among Commonwealth diplomats to questions involved in new membership. There was some fear in Canada that South Africa might seek to veto membership in the Commonwealth by the Gold Coast. There were worries about special defence or other relationships the United Kingdom might seek to obtain as a quid pro quo for independence. There was, in fact, the big question as to whether in the new phase of the Commonwealth it was up to the United Kingdom alone to decide whether a country which had achieved self-government should be admitted to the Commonwealth. Many well-intentioned legalists set to work on various formulas to reconcile the paradoxes, but fortunately they were thwarted by those who knew that the health of the Commonwealth depended on living with paradoxes. Although it was Canadian policy to give a helping hand in the United Nations and help the British liquidate their empire with the least pain, the political instinct against getting

186 The Shaping of Peace involved in the steps leading to independence remained strong. The wise men in Delhi and Karachi had no desire to intervene, provided the British moved along, as they were clearly intending to do, in the transformation of an empire into a commonwealth. So the process worked well and the paradox did not have to be faced until the early sixties over the question of the readmission of South Africa after it had become a republic. Canada showed its enthusiasm for the move towards Commonwealth status by establishing diplomatic relations with new members promptly as well as by using its considerable influence to resist the revival of old fears and prejudices in both London and Canberra when Pakistan followed the Indian example and became a republic. In 1944 (11 May) King had told the Commonwealth prime ministers that 'in the British Commonwealth there has been evolved a unique alliance of a peculiarly tough and enduring kind whose members act together, unlike so many allies bound by explicit treaties, not because they are compelled to act together, but because they have the will to act together.' 'Our friends,' he added, 'have discovered that the primary objects for which the members of the Commonwealth act together are objects which can be shared by other countries of goodwill. They have realised that the Commonwealth is not a Power bloc exploiting its own selfish interests, but a group of like-minded nations whose close association has in the past and may in the future form the most reliable element within the framework of the world order.' By 1957, the Liberal government had grounds for satisfaction about the course prescribed. Douglas Anglin has shrewdly pointed out that: 'Canada did not so much propose the pattern of the present Commonwealth as reject all possible alternatives.'34 It is doubtful, of course, whether there was a clear-cut alternative position. The new version of the Commonwealth developed, to some extent, out of the need for Canadians to sound positive rather than negative, to rationalize and idealize what alone was possible - a recurrent characteristic of Pearsonian policy-making. Canada could not avoid leadership of some kind - leadership attributable partly to its position in the middle. In the thirties it was poised as a bi-ethnic country between the Anglo-Saxon members on the one hand and the Afrikaners and Irish on the other hand, and between monarchists and republicans. In the multiracial Commonwealth of the fifties Canada was regarded as a progressive, without special interests, on the great issues of colonialism. That the image was not entirely justified would be admitted by a conscientious Canadian, but there it was. Although Canadians boasted that their position of special influence rested on their having no imperial possessions, it rested also on their having no imperial obligations. It was easier to march in the van when you did not

187 The New Commonwealth have to face the real dilemmas of the British, Australians, and New Zealanders in administering subject peoples during a period of transition to selfgovernment. If self-righteousness can be held in check, there is a case to be made for the healing diplomacy of Canadians. The Commonwealth needed it, and Canadians responded. By 1957 -or even 1968 -there was no backing away from the role of 'helpful fixer.' To a large extent the role was thrust on Canadians, but it suited the new activist mood and External Affairs was not bashful about exploiting it. Expectations of Canada were established which persisted into a new phase when even harder issues had to be faced - South Africa, Rhodesia, for example - and the association became less like the club of men steeped in British liberal traditions of government and diplomacy - of Oxford and LSE - which it had remained even in the Asian phase.

9 The Asian Dimension

'The only result of war,' he [General MacArthur] used to say, 'is victory. There is no other object in war but victory.' I always thought myself that the object of war is peace; whether you obtain peace or not depends on the kind of victory you win. LESTER B. PEARSON1 A P A C I F I C POWER

That Canada was a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power was a fact increasingly stressed after the war - especially by British Columbians. It was part of the new international thrust. That the Pacific front was important could hardly have been misunderstood by a people who had witnessed events from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima - but they were largely witnesses. In the end, of course, Canada was caught up in the turbulence of Asia, and that continent provided challenges to Canadian foreign policy at least as taxing as those of Europe Korea, China, Indochina. Japan was no longer much of a problem. It became increasingly interesting as a trading partner, and the United States looked after the security issues. There was no need for a North Pacific Treaty Organization and not the slightest chance of aligning in that way the major powers round the ocean. The South-East Asia Treaty Organization, a pale reflection of NATO, was not a Pacific pact. Canada did not, as west-coast critics often suggested, reject membership in that organization. It was neither invited nor wanted in a body comprising a region in which it had no national involvement. An application would have been very embarrassing to those who were trying to keep South Korea and Formosa out. The Pacific is too vast to be a region in the sense that the North Atlantic may be considered. There is no common cultural heritage linking lands so diverse. Canada's considerable involvement in Asian affairs had little if anything to do with its being a

189 The Asian Dimension 'Pacific power.' It was involved because it was a middle power, a United Nations power, a member of the Commonwealth, concerned with the stability of the great globe itself. The fact that during the war Canadian forces were deeply committed in Europe and very lightly committed in the Far East had its effect. In a very short time Canadian troops were back in Europe, and Canada was involved in a peacetime alliance commitment unprecedented in its history. It was easier to resume an alliance role in Europe because Canada had become accustomed to this in two world wars. Just as Canada had been content, however, to let the Americans run the war against Japan, they had no national interest in challenging the American will to dominate the North Pacific after the war. Canada's foreign policies in Europe were simplified by being an ally and a subordinate ally, and their visibility was diminished. In the Far East, Canadians would not have liked to call themselves 'neutral,' but they were, technically at least, non-aligned. It would be futile to debate whether Canada had more influence as an ally in Europe than it had in Asia as a non-ally. Its participation in Asian affairs, however, was considerably more varied, more complex, and more easily identifiable. Its diplomatic activity in securing a Korean armistice and maintaining an Indochinese armistice, its active diplomacy over Indonesia and on relations with the People's Republic of China has no parallel in Europe. This is not to argue that a neutral position vis-à-vis Europe would have been more profitable. The circumstances were not comparable. A status of non-involvement (and the diplomatic opportunities arising therefrom) was a consequence, not a policy. Canada's freedom for manoeuvre on Pacific questions owes something to the fact that, not being an ally in any pact relating specifically to the Pacific area, it was not committed to agreements on tactics or common fronts as it often was in NATO. This freedom was limited, however, by a conviction that the major NATO allies would be weakened by embarrassments in Asia. The Canadian attitude to communism, in the early years of the Cold War, could not have been described neatly as universalist, although the language of universal collective security against aggression wherever it raised its ugly head often suggested that it was. Canada's alignment was a product of concern over European security and the conviction, deepened by the war, that Canadian security, military and economic, depended on the health and strength of the United States and the Western European democracies. As Escott Reid told the Australians in 1948 when Herbert Evatt expressed surprise that Canada would join a pact covering the North Atlantic although it had rejected the Pan-American Union: 'The first line of defence for all the free countries, whether Australia or Canada, is surely Western Europe. If the

190 The Shaping of Peace Soviet Union were to succeed in conquering Western Europe, we should all be in imminent danger.'2 The Chinese revolution and the Korean War, however, turned Ottawa's attention to Asia. The effect of Korea was ambivalent. The first, unwelcome conclusion was that there might, after all, be a monolithic communist conspiracy as the hard-liners had been saying. The need for the Western world, including as many non-communist powers as possible, to stand together was reinforced. The cause in Korea as far as Canada was concerned was the cause of the United Nations, of maintaining collective security. The challenge to collective security through the United Nations had come from one communist state, presumably supported by the others; only the communist states in the United Nations supported the 'aggressors.' In this sense, therefore, international communism was the enemy. In a state of war none of the sins of the enemy is neglected. Discrimination between their just and unjust claims, which officials had sought to maintain, was lost in the shouting. And yet the war forced Canadian policy-makers, and particularly Lester Pearson, whose role required a UN, not just a Canadian, perspective, to look at intra-communist relations as a hard strategic factor. In Canadian eyes the Chinese involvement was of a different order from that of the Soviet Union, increasingly regarded as the mastermind, the real villain. Pearson was careful not to associate himself with that school of thought which saw the Chinese communists as 'agrarian reformers.' They were obviously ideologically communist and had the endemic antipathy to the West which all communists had. He continued to insist, however, that Canada did not oppose communism as such, even though Canadians took a poor view of it as a way of life. Canada opposed aggression. That was why it had banded with others to oppose the USSR-not to do away with collective farming. It was only by trying to cope with what might be legitimate Chinese defensive reactions that the Chinese were brought to an armistice and the Korean War curbed. So a natural tendency to discrimination between the Chinese and the Russians, almost drowned in the shock of the Korean attack, was revived as a working principle by the requirements of Pearsonian diplomacy - even though political considerations frustrated the logical conclusion, recognition by Canada of the People's Republic of China [PRC]. When it came to Asian communism there was a distinction Canadians felt it particularly important to make. From the beginning it had been regarded as essential to link the cause of democracy - it was never called the cause of capitalism - with the cause of reform in the non-Western world. This was strengthened by the Commonwealth experience. Pearson put this perspective clearly in an address in 1953 to the Harvard Alumni in Cambridge.

191 The Asian Dimension There was no dispute, he said, over 'the necessity of resisting Communist military aggression.' He noted, however, two attitudes over 'the nature and extent of our collective obligations, if any, to defeat Communism as such, in Asia.' One attitude was to prevent the appearance of communist governments or weaken and destroy them if they gained power. The other school of thought, with which he identified himself, was described as follows: They feel that Communism in Asia, though it may be far deeper and more sinister than 'agrarian reform,' is a social, economic and political development, growing out of special Asian conditions and one primarily for Asians to deal with; that the only justification for direct Western intervention is when Communism expresses itself in military aggression. It is felt that our obligation in this matter is positive, not negative; not to intervene against Asian Communism, an intervention which would be stigmatized in Asia as Western and colonial; but to intervene in favour of democracy and to help Asian governments build up free and stable institutions which will defeat Communism by doing more for the welfare of the under-privileged and undernourished millions of the East than Communism can ever hope to do. We should also ... not expect Asian governments or Asian people automatically to accept our Western views of the cold war and the Kremlin conspiracy.3 CHINA

The assumption that recognition of the Peking government had been postponed by the Korean War rather than abandoned as a policy was maintained. No effort then or later was made to set up the embassy in Taipei. The unrecognized mission remained in Nanking throughout the height of the Korean War until February 1951 when supervision of the property was turned over to the consul general in Shanghai. It was hoped that the consulate could be of some help to those that were left, but its operations proved impossible and in 1952 it too was withdrawn. The British were left to look after the interests of Canadians as they could, but it was some years before they were able to establish a diplomatic presence in Peking. The Korean War had a paradoxical effect on the question of relations with the PRC. It made relations impossible and revealed the disadvantages of noncommunication. A new element was to complicate the question from here on. At any time up to the outbreak of the Korean War a decision by Canada to recognize Peking would have been accepted as reasonably timed even by those who opposed the decision. Once the natural moment for recognition had passed, however, there arose the additional question: 'Why now?' An inability to answer that question satisfactorily frustrated Canadian action at

192 The Shaping of Peace various times when the government seemed disposed to move. It was not so much a question of the Korean War or the Chinese threats to the offshore islands (or later on events in Vietnam or the Cultural Revolution) being sound grounds for refusing recognition or of breaking existing diplomatic relations with Taipei. The problem was that they made the time seem inappropriate to do something quite deliberately which had not been done before. On other occasions the problem was the state of internal politics in the United States. It was not simply a matter of remaining passive to avoid American displeasure but sometimes of avoiding action at a time, preceding an American election, for example, when a Canadian precedent was more likely to force an American administration into pledges against recognition. There was a limit to what Canadian diplomacy could do with the Chinese. Its attention was largely devoted to American policy. A Canadian concern, as usual, was that they knew the attitudes of some officials they dealt with in the State Department were not far from their own, but the problem was Congress and the volatile nature of American opinion.4 Pearson was himself convinced that it was necessary to seek negotiations with the Chinese but he was not prepared to get involved unless there was some assurance that the Americans would agree to negotiate. He was particularly concerned by the fear in the United States of talking to communists that became more and more obsessive during the McCarthy period. He knew negotiations would be extremely protracted and at best he hoped only for a series of negotiated settlements that might begin to reverse the trends. What alarmed him was 'the rapid drift in United States policy towards an irrevocable break with the Chinese communists and of the danger of the United States adopting a policy of assisting the Chinese resistance movement on the mainland and of further rearming Chiang Kai-shek.'5 The important thing was not to back the PRC into a corner. Throughout the war and afterwards Canada had insisted that the mission of the UN was to restore the situation before aggression, not to unify Korea by force, and in no way to intervene in China. Speaking to a federal-provincial conference in Ottawa on 4 December 1950 he said the Chinese must have felt their interests were gravely threatened by UN action in Korea.6 As soon as possible, then, serious efforts would have to be made to reconcile UN interest in resisting aggression with legitimate Chinese interests. Recognition was impossible while the PRC was participating in an aggression. (Canada tried to make a fine distinction between a Chinese aggression as such and Chinese participation in an aggression already launched by the North Koreans.) However, once an honourable settlement had been reached in Korea consideration should be given to such a move. A note of caution was sounded, however. The

193 The Asian Dimension reassessment of the PRC which would be made after peace had been achieved would have to take into consideration that it had proved itself a more active and possibly even expansionist power. There was more inclination now to give some weight to the American argument that a recognized Chinese government could have disruptive effects in the Far East. The question of Formosa, which had not been of importance in earlier considerations of recognition, loomed large as the territorial situation hardened. The Canadian government had agreed with President Truman's action in interposing the Seventh Fleet at the beginning of the Korean War because they saw in this an effort by the more sensible men in Washington to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from launching an attack on the mainland. As for the eventual disposition of Formosa, Canadian policy was to maintain consistently that this should be determined at an international conference convened after the signing of an armistice as provided in the Cairo Declaration. In May 1951 Pearson said that 'the people of Formosa themselves might be given some consideration' and by February 1953 this had solidified to 'the wishes of the people there would naturally be a primary consideration.' When the Nationalist government tried to institute a blockade against the mainland, the Canadian government ruled that this was illegal because it could not be made effective. The government consistently opposed a complete embargo on trade with mainland China on the grounds that it would only drive the PRC to even greater dependence on the Soviet Union. While the United States severed all economic relations, Canada was content to prohibit trade with China in strategic goods. Once the armistice had been agreed to, discussion of the China issue settled into a stalemate. External Affairs continued to look for openings. They suggested, as one possibility, the withdrawal of recognition from the Nationalists without recognition of the PRC.7 There were always reasons, however, for the cabinet to put off a decision. There was no need for Americans to pound the table. The reaction of Congress and the administration, as well as the American press and people, to a Canadian willingness to do business with the unspeakable Chinese was obvious to anyone in Ottawa. The consequences could only be contemplated, but those primarily interested in promoting Canadian economic interests were not enthusiastic about being provocative. The Canadian public, although it maintained an independence of view, was subjected to a barrage of anti-communist Chinese news and views from across the border. While it is fair to speculate that a majority of Canadians would have accepted a decision of this kind by the government, there would have been some very strong opposition in and out of parliament. George Drew and John Diefenbaker undoubtedly put a rein on the

194 The Shaping of Peace minister by their hostile questioning about his guarded and ambivalent statements on recognition.8 In Canadian statements there are recognizable two sets of concern. One of these had to do with the disruption and weakening of the Atlantic alliance resulting from divergent policies in the Far East, particularly the breach between British and American policies. Pearson's concern on this subject became more and more evident. He even took the argument into the antagonist's camp in his speech at Harvard on 11 June 1953. He was bold in speaking as he did in the United States, for it was the high tide of McCarthyism and he knew there were those in Washington who regarded his political affiliations as sinister. His context was the necessity of maintaining a solid alliance in the face of international communism. He was arguing, however, not that the lesser allies should align themselves with the United States but rather that the Americans should recognize that the line they were taking on China was unacceptable to their allies. The point was made again strongly in an article in the December 1953 issue of World entitled 'Don't let Asia split the West.' The second set of concerns had to do with the effect that United States policy might have on China, on other Asian countries, and on their relations with the West. Canadian thinking about China policy was an aspect of thinking about Asia generally. American policy in Asia was conditioned largely by consideration of China. Canadian officials insisted that heavyhanded containment, isolation of China, non-recognition, and implicit bellicosity would strengthen the hand of Russia in Asia, make it much more difficult to contain Chinese expansionism and communist subversion generally, discredit the West in non-aligned Asia, greatly increase the mutual problems in relations between Asian and Western countries, and in general decrease the chances for progress towards some sort of security in the world. This was more than just a middle power's view on tactics. There was a clear differentiation of Weltanschauung. When St Laurent returned from a visit to the Asian Commonwealth partners early in 1954 he seemed anxious to move. However, he was reported to have said in Korea on the way home that he thought they would soon have to deal with the government the Chinese people 'wanted.' This raised a storm of controversy that made action inappropriate at the moment. In any case, nothing could be done until after the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina set for April that year. In explaining his faux pas, however, St Laurent made a statement which persisted as basic Canadian policy during his régime. He said that although he saw no reason for considering diplomatic recognition at that moment, 'it would be most unfortunate ... to tie ourselves down by declarations and commitments that would make it

195 The Asian Dimension impossible for us at any time to come to the conclusion that even the diplomatic recognition of China would not [sic] be helpful to peace and security in the world.'9 At the Geneva Conference China policy was informally discussed among Pearson, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, and Richard Casey of Australia. They all felt that recognition was sensible and inevitable and wanted their governments to move in that direction. However, they also realized as close allies of the United States that the humiliation of that country was not in their interest. There was a tacit agreement, therefore, to consider whether they might together move towards recognition at a moment when that would be most helpful to ease the American path. Casey's interest in this policy was repudiated later by his hawkish prime minister, Robert Menzies, but there continued for some years an understanding between Brussels, Ottawa, and Canberra to keep in touch on the subject.10 One result of the Geneva Conference was the release late in 1954 of the only Canadian prisoner of war in China, Squadron Leader A.R. MacKenzie. Ottawa received word of the date scheduled for his release at the same time Peking radio revealed harsh sentences passed on United States airmen whom they held. MacKenzie had been shot down in Korea and there was little hope he had survived until Chester Ronning raised the case with his old friend Wang Ping Nan at Geneva and was informed shortly afterwards that he was alive and would be returned. The special treatment accorded him was undoubtedly attributable to the Chinese regard for Ronning and probably also the strikingly different personal disposition of the Canadians in Geneva as compared with the Americans, all of whom were forbidden to converse with the Chinese. Early in 1955 the crisis over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which the Chinese were threatening to seize, forced the Canadian government to clarify some elements of its China policy. Pearson made a very clear statement in the Commons.11 Canadian policy remained that the final disposition of Formosa should be dealt with by international negotiation, perhaps in a Far Eastern conference, and pending such a determination Formosa ought to be neutralized to prevent both a communist assault on it and its use as a base for assault on the mainland. However, he saw a distinction between Formosa and the Pescadores on the one hand and the offshore islands on the other as the latter were indisputably part of the territory of China and the former, which had been Japanese colonies for fifty years, were disputable. The argument for neutralization did not, therefore, necessarily apply to the offshore islands and Pearson welcomed President Eisenhower's suggestion that Nationalist forces thereon might be redeployed. A few days later, on 28 January, he was more explicit: 'Any obligation which we might have in

196 The Shaping of Peace regard to Formosa could arise only from our responsibilities as a member of the United Nations.' Canada was not committed, he said, by American policies. He repeated an earlier statement that the PRC would have to participate in any fruitful UN discussions on the crisis and he described that crisis as 'this particular phase of what after all remains ... a Chinese civil war.'12 When Pearson visited New York in February Dulles did not seem particularly upset by the Canadian position or that expressed by the Commonwealth leaders.u Having already persuaded Chiang to evacuate the Tachens, Dulles doubted that he could do much more immediately. He hoped, however, to convince Chiang that his future lay in Formosa only. In time this might lead to withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu and hence eventually to some sort of ceasefire in the area. This, however, would be possible only if the communists refrained from attacking. Pearson realized the importance of this statement in discouraging the Chinese communists from taking what could be very dangerous action. 'I gained the definite impression,' he told the Canadian high commissioner in Delhi, 'that Dulles expected me to pass on his views in directions which might eventually lead to Peking and I indicated to him that I would be reporting our conversations to some of our friends.'14 The Canadian high commissioner in Delhi conveyed the word to Nehru, suggesting that the latter might pass it on to Peking. Shortly after that the fighting began to slacken - for various reasons, no doubt. In connection with this particular crisis Pearson made a significant comment on the Canadian commitment to the United States. On 14 March 1955 he told a Toronto audience that 'the neutrality of either of us [Canada or the us], if the other were engaged in a major war in which its very existence were at stake, would be unthinkable.'15 Although this was a statement of what for most people was obvious at that time, it created somewhat of a storm on the part of some reporters and members of parliament. Speaking then in parliament during a general review of foreign policy on 24 March Pearson denied that he had abdicated control of foreign policy. He said: 'I want to reaffirm my view that we could not stand aloof from a major war which threatened the very existence of the people of the United States; but I must add in all frankness that I do not consider the conflict between two Chinese governments for possession of these Chinese coastal islands, Quemoy or the Matsus, to be such a situation, or one requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese nationalist regime.'16 Canada was, of course, concerned in the matter because even a limited United States intervention could spark a major war. Although Canadian policy on Formosa was never explicit, at no time was the PRC claim accepted. There was no special tenderness towards the Nation-

197 The Asian Dimension alist government, although there was profitable trade, but there was concern about handing over the people of that island to the communist régime. The Nationalists did not consider Canada to be friendly, as Chiang Kai-shek complained bluntly to a Canadian Press correspondent in 1952.17 In the circumstances Ottawa could not reject the American strategic argument although they regarded it as overstated. The official Canadian view was that Formosa was an important, if not a vital, link in the island defence chain. It was not really necessary for the Americans to control it, but it would be a set-back if the communists did. The views not only of the Americans but also of the Australians and New Zealanders had to be taken into consideration here. There were signs of progress in 1955. The embassy in Washington reported some influential opinion in the State Department moving towards what came to be known as a 'two-China policy.'18 They did not contemplate renouncing Formosa or Chiang Kai-shek, but the idea of Chiang's reconquering the mainland was being quietly abandoned. Dulles's comments to Pearson over the islands seemed to confirm this shift to an effort to stabilize the status quo. There was also evidence of movement from rigid positions by influential Americans, many of whom, then and later, privately encouraged Canadians to give a lead. After a statement of this kind in the summer of 1955 from the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Walter George, there was some worry in DEA lest there be one of those incalculable American swings and Canada would be caught in the embarrassing position of tagging along instead of pointing the way.19 The Chinese were sounding less aggressive, and it was an opportunity to get off that hook on which some government leaders had, to the dismay of the department, impaled themselves by implying that there would have to be some kind of Chinese renunciation of aggression if Canada were to recognize them as nice people. The declaration of 'aggression' by the United Nations Assembly was certainly a hurdle to be overcome if Peking were to be seated there. To test the water and provide some leadership Pearson made a speech to the Women's Canadian Club in Vancouver in August 1955.20 He said that the offshore islands dispute had reinforced Canadian views of long standing that issues in the Far East would be more amenable to peaceful negotiations if the PRC were widely recognized; moreover, if the UN were to play any significant part in such problems the PRC would have to be seated there. He saw signs of a willingness on the part of the communist government to behave less aggressively. Canada had already sat down to talk with the PRC representatives at Geneva and it was unrealistic to expect them to accept UN invitations to conferences when China was represented there by the Nationalists. This line of argument was approved by most of the major newspapers

198 The Shaping of Peace that commented, but the response did not provide the sure consensus to spur the cabinet into bold action. Although the Vancouver speech had not provoked the hoped for response in Canada, it attracted attention abroad. The Nationalist Chinese ambassador in Ottawa knew what it meant and enquired anxiously but resignedly what was intended. Spaak and Casey were particularly interested. The French were showing signs of reconsideration although it was they, at this time, who seemed most worried about upsetting Washington - and Saigon.21 At the UN rumours reached the Chinese ambassador that Canada was proposing to break with the United States policy of imposing a moratorium on discussion of the subject of the Chinese seat. The State Department feared its majority for the moratorium might dwindle that year. Spaak and Pearson did consider whether they might propose an ad hoc committee of the Assembly to review all aspects of the question, including the possibility of deciding that the Chinese 'aggression' in Korea was now over. The American reaction to the Vancouver speech was circumspect. The desk officer in the State Department wanted Dulles to send a personal message to Pearson but this recommendation was not accepted. The ambassador, instead, was instructed to 'express United States concern' at the possibility of early Canadian action. He was told that what Pearson had said was that the time seemed favourable for a searching re-examination but that cabinet had not yet considered the matter. The Americans made similar representations in Brussels.22 The subject was discussed again the following spring when St Laurent and Pearson met with Eisenhower and Dulles and the president and foreign minister of Mexico at White Sulphur Springs. Press reports suggested there had been a Canadian-American controversy, with Eisenhower being particularly emphatic. In fact Pearson expressed his concern over the repercussions of delaying recognition, and, as he told the Standing Committee on External Affairs: 'There was a very forthright and frank expression of United States views on this matter by the President and by the Secretary of State along lines which had previously become familiar.' The question of Canadian policy was not discussed, and there was no question, therefore, of the Americans having told Canada what to do.23 The uncompromising nature of Eisenhower's position, especially on the seating of the PRC at the UN, did, however, discourage hopes that the United States position was becoming more flexible. The fear was not that the United States would punish Canada for any action it might take but that they would withdraw from the UN if Peking was seated. It was undoubtedly the best opportunity since June 1950, but it slipped away. The arguments were not about the merits of the case, just the timing

199 The Asian Dimension and the formula for Formosa, but the case for waiting a little longer prevailed. There was always some reason for delay. Pearson was leaving for Moscow and New Delhi, and if action were taken on his return all the wrong things would be said about the influences upon him. Bilateral talks between the Americans and Chinese were coming up in Geneva, and so on. Most serious was the fear that the Americans were not yet ripe for spurring, and a move by the Canadians and others either on seating at the UN or diplomatic recognition would set the cause back. In its last year in office the government's policy on China remained stationary, partly no doubt because its mind was on the Middle East and Europe, not to mention Canada. After the Vancouver speech there was as promised a 'searching look.' The results were presented to parliament on 31 January 1956.24 'We have made this re-examination and we feel that the careful policy we have been following, and are still following, has been the right one; rejecting on the one hand immediate diplomatic recognition but rejecting on the other hand the view that a communist regime in Peking can never be recognized as the government of China.' The usual pro and con arguments were reviewed and there was little new. There was a somewhat sharper tone vis-à-vis the Nationalists, attributable partly to the action of that government in vetoing the carefully arranged and Canadian sponsored proposal for the admission of new members in the Assembly just concluded.25 '...the anomaly of that government representing China at the United Nations, with a veto that can block any action desired by 52 other members, is becoming increasingly apparent.' Pearson concluded by saying that one should not be distracted by the question of recognition from seeing 'the longer term issues which are raised by communist China's emergence as a new and powerful force in the world.' That emergence might be as historically important an event as the Russian revolution of 1917. 'Indeed, one day in the future these two revolutionary forces may clash.' The Suez crisis and the invasion of Hungary in the autumn of 1956 not only diverted attention from the Far East but discouraged bold moves visa-vis the communist powers. Pearson recognized furthermore that Canadian initiatives ought not to be taken too often lest other powers think that success had gone to the head. Hopes of détente with China had diminished since the Geneva Conference and the attitude of Peking was such that there could be no assurance among the China specialists in Ottawa that a Canadian gesture of recognition would be accepted by the PRC without unacceptable concessions. Nevertheless, the view of these specialists was that the problems of recognition would get worse and that there were real risks in the continued isolation of China. It was a view shared by Pearson and St Laurent

200 The Shaping of Peace as they went out of office. It was a view strongly held by the new secretary of state for external affairs, Sidney Smith, when he came into office in September 1957, but there were new reasons for not moving at that time and the cycle of procrastination continued. INDOCHINA

The fear of a war between China and the United States which preoccupied Pearson and his colleagues led to heavy duty in, of all places, Indochina. The end of the fighting in Korea left the Canadian government with the unresolved dilemma over collective security. The Korean effort under the UN banner had not been a failure; it had stopped 'aggression.' Strategically, however, it was clear that invoking the principle of universal collective security against communist forces dominating the heartlands of Europe and Asia, with nuclear weapons and enormous reserves of manpower, could lead to disastrous reverses for the West, for the United Nations, and possible mutual destruction. The negotiation of a ceasefire in Korea had led Canadians back to emphasizing the mediatory functions of international organization. Western military strength had been consolidated in NATO, but its all too meagre resources had to be applied sparingly, bearing in mind always that they must not be tempted away from Europe. There was the uncomfortable possibility that the communist powers were embarked on a programme of putting the Western powers off balance, expanding not by the use of but by the threat of force along their considerable periphery. What kind of dissuasion was required to meet that strategy? Even if collective security wouldn't work, one could not blink the consequences of renouncing it even as a possibility. In the circumstances, therefore, one was driven back to ultimate reliance on United States power and, in particular, on United States nuclear power. The trouble here was less than firm confidence in the way in which that military power was being directed in Washington. It was the only force that could be counted on to induce the communist powers to settle for mediation. Dulles used it crudely when he talked about dependence on the great capacity to 'retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing.'26 It was hard to fault the logic of this policy and Pearson accepted it, but such a simplistic strategy alienated friends in Asia and elsewhere that the West very much needed. It also raised serious doubts about the credibility of the American posture, which would have been more effective if left unspecific. Pearson was so troubled by what was being called the 'New Look' that he resorted to unquiet diplomacy by a direct rebuke to Dulles in a speech in

201 The Asian Dimension Washington.27 He then obtained from Dulles assurance that the choosing would be done by a 'free world coalition' and that the capacity was not simply for nuclear or military but also for political action.28 Deterrence by diplomacy was more congenial to Ottawa. Perhaps there was a functional answer to the dilemma. Unless there was a threat of counterforce the powers would not accept mediation. Could one leave it to the great powers to do the threatening and the middle powers to do the mediating? As a committed member of a military alliance Canada could not spell it out in those terms, but there was some tendency to think that way. It was tempting for a moral middle power to argue that mediation was better than military confrontation, but it was unfair if the two were complementary. The American military posture had to be supported in general though not specific terms. Their tactics were open to criticism, but fear of what Pearson constantly referred to as 'communist expansionism' was shared by doves and hawks in Ottawa. Needless to say, opinion among advisers and ministers was not uniform. Douglas Ross, after scholarly research of the evidence, has described the 'tendencies' in the Department of External Affairs by identifying three 'loosely defined groupings of conservatives, liberal-moderates and left-liberals, each of which brought a distinctive and reasonably coherent set of beliefs and preferred instrumental responses to bear on the unfolding Indochina debate.' In his view, however, 'The liberal-moderate tendency predominated in DEA policy debates for at least the first two and one-half years of Canadian involvement in Southeast Asia.'29 This 'liberal-moderate' tendency was congenial to Pearson, even though his public statements sometimes suggested otherwise, and it was his policy that prevailed during the 1954-6 period with which this chapter is concerned. Communist 'take-overs' in Asia were regarded in the prevailing view as good neither for the strategic balance nor for the inhabitants. Unmitigated anti-communism was regarded with due scepticism, and the search was ever for the moderates in an immoderate setting. For those who had witnessed with dismay what had happened to liberal moderates in Eastern Europe it was hard to avoid the fear that Communist parties posed in Asia the same kind of threat to régimes struggling with self-government as the Communist parties supported by the Soviet Union had done in Europe. In thinking about the way in which communist strategies in Asia could be frustrated, Canadian policy-framers were affected by the Commonwealth experience. They saw India, whatever its faults, as the bastion of democracy and constantly emphasized that the struggle against communism would not be won by arms but by a strengthening of endemic government liberated

202 The Shaping of Peace from overseas domination but assisted by Western powers in its economic and political struggles. In the Canadian view, it would be disastrous to try to shore up the political structures of South Asia, many of them newly independent, by massive military assistance. The communists had to be fought on the political level by peoples unencumbered by the colonial tie. To understand Canadian attitudes to the governments in Saigon of Bao Dai and Diem, it must be recalled that they were at that time nationalist and anti-colonialist régimes trying to establish self-government in place of the French. There was always, of course, the awkward possibility of a military threat to be countered, but this could be met only by indigenous forces. The security required for the strengthening of democracy could be sought only in the precarious balance of mutual deterrence. The deterrence was ambiguous, devoid of the certainty 'realists' demanded, but there could be no certainty. On the ground it could mean a policy of minimal military assistance (although not, of course, from Canada) sufficient to maintain a local stand-off capacity. In words used by the British over Laos and Cambodia at the Geneva Conference of 1954 these countries, by declaring themselves neutral, would be protected by a 'plate-glass curtain.' It was easily smashable, but neither side would want to do so for fear of uncertain consequences. It was their different approaches to this plate-glass concept that led Ottawa and Washington to reach different conclusions about the Geneva agreements on Indochina in 1954 and to become functionally involved in that area in quite different ways. Douglas Ross notes substantial differences between Canadian and American 'geopolitical' premises. 'Where Americans of the geopolitical persuasion tended to think in the grandiose, and apocalyptic categories of the heartland theory, that is, thinking on a truly global scale, Canadian leaders were much more inclined to look at specific situations and the specific alterations in the geopolitical calculus that had been caused by the advent of atomic technology and long-range air power.'30 It was the functional approach. The difference was also attributable, of course, to the fact that the us had the responsibility of maintaining the counterforce. After Korea, Americans could not with equanimity contemplate another land war in Asia but the self-confident military were developing their gamesman approach, the scoring of points by bombing successive targets until the opponent would cry 'Uncle.' The excesses of McCarthyism aggravated the gap between the United States and its allies. These were scary times for the latter. The men Canadians talked with in the State Department were usually within reach, and Eisenhower was likely to be cautious, but the wild men often seemed out of control.

203 The Asian Dimension Canadian policy throughout the whole Korean experience had been guided by a fear of land war in Asia, although it had never been expected that they might be asked to play a direct role in averting that danger. In July 1954, however, the Canadian government was asked by the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, on behalf of those powers that had associated themselves with the so-called Geneva agreements on Indochina, to serve along with India and Poland on the three international control commissions being established for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, respectively, to supervise the carrying out of the terms of the agreements. The invitation came as a jolt. Although the concept of the mediatory middle role had been growing, it had been associated largely with disputes that were not in the centre of East-West conflict. Canadians as individuals were serving under United Nations command in Palestine and Kashmir but in the case of Indochina there would be no United Nations authority. The three commission powers would be more or less on their own. The Geneva Conference had been held in UN quarters at Geneva, but it was not a UN conference because the People's Republic of China rejected such auspices. The commission would be responsible to a conference that had dissolved, although its co-chairmen, Eden and Molotov, were authorized to receive reports. To make things worse, the United States had dissociated itself from the final stages of the conference and although it had agreed to observe the terms, it withheld the kind of moral support which seemed to Canadians essential if the plate-glass was to hold. Aside from the armistice agreements, which were signed by their respective high commands, there were no signatures as such to the Final Declaration, which contained political provisions of dubious practicality, including the stipulation that there would be elections in two years time. The chance of the terms being fulfilled depended very much on the good intentions of the parties and certainly not on any force that could be exerted by an observer team. It was all the more disconcerting, therefore, that the government of the 'Republic of Vietnam' in Saigon refused to associate itself with the terms of either the armistice agreement or the Final Declaration. The French were still largely in control, however, and they were committed to the agreement. Subsequent events would show, however, that they were rather more anxious to liquidate their commitment in the area than to help build a stable regional peace. Up to that time Canada had been careful to steer clear of involvement in Indochina, where the French had been struggling since the end of the war with armed resistance of one kind and another. Although France was an ally in NATO, Canada had accepted no obligation vis-à-vis its overseas colonies.

204 The Shaping of Peace The government avoided criticizing the French publicly and was careful to make no promises of a military kind. The French had not wanted to bring the matter to the United Nations, and it was only through the UN that Canada would consider any commitment. There were a few Canadian missionaries and very little trade to make up any 'vested interest' Canada had in Indochina. Canada had encouraged the French to meet the communist threat by granting self-government, and it had recognized the governments which were set up. When the military situation became grim for the French early in 1954 the United States, which was by then giving the French strong support, was so alarmed by the communist threat that it proposed united action in Indochina by the Western powers and a regional agreement on security in Southeast Asia. There were sharp differences between the British and the Americans on this subject, as the British were extremely cautious about an involvement in that part of the world and, like Canada, influenced by the thinking of the Asian members of the Commonwealth. In a statement in the House of Commons on 28 May 195431 Pearson candidly expressed reservations about the United States position and associated himself with the British approach. He was not enthusiastic about Dulles's pactomania and emphasized the need to end the war and then base arrangements for 'collective security' in the area on the agreed terms. He warned that 'the exigencies of the military situation ... should not push those concerned into premature or ill-considered discussion of political or defence arrangements' because the Asians would not support these and the communists could claim that the Geneva Conference was being sabotaged. He said bluntly that the type of security arrangement suitable for the Atlantic area might not be practical or desirable in Southeast Asia. The heart of the Canadian position was set out in his statement that 'while it is true that if peace is threatened by communist aggression anywhere, it is threatened everywhere, it is also true that Canada cannot be expected to accept special or regional defence commitments in every part of the world where collective arrangements may be advisable.' The Geneva Conference, which had been agreed upon by the foreign ministers of the great powers several months before, had been in two parts. Canada took part in the sessions dealing with Korea but had, of course, no reason to be included in the discussions on the war in Indochina which took place in separate sessions with a different composition except for the major powers. When the Korean talks broke up in disagreement the Canadian delegation returned, leaving an assistant under-secretary as observer of the continuing talks on Indochina which were attracting the attention of the world. The Canadian delegation's behind-the-scenes activities, as described in

205 The Asian Dimension chapter 7, together with the known Canadian resistance to American policy over Korea, undoubtedly had much to do with the nomination of Canada as the Western member of the commissions. The nomination was said to have been made by Chou En-lai at the suggestion of Krishna Menon. There was no early indication of Canada's being named, as Belgium was the country under consideration on the 'French side.' The Canadian observer had left, therefore, before Canada was proposed at the last minute.32 The choice of the members of the commissions had been one of the stubborn difficulties in reaching an agreement. A troika formula had finally been accepted as this was considered better than the thoroughly unsatisfactory arrangement in Korea where two genuinely neutral countries, Switzerland and Sweden, had found themselves in perpetual deadlock with two dubious 'neutrals,' Poland and Czechoslovakia. According to the Indochina formula a neutral country, India, was to be chairman, with representatives of the communist and the Western worlds as members. It was clear that these were not intended as commissions of neutral countries. Whether the communist and Western members regarded themselves as spokesmen or advocates of their 'causes' was left to their interpretation. Canada's reputation for independence and fairness may have been the main reason it was chosen, but the fact that it was a sufficient military power to field a well-equipped team and that it could provide a substantial number of officers speaking French, the second language of Indochina, were undoubtedly considerations. The expectation that Canadians could work well with Indians may also have been a reason. It was one of the arguments in Canada in favour of accepting. Belgium was regarded as too closely tied to France and it was, after all, independence in judging French interests rather than American that were at stake. It was, nevertheless, regarded as essential that a member of the commissions should not be closely associated with American policy in Asia, which was out of harmony with the Geneva policy. Chou En-lai had talked frequently in Geneva with Ronning, from whom he would certainly have gained the impression that Canadians did not share American views on Asia. There is evidence that both the French and the Americans would have preferred Belgium,33 but, of course, the Americans had abandoned their influence on an agreement with which they were dissociating themselves. It was only two days before the deadline for agreement set by the new prime minister of France, Mendès-France, expired that Chou En-lai proposed to Eden that the commissions be composed of India, Canada, and Poland. Although the Canadian mission in Geneva was maintaining contact with the British delegation, there was no consultation either there or in Lon-

206 The Shaping of Peace don or Ottawa and the first word Ottawa had was a report from Geneva in the New York Times on 19 July. There was no opportunity to forestall such an announcement. A refusal would have had to be public. Canadian diplomatic representatives tried frantically to get more details of what was proposed, but it was clear that the terms for the commissions had been hammered out clumsily to meet the deadline. The governments involved had not thought very precisely on the role of the commissions. There was every practical reason against accepting this invitation. There was little indication how long it would last or how much it would cost and, above all, the authority to whom the commissions would be responsible. Canada had no experience of Indochina and little knowledge of the area. Its armed forces were heavily committed to the new obligations in NATO and an inadequately staffed foreign service was terribly stretched opening new missions because of pressure from the minister of trade and commerce. The British and French could be expected to be helpful but not the Americans. The experience the Swiss and Swedes had had in Korea with the Poles cast doubts on the possibility of the commissions achieving much. Nevertheless Canada was caught by its own much-publicized commitments to supporting peace by diplomacy, by mediation, by trying to hold the line while parties sought agreement, by the avoidance of war at almost any cost. There was no obligation involved to the United States, which had little faith in either the agreements or the commissions. There was no felt obligation to France except that Canada had warmly approved Mendès-France's effort to extract France from its colonial mess and would not want to let him down. Parliament was not in session. Many members of the cabinet were absent. Public opinion, such as it was, was divided between the belief that Canada should accept the task it was equipped to carry out and those who recognized the danger of further complications and commitments. Friendly governments urged Canada to accept - even the United States which, in spite of its sceptical view of the commissions, seemed to think that it would be better with Canada on than off. The State Department had shed the illusions of the pre-Korean period that the Canadians would, in the nature of things, see eye-to-eye with them over Asian affairs. The world at large had welcomed the relief of tension that came with the agreements, and it was realized in Ottawa that a Canadian refusal to play its part would be badly received almost everywhere. The Geneva Conference had disbanded and if there had to be a replacement for Canada the whole package, put together with such difficulty, might have to be reopened. Even though the list of arguments for not accepting was probably longer and stronger than those for accepting, there was really no decent way out. In the internationalist community, including the

207 The Asian Dimension Department of External Affairs, there was a great sense of challenge, but it was sobered by the realization of the unpleasantness of the task and the limited chances of success. How long the assignment would last was uncertain. There was reason for hope that because the parties in the ceasefire were obviously disposed to carry out the terms, that could be arranged fairly quickly. There was a provision of somewhat uncertain authority for elections in Vietnam in two years. The supervising powers were asked to observe these elections when they took place and that could be another arduous responsibility. On the other hand, if these elections could be arranged, one could think of a maximum term for the Vietnam commission of two years. A problem about this assignment which was not apparent at the time became so later when the question of Canada's role in Vietnam was a matter of controversy. Canada would enter this tortured conflict as a judge not of the rights and wrongs of the conflict but solely as a judge of the parties' behaviour towards an agreement imposed on them and not necessarily fair in all respects. In quite properly opposing the party which showed the least regard in practice for the terms of the agreement Canadians might well be acquiring a limited or prejudiced view of the merits of the contenders in the long historical perspective. At any rate, they would be leaving themselves open to criticism by those who failed to grasp the assigned role of a commission member. Cabinet met on 28 July, following which a message of acceptance was sent to Eden. An explanatory statement was then issued to the public. Regret was expressed that this was not a United Nations assignment but it was considered that playing a part in trying to establish conditions of security and stability in any part of the world was in harmony with the responsibilities of a UN member. Canada was not being called upon to guarantee or enforce the ceasefire, as the parties alone were responsible for the implementation of the agreement. 'The International Commissions themselves have no enforcement obligation or responsibility. Their function will be solely supervisory, judicial and mediatory.' The commissions were considered to have a 'reasonable chance' of success. If Canadian expectations were ill founded, however, and the commissions were frustrated by obstruction 'then, of course, no useful purpose would be served by continuing their existence.'34 If the commissions were to play any useful part in the disengagement of forces, they had to be on the ground fast. Although the numbers involved seem small in the light of later commitments to UNEF, the drain on the forces was in fact heavy because virtually all had to be officers. The defence authorities thought this kind of mediatory activity without weapons was more the duty of External Affairs than themselves, but the Geneva agree-

208 The Shaping of Peace ments had stipulated military officers and, in spite of the need to satisfy what were considered demands of higher priority in Europe, the defence authorities did conscientiously select officers of high calibre. In addition to the military officers there had to be senior External Affairs officers in the headquarters in the three capitals. Without the UN, the secretariat had to be provided by the three powers themselves and some contribution to it was necessary, especially as it required bilinguals. By 1955 the total Canadian contingent was 170. To begin with, a conference was held at New Delhi where Indians, Poles, and Canadians gathered to draw up their rules of procedure and settle certain basic dilemmas left open by the agreements. The Delhi meeting went quite well and although the logistics problems were enormous the commissions were established in the three countries in August with some hope that in spite of difficulties enough consensus could be achieved to carry out at least the immediate tasks. By the time they arrived, the ceasefire and disengagement were well under way. The Commissions internationales de contrôle, as they were called in the official texts, were supervising bodies, called informally in English the International Supervisory Commissions because the French word contrôle is better translated as supervision. The Joint Committees consisting of the belligerents were responsible for the actual execution of the armistice. The ambiguities of the assignment were very much present in the minds of Canadian planners. Canada had been appointed as a Western representative, although not a Western delegate. Questions arose as to whether commissioners would act on their own or under instructions from Ottawa and, in particular, whether they should regard themselves as impartial or as attorneys for the French and South Vietnamese. The view was strongly held by the government that although there was no pretence of being neutral in the broader East-West conflict, there was no reason why the Canadians, in this situation, should not act fairly and impartially in deciding on evidence. There seemed to be little hope of the commissions carrying out their mission unless there was some degree of objectivity by their members. For this policy a strong agent was necessary and Pearson persuaded Sherwood Lett, previously Brigadier Lett and later Mr Justice Lett, to abandon a tranquil life in Vancouver to take on the arduous assignment of the central role as commissioner in Vietnam. Career DEA officers served as commissioners in Laos and Cambodia. Lett was a man of extraordinary integrity, liberal minded in his general views on world affairs, and dedicated to the principle of impartiality contained in his instructions. He had remarkable patience and endurance, maintained scrupulously balanced relations with the parties to the agreements, and imposed this discipline on his staff. It could hardly be expected

209 The Asian Dimension that all the staff would be equally impartial. The commission for Vietnam was set up in Hanoi where life after the Viet Minh took over was grim, highly restricted, and not exactly beguiling. The instructions dated 24 August which Lett carried with him to Vietnam provide evidence of the Canadian attitudes at the beginning of the experience.35 First of all the letter gave the Canadian appreciation of the agreements. At the time of the conference the French military hold on North Vietnam was slipping, the French-sponsored government of Vietnam had not achieved enough popular support to be effective. Proposals for military intervention by other powers were foredoomed to failure and might well have led to wider international hostilities. Accordingly, although the ceasefire was unsatisfactory from many points of view, the agreements were the best obtainable in the circumstances since they were based on political and military realities. It was a more reliable way to resist communist takeovers than what some Americans were contemplating. 'Whatever their defects, the agreements, if properly implemented, would prevent Laos and Cambodia from falling under communist domination in the immediate future and would make possible a build-up of military and political resistance to further communist encroachment in Vietnam south of the demarcation line.' Canada, it was emphasized, was not disposed to participate in any regional pact. The commissions would have no executive responsibilities; their functions were described as 'supervisory, judicial, and mediatory.' As for the question of whether the commissioners acted on their own or as agents of their governments, there was a common-sense compromise. It was foreseen that Lett would find it necessary to act on his own in most disputes, but he was to keep Ottawa well posted and where possible seek advice before taking decisions that would involve the exercise of the veto or give rise to subsequent reference to the conference powers. It was recognized that Canada's representatives on the commissions would reflect a Western outlook: '... it is important that they should at all times do their utmost to maintain an attitude of judicial impartiality in the performance of their duties.' The objectives of Canadian policy in the area were stated as maintenance of the peace, the encouragement of the development of a Southeast Asia defence organization in a way that would cause the least possible offense to the neutralist countries, particularly India, Burma, and Indonesia. As Dulles had made clear he intended going ahead with the development of SEATO, the Canadian position shifted from sceptical opposition to acceptance of the inevitable and the hope of guiding it in the least offensive directions. The third and fourth objectives were to contribute to the economic and social strengthening of countries in the area so that there would be strong, inde-

210 The Shaping of Peace pendent, non-communist régimes, free of the old imperial ties and therefore better able to resist effectively communist attempts to take them over by means of infiltration and subversion. There were other guidelines. 'In the discharge of your official duties an attitude of scrupulous fairness and impartiality and support for the strict observance of the terms of the cease-fire agreements will do more than anything else towards winning the confidence of your Indian colleague. Above all, it will be vital to avoid giving the impression that you are attempting to "protect" French interests or to further American policy.' Trying to get along with the Poles was also stressed as desirable in spite of the expectation that the Pole would have little leave to depart from firm instructions as to his partiality. Some reasons for confidence were based on the expectation that the communist powers were anxious that the ceasefire come into effect. It was recognized, however, that the Viet Minn, and probably with Polish assistance, would want to violate the terms of the agreement in some respects, because its implementation would 'prevent them from taking over the whole of Indochina as they had hoped to do.' Circumspection was advised in relations with the French and the Americans but not necessarily with the British who in fact would be handling diplomatic and consular problems for Canada. Although the Viet Minh had not been recognized as a government it would have to be regarded as the provisional de facto governing authority in the north. The government in Saigon had been recognized in the context of its struggle for independence from France, but diplomatic relations were still carried on through the British. It was not a thoroughly impartial stance, but at least it balanced that of Poland. The principal tasks of the Vietnam commission were to assist in the ceasefire and the disengagement of the forces. The forces had been scattered like a checkerboard throughout the whole country, but the agreement called for the phased transfers over 300 days so that by the end of that period the Viet Minh forces would be concentrated north of the 17th parallel, where there would be a demilitarized zone, and the 'French Union Forces,' which included South Vietnamese troops, would be installed south of that parallel. There were provisions also for the free movement of population during a specified period, also supervised by the commission. The commission was to assist in the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees. The agreement, furthermore, sought to provide for a freezing of arms and armed forces where they stood at the time of the agreement but it banned only imports, except for replacements, and not internal production. It was the commission's duty to check on illegal entry of military personnel or equipment into either part of Vietnam. The quite separate commissions in Cambodia and Laos had different functions.

211 The Asian Dimension Although the long history of the Vietnam commission was one of frustration and stalemate, its record during the first 300 days provided some justification of its existence. The ceasefire was largely carried out before the commission was on the ground. During the earlier period when the forces were being regrouped the commission was with difficulty establishing itself in its headquarters and in its various fixed and mobile teams. It was a very small body of people to have much direct influence in a very large country with enormous borders. However, the commission did at least show its possibilities by intervening with compromise suggestions and by ironing out misunderstandings. It was particularly successful in the crucial exercises when the communists took over Hanoi, and then later Haiphong, from the French. In the case of Haiphong, in particular, there were apparently irreconcilable disputes, but in this case the commission virtually imposed a procedure on the two parties. It was able to do so because the Indian chairman took it upon himself to be the voice of the commission - an assumption of authority which the Canadians approved. The other obligation in which there was some success was the release of prisoners of war. These were both duties in which the parties had an interest in fulfilment. They were by no means easily and satisfactorily carried out, however, because of the ill will and suspicion which prevailed after so much fighting. The exchange of prisoners of war was messy because records were not good and many Vietnamese had deserted or changed sides. The commission did some useful prodding and in the end, by the investigations it carried on of special cases, saved the lives of some hundreds of prisoners. The question of refugees was much less satisfactory. The consensus which had been achieved, although with difficulty, began to break down. In the Canadian view the Poles rigidly and without exception supported the Viet Minh. The Canadians tried for a compromise and the Indians did too, but often the Indian compromise was somewhere between the Canadian compromise and the rigid Polish position. Most of the refugees going south were Roman Catholics and the Viet Minh put all kinds of obstructions in their way. The harshness of the Viet Minh towards these civilians as witnessed by Canadians undoubtedly had an effect on their impartiality. The American press was making a good deal out of Viet Minh violations of the agreement and Canada came under some public criticism. The Indians were inclined to think the Canadians made too much of the movements of a few hundred thousand Catholics and the arguments in the commission were wearisome. The other task that caused endless bickering and in which the commission had little success was that of checking the illegal entry of military personnel or equipment. The commissions had too few teams to deploy along the land frontiers or even in the ports. It was easier to check against illegal entry in the

212 The Shaping of Peace south, particularly of American material, because this could come in only through a few ports. The big problem was the enormous border between North Vietnam and China. In the early stages of the commission Canadians were put on the spot again by Western opinion, in this case particularly French, with charges that all kinds of illegal war matériel was pouring down from China. There were, of course, counter-charges about American imports in the south. Neither side was able to produce clear evidence, but the commission could not be at all certain that it had prevented such entry. This was particularly true in the north where the North Vietnamese not only resisted the establishment of fixed teams on the principal roads to China but played games with the commission when it tried to establish mobile teams. Reasons were constantly being invented to frustrate efforts of the commission, supported usually by Indians and Canadians and actively resisted by the Poles, to set up appropriate controls. This constant battling with the Viet Minh supported by the Poles did a good deal to erode the Canadian determination to be impartial. Since it seemed clear that the Poles regarded themselves as attorneys for the north, Canadians found themselves either deliberately or unavoidably arguing the other case. The French were on the whole helpful and co-operative, but they had the difficulty of speaking for the South Vietnamese who resented the agreement and were not disposed to be co-operative. By the summer of 1955 there was reason to fear that the effective days of the commission were over. The country was de facto divided in two and the immediate danger of a resumption of hostilities had subsided. The authorities in Saigon and Hanoi were beginning to consolidate their authority. Members of the commission continued their very heavy obligations, meeting constantly, trying to find agreement or compromise on hundreds of items having to do with control of the borders, complaints of reprisals, and other matters, all of which were probably well beyond their capacity even if agreement had not been increasingly difficult to reach. To make things worse, the French were preparing to leave. The Saigon government was now under the presidency of Ngo Dinh Diem, who was more responsive to American influence and assistance. It was the French on whom the commission had been dependent for most of their logistics. Without them, there could be no Joint Committee as the executive arm of the agreements because the South and North Vietnamese would not sit together. Serious questions were raised in Ottawa as to whether the International Commission could continue its operations and in particular what Canada should do. Whereas the tremendous activity of the first 300 days, and some feeling of accomplishment, had been the basis of a strong morale among the Canadians

213 The Asian Dimension serving in Vietnam, the realization that they were settling down to months, and possibly years, of continuing frustration raised doubts about the zeal of the forces to carry on. A particular problem was the attitude of the South Vietnamese government. In conversations with the Canadians they showed no respect for the agreements or the commission and took the attitude that if this wicked armistice had not been imposed upon them they would be free to march to Hanoi.36 In this attitude they undoubtedly had the support of some Americans, but on the other hand the State Department had been coming round to see the advantages of a régime in which the parties could be held to the terms of the ceasefire. As one Canadian report described the new American attitude: 'There is no doubt of their conviction (new-found perhaps but nevertheless firm) that the Commission has an important role to play in their own calculations and that the Geneva armistice must be preserved. Their support of the Commission is gratifying but it could even prove embarrassing. Their somewhat cold but not hostile attitude ... has had certain benefits. There is a danger, however, that they will now make it known in characteristically simple terms that the Commission is Diem's best defence and IndoChina's barrier against the Communists.'37 The Americans were careful to conform in a literal and grudging way to the stipulations. They were not likely to reveal to the Canadians the extent of their clandestine efforts as revealed some years later. In the summer of 1955 a mob in Saigon attacked the commission headquarters and dangerously threatened the Poles and Indians. The Canadians objected strongly to this behaviour which seemed to have been encouraged by the government. At the same time, Diem was proposing that the question be turned over to the UN and the Americans were supporting him. Although the Canadians would have been delighted to have the work of the ICC transferred to the UN, they protested to the Americans that because everyone knew this was impossible they were proposing a diversion that would only infuriate all those who wanted the armistice to work.38 The Indians were threatening to give up in disgust. The question of elections was looming. The assumption of most observers was that the Viet Minh had been induced by the Russians and Chinese to accept the armistice because there was a promise of elections within two years which they were confident would mean a decision in their favour. Unfortunately, the declaration about elections was not an agreed declaration among the Vietnamese themselves, who alone would be able to carry it out. It was a notice of intention by the great powers along with the Viet Minh in the Final Declaration at Geneva, an unsigned document which, in the view of the legal advisers in External Affairs, did not have the binding force of an

214 The Shaping of Peace international agreement. Of the powers only France had any capacity to carry out this undertaking - and that only in the southern zone. By the time the elections were to be held, however, France had withdrawn from Vietnam. None of the other great powers was in a position to do more than beg the parties to hold elections. It was not the responsibility of the commission to see that the elections were held. The Indians, Poles, and Canadians had been asked to arrange for supervision of the elections when they were held and it was assumed that a new organization would have to be set up for that purpose different from the ICC. Canada had indicated it would accept this responsibility with the proviso that the elections would have to be entirely free in Canadian eyes.39 The Canadian position was that some fresh direction from the Geneva conference powers would be necessary before the machinery for the supervision of the elections could be settled. A prerequisite would be an agreement between the Viet Minh and the State of Vietnam on electoral procedures acceptable to the Geneva Conference powers.40 Canada was not ready to accept any executive responsibility for these elections but it was prepared to move cautiously in the direction of good offices. Canadian diplomats did, therefore, caution Diem and the other ministers in Saigon against taking so negative an attitude towards the political settlement. They were so concerned in the summer of 1955 at the 'cocky' attitude in Saigon, their failure to recognize that their security depended on the perpetuation of the Geneva understandings and the commission, that they drew their fears to the attention of the British and Americans.41 The British offered the same advice, and the view was shared in the United States State Department that the South Vietnamese ought not to put themselves in the wrong by refusing even to discuss the subject of elections. It was not a view held by all Americans. The unwisdom of the South Vietnamese at this time has encouraged the persistent assumption that the elections were frustrated by the refusal of the South, backed by the Americans, to hold them. In fact, the possibility of anything that could be called free elections was illusory. Free elections in which everybody in the North voted for Ho and everybody in the South voted for Diem would not help very much. Elections in the North would clearly have been the kind of elections that are held in communist countries, particularly in the earlier stages. Elections in the South would have been more free but in the chaotic state they could hardly have represented a calm judgment of the citizens. There was a basic paradox about which, as a departmental memorandum put it, 'we ought not to kid ourselves any longer.' 'The paradox is this: It is of the greatest importance that peace be maintained in Indochina by maintaining the structure established at Geneva. This structure can be maintained only if the provisions concerning

215 The Asian Dimension free elections are carried out. However, there cannot be elections next year which could reasonably be called free by Asian, European or by any other standards than those of the Soviet Union. It is not a question of modalities ... you cannot have free elections in an unfree atmosphere.'42 Some people in Ottawa were beginning to think that the best hope for Vietnam was that the two sides, after they had settled down and felt more secure, might eventually begin discussions for reunification. So long as they would not talk to each other, however, there could be no arrangements for nation-wide elections. 'Anything like uniform, national, free elections for a legislative assembly or even for a constitutional assembly must not be seriously considered as a possibility. There are possibilities, however, of finding some formula which would allow the two governments to continue in power but provide some kind of federal council or planning body to work towards unification. This might not be strictly in accordance with the Geneva Agreement but it would presumably be acceptable if the parties could agree to it.'43 The Indians and the French were found to be thinking along these lines also. The prospect of elections, however, remained so remote throughout this period that it was never necessary for the Canadians, Indians, or Poles to begin making their arrangements. Contemplation of such a task of supervision haunted the Department of External Affairs, already over-burdened with the commission, but at the same time they realized that the ending of this possibility condemned them to an indefinite period in Vietnam. The prospect of elections in Vietnam gradually faded. There was no one moment of decision for the Indians or Canadians to abandon the commission. There were pressures in Ottawa to cut the commitment and the Department of External Affairs would have liked to be relieved of the burden. Some at least of the Canadian military, on the other hand, were beginning to find peacekeeping an interesting challenge and an organizational raison d'être. A Canadian withdrawal would have been denounced by Poland and the Soviet Union as a concession to American pressure designed to free Saigon of its obligations. There was little justification of the commission on the basis of the work now being accomplished. Increasingly, therefore, the argument for remaining was an argument for maintaining a symbol of the Geneva agreements on the basis of which the parties and their sponsors might some day construct a real peace, after they had recognized the dangers and disadvantages of other courses. It was not so much an argument for staying as an argument against resigning. It was not an argument based on a firm hope but on a feeling that as long as there was any chance of the agreement and the commission holding the country together and preventing the spread of fighting, Canada ought not to abandon it. Perhaps also there was a

216 The Shaping of Peace certain pride in the experiment because Canadians had spent so much time defending the concept of Geneva and the ice to the sceptical Americans and others. During the period of the mid-fifties, furthermore, the structure of the ceasefire was on the whole being maintained. The terms of the armistice were being violated right and left in ways which boded ill for the future but were not at the moment upsetting the work of consolidation going on in both parts of the country. 'Apart from its general function as a shock-absorber between the two sides and as an agency for keeping temperatures down,' the Far Eastern Division of External Affairs noted in a briefing paper for the minister of 3 February 1956 the following reasons for not withdrawing the commission. Although withdrawal would not affect the legal obligations of the parties to the ceasefire agreements, it would have an unsettling effect and implementation of further clauses could not be expected without the commission's prodding. There would be increased danger of incidents and moving of troops in the demilitarized zone. The Viet Minh would lose its reasons for compliance as the prospects of a political settlement faded, and the South would abandon its compliance with the ban on war matériels. SEATO would be encouraged to involve itself and provoke counter-measures by the Chinese. Failure of the commission could be regarded as a rebuff to India, and Indian neutrality was seen as a valuable deterrent force, complementary to the 'hold-the-line' concept of SEATO. Another memorandum put the issue more bluntly: 'A policy of bringing things quickly to a head or of abandoning the Geneva Agreement might serve our narrow interests best as it would probably lead quickly to the withdrawal of the Commission. A policy of stalling, however, of maintaining the peace but achieving little success in reaching a settlement could be for us very arduous. It might keep us involved in Indochina for a very long time and it would certainly engage our representatives in frustrating labours. It might, however, be the best chance of keeping the peace and holding the line in Asia.'44 The situations in Cambodia and Laos were somewhat different. Cambodia looked like an early success story. The communist forces there were not substantial and had acquired no status in the Geneva agreement. Elections were to take place in a year and they duly did, with King Norodom Sihanouk presiding over a reasonably united country. Canada had been keen, as had Anthony Eden, on the protection of Cambodia and Laos by establishing them formally as neutral states. Sihanouk was disposed to be quite neutral and when the elections were over Canadians argued that the commission should close shop. In the Canadian view these international bodies should do their duty and depart rather than hang around inhibiting the

217 The Asian Dimension government of the country. The Indians and Poles would not agree to the liquidation of the Cambodian commission on the grounds that the three armistices were interlinked. Canada recognized some validity in the argument and agreed to maintain the commission with a much reduced presence in Phnom Penh. The commission in Laos had more to do. Here the agreements called for the regroupment of the communist Pathet Lao in two northern provinces. The French troops departed, but the commission was never able to establish the kind of supervision in the north which assured them that the North Vietnamese had also crossed the border. There was much to be done also on the political front in Vientiane. The agreement stipulated that the regroupment of the Pathet Lao was to last until there had been a 'political settlement.' In the small capital diplomacy could be effective and the Canadian representatives probably played a larger role in Laos than in either of the other countries. Their diplomacy was more effective in that it complemented that of the British and French. All three countries urged the Laotians to a 'neutralist' solution, but that was a dirty word for the Americans. Canadians viewed with dismay the activities of the Americans in supporting right-wing elements, and at one point, in order to persuade the Americans that they were not necessary, tried to persuade the French to provide the military help which the Geneva agreement allowed them alone to maintain. After a great deal of pressing and pulling the neutralist Souvanna Phouma was established as prime minister. He negotiated with the Pathet Lao leader, Souvanavong, his half-brother, an agreement which ended hostilities and provided for réintégration and elections. It was not until 1958, however, that the settlement was reached and the Laotian government told the commission it was no longer needed. Again the Canadians took the position that this was right and again they were opposed by the Indians and Poles. Again there was a compromise according to which the commission remained in existence but was not resident in Vientiane, where it was extremely unwelcome. By 1957 the armistice in Vietnam was beginning to crumble. The worst period for the commission in Vietnam was yet to come. Canadians were constantly threatening to resign, but each time they were persuaded by their friends to stay-and by their antagonists likewise. As they contemplated departure, however, they saw more clearly the significance of such a body as an 'international presence,' a promise and a threat of concern by the international community. It was a perception of international institutions that would be increasingly recognized in the UN. The most important thing was not to preserve the commission but to preserve the Geneva agreements. The dilemma was set forth in a letter to the commissioner in Hanoi:

218 The Shaping of Peace We have, of course, taken the view and still do that the Commission has a symbolic value and should be retained in Vietnam as long as possible because to remove it would threaten the Geneva framework on which peace rests. The symbolic function would undoubtedly best be achieved by continuing the Commission at full force, by improving our procedures, and thereby making sure that the Geneva Agreements are observed. On the other hand, it is conceivable that it could be achieved simply by having a Commission waving an international flag in Hanoi or Saigon or both. What I am worried about is that we may find ourselves drifting into a situation in which we have the worst of both worlds. In other words, we would maintain the full staff and framework and endeavour to carry on all the prescribed functions, but for an increasing number of reasons we would be incapable of performing any of these functions satisfactorily. Such a situation would be hard on our morale and on our pride; it would also be very hard on the prestige of the Commission. If the Commission becomes a farce, can it have any value as a symbol?45

The financial arrangements were inadequate and the cost to the Canadian taxpayer was more than expected. There were rumblings in Ottawa. It remained a heavy drain on the personnel of both the armed forces and External Affairs. There were few compensations but there were some. The exposure both to Asia at its less glamorous and to the delicate art of 'middle-powermanship' was useful for a considerable number of foreign service officers and military officers. It was a training both positive and negative. The relative success in promoting a tranquil establishment of the ceasefire, regrouping, and exchange of prisoners confirmed hopes that there was a legitimate function for what was to become known as 'peacekeeping.' A lesson borne in mind thereafter was that the third party could be successful only if the parties had, willingly or unwillingly, accepted the terms. Where the commission had achieved little was in the provisions for human rights which, however desirable, were totally beyond the capacity of a small - or even a large - supervisory commission to carry out. It could make only spot checks on the movement of refugees under Article 14(d) and it was utterly swamped by the obligation to investigate political reprisals under Article 14(c) among the millions of people ravaged by civil war. How to face such impossible demands on peacekeepers was to remain a dilemma thereafter. The Geneva agreements may never have been reached without such political provisions, and in the pressure to extinguish fighting many such promises have been made since. Putting them into ceasefires is naive or dishonest and it leads to frustration and humiliation for the peacekeepers. In the case of Vietnam, the same may, of course, be said about the elections which no party to the agreement could seriously have believed pos-

219 The Asian Dimension sible. And yet to leave them out may allow a war to get out of hand. It was for a middle power-in-training a rough but useful lesson in the need to live with paradox and to recognize that morality in international politics is prismatic. For the middle power on the make there were also certain advantages in diplomacy. Although Indochina did not maintain the priority it had had in 1954 or was to assume in the sixties, nevertheless it was considered one of the major items on the international agenda. In such discussions Canada could participate as something like a principal. It was almost the only Western country with legitimate access to North Vietnam. Canadian diplomats discovered that in their arguments with the major powers, and particularly with the United States, there was an advantage in arguing from an on-thespot position. It was an area on which they could speak their mind with reasonable authority, not just in Washington but in London, Paris, or New Delhi, without being brushed aside as presumptuous. It was perhaps an experience of the big time which helped to perpetuate some illusions about Canadian influence. Calculations as of several decades later about the Indochina experience played no part, of course, in the evolution of thinking on the shaping of peace in the mid-fifties. Canadians were, in fact, sufficiently confident of the value of intermediary activity to favour it when further challenges came. The conviction was strengthened, nevertheless, that such actions were best sponsored by the UN-although there was no feeling that they had sinned by getting involved in actions outside the sacred chambers when that was the only way open. Defending the Geneva 'settlement' was a step further towards the acceptance of détente. Canada did not favour the division of Vietnam any more than it favoured the division of Korea or Germany, but such divisions, if they existed, were seen as temporary solutions, ways to isolate conflict by stabilizing it, and in short better than the alternatives. The memorandum cited above on the value of stalling noted an article by Raymond Aron on the situation in Southeast Asia: J'avais fait observer que les situations les plus stables dans le monde actuel sont celles de partage, pourvu qu'il y ait une armée des deux côtés de la ligne de démarcation... Toute position qui ne peut-être modifiée qu'avec un risque de guerre générale est une position sûre. Il en est deux exemples: Berlin et la Corée... la probabilité me parait être que, dans l'atmosphère de détente, l'expansion communiste, dans le Sud-Est asiatique, ne sera pas poussée très fortement, et qu'il y a même une chance de ne pas faire à élections en juillet 1956 et de ne pas avoir de grandes opérations militaires.46

220 The Shaping of Peace Aron's argument for living with division was congenial to thinking in External Affairs. It was unfortunate that the Russians were giving a twist to the term, but it was a concept of 'peaceful co-existence.' At exactly the same time Canada was leading the cause in the UN Assembly for ending the conflict over new members by admitting them all.47 That too was an argument, and a successful one, with the Americans whose political leaders were still very uncomfortable with the idea of accepting, even de facto, the communists' ill-gotten empire. The Canadian strategic view of Indochina then and later, it should be noted, accepted the inevitability of division, not because it was attractive but because that was the way it was for at least the time being. Those peoples that had not been engulfed by the communists should be helped to stave off that unhappy fate. If those in the north could be liberated from communist rule by domestic forces, so much the better, but foreign intervention was not the way. It was not a doctrine of roll-back. That doctrine would soon receive a fatal blow in Europe over Hungary, but the Americans were loath to abandon it in the Far East. Indochina passed into a new phase after 1957. There were new people in charge in Ottawa and, according to Ross, the 'conservatives' began to predominate over the 'liberal-moderates.' There was little noticeable change of policy when the Diefenbaker government took over and the change of personnel does not alone account for the shift of 'tendency.' The situation on the spot changed. Violence increased. Outside powers became more involved. Respect for the Geneva 'stand-off' declined even more. The further responsibilities of the Vietnam commission, human rights, and borders could not be fulfilled. The internal situation became increasingly polarized. The Canadian approach was based on the assumption that there could always be a compromise. They saw the combatants not just as black and white, good and bad guys. They were always looking for grey guys. That may well be a liberal illusion, and all the efforts to find a compromise merely a postponement of 'the final solution.' The question can still be raised, nevertheless, whether the Geneva agreements might not have held if the Americans had given them their moral support from the beginning. It is somewhat the same question raised about the 'failure' of the League of Nations and suggests that the flaws may be found in the will rather than in the formulas.

10

The Meaning of Alliance

Being an ally is a condition with which Canadians do not easily come to terms. A country which for too long associated with and measured itself against two great powers places inordinate value on its independence. A mythology has developed in which Canadian history is seen as a struggle for liberation from Britain and then the United States, with true independence, as enjoyed by other mythical states, still eluding the victim's grasp. It is an interpretation that ignores both the circumstances of the country's birth and the extent to which sheltering in this comfortable triangle was both wise and deliberate policy. Canadians have consistently opted of their own will for collective defence, recognizing thereby the limitations and obligations imposed by a relationship they believe to be in their own best interests, but impulsively resenting requirements to conform or contribute according to the calculations of outsiders. In the fifties, however, the country was perhaps as relaxed in an alliance as it has ever been before or since. That was partly because Canada had so obviously played a leading part in establishing the alliance. There were those, of course, who did not like NATO. Some argued that as there was no serious threat the alliance was unnecessary. Canada could be more useful as a neutral or could just avoid provocation and look after its own affairs. These arguments were more logical than the positions of those who accepted NATO and Canada's membership but wanted no 'interference' from the alliance. The fact that NATO was a contract made for the defence of Canada was more easily obscured as the United States became predominant in its strategy. It was easy to revert to the more traditional stream of nationalism that fed on a sense of victimization, a fear of being 'pushed around.' The alliance-minded men of the fifties could be said, however, to have been just as nationalist in their own way. The emphasis was not on indepen-

222 The Shaping of Peace dence but on Canada's being the most respected and reliable member of the team. By having the best if not the biggest contingents in Europe and an energetic but collaborationist diplomacy, Canada would have an image of which to be proud. The later nationalists interpreted this attitude as docility, and no doubt the anxiety to preserve this reputation as a good boy was at times an argument for conformity. Both in theory and in practice, however, the 'good ally' insisted on the right to differ on tactics and argued against docility and rigidity. It did act, however, in accordance with the conviction that there were times when it was essential to abandon resistance and stand shoulder to shoulder to remind the communist powers that the reason the allies had come together in 1949 was still valid. In doing so, however, it was usually made clear that Canada had not been intimidated, that they were engaging in a deliberate gesture of solidarity - solidarity with a group, not just with the superpower. Although there was never any doubt as to which member counted most, Canada saw itself as part of a multilateral alliance and within that alliance as much an associate of the smaller European members as part of a North American front. THE SHAPING OF NATO

Any illusion the NATO allies may have had that the emphasis on Article 2 was merely the Canadian government's way of assuring a political majority for the treaty was dissipated after the treaty had been signed and discussion of the organization to be set up got under way. For reasons of expediency such discussion had been postponed until the treaty was agreed upon. The working group set up for this purpose started meeting in August 1949. The Canadian representative promptly raised the question of economic and financial action and was strongly opposed by the British and American representatives. The intention of the latter was to concentrate on what seemed most important - defence arrangements - and to promise consideration of other kinds of machinery in the indefinite future. The State Department was irritated by the Canadian initiative, and Acheson as chairman suggested Canada submit a specific proposal of a procedural character, having a shrewd idea that being specific on the subject was what was most difficult for the Canadians. Reluctant though he was, Hume Wrong was doing his best. He confessed, however, in November 1949 that paying due regard to the activities of GATT, the Bank and Fund, OEEC, the Economic Council for Europe, and other bodies, as well as the tripartite arrangements in Washington, he had not come up with any answer except the somewhat negative one that there might be useful scope for a North Atlantic Economic Council when the

223 The Meaning of Alliance European Recovery Programme was wound up in 1952. He feared Canada would incur the suspicion that they were advocating the creation of a new international agency as an end in itself and not as a means to an end.1 In the meantime, an interdepartmental working committee involving External Affairs, Finance, Trade and Commerce, and the Bank of Canada had been set up in Ottawa but was not able to decide on useful immediate functions under Article 2. Those actually involved in the negotiations realized the dangerous situation into which Canada was getting and advocated temporizing. Pearson respected their good advice but was anxious not to give the impression that Canada was losing interest in Article 2, as that was not the case.2 Considerable attention had been paid to Article 2 in the House of Commons, and public opinion, whether or not it had been created by the government, remained to haunt them. There had not been much opinion along these lines in the other countries, except for platitudinous references to the spiritual nature of the community. There was not even whole-hearted support in the Ottawa bureaucracy. Senior officials in the Department of Finance were particularly unenthusiastic. Challenged to come up with something, the bureaucrats did make a cautious suggestion to be used at the May 1950 Council meeting in London that a committee should be set up of government officials from half-a-dozen countries who were acknowledged experts in economic policy. They would in the first place study the possible economic application of Article 2 in the years beyond 1952. They would concern themselves particularly with the relationship between the economic pledges of Article 2 and other pledges of economic co-operation in the United Nations Charter, in GATT, Bretton Woods, and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. Significantly it was suggested that the group might also consider extension of economic co-operation under the treaty to include non-signatory powers. That Council meeting, however, was more concerned with finding out what Canada could produce in the way of Mutual Aid. A possible solution to the Canadian dilemma came in May 1950 when it was decided to associate Canada and the United States informally with OEEC as a means of providing continuing economic links between the North Atlantic countries on both sides of the ocean. It was the ingenious approach of Norman Robertson who realized among other things that a controversy had developed within External Affairs and between External Affairs and its friends abroad which was self-perpetuating and out of touch with reality.3 For some, this step ended the hope of economic action under Article 2. For others it ended the necessity. It was a good functionalist measure. OEEC, with

224 The Shaping of Peace its own membership, could deal with economics, and NATO, consisting of those willing to fight, would be the military organ. Drew and Coldwell both endorsed this Canadian association with OEEC when it was announced in the Commons, thereby taking some of the heat off Article 2. The emphasis on military arrangements required by the Korean War removed consideration of institutionalizing Article 2 from the agenda. Pearson himself was much involved in the military and political aspects of the Korean War and in the test it brought to the unity of the alliance. He concentrated now more on the economic pledge than on the economic machinery. The institutionalist voice in the department was, however, not stilled. Escott Reid saw in the Korean challenge an opportunity not only to create an economic commonwealth of the Atlantic but to push on to a political commonwealth. He recognized that the emergency required participants to rearm quickly and leave short-term considerations to be balanced against long-term considerations. Insofar as there was a choice, however, 'we should all choose those ways of re-arming which will assist rather than retard progress towards the goal of a North Atlantic Economic Commonwealth.'4 In the course of a visit to Western Europe in the summer of 1951 Pearson, in discussion with leaders, particularly in the smaller European countries, explored the idea of a bifurcated North Atlantic organization, with one side concentrating on military matters and the other side on economic and social questions. Countries like Sweden, which did not want to abandon its neutrality, could be involved in the latter. He found considerable sympathy in The Hague, Copenhagen, and Oslo with his view that the admission of Greece and Turkey over-emphasized the military aspects of the treaty at the expense of the concept of an Atlantic community. Like other Canadians, Pearson felt more at home in Scandinavia, even in a neutral capital like Stockholm, than in Mediterranean Europe. If it was a question of preserving free Western democracy, this seemed more alive in the north than in the south. At the same time neither he nor his friends, such as Halvard Lange of Norway, doubted that the military priority had to come first in existing circumstances. With Lange, Pearson forged a special attachment, and the 'Ottawa-Oslo axis,' to which Paul-Henri Spaak once referred somewhat acidly,5 was a valuable and congenial aspect of Canadian diplomacy both in NATO and the United Nations. In talking to the Swedes Pearson was particularly anxious to emphasize a sympathetic understanding of the reasons why Sweden had kept out of NATO, together with a regret that they were not in the brotherhood. The abrasive attitude which the Americans had taken towards the Swedes and the holy condemnation of neutrality was particularly irritating to Cana-

225 The Meaning of Alliance dians who had had barely ten years to forget the glorification by the Americans of neutrality as virtue.6 When the NATO Council met in Ottawa in September 1951 the foreign minister of the Netherlands, Dirk Stikker, sought to please his hosts by emphasizing in general terms the need to pay attention to the 'practical development of the Atlantic community as a major objective of the NATO countries.' At about the same time, however, the opposition within the Ottawa bureaucracy to mechanistic interpretations of Article 2 came to the surface. It seemed that the strong doubts held by Hume Wrong in Washington were shared by most of the envoys abroad including influential advocates like L.D. Wilgress, the Canadian representative at the NATO Council. Some blunt questions were asked as to just what exactly was meant by a 'political commonwealth' and emphasis was placed on the hopelessness of moving far in this direction, given the attitudes of the major powers in particular and the allies in general. The outburst was caused by a departmental policy paper7 which expressed the hope that 'the practice of working together in both the military and economic spheres will some day lead to a political commonwealth of the Atlantic which might be so close as to be a federation.' An appendix to the memorandum took the view that 'a federal commonwealth of NATO' was not just impractical but 'especially undesirable from Canada's standpoint.' Wrong stated his view that Article 2 was 'primarily a pledge by the governments that in their own national policies they will give effect to the economic and political undertakings set forth' and argued, 'Might not an effort be made in documents and public statements to avoid in future references to "the implementation of Article 2"?' He thought that 'the idea of the creation of "a political Commonwealth of the North Atlantic" is in present circumstances so remote from attainment that to discuss it as an aim of current policy is unrealistic.' It was advice which could have saved Canada continuing embarrassment, although it was probably too late to arrest the spread of the phrase in parliament and the press.8 At the same time, however, there was some shift of emphasis on the part of those who wanted to get on with practical forms of economic collaboration among the NATO partners. The original and rather doctrinaire enthusiasm for European integration was being tempered by a realization that if this European integration did not take place within a broader Atlantic framework the results could be bad for Canada. In a cogent memorandum of 6 September 1951 Douglas LePan noted for the minister the strong temptation to say that European integration and the formation of a North Atlantic community are equally illusions, but the Schuman plan and the Pleven plan suggested that

226 The Shaping of Peace the integration of Western Europe might actually be realized. 'European economic integration could very easily mean the creation of new trade barriers against Canadian imports; military co-operation amongst the countries of Western Europe could mean a great growth in neutralist sentiment. Both these possibilities would imperil the success of the North Atlantic Treaty. They would be particularly dangerous for Canada, since we would be left to deal with the United States on our own and almost inevitably would sink into a policy of simple continentalism.' The end as he saw it was that the logic for beginning to give economic meaning and content to the North Atlantic community was inescapable, but nevertheless it was very difficult to see how a beginning could be made. The long and unsatisfactory debate over a common foreign policy in the Commonwealth had left Wrong, Robertson, Wilgress, and others cautious when it came to NATO. Some thought, however, that NATO was a very different case and a common policy was essential and possible. Reid wanted machinery for consultation on foreign policy, but even that would not be sufficient. He cited a State Department official who had spoken of'the development of certain conventions of an unwritten Atlantic constitution.' Reid proposed conventions according to which no member government should adopt a foreign policy on a matter of concern to the whole alliance without previous consultation with and taking into consideration the views of the other members of the alliance. Among suggestions for economic co-operation was the making of intergovernmental arrangements in defence production and defence finance. Another was planned co-operation in the specialized agencies of the United Nations, in GATT, and in ECOSOC where the Atlantic countries, acting as a 'nuclear group,' could spark progress. This kind of co-operation would improve NATO'S image because it would be something bigger than a military organization.9 However, although Reid's own view of the way in which the wealthy were obliged to aid the poor was in the best humanitarian tradition, the co-ordination of the economic power of the Western countries might have been regarded by the rest of the world as an even more heinous example of imperialism than the kind of military co-ordination which some of those countries at least regarded as legitimate.10 One wonders also what they would have made of the proposal for a preferential North Atlantic migration system. An approach to the function of NATO which reflected some private official thinking in Ottawa was contained in Reid's somewhat prophetic comments in a memorandum, 'Paper on Canadian Policy in NATO,' dated 28 April 1951: 'While the problems for Canada are peculiarly difficult, all the other countries in the Western world are faced with the problems created by the

227 The Meaning of Alliance fact that in a two-power world the United States is so much the preponderant power on our side. If there is a war and we win, it is highly probable that that part of the world which is not reduced to anarchy will be ruled pretty directly by the United States. He thought that, 'Even in its present rudimentary state, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does provide a check and balance on United States power.' A problem for the internationalists who were devising Canadian foreign policy at this time was that their enthusiasm for creating international institutions led them in exclusivist directions they had not intended. Some other countries were worried by all this Atlantic zeal. Pearson had to assure his Australian opposite number, Richard Casey, in a letter of 12 October 1951, that the kind of consultation on foreign policy which Canadians had in mind for the North Atlantic countries would be designed to speed the exchange of information and promote harmonies in foreign policies but not create a NATO bloc in international affairs or exclusive commercial arrangements. In a speech in Toronto on 2 September 1952 he specifically rejected 'ring-fence policies as the basis of the relationship between NATO countries and other free democracies.'11 It was Pearson's habit to adjust his views to the inevitable rather than bow to it. The Canadian political attachment to Article 2 was a continuing problem. After the immediate military threat seemed to have subsided in 1952, the CCF attacked the government on its failure to get anywhere with the article. Pearson replied to this criticism in the House on 1 April with a significant comment. After claiming that Canada had done more than any other country to achieve its implementation, by developing economic and political co-operation in building the Atlantic community, he pointed out that no one country could determine NATO policy on its own. Then he added that if they looked at Article 2 they would find that unlike certain other articles in the treaty, it did not provide specifically for any special NATO machinery. Nor did it necessarily entail joint programmes of action among member nations, although that might of course develop. He described Article 2 as 'a rule of conduct which member nations undertake to follow in their internal and external policies generally, and not merely in their policies visa-vis one another.' He added: 'We are not so concerned in NATO with talking about some grandiose or airy Atlantic NATO structure... as we are in laying foundations on which to build the future.'12 Some gestures were made by NATO. In September 1951 a Temporary Council Committee was set up with representatives of the United States, Britain, and France to examine means of reconciling collective defence requirements with the political and economic capabilities of each member. In

228 The Shaping of Peace Pearson's view an opportunity was lost when the TCC was not given a decisive role in attempting to pool within the alliance research, development, standardization, and joint production of armaments. He did consider a gain, however, the regular annual review of collective defence needs and national performances 'which was as important to the coalition as it was occasionally irritating to governments.' The review, which praised, blamed, and recommended, had no binding effect on governments, which remained masters of their own policies and appropriations, 'but the surveys were bound to influence their planning for, and participation in, the common defence.'13 There was much about the TCC, however, that Ottawa in practice disliked. As a measure of supranational authority it fell between two stools. It tended to impose on members an allocation based on capacity to pay rather than calculated strategy, and in Canada the complaint was increasingly made that the Canadian defence budget was set to meet the wishes of the annual review regardless of whether it could be rationally spent on Canadian forces. There were various polite efforts by friendly delegations and the secretarygeneral to meet the Canadian wishes, but the committees and sub-committees made little concrete progress. It is curious, in the light of Canadian hopes for an Atlantic community, that little attention was paid in the early stages to instrumentalities for co-ordinating foreign policy. When the new under-secretary, Arnold Heeney, made an exploratory visit to Europe in the spring of 1950, he encountered the view in some capitals that there was insufficient political co-ordination. The French were proposing a ministerial council to co-ordinate defence, economic, and foreign policies, and the State Department had some ideas for machinery. Charles Ritchie looked into the subject in April and confessed that 'our own thinking on the subject has so far been floating about rather vaguely and we gather that this is true also of the State Department and the Foreign Office.'14 When the Korean War showed the need for harmony, Pearson proposed to the September 1950 Council a single Council of Ministers instead of the system by which ministers concerned with foreign policy, defence, and finance belonged to separate committees. Encouraged by the American chairman, Canada prepared and submitted on 17 October an extensive memorandum. This was the season of acute crisis in the Korean War, and the proposals were swept along with others into a major reordering of the whole structure of NATO. The end result was regarded as sufficiently Canadian in inspiration to warrant the attendance of the Canadian representative, Dana Wilgress, along with the chairman, when the changes were announced at a press conference on 4 May 1951. What really mattered, however, was not the machinery so much as the practice of consultation, especially by the great powers. Other governments

229 The Meaning of Alliance might want to talk about Yugoslavia or Berlin but Acheson showed 'a strong disposition to cut short any general discussion of the world situation.' The Deputies tried to get an agreed minute on Yugoslavia in 1951 which would be approved by governments as North Atlantic policy, but they ran into the inevitable problem of getting twelve governments to agree to anything more than an empty generalization. So the Deputies agreed - and the Canadians thought it wiser - that minutes of the Deputies be simply referred to governments for information instead of trying to use the agreed minute as an instrument for formulating a common foreign policy.15 The effort, if not to produce a common policy, at least to minimize disunity, went on, more or less ad hoc, in response to the challenges and threats of the world situation. M I L I T A R Y CONTRIBUTION

Article 2 was, of course, far from the highest priority on NATO'S agenda. The NATO Council directed its immediate attention in 1949 to the military aspects of the treaty. In all the memoranda and messages dealing with the establishment of NATO that Canadian officials turned out there was an extraordinary lack of attention to the specific military requirements which might be made of Canada. It was clearly not foreseen that such forces would be expected on a standing basis. Consideration was given to the political aspects of any provision for calling on Canada to provide forces, but this seemed to be an abstraction, divorced from the reality of the forces as they existed. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff took an interest from the beginning in finding an appropriate voice. The habit of intimate association with the British and Americans in military matters persisted, and there was a tendency for some time to think of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington as the military authority to be taken seriously. From these allies the Canadian military had acquired a deep suspicion of the security of the French and some other continentals - a suspicion which stood in the way of the transformation of the Anglo-American establishment, with a special position for Canada, into something more genuinely multilateral. The idea that Canada was the third military power persisted also (although by 1948 Canada was hardly a military power at all), and an assumption that on functional grounds Canada would have a special place in the NATO military hierarchy. Experience had also taught the Canadian military to believe in the importance of securing a voice in the early planning stages before the great powers had got them committed. There was another special Canadian concern from the beginning which was to be significant, one of the many practical considerations that led government policy and practice away from that ideal state of Atlantic unity so

230 The Shaping of Peace ardently proclaimed. It was feared that some kind of Atlantic Chiefs of Staff might gain control over North American resources,16 a worry shared in Washington. In the emergency of the late forties it was recognized that the Europeans were exceedingly dependent upon North American supply, and it seemed important, therefore, that the centralized Atlantic body should not have power to determine the North American contribution. The Americans extended this jealousy to their military operations in North America, an anxiety expressed also by General Foulkes and the Canadian military. There were some reasons for it, but it did not strengthen the argument Pearson was making about the mutual dependence of the two continents. A North Atlantic Defence Committee was promptly set up, consisting of the defence ministers of the member countries. There was also a Military Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of all members. The 'steering committee' emerged as the so-called Standing Group, the members of which were the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The Canadian military were disappointed and indicated their disappointment to the press. Cabinet, however, was cautious about getting out on such a limb. Pearson was angry at the leaked press report, as he knew it had come from National Defence. He made clear to the press that the government had not asked to be a member of the Standing Group and sought to counteract the impression that there had been a failure and a disappointment.17 The newly formed Defence Liaison Division in DEA wanted Canada to be a full member, but Pearson thought the committee as proposed was 'possibly the best course.'18 The idea of Canada being on this select body was strongly supported by the French and Charles Ritchie of the embassy in Paris was told at the Quai d'Orsay that Canada was 'first cousin' to all the other proposed members and could serve an invaluable role as intermediary.19 The United States Chiefs of Staff opposed Canada's membership on familiar grounds; it would encourage the aspirations of other lesser lights, Italy and the Netherlands specifically. There was no lobbying for the position. A DEA memorandum for the minister of 1 April 1949 pointed out that 'it could indeed prove embarrassing if we were to insist on any given scheme for our own representation and then find that we seriously disagree with the criteria proposed by other countries for apportioning the burden of men, money and supplies.' Yes, indeed. It was the old dilemma about the price in commitment to be paid for a voice. When Heeney, Robertson, and Wrong met with the Chiefs of Staff on 18 May they agreed that defence planning could best be done on a regional basis with co-ordination by a small committee of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and possibly France. Canada should accept membership only if asked. They preferred Washington as the headquarters.20

231 The Meaning of Alliance To meet the situation External Affairs successfully recommended its favourite functionalist formula, similar to that obtained in the provision for raising forces for the United Nations:21 before the Standing Group made any recommendations involving the use of forces, facilities, or resources of a country not represented in the Standing Group, that party would have the right to participate in the work of formulating such recommendations. In this way two conflicting worries of the government would be met. Canadian forces would not be committed without Canadian involvement in the strategic decision, and on the other hand Canada would escape the moral obligation to send forces to Europe that would almost inevitably go with major power status in the Standing Group. A similar caution was exercised in connection with other bodies being set up. There were to be regional planning groups, and Canada was happy to take part in one of these, the Canada-US group, but ambivalent about membership of the West European regional planning group.22 In the end Canada went along with the United States in membership of this group. The attitude taken towards the Military Supply Board was equally interesting. Canada had been inclined to think this should be set up in Washington, but when they heard the American objections they agreed it would be better to have the board in Europe, as this would place more responsibility on European members for meeting their own needs. Such an arrangement would also leave Canada free to make direct arrangements with the United States regarding supplies and production for the North American region without reference to the Supply Board, and it would leave the initiative to the United States and Canada in meeting the needs of European members.23 Up until the decisive year, 1950, it was hoped that Canada could play its responsible share in NATO by providing the necessary supplies, strengthening the North American sector, and preparing to provide reserve forces in an emergency. Such a policy would be consistent with a small active force and a moderate increase in the defence budget. Canada had early cause to worry over the burden of supply it would be expected to carry. The Americans tried without success to get from Canada the kind of forthright commitment that would help persuade Congress that the United States was not expected to foot the bill alone. On 23 November 1949 Claxton placed the problem of Mutual Aid, as provided for under Article 3 of the treaty, before the Cabinet Defence Committee. He pointed out that Canada could not provide many troops for Europe and was handicapped in furnishing military equipment by its large United States dollar content.24 He was authorized to make to the NATO Defence Committee a cautious commitment to determine deficiencies of military supplies, see what could be done 'in the light of physical and

232 The Shaping of Peace financial capabilities to do so,' and to oner training facilities. When he went to the meeting he was disturbed by the extravagant plans for men and munitions being talked about. There would be an estimated deficit on military requirements of something like fifteen billion dollars for the NATO countries - and at a time when neither the United States nor United Kingdom planned to increase their defence budgets for North Atlantic defence. Pearson feared recrimination against Canada as a supplier country.25 In the spring of 1950, even before the Korean War transformed attitudes, it was realized that Canada had assumed incalculable obligations. Wrong reported that Canada had so far escaped serious criticism because of its war and immediate postwar record of economic assistance but 'It was becoming increasingly difficult to explain our present inaction, especially when our public statements on financial and trade matters were so optimistic in tone ... and it would not be long before we would find that our partners, and particularly the United States, would be asking us why we had dropped out.'26 There was a notable change, however, after the Korean attack. The crucial decisions of the government in the summer of 1950 to raise forces and despatch them and to increase vastly the defence budget undoubtedly strengthened the Canadian voice. Canada had promptly offered early in 1950 to train army officers and air crew for the forces of other NATO countries, and this offer was quickly accepted by six European countries. The expense of training air crew for NATO countries during 1951-2 was estimated at $64,500,000, to be applied against the Mutual Aid appropriation. In August 1950 Canada offered to NATO the armament and ammunition for a division. It was United Kingdomtype armament which Canada wanted to be rid of so that it might purchase corresponding American equipment. Hitherto the Canadian argument had been that it was better to put the money and effort into equipping the men standing ready in Europe than to use it for Canadian forces to be sent over. Now the decision was made to send Canadian troops to Europe: 'We feel... that equipment without men is even less useful than men without equipment. For obvious reasons, it is important that all the countries concerned in our collective defence should contribute men as well as equipment to the defence of western Europe. Accordingly we propose, if parliament approves, to place in the integrated force elements of the Canadian army.'27 On 22 October 1951 the minister announced a government decision to send a brigade, which would be grouped with the British, Dutch, and Belgian forces. At the same time he stressed that Canada's most substantial contribution would be air force, and foresaw 11 squadrons at full fighting strength with a supply line which altogether would require a very large portion of the total defence budget.

233 The Meaning of Alliance The 'obvious reasons' to which the minister referred were many and they were all too obvious. The feeling that a world-wide crisis was at hand gripped the Europeans as well as the North Americans, and a complacent attention to the military structure gave way to rapid planning of an integrated NATO force to be led by the great commander, General Eisenhower. In spite of the demands of the military front in Korea, the United States, in the autumn of 1951, decided to increase very considerably its forces in Europe. There was a general call for everyone to contribute to the integrated force. The very fact of an integrated force removed at least the ostensible Canadian hesitations over fighting in the tail of one of the great powers. Given the positions staked out by Canadian spokesmen, it was as difficult for the government to resist this conclusion as it had been the previous summer to hold out against sending a contribution to the United Nations force in Korea. The nightmare of conscription had been laid by the fact that enlisting had been more than adequate, especially in Quebec, and there was confidence in the ability to maintain volunteer forces for NATO - at least until there was an all-encompassing emergency. The government had been criticized by the opposition and the press more for its failure to act than for excessive zeal and the public seemed well disposed to the new move. It might be argued that if the External Affairs activists had been content to sit out the movement for a North Atlantic Treaty, or at least to wait until an invitation had been extended, rather than lead the crusade, the government would have been in a stronger moral position to withhold troops from Europe in 1951. Given the momentous events of 1950 and in particular the example of extreme exertion set by the United States, it is doubtful whether the Canadian public would have accepted a passive role. Whether this contribution of troops assured Canada of an influential position in European and Atlantic affairs remains a question for debate. There is little doubt, however, that if the Canadian government had not responded by sending forces to Europe when the idea of an integrated force was being developed, its opinions subsequently on NATO issues would have commanded considerably less respect. The acceptance of obligations by Canada was seen as important in the struggle against a lapse by the us Congress into 'isolationism.' If Canada had refused to send troops to Europe, Canadians would probably have found themselves stressing and magnifying their continental role to maintain some reputation for responsibility. Canada's reputation in NATO for 'responsibility' was and remained a continuing problem. External Affairs and National Defence were understandably most concerned about it, and the political leaders worried about the cost. It was hard to get the partners in the alliance to realize that Canada was a special case. It was, for one thing, the only member that could not count on

234 The Shaping of Peace some form of compensation from the United States for its NATO expenditures. (Nor would it later get any compensation from Germany as did Britain, France, and the United States because Canadians were there as allies, not as an occupying power.) The Europeans, who had grown accustomed to allocation in accordance with statistics through the Marshall Plan provisions, wanted to apply the same kind of automatic assessments in NATO. They had a habit also of talking about provisions, as in the so-called Medium Term Plan, that were quite unrealistic. The three-power Standing Group that acted as a NATO chiefs of staff began acting in an arbitrary way. Without prior consultation with the Canadian authorities they prescribed a Canadian contribution that Claxton told the Defence Committee was 'well beyond Canadian capacity as presently organized.'28 It was pressure from the NATO Council in late 1950 that forced the Canadian decision to make its army and air force contribution. When General Eisenhower's headquarters were set up at SHAPE, pressure began to come from that source to increase the contributions, and also to dictate how the forces should be raised. The Cabinet Defence Committee agreed with Pearson's view that 'it would not be desirable for the Canadian Military Representative to SHAPE to be summoned before General Eisenhower to justify Canada's method of meeting its force requirements.'29 The defence budget shot up to an estimated 11 per cent of the net national income for 1951. Ottawa's view was that decisions in this field were basically political. It was simply not politically possible for Canadians to make the same kind of contribution as Europeans to what was rather narrowly conceived by the public as the defence of Europe. In this they found some common ground with the Americans, but the Americans, on the other hand, were now driving this enterprise. They did not need to worry about being pushed around, and they did not have comparable problems of foreign content in their defence production. On the other hand, as a departmental memorandum of late 1950 pointed out, if Canada did not participate in the procedures set up for this purpose, it could be accused of flouting the principle of 'pooling resources' to which it had subscribed: Canada might be suspected 'of willingness to play the game only as long as it did not cost too much, of unwillingness to allow our partners even to look at the rich resources that we might be devoting to the common cause.'30 Cabinet accepted the DEA recommendation for participation on 22 December 1950, but with the proviso that the findings of the experts 'were not binding in any way upon the participating governments.' Pearson communicated this decision to Wilgress with the advice that 'we must now do our best to make sure that the difficulties and dangers which we have always anticipated are reduced to a minimum.'31 When Wrong explained

235 The Meaning of Alliance this 'reluctant decision' to the Americans they were sympathetic and agreed that 'it would not be possible for the experts to develop a formula which could be used to indicate what a country's contribution to the common defence effort should be.'32 Canada had made its point, and the enthusiasm of the new NATO bureaucracy had been checked. When the Annual Review, by which members' defence efforts were subjected to critical scrutiny at headquarters, was instituted, the Canadian representative was instructed to explain that providing figures as required was not in accord with the Canadian financial year and ran counter to Canada's 'traditions of budgetary secrecy and parliamentary control of the purse.'33 So much for the need so often professed in lyrical speeches to surrender sovereignty to an international authority. Once the troops were in Europe it would be very hard to withdraw them. That they would stay there indefinitely was not the expectation of the government. When the Europeans recovered they could hold the line themselves. The strategic assumption of 1950-1 was that the Western world was facing a drastic emergency that would be settled one way or the other in a short time. However, after the Korean War, the armistice in Indochina, the death of Stalin, and some indications of détente, NATO settled down for a long siege. The NATO contribution became a major and integral part of the Canadian defence effort, and the supply of arms under Mutual Aid became less significant. The Canadian electorate accepted the situation and the budgetary requirements with remarkably little protest for the time being. NATO in concert kept calling for larger goals, and with Canadian representatives constantly supporting the 'beefing up' of the alliance, the time for withdrawal or even of reduction never came. Pearson told Dulles in 1954 that Canada saw its northern defence role as an important part of NATO because it protected the retaliatory power of the United States. It might be necessary for that purpose to transfer air power from Europe but 'we would in any event, I assumed, wish to maintain some forces in Europe as an evidence of solidarity in the defence of that area.'34 Although NATO linked Canada and the West European countries more closely in many ways than they would otherwise have been, the association also caused some strain on relations between Canadians and Europeans. Bonds can solve and also create problems. A rather critical view of the Europeans developed in some quarters in Ottawa, where they were regarded as scroungers. During the build-up period, for example, it was said that 'Our European partners are still procrastinating, postponing defence orders until they know what they are going to get from the U.S. (and Canada), and - still more important - who is going to pay for items which they could make sur-

236 The Shaping of Peace plus to their own requirements.'35 In the earlier years there was little criticism of Canada on the military and Mutual Aid side. It was not too difficult for Canadian ministers to marshal the appropriate statistics to show that the Canadian effort, in budgetary terms at least, was comparable to that of the others. The attitude to Canada as a generous benefactor faded, however, as the unequal wartime relationship was replaced by the more normal association of countries expected to share burdens. THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO

Greece and Turkey36 The size and shape of NATO remained a problem. When it was being established, Canada had shown particular sensitivity about the extension of commitments in the Mediterranean and the inclusion of countries whose brand of democracy was in doubt. After swallowing Portugal it would be difficult to object to Greece and Turkey, which were more democratic than the Salazar régime but nevertheless not easily digestible. In the often noble concept of the civilization of the North Atlantic there was a trace of the old idea of Christendom, and the Turks hardly qualified for that. The Korean War, however, strengthened those who regarded the priority for military considerations as inescapable even if regrettable. In Korea the Turks provided one of the toughest contingents to the United Nations force. They and the Greeks wanted full membership in NATO for the status it would give them as well as for the deterrent effect it would have on the Russians. In August 1950 the Turkish ambassador called on Pearson to make preliminary feelers about Canada's attitude if Turkey were to apply for membership. In assessing a position to be taken, departmental memoranda recognized that there were pros and cons but for the time being the cons had it.37 They hoped that the applicants might be content with special arrangements such as those made by the NATO Council in September 1950 to associate the Turkish government with planning the defence of the Mediterranean. Canada was happy to agree to an American proposal that it would be undesirable for any member to give the Turks an indication of its position pending an exchange of views among all North Atlantic countries. Canadian diplomats were instructed to be non-committal, even the unfortunate Canadian ambassador in Ankara, General Odium, who had for some time been reporting with characteristic zeal about Turkey's will to fight in the event of war. The Turks were blunt in their representations. The Greeks also made their anxiety for membership known. Then, of course, the usual thing happened. The Americans informed the British and French that they had decided the relationship of Greece and

237 The Meaning of Alliance Turkey to NATO could best be met by their inclusion as full members. The news was immediately leaked to the press, and the question was formally raised by the United States in the NATO Deputies meeting on 16 May 1951. There was indignation in Ottawa. The position was that 'it would be unwise to allow ourselves and other NATO members to be hustled into a premature discussion of the topic.'38 Cabinet on 18 May recommended postponement of the discussion. At this point both the Turkish and Greek ambassadors were on the minister's doorstep. The former argued that his country considered that there were four great powers in the alliance and, as the fourth one, Canada was expected to make its voice heard. This appeal to Canadian susceptibilities did not work. He was told that Canada would not take a passive role, a comment that may have reassured him but should not have. The other lesser powers in NATO were, to say the least, dubious and the British unenthusiastic, although it was recognized that they would go along with the Americans. Dana Wilgress, the Canadian representative at NATO, was advised at the end of May not to play a prominent role in the Deputies discussions since 'It would be improper for the Canadian Government to take a leading part in urging a course of action which would involve others in extending commitments, although it is quite proper for Canada to comment on any measure which would substantially alter the character of NATO.' One reason for caution was that parliamentary approval would be required because admitting the two countries would constitute a major commitment for defence in an area where Canada had not been directly involved. In the meetings of Deputies, Wilgress found it embarrassing to remain detached when Canada's friends, the Dutch, Norwegians, and Belgians, were vigorously arguing for a Mediterranean pact rather than full membership in NATO for Greece and Turkey.39 He was finally authorized, therefore, to make a statement in which he proposed a Mediterranean pact but said it should be considerably abbreviated, omitting such provisions as were contained in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and should deal 'entirely with the reciprocal security consideration of the signatory countries.'40 This, he said, would enable NATO to develop along the lines originally contemplated. Finally, however, when only Norway and Canada were holding out, Pearson reported to cabinet on 8 August that it was undesirable to have further delay and controversy. There was general agreement, he told them, that if an aggression were launched against Greece and Turkey it would probably be met by a collective effort as in Korea. Cabinet therefore decided to support the admission of Greece and Turkey at the NATO Council meeting to be held in Ottawa. When he stated the Canadian position to the Council on 18 September, Pearson explained Canada's caution as dictated by concern for the future of NATO 'lest by set-

238 The Shaping of Peace ting a precedent for extending membership in this way its original purpose and character be lost and the whole organization be converted into a purely military alliance of anti-Communist states.' Germany Although the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany was a more important step, it was less significant in this context because the official Canadian attitude moved with the consensus. The part played by Canada was, in fact, somewhat closer to its over-celebrated mediatory function because Canada was neither an occupying state nor a European state and because Lester Pearson, at the height of his power, could be helpful in a personal capacity. It was not that Canada regarded itself as an observer. Its right to a say in any German question was a sore point, as described in the chapter on 'peacemaking' in volume 1. In 1950, however, Canada had declared itself no longer at war with Germany and on 26 October of that year made a statement referring to 'the desirability of bringing the Federal Republic of Germany into closer association with the community of free nations.' The question of a peace settlement had become less important than that of association with a more or less normal state. Along with its NATO allies, Canada recognized the Federal Republic and refused to have any truck with the East German régime. In August 1951 T.C. Davis presented his credentials as first Canadian ambassador in Bonn. The question arose in NATO of the rearmament of Germany. Up until the eve of the Korean War Canada had continued to favour German demilitarization and disarmament, and when the ambassador went to Bonn it was explained that although consideration had been given to the military potential of the new republic, such a step in no way suggested that the republic should be considered as a possible military ally.41 However, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was beginning to think otherwise. In a report of its Joint Planning Committee on 24 April the conclusion was reached from a military viewpoint that 'for the successful defence of Western Europe in the foreseeable future, Western Germany must be rearmed' and such military forces as were organized 'should be eventually integrated with the military forces of Western Europe.' Because of the political considerations, which were recognized, Germany should organize a police force on a paramilitary basis under control of the occupying powers. External Affairs did not disagree totally but put more emphasis on the political factors. The Canadian military authorities were no doubt influenced by their association with United States and other NATO military officers. Each member had its own interests and concerns, but there persisted up to a point a certain NATO orthodoxy among the military of which the Canadian service chiefs tended to be supporters.

239 The Meaning of Alliance By the end of 1951 Canadian troops were back in Germany and whatever disadvantage Canada's voice had suffered because of the refusal to participate in the occupation had been removed. There is no great evidence that it made much difference. The Canadian troops sent to Germany in 1951 went as a contribution to Western European defence and not as troops of an occupying power. They were an expensive contribution and the cost meant that Canada had an increased interest in the employment of German forces in Western defence. Germany had the capacity to strengthen that defence crucially. Furthermore, its contribution as a member of NATO to the budget would take pressure off other members. Canada went along with the general view that there ought to be no separate German defence forces and favoured the idea of a European Defence Community. The EDC did not work out, however, and by the time the NATO Council agreed in 1955 to admit Germany to NATO, Canada was prepared to give support. At the Conference of Nine in London in September 1954 Pearson was active behind the scenes putting together an agreement on Germany and NATO. The Canadian view had earlier been to get Germany into NATO through an enlarged Brussels pact that would not conflict with or overshadow the Atlantic alliance. The government was not enthusiastic about rearming Germany or altering the pattern of the developing Atlantic community, but if provision had to be made for German association with NATO it was in the end agreed that the most satisfactory framework was that of a full member rather than as an outsider. Although they had been somewhat more reluctant in earlier stages than the United States to forgive and forget and had worried more about the risks of German rearmament, nevertheless when that decision was made, great emphasis was placed by Canada on the need to accept the new policy wholeheartedly. That meant regarding Germany as in every way an equal member of the alliance. Because the Germans were doing commendably well at working their new democratic government, the question proved not as embarrassing as in the cases of Portugal, Greece, or Turkey. ODD MAN OUT

For Canada there was an increasing problem of determining just how it fitted into this curious alliance. It was always the odd member in a grouping that was inevitably regarded as roughly bilateral - Europe and America, with American meaning the United States. It had seemed natural for Canada to be an initial member, in the late forties so soon after the war when Canada had been the major secondary power. Although the men with 'Atlantic vision' in those days tended to think of 'European unity' as a component and comple-

240 The Shaping of Peace mentary part of the movement, NATO was still very much a collectivity of states of various sizes. James Reston pointed out that the inclusion of Canada had made a mutual alliance out of what might otherwise have been an American aid-to-Europe scheme.42 Although the visionaries in Ottawa had a soft spot for European unity also, they had to be the first to recognize its awkward implications. As noted previously, Hume Wrong and Douglas LePan, among others, had seen this difficulty.43 Canadian embarrassment at being assigned in this way as a North American adjunct, a role it was seeking through NATO to escape, was nevertheless an insufficiently worthy ground on which to oppose a cause so widely regarded as sacred. Canadian isolation, furthermore, was less apparent when the United Kingdom was also rather special. The British clung to the special relationship with the United States, and Canada was also part of that ABC triangle - an additional complication of the Atlantic jig-saw for the Canadian political philosopher. How then was Canada related to Europe itself? In spite of Pearson's insistence on NATO as a reciprocal aid scheme between Europe and North America, NATO councils concentrated on Europe. It was through NATO that Canada was now related to the German problem, and its attitudes towards Eastern Europe or Spain or Cyprus would be conditioned by the NATO obligation. The right of Canada to have a say about European affairs was stubbornly regarded as a right earned by its rescue operation in two European wars and its provision of troops under NATO. Europeans would acknowledge that right, but that did not mean they would pay much attention to Canadian interference in their affairs - other than the continued provision of aid. The Department of External Affairs was inordinately preoccupied with European affairs and its small staff overdeployed in that area. Canadian influence in Europe, however, was attributable to personality as well as to nationality. There was some diplomatic advantage, for Pearson in particular, to be outside the Europe-United States axis, but it is unwise to make deductions about a Canadian role as interlocutor from his special function in time and space. It was after he retired from being an international troubleshooter (at about the time Canada's place in the Atlantic hierarchy subsided to normal and the Europeans felt less need of help from Canada and were less mindful of past obligations) that the ambiguities of the Canadian place in the NATO scheme became more apparent. Because he was regarded as an Atlantic wise man, Pearson was consulted by Churchill, Eden, Mendès-France, and others. This consultative role could be seen for example at the Conference of Nine in London in September 1954, which had reached agreement on the association of Germany with NATO. There was no special Canadian interest at stake and Pearson's func-

241 The Meaning of Alliance tion, as so often, was that of soothing, interpreting, and looking for ways out of dilemmas. Typically, he did his best to understand and interpret MendèsFrance, the new boy among the NATO statesmen. Consultation with the British and the Europeans was thick and fast. Significantly, however, on the eve of the conference Pearson noted in a memorandum dated 27 September: 'We have now ... seen all the delegations but the American. I have tried to arrange a meeting with them but without success. I suppose they feel we don't present any problems, as the only effort they have made to consult with us is a telephone call from "Livy" Merchant paying his respects!' Evidence of the unusual position he held in the NATO hierarchy is to be found also in conversations he had with both Dulles and Eden in December 1954. The main question at issue was the growing concern in NATO over multiple control of the atomic weapon. Pearson was aware of the delicate constitutional issues at stake. Having been brought up in the Mackenzie King era he was certainly aware of the reluctance of any Canadian parliament to delegate authority to bring it into a war. However, he realized also the difficulty of other member states and particularly, of course, the problem of the American constitutional process. He told Dulles he was inclined to agree that discussion in the NATO Council, let alone with the public, on this subject ought to be discouraged. He stressed continuous consultation to keep policies in alignment - an old Canadian fetish - and emphasized the desirability of agreement on alert procedures so that the military would know what had to be done in an emergency. Dulles thought that there should be some secret discussions among the powers principally concerned, which he identified as the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. When the subject was discussed with Eden on the same day, he wanted a first examination of the problem by the British, American, and Canadian governments alone, to be followed by discussions with the French and later with the other NATO members. Eden's was the old British desire to emphasize the Anglo-American special position, within which he was willing to include Canada. The interesting point is that, before the rise of Germany within NATO and with the continuing suspicions of France, Canada was still a member of the in-group. It is no wonder that French resentment of 'the Anglo-Saxons,' which was to burst forth later under de Gaulle, included Canada. In the conversation with Dulles, Pearson raised a dilemma that casts an interesting light on the Canadian debate in 1968-9 over the maintenance of forces in Europe. In Pearson's mind there were two continents in the NATO area and the defence of North America was as important as the defence of Europe. In those days of the bomber threat it was not difficult to argue that the defence of the homeland of the Strategic Air Command [SAC] against

242 The Shaping of Peace Soviet bombers was basic to the defence of the Atlantic area. The Early Warning system in which Canada was playing a part was vital. Pearson pointed out to Dulles the possibility that the demands on Canada on this essential front might eventually reduce the Canadian air defence contribution in Europe. It was not an immediate probability but he was looking ahead. He assumed Canada would wish to maintain some forces in Europe as evidence of solidarity in the defence of that area but nevertheless the problem existed and was becoming more difficult as Canadian resources would not permit an increase of defence activities in Canada and the maintenance of activities in Europe on the present scale.44 ' S H A K I N G DOWN'

The first three or four years had been exciting and exhausting. It was realized, as international tension subsided somewhat, that it was going to be difficult to sustain public support of NATO, particularly if this meant increasing Canadian contributions, when the fear of an emergency had diminished. Maintaining enthusiasm by Cold War propaganda was not much to the liking of either politicians or officials, particularly as this line was so thoroughly discredited by the excesses of McCarthyism in the United States. Still there were plenty of references to the dire Soviet threat and they reflected fears sincerely held. These were usually related to admonitions about NATO unity and anguish over NATO failures to meet its goals. The voice of the pragmatists, however, could still be heard and there was increasing support for a more sober perspective on NATO than was possible at the time of creation. The voice had many of the inflections of Hume Wrong. Wrong came back from Washington to be under-secretary in 1953 but he died shortly after. Although his death was an irreplaceable loss, his insight, the peculiar brand of functionalism that he had largely invented, persisted and continued long after to influence the External Affairs philosophy. Typical of this approach was a memorandum prepared in 1953 over the signature of A.E. Ritchie, the head of the economic division, and worth citing at length for that reason.45 Ritchie was concerned at the tendency to put discussions on the subject under such headings as 'Whither NATO?' or 'What's Wrong with NATO?' He questioned the reality, or at least the extent, of the alleged loss of momentum in the alliance 'which may in fact be more in the nature of a "shaking down" in preparation for the longer and steadier cruise.' 'In order to answer the question of whether or not the progress of NATO is satisfactory from a realistic point of view, we have only to ask whether Canada itself would have been prepared, or would now be prepared, to go more quickly.'

243 The Meaning of Alliance He thought force goals had been set without regard for the real economic and political limits to what could be done. 'To go on setting unreal objectives and to pretend up to the last moment that they will be reached can only result in the kind of emotional let-downs which it seems most desirable to avoid. Moreover the danger is that the real and concrete gains of NATO will not be appreciated.' As for Article 2, Ritchie admitted that the results of efforts to implement it had been negligible but this demonstrated that this Article should not be specifically related to action to be taken by NATO agencies as such. Its importance lay in the obligation it placed on member countries to pursue harmonious national policies and to encourage international economic and social collaboration. The sooner that was recognized the better 'and we should get away from the idea that somehow or other Article II has been a failure because the main problems of international trade and payments and other non-military matters are not being dealt with through NATO machinery.' In this context he cited the good work just done by the Commonwealth economic conference. He took the functionalist approach also on the exchange of views on political matters. It was surely never realistic to expect that the great powers, who must take responsibility and pay most of the shot, would be prepared to accept the thesis that vital matters affecting their national interest should be discussed and formulated in NATO and that they should be answerable to NATO for their actions. The most that could reasonably be expected was a frank exchange of views about matters which there was a general willingness to discuss. The smaller countries, to the extent that they did not have other channels of approach to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, would have to content themselves with the hope that their interests, as expressed in Council, in informal discussions in Paris, and through normal diplomatic channels, would be taken into account by the great powers concerned, within the general framework of co-operation enshrined in the treaty. The accomplishments of NATO had not been insignificant in the light of what could reasonably be expected in the time available, Ritchie concluded, and the so-called loss of momentum had been more imaginary than real. 'I wonder whether we may not have allowed NATO, and particularly the business of trying to meet military requirements in Western Europe, at a military speed, to loom disproportionately large in our consideration of foreign and strategic affairs as a whole.' He wondered also whether too much attention had been attached to the excitable press reports which appeared before and after major NATO meetings rather than to a hard-headed assessment of the real possibilities of progress.

244 The Shaping of Peace CONSULTATION

By the mid-fifties when the government was pressed by the CCF and others over the failure to get on with Article 2, the emphasis was shifted by spokesmen to the importance of political consultation. In reply to a question from M.J. Coldwell46 in May 1955, Pearson emphasized the progress made in political co-operation and cited the NATO Council meeting he had just attended. He noted the greater frankness of the discussions, particularly by the Americans, British, and French, and recalled Spaak commenting that the meetings were 'becoming more and more like Cabinet discussions' and talking about 'the development of what he called "the Commonwealth of Atlantic powers."' He added that the admission of Germany to the Council made these political exchanges even more valuable. Indeed, in his first interview with the German chancellor, Adenauer had commented that in the course of history purely military alliances had never been of long duration and it was important to develop the other aspects of the North Atlantic association.47 At the Council meeting, however, Pearson had sounded a little less enthusiastic about progress towards cabinet-type discussions in NATO. The meeting had been concerned with the position to be taken by the major Western powers at the forthcoming summit. While expressing pleasure at being informed by the Big Three ministers, he said they had not come to Paris to give a mandate to three of the members to act jointly on behalf of the rest, as the British foreign secretary had implied. He reminded them that all ministers had their responsibilities to parliament 'and there was a danger, if the Macmillan suggestion became doctrine, that it would play into the hands of the Russians.'48 Détente was the end sought, but the vision retreated when tensions relaxed. Canadian leaders were anxious to encourage opportunities for negotiation with the Russians and, in 1955, Pearson was the first NATO foreign minister to go to Moscow. Nevertheless, he was constantly warning NATO against disintegration in the face of détente. He was far from confident about Soviet intentions, and he stressed the military threat from increasing Soviet strength. While he was genuinely worried about the competitive co-existence propaganda of the Russians, he felt NATO must find a more durable base than the fear that brought members together in 1949. In a speech at Clark University on 3 June 1956 he said: 'When NATO'S task was almost exclusively military, the ways and means of providing defence against aggression could be thought of in terms of men and missiles. But the strength which NATO now needs, to cope with competitive co-existence, has to be cultivated also in terms of public attitudes and of consultation and of voluntary and close co-operation between all member governments.'49

245 The Meaning of Alliance The Canadian policy was to welcome any signs of détente, but to see it as a product, for the time being at least, of successful military counterbalance that must be maintained. The recollection of Munich was vivid, but the lesson was not that appeasement was always mistaken; rather that constructive and equitable negotiation cannot be conducted from a position of weakness. Co-existence on a basis of strength was regarded as possible, or at least something that could reasonably be hoped for, with the Soviet Union. The new fact of the nuclear weapon seemed to rule out any acceptable alternatives to co-existence. In the fifties, however, 'peaceful co-existence' was still widely regarded as a Soviet trap, and those who thought it feasible or believed in 'détente' were regarded by the orthodox as ingenuous. Looking in retrospect at the discussions that actually took place in the ministerial meetings of the NATO Council in the fifties, one might well conclude that there was about as much political consultation as could reasonably have been expected. One might look at the May 1956 meeting as an example. It was agreed by all the ministers that the development of the alliance's non-military activities would be the principal subject of consideration - and discussion was exceedingly frank. Dulles did not oppose non-military forms of co-operation but insisted it could not be at the expense of the military effort. Among other things, he warned against putting a NATO trademark on aid to uncommitted countries because they would not like it. As for a NATO voting bloc in the United Nations, he noted that the Foreign Relations Committee in the us Senate had been promised that would not be done, because of the trouble it would cause in the OAS. The French foreign minister, Christian Pineau, talked confidentially about the political situation in France which made gestures of rapprochement to the USSR necessary. The foreign minister of Germany was equally frank on the political dangers for him of rapprochement without unification. Pearson cited as especially useful Pineau's explanation of French problems in north Africa as well as the presentation by Dulles and the Turkish foreign minister on the Middle East. Summing up the session, he said it 'brought into sharp relief the fact that the eau's explanation of French problems in north Africa as well as the presendepends partly upon improvements in Council procedure; but even more upon member governments taking NATO more seriously as a main agency for their international consultations.' The procedural problems, he thought, could probably be handled without any major change in structure or the treaty.50 The problem may have lain in the excessive expectations of proclaimed agreement. Council meetings were inevitably too large and formal, but they were always the occasion for whispering in corridors, bi-, tri-, and multi-

246 The Shaping of Peace lateral negotiation. The ambassadors consulted constantly, the diplomatic network hummed with activity. And in such activities as the sharing of estimates of Soviet intentions, a very valuable service was performed - quite as often to moderate as to provoke alarm about Soviet intentions. On central European issues, such as Berlin, the harmonization of policies was remarkably successful. The failures had to do largely with the imperial involvements of the European members in the Middle East or north Africa and of the United States in Asia, but these were the issues on which Canada was anxious to keep clear of common policies. The obstacles to a 'common foreign policy' were similar to those Canadians had foreseen when unison was proposed for the Commonwealth - the fallibility of institutions and even more the divergent interests of countries separated by geography and history. Pearson told the ministerial meeting in December 1955 that the USSR was frightened as much by the unity of NATO as by its strength. Sometimes it seemed that the frantic effort to achieve an unachievable unity only strengthened the image of disunity. The final effort to do something serious about consultation during this period was the establishment in May 1956 of Pearson, Martino of Italy, and Lange as the 'three wise men.' The Committee of Three was launched in a sense of great urgency and with the strongest professions of good intentions. Between the time of its establishment and the presentation of its report in December the Suez crisis occurred. No greater lesson could have been arranged to demonstrate the importance of the mission. In the committee Pearson was, of course, acting in his personal capacity, but the recommendations made were submitted in advance to the Canadian cabinet and they indicate therefore Ottawa's official thinking at that time. The Wise Men emphasized the importance of discussing problems collectively in the early stages before national positions had become fixed. At best they felt this would result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the alliance and at the very least it would ensure that no action was taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others. Certain specific principles and practices about informing the Council and refraining from action without consultation were laid down. The report emphasized that members should in their policies show a real regard for the economic interests of other members. However, NATO should not take over any of the functions of existing international agencies where most of the questions in the economic field of interest to NATO members would be dealt with most effectively. That ought to have buried the idea that Canada wanted to turn NATO into an economic organization, but the legend persisted.

247 The Meaning of Alliance In the course of his preparations for the job of wise man, Pearson had a long and interesting discussion with Dulles in Washington on 12 June 1956 in which Dulles revealed frankly the reasons why it was difficult for the United States to clear its policies with its allies as was being recommended. With the United States having major responsibility for military and other policies, there was no question of the Senate putting up with a stipulated procedure for clearance in advance. When Pearson asked whether NATO might have a role in negotiations with the Soviet bloc Dulles replied that while NATO members should be able to consult with the Americans through the Council, the task of negotiation should be reserved for certain governments. He said there were two main categories of questions: world-wide policy matters that did not affect NATO members more directly than other members of the international community and those matters in which NATO members were more directly affected. Under the former he mentioned particularly Formosa and Kashmir. The United States was not going to undertake an obligation to consult in NATO when this would duplicate or interfere with the consultative procedures of the United Nations or other regional bodies such as SEATO. On these questions the United States would not regard themselves as under any compulsion to consult even to the extent of exchanging views. As in the past, Dulles would be prepared to expound United States policies and have questions asked in order to promote what he called a 'more sympathetic attitude towards USA policy.' However, on the second category, and he mentioned for example the unification of Germany, there should be an effort to establish a common policy. He also stressed the importance of common lines of policy on issues relating to north Africa, especially since Algeria was part of the area at that time. He did not favour a common position on the colonial problem which he thought would only raise trouble. This was a time, of course, when Asian questions that were later to divide the NATO alliance were being dealt with by the United States in an entirely separate compartment. In the course of this discussion Dulles also pointed out the problem the United States had in reconciling effective consultation with its allies with the quick decisions that were necessary. A habit the Americans had at this time that particularly annoyed Canadians and other allies was making public, and usually negative, responses to statements from the Russians or their satellites on such questions as disarmament. Dulles, referring particularly to the president's reply to Bulganin's first message on disarmament, said that in this case they knew through previous consultations roughly what the attitudes of the allies were on the issues raised and that the president had

248 The Shaping of Peace wanted to make a quick reply to get the maximum psychological effect. Because of its world-wide responsibilities it was in some cases more difficult for the United States to consult than it was for other countries. It was important for allies to bear in mind that as the United States often had to bear the brunt of their actions they should keep in mind the importance of consulting the United States before acting. This remark was made just a few months before the Suez crisis. A central problem of creating the kind of Atlantic Community Canada wanted was the difficulty of fitting in the United States. Canada was an unsymmetrical feature; and so was the United States. The ideal condition for consultation and joint action is something approaching equality. In the first decade of NATO the United States did not, as expected, become less dominant; it became more so. Its world-wide involvement was such that the schemes of 1948-9 were very hard to implement. The problem was not just the product of United States unwisdom or arrogance; it was intrinsic. Dulles's exposition of the facts of life were not as easily challenged as the principles of his foreign policy. The Canadian expectation that the awkward problems of the relation to a superpower neighbour could be best approached in company was looking less certain. There was no doubt that it was a good way to be involved in the broad international questions of the times, avoiding satellitism or provocative confrontation. The bilateral, continental issues, however, were largely untouched. The Old World, in fact, was not much interested in being called upon to redress, for Canada's sake, the imbalance of the new. By 1957 the maintenance of NATO was still regarded as essential in the Canadian interest, but the special advantages for Canada had paled. CONTINENTAL DEFENCE AND THE ALLIANCE During the fifties, in the period of the tight alliance, there were few questions raised about continental defence in principle. The independent positions Canadians were able to take in foreign policy regardless of the military association with the United States and the clear identity of the Canadian forces within NATO were reassuring although they may have obscured some longer-range consequences of continental defence in practice. The aim of the services was to work together efficiently and this they were able to do through the service cobweb. The inevitable logic of continental defence, however, pointed towards the North American Air Defence agreement [NORAD] of 1957 which was being prepared by the service representatives to stake out the terms of collaboration in wartime. Diplomats and politicians were cautious, but the service chiefs were self-confident. One of them, Air

249 The Meaning of Alliance Marshal Slemon, had been so much affected by American practice that he acted in a very un-Canadian way by proposing publicly in 1955 a unified command of the air defence of the continent.51 As continental defence moved towards its conclusive stage, however, disintegrating forces were already in action. The strategic assumptions about the threat were less surely held after the death of Stalin. The excesses of McCarthyism in the United States had repelled Canadians. Lester Pearson had directly challenged John Foster Dulles's doctrine of massive retaliation,52 and in the case of the Chinese offshore islands had bluntly informed the Americans that the continental partnership would not apply in a war over that kind of issue.53 There was considerable irritation with what was regarded as high-handed actions by Americans at weather stations and other bases in Canada - an irritation that the press naturally aggravated. Most important of all, technological developments, and particularly the arrival of Sputnik and Soviet missiles, raised doubts about the strategic significance of the plans for continental air defence. The RCAF was riding high and in the opinion of an increasing number of critics too much infatuated with the USAF. Two retired army generals raised serious questions about the enormous sums spent on air defence and the consequent neglect of ground forces. The criticism, which aroused a good deal of controversy in the country, came at a time when there was widespread concern in the United States, and Europe as well, over too much dependence on a nuclear strike by air which might prove unusable and the need to maintain conventional forces for limited war. The Canadian public was being confused also by the new concept of peace by nuclear deterrence. It was hard for them to see continental defence arrangements as designed to protect not North American citizens but the Strategic Air Command on the grounds that the only defence was the threat of offence. Clear thinking was not easy on any of these subjects. Few policy changes were made, however, before 1957. It was left to the subsequent government to grapple with the new uncertainties. When Air Marshal Slemon made his rash comment on unified command in 1955 he said that it appeared 'inevitable.' That was certainly the view of the military. Officials and political leaders in Ottawa tended to see it the same way. For the latter it was not so much desirable as inescapable. Canada was, in the words of Roger Swanson, an American student of the subject, 'locked in.' 'Geography, coupled with technological advances and the increasing Soviet threat, demanded integration and planning of North American defense activities. The result was an era of responsive nondecision for Canada - a nation with limited resources of men and materials. The Canadian decisionmaking process instead of involving viable alternatives, became a process of

250 The Shaping of Peace reaction to tremendous technological-strategic demands, with the future portending ominous developments in the light of one fundamental, irrevocable fact.'54 That fact was, as Edgar Mclnnis perceived it, that '... if she [Canada] could not fulfil this essential [defensive] role on her own soil with her own resources, she must admit American supplementary activities within her own borders and the consequent American authority over such activities. As costs increased with advancing technology, so did the need to let the United States undertake the steps that Canada could not carry out by herself, and to provide the necessary facilities within Canada for the resulting American operations.'55 That was an assumption that few were questioning in the first half of the fifties. If the United States was at war, it was repeatedly said, Canada could not escape involvement. The geographical link was indeed inevitable and Canadian defence policy could never be carried on as if Canada were an island. The case for co-operation or co-ordination is close to inevitable. The nature of the programme, however, does depend on common or disparate assumptions about the expected antagonist. There were considerable variations in the estimate of the threat and an even greater variation about other potential enemies, China and later Cuba. The extensive programme of the fifties was possible because of a common belief that the Soviet Union threatened each country on its own, not that one was helping the other against the latter's enemy. In the sixties, however, when the United States was at war on its own, the consensus would flag. The development of new weaponry and increasing concern over Canadian sovereignty within the alliance would make the issues a great deal more complex than they had seemed in the heyday of alliances.

11 The Continental Relationship

CONSTRUCTIVE AND H A R M O N I O U S CO-OPERATION The Canadian Government looks forward to the fruitful development of this great Seaway Project in constructive and harmonious co-operation with the United States ... Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'affaires, a.i., of the United States embassy in Ottawa The United States Government... welcomes this new opportunity for constructive and harmonious co-operation between our two countries. Charge d'affaires, a.i., of the United States embassy in Ottawa to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Exchange of correspondence, 17 Aug. 1954, concerning the construction of the Iroquois Dam) '

A sweet formula from the lexicon of international diplomacy or the bourgeois service clubs, this dialogue obscured competition, intrigue, and the intrinsic inequality. Nevertheless, it was an apt description of what Canadian and American governments sought in the fifties. On the Canadian side it was not ingenuous; it was a better way than habitual confrontation to defend and advance the Canadian interest. It was a formula, of course, for border and other bilateral problems. The relationship in world affairs was more complex. The Canadian government had approached its relations with the United States after the war in the same fresh spirit with which it approached the brave new world at large, but this relationship remained in a separate com-

252 The Shaping of Peace partment. Officials hoped to construct a better balanced North American society, not a continental institution. At the end of the war the structures that had been intermeshing the Canadian and American war efforts were largely dismantled. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence continued along with the International Joint Commission, which predated even the First World War, but these were bodies designed to solve international problems or formulate parallel policies, not to preside over a common destiny for two countries. What was meant by 'constructive and harmonious co-operation' was a rationalized complementarity, the kind of non-institution which emerged as the result of the negotiations over the St Lawrence Seaway. As R.A. MacKay describes it: 'A striking feature of the Seaway agreement is that there is no overall formal treaty providing for construction or operation ... Nor is the seaway managed by any single administrative authority: instead each partner administers the part that runs through its territory. This required an unusual degree of cooperation and consultation at the construction stage, as it does in the operational stage.'2 It is surprising, perhaps, that there was little if any disposition among postwar planners in Ottawa to bring the uc and other bodies into the United Nations framework. One of the principal purposes of the United Nations was to protect the weak against the strong, and Canada was a vulnerable neighbour. The idea of the United Nations as a body which would guarantee Canada against its great neighbour is not a theme stressed in the private planning papers or the public statements of Canadians at this time. No doubt there was a comforting feeling, and with justification, that all countries which subscribed to the Charter would be under moral obligation to behave better to their small neighbours. In the realm of trade and finance international agreements and controls were seen as means by which the United States along with other countries would be persuaded to abide by principles of free exchange to which Canada was - or thought it was - devoted. The principal reason for keeping continental relations in a separate compartment was probably Canadians' confidence in their ability to deal with the Americans. They did not entirely swallow the American assumption of being more virtuous than other countries, but there nevertheless was a belief in Canada that North American relations were conducted on a higher moral plane than those of other continents. Professing that belief was in any case a way of blackmailing the Americans into good behaviour. It was one continent where the threat of military force was irrelevant. Canadians feared the exercise of American superior power in many ways, but they had no fear of an invasion of the kind the Security Council was expected to deal with.

253 The Continental Relationship Although they would never admit for a moment that Canadian-American relations were other than those between two sovereign countries, there was a tendency in Canada to think of these relations as their own private business in which outsiders, even an international organization, should not interfere. Mackenzie King and others liked to compare it in this respect with the Commonwealth and in both cases to deplore the need for institutionalizing the relationship. It was a prime example of what social scientists call 'a subordinate state system,' entities which in the words of Raymond Aron 'spontaneously live a common destiny and make a distinction between what happens within and what happens outside their geographical-historical zone.'3 James Eayrs' apt comment on this was: 'The ideology of the Canadian-American relationship, then, consists of two propositions. First, that there exists between the two countries a community of interests and an equation of identity which render nugatory and unnecessary external mechanisms for the settlement of their disputes. Second, that insofar as they have been left alone by the twentieth century to settle their disputes, they have succeeded to a degree which other nations have not experienced and which must be their constant envy.'4 RELATIONS IN THE FIFTIES

The fifties ushered in a new phase as a result of many factors: the coming to an end of the reconstruction period or at least of the reconstruction mentality in Washington and in Ottawa; the Korean War and the armament of NATO; impressive Canadian economic development; and the coming to power of the Republican party. The complexities of Canada-United States economic relations are not our concern here. Some brief generalizations about economics and foreign policy or at least the way they were perceived are required, however, to explain the climate in which the structures grew. The return of the alliance mentality certainly had an influence on economic relations. As described in chapter 4, the joint United States-Canada Industrial Mobilization Committee was set up even before the Korean War, Canada was pressing again to get reciprocity in defence purchases, and in October 1950 there came the statement of principles for economic co-operation which emphasized common defence and the use of resources for the best combined results.5 Within this framework and inspired by industrial progress there was in Canada a mood of nationalist self-confidence, to be noted in the determination to proceed with the production of Canada's own world's best aircraft, the Arrow, not to mention an all-Canadian St Lawrence Seaway, and

254 The Shaping of Peace even the consideration of an all-Canadian Columbia River diversion. The hope, however, of restoring the old trade triangle with Britain ceased to be at the centre of policy. The effort to balance trade went on. Japan and other countries began to loom as new possibilities, but the principal effort was directed towards getting a better market in the United States. This confident mood was reflected in an address of 20 September 1951 by the deputy minister of trade and commerce, W.F. Bull, to the Canadian Exporters' Association,6 which provides a useful summary of the calculations and illusions of the period. He began by noting the significant alteration of the pattern of Canadian exports. Whereas traditionally Canada sold about 65 per cent of its exports in overseas markets and the other 35 per cent in the United States, the flow had been reversed. The reasons were, first, the power and expansiveness of the American economy; second, the increased American demand for raw materials coinciding with the depletion of their natural resources; third, the lowering of American tariffs since the war, abetted by the Canadian negotiators at the GATT meetings who had obtained further extensive reciprocal tariff concessions from the United States; finally, the vigorous Canadian effort to get into the United States market when Canada was faced with declining sales overseas. Although primary products had counted for the major increase, nevertheless secondary products had increased substantially. Canadians were now processing many raw materials to a higher degree than before the Second World War, although the exports of manufactured goods had not kept up with the exports of primary materials. It was fortunate that the United States could take Canadian goods when they could not be sold abroad, but nevertheless Canadians should not be overly dependent on one market, especially as the United States was not likely to be a satisfactory long-term market for such products as wheat, flour, and manufactured goods. The redirection in exports unfortunately was not matched by redirection of imports, and Canada was now buying about 67 per cent of its imports from the United States. It was a fair estimate at the beginning of a new era. It was hard to foresee the extent of the new balance-of-payments problems that would result from the shift to a continental market or the consequences for Canada of the expanding interest of a new superpower in Canadian resources. The principal themes of economic negotiations had more to do with ground-fish fillets or the sale of aircraft than the great principles of commerce. A fair amount was achieved by badgering, hints of retaliation, wire-pulling, pleas for understanding on the highest and all levels below. Many things were arranged by bureaucratic interlocking, often as a result of a common trans-

255 The Continental Relationship national interest of the specialists against the politicians of both countries. Economic relations, one might say, were perfectly normal. The coming to power of the Republicans had worried Canadians. Traditionally they had regarded the high-tariff Republicans as their antagonists. The influential friends they had in the Democratic administration were swept away and the newcomers looked a tougher crew. Although Canada and the United States continued their coincidental interest in promoting freedom of trade in international conferences, there was less benevolence in their attitude towards each other. There was more controversy between the State Department and the Department of External Affairs, and Congressmen sometimes wondered if the Canadians were 'loyal.' The best friends Canada had in Washington in the numerous issues having to do with defence production were in the Pentagon. They considered their Canadian colleagues reliable allies and wanted to maximize defence production in North America. Something of this same spirit made Eisenhower a good friend. His direct interest in Canadian issues was not great, but he still saw the Canadians in a D-Day glow. There seemed little reason to fear the attention Americans were now giving to Canadian raw materials. Canadians were eager to sell them, to complain vigorously when Congress sought to restrict the importation of lead or zinc or oil, and to get American investment in their development. In arguing against restrictions Canadians never hesitated to use the 'continentalist' argument that Canada was a safer source than countries that were really foreign. They argued also that, because of the special impact on the Canadian economy of us measures, Canada should be exempted from restrictionist legislation aimed at foreign countries. Because of the prosperity that was coming to Canadians from the flow of resource exports and us investment, concern over the consequences was not a major theme until the final years of the Liberal régime. Worry over too great dependence on the American market had, of course, been a theme in official memoranda during the whole postwar period, but the world situation was regarded as such that Canada had little alternative.7 By the middle of the decade, however, an uneasy feeling that Canadian industry and resources were being taken over with little resistance became a stronger political strain. The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Massey Commission) pointed out also the need to sustain Canadian cultural life against powerful forces from the United States. Although the report of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (Gordon Commission) was not published until the new government was in power, nevertheless it was clear beforehand

256 The Shaping of Peace that this was the subject about which they were most concerned. Significant of the issues that were to preoccupy the governments of Canada from then on was the proposal by the minister of finance in the budget speech of 20 March 1956 to levy a 20 per cent excise tax upon the advertising revenue of Canadian editions of foreign magazines. The feeling that something must be done to reverse trends that were diminishing Canada was a factor in the defeat of the Liberals in 1957 and 1958 although there was little consensus as yet about what that something should be. There was a wide-spread assumption that continentalization had taken place because the Liberal leaders, abetted by the bureaucrats, willed it that way. They had always been accused of being a North American party. After a Conservative government was unable to change the pattern, there was a wider recognition of the structural problems of Canadian 'independence.' On world affairs the relationship was even more complicated. Pearson created a sensation in 1951 by saying that 'the days of easy and relatively automatic political relations with our neighbours are, I think, over.'8 It was not his intention to argue against the pursuit of 'constructive and harmonious co-operation' in the world at large as well as in North America, but he thought the public should be aware that as both countries were now plunging into international problems, and at different levels, co-operation would be more difficult to work out, and the agenda of problems was much longer than it had been in the days when both countries were aloof. It has never been easy for many Canadians to comprehend that loyal association with a stronger power with which Canada has an interdependent security relationship does not require simple submission to the views or will of the stronger power. Others have assumed that the only way Canada could prove its independence is to oppose Britain or the United States. The St Laurent government rejected both approaches. Pearson, who had helped create the United Nations and the Atlantic alliance, was already in 1951 differing firmly and publicly with what he, and most of Canada's allies, regarded as dangerous American aberrations in Asia. He was warning Canadians and also Americans that there would continue to be that kind of ambivalence in relations with the United States and they would have to meet it with vigilant calculation rather than motherhood phrases. As the relationship in world affairs is defined at length in other chapters, it is necessary here only to note its impact, if any, on continental issues.9 On world economic questions the two countries had interests that often conflicted, but they were in considerable agreement on the kind of world that would suit them best. On Europe and the Middle East there were few basic differences, but the perspectives on Asia, where attention was focussed in

257 The Continental Relationship the fifties, diverged. Both feared the spread of communist power, but their attitudes on how to deal with it reflected the assumptions of countries with contrary histories and constitutional practices. The very different degrees of power and responsibility in world affairs inevitably and properly conditioned their approaches also. For this period it might be said, at the risk of gross over-simplifications, that Canadians were coming to terms with the inevitability of peaceful co-existence, while the Americans were still - or sounded as if they were - more intent on victory over the devil. It is difficult to trace any impact of Canadian foreign policy on American attitudes towards economic or other bilateral issues affecting Canada. Congressmen supporting certain grievances against Canada might bolster their cases with charges that Canadians were soft on communism, but Americans as a whole were little conscious that Canada had a foreign policy at all. On the other hand, the assumption of Canadians that Congress or the administration might react angrily against some Canadian interest undoubtedly had a sobering effect on decisions. In a policy of seeking 'constructive and harmonious co-operation' the security of a common cause was helpful, perhaps essential. The administration was more aware than the public that Canada had a foreign policy that could be helpful or troublesome. STRUCTURES

The lack of formal structures to cope with issues between the two countries may owe more to Canadian than to American traditions. After all, it was the Canadians who cared most about these issues and had most often to draw the attention of their neighbours to them. Americans like grand designs, and on the whole Canadians are leery of them. The relationship was unstructured but not entirely unsystematic. Ways and means were found to meet the demands. All but a few grand issues were local, specific, and ad hoc, and these peoples had had several centuries' experience at working rules. To understand the 'system' one has to look at the way it worked. The agenda is enormous, and one must be selective. It is proposed now to look at the handling of a few major issues and several of the few joint institutions that existed in search of patterns for harmonious or inharmonious co-operation. The most notable instrument for promoting 'constructive and harmonious co-operation' had been in place for many years. The International Joint Commission was an ingenious device by which three Canadians and three Americans, acting as wise men rather than as agents of their governments, could hammer out recommendations in the mutual interest on matters 'along the common frontier.' It remained the sovereign right of each govern-

258 The Shaping of Peace ment to act or not act on these recommendations, a formula to protect the position of the weaker partner while giving the stronger due opportunity to secure its interests. The principles by which it should act were set out in advance in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. That treaty and the establishment of the commission had signified the will of the United States, after long resistance, to accept the existence of Canada as a legitimate sovereignty with which it must, as a regrettable necessity, adhere to the civilized principles of international behaviour it had since 1776 earnestly advocated for the world at large. Although there were in 1945 critics of the commission and of some of its recommendations, it was recognized as successful, even sacrosanct. It would not only be retained as a matter of course, there was not much serious talk of altering it. International institutions can be useful - indeed essential - instruments for managing international relations. They can also be escape mechanisms for tired or lazy thinkers. There is a persistent temptation to think that a good institution can be set up to take care of the problems that arise between sovereign states, thereby saving legislators and bureaucrats the worry of dealing with them. After the war there was even a mystic belief that by saying that sovereignty had been transferred to some international body, the mechanism would somehow relieve governments of the need to protect the interests of their own people and conflict would be exorcized. The genius of the uc is that it is not based on this illusion. Indeed, it would suffer gravely if it assumed the full responsibility for settling problems along the border. Used properly it plays an exceedingly valuable role in assuring equitable settlements and relieving tensions. It can be, however, only a complement to negotiation between the two governments. When the problem is primarily geographical, the negotiation can be more or less routine. When, as in several major issues of the forties and fifties, there are far-ranging economic implications, its role, still valid, must be carefully circumscribed. Its function may be to maintain and define the status quo in a geographical sense, but the economic status quo is not at all sacrosanct. The continent has been unequally developed, and Canadians do not want to be tied to the present ratios. Any sound formulas must be based on a recognition of the historic fact that the United States and Canada are in a state of continuing competition. Good institutions, such as the uc, help prevent this from becoming zero-sum competition and promote the concept of common or balanced interests. The competition must, however, have room to breathe. The issues are bound to be or become political. In the real world there is no escape from continuing negotiation between sovereign states. Since the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 negotiations between the United

259 The Continental Relationship States and Canada have been relatively civilized. The tactics, nevertheless and inevitably, include jostling, bluffing, threats of unilateral action, appeals to sacred principles and the United Nations Charter, and what one might call greymail. It was not until the post-Second World War period, when the UC investigated the possibilities of the development of the St Lawrence and the upper Columbia River Basin that it had before it what Maxwell Cohen (Canadian chairman, 1974-9) called truly major questions. 'Both large projects,' he pointed out, 'reached maturity and completion based on the Commission's orders and investigations in the 1950s. In the St Lawrence, as an example, there were two Orders of Approval as well as a Reference, while the Columbia River investigation led to a Statement of Principles by the Commission in 1959 upon which the subsequent Columbia River Treaty of 1961-1963 itself was based.'10 The development of the St Lawrence Seaway and of power on the Columbia River were both on the agenda of the International Joint Commission but, as they involved important political decisions, roles were played by the executive and legislative bodies in both countries. They provide interesting studies of the ways in which Canada may or may not get satisfaction vis-à-vis its great superpower neighbour when it is entirely on its own and without recourse to multinational institutions - except perhaps the hovering spirit of the UN Charter. ST LAWRENCE SEAWAY

The development of the Great Lakes-St Lawrence system had long been under discussion between Americans and Canadians, but by the end of the forties a situation of stalemate had been reached. Both sides had been responsible for stalling. In 1948 the Canadian government still lacked zeal, but within the next year or so officials came to see the seaway not only as highly desirable but as essential to increase electric power in Ontario and Quebec, transport Labrador ore and Western oil, and open up the interior for multinational trade. New York and Ontario proposed that they proceed with power developments in the International Rapids section, leaving navigational improvements to be handled separately by the federal governments at their pleasure. Neither federal government was enthusiastic. President Truman's efforts to get Congressional approval ended in the House of Representatives in July 1951. This defeat was the last straw for Canada. As early as January 1949 St Laurent had said in the Commons that the value of St Lawrence power was so great that if implementation of the 1941 agreement could not be obtained,

260 The Shaping of Peace the government would have 'to give very serious consideration to going ahead and developing it on the power site alone.'11 He made this point personally to Truman on a visit to Washington in February of that year. By the summer of 1950 the government was seriously thinking of building the navigation works itself, and the minister of transport, Lionel Chevrier, was told to begin preparing domestic and American public opinion for such a course.12 Such bold action, although it reflected the mood of Ottawa at the beginning of this decade, was greeted sceptically, both by Americans and by Canadians unused to this kind of assertion.13 In August 1951 discussion of technical and financial questions was opened with Quebec and Ontario. On 28 September the prime minister made a 'surprise' visit to Washington. The President expressed his preference for joint action and hoped that Congress would act 'but stated he would support Canadian action as second best if an early commencement on the joint development does not prove possible.'14 Parliament then took action to allow Ontario to work with an appropriate United States agency to develop power in the International Rapids section and create the St Lawrence Seaway Authority empowered to build either an all-Canadian seaway or to co-operate with an appropriate agency in the United States. In spite of presidential support, however, there was no progress in Congress. On 30 June 1952 the two federal governments sent applications to the uc and exchanged notes agreeing that Canada would construct the works necessary to provide uninterrupted 27-foot navigation between Lake Erie and Montreal on the Canadian side of the boundary when all arrangements had been completed for the joint development of power. The navigational facilities were to be completed as concurrently as possible with the power development. There was developing a strong Canadian will to build the seaway alone, although officials recognized advantages in a joint operation. This Canadian decision to go it alone, now recognized as something more than a bluff, had a considerable effect on the American situation. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence endorsed the project, seeing the additional power and improved navigational facilities as contributing 'to the development of Canada's huge resources and to making her an even stronger partner of the United States, whether in peace or in war.' This was partly General McNaughton's doing.15 As chairman of the PJBD since 1945 and chairman of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission in 1950, he stressed the significance of the seaway for continuing defence-a clever ploy in the defence-minded atmosphere of Washington and particularly with the new president, Eisenhower. There was also increasing support from the farmers of the American

261 The Continental Relationship west and the American steel industry. Furthermore, the new proposals opened for the United States an avenue to take part on a limited scale at much less expense. The Canadian-American decision to proceed with the power priority plan on the understanding that Canada would build the seaway put an end to talk of development for the basin as a whole and simultaneously removed the question of power development from the congressional arena. Bills providing for American participation in the seaway were announced in December 1952 by Representative Dondero and Senator Wiley. The Canadian government insisted it would brook no delay. The WileyDondero bills were introduced in January 1953, in May Messrs St Laurent and Pearson had informal discussions with Eisenhower in Washington, subcommittee hearings were reopened on 20 May, full debate in the Senate opened in January, and the bill was passed on 20 January 1954. What emerged was not a joint seaway enterprise but rather two national enterprises in the construction of which there would be co-ordination in the interest of permitting through navigation as soon as possible but with the Canadian government insisting on its right and its intention eventually to complete the all-Canadian route. There is no over-all formal treaty providing for construction or operation, just exchanges of correspondence. The seaway is not managed by any single administrative authority. Each partner administers what runs through its territory. The 1954 agreement relieved Canada of the obligation to build facilities in the International Rapids section, a concession to the Americans so that there would not be competing American and Canadian locks. However, the Canadian government specifically stated its intention, if and when parallel facilities were required, to complete navigation works on the Canadian side. It was inevitable that there should be criticism of those who had agreed in the end to participation, even on a limited scale, of the Americans. General McNaughton, however, told a representative of the Engineering Institute of Canada, which had pressed for unilateral action, 'we have come out of the discussions ... without having conceded a single point which is vital and not possible of correction at our own instance at appropriate times of our own devising.' He was an astute and enthusiastic tactician and exulted in the way in which diplomatic force was applied. The Canadian note of January 1953, he told the National Defence College, 'called the shots.' 'Our friends across the border could come in with us if they wanted to, but it would be on our own terms. We had by-passed the obstructionists who had stood in our way down the years and we had taken over the diplomatic initiative.'16 McNaugh-

262 The Shaping of Peace ton's forcefulness and his remarkable grasp of all the details undoubtedly played a part in persuading the Americans in the final stages that the Canadians meant business. It is the function of the Department of External Affairs to see all sides of a question, to note both the short-range and the long-range international consequences of Canadian actions, even when - or perhaps particularly when the Canadian public is enraptured with a particular course. It is theirs to warn, not to decide. It was their job to worry over precedents and to look for complications. Above all, they had to bear in mind that bilateral relations are a two-way street and there was always an argument for preserving good working relationships if possible between the two North American countries. On 26 August 1954 a DEA memorandum set out some of the arguments for joint construction. There was the important fact, for example, that there could not be a 27-foot seaway in the international section of the river unless dams across the river were built, the construction of which rested on voluntary and continuing co-operation between Canada and the United States. The working philosophy of the government was then expounded: Canada and the United States are good friends and neighbors, bound together in peace and war in a multitude of great projects. Although there are often differences of opinion, even disputes between us, it is the deep desire of the peoples and governments of both countries, regardless of party affiliation, to try to settle common problems by consultation and agreement, rather than by unilateral competing decisions. Once the people and Congress of the United States resolved to participate in the seaway by building works in the international section, a Canadian decision to 'go our own way' and to build now the Barnhart works in Canada without any regard to the decision of the United States, however late in the day that decision may have been taken, would have been a blow to good relations, and would therefore have done damage to Canada's broad national interests.17

So powerful were the political forces involved in the seaway that there would have been no question of the main issues being settled in any other way than by the acts of the sovereign governments. The role of the uc was nevertheless crucial throughout and remains so in that it was and is essential to preparing and operating the project. If a single and jointly operated seaway had been provided, the uc, or a specialist body appointed by it, would probably have prepared the blueprint. The commission had played its part by making the original recommendation in 1921, and it was consistently a vehicle for keeping the proposal alive. For a man like McNaughton it was, of course, an ideal base from which to press the case. It should be noted, how-

263 The Continental Relationship ever, that as he was a member of the commission he was not used by the Canadian government in its negotiations with Washington. In the words of Lionel Chevrier, the UC 'was ultimately responsible for everything, since it was not only an international administrative body but also a high court. The U.C. could, for instance, handle the complaints of any municipality which complained that seaway work was polluting its water supply. It could deal with the charges of any private citizen that changed water levels were damaging his property. The U.C. created the Joint Board of Engineers and the Lake Level Board. It recommended the creation of the International Board of Control.'18 C O L U M B I A RIVER

Differences over the disposition of the waters of the Columbia River were emerging at the time when a settlement was being reached over the St Lawrence Seaway. Would the constructive and harmonious principle, enunciated in the context of the St Lawrence, apply when national interests were more directly in conflict and the two administrations were at odds, as they had not been over the seaway? It is not intended here to deal fully with the issues over the Columbia, which were to last through the Diefenbaker administration and into the Pearson administration in the sixties. By 1957, however, the confrontation had been established and the important issue of the role of the UC in negotiations raised. Canadian tactics, particularly those of General McNaughton, perhaps owed something to the success over the St Lawrence. The Americans would be presented again with a threat of unilateral action by Canada to bring them round to a more reasonable negotiating position. The general's experience of the Americans was revealed in his prediction to Davie Fulton in a letter of 13 April 1956: 'There would be a rude shock to the American public. It would take some time for persons in authority in U.S. water matters to appreciate that a check had been given to their plans. Then there will be personal attacks on me for the impertinence of such an affront. There will be official representations of unneighbourliness and attempts to misinterpret the meaning of Article II. There would be a personal communication from General Eisenhower [talking of past friendship and future co-operation.] Then, gradually, it would penetrate that the Canadian position was justified and that we meant business and they had best seek an arrangement.'19 It did happen roughly that way. McNaughton and his supporters were inclined to think that the difference in the case of the Columbia was that the External Affairs people, including their minister, preferred their kind of quiet diplomacy to

264 The Shaping of Peace his strong methods and took the issue out of his hands. There were, however, reasons other than a lack of guts for negotiating with the Americans on the Columbia and the St Lawrence through diplomatic channels rather than through the UC. The issue of the Columbia was essentially a question of the maximum use of water for the development of power on a river that crossed the border. It was not a boundary water like the St Lawrence and the legal situation was more complex. It raised under the new conditions of the late twentieth century the issue endemic to the age-old division of the continent - the competitive use of resources for national development. In this case the Pacific northwest of the United States had already undergone rapid economic development based on water power but it needed more. British Columbia had not yet reached the stage of industrialization when it lacked power. It was still more interested, as Canadians traditionally had been, in getting funds for the development of its resources. In the new postwar mood in Canada, however, there were people, of whom McNaughton was one, who realized that what was at stake was the possibility of a great Canadian industrial development in the west. They feared that short-sighted agreements about the provision of power and other resources to the United States would simply perpetuate the imbalance between the two countries. Although Canadians had not particularly liked being hewers of wood and drawers of water, they had nevertheless accepted the considerable financial rewards of selling their resources for American industry, and the Americans had had good reason to think that this mutually advantageous arrangement would continue. Major issues of CanadianAmerican relations since the fifties have been provoked by changing Canadian attitudes on this subject. The Columbia debate ushered in the new era. The issue began when during the war the United States had proposed, and Canada had agreed, to refer to the uc for investigation and recommendations the further uses and development of the waters of the Columbia River system. The commission appointed the International Columbia River Engineering Board [ICREB] to carry out its investigations, uc discussions should then have awaited completion of the board's report, but the American need for power, and heavy flooding in the United States section of the Kootenay in 1948, brought a US request for the UC to make a special interim report on works that might be constructed to prevent such disasters in the future. The board duly recommended, in 1950, the construction of a dam near Libby, Montana. The commission rejected this report, but Congress approved the Libby project and as a result the United States applied to the UC on 12 January 1951 for approval to build the Libby Dam. This application was note-

265 The Continental Relationship worthy as one of the few instances when the uc became and remained divided along national lines. Because of this and some domestic objections to the site, the United States withdrew its application in 1953. A Canadian problem in the early stages was simply that they did not know well enough what was in the Canadian interest. The United States Corps of Engineers had thoroughly surveyed the situation for years, but there was no comparable work on the Canadian side. By 1953, however, General McNaughton was acquiring a firmer view of what Canada needed. The Americans were importunate and that in his view was a good reason to stall for better terms.20 When, on 22 May 1954, the United States submitted a new Libby application, the Canadian government reiterated its demands for compensation and reserved the right to oppose approval if current studies showed that better use could be made of the water. The government was now considering the possibility of diverting some of the Kootenay water to the Columbia, a consideration which was not surprisingly characterized as unreasonable and unprecedented by the chairman of the United States section of the UC. McNaughton in particular was fascinated with the possibilities for enormous power development for Canadian use as a result of diversion and he was of course quite aware that this was the Canadian challenge 'to go it alone.' There were signs of response to this kind of pressure in the United States position because in the new Libby application the us did offer recompense for the use of Canadian resources although preferably in dollars rather than power, and not enough to satisfy the Canadian government. On 1 June 1955 McNaughton told the Commons Committee that in mid-1954 the United States 'thought that there was not very much we could do about it in the way of using the water ourselves' and so 'broke off the discussions on these downstream benefits.'21 If that was the case then the Americans had to be shown. In late 1953 and early 1954 Canadians were just beginning to recognize the potential in their part of the river. The upper Columbia began to be highly attractive for its power prospects. The feasibility of a major storage project at Mica was proved and a Kootenay diversion was shown to be practical. The Americans began to see that if there were going to be major storage projects on the Canadian end of the Columbia they would be of great benefit to them downstream. The other party to all this, which was later to have a decisive influence, was the British Columbia government. From the time that the ICREB had been established, the British Columbia government had been consulted and kept closely informed about all investigations and negotiations regarding the Columbia. From an early stage there was suspicion in Ottawa of Premier

266 The Shaping of Peace Bennett's preference for making a fast buck. In 1954 rumours had reached Ottawa about a proposal by Kaiser Aluminum to build a low dam at Castlegar to impound water on the Arrow Lakes as storage for generation downstream in the United States. The attraction for British Columbia was that it would get 20 per cent of the downstream benefit from Kaiser. In the federal view this was a very low price, and the plan would spoil the chances for maximum use of the Columbia which Ottawa was considering. It had been a basic Canadian working principle for a long time that power once committed to the United States could be withdrawn only with great difficulty whatever the terms arranged at the time because of the vested interests which would have developed and rest on the continuation of power. This principle could be traced to the exasperation felt during the First World War when the United States opposed diversion of hydro-electric power contracted to them by Ontario, although it was desperately needed by Canada for war industry. That is why not only Canada but British Columbia had to be protected from Premier Bennett. On 11 July 1955 the Canadian government met the threat by enacting the International River Improvements Act which asserted that nothing could be done to alter the flow of an international river without a federal licence. At this point the minister of northern affairs and national resources, Jean Lesage, made an important statement of 'guiding principles of policy.' These, he said, 'require that a project must be compatible with present and future needs of the country and with the optimum development of the site and the whole watershed. If no effective use of the water resources can be made in Canada, the improvement executed in Canada to permit downstream utilization must provide for benefits commensurate with the water resources thus made available.'22 The confrontation between Canadians and Americans on the uc, and, in particular, between the Canadian chairman and Governor Jordan, the American chairman who had been appointed to stand up to the highly respected McNaughton, reached crisis point in 1955 when, at the semiannual meeting on 5 April, the Canadian proposal for diversion was formally presented. McNaughton argued that it would not injure United States interests and Jordan rejected the arguments at the next meeting in October. Jordan would not even consider co-operative arrangements based on diversion because that was not within the terms of the Columbia reference. He went so far as to make what was regarded in Ottawa as an implicit threat. If Canada were to proceed with the Columbia diversion then 'obviously ... the United States, as injured Sovereign, will not be limited to the redress provided for an injured party by article 2.'23 At this point differences developed within the Canadian front. McNaughton's biographer has outlined that on 29 February 1956 McNaughton met

267 The Continental Relationship Pearson and left with the impression that Canada was about to engage in talks with the United States in which the Canadian position might be compromised. Shortly thereafter he learned that a draft of a statement which the prime minister was to make on this subject at a conference with President Eisenhower and the president of Mexico at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, would refer to 'gaps and deficiencies' in the Canadian legal position. According to McNaughton, he 'managed to persuade those concerned that such a pronouncement would end all possibility of maintaining our rights under Article II of the Treaty of 1909.'24 He was reassured, however, by Jean Lesage that he would continue to stand for the principles of Article 2, but he retained his doubts as to whether Pearson understood the water problems in the Columbia and External Affairs comprehended the legalities. The Department of External Affairs was, however, genuinely concerned about certain legal problems. It is not likely, furthermore, that they or Pearson would have undercut the Canadian position by telling Eisenhower of their doubts. If a government is to take a strong position, however, it is important that its own spokesmen be aware of areas in which its position might be vulnerable. There was no doubt about the legal right of Canada to make diversions, but External Affairs had some worries over other aspects including the scope of the uc's mandate. Even McNaughton told the Commons Committee that the matter 'is not quite as simple as abc ...' At White Sulphur Springs an agreement was reached to discuss the Columbia at the intergovernmental level. This agreement was in fact peripheral to the purpose of the meeting, which was intended as an opportunity for the president to talk about world and hemisphere affairs with the heads of government of Mexico and Canada. The general assumption, shared by St Laurent, was that the tripartite meeting was a public relations demonstration to illustrate that the president had recovered from his serious illness and could be a candidate in the forthcoming election. Opportunities were provided for some bilateral discussions, but there was nothing in the nature of the conference itself to induce Canadians to turn soft on the Columbia issue for broader political reasons.25 In counteracting the view that there had been a sell-out attributable to presidential conviviality, the prime minister said with uncharacteristic bluntness to the House of Commons on 9 April that 'the chairmen of the two sections had publicly expressed views so diametrically opposed to each other that there was little probability of their being able to make the kind of progress we would hope would be made in arriving at a solution of these problems.'36 The general was upset by what he regarded as 'this evidence of lack of support' and thought of resigning. It was probably the tone of the prime minister's comment rather than the decision to hold diplomatic talks that upset McNaughton because the positions taken by both

268 The Shaping of Peace chairmen had been backed by their respective governments. Speaking to the Commons Committee on 7 June 1956 McNaughton explained why it was proper, in accordance with the treaty, for the governments to seek agreement when 'the Canadian section and the United States section are evenly divided on a question of fundamental significance.' In the House of Commons on 23 May 1956 Jean Lesage tabled a joint Canada-United States announcement which indicated that discussions had to be taken up on a political level not merely because of the stalemate on the Columbia but because 'It has recently appeared ... that the development of the resources of such basins as the Saint John, the Columbia, and the Yukon requires, among other things, the solution of various complicated legal, economic and engineering questions. In agreeing to examine the matter of waters which cross the boundary, the two governments realize that there may be no easy or quick answer to the problems which are arising today in such areas and that the studies may reveal that the boundary waters treaty of 1909 is sufficiently broad to meet present problems.'27 The implication was, of course, that the treaty of 1909 might no longer be adequate. If the basis of the relationship was to be altered, this would require political calculations that could be handled only by elected governments. On the Canadian side the decision to move to diplomatic discussions was by no means a recommendation only of the Department of External Affairs. Lesage, in a letter to Pearson of 3 February 1956, argued that 'only the two governments ... can settle the points unanswered in the Treaty.' He emphasized that there should be no indication of a slight to the commission in proceeding with direct negotiations and he felt the Canadian chairman should participate fully in any intergovernmental discussions. As far as External Affairs was concerned the under-secretary, in a memorandum for Pearson of 17 January 1956, recognized the dilemma. The knowledge and experience of the commissioners in the matters under discussion would be of great value on the delegation but on the other hand there might be a conflict of interest between their status as government representatives and as commissioners serving in an international quasi-judicial capacity on the IJC. The commissioners would be placed in an untenable position if they had been associated with stands taken by parties, and the governments, as was quite likely, decided to refer subsequent questions to the commission. He recognized, however, that difficulties might arise if the chairman of the Canadian section was not included. The view that McNaughton was the only dependable advocate of the Canadian interests was current and public. C.D. Howe did not think the policy questions could ever be settled by the commission and suggested the formation of a cabinet committee to consider

269 The Continental Relationship the possibility of proposing to the United States that 'a special tribunal be established to deal with this one matter.' The under-secretary of state for external affairs, Jules Léger, objected to this proposal because, among other reasons, the uc already existed for such purposes. It was Lesage who took the initiative over negotiations with the United States. Pearson was somewhat cautious about the timing and so also was the Canadian ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney, although they agreed that the UC was not the best channel for negotiating these basic issues of principle and policy.28 Most important of all was a desire to preserve the status of the International Joint Commission, which had served Canada so well for many years. In External Affairs it seemed clear that the founders had intended the commissioners to act in a quasi-judicial capacity and not as advocates for the governments which appointed them. The commissioners, it was recognized, would naturally have some national bias and be alert to ensure that the interests of their own country were adequately protected, but there was a clear distinction between this situation and one in which the commissioners were witnesses, advocates, and negotiators on behalf of their own countries as well as quasi-judicial functionaries purporting to make objective recommendations to governments. As External Affairs saw it, 'if an argument between governments is to be worked out within the framework of the International Joint Commission, counsel for the respective governments, and not the Commissioners, would put forward government views and conduct negotiations, albeit under the good offices of the Commission.'29 More than the Columbia was at stake. An important function of the UC was to deal with problems in such a way as to forestall their evolution into questions of high policy. Could one ask whether the commission had failed? Given the tremendous implications of Libby, Canada could not have treated that application as it would any other. Downstream benefits, with their enormous implications for wealth and power in the Pacific northwest, was a new principle, and just as Canada was unlikely to give it up so too the Americans could hardly be expected to accept it without a fight. The primary factor preventing early settlement was the different stage of development in the Canadian and American areas. In the early years, therefore, Canadian and American interests were not amenable to compromise. By the time they were amenable, that is from about the end of 1955 when Canada was ready to move, downstream benefits were no longer so strange a notion and the United States had to be willing to compromise. Positions in the uc, however, had hardened to the point where the possibility of settlement in that body was slight. It is not to be regretted, however, that the Columbia was passed to the commission so early. Because

270 The Shaping of Peace of the uc the conflict was contained within manageable limits and the issues were progressively defined to the point where mutually acceptable compromise became possible. We are concerned here with the relationship between the uc and the diplomatic process as institutions for conflict resolution, a relationship somewhat too dramatically exposed over the Columbia in the mid-fifties. The Columbia issue plagued Liberal and Conservative governments and ended in an agreement which has been generally regarded as less than satisfactory to Canada. That unsatisfactory result had more to do, however, with the failure of a common front in Canada, specifically cross purposes between Victoria and Ottawa. Because the issues were intensely political and the economic implications so far ranging, it became even less possible to cope with it in the uc. The experience, however, seems to have strengthened the will of both governments to avoid subjecting the uc to conflicts of this dimension because of the permanent damage that could be done to the most successful of Canada-United States institutions by splitting it too often on national lines. It is noteworthy that although there seemed to be differences between governments and oppositions on this question, including the role of the UC and its chairmen, there was little difference between Liberals and Conservatives in office. CHICAGO DIVERSION AND OTHER ISSUES

The major institution of the Canada-United States relationship remained negotiation between sovereign powers, and the habits, customs, even principles of such negotiation were evolving to meet new challenges. One good reason External Affairs officials were disposed, as in the case of the Columbia River, to maintain a civil negotiation with the Americans was the evidence that it paid off-although not always, of course. It is the professional duty of diplomats to keep talking to each other civilly, even when their political leaders are about to declare war. Another case in which it paid off at the time concerned Chicago's garbage. This time the Canadian government, by both quiet and loud diplomacy and by exploiting as many allies as possible within the United States, did get support at the highest level. It was the perennial question of diversion of water from Lake Michigan into the Chicago Drainage Canal. Canadian opposition had been consistent for a long time, and in their opposition they were joined by all those in the United States who had an interest in maintaining high water levels in the Great Lakes-St Lawrence system-the lake carriers, the power interests, port authorities, and, eventually, the steel companies. All the Great Lakes

271 The Continental Relationship states except Illinois were opposed. The status of Lake Michigan is different from that of the other Great Lakes shared between the two countries, and the Chicago Canal has not been on the agenda of the uc. Nevertheless, bilateral disputes over the Chicago diversion were subject to Article 2 of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the relevant portions of which give to both parties the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of waters on its own side of the line that flow across the boundary, and the right to object to diversions. By order of the US Supreme Court in 1930 a limit was placed on the amount of water that might be diverted through the Chicago Drainage Canal, but it was provided that increased diversion might be authorized by Congress. There was increased demand for more diversion in the fifties and bills to that effect were introduced in Congress in 1953, 1955, 1957, and 1959. The House passed all four bills, but the Senate concurred in only two. These two were vetoed by President Eisenhower in 1954 and 1956. As soon as the 1953 bill came under consideration Canada made its opposition known privately. These early informal representations were largely to ensure that American officials understood the seriousness of Canada's continuing concern. The State Department could certainly assume opposition from past experience. That department had in fact been the ally of the Canadians on the diversion issue ever since the thirties. Its opposition to unilateral American diversion was based on considerations partly of legal principles and partly of broad policy. During the fifties the State Department regularly argued that the United States should refrain from taking unilateral action on such a matter in the face of Canadian opposition, a view that had been held earlier and expressed by President Roosevelt in 1934. The Canadian ambassador delivered a formal protest note to the secretary of state on 1 February 1954. He argued that any increase in the diversion would be prejudicial to the rights and interests not only of Canada but of the United States as well. He pointed out that the effects on the levels of Lake Ontario were already under study by the International Joint Commission and suggested that decisions on changing the present arrangements should be postponed until the commission's study was complete. After the House passed the bill Canada sent a second formal note on 10 March before the opening of hearings in the Senate Public Works Committee. This time the Canadian note cited legal considerations, pointing out that if the increase took place the government would 'consider that there would be material injury to the navigation interests on its side of the boundary.' It noted also that the Niagara Treaty of 1950, which assumed unaltered flows, would be affected. As it had done earlier, the State Department tried to avoid legal wrangles with Canada on this issue, never formally recognizing or denying

272 The Shaping of Peace Canada's claims. When the Senate passed the bill on 20 August, the Canadian government delivered its third formal note on 24 August. Whereas the first two had been intended to influence Congress, this one was intended for the president. Lest there be any doubts about the strength of Canadian concern, the American minister in charge of the embassy in Ottawa was summoned to receive a verbal protest and the ambassador conveyed an oral protest to the State Department in Washington. The full diplomatic cannonade was sounded. When the president vetoed the bill he gave four reasons. Existing diversions were sufficient for navigation; all methods of control of lake levels should be considered before choosing one; the bill authorized diversion 'without reference to negotiations with Canada'; and the legitimate interests of other American states were involved.30 There is evidence from a conversation the president is said to have had with Senator Dirksen, a powerful supporter of diversion, to indicate that the last of these four reasons was the most important.31 A different tactic was tried when in 1955 a similar bill, modified to protect downstream Illinois towns from flooding, was introduced in the House and approved on 16 July. Canada made no formal representation, a fact that was used by advocates of diversion in the House debate. The State Department did not actively oppose the bill in the House either. The uc had ordered the International Lake Ontario Board of Engineers to study the effect of an increased diversion at Chicago on Lake Ontario in terms of both navigation and power generation. The Canadian government and the State Department were no less opposed; they were trying other methods. The State Department even tried to get the Chicago Sanitary District to endorse an amendment to the bill providing that no diversion would take place until an agreement had been reached with Canada. They were unsuccessful. Then on 13 February 1956 Canada delivered its fourth protest note, restating the familiar objections before the Senate began hearings on the bill. In spite of efforts of the State Department, the Senate passed the bill, but the president vetoed it on 9 August, giving reasons similar to those stated in 1954. J.R. Wagner, who has made a careful study of this case, has concluded from interviews with State Department officials and the testimony of Senator Dirksen, that, unlike the 1954 veto, the 1956 veto was attributable to Canadian representations.32 In testimony before the Senate Public Works Committee the State Department representative said that the principle of joint action with Canada was fixed on 'broad policy grounds' that took precedence over American legal rights on Lake Michigan. When views of this kind were firmly held by

273 The Continental Relationship friends in the State Department the anxiety of Ottawa officials to maintain the constructive and harmonious relationship is understandable. The attitude of the 'friends' was, of course, based on factors more enduring than simple good will. Wagner emphasizes that the State Department was anxious to avoid setting a precedent that Canada might use on the Columbia. There is no evidence that Canada mentioned the Columbia in this connection, but in the State Department they were well enough aware of what McNaughton had in mind. It was a recognition of the inevitability of give and take in boundary relations that led officials on both sides to keep the debate within limits. The State Department's aversion to unilateral action had been consistent since the thirties. Aside from the more notable issues of the St Lawrence, Columbia, and the Chicago Canal, there were plenty of matters to keep the diplomats and politicians on both sides of the border busy. Some of these were boundary issues dealt with in the normal judicious and protracted way with the help of the uc. There were normal but not exacerbated divisions on national lines in the uc over pollution in the Detroit-Windsor and the Sault Ste Marie areas, projects for developing Passamaquoddy power, or the St John River Basin. A successful agreement was worked out concerning water diversion for power at Niagara, but there were difficulties over the Souris River submission and in 1955 there was a difference on national lines in the UC over the Waterton and Belly Rivers in Alberta and Montana. In that case separate reports were sent to the respective governments. Although issues in the UC were to a remarkable extent dealt with on their own merits, it was inevitable that the commissioners would have an eye to precedents, to general principles established in one case because of their effect on others. The differences over WatertonBelly were obviously related to the Columbia. In the latter case, McNaughton provoked the Americans into a statement of principle on a matter of limited importance for Canada that would help his case significantly on the Columbia, which really mattered.33 A good deal of time was spent by the Canadian embassy in Washington with complaints over restrictions imposed or threatened by Congress or the United States Tariff Commission that would affect Canadian produce. When Canadian politicians made a general complaint, as they frequently did, about American behaviour of this kind, United States diplomats pointed out that they spent a good deal of their time combatting unfair discrimination against, for example, Florida grapefruit. The political leaders on both sides had a habit of portraying themselves as devoid of selfish national interests while

274 The Shaping of Peace the officials worked together to straighten things out when they could. There was undoubtedly some playing off of product against product, and it all caused irritation in particular places. Wiser people accepted this as a kind of game likely to be played indefinitely by neighbouring countries. It was not easy to mount an effective lobby in Congress, and congressmen and senators resented this in any case. Often there were not only the State Department but favourable interest groups to exploit. A man with authority and the respect and contacts in Washington that C.D. Howe had could move people at high levels. In 1948 Canada was able to get the United States attorney general to withdraw subpoenas issued against Canadian newsprint companies. In 1956 the president himself rejected a recommendation of the United States Tariff Commission for an increase in the duty on groundfish fillets of which Canada was the leading exporter to the United States. These interventions meant hard slugging but, as the 1955 External Affairs Annual Report noted, they had achieved success 'in the main cases' where Canada had intervened against increased United States protection and tariffs. THE C A N A D A - U N I T E D STATES PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE 3 4

The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence is an interesting example of the kind of international institution regarded as most suitable for the North American relationship. In a sense it grew and shaped itself. It was less the product of conscious theorizing about international organization than were the other international organizations with which Canada was associated - the United Nations system, NATO, or even the Commonwealth. There was little time to think about it when President Roosevelt popped the question at Ogdensburg one August day in 1940. Its basic bicameral rather than unicameral nature was a product of instinctive Canadian attitudes confirmed by the reasonably successful operation of the International Joint Commission along these lines. Even though the United States was neutral when the board was established, the continental defence preparations envisioned were directed against a perceived common threat. Later there was a wartime alliance and after that a peacetime alliance based also on a more or less common perception of threat. This new stage of the Canada-US relationship was labelled 'permanent' when the board was established. The uc is also envisaged as permanent, but it is based on the inevitability of geography. So, in a sense, is the PJBD, but its permanence depends upon certain assumptions about the common interests of the two countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world which may change from

275 The Continental Relationship time to time and be assessed differently by the two governments. During the period with which we are now concerned it was infused with a sense of alliance, following a transition period at the end of the war when the board had been more concerned with liquidating than building the infrastructure of alliance. The countries were not allies when it was established, and there would be an argument for its continuing if the alliance dissolved. It can be a useful and perhaps essential instrument for regulating the problems which geography makes inevitable in the defence planning of countries which, whatever their foreign policies, can never be otherwise than contiguous. McNaughton, who was chairman of the Canadian sections of both the PJBD and the UC, contrasted 'the free understanding co-operative association of the PJBD with the very different experience in another joint Canada-U.S. body, the uc.' 'In the board we were moving with common objectives for the defence of North America. In the DC the situation is far different for here we are rivals for the beneficial use of the waters along the boundary and for the immensely valuable resources they represent.'35 The PJBD, as well described by R.M. Macdonnell, a DEA member in 1944-7 and 1955-7, provided a forum not only for making joint recommendations but also for negotiating, exchanging views, testing ideas, and for quietly rejecting impracticable solutions. However, he said, the board wisely never became what some well-meaning people frequently advocated, a supranational group of independent advisers tendering objective advice to governments hungering for objective appraisal. 'A service or diplomatic member on the Board put his views before his political chiefs; if accepted, they became the subject of international negotiation, but if rejected, they simply died.'36 The board consists of a Canadian section and an American section, operating independently in Ottawa and Washington and coming together only for meetings, which, after a very active programme at the beginning, settled down to a routine of approximately three or four times a year. An important feature for a defence board was that on both sides there was a civilian chairman (even if he was sometimes a retired general), representatives from the three services of each country, and also from the State Department and the Department of External Affairs. The PJBD resembles the UC in that it has no power to make binding decisions; its function is jointly to study problems which have arisen or which might arise and then make recommendations for government action. In such circumstances there can be no voting; the procedure is a search for consensus. Although much has been made of the fact that, in the early stages at least, virtually all recommendations were implemented by the two governments, one of the most valuable functions of the board, particularly from the Canadian point of

276 The Shaping of Peace view, was to shoot down in advance proposals that would not have been acceptable to governments. Lines were sometimes drawn professionally rather than nationally with, for example, both air forces or the State Department and the Department of External Affairs seeing eye to eye. The principal value of the board was perhaps not so much the formal recommendations which it made but rather the injection into the policy planning and administering structures of the two governments of a good many influential people who had been through this enlightening experience of seeing each other's points of view. After the war there were fewer recommendations of a formal kind. Understandings were written into agreed minutes. What mattered most was the kind of influence that could be exerted by the board informally and, therefore, much depended on the personality and political status of the chairmen. Fiorello LaGuardia, the first United States chairman, had the ear of President Roosevelt, Dean Acheson had a good relationship with Truman, and John A. Hannah could get direct to Eisenhower. This was important for Canada as a means of access to power not always reachable through diplomatic channels. They could get the decision-makers to see the Canadian point of view on Newfoundland bases or Arctic ice islands. According to R.A. MacKay, McNaughton 'had tremendous influence over the American military thinking in Washington in general.'37 General McNaughton was chairman of the Canadian section from 1946 to 1962, and he considered that one of the most important aspects of the PJBD was its freedom from subordination to the military. His attitude on this subject was clearly set out in a conversation with the secretary of state for external affairs, to whom he spoke of his concern that the PJBD should continue to be regarded as an important arm of the external policy of Canada and not regarded as something essentially for the Department of National Defence. He stressed the importance of ensuring 'that defence arrangements between Canada and the United States were not allowed to be made either formally or, worse, informally direct between the military staffs.' He added that 'If this were done we would wake up some day to the existence of commitments of serious import, the significance of which probably had not been recognized by the military officers at the time they were entered into.'38 McNaughton put his finger precisely on the principal issue. It was the function of the board to see that relations between the two countries ran smoothly and that the joint product was as effective as possible. Sometimes, however, they had to oppose efficiency. The professionals working together were bound to pursue efficiency, and efficiency could lead to continental integration unless there was someone apart to keep an eye on the conse-

277 The Continental Relationship quences. The board was based on a dedication to the belief that in matters of defence the United States and Canada were bound together by a basic common interest, but it was also based on the principle of maintaining Canadian sovereignty. It was not assumed that Canada must submit to an American command structure except possibly if North America was under attack. Canadian military personnel during and after the war were, for the most part, much concerned with Canadian rights. They had had a long experience of preserving the Canadian military identity. It was their duty, however, to see that the co-ordinated defence was effective and in particular to see that provisions were made in peacetime so that wartime collaboration would be more than a rhetorical phrase. The board was based on a recognition of a normal conflict of interest and perception between the services on the one hand and the diplomats on the other. The great virtue of McNaughton as a chairman was that he could constantly keep in mind and also reconcile the principle of productive collaboration with the most vigorous defence of the Canadian national interest. From the American perspective, of course, the PJBD loomed much smaller. Steven Ruvinsky, who has studied the record from the American view, concludes that the United States section acted almost without direction from above. He found no presidential directive but only lists of Joint Chiefs of Staff needs to be negotiated with Canada. If any military command needed something in Canada, they would take it up directly or send it to their member on the PJBD. United States members could discuss any idea without higher approval. In fact, it would first be discussed with Canadians in the PJBD or elsewhere to make sure Canada would agree before bothering the higher-ups. For the United States North American defence was only one part of United States defence policy, whereas for Canada it was of first importance. The Canadian section, therefore, received more governmental direction than the United States section. Ruvinsky wonders whether this important point escaped the Canadian cabinet.39 The lop-sided situation was not necessarily disadvantageous to Canada. The PJBD was a place where they could quietly use their pressure at a formative stage and influence United States policy without all the diplomatic fuss and possible public debate which attends summitry. The PJBD was not so much a regional organization as a kind of regional working arrangement. It was not an organization of two neighbouring countries for the pooled defence of those two countries or for the continent which they shared. The scope of the PJBD from the beginning was strictly limited to 'the North half of the Northern Hemisphere.' But this was limited to northern North America, an area which included Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador, Alaska, and coasts of the United States adjacent to the Canadian

278 The Shaping of Peace border. Greenland and Iceland were excluded and also the Caribbean Islands, Central America, and the United States with the exception of the coastal regions mentioned.40 It included all of Canada but only part of the United States. If this might seem unfair, it was entirely acceptable to Canadians who neither during the war nor after wanted responsibility for American defences which looked southward. The Americans for their part had no wish to have Canadians interfering in their action in this area or fully sharing intelligence. In practice the Americans and Canadians kept the PJBD separate from NATO. The Canadian military shared the American military's distaste for overseas 'interference.' Canadian diplomats and politicians tended to find the multilateral cover more attractive. As the PJBD preceded NATO, it was inevitable that consideration would have to be given to its relationship to the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group that was set up along with other regional groups in Europe when NATO was established. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff considered transferring all defence planning from the PJBD to NATO but met strong contrary American arguments with which the Canadian Chiefs eventually agreed. The American arguments were that the PJBD was permanent whereas the NATO agreement was on a twenty-year basis, the NATO treaty covered only the Atlantic whereas the Joint Board was concerned with the Pacific as well. Territorial and coastal defences were regarded as national matters outside the scope of NATO, but as air defence was a joint matter Canadians were willing to see if this could be a possible NATO activity in the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. The American Chiefs were very sensitive here. They did not want the European partners to be insisting on having air defence facilities on the scale of what was being planned for North America. In particular they did not want the Europeans to have anything to do with the Strategic Air Command. It was also the American view that the Europeans were not reliable recipients of high security information. In spite of arguments from External Affairs, it was agreed in 1950 to leave continental defence as it was. When the matter was reconsidered in 1952 at a time when the Regional Planning Groups of NATO were to become integrated commands under a supreme commander, Canadians were less enthusiastic because this would have meant the appointment of an over-all United States commander and a hierarchical system which they had always regarded as inappropriate for North America. The Europeans had shown no desire to become involved in North American defence, and there was no further effort to integrate the PJBD, although when NORAD was established the question of its relationship to NATO became a political issue.41 Although the Canada-US relationship was always regarded as unique and secluded from interference from extracontinental forces, nevertheless it was

279 The Continental Relationship seen as one element, and a peculiarly happy one, in the framework of world order. King was being perfectly sincere when he said of the Ogdensburg Agreement and the board it established: 'It is part of the enduring foundation of a new world order, based on friendship and good will.'42 In his eyes, of course, it was the good will that made it unique and an example to the more quarrelsome people of less enlightened continents. The North American formula for peace, however, was seen as one worthy of wider application. King liked it perhaps because there was no collective security nonsense about it, no supranational authority. This was co-operation in defence based on geography and shared principles rather than on political commitments. It strengthened rather than diminished Canadian sovereignty. He and others liked to say also that it established a relationship between the United States and Canada similar to that between members of the Commonwealth, but there was, of course, no permanent joint defence board in the Commonwealth acceptable to Canada. Dean Acheson thought that the Canadian-American experience with the board had been helpful in developing the defence association of fourteen countries in NATO. He emphasized the way in which Canadian and American colleagues on the board worked over a problem continuously and exhaustively until, through pressure of good will and hard work, the solution was forced out. Although the PJBD did not have such a formal basis as NATO and made recommendations rather than asking its governments for binding obligations, nevertheless many of the actions taken in NATO 'lie in the field of co-ordination of effort rather than through binding agreements upon the nations concerned.' As the Atlantic countries assumed voluntary action to carry forward joint programmes in the way Canada and the United States had done, he said, the difficulty and friction that so often developed in attempting to draft binding agreements could be avoided.43 Should the PJBD be regarded as one of the elements making for the continentalization of Canada or as a defence against the process? There is a danger here of mistaking the instrument for the policy. The question is whether the idea of defence collaboration having been accepted, the existence of the PJBD unnecessarily diminished Canadian sovereignty. The very process of working together towards a common end does encourage the removal of barriers. Erosion probably occurred, however, to a greater extent on the military staff level than in a body designed to distinguish separate interests. The board prevented this process from going further. It formally put the brakes on extravagant proposals for Arctic defences. It could be helpful not just for simple resistance but for seeking out formulas - for Newfoundland bases or radar chains or research in the north - that would give the Americans some reasonable measure of what they wanted and therefore

280 The Shaping of Peace prevent the building up of intolerable pressures. In certain cases the Canadians on the PJBD would help make the American case more rational. During the period when the American and Canadian military were pressing for the action which emerged in the Joint Statement of February 1947, it was a force within the Canadian policy community urging the case for going further, against the hesitations of the cabinet. Without the structural association, however, United States requests would not have vanished. They probably would have been cruder. The government could use it to cool off the Americans. When King was under pressure in the House over the reports in 1946 of United States 'demands' in the Arctic, he could assure everyone that the PJBD was studying the problem and would produce carefully considered proposals as required.44 One of the principal values of such a permanent institution is to deflate panic and put controversial issues in perspective. If there was a military bias, this came more from the Canada-u.5. Military Co-operation Committee. The MCC was established in 1946 under the wing of the board to consider the military factors in revising the basic defence plan. It too had a United States and a Canadian section and included State and External representatives. When new plans were launched the MCC considered the practical implementation. However, in 1949 it was divorced from the PJBD and shed its civilian members. It did not become the Regional Planning Group under NATO although it had virtually the same membership. As had happened during the war the purely military liaison bodies were more active after the PJBD had helped set out the guidelines. Not unnaturally the services tended to prefer, if possible, planning in their own bodies and showed an occasional tendency to regard the PJBD as a body that interfered with military logic. The function of the PJBD, as of the other functional Canada-US bodies, was to prevent drama. That is perhaps the function of all international institutions. A risk is that in North America when they work well the Americans are inclined to regard them as domestic, lacking as they do the high drama of real international affairs. Perhaps Canada would have had more success in forcing the United States to recognize it as a foreign state if the relationship had been enshrined in treaties. Canada's friends in Washington, including presidents, from Roosevelt on, had preferred executive agreements or simple joint pronouncements because they wanted to keep the relationship clear of the entangling biases of Congress. So long as this was possible, as it was in the congenial climate after the war, Canada did get informal arrangements with the United States which were free of the booby-traps with which they might well have been hung by Congress - a body not often moved by enthusiasm for 'constructive and harmonious co-operation.'

281 The Continental Relationship DEFENCE PRODUCTION

During the early and mid-fifties defence production sharing became an established routine and was little questioned. With the establishment in 1951 of the Department of Defence Production, Canada had put in place the essential facilitating machinery. The DDP was crucial to Canadian intentions for it was able to oversee arrangements which needed constant management. Nothing was automatic about defence production sharing. Eternal vigilance was the price of survival and of good business. It was the high tide of the alliance spirit, of close military collaboration in North America and Western Europe. There was less disposition in Canada as well as the United States to question defence spending in general than at later periods when the sense of common purpose flagged. Canada was worried as the Korean War subsided and American purchases of defence material fell off also. It was again time to get a reaffirmation of the Hyde Park spirit. Howe, as minister of defence production, with a high-powered delegation, went to Washington in October 1953 and got from an unusually senior American delegation agreement in the following terms: '(l) The United States and Canada can better defend themselves and do justice to their worldwide commitments by viewing defence problems as continental rather than national, (il) The effective utilization of joint resources is fundamental to the joint defence and the economic strength of both countries.'45 The co-operation during the Cold War was by no means as closely 'integrated' as it was during the hot war, but the spirit was similar. The DDP set up an office in Washington, the members of which had very close relations with their American opposite numbers, intent primarily on doing as much business as possible both for the common defence and for the national interest. With better service by telephone and aircraft than during the war years, defence production 'integration' could be carried on effectively on the functional level. Despite the relatively smooth operation of production sharing there were virtually no formal provisions for the actual conduct of the operation by the two countries. No legislation was enacted, and the 'sharing' was carried on by personal and informal channels. A rough balance in defence trade was maintained largely through C.D. Howe and DDP'S 'personalized horse-trading' approach to the administration of the agreement. It was good business for Canada because instead of letting trade take its natural course, which would undoubtedly have meant a large Canadian deficit in defence purchases, from 1952, when the policy under the principles of economic co-operation got under way, until 1958 there was a rough balance of exchange between the two countries in defence materials. Again, as

282 The Shaping of Peace in wartime, Canada did sacrifice some of its independence in that it was necessary to adapt to American practice its controls on such strategic items as steel. Throughout the history of production sharing, the United States has been more concerned with the military aspects. After the war they wanted Canadian co-operation in continental defence, and helping Canadians with the economic problems involved seemed a small price to pay. They felt they needed Canadian resources and they wanted to mobilize the continent. United States leaders, even in the Pentagon, were aware of Canada's sensitivities about sovereignty, particularly with respect to air defence, and they saw some form of production sharing as a politically astute means of enabling the Canadian government to complete its air defences in an economically viable manner. At the same time, of course, they never doubted that Canada as well as the United States was being defended, and the Canadians ought to do their fair share. The term 'defence production sharing,' though widely used, requires definition. In the early postwar years it meant reciprocal purchases of defence equipment. In the early to mid-fifties the term, for Canada, meant selective competition with United States defence firms for United States defence contracts - particularly in the highly specialized aircraft and electronics fields. After 1958, however, the term meant virtually total access for Canadian defence firms to compete on an equal basis with United States firms for American military contracts. It might be said that the real 'sharing' was not achieved until after the period with which this book is concerned, but what happened after 1958 was the logical consequence of movements over the previous seventeen years since the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941 -just as NORAD in 1958 was the logical consequence of Ogdensburg and the joint statement on defence co-operation of 1947. The choice for Canada was more often seen at this time as between bilateralism and multilateralism. Unilateralism, the idea of Canada going it alone in economics or defence, as a yearning perhaps more than a policy, was more a phenomenon of the sixties. Some older legislators, with their revived hankering after isolation, might be called unilateralists. Prewar nationalists tended to be continentally minded because they were still fighting the British and emphasized Canada's 'natural' ties in the western hemisphere. However, a new breed of more self-confident nationalists in politics and the bureaucracy after the war did not conceive of Canada staying aloof. They were bullish on Canada's future but aware of the stark realities of a dependent economy at that stage of development. They were dedicated believers in multilateral solutions, but in the short run they could see no alternative to exploiting the

283 The Continental Relationship close continental association to get Canada over the hump. Alternatives were hard to find. Autarky was uncongenial and very unfashionable. Defence production sharing during the war had been very profitable for Canada, and might be so again. 'Apart from its immediate usefulness as an instrument of victory in war,' said C.D. Howe, 'the Hyde Park Agreement provided a pattern for future collaboration in the mobilization and coordination of the Canadian and American economies for the defence of North America and the free world.'46 If the rhetoric of the time seems to imply that what was done was in pursuit of a philosophy of continental unity, these were the stock phrases of the new world order, and the terminology of unity was, as ever, without precision. Politicians and bureaucrats were attracted by the philosophy, not to mention the results, of removing continental barriers to trade. Even before the war the trend had moved in that direction with the reciprocal trade agreements. Canadians had always been hypnotized by the glittering market over the border, constantly being rendered inaccessible by American legislation. Government leaders wanted not only to remove barriers but also to broaden and deepen the Canadian industrial base established during the war. From that perspective American industrial and financial 'penetration' were seen in a different light from that of the 1960s. A weakness of this philosophy was some failure to recognize that continentalism was not internationalism and that renouncing nasty old nationalism vis-à-vis the United States was not necessarily contributing to the brotherhood of man by and large. It was hoped, however, that with vigilance Canada might so strengthen itself through continental co-operation that it could, as a powerful middle power in the world economy, eventually increase its independence. Most leaders denied the logic of political integration, although some accepted that too as good for Canadians, if not necessarily for Canada.47 The experience of the interwar years had discouraged people of that generation from believing that Canada could practice austerity in isolation without losing Canadians. The government was criticized more frequently for not prosecuting the cause of production sharing vigorously than for being 'continentalist.' Whatever the anti-continentalist traditions of the Conservative party as affirmed by latter-day romantic historians, the Conservative opposition limited its criticism to its obligatory questions on tactics. The Conservative party and the conservative element in Canadian society, however antiAmerican many of their traditions, supported, with a few articulate exceptions, what seemed to them the common sense of common defence and common profit against a common enemy. The CCF had its vested interest in industrial employment which tempered its growing antipathy to American

284 The Shaping of Peace capitalism. When the Conservative party came to power in 1957 they proceeded without question to the culmination of a continental defence association by hastily approving NORAD, and when they had buried the great nationalist Liberal adventure in aircraft building, the Arrow, they promptly sought in Washington a new agreement on defence production sharing which, it was affirmed by the minister of defence production, Raymond O'Hurley, carried out 'the basic idea of co-operation expressed in the Hyde Park Declaration and 1950 Statement of Principles.'48 A Liberal government would almost certainly have done all the same things. Although the history of defence production sharing is significant, illustrative, and consequential, it is also unique. The mixture of defence and economics was special. There are parallels and comparisons with other aspects of the relationship, but generalizations from defence production should not be pressed too far. Neither government, and particularly not the United States government, was disposed to extend into other branches of the economy principles and practices that were justified on the basis of defence requirements. The Auto Pact of 1965 is in some ways comparable, but the auto trade also has its unique features. Sometimes the arrangements were seen by Americans as ways and means of assuring themselves of Canadian matériel or preventing Canadians from relaxing controls and enjoying advantage at their expense. More often they were inclined to see the agreements as a concession to the Canadian interest under pressure from the State Department and in accordance with some general and rather one-sided assumptions about 'collective security.' The mining and manufacturing interests in the United States, as W.R. Willoughby has pointed out, 'recognized no responsibility for the maintenance of balanced Canadian-American trade in defense arms and supplies or for the promotion of cordial Canadian-American relations' and, after the Korean War, they insisted on preferential treatment of domestic producers.49 The friends of Canadian defence production were in the Pentagon and the State Department. The uniqueness of defence production was attributable also to a particular wartime experience not soon forgotten by those who had worked in the centre of it, seen in retrospect as a time when the sense of common interest flourished to such an extent that wonders were accomplished in collaboration. In time of trouble it lurked in the national consciousness as a Utopian situation, close to the North American mythology of good will as the sure key to success. But what was the effect of this industrial alignment on foreign policy? Was the enormous vested interest Canada had acquired in the American defence market a barrier to the expression of dissent or the pursuit of an 'independent' foreign policy? It was a problem of which the Canadian public did not

285 The Continental Relationship become acutely aware until the Vietnam War, when it was clear that a Canadian decision to cut off arms supplies with which Americans would fight in Vietnam, as some Canadians were demanding, could be made only at the cost of severe disruption of the Canadian economy. It would probably have meant the denunciation by the United States of the DPS agreements, which had been designed to fit the alliance within NATO which the Canadian majority still wanted to preserve. There was no doubt that Canada, in pursuit of its legitimate economic interest, had got itself into a position that placed a constraint on its freedom of movement in foreign policy - more serious than mere diplomatic pressure from Washington because there would be severe political cost to any Canadian government which disturbed the defence economy. However, that constraint was never really tested. The extent to which the Canadian government was prevented by economic reasons in the fifties from taking divergent positions on United States military doctrine such as massive retaliation can be exaggerated. The United States wanted and, to an extent, needed Canadian co-operation in defence and defence co-operation. The Canadian government probably went as far in opposition as it wanted to go. Because of its strategic doctrine, its acceptance along with Britain and the other allies of the need to keep the United States strong even when it was wrong-headed, it is doubtful if at any time in the fifties a cabinet majority wanted a more 'independent' policy than that which was in fact pursued. Without a basic consensus on foreign policy there could not have been defence production sharing agreements. An American student of Canadian defence policy in this period said of the situation at the end of the Korean War: 'Thus, one of the important preconditions for the establishment of a meaningful, comprehensive division of labor between Canada and the U.S. in defense production was fulfilled. Ironically, however, it was attained only at the time when the political will necessary for such a program was disappearing.'50 There is an inevitable relationship between the political will and effective defence-production sharing, a factor which raises doubts as to whether full integration, unaffected by extraneous factors, is inevitable. OTHER INSTITUTIONS

The largest number of Canadian-American committees during this period were in the military sphere. The North American Air Defence agreement [NORAD] was not established until after the end of the Liberal period of government.51 It was basically a framework for collaboration rather than a merger of forces, although it had more integrating features than earlier arrangements. It provided for collaboration of two national entities, but the

286 The Shaping of Peace provisions for a single headquarters went further than, for example, the St Lawrence Seaway. NORAD was the logical culmination of defence arrangements on which both countries had been working for a decade, a compromise, acceptable to the times, between the logic of efficiency and political caution. In a sense it put into peacetime practice what the Basic Security Plan [ABC-22], conceived before Pearl Harbor, had proposed for a wartime emergency. Although the arrangement was effected by the Conservative government in Canada, the agreement had been prepared in tentative form by officials, and with the knowledge of ministers, during the Liberal government. The agreement would very probably have been put into effect by a continuing Liberal government, although there was more concern among the Liberals, particularly on the part of Pearson, over the international implications. It was perhaps the ultimate product of the period when the alliance was taken for granted. It should be seen in perspective more as a culmination than as a new beginning because it was about this time when, for various reasons, the unquestioned acceptance of alliance and partnership was dissipating. It is significant that although it has been renewed several times, later arrangements have been designed to re-emphasize the border by creating a Canadian zone in place of zones which, for good strategic reasons, straddled national boundaries. During the period from 1945 to 1957 other agreements were reached and institutions established which might be noted. The Joint Canada-United States Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee, set up in April 1950 and reconstituted in 1951, has been mentioned. In 1950 the convention providing for reciprocal privileges for halibut fishing vessels was put on a permanent basis. In March 1951, when Americans were busy building shelters, there was an agreement for close integration of civil defence. Canadians were prepared to go further in making provisions for emergencies than for everyday living, partly because in the kind of crisis envisioned, the saving of lives would clearly have priority over every other consideration and partly because crises were not assumed to last forever-or certain to occur at all. NORAD itself was in fact a provision for integrated operation when the balloon went up. In 1954 an International Great Lakes Fishery Commission was established, its concern being to see that the lakes were stocked with fish. It was far from being, however, the supranational authority over the Great Lakes which has from time to time been proposed on both sides of the border. In 1954 there met for the first time a ministerial body, the joint United States-Canada Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which was the almost inevitable product of mutual complaints over barriers to trade. Whenever Canadian and American ministers, prime or otherwise, got together

287 The Continental Relationship they decided that all these irritations could be settled if they only talked face to face from time to time. So the idea of a committee on the ministerial level was accepted and met about once a year. The persistent problem for this body, which has never been either regular or effective, is that relations with the United States are a high priority concern at all times for a considerable number of Canadian cabinet ministers but they are rarely of high enough priority to persuade their American opposite numbers to take off the required amount of time. Nevertheless, they did provide an opportunity at sessions in 1954 and 1955 for Howe and Pearson to explain Canada's dissatisfaction with us agricultural policies to the secretaries of state, agriculture, and the treasury. The American provision of grain abroad under what, in Canadian eyes, was the infamous PL480 was the major irritant in Canadian-American relations in the fifties. THE SEARCH FOR COUNTERWEIGHTS

In the construction of the United Nations system Canada had opposed regionalism in principle but took a functionalist perspective in practice. The opposition was based on a profound conviction that Europe and North America were interconnected and that one of the main reasons there had been two world wars was the failure of North America to involve itself in European questions. Another reason was Canada's discomfort in its own region. Canada did not feel at home in a 'western hemisphere' which enveloped the very different countries of South America. As for North America, regional bodies composed of one super-power and one middle-sized power just would not work. The objection was not based on a lack of appreciation of common interests. The formulas for dealing with these, however, had already been worked out. Far from feeling that Latin America might be a power to right the imbalance of the North American design, Canadians were consistently anxious not to have their relations with the United States mixed up in American relations with Latin America. Throughout the war they had suffered because the Americans feared making any concessions in representation and consultation to their substantial ally, Canada, on the grounds that they would have to apply the same principles to Latin American countries.52 The Mexicans, incidentally, had their own comparable institutions to deal with border problems with the United States and showed no interest in multilateralizing them in the OAS. The relationship with the United States was of such overwhelming importance it conditioned the Canadian attitude to other international organizations. Canadians wanted to keep the relationship special because it had to be

288 The Shaping of Peace treated with special caution. It was special because of its overwhelming priority. Government and opposition clung to the concept of counterbalances, but these kept slipping away. The exigencies of continental defence became harder to ignore in light of the strategic concepts which the Canadian government shared with other Western governments. In economics the counterbalances became less and less effective as what was regarded as a temporary reorientation of the Canadian trade pattern during the postwar period became fixed. What was more, Canadians were prospering in this pattern. Until the end of the war the Americans themselves had been less than enthusiastic about allowing a spokesman from the British empire into the pure republican climate of Pan America. After the war, their attitude changed. The American military were anxious to get Canada involved in their schemes for hemisphere defence, although this anxiety ceased to be urgent when Canada was involved with them in a North Atlantic defence structure. Canadians were of two minds on the subject and there were a good many Canadians, particularly of the old nationalist school, who believed Canada should take its place among the nations of the 'New World,' just to make clear that it was not a British colony. French Canadian intellectuals in particular thought this way, stressing somewhat unrealistically the bonds of common Latinity and common Catholicism. Cabinets were divided, and there were occasions when the Canadian flirtation with the OAS came close to fulfilment. It preoccupied a group of intellectuals but was never a popular issue. The opposition to membership was perhaps more instinctive than rational. There were no historic ties with Latin America, as there were in the United States. There was a much more satisfactory balance of power in the Commonwealth and in NATO, and in those organizations, unlike the OAS, there was no voting. Some people saw the possibility of Canada exercising in the OAS its middlepower mediatory role. Others felt that the polarization in the OAS was too great. Some feared Canada would be pressured into supporting the American positions while others feared an alignment with the United States based on similar approaches to hemispheric problems. The strongest argument, or perhaps intuition, against membership was a feeling that it was in the Canadian national interest to have as few rows as possible with the United States administration and Congress. But however much the world changed it was hard for Canadians to uproot the deep historic belief that the special relationship was triangular. The triangle had provided the mutual deterrence which allowed Canada to grow up in peace during the period of Anglo-American rivalry. Then, since 1871, the tacit alliance of British and American imperialisms had seemed to protect Canada as a fire-proof house in a turbulent world. The British had better

289 The Continental Relationship reasons during these difficult times to cling to the special relationship with the United States. For Canada it was a fact of nature to be accepted rather than stressed. The Canadian internationalists were more inclined to see the old triangle reborn in the North Atlantic system. They were less suspicious of non-Anglo-Saxon foreigners than was Mackenzie King and more confident of Canada's ability to stand on its own feet in international politics. For them the Commonwealth became something bigger than a bilateral relationship with Britain and they saw Canada's destiny as something more than that of a eunuch. What they did not shake off, however, was the conviction that aside from a Russian-American war over their heads, the greatest disaster for Canada was a split between Washington and London. This anxiety was never displayed more strongly than over the Suez crisis at the end of the St Laurent-Pearson régime. And in spite of all the signs, Canadians had not even by 1957 completely given up the hope that Britain or Britain and Europe would eventually resume their important economic role in a better balanced Canadian economy. John Diefenbaker came into power in 1957 with a promise to divert 25 per cent of Canadian trade from the United States to the United Kingdom. Although the Liberals had not put a percentage point on it, this was what they had been trying to do for years. C.D. Howe told a New York audience bluntly on 6 December 194953 that the world looked to the United States for leadership in restoring the balance of trade and he explained precisely what he meant: the shifting of several hundred million dollars worth of imports from the United States to Great Britain and other European countries. The Liberals had learned in the meantime that it could not be done. They were spending most of their time during the fifties trying to knock down the barriers to Canadian entry which a Republican administration was maintaining and, among other things, fighting the Americans over their give-away programmes, which were seriously interfering with Canadian grain exports in the world at large. A new government had to learn for itself that the comfortable isosceles world could not be restored. CONCLUSION

The dilemma for Canadians about the 'special relationship' was this. They must avoid defining it too precisely lest they become involved in institutions that looked equitable but would inevitably be loaded on the side of the major power. Nevertheless, American vitality was such that they did need some rules and regulations. They needed these rules not so much in a struggle with the State Department or the US administration as to help their friends in

290 The Shaping of Peace Washington restrain the exuberant entrepreneurs of the Republic. It was also necessary to restrain Canadian entrepreneurs who were easily lured by Americans into arrangements that were good for their business but, if multiplied, could have a disastrous effect on a national economy. Then too the American political system was such that American policies could be exceedingly captious - customs regulations for example. Timid Canadians needed a good deal of encouragement to assault the US market, and it was essential that they have some assurance of consistency in the treatment their products would get at the border. Typical of the Canadian anxiety to get some rules of the game were the arrangements made when the Western powers and the North American economies had been turning seriously to war production. Canada agreed very happily to a proposal from the United States for a Joint Industrial Mobilization Committee which resembled somewhat those that had existed during the war. The committee set out to establish principles for economic co-operation, which were proclaimed in the exchange of notes on 26 October 1950.54 The principles called for a 'co-ordinated program of requirements, production and procurement,' the institution as it became necessary of co-ordinated controls over the distribution of scarce raw materials and supplies. It was clear, however, that these were to be parallel national controls seeking to facilitate consultation and the removal of barriers. This agreement on principles was effected by a formal exchange of notes between the secretary of state and the Canadian ambassador. This informality was typical, and the reason, as given by Maxwell Cohen,55 is as follows: 'Perhaps the most insistent lesson of treaty form in recent years is the clear shift in the method of obligation from formal treaties and agreements to exchanges of notes and even simple declarations. This more informal technique avoids constitutional and political difficulties, but of course the method is not well suited to situations where the ratification process is politically desirable and where implementation by municipal law seems necessary and is to involve extensive legislative enactment.' Canada might have felt more secure with formal treaties, but it had to accept the wisdom of the American administration's recognition of the difficulty of piloting them through a legislative process that was always protracted and biased against international give and take. Cohen documents the increasing reliance of Canada and the United States on this kind of 'treaty structure' in the postwar period in dealing with the tremendous agenda of issues from taxation to extradition, unemployment insurance, weather stations, atomic energy, boundary waters, and smuggling. Co-operation in the fifties was on the whole harmonious. It was constructive also perhaps in the sense the word was intended - the production of a

291 The Continental Relationship state of security and prosperity for North America greater, because of that co-operation, than the sum of two parts. There was little construction of continental institutions. Americans were only fitfully aware of any need and not anxious to dilute their control over their own policies. Canadians were chary of bodies which, they assumed, would, by an inevitable system's bias, operate in favour of the stronger member. Were they in fact mistaken? Supra-sovereign authorities to dispose of the resources of the continent were never under consideration. Those few institutions that were continued or set up new, whether they were formal bodies or agreed principles, were designed to stake out and protect the Canadian interest against the uninhibited power of American society. The protective role of the UC and the PJBD are obvious. The 1947 Joint Statement on Defence and the 1950 Statement of Principles for Economic Co-operation enunciate guidelines to which not only the Canadian government can appeal but also the United States administration when Congress feels unrestrained. They will not always work, but they are better than no code at all. Likewise, of course, the United States can thereby expect Canadian governments to play fair. MORAD, which seems a step in the continentalization of North American defence, can be regarded from another angle as a means of preserving a Canadian role and an appropriate degree of sovereignty in a situation in which, if there were no rules, the Americans would simply take over defence of the continent. Without the defence production agreements, there might well be no defence industry in Canada at all. As Canadians were becoming aware of the need to protect Canadian resources and culture, they might have been well advised to seek, before the controversies over magazines and television became entrenched, formal agreement on principles that recognized the priority of national cultural interests in certain situations over the simple force of economics and the magnetic power of the USA. Hume Wrong, as usual, had foreseen the problem when he wrote to Pearson on 15 April 1948: 'We now seem to be moving rapidly into a new period of close economic and political co-operation which ... calls for the United States Government to take a broad, statesmanlike view of its economic relations with Canada, and to do so in a concrete way in the common interests of the two countries ... It may be a most opportune time to reach an agreement which would diminish the possibility of the recurrence of the badgering and harassing tactics of certain control-minded administration officials and certain small but powerful congressional elements.' It is a need even more evident a generation later when such agreements may be harder to extract.

12

The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament

UN D I P L O M A C Y

It was the United Nations as an agency for diplomacy rather than the enforcement of collective security which Lester Pearson stressed in his last comment on the subject before giving up his position as secretary of state for external affairs in June 1957. 'The Canadian view is that the United Nations is an agency for reconciliation and negotiation, a forum where opponents can maintain contact and eventually reach compromises and solutions. It is not a substitute for diplomacy; it is a place where one can conduct diplomacy more effectively.'1 The period from the Korean War until this statement was written just after the session on Suez was a heyday of United Nations diplomacy, certainly from the Canadian point of view. It is with this period of Canadian diplomacy at the United Nations that this chapter and the next are concerned. In Ottawa officials were already becoming reconciled to the idea of the UN as an agency primarily for the resolution and prevention of conflict in the late forties before the Korean War induced an effort at collective force. Before that war was over it seemed as if the more significant function for the UN would be its role in getting an armistice in Korea rather than its part in organizing a coalition. For a time, however, under the impetus of the experience of 1950, Canada was, as described in chapter 7, caught up in the various efforts to develop institutions that would better enable the UN to act against aggression in future. Canada was a member of the Collective Measures Committee and considered itself as having a special status because its provision of a special force for UN use was regarded as a precedent. It was not a precedent that galvanized other states into action and by 1952 Canada was itself backing away from this commitment. No one was very anxious to organize another UN fighting force, and plans for doing so did not long engage the attention of

293 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament either the Security Council or the General Assembly. It was not until the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] was set up in late 1956 that the idea of a UN force was revived, and this was something very different from the UN force in Korea. When Canada went off the Security Council at the end of 1949 External Affairs felt deflated. The early stages of the Korean War were dealt with in the Security Council, but from the autumn of 1950 the General Assembly was thoroughly involved. Not only was the Canadian delegation active in efforts to get a settlement but Pearson was a member of the small team at the centre of UN diplomacy. In the autumn of 1952 he became president of the United Nations General Assembly. The sources of power in an agency for diplomacy are special. Power is related to function. The special power of an elected officer of a UN body is considerable if he knows how to use it. The influence of the great powers, backed by military and economic capacity, was sui generis. The particular kind of strength Canada had in UN diplomacy at this time was, to some extent, attributable to its powerlessness. At the same time, enough military or economic capability to deliver in accordance with promises was, as the Korean War had demonstrated, an aspect of diplomatic capacity as well. Contrary to the expectations of 1950, what may have been Canada's most effective period in the UN came at a time when it was not a member of the Security Council. During the fifties there was an accumulation of influence in the UN which made possible leadership over the question of new members in 1955 and the Suez crisis in 1956. It was a time when major new issues appeared in the Assembly. The Interim Committee, which Canada had supported as a means of strengthening the capacity of the Assembly and providing a fall-back position to the Security Council, gradually petered out along with many of the other initiatives of the 1949-51 period. The big battles were fought in the plenaries, the committees, and the corridors of the General Assembly where all could take part. Although the period with which this chapter is concerned seemed like the height of Cold War, the UN was preoccupied with issues that did not produce simple East-West divisions. After the alarms and panics of 1948-51 the Cold War settled into stalemate followed by the search for détente after the death of Stalin and the Geneva meetings of 1954-5. The build-up of NATO strength gave the Western powers a confidence which made them less panicky. The Russians acquired their nuclear capacity and that made them also less panicky. It was, however, the time of McCarthyism in the United States and Vyshinsky in the UN, and the speeches and reports of even a moderate protagonist like the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs look feverish

294 The Shaping of Peace in retrospect. Beneath all this, however, there was a settling down, discernible perhaps only by a historian. There was no visible progress being made on disarmament, for example, but out of frustration the powers were reaching for the concept of mutual deterrence and arms control which came to dominate their thinking in the sixties. The UN became more complex and more interesting because it was less a simple confrontation between two opposing camps. Although membership was frozen for most of the period, the Asian, Arab, and Latin American members were making their weight felt. Colonial issues dominated the agenda of the political committees and of the economic and social bodies as well. Aid and development as well as racial issues became of increasing importance. The Cold War struggle for propaganda and strategic advantage complicated the discussion of colonial issues, but the third force kept UN policies and diplomacy supple. In the efforts at suasion, the great powers counted most because they were great powers and could, whether deliberately or not, intimidate as well as offer rewards for good behaviour. This capacity nevertheless disqualified them for some roles, and the field was open for skilful and well-placed diplomats from less intimidating countries. To weigh one kind of power against the other would be meaningless. Power was only power when it was applicable. Canada was fortunate also in that it had a strong government at home backed by an unusual consensus on foreign policy. A source of strength was the close harmony between the prime minister and the minister. The election of 1957 proved that, in the latter stages at least, the government was by no means as strong in the country as it thought, but as long as it thought it was strong it supported a strong foreign policy. Canadian delegations could be allowed to pursue what looked like constructive internationalist policies without too cautious regard for political repercussions at home - which is not to say, of course, that the sensibilities of the provinces, of French Canadians, the Orange order, or the commerce-oriented continentalists were entirely disregarded. The economy was moving reasonably satisfactorily, or at least away from the more perilous dilemmas of the late forties. In the constellation of powers Canada was finding a position congenial on the whole to middlepowerism. The imbalance between its UN rhetoric and military capacity was being corrected. Canadian defence forces expanded rapidly and although they did so largely in the context of the North Atlantic and North American alignment, it was not forgotten in the UN that they had contributed substantially, if belatedly, to the UN force in Korea and were sufficient to act in supervisory capacities in Indochina and the Middle East. Canada's loyalty to NATO was strong and it certainly conditioned, although it

295 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament did not determine, the positions adopted in the UN. From the beginning Canada had insisted, along with the United States, that NATO issues were Atlantic issues and members were not obliged to support the overseas positions of their allies. Whether this NATO association was a handicap to Canada's UN diplomacy was a matter of debate. The truth is probably that it was and it was not. Antipathies to NATO were not as strong during this period as they later became. Many leaders of Asian, African, and Latin American countries either publicly or privately approved of NATO and shared its fear of the communist powers. Canada's association in NATO with the United States, Britain, and the other major powers gave it some status and consequence in the eyes of members who perhaps attributed to Ottawa too much influence over the great powers. The very fact that Canada was aligned added weight to its frequent gestures of independence. Being privy to many of the secrets of great-power diplomacy was also an effective, perhaps essential, instrument in the Canadian armoury. When Canada took a bold lead, for example, in the case of new members in 1955, it could be assumed by some of the more timorous countries that the action was taken in full consideration of what the major powers were likely to do. At the same time, of course, there could always be the suspicion that Canada was a stalking horse for NATO great powers. The alignment with countries like France, the Netherlands, and Portugal inhibited more active diplomacy on many colonial issues. There were things, for example, which Swedes could do that Canadians could not. One of these was fill the post of secretary-general of the United Nations. Canada was a member not only of NATO but also of the Commonwealth which included the major non-aligned and developing countries in the UN. Being thus associated with colonialist and anti-colonialist powers made the Canadian diplomatic position often ticklish. The Commonwealth was far from being a bloc in the UN, but the old-boy network was strong. Relations were exceedingly, sometimes excessively, candid. The Canadian dislike of blocs in the UN led them to oppose not only a Commonwealth bloc but also a NATO bloc. There was in fact general agreement that there ought not to be a NATO or West European bloc, partly because it was unlikely to hold on all issues and its differences would be more exposed, and partly because it would provoke tighter alignment on the part of non-Western powers. Nevertheless, there was an expectation by NATO and Commonwealth powers that their associates would give their positions sympathetic consideration and at the very least refrain from public denunciation. The policies of the United States were, of course, of primary importance to all members of the United Nations, including the Soviet Union, because

296 The Shaping of Peace their posture was always a principal element in either the creation of or the solution to the issue. Canadian policy-makers had still not got over their feeling of relief tinged with anxiety at the assumption by the United States of its role as 'free world leader.' Because this leadership and the solidarity of the Western alliance had to be maintained in the face of a challenge taken as seriously in Ottawa, London, Paris, or Canberra as it was in Washington, there was no doubt that concessions in the end would have to be made to solidarity. The maintenance of a strong front was seen not as submission to the American interest, but as utterly essential for the defence of Canadian interests. With such a philosophy submission came at the end rather than at the beginning of the process of policy-making. The Canadian attitude was by no means docile, and in the notable case of the admission of new members American objections were in the end over-ruled. Frequently American positions were modified in the process. In the case, however, of declaring China an aggressor or at the Korean conference in Geneva in 1954 it was clear in the end that the United States was going to have its way and the decision was made for a solid front. In the first place strength in the face of the communists was regarded as essential. In the second place pressing a case too far would undermine the confidence in Canadian good intentions that was essential if any influence at all was to be maintained in Washington. Thirdly, Canada would have been left isolated because its habitual associates would usually rally first to support the Americans. Before rallying, however, Canada found opportunities to strengthen its reputation for healthy independence - or for wilful mischievousness. The unique role of the United States in the United Nations has been obscured by the use in common parlance of misleading verbs. The United States had a commanding position in the UN by reason of its own incomparable power, its generosity, its dedication to world order, and its moral arrogance. That position had not only been assumed, it had been accorded tacitly by most members of the world community who sensed, although they could not acknowledge, the need for leadership. Because the UN could not by majority vote do all the things expected of it, the US was a kind of surrogate UN. That often meant taking unilateral action without due regard for the interests or opinions of others, but it also meant receiving the buck on the last pass. However, the us never 'ran' or 'controlled' the UN, as legend has it. Insofar as it 'dominated' and 'managed,' it did not have an entirely free hand. It did not have a docile and submissive majority to play with. It had, usually if not always, to negotiate and compromise to be assured of support. When fellow members were said to be lining up behind a us resolution, the chances were that that resolution had been considerably altered to gain sup-

297 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament port and was more a group than an American product. The American position was ambiguous and invidious, and everyone else complained. Few, however, doubted that it was better to have the Americans to lean on - and be leaned on by - than to try to run a world body without their muscle. The fear that the us might, in a temper, walk out - over the seating of the Peking régime or admission of new members, for example - continued to play a part in the calculation of Canadian policies. Much of the art of diplomacy at the UN in the fifties was in exploring ways and means of working with, exploiting, or trying to tame this powerful force at the heart of the system. It was not easy to deal with the Soviet Union, but it was a good deal simpler than calculating how to assess the amphibolous state that was like no other - the USA. In spite of the unshakeable assumption of common interest there were persistent - one might almost say habitual - differences with the Americans. These were differences of temperament, of historic experience, but also differences of function. The great power and the middle power were obliged to act quite differently. The fact that this could all be justified as complementary and good team work, as it often was in speeches, did not mean that it was always regarded that way in the heat of battle. The basic fact was that American policy, whether good or bad, mattered enormously. Canadian policy, even though it might be tactically influential or catalytic, was in substance of minor consequence. It would have been different, of course, if Canada, like Korea or South Africa or Israel, had been a major party to a dispute, but it never was. As in the case of the Chinese seat in the UN the initial position taken by the United States towards Peking set the framework of the dispute for two decades for everybody. In the deliberation of Canadian policy the American position was one essential element for consideration. It was an essential element for all UN members. The question of whether or not Canadian policy was dominated or dictated by the United States has to be seen in the light of the fact that, whatever Canada or any other member might do, the United States usually had a hand in establishing the conditions to be reckoned with. There were certain problems involved in dealing with the United States which Canada was discovering in the United Nations.2 The most persistent problem was that Canada had to deal with the State Department and in the State Department it very often found views close to the Canadian. However, it would then be discovered that the president or the military were pursuing a quite different policy. The Canadian government had been miffed in particular in the summer of 1950 (partly perhaps because its conscience was raw) when the United States ambassador in Ottawa presented an aide-

298 The Shaping of Peace mémoire considered unnecessarily blunt requesting Canadian combat forces for Korea just at a time when it had been made known on high levels in Washington that the provision of ground troops in response to the secretarygeneral's appeal of 14 July was under active consideration by the government. When this was pointed out to the secretary of state, Dean Acheson, he implied that the emotional state of American public opinion sometimes made it necessary to put the heat on.3 It is an argument American officials might themselves have found occasion to use when Canadian political leaders made rambunctious speeches to appeal to an aroused Canadian public opinion at a time when negotiations were going on between officials to find a rational compromise. The problem for Canada, however, was that the United States had too many allies to consider and, although Canada was sometimes regarded as special, consultation with allies was time consuming and rarely loomed as large as the more pressing problems of dealing with the other powers in Washington such as the Pentagon or the White House or Congress itself. At times the United States mission to the UN in New York was a power in itself. In the early fifties it was under the direction of a Republican senator during a Democratic administration. At times it was under the direction of a powerful political figure such as Henry Cabot Lodge who dealt with the White House rather than the secretary of state. Over the issue of new members Paul Martin had to cope with officials of the United States mission, with Secretary of State Dulles, and with the head of the mission, Cabot Lodge, none of whom seemed entirely in agreement with each other. This internal dispute over policy was sometimes carried to the press. Canadians were annoyed, for example, when one faction in the United States delegation in Paris in 1948 used the Herald-Tribune to discredit the endeavours of the non-permanent members of the Security Council seeking to find a solution to the Berlin Blockade, although this endeavour was being blessed officially by the United States delegation. In Canadian eyes American tactics had a habit of shifting giddily. This unsteadiness was attributable partly to the impulsive nature of American tacticians and partly to organic confusion in Washington and New York. Canadian policy could be more consistent because it was in the hands of a closely knit department, minister, and prime minister in the East Block and partly, of course, because it was more often that of a concerned observer than a participant in the dispute. Canadian diplomats recognized the pressures in Washington and accepted the fact that American tactics might be turned upside down in a short time. They did not enjoy, however, the selfrighteous enthusiasm with which each tactic was defended and the tendency

299 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament to regard any difference of opinion on the part of friends as evidence of latent Bolshevism. In the closing days of the 1950 Assembly Dulles had come into sharp personal conflict with Canadians on the spot when, in terms of outraged virtue, he denounced an attempt by the Soviet representative to postpone for a few days discussion of the item dealing with alleged United States aggression in Manchuria. However, within a couple of days the United States delegation was insisting that this item should give way to another item on the agenda. This high moral stand gave way to further shifts of position for a whole fortnight. At that time friends were particularly reluctant to differ with the Americans, but when votes were called frequently they had difficulty getting reversals of their own instructions from their foreign offices. The Americans, who inevitably took much time getting an instruction put together from the various powers in Washington, were impatient of other governments who could not produce support within a few hours. The Americans tended, like the Russians, not to be overly concerned with consistency. The Canadians were less rigid than the British Foreign Office, which was loath to authorize so much as an abstention in a sub-committee without considering precedents that could be embarrassing for the next few decades, but they did tend to be cautious about positions on, for example, domestic jurisdiction that could be turned against them. They worried over American sponsored resolutions condemning forced labour in the Soviet Union which were hardly in keeping with the position they took against resolutions concerning apartheid in South Africa, especially as it would be politically difficult for a Canadian government to look soft on forced labour. The Americans tended, like the Russians and the anti-colonialists, to use Article 2(7), which forbids intervention in domestic matters, according to taste. It worried Canadians also that the Americans in the flush of the Korean War were prepared to alter heedlessly the structure of the United Nations. Canada did accept the Uniting for Peace resolutions as they emerged but, along with the British, used its influence to restrain an American zeal that might well have transformed the United Nations from the bridge-building organization to which Ottawa was devoted into a 'free-world' coalition or given the Assembly powers which the United States would have bitterly regretted later when majority power in the Assembly shifted. Temperamentally the difference showed up in attitudes towards rhetoric. Canadians at this time, and especially the officials, were in an austere mood. They were particularly riled by the verbosity of Latin American speechmaking, the preoccupation with declarations of human and other rights which they rarely honoured in practice. American spokesmen were by no means as effusive as the Peruvians or Uruguaians, but they liked this kind of

300 The Shaping of Peace thing better than the Canadians. Because Canadians were usually scurrying around trying to put together more moderate resolutions and were turned off by the clichés of the Cold War or anti-colonialism they sometimes felt themselves less popular with the United States delegations than were more perfervid friends like the Latin Americans and the Filipinos who gave the Americans great rhetorical support but had a tendency not to pay their dues or be on hand when the votes were taken and whose domestic habits made the 'free world' look not so free. The difference was partly in the fact that whereas Canadian diplomacy at the UN was for the most part conducted by phlegmatic professionals, there was a much larger political element in the United States establishment. American arm-twisting tactics were often resented but on the whole not taken too seriously. United Nations diplomacy, like all diplomacy, is a matter of give and take. Support for an American resolution in one case could hardly fail to induce a more friendly disposition on the part of the Americans to support a Canadian resolution over the next issue. There was nothing very systematic or Machiavellian about this fact of life. Canadians always knew that American good will would be useful to them in more ways than one, but they were seldom, if ever, confronted with an ultimatum. What Canadians were discovering in this multilateral atmosphere was that they could be adept at organizing their own coalitions. Particularly on Far Eastern issues there was a certain consensus among the major Commonwealth countries, including the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and New Zealand, less often Australia, and in association with some West European countries and Latin Americans they could effectively block or divert American tactics that seemed unwise. Needless to say, the Americans did not much like this kind of activity on the part of Canadians, particularly when, as was often the case, it was in association with the Indians whom they suspected. It was necessary to make constantly clear that Canada was acting out of conviction rather than mischievously. Partly because of the alliance relationship but also because of Canadian influence in the Assembly, Canada did enjoy a position of intimacy with the Americans on most UN subjects, although no more so than the British and a few others. Both formally and informally there were extensive advance consultations on policy which gave Canada a head start in formulating its policy. In cases such as disarmament, however, where the hammering out of a US policy among the various agencies in Washington was a major problem, United States intentions were often divulged to Canada and other allies only on the eve of a conference. On some issues advance consultation did give Canada a chance to question American policy in a formative stage before it

301 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament had gelled and become immovable. But there were the usual disadvantages in consultation. If Americans made some slight concessions in advance to suit Canadian views, they would assume a right to expect Canadian support. Furthermore, insistence by Canadians that the Americans should consult in advance obviously required a similar commitment on the part of Canada. When Canadians wanted to pursue a policy or a tactic they knew Americans would not like, as over new members, they were reluctant to give advance notice so that the Americans could organize frustration. There was some concern expressed by Canadians at this time over what seemed to be an increasing Americanization of the Secretariat. Canada was still pursuing its ideal of an international bureaucracy and although the Americans paid lip service to this ideal, particularly when it was frustrated by the communist powers, nevertheless, in accordance with the spirit of the time, they wanted their own men in key positions. One reason Canadians had not wanted the UN to be in New York was that they felt it had a better chance for an international spirit if it was in Geneva or some country that was culturally less intimidating. After a few years residence in New York, however, bombarded by American media, members of the Secretariat tended to lose their national perspectives. American attitudes on office procedure and standards of living took over. Americans believed in objectivity, but it was, of course, a Western kind of objectivity. There were Americans in very senior positions in the Secretariat whose influence was at first somewhat feared by the Canadians, but in the end men such as Andrew Cordier and Ralph Bunche became the living proof that there could be international men. When, under the influence of McCarthyism, the United States government ordered the secretary-general to get rid of 'subversive' Americans, Canada resisted firmly if not vociferously. They were not at all happy about the weakness of Trygve Lie in the face of this challenge, but it may have been the advent of a Republican régime and the challenge of the McCarthyites that had a good deal to do with turning the leading American members of the Secretariat into international men. Diplomacy is, of course, a personal as well as a national affair. Canadian diplomacy had a unique instrument in Pearson who had appropriate qualities, long experience, and a sense of perspective that included a nice calculation of just how far a Canadian should swing his weight. He was unique in that he was a political leader with a professional background. The prime minister left diplomacy to Pearson although he himself spoke well and added prestige and dignity to the Canadian image on the occasions when he took part in international conferences. With one notable exception, however, the professional politicians of the time did not play a very active role at the UN.

302 The Shaping of Peace The exception was Paul Martin who, although he was minister of national health and welfare, acted as surrogate foreign minister on many occasions. He had had experience at the League of Nations and closely followed foreign policy, particularly the affairs of the United Nations and its agencies. His shrewd political sense was especially valuable in the UN Assembly as was brilliantly demonstrated when he led the successful revolt of the lesser powers against the great powers, in 1955, over the admission of new members. He had had wide experience in international conferences and acquired the extensive acquaintance among foreign ministers and other important figures that is essential to effective diplomacy. He was more of a rhetorician than Pearson and their particular qualities complemented each other. Brooke Claxton, who was minister of national defence until 1954, was also much interested in foreign policy and played an active part in the early days of NATO. Although in Pearson's absence he acted sometimes as External Affairs minister and although he had been active in the establishment of international agencies during the war, he was not involved at the United Nations. Jean Lesage, during his period as parliamentary assistant to the secretary of state for external affairs, was engaged in ECOSOC matters and served very effectively on General Assembly delegations. Unfortunately, however, it was never the policy of the Liberal government to allow politicians other than Pearson and Martin to stay long enough in UN activities to acquire the requisite prestige and experience. Particularly regrettable was the habit of assigning positions on Assembly delegations as political rewards so that each year there appeared a new group of innocents in New York, Paris, or Geneva. The demands of patronage did not allow them to be reappointed after they had shown promise. The professional advisers, in contrast, stuck with the UN longer, and their influence over the political appointees was perhaps greater than it should have been - and indeed greater than they wanted it to be. The professionals were not all from the Department of External Affairs. One of the ablest advisers was Sidney Pollock of the Department of Finance, whose acute mind, mastery of the subject, and long experience, not only in General Assemblies but in the meetings of specialized agencies as well, gave him a strong voice in the determination of Canadian policies - to such an extent that the difference between Canadian attitudes on matters of substance and Canadian positions in the budgetary Fifth Committee frequently attracted attention. The special recognition Canada acquired during this period was unique but also typical. It was a heyday of middle-power activities, and a lot of middle powers were behaving like middle powers. The Australians and New Zealanders, who had been forces in the late forties, continued because of the

303 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament high quality of their professional diplomats to be active and effective, but their strong alignment after their Labour parties went out of power often denied them appropriate recognition as mediatory people. Some of the European countries, Belgium for example, which were effective middle powers in the late forties and early fifties became hard liners as colonial issues emerged. There developed a particular affinity between Canada and the Scandinavian countries at this time based on a disposition to view current issues from the same perspective. There was the so-called 'Oslo-Ottawa axis' based on a close understanding between Pearson and Halvard Lange, the Norwegian foreign minister, both in the United Nations and in NATO. The 'Sanitavian bloc,' as Andrew Boyd of the Economist called it, emerged in the fifties. Central to it was Dag Hammarskjôld. His emerging concept of his own function and the function of the United Nations was close to that of the Canadians and the Norwegians and there developed an association based on close personal trust. He needed collaborators among the delegations, but he needed collaborators who would work with him while not exploiting him indiscreetly. Habits of working together grew. Tactical successes acquired for the Sanitavian diplomats the aura of influential operators, and that meant they were taken seriously even by those who were not sympathetic with their aims or tactics. Because some of them were aligned Western powers they were regarded by the major Western powers as ultimately loyal if somewhat unstable. What the Russians thought it is difficult to say, but the Eastern Europeans, and particularly the Poles and Yugoslavs, treated them with relative candour. With the Yugoslavs in particular they had an interesting working relationship, based to some extent on the fact that between them they could pool a certain amount of well-based information concerning the dispositions of the major powers. These groupings were evanescent, highly informal, and precarious to identify. They depended on shifting personalities and personal relationships. When the new members were admitted after 1955 countries such as Austria, Ireland, and Japan, who were in some respects similarly floating free, tended to join in this mediatory collaboration. These countries fielded some particularly able diplomats - Kurt Waldheim, for example - who had acquired considerable UN wisdom as observers during their period of non-membership. The one thing which disqualified a country from this group was too tight an alignment. The Irish were conservative Europeans having affinities with the anti-colonialists. The Austrians were neutral by great-power agreement. The Japanese were members of the Asian-African group with views on the world closer to those of the Atlantic countries. Brazilians and other individual Latin Americans were skilled and influential collaborators. Canada, Norway, and

304 The Shaping of Peace Denmark were recognized as members of an alliance but less rigid in their views on the Cold War and sympathetic to the aspirations of countries emerging from colonialism. With the Scandinavians in particular Canadians seemed to share a kind of northern Protestant conscience along with a stern pragmatism. Much more powerful politically, however, was the emerging Afro-Asian group although at that time it was more frequently known as the Arab-Asian bloc because the number of African members outside the Middle East was negligible. The unquestioned leader of this group was India, partly because of its sheer size, partly because of the prestige of its leader, Nehru, and partly because it was the emergence of India and Pakistan in 1947 as great independent Asian countries, setting a pattern of co-operation with their former masters, that inspired the relatively peaceful dissolution of empires within a United Nations framework. Pakistan was by no means a negligible factor and it had some very able diplomats, but it was always within the shadow of India. Krishna Menon became a dominant figure in the Assembly, feared and disliked but taken seriously. In the earlier days India had acquired leadership by affection and respect. It might be said that Menon clawed his way to great-power status in the Assembly. Messrs Pearson and Martin were among the few diplomats who knew how to get along with him - one of the principles being to treat him with the same kind of utter candour with which he behaved. They knew each other well and rarely lost contact even though at times they were working hard to frustrate each other's resolutions. When Krishna Menon suggested to Chou En-lai in Geneva in 1954 that if they had to have a Western power on the International Control Commissions for Indochina they would find the Canadians the best of a bad lot he said something about the essence of the relationship.4 When one looks at the policy positions Canadians adopted on many of the UN issues at this time and particularly on colonial and racial issues, it is harder to understand how they acquired a sympathetic image on the part of the anti-colonialists or a reputation for a position in the middle. It was probably more a matter of style, an easy way of dealing with non-European peoples, and a tendency on the part of the anti-colonialists to misread Canadian history. When President Sukarno addressed the Houses of Parliament in Ottawa in 1956 he stunned the members with a reference to the Canadian wars of national liberation in 1857.5 Canadian spokesmen were not disposed to picture themselves as the first successful colonial revolutionaries, but they were not required to refute misinterpretations which strengthened their diplomatic stance. They did have the advantage that they had no blatant racial

305 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament problems internally. Conflict between peoples of European origin within Canada were of no interest to Africans or Asians while the plight of Indians or Eskimos was not highly publicized and was the subject of only an occasional malicious reference. Whereas the less hypocritical Australians suffered because they talked of a 'white Australia' policy, Canadians were much more tactful about their immigration policies, which at that time clearly discriminated in practice against non-white peoples. It was an exhilarating time for a Canadian diplomat in the United Nations. He was learning his trade at a time when his influence could be considerable if he had the wit to make it so. It was a forum where, above all others, his identity was assured. DISARMAMENT

In the United Nations Canada has perhaps achieved no loftier status than its membership on the five power sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission, from 1954 to 1957, along with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. It was the ultimate expression (or the reductio ad absurdum) of the theory of functional representation. It perpetuated a special position which Canada had had, because of its part in creating atomic energy, as the only lesser power with the status of permanent member on the UN Atomic Energy Commission set up in 1946.6 The question is whether the functionalist argument had not with time become dysfunctional. The reason for Canada's having a special initial status was valid, but it hardly seemed to apply to the era of thermonuclear weapons and massing armies in the fifties. The answer may be suggested in the comment of a historian of the disarmament negotiations who had been one of the American officials throughout: 'General McNaughton was the first of a long line of brilliant Canadian representatives who, because of their ability and knowledgeability, wielded an influence out of proportion to the military strength of Canada.'7 That is, it might be argued, one kind of functionalism. With that kind of reputation it is probable that, although Canada would never have been selected at this late date for special recognition, no one wanted to deprive it of a status it had earned. Its presence was frequently rationalized as the voice of the other powers.8 The notable Canadian effort in the Atomic Energy Commission has been described in chapter 3. It remains to pick up some of the threads of Canadian activity on disarmament or arms control in general before looking at the travails of the lesser power in higherpowered company.

306 The Shaping of Peace Effect of the War Canada's record on disarmament at the League of Nations had not been impressive. Europeans disliked being read the routine lecture from Canadians about the unfortified frontier as an example of disarmament for the rest of the world. The very fact that Canada considered itself 'a fire-proof house' and that it was recognized as invulnerable and lucky by other countries meant that Canadian precedents in unilateral or bilateral disarmament made little impression on more exposed countries. One problem with taking the lead in disarmament matters is that the best way a country can impress is by sacrificing or offering to sacrifice some element of its own security. Canadian forces during the interwar period never remotely reached levels that would have been touched in any multilateral disarmament agreements. In the same way, after the war, efforts by Canadians to cite their own example in renouncing the production of nuclear weapons have been handicapped because Canada's sheltered position is regarded as unique. The Canadian attitude to disarmament was expressed bluntly by King in the House of Commons in 1936 when he said that there were two positions. The first was security leading to disarmament; the second was disarmament first and then security - and the latter was Canada's approach.9 It is a chicken and egg argument that still divides disarmers and arms controllers. As Grant Davy has pointed out,10 this argument was a misinterpretation of the RushBagot Treaty which Canadians were constantly flaunting at the League. It was not the disarming of the Great Lakes in the 1840s (which in fact preceded the disarming of the land frontier by several generations) that brought peace and security to North America. The peace and security was guaranteed by various factors and balances to the point where armed defences of the border appeared as irrelevant. One of the reasons for doing away with arms in North America was the general recognition that in the event of war there was no contest. The Canadian experience is by no means irrelevant for other parts of the world, provided the lesson is got straight. It is not an argument for disarmament first and then security. The war experience naturally had a profound effect on thinking about disarmament. The new basis of Canadian policy was that countries could be expected to disarm when there had been established a reliable framework of security on which they could depend. Not that Canada delayed its own headlong and unilateral disarmament for this purpose. Whatever might have been the intellectual and rhetorical basis of Canadian disarmament policy in international institutions, in defence policy there was quick reversion towards the strategic assumptions of a fire-proof house. Little attention was paid in Ottawa to disarmament in the preparations for the new international organi-

307 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament zation11 and the subject was hardly raised in parliamentary debates on the subject. It is not even mentioned in the report on the San Francisco conference. This is not surprising as nobody else at Dumbarton Oaks or San Francisco was thinking much about it. At that point everyone seemed agreed that collective security had to precede disarmament. For the first decade of the UN Canada was not lacking in forums in which to press disarmament policies if only it could devise them. The UN Atomic Energy Commission lasted from 1946 to 1951. Canada was a member of the Commission for Conventional Armaments when it was perhaps most active, during 1948 and 1949, by reason of the fact that at that time Canada was on the Security Council. When these two bodies were merged in the Disarmament Commission in 1952 Canada remained a member and, what is more, became a member of the élite five-power sub-committee. This position meant that Canada had a special responsibility to take part in the discussions on disarmament in meetings of the General Assembly and gave a note of authority to what Canadians said. None of these bodies made very substantial progress, although in retrospect one can note the advantage there was in having the antagonists groping towards the least common denominator. The problem for Canada and for its partners was not the will but the way. Disarmament is intellectually one of the most baffling of topics. At any rate Canada did have a small establishment in Ottawa, both in External Affairs and National Defence, which tried to cope more intelligently with disarmament as an aspect of international politics than had its predecessors at the time of the League. On functional grounds Canada could speak more confidently in the discussions of atomic than of conventional disarmament. In conventional armaments it ranked low whereas it was at least an 'atomic power' in name although it did not even contemplate having atomic weapons. When the two bodies merged, Canada lost something of the raison d'être that had given it prestige in the UNAEC. At its first session the UN General Assembly started talking about disarmament and Canada made known views which showed how far it had moved from its prewar convictions. The Canadian representative in the First Committee criticized Soviet proposals on the ground that although they stated general objectives they failed to state methods of achieving them. This could be done only 'by working towards a system of world security which will offer protection at least as effective to the Members of the United Nations as their own national forces ... [and] by developing such international safeguards as will give assurance to any nation that does disarm that it will not be suddenly attacked and struck down by another nation that may have violated its pro-

308 The Shaping of Peace mises to disarm.'12 Speeches at this Assembly revealed that nobody quite knew in which direction to move. Perhaps the antagonists were beginning to square off, but nobody was as yet sure on what points to take a stand. Typical of this confusion was the fact that in the early years of discussion the two sides did a complete volte-face on the argument whether atomic and conventional armaments should be considered together or not. This uncertainty and a general desire in the first Assembly to reach some basic agreement on this subject - some basic agreement on anything - led to the passing of a unanimous resolution on 14 December 1946 stating the principles governing the general regulation in the reduction of armaments. Resolution 42(0 embodied the principal points Canada had been making - that an effective security system must be a prerequisite to disarmament, that control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was related to the abolition of atomic weapons, and that there was no use trying to devise schemes which would supersede the greatpower veto. The report on the United Nations for 1946 was perhaps unrealistically enthusiastic about the agreement, but it might well be argued that this was the best way to get started. Even General McNaughton kept in the background during the two years, 1948-9, when Canada was a member of the Commission for Conventional Armaments [CCA]. The reason for this reticence was partly functional but partly that Canada, and others as well, had not figured out what to do in the light of the atomic weapon. It was, to say the least, hesitant about conventional disarmament in the present imbalance with the Russians, although reduction of forces was a long-range aim that no country would want to disavow. By the time Canada became a member of the CCA at the beginning of 1948 it had been in existence for six months and the lines had been drawn. The principles stressed by the Western participants, including Canada, began as usual by insistence that there had to be confidence in provisions for security as an essential preliminary. Emphasis was put on the need to have military agreements under Article 43, effective control of atomic energy, and peace treaties with Germany and Japan. There must be safeguards against violations and an effective enforcement system to punish violators. The Russians in 1948 produced a new proposal on disarmament the basis of which was that the five permanent members of the Security Council would reduce by one-third within one year all their land, naval, and air forces, conclude a convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons, and create within the framework of the Security Council an international control body to supervise both the reduction and the prohibition. The Canadian argument against this was that of its friends and allies. A one-third general reduction would be quantitative only and would ignore entirely the qualitative differences. There

309 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament was no provision for enforcement, and there would be no way of knowing what the Soviet Union was doing because of the secrecy in which its armed forces were shrouded. A vulnerable aspect of the Canadian and allied position was the insistence that the question of atomic and conventional armaments be discussed separately. The Western participants had found themselves with that position in the course of argument and were stuck with it. As McNaughton explained to the Standing Committee on External Affairs on 5 June 1947, although the two matters were basically inseparable, if atomic energy could be controlled it would lead to regulation of other types of armaments.'3 To discuss them all together would, he thought, lead to a lot of 'loose and general talk' about principles without getting down to specific plans. The Canadians and friends were insisting that an agreement on atomic weapons was an essential preliminary to an agreement on conventional weapons, but that position became increasingly untenable as the prospects of international ownership became less feasible. Stalemate

The outbreak of the Korean War made any serious movement on disarmament virtually impossible for the next few years. There was little hope for progress in any case. By the spring of 1950 the Soviet Union had ceased attending both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments as well as the Security Council. The UNAEC had wound up with Western proposals on the book. These were not, however, as the Russians charged, simply the Baruch proposals unmodified. The British, French, and Canadians had tried hard to meet whatever Russian objections seemed reasonable. General McNaughton in particular had dedicated himself to eliminating any inessential details which the Russians could not be expected to accept. If there ever had been a time, however, when, under the terrifying impact of the new invention, countries were ready to set up international ownership, that time had now passed. The Americans were becoming much less disposed to share their secret with anybody, and the Russians in any case already had the secret. Eventually that parity could lead to a new approach to international controls, but only the far-sighted could see this in the tumultuous early fifties. Official Canadian statements during this period were pessimistic, but Pearson stressed the need to keep on trying. That was part of the Canadian conviction that in this time of stress it was particularly important that the UN as an East-West body be maintained because some day progress might be possible. It was a time of close Western solidarity but a time also when Canada

310 The Shaping of Peace was being tactically unaligned in the effort to get a settlement in Korea. In November 1951, when one of the Soviet 'impossible demands' was the removal of military bases abroad, Pearson suggested that support of the Western proposals at that point should not prevent some discussion of this question. This was doggedness without much illusion. He was aware also of the need to make the Western position look as reasonable as possible in the light of the Soviet propaganda campaign, beginning with the Stockholm declaration of 1950, designed to appeal to those with the old simplistic views of disarmament and to an emerging postwar generation of abolutist radicals. Another motive was the constant Canadian concern that the Americans would, in the mood they were in, slam the door on any possible feelers from the other side. That there were sometimes feelers to be taken seriously was being proved even then by the Soviet move in the UN corridors to get an armistice in Korea. There was also some sense of solidarity with the lesser against the greater powers. The delegation to the 1953 Assembly reported a resurgence of dissatisfaction against all the great powers 'stuck behind long dead formulations of their respective positions.' They cited with approval the Peruvian representative's complaint 'that the smaller powers in the Assembly were becoming nothing more than a Greek Chorus, brought over onto the stage to comment sadly upon the tragedy of the Heroes whose fate they share without sharing in the responsibility for their actions.'14 There were terrible paradoxes to be faced, and it is a mistake to look at this period as one of total cynicism over disarmament. In the UN Secretariat and in the various missions dedicated people were constantly seeking to find ideas which might work. The simple desire not ever to break off the dialogue was important. The idea of mutual deterrence, of sophisticated concepts like second-strike capability, had not yet gained currency. Even if there were officials in Ottawa who would have liked to propose some real concessions by the West they knew there was little hope these would be accepted in Washington - even if they got past the strongly defence- and collective-security-minded Canadian government. Governments inevitably drifted into propaganda positions and became in some respects the victims of their own propaganda. Which is not to say, of course, that their fears were figments. The Disarmament Commission, 1951There was nevertheless some procedural progress made, or at least procedural change. The insistence on separate discussion of atomic questions had been primarily a Washington conviction although General McNaughton agreed with it in principle. In the autumn of 1951, however, the Committee

311 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament of Twelve, set up by the Assembly in late 1950, proposed a single disarmament commission. The Russians were now proposing that the Atomic Energy Commission go to work again. Acheson explained that the Americans had believed the problems involved in atomic energy were so novel they should be dealt with separately and the problem of conventional armaments would be to a large extent solved automatically following the disarmament of the Western nations in the years 1945 to 1947. Since both of these beliefs had proved to be wrong he thought a single commission should now be formed. It was a time for middle-power conciliatory diplomacy, but not that of a committed power like Canada. A compromise procedural resolution was introduced by Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, and eventually a new proposal was tabled by a sub-committee under the chairmanship of the foreign minister of Mexico. Eventually a single disarmament commission was set up, the procedural agreement being all the more surprising because, during the General Assembly debate, the attacks and counter-attacks, whipped to fury by the debating skill of Vyshinsky, were as wild as ever. External Affairs thought the Disarmament Commission was probably a useful development, not because it was expected to heal the breach but 'Should the policies of the major powers at any time be altered, and in particular should the USSR show any inclination seriously to discuss practical plans for these purposes, an appropriate agency is now available.'15 Setting up the commission, in the view of External Affairs, was not a major move and was not going to break a deadlock on substance.16 So gloomy were the attitudes in Ottawa towards disarmament that there was not even much satisfaction that Canada had again become the only permanent member of a UN body apart from the great powers. This flattering but anomalous position had been perpetuated when the Committee of Twelve was set up, and now the new Disarmament Commission gave Canada the same status it had had in the original UNAEC. The gesture illustrates the particular confidence there was in Pearson at that time. The Russians, of course, did not agree, but they were prepared to accept Canada, possibly to have someone present a little more imaginative and flexible in that highly polarized atmosphere. The Disarmament Commission provided another forum for propaganda attacks. One Canadian initiative was an attempt to have the meetings closed so that there might be some serious effort to deal with technical questions. The Russians were using the commission not only to support their general views on disarmament but also to launch their campaign about 'germ warfare in Korea' and they had, therefore, no interest in closed sessions. The Soviet representative argued that the Western states always leaked their statements to the press after closed meetings in any case. The Canadian proposal was

312 The Shaping of Peace defeated. In the commission the leadership in efforts to find new ways to explore the possibility of Soviet agreement was taken by the very able French delegate, Jules Moch, and although the Canadians were active in the behind-the-scenes discussions on the Western side, they continued to take a back seat. A revised Canadian approach in principle to disarmament discussions, however, was beginning to congeal. It was expressed in the following terms in the report on Canada and the United Nations: 'It is recognized that any real progress towards the goal of disarmament can be measured only by the extent to which agreement can be achieved between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. It is therefore Canada's main objective to bring about such agreement by any means which will at the same time safeguard national and collective security. To do this, there must be a balance of risks and safeguards on both sides and it therefore follows that no general plan of disarmament is likely to have any prospect of success unless it not only deals at the same time with both conventional and atomic armaments but also incorporates all three segments of the problem: a decision to prohibit atomic weapons and reduce armed forces and armaments; safeguards of disclosure and verification of information on such weapons, armed forces and armaments; and a system of international control to enforce the plan.'17 The report also, needless to say, expressed the hope that the Disarmament Commission could be made into a working body rather than a forum, that it could do constructive work if it concentrated on its terms of reference. It was a formula for the impossible, of course, but there was growing realization that the Russians had to be negotiated with and not just voted down. One positive note was struck in these dreary discussions when in December 1953 President Eisenhower made his famous 'atoms for peace' proposal. The basis of the proposal was that the governments principally involved in atomic research and production should start to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. Such an agency, acting under the United Nations, could use this bank of materials for peaceful purposes in such fields as agriculture, medicine, and electric power. His hope was that this would be a first step towards East-West co-operation on atomic energy and could be undertaken without arousing the irritations and suspicions that were obviously going to accompany any system of worldwide inspection and control. This was exactly the kind of functional approach to peace that would appeal to Ottawa, where it was greeted warmly. St Laurent called it an 'imaginative and constructive approach to what is perhaps the greatest problem of the day' '8 and the opposition approved likewise. Canadians were warned by Pear-

313 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament son and others that this proposal did not in itself offer a solution for the problem of atomic disarmament, and the response of the major powers to the idea of stockpiling was not enthusiastic. Nevertheless, it was the beginning of an effort that led to the setting up of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957, and signalled further attempts to get agreement on atomic energy by avoiding the paths of confrontation. The Canadian emphasis in the Disarmament Commission on the desirability of confidential negotiations had a curious echo. In the General Assembly in 1953 the Indians called for a sub-committee of the 'powers principally involved' to seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the full commission. In its original state the Indian amendment had urged 'the representatives of the governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada to hold private talks.' In later versions this was simply 'powers principally involved,' but when the Disarmament Commission met in April the British, French, and American representatives specifically proposed the inclusion of Canada. As Cabot Lodge said, Canada 'occupies a unique place both for reasons technically connected with disarmament and also because of its gifts of international moral leadership.'19 The Canadian representative responded shyly but obviously gratefully. Vyshinsky accepted the states mentioned in the resolution but queried why the list excluded such countries as Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and India. It would be hard to argue against Vyshinsky's conclusion that the sub-committee as proposed was one-sided.20 While it would have been hard for Canada to refuse this recognition, it might have been wise for them to decline. To do so would have been in accordance with the persistent effort to remove cause of legitimate Soviet objection. The argument for having India on the sub-committee, even if it was not a member of the Disarmament Commission, was strong - the need to hear the voice of the non-aligned. Washington's view of Nehru and his foreign policy at that time was such, however, that they would have done almost anything to keep the Indians out. They were even prepared to accept Canada although by 1954 there were many in Washington who regarded Canada as naive on arms, security, and the Soviet challenge. The Five-Power Sub-Committee

The five-power sub-committee met first in New York in April but held all its subsequent meetings over the next few years in London. The Canadian participant most of the time was Norman Robertson, the high commissioner in London. In 1954 the first hydrogen bomb was exploded. There was a note of desperation in Canadian references to the committee. In spite of the continu-

314 The Shaping of Peace ing rejection of the Soviet approach there was an insistence on the need to do something before it was too late. Canada and its colleagues had moved away from the Baruch plan and in particular from the recognition of international ownership as a goal. Canadians since McNaughton's time had been attached to this principle and were perhaps more reluctant than the others to abandon it. However, as Jules Moch, who in many ways was the leading figure in the sub-committee, said: 'in the present state of development in atomic science the Baruch plan as formulated in 1946 is today obsolete and would today be ineffective.' The enormous increase in nuclear materials made the prospect of ownership hopeless. It was at about this time that more sophisticated concepts of mutual deterrence and arms control were being put forward by academics. They were noted with considerable interest by younger officials but regarded sceptically by those who had learned to be distrustful of the old balance-of-power game. Pearson was still strongly insisting on international control and in the first session of the sub-committee referred to the idea of deterrence as 'a pretty shaky foundation for international peace.' In his speech to the General Assembly in September 1954 he was even stronger. '... whatever reliance,' he said, 'can be placed on a reciprocal capacity to blow each other up gives at best cold and limited comfort. I hope that before it is too late something better and more civilized can be found. Thermo-nuclear devices are too dangerous - the threat that they pose to the very existence of life on this planet is too great - for sane men everywhere to view with equanimity their existence in a divided and frightened world.'21 In 1951-5 the discussions moved towards the concept of stages. This was the basis of the Anglo-French proposal which the Canadians supported. As interpreted by Robertson, it represented a considerable step over the old so-called 'Baruch plan' in that it covered not only atomic but conventional armaments as well. It also sought to meet the Soviet objection that the previous plan had left the prohibition of atomic weapons to the last. The Anglo-French plan provided for the prohibition in three parts: a conditional prohibition of use at the beginning, a prohibition of manufacture in the middle, and a prohibition of stocks and a conversion to peaceful uses at the end of the process. To remove another Soviet fear the proposal provided that an international control organ would not exercise its rights before there had been some reduction or prohibition. The Anglo-French plan contemplated reductions and prohibitions taking effect progressively as the control organ was in a position to exercise more and more its ultimate authority. 'The control organ would, in other words, be growing up with its task.' Robertson saw a simultaneity in each stage of reduction, prohibition, and control and

315 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament thought that for the first time a proposal had been put forward which did provide for genuine viable simultaneity.22 He pointed out to the Russians that if they had accepted the concept of international authority there would have been less need to interfere with national sovereignty. Having abandoned that idea, however, they had to have a control system that would be specific in its requirements. There was no specifically Canadian interest or approach to be put forward. The paramount Canadian interest was in getting an agreement that would lessen the danger that Russians and Americans would have a nuclear war over their heads. A respectable and useful Canadian contribution was guaranteed by having as participant Norman Robertson who was not only one of the most intellectually gifted but also morally dedicated of senior Canadian external affairs officers. He was an unillusioned idealist. As one of his advisers at the sub-committee later commented: 'I think Norman's basic attitude was that the meetings were hopeless, but essential.'23 Neither he nor anyone else would have been naive enough to imagine that Canada could pose as a mediator in that company or pretend to be neutral. Nevertheless, his ingenuity and imagination made him useful in putting forward suggestions. Tactically there were occasions when it was advisable that a suggestion come from the one small power in the sub-committee. Robertson had grave misgivings about the London talks, and so had Pearson who sent him a telegram on 2 March 1955 which reflected the direction in which thinking in the East Block was moving. It was not uncritical of the major ally. 'Merely to attempt to score a propaganda victory by exposing the "insincerity" of the Soviet proposals seems a pretty frivolous approach to this desperate problem,' he commented, 'and I am afraid this was what Lodge had in mind when he left New York.' Pearson recognized, however, 'that none of the rest of us has been able to suggest a more constructive approach as yet.' The Soviet proposals were not encouraging, the prospect of agreement remote, and failure in a period of acute tension was not a happy prospect, 'but it is perhaps best that we should face the implication of failure squarely now rather than encourage the public any longer to believe in the practicability of elaborate schemes of disarmament demanding a degree of inspection which it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union-or the other powers in present circumstances - would be willing to accept.' He was not one to give up, however. He wondered whether 'the best hope of peace is the possession by each side of the capacity to destroy the other ... we might then examine the possibility of mutual agreements which would prevent even that situation from getting out of hand.' He was thinking of voicing publicly some of these doubts 'in order to introduce a little fresh air into the

316 The Shaping of Peace public discussion of this subject' but he realized that to raise doubts at that stage of the London talks might be considered treacherous. If, as seemed inevitable, the sub-committee failed to produce agreement the time might come for a candid acknowledgement that they had to abandon present proposals and seek an entirely new approach. 'If we are going to do so, then it is essential that the meetings end, not in acrimonious triumph over the perfidious Russians, but in recognition that our respective solutions for a problem of unprecedented complexity do not gibe, and in agreement that we should adjourn the session for a stipulated period in order to go home and think out a new approach.'24 In July of that year he suggested to the NATO Council the idea of a specialized agency to deal with disarmament. He saw this as a useful end in itself but also, as it would be open to any country to join, a means by which countries outside the exclusive circle could make themselves heard - a demand being made insistently at that point by the Italian foreign minister.25 Debate on disarmament went on as well in the General Assembly. There was some evidence of détente now and when Vyshinsky put forward a new proposal on disarmament at the end of September 1954 Paul Martin, who carried the disarmament debate for Canada in these years, was quick to pick it up. The notable part of the proposal was that it accepted the Anglo-French plan as a basis for the future work of the Disarmament Commission. This meant the Russians for the first time proposed a staged disarmament plan that did not include the unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons as the first step. Needless to say, Vyshinsky made some other proposals that were less acceptable. On 12 October Martin put forward a Canadian resolution designed to wed the Anglo-French and Soviet proposals. He asked the other members of the sub-committee to act as co-sponsors. British, French, and Americans agreed immediately and after some amendments the Russians agreed a short time later. The resolution provided for the consideration by the disarmament sub-committee of various Western proposals, the Soviet resolution, and other proposals submitted by India, Australia, and the Philippines. The resolution was approved unanimously on 4 November. The useful tactical role that the odd man out in the sub-committee might sometimes play is indicated in the moves behind the scenes at the Assembly to stage that performance. When the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada held private discussions preliminary to the 1954 Assembly and agreed on the text of a draft resolution providing for the reconvening of the sub-committee, the question of sponsorship arose. Moch objected to the proposal for sponsorship by the four Western powers because the Soviet Union should not be excluded. As it would be difficult for any of the major

317 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament powers to act as sole sponsor, Moch suggested that Canada do so initially and invite the other four to co-sponsor. The Western three would then accept and it would be hard for the USSR to refuse. Paul Martin then embarked on ten days of intricate negotiations with Vyshinsky which eventually produced an amended resolution that the Russians were prepared to co-sponsor - the first time since January 1946 that East and West had been joint co-sponsors. The considerable publicity Canada got helped create the climate of 1955-6 when its reputation peaked. Although resolution 808 (ix) was procedural it did provide some encouragement and satisfaction after a long and discouraging period in disarmament. The Swedish representative, after the resolution had passed, praised the Canadian delegation's negotiating skill and said it would be a valuable asset in the future negotiations in which he would like to assume that Canada would continue to play a similar role which would be appreciated by the smaller powers.26 The Canadian approach to disarmament during the last period of the subcommittee became still more pragmatic. It was defined by Paul Martin on 5 July 1956.27 The complete elimination of nuclear weapons, he recognized, could not be effectively controlled because of technological developments, and such a policy could not at this stage be part of a disarmament plan. Nevertheless, when it became technically feasible, complete elimination should be part of a comprehensive disarmament programme. Negotiations should continue for agreement on those aspects of disarmament which were controllable. These included reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and control of future production of fissionable materials to guarantee their use for peaceful purposes. A move away from the universalist programme to the step by step, confidence-building approach is notable in Martin's advocacy of the establishment of effective early warning systems against surprise attack, such as the Eisenhower 'open skies' plan and a plan Bulganin had put forward for ground control posts to watch strategic crossroads, as an integral part of the early stage of any disarmament programme. Without abandoning the ultimate objective of a comprehensive plan, the sub-committee should determine what initial steps could be taken without delay. From 1955 to 1957, when it ceased operations, the disarmament sub-committee, meeting for the most part in intensive sessions after long intervals, had a bewildering programme. Reports were made to the General Assembly and fresh starts were taken, quite often when the Russians seemed to have made major concessions that later turned out to be largely verbal. There was an atmosphere of unreality about these efforts to devise, adjust, and revise plans on both the Soviet and Western sides which, as one can see in retro-

318 The Shaping of Peace spect, never had much chance of meeting. It was a period when the two superpowers were, in great secrecy, revising their whole strategic concepts, a period that ended in August 1957 with the first Sputnik. It was a time of acute confrontation in Europe over Germany and the Hungarian and Middle East crises. It was not a time when any party wanted to take risks. Yet the men involved in the disarmament discussions were for the most part the idealists in their respective governments - Moch in France and Stassen in the United States, for example - who feared the consequences of breaking off the dialogue. No country was more insistent on this point than Canada. Both sides probably had to work their way through their impractical first proposals during the fifties so that some limited progress could be made during the sixties. Out of this stalemate came a shift of attention from disarmament which, under the circumstances, looked hopeless, to arms control and limitation, a direction which eventually gave new momentum in the next decade. The Canadian contribution in the sub-committee meetings was intelligent, respectable, and reasonable but cautious in initiative. This was not a result of deliberately choosing the role of obedient ally. Officials who were concerned about Canada's reputation for flexibility and open-mindedness found fewer opportunities to play this role in the sub-committee than in the Assembly where Canada could on occasion act as a leader in association with other lesser powers in mobilizing opinion. In the sub-committee, however, responsible Canadian representatives had to realize they were playing for very high stakes and an independent position could be justified only if Canada was utterly assured of its soundness. Grand strategies were for the most part the private possessions of the superpowers and, to a lesser extent, Britain and France. The great drama in the formulation of Western strategic policy was worked out in Washington, in rough negotiation between the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and at times also the special unit for disarmament set up under Harold Stassen. Canadians usually learned of the American position on the very eve of the opening of a London session. The position would then be subjected to the same kind of scrutiny in the subcommittee as Soviet proposals but Canada's freedom to criticise it was inhibited, as was that of the British and French, by a reluctance to tamper with the strategic calculations of the power whose strength was, they believed, the guarantee of their own security. There was, in any case, no point in welcoming the current Soviet proposals, which were, by Canadian standards, exceedingly reactionary. It was basically a dialogue between the Russians and Americans. It should be noted, of course, that Canada was not just supporting Americans; it was supporting some Americans against others. There was

319 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament always a battle in Washington between the disarmers on the one hand and the chiefs of staff" and frequently Secretary of State Dulles on the other. As the Canadians were aware, the president often threw his weight behind the disarmers. This may account to some extent for the enthusiasm Canadians had shown for the Eisenhower proposal for 'open skies.' At least occasionally Canadians regarded themselves as spokesmen of the lesser powers. They consistently and alone opposed the setting in the subcommittee of figures for the limited arms of countries other than the great powers. Maximum figures for the forces of the Soviet Union, Britain, and France were bandied back and forth and some agreement was reached. Canadians, however, said that it was not for the sub-committee to set limits for other countries without consultation. The objection was not carried to the point of jeopardizing agreement on this subject because agreement was never that close. There was revealed, however, the old Canadian sensitivity about having the great powers of the Security Council decide policies for other countries without their participation. Canada objected also to a French plan by which it was stipulated that savings from the reduction of armaments would be used for economic aid programmes. The Canadian representative was required to say that Canada had some development problems of its own to attend to. This recalcitrant position reflected the still stubborn attitude of the Canadian government towards having its domestic policy dictated by international bodies. Curiously enough, one subject on which Canadians showed more independence than others was the composition of the sub-committee itself. Canadian officials were aware of the growing dissatisfaction in the Assembly with the work of the commission and the sub-committee and that questions were being raised about the composition. Among Canadian officials were those who thought Canada had landed itself in an anomalous position contrary to its own concept of functionalism and would be better to withdraw or have the commission enlarged. Pearson was particularly uneasy and in 1957 offered to withdraw,28 if by so doing it advanced the cause of disarmament. In a statement on 4 April of that year Pearson said: 'These annual exercises on disarmament cannot be said to advance the matter very far, but they do keep the subject before the public. This year the Assembly proved a useful forum in which to push the Great Powers towards more serious consideration of limiting nuclear tests, a move in which the Canadian Delegation assisted. There is much to be said for the practical arrangement by which the responsible powers work on such subjects as disarmament in a small private committee, but are subject in the Assembly to the pressure of public opinion from other delegations.'29 Canada's anxiety to alter the composition of the

320 The Shaping of Peace sub-committee was not supported by the other Western powers, not so much out of love for Canada as out of anxiety not to let in a lot of other tiresome people. The Russians, however, expressed increasing dislike for both the Disarmament Commission and its sub-committee and pressed in particular for including India. By the summer of 1957 it was clear that the Russians would not put up with the continuation of the bodies as they stood and Canada prudently took a lead in proposing compromises that would have considerably enlarged the Disarmament Commission and presumably the sub-committee.30 Disarmament and Arms Control One reason for the inactive Canadian role was the profound scepticism in Ottawa about the prospects of disarmament at that stage. This can in no way be regarded as a triumph of the militarists over the pacifists because it was strongest among those most committed to the United Nations. They saw that there was no hope for the kind of disarmament controls being discussed in London and there was also no chance of accepting uncontrolled disarmament. If there had been desperate conviction in Ottawa that a compromise proposal would have saved the discussions, then the attitude might have been different, but the game of revisions and counter-revisions just did not seem worth while. Thinking increasingly in terms of détente and deterrence, they wanted to explore the possibilities of mutually agreed limitations of arms. Moving ahead by limited agreements for specific aims or specific areas appealed to their bias for building international agreements stone by stone. They could be useful as themselves and as confidence builders. This open-minded approach did not help them to get closer to the Russians because the Russians took the strongest exception to proposals that, they said, might control arms but did nothing to limit or get rid of them. Eisenhower's 'open skies' proposal, according to which the superpowers would agree to forms of surveillance of specified areas in their own countries, was seen as a laudable effort to make a start. There was some flurry in Ottawa when it looked as if the American president was promising without consultation to open areas of Canada, but this was dealt with fairly easily because of the disposition in Ottawa, both by the Liberal and later the Conservative government, to take part. At a press conference in May 1957 Dulles suggested that the Arctic and other less densely populated areas might be a good place to start. In answer to a question about Canada, he said: 'Canada has already indicated that it is sympathetically disposed to move along those lines.'31 It had limited appeal to the Canadian military, and when efforts were being made to put forward a specific Canadian offer to open

321 The United Nations: Diplomacy and Disarmament territory, it was difficult to persuade the Canadian military that the aim of the game was confidence-building and not just tricking the Russians into exposing something vital while the Canadians and Americans made non-vital concessions in return.32 Canadians had shown more enthusiasm than others when the British put forward proposals for some kind of mutual inspection system in the centre of Europe. By the end of this period Canada was moving towards a more positive stance on the one major effort towards arms control that was to have some success - the control of nuclear test explosions. Canada participated in the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation set up in 1955. Up until 1957, however, Canadian attitudes were remarkably passive, and there was a tendency among spokesmen to pooh-pooh the charges of pollution and contamination. Roch Pinard told the Assembly in December 1956 that, after weighing the best scientific evidence, Canada did not favour the immediate banning of all tests. The needs of defence had to be taken into consideration. The first step might be to help the nuclear powers to agree on a self-denying ordinance.33 The change in 1957, however, reflected increasing public concern in Canada and elsewhere. In January 1957 Canada co-sponsored with Japan and Norway a draft resolution for the advance registration of nuclear test explosions. One might see in the disarmament scenes in the mid-fifties the last effort to apply the universalist approach to the UN which had dominated the hopes if not necessarily the expectations of the founders. The Utopians turned cynics, but those whose dedication to one-world concepts had always been tempered by a healthy will to tackle the problems by sectors were not daunted. The shift was not simply from universalism to regionalism. The sectors to be attacked could be regional if that was functional, as for example schemes to avoid surprise attack in Europe. On the other hand, they could be elements of what was inescapably a universal problem - nuclear proliferation. To cope with these sectors new and varied institutions would be required. When the 'elitist' approach of the sub-committee was abandoned, the Disarmament Commission was stretched to the logical absurdity of a commission of the whole. Then those primarily responsible for armament, the members of NATO and the Warsaw pact, accepted the responsibility to seek disarmament themselves in Geneva, a process which has continued in various guises, with the addition of other powers for functional reasons. 1957 was the beginning of a new era of technologies, strategies, and alignments. It would be ever more baffling in its complexity, but the encounters with reality in the Disarmament Commission and the sub-committee were paying off. '... in the last year or so,' Pearson told the General Assembly at the last

322 The Shaping of Peace session he attended, 'there has been a growing realism in disarmament discussions. There has been considerably less tendency to advance proposals which, like the unconditional banning of the bomb, were recognized even by their advocates as quite unacceptable to other powers involved and were put forward for purposes which had little to do with disarmament or security.'34 By that time he and his colleagues had recognized that their own proposals for international control were equally unacceptable and that a fresh approach was required.

13

The United Nations in the Fifties

COLONIALISM

The United Nations was increasingly preoccupied in the fifties with issues arising from the break-up of empires. It was not the agenda foreseen by the founders in 1945, but it was irresistible. Canada was faced thereby with a requirement to take positions on issues in which the sorting out of principles, interests, loyalties, and tactics was forbidding. On functionalist grounds Canada had, in spite of the prodding of some officials, preferred a back seat on colonial issues because, as spokesmen never cease to reiterate, Canada was not a colonial power. It had, however, taken a 'progressive' stance on selfgovernment, according to its lights, which were largely turned on by the somewhat benign Commonwealth experience. As a progenitor of that Commonwealth, however, a helpful role was expected of Canada. It was the area, furthermore, in which the mediatory role to which the country was already inclined seemed most applicable. Pearson's and McNaughton's intermediary efforts over Palestine and Indonesia as well as the Korean armistice had created expectations.' The 'colonial' issues which arose proved, however, much more ambiguous than the simple progression to responsible government of ripe colonies. These were conflicts between successor states, as over Kashmir or New Guinea; civil war in Algeria and Cyprus; racial policies in South Africa; and economic help for dependencies now on their own. The targets of the anti-colonialists were often Canada's allies and associates in NATO and the Commonwealth, among whom there was the common expectation of forbearance, at least in public statements. Although the arguments on colonialism were always couched in terms of morality, it was rarely easy for pragmatists to figure out what exactly was right and wrong. Even when there was a fair consensus as to what was wrong,

324 The Shaping of Peace apartheid in South Africa or Portuguese colonial practices, for example, there was the daunting question of what could be done about it. The Charter forbade interference in matters of domestic jurisdiction, and there was a strong argument for maintaining that principle. It provided a framework for the weak and, if not preserved, the UN could be swamped in irreconcilable conflict. On the other hand, the obligation to promote self-government and human rights was hamstrung if the provision was too literally interpreted. The paradox had to be lived with. Moreover, the UN did not possess the force or the collective will to intervene, and there was no use calling on it to do things its members could not agree to sanction or accept. Denunciation by speech or by resolution had a place, but it was a last resort. It often made the sinner more stubborn. With these contradictions Canadian policy was groping in the fifties. Its policies changed little in this period, but they were beginning to reflect a growing awareness of the needs and wants of what were then called the 'underdeveloped countries,' a trend for which the UN experience was largely responsible. What could the UN do in practice - or rather what could be done through the UN? Some change of expectations by Canada might be noted in the position taken over the disposition of Italian colonies after the war and the pretensions of the General Assembly to dispose of colonies a few years later. In the headier days Canada had shown some anxiety to associate the United Nations with the peace settlement in order to establish its authority. 2 In Canadian statements on the Italian colonies there had been evident an assumption that it was the right of the UN to dispose and for others to accept. The right of the inhabitants to decide their own fate was, of course, stressed, but it had been all too easy to impose a federal association with Ethiopia on the Eritreans because of the convenience of this device. There were second thoughts in Ottawa about this process, some realization of the unsuitability of the world organization to legislate justly in situations so complex. By the time of the Seventh Assembly, which stretched through the winter of 1952-3, when preoccupation with the Cold War was receding, there is evident a major concern with colonial and racial issues. In his foreword to the published report on that session3 Pearson acknowledged that the issues were debated for the most part in a moderate and constructive spirit but nevertheless they raised 'fundamental and far-reaching questions regarding the boundary between those matters which are of domestic jurisdiction and those in which the United Nations is competent to intervene because, according to the convictions held by some members, they have important international implications.' These issues he thought would demand 'the most careful consideration and will call upon all our resources of statesmanship and goodwill

325 The United Nations in the Fifties to resolve. They are issues which if handled and discussed in the wrong way can weaken, indeed destroy, the world organization.' Canadians felt they should be on the side of decolonization but they were dedicated to orderly and measured progress to self-government, satisfied on the whole with the way the British were proceeding to this end, less satisfied about the other colonial powers but mindful of the alliance tie. It was the Canadian way to encourage reluctant colonial powers by praising whatever steps they did take in the right direction rather than scourging them for recalcitrance, as was the habit of other powers. When, in the 1955 Assembly, other powers were expressing doubts whether the Dutch had really provided self-government for the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam, the Canadian delegate chose to praise the Dutch for what they had done to raise these parts of the empire to equal status. Such praise was not hypocritical. It was based on a calculated belief that although there might be some doubts about the full equality of the status, praise would encourage them to go further whereas denunciation would be counter-productive. It also, of course, made life easier with an old friend and ally. Immoderate attacks on the colonial powers by Asian and African delegations bothered Canadians not only because they regarded them as unfair but also because they widened the gap between the European and non-European powers whereas the great Canadian ideal was one of growing co-operation and partnership. This concern was heightened by the way in which, in Canadian eyes, the plight of the dependent countries was exploited by the communist powers. It was enfuriating that the unfree condition of the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union could not be treated as a colonial issue because of what was dubbed the 'salt-water fallacy,' according to which a colony is not a colony unless it is separated by water from the imperial power. There was fear of groups coming to power in developing countries which might make strategic deals with the Soviet Union or China. It was not simple anti-communism but a will to encourage those seeking to build democracy and admiration for the liberal-socialist-nationalists in the developing countries who would be ruthlessly displaced by the communists if, with Soviet assistance, they forced their way to power. The precedents in Eastern Europe were still vivid and the differences in Asia insufficiently appraised. There was plenty of evidence of a grand communist strategy for colonial peoples as laid down at the Communist party session in Calcutta in 1948. The 'communist conspiracy' was not invented; its capacity was perhaps over-estimated. At the UN Canada was more often arguing with its friends that they must not assume that anticolonial movements in Asia and Africa were inevitably manipulated by Moscow. On the other hand, they did not always ignore the pleas of their allies; in

326 The Shaping of Peace the 1956-7 Assembly, for example, the Canadian delegate in the Fourth Committee opposed hearing petitioners from the Cameroons whom the French government had considered 'subversive.' Although Canada was never a member of the Trusteeship Council, and according to the functionalist principle did not want to be, it could not avoid debate on these issues in the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the General Assembly and in the First (Political) Committee or the so-called Ad Hoc Committee which dealt with many colonial issues. They did not necessarily have to speak but they did have to vote. Even an abstention was a declaration of position. Their dilemma was revealed in the question of the authority of the Assembly on these subjects. Because they felt that on principle the Charter should be upheld, Canadian representatives insisted on the distinction between designated 'trust' territories and other territories whose peoples had not yet obtained a full measure of self-government. The trust territories, with the exception of Somaliland, had all been mandates under the League of Nations and they were now the subject of trusteeship agreements between the administering authorities and the United Nations. The other territories were of concern to the United Nations only because of the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories contained in the Charter. They were the subjects of reports to the United Nations, but this was a consequence of obligations voluntarily assumed by the administering states in response to the Charter. Over the way in which the trust territories were administered the Assembly had a much clearer authority, and the anti-colonialists, of course, sought to extend that authority over those that were not in trust. The Canadian belief was that the administering powers should be carefully scrutinized and held to their pledges to bring the territories to self-government as soon as possible. Privately they urged the administering territories to move more rapidly and, with the British in particular, endeavoured to counter the deep suspicion held by officials in the Colonial Office of their critics in the Assembly. In public, nevertheless, they took positions close to those of the administering powers, or at least the more enlightened ones. They opposed the pretensions of the Fourth Committee and the Assembly in general to subordinate the Trusteeship Council to their will. They also supported the position of certain colonial powers, the Dutch in the case of the Antilles and Surinam and the Danes in the case of Greenland, when they announced that these territories had achieved self-government and there would therefore be no more reports. Some members of the Fourth Committee wanted the Assembly to decide whether satisfactory self-government had been achieved. Their own experience as an emerging colony enabled Cana-

327 The United Nations in the Fifties dians to realize that at a certain point it was the colonials themselves who would resent being treated as a colony. When sixteen new members were admitted to the United Nations in 1955 they were asked to indicate whether they had under their administration any territories that fell within the scope of Chapter 11, the chapter dealing with non-self-governing territories. Fourteen members, including Portugal, replied, all negatively. Among those who did not reply at all was Spain. The General Assembly was naturally sceptical and considered a draft resolution to set up a committee to look at the explanations given. The resolution failed to get a majority. Canada opposed it lest such a move open the way for investigation of the constitutional framework of new member states, creating thereby an undesirable precedent. The objection was not on the colonial issue itself but on general principle. Canada, it was said, had always taken the position that every member state was competent in the interpretation and application of its own constitution. Therefore the proposed resolution threatened one of the foundations of the Charter - the constitutional sovereignty of member states. In the earlier years, while Canada took a cautious and conservative attitude on domestic jurisdiction, it had a fairly liberal attitude towards the discussion of colonial issues, provided this was contained within limits. In the mid-fifties, however, this policy was reassessed because of concern over the competence of the Assembly to discuss every question and the overloading of the agenda with special grievances that could only be dealt with in bilateral negotiations. In the commentary for the delegation to the Tenth Assembly in 1955 it was noted that Canada had previously supported references to the International Court and given 'a liberal interpretation to Article 2(7) to permit a wide inscription of items on the agenda and their discussion by the Assembly under Article 14, which establishes the Assembly's right to discuss and make recommendations "for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations."' In future, however, each case should be weighed on its merits, 'the final decision being made on the basis of whether inscription and discussion would serve a useful or harmful purpose either in finding a solution or in reducing the tensions which the problem has brought about among member states.' Issues concerning South Africa posed the hardest decisions. There were variations in attitudes among politicians and officials, and many of them were critical, but in general awareness of the evils of racial discrimination was by no means as raw as it was to become later. It was a time of particular sensitivity about public criticism of allies and other members of the Com-

328 The Shaping of Peace monwealth. Great discretion had been exercised in the quarrels of India and Pakistan. The new Commonwealth was taken seriously, but its bonds were still fragile and might be ruptured by rude behaviour. There was a strong belief that it was better for South Africa to remain within the family under the influence of a good home. There was some reluctance also to denounce a friendly government for its failure in dealing with a problem which Canadians did not themselves know, especially when Canada was still discreetly trying to keep its own population white. In addition there was the special position Canada and South Africa had had within the Commonwealth as it first emerged from the empire. As the term 'racial' was used in the early part of the century, the membership of South Africa was regarded as a triumph over the 'racial' interpretation of the empire - that is, that it should be all British. The Commonwealth movement had to a large extent been a product of the liberal settlement of the South African War. Canada's allies in the progress towards self-government and in the fight against the unified Commonwealth had been South Africa and Ireland. South Africa had had a place in the hearts not of the reactionaries in the Commonwealth but of liberals. As Ottawa saw it, the UN was a place to build bridges. It should include saints and sinners. Wickedness was wide-spread among nations and the arguments Canada had used against expulsion of the Soviet Union ought to apply also in the case of South Africa. After espousing some theoretical enthusiasm for sanctions during the brief flirtation with collective security at the end of the war, Canadians were reverting to their sceptical attitude towards sanctions as a weapon against misbehavers, a disapproval based not on moral but on practical grounds, on grave doubts whether they were ever effective. There were three issues concerning South Africa in the General Assembly. From the beginning of the UN the treatment of Indians in South Africa and the disposition of Southwest Africa had been on the agenda. The more challenging question of apartheid appeared for the first time in the Assembly of 1952-3. The raising by India and Pakistan in the Assembly of the treatment of Indians in South Africa had distressed Ottawa. Canada pressed for a round-table conference of the parties concerned in the hope that something of the new Commonwealth spirit would rub off. The Indians and the Pakistanis took a moderate stance and were prepared for negotiations, but there was no give in the South African position. There was real concern about the maintenance of Article 2 (7) and the right of the Assembly to intervene in a question that seemed clearly a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The insistence, therefore, that a judgment on the legal question be sought from the International Court was a device to avoid a stand but also a défendable argument.

329 The United Nations in the Fifties The same effort to find refuge in the Court was made over Southwest Africa, a former League of Nations mandate. Unlike the other mandatary powers, South Africa refused to accept a new trusteeship agreement with the United Nations. Canada began by saying that the Court must decide, but the Court said that South Africa was not obliged to bring Southwest Africa under the trusteeship system although it strongly favoured such a course. The mood of the Assembly was to demand that South Africa do what it was told. Canadian delegations insisted that the Assembly was in no position to force; it could only persuade. What they tried to do was get a proposal from the General Assembly which South Africa might accept and to avoid proposals which 'appeared unnecessarily provocative.' According to the 1950 delegation's published report: 'In the Canadian view, the primary responsibility of the Assembly at this stage lay in discovering means of implementing the Court's opinion, and not in reviving past issues.'4 Although Canadians kept a low profile, they were often active behind the scenes trying to find a 'helpful' kind of resolution. Canada recognized that the only way the Assembly or even the Security Council could induce members to do what they wanted was to persuade them that it was in their interests to do so. That might be regrettable, but it was a fact of contemporary life. Ordering countries to do things they would not do lowered the prestige of the United Nations. Denunciation might be morally satisfying but it was counter-productive. Abstention from denunciation facilitated the capacity to be useful, since a member was not acceptable as an intermediary once it had loudly espoused the cause of one party. The refusal to take a strong stand on issues was sometimes attributable to timidity for political, strategic, or economic reasons. Sometimes, however, it was a calculated tactic. In company the soft-voiced state might accomplish something. As early as the 1952 session of the Assembly the delegation noted a trend in the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee which was to become of increasing importance in shaping the Canadian role: 'By the latter part of the session a middle group of moderates had begun to emerge among the smaller powers ... It was a very shifting group without real cohesion, but it gave Canada a number of friends with whom we could normally act in common. If these states should become more consistent in their opposition to extreme or impractical proposals, they might have a moderating effect on still other states with which they are associated.' It was less noticeable, of course, in these circumstances that one had failed to denounce the Netherlands, France, or Portugal. Canadian delegations avoided leading roles on Cyprus and West New Guinea which came on the agenda in the mid-forties. In the 1948 dispute between the Indonesians and

330 The Shaping of Peace the Dutch, Canada had achieved something of a triumph in the Security Council from its position in the middle. However, when the Indonesians under Sukarno, grown aggressively 'anti-imperialist,' began demanding that the primitive and unrelated inhabitants of Dutch New Guinea be handed over to the new country Canada was something less than neutral. Canada had doubts about the wisdom of the Dutch in hanging on to this remote and unprofitable area, but they did think that the inhabitants, who showed no visible wish to join Indonesia, would have a better chance to emerge from their primitive level with the help and guidance of the Dutch who were already installed. They wanted to be friendly with Sukarno, as with all new countries, but there was a growing fear of the imperialism of the anti-imperialists. In the 1957 Assembly the Canadian representative noted the Indonesian argument that Indonesia was a state that was not based on race or religion and therefore the fact that the New Guineans were of a different race was irrelevant. However, this must not be used as an argument for extending the state to include races which had no desire to be included.5 The problems of French North Africa provided Canadians with more opportunity to apply Sanitavian tactics. There was no very warm sympathy for France's policies in North Africa, but there was anxiety to avoid offending the French. The basic reason was the NATO alliance rather than the sensitivity of French Canadians. Among French-Canadian intellectuals there was considerable sympathy with the Algerians in particular, and a cause of embarrassment was the frequent representations made by the French ambassador against programmes of the French network of Radio Canada sympathetic to the rebels. Denunciation of the French was ruled out when successively the questions of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria came on the agenda of the General Assembly, but at the same time Canada upheld its stance of sympathetic understanding for colonial peoples anxious to achieve self-government. The questions of Tunisia and Morocco were first raised in the Assembly in 1951 as the Arab and Asian countries became restless about the treatment of their fellows by European powers. Neither Tunisia nor Morocco could be described as colonies, but they were both in subordinate positions to France. There was a genuine question as to whether Article 2(7) applied, but the French, as always, took a haughty view of any interference from the United Nations. Over these issues there emerged three groups of members roughly typical of debate on colonial issues at that time. There were, in the first place, the African and Asian states, supported by the Soviet bloc, whose positions varied from reasonably stated criticisms of France to charges of gross imperialism. At the other extreme were Australia, Belgium, South Africa, and the

331 The United Nations in the Fifties United Kingdom which at this time took rigid positions on domestic jurisdiction, particularly on colonial issues. In the centre were the Sanitavians, supported usually by the Americans, who preferred for alliance reasons not to appear out in front. Some of the more professional Latin American diplomats, particularly the Brazilians, played central roles. What usually happened was that the anti-colonialists would produce a condemnatory resolution which would not get the requisite majority. Then the middle powers would produce a milder resolution which made its point by expressing confidence that the French government would further the effective development of free institutions. The colonial powers would abstain and the middle resolution would carry. Although the French took a dim view of the discussion and of any of those who participated in it, they did move towards settlements with both Tunisia and Morocco. In November 1954, however, revolt broke out in Algeria, a serious issue since Algeria was regarded as a part of metropolitan France and in French eyes there could be no doubt of the applicability of Article 2(7). When the General Assembly decided on consideration, the French walked out. There followed a frantic effort to find some kind of compromise that would enable the French to return, in which the Canadians were busily engaged, but it was an Indian resolution which came up with a formula that would allow the French to come back and also satisfy the Asians and Africans. When the French returned, the Canadian delegation issued an unctuous statement: 'The wise counsel, which the distinguished representatives of France can voice in the Assembly, has been lacking in the debates during the past two months ...'6 An extenuating circumstance was that Mendès-France was still prime minister, that he had that summer forced a settlement in Indochina, the French were preparing to abandon their Asian empire, and it was very important for Canada to have their co-operation in the work of the International Control Commissions. In subsequent years the situation in Algeria got worse. The French maintained their stern position on the competence of the UN. Canada supported them on the applicability of Article 2(7) and, in accordance with the new policy of pragmatism, opposed inscription in 1955 and 1956. An additional reason for this position in 1956 was the worry that even an abstention, following on the Suez crisis, would put a severe strain on Franco-Canadian relations. The Canadians were pleased, nevertheless, when in the 1956-7 session the French agreed to come and state their case. There followed a classical performance by Canada and other countries that well illustrates the pattern of Assembly diplomacy on political issues in those years. There was a resolution by seventeen African and Asian countries calling somewhat per-

332 The Shaping of Peace emptorily for negotiations. There was a resolution by five Latin American countries, Italy, and Spain expressing the hope that a just solution would be found. At this point Ireland, Norway, and Canada pitched in to propose amendments which, if adopted, might get adequate support for the seventeen-power resolution. The amendments provided that the Algerian people should be entitled to work out their future in a democratic way and proposed 'effective discussions for the purpose of resolving the present troubled situation' and to find a solution to the Algerian question. The amendments did not quite make it, as the vote was tied. Then began consultations among the various sponsors, and a compromise emerged co-sponsored by a group of Asian, European, and Latin American countries, and Canada. The Assembly gave it unanimous approval, with France not participating in the vote and South Africa absent. Resolution 1184 (xii) was obviously produced by a committee. It expressed 'the wish that, in a spirit of effective co-operation, pourparlers will be entered into, and other appropriate means utilized, with a view to a solution, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.' The game of word juggling is hard to appreciate at a distance. Indeed the game of putting together resolutions had become fascinating to diplomats and almost therefore an end in itself. Although the Irish, Norwegians, and Canadians laboured long and hard in the belief they were sparing their French friends and allies from the humiliation of a rough resolution, they got no thanks from the French on the spot. The French expected their friends and allies to support them totally and made it clear that they would rather have a ridiculous resolution passed than a compromise that would seem to give some justification to the Assembly for its illegal action. France-Canada relations at the UN were distinctly cooled. Those who had worked hard to save the French from denunciation were enfuriated at their arrogant attitude. These were but skirmishes, of course, before the composition of the Assembly changed and new lines were drawn. The United Nations was entering a new era in which the conservative assumption about its authority would be challenged. It was not to be, however, a simple struggle between supporters of the status quo who wished to limit the powers of the world body and the revolutionaries who wanted it to legislate a new international order. On the powers of the UN the communist states were the most restrictive, and the new states wanted no interference with their own sovereignty. In the debate on colonialism in the fifties Canadians were feeling their way, sensing that questions were being raised that had far-ranging significance for the institution they held dear. The new challenges were to be welcomed and feared at the same time. If there is one element of consistency in Canadian

333 The United Nations in the Fifties policy at that time it was constant concern for the health and strength of the institution. In the determination of policies concern for the institution, unconsciously perhaps, had priority over the merits of the case. Fear lest the UN be pressed too far or asked to take decisions and consequent responsibilities it was incapable of administering with requisite serenity was often the determining factor. There may have been insufficient awareness, of course, that the UN could lose the respect on which its authority is based if it could not be used effectively to move the world along. This cannot be an either/or question. Both considerations are valid. AID AND D E V E L O P M E N T

The economic role of the UN was being likewise challenged. Although Canada had been keen on an active economic role for the UN, this too had been seen in liberal terms, an agency for removing the shackles on trade and finance and co-ordinating all kinds of activities, as well as assisting the international community to regulate itself. Now the pressure was on from the poor countries to turn the UN and its agencies into a body that would raise funds and administer them to help right the balance between rich and poor. The purpose was hard to oppose, especially by a country that described itself constantly as being on the side of change and progress. It was not just that the financing was well beyond the amounts the Canadian or other Western governments had begun to think of. There were the implications of transforming the world body by a precedent, which might itself seem desirable, into an administrator of funds over which the spenders would have more control than the providers. Whatever one liked to think, the UN was not the embodiment of pure equity. It was a highly political institution short on consensus. The fifties was a time when aid and development were becoming the major priorities of the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the specialized agencies. In response Canadian policy was evolving slowly from nervous resistance towards acceptance of the need to offer some positive proposals. This evolution took place in continuous debate in Ottawa between officials and politicians who were wary about taxation and the lack of accountability of the recipients and those who were more concerned with the humanitarian considerations, with the requirements of the UN and the repute of one of its most loyal members. Support for the latter came to some extent also from those interested in expanding trade because of the argument that prosperous developing countries would be more likely to buy. Sceptics in the cabinet kept the secretary of state for external affairs and his staff on a leash. The

334 The Shaping of Peace reasons Canadian policy and practice became more generous, though by no means extravagant, were various. It would be wrong to see the motive as simply humanitarian, but it would be wrong also to assume that there was no element of human concern involved. The importance of the institutions to which Canada belonged, specifically the UN and the Commonwealth, in this evolution, was critical. Such bodies succeed by peer-group pressure. It would have been easier to ignore or postpone action if Canada had not faced the pressing necessity to subscribe its due share and preserve its self-respect when institutional programmes were initiated. In the end cabinet did not like to see Canada humiliated. Furthermore, these international bodies, and particularly the UN system, provided mechanisms which a middle-sized country new at the game needed. The first step was the easiest - the provision of technical as distinct from capital assistance. When the UN took up President Truman's 'Point Four' in 1949, a technical assistance programme was authorized, but the funds were to be subscribed voluntarily rather than levied through the UN budget. The idea that the economies of the poor could be transformed by lending the technical expertise of the West appealed strongly to Canadians. This was well within the bonds of what could be done with a minimal establishment. Even so, it was not easy at first to get the cabinet to provide money, overwhelmed as they felt with the pressing demands for defence expenditure. It was unfortunate that the question of money for aid was thus associated with the requirement for defence as it permitted Western governments an escape mechanism. The will to be generous was reiterated but the act postponed until disarmament had set in. It did not help either that the first UN pledging session for technical assistance came at the time when cabinet was resisting pleas from Pearson and the 'internationalists' to do their duty by the Colombo Plan. Very modest contributions to both were eventually eked out, with pride as a major motive. Technical assistance appealed because it might work miracles at modest cost. The sums involved did not approach what would be demanded for 'capital assistance.' The problem in the early years was spending the amounts made available. There was no machinery in Ottawa for seeking out and arranging contracts with experts or receiving people from abroad for training in Canada. The Department of External Affairs could handle it in only the most rudimentary way. When the Department of Trade and Commerce offered to set up a unit to handle it, External Affairs recognized that this was a much more effective way to deal with engineers and other specialists across the country. Needless to say, they were reluctant to see this programme listed under the umbrella of Trade and Commerce. On the other hand, there

335 The United Nations in the Fifties was much to be said for getting C.D. Howe's voice in cabinet on behalf of technical assistance. Provision was made for control over policy by an interdepartmental committee with External Affairs in the chair. By 1952 the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly reported that although valuable work was still being done under the Technical Assistance Programme, 'we have now reached the stage where it is largely taken for granted, or at least where some new initiative is needed if United Nations action in economic matters is to be fruitful, or indeed possible at all.' After facing the pressures on the spot the delegation cautiously suggested: 'The much discussed International Development Fund, for example, might possibly, with careful organization and proper safeguards, be the most economical and effective way to meet certain of the financial needs of under-developed countries.' Resistance, however, was strong in Ottawa, and the United States and United Kingdom were opposed to the proposed fund. The instructions to the delegation the next year allowed support only if this were offered also by the us, UK, and other countries that would be expected to make substantial contributions. If a discussion of the plan was 'precipitated,' the delegation was to seek by procedural measures to stall and not to take any lead. The delegation was to emphasize the 'very substantial contribution' Canada was making to the International Bank, the Technical Assistance Programme, and the Colombo Plan. 'At the same time the delegation should point out that the ability of Canada to do more is limited by the demands on Canadian resources for the development of our own country and the heavy burden of defence expenditure.' The prevailing philosophy was set out in the instruction that 'financial and technical aid should be applied within the framework of sound internal fiscal policies, well-considered development programmes, progressive legal and social systems, and efficient administration.' The main responsibility rested upon the underdeveloped countries themselves and 'progressive attainment of better internal conditions would improve the outlook for grant assistance and, more importantly, for a natural flow of investment from other countries.'7 By 1954 the proposal had become one to establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development [SUNFED] and the principal advocates were not the wild Latins but the responsible Dutch. Canada was willing to support a declaration whereby members undertook when sufficient progress had been made in international disarmament to devote a portion of the savings to an international fund. They were willing, however, to support an International Finance Corporation [IFC] under the International Bank, where the 'responsibles' were in control, even though the us and UK opposed. By 1955 the attitude was less intransigent, and support of the IFC had become energetic.

336 The Shaping of Peace France and other European countries were beginning to support SUNFED, and the UK was weakening. The Western countries, including Canada, were beginning to realize that they would have to propose something, and the US was expected to offer its own plan to counteract SUNFED. Pearson was scouting for an acceptable new approach in a speech to the Canadian Red Cross Society on 12 March 1956, saying that the UN 'should be brought more closely into the international economic assistance picture.' He did not think all mutual assistance programmes should be administered by the UN and offered a suggestion well within the more conservative view of its function: 'What I would like to see is an agreement between all nations contributing to any form of international assistance that they would submit all their plans and policies in this field to the United Nations, where they could be examined, made public, and coordinated; where any suspicion that they were being used for political purposes could be challenged; and exposed as true or false.'8 The delegation for the 1956-7 Assembly was told, with regard to SUNFED, to be 'sympathetic yet somewhat reserved.'9 Another project considered at this final Assembly for the Liberal government concerned the industrialization of underdeveloped countries. These countries were pressing for new UN machinery or even a specialized agency dedicated to the purpose to which they gave a high priority. Canada was, as usual, dubious whether a new establishment was needed, but 'the general approach of the Delegation should be one of forthright sympathy for the efforts of underdeveloped areas to diversify their economies by promoting the establishment of economically sound industries.' MEMBERSHIP

By the time the United Nations was celebrating its tenth anniversary Canada was riding high at the General Assembly. Its capacity for leadership was dramatically displayed in the crucial issue of new members, resolved in 1955 after years of stalemate. This decisive step in the direction of universality had a profound effect on the United Nations, shifted its balance of power, and, according to opinion, saved the United Nations or wrecked it. The predominance of the Western powers began to ebb. The easier days were over, but the United Nations, by becoming more representative of the existing world, escaped fossilization. Ten years after its founding the United Nations was acquiring a new look. It could no longer be thought of as a coalition perpetuated, the free world embodied, a crusade for the values of 1945. After searching debate Canada committed itself to this new look, by no means

337 The United Nations in the Fifties unmindful of the adjustments, both painful and promising, that would be required. Hammarskjold's analysis at the end of the session was apt: The United Nations has I think never been, in a sense, in such a state of flux as it is at present. The very uncertainty, the very complications in the Assembly, indicates not regroupings, not new leaderships - nothing of the kind - but a beginning of a thawing of fixed patterns which have existed for years, with a groping towards new orientation on a more strict national basis, with less of overriding ideological considerations. From my point of view, that is one, perhaps awkward, step in the direction of maturity, because it does mean that we approach more to the system with at least a parliamentary accent than the one we have had before. That accent, I think, is likely to be made sharper when we get sixteen new Members around the table and I would say, all to the good, even if it would give us a whole lot of new difficulties.10

In a study of Canadian diplomacy, and in particular Canadian policies in the UN, this issue is of importance for a number of reasons. Canadian attitudes on universality of membership are indicative of shifting concepts of the UN. The leadership of lesser powers provided by Canada had much to do with the position of influence and the expectations of Canada in the special Suez session the following year. It displayed also the reserve strength of the Canadian team. The star performer, Pearson, was absent from the Assembly and it was the alternate star, the Honourable Paul Martin, who performed one of the most remarkable feats in the history of the General Assembly. The routing of the great powers showed what an assorted group of middle powers could achieve by unison. The issue was important also because it led to a serious row with the Americans and tells something of the techniques and the consequences of opposing American policy in the UN. The question of whether membership in the United Nations should be based on universality arose, of course, at San Francisco. Canada was not prepared to think that disreputable states could have the privilege of membership." It favoured the insertion of Article 4 which provided that membership was 'open to all other peace-loving states which accepted the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.' Canadians had squirmed at the admission of Argentina because its Peronism had been too well disposed to the fascist enemy during the war. However, although Canada insisted on qualifications for membership, it strongly opposed the veto over applications in the Security Council. According to Article 18(2) of the Charter the General Assembly's decision on an applicant state must be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. Article 27(2)

338 The Shaping of Peace provides that all 'procedural matters,' which includes membership, are subject to the Security Council's decision by seven affirmative votes with no negative vote from a permanent member - that is, the veto. The problem confronting the UN in the fifties was that almost from the beginning the Soviet Union had vetoed European countries and those emerging from colonial status who might be regarded as Western in their orientation. Canadians were particularly enfuriated by the persistent vetoing of Ceylon, presumably because of its association with the Commonwealth. The Western powers had no need to use their veto because they could expect a majority vote in the Security Council when they blocked the applications of Soviet associates such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary which they would not acknowledge as 'peace-loving states.' There were certainly reasons for suspicion of these régimes, which had been forced upon rather than voted into power by the people, and their dedication to human rights according to the Charter was suspect. It was difficult, however, to know how they could be excluded as non-peace-loving when the Soviet Union, and countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, with the same standard of civil rights, were members. In the same way it could be argued that the Russians were inconsistently discriminating between Ceylon, a late arrival, and India and Pakistan which had got in under the wire. It was largely the patent inconsistencies of any simplistic positions that drove Canadian policy gradually away from its high moralistic stands towards a political solution. When the Russians first proposed a package deal in the Security Council in 1949 Canada opposed it as 'a serious violation of the spirit and terms of the United Nations Charter.'12 They were cautious also about suggestions from Latin American states, anxious to have Italy admitted, for devices to alter the Charter provisions on membership. The Peruvians wanted a judgment from the ICJ which would be binding on the Security Council, but Canada opposed this as unrealistic 'and also a patent circumvention of Article 4 of the Charter.'13 They opposed submission of the question to the Court also lest the Court merely strengthen the authority of the veto. This in fact did happen when the Court gave its opinion in 1950 that the Assembly could not effect admission of a state. By 1950 Canadian opinion was growing less rigid. In May of that year Pearson said to a parliamentary committee: 'there is a growing feeling that we should reopen this question of applications and let in everybody that applies. That would... include certain communist satellite states, but it would include Italy, Ireland, Portugal and other states which are not communist. My own view is that we should reconsider this whole question of applications and possibly accept all of them.'14 That year Trygve Lie recommended universality of membership as part of his ten-point memoran-

339 The United Nations in the Fifties dum on a peace programme. However, when the Assembly met in December it was faced with the Korean War and the Canadian representative did not think the time was propitious to move. By 1951 Canada was taking a pragmatic view of the package deal and the Assembly delegation was authorized to explore the possibility of 'a horse trade.'15 When in 1952 the Soviet Union proposed its package Canada was one of the twenty-five countries that abstained in spite of the fact that the proposal had been attacked by the United States representative as 'blackmail.' By 1952 the question of a horse trade was being actively discussed within the Department of External Affairs, some officials pressing for action which might crown Lester Pearson's expected term as president of the General Assembly. There was intense discussion with other diplomats, including a short-lived proposal from within the United States Department of State for a package deal.16 Canada was one of the members of a Special Committee of nineteen countries set up to study all proposals for resolving the dispute. In the debate in 1953 the Canadian representative said that his delegation supported 'the principle of universality of membership,' but the next year Pearson was more careful when he described the Canadian aim as 'near universality.' The Soviet Union refused to take part in the work of the Special Committee and it could do no more than report back to the Assembly the various attitudes and proposals. A Good Offices Committee was set up but made little progress. By 1955 exasperation had grown to a point where it was about to boil over. There were now fourteen applicants being excluded by the Soviet veto (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Cambodia, Laos, South Korea, and South Vietnam). Albania, Outer Mongolia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, North Korea, and North Vietnam were excluded by majority votes in the Security Council. Spain presented its application at the 10th session. Just at this time the Asian-African conference in Bandung passed a resolution in favour of universality and there was evidence from various quarters of support for any initiative along these lines. The tenth anniversary ceremonies of the United Nations, which took place in San Francisco in June of 1955, provided an opportunity. The Good Offices Committee had tried to get the permanent representatives to consider a compromise on this occasion, but the British and Americans refused. In his speech Pearson supported consideration of a compromise proposal for the admission of all applicants except those temporarily divided.17 It was generally realized that the special problems of Germany, China, Korea, and Vietnam ought not to complicate the issue. While at this conference Dulles, the British, and the French reinforced their opposition to any package deal;

340 The Shaping of Peace Pearson, along with the lively Peruvian representative, Belaúnde, talked with Molotov on the subject. Molotov put forward several compromise proposals of his own which excluded the divided states but also a number of other countries as well, including Japan. By his statement Pearson had, as Hammarskjôld later noted, 'crystallized ... what was very much in the air at San Francisco. So there was a solid build-up of an atmosphere where something could be done if some governments or some men had the wisdom to find the right formulas and the courage and the guts to carry them out.'18 A good deal of attention was given to this subject in Ottawa in the summer of 1955, but the Canadian effort was directed at trying to persuade the three Western great powers to reach an agreement with the Russians. As in all major UN questions there was constant consultation with the Americans, British, French, and other allies as well as with the Commonwealth, Scandinavian, and Latin American countries with whom Canada regularly associated in its UN projects. At that time, however, there was no definite Canadian intention to propose a resolution. The Russians, who had had some talks on the subject with Nehru in Moscow, were much interested, as they always had been, in doing something. They were more badly in need of some allies in the Assembly than were the Western powers. In September the Soviet counsellor in New York approached the Canadian ambassador about a report that there might be a Canadian initiative and said the Soviet delegation would react favourably.19 When Martin set off to the General Assembly in September he had in the back of his mind the possibility of a Canadian-sponsored resolution which he assumed would be rejected in the Security Council but which would nevertheless put on record the views of the majority in the Assembly. In the meantime, officials in Ottawa were getting impatient with the Americans, who were slow in letting them know their conclusions on the Canadian recommendations. In New York Martin initiated active diplomacy in talks with American, British, and Soviet representatives. When Dulles was in Ottawa on a visit Pearson raised the subject with him. They got no further than Dulles's flat opposition to the inclusion of the East European communist states. The British and French were both nervous of the effect on the colonial debates of the admission of so many new anti-colonial members. Martin told Harold Macmillan, who was in New York, that Canada was prepared to take an initiative. He did not get a flat refusal from Macmillan who indicated, however, that there were so many important matters being discussed he did not want to upset Dulles.20 After a talk with Molotov, however, Martin concluded that it would be wise to move ahead. Molotov indicated his belief that the time had come to

341 The United Nations in the Fifties make some progress in the Assembly and said his delegation would be prepared to consider with care in the Security Council a resolution from the General Assembly for the seating of as many countries as possible.21 By the end of September Martin was actively canvassing the possibility of an Assembly resolution. As was often the case at this time, a valuable if discreet collaborator in the Canadian initiative was the secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjôld. Macmillan was reasonably helpful in New York although noncommittal, but he was nervous about precipitate action. Martin sensed, however, that it might be necessary to act quickly while the Russians were disposed as Molotov had suggested. The question of timing then became all-important. Support for an initiative was coming from various directions, right and left, and including even the Australian representative, Sir Percy Spender, who was never a notable friend of the anti-colonialist crew. Martin's idea, which later was the basis of the successful resolution, was that the Assembly should simply ask the Security Council to consider the express desire of members of the General Assembly to admit the eighteen outstanding applicants. Canada was still anxious not to do anything contrary to the Charter, and the Charter specified that proposals for membership had to be initiated in the Council. Martin was even prepared, when the British objected that the principle of universality was in conflict with the terms of Article 4, to amend the Canadian reference to that principle in the draft resolution by stating that it must be applied subject to the terms of the Charter. A problem for Canadian planners in New York, as was often the case, was that whereas many officials in the American and British delegations were sympathetic to the initiative, the views of their politial masters were unpredictable. There were grounds for worry also about less well-balanced proposals which Krishna Menon and others were suggesting. External Affairs officers were divided, some anxious to take a step forward which they thought would be good for the UN and others more worried about flouting the larger allies. Both Pearson and Martin found the advice of the former more congenial. The major powers were informed at all stages as Martin and his associates re-drafted the resolution to adapt it to various possibilities opened up from time to time by hints from the great powers. It was perfectly clear, however, that the Americans and the French were not going to support the proposed resolution, and it is foolish to share all plans with those one is trying to outwit. The British were less firmly opposed and there was closer consultation with them and with Australia and New Zealand. What Canada was trying to do was coerce the great powers into agreement in the Security Council and to do so they had to keep threatening action with their supporters in the

342 The Shaping of Peace Assembly. If it became clear that the great powers did not plan to initiate action themselves, then the Assembly resolution would be pressed.22 The principal complications which loomed were the candidatures of Japan and Outer Mongolia. The Japanese observer in New York warned Martin that the Chinese Nationalists would upset any proposal by vetoing Outer Mongolia - a well-based prediction. The American representative in the UN, Cabot Lodge, while he was clearly and, of course, justifiably seeking to block the Canadian initiative, was complaining to Martin that the Canadians were acting without consulting the Americans. Then came a blast from Dulles himself. On 23 November he summoned the Canadian minister, George Glazebrook, who was chargé d'affaires of the embassy in Washington, and complained vigorously that Canada had not adequately consulted the United States concerning its proposed resolution. Among other things he said that he had first seen the Canadian resolution when it was shown to him by General Franco during a stop in Madrid on his return from a Foreign Ministers meeting. General Franco was of course interested because Spain was a candidate. When the chargé d'affaires pointed out that consultation had taken place, Dulles admitted that there might have been some of which he was unaware. In fact the Canadian embassy had informed the most senior official in the State Department of their intentions on 7 November, well before Dulles saw Franco. What is more, Dulles had sent a personal message on 8 November to Macmillan in which he said, 'Word reaches me from New York that the Canadians have specifically included Outer Mongolia in their draft resolution,' and sought to persuade Macmillan not to support it.23 Dulles said to Glazebrook 'that in view of the relations between the two countries, he would have expected a more co-operative attitude. The United States administration had been as helpful as it could to Canada, for example in excluding Canada from the restrictions on imports of oil.'24 The chargé d'affaires was not given the impression that this was intended as a threat of sanctions and it was not interpreted as such.25 On the other hand, of course, the recognition of the disadvantages of a quarrel for the smaller partner is always part of the game of diplomacy. Cabot Lodge, the us ambassador to the UN, was cruder than Dulles, however. In conversation with Martin he accused the Canadians of bias against the Republican administration and said that unless Canada withdrew its resolution the United States government would feel constrained to take certain actions against Canada, including an embargo on the importation of Canadian oil into the United States. Martin strongly denied the charge of prejudice and refused to consider withdrawing the resolution. True

343 The United Nations in the Fifties to form, Lodge then floated the rumour that there was a difference of opinion between Martin and Pearson on the resolution, whereas in fact the two had worked closely together on the whole project. Pearson flew to New York and told Lodge that the Canadian resolution had the support of the whole cabinet. On 14 November Martin raised the question of the admission of new members and on 1 December the draft resolution26 was debated in the Ad Hoc Political Committee. The British at the highest level had sought to persuade Canada to defer action but they did not complain, as the Americans had, over a failure of consultation. The resolution had twenty-seven cosponsors and it stated that 'The General Assembly... Believing that a broader representation in the membership of the United Nations will enable the Organization to play a more effective role in the current international situation ... Requests the Security Council to consider, in the light of the general opinion in favour of the widest possible membership of the United Nations, the pending applications for membership of all those eighteen countries about which no problem of unification arises; Requests further that the Security Council make its report on these applications to the General Assembly during the present session.'27 In introducing the resolution Martin said28 that the problem was not legal, constitutional, or procedural but was political and could only be solved by compromise. He admitted that there were some applicants whose régimes Canada did not like but the edge was 'more likely to be taken off intolerance and misapprehension within the United Nations than in barren isolation.' He admitted that Canadian policy had changed. They now thought that this resolution was a workable solution which did not contravene the Charter, the Charter being described as 'a document which has to be interpreted with understanding and with moderation.' The United Nations might have been formed with a membership of those who saw alike on most things but Canada did not doubt the much greater value of an organization embodying all the major traditions and contemporary philosophies of government. Although there were many co-sponsors, the leadership had been assumed by Martin at a point when his political sense convinced him that the situation was ripe. He was fully aware of the impossibility of reaching an agreement among so many co-sponsors on a draft resolution and to avoid this process a text was produced by the Canadian delegation alone, bearing in mind of course the views of the important co-sponsors. This draft was then circulated and the delegation campaigned for co-sponsorship and support. The co-sponsors were a varied lot from all continents. So used was the Assembly to

344 The Shaping of Peace dividing into groups in accordance with the spectrum of the Cold War that this alliance of the constitutionally underprivileged created a strong sense of elation which intimidated the great powers. There was one snag in the Canadian draft that had been unexpected. The resolution excluded divided countries, but one of the applicants was Ireland and the Irish would not accept this definition of themselves. After sessions of verbal gymnastics the drafters came up with the definition of countries 'about which no problem of unification arises,'29 the presumption being that the fact that the island of Ireland was politically divided had no bearing on its membership in the UN. It would have been a considerable disappointment to the Canadian sponsors if Ireland had been left out, and so delicate was the agreement in any case that the defection of one candidate might upset the apple cart. In the debate in the committee Martin gave effective leadership to a variegated coalition. The resolution was supported by the Soviet Union and its colleagues and also by the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Turkey, among the NATO countries. The British gave only equivocal support in the debate but in the end voted for the resolution. Only China and Cuba voted against it, and the United States, Belgium, Greece, France, and Israel abstained. The Americans in their speech did promise not to use the veto in the Security Council. Lodge was not only ugly towards the Canadians, he also charged the secretary-general and his staff with partiality. When the resolution came to the plenary session the French made an angry attack on it. However, the vote was virtually the same in plenary as in the Ad Hoc Political Committee and the resolution therefore carried with ease. There was trouble, however, in the Security Council. The Americans were cowed but in an obstructive mood. The British praised the Assembly resolution although they did not fail to note legalistic problems. The Chinese representative, however, in spite of appeals from Eisenhower to Chiang Kai-shek, vetoed the application of Outer Mongolia and that upset the whole package. The Soviet representative thereupon vetoed all the 'Western' applicants. Canada was not then on the Security Council, but the cause was ably presented there by Martin's collaborators, Signor Belaúnde and Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand, who was president that month. After the disastrous session of the Council on 13 December Martin had a post mortem with the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Kuznetsov, one of the most approachable of the Soviet diplomats, and the possibility was raised of a new compromise in which Japan and Outer Mongolia would be excluded. Kuznetsov got approval for this proposal very quickly and on the next day the Security Council met again and approved a Soviet resolution recom-

345 The United Nations in the Fifties mending the admission of all applicants on the previous list except Japan and Outer Mongolia. There were no votes against the resolution, but Belgium, China, and the United States abstained. A triumphant plenary session of the Assembly was called that very evening and approved by large majorities the Security Council's recommendations. When the outcome was announced by the president, Martin was honoured by an overwhelming standing ovation.30 Sir Leslie Munro said Martin 'may be justly described as the chief architect of this successful and historic event.' Even the British representative referred to his 'indefatigable and far-sighted leadership.' There were many other tributes to his efforts, but not from the American and French representatives. Such operations as this are always co-operative affairs and it is never easy to determine exactly who was responsible for this or that when it was partly a group experience. There is no doubt, however, that the Canadian representative deserved most of the credit for determination, for timing, and for the invention of the successful formula, the resolution which would enable the Security Council to give its approval to a package without the fear on either side that in an applicant-by-applicant vote they would be double-crossed. What he had worked for in the first place was an agreement among the great powers in advance, but when this was unachievable he rallied the forces and put the great powers on the spot. Although every effort was made to avoid acknowledging it, the fact was that the whole affair was a contest between Martin and Lodge, each seeking not only to persuade but also outmanoeuvre the other. Martin won the contest, and Lodge behaved as bullies do when they lose. Martin was undeterred by the fact that he had a great deal of co-operation from the Soviet representative, and his chief opposition came from the three major Western powers and Nationalist China. This was a tricky position for a Canadian to be in at that stage of Cold-War thinking, but he was protected by the breadth of the coalition and perhaps also by the secret support of many people within the British and American administrations. The incident no doubt increased the respect in London and Washington for the power which the Canadians were able to exert. It did not increase the affection in which they were held in all circles. As for the French, it was but the culmination of hostility towards Canadian diplomacy in the United Nations, which was based on deep-rooted philosophical and temperamental differences. The fact that the great powers and particularly the United States had been successfully defied was in itself important in the evolution of the United Nations. The sway of the Americans was never as unchallenged as legend has it. US policy had often been amended or diverted by the resistance of friends and associates, but it had never been so overtly forced to alter its

346 The Shaping of Peace policy. To have defied the will of such an Assembly majority and use the veto to do so would have gravely tarnished the image the US had set for itself. This was not done lightly. Although all states were prepared to oppose the British, Americans, or French, ad hoc, there was always a reluctance to stand up to them in the final count on an issue about which they felt strongly and which seemed to affect the international framework. Many of the co-sponsors of the resolution on new members, as for example Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Thailand, Brazil, or Peru, were of this disposition - not to mention Canada. One of the factors that affected them may well have been the belief that if the Canadians, who were closely allied with the major Western powers, considered this an issue on which it was safe to defy the great powers, then it would be safe for others - not merely safe for their own interests but for the international balance. Some of the mystique of American predominance, the managerial role, had now been dissipated. It may be significant that Dulles told Pearson he had been in great distress. He thought the situation might be so serious as to affect the attitude of the United States to the United Nations generally. What especially worried him was 'the effects on opinion of the exclusion of the United States from the meeting of "52," something which he deplored.' It was the fifty-two, of course, the supporters of the resolution, who had taken over the master-minding of the operation.31 Relations between Ottawa and Washington were bruised. The fact that Dulles had summoned the Canadian minister became known to the press and, needless to say, the tone of the 'scolding' was considerably exaggerated. Public opinion in Canada was roused, but it was the behaviour of Lodge more than Dulles that caused anger on the part of those in the know. Because it was considered important to the Canadian interest to get this matter straightened out, Pearson discussed what had happened with Dulles when they met in Paris in December at the NATO Council meeting, and the Canadian ambassador, Arnold Heeney, raised the matter vigorously with the State Department.32 Canadian concern had been stimulated also by the fact that right-wing politicians such as Senator Knowland in the United States were accusing Pearson of being engaged in a plot with Molotov, a point noted by Dulles in his talk with Glazebrook. Pearson told Dulles that his conversation with Molotov on this subject had 'been brief and non-committal' and he had informed the State Department of it. 'If I had, in fact, been plotting with Mr. Molotov on this issue, I was a pretty inept plotter in keeping the victim so carefully informed.'33 Heeney reminded Livingston Merchant in Washington that in Moscow in October Pearson had defended the us position to the Russians on many matters and got no thanks for it.34 Dulles told Pearson he did not believe in the plot with Molotov and he also

347 The United Nations in the Fifties rejected, with implied disparagement of Lodge, the insinuation that the Canadians did not want to work with a Republican administration. What bothered Dulles most was the inclusion of Outer Mongolia in the package and he accused the Canadians of not telling him this. Dulles argued that the inclusion of Outer Mongolia, to which not only the United States but more particularly the Nationalist Chinese were intractably opposed, had spoiled the possibility of negotiation. In view of the fact that in the end a compromise was reached which did exclude Outer Mongolia, the American argument had some substance. The Canadians were able to point out that they had given serious consideration to this aspect of the question but decided there was no other way the Russians could be persuaded to support the resolution. The Canadians had realized that the only bargain for the admission of Outer Mongolia would be the admission of Japan and they had at an earlier stage told the Japanese that they would not consider a proposal from which the Japanese were omitted. In the end, that was the bargain that was reached and Canada went along with it. In the momentum of the occasion there seemed no alternative. Furthermore, the Russians had indicated that Japan could be considered at the next session, and in fact both Japan and Outer Mongolia were then admitted. The Americans perhaps adjusted more quickly than the British and French, many of whose officials became even more cynical about the United Nations and were therefore in a mood to give it up almost entirely the following year after the Suez crisis. In the East Block there were fewer illusions than were implied in the speeches which portrayed an inevitable development as a turning-point towards a greater future for the international organization. That was the sober hope of the realists in the back room, but they recognized, nevertheless, the turbulence that might ensue. The austere Canadian ideals of ten years previously about Assembly debate and behaviour would be further than ever from realization and the Western powers were going to take a pounding. They considered but discarded proposals being made to cope with the deluge, as for example changing the rules so that a two-thirds vote in the Assembly would be necessary to get an item on the agenda. Canadian officials were not unsympathetic to the problem the colonial powers faced with speeches and votes often lacking in rationality, but they argued that any effort to change the rules would only provoke greater controversy and bitterness. They argued that Western powers must face up to the fact that the future of the organization was in the hands of the majority of the members, including the new ones, and the best course was to rely on their political wisdom. Commenting at one point on a negative French reaction to the Canadian proposal, Pearson said: 'Surely the UN was not formed to protect the colonial powers.'35 To the bleats of the Europeans, who were always

348 The Shaping of Peace afraid that the less civilized continents would triumph over them in a sinister 'Afro-Asian bloc,' the Canadians pointed out how porous that bloc was and that furthermore ten of the sixteen new members as of 1955 were European. The deliberate shift from a legal to a political decision would have its consequences. Canadians themselves had moved a long way in ten years from a more rigid interpretation of the Charter. On this issue they were contending that the Charter was essentially a political rather than a juridical instrument. It is worth noting that when the International Court first ruled in 1948 in favour of a juridical interpretation of Article 4, a minority of six, including the British, French, and Canadian judges, had declared that the admission of new members was essentially a political act and a member state was therefore entitled to make its consent to admission dependent on the admission of other countries.36 This view was now being broadly accepted, together with the view that the legal and constitutional approach to Article 4 had proved sterile and a compromise was the only way out of a continuing deadlock. Nevertheless, there were disadvantages in weakening respect for the law of the Charter, especially as there were many occasions when legal interpretations were possible and were a good way to settle a dispute.37 Although it was frequently said that Canada now supported the doctrine of universality of membership, this was not quite the case. Canadian philosophy as Martin described it was to have 'a United Nations which is as near universal as possible.'38 As the Canadian representative on the Special Political Committee stated on 29 January 1957 in considering a proposal for the admission of North Vietnam and North Korea: It has been suggested that those of us who promoted the admission of so many new members last year have committed ourselves to a doctrine of universality and that this doctrine means that every applicant should be admitted. I can assure you that Canada has never accepted such an argument. We have argued for making the United Nations as universal as possible and representative of many points of view and forms of government, whether we like those forms of government or not. To suggest, however, that we should admit every authority which asks to come in, without assuring ourselves that this authority has some substantial basis for legitimate existence is to carry things much too far. I doubt very much if any member of the United Nations could face with equanimity the consequences of such a policy - or lack of policy.39 SUEZ

The climax came with the Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956. The nationalization by Egypt of the Suez Canal in June, followed in October by the

349 The United Nations in the Fifties Israeli invasion of Egypt and an Anglo-French intervention ostensibly to protect the Canal, posed a challenge for the United Nations, NATO, and the Commonwealth which would profoundly affect their capacities to cope and survive. They all did, chastened but probably strengthened by the sheer exhilaration of survival. The UN was certainly fortified, not only because it had provided a formula and moral force to induce peaceful settlement but also because it had transformed the rudimentary concept of UN surveillance into a substantial United Nations Emergency Force. The phenomenon of UN interposition which came to be known as 'peacekeeping' was not the revival of collective security or what was envisioned in Article 43 of the Charter, but it was a practical if limited instrument which gave the UN new capacity and confidence at a critical point in its history. For his part in all this Lester Pearson won and deserved the Nobel Prize for Peace. He and Canada were in the right place at the right time to provide the critical leadership. It was as if the evolution of middle power had been consciously leading to this moment. For this reason the crisis must be given due attention in any account of Canada's part in shaping international institutions. It is not necessary, however, to recount here at length what happened, as this has been related by Lester Pearson in his memoirs arid in great detail by others.40 Attention in this chapter will be directed to those aspects of this story that concern the evolution of the UN as an institution, including the practices of UN diplomacy, and, of course, to illustrate the Canadian conception of those institutions as they themselves were shaped by the challenge.41 The United Nations was transformed in a few days at the end of October and the beginning of December 1956, by policies imposed in all-night sessions, with little or no time for research, testing, or the exploration of alternatives. The pressure came from events. Opportunities had to be seized, ends and means adjusted. It is in this way that the institution has grown since San Francisco, not by Charter review, constitutional conference, or a supraroyal commission. The question arises as to the preparation required for a quantum leap. How, in particular, does a lesser power plan? Should it meet each crisis with a prepared policy, or is the requirement professional dexterity, based on accumulated experience, adequate but not necessarily exhaustive knowledge of the area in crisis, and above all sensitivity to the emotions involved? Canada did not have in 1956 a clearly defined Canadian national policy in the Middle East, something which critics frequently demand. The question is whether a country of medium power ought to have prescribed policies for all parts of the world. If they have not thought out a policy they are caught unprepared by crises which have a habit of occurring almost as unpredictably as natural disasters. A policy on the other hand that bears no relation to the

350 The Shaping of Peace country's capacity or relevance can be misleading. Capacity to act will be at least partly determined by the circumstances of the crisis. For a member of the United Nations, however humble, the requirement to take a stand or do something constructive about international problems is constant. Just what can be done that is constructive will depend, however, on whether the crisis erupts in such a way that it comes before one of the UN bodies. It depends also on the disposition of the great powers and the regional blocs, as well as the state of security in the area. Knowing the UN game is essential and any reputable medium foreign office needs sufficient background knowledge to make quick decisions when they are required. Since its earlier efforts in the Assembly and the Security Council in the late forties to provide good offices on Palestine questions,42 Canada had adopted the role of concerned observer. Aside from being relatively generous in helping Palestine refugees and providing individuals for the role of UN truce observers, there was little that could be done. In areas where the United States and the United Kingdom were at odds, the government was not anxious to get its fingers burned. External Affairs officers felt somewhat frustrated. 'Personally,' Pearson confessed to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Vancouver, 'I would have liked in the Palestine issue to have taken a strong independent stand for what we thought was the proper and right solution and to have dismissed the British and Americans with "a plague on both your houses; on votes in New York; and oil in Arabia." But then "irresponsible" civil servants can always afford the luxury of these courageous fancies.'43 During that earlier period of the Palestine issue he had been a government servant. Now he had political responsibilities as well. The fact that no specific Canadian role was identified did not, of course, mean that the importance of the area to world peace and therefore Canadian security was underestimated. Diplomatic missions were established in Cairo, Beirut, and Tel Aviv and close attention was given in the Department of External Affairs to all the moves in the chess game. The most important Canadian was General E.L.M. Burns, head of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, but General Burns did not consider himself the representative of Canada and scrupulously refrained from consulting the Canadian government - a position of which the authorities in Ottawa completely approved. There is no doubt, however, that his reputation for objectivity rubbed off on the Canadian image. After the Korean trial Canada increasingly regarded the UN as a framework for détente rather than an instrument for the enforcement of peace. The Middle East, maintaining its uneasy equilibrium, with aggression and victimization on both sides, seemed the right area for such an approach. It

351 The United Nations in the Fifties was hoped that forces would remain in balance long enough for the Israelis and Arabs to explore their way towards a more disciplined hostility and then peaceful co-existence. There had been no question of Canada's joining in the tripartite declaration of 1950 by which the United States, Britain, and France guaranteed the armistice lines, but Canada supported it. It was the heyday of NATO, and the danger of a Russian push to the Mediterranean was viewed with concern. Nevertheless, there were doubts about the way in which the major Western allies were meeting this challenge. In the early months of 1956, when the situation was deteriorating rapidly, the idea was canvassed in the Department of External Affairs that the three Western powers might invite the Russians to join in a quadripartite settlement of the arms issue in particular and possibly later a Palestine settlement. This thinking was conditioned by the apparent success at that time of the 1954 Geneva Conference. There the Western powers had sat down not only with the Russians but with the communist Chinese to reach an agreement on Indochina based on an assumption that, however much they all wanted to struggle for advantage, none of them wanted a grand explosion. Ordering the Russians to stay out of the Middle East was not only futile but hard to defend. They had presumably as much right to be there as more distant Atlantic powers. The suggestion was based not on wide-eyed belief in the compatibility of Western and Soviet aims in the area but rather in the hope that confrontation could be stabilized into détente - a view which became more orthodox a decade or so later.44 Pearson found this idea interesting and tried it out on both Dulles and the NATO Council.45 It was not an idea to appeal to Dulles who had virtually rejected the Geneva agreement on Indochina, but it had more appeal for Eden who felt, as a result of recent talks with Bulganin and Khrushchev in London, that the Russians were aware they were playing with fire in the area. Canadians were concerned over the obvious breach among their major allies. They had seer/Dulles and Eden fall apart over Indochina, and in the Middle East there were obvious conflicts of national interest as well as conflicts of perspective. Canadians were aware of oil as a cause of ill feeling between British and American entrepreneurs, but it all seemed remote from the national interest of Canada and it cannot be said that oil played a great part in the Canadian approach to Middle East questions at this time. In accordance with traditional Canadian concepts of world security and the particular anxieties of the fifties, Ottawa wanted a strong Anglo-American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. They would prefer this to be a happy condominium, but if the British were on the way out, then it was well that there be a strong American presence. Throughout the Suez crisis the policy-

352 The Shaping of Peace makers in Ottawa never considered themselves opposed to the British or British interests, only to anachronistic imperialist reflexes. They had welcomed Eden's policy of withdrawing British troops from the Canal Zone in 1955 because that seemed in accord with the precedent set by withdrawal from India, which had led to friendly co-operation and equality in a new Commonwealth. With the Americans they seemed to have more in common on 'imperialism' but there was a basic difference between the approach of Pearson and that of Dulles, who seemed quite prepared to exploit the British dilemma. At one point he even suggested to Pearson that Canada might supply F-86s to Israel, an act that could help restore the balance which the United States wanted but which might affect the American posture of neutrality in the eyes of the Arabs. Pearson had his own reasons for maintaining Arab as well as Israeli good will. Canadians were reluctant to urge the British formally to act in this or that way, but it was obvious in Whitehall which ways they favoured. Consultation between British and Canadians was constant on all levels. Ubiquitous and formal admonitions were not expected. In spite of the Canadian nervousness of Soviet intentions, there was scepticism in Ottawa over exaggerated ideas of Nasser as a tool of Moscow. The Canadian argument for better understanding of the Arabs resembled similar attitudes about revolutionary movements throughout Asia (and later in Cuba). These people were not simply communist tools and ought not to be driven to become tools. The Canadian attitude throughout the Suez crisis was conditioned to a considerable extent by Pearson's personal impressions of Nasser when he visited him in Cairo in November 1955 on the way back from the Colombo Conference. On the whole it was a reasonable exchange which convinced him that Nasser was not simply a rabble-rouser or a willing tool of the Russians. At the same time he recognized the strength of his passion and was not unduly optimistic as a result. Nasser had made clear that he was willing to get as much help as he could from the Soviet bloc but that he was also interested in getting it from the West as well.46 The question of arms control was unavoidable. Canada had to have a policy on arms shipments. It was not anxious to be a major factor in supplying arms to the area and supported, therefore, the general Western policy of keeping a balance of arms supplies so that neither side would be tempted to attack the other. This required some kind of international co-ordination. When the question of arms shipment was raised in the House of Commons in January 1956 the government insisted that whatever arms shipments there had been by Canadians were insignificant and defensive and great care was taken to show no favouritism. Shipments to Israel were far larger than to Arab countries, but it was a question not of deliberate government ship-

353 The United Nations in the Fifties ments but rather of government permits for export. The direction of exports reflected the initiative of entrepreneurs as much as the will of the authorities. The imbalance was partially redressed in 1955 when a total of $770,825worth of arms were permitted for Egypt and $1,332,110 for Israel as compared with $735,547 for Israel and $296 for Egypt the year before.47 This was attributable to the sale of Harvard training aircraft to Egypt. Canadians were worried, however, by the word of large shipments of arms from Czechoslovakia to Egypt. When, a few months later, the Israelis asked for F-86 aircraft, the government agreed, although it took its time doing so. Ben-Gurion promised they would be used only for defensive purposes. None of them, however, had been shipped before the Israelis launched their attack in late October, and the permit was then cancelled. In February 1956 Sir Anthony Eden, the new British prime minister, and Selwyn Lloyd, foreign secretary, visited Ottawa. They expressed considerable worry about Nasser's intentions and said Lloyd was going to Cairo shortly to have a frank talk. Nevertheless, they seemed more worried about the possible actions of the Israelis, especially when they started to build their canal on the Syrian frontier. They hoped the Americans would be firm on exports of arms to Israel because they did not want to drive the Arabs to the Russians. When Pearson talked about the difficulty of expecting the Israelis to behave peacefully when they were surrounded by neighbours dedicated to their destruction, Eden spoke of the assurances that Nasser had given. Lloyd stressed the desirability of 'policing' the area - not by a police force to prevent aggression, as this was impossible, but by increasing the observer force, going up to 1000 if necessary. His vision of a force deterring trouble on the borders was not unlike what UNEF eventually turned into.48 There was not much separating British and Canadian points of view on Middle East questions at this time. Two things happened, however, which drove them apart. In the first place Eden and some of his colleagues became convinced in the next few months - with considerable assistance from intelligence reports - that Nasser was more deeply involved with Moscow than he had pretended. Second, Nasser decided in June to nationalize the Suez Canal. The alarming reports of the arming of Egypt were not ignored in Ottawa but treated with a little more caution. The action on the canal was regretted largely because of the effect it might have on the British. Their deep feeling about the Suez Canal was an imperial instinct that Canadians had escaped. They had not acquired, by fighting there during either world war, superstitions about its vital role in their security. Canada had not been involved in the promise of assistance to the Egyptians in building the Aswan Dam, the reversal of which drove Nasser to quick action on the canal. Few

354 The Shaping of Peace Canadian ships went through the canal and there was no Canadian financial involvement in the company. A Liberal government was not disposed in principle to like nationalization, but when compensation was offered, as in this case, such an act did not seem criminal. As a trading nation Canada did not like to see waterways closed or used discriminately but they were not inclined to accept the more lurid views of the Europeans about the incapability and the unwillingness of the Egyptians to run the canal responsibly. What deeply worried Pearson, however, were his well-based fears of the unwise and irrational actions the British might take. In a message of 27 July to the Canadian high commissioner in London he predicted what would happen.49 He had grave doubts that the strong action Eden was proposing would be supported by Washington and felt they would be most unwise to act until they were confident of United States support. He was worried by the implication that Eden's expressed desire to 'seize this opportunity of putting the Canal under proper international control and permanent arrangement' could be achieved only by the use of force, which the British did visualize as a last resort. 'But is it not clear that to be effective enough force would have to be used to destroy the Nasser Government and take over Egypt? Any effort to use force, in fact, would in all likelihood result in an appeal by Egypt to the UN. That would be bringing the UN into the matter with a vengeance and by the wrong party.' The government was accused by its opposition of standing by and doing nothing to avert the crisis during the period from the nationalization of the canal until fighting began at the end of October. The extent to which Canada did try to advise restraint and caution on all parties was not ascertainable from public statements. Whether loud statements or denunciation or the proposal of grand schemes would have been more effective than the quiet but insistent diplomacy employed is debatable. Canada was not asked to take part in the various conferences of those principally interested because it was not an important Suez user. The government had no particular anxiety to become involved, and the classic principles of functionalism would lead it to exclude itself. There was now an instinctive feeling that when there was nothing obvious to be gained either nationally or internationally from taking a strong stand there was a lot to be said for maintaining what could turn out to be a position of strength in a crisis. The principal Canadian activity was doing what little could be done to facilitate communications and understanding between London and Washington and making suggestions as to how the two might move closer together. Pearson's pivotal position was recognized when in early August Dulles asked the Canadian ambassador to follow developments closely and to exercise in London and elsewhere 'considerable Canadian

355 The United Nations in the Fifties influence in the direction of a peaceful solution of this very anxious problem.'50 Krishna Menon in Cairo called on the Canadian ambassador to say Nehru hoped Pearson would use his private influence with Eden to persuade him to use the utmost discretion in dealing with the canal situation. Pearson did, in fact, urge the British leaders at least to hear what Krishna might have to say and the Foreign Office agreed.51 The message to the British was consistent. Do nothing rash and above all do not do anything without an assurance of American support. Seek action through the United Nations. When the British and French did in September decide to go to the Security Council there was, however, some worry that they might be seeking to use the UN as a cover for their own actions. The discussions in the United Nations among the four foreign ministers and under the guidance of Hammarskjôld seemed to go well and the set of principles on which the Security Council unanimously agreed on 13 October brought considerable satisfaction in Ottawa and perhaps a state of confidence that accounts partly for the severity of the shock at the end of the month. In his memoirs Eden says that Pearson did not rule out force as a last resort.52 It is clear from his statement to the NATO Council on 5 September what Pearson had in mind. 'We must, I think, rule out force. I say that not without qualification because otherwise we would not be spending between 40% and 50% of our budgets on defence. But we must rule out force except as a last resort and use it only in accordance with the principles we have accepted in the NATO Pact and the UN Charter.'53 The use offeree unilaterally or even bilaterally as proposed by the British and the French was certainly ruled out. What Canada did not know was that secret plans were being made on the highest level alone, unknown even in the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay. Ottawa knew what everyone knew-that the British and French were assembling forces in the Mediterranean and making other preparations for possible conflict. Having some idea of the madness that had seized Downing Street they could not rule out the possibility that these were intended to be used. On the other hand, the publicity attracted to them suggested that the motive was deterrence. Not until some years afterwards was it revealed that during August and September plans had been agreed upon to use force and close collusion not only with the French but with the Israelis.54 That the British and French were working together was taken for granted. That a scenario was being set up with the Israelis, however, was not known. In the circumstances, the Canadians can hardly be accused of blindness. There is evidence, however, that the Australian prime minister, Robert Menzies, was treated differently. This is not surprising as he was in full support of British policy. Australia was, furthermore, a member of the Security

356 The Shaping of Peace Council at that time. The British cannot perhaps be blamed for failing to share with the Canadians secret plans for an operation which Canadians had made clear they would oppose. In his message to Eden after the fact, St Laurent acknowledged 'that in view of the rapidity with which your government and that of France felt it was necessary to act, it could not be otherwise.'55 On 10 September Menzies had joined the French prime minister, Guy Mollet, and the foreign minister, Christian Pineau, in secret discussions with British cabinet ministers about the assault on Port Said which was planned for the middle of that month. When details were finally worked out in London on 25 October in consultation with at least part of the cabinet for the plan that was eventually carried out a message was sent to Menzies informing him. Ottawa was disturbed by but not entirely unprepared for the Israeli attack on 29 October. They took for granted that action by the Security Council to persuade the Israelis to withdraw would be supported by the British and Americans as well as the Russians - if not necessarily by the French. This was followed shortly, however, by the British and French ultimatum to the Israelis and the Egyptians to withdraw from the Suez Canal and warning that their forces would occupy key points in the canal area to separate the belligerents and protect freedom of passage through the waterway if the two parties did not cease hostilities. Explanation of this action was sent to Commonwealth governments and other allies at about the same time as the announcement was being made in London and Paris, but officials and government leaders in Ottawa heard the news through the media. The reaction was stunned and uncomprehending. In the East Block Eden's explanation was regarded as entirely disingenuous. Anger was stimulated as much by a feeling that the British were insulting their intelligence as by the crudity of the action itself. The minister kept cool. A feeling that there must surely be some rational explanation led him to be cautious in a press conference. He went no further when pressed than to regret that the British and French had found it necessary to take this action when the Security Council was seeing to the matter. Canada's carefully shaped world was falling apart. The United Nations had been treated shamefully by Canada's best friends. NATO and the Commonwealth had been ignored. The sense of impending disruption, however, produced a mood of sobriety. There was an absurdity in the situation that made the ringing of hands and denunciation pointless. As long as the matter was in the Security Council there was little Canada could do as it was not a member, but when, in accordance with the Uniting for Peace procedure, an emergency session of the Assembly was called it was clear that Canada would

357 The United Nations in the Fifties have to take a position. After the affair of the new members the previous year the tendency to look to Canada for leadership had been strengthened. It was impossible for the Canadians, holding the views they did, to rally to the British and French. Political as well as diplomatic considerations cautioned against joining the pack in condemnation of the British and French. There was also the strong feeling that the British, abetted by the French, had made a ghastly mistake from which they should be rescued. It was, The Economist said, 'like finding a beloved uncle arrested for rape.'56 It would have been harder for Canada to sit on the sidelines than to act boldly. Most important of all was a feeling that the world was rushing to a tragedy and somebody had to do something to avert it. About the last thing anyone involved had time to think of was the fulfilment of 'Canada's role as a middle power.' The idea of interposing a UN force was not really invented at this time. It was there to start with. It had been discussed with the British earlier. When John Diefenbaker had suggested it in the House in January57 Pearson agreed with him, saying that he had discussed the idea with representatives of the Arab and Israeli governments and with General Burns. The question was by what tactics to achieve it. It was idle to talk about the UN forcing large or small powers to obey its command. How could a situation be manoeuvred which would make all the parties concerned feel that it was in their best interest to accept a UN force? How could a howling Assembly be persuaded to support such a proposal with a convincing majority? Not by glorious speeches, that was clear. In a sense the British and French, who were going to be the principals to persuade, provided the key by their own manoeuvre. They had taken it upon themselves to separate the combatants and protect the canal. That was an appropriate cause for the United Nations, not for two self-appointed great powers. However, a UN force did not exist. If it was to be effective it would require professional troops and it would have to act fast. An ideal UN force would have none of the interested parties represented at all, but the British and French would be on the ground shortly and if they could be persuaded to keep the peace round the canal until they were relieved by a proper UN force that would be a move in the right direction. If the British and French had landed immediately this might have been the only way. In fact they did not and there was time for the idea of a UN force to evolve further. It was realized in Ottawa that blessing the French and British aggressors by making them a UN force would be far from popular in the Assembly. At the same time it had the makings of a way of leading the British and French into a face-saving retreat as soon as they had discovered the enormity of their mistake. It was not so much a firm proposal as a way of getting started.

358 The Shaping of Peace A message from Eden to St Laurent on 31 October explained the UK rationale and asked for support. St Laurent's reply was firm and courteous but made clear that Canada could not support British action. Pearson set to work to find out what prospects there might be for the idea of a force. He instructed the Canadian high commissioner in London and the ambassador in Washington to make enquiries. Neither government seemed to find it an answer to the immediate dilemma, but Eden did the next morning include the following statement when he spoke in the House of Commons: 'The first and urgent task is to separate these combatants and to stabilize the position. That is our purpose. If the United Nations were then willing to take over the physical task of maintaining peace in that area, no one would be better pleased than we. But police action there must be ...' That provided the clue for Canadian diplomats to get a process in motion. When Pearson went to New York on Thursday, 1 November, for the emergency session of the General Assembly the idea of a UN force was to say the least in an evolutionary state. It was clear, nevertheless, that his arrival was expected and there was lively interest in the Assembly and in the Secretariat in what he would do. The Americans had arrived ready to take a lead. They had a draft resolution that Dulles himself was going to press. It avoided condemnation of the 'aggressors' but called for a ceasefire and withdrawal and a report from the secretary-general on compliance. In a talk with Dulles, Pearson accepted the American procedure, although he said he would have liked time to work out some constructive proposal for machinery to affect a lasting settlement. Dulles, too, regretted the lack of time but said that if Pearson did make proposals the United States would support them. Pearson developed to Dulles the idea of an international police force to maintain order along the demarcation lines in Palestine. He told Dulles also that he wanted to provide Britain and France with suitable bases for accepting the United States resolution and enabling them to withdraw from their involvement without losing too much face. He was insistent on using the crisis to work towards a long-range settlement and not merely to leave things as they had been. Canada was faced with an immediate and crucial decision: how to vote on the United States resolution. To vote against the United States resolution with the small band of 'colonialists' would have ended all hope of putting forth acceptable proposals. The cabinet in Ottawa was keeping a close eye on proceedings and several of its members would have opposed on political grounds a stand that could be interpreted as direct opposition to Britain and France. An abstention would be politically wise, but it also would be tactically useful - as it proved. An indication of the respect in which the Afro-

359 The United Nations in the Fifties Asian group held Pearson was that the Pakistan representative informed him the group would be happy to have Canada make the motion for closure of debate. As the minister expected to abstain in the resolution he declined. Not only the milder Afro-Asians but also the Scandinavians and Turkey, who planned to vote for the UN resolution, wanted Canadian support. It was risky disappointing them, but the need to keep the confidence of the British and French was also apparent if they were to be led through the Assembly to a retreat. Virtually all communication between the British and Americans had been broken off. Dulles told Pearson that he had been cut off for some time by the British and French-not surprisingly. The American ambassador on the spot, Cabot Lodge, had told his staff not to talk to the sinners. The Canadians and British kept in closest contact in London, Ottawa, and New York. Collaboration was particularly fruitful in New York because members of the British delegation and, to some extent, the French delegation had been dismayed by the policies of their own countries. Although they loyally carried out instructions, they were anxious to encourage what they saw as a Canadian rescue operation.58 Members of the British delegation made sure that Eden's words about a UN force had not escaped the Canadians and did their best to work out a scenario by which the Canadian initiative could be grasped by the politicians in London.59 The British representative at the UN picked up the idea by saying that the urgent task was to separate Israel from Egypt and stabilize the position but 'if the UN were willing to take over the physical task of maintaining peace in the area, no one would be better pleased than we.' Pearson's tactic was simple but brilliantly played. He had the mental as well as the physical power of an athlete. His role was that of quarterback, inventing plays and giving signals, shifting his ground to take advantage of openings and exploiting adversity pour mieux sauter. His vast experience and his nimble grasp of essentials gave him the necessary confidence, and his own assurance under pressure inspired the confidence of others - although even his own advisers were sometimes bewildered by the mobility of his tactics. He made no speech in the debate, abstained, and then rose to explain his abstention. He made no judgments except to regret that force had been used in the circumstances. His approach was ruthlessly pragmatic. He did not disagree with the proposal for ceasefire and withdrawal but thought that the resolution did not go far enough; the opportunity should be taken to link a ceasefire to the absolute necessity of a political settlement in Palestine and for Suez. Then followed one of the most potent conditional sentences in UN history. 'I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution ... authorising the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements

360 The Shaping of Peace with member governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.'60 His own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force. Dulles then took the floor to support the Canadian approach and said he would be happy if the Canadian delegation would introduce a concrete suggestion. There was now no turning back. There was a sense of relief in the Assembly that somebody was doing something, but that something was less concrete than was widely assumed. It was more a tactical idea than a plan. There had been much talk of UN forces for a long time but very little attention to the nuts and bolts. What was required went well beyond the observer missions with which the United Nations had now had considerable experience. It was urgently necessary to talk to the secretary-general, and Pearson, with his advisers, had lunch with Hammarskjôld the following day. Hammarskjôld was depressed because he had been optimistic about the talks among the foreign ministers in New York and felt betrayed by his friends. He was so much concerned about the situation in the Gaza Strip that he thought he might have to ask the United States to intervene as they were the only power with forces in the area. He doubted very much the police force would be accepted, especially by the Israelis, as Ben-Gurion considered even the UN observers to be intruders who ought to have diplomatic status. It would have been contrary to his nature, however, to dismiss the idea. His negative response was to some extent his method of looking for the weaknesses of a proposal before sponsoring it - a technique which Pearson regularly used himself. Later that day Hammarskjôld was asking his staff at the Secretariat to start exploring the possibilities.61 Pearson returned to Ottawa to talk to the cabinet, where he received strong support for his proposal, including support from the minister of national defence. They were still contemplating a force that might initially have to be built around the British and French on the spot. A strong United States component was envisaged simply because it was doubted that anybody else could get the boys there in time. There were indications that in the NATO Council in Paris the Canadian tactic was well received.62 The British foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, seemed to be grasping the opportunities offered him. The first resolution the Canadians had drafted recommended the immediate establishment of a UN force and asked the Security Council to make arrangements. It suggested that the United States government should be asked to provide the necessary personnel in the emergency and that General Burns should be appointed commander-in-chief. The force should be in two stages. The 'emergency police force' should be withdrawn as soon as the

361 The United Nations in the Fifties United Nations had had an opportunity to work out a long-term police policy. It was then envisaged that something less haphazardly constructed should be set up not just to look after the present emergency but to provide the conditions for peaceful settlement and provide also, although this was not stated, a possible prototype for somewhat more enduring UN police forces. Although critics in Ottawa were saying that Canada was blindly accepting American policy, it could just as easily have been argued that the Americans were accepting Canadian policy. In fact, there was at this stage close collaboration. Pearson was quite willing to let the Americans take the lead, but the Americans shrewdly realized that Canadian leadership would be more likely to attract wide support. An American initiative could conceivably provoke Cold War divisions of opposition and abstention. The Canadian mission had maintained unusually good relations with the Arabs and with other Asian and African delegations too often neglected by the Europeans. Through the Commonwealth association they had the collaboration of India and Pakistan, the two most influential countries in the Afro-Asian group. The resolution which Canada submitted was in fact drafted by the Americans, but it was used by Pearson only because of its tactical advantages. When he returned to New York on Saturday he discussed tactics with Lodge and showed him the Canadian draft which had already got some conditional acceptance from the British. Pearson emphasized the importance of having something which the British and French would not oppose. Lodge, however, had a very simple resolution which said merely 'the General Assembly, bearing in mind the urgent necessity of implementing Resolution A/3256 of November 2nd, requests the Secretary-General to submit to it within fortyeight hours a plan for the setting up with the consent of the nations concerned of an emergency international UN police force to carry out the purposes of Resolution A/3256.' Lodge did not think the British and French could oppose that, and he had reason to believe it would be acceptable to the Egyptians and consequently to the Afro-Asians. It seemed advisable, therefore, to use a text to which the Egyptians had presumably agreed. There was a general expectation in the Assembly that Canada would introduce a draft and the Canadian resolution, which was basically Lodge's text with a few alterations, spread widely.63 Fortunately the Assembly went on until early in the morning and there was time to round up support. The Egyptians got word from Cairo that Nasser had agreed in principle - with a good deal of Indian encouragement no doubt. A major problem, however, was that nineteen Asian and African members had also produced a resolution64 which they were determined to push

362 The Shaping of Peace through. The resolution showed the influence of the moderates within the group and was designed simply to reaffirm the United States resolution and get the ceasefire moving. It was the kind of additional squeezing of the British and French that Canada would not have initiated and on which Canada would probably have abstained, but a bargain was reached by which Canada would support the Afro-Asian resolution and the Afro-Asians would support the Canadian resolution. The support of an Afro-Asian resolution, however mild, subjected Pearson to criticism in Canada that he had denounced the mother countries. In fact he was careful throughout never to do so, and one of his motives was to avert the passing of resolutions which did. His great achievement was to divert the anti-British and -French passions of the Assembly into the support of a constructive proposal. The Afro-Asians even allowed the Canadian draft resolution to be voted on first. The vote was 57 in favour with none opposed. Britain, France, Israel, and their friends, along with the Soviet bloc, abstained. Now it was necessary to make the proposal a reality. Hammarskjóld needed help and support and a small group of old friends coalesced around him of which the leaders were Pearson and Hans Engen, the Norwegian representative. Lacking as it does a government, it is in this informal way that the Assembly programme is 'managed,' the composition of the cabal shifting, of course, to reflect the movers and shakers of the particular enterprise. The Indian representative, Arthur Lall, was helpful in this one as was the Colombian representative, Francisco Urrutia. Lall remained quite indispensable, and it was fortunate that Krishna Menon, who did not like UN forces, was delayed by the consequences of the crisis on civil aviation and arrived after Delhi had committed itself to the scheme. Once Hammarskjóld was faced with this challenge he took it up enthusiastically. This enthusiasm was all the more remarkable in that from the night-long sessions on Suez the Assembly had to turn to emergency discussions of the situation in Hungary where the Russians had moved back into Budapest. The recognition of helplessness in the face of Soviet action gave those who believed in the UN an added impetus to do something that might strengthen the organization. Contributions to the force were being offered by many countries, and the United States was promising co-operation in logistics, supply, and transport. Original Canadian concepts had to be modified in two ways. It was obvious from the tempers in New York that there would be no possibility whatsoever of including the British and French in a UN force, but as there was now hope that the British and French might declare a ceasefire this no longer seemed essential. Because of the threatening tone assumed by the Russians there

363 The United Nations in the Fifties was a general, although not always articulated, reluctance to have Soviet troops in the UN force. It was hardly possible, therefore, to have Americans. So it was agreed that the force would be made up entirely from countries that were not permanent members of the Security Council. Canadians pleaded with the British to hold off their proposed landings until the resolution with details of the UN force had been secured, but the lumbering French and British military machine had been set in motion and it was apparently not possible to stop it. At any rate, the British had to experience still more vividly the dangers of their political and economic isolation before they were ready to cry uncle. In spite of these set-backs Pearson himself was elated. In a message to Ottawa on 5 November he expressed a hope that Canada could offer a battalion even before the House of Commons convened. 'We are really at a critical stage in developments at the moment and if we can exploit the possibilities of a UN force quickly and effectively we may not only find a way out of the present difficulties and save the UN from a disastrous set-back, but also have paved the way for UN progress in the whole field of collective security through the Assembly action.'65 He realized, however, that the struggle was not over and indeed it was not. On 4 November his plan was approved by the passing of a draft resolution66 sponsored by Canada, Colombia, and Norway providing for the establishment of a UN command with Major-General Burns as chief and authorizing other necessary measures. With the attitude of crisis lifted, however, as Pearson had feared, controversy returned. British and French paratroopers landed in Egypt and the tempers of the Arabs naturally became hotter. The Russians obviously did not like the way things were going and started to threaten unilateral aid to the Arabs. The accumulating pressures began to work on the British. They faced hostility from a UN majority, much of the Commonwealth, and, with economic implications, from the United States. By 6 November the British and French were ready to give up and agreed to a ceasefire. The improvisations in these hectic days proved of continuing importance. It could be argued that a UN force of any kind should be under the direction of the Security Council. As this one was, however, created by the General Assembly, it might have been assigned to the direction of that inchoate body. Clearly the right of the Assembly to lay down lines of policy could not be challenged, and yet to make the directions of an emergency operation subject to the sometimes captious and always tardy mechanism of this forum would have kept the operation from moving at all. So the responsibility for preparing a plan and then for administering it was given to the secretarygeneral. In a sense he took over the negotiations, and confidence in Ham-

364 The Shaping of Peace marskjold was so widespread that this important evolution in UN practice was established in a way that would never have been possible in a constitutional committee. It was recognized, however, by Hammarskjôld and the small cabal around him that he would need political support in the delicate decisions that would have to be made. So an advisory commission was established to assist the secretary-general, composed largely of representatives of the countries contributing forces and nicely balanced to represent the UN majority. There was a seemingly endless series of problems. The Israelis were not at all disposed to withdraw, although they accepted the ceasefire. The British and French took a long time to get out, insisting that arrangements be made first for the clearing of the Suez Canal, which had been deliberately blocked by Nasser in the early stages. When the British agreed to the ceasefire Eden warmly thanked Canada for its 'steadying influence' and then looked to Canada to support their causes, as, for instance, in canal clearing.67 The Canadian role in this later stage was less dramatic but probably just as important in the effort to foresee and forestall crises, to maintain communications and diminish suspicions. Maintaining its own reputation was like walking a tightrope. One important contribution was to provide military advice. Senior officers came from Ottawa and in the company of Scandinavian colleagues helped the Secretariat work out essential details for the force. The Americans were anxious to be helpful, but somewhat too anxious. When Arnold Heeney reported from Washington that Admiral Radford wanted to start planning with General Foulkes, it was decided that this would be unwise lest the UN force get too much of a United States flavour. On this matter the Americans were quite understanding. In other aspects United States policies were less helpful. Dulles had been in hospital since the early stages of the crisis and too much power was left in the hands of Cabot Lodge. When Selwyn Lloyd arrived in New York Pearson invited Lodge to a luncheon à trois, but Lodge refused. The classic Canadian role of intermediary was called upon as rarely before. A particular cause of anger on the part of the Canadians and others came when Lodge, on 22 November, gratuitously supported a harsh resolution put forward by Krishna Menon virtually accusing the British and French of bad faith in not withdrawing and rejecting an amendment by Spaak of Belgium which acknowledged the fact that the British and French had in fact begun the process of withdrawal. What was peculiarly maddening was that the British and French had been persuaded by their friends to begin withdrawals in order to meet Lodge's requirement for not supporting the Indian resolution.

365 The United Nations in the Fifties Another example of tightrope walking was on 7 November when there was an Afro-Asian resolution68 calling for immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory and urging the secretary-general to communicate the resolution to the parties and report within twenty-four hours to the Assembly. There was some nervousness about this one in Ottawa where opposition criticism was having its effect on the cabinet. The prime minister expressed a preference for abstention. On the spot, however, Pearson felt himself obliged to vote in favour of the resolution rather than abstain because he had got some concessions out of the sponsors. Krishna Menon had made what he considered a genuine effort to meet Canadian difficulties by giving a less rigid interpretation to the word 'immediate.' Above all, as Pearson explained to St Laurent, it was essential to get unanimous support from the non-communist countries for resolution 1001 (ES-!) on the UN force being put forward at the same time. It was this resolution that established the advisory committee composed of Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Iran, Norway, and Pakistan, and the advisory committee members were being carefully watched to see how they would vote on withdrawal. If Norway, Canada, and Brazil had abstained, they would have attracted suspicions of their intentions. Pearson reported that some countries were still suspicious that the force was a smoke-screen behind which the British and French would remain at the canal, and he thought that his support of the resolution had in fact put the extremists in the Arab-Asian group into a disadvantageous position. That was the way it was at the UN front, but such explanations were not easy to give in the House of Commons. The most serious political problem for Canada came when the Egyptians indicated they would prefer that Canadian forces not be included. In spite of the attitude of the opposition towards Canadian diplomacy, there was widespread support in Canada for the idea of UNEF. National Defence had taken it seriously and plans were rushed to get the best possible contribution to the spot in the shortest possible time. The Queen's Own Rifles were ready to embark on the Magnificent at Halifax. At this point the gentle Egyptian ambassador to the UN, Omar Loutfi, came to see Pearson on what he called 'a delicate matter.' He said Fawzi had asked him to see Pearson and to say that they agreed to the idea of an international force, were grateful for Canada's and Pearson's role, and were glad to have General Burns, but there was a question about Canadian forces - Canadian soldiers had as their commander the Queen of England. They wanted neutral forces; they did not, for example, want the Pakistanis. The Egyptian people did not understand, as he did, and feelings were high. The problem was of course the Canadian uni-

366 The Shaping of Peace forms which were indistinguishable from those of the British. There had been some previous indications that the Egyptians might take this line. Pearson explained to Loutfi how extremely difficult it would be for Canada at that point to accept that its troops were not wanted. It was very hard for Canada, which had taken the difficult decision to act independently of Britain, to be told that its troops were indistinguishable. Loutfi indicated that Burns would be quite acceptable but Pearson expressed doubt whether Burns would act unless Canadians were employed. Realizing the devastating political consequences if this were known, Pearson sought to stall. It was agreed that Hammarskjold would discuss the matter with Nasser when he went to Cairo in a few days. The reaction in Ottawa was furious, particularly from National Defence, and it was difficult to delay the embarcation without attracting attention. Hammarskjold gave strong support and insisted to Nasser on the Canadians being included. The Americans helped also, but the crucial support came from the Indians. Nehru put the Canadian case to Nasser and Krishna Menon did so in what Nehru described as very strong language. Nasser was not easily swayed and it was eventually General Burns who provided the solution. He was receiving more offers of infantry than he needed and he came to realize that what he needed most from the sophisticated Canadian forces was air transport and supporting troops such as signallers, engineers, supply and medical units. This would seem to meet what was legitimate in the Egyptian objections, for such troops would not be visible to the Egyptian population, particularly in the troubled Canal Zone. Word of the controversy had leaked out and a good deal of anti-Nasser enthusiasm was whipped up. There was no doubt that Burns's formula served the best interests of UNEF, but it was difficult to prove to the Canadian critics that this had been other than the acceptance of humiliation.69 Although it was upsetting to Canadians there was justification for the Egyptian position. When the Canadian ambassador in Cairo talked to Nasser he seemed very anxious to say that he appreciated the Canadian situation.70 He asked the Canadians to remember, however, that the Egyptians had had a long and recent history of military occupation and simple folk throughout the country would find it difficult to accept this new experiment, seeing in it some disguise of foreign occupation. He himself had no such doubt, but he was concerned lest some fanatical Moslem group seize an opportunity to accuse him of giving in to foreign occupation forces disguised in some new fashion. He admitted to the ambassador after this incident, however, that he had misjudged the public temper because in fact there had been no criticism or grumbling about UNEF which had come to his ears.

367 The United Nations in the Fifties The Canadian hope that there would be first an emergency force and then a more permanent UN establishment was thwarted by events. If this was to be a true UN force then it was to be independent of governments and responsible only to the UN. Seen in the context of the long dispute between Arabs, Israelis, and the Western powers in the Middle East, rather than in the context of the immediate events of October 1956, it was a natural Canadian view that the force should be independent of all governments, including those of the parties concerned. This view ignored, however, the fact that in the eyes of the vast majority of Assembly members it was Israel, along with Britain and France, which had been the aggressors. Egypt was the victim being rescued by the UN. Although in the Canadian view the UN force was to be stationed on both sides of the demarcation line and the Israelis were urged to accept it, they were allowed to defy the Assembly. The weakness of the Canadian position when Egypt's right to remove UNEF arose ten years later was that it was not accepted by Israel in 1956. If one interested party, and particularly the offending party, had the right to reject, it would seem to follow that the other party, and the party offended against, had the right to accept and reject. Canada's position in principle would have been stronger if it had supported the protest of Pakistan when that Moslem country was rejected by Egypt because of its membership in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. Although neutrality or objectivity is roughly regarded as a qualification for peacekeeping services, the difference between neutralism in the Cold War and in the immediate conflict has been obscured. The Indians, for example, took for granted that their status as non-aligned qualified them for peacekeeping in the Middle East, although they were totally aligned with Egypt over the issue with Israel and very largely aligned with them over the canal. It was, in fact, Canada that was in this situation non-aligned. Pearson's footwork in the early stages of the crisis had been dazzling. Quarterback, tight-rope walker, he became also a brilliant choreographer, scenarist, or stage-manager, in partnership with Hammarskjôld, Engen, and others, ad hoc. To extricate the parties from the intolerable situations in which they found themselves, package deals were essential. None of them, however, trusted the other to keep a bargain. Furthermore, none wanted to be seen making concessions. Rarely was there so obvious a need for the trusted middlemen to work out plans that could be privately accepted but not publicly acknowledged. The craft of ingenious packaging had been perfected by Canada at the previous Assembly. The question of clearing the canal provided a challenge at the end of November. The Assembly was trying to persuade the British and French to withdraw, but the latter had committed

368 The Shaping of Peace themselves to tying withdrawal to provision for the clearing of the canal. The package took the form of what was called a 'four-act play.' According to plan, the secretary-general would announce the actual strength of UNEF to show that it was adequate. Then Britain would announce that under these circumstances it would withdraw all its forces by a certain date. Nasser would then say that in view of Britain's decision he would no longer insist on waiting for the last soldier to depart before clearance could start. Finally, the secretarygeneral would announce that work would start immediately on clearing the canal. As the parties were not speaking to each other the promises all had to pass through the secretary-general.71 The timetable was worked out. By the end of the year the invaders had departed and the UN fleet had begun work on salvage. It was the end of what might be called the emergency phase of the UN crisis. The Canadians were still insisting that the UN must turn its attention to a resolution of the conflict that had caused the trouble in the first place. This would have been hard enough under any circumstances, but it was complicated by the stubborn refusal of the Israelis to withdraw. Unlike the British and the French, who had suffered a diplomatic humiliation, the Israelis were cocky from a military victory. They were understandably anxious not to retreat without guarantees that they would not again be subjected to raids from Arab territories and prevented from sailing their ships through the Gulf of Aqaba. Their wishes here coincided with Pearson's anxiety to turn the crisis into a lasting settlement, but unfortunately this purpose conflicted with the view of the majority of the Assembly that any concessions made at this point to the Israelis, however justifiable in the long-term, could be regarded as the fruits of aggression. Pearson recognized this argument. In association with the Americans and others, he did what he could to persuade the Israelis to withdraw. In the end it was only a blunt threat from President Eisenhower that made them face facts. Pearson's position was still strong enough behind the scenes for another successful choreography. There was no hope of Israel getting the guarantees it wanted formally from the UN, but enough members did recognize that guarantees would help to get the Israelis back beyond their own borders and return the situation in the Middle East to something like normal. So guarantees were given to the Israelis privately, including a memorandum from Dulles to Abba Eban, the Israeli ambassador to the UN, saying that the United States supported free passage through the Strait of Tiran. On the strength of these and intimidated by American pressures and perhaps the hopelessness of their situation in the UN, the Israelis agreed in early March to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and from Sharm el-Sheikh. It is worth noting that in the intense consideration given to the Gaza Strip, the crowded

369 The United Nations in the Fifties and explosive area which the Israelis were reluctant to abandon because it had been the base of fedayeen raids, Canadians had pressed for the establishment of a UN authority. This had seemed one way of getting the Israelis out, but there was obvious also the old wistful Canadian anxiety to try out a UN administration. In his memoirs Pearson said of this: 'Gaza would have been the first territory to be directly administered by the UN. I do wish it had been possible.'72 The Suez experience naturally had a significant effect on Canada's conception of the ways and means of using the UN to forestall and resolve conflict. The approaches as they were evolving in the last months of the Pearson régime are well illustrated in a memorandum from the permanent mission in New York contemplating how progress might be made.73 The message, which was cautionary, began by pointing out that Arab-Israeli differences could not be approached with the same swiftness that had characterized resumed discussions about a canal settlement. The Israelis were still calling for direct negotiations with the Arabs, convinced that the Arabs could be frightened into a negotiating mood. That meant that an approach through a peace conference should be ruled out for the time being. An alternative would be an imposed settlement, but this would require agreement among the great powers that was not foreseeable at that point. (This was eventually achieved in Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.) What the mission favoured was a UN approach, ultimately perhaps a new settlement commended by the General Assembly. This meant asking the Assembly to keep UNEF in position along the demarcation line and to extend this function to include lines between Israel and all its Arab neighbours. UNEF should operate on Israeli territory as well as in the Arab countries. It was a way of moving on to the second and more permanent stage of the force, as originally envisaged. It should be done, however, without stirring up confrontation by the whole new issue of a permanent force to replace the emergency force. With the stability to be provided by the force, then the secretarygeneral would explore, through private consultations and with the help of an advisory committee, not only the means of maintaining order in the area but of bringing about a settlement and assisting in the economic development of the area. The mission's perspective had altogether the advantages and disadvantages of its professionalism. It would be hard for political leaders to espouse publicly a course so devious, and yet as a set of informal and adjustable guidelines it offered a plausible way to work for what the Canadian public wanted - peaceful accommodation between two just causes. If there is an argument for having no fixed policy for a distant area except to take a responsible interest and avoid simple judgments, Canada's role in the Suez crisis is probably the strongest case to be made for it. It is not a

370 The Shaping of Peace prescription for all seasons. It is more appropriate in areas where Canada is not involved by specific national interest or by an institutional association and in areas such as the Middle East where, in Canadian eyes, the conflict was not between right and wrong but between two or more rights and perhaps also two or more wrongs. Whereas, in the opinion of most members of the United Nations, there was wrong-doing by Israel, Britain, and France, Canada saw this as an unhappy incident of a longer struggle in the context of which there was much to be said on all sides. The situation was complicated by the fact that there were two issues rather than one at stake-that of Israel's relations with its Arab neighbours and that of Egypt's relations with Britain and France and the other users of the Suez Canal. For those who supported the anti-colonialists in general and Arabs in particular that was no problem. For countries like Canada the moral issues had to be looked at separately - and there was no doubt that, despite the ambiguous public utterances, Israel's sin was more excusable than that of the European powers. Even in the latter case, however, it was both wise and justifiable to treat it as an aberration. Finally should be noted the Pearsonian philosophy out of Hotspur, which he cited to the UN Assembly, 'Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety.' It is only in times of crises when the parties are scared that progress can be made towards lasting settlements or towards the creation of new institutions - peacekeeping forces for example. Perhaps crises have to approach boiling-point before anything can be done about them. It is not a means for shaping the peace that one can readily prescribe. Building from precedent to precedent can mean from crisis to crisis and is a dangerous game. It took repeated cholera epidemics to get states to set up quarantine, and it took two wars to create the United Nations. The greatest enemy of progress has been complacency. Hotspur's is an argument not for stirring up trouble but for seeing crises as opportunities, a philosophy which encourages optimism and determination rather than despair when catastrophes happen. It means also living with all kinds of moral ambiguities in the interest of what seems the higher international interest - the avoidance of war and the fortification of international institutions. HUNGARY

There was considerable reason for satisfaction with the role of the United Nations - and of Canada - over Suez, but much less over the ways in which the UN could be employed to counter the Soviet intervention in Hungary, which came before the Security Council and the General Assembly at about

371 The United Nations in the Fifties the same time. The UN was accused of applying double standards to Western and Eastern offenders, and Pearson was accused at home of having devoted his energies to countering the British and French rather than the Russians. Because the Canadian part in the Hungarian affair was not one of leadership, it need not be examined here in detail. However, it is useful to compare the attitudes towards the UN function in these simultaneous challenges. The uprisings in Hungary of October 1956 were dealt with first in the Security Council of which Canada was not a member. When the Security Council was convened on 28 October to consider the situation, Canada agreed, along with twenty-four other countries, to express its concern to the secretary-general. The Canadian note cited Pearson's statement that 'the forces of world opinion must be mobilized' and 'The United Nations is where this should be and can be done.'74 The Western powers were cautious while there was a chance that the Russian forces might withdraw, but when on 4 November Soviet divisions launched a massive assault on Hungary and sealed the Austrian border the Security Council met urgently. Action was frustrated by a Soviet veto, and the subject was transferred to an emergency session of the General Assembly, which met on a Sunday afternoon following the all-night session at which UNEF had been authorized. Although Pearson was inexhaustible and angered by the Soviet action, it was no time for him to carry the torch. He sensed better than many UN actors that it is better to have leadership thrust upon one than to appear too eager. In any case, there were able Europeans ready and willing. A resolution was passed condemning Soviet action and calling on the USSR to withdraw its forces without delay, affirming the rights of the Hungarian people, and requesting the secretary-general to organize relief supplies. In a strong speech to the Assembly Pearson contrasted Soviet action with the decision of the United Kingdom and France to hand over 'what they claim to be solely their police role' to a UN force. He appealed for admission of UN observers and a UN investigation.75 In his memoirs he says he would have been tempted 'to have a UN Assembly Committee fly straight to Budapest with the UN flag and some men in uniform,' but acknowledges that this was 'an emotional reaction.'76 He did toy with the idea of some kind of UN police action, but when this was picked up by the headstrong and less experienced Italian delegation the Americans thought it would not be either 'useful or sensible' to propose another UN force. There followed during November manoeuvres to get through the Assembly resolutions that would mobilize public opinion against the Russians in the hope that they might be restrained from more drastic measures against the Hungarians. Calling upon a UN force to drive the aggressors out was

372 The Shaping of Peace recognized as a gesture that would only underline the impotence of the UN. 'What, in fact, could the Assembly have done?' an External Affairs memorandum asked: To have intervened militarily would not have commended itself to a majority ... of the Assembly's members, and in any case no country was prepared to risk a Third World War on the issue. The United Nations Emergency Force had been sent to Egypt 'to secure and supervise' an agreed ceasefire, and with the consent of the Egyptian Government and the other parties concerned. No such consent could have been obtained from the Soviet Government or their puppets in Budapest... Given this situation, there was really no middle alternative for Western policy between delivering an ultimatum to the Soviet Union to cease intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary on pain of thermo-nuclear attack, and doing everything possible through the United Nations and in other ways to mobilize the moral force of world public opinion.77

The dilemma was between getting strongly condemnatory resolutions through the Assembly with a small majority or getting more moderate and constructive resolutions passed by impressive majorities. If the Russians were to recognize that they were losing something and therefore be deterred, those majorities would have to have very broad support from the Asian and African members. The latter, in their anger over Suez, took some time to come round to speaking and voting against the Soviet Union. The Russians got no support from the Afro-Asians, but the constant abstention of India and some of the other key members of the group was not good enough in Western eyes. The Canadians made a special effort in New York, New Delhi, and other capitals to persuade the Indians, Ceylonese, and others to make the Russians suffer. A particular problem was Krishna Menon in New York, who seemed reluctant to go even as far in opposing the Russians as Nehru wanted him to. The Canadians made sure that the authorities in New Delhi were made aware of what Krishna was up to. At the same time, they were critical of the way in which the Americans as well as the British and French had handled him. Instead of trying to collaborate on a resolution which the Indians might co-sponsor, they set out to defeat him. 'The danger is that Lodge and Knowland, who are clearly elated by their victory, will tend to assume that the way to treat the Indians in these things is not to collaborate with them but to lick them and seduce the other Asians from their side.'78 Perhaps the most useful contribution Canadians made was to use the strong moral position they had acquired by opposing their own allies over Suez to argue with the 'neutralists' that non-Western imperialism had to be de-

373 The United Nations in the Fifties nounced as well. However restrained the Indian position seemed to the Western powers, it was adequate to surprise and anger the Russians. Collective security enforced against one of the great powers had, of course, not been envisaged by the founders of the UN. The veto in the Security Council saw to that. Strictly speaking, therefore, there was no reason for disillusionment. The impotence of the world community before this blatant aggression inspired, nevertheless, a sense of failure. It seemed essential to the Canadians, and to most of their Western colleagues, that they use the UN for whatever purpose it might usefully serve, even if the results were limited. To act otherwise would be to endorse gross misbehaviour. When asked at a press conference on 9 November what the next move might be, Pearson cautioned: Though our good will may be unlimited and our indignation unbounded the possibilities of intervening in Hungary without causing even more desolation and destruction to the Hungarian people are limited.' For the UN there can always be goals short of the ultimate. Canada supported therefore various efforts to send the secretary-general to Hungary and to establish observation or negotiating missions. The first resolution they co-sponsored was on 10 January 1957, which set up a Special Committee for continuing observation of events. They were exasperated by Soviet rejection of UN efforts to send relief. They discouraged, however, a suggestion that they serve on the Special Committee. Canada had no diplomatic mission in Budapest and thought it would be better to have members from countries that had.79 Scoring points in the Cold War debate was not, in these circumstances, a defensible end in itself, although it was important that Soviet hypocrisy be exposed. The kind of calculation that had to go into a UN strategy is indicated in an interesting telegram in January from the delegation in New York.80 They were becoming worried that passing resolutions with ever-decreasing majorities which the Russians and Hungarians would never accept was proving counter-productive. It would be better to find a formula that might actually assist to get the Russians out of Hungary. Futile resolutions might goad the Russians into abandoning all hope of a native communist régime and setting up an outright military government. The reluctant conclusion at that point was that it would probably be better for the Hungarians to have a Hungarian government, even if it was the Kadar régime, and work out some relationship with the Russians - a perspective not at all popular at the time but which events seem to have proved wise. 'Although it may sound rather cynical I think we must conclude that the struggle for Hungary may well be over, at least temporarily, in which case our main political pre-occupation ought to be to preserve the gains made by the Poles.' It was feared

374 The Shaping of Peace that to push the Russians to the worst repression would threaten the gains being made in Poland and create violence and tensions that would endanger the fragile peace in Europe. External agreed with the general conclusion that the point of diminishing returns had been reached on resolutions.81 Attention was thereafter directed towards seeing that the Special Committee, which was taking evidence from Hungarians outside the country, produced a report that would be irreproachably objective. It was assumed that the facts revealed would speak for themselves. Although there would be no formal sanctions, it would be made clear to the Russians that behaviour of this kind was incompatible with the cultural, scientific, and commercial exchanges in which they were now showing an interest. If the Russians could not be prevented by UN action from behaving in this way, they must at least be made to realize that there was a price to be paid. One of the penalties they paid this time was losing in the UN much of the good will they were acquiring by their support of the Arabs over Suez. In the long run, furthermore, these events in Hungary played a critical role in the alienation from Moscow not only of the social democratic left but of Communist parties and partisans in Western Europe. In his final comment on the United Nations during his period as secretary of state for external affairs, written in March 1957, Pearson tackled the criticism of the UN action over Suez and Hungary: It was not the United Nations General Assembly which displayed a double standard of morality in its attitude to the crises in Hungary and Egypt. The Assembly was no less forthright in its insistence that the Russians should withdraw from Hungary than it was in requesting the withdrawal of forces from Egypt. It was the Soviet Union, in its cynical disregard for the principles of the Charter as upheld by the Assembly, which was guilty of a double standard. Unless we understand these aspects of the problem clearly, we are apt to tear down this great international organization instead of building it up.82

In both cases the aggressors were great powers. The Assembly had not, on that account, ignored the issues. They sought to do whatever they could. The difference was that one of the powers was not moved by public opinion or susceptible to economic and other pressures as the others were. The British and French were both democracies embedded in an international system and could not flourish unto themselves. It is ironic, perhaps, that the success of the UN system depends on the vulnerability of its members to pressures short of armed force and governments in the best position to resist are those which can shut the ears and tighten the belts of their citizens.

375 The United Nations in the Fifties As for the charge that Canada had been more zealous over Suez than Hungary, the explanation is in the timing. There was no deliberate choice. The Middle Eastern crisis came first and at a time when the situation in Hungary looked more hopeful. Pearson became engaged before there was anything Canada could do about Hungary. To have been a major sponsor of initiatives in Hungary might have upset the delicate balance he was trying to maintain with the non-aligned and diverted him from the intensive negotiations required to get the new UN force in operation. A more plausible charge of inconsistency might be that Canada denounced Soviet aggression more vehemently than it had British or French or Israeli. Canadians did, of course, fairly or unfairly, regard the Soviet action as worse because it was, in their eyes, one more revelation of the brutality of Soviet means to their ends, whereas what the British and French had done was an aberration of otherwise worthy people, people furthermore with whom one could argue, and who did in the end withdraw. Nevertheless, in the Suez debate and elsewhere Canadians had stressed the ineffectiveness of denunciation and pleaded for pragmatic efforts to resolve disputes rather than verbal attacks. However, the opposition to denunciation was usually related to tactics. In the Suez case it was part of the effort at mediation. In the Hungarian case there was no disposition to regard Canada as an acceptable mediator. The UN itself, however, could be an intermediary. 'We should be ready to provide a face-saving device for the Russians if they have any inclination to ... permit a reasonably independent government in Budapest,' the delegation advised in December.83 In his statement of 4 November Pearson referred to his proposal the previous day for the intervention of the United Nations force for peaceful purposes in the Middle East and asked: 'Why should we not now establish a United Nations mission or United Nations supervisory machinery of an appropriate kind for the situation in Hungary?' External on 14 November favoured strong support for 'the rapid implementation of those portions of the resolution within the power of the UN' and 'the investigation of the situation should be given top priority.' They did not want 'to prejudice what slight chances still remain of gaining a modicum of independence and peace for Hungary nor of interfering with the distribution of relief... but our impression is that while the Russians are likely to be moved largely by the resistance of the Hungarians themselves, they may now be more susceptible to world opinion than in the past.'84 So long as there was any chance of working out formulas of accommodation, then the damper might be held on the rhetoric. It was worth holding back, furthermore, if a moderate resolution would gain wider support. As the question dragged on into the spring Exter-

376 The Shaping of Peace nal was prepared to take a cautious position on Hungary in order not to spoil the somewhat more hopeful prospects at the disarmament session about to begin in London. However, if the only way of having any impact on the Russians was to raise world opinion against them, then the damnation should be vigorous. In any case it was irresistible. It was an expression of genuine anger rather than calculated policy. Of course, it was also politically essential for the government to raise a louder voice against the Russians than against the British. There were practical things that Canadians could do over Hungary, and the exceedingly strong feelings they had on the subject enabled the government to take extraordinary measures. One hundred thousand dollars for relief were promptly given to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and $100,000 to the Canadian Red Cross. Subsequently the Canadian contribution for Hungarian relief was increased to one million dollars. Whether they wanted to or not, the Canadian government could not help being involved in the disposition of the refugees because Canada was the country to which a great many of them wanted to come. The Canadian embassy in Vienna was besieged and special procedures were set up. Eventually over 36,000 Hungarian refugees were admitted into Canada. At first the government was a little hesitant to relax its regulations too far and upset the carefully calculated programme. The necessity for a security clearance and rules preventing the admission of people belonging to the Communist party were obviously hopeless to administer in such a situation. However, the strong tide of public opinion swept away their reserves and most of the obstacles were waived for the time being. It was a very different attitude to refugees from that displayed ten years before.85 For this there are many reasons. Antipathy to the Soviet Union was certainly one of them. Canadians were less fearful of immigration, partly because so many more of them had recently been in that category. It is fair to speculate, furthermore, that exposure to the United Nations had created greater sensitivity on human rights. Then too there was a new factor that would enormously affect the mobilization of world opinion and the role of the Assembly as forum. Aggression and suffering were now to be seen, in part of the world at least, on television. It was, along with Sputnik and jet aircraft, one of the technological inventions that would distinguish the later years of the United Nations from its pioneer decade.

14

The Search for Equilibrium

[As the period with which these volumes are concerned came to an end, the author had been for some time an assistant under-secretary of state for external affairs with responsibility for, among other things, the United Nations. The following are his personal reflections, after the lapse of a generation, on the prospect of 1957.] What strikes me particularly on reviewing the record is the extent to which the health and strength of institutions was consistently the prior claim on Canadian policy-makers throughout this time of the Creation. Any immediate interest would often be sacrificed for the conservation of the structure. There was reason for this, in that for a perversely situated country institutions were essential. They provided formulas for the expression of the Canadian will and the protection of the Canadian interest. The country's requirements were unconventional, and a pattern was needed to cope with intricacy, a pattern quite different from those of the countries with whose strategies Canadians were most familiar. The framework that was emerging in the 1950s-a near universal United Nations in which could be encompassed, without too precise definition, a North Atlantic defence alliance, a consultative Commonwealth with historic roots, and some serviceable ways and means for the continental dimension - looked like one on which Canada could build. It was necessary not to be beguiled into false confidence by a neat package, as Mackenzie King had been lulled by his shapely but empty designs for a defence policy in 1938.' Some order was required, nevertheless, to provide positive direction for policy-makers and to avoid frustration for the citizenry. Conserving the institutions meant seeing that they had useful things to do: an emergency force for the United Nations or a Colombo Plan for the Com-

378 The Shaping of Peace monwealth. Sometimes it meant taking risks in the interest of growth: broadening the membership of the UN, NATO, and the Commonwealth beyond the limits of the comfortable club. But it also meant caution about overloading institutions whose muscle was untested and recognizing the limits on international government in a world that was not laid out in symmetry. Regrettable as it was to abandon the Hungarians, the United Nations could not be jeopardized by a quixotic effort at collective security in Eastern Europe. Awkward though it was to have a republic in the Commonwealth, that was the way to preserve the institution. The integrity of the International Joint Commission must be maintained by divorcing it from the process of negotiation, even if that seemed to weaken the bargaining hand. These institutions came to be seen by the shapers of peace in Ottawa less and less as the fixed framework of a world government. The search was more often for expedients than solutions, and that did not mean failure. World order would be for ever a balancing act. The requirement was a world in equilibrium, even though it is in the nature of equilibrium to be nondurable. Although Canadian policy-makers had fitfully grasped that principle in 1945, we were more surely aware of it in 1957 when the institutions we had laboured to build were all threatened. We had hoped for but not counted on permanence, and the shocks could be absorbed. Western predominance had been one kind of equilibrium. It was being succeeded by détente, as yet barely acknowledged. Another and eventually deeper division of the international community into three worlds was in sight. The crisis of 1956 made clear that it was not just a question of getting things back on the rails: new tracks would have to be laid. To begin with, the institutions on which Canada depended had all been challenged. The Commonwealth, the Anglo-American association, NATO, and the UN itself could never be quite the same again. During the winter and spring of 1956-7 we were engaged in efforts to pick up the pieces and put them together in new patterns. The Commonwealth was in a way strengthened because in such a test it had held. There was a shift of weight within the institution. The Canadians, the Indians, and others had helped the British recover from their errors. A new Commonwealth, intended for the maintenance of dialogue rather than the preservation of a bloc, had proved its value under the most severe of tests. Having survived its last paroxysm of imperialism - what Norman Robertson called the politics of menopause - Britain could more easily take its place as a member of the Commonwealth like the others. What was less apparent then was the extent to which the Suez experience had soured many in Britain towards an institution that was turning out to be a restraint on their

379 The Search for Equilibrium policies rather than an instrument to promote them. There were other Britons, of course, who concluded that the Commonwealth had helped to rescue them and that it could, as Canadians were arguing, play a useful part in easing the transition from an empire that had become an insupportable burden. From the East Block the Commonwealth looked like an institution even more worthwhile maintaining and the public was beginning to see it as something more than a tie to the Mother Country. The orientation of Britain was becoming important in another respect. Soon Canada would have to come to terms with the movement for European integration and the possible incorporation of Britain into another economic and diplomatic bloc. Heretofore the Canadian position had been ambiguous. In the early postwar enthusiasm for the denunciation of sovereignty, for Franco-German rapprochement, and the revival of Europe as a power in the world, External Affairs officers, and Lester Pearson in particular, had praised the European movement, although those concerned with trade had reservations. External had even expressed annoyance at British reluctance on the grounds of other commitments to the Commonwealth. The Department of Trade and Commerce was not worried by the European Coal and Steel Community, but they were sceptical about the Pfimlin Plan for a European agricultural market. Mr Pearson strongly supported the European Defence Community and wanted it tied to NATO.2 Perhaps it was over-confidence in Canada's position as a founding father in NATO that kept External Affairs from recognizing the challenge that would come to our position when a European bloc congealed in NATO and in the UN. Traditional resistance to the centripetal force of London had not prepared Canadians to see the economic and diplomatic disadvantages there might be if the British turned their backs on the Commonwealth. If Britain and Europe were to be a counterweight to the increasing centripetal force of Washington, it would hardly serve that purpose if Canada were to be excluded rigidly from their charmed circle. That issue would have to be faced by the new government. An unfortunate consequence of the Suez crisis was the mutation in a balance of Western power that Canada had found congenial. Western policies had been to a considerable extent a consensus in which the British and to a lesser extent the French played an important role. That situation suited a middle and independent-minded power like Canada better than uncontested leadership by the United States. For the time being the British and French had lost credibility, although we thought they could have regained it at the UN if they had tried harder. It was a cause of distress that the attitudes of all major powers to the United Nations left so much to be desired. The Russians had also suffered a reversal and were certainly not in a constructive mood. A

380 The Shaping of Peace vacuum of a kind was created in which middle powers had their heyday, but there was little joy in that if the great powers were not sustaining their responsibilities. American leadership was not inspiring. Dulles was ill, and there was no strong hand at the State Department where, we always thought, people were more sensible than in other parts of Washington. Although we were concerned about the British denigration of the United Nations, by the spring of 1957 we were also worried by President Eisenhower's unreal moralizing about it. The Americans, who had been critical of Hammarskjold at an earlier stage, had been converted. Eisenhower was moving into what was known as the 'leave it to Dag' period in which the Americans seemed to think they could turn over hot issues to the UN without working out their own policies in accordance with the obligations of a great power. As for the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' on the Middle East, it looked like a revival of the pactomania which Ottawa had never much liked. A departmental paper at the conclusion of this climactic 1956-7 session of the Assembly noted: The us Administration not only talked foolishly about letting the UN determine its policy, but it also tended in crucial moments to act as if it believed this were possible. During the worst days of the Middle East crisis the us displayed almost no initiative in the UN. It seemed quite unaware of the fact that turning to the UN means turning up in New York with some well thought out proposals, negotiating vigorously with other countries in New York and Washington and all over the world, producing plans, schemes and compromises of all kinds. Instead there was a tendency just to sit back and let the majority decide on any proposal which happened to pop up. It was this aspect of American policy rather than the American expression of its intention to act through the UN which can be most justly criticized by other countries.3

Hammarskjold had complained to Pearson about Dulles and about the tendency of the United States administration to use the UN as 'a tool' to get them out of domestic political difficulties without any real regard for the interests of the UN as a whole. He mentioned that when he had been trying to negotiate with Peking over the imprisoned flyers Eisenhower and Lodge both gave press conferences which left him with little room for negotiation. Dulles had taken actions affecting the negotiations without consulting him at all. It was absurd, he said, to condemn the Chinese unheard and at the same time request the secretary-general to negotiate with them. He was afraid that again for domestic political reasons they would ask the Council or Assembly to take some action on Formosa or the coastal islands which would only make matters worse.4

381 The Search for Equilibrium As collective security by enforcement was not a practical policy, some other formulas for sustaining peace or keeping the level of war manageable had to be found. Balance of power as it had been practised was a discredited concept. Unconditional surrender was not feasible. Antagonists would have to be kept in equipoise. There was no real alternative, therefore, to tolerating more wickedness in the world than the victors in the great crusade had hoped. Making the world a better place would have to come not by punishing sin but by raising world levels of conscience and of consumption. Peace was more likely to come as a by-product. Making the prevention of war the overweening preoccupation of the United Nations could serve only to heighten tensions and spread conflict. Fighting, nevertheless, could not be ignored and wherever possible the UN should be used to bring it to armistice. From a state of equipoise it might even be possible to control the proliferation of arms and eventually achieve balanced reductions. Disarmament and collective security were increasingly recognized as simple creeds the pursuit of which had resulted only in stalemate and escalation. On the other hand neither worthy aim could be renounced without qualms. They were important as goals even if questionable as theories. Inis Claude takes a wise approach to this dilemma: Yet, the point remains that the theory of collective security has inspired the growing recognition that war anywhere is a threat to order everywhere, has contributed to the maintenance of the realistic awareness that it is states which are the effective components of international society and which are consequently the essential objects of a system aiming at the control of international disorder, and has stimulated the rudimentary development of a sense of responsibility to a world community on the part of governments and peoples. As a doctrinaire formula for a global panacea, collective security is a snare as well as a delusion; as a formulation of the reality of global involvements and the ideal of global responsibilities, it may be a vital contribution to the evolutionary development of the conditions of peace through international organization.5 The experience of 1956 renewed the Canadian interest in seeking the security of the Middle East in neutrality - an analogy in part from the Indochina experience. There was a return in departmental memoranda to the arguments of the previous spring for recognizing that the Soviet Union could not be excluded from the area and making efforts to involve the Kremlin in responsibility for stability. That Soviet and Western aims in the Middle East were antagonistic was taken for granted, but there was a basic hope, if by no means total confidence, that the Russians would seek to gain their ends with-

382 The Shaping of Peace out starting the shooting. The equilibrium could be maintained by a checkmate which the powers would eventually learn to live with. The Americans, however, seemed to be trying simply to rally Arabs to a Western cause. It was not a policy in which we had great confidence. We were not unduly sanguine about any policy, but clung to the hope of moving towards a settlement achieved within and authorized by the United Nations that would not set the Arabs against each other as well as against the Israelis. Ironically, however, the paranoia that had driven the British and French into seeing a Moscow-Cairo plot in 1956 was adopted with enthusiasm by the Americans, encouraged by their intelligence services. Different lessons had been drawn in Washington and in Ottawa from the Suez crisis. What could be expected of the Russians? If equilibrium was to be sought, it was essential to calculate their intentions and reactions. A searching new look had been taken in External Affairs at Soviet policy after the winding up of the Korean War, the Geneva conferences, and the death of Stalin. There resulted a restatement, in somewhat more hopeful circumstances, of the doctrine of firmness tempered with fairness. To define a departmental memorandum as Canadian foreign policy would be presumptuous. There was not even unanimity within the department, but the memorandum6 did represent a certain consensus among the influential advisers. It was largely the work of one of the most respected observers of the Soviet scene, Robert Ford, who served in Moscow a total of twenty-one years. Although its tone is considerably cooler than the more farouche language being used in public statements, the assumptions in the memorandum explain a great deal about the minister's and even the prime minister's actions, if not necessarily their words. The essential argument of the study was that peace, or at least a state of Cold War which passed for peace, could be maintained. This did not necessarily mean that either side had abandoned its hope that eventually some or all of the rest of the world could be converted to its way of life, but it did mean that it should be possible to eliminate war as a means to bring about changes. The experts on Soviet policy were uneasy over the ritual formula with which NATO and other military appreciations of the time commenced to the effect that although Soviet tactics might have changed, their longrange intentions to conquer the world through communism had not. The study did not question the long-term hopes of Marxist indoctrinated leaders to help establish communist régimes on all the continents. The objection was to the unsophisticated assessment of the means that might be used to this end and the possibility of achievement. Specific issue was taken with the assumption in United States government circles, as reported by the

383 The Search for Equilibrium Canadian ambassador, that peaceful co-existence was impossible. This was described as not only unduly pessimistic but positively suicidal, as the only alternative would lead to the near extermination of a large portion of the civilized world no matter whose the victory. A policy of firmness and patience should not be regarded as something that would achieve results within five years. A comment of a few years back on Kennan's policy of containment was cited - that it was a thesis for the British but impossible for the Americans as the latter would not wait twenty-five years for it to work itself out. Evidence of a new situation was found in the change of leadership in Moscow, in the fact that the Russians knew that they were approaching equality in weapons of mass destruction and were increasingly conscious of the consequences for all concerned of the use of those weapons. A state of impasse had been reached, and both sides were having to consider the implications of impasse. A backward look was taken at Soviet policies since the war, particularly in Eastern Europe, and the conclusion was that Soviet policies had been primarily defensive in motivation. It was an interpretation to which Canadian diplomats had clung as a probability throughout the worst of the Stalinist period, but the mysteries of Soviet policies were such that there could be no certainty. This was an analysis rather than a moral evaluation. The brutality of Soviet policy in Eastern European countries was not excusable, but the world had been divided, whether one liked it or not, and the best hope for the East Europeans was to work out their own terms for living under Soviet hegemony. A neurotic Soviet concern with its outer defences was not to be accepted as valid evidence of further expansion. Even though the Russians were not basically military expansionists, they would want to have friendly and preferably communist governments in as many neighbouring countries as possible and they would keep pressing at the edges. The Berlin Blockade, the invasion of South Korea, and other such steps had probably not been predetermined moves in a calculated and monolithic communist policy of overwhelming the West. These had rather been miscalculations about what they could get away with in the Soviet sphere of influence. Among the reasons for believing that there were new opportunities of 'détente' (a word that did not become fashionable until later) was that the Russians had recognized their miscalculations, including their doctrinaire belief that the Western economies would collapse in depression after the war. The Russians were aware of the internal problems they themselves faced, in contrast with the rising prosperity in Western Europe and North America. Whatever illusions they might have had of a world-wide communist network controlled from Moscow had been shaken by the defection of Yugoslavia. They had

384 The Shaping of Peace been taken by surprise by Mao's success in China and knew that he was no more likely than Tito to be their docile instrument. The argument was that the Russians would, in the circumstances, prefer to carry on the struggle with the West by cold rather than hot war. They would try a policy of 'peace at no price.' The recommended Western policy was not to make unwarranted concessions but to be alert for Soviet feelers towards agreements which were mutually advantageous and could lead to the reduction of tension. The hard-liners in Washington, London, and elsewhere dismissed these in advance as traps. In Ottawa we were more inclined to think that they might be traps but some exploration was desirable before that conclusion was reached - at the very least to make clear which side was being intransigent.7 The memorandum emphasized the danger of frightening the Russians: 'There is a point in establishing these [American] bases at which they tend to create the very thing they were designed to avoid. Apart from all the political considerations, no great country could sit by and witness with indifference the progressive closing in of the enemy.' Fairness and firmness required a strong exercise of imagination, as in trying to see how the American bases looked to people in Moscow. There was concern at the extent to which Western estimates of Soviet intentions were based solely on Soviet dirty tricks. According to the memorandum signs of Soviet movement towards détente ought not to be dismissed simply because they were inconsistent with continuing evidence of espionage activities in support of communists abroad, '...we must recognize that much in the USSR is inconsistent, starting with the basic paradox that one of the most likeable, human and kind peoples in the world is also capable of the most atrocious barbarities.' Firmness, however, meant the maintenance under the circumstances of military strength. Although even more doubt was expressed than in the late forties of a fixed Soviet intention to march their armies across Europe to the Channel, there was no disposition to tempt the Russians with weakness. There should be no relaxation in the maintenance of NATO at full strength and of the Canadian contribution in West Europe. The difficulty was fully recognized of persuading the Canadian and other Western peoples to accept the necessity of heavy military tax burdens without continuing the atmosphere of crisis. The answer was seen in maintaining forces not necessarily designed to match the Russians man to man but enough to make clear that aggression would touch off war with the Western powers. Finally, the memorandum argued that as far as Southeast Asia was concerned a policy of bolstering military defences would defeat the purpose of creating economic

385 The Search for Equilibrium conditions essential to the resistance of democratic countries to communist pressure. Attitudes on Cold War issues were, of course, never monolithic in the External Affairs community. The détentiste views of the memorandum cited were not accepted by all officers. Those whose preoccupation had been with defence and NATO were less sure of the argument that there had been a miscalculation of Soviet intentions in the immediate postwar period and that Soviet policy had itself been based on a miscalculation of Western intentions in Eastern Europe. Mr Pearson's scepticism of Soviet policy was based on their recurrent frustration of his hopes, but he was always anxious to listen to those offering reassurance - particularly during the period after Stalin's death when something better seemed possible. Just how the Russians regarded Canada as a result of the policy of fairness and firmness is hard to say,8 but there was some evidence that they did recognize on the part of Canadians an aspiration to independence. Soviet propaganda played relatively little attention to Canada and on the whole characterized it more as a victim of than a collaborator in 'American imperialism.' Soviet diplomats who had seen a good deal of Mr Pearson at the United Nations and elsewhere could have had no doubt that he was an independent force although he made no pretence of being non-aligned. At the tenth anniversary celebrations in San Francisco of the founding of the United Nations Molotov formally invited him to Moscow and he accepted. He was the first NATO foreign minister to go. He was anxious to see for himself and test the possibilities suggested in the recent departmental review. There were a few special questions he wanted to raise with the Russians, including the Canadian assignment in Indochina and his interest in the admission of all applicants to the United Nations. For the most part, however, he wanted to get the feel of Khrushchev, Molotov, and company on disarmament, Germany, and general questions of East-West relations. He also felt the typical Canadian compulsion to tell the Russians that the Americans were not as bad as they thought.9 This he did constantly, making his point more effectively by not hesitating to talk about certain Canadian policies over which they were in disagreement with the Americans. Needless to say, the Russians did not accept the Canadian estimates, but they had too much respect for their guest to try the cruder ploys of dividing Canada from the United States. Khrushchev in fact spoke of his personal regard for Eisenhower and even said a few good words about Dulles. The discussions were about as frank as could have been expected. Khrushchev and Bulganin received Mr Pearson in the Crimea and the discussion there was much franker and more rewarding than

386 The Shaping of Peace that with the excessively bland Molotov in Moscow. Khrushchev was blunt and brandished his nuclear weapons but he was also more human, leaving the impression of someone with whom one could argue and negotiate but with whom it was best to be not only blunt but also strong. On the whole the Moscow visit confirmed the lines set out for Canadian policy to the USSR. Within a year, however, Soviet policies of supplying arms in the Middle East and in particular, of course, Soviet policy in Hungary changed the climate. It was not an atmosphere in which there could be great advances towards détente, and the interpretation of Soviet intentions turned harder. Nevertheless, even in the wake of the Suez and Hungarian crises Soviet diplomats in New York sought out Canadians for discussions on how to get back into the habits of peaceful coexistence. The Russians, like the British and French, were in the dog house, and communication between them and the Americans had broken down entirely. It was probably a desire to establish contact with someone in the West who would know what was going on that led Kuznetsov, the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, to approach the Canadian ambassador, R.A. MacKay, late in November 1956 to suggest that it might be useful for some Soviet-Canadian talks to take place on matters other than Suez and Hungary such as, for example, enlargement of the Security Council and disarmament.10 There were similar Soviet approaches at various levels of the Canadian delegation, and in each case there was a more or less candid explanation of the embarrassment they felt over Hungary. In spite of their perpetual antagonist position, the Russians had at almost all times had discussions with the Americans and the British in the corridors of the UN, even when it was only to discuss procedures. Presumably when contact with the major Western powers was cut off, they regarded Canada as a useful medium, no doubt in view of the influential role Canadians had been playing. It was not the first time there had been such contact. Kuznetsov referred in his approach to a small informal dinner during the 'new members' issue the previous year for a candid airing of views between Kuznetsov, Malik, and Zaroubin, with Paul Martin, R.A. MacKay, and myself. These exchanges with the Russians were continued and about a month later when Mr Pearson was in New York, he, MacKay and I were invited to lunch with Kuznetsov. The Russians apparently found the talks useful. Sobolev, the Soviet ambassador, stressed emphatically to the Canadians afterwards their value and urged that they should explain their views to each other even though they did not always agree. The talks did not stay off the major subjects and even included a frank exchange on a settlement in the Middle East. Although these exchanges consisted to a large extent simply of the clarification in more

387 The Search for Equilibrium reasonable terms of the positions the two sides were taking publicly, they were of some advantage for guessing how far the other side might be prepared to go. A senior Soviet official gave what he called a frank and confidential explanation of their policy in Hungary when his Canadian interlocutor had suggested inconsistency in the Soviet policy towards Hungary and Israel. What had happened, he said, was that at an early stage in the difficulty in Budapest the Soviet Union had decided to withdraw its troops entirely from Hungary. This had been a difficult decision to take but they had thought it the best course. Then, however, there were 'developments' which proved that their vital interests were at stake. Things were happening which would threaten the Soviet government not only in Hungary but in all Eastern Europe and they had to take steps to protect these vital interests. In this conversation there was little reliance on the conventional hypocrisy on the subject. Part of the explanation of this Soviet-Canadian dialogue was no doubt personal. Kuznetsov and Sobolev were the most quiet-spoken of Soviet representatives, and Sobolev, who had been on the UN Secretariat for some time, had long had a reasonable association with Canadians from General McNaughton on. Like many other non-Western diplomats they found conversation with Mr Pearson easier than with most Western foreign ministers. The Russians, too, had a problem with the American ambassador, Cabot Lodge, and they confessed that although they could have useful discussions with his deputy, James Wadsworth, Lodge was impossible. It was never easy for them to talk to Dulles. At this point the British were in no mood for conversation and at any rate were not to be regarded as 'spokesmen' for the Western powers. The value for the Russians was not that the Canadians were Western deviants but that they were bona fide if somewhat less rigid members of a group with which it was important for the Russians to maintain some contact. It is perhaps necessary to note that in the departmental documentation throughout this period the idea of a Canadian role of mediation or interpretation between the Russians and the West never appears. That Canada as a small power without the responsibilities of the Americans or the British was in a position on occasions to sound out the Russians, or more particularly the Poles, was an idea mentioned. Basically, however, the view was that Canada, insofar as possible, should make up its own mind and do its own exploring. There was a job seen in trying to remove Soviet fears of the United States, and Canadian diplomats were constantly offering their own interpretations to the Americans of Soviet policies. So were other allies. If Canadians could help along now and then the cause of better understanding between East and

388 The Shaping of Peace West, so much the better, but the idea of a vocation as an intermediary between Moscow and Washington would have been dismissed as presumptuous and inconsistent with alignment. There was also a belief, which the Moscow visit confirmed, that Canadian views on American policy were taken more seriously because there was a close relationship between the two countries. To our distress the British after Suez proceeded to vent their resentment against the United Nations in such a way as to undermine the influence they had had there since the first session in London. In spite of the public beating they took over colonialism, their leadership in decolonization was widely respected and the skill and wisdom of their UN diplomats was valued. Menon himself had once made a fulsome speech praising their policy in West Africa. Although Canadian association with the British was by no means automatic, we found ourselves working together frequently in the UN because our habits of mind and on the whole our historic perspectives led us to see things in similar ways. As for the members of the Foreign Office who worked at the UN, they assumed after Suez that they were pariahs in the Assembly, and took a back seat in committees. A certain reticence during that Assembly was undoubtedly wise, but reticence turned too easily into cynicism. While External Affairs officers watched the Foreign Office drift into an attitude of increasing hostility towards the United Nations, efforts were made to meet the British arguments. The Foreign Office in London undertook a re-evaluation of the UN with jaundiced results that were challenged by Canada House. Although many British officials on the spot recognized for the most part that the Assembly, as a result of the Canadian initiative, had in fact rescued them from disaster, this was not a view they could put to their political masters who had sanctioned the policy in the first place. Many in the Foreign Office, including in particular the permanent secretary, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, shared the predominant view of the British Conservatives that the UN was a tiresome, unrepresentative, inequitable affair and less attention should be paid to it. A memorandum prepared for Prime Minister Macmillan to take to Bermuda for talks with the Americans, and also with Canadians, to try to heal the transatlantic breach was contemptuous of the UN and suggested the UN should be by-passed or at any rate the Assembly should be by-passed in favour of the Security Council where the British and French had their vetoes. Messers St Laurent and Pearson went to Bermuda with strong briefs prepared in External Affairs to meet the British arguments and to encourage them to resume the constructive role they had played in the UN - a body which, after all, was not going to be exorcised because they had grounds to resent it. In fact, Macmillan did not speak along these lines, pro-

389 The Search for Equilibrium bably because he had concluded that not much could be accomplished by doing so. He did suggest, however, that the item be considered at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London in June - where no doubt he would count on support from Menzies. In fact, however, neither Mr St Laurent nor Mr Pearson attended that conference. The Canadian prime minister was John Diefenbaker, who had been in office only a few days and who had been one of the chief critics of Canadian policy at the UN. Macmillan did not take advantage of the situation to seek agreement from a new Canadian voice. He had undoubtedly seen the Canadian arguments, for the External Affairs brief had been informally passed to the Foreign Office, and he probably realized that they would be supported by Nehru and other prime ministers and exacerbate tension over an issue he preferred to drop. Canadian defence of the UN to the British was essentially conservative. It might have been assumed that after the triumph in the Assembly over the Suez crisis Canadian officials would have rejoiced in the power now wielded by the popular house, but we were cautious in our calculations as to how things were moving. The contemptuous British attitude towards the Assembly majority and what they called the 'Afro-Asian bloc' did prod us into defence of the Assembly and to point out vigorously that the 'Afro-Asians' were not a bloc but a group, as they called themselves, and that they were anything but united. It was also pointed out that, contrary to what the British were suggesting, the group had not supported the Soviet Union over Hungary, although some of them had been less strong in their criticism of Soviet policy than had been hoped. As for the British insistence that the Assembly should now be by-passed and the Security Council used when it was necessary to use the UN at all, it was the British and French who, by using their veto in the Security Council, had been responsible for removing the Suez issue to the Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure. We were not anxious to see the Security Council lose its authority. As for the Assembly the Western powers had in fact never been able to 'control' it but to exert a certain 'guidance' which, objectionable as it might have been in principle, did provide the body with some discipline and purpose. Disarray in the Assembly would be encouraged if the British and French abdicated leadership roles. What should be re-established was sufficient great-power unity or at least tolerance - to enable the United Nations to work as intended. In the argument with the British, we in External Affairs were forced to a new assessment of the UN and to hone our arguments. It was the defence of a cherished institution, but the tone was by no means simply defensive. That the UN was into a new phase is clear from the introductory statement of the

390 The Shaping of Peace DEA memorandum, 'The Role of the United Nations,' previously mentioned: 'The core of the criticism is the belief that the United Nations is increasingly dominated by a majority of African and Asian countries allied from time to time with the Soviet bloc and Latin America, which is irresponsible in its attitude to international relations, dominated by an irrational hatred of Western countries, and unwilling to pay for the wide-ranging economic measures which it sponsors. It is said that the situation is growing continually more acute, that the crisis was accentuated by the admission of new members from the formerly dependent territories, it will soon be entirely out of hand.' That had not been the primary issue tackled in previous defences of the UN system, which were concerned mainly with the actions of the Soviet Union, but it would be of first importance in any similar analysis thereafter. The memorandum was devoted largely to arguing that it would be fatal for the Western countries to treat the 'group' as hostileespecially as that group was going to get larger. 'Provided groups do not become disciplined blocs they can be a good thing ... for an Assembly which has grown almost out of control. The threat to the Assembly may be the threat of anarchy rather than the threat of bloc voting. In this situation there is a good deal to be said for having fluid and overlapping groups who try to organize their thinking and put forward their view through spokesmen.' Above all, the memorandum emphasized that the UN did not create the problems it tried to deal with and it was an illusion to think that they would be better handled by ignoring the UN. There was still room for vigorous diplomacy by the powers without rejecting the UN. 'The problems arising from the transformation of empire and the passions aroused thereby are the product of historical processes not the United Nations. The United Nations provides in fact the only framework within which this transformation has a chance of taking place with the most peace and the least pain.' Because of the critical attitude of many Canadians after the events of 1956, Mr Pearson thought these arguments should be made public. He made an address11 to the Women's Canadian Club in the Loyalist stronghold of Saint John in April 1957, which was based on the departmental memorandum. He recognized that majorities in the Assembly could be prejudiced and their anti-colonialism was not always fair. He regretted that it was not possible to prevent the Russians from their actions in Hungary but, 'It would be rash, and might be fatal, if we tried on all occasions to take UN enforcement action in order to see that justice is always done without any regard to the consequences; or without, to be perfectly frank, any regard to the big blunt fact of the Red Army.' What had happened, he stressed, was that the Western powers no longer had 'that dominating influence on the actions of the

391 The Search for Equilibrium United Nations' which they had in the past. 'It by no means follows, however, that the West is now automatically frustrated in its efforts to secure a necessary majority for its measures. It does follow that it must work harder to get support for them.' What was disappointing for Mr Pearson, nevertheless, was that it had been impossible to seize the moment to get a lasting settlement in the Middle East. There were no two stages for the United Nations forces, as he had contemplated. It remained an emergency force for ten years. Nevertheless, the precedent proved of great importance in the subsequent history of the UN, particularly in dealing with the Congo crisis coming up shortly. What came to be known as 'peacekeeping' opened a new phase of United Nations thinking about its function, under the guidance of Dag Hammarskjóld. Like all good institutions it has suffered from the exaggerations of enthusiasts and critics. It is misjudged particularly by those who consider that international deals and mechanisms are successful only if they last for ever. Pragmatists like Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarskjóld would see peace and stability as matters for constant improvisation and brokerage, not the contrivance of a charter for Nirvana. Peacekeeping was a means to an end of which advantage had to be taken if the end was to be achieved. The burst of enthusiasm in early November for a permanent UN force diminished, like other hopes of the time, when the atmosphere of crisis receded. Not only the Russians were bitterly opposed to anything in the nature of a permanent UN military establishment. The Indians, partly worried no doubt about what might be threatened in Kashmir, would not hear of such plans and encouraged the other Asians and Africans to resist. Although the suspicion of the Arabs that UNEF would be a United Nations cover for the old imperialists had been overcome during the crisis, it persisted. The fear of landing parties of foreigners who insisted they were coming for your own good and never left was deeply rooted in the Middle East, not to mention Latin America and other parts of the world not yet designated as Third. So, although there were revived in Ottawa some of the enthusiasms noted in the early fifties for observer corps and a permanent UN establishment, Dag Hammarskjóld did not give them his support because he realized that they were politically impossible to achieve. Even more reluctantly, Mr Pearson came to the same conclusion. On the other hand, the Canadian, Scandinavian, and other military men who took up the peacekeeping role with enthusiasm but had to suffer the repeated frustrations of improvisation, became a strong lobby to insist, although in vain, that the UN Secretariat ought at least to have something like a chief of staff. For Canadians the peacekeeping role was to be of central importance in our concepts of the UN and of our place in

392 The Shaping of Peace it. Happily too it brought soldiers along with civil servants and political leaders into service with the United Nations. Instead of capitalizing on success in 1956, however, it was considered advisable for Canadians to lie low for a while. When it was suggested early in 1957 that there might be a revived effort to get a settlement on Kashmir in which Canada would play a leading role, Ottawa backed away, not only because we had some doubts about the practicability of the exercise but also because there was a feeling that Canada had over-stretched its resources. There was a genuine concern about the resources of the department itself. When it was suggested to Canada House that the department might send its Kashmir specialist to meetings in London the answer noted that that was a luxury an under-staffed and over-stretched department could not afford. There was no Kashmir expert. There was at any one time just the man who happened to be working on India and Pakistan in the Commonwealth Division and the man who was doing it at that point had spent his foreign service in Peru. The Middle East had been watched carefully as had other troubled spots in which Canada was involved. The danger, however, of rushing off in all directions, not very well prepared or informed, was one of which the department was conscious. The painful experience of having to field a large team in Indochina, about which no one in the department knew anything at first hand, was still vivid. Perhaps more important was the view of the department, which was also the view of the minister, that Canada could gain all too quickly the reputation of a busy-body and destroy the respect which it had at that point acquired. Mr Pearson's policy had been to accept leadership when pressed or when Canada had an idea or a perspective or a position of neutrality to contribute. He sensed the danger in approaching this question from the other direction. As a diplomat who enjoyed the game and believed in its importance but also a politician, newly converted but believing in the parliamentary system, he was by no means unaware of the consequences of his successes and failures on the prestige of Canada and on its Liberal government. He knew how quickly success could turn to failure. He had also from October to March spent a great deal of time in New York and there were a lot of other immediate issues to look after at home - including, of course, the prospects of an election about which he was less sanguine than his cabinet colleagues. The diplomacy and the policies of Canada in the decade after the war were designed for masters at the game. Men like Lester Pearson and Paul Martin could carry the ball in subtle plays because they had long and varied experience and had acquired reputations which gained them power and authority. Being Canadians provided an appropriate background, but they had become

393 The Search for Equilibrium men of the UN, the Commonwealth, of NATO, and the world at large. When a new government came to power, the basic policies and principles did not change greatly, although the style did. It was much harder, nevertheless, for new men to play this game, not because they lacked quality but because they had not been around long enough in the right circles. The new government, furthermore, had to deal with new complexities. The shape of a relatively peaceful world that had been emerging ten years after the war had ended was already in a new convolution. Things were getting much more complex but not necessarily worse. The Suez debacle, Hungary, and the arrival of Sputnik seemed to move the world towards polarization between the superpowers, away from that balance Canada had found congenial. Technology would raise new questions about the place in grand strategy of middle powers, a term that would soon be used to describe Britain and France, even Germany and Japan. The move nevertheless towards the doctrine of mutual deterrence and the gradual acknowledgment of détente on both sides opened the way for, indeed made imperative, efforts at peaceful settlement in which there was a definable function for powers of all sizes. The United Nations, the Commonwealth, NATO, and North America were moving into periods of storm and stress with the lines far less clearly drawn, but they would all be moving closer to the basic issues. The stress on international institutions would come not from decay but growth.

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Notes

NOTE ON SOURCES Unless otherwise specified, documents referred to may be found in the Department of External Affairs records. United Nations documents are in the CHA and other United Nations depository libraries. The poll mentioned was conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion and is available in the CIPO'S Toronto office. CHAPTER 1: ILLUSION AND DISILLUSION 1 'Canada in a Two-Powered World,' Behind the Headlines, vm, April 1948, 1 2 Canadian approaches to collective security when the Charter was being drafted are outlined in more detail in volume 1, chapter 8. 3 For a description of the Canadian concept of functionalism see volume 1, chapter 2, 72-3. 4 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 26 and 28 March 1945, 220-31, 294-312 5 In a lecture of 20 January 1949 by R.G. Riddell, head of the United Nations Division in DEA, in which he deals with current worries about the UN, there is no reference to its economic and social functions except briefly and subordinately as one of the causes of war to be removed. 6 Donald M. Page, éd., Documents on Canadian External Relations, XII (Ottawa 1977), 2052 CHAPTER 2: THE COLD WAR 1 Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973 (Cambridge, Mass. 1974), 39

396 Notes for pages 13-18 2 Ibid., 37. See Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (New York 1977), for a reasonably balanced history in which, nevertheless, not only NATO but the United Nations itself appear to be purely inventions and instruments of the United States. 3 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York 1973), 261; and George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston 1967), 320ff 4 Wrong to Pearson, 14 July 1947 5 Canadian anger was particularly roused by the persecution of a Canadian diplomat, Herbert Norman, by the Un-American Activities Committee. 6 Escott Reid, Memorandum, 'The United States and the Soviet Union: A Study of the Possibility of War and Some of the Implications for Canadian Policy,' 30 Aug. 1947 7 See, for example, Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (Princeton 1973), and Yergin, Shattered Peace. 8 Reid's memorandum of August 1947, for example, set the first priority in diminishing the possibility of war to 'economic assistance to that part of Europe which is outside Soviet control in order to restore stability, prosperity, and hope and thus to lessen the possibility of pro-Soviet elements capitalizing on discontent in order to get power,' 14. For statements on the Canadian economic interest in a revived Europe, see volume 1, chapter 3. 9 In Lloyd C. Gardner et al., eds., The Origins of the Cold War (Toronto 1970), 115 10 See volume 1, chapter 2, 52-60. See also R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, American Dollars- Canadian Prosperity: Canadian-American Economic Relations, 1945-1950 (Toronto 1978), and Robert Bothwell and John English, 'Canadian Trade Policy in the Age of American Dominance and British Decline, 19431947,' Canadian Review of American Studies, vm, spring 1977, 52-65. 11 A detailed account of reporting from the Canadian embassy in Moscow may be found in Don Page, 'Getting to know the Russians, 1943-1948,' a paper presented to a meeting of the Canadian Association of Slavists, 29 May 1978. Don Page and Don Munton, in 'Canadian Images of the Cold War 1946-7,' International Journal, xxxii, summer 1977, provide a spectrum of views in DEA based on Escott Reid's memorandum, 'The United States and the Soviet Union,' which was circulated for comment to a number of officers. 12 Report in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, in: Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto 1972), 319ff, and reproduced at 375-80 13 Ibid., 327 14 Charles Ritchie's comment in his diary on the crude tactics of the Russians at San Francisco is revealing: 'It is unfortunate from our point of view as well as theirs that they should have made such a bad showing, for I think they are proposing to make a serious effort to use the organisation and are not out to

397 Notes for pages 18-24

15 16 17

18

19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30

wreck it.' The Siren Years: A Canadian Diplomat Abroad, 1937-1945 (Toronto 1974), 202 Wilgress to Robertson, 20 Oct. 1943 Wilgress to SSEA, 31 Aug. 1943 Arnold Smith's views cited here are to be found in despatches or enclosures from Leon Mayrand, the chargé d'affaires, to the SSEA, dated 15, 16, 19 April, 18 May, and 6 June 1954. The chargé took responsibility for the views in his despatches although the drafter's initials indicate that they were written by Smith. 'The Russians and the Rest of Us,' undated, by Arnold Smith, and 'Memorandum for Mr. Pearson,' from Escott Reid covering the Smith memorandum and dated 10 Jan. 1948 Wilgress to SSEA, 25 Sept. 1945 Ibid., 29 Oct. 1945 Quotations from Wilgress to SSEA, 21 March and 24 April 1946. It is worthy of note that the revelations of the Gouzenko affair, which took place at the time, seem to have had no notable impact on the views expressed. For a detailed analysis of External Affairs views of the USSR at this time, see Page and Munton, 'Canadian Images of the Cold War,' 577-604. Wilgress to SSEA, 21 March.1946 Kennan, Memoirs, 547-59 See volume 1, chapter 8, 249. Notes on delegation meeting, 21 May 1945 Bohlen, Witness to History, 220-1 Despatch from Berlin of Oct. 1946 For a description of the effects of secrecy on observers in Moscow see the author's 'I Remember Stalin,' Weekend Magazine, xxvm, 4 March 1978. The chilling aspect of the affair is suggested in the comment of Hans Morgenthau: 'How effective was this use of communism for the purpose of the Russian state was strikingly revealed in the testimony of the British and Canadian members of the Grouzenko [sic] spy ring before the Royal Commission investigating the case. When asked why they had betrayed their own countries to the Soviet Union, almost all of these members replied that they had done it for the sake of humanity, that concern for humanity supersedes loyalty to any individual nation, and that the interests of humanity and those of the Soviet Union are identical.' In Gardner et al., eds., The Origins of the Cold War It is curious that leading 'revisionist' historians such as Fleming and Kolko in their voluminous accounts of this period choose to make no reference at all to the Gouzenko affair although it had an important effect on United States policy concerning atomic secrets (volume 1, chapter 7, 204) and the prosecution of American officials.

398 Notes for pages 27-37 31 Wrong to Holmes (London), 1 March 1946 32 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record. Ill: 1945-1946 (Toronto 1970), chapter 2 33 See volume 1, chapter 7. 34 For example, André Fontaine, History of the Cold War (New York 1968), 269 35 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, m, 140 36 Chargé d'Affaires in Soviet Union to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 Feb. 1946, in Donald Page, éd., Documents in Canadian External Relations, xn: 1946 (Ottawa 1977), 2041-2 37 An interesting comment on the case appeared in the Left Liberal New Republic on 20 Dec. 1948: '... the Dominion handled it like a trained surgeon who knows his business. It was a cool, expert, definitive job of exposure, and before there was any time for big headlines, the story was all over,' 119. 38 As suggested, for example, by R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein in 'Looking Back at the Cold War: 1945-54,' Canadian Forum, LII, July-Aug. 1972, 8-11 39 Page and Munton, 'Canadian Images of the Cold War,' 602 40 Wilgress to SSEA, 25 April 1947 41 Pope to Pearson, 29 Sept. 1947 42 Reid, 'The United States and the Soviet Union,' 11 43 Wilgress to SSEA, 14 Nov. 1945 44 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, III, 19 45 DEA, Statements and Speeches, 49/34, 14 Oct. 1949 46 From his private papers 47 Wilgress to SSEA, 25 April 1947 48 Odium to SSEA, 16 Oct. 1945 49 Wrong to Pearson, 14 July 1947 50 Reid, 'The United States and the Soviet Union,' 21-2 51 Pope to Pearson, 29 Sept. 1947 52 R.A. MacKay, comment on Reid's paper of 13 Sept. 1947, undated 53 Cadieux, Memorandum for Mr Teakles, 17 Oct. 1947 54 'Influences Shaping the Policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union,' 4 Dec. 1947. The bulk of the memorandum was the work of Hume Wright of the embassy staff and the conclusion was by the ambassador, Hume Wrong. 55 Page and Munton, 'Canadian Images of the Cold War,' 604 CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT OF A MIDDLE POWER 1 Jan Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (London 1918), 45 2 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 28 March 1945, 308

399 Notes for pages 37-55 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27

See volume 1, chapter 8, 266. Canadian Club, Toronto, 19 Feb. 1945 Debates, 10 Dec. 1947, 130 R.G. Riddell, 'The Role of the Middle Powers in the United Nations,' Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 48/40, 22 June 1948 'The Middle Powers in the United Nations System,' International Organization, I, June 1947, 307 United Nations Conference on International Organization, I, 27 April 1945, 194 Brooke Claxton, 'Canada at the Paris Conference,' International Journal, n, spring 1947, 126 Debates, 17 Dec. 1945, 3638 See volume 1, chapter 2, 33ff. DEA, 'The United Nations, 1946,' Conference series, 1946, no 3, 22-3 Debates, 17 Dec. 1945, 3637 See volume 1, chapter 7, 204ff. Frederick Osborn, 'The USSR and the Atom,' International Organization, v, Aug. 1951, 485 John Swettenham, McNaughton. in: 1944-66 (Toronto 1969), 112 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, Jr, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, i: The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park, PA 1962), 574 T.A. Stone to N.A. Robertson, 1 July 1946 Provisional instructions for the Canadian representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, 7 June 1946 Starnes to Ignatieff, 6 Nov. 1946 The private view of the delegation was that Baruch had been even more uncompromising than expected. 'Certainly the impression derived from the text was reinforced by the spectacle of the grim visaged Wall St. financiers who were ranged behind Baruch, while Groves sat like a cop behind them looking as if he was there to make sure that nothing was given away.' Letter from Ignatieff, 14 June 1946 Wrong to Howe, 8 Aug. 1946 Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto 1967), 197 UN Doc AEC/18, 28 Dec. 1946 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record. Ill: 1945-1946 (Toronto 1970), 406 Memorandum for St Laurent, 18 Dec. 1946 Putting forward his proposal in December Baruch had nauseated the commission by saying: 'For myself as I look upon a long past and too short a future I

400 Notes for pages 55-67

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41

believe the final epitaph would be "he helped to bring lasting peace to the world." ' This led the Polish delegate to speak scornfully to McNaughton about 'voing for an epitaph.' (5 Dec. 1946) UN Doc A/C. 1/340 DEA, 'Report on the United Nations Conference on International Organization,' Conference series, 1945, no 2, 11 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 2nd part, 1st sess., 29 Oct. 1946, 827 See chapter 5. Reproduced in DEA, Canada at the United Nations, 1947 (Ottawa 1948), 175, 177 Ibid., 15 Ibid., 50 Robert A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO, 1946-1949 (Toronto 1959), 148 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record. IV: 1947-1948 (Toronto 1970), 135-6 Ibid., 141 Quoted in Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto 1974), 7 Ibid., 13, n 30 He sent Lester Pearson to Washington to talk to Truman, no less. State Department officials were baffled and reflected their annoyance by raising questions about Canada's commitment to the Security Council which they were just joining. The best detailed account of this affair is Pearson's record in Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. 11: 1948-1957, ed. John A. Munro and Alex. I. Inglis (Toronto 1973), 135-44, of his effort to present in Washington views with which he did not at all agree and his work in finding a way out. In a book review in the Globe and Mail, 14 Oct. 1961, St Laurent characteristically played down the significance of this incident and denied that it was a 'watershed,' but Pearson's account confirms the view that this was a real trial of strength between forces in the cabinet and marked, symbolically at least, the revolution in Canadian foreign policy. Dale Thomson gives a more muted account of this affair than King confided to his diary. He says King clung to his view that a world conflagration was likely while St Laurent did not expect another war in his lifetime. At home St Laurent thought Quebec would support Canadian participation in UNCOK because it was a UN rather than a British imperial undertaking, but King said four-fifths of Canada would oppose such a move and every MP from Quebec would speak against it. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 224-5

401 Notes for pages 69-80 42 The following account is based largely on the author's notes and his recollections of the exercise, in which he participated. 43 DEA, Canada and the United Nations, 1949 (Ottawa 1950), 39 44 Pearson to Robertson, 29 Jan. 1948 45 See chapter 11. 46 UN Doc s/1234, 28 Jan. 1949 CHAPTER 4: COLLECTIVE ACTION: NORTH A M E R I C A 1 Cited in C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa 1970), 98 2 From Steven Ruvinsky, 'The Place of Canada in American Continental Strategy 1946-1957,' PHD thesis in progress. I am particularly indebted to Ruvinsky who has searched the United States files for this period and cast new light on United States policy on continental defence. 3 Cited in F.H. Soward, 'A Survey of Canadian External Policy,' prepared for DEA 1952, chapter 3, 69 4 Text in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada. Hi: Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto 1972), 375-80 5 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 70. The Joint Basic Security Plan to replace ABC-22 is reprinted in Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, 381-8. 6 Heeney memorandum for the prime minister, 12 June 1946 7 Wrong 'memorandum,' 11 June 1946 8 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 70-1 9 Cabinet Defence Committee, 19 July 1946 10 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 71-2 11 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, m: 1945-1946 (Toronto 1970), 362-4 12 The acting secretary of state, Acheson, warned Truman of King's reluctance 'to reach any decision until events have made it imperative to do so,' and of Canadian sensitivity about sovereignty and about implications for the Commonwealth, points insistently made by the American ambassador. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, v (Washington 1969), 57 13 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 72-3. The United States report of the meeting (ibid., 61-3) does not contradict the Canadian version. It was based on Pearson's report to the State Department of the conversation. The oral message is in ibid., 58-61. These documents and King's account are also found in Roger Frank Swanson, éd., Canadian-American Summit Diplomacy, 1923-1973 (Toronto 1975), 106-14. 14 Records of the PJBD, meeting 4-5 Sept. 1945

402 Notes for pages 80-9 15 Department of State Bulletin, xiv, 19 May 1946, 860. It is possible that this reference was specifically intended to include Canada in exemptions from the Buy American policy. 16 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 78 17 Wilgress to SSEA, 25 April 1947 18 F.H. Soward, Canada in World Affairs, 1944-46 (Toronto 1950), 273-4 19 Canadian defence relations with the United States, 11 May 1944, PHP 20 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 73 21 Ibid. 22 Charles Foulkes, 'Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age,' Behind the Headlines, XXI, May 1961, 3 23 See volume 1, chapter 5, 154-6. 24 FRUS, 1946, v, 64. Memorandum dated 12 Nov. 1946 25 See volume 1, chapter 2, 65-9. 26 Memorandum of 1 Oct. 1946, FRUS, 1946, v, 56 27 Ibid., 57 28 Lester B. Pearson, 'Canada Looks "Down North,"' Foreign Affairs, XXIV, July 1946, 643, 644 29 Memorandum by assistant chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Parsons), 12 Nov. 1946, in FRUS, 1946, v, 65 30 The American report of this meeting is reproduced in ibid., 68-75. The Canadian report is summarized in Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 75ff. 31 Text in R.A. MacKay, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto 1971), 228ff 32 FRUS, 1947, m (Washington 1972), Canadian minister in the United States (Stone) to the chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson), 106 33 'Defence of North America,' Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 48/18, 12 April 1948 34 New York Times, 18 May 1946 35 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 12 Feb. 1947, 347 36 In the preparation of this section I have been greatly helped by the researches of two scholars, John Kirton and Danford Middlemiss. A summary version of Kirton's work has appeared in Andrew Axline, et al., Continental Community?: Independence and Integration in North America (Toronto 1974). Middlemiss's research is available in an as yet unpublished University of Toronto PHD thesis entitled 'A Pattern of Co-operation: the Case of the Canadian-American Defence Production and Development Sharing Arrangements, 1958-1963.' 37 See volume 1, chapter 6. 38 The dismantling of the wartime arrangements is described in volume 1, chapter 4.

403 Notes for pages 89-94 39 Middlemiss, 'A Pattern of Co-operation,' 58 40 See volume 1, chapter 2, 24ff. 41 Memorandum by the assistant chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Foster) to the director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), 2 Jan. 1948, in FRUS, 1948, ix (Washington 1972), 405-6 42 'Some Canadian Problems and Projects,' DEA, Statements and Speeches, 48/3, 30 Jan. 1948 43 FRUS, 7947, in, 127, 128 44 'Integration and Disintegration on the North American Continent,' International Organization, xxvm, autumn 1974, 857 45 In addition to R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, American Dollars- Canadian Prosperity: Canadian-American Economic Relations 1945-1950 (Toronto 1978), chapter 3, the following is based on the prime minister's own recollections as record in J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record. IV: 1947-1948 (Toronto 1970), 259ff; an account by Pearson in Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. I: 1897-1948 (Toronto 1972), 291ff; the American side of the story in FRUS, 1948, ix, 405ff; and on the testimony for which the author is grateful to Messrs Hector McKinnon and John Deutsch. The story was checked with Deutsch in October 1975, shortly before his death. 46 'Customs Union with Canada,' Life, xxiv, 15 March 1948, 40 47 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, iv, 262 48 Ibid., 263 49 Pearson to Robertson, top secret and personal letter, 22 April 1948 50 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, iv, 265 51 Ibid., 267. Richard Jebb, a British author, in this volume and in The Britannic Question, 1913, argues the case for the Commonwealth as an alliance rather than an imperial federation in terms which King would find congenial. 52 As related in chapter 5, Canadian-British-American discussions leading to the North Atlantic Treaty were being conducted at this time in great secrecy. 53 FRUS, 1948, ix, 411. Canadian ambassador (Wrong) to the director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), 1 April 1948 54 Cuff and Granatstein, American Dollars- Canadian Prosperity, 78

55 Ibid., 412 56 That was in fact the way it was greeted by Hector McKinnon when King's comment was drawn to his attention. 57 International Canada, Nov. 1974

58 Mike, I, 292 59 See volume 1, chapter 3. Cuff and Granatstein, American Dollars- Canadian Prosperity, chapter 4.

404 Notes for pages 95-102 60 FRUS, 1948, ix, 408. Memorandum by the associate chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Willoughby) to assistant secretary of state for economic affairs (Thorp), undated 61 Cited in Middlemiss, 'A Pattern of Co-operation,' 157 62 St Laurent, Statements and Speeches, 49/34, 14 Oct. 1949 63 Cited in Debates, 5 June 1950, 3196 CHAPTER 5: COLLECTIVE ACTION: NORTH A T L A N T I C [For more detailed history and other perspectives on the subject of this chapter see Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949 (Toronto 1977), the only account by one of the participants, and James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, iv: Growing Up Allied (Toronto 1980).] 1 Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, 83rd Plenary Session, 18 Sept. 1947, 65 2 Escott Reid, Memorandum, 'The United States and the Soviet Union: A study of the possibility of war and some of the implications for Canadian policy,' 30 Aug. 1947 3 See, for example, the instructions of 13 August 1948 to General Vanier in Paris. 4 See Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. II: 19481957, ed. John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis (Toronto 1973), 38-9. 5 Escott Reid, 'An Approach to some of the basic policies, 1946,' memorandum dated 9 Feb. 1946, under covering note to Pearson, 12 Oct. 1946 6 What is reported here is the conventional wisdom of the times. See also chapter 2, 'The Cold War.' 7 Reid to Wrong, 5 Nov. 1947 8 See Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 29-30. 9 Lester B. Pearson, 'Peace through the United Nations,' Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 48/2, 26 Jan. 1948 10 See volume 1, chapter 4. 11 See King's speech in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 17 March 1948, 2303. 12 Mike, n, 39 13 Pearson, 'Peace through the United Nations'; Louis St Laurent, 'Problems of Canadian sovereignty,' Statements and Speeches, 48/22, 26 April 1948 14 Reid memorandum for Pearson, 26 June 1948 15 Wrong to Reid, 17 June 1948 16 Robertson to SSEA, 28 June 1948

405 Notes for pages 102-9 17 Pope to SSEA, 28 June 1948 18 Pearson to SSEA, 29 June 1948, followed by an even stronger memo on 30 June 19 This assumption is based on the nature of a letter about the airlift Claxton wrote to St Laurent on 30 June. 20 Reid to SSEA, 28 Sept. 1948 21 Robertson to SSEA, 12 Oct. 1948 22 In response St Laurent feared Canada would be acting like a colony recruiting forces for the UK. F.H. Soward, 'A Survey of Canadian External Policy,' prepared for DEA, 1952, chapter 5, 38 23 Ibid. 24 Canada at the United Nations, 1947, DEA, Conference series, 1947, no 1, 179 25 It is recognized in the official NATO version as the initial public statement leading to Bevin's pronouncement and the Vandenberg Resolution. See NA TO: Facts and Figures (Brussels 1971), 19. 26 'On an anniversary,' Foreign Affairs, xxvn, Oct. 1947, 1-4 27 Ignatieff, New York, to Reid, Ottawa, 22 Nov. 1947 28 The exchanges during this period are summarized in Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 82ff. 29 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, vol. 1 (Boston 1967), 407 30 See chapter 4, 85-8. 31 Cited in Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 87 32 Pearson, New York, to SSEA, 22 March 1948 33 The gist of this telephone message is contained in a draft telegram from Reid to Pearson dated 23 March 1948, which was not sent as the minister considered that he had covered the ground in his call. 34 In Ottawa the only persons who saw the telegrams were King, St Laurent, Pearson (under-secretary), Reid (deputy under-secretary), Claxton (minister of national defence), Foulkes (chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee), and Heeney (secretary of the cabinet). 35 Pearson admitted this in his memoirs. Mike, H, 43 36 'Security Pact for the North Atlantic Area,' memorandum for the prime minister, 29 March 1948 37 Pearson to Prime Minister, 12 April 1948 38 Memorandum, Pearson to Prime Minister, 29 March 1948 39 Memorandum, Pearson to Prime Minister, 12 April 1948 40 Pearson to Prime Minister, 29 March 1948 41 Pearson to Wrong, 18 May 1948 42 See volume 1, chapter 5, 154 ff. 43 Pearson to Prime Minister, 20 July 1948

406 Notes for pages 110-20 44 Stone to Pearson, 29 July 1949. Pearson's marginal comment on this letter was, 'Surely the Americans must see that no one is going to join the Brussels Group as long as the question of U.S. association with Atlantic security is not decided.' 45 Wrong to Pearson, 4 Sept. 1948 46 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 92 47 Memorandum, Pearson to Prime Minister, 4 Jan. 1949; C.S.A. Ritchie, Record of Pearson conversation with Gladwyn Jebb, Paris, 19 Nov. 1948 48 Soward 'Survey,' chapter 3, 97. The Americans, however, wanted neutrals excluded from any benefits. 49 Sean McBride to Pearson, 7 Feb., and Pearson to McBride, 2 Feb., 1948 50 The 'free trade' discussions are described in chapter 4, 90ff. 51 Pearson to Wrong, 21 Feb. 1949 52 Wrong to Pearson, 21 Feb. 1949 53 Wrong to Pearson, 9 Feb. 1949. By the 'other political elements' he meant the CCF, but an ambassador could not make partisan comments. 54 Robertson to Pearson, 17 Feb. 1949 55 Wrong to Pearson, 9 Feb. 1949 56 Ibid. 57 Wrong to Reid, 17 June 1948 58 Memorandum to cabinet on 'The North Atlantic Treaty,' 6 Oct. 1948 59 Mike, H, 61-2 60 This diplomacy is well described by Escott Reid in 'Canada and the Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1949,' in Michael Fry, éd., Freedom and Change (Toronto 1975). The account of Wrong's statement to Hickerson is on page 128. 61 Vanier to SSEA, 19 Feb. 1949 62 Mike, n, 58 63 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 94-5 64 SSEA to Wrong, 17 Feb. 1949 65 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 100 66 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York 1969), 282 67 Debates, 1949, 239 68 Pearson for the Prime Minister, 'Security Pact for the North Atlantic Area,' 29 March 1948 69 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, iv: 1947-1948 (Toronto 1970), 190-1 70 Ibid., 188 71 Ibid., 177

407 Notes for pages 120-33 72 Mike, H, 40-1 73 A British request for assistance over an incident at Chanak in 1922, arising out of the peace settlement with Turkey, had roused King and created a furore which became a legend of Canadian foreign policy. See G.P. deT. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations (Toronto 1950), 358-60. 74 The source of these comments on the Paris session of 1948 is the author's recollections and notes. 75 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, iv, 161-2 76 Ibid., 162 77 Debates, 17 March 1948, 2303 78 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III (Washington 1974), 'Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 10 Sept. 1948, 4 p.m.,' 249 CHAPTER 6: THE C O M M U N I S T 'MONOLITH' 1 F.H. Soward, 'A Survey of Canadian External Policy,' prepared for DEA 1952, chapter 5, 60 2 For a contrary view see J.G. Castel, 'Polish Art Treasures in Canada 1940-1960: A Case History,' American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 68th Annual Meeting, 25-27 April 1974, 121-7. 3 For a detailed account see Aloysius Balawyder, The Odyssey of the Polish Treasures (Antigonish, NS 1978). Although the dispute soured relations between the two governments for over a decade, it was ironically the effort by diplomats on both sides to find a solution which promoted an interesting and profitable dialogue eventually between these two somewhat restless neighbours and allies of the superpowers. 4 DEA, Canada and the United Nations, 1949 (Ottawa 1950), 46, 46-7 5 DEA, Canada and the United Nations, 1950 (Ottawa 1951), 74 6 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 5, 66 7 Repeated by St Laurent, Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 10 Feb. 1947,235 8 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 5, 76 9 Embassy, Moscow, to SSEA, 26 Aug. 1948 10 Deputy minister of finance to USSEA, 6 Nov. 1944 11 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 4, 139 12 SSEA to embassy, Chungking, 21 Sept. 1945 13 Cited in Kim Richard Nossal, 'Strange Bedfellows: Canada and China in War and Revolution, 1942-1947' (PHD thesis, University of Toronto, 1977), 258-9. 14 A.R. Menzies to Wrong, 14 March 1944 15 Odium to SSEA, 7 Aug. 1944

408 Notes for pages 133-43 16 Compensation was eventually paid in 1973 after Canada and the People's Republic of China had established diplomatic relations. 17 An excellent account of Odium's reporting and his idiosyncracies is to be found in Nossal, 'Strange Bedfellows.' 18 Odium to SSEA, 4 Sept. 1946 19 Ibid., 16 Oct. 1945 20 Pearson, New York, to Laurent Beaudry, 6 Nov. 1947 21 On 4 Feb. 1950 Wrong reported from Washington that 'Recognition of Communist China is a dead issue at the moment in the United States.' Wrong to Acting SSEA 22 Ronning to SSEA, 29 Dec. 1949 23 Ibid., 28 March 1950 24 Memorandum for the minister on the recognition of the new Communist Government of China, 2 Nov. 1949, signed T.C. Davis 25 'China Situation - recent developments,' 15 Nov. 1949, unsigned 26 Wrong to SSEA, 26 Jan. 1950 27 Wrong to SSEA, 4 Feb. 1950 28 Debates, 16 Nov. 1949, 1838 29 Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto 1967), 286-7 30 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 4, 24 Nov. 1949, 156 31 Wrong to Pearson, 4 Feb. 1950, and Wrong to SSEA, 4 Feb. 1950 32 SSEA to embassy, Nanking, 27 and 28 April 1950 33 Ronning to SSEA, 16 and 22 May 1950 34 Ibid., 23 May 1950 35 A.D.P. Heeney, Memorandum for the Minister, 'China - Relations with Peking Government,' 29 May 1950 36 Ronning to SSEA, 13 June 1950 37 The UK high commission reported these talks to the department in mid-May. They indicated incidentally that the Americans had said they would vote against any proposal to unseat the Nationalists in the UN but would accept a majority decision, a comment which eased one of DEA'S worries over the consequences of recognition. 38 A.D.P. Heeney, memorandum for the minister, 'Relations with the Peking Government,' 4 July 1950 39 SSEA to Ronning and to consul-general in Shanghai, 8 July 1950

CHAPTER 7: THE CHALLENGE OF KOREA 1 For a much more detailed account of the events see Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. H: I948-1957, ed. John A. Munro and

409 Notes for pages 143-51

2

3 4 5

6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20

21 22

Alex. I. Inglis (Toronto 1973), chapters 7 and 8; and Denis Stairs' thorough and perceptive account and analysis in The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto 1974). Action by the UN in Korea was not in fact taken under the collective security articles in chapter 7 of the Charter, but it was justified both in the UN and at home by the logic of collective security. See Arnold Wolfers, 'Collective Security and the War in Korea,' Yale Review, XLIII, June 1954. UN Doc s/1508/Rev. 1, 27 June 1950 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 30 June 1950, 4459 Claxton and his advisers were convinced from the beginning that air and naval support of the South Koreans would not be sufficient and that UN ground forces would be required. Cited in Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, 77 Mike, II, 155-6 Blair Fraser, The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967 (Toronto 1967), 98 Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada (Official History of the Canadian Army) (Ottawa 1966), 20 See Pearson's record of his talks with Acheson, Mike, II, 149-54. Wood, Strange Battleground, 24 Department of External Affairs, Canada and the Korean Crisis (Ottawa 1950), 31-5 Debates, 31 Aug. 1950, 93-4 Chiefs of Staff Committee, 18 July 1950; Cabinet Defence Committee, 19 July 1950 Embassy, Washington, to DEA, 20 July 1950 Pearson to St Laurent, 1 Aug. 1950 Mike, II, 157 As acting Canadian representative to the United Nations, I probably felt more acutely than most the embarrassment of the gap between Canadian statements and Canadian action, but I recognize in retrospect how unaware I was of the political and military realities in Ottawa. Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto 1967), 292 In Livingston Merchant, éd., Neighbors Taken for Granted: Canada and the United States (New York and Toronto 1966), 134-47 An advance party for administrative purposes sailed for Korea in October. The main body arrived in December, completed ground training near Pusan, and were not in action until February 1951, by which time Ridgway's forces were beginning to push the Chinese back. DEA to Pearson, New York, 28 Sept. 1950 Mike, n, 161

410 Notes for pages 151-60 23 Debates, 1 Feb. 1951, 55-6 24 Department of External Affairs, Documents on the Korean Crisis (Ottawa 1951), 2-3 25 See chapter 9, 192. 26 These points were set out in a memorandum prepared by Escott Reid in November 1950, which Pearson sent to missions abroad. 27 'A Report from Lake Success,' Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 50/48, 15 Nov. 1950 28 See, for example, Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York 1972). 29 'Canadian Policy in the Present International Crisis,' Statements and Speeches, 50/51, 5 Dec. 1950 30 His diary accounts of his activities in this role are contained in the appendices to Mike, n. They provide a valuable account of the intricacies of UN diplomacy and evidence that as a member of this UN committee and later as president of the UN Assembly Pearson had a central position in the protracted effort to get not just a formal ceasefire but to bring the actual fighting to an end. As a UN officer, he had more authority in talking back to the Americans. After his strenuous efforts to get an acceptable report by the Committee of Three, Jack Hickerson of the State Department told Wrong that never before had the State Department been subjected to such arm twisting. He said they would take it from nobody but the Canadians. (Mike, n, 295) As members of that key committee, the Canadians had more clout than they had as the neighbourly nuisance. It was Pearson, the formidable UN operator, that they had to respect. In any case, Jack Hickerson was always the last best friend Canada had in Washington. 31 See chapter 9, 196. 32 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York 1969), 531 33 Mike, II, appendix 2 34 'The Korean Crisis,' External Affairs, in, Feb. 1951, 55-6 35 Mike, n, 311 36 This account is largely based on the author's own notes and recollections. See also his 'Geneva: 1954,' International Journal, xxii, summer 1967, 457-83. 37 Official records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, First Committee, 615th meeting 38 These efforts and the us response are outlined in a DEA memorandum of 1 April 1954. 39 'Canada and the United Nations: Korea,' External Affairs, ix, Feb. 1957, 59 40 The observations in this section on External Affairs conclusions from the Korean experience are distilled from a memorandum, "The Role of the

411 Notes for pages 162-73 United Nations in thé Maintenance of Collective Security,' 8 Aug. 1951, prepared by JWH, with comments of other officers to whom it was sent, in particular a telegram from Canada House, London, 5 Sept. 1951. 41 For External views and Pearson's, see A.O.P. Heeney, memorandum for the Minister, 'Role of the United Nations in a General War,' 22 Aug. 1951. 42 Max Freedman, memorandum to Grant Dexter, editor, Winnipeg Free Press CHAPTER 8: THE NEW C O M M O N W E A L T H 1 See volume 1, chapter 5, 151-4. 2 F.H. Soward, 'A Survey of Canadian External Policy,' prepared for DEA 1952, chapter 2, 20 3 Cited in ibid., 23 4 For a personal impression of what went wrong in Commonwealth meetings at the UN during the fifties see JWH, memorandum for the under-secretary, 'Commonwealth Relations at the 1958 Session of the United Nations General Assembly,' 22 Dec. 1958. 5 Robertson, from Paris, to DEA, 9 Sept. 1947 6 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 2, 28 7 Ibid. 8 For a detailed account of Canada's policies on India's role in the Commonwealth see Frank Hayes, 'The Evolution of Canada's Commonwealth Relations: 1945-1968' (PHD thesis, University of Toronto, 1979), chapter 3. 9 J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record. I: 1939-1944 (Toronto 1960), 408. 10 Pearson to Prime Minister, 29 May 1947 11 Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto 1967), 206. King's account is to be found in J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, iv: 1947-1948 (Toronto 1970), 42-4. 12 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 2, 34 13 High Commissioner, New Delhi, to SSEA, 27 May 1948 14 Reproduced in Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. n: 1948-1957, ed. John A. Munro and Alex. I. Inglis (Toronto 1973), 104 15 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 2, 36 16 Cited in ibid., 57 17 Ibid., 37 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Douglas LePan, Bright Glass of Memory (Toronto 1979). Chapter 4 of these memoirs is a vivid and illuminating account of the beginnings of the Colombo Plan by the senior Canadian official involved.

412 Notes for pages 175-95 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34

DEA to embassy, Washington, 9 Aug. 1950 Embassy, Washington, to DEA, 8 Sept. 1950 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 2, 47 For an analysis of the various Canadian motives for participating in the Colombo Plan see LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, 223ff. Cited in Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 2, 47-8 Ibid., 47 An account of the London meeting is contained in ibid., chapter 2, 5Iff. For an account of these efforts see ibid., 53-5. 'Canadian Policy with respect to the Commonwealth,' Departmental Policy Paper, 26 July 1951 Ibid., 31 The following account of the Prime Ministers' conference is based for the most part on the author's notes. Menzies tried to perpetrate a draft communiqué which, by its crude Cold Warrish tone, would have gravely embarrassed the non-Western prime ministers and was objectionable to St Laurent as well. JWH to Escott Reid, New Delhi, 24 July 1956 D.G. Anglin, 'Canadian Policy Towards International Institutions 1939-1950' (PHD thesis, Oxford, 1956), 69 CHAPTER 9: THE ASIAN DIMENSION

1 Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, n: 1948-1957, ed. John A. Munro and Alex. I. Inglis (Toronto 1973), 179 2 Conversation with Australian high commissioner, 25 March 1948 3 Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 53/30, 11 June 1953 4 The differences with the Americans on this subject are outlined in the chapter on Korea; in particular those which culminated over the declaring of China as an aggressor in January 1951. In chapters 7 and 8 in volume u of his memoirs and in the appendices Pearson has outlined his attitudes vis-à-vis China and the United States. 5 SSEA to ambassador, Washington, 9 Feb. 1951 6 Cited in Mike, n, 165-6 7 Memorandum for the minister, 10 Feb. 1951 8 For example, the House of Commons debates on 25 and 26 March 1954, 3335-6, 3373rT, before Pearson went to Geneva 9 The prime minister's lengthy explanation is reported in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 25 March 1954, 3334.

413 Notes for pages 195-205 10 References to understandings in Geneva are from the author's notes of this conference. For Spaak's interest see USSEA, memorandum for the minister, 'Recognition of China,' 6 Sept. 1955. 11 Debates, 25 Jan. 1955, 498-9 12 Cited in Robert W. Reford, Canada and Three Crises (Toronto 1968), 45 13 SSEA to high commissioner, New Delhi, 19 Feb. 1955 14 Ibid. 15 'Some Aspects of Canadian-American Relations,' Statements and Speeches, 55/8 16 Debates, 24 March 1955, 2344 17 Canadian Press report from Taipei, 28 March 1952 18 Heeney to Holmes, personal letter, 31 Jan. 1955 19 USSEA, memorandum for the minister, 'Recognition of China' 20 Statements and Speeches, 55/30, 25 Aug. 1955 21 USSEA,'Recognition of China' 22 Embassy, Washington, to DEA, 6 Sept. 1955; SSEA to ambassador, Washington, 9 Sept. 1955 23 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 4, 24 April 1956, 99 24 Debates, 31 Jan. 1956, 710-11 25 See chapter 13, new members, 336ff. 26 Reproduced in us Department of State Bulletin, xxx, 25 Jan. 1954, 108 27 'A Look at the "New Look,"' Statements and Speeches, 54/16, 15 March 1954 28 Debates, 25 March 1954, 3328 29 Douglas Ross, 'In the Interests of Peace: Perception and Response in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-making concerning the International Commission for Supervision and Control for Vietnam, 1954-65 (PHD thesis, University of Toronto, 1979), 897. This study is a sound, well-documented, and objective analysis of Canadian policies vis-à-vis Vietnam. Readers should be aware, in assessing the slant of this chapter, that Ross identifies the author as one of the 'liberal-moderates.' 30 Ibid., 165 31 Debates, 28 May 1954, 5189ff 32 Our observer, the author of these volumes, had been persuaded by a puritan conscience that he ought not to dally longer on the Swiss Riviera while others did his work in Ottawa. As a consequence his conscience has ever since wrestled with the question of whether he might not have twisted the arm of Chou En-lai, Molotov, et al. to get Canada off the hook on which it was to be skewered for some twenty years.

414 Notes for pages 205-25 33 Charles Taylor, Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam: 1954 to ¡973 (Toronto 1974), 7. The us representative at the Geneva talks, Bedell Smith, recommended against Canada. He had been angered by Canada's resistance to us tactics in the Korean section of the Geneva Conference. 34 'Statement on Canadian membership in the International Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,' Statements and Speeches, 54/36, 28 July 1954 35 Pearson to Lett, 24 Aug. 1954 36 These impressions were gained by the author in Vietnam in the spring of 1955 and are reprinted in a memorandum for the minister, 'Prospects in IndoChina,' dated 11 July 1955. 37 JWH, memorandum for USSEA, 'Discussions with the State Department on Indo-China,' 2 Sept. 1955 38 SSEA to Washington embassy, 12 July 1955 39 Pearson, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 13, 24 May 1955, 539 40 See memorandum on Indochina, 6 Jan. 1955, para. 15, prepared for the prime minister for his visit to New Delhi. 41 SSEA to high commissioner, London, and ambassador, Washington, 12 July 1955 42 JWH memorandum for the minister, 'Prospects in Indo-China' 43 Ibid. 44 JWH, 'Discussions with the State Department' 45 Personal letter, J.W. Holmes to David Johnson, 23 March 1956 46 Raymond Aron, 'La situation dans le Sud-Est asiatique: de Bangkok à Bandoeng,' Politique étrangère, III, juin-juil. 1955 47 See chapter 13, 336ff. CHAPTER 10: THE M E A N I N G OF A L L I A N C E 1 Wrong to Heeney, 18 Nov. 1949 2 Pearson comments on a memorandum from Heeney of 29 Sept. 1949 3 F.H. Soward, 'A Survey of Canadian External Relations,' prepared for DEA 1952, chapter 7, 52 4 Memorandum, Reid to Ritchie, 7 Sept. 1950 5 See Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London 1962), 103. 6 An account of this trip is contained in a Pearson memorandum entitled 'Trip to Western Europe, July 1951,' some of which is reproduced in Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. II: 1948-1957 ed. John A. Munro and Alex. I. Inglis (Toronto 1973), 70ff. 7 'Western Europe and the North Atlantic Community,' 17 July 1951

415 Notes for pages 225-36 8 Wrong memorandum, 15 Oct. 1951 9 Escott Reid, memorandum, 'Development of the North Atlantic Community,' 10 Sept. 1951 10 Dulles told the NATO Council in May 1956 that creating or appearing to create a NATO voting bloc would be difficult for the United States as the administration had assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when recommending approval of NATO, that it would not be used to form a voting bloc because of the United States position vis-à-vis the OAS. 11 Pearson, 'How is NATO doing?' Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 52/30, 2 Sept. 1952 12 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1 April 1952, 1013, 1014 13 Mike, II, 65-6 14 Memorandum for USSEA, 'Permanent Commission for Political and Economic Co-operation under the Atlantic Treaty,' 19 April 1950 15 Department of External Affairs, NATO Roundup, no 1, 12 May 1951 16 Heeney, memorandum for SSEA, 'Re: Defence Organization under North Atlantic Treaty,' 1 April 1949 17 Ottawa Citizen, 3, 4 Sept. 1949, and memorandum, Pearson to Heeney, 3 Sept. 1949 18 This view of Pearson's dated from the early stages, 13 April 1948. 19 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 100 20 Ibid., 101 21 See volume 1, pp 250-1. 22 Cabinet Defence Committee decision of 14 Sept. 1949 23 R.A. MacKay, Memorandum for the Minister, 'Atlantic Treaty - Summary of Progress of Discussions in the Working Group to 2 September,' 5 Sept. 1949 24 See chapter 4, 89. 25 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 107-8 26 Ibid., 112 27 Debates, 5 Feb. 1951, 94 28 Soward,'Survey,'chapter 3, 118 29 SSEA to Wilgress, 17 March 1951 30 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 3, 121 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Statement of 23 Oct. 1952 34 Mike, 11, 84 35 DEA, NATO Roundup, no 1, 12 May 1951, 8 36 Source for the following account is, unless otherwise identified, the account in Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 5, 67ff.

416 Notes for pages 236-52 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55

SSEA to Wrong, 20 April 1951 SSEA to Wilgress, 19 May 1951 Wilgress to SSEA, 17 July 1951 Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 5, 70 SSEA to Pope, 22 April 1950 New York Times, 8 July 1948 See chapter 5, 110, 113, and supra, 225-6 Mike, II, 82ff Ritchie for the under-secretary, 'Progress in NATO,' 10 Feb. 1953. Ritchie himself later became ambassador in Washington and then under-secretary. The drafting of the memorandum was the work of J.H. Warren who has been, among other things, deputy minister of trade and commerce, high commissioner in London, and ambassador in Washington. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 13, 24 May 1955, 541-2 Reported by C.S.A. Ritchie, in a memorandum to the Under-Secretary, 10 May 1955 Pearson report from Paris to the Under-Secretary, 16 July 1955 L.B. Pearson, 'International Co-operation and a new NATO,' Statements and Speeches, 56/16, 3 June 1956 Pearson memorandum, 'Appreciation of NATO Ministerial Meeting, 4-5 May 1956,' 11 May 1956 Speech to United States and Canadian Aviation Writers Association in Montreal, 1 June 1955 'A look at the "New Look,"' Statements and Speeches, 54/16, 15 March 1954; Debates, 25 March 1954, 3329-31, 1 April 1954, 3555-7 Debates, 24 March 1955, 2342-3; 29 March 1955, 2477-8 Roger Frank Swanson, 'An Analytical Study of the United States/Canadian Defense Relationship as a Structure, Response and Process: Problems and Potentialities' (PHD thesis, American University, 1969), 218 'A Middle Power in the Cold War,' in Hugh L. Keenleyside, et al., The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs (Durham, NC 1960), 159 CHAPTER 11: THE CONTINENTAL RELATIONSHIP

1 In R.A. MacKay, éd., Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto 1971), 269-71 2 Ibid., 261. On us policies see Larry Aronson, 'The Northern Frontier: United States Trade and Investment in Canada 1945-1953' (PHD thesis, University of Toronto, 1980).

417 Notes for pages 253-67 3 Cited in James Eayrs, 'Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues,1 in John Sloan Dickey, éd., The United States and Canada (New York 1964), 55 4 Ibid., 57 5 This statement of principles had little immediate effect on the Americans' will to buy Canadian, but their increasing interest in Canadian raw materials as their own were depleted altered somewhat the attitude of Washington. See Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto 1979), chapter 15. 6 MacKay, éd., Canadian Foreign Policy, 77-9 7 For a critical examination of this question see R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, American Dollars- Canadian Prosperity: Canadian-American Economic Relations, 1945-1950 (Toronto 1978), chapter 5. 8 L.B. Pearson, 'Canadian Foreign Policy in a Two-Power World,' Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 51/14, 10 April 1951 9 See particularly chapter 12, 295ff, on relations with the United States in the United Nations. 10 'The Régime of Boundary Waters - the Canadian-United States Experience,' Hague Academy Lectures, 1975 (Leyden 1977), 276 11 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 28 Jan. 1949, 66 12 Lionel Chevrier, The St. Lawrence Seaway (Toronto 1959), 42-3 13 William R. Willoughby, The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study in Politics and Diplomacy (Madison, Wise. 1961), 225 14 'Canada offers to construct St. Lawrence Seaway,' Department of State Bulletin, xxv, 8 Oct. 1951, 581 15 John Swettenham, McNaughton. Hi: 1944-1966 (Toronto 1969), 215-16 16 Ibid., 224-5 17 MacKay, éd., Canadian Foreign Policy, 275 18 Chevrier, The St. Lawrence Seaway, 54 19 Swettenham, McNaughton, HI, 262 (square brackets in original) 20 House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 8, 19 March 1953, 257-8 21 Ibid., no 16, 1 June 1955, 624

22 23 24 25

Cited in Swettenham, McNaughton, in, 250 Cited in ibid., 259 Quoted in ibid., 269 This innocuous conference has assumed a sinister role in the interpretations of those who regard high-level Canadian-American meetings as rituals of submission with cocktails. It is said that St Laurent and Pearson were browbeaten also into reversing a decision to recognize Peking (see chapter 9, 198). The author, who accompanied the prime minister to White Sulphur Springs - and

418 Notes for pages 267-83

26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46

47

who has checked the records - recalls only a surfeit of ritual tours d'horizon, over-sumptuous food, and toasts. Debates, 9 April 1956, 2728 Debates, 23 May 1956, 4249 Interview, April 1974, with F.J.E. Jordan of the Ottawa staff of the IJC DEA, memorandum, USSEA to the minister, 14 Nov. 1957 Department of State Bulletin, xxxi, 11 Oct. 1954, 540 J. Richard Wagner, 'Canada's Impact on United States Legislative Processes: The Chicago Diversion Bills,' University of Arizona, Research Series no 14, Feb. 1973, 10 Ibid., 13 Swettenham, McNaughton, ill, 244-5 See William R. Willoughby, The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States (Toronto 1979), chapters 9 and 10. McNaughton to H.L. Keenleyside, 6 Feb. 1961, quoted in Swettenham, McNaughton, III, 209 Testimony to David P. Beatty in 'Canadian-American Joint Defence Board, 1946-1963' (PHD thesis, Michigan State University, 1969), 70-1 R.A. MacKay to Beatty in ibid., 214 Swettenham, McNaughton, in, 208. See also Joseph T. Jockel, 'The United States and Canadian Efforts at Continental Air Defence, 1945-1957' (PHD thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1978). Steven Ruvinsky, personal note to the author, Feb. 1979 Stanley W. Dzuiban, Military Relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington, DC 1959), 48 See Charles Foulkes, 'Complications of Continental Defence,' in Livingston Merchant, éd., Neighbors Taken for Granted (Toronto 1966), 117-19. Debates, 12 Nov. 1940 Department of State Bulletin, xxvn, 1 Dec. 1952, 847-8, and a letter from Acheson, 16 July 1963, quoted in Beatty, 'The Canadian-American Joint Defence Board,' 186-71 Debates, 28 June 1946, 2987-8 'Canada-u.s. Economic Co-operation Reviewed,' External Affairs, v, Nov. 1953, 326 D.W. Middlemiss, 'A Pattern of Co-operation: the case of the CanadianAmerican Defence Production and Development Sharing Arrangements, 1958-1963' (PHD thesis, University of Toronto, 1975), 156 A CIPO poll of 19 Feb. 1944 showed that 70 per cent of those polled favoured free trade with the United States.

419 Notes for pages 284-306 48 R. O'Hurley, 'The Why and How of Defence Production Sharing,' Industrial Canada, Nov. 1959, 43-6 49 Cited in Middlemiss, 'A Pattern of Co-operation,1 160 50 Jon B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963 (Baltimore 1967), 176 51 For an account of the planning of MORAD see General Charles Foulkes, 'The Complications of Continental Defence,' and his testimony to the House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 15, 22 Oct. 1963. 52 See, for example, volume 1, chapter 2, 30. 53 C.D. Howe, 'Canada in Today's Trading World,' Statements and Speeches, 49/46, 6 Dec. 1946 54 MacKay, éd., Canadian Foreign Policy, 84-7 55 'Canada-United States Treaty Relations: Trends and Future Problems,' in David R. Deener, éd., Canada-United States Treaty Relations (Durham, NC 1963), 185-95 CHAPTER 12: THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S : DIPLOMACY AND DISARMAMENT

[In the preparation of chapters 12 and 13 I have found two unpublished doctoral theses especially helpful: Grant Davy, 'Canada's Role in the Disarmament Negotiations: 1946-1957' (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1962), and Michael J. Tucker, 'Canada's Roles in the Disarmament Negotiations: 1957-1971' (University of Toronto, 1977).] 1 Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, 1956-7 (Ottawa 1957), iv 2 These comments are based to a considerable extent on notes the author made in 1951 when he was acting permanent representative of Canada at the UN. 3 See chapter 7, 145. 4 Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (London 1968), 49 5 The record, as it appears in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 5 June 1956, 4778, was altered to refer more correctly to the 1837 uprisings. 6 See volume 1, chapter 7, and volume 2, chapter 3, 45ff. 7 Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, DC 1961), 121 8 See, for example, ibid., 341-2.

420 Notes for pages 306-20 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Debates, 18 June 1936, 3869-70 Davy, 'Canada's Role in the Disarmament Negotiations: 1946-1957' See volume 1, chapter 8, 243. The United Nations 1946, DEA Conference series no 3, 1946 (Ottawa 1947), 183 A.G.L. McNaughton, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 9, 5 June 1947, 240-1 Cited in confidential report of delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 1952 'Canada and the United Nations: The Disarmament Debate,' External Affairs, ix, Feb. 1952, 74 Commentary for delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 1951 Canada and the United Nations, 1951-2 (Ottawa 1953), 15-16 Debates, 9 Dec. 1953, 735 United Nations, Disarmament Commission Official Records, 32nd meeting, 9 April 1954 (UN Doc. oc/pv.32), 9 Ibid., 34th meeting, 19 April 1954 (UN Doc oc/pv.34), 6 Lester B. Pearson, 'Statement to the Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,' Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 54/41, 23 Sept. 1954 UN Doc DC/SC.I/SR.I/Rev. 1, pv.19, 17 June 1954 Personal letter, Marshall Crowe to the author, 21 March 1975 SSEA to high commissioner, London, 2 March 1955 Pearson (Paris) to USSEA, 16 July 1955 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 9th sess., 497th plenary meeting, 4 Nov. 1954, 277 'United Nations Disarmament Commission,' External Affairs, vm, Aug. 1956, 234-5 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, llth sess., 1st Committee, 829th meeting, 25 Jan. 1957, 96 L.B. Pearson, 'The Present Position of the United Nations,' Statements and Speeches, 57/26, 4 April 1957 It should be noted, of course, that the lead here was taken by the new Conservative government in Ottawa. In doing so it was not taking a new position because the previous government had been moving in this direction. It was particularly desired by DEA officials and they may have had undue influence in this case on the new government. On the other hand, the new government did show wisdom and restraint in sponsoring a policy that might well have led to the criticism that they were acquiescing in a diminution of the great Canadian role as a middle power.

421 Notes for pages 320-40 31 'Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 14,' Department of State Bulletin, xxxvi, 3 June 1957, 895 32 Personal experience of the author 33 Roch Pinard, 'Review of International Affairs,' Statements and Speeches, 56/38, 5 Dec. 1956 34 Pearson, 'Disarmament,' Statements and Speeches, 57/8, 21 Jan. 1957 CHAPTER 13: THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIFTIES

1 See chapter 7. 2 See volume 1, chapter 4, 108, 123, 135-6.

3 Canada and the United Nations, 1952-53 (Ottawa 1953), iv 4 Canada and the United Nations, 1950 (Ottawa 1951), 130 5 J.W. Holmes, 'West New Guinea,' Statements and Speeches, 57/18, 27 Feb. 1957 6 Cited in Canada and the United Nations, 1954-55 (Ottawa 1956), 20 7 Instructions to 8th UNGA, 1953, chap. v/ES/3, L.B. Pearson, 17 Sept. 1953 8 Pearson, 'New Aspects of International Competition,' Statements and Speeches, 56/6, 12 March 1956 9 Among the complications of SUNFED was the question of whether contributions in kind should be permitted. It was feared the United States might favour this as a way of disposing of the surpluses, already a sore complaint by Canada. The various Canadian suggestions may be found in a memorandum for cabinet of 30 April 1956 and the extensive commentary provided for the guidance of the delegation to the llth session of the UNGA, dated New York, 12 Nov. 1956. 10 Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., Public Papers of the SecretariesGeneral of the United Nations, n: Dag Hammarskjold 1953-1956 (New York 1972), 636-7 11 See volume 1, chapter 8, 255-6. 12 United Nations Security Council, Official Records, fourth year, no 42, 444th meeting, 15 Sept. 1949, 4 13 Policy guidance for the delegation to the UNGA, 1951 14 Standing Committee on External Aifairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 3, 1 May 1950, 64

15 Policy guidance for UNGA, 1951 16 Escott Reid, memorandum for the minister, 3 Aug. 1952 17 Pearson, 'The United Nations - Review and Preview- 1945, 1955, 1965,' Statements and Speeches, 55/23, 22 June 1955 18 Cordier and Foote, eds., Public Papers, 635

422 Notes for pages 340-8 19 Permanent delegation, New York, to DEA, 15 Sept. 1955 20 Assembly delegation, New York, to DEA, 29 Sept. 1955 21 Much of the information in this chapter is drawn not only from official records and the author's own records, but also from an account kindly made available by Mr Martin. 22 The External Affairs officers at home base were somewhat concerned that Martin and the delegation in New York would press the resolution too anxiously without giving the great powers a chance to act and avoid the troubles foreseen in the Canadian resolution. SSEA to delegation, New York, 31 Oct. 1955 23 United Kingdom Foreign Office telegram of 8 Nov. 1955 to UK delegation, New York 24 Embassy, Washington, to DEA, 23 Nov. 1955 25 This statement has been checked with Mr Glazebrook. 26 UN Doc A/AC.80/L.3 and Add. 1 and 2 27 United Nations General Assembly, Res. 918 (x), 8 Dec. 1955 (A/3116: General Assembly, Official Records, 10th sess. Supplement no 19) 28 Martin's statement is reproduced in External Affairs, vu, Dec. 1955, 328-30. 29 The author, a one-time teacher of English grammar, is nevertheless inclined to regard this dubious construction as his notable contribution to international peace. 30 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 10th sess., 555th plenary meeting, 14 Dec. 1955, 437ff 31 Pearson memorandum, 20 Dec. 1955, of conversations with Mr Dulles on 15 Dec. 1955 32 A.D.P. Heeney, The Things that are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian public servant (Toronto 1972), 138-9 33 Pearson memorandum of conversations with Dulles, 15 Dec. 1955 34 Heeney to Pearson, personal letter, 2 Dec. 1955 35 Comment on a telegram of 20 Sept. 1955 from the embassy in Paris 36 Cited in Cordier and Foote, eds., Public Papers, 629 37 See in particular a memorandum dated 3 Jan. 1956, 'Admission of New Members,' by Marcel Cadieux, head of the UN Division in DEA, who had been involved in the effort at the Assembly. 38 Reproduced in External Affairs, vu, Dec. 1955, 330 39 Canadian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (llth sess.), Press Release no 46, 29 Jan. 1957, 'Admission of New Members, statement of Mr. J.W. Holmes in the Special Political Committee on January 29, 1957'

423 Notes for pages 349-61 40 See, for example, Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Crisis (Toronto 1964); James Eayrs, The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey (Toronto 1964); and Robert W. Reford, Canada and Three Crises (Toronto 1968). 41 The account is based on the author's recollection, his own barely decypherable notes accumulated as an adviser to Mr Pearson, and a re-examination of the communications between New York and Ottawa as well as with London, Delhi, Paris, etc. These latter will be specifically cited only when there is a quotation. 42 See chapter 3. 43 L.B. Pearson to CIIA, Vancouver branch, 21 June 1948. Reproduced in Words and Occasions (Toronto 1970), 71 44 Memorandum for USSEA, 'Western policy in the Middle East,' 8 March 1956 45 Mike: the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. II: 1948-1957, ed. John A. Munro and Alex. I. Inglis (Toronto 1973), 223-5 46 Ibid., 220-3 47 Debates, 24 Jan. 1956, 466 48 This account is based on the author's notes of the meeting. 49 Mike, II, 227 50 Ibid., 230 51 Robertson, Crisis, 114, 116, 124 52 Robert Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London 1960), 458 53 Mike, II, 233 54 The nature of the collusion was revealed by the French to a Canadian journalist, Terence Robertson, who describes it in Crisis. 55 St Laurent to Eden, 1 Nov. 1956, reproduced in Mike, n, 238-9 56 'Shock and Distress in Ottawa,' The Economist, CLXXXI, 10 Nov. 1956, 516 57 Debates, 31 Jan. 1956, 723 58 See, for example, Paul Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect (London 1974), 229-30. 59 For an account of the liaison with British and French officials see JWH, memorandum for the minister, secret and personal, 6 Dec. 1956. 60 Pearson, 'Middle East,' Statements and Speeches, 56/22, 2 Nov. 1956 61 This account is based on the author's notes of the luncheon and on a personal letter, JWH to Pearson, 8 Dec. 1956 62 NATO, Paris to DEA, 2 Nov. 1956 63 UN Doc A/3276, 3 Nov. 1956, Res 998 (ES-!) 64 UN Doc A/3275, 3 Nov. 1956, Res 997 (ES-!)

424 Notes for pages 363-82 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

Permanent mission, New York, to DEA, 5 Nov. 1956 UN Doc A/3290, 4 Nov. 1956, Res 1000 (ES-!) High Commissioner, London, to DEA, 6 Nov. 1956 UN Doc A/3309, 7 Nov. 1956, res 1002 (ES-!) Burns's account of this matter is to be found in his Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto 1962), 198ff. Embassy, Cairo, to DEA, 9 Dec. 1956 See Reford, Canada and Three Crises, 126ff. Mike, II, 272 Canadian delegation, New York, to DEA, 17 Dec. 1956 Permanent representative of Canada to Secretary-General, 29 Oct. 1956, UN Doc s/3701 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 564th plenary meeting, 2nd emergency session, 4 Nov. 1956, 12-13 Mike, II, 254 DEA, Final Report, llth sess. (UNGA), 2nd emergency special session, 'The Situation in Hungary' Canadian delegation to DEA, 13 Dec. 1956 DEA to Canadian delegation, New York, 7 Jan. 1957 Canadian delegation, New York, to DEA, 7 Jan. 1957 DEA to Canadian delegation, New York, 30 Jan. 1957 Canada and the United Nations, 1956-57, \ Canadian delegation, New York, to DEA, 11 Dec. 1956 DEA to permanent mission, New York, 14 Nov. 1956 See volume 1, chapter 3. CHAPTER 14: THE S E A R C H FOR E Q U I L I B R I U M

1 See page 76. 2 Pearson, letter to Dirk Stikker, Netherlands foreign minister, 10 Jan. 1952 3 Department of External Affairs, 'The Role of the United Nations,' 16 March 1957 4 D.M. Johnson, memorandum of a conversation between Mr Pearson and Mr Hammarskjold on 16 Feb. 1955 5 Inis L. Claude, Jr, Swords into Plowshares: the Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (New York 1971), 284 6 DEA, 'Relations with the U.S.S.R.: A Re-assessment,' July 1954 (revised Nov. 1954). Mr Pearson sent the whole memorandum to the prime minister recommending that he read it in full.

425 Notes for pages 384-92 7 This attitude was by no means confined to the Liberal government. When Sidney Smith was secretary of state for external affairs he and the Norwegian foreign minister, Halvard Lange, defied a premature rejection, without adequate consideration by the NATO allies, of the so-called 'Rapacki Plan' and held a confidential session in the backrooms of the United Nations in New York with the Polish foreign minister at which they invited him to explain clearly to them what he had in mind, making perfectly clear at the same time that there was no question of their being negotiators on behalf of NATO. 8 See 'The Soviet Attitudes towards Canada,' memorandum enclosed with a despatch of 12 Feb. 1952 from the embassy in Moscow. 9 An account of this visit may be found in Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. II: 1948-1957, ed. John A. Munro and Alex. I. Inglis (Toronto 1973), chapter 9. 10 The account of these Soviet-Canadian talks is based on the author's notes. 11 Lester B. Pearson, The Present Position of the United Nations,' DEA, Statements and Speeches, 57/22, 4 April 1957

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Index

Abbott, D.C. 91, 92, 93 Acheson, Dean 146, 150; on atomic energy 47; and Canadian policies 80n; on continental defence 85; on Article 2 of NATO 114, 115, 116; on publication of NATO text 117-18; on aid to China 132; on forces for Korea 147; and Korean War 151, 153; on Indian foreign office 154; on Pearson's role in Korea 156; on Commonwealth 172; and NATO 229; and PJBD 276, 279; on us public opinion 298; on Disarmament Commission 311 Acheson-Lilienthal plan 47-8, 51 Adenauer, Conrad 244 Advisory Panel (atomic energy) 48, 49, 51 Africa, North 245, 246, 330; and NATO 111, 112 Albania 339 Alberta 273 Algeria 184, 247, 323, 330; and NATO 112; and Article 2 (7) 331-2 Aqaba, Gulf of 368 Arctic: in continental defence 80, 82, 86, 87, 276, 279, 280, 320

Argentina 38, 59, 69, 337 arms control and disarmament 247, 294, 300, 320-2, 381; first UN debate on 43; Molotov on 52; at UN 305-22; revised Canadian approaches to 312; in Middle East 352-3 Arrow Lakes 266 Atherton, Ray 90, 95 atomic bomb 45; and USSR 22; secret of 27-8; and American power 30-1; Wilgress on US possession of 31-2; and San Francisco 40; as deterrent 56 atomic energy: Wilgress on 31; and UNAEC 44-56; King on 45; ABC sharing of secret of 45-6; us sharing of 309; and 'atoms for peace' proposal 312-13; nuclear test bans 321, 322 Atomic Energy Commission see United Nations Atomic Energy Commission Attlee, Clement 27, 99, 169; on Soviet policies 18; and Commonwealth 171 Australia 38, 57, 61, 172, 302, 316; and UNAEC 48, 52; and USSR 'war mongering' resolution 63; and Korean elections 67; and Indonesia 73; and recognition of China 136, 137; and Korean War 144, 148; and Common-

428 Index wealth 166, 187; and Commonwealth status of India 169, 170; and Colombo Plan 173; and UN colonial issues 330; and admission of new UN members 341, 346 Austria 303, 339 Auto pact 284 Avro Arrow 253, 284 Baghdad pact 184, 367 Bajpai, Sir Girja 172 Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D. 184 Bandung conference 339 Bao Dai 202 Belly River 273 Baruch, Bernard 47, 48, 50; plan for atomic energy 50-5 passim, 309, 314 Belaúnde, Victor 340, 344 Belgium 38, 205, 237, 303; and Berlin Blockade 70; and recognition of China 136, 141; and NATO 232; and UN colonial issues 330; and admission of new UN members 344, 345 Ben-Gurion, David 353, 360 Bennett, R.B. 131 Bennett, W.A.C. 265-6 Berle, Adolph 85 Berlin 229, 246; Blockade of 55, 69-72, 101-4, 121, 298, 383 Bermuda conference 388-9 Bevin, Ernest 27, 104n; on Soviet policies 18; on Berlin airlift 102; on St Laurent speech on alliance 104; on proposed Atlantic alliance 105 Bohlen, Charles 13-14, 23, 34 Boundary Waters Treaty (1909) 258, 267, 268, 271 Bramuglia, Juan Atilio 70 Brazil 38, 303, 331, 346, 365 Bretton Woods 17, 41, 223

British Columbia 188, 264, 265-6, 270 Brook, Sir Norman 170, 171 Brussels pact 105, 107, 109, 239 Bulganin, Nikolai 247, 317, 351, 385 Bulgaria 23, 126, 338, 339 Bull, W.F. 254 Bunche, Ralph 153, 301 Burma 168, 172, 209 Burns, E.L.M. 350, 357, 363, 365, 366 Byrnes, James 47 Cabinet Defence (War) Committee 78, 79, 83, 231, 234 Cadieux, Marcel 35 Cairo Declaration 193 Cambodia 202, 339; control commission for 203, 209, 216-17 Cameroons 326 Canadian Army Special Force 146, 147 Canadian Forces Act 146 Canadian Red Cross 376 Casey, Richard 195, 198, 227 Ceylon 338, 339; and recognition of China 137; and Commonwealth 168, 178; immigration from 172; and Colombo Plan 173, 174; and Hungary 372 Chalk River 48, 50 Chanak 102, 121 Chevrier, Lionel 260, 263 Chiang Kai-shek 134, 135,193, 196, 197, 344 Chiang Kai-shek, Madame 131 Chicago Conference on Civil Aviation 37 Chicago diversion 270-3 China: Mutual Aid to 132, 133-4 China, People's Republic of 127, 313, 380; recognition of 135-42, 191-200, 267n; and Korean War 149-59

429 Index passim; and 1956 Commonwealth Conference 184; return of A.R. MacKenzie 195; offshore islands 195, 196, 249; seating at UN 195-9, 297; and materiel for Vietnam 212 China, Republic of (Nationalists) 133-5, 193; seat at UN 141n, 344, 345, 347; and Korean War 144 Chinese Immigration Act 131 Chou En-lai 135, 154, 156, 159, 205, 304 Churchill, Sir Winston 18, 41, 99, 240 Citizenship Act (1947) 169, 181 Claxton, Brooke 147, 166; on UN voting procedures 39; and Korean elections 65, 66; and Korean War 145n; and Berlin airlift 103; and international military force 146; and Colombo Plan 175-6; on NATO commitments 231-2, 234; diplomacy of 302 Cohen, Maxwell 259 Cold War 12-36, 67, 189, 242, 281, 293, 294, 300, 304, 373, 382, 385 Coldwell, M.J. 118, 140, 172, 224, 244 collective defence 144; and collective security 5; North American 76-97 passim; and NATO 118 collective security 144, 160-4, 378, 381; Canadian attitudes on 5-11 passim; and Korea 66, 144n, 146-7, 149, 200; King and 122; and UN Collective Measures Committee 160; and Hungary 373 Colombia 363, 365 Colombo Conference (1950) 138, 142, 172-4, 352 Colombo Plan 172-8, 334, 335, 377 Columbia River 254, 259, 263-70, 273 Commissions internationales de contrôle (Indochina) 208

Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs 286-7 Commonwealth 35, 76, 165-87, 253, 377, 378, 392, 393; and defence 9, 81, 83, 84, 279; and South Africa 43; and NATO 99-100; and Berlin airlift 102-3; and proposed Atlantic alliance 109; and recognition of China 136, 137, 141, 172, 173, 174; and UN 167n, 295; preferential trade 182; St Laurent visits Asia 194; as counterweight 288; and us Asian policies 300; and UN colonial issues 323, 327-8; and admission of new UN members 340; and Suez crisis 349, 356, 361 - Conferences: (1948) 168; (1949) 172; (1951) 178; (1956) 183-7; (1957) 389 Commonwealth Consultative Committee 175, 177 Congo 391 Congress (us): and UNAEC 52; and continental defence 82; and NATO 109, 117; and recognition of China 192; and St Lawrence Seaway 259-63 passim; and Chicago diversion 271-2 Connally, Tom 115 Co-operative Commonwealth Federation [CCF] 40, 114n, 283; and NATO 114, 118, 227; and recognition of China 140; and Korea 148 Cordier, Andrew 301 Costello, John A. 168 Council of Europe 104 Council of Foreign Ministers 25 Crimea 385 Cripps, Sir Stafford 171 Cuba 250, 344, 352 Cyprus 240, 323, 329

430 Index Czechoslovakia 12, 69, 99, 105, 124, 205,313,338 Davis, T.C. 136, 139, 238 Defence: continental 76-97 passim, 248-50, 274-81; military standardization 78, 85, 89, 96; statement on co-operation with us 84, 85-8, 280, 282, 291; production sharing arrangements with us 88-90, 255, 281-5, 291; and raising of force for Korea 145; special force for collective action 161; and staffing Indochina commissions 207-8, 218; and NATO 229, 230, 232, 233; Joint Planning Committee 238; Avro Arrow 253; Military Co-operation Committee 280; cooperation with us in civil 286; and force for Middle East 360, 365-6 Defence Production, Department of [DDP] 281 de Gaulle, Charles 241 Denmark 304, 326, 344 Deutsch, John 91, 9In, 92 Diefenbaker, John George 193, 220, 263, 289, 357, 389 Dirksen, Everett 272 Dixon, Sir Owen 73 Dondero, G.A. 261 Drew, George 140, 193, 224 Drury, C.M. 124 Dulles, John Foster 159, 204, 235, 241,242, 298, 319, 380; relations with China 196,197, 198; at White Sulphur Springs 198; on instant retaliation 200, 201, 249; and SEATO 209; on NATO 226n, 245, 247-8; on Manchuria 299; on 'open skies' 320; and admission of new UN members 339, 340, 342, 346, 346-7; and Suez crisis

351, 359, 360; Khrushchev on 305; Soviet relations with 387 Dumbarton Oaks 307 Duplessis, Maurice 125, 139 Eban, Abba 368 Economic Council for Europe 222 economic policies 17; and defence production sharing 88-90, 281-5 passim; 'free trade' discussions with us 90-5, 283; statement of principles re cooperation with us 97, 253, 291; MFN agreements 182; in NATO 112-17, 222-3; and magazine advertisement tax 256; Industrial Mobilization Committee 290 Eden, Anthony 158, 203, 205, 207, 216, 240, 241; at 1956 Commonwealth Conference 184; and Suez and Middle East 351, 354, 359, 364; visits Ottawa 353 Egypt 348-70 passim Eisenhower, Dwight David 184,202, 233, 255, 276, 380; and Chinese offshore islands 195; at White Sulphur Springs 198, 267; and St Lawrence Seaway 260, 261; and Chicago diversion 271-2; 'atoms for peace' proposal 312-13; 'open skies' plan 317, 319, 320; and UN membership 344; and Suez 368; Khrushchev on 385 Engen, Hans 362 Entezam, Nazrollah 153 Eritrea 324 Ethiopia 324 European Coal and Steel Community 379 European Defence Community 239, 379

431 Index European Recovery Programme 223 Evatt, Herbert 51, 166, 189 External Affairs, Department of: postwar planning 4; Cold War assessment by 29; on NATO 100; on Berlin airlift 102; and proposed Atlantic alliance 108, 111; on political Atlantic commonwealth 225; on Portuguese membership in NATO 111 ; and Article 2 of NATO 115; and Article 5 of NATO 117; and Yugoslavia 124; on aid to China 132, 133-4; on recognition of China 136-7; on Commonwealth relations 169, 179-81; and Asian immigration 172; divisions in re Indochina 201; and staffing of Indochina commissions 208, 218; guidelines for Vietnam commissioner 209-10; on Vietnam elections 215; on Vietnam commission 216; on Turkish membership in NATO 236; on St Lawrence Seaway 262; and Columbia River 263-4, 268, 269; and PJBD 275; on disarmament 311, 312; and technical assistance 334-5; on UN, Suez, and Hungary 372; on Hungary 375-6; and us Middle East policies 380; assessment of Soviet policies 382, 390; on role of UN 390; expertise of 392 Export Credit Insurance Act 133 Far Eastern Commission 139 Fawzi, Mahmoud 365 fedayeen 369 federal-provincial relations 44 Financial Post 82,92 Finance, Department of 176, 177, 183, 223 Finland 126, 339

Fisheries Supply Board 124 Food and Agriculture Organization 124 Ford, Robert 382 Formosa 152, 178, 188, 192, 195, 247, 380; us defence of 149, 150; and recognition of PRC 193; policy towards 196-7 Foulkes, Charles 84, 146, 14, 230 France 295; and UNAEC 48, 51; and atomic weapons 56; on UNGA Interim Committee 62; and USSR 'war mongering' resolution 62-3; and NATO 99, 107, 112, 116, 229, 230; and recognition of China 136, 141; and Korean War 144, 153; and Geneva Conference 158; and Indochina 202-20 passim; and disarmament 305, 319; and UN colonial issues 326, 329, 330-1; and Algeria 331-2; relations with at UN 331-2, 345; and admission of new UN members 344; and Middle East and Suez 351, 355-70 passim Franco, Francisco 42, 43, 128, 129, 342 Fulton, Davie 263 functional representation: in the UN 39-40; in NATO 229; and UN Disarmament Commission 305, 321 functionalism: in DEA 4; and international military force 6; and role of smaller states 38; and disarmament debate 43; and UNAEC 440-56 passim; in NATO 110, 231; in mediation 201; and OEEC and NATO 223-4; and disarmament sub-committee 319; and UN colonial issues 323 Gardiner, J.G. 66, 176 Gaza 360, 368, 369 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] 91, 181, 182, 222, 223, 226

432 Index Geneva Conference (1954) 193, 351; on Korea 144, 156-60, 195, 204, 296; on Indochina 202, 213 George, Walter 197 George vi 170 Germany 5, 234, 247, 318, 339, 393; Council of Foreign Ministers meeting on 25; and NATO membership 238-9, 244; on rapprochement 245. See also Berlin Blockade Glazebrook, G.P. del. 38, 342, 346 Gold Coast (Ghana) 183, 185 Gomulka, Wladyslaw 125 Gouzenko, Igor 15, 22n, 24n, 24-8, 32 governor general 181 Great Lakes 270-1, 272, 286, 306 Greece 62, 122, 224, 236-7, 344 Greenland 80, 278, 326 Gromyko, Andrei 49, 51 Groves, Leslie R. 50n Gruenther, Alfred M. 146 Guatemala 64 Hannah, John A. 276 Hammarskjôld, Dag 303, 340, 391; on admission of new members 337, 341; and Suez crisis 355, 360, 362; and UN force 363-4, 366; on us policies in UN 380 Harriman, Averell 91 Heeney, Arnold 79, 228, 230, 269, 346, 364 Hickerson, Jack 93, 115, 116 Hiroshima 45, 48, 188 HoChi-minh 214 Holland, S.G. 184 Holmes, John W. 23n, 147n, 154n, 205n, 267n,344n Hong Kong 131,147 Hopkins, Harry 23

Howe, C.D. 47, 274, 287; and ICAO conference 37; and 'free trade' discussions 92-3; on negotiating with us 95; on aid to China 132; on Columbia River 268-9; and defence production sharing 281; on Hyde Park 283; on trade with us 289; and technical assistance 335 human rights 44, 218, 324, 376 Hungary 125, 126, 199, 220, 318, 338, 339, 362, 370-6, 378, 386, 387, 393 Hyde Park Agreement (1941) 88, 89, 95-7,281,282,283,284 hydrogen bomb 313 Iceland 80, 278 Ignatieff, George 58, 63 Ilsley, J.L. 65, 66, 128, 132 immigration 305; Chinese 131; Ceylonese 172; status of Irish 168; Indian 169-70,171-2; Pakistani 170, 172; and Hungarian refugees 376 imperial conference 167 Inchon 150 India 38, 40, 162, 300, 316, 328, 338; and UNAEC 55; and South Africa 42, 43; and Kashmir 72-3; and Indonesia 73; and recognition of China 137, 138; and Korean War 151, 152, 154, 156; and Geneva Conference 157; immigration from 169-70, 171-2; and Colombo Plan 174; and Commonwealth 178; Canadian assessment of 201; on Indochina commissions 205, 210-17 passim; in Afro-Asian UN bloc 304; in disarmament negotiations 313, 320; and Suez crises 361, 365; and UNEF 367; and Hungary 372, 373; and permanent UN force 391

433 Index Indochina 15, 294, 304, 381, 385; control commissions in 200-20, 331, 392 Indonesia 69, 72, 73-4, 189, 209, 323, 329-30 Industrial Mobilization Committee 96-7, 286, 290 Inter-American Defence Board 80 International Atomic Development Authority 47-8, 51 International Atomic Energy Agency 313 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 222, 335 International Court of Justice 327, 338, 348; and South Africa 42, 43; and religious persecution in East Europe 127; and Commonwealth disputes 181-2 International Columbia River Engineering Board 264, 265 International Development Fund 335 International Finance Corporation 335-6 International Great Lakes Fishery Commission 286 International Joint Commission 252, 257-8, 271, 273, 274, 291, 378; and St Lawrence Seaway 260, 262-3; and Columbia River 263-70 passim; and PJBD 275 International Lake Ontario Board of Engineers 263, 272 International Labour Organization 127 International River Improvements Act 266 International Trade Organization 38 Iran 21,135,365 Iraq 311 Ireland 303, 328, 332, 339; and NATO 112; and Commonwealth 167-8; UN membership 344

Israel 127, 184, 297, 344; and UN membership 68; recognition of 68; in Suez crisis 349, 352-70 passim Italy 5,230,316,332,338,339,371; and Atlantic alliance 111; and recognition of China 141; colonies 324 Japan 5, 131, 134, 135, 188, 189, 254, 303, 321, 339, 393; Commonwealth and peace with 166; UN membership of 340, 342, 344, 347 Jebb, Gladwyn 105, 154 Jerusalem 64, 68 Jessup, Philip C. 71, 72 Jordan, Len 266 Jordan 339 Kadar, Janos 373 Kashmir 69, 72-3, 176, 184, 203, 323, 391,392 Kearney, J.D. 170-1 Kennan, George 29, 34, 383; on Soviet policies 22, 86; and Truman Doctrine 13; Atlantic 'dumbbell' concept of 106 Kerr, Clark 18 Khrushchev, Nikita 24, 351, 385, 386 King, W.L. Mackenzie 7, 18, 41, 42, 253, 289, 377; and Gouzenko affair 24-8 passim; on sharing atomic secret 32; on middle power concept 37; on UN 40; on atomic energy 40, 45, 53, 55; at San Francisco 56; and membership on Security Council 59; and Korean elections 65-7; and UNCOK 67n; on Kashmir 72; on defence 76; defence discussions with Truman 80; us assessment of 80n; on continental defence 84-5, 88, 279; on 'free trade' discussions with us 91-4 passim; and

434 Index NATO 119-22; on Pearson and St Laurent 120; assessment of 121-2; and China 131, 132; and Commonwealth 165-6, 169, 186; on disarmament 306 Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone 388 Knowland, William F. 346, 372 Kootenay River 264, 265 Korea 15, 122, 135, 143-64, 285, 293, 297, 310, 339; UN force for 15, 54, 175; and Security Council veto 55; UN Commission to observe elections in 62, 65; and revival of Hyde Park 97; in question of recognition of China 140, 141-2; UN action in 144n; Canadian contribution to 150n; unification of 156-60; and Colombo Plan 176; in 1951 Commonwealth Conference 178-9; and attitudes towards Asia 190; and relations with PRC 191-2; and UN 292 Krishna Menon, V.V. 157,204,304, 341; at Geneva Conference 158-9; and Suez crisis 355, 362, 364, 365; and UNEF 366; and Hungary 372 Kuomintang 134 Kuznetsov, V.V. 344-5, 386-7 LaGuardia, Fiorello 276 Lall, Arthur 362 Lange, Halvard 224, 246, 303, 384n Laos 202, 339; control commission for 203, 209, 216, 217 Latin America 44, 163, 287, 288, 295, 299, 300, 303, 390; and UN veto 39; and hemispheric defence 80-1; and UN colonial issues 331, 332; and admission of new UN members 340 Laureys, H. 128 League of Nations 39,43, 122, 143, 220, 302; sanctions 5; and collective

security 7; and disarmament 306; mandated territories 326 Léger, Jules 269 LePan, Douglas 173, 225-6, 240 Lesage, Jean 266-9 passim, 302 Lett, Sherwood 208-9 Libya 339 Lie,Trygve 145,146,301,338-9 Life magazine 92 Lodge, Henry Cabot 298, 313, 372, 380; and admission of new UN members 342-7 passim; and Suez crisis 359, 361, 364; Soviet relations with 387 Lloyd, Selwyn 184-5, 353, 360, 364 Loutfi, Omar 365-6 Lovett, Robert A. 91 MacArthur, Douglas 149, 152,156 McCarthyism 14, 24, 192, 194, 202, 242, 249, 293, 301

Macdonnell, R.M. 275 MacKay, R.A. 34-5, 386 MacKenzie, A.R. 195 McKinnon, Hector 91, 92 Macmillan, Harold 244, 340, 341, 342, 388 McNaughton, A.G.L. 273, 314; on UNAEC 46-56 passim, 309; on Security Council 60; on Palestine 67-8; and Kashmir 72-3; and Indonesia 73; on PJBD 87, 275, 276-7; and St Lawrence Seaway 260,261; and Columbia River 263-70 passim; and disarmament and arms control 305, 308, 309; relations with USSR 382 Malaya 172 Malik, Yakov 71, 72, 386 Manchuria 135, 152, 299 Mao Tse-tung 384 Marshall, George C. 13,134,135

435 Index Marshall Plan 17, 36, 74, 94, 113, 234 Martin, Paul 298, 304, 392; on Indian participation in Geneva Conference 157; UN diplomacy of 302; in disarmament negotiations 316, 317; and admission of new UN members 337, 340-5 Martino, Gaetano 246 Massey, Vincent 166 Mayhew, Robert 176 Mendès-France, Pierre 205, 206, 240, 241,331 Menzies, Arthur 139 Menzies, Robert 184, 195, 355-6, 389 Merchant, Livingston 241, 346 Mexico 37, 38, 181, 198, 267, 287, 311 Middle East 294, 318, 375, 391; in 1956 Commonwealth conference 184; Canadian policy in 349-50; tripartite declaration on 351; us policies in 380, 381-2; USSR policies in 381-2; peace forces for 391. See also Palestine, Suez middle powers 37-75; and Korean War 148; role of 294-5; at UN 302-3, 329; in disarmament negotiations 311; in Suez crisis 357 Military Co-operation Committee 78, 79, 82, 280 Ming Sung Industrial Company 133 Mitchell, Humphrey 66 Mobile Striking Force 145 Moch, Jules 311, 314, 316-17, 318 Mohammed Ali 184 Molotov, V. 23, 52, 203, 340-1, 346, 385, 386 Montana 264, 273 Montgomery, Bernard Law 84 Morocco 330-1 most-favoured-nation agreements 182 Munich 5

Munro, Sir Leslie 344, 345 Mutual Aid 131, 132; in NATO 223, 231,232,235,236 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 184, 352; and USSR 353; and Suez crisis 361, 368 Nehru, Jawaharlal 304, 313, 340, 389; and recognition of China 142; and Korean War 151,153,154; and India's Commonwealth status 169, 170; and relations between Asia and the West 176; relations with St Laurent 183; at 1956 Commonwealth Conference 184; and Chinese offshore islands 196; and UNEF 366; and Hungary 372 Nepal 339 Netherlands 38, 230, 237, 295; and UNAEC 52; and Jerusalem 69; and Indonesia 73-4; and recognition of China 141; and NATO 232; and UN colonial issues 325, 326, 329-30; and SUNFED 335; and admission of new UN members 344 Netherlands Antilles 325, 326 New Delhi Conference on Indochina commissions 208 New Guinea 323, 329-30 New York Times 82, 206 New Zealand 302; and recognition of China 136, 137; and Korea 144, 148, 158, 159; and Commonwealth 169, 170, 187; and admission of new UN members 341, 346 Newfoundland 84, 277, 279 Ngo Dinh-Diem 202, 212, 213 Niagara River 273 Niagara Treaty (1950) 271 Norodom Sihanouk 216 Norstad, Lauris 85 North American Air Defence [NORAD] 248, 278, 282, 284, 285-6, 291

436 Index North Atlantic Defence Committee 230 North Atlantic Economic Council 222-3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] .4, 10, 15,34,39,54,87, 98-122, 189, 288, 377-9, 384, 385, 393; and reciprocal guarantee 106-8; Working Group 122; Council of Deputies 124; and Spain 128-9; and collective security 161-4 passim; and Commonwealth 179; and China 194; attitudes to 221; shaping of 222-9; Temporary Council Committee 227-8; military contributions to 229-36; Standing Group 230, 231, 234; Military Committee 230; Military Supply Board 231; Defence Committee 231; Annual Review 235; Conference of Nine (1954) 239, 240; Committee of Three 246; and PJBD 278; Regional Planning Group 278, 280; and UN diplomacy 295; and disarmament agency 316; and Suez crisis 349, 356, 360 - Article 2 109, 112-17, 121,222, 223-6, 229, 243; Article 3 231; Article 5 117, 121-2; Article 11 112 North Atlantic triangle (Canada-UK-us relations) 10, 22, 221, 254, 288-9; King's belief in 25; and Gouzenko affair 27-8; linch-pin role in 41; and continental defence 84; and NATO 240 Norway 303, 321, 332; and NATO 237; and admission of new UN members 344; and UN force 363; and Suez crisis 365 Nunn May, Alan 27 Odium, Victor 33-4, 134-5, 236 Ogdensburg Agreement (1940) 9, 82, 274, 279, 282

O'Hurley, Raymond 284 Ontario 259, 260, 266 Organization of American States 226n, 245, 287, 288 Organization for European Economic Co-operation 113,222,223-4 Osborn, Frederick 46 Outer Mongolia 339, 342, 344, 347 Pakistan 228, 304, 311, 328; and Kashmir 72-3; and recognition of China 137; and Commonwealth 168, 169, 170, 178; immigration from 170, 172; and Colombo Plan 174; and Suez crisis 359, 361, 365; and UNEF 367 Palestine 61, 63-5, 67-9, 120-1, 135, 203, 323, 350, 359 Pan-American Union 6, 189 Parsons, Graham 85 PathetLao 217 Patterson, George 136, 142 Pavlov, Vitali G. 28 Pax Americana 29-36 peacekeeping 65, 391-2; and Indochina commissions 203, 215, 218; and UNEF 293; and Suez crisis 349 Pearl Harbor 78, 131, 188,286 Pearson, Lester B. 4, 10, 66n, 105, 287, 392; and international military force 5, 359-60; on 'sovereign equality' 38; on middle powers 38; on Security Council 40-1, 57; and UNAEC 54, 55; as conciliator 61; and Palestine 63, 350; and Kashmir 72; on northern defence 79, 81, 86, 235; on UN and defence 83-4; on USSR policies 86, 153, 390; and continental defence 86; and economic issues in NATO 93-4; on peace through UN

437 Index 100-1 ; on proposed Atlantic alliance 108, 110;asssEA 110; on NATO HOn, 111, 118, 224, 227, 234, 241-2; on Article 2 of NATO 115, 227; on King and NATO 120; on Spain 128, 129; on arms to China 135; on recognition of China 139, 192; relations with Nehru 151; on Korea 151, 152, 153; Committee of Three on Korea 153-4; on Indian role in Korean negotiations 154; on China as aggressor 155; on collective security 163; and Commonwealth 165, 169, 171; on aid to Asia 176; on Asian and Soviet communism 190-1, 201; on us Asian policies 194, 204; on Chinese offshore islands 195-6; on commitment to us 196; on UN recognition of PRC 197, 199; at White Sulphur Springs 198; rebuke of Dulles 200-1; on NATO annual review 228; on NATO Council of Ministers 228; on Greek and Turkish membership in NATO 237; on German membership in NATO 239; on NATO consultation 241, 244, 245, 247-8; visits USSR 244, 385-6; on NATO Committee of Three 246; on relations with us 256; and Columbia River 267, 269; on UN diplomacy 292; president of UNO A 293; UN diplomacy of 154n, 301; in disarmament negotiations 310, 319, 321-2; and 'atoms for peace' 312-13; on mutual deterrence 314; on arms control agency 315-16; on colonial and racial issues 324-5, 347; on SUNFED 336; and admission of new UN members 338, 339, 340, 343, 346; Nobel Prize 349; and Middle East 351; on Nasser 352; on use of

force in Middle East 354, 355; as mediator between us and UK 354-5; on contribution to UN force 363; on Gaza 369; and Hungary 371, 373, 375; on UN, Suez, and Hungary 374; and European integration 379; at Bermuda conference 388; on Western dominance of UN 390-1 Pepper, C.D. 117 Permanent Joint Board on Defence [PJBD] 77, 78, 79, 86, 87, 252, 260, 274-81,291 Peru 299, 310, 338, 346, 392 Pfimlin Plan 379 Philippines 178, 300, 316 Pickersgill, J.W. 121 Pinard, Roch 321 Pineau, Christian 245, 356 Pleven Plan 225 Poland 23, 32, 38, 124, 130, 205, 303, 338, 373, 374, 387; and UNAEC 48, 53; art treasures of 125-6, 126n; and Indochina commissions 205, 206, 210-15 passim, 217 Pollock, Sidney 302 Pope, Maurice: on American intelligence 18; on Soviet policies 21, 30; on East-West relations 23; on relations with us 34; on continental defence 77-8; on Berlin airlift 102 Portugal 129, 295, 324, 339; and NATO 111, 114, 236; and UN colonial issues 327, 329 Post-Hostilities Problems Committee 18,83 Potsdam 21 Privy Council (UK) 181 Progressive Conservative party 40, 270, 320; and NATO 118; and recognition of China 140; and Korea 148; and co-

438 Index operation with us 283-4; and MORAD 286 public opinion 283n, 298; and Gouzenko affair 28; and continental defence 85; on NATO 110; and religious persecution in Eastern Europe 126; on Indochina commissions 206; and nuclear test bans 321; and Hungary 371, 372, 376 Quebec 259; and UNCOK 67n; and NATO 114, 233; and Polish art treasures 125; and forces for Korea 148; and St Lawrence Seaway 260 Radford, A.W. 364 Rand, I.C. 63-4 Rapacki Plan 384n Rau, Sir Benegal 153, 154, 178 refugees: relief to Arab 69; in Vietnam 211; Palestinian 350; Hungarian 376 Reid, Escott 105; on economic assistance to Europe 17n; on relations with us and USSR 16, 34; on Security Council 54, 58; on proposed Atlantic alliance 101; attitudes towards NATO 113; on NATO 189-90, 224, 226, 226-7 Reston, James 82, 88, 240 revisionist history 12-13, 16, 24n Rhodesia 187 Riddell, R.G. 38, 54, 105 Ridgway, Matthew B. 150n Rio de Janeiro conference 81 Ritchie, A.E. 242n, 242-3 Ritchie, Charles 18n, 228, 230 Roberts, Frank 31 Robertson, Gordon 31 Robertson, Norman 25, 28, 29, 31, 41, 58, 146, 230, 378; and Berlin Blockade 70, 102; on proposed Atlantic

alliance 111; on Article 2 of NATO 114, 115; on association with OEEC 223; and disarmament negotiations 313,314,315 Romania 23, 32, 126, 130, 338, 339 Running, Chester: and recognition of China 136, 138-9, 140, 141, 142; at Geneva Conference 159, 205; and release of MacKenzie 195 Roosevelt, F.D. 13, 41, 271, 274, 276, 280 Royal Air Force 102 Royal Canadian Air Force 9, 249 Royal Commission to investigate the communication of secret and confidential information to agents of a foreign power 24, 25, 28 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects 255 Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences 255 Rush-Bagot Treaty 306 St Laurent, Louis 63, 66n, 103n, 178; on us 32-3; on relations with USSR 52; on USSR and atom bomb 53; on Security Council 57, 59; on UN commission on Korean elections 65, 66, 67; on economic co-operation with us 92, 96; on UN 98; on Berlin airlift 102-3, 103; on Atlantic alliance 104, 107; on duration of NATO 112; on Article 2 of NATO 114; and shift in foreign policy 119-22; and possible recognition of Vatican 127-8; on diplomatic relations 129; on contribution to Korea 145; and Commonwealth 165, 168, 169, 183; on recognition of PRC 194-5; at White Sulphur Springs

439 Index 198; on St Lawrence Seaway 260; on Columbia River 267; on 'atoms for peace' 312; on Suez crisis 356; at Bermuda conference 388 St Lawrence Seaway 252, 259-63, 286 Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira 236 San Francisco see United Nations Conférence on International Organization Scandinavia 107, 303; and NATO 112, 224; in 'Sanitavian bloc' 305; and admission of new UN members 340; and Suez crisis 359; and UN peacekeeping 391 Schuman Plan 225 Sharm el-Sheikh 368 Skelton, O.D. 165 Slemon, C. Roy 249 Smith, Arnold 20-1 Smith, Bedell 158 Smith, Sidney 200, 384n Sobolev, A.A. 386 Social Credit 118 Somaliland 326 Soong,T.V. 132 Souris River 273 South Africa 42, 43, 297, 299, 323, 324; and recognition of China 137; and Commonwealth 170, 183, 185-6; racial policies of 327-8; and UN colonial issues 330, 332 South-East Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] 188, 209, 216, 247, 367 Southwest Africa 42, 328 Souvanavong 217 Souvanna Phouma 217 Spaak, Paul-Henri 195, 198, 224, 244, 364 Spain 42-3, 240, 332, 339; recognition of 128-9; and UN colonial issues 327

Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development [SUNFED] 335-6 Spender, Sir Percy 174, 341 Sputnik 249,318,376,393 Stalin, Joseph 13, 15, 21, 23, 27, 123, 249, 293, 385 Stassen, Harold 318 State, Department of (us): and atomic energy 47; on continental defence 85; and defence production sharing 89, 284; on proposed Atlantic alliance 109-10; and recognition of China 138, 192; and forces for Korea 150; and 'two-China' policy 197; and Vietnam 213; and Chicago diversion 271-3 passim; and PJBD 275; relations with 297 Stepinac, Archbishop 123, 124 Stikker, Dirk 116,225 Stone, T.A. 105, 109 Strategic Air Command 241-2, 249, 278 Suez 183, 184, 185, 199, 246, 248, 289, 292, 337, 348-70, 374, 375, 378-9, 393 Sukarno 304, 330 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe [SHAPE] 234 Surinam 325n, 326 Sweden 69, 205, 206, 295, 317 Switzerland 112,205, 206 Syria 311,353 Taiwan see Formosa Thailand 144, 346 Thorp, Willard 95 Tiran, Strait of 368 Tito, Marshal (Josip Broz) 123, 130, 384 Trade and Commerce, Department of: and Colombo Plan 177; and trade

440 Index with us 183; and technical assistance 334-5; and European integration 379 Truman, Harry S. 13, 27, 31, 193, 259, 276; and UN commission on Korean elections 66; and continental defence 80, 86; forces for Korea 144; 'point four' programme 334 Truman Doctrine 13-14, 33 Tunisia 330-1 Turkey 21, 245, 344, 346; and NATO 112, 224, 236-7; and Korean War 144; and Suez crisis 359 Ukraine 70 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] 162; as aggressor 8; and Cold War 12-36 passim; postwar policies of 19-24; and UNAEC 48, 49, 309; and UN participation 52-3; and 'war mongering' resolution 62-3; and Palestine 63, 67; and Berlin Blockade 69-72, 101-4; and continental defence 78, 79, 81; assessment of threat from 98; forced labour in 127, 299; relations with China 135; and Korean War 152, 157; Pearson visits 244, 385-6; in disarmament negotiations 305-22 passim; and UN colonial issues 325; and admission of new UN members 338-48 passim; involvement in Egypt 353; and UN force 362-3; and Hungary 370-6; DEA assessment of 382-8; relations with Canada 385-6; meeting with at UN 386-7 United Kingdom [UK]: and Canadian defence 8; assessments of Soviet policies 18-19; and Gouzenko affair 27; and UNAEC 48, 51, 52; and atomic weapons 56; on UNGA Interim Committee 62; and Palestine 63, 64;

and continental defence 84; and Berlin airlift 103-4; and proposed Atlantic alliance 105; and Article 2 of NATO 112-17 passim; and Canadian consular affairs 126, 167; and recognition of China 137, 138; and Korean War 144, 148, 153, 158; and Commonwealth consultation 166-7; relations with Ireland 167; relations with India 167-72 passim; and Ceylon 168; and new Commonwealth 180, 378-9; and Southeast Asia 204; and Vietnam 214; on NATOTCC 227; on NATO Standing Group 230; UN diplomacy of 299; and Disarmament Commission 305; and UN colonial issues 325, 326, 331; and international development fund 335; tripartite declaration on Middle East 351; and Suez 352-70 passim; and European integration 379; and UN role after Suez 388-9 United Nations [UN] : and collective security 5; international military force for 5-11 passim, 15, 64, 131, 146, 161, 292, 358, 360-4, 391; trusteeship system 22, 68; 'Uniting for Peace' resolutions 39, 160, 162, 299, 356, 389; voting procedures in 39-40; and arms control and disarmament 43, 305-22; and Palestine 63-5; and continental defence 83; and Berlin airlift 103; and role of NATO 118; and recognition of Spain 128; and recognition/seating of PRC 141, 192-3, 197, 198, 199, 297; Military Staff Committee 143; and Korea 149, 150, 151, 154-5, 157, 159; Collective Measures Committee 160, 161, 292; and Commonwealth 166-7, 180-1; and Colombo Plan 174; new mem-

441 Index bers of 199, 293, 302, 327, 336-48, 385; and Indochina commissions 203; and Canada-US relations 252; colonial issues 294, 304-5, 323-33; Secretariat 301, 310; politicians at 302; and aid and development 333-6; and Suez crisis 348-70; emergency session on Hungary 370-6 - Charter: Article 2(7) 43, 126-7, 299, 327-31 passim; Article 4 337, 341, 348; Article 10 39; Article 14 327; Article 18(2) 337; Article 23 58; Article 27(2) 337-8; Article 31 51; Article 43 7, 60, 83, 308, 349; Article 51 39,54,83,99, 108, 118, 143; Article 52 83; Article 53 99, 118 - Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] 10, 58, 75, 302, 333; and forced labour in USSR 127; and NATO 226 - General Assembly: First (Political) Committee 326; Third (Economic and Social) Committee 126; Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee 326, 329; Fifth (Finance) Committee 44; Interim Committee 39, 61-2, 67, 293; Committee of Three on Korean ceasefire 153, 154; Committee of Twelve 311; Ad Hoc Political Committee 326, 343, 344; Good Offices Committee 339; Technical Assistance Programme 335 - Security Council: and collective security 5-11 passim; Interim Committee on the Problems of Voting 39; and UNAEC 50, 52; and veto 52-6; and Palestine 67-9; and Berlin Blockade 69-72; and Korea 144 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 42, 44-56, 75, 305, 306,

307, 309; Scientific and Technical Committee 50 United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments 307, 308, 309 United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [UNCIP] 72, 73 United Nations Commission for Indonesia [UNCÍ] 73-4 United Nations Commission on Korea [UNCOK] 67n United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea 151 United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco 1945) 6,20,23,39,40,41,45,56, 143-4, 307 United Nations Disarmament Commission 305, 307, 310-13; five-power sub-committee of 313-20; enlargement of 3 20n United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] 5, 207, 293, 349, 353, 365, 371,372,391 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 376 United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund [UNICEF] 124 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference (1944) see Bretton Woods United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration [UNRRA] 37, 41, 124 United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation 321 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine [UNSCOP] 64 United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization [UNTSO] 350

442 Index United States [us] : and continental defence 8, 9, 76-97 passim; and Cold War 12-36 passim; assessments of Soviet policy 18-19; in UNAEC 49-56 passim; and Palestine 63, 64, 67, 68; and Commission on Korean elections 66; and Berlin Blockade 71-2, 103-4; and Indonesia 74; public opinion in on defence 81; statement on defence co-operation with 85-8, 280, 282, 291; defence production sharing with 88-90, 255, 281-5, 291; 'Buy American' Act 80n, 89, 96; 'free trade' discussions with 90-5, 113, 283; statement of principles re economic co-operation with 97, 233n, 253, 291; and Article 2 of NATO 112-17 passim; publishes text of NATO 117-18; and aid to China 132; and recognition/ seating of China 138, 140,141,142, 191-200 passim; and Korean War 145, 146, 148, 149, 153, 154, 159, 290; attitudes to India 151, 154, 313; and China as aggressor 155, 296; and Commonwealth 166, 172-3,178-9; and Colombo Plan 175; Asian policies of 178, 256-7; counterweights to influence of 180, 287-9; and instant retaliation 200-1; on NATOTCC 227; on NATO Standing Group 230; and expanded NATO membership 236-7; economic relations with 253-5; Pentagon 255, 282, 284, 298, 318; and St Lawrence Seaway 259-63; and Columbia River 263-70; and Chicago diversion 270-3; Tariff Commission 273; trade with 273-4; civil defence co-operation with 286; PL 480 287; exchange of notes instead of treaties with 290; and UN diplomacy 295-305

passim; in disarmament negotiations 305-23 passim; and international development fund 335; and admission of new UN members 338-48 passim; rift with re UN membership 342, 346-7; tripartite declaration on Middle East 351; and Suez crisis 352-70 passim; and Hungary 371 United States Air Force 96-7, 103, 249 United States Corps of Engineers 265 Urrutia, Francisco 362 Vaillancourt, Emile 124 Vandenberg, Arthur H. 108; resolution 104n, 109,115 Vatican 127-8 Viet Minn 209, 210, 211, 214, 216 Vietnam 14, 339; control commission for 203, 208-16; elections in 207, 213-14; refugees 211; and defence production shanng 285 Vyshinsky, A.Y. 55, 71, 293, 311, 313, 316,317 Wadsworth, James 387 Waldheim, Kurt 303 Wall Street Journal 97 Wang Ping Nan 195 Warsaw pact 162, 321 Washington Conference (1945): and Gouzenko affair 27-8; and UNAEC 46 Washington Conferences (1948) on proposed Atlantic alliance 106, 107 Waterton River 273 White Sulphur Springs, Canada-usMexican meeting at 198, 267 Wiley, Alexander 261 Wilgress, L. Dana 18, 28, 29, 34, 41; on Atlantic community 33; on Soviet policies 19-20, 21-3, 30; on atom

443 Index bomb and East-West relations 31; on northern defence 81; and NATO Council 225, 228; on expanded NATO membership 237 Wright, Hume 36n Wrong, Hume 4-5, 41, 105, 230, 240; at League of Nations 3; on postwar world 3, 33; on proposed Big Three conference 10-11; on Gouzenko affair 25-7; on us policies 35-6; on UNAEC 49; on membership of Security Council 57; on USSR threat 79; on continental defence 79-80, 86; on economic relations with us 90; in 'free trade' discussions with us 93;

on proposed Atlantic alliance 106, 113; on Article 2 of NATO 114, 115, 225; on US attitude to Article 2116; on Article 5 of NATO 117; on collective defence 122; on China 131; on us and recognition of China 136n, 138; on Commonwealth 172-3; on NATO commitments 232, 235; death of 242; and co-operation with us 291 Yalta 14, 21 Yugoslavia 40, 123-4, 229, 303, 383 Zaroubin, G.N. 27, 28, 386