The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey: Operational Research, Strategic Studies, and Canadian Defence in the Cold War 9781487518127

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Original Diagrams
Acknowledgments
Introduction
A Note on Sources and the Text
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Section One: Operational Research
Section Two: Strategic Studies
Section Three: Canadian Defence
Additional Documents
Afterword
Note
Bibliography of Works
Photo Credits
Index

Citation preview

THE SELECTED WORKS OF GEORGE R. LINDSEY Operational Research, Strategic Studies, and Canadian Defence in the Cold War

THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE OF WAR

The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey Operational Research, Strategic Studies, and Canadian Defence in the Cold War

Edited by MATTHEW S. WISEMAN

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

©  University of Toronto Press 2019 Toronto Buffalo London utorontopress.com Printed in the U.S.A. ISBN 978-1-4875-0353-6 Printed on acid-free paper. The Canadian Experience of War Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: The selected works of George R. Lindsey : operational research, strategic studies, and Canadian defence in the Cold War / George R. Lindsey; edited by Matthew S. Wiseman. Other titles: Works. Selections Names: Lindsey, George, 1920–2011, author. | Wiseman, Matthew S., 1986–, editor. Description: Series statement: The Canadian experience of war | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana 20189065699 | ISBN 9781487503536 (hardcover) Subjects: LCSH: Military research – Canada – History – 20th century. | LCSH: Operations research – Canada – History – 20th century. | LCSH: National security – Canada – History – 20th century. | LCSH: Cold War. | LCSH: Canada – Defenses – History – 20th century. | LCSH: Canada – Strategic aspects – History – 20th century. Classification: LCC U395.C2 L56 2019 | DDC 355/.07071 – dc23

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council, an agency of the Government of Ontario.

For the Lindsey family

Contents

List of Original Diagrams  ix Acknowledgments  xi Introduction  xv A Note on Sources and the Text  xxxiii Abbreviations and Acronyms  xxxv Section One: Operational Research 1967 Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada  3 1974  Operational Research for NATO’s Navies  19 1979 The Contribution of Operational Research at National Defence  29 1983 Early Days of Operational Research in Canada and the Founding of the Canadian Operational Research Society 36 1995 Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research on Radar in World War II  47 Section Two: Strategic Studies 1980 The Linkages of New Technology to Strategic and Theatre Deterrence and Warfighting  59 1980  The SALT Treaty from a Canadian Point of View  68 1983  Systems Analysis and Global Strategy  88

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1986 The Strategic Significance of Changes in the Offence/Defence Balance  108 1993  Taxonomy and Measurement in Arms Control  126 Section Three: Canadian Defence 1971 Canadian Security, Sovereignty, and National Development: Possible Contributions by the Armed Forces and the Defence Research Board  133 1972  Canadian Maritime Strategy in the Seventies  152 1980 Operational Research and Analysis: Flexible Response to the Needs of Canadian Defence through the Post-war Years  166 1980 The Realities of Strategic Deterrence and Their Implications for Canada  182 1983  A Canadian Perspective on Canada-US Defence Relations  191 Additional Documents 1971  Managing the Expos to the World’s Championship  207 2009  Operational Research: Remarks by George R. Lindsey  213 Afterword  219 Notes  225 Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey  245 Photo Credits  259 Index  261 Photographs follow page 56

Original Diagrams

Figure 1 ICBMs: Throw Weight and Number of Independent Warheads 82 Figure 2 SLBMs: Missile Range and Number of Independent Warheads 84 Figure 3 Intercontinental Bombers: Payload and Number of Aircraft  86

Acknowledgments

Over the past three years I have worked part time at the Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS), eagerly sifting through the papers of the late George Lindsey and immersing myself deep in the evolution of strategic planning in Canada’s post-war defence establishment. On this topic Lindsey is a superb teacher. His education in nuclear physics and military background in operational research are a strong combination, and his first-hand experience as a strategic analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence provides insight into the development of security policy in Canada and abroad during the Cold War. Lindsey’s papers are a treasure trove for those who seek a fresh perspective on the scientific and technical aspects of Canada’s Cold War defence policy. My appreciation for the value of the archival documents was high from the outset, when Professors Terry Copp and Marc Kilgour entrusted me with the task of organizing and cataloguing the collection into what is now the George Lindsey fonds of the Laurier Military History Archives at the LCMSDS. I was the second student to work with the documents. Kirk Goodlet, then a PhD candidate in History at the University of Waterloo, deserves recognition for his efforts to organize the collection before it passed to me. This book would not exist if not for the autonomy I received to complete the task, and I am deeply grateful to Terry and Marc for their trust and confidence. I also wish to extend my thanks to Professor Mark Humphries, who supported the idea for a volume based on Lindsey’s unpublished work since rejoining the LCMSDS as director in 2014. Mark and Lyndsay Rosenthal liaised with Len Husband and the University of Toronto Press (UTP) on my behalf, and without their efforts this book would remain unpublished. Len was extremely helpful throughout the revision process, and

xii Acknowledgments

I am especially thankful for his willingness and support to guide this project from manuscript to book. Janice Evans at UTP facilitated the editing process, and I am thankful for her professional support. Barry Norris was an excellent freelance copy editor. The entire book went through multiple revisions, and the final draft is due in large part to a number of significant contributions. Professor Roger Sarty did not hesitate when asked to apply his keen editorial eye to the introduction. His knowledge of the post-war Canadian defence department and literature on the topic helped to elucidate context and refine my ideas about Lindsey’s professional position and influence. I am thankful to Professors Copp, Humphries, and Sarty for engaging in critical discussion and feedback, without which this book would be incomplete. I owe a debt of gratitude to the entire Lindsey family, to whom this book is dedicated. June Lindsey, wife of the author and subject of this book, invited me into her beautiful Ottawa home on three separate occasions, each instance sharing details about her late husband over a delicious home-cooked meal. June allowed me to sift through family records and indulged my appetite for science and the Cold War, openly answering questions and sharing anecdotes based on recollections of her personal and familial experiences with the Canadian defence establishment. June is a remarkable story herself. She was educated at the University of ­Cambridge and became one of the first women scientists to earn a position with Canada’s National Research Council in the early post-war period. I hope to have the opportunity to learn and write about June in the near future. Three other members of the Lindsey family shared stories with me as well, including June’s two children, her son Professor Robin Lindsey and daughter Professor Jane Lindsey, and her brother-in-law Casimir Lindsey. I am thankful for the ongoing support of the Lindsey family, and I hope this book brings happiness to their home. Research for this project depended on financial support from a number of sources. I wish to acknowledge the support of the LCMSDS, the Department of History at Wilfrid Laurier University, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I also wish to thank Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), the National Capital Branch of the Canadian International Council, and the journals Canadian Military History and Optimum for granting permission to publish or reprint Lindsey’s work. Full details about the original source of each reprinted document appear in the notes section of the book. DRDC not only granted permission to publish internal government reports written by Lindsey, but also offered to review the manuscript’s introduction. I

Acknowledgments xiii

particularly want to thank Thierry Gongora, Acting Chief Scientist, Operational Research and Analysis, at DRDC for coordinating the reprint request, providing revisions to the introduction, and supporting the project from the start. Charles Morrisey of DRDC also read the introduction, and I am thankful for his useful comments. Finally, I would be remiss not to thank the primary author himself. Although I never had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of George Lindsey, he meticulously maintained a large volume of personal working documents during and after his career with the Canadian government that helped me navigate and understand the complex and challenging circumstances encountered by officials, policy makers, and strategic analysts in Ottawa during the Cold War. If not for Lindsey’s efforts, a void would remain in our understanding of Canadian security in the post-war period, and for this I will remain thankful. Matthew S. Wiseman Waterloo, Ontario

Introduction

Dr George R. Lindsey (1920–2011), a leading Canadian defence scientist, gained widespread recognition in the Western alliance during a government career that spanned nearly the whole of the Cold War. Trained as a scientist in nuclear physics, he conducted operational ­research during the Second World War and became a strategic analyst for the Canadian defence department in the post-war period. He played a key role in developing modern capacities in both fields while defending ­Canadian interests on the front lines of Cold War military planning and preparations. He worked toward the cause of a more effective security relationship among the North Atlantic partners, influencing policy in such important areas as air defence, anti-submarine warfare, and the militarization of space. In an active retirement he then addressed the circumstances of the post–Cold War world. This book provides access to a selection of documents that Lindsey wrote during his long and interesting career, many that received limited circulation or went unpublished in the open literature. Lindsey left ­behind a collection of rich records that offer insight into his personal predilections and professional dispositions. While a significant amount of his government work remains classified, what information is open provides unique insights into post-war defence and policy making in C ­ anada. The writings provided here describe the work of an influential and largely unknown Canadian while also shedding light on the importance of ­ ­governmental defence research for Canada’s national and international Cold War security policies. Lindsey’s records thus not only chronicle the noteworthy experiences of a pragmatic defence scientist, but also elucidate and nuance our understanding of the priorities of the Canadian defence establishment during a significant period in world affairs.

xvi Introduction

Most of Lindsey’s work was for government use only, as was most of the important information to which he had privileged access. He was acutely aware of the gulf between what he intimately knew were the very practical and immediate concerns that dominate the lives of policy makers and the perspective of writers not privy to classified materials. In a 1983 paper Lindsey remarked, “the assumptions and scope of academic studies [on war and strategy] are often considerably broader than is the case for those done in government.”1 Here lay one source of “disputed concepts” between the detailed analysis upon which policy was built and accounts produced by academics or other non-government scholars. Without access to classified “memoranda, working papers, briefings, submissions, speeches, telegrams, and conferences,” academics, Lindsey argued, could not possibly consider “what could properly be described as the most practical and important government research on war and strategy.”2 The merit of Lindsey’s argument is difficult to ignore. As a civil servant in defence, he belonged to a select group who were privy to information that was inaccessible to the public. He was also among those who had a direct impact on the formation and implementation of Canada’s national and international security and defence policies. His career in the civil service lasted for thirty-seven years (1950–87), during which he established a reputation as Canada’s leading expert in operational research (OR) and systems analysis. He did so as an employee of the Defence Research Board (DRB), Canada’s first peacetime establishment for military science. Possessed of a keen intellect and pragmatic desire for calculated efficiency and problem solving, Lindsey developed a ­meticulous understanding of strategy and Canadian affairs. His research achievements, high standing among his peers, and international influence deserve recognition. Education and Military Service George Roy Gzowski Lindsey was born in Toronto, Ontario, on 2 June 1920 to Lieutenant Colonel Charles Bethune Lindsey and his wife Wanda Casimira (née Gzowski). His lineage leaves the historian in awe. On his father’s side, Lindsey was a great-great grandson of Toronto’s first mayor, William Lyon Mackenzie, who became a fugitive three years after his 1834 election for his role in the Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837. Queen Victoria offered a reward of one thousand pounds for Mackenzie’s capture, but he fled south to the United States to evade prosecution.3

Introduction xvii

Mackenzie resettled in Toronto in 1850 after the rebels had received the offer of a general amnesty. He had fourteen children, including a daughter named Janet, who married British-born journalist and political activist Charles Lindsey. He also had a daughter Isabel, who married lawyer John King and became the mother of William Lyon Mackenzie King, Canada’s tenth prime minister, who served from 1921 to 1930 and again from 1935 to 1948. On a secret trip to England during the Second World War, Mackenzie King captured the attention of British military officials when he requested the presence of Lieutenant George Lindsey, then on secondment from the Royal Canadian Artillery to p ­ erform radar research.4 The officials relaxed after learning that Lindsey was the prime minister’s cousin. Both parents had a profound effect on Lindsey’s personal and professional life. His father was an officer in The Queen’s Own Rifles for most of his life, a distinguished veteran of frontline service in the First World War and throughout the Second World War with the Veterans Guard of Canada.5 His mother was a grandchild of Sir Casimir Gzowski, the prominent Polish-born engineer who established extensive infrastructure in Ontario during the late nineteenth century and served the province as acting lieutenant governor from 1896 to 1897. Queen Victoria gave Gzowski a portrait of herself in 1891, which today remains with the Lindsey family along with a wanted poster issued on Her Majesty’s behalf for the capture of the rebellious William Lyon Mackenzie.6 Raised on family traditions of engineering and military service, ­Lindsey showed unusual promise as a child. Against the wishes of his parents, he chose to attend secondary school at University of Toronto Schools (UTS), rather than Upper Canada College (UCC). His father and grandfather were products of UCC, but Lindsey decided on UTS because of its reputation for producing high-calibre students and some of the top academic grades in Toronto.7 His concentration on academic subjects brought him to Trinity College at the University of Toronto, where he earned an honours degree in mathematics and physics in 1942. After graduating with distinction, Lindsey enlisted in the Royal Canadian Artillery, and took courses in radar, qualifying as lieutenant, Electrical Methods of Fire Control, one of the cover terms used to disguise Allied progress with this new technology.8 Lindsey first worked on army radar projects for the National Research Council (NRC) in Ottawa before joining the British Army Operational Research Group (AORG) in London.9 As a junior officer, he conducted military operational research that focused on the applications of radar

xviii Introduction

to air defence. At the time, radar was secret military technology in its infancy. Lindsey was one of a select group of Canadian scientists involved in techniques of defence against bomber aircraft employing electronic countermeasures and in the application of both heavy and light anti-aircraft guns against the German unmanned aerial vehicle known as the V-1 flying bomb.10 His work with AORG also included data analysis of photographic radar records of shell bursts. As the first technological systematic detection of trends and changes in enemy tactics, radar data analysis became effective for military operations.11 Lindsey’s work in air defence and radar in support of field artillery had wide wartime applicability.12 He used advanced mathematics and other scientific methods to study exercises and actual military operations against enemy aircraft. His work measured the military effectiveness of Allied operations and helped improve tactics through calculated modelling. Combined with similar research conducted by the army, navy, and air force against enemy air, land, and sea forces, operational research (OR) gradually extended to encompass many wartime activities.13 OR was particularly important in the deployment of naval forces to defeat U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic and to many aspects of effective fighter defence against the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain. When the Canadian Army established its own AORG in 1944, L ­ indsey returned to Canada and continued to work there until the end of the war. Following his retirement from the army in 1945, he resumed studies and obtained a master’s degree in nuclear physics from Queen’s University the following year. Afterwards he took up summer employment at the newly constructed NRC Chalk River Laboratories on the Ottawa River, where he conducted experiments with the Zero Energy reactor ­before ­returning overseas to complete a doctor of philosophy in the ­Cavendish Laboratory, Department of Physics, at Cambridge.14 As both an undergraduate and graduate student, Lindsey won ­numerous scholarships for research in nuclear physics.15 Outside schoolwork, he socialized and stayed actively involved in sports. A stint with the C ­ ambridge hockey team resulted in an offer to play goalie for the ­Scottish national team.16 He considered the offer but declined, knowing the ­statistics went against a career in professional hockey. Lindsey also met his future wife, June Broomhead, at Cambridge, herself a bright PhD student in X-ray crystallography. She received three offers of marriage, but agreed to marry Lindsey because he was the only man she could not push around.17 “You felt that he was a straight, completely honest man,” she said upon reflection in an interview with Sandra Martin of the Globe

Introduction xix

and Mail.18 He was “very bright, but he kept it hidden, [had a] clever sense of humour [and] could turn his hand to anything.” The pair married on 20 August 1951, after both had earned their doctorate. By then L ­ indsey had returned to Canada to work in government. His bride followed that ­November, and spent one year searching for employment before receiving a postdoctoral fellowship at the NRC. Together they raised two children. Son Robin is currently an economist at the Sauder School at the University of British Columbia, and daughter Jane is a ­biostatistician in AIDS Research at the Harvard School of Public Health.19 Lindsey’s Career in Defence Lindsey’s career with the Canadian government began upon completion of his doctoral degree in nuclear physics in 1950. His first position in government was with the Operational Research Group of the D ­ efence Research Board (DRB), where his wartime experience in r­ adar proved ideally suited for post-war studies in strategic air defence. E ­ stablished in 1947 as a branch of the Department of National Defence (DND), the DRB provided scientific and technical assistance to the C ­ anadian armed services as well as strategic policy advice to the minister of ­national ­defence.20 The extensive technical advances in military methods and equipment made during the Second World War required an active program of defence research and development to support the post-war needs of all three branches of the Canadian military. Because of fundamental professional differences between scientist and soldier, policy makers in Ottawa decided that civilians outside the organizational framework of the armed services would manage defence research. As a separate entity within the DND, the DRB became an integral element of Canada’s post-war national defence structure, partnered with but independent of the military.21 After consideration by the chiefs of staff and consultation with some of Canada’s leading scientists, Omond Solandt was assigned to direct the organization of defence research and development in Canada. A noted physiologist from the University of Toronto and Cambridge, Solandt earned his reputation in OR during the war while with the British AORG.22 Following the war, he applied his academic and military experience to Canadian problems as director general of defence research and founding chair of the DRB.23 Lindsey was one of Solandt’s first recruits for the DRB. The two had met during the war as part of the AORG, and had developed a strong relationship based on mutual interests and a

xx Introduction

passion for science. While completing his doctoral degree at Cambridge, Lindsey received a visit from Solandt, who offered him a position with the DRB.24 Thankful for the opportunity, Lindsey accepted and returned to Canada, where his academic and wartime experience proved a powerful combination for a growing defence establishment in need of strong strategic direction. Operational research emerged during the Second World War, born because of experiments on the use of radar. Systems analysis, on the other hand, originated in the US Department of Defense under Robert McNamara in the early 1960s.25 Canada appropriated both approaches for the purpose of defence research in the post-war period.26 To Lindsey, OR and systems analysis were equally important “tools of management” and essential components of Canada’s national defence department.27 In fact when the DRB created an OR organization to assist management at various levels, the DND became the world’s first government department to institute and carry out operational research on a continuing professional basis.28 Lindsey’s career with the DRB began in 1950. Solandt had created an Operational Research Group (ORG) within the DRB the year prior, and Lindsey joined a small OR team that supported the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). At the time, strategic concerns in Canada centred on continental air defence against Soviet long-range nuclear bomb-carrying bombers, particularly the Tupolev TU-4. Lindsey quickly became an ­important asset, working both in and outside Ottawa. As a key member of joint Canada-US negotiations on continental air defence, he worked with Harold Larnder, who coined the term “operational research,” on the development of a semi-automated radar defence system called the McGill Fence.29 Financed by the DRB, the project resulted in the Mid-Canada Line, joining the Pinetree Line and later the DEW Line to form the North American continental radar defence network. As his work on air defence continued, Lindsey joined John Foster of McGill University as the only two Canadians to participate in a joint Canada-US study group during the summer of 1952 at MIT’s Lincoln ­Laboratory in Lexington, Massachusetts.30 Composed mainly of scientific defence analysts, the forty-five member group estimated the potential effects of a Soviet nuclear strike on North America, and determined that significant improvements in continental air defence required i­ncreased early warning. From this conclusion the Lincoln Summer Study Group made recommendations that helped provide a foundation for the framework of the initial North American Air Defence Command (NORAD)

Introduction xxi

agreement, which both countries signed in 1957.31 In the formative days of NORAD, officials in Washington considered continental air defence to be the first and last line of defence against a potential Soviet attack. Despite its much smaller forces, Canada was anxious to be an equal partner with the United States in continental defence. Operational research, where brains counted as much as brawn, represented an area where the defence establishment in Ottawa could wield considerable influence in Washington. Indeed, the work of Lindsey and his team was widely respected on both sides of the border. Lindsey was particularity effective as a Canadian voice against the American determination to place radar stations in southern Canada.32 He clearly articulated that Canadian security interests were distinct from those of the United States. His most significant contribution to the 1952 debate was a report that examined the implications to Canada of the proposed North American air defence system, in which he emphasized the strategic issues of Canadian geography. In the event of a Soviet air attack, the orientation of an air defence network would determine the pattern of any resulting devastation. To avoid substantial destruction near highly populated Canadian areas, Lindsey recommended that construction of radar lines take place farther north than the Americans had originally proposed. Lindsey was firm on this stance. According to one DRB report, he injected a strong “sense of reality into the assessment of the capabilities of highly mechanized equipment” for Canada’s contribution to continental air defence, and “without his work Canada would almost certainly have been drawn into participation in a more complex, expensive, and less effective air defence system.”33 Lindsey worked in the OR section of the DRB between 1950 and 1954, until he succeeded Larnder at the RCAF Air Defence Command in St-Hubert, Quebec, as senior operational research officer and scientific adviser.34 While with the RCAF, he worked on OR related to the performance of radar, aircraft, and ground control centres. He also cooperated in studies with colleagues from the United States, simultaneously furthering professional relations first developed as a member of the Lincoln Summer Study Group and strengthening Canada’s voice in negotiations concerning the creation and implementation of NORAD. Lindsey earned a promotion to director of the Defence Systems Analysis Group (DSAG) in 1959, and joined the Joint Ballistic Missiles Defence Staff, National Defence Headquarters. For three years he analysed the capabilities of the Sentinel and Safeguard ballistic missile defence systems that were under design for integration into NORAD.

xxii Introduction

Among the more influential of Lindsey’s colleagues and friends was Robert (Bob) Sutherland, a prominent policy analyst who helped ­advance operational research in the Canadian defence department. In fact Lindsey’s promotion resulted from the DRB’s decision to support Sutherland’s work through the establishment of the DSAG. Lindsey’s organization of the new group reflected his method of operation.35 In place of special training for his new staff, he set up a series of weekly seminars at which each member presented a detailed exposition of a selected topic related to the scientific background of an area in analysis work.36 The approach built an effective team, and provided a foundation of seminar papers for domestic and international meetings in subsequent years. Lindsey’s career took an important turn in September 1961 when he became chief of the Operational Research Group at the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Research Centre at NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic establishment in La Spezia, Italy.37 He directed OR concerning naval exercises, the performance of anti-submarine barriers, and maritime surveillance. At the time Canada was involved in North ­American ASW research, but had relatively little contact with ASW ­research counterparts in Europe. Prior to Lindsey’s arrival in Italy, work at the technical centre had concentrated on oceanographic research. NATO maritime operations lacked OR experience, so in his new role Lindsey helped ­establish an OR group to assist in managing the evolving strategic threat at sea. He participated in conferences on military OR, and under his tutelage the ASW Research Centre developed a tactical understanding of radar and sonar detection equipment, as well as a strategic understanding of the makeup and deployment of naval task forces and required air support. Lindsey’s placement also advanced Canada’s presence in the North Atlantic security partnership and prominence as a contributor to international security. As Lindsey’s contributions mounted both in and outside the Canadian defence establishment, so too did his stature in the eyes of his superiors. In a letter of recommendation dated 25 March 1963, Sutherland, then chief of operational research at the DRB, referred to Lindsey as “the most able military operational research man … not only in ­Canada but in any other country.”38 The letter further described Lindsey as an individual of firm character whose principal limitation was stubbornness. He was reasonable but not easily persuaded – just the personality type needed for success as a prominent civil servant in defence. The timing of ­Sutherland’s recommendation was significant. In 1963 the entirety of

Introduction xxiii

Canada’s national defence department, including the DRB, came ­under direct pressure from the Glassco Commission, which ­recommended an organizational restructuring. The newly elected Liberal government under Lester Pearson accepted the need for reform, but Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer and Associate Minister Lucien Cardin sought the advice of senior DND officials as a second opinion. One of the senior DND officials was Sutherland, who became the principal ­author of the 1964 White Paper on Defence that Hellyer tabled in Parliament on 26 March of that year.39 Four years later, in February 1968, the passing of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act officially combined the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the RCAF into a single Canadian Armed Forces. The unfortunate death of Sutherland in early 1967 left Lindsey to help lead the DRB through a series of major organizational changes that ­resulted from the integration and unification of the armed services. Named successor to his colleague and friend, Lindsey became chief ­superintendent of the Operational Research and Analysis ­Establishment (ORAE). In his new role Lindsey directed a program determined by agreement between the deputy minister of DND, the chief of the ­defence staff, and the chair of the DRB. The job came with two hats. Along with his promotion to chief superintendent, Lindsey simultaneously assumed the position of director general of operational research at Canadian Forces Headquarters.40 In an evolving science program that aimed to be more responsive to the needs of the forces, Lindsey recognized that analytical expansion was necessary to maintain the relevance of operational research and strategic studies.41 Upon his appointment as chief superintendent, a DRB press release referred to Lindsey as a Second World War operational research pioneer with a “wide and varied background in his scientific speciality.”42 The press release was on point, as is evidenced by Lindsey’s ingenuity in the face of stark organizational challenges. He used his new position to help expand ORAE into research areas that emphasized strategic, social, and economic studies. Lindsey embraced each field and ensured it had the appropriate staff. He had inherited ORAE on the decline, but managed to create a more sophisticated organization with multiple divisions and no fewer than two hundred people reporting to him, one-quarter of whom were “uniform people,” according to Ron Cleminson, a former colleague of Lindsey’s in arms control and verification studies.43 ­Lindsey found success in this role, and devised a management method that ­survived several departmental reorganizations through the late 1970s.44

xxiv Introduction

Positioned relative to the determination of policy at the highest levels of the Canadian government, Lindsey’s influence was consequently strong and far-reaching.45 In a letter dated 17 April 1969 to Robert Uffen, the third chair of the DRB, the vice chief of the defence staff, Lieutenant-General E.M. Reyno, wrote: “I got the message loud and clear with respect to George Lindsey. You were quite right when you said he is the type of chap who seems to get called in to clean up matters after debate has been raging for weeks.”46 In this particular instance, ­Lindsey had convinced some of Canada’s top military personnel of the importance of civilian staff in defence research. Later in the letter, Reyno ­admitted “the parochial nature of top military management … tends to make us overlook readily accessible, but non-military, talent.”47 Between 1967 and 1975 very few major policy studies at the DND went without a contribution of ideas or analysis by Lindsey. He was ­particularly proud of a status report on North American defence and the strategic balance to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National D ­ efence.48 In May 1969 he contributed a three-part study titled Strategic Weapons Systems, Stability, and Possible Contributions by ­Canada.49 His brief and testimony served to educate the committee on complex issues involving strategic deterrence. Lindsey specifically clarified the ambiguous relationship between Canada and the US with regard to cooperation in ballistic missile defence, further demonstrating his knowledge of aerospace security and expert analysis of Canada’s geostrategic challenges.50 As an ardent researcher, Lindsey’s professional contributions extended beyond his work for the Canadian defence department. ­ When the deterioration of the environment captured the attention of scientists in the mid-1970s, he used his experience in analysis and strategic planning to contribute to the burgeoning field of global studies. ­Following an invitation to prepare the outline for the first major study of the Montreal-based Institute for Research on Public Policy, the DND granted Lindsey a leave of absence. He also received an invitation from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) to discuss anti-­ submarine warfare at its annual conference in Sweden in September 1975. The director of the IISS, Christoph Bertram, praised Lindsey, who was recognized internationally as an expert on anti-submarine warfare, as “one of the few people who can deal with this sensitive subject in an informative way.”51 Lindsey’s presentation marked the first time that a Canadian had received an invite to speak to the prestigious Institute.

Introduction xxv

As a bridge between science and government, Lindsey developed an extensive international resumé. He was a member of the NATO Advisory Panel for Operational Research, and received a special invitation in 1971 to consult on the establishment of a military operational research unit in Malaysia.52 His report on the situation led to a successful program in which OREA provided OR personnel to Malaysia and in return accepted Malaysian trainees to Ottawa. Lindsey also served in an advisory role as the C ­ anadian representative to the five-nation Technical Cooperation Program, conducted along with the United States, United Kingdom, ­Australia, and New Zealand.53 With the Technical Cooperation Program in the mid-1970s, Lindsey contributed to a panel on ballistic missile ­defence and served as executive director of an undersea warfare panel of the a­ nti-submarine study group. His involvement in undersea research ­advanced his career and he became the Canadian representative to the High Level Group of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, which further increased the international experience he first developed during his time in Italy.54 Lindsey’s title changed to chief of defence research and analysis ­establishment in 1978, a position he occupied until his retirement from government in 1987. Although he had retired from the DND, he a­ pplied his experience to study such topics as the strategic significance of the Arctic, nuclear deterrence, and the weaponization of space for organizations that included the IISS, the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security. L ­ indsey was also a regular contributor in studies for the Non-­Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the ­Department of External/­ Foreign ­Affairs throughout the 1990s. He studied international inspection and verification of arms-control agreements, and often lectured in Canada and abroad about contemporary defence and international security issues. Lindsey’s involvement in government did not end with his retirement in 1987. He remained actively involved in security research and published on topics including Canada-US defence relations, defence technology, and the history of Canadian scientific applications to defence. Hs contributions to defence studies received further recognition in 2000 when he became chair of the Institute for International Affairs study group on North American security.55 In this capacity Lindsey made several appearances before parliamentary committees concerned with missile defence and the threat of terrorism. Passionate about the results and applicability of his work, Lindsey continued to research, write, and

xxvi Introduction

lecture for another decade. He died on 6 September 2011 at the age of ninety-one, but the research materials he left stand as an invaluable source on the inner workings of strategic analysis and policy making in the Department of National Defence during the Cold War. Lindsey’s Written Legacy Lindsey promoted the growth of the OR profession, in Canada and throughout the world. He was the third president of the Canadian ­Operational Research Society, following his mentor and friend Omond Solandt and Dan de Leevy. He contributed research papers to OR journals in Canada and the United States publishing on both military and non-military issues. In fact Lindsey was the first to apply statistical analysis to the sport of baseball and to publish the results.56 He maintained a deep affinity for analysing play-by-play data, and used his training in OR to determine the effectiveness of decisions made by opposing teams. As a military strategist Lindsey was particularly interested in how singles, steals, walks, and other in-game manoeuvres fit together as if battlefield tactics.57 As he wrote in 1959, “baseball is a game well suited for operations analysis, and is already well provided with statistical records of past performances of individuals.”58 The interpretation of data on past performance could vitally influence key coaching decisions, or so Lindsey thought when he watched and listened to baseball, his favourite pastime. He played baseball in his youth and closely followed the Major Leagues throughout life. On one fortunate occasion, he was able to watch Babe Ruth play an exhibition game in Toronto. As he grew older, Lindsey listened to as many games as he could, recording play-by-play data and studying box scores. When he was overseas, he relied on his father to listen and record data for future analysis. “We were looking to find the best strategy for different circumstances,” Lindsey told columnist Jeff Blair upon reflection in 2005.59 “Baseball lent itself to [analysis] because the rules hadn’t changed,” he continued. “There is no time element … With the military, weapons were always changing. That meant the rules changed, too.” Lindsey used tables, equations, and distribution graphs to detail his findings, but his pioneering contributions to data analysis remained largely unrecognised until Alan Schwarz dubbed him the “Darwin of the Diamond” in a published history of baseball statistics in 2004.60 Lindsey’s devotion to the OR profession was equalled only by his commitment to defence studies. He published in Air Force Journal, Defence

Introduction xxvii

Quarterly, Optimum, and the prestigious scientific journal Nature, among others. He lectured frequently at the National Defence College, the military staff colleges, and the Canadian service colleges. Lindsey also promoted government outreach. He contributed to scholarship and fellowship programs offered by the DND that fostered links between the military and universities in Canada. He wrote important books as well, and showed a considerable ability to attract scholars interested in international defence and security issues. Lindsey’s most successful collaboration with an academic researcher ­occurred during the early 1970s. While taking language training in Quebec, he collaborated with political scientist Albert Legault of ­ ­Université Laval to write Le feu nucléaire (Nuclear fire) in 1973.61 The following year, Cornell University Press released an English translation titled The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance.62 The book targeted a wide audience, ­including students, academics, military planners, journalists, and the public. Written specifically for readers without a background in the physical sciences, Lindsey and Legault described their work as an easily comprehensible text on “the salient features of nuclear energy and strategic weapon systems.”63 Sophisticated yet accessible, The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance addressed the various complexities of strategic analysis, deterrence, and arms control in international affairs. In clear, concise, and lucid prose, Lindsey and Legault covered such topics as the chemistry and physics of nuclear explosives, the mathematics of offensive and defence missile systems, and the nuances of contemporary disarmament negotiations related to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Anti-­Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Vladivostok Agreements. Given its original publication date, the book remains a unique and valuable source of information on the many scientific and technical aspects of the land-, sea-, and air-based threat of weapons proliferation as well as the subsequent international political response at a time when many military intricacies of the Cold War were elusive to social scientists and the wider public. Lindsey’s research was not restricted thematically to the post-war ­period. Before historian Donald Avery published The Science of War,64 named honourable mention to the 1999 Sir John A. Macdonald Prize for best book on Canadian history, In 1997 No Day Long Enough, a Lindsey-edited collection chronicling Canadian science in the Second World War, ­introduced readers to the complexity of Canada’s wartime scientific effort.65 The collection features first-person accounts written by scientists and engineers who not only had undertaken Canadian

xxviii Introduction

research and development during the war, but also had contributed significantly to the growth and utility of Allied science. The first-hand experiences, perceptions, and insights of the contributors highlight the pace and ­intensity of technological growth in Europe and Canada at a time when the Allied war effort increasingly relied on non-military expertise to ­expedite victory. Covered in depth are topics that include the National Research Council of Canada; wartime medical, chemical, and biological research; scientific applications to air, naval, and coldweather problems; and research and development concerning weapons and ammunition. Lindsey himself contributed three chapters about the emergence and importance of radar and operational research. He also wrote a section titled “The Helmsmen,” which detailed explicitly the significant contributions to Canadian science of Andrew McNaughton, C.J. Mackenzie, C.D. Howe, and Lindsey’s colleague and friend Omond Solandt. Solandt’s contribution to Canadian science had a particular influence on Lindsey. Not only did Solandt provide Lindsey the opportunity to work in government; he also supported Lindsey’s ascendance in the Canadian defence department. In October 1955 Solandt described Lindsey as “one of the ablest people” in the DRB, a man respected by his scientific colleagues as well as all those in the RCAF who knew of his work on North American air defence.66 The feeling was mutual. Lindsey had the utmost respect for Solandt, and thought he deserved more recognition for his contributions to Canadian science and defence than he received.67 In 1994 Lindsey co-published an edited collection of articles originally presented two years earlier at a symposium in honour of Solandt, “physician, soldier, scientist, and above all, innovator … whose record was outstanding in organizing and managing the practical application of science to problems in war and peace.”68 Titled Perspectives in Science and Technology, the collection provides direct insight into the influential role Solandt played as a pioneer in the field of OR and a visionary of Canadian science. Among the twenty contributions to the collection, Lindsey’s essay is titled “The Management of Science in the Defence ­Research Board”; he also chaired the final session of the symposium, which became the book’s conclusion. In the book, Lindsey refers specifically to Solandt’s multidisciplinary leadership approach, including his rare ability to marshal appropriate talents from any relevant scientific discipline and find practical solutions to complicated problems.69 Solandt’s ability to discover and cultivate

Introduction xxix

talent seems to have been a feature common to all his activities and personal relations. In Lindsey’s own words: “Solandt’s familiarity with so many scientific disciplines exactly fitted him for his work in operational research, and for his duties as founding Chairman of the Defence ­Research Board … His wartime experience with [the] British AORG was directly applicable to his success in applying science to the problems of the Canadian armed forces, industrial users, and distressed countries … Omond Solandt was one of the greatest figures in applied science in the history of Canada. He has left a legacy of how applied science should be done.”70 Solandt’s ability to cultivate constructive links between scientists and the bodies or groups whose activities their research supported impressed Lindsey the most. In the book’s concluding remarks, Lindsey and fellow editors Cecil Law and David Grenville reflected on Solandt’s determination. In their estimation, Solandt resisted “the pressures of bureaucracy to submit the management of scientific personnel to the procedures applied to the administrative civil service, which were not well adapted to the problem of identifying and quickly employing unusual individuals with special qualifications.”71 Lindsey became acutely aware of such bureaucratic pressures ­during his career. As a civil servant in defence, he experienced two vastly d ­ ifferent economic realities. Canada’s defence establishment expanded between the late 1940s and early 1960s, only to face significant reorganization and reduction when federal budgets reallocated funds in the 1970s. L ­ indsey grew increasingly agitated with the disregard showed for C ­ anadian ­defence science by successive governments from the mid-1960s onward. His strong opinion came through in a 1987 retirement interview with ­national defence and foreign affairs columnist John Best in which L ­ indsey referred to the throttling of defence research in Canada as an act of “malign neglect.”72 Speaking to the issue of defence expenditure in a March 1990 interview with Jane’s Defence Weekly, Lindsey further stated: “Research isn’t nearly as expensive as development, and development isn’t nearly as expensive as production. So I think the wise investment is to do lots of research and be rather selective in development and very selective in procurement.”73 He firmly believed that curtailing scientific research was bad economy. Despite his disagreement with changing government priorities, ­Lindsey remained thoroughly committed to his role as a civil servant in defence. He often relied on non-governmental publications in his own research and writing, and during and post-career at the DND he

xxx Introduction

consulted academics researching topics as broad as Canadian defence policy and as specific as strategic nuclear deterrence. Three of the foremost scholars on Canadian Cold War strategy, Joseph Jockel, Andrew Richter, and James Fergusson, relied on Lindsey to review their studies on air defence and nuclear weapons prior to publication.74 All three scholars regard Lindsey as one of the more significant Canadian defence officials of the early nuclear age.75 Lindsey’s Historical Relevance Described as a modest person, Lindsey’s keen intellect, work ethic, and foremost stature among his peers are evidence that his achievements were certainly not modest.76 In a remembrance column published shortly after his passing in 2011, former Navy League of Canada executive director Fraser McKee wrote that Lindsey was the “quiet brains behind not only DND’s operational assessment and analysis, but also involved in the same functions for Foreign Affairs … It was a pleasure to be associated with [such a] brilliant, trusted and yet very approachable man.”77 Although most of Lindsey’s government work was classified, his important contributions to Canadian science and defence received public recognition in 1989 when he was named an Officer of the Order of Canada. The citation reads: “[Lindsey] has a world-wide reputation as an authority on deterrence policy, arms control, nuclear weapons policy, naval warfare and strategic analysis … he has published extensively and is a sought-after speaker among defence scientists both in Canada and in NATO.”78 In ­November 2012 Lindsey’s own peers established the George Lindsey Award for Career Achievement in Defence Analysis. The Lindsey Award plaque stands on display in the corporate boardroom of the Defence ­Research and Development Canada Centre for Operational ­Research and Analysis as a tribute to the enormous role its namesake played in the development of defence research and science policy in Canada.79 The documents collected in this book cover an active and politically volatile period in world affairs, when the international community ­applied science in search of practical solutions to complicated problems. Lindsey lived this experience. He worked on the front lines of ­Canadian defence during a tense period in modern history, and made important and long-lasting contributions to the safety and stability of Canada. Those contributions deserve attention. Just as the Canadian military became dependent on the work of government scientists to teach the

Introduction xxxi

technical aspects of national security, so too should scholars of post-war Canada become dependent on the records of government defence scientists to better understand the development of security research and defence policy. Without proper investigation into the types of defence research covered by the documents in this book, a significant void will remain in the interpretation of Canada’s Cold War experience. Although the documents provided here offer insight into Lindsey’s diverse and influential career in the Canadian defence department, they should not be taken as comprehensive records of defence science in ­Canada. There is an immense amount of documentation on the subjects of operational research, strategic studies, defence science, and policy formation in Canada during the Cold War, and the documents presented here are complementary, rather than definitive research materials. ­Conversely the value of Lindsey’s records should not be underappreciated. Much of his government work was confidential and unpublished, and what he did publish in the open literature was both selective and limited. This book lifts such restrictions, giving scholars unique and ­unfiltered information pertaining to some of the more complicated aspects of Canadian defence and security during the second half of the twentieth century. Divided thematically into three sections, the documents here explore specific aspects of Lindsey’s diverse professional experience. In Section One, “Operational Research,” are records pertaining to the inclusion of operational research in military planning and execution. The documents focus on the post-war period as well as the origins of OR in Canada and its importance to the DND. Section Two, “Strategic Studies,” builds on the foundational framework provided in the first set of documents. Lindsey’s records on strategic studies highlight the practical applicability of in-depth scientific inquiry to the more technical security issues of the Cold War period. His academic background as a nuclear physicist developed over the course of his career into a specialty in aerospace defence, and his writings demonstrate the level of sophistication required to make sense of complex post-war strategic issues. Lastly the documents in Section Three, “Canadian Defence,” trace the evolution of Canadian defence policy throughout much of the second half of the twentieth century. Covering topics that include land, sea, and air defence, the intricacies of Canada’s strategic experience in the Cold War find extensive detail in these documents. In the direction of his predecessor Robert Sutherland, Lindsey wrote with an eye toward explaining the implications of Canada’s geography,

xxxii Introduction

economy, and international position in a constantly changing strategic atmosphere.80 He stood out among the most distinguished of his peers as a leading scientist and dedicated civil servant. His records provide a fresh perspective on a variety of topics related to Canadian defence in the post-war years, and his experiences reveal a distinct awareness of many critical strategic issues that Canada faced during the Cold War. Lindsey navigated complex problems for the Canadian defence establishment, and his sources offer valuable insight into the manner in which senior defence officials approached issues thought to be significant in the ­nuclear age.

A Note on Sources and the Text

Except where otherwise stated, the original copies of the documents that appear in this book are held in the George Lindsey fonds of the Laurier Military History Archive at the Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) in Waterloo, Ontario. I listed the accession numbers for the original files in the notes for each document. The George Lindsey fonds at the LCMSDS consists of materials written and collected by Lindsey during and after his career with the Department of National Defence, including departmental reports, personal correspondence, lectures, newspaper clippings, magazines, papers, conference proceedings, and government and non-government publications on a variety of topics related to Canada’s security and defence policy between 1945 and 2005. The LCMSDS acquired the fonds from the Lindsey family in 2011. Additional documents related to and created by George Lindsey can be found at Canada’s national repository, Library and Archives Canada, in RG 24, the record group of the Department of National Defence. Additionally in Ottawa, the Directorate of History and Heritage houses a collection of George Lindsey and Robert J. ­Sutherland papers, accession 87/253. In order to differentiate the notes that appear in this book, citations I added to the original text appear in italicized font. Notes that appear in standard, non-italicized font are the original citations. Exclusive of the notes to the introduction, this rule applies throughout the book. The content of the original notes is unchanged, but the format has been updated to The Chicago Manual of Style. Text I added before each document also appears in italicized font. I also updated spelling to current Canadian usage, except where a change might have altered the original phrasing.

xxxiv  A Note on Sources and the Text

Original subheadings are unchanged, save for the removal of numbers and the alteration of font for the purposes of style and clarity. At times the original text is laden with abbreviations and acronyms. On the first use of an uncommon abbreviation or acronym, I inserted the full wording in square parentheses for clarity and ease of reading.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AA anti-aircraft AAFCENT Allied Air Forces Central ABM anti-ballistic missile ACE Allied Command Europe ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic AFHQ Air Force Headquarters (Canadian) ALCM air-launched cruise missile AMF Allied Command Europe Mobile Force AORG Army Operational Research Group AORS Army Operational Research Section ASAT anti-satellite weapon ASBM air-to-surface ballistic missile ASW anti-submarine warfare AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System BMD ballistic missile defence BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System CAG Canadian Air Group CARDE Canadian Armament Research & Development Establishment CAORE Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment CAST Canadian Air-Sea Transportable CEP circular error probability CF Canadian Forces CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CIC Canadian International Council CINCCHAN Commander-in-Chief, Channel Command CINCNORAD Commander-in-Chief, NORAD

xxxvi  Abbreviations and Acronyms

CIIA Canadian Institute of International Affairs CMBG Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group CORS Canadian Operational Research Society CPF Canadian patrol frigate CW chemical warfare DEW Line Distant Early Warning Line DND Department of National Defence (Canadian) DORE Defence Operational Research Establishment (Canadian) DRAE Defence Research Analysis Establishment (Canadian) DRB Defence Research Board (Canadian) DRML Defence Research Medical Laboratories (Canadian, DRB) DSAG Defence Systems Analysis Group (Canadian) DSSO Defence Scientific Service Officer (Canadian, DRB) ECM electronic countermeasures ELINT electronic intelligence EW electronic warfare FRODs Functionally Related Observable Differences GLCM ground-launched cruise missile HAA heavy anti-aircraft HQ Headquarters IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile IFORS International Federation of Operational Research Societies IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty IOC initial operating capability IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile LAA light anti-aircraft LCMSDS Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and ­Disarmament Studies LOC lines of communication LRPA long-range patrol aircraft MCL Mid-Canada Line MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle MRBM medium-range ballistic missile MX Missile Experimental

Abbreviations and Acronyms  xxxvii

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NORAD North American Air/Aerospace Defense Command NRC National Research Council (Canadian) NWS North Warning System OR operational research ORAE Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (Canadian) ORG Operational Research Group (Canadian) ORS Operational Research section ORSA Operational Research Society of America OSI on-site inspection OTH over-the-horizon radar RAF Royal Air Force RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force REME Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic SAGE semi-automatic ground environment SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAM surface-to-air missile SDI Strategic Defense Initiative (American) SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SLBM sea/submarine-launched ballistic missile SLCM sea/submarine-launched cruise missile SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine SSN nuclear-powered submarine SSK hunter-killer/anti-submarine warfare submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty TRE Telecommunications Research Establishment (British) UCC Upper Canada College USAF United States Air Force UTS University of Toronto Schools VSTOL vertical and/or short take-off and landing aircraft WP Warsaw Pact WPO Warsaw Pact Organization

George R. Lindsey, Order of Canada, 1989.

SECTION ONE Operational Research

1967

Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada

This document is a condensed version of a larger research report George Lindsey wrote to give the Department of National Defence a historical review of post-war military operational research in Canada.1 Labelled at the security level of “restricted” upon its release, the report covers institutional activities that Lindsey deemed safe for uncleared audiences and prospective recruits. The document reveals enough of the overall direction of operational research in the Canadian defence establishment in 1967, however, that it was not published or communicated to anyone expect for official purposes. The complete report, printed at the security level of “confidential,” is Operational Research Division (ORD) Informal Paper No. 67/P9, with the title “Military Operational Research in Canada, 1949–1967.” Introduction In the eighteen years since its post-war reincarnation in the Department of National Defence, operational research has become involved in a very large number of the activities of the Canadian Armed Forces. There is always trouble over the definition of what constitutes operational research. In its broadest sense, practitioners of the military profession have been employing it for centuries. For the purposes of this paper it will be taken to include the activities sometimes defined as systems analysis, but to exclude management engineering (with organization analysis, work study, etc.) and technical research on human resources. To a greater extent than most other defence scientific activities, operational research has been practised by comparatively small groups in many units. There has been a large participation by serving officers (amounting to approximately one-quarter of the manpower involved). The control of the research programs and the use of their results has been exercised by military commanders at various levels.

4  Section One: Operational Research

Over the eighteen years there have been numerous changes in the organization of the operational research units. In the earliest days they included research on human resources, with emphasis on personnel selection and military psychology. But in 1952 this work was transferred to other parts of the Defence Research Board (DRB). In the maritime area a large fraction of the effort (nearly one-half) has been based in the operational units (Atlantic Command, Maritime Air Command, and their successors, including small sections at the Maritime Warfare School, Operational Evaluation Unit, and with Pacific Command). Operational research on air activities other than maritime was also conducted by placing a substantial fraction of the personnel (about one-third) in operational commands (Air Defence Command, Tactical Air Group, NORAD HQ, NORAD Northern Region, 1 Air Division, Air Transport Command). In the mid-1950s, when joint plans were being prepared for the air defence of North America, an OR [operational research] team was based in Washington. With the exception of two small field OR teams (in Korea and, for a short time, in Germany and a recently formed ORS [OR section] at Mobile Command) army operational research has been based in Headquarters. The Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment (CAORE) began in Kingston, but was organizationally part of Army HQ. Prior to integration CAORE was the largest OR unit in Canada. Canadian OR scientists have filled exchange postings with corresponding British organizations, and have served with various NATO formations (AAFCENT [Allied Air Forces Central], SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe], SHAPE Technical Centre, SACLANT ASW [Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Anti-Submarine Warfare] Research Centre). The chief role of the Defence Research Board has been to supply the professional civilian scientists who constitute the core of the operational research effort. Although there are transfers of personnel with DRB HQ and laboratories, the majority of the scientists engaged in operational research are transferred from one OR team to another, and build up over the years the expertise and continuity which comes with long experience in the various aspects of one profession. One of the contributions of operational research to the armed forces has been intimate cooperation in the conduct of their daily business. Most of the staff work and decisions in a military HQ demand the efforts of a considerable number of people, and the results are to a large degree

Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada  5

anonymous. In many cases the contribution of a scientific point of view can be of great value, but it is not possible to isolate this contribution from all of the others. In organizational trees the OR unit normally appears as part of the military staff, often reporting to the senior officer responsible for operations. Before the three Service HQ were integrated into Canadian Forces HQ (CFHQ) in 1964, there were five OR sections in Ottawa; CAORE, Directorate of OR (Navy), and ORS under the Chief of Air Operations, Directorate of Systems Evaluation under the Chief of Operational Requirements in Air Force HQ (AFHQ), and the Systems Analysis Group which worked for the Joint Staff and for DRB. After integration the Operational Research Division was created, reporting to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, it inherited the scientific and military officers and some of the support staff of the five sections. For purposes of personnel administration the civilian component (both scientific and support) is also organized into the Defence Operational Research Establishment (DORE), which is one of the main units of the Defence Research Board. DORE also supplies the civilian scientists to the field ORSs. The Director General of the Operational Research Division in CFHQ is also Director General of DORE in DRB. Operational Research in the Field of Maritime Warfare Operational research has played a key role in the design and analysis of operational trials and exercises involving the performance of anti-­ submarine (AS) detection and attack systems. The tactics used by ships and aircraft are continually evolving in order to exploit the improved performance of their equipment, or to offset the improved performance and tactics of the submarines. Canadian maritime forces have shown great initiative in the development of equipment and tactics in the AS role, outstanding examples being the variable depth sonar, the use of explosive echo ranging with air-dropped passive sonobuoys, and the employment of helicopters and of sonobuoys by ships. In these cases and many others (especially in connection with the Argus aircraft), the operational research sections have been instrumental in the combination of the technical, operational, and statistical knowledge which is necessary in order to devise and improve appropriate tactical procedures. To supplement mathematical studies and the analysis of actual trials, research on tactics has employed the synthetic trainer in the Maritime Warfare School.

6  Section One: Operational Research

In addition to the improvement of tactics, operational research employs the analysis of maritime trials and exercises to assess the performance of various units, the significance of weather conditions, and a host of other factors which must be measured at sea and understood if the art of anti-submarine warfare is to progress. In the early 1960s a plan was studied for the measurement of overall fleet effectiveness. Although never implemented in toto, parts are now used for the assessment of ship and squadron effectiveness. A statistical summary was made of the effects of weather on maritime operations in the North Atlantic. This has been widely used in the planning of exercises and operations. Prior to the selection of the American SQS-5 as the basis for the Canadian SQS-503, an operational analysis was made of the relative merits of the medium-range hull-mounted sonar sets available at the time. Studies were made and procedures improved in connection with the selection and training of sonar operators. Studies on the performance required of hydrofoil craft in the anti-­ submarine role have been made in several of the OR sections, as well as by the systems group at the Canadian Armament Research & Development Establishment (CARDE). In addition to anti-submarine warfare, operational research has been directed to air defence of the fleet. AA [anti-aircraft] guns have been evaluated from firing trials, and assessments have been made of the effectiveness of various surface-to-air missiles and of fighter aircraft operating from a carrier. Other naval studies have included mine warfare, underway replenishment, and the capability for the sea lift of troops. The type of aircraft best suited for Canada’s continuing role in shorebased anti-submarine patrolling has been the subject of a long series of OR studies. Considerable OR work has been done on the evaluation of airborne anti-submarine radar, using both controlled experiments and operational exercises. This and other work has led to useful conclusions regarding the best tactics for use of radar and of passive radar intercept receivers for detecting submarines. The success of low frequency free-floating air-dropped sonobuoys for ASW has led to suggestions for fields of moored buoys. The concept has been investigated by computer simulation and sea trials. One of the major operational research contributions to maritime effectiveness has been made in the field of command and control. It is axiomatic in all maritime actions that there will never be enough ships

Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada  7

and aircraft to thoroughly cover the huge areas of ocean involved in the search, and hence it is necessary for the Commander to try to concentrate forces where the intruders are [located]. Conversely, if ships and aircraft can be moved from where there are no targets to regions where targets are [located], the effect is the same as increasing the size of the effective force at no cost. OR in the Canadian Army Operational research has been applied to the assessment of the effectiveness of army weapons ever since the trials in 1949 to test the lethality of three-inch mortar bombs bursting in various types and depths of snow. Some of the other weapons tested or evaluated include artillery weapons (together with a study of the optimum size of fire unit), [variable time]fused projectiles, flame throwers, [chemical warfare] weapons, heavy machine guns, infantry small arms and tank, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft weapons (both ballistic and guided). An investigation of the divisional weapons systems carried out with the US and the UK compared direct and indirect fire weapons for their effects on personnel and armoured units. An extensive study was made of the body dimensions of the Canadian soldier, and the results used in the design and positioning of the butt and sight of the C1 rifle. In addition to the data on anti-tank warfare obtained from war gaming, considerable analytical work has been done on anti-tank operations. A parametric computer model has been developed, which permits the rapid evaluation of the effectiveness of future anti-tank weapons as soon as the quantitative estimates of their capabilities are available. The result of these studies, which cover several cost-effectiveness analyses of several different weapons for various types of terrain, have had a direct effect on the choice of anti-tank weapons for the Canadian land forces. For example, there was the decision to provide a family of such weapons, and, recently, to procure the KARL GUSTAV medium anti-tank weapon. A study of the requirement for anti-tank ammunition resulted in an alteration in the stocks held. Other cost-effectiveness studies have been done on comparison of anti-aircraft guns with one another, with surface-to-air missile systems, and with the REDEYE weapon with and without an infrared acquisition device. One such study contributed to the decision to obtain the ET-316 RAPIER.

8  Section One: Operational Research

Throughout the period of this review a vital and very important contribution has been made by OR in assisting the armed forces and DRB, but particularly the land forces, in the design, conduct, and analysis of field trials and experiments. The work has been directed towards efficient experimental designs and the deriving of valid conclusions. It can be said that this contribution has been one of the major ones, which has had a cumulative effect in improving the quality and standard of field trials and experiments throughout the Department of National Defence. One of the main subjects requiring continuing field trials has been the design of combat clothing and equipment. In the period up to 1955, when one of the main defence roles was the maintenance of a mobile striking force, operational research was done on many aspects of operations in the Arctic regions. Subjects studied included methods of detecting enemy lodgements, ground navigation, transport, and logistics. OR personnel jumped with the paratroops and participated in the exercises. One result was the introduction of in-flight feeding in order to reduce fatigue. Comprehensive investigations were conducted on the effects of different air weapons on military defences constructed in winter from locally available materials. A study was made on the savings that could be affected by standardization of vehicles and engineering equipment on the Northwest Highway System. A detailed analysis was undertaken of certain Arctic battles in Finland during the winter of 1939–40. During the Korean War a small OR team was attached to HQ 25 CIB [Canadian Infantry Brigade], and worked on problems concerning the effectiveness of artillery fire and infantry weapons, the collection and analysis of medical statistics, and the calculation of wastage rates and reinforcement flow. Assessment of the implications of tactical nuclear weapons on the conduct of land warfare is a large subject, in which calculation and analysis must take the place of actual experience. Operational research has been applied to this problem since 1950. An early study demonstrated that a nuclear battle will be highly mobile, and fought over wide frontages and considerable depths. An increased requirement for armoured personnel carriers was identified. A study of the reliability of Centurion tanks concluded that it has been quite high, and there is no apparent decrease in reliability with the number of times that a tank is rebuilt. In recent years the largest single activity in land operational research has been in tactical war gaming. War gaming has been used mainly as a

Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada  9

research tool for generating data about various aspects of land operations. The settings have covered both conventional and nuclear war, at various levels between corps and battalion. Theatres have varied from Northwest Europe to undeveloped areas of Africa or South America. Roles have included the NATO central front, the ACE [Allied Command Europe] Mobile Force, peace restoring, peacekeeping, and internal security. The results of these games have contributed to changes in army tactics, organization, and equipment, such as the procurement of the Honest John SSM [surface-to-surface missile], increases in the number of 106 mm recoilless rifles and tanks in the CIBG [Canadian Infantry Brigade Group], and the introduction of tanks into the infantry battalion as anti-tank weapons. The vital importance of collection and dissemination of battlefield intelligence has been emphasized, with a consequent impetus to the Periscopter and Reconnaissance Drone projects. Lessons concerning logistic supply have been learned from the war games. As an extension of the work on war gaming, a new technique has been developed to apply war game rules to forecast the probable results and (simulated) casualties in real field exercises, as they proceed day by day. It has proved to be possible to modify the exercises in order to ensure that situations develop which will provide maximum training. A manual describing the methodology and its application has been prepared for use in the field. In addition to the use of the war game for research, and for control of field exercises, it has been found to have considerable value for training, A “Training War Game Handbook” has been produced, which details the organization, functions, and administration required to establish a training game, and provides the rules and procedures for play. Such a game exercises commanders and staffs in making plans and decisions when opposed by an uncontrolled malevolent enemy intent on frustrating their actions. Training games have been conducted at the Canadian Army Staff College with very favourable results, and it is considered that they possess a good potential for training of commanders and staffs in field force formations. Considerable time and effort have been devoted to the development of land combat models and simulations to provide computer programs for the rapid calculation of data on various aspects of land combat, such as the probability of success of attacks, the results of manoeuvre and exchanges of direct fire, rapid evaluation of changes in organization, equipment, and tactical characteristics of different formations, and the recording and rating of calculations for land-played games.

10  Section One: Operational Research

Over the last several years considerable effort has been devoted to studies on land force combat intelligence. These have included investigations of operations at night and the effectiveness of various night vision and aiming aids. Large-scale field trials have been conducted. Objectives of this work include the determination of which devices should be provided and on what scales of issue. Two other important studies on combat intelligence involve the development of a computer simulation of a combat intelligence system at the brigade level, and an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of introducing automatic data processing into a brigade group in the field at different levels. Related work includes analysis of terrain and intervisibility and investigations of photographic interpretation. In addition estimates have been calculated of the coverage of ground-based radars for the surveillance of vehicles moving on roads. Operational research scientists have made a contribution to studies of the employment of helicopters for land force use. OR in RCAF Activities In the field of air defence, operational research has produced a considerable number of concepts and procedures that were accepted by the Canadian Forces. Since the construction of the Canadian component of the North ­American Air Defence System (circa 1952), the Aircraft Control and Warning System has been the subject of intensive operational research. The performance of the radars has been studied from many aspects (coverage vs. various targets, calibration accuracy, height finding accuracy) and certain procedures such as selection of beam tilt angle were improved. A slide-rule type of computer was designed to predict the range at which various aircraft would be detected for different screening and tilt angles. It was discovered that the sun could be detected when it was low on the horizon, and the signal used to orient and calibrate the radar. The Defence Research Medical Laboratories (DRML) devised a procedure for the best adjustment of displays and of room lighting. The passage of information through the air defence system was intensively studied during the period when manual plotting and voice transmission was used. Procedures were altered frequently as circumstances and installations changed. The DRML cooperated in these studies. Before the SAGE [Semi-Automatic Ground Environment] system was adopted there was a great deal of preliminary study in Canada as well as

Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada  11

the US. Canadian operational research analyses favoured a smaller and less ambitious system, matched to the air traffic and weapons density expected over this country. However, the ultimate decision was to install SAGE throughout NORAD. The process of identification of unknown aircraft occupied much attention. A system of “critical numbers” was devised in order to alert the commanders when the distribution of unidentified tracks reached an unusual pattern. The importance of early warning was investigated by a joint US-­ Canadian study, which influenced the positioning of the DEW [Distant Early Warning] and Mid-Canada warning lines. A great deal of operational research was devoted to the Mid-­Canada Line [MCL], starting with the demonstration and selection of the Bistatic Doppler System and its early trials on test links in the Ottawa Valley. When installed, extensive flying trials were conducted to assess its coverage against very high and very low flying aircraft. Difficulties with false alarms necessitated extended study, as did the determination of the proper sensitivity settings. By systematic study of the pen signatures, and proper training, it became possible to distinguish small fast aircraft from large slow ones, and to reject the signals caused by geese, lightning, and manmade interference. Employment of the radar and MCL information for the best tactical use of interceptors was under constant review by trials and exercises and  by theoretical analysis. At one period the density of interceptors was so high that very careful tactics had to be used in order to avoid saturation of the control capacity. It was necessary to devise procedures agreed with the neighbouring air defence sectors in the US. It proved possible to use MCL reports to expedite the reaction, and as a result of operational research it was decided to redeploy some of the control and interceptor strength to stations where they could best be exploited. In these analyses the combination of the various detectors and weapons was treated as one overall system, irrespective of nationality, and its effectiveness for air defence maximized. For considerable periods exercises were designed for research and improvement of tactics rather than for training alone, and the results subjected to close analysis by scope photography. A number of the concepts and procedures for tactical employment of interceptors, counter-ECM [electronic countermeasures] activities and the evaluation of radar performance were adopted by the USAF.

12  Section One: Operational Research

Systems studies were made of weapons which were adopted (e.g. CF-100 with its various armament and fire control modifications, and Bomarc) and many which were not (e.g. Velvet Glove, Arrow with its fire-control and other avionics, Talos, Nike Ajax, Nike Hercules). Another type of operational research study which originated in Air Defence Command and was later used in other flying commands concerned the relationship in a flying station between the amount of flying, the number of maintenance personnel, and the maintenance schedule. Using the theory, and after data have been accumulated on the incidence of unserviceability of a given type of aircraft, it is now possible to predict the number of aircraft that a squadron must possess to meet a given flying commitment, or the additional maintenance personnel required to meet a commitment when the aircraft strength is fixed. Such studies are under way for the CF-5. In 1 Air Division operational research has been applied to squadron training in the air-to-air firing of both guns and rockets. For example, after establishing the learning curve of firing performance with time on the firing range it became possible to make an informed judgment regarding the necessary length of the course of firing exercises. Considerable work was also done on the analysis of procedures for scoring pilot performance as related to rocket hit probability. Photographic procedures were introduced to the Type 80 control radar, for checking routine performance and to assist in exercise evaluation. Statistical analysis was able to isolate certain causes of accident rates. When the Air Division converted to the strike-reconnaissance role, the ORS studied problems such as bombing accuracy and its measurement, vulnerability of bases to attack by air or IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile] and methods of reducing it, vulnerability of strike/­ [reconnaissance] aircraft to ground fire, and the choice of strike routes to minimize losses. In Air Transport Command many practical problems arise in the scheduling and loading of aircraft which are amenable to operational research. Analysis of UN air lifts and exercises involves evaluation of command and control, transfer techniques, incidence of unscheduled maintenance, and many other facets of transport operations. Interesting mathematical problems continue to arise out of these studies. Examples are transient queueing of messages in the communication system, combinatorial probability applied to refuelling under varying conditions of weather, temperature, and load, and the use of integer

Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada  13

programming in the transportation problems (since a fraction of an ­aircraft cannot fly). Data from actual experience have been used to develop a mathematical stochastic simulation model of long-range air lift. This model promises to be useful for the planning of air lifts in Mobile Command and at CFHQ as well as at Air Transport Command. Naturally the planning of ACE Mobile Force, United Nations, and other overseas operations ­requires detailed and accurate knowledge of the capabilities of Air Transport Command. Since the issue of the 1964 Defence White Paper, an OR team has been studying tactical air operations. When the CF-5 was selected, research was directed towards the evaluation of alternative avionics and weapons systems for this aircraft, and towards the desirable characteristics of a future tactical aircraft to follow the CF-5. Attention is being directed towards the possibilities of a multi-purpose aircraft capable of close support, interdiction, reconnaissance, and air-to-air combat. An important element in these studies is the assessment of the vulnerability of the aircraft to ground fire, and its dependence on the tactics employed. Command and control of tactical air operations is also being studied. Other Operational Research Studies

Survival Studies Responsibility for civil defence has changed several times, and does not now rest with the armed forces. No very large expenditure has been made. Nevertheless a considerable amount of work has been done. Calculations have been made of the effects of nuclear weapons bursts over Canadian cities, with estimates of the casualties and damage caused by blast, fire, and radiation. Forecasts of the distribution of fallout over the entire country have been calculated for various types of attack on ­Canadian and/or US targets. Assessments were made of the requirements for dissemination of warning, radiac instruments, blast and fallout shelters, and of the organization, training, and equipment needed for re-entry operations. Various features of the likely post-attack situation were analysed. Assistance has been given in preparing lists of possible targets in ­Canada, and of different attack patterns. A methodology was developed for estimating fire spread.

14  Section One: Operational Research

Ballistic Missile Defence Canada has not participated in either the offensive or defensive side of the ballistic missile confrontation. However, it is important that some group in the Department of National Defence preserve an acquaintance with this field, which is of course central to the military strategy of the superpowers. The fact that the US has announced its intention to install a light ABM [anti-ballistic missile] system has made it all the more necessary for ­Canada to maintain up-to-date knowledge of this subject. Current studies are addressed to the hazards to Canadian population produced by ABM engagements over our territory. Canadian operational research studies have examined the progress of active ABM defence through the years. They were able to predict that the early Nike Zeus system would not be successful because of the problem of discriminating decoys. As each technical change occurred, the significance of Canadian territory for the defence of the US was reconsidered. A variety of studies have been carried out on ballistic missile trajectories, particularly in relation to accuracy and direction of attack. Some operational research was involved in a study of the possibility of detecting ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] by reflected sunlight, using airborne detectors. Experimental work at CARDE was related to this investigation. Some computational work done on BMEWS [ballistic missile early warning systems] proved useful to the Americans in deducing the coverage and the ability to predict the impact points. An analysis of the vulnerability of ICBMs and MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles] led to an assessment of the value of road or rail-mobile deployment in Canada and in NATO Europe.

Military Use of Space Shortly after the achievement of the launching of earth satellites, much concern was raised over their possible military potential. From the outset it was fairly clear that this type of operation, and more particularly of men in space, would be so expensive that only the major world powers could become seriously involved. But it was necessary to evaluate the possible threats to North America, and to identify what part the Canadian Armed Forces might have to play in defence against such threats. Many aspects of potential space operations were analysed with the help of computer simulation. These included simulation of a satellite-home

Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada  15

boost-phase ICBM detection system, a series of simulations of different phases involved in making a friendly satellite rendezvous with an enemy satellite, simulation of a system designed to intercept and kill enemy ­satellites, and analyses using intelligence input data to identify present Soviet enemy space activities and forecast future intentions. Generally speaking, it was shown that a direct threat from space was unlikely, since it would be more costly and less effective than the employment of ballistic missiles. The most attractive employment of satellites for military purposes was seen to be in the field of reconnaissance and communications. Without the use of classified information it was possible to show that the potential in both applications is very significant. Throughout these investigations the significance of Canadian geography was under constant study. While it was obvious that Canada could not become unilaterally involved in a space program, there was the possibility that some activity could be attempted in partnership with the US. In the final event, the Canadian Armed Forces did not become involved. The Canadian studies were made available to various US agencies, who may well have made use of them in their own programs.

Arms Control Contributions have been made to the methodology of analysing measures of arms control. It has been demonstrated theoretically that a situation of stable deterrence cannot be transformed into one of disarmament without passing through a stage of very precarious stability. Studies have also been made pertaining to the control of a nuclear test ban.

Logistic Studies Integration and unification of the armed forces has made possible the creation of a single integrated supply system. Inventory management will be performed on a national level, using a computer-based automated information system. The program to plan and design the system (known as the “DEVIL” program) has raised a number of complicated problems of a mathematical and statistical nature which are amenable to the methods of operational research. Studies have been made of inventory control policy, based on past data from the separate service supply systems but designed for the ultimate

16  Section One: Operational Research

integrated operation. Using such techniques as marginal analysis, it will be possible to program the initial computers to base reorder instructions on the patterns of demand, and to know with a fair degree of certainty what will be the probable frequency of stockouts. Repair and overhaul offers another field for operational research. Considerable economies are expected in the original order of spare parts when large new systems are purchased. The mounting and support of operations overseas is entirely dependent on logistics. Supply of both air and sea lift is being subjected to extensive operational research studies.

Operational Research in Personnel Problems In addition to the work of the psychologists, which has been taken to be outside the area of operational research for the purposes of this paper, there have been a few studies of a mathematical or statistical nature. When it was important to be able to assemble a given number of aircraft controllers on short notice in the event of a surprise air defence alert, it was the practice to maintain a roster of qualified officers who were not allowed to leave their quarters. This caused considerable personal inconveniences. A study of the habits of officers not on roster revealed that it was only on infrequent and predictable occasions (such as major holiday weekends) that the required quota could not be assembled in the time allowed. In most normal circumstances the roster was not needed in order to have a high assurance of being able to fill the controller positions. The transfer of military tradesmen among the radar stations of Air Defence Command used to consume a great deal of time of the personnel staffs searching files in order to list and match a number of routine requirements. The process never ended, since the rules required tradesmen to be moved before their stay in one station exceeded a certain maximum. It proved possible to perform this process by computer, which would offer the solution which obeyed all the rules and also minimized the total travel cost. The staff could then study the computer solution and veto it if there was some objection not contained in the rules. In this event the computer would substitute the valid solution with the next lowest travel cost. The career progress of military officers can be studied on an actuarial basis and a mathematical model constructed to predict the progress through rank with age. Promotion policy can thus be related to future rank structure.

Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada  17

Application of Developing Operational Research Techniques to Management Problems Although the work normally described as “management engineering” has been excluded from this paper, there are some other types of problems in the general area of management to which the newest techniques of operational research have been applied. When the “PERT” technique for analysing the various interlocking steps in a complicated process was very new, one of the operational research scientists prepared an instructional manual subsequently published for use throughout the Canadian government service. Many of the OR studies concerning the choice of alternative systems employ cost-effectiveness analysis, and improvements to the techniques are sought continually. Many problems in planning reduce to assignment of priorities for the allocation of scarce resources. Research is being done on systematic methods for relating program priorities to the overall objectives.

Miscellaneous Mathematical and Statistical Techniques Mathematics and statistics form the normal tools of most operational research. However, improvements in the methods are being made throughout the profession, and many of the practitioners rely on the advice of specialists when confronted with unusual problems. The same may be said of the use of electronic computers. A small OR group specializes in these techniques, applying and improving them as required, and acting as consultants, advisors, and instructors to their colleagues and to other members of the Department of National Defence when requested. Among the mathematical techniques applied to practical problems are linear programming, integer programming, dynamic programming, and queueing theory.

Statistics Concerning the Civilian Scientific Personnel in Defence Operational Research The number of Defence Scientific Service Officers [DSSOs] employed by the Defence Research Board and attached to the various operational research organizations has totalled about 155. The total strength of

18  Section One: Operational Research

DSSOs at any one moment rose fairly steadily from 1949 to 1960, and then levelled off at about 60. At the time of writing (November 1967) there are 59 on strength. About 30 per cent of these have been on strength for ten years or more, about two-thirds for five years or more. Of the 97 once but no longer employed in operational research, fewer than 30 per cent stayed as long as five years; half left before three years. The median age of the DSSOs on strength today is 42. [Thirty-six] have been trained in physical sciences or mathematics, 14 in engineering, and 8 in other disciplines. [Forty] per cent have a master’s degree and 12 per cent a [doctorate]. About 20 per cent of the present group had experience in operational research before joining. [Eighteen] of 59 have served at least one tour of duty outside of ­Canada while on strength. One generalization which has been noted many times, and is confirmed by these statistics, is that a “typical” recruit comes into operational research without prior experience, and that it takes about three years to discover whether he is suited to it (and it is suited to him). About half of those who try it leave fairly soon, most of the other half remain to make a career of it.

1974

Operational Research for NATO’s Navies

George Lindsey presented this paper as a keynote address to the Second NATO Naval Operational Research Symposium in Norfolk, Virginia, on 16 July 1974.1 At the time of the address, Lindsey’s international role and stature was on the rise. His involvement in undersea research and experience as chief of the Operational Research Group at the Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centre of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic establishment in La Spezia, Italy, opened the door for him to become the Canadian representative to the High Level Group of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group in the mid-1970s. In this paper, Lindsey emphasizes the value of OR to “objective” and “dispassionate” numerical analysis for the promotion and maintenance of international security at sea. He references sea lines of communication and information exchange, and stresses OR as a tool to support NATO as a multinational yet cohesive body for collective military cooperation and maritime security. Introduction The theme of the conference that has just been opened is “Maritime Operational Research in NATO: Requirements, Resources, and Results.” To a large extent, the thirty-odd speakers who will follow me, and the organizations from which they have come, represent our Resources. They are primarily national organizations, but several do owe their allegiance to the Alliance as a whole. One can identify the staff of Allied Command Atlantic [ACLANT], our hosts here today, the SACLANT ASW Research Centre in La Spezia, the SHAPE Technical Centre at The Hague, and some NATO bodies such as the Defence Research Group, which has sponsored studies in maritime as well as other fields, the NATO Naval Armaments Group, and the Special Panel on Systems Science.

20  Section One: Operational Research

It is a characteristic of the North Atlantic Alliance that its strength lies in its member nations. But many of the most serious problems of the Alliance are difficult to perceive, or at least to worry about sufficiently to really study, in a national capital. And as the military contributions of the nations to the Alliance become fewer, with more and more preoccupation with national problems and with economies, the tasks of NATO, SACLANT, SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe], and CINCCHAN [Commander-in-Chief, Channel Command] become correspondingly more difficult. If there is any military activity, which must be coordinated to succeed, surely it is that of a dozen separate navies based in two Hemispheres. And if the smaller navies look to their major NATO commander for guidance as to future threats, future operations, and future equipment, he is going to need all the resources that he can muster to be able to undertake this task. One resource is operational research, and it may well be that NATO would benefit by a modest transfer of OR resources from the national to the central NATO agencies. However, until this occurs, we must face the fact that most of the resources are to be found in the national capitals, commands, and establishments. The next thirty papers will give us some interesting results, as did the thirty-five papers delivered at the first symposium two years ago on ­capability assessment as a basis for maritime force planning. And there is machinery for exchange of maritime OR results within NATO, including the recently formed Central Registry of Operational Research Reports and Studies. National security policy creates some barriers, but personal contacts allow good liaison to be maintained. The larger nations give more than they receive, but that is the nature of the Alliance. Because the third topic, Requirements, does not appear to be stressed in the papers, it will be the main subject of my remarks.

Obtaining an ACLANT Overview The welding of an association of fifteen independent nations with very different characters, histories, and interests into a strong cohesive alliance may well pose the most difficult problem faced by political and military men in our time. The difficulties are especially prominent in matters of economics, such as rationalization of research, development, procurement, and production, and they are evident in questions of standardization and supply. On land and in the air, a remarkable diversity is evident in the balance and type of forces provided to SACEUR by the member nations. This is in sharp contrast to the Warsaw Pact, whose land and air

Operational Research for NATO’s Navies  21

forces appear to have been all ordered from the same catalogue. This fact must ease the task of the WPO [Warsaw Pact Organization] planners, unless it happens to be a poor catalogue. What about the maritime forces of NATO? Geography dictates that some nations are much more dependent than others on the sea, so that diversity is to be expected. History has shown some nations such as the Netherlands, Portugal, and Norway are prominent on the maritime stage to a degree far beyond their modest size. Perhaps it should not be surprising if SACLANT is offered national forces of great variety in composition, or if only three fleets of the fifteen nations make any attempt at an internal overall balance. This may not even be a handicap to NATO, and it may confuse the WPO. But it does pose SACLANT the problem of making up his team from fleets of very different capabilities and specialties. At least it is not too difficult to assemble fleets from widely separated home ports. One hopes that enlightened self-interest has motivated the nations to select their fleets to perform well in the roles they will need to fill in waters close to their home bases. However, for effective performance of most of the major maritime tasks it has been demonstrated that several types of vehicles, sensors, and weapons systems need to cooperate in a carefully integrated manner. And for many tasks the presence of very expensive units, such as carriers, cruisers, or nuclear-powered submarines, may be necessary, but possible only if one of the few large nations possessing them is able to provide. Roles for NATO Naval OR This situation has significance for operational research in ACLANT and the NATO navies. The OR in each nation will have the responsibility to keep abreast of developments in its own force, and to maximize the effectiveness of its own units. But where carriers, for example, are concerned, the OR studies in countries like Belgium, Germany, or Italy must rely on information from allies, and those in Canada and the Netherlands have only fading memories of national involvement. The conclusion could be that ACLANT has a need for a strong central OR facility, where these varied types of knowledge can be assembled, or, failing that, very close ­exchange of information and perhaps of personnel. Moreover, those large NATO maritime exercises, which offer the precious opportunity for the varied national contributions to work and learn together, should be the subject of well-planned and thorough operational research, both in their initial design and subsequent analysis.

22  Section One: Operational Research

Another vital role for operational research in ACLANT is in studies of fleet composition, both for planning of future construction and for the assembly of task forces from existing ships. Both activities are, of course, fraught with political considerations far beyond the realm of science or even of the naval profession, and involve national objectives which may not be identical with the collective objectives of NATO. Nevertheless, it is highly desirable to have as a goal, probably an unattainable goal, an ideal fleet composition. Such studies need to be carried out with imagination, giving very full consideration to the objectives which NATO is trying to attain, and to the reactions of the enemy, who may at a future date oppose us with an unorthodox combination of tactics and vehicles. These studies must be cast some years into the future, when, for example, the USSR may possess a significant force of aircraft carriers, amphibious forces, and friendly air bases far from the Soviet Union, while NATO may have lost bases and overflight rights which she takes for granted today. Unfashionable scenarios may deserve consideration, perhaps including limited war at sea alone, economic blockade not accompanied by active hostilities on land, and a NATO unable to import oil. An important class of study of future force composition is one which avoids the detailed analysis of existing units or types, but seeks to establish the relative advantage for particular roles of broad classes of weapons systems. An excellent example of this is the analysis of the shallow water ASW problems sponsored by Panel VII of the NATO Defence Research Group, where a contrast is made between the success of many small and cheap units as opposed to a few large and expensive ones of superior individual capability. We are to have a report of this project during this symposium. There are advantages in tackling such a problem in a NATO forum initially, where it may be difficult for vested interests to strangle unwelcome approaches at birth. But at a later stage it is highly desirable to have national agencies take hold of the many loose ends left hanging, in order to provide more rigorous substantiation of the findings. Another type of study of future force composition which I would commend to your attention is one in which unconventional methods of conducting ASW operations are involved. Acoustic detection is still a poor best, and traditional methods of exploiting acoustic systems may have reached the region of diminishing returns. Perhaps we should turn our attention more towards the study of unconventional vehicles, which may have a better chance of realizing the full potential of the advances that have been made in acoustic detection. For example, can the dramatic increase in detection range of RAP2 sonar be realized in operations if it

Operational Research for NATO’s Navies  23

is deployed from a vehicle other than a destroyer? What is the best way to get the most out of mobile passive arrays? Studies in which OR can contribute are now being done in these areas, and there is at least one paper in this symposium which falls into this category. Related to studies of force composition are those of strategy and tactics of employment. These have been subject to repeated analysis at the detailed level of anti-submarine screens, datum searches, and convoy patterns. But there are large questions such as the relative advantages of concentrating anti-submarine defence around the ships to be protected, deploying it throughout an area, perhaps in lanes, or concentrating it along barriers. We may find our ASW aircraft being engaged by missiles from submarines or surface vessels. Is the effectiveness of an SSK ­[hunter-killer/anti-submarine warfare submarine] enhanced or degraded by causing it to work with other SSKs, with aircraft, or with ships? Is an SSN [nuclear-powered submarine] an asset in an anti-submarine escort role? What is the best way to protect a very large and valuable fast supertanker or container ship at sea, and do we need to devote comparable attention to its defence while moored and transferring cargo? For the protection of commerce, are we devoting adequate attention to air and surface as well as submarine threats? Problems such as these have received sporadic attention, often at the national level, but they probably deserve considerably more, and on an international basis. The topics discussed in this section are likely to involve the interest and responsibility of high-ranking officers of ACLANT. After all, it is they who are charged with maintaining an overview of NATO’s naval situation and problems. It follows that they should be the sponsors of this type of OR study and should maintain close contact with the progress of the work. And they should be prepared to embark on investigations that could initiate profound changes in the composition of future maritime forces, not excluding important changes in the proportions of carriers, cruisers, destroyers, patrol craft, submarines, hovercraft, and hydrofoils, or of fixed-wing and VSTOL [vertical and/or short take-off and landing] aircraft and helicopters whether land- or sea-based. Application of Operational Research to Maritime Exercises In spite of its many ingenious extensions, such as simulation by computer, analysis of cost-effectiveness, or mathematical modelling, the basic roots of operational research, which gave it its name, lie in the study of actual operations. The operations most likely to yield information of high value for the

24  Section One: Operational Research

improvement of the combat effectiveness of NATO’s maritime forces would be operations of war against a well-equipped enemy. However, NATO has never gone to war. During the life of the Atlantic Alliance, several of her member nations have engaged in combat, and have gained practical experience in certain operations such as carrier-based air attack of land targets, sea support for land forces, neutralization of light coastal forces, or riverine operations, but the maritime operations have never attained the scale of combat against powerful opposing maritime forces that would characterize a full- or even medium-scale war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Thus, for a period of twenty-five years both NATO and its member nations have had to plan operations against Warsaw Pact submarines, surface, and land-based air forces without the experience of actual combat against any of these forces. We have had to make do with three substitutes: a. operations of surveillance and tracking against real “enemy” units; b. deduction from intelligence and observation of their wartime ­strategy, tactics, and effectiveness; and c. conduct of NATO exercises in which an Orange [enemy] force was supplied by our own units. All three of these surrogates for operations of war are of some value, and a major task for operational research is to extract the maximum amount of useful information from them. However, we should never lose sight of their extreme limitations in forecasting the expected outcome of combat operations against the real enemy. There are likely to be many special tricks, which a prudent enemy will not reveal in peacetime. Examples would be the use of more advanced forms of electronic warfare, or the extraction of the maximum performance in speed, altitude, or depth from ships, aircraft, or submarines. And it is quite probable that surprises are in store for us regarding the capabilities of enemy weapons and their modes of employment. A special caution may be in order on the subject of impressions gained from NATO maritime exercises. Because the prime objective for most exercises is training, we tend to put most of our best units in the Blue [friendly] force, to simulate Orange by a meagre allotment of real strength perhaps fleshed out by imaginary units or magic powers of resurrection after destruction, and to design the exercise to ensure contact and practice for as many Blue units as possible. Moreover, for anti-submarine exercises we are usually short of submarines, use too few, and oblige them to operate in zones which limit their freedom of action. The operators of the detection systems are artificially alerted to the likely presence of submarines.

Operational Research for NATO’s Navies  25

Simulated attack by standoff missiles will give no training to the crews of the simulated targets. To quote Captain R.H. Smith, USN: “The effect has been to promote a narrow, distorted, and small-scale view of ASW. It has contributed to lulling us into an exaggerated sense of well-being concerning our detection capabilities, particularly on the part of the surface forces, which has played us poisonously false.”3 And, of course, the use of weapons and even some sensors cannot be realistically simulated in a peacetime exercise, and numerous safety precautions must be observed to minimize the danger of an accident. Moreover, the prosecution and attack of false sonar contacts and expenditure of imaginary ammunition escapes the penalties that would be exacted in wartime. The decreasing number of ships in the NATO navies and the increasing restrictions on fuel are likely to make these limitations even more pressing in the coming years. A responsibility for operational research will be to contribute to the design and analysis of exercises so as to make the very best out of what we have and can do, but it must also be alert to the dangers of drawing unjustifiable conclusions from exercises that fall very far short of real combat against the full maritime strength of the Warsaw Pact. Another disappointing feature of NATO naval exercises, which does not seem to improve with the years, is the perennial rediscovery with each exercise that serious difficulties arise from the misuse or neglect of the proper operational procedures, and from misuse or inadequacy of communications. Rediscovery of the problems does not seem to lead to their solution, and these problems sometimes prevent the carrying out of those tactical aspects of the exercise, which constituted its main objective. The long intervals between large NATO exercises and their varied type and scale make it difficult to maintain a continuous overview of progress or deterioration. This difficulty is exacerbated by the turnover in personnel, which so often faces every exercise with the need to assemble a new team to conduct the analysis. One of the elementary requirements for good statistical analysis is to have homogeneous data, collated in a consistent and uniform manner throughout the entire period of the experiment. For a time-series to be valid, it is vital that the rules of data collection should not be altered. In this connection I often remember the work of Mr J.R. Vesey, who directed the Operational Research Section of RAF Coastal Command, for a period of twenty years. His determined support for land-based air earned him a certain opposition from the Royal Navy, and his holding of the same post for two decades may not have impressed ambitious upward-mobile officers and scientists, but Jack Vesey accumulated in one

26  Section One: Operational Research

filing cabinet and without benefit of computers at Northwood the only consistent continuous analysis of airborne anti-submarine operations uniformly collected over a long period of time. It was a tragedy when his cabinet was destroyed in a fire and the records lost. A type of exercise analysis often overlooked is that of the WPO maritime forces. Whether our information is gathered from the overt presence of ships or aircraft, or by the non-intrusive means of submarines or earth satellites, it should be examined by the same personnel who analyse NATO exercises, and the conclusions fed to the operators. In concluding these remarks about OR and maritime exercises, I would like to commend the efforts of the Maritime Exercise Analysis Steering Group. There is reason to hope that steps recommended by this group, including the formation of a Permanent Analysis Team, may go a long way towards a remedy for the current deficiencies of exercise analysis in NATO. Other Types of Maritime Operational Research Needed by NATO We must be careful not to define naval operational research in terms so broad as to encompass all of naval science. There are many important areas of strategic and intelligence studies, of the design of ships, aircraft, weapons, and instruments, of medical, psychological, and many other types of research applied to maritime matters that do not require the results of operational research. But OR can make a very useful contribution to intelligence, to the design of weapons systems, and to the choice among alternative systems. It has a prime role to play in the development of tactics and in the management of resources. Although the collection and analysis of statistical data should never become the only activity of an OR section, an operating command is likely to encounter many problems for which this will be an important duty, and the OR section will often possess both the personnel and equipment capable of carrying it out. As a general guide, it is suggested that it is good practice to task the OR section with the examination of statistical data on a trial basis or for a limited period. But if it becomes clear that a new series of data deserves to be collected and analysed on a regular basis, the responsibility should be turned over to another part of the Command staff, with the OR section acting as a consultant if required. Examples could be the collection of operational information concerning behaviour of WPO units, or records of performance of sonar or radar. They could also include statistics on miscellaneous items such as false sonar contacts, radar returns from icebergs, or reliability of

Operational Research for NATO’s Navies  27

wireless reception, together with analysis leading to convenient methods of ­predicting future performance. There can be little doubt that electronic warfare is assuming much greater significance. Unfortunately, this is a difficult subject on which to do operational research in peacetime, unless NATO and the WPO choose to expose their measures and countermeasures. However, it is very important to obtain sufficient information to be able to construct mathematical models of EW [electronic warfare], including its effects on existing sensor and weapons systems, so that we can make some sort of prediction of the results of the measures and countermeasures should battle ever be joined. It is also important to provide ourselves with a rapidly acting combat intelligence system to pass information on EW, both laterally for the immediate benefit of friendly units, and backwards for analysis by a central organization equipped to devise counter tactics and measures. A related subject, overdue for attention, and to which operational research could be applied at any time, is acoustic warfare. This would include the planned and coordinated control of transmissions so as to confuse submarines about the location of ships in a group. And it would take note of another thought of Captain Smith: “In our surface forces, long legatee of lack of imagination, we continue to proceed as if the surface ships could make no better contribution to ASW than by carrying a low-frequency high-powered sonar whose modest detection ranges are limited by the same iron laws of refraction which bound the sonars of a generation ago; ranges that are miniscule compared to the distances which its sonar energy reaches out to alert the enemy submarines of both the presence and accurate location of him who transmits it.”4 If the submarine is prevented from completing his attack using passive sonar information only, he may offer additional opportunities for detection through his employment of active sonar, radar, wireless, or periscope. Research is badly needed in torpedo countermeasures and in countermeasures to anti-ship missiles. But in the absence of real use, this may have to be done in laboratories, and on carefully instrumented ranges: “A recent study made by a group of officers at the US Naval War College, Newport, RI, on possible future development in the US Navy, made the following interesting forecast. In weapons development there will be significant advances in laser weapons, liquid-propellant gun systems, gun projectiles with terminal guidance, micro-miniaturized avionics, highstrength and heat-resistant missiles, weather control, and remotely piloted vehicles. The group expressed the view that the greatest potential lies in revolutionizing warfare by the use of laser beams, which will open up

28  Section One: Operational Research

vast possibilities for naval anti-aircraft, anti-missile and air-to-air weapons. In general they foresaw the development of smaller, faster, and highly automated warships austerely manned but having large fire-power.”5 The development of technical advances such as these is not the business of operational research. But a vital area to which OR should be far more energetically applied is analysis of the cost, effectiveness, and optimum combination of sensors and weapons, both for offence and defence. It has been usual to concentrate on specific areas, such as guns, missiles, radars, sonars, jammers, and decoys. But the ship designers need to know the proper mix, taking into account underwater defence, acoustic countermeasures, anti-missile defence, electronic warfare, and other requirements as well as the primary systems for ASW and air defence. Naval operational research is already well established in the area of logistics, including maintenance, repair, and supply. There is probably no other area in which research can be more easily shown to be cost-­ effective. It should be pressed further back into the decisions regarding design of equipment and policy regarding the stocking of replacement parts, and it should be worked into all the calculations of life cycle costing. The lack of recent experience with expenditure of ammunition and other warlike stores should not allow us to forget to make realistic provision for this crucial item. The analysis of manpower supply is a subject worthy of operational research. Recruiting, training, posting, promotion, and retirement can be studied by mathematical models. This can permit the prediction of the implications in future years of changes in personnel policy. An important requirement is to assign mechanical tasks such as data storage and retrieval to the computer, but to reserve the personal consideration of individuals for human control. Many of the mathematical techniques of operational research were developed in wartime naval applications.6 It is desirable that these tools be kept sharp by use on practical problems such as the theory of search (at the base of the geometrical calculations for [anti-submarine] tactics), queueing theory (which is very useful for analysis of problems such as congestion of message traffic or of time delays in repair and maintenance), or the theory of games (which can be applied to the tactics of mine warfare). However, the vital contribution of operational research will not be the mathematical virtuosity of its practitioners, but its ability to bring objective, dispassionate, thorough numerical analysis to those problems that really matter for the future of the North Atlantic Treaty’s maritime forces, and consequently for the future of the Atlantic Alliance and the Western world.

1979

The Contribution of Operational Research at National Defence

George Lindsey presented the original draft of this paper at the Annual Canadian Operational Research Society Conference in Montebello, Quebec, on 22 May 1979.1 As chief of the Canadian Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence, he was in an ideal position to provide a detailed and analytical outline of the development of operational research in the Canadian defence establishment. The panel to which Lindsey presented considered the contribution of operational research to planning, and in Lindsey’s assessment, OR was vital to the development of effective short- and long-term national military strategy. Operational research had its origin as research on military operations shortly before the outbreak of World War II, and its great initial development in analysis of actual operations of war, during which time its value was very clearly demonstrated, at both the tactical and strategic levels, as well as for the design and employment of weapons systems. Since the end of World War II, there has been little opportunity for study of actual operations of war in the Canadian Armed Forces, and the character of the OR done in the Department of National Defence [DND] has changed in its emphasis through the last thirty years. During the 1950s, a time of modernization and expansion, there was much need for OR in planning for new equipment and in development of the best tactics and procedures to exploit the new equipment. In the absence of real operations of war, the best possible use had to be made of field exercises and war games. The 1960s brought retrenchment in defence, with decreasing budgets forcing reductions in manpower and inability to replace aging equipment. They also brought unification of the armed forces, with consequent major changes in organization and procedures. During this period, OR moved into the area of logistics and of manpower analysis.

30  Section One: Operational Research

During the 1970s, there have been searchings [sic] into the problems of international stability and into the rationale for Canadian defence forces. These produced a need for a new type of defence research involving strategic and social studies, which have been undertaken by DND’s Operational Research and Analysis Establishment [ORAE], a­lthough it is questionable whether they should be described as operational ­research. Another major change was the provision of substantial sums of new money for badly needed new capital equipment, to be acquired through a systematic planning process. In support of these programs, ORAE found itself engaged in research probably better described as systems analysis than as OR. For the remainder of my time, I shall give examples of these various types of work. They are all defence research. If you accept the definition that OR is what operational researchers do, then they are also OR. If you prefer another definition, I will leave it to you to decide how many of them are operational research. The three types of weapons systems that have occupied the most attention by our analysts are anti-air, anti-submarine, and anti-tank. Good reasons for this are that our most likely enemies are very well provided with aircraft, submarines, and tanks. From an analytical point of view, these three problems have both similarities and differences. All three can be divided up into phases of detection and attack. But the detectability of an aircraft by radar is fairly easy to calculate, predict, and model – that of a submarine by sonar much less so; and that of a tank by eye is dominated by the details of terrain, background, and atmospheric conditions. Given detection, the attack on an aircraft, submarine, or tank is comparatively straightforward to analyse unless the target is fighting back. However, it is very likely to be fighting back, and in the case of a tank its friends are also likely to fight back. Rather than rely on calculation, one would prefer realistic exercises. Obviously in an exercise, the target cannot be killed, but short of this final step there is a high degree of realism in both air defence and anti-submarine exercises, and a good opportunity to collect and record data which can be used to predict whether a kill would have been obtained. The number of units involved in a particular engagement is normally very small, perhaps as low as one aircraft versus one aircraft, or one ship or one aircraft versus one submarine. It is comparatively easy to put the necessary recording instrumentation into an aircraft or a ship, and to reconstruct the movements after the engagement. These considerations appear very different with anti-tank exercises, where many units of various types are simultaneously engaged, where

The Contribution of Operational Research at National Defence  31

the circumstances of intervisibility are usually very complicated, and where it is not usually possible to record movements or weapon engagement data. Because of these many practical difficulties in deriving analytical results from army field exercises, a great deal of effort has been devoted to the design, play, and analysis of war games. The Canadian land/air war game goes into extreme detail, and as a result, takes a long time to prepare and is very slow to play. It requires an elaborate book of rules based on many analytic models of factors such as detection time lapses and kill probability of various weapons against various targets. It is organized into three components, carefully separated in separate rooms: the two opposing sides, blue and orange, and control. The passage of information between rooms is carefully controlled. Attempts to speed up the game by online computer assistance have not been successful, but the computer is very useful for record keeping, reconstruction, and calculation of many details needed for decision by control. Naturally, military planners need all the analytical evidence that can be provided, to answer questions for the future such as: • Will new precision-guided weapons prove the answer to the tank? • Will modern surface-to-air missiles drive aircraft away from the battlefields of the future? • Can surface ships survive against modern aircraft armed with ­anti-shipping missiles? • Can there be an effective defence against modern submarines armed with anti-shipping missiles? Of all the problems related to weapons and tactics, anti-submarine warfare is probably the most fruitful subject for peacetime OR. Sonar offers endless material for operational analyses, whether hull-mounted, towed, fixed, or in sonobuoys. Sonobuoys themselves come in many forms, including active and passive, directional and anti-directional, free-floating and moored, continuous and command activated. The introduction of the Argus MPA [marine patrol aircraft] allowed many years of productive OR. Plans for the ASW hydrofoil involved OR, but in the end the project was abandoned because of high cost. Planning for the Aurora LRPA [long-range patrol aircraft] began about fifteen years before initial delivery, and OR studies had a large part to play in refining the requirements and making the selection, especially as regards the type of avionic equipment to be acquired.

32  Section One: Operational Research

There is also a lot of systems analysis being performed in the process of selecting the New Fighter Aircraft and the Canadian Patrol Frigate. In all three cases, the total amount of money available for acquisition has been specified, so that the problems are those of optimizing the return from a known investment. However, they are by no means simple, since several military roles are involved, and it is necessary to take account of many economic aspects of the programs, such as industrial benefits. In the case of the patrol frigate, the present studies are concentrating on six ships of orthodox design. But it is quite possible that the follow-on class could be of a radically new type. Many of the operational aspects of continental air defence have offered good material for operational research, both in planning systems and in developing procedures. In particular, the performance of radar, the processing of information, the passage of warning, and the direction of interceptor aircraft have been very extensively studied. In some cases, the performance of the human operator has been overtaken by computers, and the computers can be used to record data previously not kept. It is interesting to compare the information processing in the air defence and anti-submarine systems. Things move much faster in the former, and detection, almost always by radar, is fairly reliable and predictable unless electronic warfare is being used. Identification can be a problem, especially if there is a fair density of civil air traffic. But detection of submarines may occur by any of several different means, none of which [is] very reliable or predictable. The overall picture changes slowly, and the data are full of uncertainty. Three other areas of air operations which have been subject to continuing OR are planned flying planned maintenance, mathematical models of air/sea lift, and search and rescue. The objective of planned flying planned maintenance is to establish the relationship among the schedule of flying from an air base, the size of the air crews, and the size and scheduling of the maintenance crews. Once this is known, a change in one can be matched by the appropriate changes in the other two. In the case of air/sea lift, the problem is to schedule cargo aircraft and possibly also cargo ships in such a way as to deliver a specified mixed load in a specified order, using specified airfields, and taking account of expected weather and unserviceability. A computer model allows this to be done quickly for any set of inputs. These last two problems are similar in many ways to those faced by civil airlines, except that they are oriented towards situations occurring once only, rather than those applying continuously over a long period. Search and rescue, which also can involve ships as

The Contribution of Operational Research at National Defence  33

well as aircraft, offers applications of the mathematical theory of search, mixed with the collection of various operational data related to the circumstances of a particular search, likely to have information available of degrees of reliability and to be subject to different degrees of urgency. Unification of the [Canadian Armed Forces] offered opportunities to rationalize the supply system, formerly acquiring and feeding three sets of materiel through three separate networks of depots, and quite apart from unification, logistics offers many problems very suitable for analysis, including policies for maintenance, repair, and replacement, for inventory stocks, for handling of lifed [sic] items, and for the provisioning of an initial set of spare parts for a newly acquired ship, aircraft, tank, or other major system with a long expected life. This type of logistical analysis has many parallels in industry, but important differences are present too. While cost is a major consideration, there is no profit to be made, and it is difficult to impute a realistic cost to a stockout or failure. The variety of items in the system is simply enormous, and the rates of turnover cover a very wide range. There is a role for marginal analysis, so that the investment in spare parts is well distributed with regard to risks and costs. Rationalization of the supply system had a counterpart in manpower policy when the CAF were unified. Many specialized trades could be merged among land, sea, and air, although this posed certain problems in training, rank structure, and pay grading. The number of personnel involved, the large number of highly standardized categories, and the importance of planning careers over a period of many years all pointed to analysis by mathematical models, although the use of computers to deal with personnel problems is anathema in some quarters. One significant advantage of a good model is to indicate the long-term consequences of an immediate change in policy, in an area where the system cannot await or tolerate the method of trial and error. Development of the theory of goal programming has been followed by very useful practical results in our analysis of manpower problems in the [Canadian Armed Forces]. Another application of analytic methodology to a practical problem in personnel administration has been made for the transfer of servicemen between posts in a particular trade group. Many factors need to be taken into account, with a certain limited degree of flexibility acceptable in most of them. For example, a radar crew established at a strength of eight could probably survive for a limited period with only six, and could usefully employ ten. A posting usually set for three years could be reduced to two or extended to four. Constraints may need to be applied

34  Section One: Operational Research

to particular posts or particular individuals, perhaps on grounds of language or medical requirements, whether of the serviceman or his dependents. In general the requirements of the organization can be put into the computer program, and its solution is then subject to human veto on grounds of requirements of the individual. Finally, a few words may be in order regarding the excursion of ORAE into strategic studies and social and economic analysis. Whether they are OR, systems analysis, policy analysis, or something else, they do represent an area of research needed by the DND, and not provided elsewhere in the established structure of the department. One area of increasing interest is that of arms control. In principle a country or an alliance could obtain security by either of two methods: it could unilaterally design and build military forces sufficient to offset those of its principal adversary, or it could attempt to negotiate with the adversary a level of forces on both sides that would leave each in a relative position sufficiently strong to provide a tolerable degree of security. The second approach requires cooperation and a certain common appreciation of many factors. A prerequisite is a comprehensive analysis of the situation at present and what could develop in the future. NATO does undertake such analyses, depending on its member countries for the studies, discussion, and criticism. When the possibility is discussed that a new CF [Canadian Forces] base may be opened, or more frequently in the current climate that an existing base may be closed, there are many factors to be considered in addition to the value of the base for military operations. Depending on the circumstances, a CF base may have considerable impact on the surrounding civilian community, both social and economic. Evidently this impact is strongest if the base is large and the surrounding community small. It is important to evaluate both effects before decisions are made. When a decision is pending regarding some operational unit, such as the transfer of an army unit, the paying off of a ship, or the replacement of a particular type of aircraft, the department wants to know what the costs (or savings) will be. The direct costs are easy enough to identify, but associated with them are many related second- and third-order costs,  such as personnel, training, and support facilities. An ultimate ­objective is a model which would track all of these costs, but it has proved to be a surprisingly complicated matter. These last types of studies, in the strategic, social, and economic areas, may not strike one as well suited for the graduates of courses in mathematical optimization or queueing theory. Many of our analysts took their

The Contribution of Operational Research at National Defence  35

formal training in physics, chemistry, or engineering, which may seem even further removed from the study of strategy, sociology, or economics. However, when mixed with a few graduates in history or political science, they seem to be well able to attack these problems. The work may not be operational research, or even systems analysis, but it is relevant to the main problems that confront the Department of National Defence. The changes in our research programs over the years have been made in response to the needs of our employers, a very necessary policy for an in-house OR organization that wishes to survive.

1983

Early Days of Operational Research in Canada and the Founding of the Canadian Operational Research Society

George Lindsey worked hard to promote OR studies outside government circles. He was highly involved in a number of significant organizations dedicated to OR, including the Canadian Operational Research Society (CORS), with which he served as president for a period in 1961. He attended the Annual CORS Conference on a number of occasions and also published in the CORS Journal. In 1983 Lindsey received an invitation to deliver the Banquet Address at the Twenty-Fifth Annual CORS Conference in Winnipeg, Manitoba. This document is the original text of his speech, which he delivered on 25 May.1 Lindsey provides personal anecdotes of some of the “founding fathers” of OR in Canada. Among the names present in the document is that of Harold Larnder, who is widely recognized as the originator of the term “operational research.” Lindsey respected Larnder as a colleague and friend, and collected materials that document Larnder’s personal and professional involvement in the history of OR. The materials Lindsey collected on Larnder are available in the George Lindsey fonds, Series 12 “Operational Research (history),” LCMSDS.2 Antecedents of the Founding of CORS The situation in Canadian operational research at the time when CORS was founded has been well described by Peter Sandiford, in the first ­article of the first issue of the CORS Journal, published in 1963.3 The following paragraphs are quoted from this paper: In response to the same favourable conditions as in other countries (namely, military experience and demand, business interest, and interest in the potential of our subject by individual scientists), operational research had taken firm root in Canada by 1957. There were two centres of growth.

Early Days of Operational Research in Canada   37 One was the Operational Research Group of the Defence Research Board, with its affiliated branches in the various armed services. The other was the Operations Research Society of Toronto. Some members of these two groups had opinions of each other, founded more on fancy [than] on fact, that were interesting if not especially accurate. One group was viewed as a collection of unimaginative civil servants who were studying non-existent military problems in an atmosphere where results really didn’t matter since there was no way of putting them to the test. They were alleged to be unable to recognize that good operational research work could be done by people who called it operations research and didn’t learn it in World War II. The other group was viewed as a slightly shady collection of confidence artists, management consultants, industrial engineers, marketing men, and those looking for the key to the door of “the room at the top.” They were alleged to care little for technical precision as long as a result looked spectacular, and to prefer their society meetings in the form of high-priced social functions amply furnished with food and entertainment. These fantasies were soon to fade as some of the scientists from the Defence Research Board joined the business ranks in Montreal and Toronto and some Toronto consultants were invited to work with the military groups. Defence Research Board The DRB group was a phoenix that had arisen from the ashes of the wartime operational research establishments. This remarkable reconstruction took place between 1947 and 1949. It has been described in a paper by N.W. Morton which was delivered in Ottawa in January 1956 to the only meeting of the Operations Research Society of America to be held to date in Canada.4 It was entitled “A Brief History of the Development of Canadian Military Operational Research.” In this paper Dr Morton told how British success induced the formation of a RCAF operational research unit under the late Professor J.O. Wilhelm in 1942, of a Navy unit under Dr J.H.L. Johnstone in 1943, and of an Army unit under Professor Tuzo Wilson in 1944. He described the excellent wartime work of these groups which numbered sixty persons in all. Many wellknown Canadian scientists participated. Among them were Professor H.L. Welsh, F.R.S., now head of the Physics Department of Toronto; Professor John Stanley now head of the Zoology Department at McGill; Dr J.W.T. Spinks, now President of the University of Saskatchewan; and Dr John Abrams, one of our Past Presidents. Some professors returned immediately to academic life at the end of the war and remained there. [Others] such

38  Section One: Operational Research as John Abrams were persuaded to come back to the new formed Defence Research Board on a full-time basis. The new Defence Research Board had as its head the eminent Canadian physiologist, Dr Omond Solandt. He had had a distinguished wartime career overseas which saw him eventually the head of the British Army Operational Research Group. This was an offshoot of the original “Blackett’s Circus.”

DRB Operational Research Group Sandiford mentioned that it was reconstructed between 1947 and [19]49. Nearly all the growth occurred during the 1950s, starting from 0 in 1947. Under Omond Solandt, as Chairman of DRB, the ORG [Operational Research Group] grew under three Superintendents: Whit Morton, John Abrams, and Bill Petrie. Much of the leadership was provided by Canadian or British personnel who had practiced OR during [World War II], a group including unusual and colourful characters. Harold Larnder is regarded by many as the founder of operational research. After the development of radar had reached the stage that aircraft could be detected and tracked at a considerable range, the practical problems of using the information for air defence needed to be examined and solved by a scientific approach. The team that had developed the radar sent some of their members to form a separate research section at RAF Fighter Command, with the express purpose of studying the operations rather than the equipment, and when Larnder came to take charge of it in 1939 he decided that the file on which their correspondence would be kept should be labelled “operational research.” During the course of the war, Larnder served as head of the OR sections of Fighter Command, Coastal Command, and Allied Tactical Air Force. Having been educated in Canada (in physics, at Dalhousie University), and having made the acquaintance of John Abrams in Coastal Command, he was persuaded to join the DRB Operational Research Group in 1951, taking charge of the new section at the RCAF Air Defence Command at St Hubert. Harold subsequently held a number of other posts with DRB before his retirement in 1967, and served as president of CORS in 1966. Harold had had the extraordinary, perhaps unique, experience of being a major participant in two great discoveries: radar and operational research. He shared in the prize awarded to Sir Robert Watson-Watt’s team for the work he did in the development of radar. But Harold was so modest that it was difficult to get him to talk about those experiences. When Canada was the host for the IFORS [International Federation of

Early Days of Operational Research in Canada   39

Operational Research Societies] Conference of 1978, and we wanted to put on a feature for the international audience, we decided to present the founder of our profession, as if a congress of physicists could be addressed by Sir Isaac Newton in person. But Harold was too shy to agree. He feared that a history specialist would challenge him, claiming prior discovery by an American, or perhaps a Russian would tell us that Popoff5 had invented OR at the time of the Revolution. It took all our powers of persuasion, a small contract (Harold was usually broke!), and several rehearsals, before he agreed to give the talk. Fortunately it is recorded on tape,6 and the text was published7 for posterity. John Abrams was an American astronomer who came to Canada to join the RCAF in 1941. Beginning as an instructor in navigation, he transferred to operational research with RAF Coastal Command. John became superintendent of the DRB Operational Research Group in 1952; in 1963 he joined the Department of Industrial Engineering at the University of Toronto. He was president of CORS in 1962. He had a remarkable ability to select and organize people so that good practical operational research was accomplished. Many of his subordinates used to complain that he spent all of his time travelling, and never wrote any papers. Eventually, it dawned on the more perceptive that he had arranged everything so well that they were able to do the research and write the papers (which they enjoyed and did well), while John did the travelling (which he certainly enjoyed and did well), to the mutual satisfaction of all. Harold Larnder and John Abrams each died in July 1981.8 Colin Barnes came from Yorkshire, and spent most of his working life in the physics department of the University of Toronto. During the Second [World] War he was involved in operational research with Eastern Air Command. The section, established in Halifax in September 1942, was the first OR field unit in Canada. After the post-war OR group was established, Dr Barnes spent the summers of 1951 to 1954 working with the RCAF in Ottawa and in Colorado Springs, and then accepted a posting to Allied Air Forces, Central Europe, in Fontainebleau, for two years. Visitors returned with tales of his life in the attic of a rustic French farmhouse, living on bread and wine. Barnes was possessed of a caustic turn of phrase calculated to devastate the imprecise or the pompous. One of his requirements was for wellmade tea, something he was unable to find in Colorado Springs until he had used his knowledge of physics to devise the proper boiling procedures suitable for an altitude of 6,000 feet above sea level. Each evening, our OR team moved from one restaurant to another, at which Barnes

40  Section One: Operational Research

delivered instructions on high-altitude tea brewing, sampled the result, and declared another failure. Finally he achieved success, on the last night before departure. Perhaps his efforts brought joy to later travellers. John Stanley, a biologist from [the University of British Columbia], [the University of] Minnesota, and Queen’s [University], joined the RCAF as an instructor in mathematics and the theory of flight, but came to the Deputy Directorate of Science in the Air Ministry in London in 1943. He played a significant part in the analysis of operations of the V-1 cruise missiles and the steps taken to destroy their launching sites. Later on he was transferred to Eastern Air Command. After the war Stanley became a professor of zoology at McGill [University], and spent a number of summers at the OR section of Air Defence Command at St Hubert, near Montreal. Stanley was the subject of close attention from both the OR and the air force community in Air Defence Command as the result of two idiosyncrasies. One was his favourite automobile, a magnificent open 1928 Rolls-Royce, whose style he matched with a 1910-vintage motoring costume. The other was his extraordinary knowledge of the mating habits of insects. Both of these accomplishments brought him fame in the world of air defence. On the occasion of an important exercise, soon enough after World War II to still command respect in Montreal, Stanley was summoned at an early hour on a Sunday morning to report at once to the key radar station in the Laurentians. Responding to the challenge, he donned his goggles and duster, mounted the ancient Rolls-Royce, and made off at [a] high (illegal) speed towards his war station. At a traffic light he found himself waiting alongside a 1912 Packard, stripped for racing and uttering defiant invitations to a drag race. When the QPP [Quebec Provincial Police] finally caught him, and accused him of exceeding 95 miles an hour (these were pre-metric days), such was Stanley’s presence, backed by the authority of operational research for national defence in an emergency, that he was given a high speed escort the rest of the way to Lac St-Denis. Once installed in the operations centre, the next task of Stanley and all the others was to wait expectantly for the bombers to be detected on the radar screen. In this instance the delay amounted to three long days and three even longer nights. Gradually the entire station gathered around the Professor. For the first time in his long scientific career he could count on the undivided attention of dozens of fascinated students, who had unlimited time to devote to his detailed accounts of the amorous exploits of the insect world. When, eventually, the bombers came,

Early Days of Operational Research in Canada   41

Stanley could count on the unquestioning cooperation of everyone in Number One Canadian Air Defence Sector. Unfortunately, Stanley’s ­scientific authority was later subjected to challenge from ­another formidable OR practitioner, Eric Leese. An extraordinarily accomplished applied mathematician from King’s College, Cambridge, in the 1930s Leese had done mathematical analysis that would now be described as operational research for the London Transport system. A gifted musician on several instruments, and one who resented the wasting of even a few minutes of precious time, Leese was obliged to spend an hour on the London underground twice a day on his way to and from work. He put the time to good use by practising the violin, until a new law (a predecessor of human rights legislation?) was promulgated to forbid the playing of musical instruments on moving vehicles. Leese transferred to the Admiralty before World War II began, and remained in naval analytical work until he came to the Canadian Defence Research Board in 1951. In his long career in many sections of the Operational Research Group he established an unmatched reputation for the efficient practical application of mathematics to real problems. He refused to marshal a more complicated model or a more accurate method than was needed to solve the real problem. He would adjust his level of sophistication to the comprehension of his colleagues, clients, and students. For many years he refused to have anything to do with computers, since their numerical simulations led the researcher away from the differential equations which told the complete story. This attitude changed when he came to appreciate the release from tedious computation and the ability offered by the more modern computers to model problems too complex for fully analytical solutions. But on one subject Leese was absolutely unbending: the rigour of precise mathematical truth. Anyone taking liberties in this direction was corrected with merciless, devastating, and unanswerable exactitude. The memorable clash of the giants occurred when John Stanley produced a mathematical analysis of anti-aircraft defences, involving applications of the theory of probability. A paper was sent to headquarters for approval by the chief, Dr Morton. No mathematician, Dr Morton wisely passed it to Dr Abrams. As was usually the case, Dr Abrams was absent for a long period, so the paper was sent to Mr Leese. Becoming impatient for the publication of his opus, Dr Stanley urged Dr Morton’s secretary to return his manuscript, in case there might be any minor amendments to make before rushing it to the printer. Ever helpful, if

42  Section One: Operational Research

incautious, Dr Morton’s secretary returned the manuscript to Dr Stanley bearing the (very unedited and uncomplimentary) marginal comments of Mr Leese, who disagreed (violently and emphatically) with Stanley’s treatment of probability. Hence arose the legendary Leese-Stanley feud, which reverberated for years until the retirement of both of these formidable characters. The style which these people impressed on the organization was one of pragmatism, direct observation, and close association with the clients (i.e. the armed services), including incorporation of armed forces officers as members of the OR teams. They would agree with the advice of practitioners such as Pat Rivett and Gene Wolsey, who urge us to get onto the shop floor. As a matter of fact they didn’t just urge us – they made us do it. However, notwithstanding this strong link to the formative experience of war, there was a gradual change from the type of work done. Operational research was complemented by systems analysis. Real operations were replaced by field exercises, gaming, simulation, and mathematical models. Attention shifted from low-level problems to high-level, and from operations to planning. Sections were established in Halifax (for anti-submarine warfare) and St Hubert, Quebec (for air defence), as well as four in Defence HQ (for army, navy, air force, and DRB). The wartime cooperation with the British and American allies continued, including loan and exchange of personnel. Operations Research Society of Toronto By 1955 there were a number of organizations in Toronto practising OR. Some of the leading personalities included: Peter Sandiford, Ben Bernholtz, [and] Bill Shelson at Ontario Hydro[,] Eric Sorensen and Bill McGuire at BA Oil, Josef Kates at KCS Limited, Harvey Gellman at H.S. Gellman and Company, Alan Pauli and John Walter at Abitibi, and Dan Delury at the Ontario Research Foundation. The members of these groups formed the Operations Research Society of Toronto. Montreal OR Club By 1957, after Omond Solandt and Peter Wilson had moved from ­National Defence to the Canadian National Railways, Peter Sandiford to Trans Canada Airlines (remember them?), and the OR section at RCAF St Hubert was at peak activity, OR was alive and growing in Montreal.

Early Days of Operational Research in Canada   43

Operations Research Society of America The Operations Research Society of America [ORSA] was established in 1952. Many Canadian[s] joined it (32 by 1957), and many members from both sides of the border interpreted the “A” to mean “North America.” John Abrams, and later Omond Solandt, served on the ­ council of ORSA. The close cooperation between the US and Canada in ­defence research produced in the Canadian defence community a strong “continental” outlook. International Federation of Operational Research Societies In 1956 a movement was alive to create an International Federation of Operational Research Societies, to be discussed in a conference planned for Oxford in 1957, sponsored by the British OR Society, by ORSA, and by TIMS [The Institute of Management Sciences]. The Secretary was none other than Pat Rivett, and the Chairman, Sir Charles Goodeve, a Canadian who had been prominent in wartime OR in Britain, and was now Director of the British Iron and Steel Research Association. Sir Charles wanted Canadian participation, and urged the formation of a Canadian society able to provide it. Patrick Robinson, of Imperial Oil, presented the conference with a survey of OR in Canada, while Solandt and Abrams went on the ORSA delegation. Canadian Section of ORSA In 1957 pressure developed for the establishment of a Canadian section of ORSA. Nigel Hopkins, Cec[il] Law, John Abrams, and Jim Radford were in favour of this move, and circulated a letter to their colleagues. It is interesting to record that they did not get their way, but each became at a later date president of the other solution to our problem – namely, the Canadian Operational Research Society. A similar move was suggested by another American society, TIMS, supported by Pat Robinson. Formation of CORS Solandt, Sandiford, Wilson, and Sorensen preferred the creation of a ­ Canadian society, rather than forming a Canadian section of an ­American society. The reaction to Nigel Hopkins’ letter showed a majority in favour of a national organization. The OR Society of Toronto,

44  Section One: Operational Research

with 50 members, sought the cooperation of their colleagues in Montreal, Ottawa, and Vancouver. Solandt invited Abrams, Delury, Hopkins, Law, Lindsey, Pauli, Petrie, Robinson, Sandiford, Sorensen, and Wilson to attend a meeting in Montreal in February 1958, at which the outline of a charter for CORS was developed. Organizational work by Solandt, Sandiford, and Wilson led to an inaugural meeting on 14 April 1958, in ­Toronto, which was commemorated exactly twenty-five years later by some of us here present this evening. Solandt was elected the first president, and Sandiford the secretary. New members were accepted as Associates, but could apply to become Technical Members. By May 1959 there were 161 members, of whom 77 were Technical Members. A membership committee chaired by Cec Law considered the qualifications. Local Sections The OR Society of Toronto became the first local section of the new national society, and was followed by Montreal in 1958, Vancouver in 1959, and Ottawa in 1960. It took another five years for the fifth section to be formed, in Halifax. The succession of presidents in the first few years demonstrated a feature of the way things are done in Eastern Canada: there was an implicit agreement that the presidency would rotate through Montreal, Toronto, and Ottawa, a sequence which endured for two complete rotations. Early Accomplishments of CORS The first of the CORS annual conferences was chaired by Alan Pauli, and held at the University of Toronto in May of 1959, the event whose twenty-fifth iteration we are celebrating here in Winnipeg. The second, held in Montreal, enjoyed a guest address by Pat Rivett, as he told us this morning. On that occasion he berated us for sins which, as happens every Sunday in churches, we resolved to abjure forever, but, as we were instructed this morning, are still being committed. CORS was accepted in 1959 by the IFORS as the accredited representative of Canada, paying dues proportional to the number of members in CORS, but voting with weight equal to the square root of the number of members. Nineteen years later the Eighth IFORS conference was held in Toronto, with CORS as the host. In 1962 the first CORS bulletin appeared, with John Walter as the editor. [The year] 1963 saw the first issue

Early Days of Operational Research in Canada   45

of the CORS Journal, edited by Jim Radford. In 1971 the CORS Journal changed its name to INFOR, when CORS combined with the Information Processing Society of Canada for joint publication. OR Twenty-Five Years Ago The universities of Toronto, McGill, and Western had conducted seminars, symposia, and panels on OR before Toronto broke new ground when it offered a four-year undergraduate course in Industrial Engineering in 1959. Before that, everyone had learned their OR on the job. As a matter of fact, many still do, quite effectively, but in the 1940s and 1950s there was no alternative. In 1959 CORS circulated a questionnaire to Canadian companies, and learned that 21 out of 49 who replied did engage in operational research. This ratio of 43 per cent represented a sharp increase over the result of 16 per cent obtained by a similar survey by Western in 1956. All of the positive respondents were large firms, including BA Oil, CNR, Dominion Rubber, Imperial Oil, Northern Electric, Ontario Hydro, and TCA. The main disciplines of the practitioners were engineering and economics. In contrast, the main disciplines of the OR scientists in the defence department were mathematics and physics. A feature of the 1950s was the rapid buildup of OR in the non-military sphere. When ORSA was formed in 1952, half of its charter members were engaged in military OR. In 1959 less than a quarter of the Technical Members of CORS were working in the defence sector. The balance of presentations at the annual conferences and of papers in the journal show the same trend, which has continued in succeeding decades. Another thing that has changed is the dependence on computers and automatic data processing. In the 1940s a Friden or Marchant desk calculator, noisy, slow, and in constant need of repair, was a prized possession. Anyone who was any good learned to carry out the arithmetic operations with his left hand and perform storage with his right hand, while he was using his brain for programming. Storage was done by writing the numbers down with a pencil. If someone took your calculator, you reverted to logarithms or borrowed a slide rule. Data that needed to be sorted several ways were recorded on cards with holes, which would be separated by long needles. No problems with programmers, time sharing, or hundred-page printouts. But if I go on in this vein, most of you will conclude that OR must have started in the Crimean War and that I was there applying Lanchester’s second law to the Charge of the Light Brigade. In

46  Section One: Operational Research

fact, the connection between the origin of OR in the Second World War and the OR of today is still visible, perhaps more evident in CORS than in ORSA, and it is a useful and valuable one. Finally, I think that the problems facing the founders of CORS reflected bigger ones that are important in Canada today. If there is a large, efficient activity functioning in the United States, should we join it or build a smaller model of our own? If we choose the first alternative, how will Canada make its own decisions, and how will it be represented on the international stage? If we choose the second, can we overcome our handicap of geographical dispersion? Unless we have our annual meeting in Toronto or Montreal, will anybody come? When the decisions were made in 1958 to create an independent Canadian OR Society, many doubted its wisdom or viability. Canadians would prefer to belong to ORSA[;] that was where the action and the Superstars were to be found. We couldn’t afford to publish our own journal. Vancouver was too far from Toronto and Montreal. Well, CORS has survived for twenty-five years, and we now have sections in Ottawa, Halifax, [southwestern] Ontario, Quebec, Calgary, and Edmonton. And thanks to the capable and energetic section in Winnipeg, we know that an annual meeting at the geographic centre of Canada can be a great success. We have come a long way from the early days. Those of us who were privileged to be there at the beginning can be very pleased to have seen CORS grow up and come of age. I hope that many of you here tonight will be able to celebrate the fiftieth annual meeting, which I hereby predict, without benefit of slide rule, log tables, mathematical programming, mechanical or electronic computer, will take place in the year 2008.

1995

Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research on Radar in World War II

George Lindsey presented this paper at the Eleventh International Symposium on Military Operational Research, held at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, England, in September 1994. He published the paper the next year in Canadian Military History, which has granted permission for its reprinting here.1 Although the material covered in the core of the paper predates the Cold War, Lindsey’s reflections on OR during the Second World War provide useful context for understanding the origins and development of his profession, as well as his postwar transition to government employment in the Canadian defence establishment. Operational research had its origin at the beginning of the Second World War, and made important early contributions to many aspects of the Air Defence of Great Britain, an activity of monumental significance in the war. Air defence depended for its success on the development of a command, control, communication, and information system on a scale that had never been approached before. It also depended on other types of technology, such as high-performance aircraft, air-to-air weapons and anti-aircraft artillery, and, most critically, on the new science of radar. All of these offered opportunities for applications of operational research, as did the study of tactics for individual engagements and of strategy for the optimum allocation of dangerously scarce resources. Of the many technological developments that made advances throughout the course of World War II, radar was the one which saw the greatest improvement in capabilities and had the most significant influence on operations. The contributions of radar to fire control of weapons, and the direction and navigation of aircraft and ships, called for systematic studies of the technical design and performance of the radar, of the weapons depending on its information, of the capabilities of the human

48  Section One: Operational Research

operators, and of the design and effectiveness of the entire system of which the radar was one vital part. This provided a glorious opportunity for operational research. There was an atmosphere of extreme urgency. There were no worries about budgets. There was no time for extensive instrumented field trials or operational evaluation – new equipment was rushed into service. The data on effectiveness under field conditions were obtained from real operations. In earlier years it was possible to find people who held senior positions in organizations conducting important military operations, and could therefore give a first-hand account of the critical decisions and results as seen “top down” from the highest level. But if one wants to go back as far as World War II, where operational research was born, it is getting increasingly difficult to find survivors who held senior appointments in the early 1940s. I am not one of these. However, I was fortunate enough to have been able to participate in operational research during World War II at a junior level, and to have spent most of the half-century since then in the study and practice of military OR. I am going to describe a few incidents which occurred in the life of a junior army officer engaged in military operational research on the applications of radar to air defence during an extremely active period. So what you are going to receive is a bottom-up worm’s-eye view of operational research during its interesting pioneer period fifty years ago. As Britain mobilized for war, both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force foresaw the coming importance of radar and the need for personnel with the technical background that would be necessary to operate and maintain the succession of new types of equipment that would follow one another as the radically new technology progressed. Britain’s scientists were quickly directed into a variety of wartime activities, with the RAF getting most of those whose backgrounds were related to radar. A request was made to Canada to provide suitable people. Several Canadian universities identified students nearing graduation in physics, engineering, and mathematics, and organized a series of courses. The navy recruited the first batch, and at one time every capital ship in the RN had a Canadian radar officer. Later the air force and the army had their turn. Nobody really knew who would be in charge of radar in the Canadian Army. The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps (REME) had not been invented. Signallers were believed to know something about electricity and wireless, but the army wanted to use their radars to direct gunfire. My badges were changed from University of Toronto

Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research   49

Canadian Officers’ Training Corps to Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, and then to Royal Canadian Artillery. After I graduated from basic courses for coast defence and anti-aircraft artillery, and a very good course on army radar, I was listed as a Lieutenant (EMFC). The term stood for “Electrical Methods of Fire Control,” a term that was intended to fool the enemy, but sometimes resulted in expectations that my job was to put out fires in the barracks. The word “radar” was secret, although we could talk about “radio location.” The magnetron was so secret that one of my early duties was to guard a magnetron with a pistol for every minute of its journey from Ottawa to a coastal defence battery in Halifax, where an experimental fire control radar, based on a new centimetric set designed for anti-aircraft use, was to be tested. The regular battery officers were absolutely confident of the infallible accuracy of their optical fire control, which was based on combining the bearings observed from two telescopes sited at the mouth of the harbour. They resented the intrusion of this crazy newfangled invention. The final test came when the guns fired 9.2-inch shells at a small towed target, using radar information. In the test, the fall of shot (easily visible both optically and by radar), straddled the target, but the battery declared the radar to be a failure since the target had not received a direct hit. We asked Halifax Fortress to show us their optical plot, so we could compare it with our radar plot. This was refused. Later a friendly spy revealed that one of their telescopes was reporting true bearings and the other magnetic bearings, with the resultant plot making its way over dry land. Fortunately no German battleship came to provide another test of the coastal defences of Canada. In 1943 I was posted to the British Army Operational Research Group to work in the section responsible for air defence and radar. The activities included the operation of recording vans on Heavy Anti-Aircraft (HAA) gunsites deployed all over Britain. These vans made photographic records of data from the radar, predictor, and guns, taken during an engagement. The analysts then reconstructed the behaviour of these devices, and estimated where the target had been and where the shells had burst. Errors made during each engagement could be assessed. Data pooled from many engagements was analysed to detect trends, including changes in enemy tactics. The complicated process of the radar fire control of HAA contained errors in many steps. Electrical and mechanical calibrations were not perfect. Human operators, of whom there were many in the systems of those days, could not track the fluctuating radar echoes from moving

50  Section One: Operational Research

targets or match the moving pointers on dials perfectly. The fuse setter added delays and made small errors. The predictor’s output depended on an assumption regarding the motion of the target while the shell was in flight. Many of the errors introduced by humans were reduced by increasing the degree of automation. Radar data could be fed directly into the predictor, and the motion of the guns and the setting of the fuse could be made automatic and slaved to the predictor commands. A memorable incident occurred during the program to make the guns follow automatically. A demonstration was organized to display this wonder to a high-ranking group of visitors. On a clear day they gathered around the guns, observed the radar acquire a track, saw the target tow cross well within range, and watched the guns move steadily and remorselessly in response to their automatic instructions. They continued to watch in surprise as all of the guns suddenly elevated to 90° and fired a vertical salvo. When the visitor’s ears had stopped ringing they discussed this unexpected event for a few seconds, until one of them remembered that what goes up must come down, whereupon they abandoned their dignified demeanour and demonstrated remarkable abilities to sprint in all directions. Automation introduced its own problems in many ways. For example, radar signals tend to fluctuate, so that their indications jitter about the correct values, while the predictor needs steady input or it will produce wildly changing estimates of future position. The input data can be smoothed by a human operator, which requires judgment, or it can be fed through an electrical filter, set to smooth over a selected time period. But what is the best time constant? Too short and there is the unwanted jitter. Too long and there will be a sluggish response to a real change in the course, height, or speed of the target. A compromise was attempted with “rate-aided laying,” which caused the reading to change at a constant rate until the operator moved his control, at which time an immediate shift in position was combined with a small change in the rate. But what should be the proportion between Delta x and Delta x dot? A major step was to make the radar follow automatically, but this made it vulnerable to ejection of what is now called chaff from the target, which could seduce the radar to follow the strongest echo in the vicinity, quite likely to be a bundle of chaff. I vividly remember one visit to a four-gun 3.7-inch HAA gunsite near London soon after the Luftwaffe had started to use chaff. We picked up an approaching bomber and followed it smoothly. I was watching the

Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research   51

A-scope tracking the range. All of a sudden the radar blip started to multiply and leave replicas of itself behind. The operator continued to track the leading blip, which was reflected from the aircraft, whose bundles of chaff were soon left behind in the slipstream. Then the guns opened up, with a most peculiar tune in four-four time; three great booms followed by a hollow bonk as if someone had struck a hollow drainpipe. This got my close attention, since I had just been reading a report about dangerous wear in barrel liners, causing premature explosions at the gunsite. New liners were in short supply, so that changes were made one gun at a time. Obviously, the number four gun in our battery was overdue for a liner change. The Vickers and Sperry AA [anti-aircraft] predictors were marvels of mechanical ingenuity. They were special purpose real-time analogue computers, long before digital technology or semiconductor chips had been invented. Their variables were processed in the form of shaft rotations, their memories were stored on three-dimensional cams whose shapes represented ballistic data and trigonometric functions, and their programs were embedded in the mechanical linkages. They were advertised as soldier-proof, a foolish boast which proved to be untrue. Their successors, the Bedford-Cossor and the Bell Telephone Labs BTL, were electrical analogue computers, whose data were recorded as voltages, memories were in potentiometers, and programs in hard-wired circuitry. All predictors had to be provided with an assumption (which would now be called an algorithm) regarding the future motion of the moving target. The simplest hypothesis was that the target would maintain the same course, speed, and height that it had at the moment that the fuse was set. But the pilot could falsify that assumption by taking evasive action, although this might spoil an accurate bomb run. Prediction along the tangent to the track would cope with a steady descent on a constant bearing, but would produce a future position that would oscillate wildly ahead of a snaked track, and would never be correct against a helical track. It could predict along a chord, but what chord? Today such problems would be classified as artificial intelligence. A solution to this problem of evasive action was offered by the Crabtree predictor, which allowed a human operator to place his personal estimate of the future position on a plot, and then direct the guns to hit that spot. An experimental mock-up was built, and an RAF pilot, who it was hoped might have psychic powers regarding the habits of his Luftwaffe counterparts, practised his skills against British bomber pilots, and predicted their manoeuvres with remarkable success. The equipment

52  Section One: Operational Research

was installed on a gunsite in London, with the latest twin 5.25-inch naval AA guns, and the next real air raid eagerly awaited. Alas, the Luftwaffe did not oblige for a long time. Finally the sirens went, a detection was made on the radar, and a hostile target approached the gunsite. The psychic pilot commenced his duties, concentrating with extraordinary skill, oblivious to the excitement of the rest of the team, and successfully forecast every manoeuvre of the German bomber. Finally the bomber disappeared from the display, the pilot looked up, exhausted but elated and inquired, “How did I do?” The answer was, “You never gave us the order to fire!” The cumulative results of experience, and technical improvements, aided by operational research, increased the effectiveness of AA Command against German bomber aircraft between 1941 and 1944 by a factor estimated to be between four and five. The air defence of Great Britain encountered a new challenge in 1944, just after the launching of the D-Day cross-Channel invasion of France. The V-1 unmanned pulse-jet flying bomb – in today’s terminology, a ground-launched cruise missile – provided a target for air defence that was easier in one respect in that it took no evasive action, but more difficult in several others, in that it was smaller and faster than the bombers of the day, flew at an altitude that was too low for easy engagement by HAA but too high for light anti-aircraft (LAA), and was likely to inflict serious damage even if brought down by AA fire unless its warhead was detonated in the air. The new threat caused AA Command to make major redeployments of the forces which had been stationed in static sites for the defence of British cities. Only cities in the south of England were within range of the V-1 launch sites in France, and of these by far the most important target was London. Once a V-1 reached London it was not useful to shoot it down and have its bomb detonate in the city; it was better to leave it alone in the hope that it would keep on going and land in the open country to the north of the city. The first strategy was to move the guns from all over Britain to the North Downs, between London and the Channel, with fighter aircraft operating to the south and barrage balloons to the north of the gun belt. An immediate difficulty arose due to the rolling hills in the area and the low altitude of the approaching V-1s, which did not enter the lowest radar beams and clear the ground clutter until they had penetrated to very close range. An improvement was obtained by installing a large horizontal wire screen around the radar site, a practice that had been

Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research   53

adopted earlier for fixed sites around cities, and adding a low vertical wire fence at the perimeter of the screen. The resulting diffraction pattern of the radar energy allowed a concentrated lower beam to escape the ground clutter but achieve early detection of the small approaching target. ­Nevertheless, the results were disappointing, and other difficulties of an operational nature were encountered in demarcation of the boundaries of operating zones for guns and for fighters. Overall, the fighters obtained better results than the guns. I remember receiving a decidedly chilly welcome in a town in Sussex, whose inhabitants disapproved of the attempts of the gunners to bring the V-1s down into their town instead of letting them proceed on to London. I also remember watching a V-1 land in London about a mile away from where I was standing, saw a dark spherical shock wave expanding into the sky from the point of impact, then felt the shock wave coming through the ground, with my feet, and later heard and felt the blast propagated through the air. As well as attempting to make HAA operate at altitudes below those for which it was most effective, efforts were made to improve the capabilities of LAA at altitudes higher than those for which it had been designed. The 40-mm shells for the Bofors guns were contact-fused, so that there was no time fuse to set, but to damage the target a direct hit was necessary. Ranges and times of flight were short, and optical tracking in bearing and angle of sight was quite accurate. The Kerrison LAA predictor would work reasonably well if fed with accurate range data, but the various optical methods of estimating range were crude and notoriously inaccurate. As a solution it was suggested that a simple radar range-only set designed for the tail-gun turret of Lancaster bombers, whose gunners could also track direction optically but required accurate range data, should be mounted on the Kerrison predictor. I participated in the work at the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE), which had designed the aircraft radar, and were preparing to modify the equipment for the AA predictors in their own model shop. I then went to LAA sites to observe their operations. I remember one night watching a V-1 make a low approach directly over our gunsite, and being engaged with very visible tracer-equipped shells. I also remember eagerly anticipating a hit, and then suddenly wondering what would happen after we hit the target. I never found out. The unsatisfactory deployment of the AA gun zone south of London was radically corrected, by moving all calibres down to a narrow belt right at the Channel coast, from where they could have an unobstructed

54  Section One: Operational Research

line of sight over the water with no obstacles, and on a clear night even see the V-1s almost as soon as they were launched from France. V-1s damaged by AA fire usually fell into the sea. Two other factors were also changed for the better. American SCR-584 radars with fully automatic tracking and data transmission were deployed in large numbers, and the guns were armed with the new and very secret proximity fuses. It was an AA gunners’ paradise. (Lesser branches of the army, and all branches of the air force, maintain that anti-aircraft gunners never go to Paradise, but I now know that this is not true.) I remember looking along the Channel coast on a clear night and seeing seven V-1s in flight at the same time, greeted by a spectacular display of fireworks, including 20-mm shells landing in the water at about one-third of the range to their target, 40-mm tracers passing very close to their targets, 90-mm and 3.7-inch proximity-fused shells detonating about 50 feet above the water well beyond their targets, other HAA shells bursting very close to the targets, and occasionally a wonderful giant explosion when a V-1 warhead was detonated. After that, Guy Fawkes and the 24th of May have never seemed very impressive. In addition to its investigations of air defence, Army Operational Research Section 1 (AORS1) made some studies of the use of radar in support of field artillery. It was suggested that mortar bombs, which were causing severe casualties to infantry in the Far East, might be tracked in their slow high parabolic trajectories, and the launcher located for counter fire. But the mortar bombs were very small and the polar diagram of the radar reflections would depend on the precise shape and angle of observation. We needed to measure the reflections from a real Japanese mortar bomb. One which had been captured in Burma was available in an ordnance establishment near London, and I was provided with a jeep and told to go and get it. It had a rather sinister appearance, with Japanese stencils on it, and the explosives expert who was about to give it to me seemed to treat it with considerable caution. I explained that we were only interested in its outer casing, nose, and fins, and had no interest in its interior. He asked me if I planned to remove the fuse, detonator, and high explosive. This was not the way I had planned my day, and I explained that our laboratory was lacking some of the necessary equipment and asked him if he could possibly save us some time and do this for me. This he did, with me as a very attentive and alert bystander. I noticed that he held the fuse between his thumb and little finger, which seemed an odd grip for something not to be dropped. He explained that if it went off he might save one or two

Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research   55

fingers that way. I was content to bring the bomb back to Ibstock Place without its innards. When the Canadian Army decided to establish its own Army Operational Research Group [AORG] and prepare to move its operations to the Pacific Theatre, I was posted back to Canada. This account has focused on the type of operational research that is closely associated with the technical performance of equipment forming an element of a complicated system. At the time, many functions which had been performed by humans, with inevitable inaccuracy, were being converted to automatic operation, which removed errors, but sometimes introduced new problems involving the need for human judgment. The type of problems with command, control, communication, and information systems being discussed fifty years later have some of the same elements. Operational research will be needed, and the practitioners may have to become very knowledgeable regarding the technical performance of the various types of equipment involved in the systems. Exercises must approximate the operational situation as closely as is possible in peacetime. But the studies may not be as exciting as they were in AORG in 1944.

1.  Army Operational Research Group, 1944. George Lindsey stands in the back row, on the left.

2.  Personnel of the 13th or 19th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, examining a damaged German V-1 flying bomb launching ramp, Almelo, Netherlands, 5 April 1945.

3.  Display, in a hangar at RCAF Station Trenton, of a captured Reichenberg IV (Fi 103R), a piloted version of the V-1 flying bomb, 16 June 1947.

4.  A soldier stands guard at Chalk River laboratories in the tense late 1940s.

5.  Defence Research Board College of Arms, 1950.

6.  Ground control approach set used for air traffic control, Uplands, Ontario, 1956.

7.  A radar station, Canada, 1959.

8.  Ban-the-bomb demonstration on Parliament Hill, 1963.

9.  George Lindsey diagramming baseball statistics in official Defence Research Board clothing, 1960s.

10.  BOMARC site gate, 1966.

11.  George Lindsey on a military operations exercise, 1970s.

12.  Second Session on Disarmament – Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, 1982.

13.  Front cover of George Lindsey’s edited collection, No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II (1997).

SECTION TWO Strategic Studies

1980

The Linkages of New Technology to Strategic and Theatre Deterrence and Warfighting

George Lindsey presented this paper at the 1980 Millennium Conference, ­London School of Economics, in April 1980.1 He wrote and delivered it to identify a number of military technologies that he considered to be in “a state of rapid and significant development.” According to the introduction to the document, Lindsey also intended to address the probable effects of military technologies on deterrence and warfighting, at both the strategic and theatre levels. He pays specific attention to the possible linkages between conventional weapons and nuclear deterrence, and to the stabilizing and destabilizing effects of new military technologies. The New Technologies The techniques of surveillance and reconnaissance have been advancing by large steps, such as the development and constant subsequent improvement of photographic, radar, and electronic intelligence satellites and the means to recover their data. In addition to satellites, which can spend no more than a few seconds per day near any one location on the earth, other unmanned vehicles are being developed, such as remotely piloted drones, able to overfly the battlefield and relay high-quality images back to the ground. Important for these systems are improvements in optical sensors, allowing penetration of camouflage and detection at night. As well as their function of observing objects on the surface of the land and the sea, satellites are employed for the detection of missile launches and nuclear explosions, for communications, for navigation, for meteorology, and for geodesy. And, precisely because of their military value, satellites are being developed for the role of interception and destruction of enemy satellites.

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A very important feature of modern military technology is the continued and remarkable improvement in the accuracy with which weapons can be guided to their targets, whether in indirect fire against a fixed target of known position, possibly at very long range, or in direct fire against a target under observation, which may be moving. Accurate indirect fire may be attained through inertial guidance, celestial guidance, radio navigation signals that may be transmitted from satellites, and radar terrain comparison. For direct fire, new Precision Guided Munitions can be steered by an observer able to see both target and missile, or can home onto a target designated by a laser beam directed by an observer who need not see the missile. Anti-aircraft missiles employ variants of these techniques often dependent on radar or infrared signals. A family of cruise missile weapons systems with antecedents in World War II has come into recent prominence because of the combination of accurate guidance with efficient small propulsion engines. With a payload adequate for a nuclear warhead, but small enough to be land-mobile, or launched from aircraft, ships, or submarines, and too small to make an easy radar target, cruise missiles are making a bid to displace both ballistic missiles and strike aircraft from some of their roles. Air defence also benefits from the improvements to missile guidance, and from new techniques for detecting and engaging aircraft flying at very low altitudes. The two dominant elements in the latter area are the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), in which a large aircraft carries a large radar able to distinguish low-flying enemy aircraft against the background of the earth, together with the apparatus and personnel necessary to control friendly interceptor aircraft, and the look-down shoot-down fire control system for interceptor aircraft. The combination of effective surveillance and accurate weapon delivery is rendering all targets on large permanent military bases increasingly vulnerable. They can be protected against conventional attack by hardened shelters, but even underground concrete silos are inadequate against attack by large nuclear warheads. As a result, there is an increasing tendency to make weapons systems mobile, so that they can be dispersed and concealed under foliage or rotated among covered housings. Aircraft with a Vertical and Short Takeoff and Landing capability can be dispersed and concealed, using roadways for takeoff and landing. Offsetting to some degree the improved capabilities for surveillance and weapon guidance is the development of electronic countermeasures. This takes many forms, including the jamming of radars and of radio guidance and communication systems, passive direction finding,

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the reduction of radar echoes and infrared emission, fitting of receivers to give warning of radar or laser lock-on, and the use of screening and decoy devices. These are all part of the even larger activity of electronic warfare, which includes electronic countermeasures. Although it has been possible for some years to design nuclear warheads to produce virtually any amount of total energy yield, it was not known how to control the proportion of energy appearing in the forms of blast, heat, initial nuclear radiation, and delayed nuclear radiation. Now, however, partial control of this energy partition is possible, so that for example the proportion appearing in the form of prompt nuclear radiation (gamma rays and neutrons) can be made much greater than the former level of about 5 per cent). A small “Enhanced Radiation ­Warhead” could be effective against tank crews without generating the great heat and blast which would be more damaging to personnel and structures at a distance from the tanks. There may be other applications for nuclear weapons with a “tailored yield.” Improvements to the effectiveness of munitions have not been restricted to nuclear weapons. Fuel-air explosives designed to deliver a downward shock wave over a considerable area, cluster bomblets, and controlled fragmentation are examples of “Improved Conventional Munitions.” New anti-tank and anti-personnel mines are appearing, with novel means for rapid dispersal. Linkages of New Technologies with Stable Strategic Deterrence For strategic deterrence to be stable in a crisis situation, each opponent must feel certain that a counterforce first strike against him could not succeed in destroying most of his retaliatory weapons. If he depends on mobility and concealment for the survivability of his ICBMs, this must be adequate to defeat the opponent’s surveillance. SSBNs [nuclear-­ powered ballistic missile submarines] deployed at sea must be invisible to the opponent’s sensor systems. Heavy bombers must be assured of sufficient warning to get airborne before an attack can destroy them on the ground. Thus, a surveillance system good enough to track mobile ICBMs and submerged SSBNs could destabilize strategic deterrence in a crisis. However, it does not seem likely that current technology has reached this level of accomplishment. A warning system giving bombers and other components of the retaliatory system time to increase their survivability would be stabilizing in a crisis, as would be surveillance giving reliable indications whether certain

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steps likely to be associated with the preparation of a surprise attack were or were not being taken by the adversary in a time of confrontation. In addition, surveillance capable of verifying compliance with agreements (or detecting violations) would be stabilizing from the point of view of arms control. Assuming that satellite surveillance systems are not capable of tracking mobile ICBMs or submerged submarines, but are able to give early warning of missile launch, preparations for surprise attack, and indications of arms-control violations, then the activation of anti-satellite operations would be highly destabilizing. The increasing accuracy of long-range missiles, coupled with the deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) is a destabilizing development, since it improves the chances of success of a counterforce strike against fixed targets. However, once the probability of target kill approaches 100 per cent per warhead, further increase in accuracy will have little added effect, although as the miss distance approaches zero, smaller warheads can be used, the amount of unwanted collateral damage will be decreased, and the escalatory effect of highly selective use of nuclear missiles may be reduced. Since their time of flight is very slow as compared to that of ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles are better adapted to a retaliatory mission than to a nuclear first strike. ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] will prolong the useful life of heavy bombers, which are unlikely to be seen as first-strike systems. Thus, neither type of cruise missile works against the crisis stability of strategic deterrence. Linkage of New Technologies with Theatre Deterrence Most of the linkages of new technologies with central strategic deterrence apply also to nuclear deterrence at the theatre level. The longerrange theatre nuclear weapons (both ballistic and cruise missile) will probably rely on concealment under natural foliage rather than in prepared shelters. Nevertheless, while their mobility makes them more likely to survive, they may still be vulnerable to advanced techniques of surveillance. Theatre deterrence will be improved by surveillance systems able to give warning of attack, including AWACS. On the other hand, effective reconnaissance by non-intrusive means such as satellites will aid in the preparation of a surprise attack, as will the possession of weapons capable of highly accurate indirect fine.

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Deterrence at the theatre level is concerned not only with prevention of the outbreak of war (pre-hostilities deterrence), but also with the prevention of escalation through increasing levels of intensity from conventional up to theatre nuclear conflict or higher (post-outbreak or intra-war deterrence). For this purpose it is important that systems such as aircraft and artillery capable of both conventional and nuclear attack should not suffer severe attrition during the early (conventional) phase of operations. Their probability of survival will be enhanced if highly accurate ordnance and the prevailing conditions of battle allow them to carry out their conventional missions with a minimum of exposure. Conversely, very effective air defence weapons are likely to exact heavy attrition during the early operations, decimating the number of dual-­ capable aircraft before they are called on for nuclear sorties. Since the aggressor is likely to depend heavily on armoured units for breakthrough and exploitation, deterrence of attack will be greatly enhanced by effective anti-tank defences. Precision-Guided Munitions, launched from aircraft, helicopters, land vehicles, and sites on the ground, together with remotely delivered mines, may provide such effective anti-tank defence. On the other hand, good reconnaissance, air superiority, and the accurate delivery of improved conventional munitions by aircraft and artillery may be enough to neutralize the defences and permit the armour and infantry to advance. In this latter eventuality, the only way to halt the armour could be by escalation to use of low-yield nuclear battlefield weapons such as Enhanced Radiation Warheads. In general, much the same considerations apply to conventional deterrence as to conventional warfighting, except that technological developments likely to favour the offence over the defence are deleterious for deterrence. They will improve the chances of success in an attack, perhaps especially if accompanied by surprise, and could also increase the motivation for pre-emptive spoiling attack by a force believing itself about to be attacked. Conversely, if technology shifts the advantage to the defence, this will tend to discourage attack and strengthen theatre deterrence. Linkages of New Technologies with Strategic Warfighting Although the chief purpose of the strategic weapons systems, at least for the West, is to deter the outbreak of war, a further purpose is to deter escalation (whether from conventional to nuclear, or from very limited nuclear upwards), for deliberate escalation to avoid defeat, or for damage limitation. Actual employment for intra-war deterrence would

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probably take the form of highly selective attack of carefully chosen military targets, dependent on the best possible reconnaissance and weapon accuracy. Once nuclear weapons were used by either side, reliable command and control would be absolutely vital. All or nearly all of the least vulnerable forces (such as SSBNs) would probably be withheld to retain the ultimate deterrent of attack on population. To the extent that anti-satellite operations and electronic warfare disrupted intelligence gathering and command and control, the danger of unintended use (or failure to use) strategic weapons would be increased. Intercontinental sorties by heavy bombers are unlikely except for the delivery of nuclear weapons, or possibly for reconnaissance of the results of nuclear attack. Once strategic nuclear weapons have been employed, warning and defence against intercontinental bombers will acquire augmented significance, with consequent enhanced importance for the role of AWACS. Linkages of New Technologies with Theatre Warfighting As already mentioned, the ability to deter a theatre attack is closely related to the ability to fight a theatre war. At the conventional level, technology which favours defence over attack will enhance both pre-­ hostilities and post-outbreak deterrence. However, it is by no means clear whether the appearance of Precision Guided Munitions will produce a net benefit to the defence. Anti-tank guided missiles, remotely scattered mines, and the Enhanced Radiation Warhead will aid the defence. Effective reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and Improved Conventional Munitions may benefit the offence more, although this is debatable. VSTOL aircraft, cruise missiles, AWACS, and look-down shoot-down fire control will contribute to both sides of the ledger. If one or more of the new systems proves to be particularly effective, adequate resupply of the key items could be decisive. And if they prove capable of inflicting severe destruction, the results of the battle could turn on attrition, reinforcement, and heavy continuing resupply. In this event, added significance will be given to maintenance and interdiction of the lines of supply, across the seas as well as on land, with increased motivation to employ nuclear weapons, perhaps especially at sea. Good reconnaissance, accurate navigation and weapon guidance, and cruise missiles (possibly armed with conventional rather than nuclear warheads) will be important for interdiction of the LOC [lines of

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communication] behind the front, while effective air defence, including SAMs [surface-to-air missiles], AWACS, and look-down shoot-down interceptors will be the main elements in maintaining the LOC. Linkages of New Technologies with Maritime Strategy The three main functions of naval power are to deny the use of the seas to enemies, to defend the use of the seas by friends, and to project military power ashore. Some new technologies not considered in this paper, especially in the field of anti-submarine warfare, are likely to affect all three functions, but particularly those of defence of the sea lines of communication and assurance of, or defence against, the deterrent function of SSBNs. Surveillance has special significance for operations against surface ships, which are unable to hide from radar-equipped satellites. It follows that anti-satellite measures, including electronic warfare, could have a major role in the protection of surface shipping. Accurate weapons guidance is likely to aid aircraft, ships, submarines, and coastal defences in their attack on surface ships more than it will aid surface ships to defend themselves against these threats. Electronic warfare may prove to be the most valuable countermeasure for defeat of anti-ship cruise missiles. Thus, for the purpose of defence of the sea lines of communication, precision guidance is destabilizing while ECM is stabilizing. The striking power of the large aircraft carrier depends on its bomber aircraft, while its survivability against air attack depends on its airborne early warning radar and high-performance fighter aircraft, supplemented by anti-air and anti-submarine escort ships. It is unlikely that VSTOL aircraft can be designed to accomplish these missions, at least in the next few years, so that power projection and to some extent sea denial will depend on large attack carriers. However, the very important embarked airborne component of the anti-submarine function can be executed by aircraft with modest speed and payload. If VSTOL aircraft could be designed for missions intermediate between those of large land-based maritime patrol aircraft and embarked anti-submarine helicopters, they could be placed with helicopters on small anti-submarine carriers or on anti-submarine cruisers no more than a quarter the size of the modern attack carriers. Following recent Soviet practice, air defence could be provided by surface-to-air missiles mounted on the forward end of the ship, while land-based AWACS could supply early warning of air attack. Thus, defence of shipping against submarines may be aided by VSTOL aircraft.

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The New Technologies as Subjects for Arms Control The first six sections of this paper have described certain new military technologies, and discussed their probable impact on deterrence and warfighting. Particular attention has been paid to their impact on the stability of the strategic balance, and for this a distinction has been made between crisis stability, concerned primarily with pre-hostilities deterrence of the outbreak of violence, and with post-outbreak deterrence against escalation in the level of violence, as contrasted to arms-control stability, concerned with the motivation to deploy more weapons systems whether in response to a perceived new threat posed by the opponent or to exploit an opportunity afforded by new technology. Presumably, the objectives of arms control include the strengthening of both types of stability. While arms control may have inherent virtue in itself, based on economic or moral grounds, it would be an ironic application of general principles if steps were taken in the name of arms control that rendered the strategic balance unstable against either type of escalation – violence in a crisis or increased stimulations to build large new weapons systems. Hence, when considering the desirability of attempting to control various forms of military technology, in addition to criteria such as “how much money would it save?” “will it be practical?” and “to what extent could agreements be verified?” we need to ask “will it promote or damage crisis stability?” and “will it stimulate the creation of new weapons systems?” Arms control has had little success in discouraging research or development of military technology, although there have been agreements not to test or to deploy certain types of weapons. None of the new technologies discussed in this paper are prohibited by arms-control agreements, although SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] II would prohibit deliberate efforts to conceal land-based ICBMs or developments in other systems subject to its limitations, and neither sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 km nor mobile ICBMs could be deployed until 1982. While the existence of highly capable reconnaissance and surveillance systems adds to arms-control stability, it has both stabilizing and destabilizing aspects for crisis stability. Accurate weapon guidance is destabilizing, especially when coupled with multiple warheads and accurate reconnaissance. However, with the technology as advanced as it is, there would seem to be little possibility for reversing these developments. Weapon mobility, VSTOL, cruise missiles, and tailored nuclear weapon effects tend to support crisis stability. AWACS and look-down shoot-down

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capability also support crisis stability, but could help either offence or defence in warfighting. Improved conventional munitions probably aid offence more than defence, although this will depend on circumstances. Development would be difficult to control, agreements to desist hard to verify. Electronic countermeasures could nullify surveillance and warning systems, which would be destabilizing, but could be used to defend ships against detection by satellites and attack by missiles, which would be stabilizing. ECM is likely to help air attack more than air defence over land, and more likely to help armoured attack than anti-tank defence. Except at sea, electronic warfare is probably on balance a destabilizing aid to the offence. Inasmuch as early warning and communications satellites promote crisis stability, and reconnaissance satellites arms-control stability, an anti-­satellite system would be destabilizing. On the other hand, reconnaissance satellites could help to prepare an attack, especially against surface shipping, in which case their destruction would be stabilizing. Removal of navigation satellites would interfere with the accurate guidance of certain missiles, which could be stabilizing. Conclusion Thus, in summary, none of the new technologies can be labelled as ­totally offensive or completely destabilizing. Some definitely favour deterrence, defence, crisis stability, and arms-control stability.

1980

The SALT Treaty from a Canadian Point of View

During his government career and in retirement, George Lindsey advocated for the reduction and use of dangerous armaments. He wrote this document in 1980, two years before making a formal contribution to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in February 1982.1 The committee examined security and disarmament issues with specific attention to Canada’s participation in the second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, which took place in June and July 1982.2 Lindsey’s contribution provided a professional view of the stabilizing and destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons as well as an explanation of the economics of international nuclear armament issues. Although Lindsey supported non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, he saw intrinsic value in the ability of nuclear deterrence to support and maintain international stability and often warned in writing against the complete elimination of nuclear arms. At a time when Canada’s federal government debated what stance to take on the nuclear arms race, Lindsey’s work, as detailed in this document, provided strategic insight into the important debate about the value of reducing the global nuclear stockpile, and of the implications for Canada of international arms negotiations.3 Abstract With or without SALT II4 there are several strategic imbalances that will cause difficulties in the years ahead. Ratification of SALT II will not solve them, but it would permit programs that would redress them, and would preserve the opportunity to negotiate agreements in the future that could reduce the probability that each side will simply try to solve its problems by extensive uncontrolled buildup of weapons. All the SALT

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II protocol does is to confirm that any form of arms control over mobile ICBMs or cruise missiles was too difficult to complete in 1979. What with the problems of cruise missiles, European systems threatening the USSR directly, and the existence of independent British, French, and Chinese nuclear forces, a SALT III that addressed these subjects would face extreme difficulties, with little hope of easy or early progress. Canada has a vital interest in the preservation of strategic nuclear deterrence, enhanced by our geographic location downwind from US missile fields. She also has a stake in the success of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Introduction Although the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the agreements deriving from them deal with weapons systems, verification, and similar subjects in the realm of military and defence concerns, they have a significance extending well beyond these areas. In fact, the significance of SALT for détente between superpowers, for East-West relations, for the prospects for arms control in broader spheres, and for international relations in general probably exceeds its significance for bilateral strategic stability. It has been said that there are two different frameworks for arms control – technical and political – and that the West uses the first, the East the second, with consequent failures of communication. This paper adopts the framework of technical, military, and strategic considerations. It will confine itself to those aspects of SALT directly related to the military balance. It will, however, extend to some remarks on the possible developments in nuclear forces in the European theatre, likely to be a subject of SALT III. A Canadian perception of SALT can be as a member of the world community of nations, as a North American neighbour and ally of the United States, or as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. In this paper, an effort will be made to address all three perceptions. The Three Offensive Strategic Nuclear Weapons Systems The primary subjects of negotiation in SALT and of Western analysis of the strategic balance, are the three types of offensive nuclear weapons systems often described as the “triad.” These are intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

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The effectiveness of offensive systems is, of course, dependent in part on the capabilities of those defensive systems designed to frustrate their purposes. Active ballistic missile defence systems were limited in the treaty emerging from SALT I,5 leaving ICBMs and SLBMs virtually unopposed by active defence, once launched on their trajectory. However, systems to warn of missile attack, and defensive systems designed to oppose bomber aircraft or submarines, have not been affected by either SALT I or SALT II. Heavy bombers, not covered in SALT I, have been defined in SALT II, in terms of the existing B-52, B-l, Bear, and Bison, to include future aircraft with capabilities similar to these, and aircraft able to launch long-range [air-launched] cruise missiles or air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Bombers are able to carry very large payloads, hence large numbers of weapons or weapons of very large destructive power. However, their ability to penetrate modern air defences is very much in question, which is the chief reason for the plans to equip them with “stand-off” weapons such as ALCMs or ASBMs which could be launched while the aircraft was still far from the intended target. Another vulnerability of bombers is associated with their normal location on major airfields, easily destroyed by SLBM or ICBM attack. Intercontinental ballistic missiles are the most accurate of the strategic weapons, and one missile is now able to deliver several warheads (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles – MIRVs) to different targets (which must be in the same general area). As accuracy is increased, the need for a heavy warhead with a large energy yield is decreased, and it would not be exaggerating to say that virtually any installation at an accurately known spot on earth can now be destroyed by an ICBM. The increasing effectiveness of ICBMs against any type of fixed target implies that ICBMs may themselves be vulnerable to hostile ICBMs. Through the 1960s, the vulnerability of ICBMs was reduced by placing them in underground silos, and then hardening the silos in thick concrete armour. However, the combination of high-resolution satellite photography and pinpoint accuracy in warhead delivery is advancing too fast and too far to be offset by the capabilities of static physical protection. It seems certain that the only means by which ICBMs (or any other objects) can be protected from missile attack are concealment or mobility. Another means could be by active defence, but its technical and economic feasibility is not certain, and significant deployment is prevented by the ABM Treaty.

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Submarine-launched ballistic missiles have the advantage of concealment prior to launch. They are somewhat less accurate than land-based systems, and suffer greater limitations on size. Reliable constant communication with the submarine can pose a problem. However, the near invulnerability of the launcher provides a very significant advantage. Stable Strategic Nuclear Deterrence The doctrinal underpinning of Western strategy depends on the concept of mutual and stable nuclear deterrence. It is by no means clear that this point of view is shared by the East. According to this concept, both opponents should be quite sure that, no matter what form of surprise attack might be launched against them, enough of their offensive weapons would survive to enable them to retaliate against the aggressor’s population to a degree that would inflict unbearable damage. The margin of certainty should be such that it would not be upset by some minor change in intelligence estimates or notice of technical deterioration, should not supply any motivation to react precipitately in times of stress, or to conduct a pre-emptive first strike. In the language of the trade, the victim of aggression should possess an “assured counter value second strike retaliatory capability,” implying that a would-be aggressor is deprived of a “counterforce first-strike capability.” In principle, it should be possible to calculate the results of a first strike (by either side) against the weapons of the opponent, to know how many would escape destruction, to predict how much damage they would do in a retaliatory second strike, and to decide whether this damage exceeded the limit that the original attacker could bear. In practice, there are considerable uncertainties in each stage of such calculations, and planners could not be confident that they had an assured capability unless the calculation allowed for a substantial margin of error in the assumptions. Starting from this base, further propositions of less fundamental status can be added. The concept of deterrence can be extended to the levels of nuclear threats at the theatre level (as opposed to the direct confrontation between the two superpowers, with the home territories of the USA and USSR engaged), and of conventional forces. The question of “coupling” or “linkage” between these three levels arises. In an analysis of the SALT [Treaty] it is appropriate to consider the problems of deterrence at the level of the European theatre, and of the linkage between theatre and “central” or “strategic” deterrence. These

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are closely involved in the protocol to SALT II, and very likely to be ­major issues in SALT III. For the purposes of preserving stable deterrence, the most attractive weapon is the SLBM. The submarine’s concealment reduces the vulnerability of the missiles, while their limited accuracy reduces their capability for a counterforce first strike against hard-point targets. This latter limitation may be removed for future very accurate SLBMs such as Trident D5. ICBMs do have a first-strike capability, and if they are vulnerable themselves, they can have a destabilizing effect. Heavy bombers do not travel fast enough to be a good first-strike weapon, but their bases are very vulnerable to a first-strike attack by missiles. Twenty Years of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Nearly all of the history of strategic nuclear deterrence is contained in the last twenty years. The deployment of the systems is illustrated in Figures 1 to 3 [following the conclusion of this document]. Figure 1 shows the deployment of Soviet and American ICBMs, starting in 1960. Plotted against the date (on the horizontal axis) is “throw weight” expressed in kilograms, and representing the mass of useful material that the missile can deliver to its target, including re-entry vehicles, penetration aids, and devices necessary to release these. All missiles characterized as “intercontinental” have sufficient range to reach most of the important targets in the other country. The throw weight can be exploited to deliver one large warhead, several smaller ones, and/ or various types of “penetration aids” which might be necessary in case the missiles were opposed by an active defence system. The height (or “thickness”) of the areas representing each missile shows the number of independent warheads deployed at each moment of time. Figure 1 shows that nearly all of the US effort has been in three versions of the comparatively small “Minuteman” missile. The first two versions had single warheads (of about 1 megaton yield), but Minuteman III has three MIRVs, with yields of about 170 kilotons each and an accuracy ([circular error probability]) of about 0.2 mile, quite sufficient to provide a deadly threat to an airfield, city, or other “soft”-point target, but not enough to give a high probability of destroying a small hardened target such as a missile silo. The 54 Titan II missiles have single warheads of very large yield (about 9 megatons). Titan I and three versions of Atlas were so vulnerable as to invite pre-emptive attack, and were abandoned in 1964 in favour of missiles in hardened underground silos.

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Figure 1 also shows that the early Soviet program included four “light” ICBMs, of which two have now been terminated (SS-7 and SS-8), and one very heavy one, the SS-9. The large throw weight of the SS-9 made it possible to project one enormous warhead (25 megatons) or several (3) large (4 megaton) warheads. However, commencing in 1974 (after the signature of SALT I, but not in contravention thereof) three new ICBMs were deployed, each with a high throw weight and with MIRVs. The most significant is SS-18, the successor to the SS-9, with 10 MIRVs. Under the terms of SALT II, the Soviet Union must restrict itself to 308 “heavy ICBMs.” They are converting the aging SS-9 into SS-18 at a rapid rate, giving themselves 3,080 MIRV warheads. They are also allowed by SALT II to convert the obsolescent single-warhead SS-11 into the MIRVed ­SS-19 and SS-17. As of 1980 it is evident that the Soviets have the greater capability and are rapidly increasing their margins of superiority. Figure 2 shows the development of SLBMs. On these diagrams the vertical axis represents range of the missile (from the submarine), expressed in kilometres, while the height (or thickness) of the small areas representing SLBM types shows the number of independent warheads. The American Polaris A1 and A2 carried single warheads. Polaris A3 had three, but these were not independently targeted. Poseidon C3 has ten MIRVs (on the average, though it can carry fourteen), so that the area for Poseidon in Figure 2 represents ten times the number of launchers. Trident C4, just now coming into service, will carry eight MIRVs. Figure 2 shows that the major Soviet investment in SLBMs is still in the SS-N-6, with a range considerably less than that (4,600 km) of the American Poseidon C3, but that they are rapidly deploying SS-N-8, whose range (8,000 km) exceeds that of Poseidon or even the new Trident C4. SS-N-18, the solid-fuel successor to SS-N-8, will have at least three MIRVs. On balance, the US has the greater capability, and will enhance its margins with the deployment of Trident. The heavy bombers of both countries are shown in Figure 3, with the vertical axis representing payload (in kilograms) and the height of the areas for each type shows the number of aircraft. Although range is important, it is partially exchangeable for payload, and can be greatly extended by aerial refuelling. The quantitative and qualitative superiority of the USA is very evident, but the margin is less than it was in 1960, and it should be noted that the large Soviet investment in modern air defence has greatly reduced the capability of American bombers to penetrate to their targets.

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New Strategic Weapons Currently Under Development: The SALT II Protocol There are two areas of development in the technology of strategic weapons which influence SALT II (and SALT III). One which has been mentioned already is the increased accuracy of ballistic missiles and their consequent threat to the hardened silos of opposing land-based missiles. The other is the long-range cruise missile. Cruise missiles are not new. The German V-I, used against London, Antwerp, and other targets in 1944 and 1945, was an effective strategic cruise missile. However, modern technology has provided radical improvement in propulsion (allowing high subsonic speed over long distances), in guidance (allowing evasive routing at low altitude and accurate terminal homing to the target), and in warhead (allowing a highyield nuclear explosion from a comparatively small device). A cruise missile can now be designed which offers a small and difficult target, and is likely to have a much better chance of penetrating enemy air defences than a manned bomber. And, as a very attractive additional advantage, a cruise missile can be launched from the ground, from an aircraft, from a surface ship, or a submarine. US technology is well in advance of the Soviets in these areas of propulsion and guidance. Moreover, weaknesses in NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces, soon to be exacerbated by the withdrawal from service of the British Vulcan medium bomber, make cruise missiles attractive as a means of strengthening deterrence in Europe. These two developments were very much in evidence during the latter stages of the SALT II negotiations. To support American security, it was important to permit a form of deployment of a new ICBM which would provide invulnerability to the new accurate Soviet MIRV, by some combination of concealment and mobility, although it would be necessary to do this in a way that would not prevent verification by “national technical means.” To prolong the useful life of the heavy bombers (especially after the cancellation of the B-1), and to provide an opportunity for NATO to improve its weak capability in long-range nuclear deterrence, it was desirable to provide for the introduction of long-range cruise missiles. From the point of view of the USSR, which was rapidly catching up to the US in the design of accurate MIRV[s], but which is thought to be behind in the technology of cruise missiles, it is probable that a total ban on both concealment and mobility of ICBMs and on long-range cruise missiles would have been welcome.

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In the event, these very difficult and important questions regarding mobile ICBMs and land- and sea-launched cruise missiles have been relegated to the SALT II protocol, which expires at the end of 1981. Since most of the relevant American programs (MX [Missile Experimental], GLCM [ground-launched cruise missile], SLCM [submarine-launched cruise missile]) would not reach the stage of deployment by that date, the protocol amounts to little more than a postponement of negotiations that could not be concluded in 1979. The long-range air-launched cruise missile is allowed under the SALT II Treaty, although subjected to the overall limits pertaining to heavy bombers, and the USAF is proceeding with its procurement for mounting ALCMs on B-52 G and H bombers. The clauses in the SALT II Treaty forbidding circumvention through other states are unlikely to cause any problems with intercontinental weapons, or prior to the expiry of the protocol. However, provision of cruise missiles to their NATO allies could be considered by the Soviets as introduction of strategic weapons through third states. The NATO program for deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe will not antedate the expiry of the SALT II protocol. Inequalities in the Strategic Balance Although the numerical ceilings in SALT II are the same for each party, there are several aspects in which the strategic positions are unequal. SALT II forbids the conversion of light or old heavy ICBMs into modern heavy ICBMs or the construction of a new heavy ICBM. The consequence of this is to allow the USSR to convert its heavy SS-9s into heavy SS-18s, each with ten MIRVs. Three hundred and eight SS-18s, plus 512 MIRVed SS-19s and SS-17s, allowed within the limit of 820 MIRVed ICBMs, would give them about 5,600 megaton-sized warheads, almost certainly sufficient to provide a disarming first-strike capability against the American ICBMs and strategic airfields. The US is prevented from building an ICBM heavier than SS-19 (the heaviest of the light ICBMs), so that a considerable inequality in total throw weight is perpetuated in SALT II. Geography established an inequality for submarine operations which works against the USSR. Two of its four fleets can be bottled up in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea (unless they have deployed before the outbreak of hostilities), while its eastern naval bases have their access to the Pacific impeded by ice and by the Japanese Islands. As a result, the Soviet Navy is obliged to rely very heavily on the submarine bases in the Kola Peninsula.

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The geographic distribution of population and industry is more concentrated in the USA than in the USSR, which means that an American attack designed to inflict a certain level of damage on the USSR would require more weapons on target than would a Soviet attack designed to do the same amount of damage to the United States. The nuclear forces of Britain, France, and China weigh against the USSR, although not counted in SALT I or SALT II. Also, nuclear-armed aircraft on US carriers, and airbases in western Europe place nuclear systems (whether operated by US or other NATO allies) much closer to Soviet territory than the distance from Soviet bases to any American territory other than Alaska. The unequal limits negotiated in SALT I made allowance for these geographical factors and for the existence of the other nuclear powers. The USSR wanted to include the “Forward Based Systems” in the SALT II negotiations, and it is probable that its eventual agreement to omit them and still accept equal ceilings was a quid pro quo for the offsetting unequal balance on heavy ICBMs. The common ceiling of 2,250 for the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, to be attained by 1 January 1981, will require a reduction of 254 below the Soviet total announced for June 1979, but only 36 below the US total for the same date. Neither will suffer any significant degradation in these reductions. The USSR will probably achieve it by reducing the number of SS-11s, ICBMs first deployed in 1966, not equipped with MIRVs, rather inaccurate by modern standards, and already reduced in numbers since 1974. The USA can accommodate its small reduction in earlier models of the B-52 bomber, for which the total of 425 in 1958 had already been reduced to 75 in 1979. Although SALT I and II were bilateral negotiations, the USA was very conscious of the concerns of its NATO allies. In particular, the definition of what is “strategic,” interpreted by the USSR as signifying power to attack the home territory of the USSR or USA, cannot be accepted by the countries of western Europe. For them a nuclear weapon on their capital city would be distinctly strategic. The need for “coupling” or “linkage” between theatre and central (or strategic) deterrence is considered by the Europeans to be crucial. If SALT II makes the central strategic nuclear balance equivalent and stable, it may be harder to see direct and close linkage to deterrence in the European theatre. An isolated “Euro-strategic balance” would become isolated from the central balance, separating the European allies from the American nuclear guarantee.

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Consequently, it can be seen that even if SALT II should be ratified, it will leave considerable business to be finished. The USA will need to deploy MX, in a basing mode providing sufficient concealment and mobility to make it invulnerable to a first strike by the MIRV mounted on the new Soviet heavy ICBMs. They will not be able to do this before the SS-18 deployment is completed, and it remains to be seen whether the level of verification that can be provided will be accepted by the USSR. The other two legs of the American strategic triad need refurbishing too, with Trident to replace the aging submarine missiles, and ALCMs to preserve the capability of the heavy bomber to strike its targets. And the concerns of the NATO partners have already resulted in the decision for a measure of theatre nuclear force modernization, involving long-range cruise missiles of the type forbidden during the duration of the SALT II protocol, as well as medium-range ballistic missiles not addressed by SALT, and accompanied by an attempt to initiate some degree of arms control on theatre nuclear forces. These latter developments will enter into SALT III, should such negotiations emerge, even though it is intended that they be conducted on a bilateral basis. Verification It is evident that the parties to these treaties have too much at stake to rely on unverified assurances. Some form of confirmation is necessary to provide a high degree of confidence that the terms of the agreement are being honoured. In this regard there is an important inequality between the USA and USSR. The open society of the former, combined with the alert and ­observant faction always quick to criticize defence activity, make it certain that any significant violation on the part of the United States would be very quickly exposed from within. In contrast, the tight security in the USSR and its refusal to permit any substantial degree of “intrusive ­inspection” make verification of its activities considerably more difficult. Fortunately for the prospects for SALT, the “National Technical Means” of verification, based primarily on reconnaissance satellites and interception of telemetry signals, allow a great deal of information to be gained about the deployment and the testing of weapons systems. Both of these means could be frustrated by intentional concealment and encryption of telemetry, but SALT II contains provisions to disallow “deliberate concealment” and “deliberate denial of telemetric information.”

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Unfortunately for the prospects of arms control, the countermeasures necessary to reduce the vulnerability of land-based systems to a disarming first strike are likely to depend on concealment and mobility. To increase survivability, it is probable that missiles will be made mobile, and placed in canisters which fulfil some of the functions of a launcher. It will then be necessary to place these in locations which will not permit efficient and accurate targeting by the opponent. This would be comparatively easy in the absence of a requirement for verification, but if it is necessary to let the other party see the missiles, to confirm that their numbers are within the agreed limits, then the designer has conflicting objectives to meet. Various schemes are being proposed which offer compromises between high survivability and high assurance of verification. However, there is a fundamental conflict between the indicated measures to reduce vulnerability of landbased missiles and the undertaking “not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means.” It may not arise until there is a firm program to deploy a mobile missile system. Aside from the problem of concealment, a number of provisions in SALT II, such as those establishing “counting rules,” “functionally related observable differences” (FRODs), and other externally observable differences, should permit a reasonably effective level of verification, but FRODs depend on cooperation, and the possibility exists of deliberate contravention. Most of these features refer to the type of weapons systems carried by aircraft. Quite a lot can be learned by observing the movements of aircraft and the type of missions for which they appear to be training. It is probably now the case that bombers are the least important of the three strategic offensive systems, whether they are carrying air-launched cruise missiles, air-to-surface ballistic missiles, or old-fashioned bombs. A number of improvements to systems, such as increases to the number of multiple warheads or lengthening the range of a cruise missile, probably could be made with little or no testing and no externally observable features. An important feature of the treaty is that its numerical limits are expressed in terms of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. It does not forbid the manufacture of additional missiles, although they are not supposed to be deployed in the launcher area. Specification in terms of number of launchers and bombers was probably all that could be verified, since satellite photography can show silos, submarines, and aircraft, but cannot show the contents of storage magazines. It is true, of course, that an important objective of SALT is to prevent a first-strike capability, and that a carefully synchronized first strike probably would not

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allow the time for reloading ICBM launchers or returning submarines or bombers to partake in the same mission. However, many of the strategic calculations involve considerations of residual forces remaining after a first counterforce exchange, and for these purposes reload weapons could make a significant difference. The difference between counting launchers and counting missiles may become important if mobile ICBM or GLCM systems are deployed, as permitted after expiry of the protocol, and a dispute could arise over the status of a canister containing a missile and playing a role in its launching. Canada’s Point of View as a Member of the United Nations The concerns of the civilized world include a very strong desire to avoid a nuclear war between the superpowers. Many nations believe that mutual and stable nuclear deterrence works towards this end; many believe that détente does, too. In spite of its limitations, SALT II is likely to support both of these. Probably more important than the advantages of a ratified SALT II are the disadvantages of a SALT II rejected by the American Senate without an agreement. The USA has the technical knowledge and the economic resources to keep the central strategic balance stable by its own unilateral actions. But the political consequences of a rejection of the treaty could be severe, and very damaging to the prospects for détente and international arms control. Canada’s Point of View as an Ally and Neighbour of the United States Unlike the European allies, Canada has a virtually automatic guarantee of the benefits of the American central strategic deterrent. We are too close neighbours for there to be any problem of “decoupling.” However, our closeness brings certain dangers as well. If a nuclear war ever did occur between the USA and the USSR, ­Canada would very quickly cease to be a detached international observer. The location of the Minuteman complexes in the northern United States, ­together with the probability that a counterforce attack on them would use ground-burst nuclear warheads of high yield, make it likely that dense radioactive fallout would descend over some of the most populated areas of southern Canada.

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Quite apart from a strike designed only against Minuteman, there is every probability that an attack would include other types of targets: early warning installations, strategic airfields, command-and-control centres, and naval bases in a first strike by missiles; air defence installations if bombers formed part of the attack; centres of industry, communication, and population in an all-out attack on the basic strength of North America. In any of these latter instances some of the targets would be in Canada. With such a threat in the background, Canada has a double stake in two of the objectives of SALT II. The first and greatest is to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, for which the chief hope is stable nuclear deterrence. The second is to limit the damage in case deterrence fails. To the extent that the number of weapons is limited, SALT II makes a small step in this direction. Canada’s Point of View as a Member of the North Atlantic Alliance Although Canada is assured of the direct protection of the USA, it has every reason to help reduce the probability of an attack on the United States. With central strategic deterrence stabilized at a state of equivalence, it has a correspondingly decreased capability to deter confrontations other than ones directly between the two superpowers. A crisis in Europe might escalate to an uncontrollable level before the USA and USSR were brought face to face. Thus, a neighbour of the USA who would share the consequences of a central strategic exchange has good reason to concern itself over the security and stability of another region which could be the site of the first outbreak and subsequent escalation. Once the fortunes of the North Atlantic Alliance are taken into account, the significance of the SALT II appears less important for its intrinsic content, but more promising as a preamble to a more comprehensive SALT III. The questions of the Forward Based Systems in Europe (and of the nuclear strike aircraft on carriers) must be faced and incorporated before much more can be accomplished in arms control with the USSR. The questions of the disparity in long-range theatre nuclear systems must be solved before stability could be prevented by unrestrained buildup on the part of the [Warsaw Pact Organization]. All of these questions form the grist for the mill of SALT III, and it appears most unlikely that SALT III can be initiated without a satisfactory conclusion to SALT II.

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Summary With or without SALT II, there are several strategic imbalances that will cause difficulties in the years ahead. Ratification of SALT II will not solve them, but it would preserve the opportunity to negotiate agreements in the future that could reduce the probability that either side will simply try to solve its problems by extensive uncontrolled armament. SALT II legitimizes Soviet superiority in heavy ICBMs. This is rapidly translated into a first-strike capability against American land-based systems. The countermeasure is to build a new ICBM, the MX, using concealment and mobility. While reducing the vulnerability of the system, this poses problems for the Soviets’ ability to verify the numbers of MX deployed. SALT II permits two other important American programs, Trident to replace the obsolescent SLBMs and ALCMs to preserve the striking power of the heavy bombers. SALT II does nothing to pacify Soviet concerns over NATO’s Forward Based Systems in Europe, nor NATO concerns over Soviet superiority in European long-range theatre nuclear forces. The latter problem may be solved by deployment of cruise missiles and MRBMs in Europe, provided that Soviet buildup is not accelerated. All the SALT II protocol does is confirm that any form of arms control over cruise missiles was too difficult to complete in 1979. What with the problems of cruise missiles, European systems threatening the USSR directly, and the existence of independent British, French, and Chinese nuclear forces, SALT III offers little hope of easy or early progress. To fill gaps and reduce vulnerabilities, the West will be obliged to pursue its programs on MX, Trident, strategic ALCMs, and theatre nuclear force modernization. If SALT II is ratified, it can initiate the difficult process of negotiating some form of arms control that will need to concentrate more on theatre than on strategic nuclear systems. Canada has a vital interest in the preservation of strategic nuclear deterrence, enhanced by its geographic location downwind from US missile fields. It also has a stake in nuclear deterrence in Europe. The author would like to acknowledge the useful comments and criticism made by colleagues in the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs on earlier drafts of this paper. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect official government policy.

Figure 1.  ICBMs: Throw Weight and Number of Independent Warheads Location on vertical scale indicates throw weight; thickness on vertical scale indicates number of independent warheads (i.e., MIRV but not MRV). SS-18 Assume 10 MIRV; assume that the USSR will deploy 308, limit of number of heavy ICBMs, allowed by SALT II. SS-9 Assume that all SS-9 will be replaced by SS-18. SS-19, SS-17 Assume 6 MIRVs for SS-19, 4 for SS-17. 820 MIRVed ICBM limit, less 308 SS-9, permits 512 total for SS-19 plus SS-17. SS-11 Assume reductions to accommodate SALT II limit to total number of strategic nuclear delivery weapons. SALT II Numbers of Figure 1 comply with SALT II limit of 820 MIRVed ICBMs. Numbers on Figures 1 and 2 comply with SALT II limit of 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs plus SLBMs. Numbers of Figures 1, 2, and 3 comply with SALT II limit of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in 1980, 2,250 thereafter through 1985. New Soviet ICBM SALT II permits a new light Soviet ICBM; if deployed, it would take the place of some SS-19 or SS-17 (if MIRVed), or SS-11 or SS-13 if not MIRVed. MX SALT II permits a new light US ICBM; this would be the MX, and would probably replace Minuteman III on a one-for-one basis; first deployment 1985, IOC [initial operational capability], 1986. 200 mobile missiles in 46,000 shelters by end of 1989; 10 MIRVs.

Figure 2.  SLBMs: Missile Range and Number of Independent Warheads Location on vertical scale indicates missile range; thickness (or “height”) on vertical scale indicates number of independent warheads (i.e., MIRV but not MRV). SS-N-8 Assume single warhead, 12 carried by Delta I, 16 by Delta II SSBNs. SS-N-18 Assume 3 MIRV; solid-fuel successor to SS-N-8, 16 in Delta III SSBNs. SS-NX-17 Experimental solid-fuel successor to SS-N-6; assume will not be deployed in quantity. SS-N-6 Assume one modification (no. 3) has 3 MIRVs; 16 in Yankee I SSBNs; reduced in number as SS-N-18 numbers build up. Trident C-4 Assume 7 MIRVs; builds up with conversion of 12 Polaris SSBNs (16 Trident C4 SLBMs), to be completed by 1982, and construction of 8 new Ohio SSBNs (24 Trident C4 SLBMs), with IOC 1981. SALT II Numbers on Figures 1 and 2 comply with SALT II limit of 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs plus SLBMs. Numbers on Figures 1, 2, and 3 comply with SALT II limits of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in 1980, 2,250 thereafter through 1985. New Soviet SLBM SALT II permits new SLBMs; a new MIRVed Soviet SLBM could take the place of the indicated buildup of SS-N-18, or could replace SS-N-8.

Figure 3.  Intercontinental Bombers: Payload and Number of Aircraft Location on vertical scale indicates bomber payload; thickness on vertical scale indicates number of bomber aircraft. ALCMs Air-launched cruise missiles will be deployed on US bombers in the early 1980s, twenty on a B-52G. IOC 1982; 120 bombers equipped with ALCMs can be deployed within SALT II limits, or more if numbers of MIRVed ICBM + SLBM are correspondingly reduced; 2,100 missiles expected by 1986, all the 151 B-52Gs could accommodate 3,020 ALCMs by 1990. SALT II Numbers on Figures 1, 2, and 3 comply with SALT II limit of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in 1980, 2,250 thereafter through 1985.

1983

Systems Analysis and Global Strategy

George Lindsey developed a strong interest in the international utility of operations research and strategic studies while he worked at the Anti-Submarine ­Warfare ­Research Centre of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in La Spezia during the 1960s. Although he spent the majority of his government career in ­Ottawa, Lindsey maintained a working interest in NATO affairs, and occasionally returned to Italy to share his research. As evident in this paper, which he prepared for a NATO Advance Research Workshop that took place in the Tuscan town of San Miniato in December 1983, Lindsey showed a particular interest in the link between military science and global strategy, as well as the uses of war gaming to advancing the security studies of the Alliance. The year after Lindsey presented this paper, he published a revised copy, in Italian, in La Rivista ­italiana di Strategia Globale (Italian Global Strategy Magazine).1 The original draft of the paper is printed here in English for the first time. Science, Systems Analysis, and Operational Research More than any other scientific specialty, except for ballistics, operational research had its roots in military problems. However, its primary military application was to research the operations of war, which it cannot do directly in peacetime. It must substitute military exercises, experimental trials and simulations, or study operations of support such as supply, maintenance, communications, or manpower which do function in peacetime. These functions are vital to the efficiency of military forces, and need to be taken into account in the determination of strategy, but they are to a certain extent technical details and means to ends, as compared to the central problems of global strategy. To permit a useful discussion of the application of scientific methods to the study of global strategy, but stop short of the domain of s­ocial

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sciences and economics, this paper will consider systems analysis, to include operational research but also analytical methodology going beyond the study of operations. For example, modern scientific techniques have proven extremely useful for the design and selection of large new weapons systems, sufficiently large and new that analysis of their (hypothetical) performance required considerable extrapolation beyond the experience already acquired by analysis of the operation of existing weapons. And, when the strategic considerations concerning nuclear war have to be studied, there is (fortunately) a dearth of real operations on which to base the analysis. Military Strategy and Global Strategy There can be no doubt that science has made immense contributions to the development of military capabilities. It is sometimes forgotten that the reverse is equally true. Under the stimulus of war, tremendous efforts are focused towards the satisfaction of military ends, by extensive use of science as well as all other available means. The residue of wars has left society with a host of benefits such as medical techniques for the treatment of shock, burns, and other casualties, radar and other devices for the safe control of air and sea traffic, jet propulsion for aircraft, the organization of staffs for planning and operations, and many other things that would not have been developed as soon without the special motivation of war. Two of these benefits are operational research and systems analysis, which are now applied throughout the developed world to the advantage of industry, commerce, and government. Although all of the scientific knowledge, including systems analysis and operational research, is available to defence departments, the vast majority of the actual applications are devoted to scientific research of the laboratory type, to engineering development, and to the design, selection, and testing of weapons systems and other military equipment. In fact, it seems that, in the Western world at least, technological ingenuity, drive, and opportunities “push” the development and deployment of weapons, rather than having the research into means of meeting vital requirements “pulled” by recognized strategic necessity. This situation is due, in large part, to the spectacular success of physical science and engineering in the advancement of the capabilities of weapons and other military equipment. We have almost reached the stage where the engineers can meet any specified physical requirement – albeit at a cost that may not be supportable. On the other hand, it does not seem that science, including social science and economics, has been

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able to provide global, national, or even subnational-level strategies with the methods and information needed to provide the solutions to the outstanding strategic problems of our time. There must be, of course, an inextricable link between military science, which determines what is physically possible, and global strategy, which determines what ought to be done (or attempted). There have been occasions when strategic necessity drove the engineers to produce a needed capability. Examples would include the various vehicles and devices needed to execute opposed amphibious landings in World War II, the development of aerial refuelling to enable strategic bombers to achieve intercontinental range, the conversion of strategic land-based ballistic missiles from highly vulnerable targets into highly survivable retaliatory weapons, and the development of the [submarine-launched ballistic missile] on the [nuclear-powered submarine]. But most changes have come from the opposite direction, with a new military capability stimulated by technological virtuosity making its appearance, and with the consequent effect on the strategic situation taking some time to be appreciated. Examples would be the fission bomb, the fusion bomb, the reconnaissance satellite, and the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle. Thus, although it might seem logical to classify global strategy as a part of military science, the two have tended to pursue rather uncoordinated and separate paths. And, very importantly, there are many ­aspects of global strategy that transcend the military dimension. Then, as the political, economic, sociological, and psychological dimensions are taken into account, military science is seen as a part of global strategy. Operational research and systems analysis have had and will continue to have a very important role to play in military science. However, the purpose of this paper is to identify their contribution to global strategy. While far less clear, and with few notable successes to their credit, they nevertheless warrant a discussion. Application of Quantitative Methods to Political Science2 Until comparatively recent times, the use of mathematical analysis, or even of quantitative methods, was confined to the physical sciences. Even within the physical sciences such methods took some time to spread from astronomy and physics to chemistry to biology. Economics, like botany, began as a descriptive science dealing in ideas and words. Today, mathematical biology is flourishing, and econometrics depends on equations and computer models.

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Efforts to apply quantitative methods to the study of the social sciences have been less successful. This is due in large part to the extremely complex nature of the situations under study, the impossibility of keeping conditions constant, and the inability to carry out simple experiments in which the effect of one or two variables can be isolated from all the others. Another reason may be the short period during which serious efforts have been applied. An approach in keeping with the methods of physical science is to record measurable quantities that might be expected to be associated with the phenomena or characteristics under investigation, and then to use statistical analysis to identify patterns or associations. Compilation of this type of data as it applies to international relations is available from sources such as the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.3 In the second edition of this publication, the data for 136 countries, comparing more than 100 variables, are grouped under the headings of political structure and performance, political protest and executive change, social patterns, national resources and development, and external relations. Some of the methods used in this type of investigation are multivariate, factor, and cluster analysis. Content analysis is used in the attempt to quantify attitudes or opinions. One political activity that has been numerically recorded and closely studied for years is voting. Associated with opinion polls, it is the subject of much interest and speculation within countries. Associated with international bodies such as the United Nations, voting patterns confirm the existence of blocs. Political, social, and economic instability has received increasing attention from researchers and analysts in recent years. There has been a search for indicators which could warn of approaching instability. And first steps have been taken in the systematic analysis of social unrest by the investigation of the hypothesis that the motivation to rebel and overturn the existing order, by force if necessary, is related to the difference between aspirations and accomplishment. A disappointing feature of many of these analyses is that they do no more than present in numerical form things that were already evident from common sense and experienced judgment. However, they can be of use for making comparisons, for indicating trends or associations, and for disproving hypotheses. And there is always the hope that they may be able to confirm hypotheses or theories that will increase our understanding and ability to predict. A serious handicap for the pursuit of quantitative studies in political science is the limited availability, inhomogeneity,

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and doubtful quality of numerical data on which to perform statistical analysis. Researchers in the physical sciences usually collect their data from experiments performed by themselves or close colleagues, or from experiments that can be repeated in other laboratories under closely controlled and precisely specified conditions. But for the study of international relations, the supply of data is not only incomplete and inhomogeneous, but sometimes consciously biased. Forecasting and Futures Studies A highly desirable requirement for nations and alliances in the determination of their global strategy is to have a reliable forecast of the situation likely to face them in the future. This is, of course, one of the functions of the intelligence services, following their collection of military, economic, political, and other information regarding the recent past and the present, and plans for the future. An important piece of operational research was done by [Albert] Wohlstetter on the United States intelligence forecasts and the decisions made regarding strategic weapons. It had been claimed by critics that US intelligence had consistently overestimated the future strength of the S ­ oviet strategic weapons inventory, and, as a consequence, that the US had been increasing its own inventory at an expanding and unnecessary rate. In one paper,4 Wohlstetter compared, retrospectively, the US forecasts for a period five years in the future with the Soviet inventory that was actually on hand five years later. He showed that the US estimates had been consistently too low, rather than too high. In a second paper, he tracked the US strategic inventory, and demonstrated that it had been going down, not up, between 1958 and 1972. There would appear to be room for more analytical studies of this nature, to validate (or refute) the accuracy of predictions (and forecasting methods), and also the accuracy of commonly accepted assumptions that may in fact be seriously misleading. Much effort is devoted to economic forecasting, the very limited success of which casts doubt on the status of economics as a true science with a well-proven theoretical foundation and a consequent ability to predict. Many economic forecasts seem to be little more than extrapolations of current trends, likely to be valid for a short period until something changes, or reminders of cyclic effects which may or may not recur in the future. Econometrics and futures studies are often based on mathematical models of the economy. A model receiving great attention in the 1970s

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was the one described in the widely read Limits to Growth.5 This employed a very simple and highly aggregated model of the world economy, and predicted disasters due to the exhaustion of natural resources and the effects of overpopulation and pollution. Although the oversimplification of the model has been recognized and criticized, it certainly helped to establish and drew attention to the undoubted fact that there are eventual limits to uncontrolled growth, and it stimulated work on more elaborate global models which addressed some of its limitations. The attractions of a mathematical model for forecasting are exemplified by the differential equations describing the motions of the bodies of the solar system. These equations allow precise prediction of events such as eclipses or the time of rising and setting of celestial objects. The predictions have been found to be correct over a period of centuries of observation of planets and other astronomical bodies, and have also served in recent years to calculate with great accuracy the trajectories of man-made space vehicles. But the prospects of an economic, social, or political model achieving such success on a global scale appear very poor indeed. What is more likely to follow is a series of models involving ever more variables and interactions, but confined to a scope much more restricted than that of the entire world economy. A method often used in futures studies and in studies of global strategy is to postulate “scenarios” depicting situations which could arise in the future, and then to forecast what would happen should such circumstances arise. If, for example, several alternative weapons systems were being considered for procurement, their performance and value could be estimated in the event that each of several very different situations (or scenarios) unfolded in the future. It could well emerge that System A was the best for Scenario 1 but poor for Scenarios 2 and 3; System B the best for Scenario 2, but poor for Scenarios 1 and 3; System C the best for Scenario 3, but poor for Scenarios 1 and 2; while System D was second best for all three scenarios. The preference of those who had to select the “best” system would depend on their judgments as to the likelihood and the importance of the different scenarios, as well as on the consequences that would arise if they happened to base their decision on the wrong scenario. Futures studies have introduced methodologies devoting systematic attention to the interactions between different relevant factors. “Cross-impact analysis” can reveal side-effects not evident on first examination. Also it is claimed that the “Delphi technique” is able to focus the knowledge of a diverse group of experts towards a forecast better than

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can be achieved by an individual acting alone. Technological forecasting has identified the progress associated with major new technologies, usually achieving initial spectacular returns, later diminishing, and finally overtaken by a superior new technology. In general, the broad concerns over world problems and fears for the future have stimulated widespread enthusiasm for futures studies. To date the hopes have not been satisfied with much in the way of solid accomplishment. Statistical Studies of War An interesting approach to the study of war is to compare the statistics of wars, or of arms races, from the past, and see if there are recognizable similarities, patterns, or regularities. This type of investigation was pioneered by L.F. Richardson and Quincy Wright, and has been pursued more recently by [Joel] Singer and his colleagues. Richardson6 selected 315 wars terminating between 1820 and 1952 and each generating at least 317 battle-associated deaths. Wright7 chose 278 wars occurring ­between 1482 and 1940, involving at least 50,000 troops. [Melvin] Small and Singer8 examined 118 interstate and 106 civil wars between 1816 and 1980, each with at least 1,000 battle deaths. One of the interesting findings of these statistical studies is that there is no consistent trend either upward or downward in the frequency of international wars. Neither is there any significant periodicity in the outbreak of wars, although there is some sign of a 15–20 year cycle in the level of violence in the world, with internal conflict growing at the present time. Most wars last less than four years. Most decisions to go to war are taken in the spring or autumn, most battles are fought in spring or summer. There has been some kind of international war in progress during all but 20 of the 165 years covered in Small and Singer’s study. The special severity of the two World Wars of 1914–18 and 1939–45 is immediately evident, with battle deaths of nine  million and fifteen million, respectively, as contrasted with the next three international wars (Korea, 1950–53, two million; Vietnam, 1965–75, 1.2 million; and ­Sino-Japanese, 1937–41, 1.0 million). All the other international wars had battle deaths below 0.32 million. The three civil wars causing the most battle deaths were China, 1860–64, two million; China, 1946–50, and Nigeria, 1967–70, each one million. As far as individual countries are concerned, Britain and France were involved in the largest number of international wars, France in the longest-lasting wars, Russia suffered the most battle deaths (9.7 million), and Germany (or Prussia)

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experienced the most intense wars. China has suffered the greatest total number of battle deaths in civil wars (3.5 million). Led by Richardson,9 statistical analysis has been employed to try to identify causes of war, and the relationship of armaments policy in peacetime to the outbreak of war. For example, it has been demonstrated that neighbouring states are the most likely to go to war, and that there is a relationship between the incidence of war and the presence of militant ideology, and also linguistic, religious, and other ethno-cultural heterogeneity. Some writers engaged in “peace research” fall into a statistical trap by inferring cause and effect from association. While it is easy to assume that “arms cause wars,” and deduce therefrom that disarmament will bring perpetual peace, it is at least as logical to start from the premise that “men cause wars,” or perhaps economic or geopolitical conditions, and that peace and security will depend on a proper balance of strength. The Power of Nations; Relative Force Capabilities The currency of global strategy is the power of nations. A direct measurement of the power of a nation cannot be made, but considerable study has been devoted to systematic assessments. [Klaus] Knorr10 places great emphasis on economic strength. The Organskis11 concentrate on population. [R.J.] Rummel12 uses time-series of various military assets. [F.H.] Hartmann13 lists seven elements: demographic, geographic, economic, scientific-technological, historical-psychological sociological, ­organizational-administrative, and military. [R.S.] Cline14 attempts to put the factors on a single value scale, adding the concrete factors that are measurable (population, territory, economic capability, and military capability) and multiplying that sum by the sum of two variables [that are] much more difficult to quantify: national strategy and national will. In this effort, Cline demonstrates the limitations of systems analysis, in that he represents in quantitative form variables which defy actual measurement. But he avoids one of the commonest weaknesses, in that he ­refuses to concentrate exclusively on what can be measured, and to ­ignore factors that are unquantifiable. A serious difficulty in assessing the power of a nation is the treatment of potential or latent power, as contrasted to actual deployed and functioning power. The economic and industrial power of Great Britain and the United States, which enabled them to win World War II, took so long to mobilize that defeat was very near in the first three years. A short war would have to be fought with the military resources already in place. But

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in matters of influence, and bargaining, the latent power of a state can weigh heavily in the balance. The assessment of direct military capability poses in itself a difficult problem. Assessment is important, both for global strategy, and in particular for the establishment of force goals and for arms-control agreements. Even if the complete Order of Battle is known for each side, a comparison of relative strength requires many factors to be taken into account beyond crude tabulated numbers. Like does not always (or even usually) fight like: bomber aircraft will be pitted against fighters and land-based air defences, not against opposing bombers; anti-­submarine forces will be opposing submarines, not opposing anti-submarine forces. Weapons of the same general type may have very different performance characteristics. And how does one establish the relative strengths of forces with very different compositions? This type of comparison ­becomes vital in negotiating arms-control agreements that permit “freedom to mix,” or have other provisions more complicated than simple equal ceilings for specified types of weapons. Another factor of great importance is the influence of geography on the roles and requirements of the opponents. NATO, for example, must keep the Atlantic supply line open: the Warsaw Pact does not depend on supply by sea. Of all the balances the ones most often discussed are those concerning nuclear weapons. In addition to the basic description such as number of launchers, size, and maximum range, there are several other measures needed to give a proper indication of the real capabilities. Throw weight, number of warheads, energy yield per warhead, and accuracy of delivery are vitally important. Derived from these are counter-military potential,15 measuring the ability to attack hardened silos, and equivalent mega tonnage, measuring the area of large soft targets that can be destroyed. To predict the results of an attack it is also necessary to estimate the reliability of the weapons and the hardness of the targets. Thus it can be seen that a considerable amount of mathematical analysis is needed beyond the simple addition of numbers of weapons. This paper discusses those applications of systems analysis and operational research to global strategy which are publicly reported. The intelligence staffs of defence departments and foreign offices do, of course, devote very considerable effort to analysing the information which they collect, but do not usually publish their findings. The vast majority of their collection and analysis is concentrated on the forces, economies, and activities of countries considered to be potential enemies, but in a few cases there are organizations charged with making “net assessments”

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to measure the relative power of nations likely to be competitors. A noteworthy source of objective data is the International Institute for Strategic Studies.16 In order to assess risks and threats that may be present or that may emerge in the future, it is important to estimate the intentions as well as the capabilities of potential enemies. Important capabilities take a long time to acquire, while intentions can change very quickly. Immediate hostile intentions are only dangerous when accompanied by significant capabilities. A current program to build up capabilities provides evidence regarding what intentions must have been in the recent past. This connection has been employed by naval analysts, examining the types of ships built by the Soviet Navy since the end of World War II and deducing what intentions must have prevailed at the time the decisions were made to undertake (or to estimate) the construction program.17 A persuasive case can be presented that the Soviet decisions up to about 1975 were of a defensive nature, reactive to developments in Western navies, but that a significant change in policy to acquire worldwide offensive naval power must have taken place during the last decade. The Theory of Games Stemming from a highly original book by [John] Von Neumann and [Oskar] Morgenstern entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour,18 game theory has spawned a branch of mathematics and many books and learned papers. A characteristic of the books and papers is that they are either very mathematical indeed, or rather entertaining semi-technical accounts of the concepts of game theory.19 There is a noticeable dearth of examples from real life in which game theory has been used to solve practical problems. Most of the key concepts and insightful solutions are associated with discrete two-person zero-sum games with perfect information. However, very few real-life situations, except for chess and a few parlour games, can be put in terms so simple. The situations present in the problems of global strategy are likely to be continuous rather than discrete, may have more than two players, are seldom zero-sum, and usually involve imperfect information. The payoff values that are central to game theory are usually unmeasurable. The value of game theory lies in the fact that systematic analysis of idealized situations that are too simple to mirror reality nevertheless uncovers conceptual ideas (minimax strategies, mixed strategies, saddle

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points, metagames, [and others]) which are quite powerful for the understanding of real competitive situations. For certain problems that are basically simple in concept, but not in detail, such as the design of a homing missile to intercept an evading target, differential game theory may in fact be able to identify the optimum program for the missile guidance, and/or the optimum evasive manoeuvres for the target.20 For the problems of global strategy, which are not simple, game theory will not provide solutions. But it may offer concepts that will be useful in the systematic (but probably not quantitative) study of the problems. War Game Simulation War gaming has a considerable history within military organizations, beginning in Germany in the nineteenth century. It is usually associated with tactical rather than strategic applications, and has been extensively used for training as well as for planning and research. For tactical studies of land warfare and for the training of comparatively junior officers, the geographic scale and the size of the units represented in the game are usually small, and it is normal to pay close attention to details of terrain. However, the same general methods can be used for the examination of larger-scale operations, where the units are divisions or even corps. In order to complete a large-scale game in a reasonable time, it is necessary to aggregate many aspects which can be treated in more detail in lower-level games. It is important to incorporate the effects of random chance into war games. In reality, events such as the success or failure to detect a target or the hitting or missing of a target by a weapon are predictable only by probability distributions, so that the same action will not always produce the same result. It would be unreal to present the players in a war game with decisions for which the outcome was specified with certainty by a rule book known to them. Most war games require the attendance of a considerable number of military officers, preferably with the rank and qualifications appropriate for the part they play in the game. War games demand the exercise of judgment, usually under the pressure of time and based on incomplete information. They probably have greater value for training or for assessment of what might happen in a real battle, than for determination of what would be the ideal tactics. The results are very much dependent on detailed rules and performance tables which must be established before the game starts. It is probable that the comparative skills of the opposing players have more

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effect on the results of lower-level games, whereas the aggregated nature of higher-level games makes their results more a direct consequence of the rules and the forces engaged, and less of the decisions made by the players. For example, many games are designed to test the defence by a NATO force attacked by a larger Warsaw Pact force. The NATO force will almost certainly be obliged to withdraw, but it may be important to obtain an ­estimate from the game of how long the NATO force can hold its ground. In a low-level game, the skills of the two contesting sides in making many decisions regarding details of the operations may have a considerable [effect] on the time that NATO can resist. But in a highlevel game many of these details will be aggregated into predetermined rules for the rate of advance of formations under various circumstances, based perhaps on the average results of games already played at lower levels, and will not be controllable by the skills of the players. War games can also be used for the study of naval warfare. In this case the units are all in continuous movement, and it is important to keep up-to-date track of their positions and the distances between them. Instead of describing the situation in words to the various players, and allowing them to keep track of the situation on a marked map, it is possible to present them with instrumented displays bearing a resemblance to the video consoles they would actually have on a ship, submarine, or aircraft. For tactical training, very elaborate automatic systems are now in use. For the examination of strategic problems, automatic war game displays are very useful for presenting the instantaneous locations of a large number of moving units. It has become possible to aid the play of both land and maritime war games by the use of computers. The rules are stored in the computers, the movement and changes of status of units recorded, the results of detections and weapon engagements calculated, and records kept of all the events. With this increasing use of computers, the possibility arises of simulating the entire situation on the computer, and playing the games without the intervention of human judgment. This has two major advantages. One is that a single game (trial, simulation) can be completed far more quickly. And, as a result of the reduced time, it is thus possible to “replicate” the play, repeating the sequence many times, with different random numbers determining the different outcomes of the various individual events. In this way the effect of random chance can be estimated, giving a better assessment of the confidence that can be placed in the results. However, if human decision is removed from the

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sequence of events during the progress of the simulation, it must have been introduced into the computer program in the form of the decision rules. This is difficult to do in a fully satisfactory manner. It is the same problem that arises with a computer designed to play chess: it will usually beat amateurs, perhaps even good amateurs, but will be defeated by a chess master, whose comprehension extends beyond what can be put into a computer program today. Our capabilities to conduct computer programming fall short of insight and ability to recognize and seize unusual or unforeseen opportunities. Computer simulation has its most useful place in the study of situations in which there is little or no human judgment involved, in which the details of the basic interaction are well understood (though likely ­including the element of chance), and in which the number and complexity of interactions is too great for rapid practical analysis and calculation by conventional methods. The methods of war gaming and simulation are sometimes extended into campaign analysis. This covers a long period of time, incorporating a series of successive engagements. Of necessity the individual engagements must be treated in a rather summary and aggregated manner ­determined by rules. Judgment enters with the introduction of new forces into the campaign, and by the reapplication of forces surviving earlier engagements. At the level of strategy, the type of war gaming discussed so far can play a part in examining the purely military dimension and in estimating the capabilities of forces. Where political factors enter, it is possible to introduce players representing such considerations as international commitments, economic constraints, and psychological factors. Sometimes players represent cabinet ministers, perhaps of different countries. However, for this type of game, it is impossible to have complete rules, and the value is more likely to be for highlighting difficult problems than for arriving at predictions or solutions. NATO makes use of a very large scale international politico-military game, involving players in each capital, every couple of years. Mathematical Models of Combat A well-known effort to represent combat by a mathematical model was undertaken by F.W. Lanchester.21 He suggested that there are two basic types, depending on whether the weapons limit the combat to a number of oneversus-one duels or allow targets over a wide area to be engaged by each

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weapon. Two sets of differential equations model those two situations, with the basic variables being the number of units engaged, and with coefficients measuring the effectiveness of the units. Lanchester developed the theory for aerial warfare, but it has been applied to sea and land warfare,22 as well as to biological problems involving predators and prey. It has been difficult to validate Lanchester’s theory by analysis of the results of actual combat. The detailed statistics of most real battles are rather fragmentary, and the circumstances and weapons do not remain the same from one battle to another. One successful validation was made for the Battle of Iwo Jima, for which complete records were available for the American forces.23 A considerable extension of this type of approach has been attempted by the historian Colonel T.N. Dupuy,24 who has traced the results of many land battles and attempted to quantify all of the important factors, so that a large number of coefficients are involved. To be convincing, the same set of coefficients would need to produce results in approximate agreement with a large number of battles. In practice it seemed that each new example required the introduction of a new coefficient in order to get the results to agree. Dupuy demonstrates consistent differences [in the military effectiveness of] the armed forces of different nations. In particular, he presents evidence that the Germans have been significantly better than their opponents, man for man, in the two World Wars. He attributes this superiority, in part at least, to the training and leadership of the German general staff.25 Dupuy has given much thought to the effect of the various weapons used in the large number of wars he has studied.26 He has, for example, demonstrated that, as weapons become more lethal, armies adopt more dispersed formations, to the extent that the average concentration of men per square mile has gone down by factors of 4,000, 200, and 16 since [ancient times, the Napoleonic Wars, and the] First World War, respectively. Two of the early and very successful applications of operational r­ esearch made in World War II were to two different aspects of anti-submarine warfare. One had to do with the size of merchant ship convoys and their force of escorts. A study of experience at sea allowed a simple mathematical model to be formulated, which indicated that losses to submarines would be reduced if the ships and escorts were formed into the largest possible convoys.27 When this was done, the losses were ­reduced as forecast. The other application concerned the attack of submarines caught on the surface by aircraft. A mathematical study of the times taken for the

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various stages of the attack, and the reactions of the submarine, showed that a great improvement in probability of success could be achieved by simply using a shallow setting on the depth charges.28 Certain functionings of instruments and weapons, and certain processes that form a part of modern combat, are good subjects for mathematical models. Detection of targets by radar or by sonar depends on a combination of physical factors, some of which can be predicted with precision, others of which are so variable as to be best described by probability distributions. The search for a moving target such as a ship or aircraft adds a kinetic factor, very suitable for mathematical description. The mathematical theory of search and detection has been well developed,29 and has useful applications in search-and-rescue procedures and on prospecting for oil, as well as for military operations. Several major questions of considerable strategic significance in World War II, related to the use of bomber-type aircraft, were subjected to intensive study by the methods of operational research, although they were not reduced to mathematical form. There was great controversy over choice of the best targets for strategic bombers, among categories such as industry, oil supply, population, and transportation. One school preferred interdiction of operational areas. Another gave priority to tactical targets on or close to the battlefield. In the case of the campaign by the Royal Air Force against the submarine threat, four-engined aircraft could be configured as bombers to attack U-boats and their facilities in port, or equipped as maritime patrol aircraft to defend the shipping at sea. In the latter case, there was a choice of flying close escort with the convoys, carrying out searches in the general area of the convoys, or attempting to interdict the U-boats while they were in transit from their bases to their operating areas. All of these strategies were used, and subsequent study of the operational data indicated that the most effective use of the four-engined aircraft was for maritime patrol in distant support of the convoys. In general, extensive post-war analyses of the results of strategic bombing showed it to have fallen short of the original expectations, or of what was believed was being achieved at the time. One of the classic mathematical problems of military science is the calculation of the probability that an attack by one or more weapons will destroy a given target. This has been applied to artillery and to aerial bombing, and, as has been mentioned earlier in the discussion of assessing strategic military power, is very prominent today in the calculation of the effectiveness of intercontinental missiles for the destruction of hardened silos. The effects of a nuclear weapon, such as blast, heat, and

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radiation, on specific structures and on personnel can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. Considerably less confidence can be placed in forecasts of the overall long-term results of large-scale nuclear attacks. Apart from the direct physical destruction by blast and fire, regard must be paid to the effects of radioactive fallout, including its introduction into the food chain, and to possible modifications of the upper atmosphere. The reactions of the population cannot be predicted with much assurance. It does seem probable, though, that the most pessimistic prophecies of “the end of life on the planet,” “the finish of the human race,” or even “the end of civilization,” are unduly alarmist. As conventional weapons become more sophisticated, as is the case for example, with multi-rod warheads for anti-aircraft weapons, shaped charges for anti-armour weapons, cluster bombs for anti-personnel weapons, or cratering bombs for the destruction of airfield runways, the prediction of their effects requires elaborate testing and calculation. This is further complicated by the offsetting measures taken to reduce vulnerability, such as fitting of armour to aircraft and tanks, and the use of decoys, jamming, and other deceptive countermeasures to defeat the guidance system of homing weapons. Some of the examples given in this section on the study of combat by mathematical models applied to problems are certainly of a strategic nature. But as was also evident in the section on war gaming, most of them are more closely related to weapons and tactics than to strategy. Deterrence and Defence A fundamental dichotomy that runs through many of the debates on modern strategy is the one between “deterrence” and “defence.” The object of deterrence is to prevent the opponent from initiating an attack because of the punishment he expects to receive if he did attack. The mathematical calculations deal with the ability of the retaliatory forces to survive the attack (probably under the worst conditions of surprise) and subsequently deliver the unbearable punishment (probably to the homeland population and resources of the aggressor). In contrast, the object of defence is to defeat the enemy forces in the field, frustrating their attack and perhaps destroying their military potential. Lanchester’s theory deals with defence. The calculations regarding such weapons systems as ICBMs, SLBMs, intercontinental bombers, and long-range theatre nuclear forces are concerned with deterrence.

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A factor of great importance associated with the concept of deterrence is that of stability. If the character of the weapons systems on each side is such that neither can hope to disarm the other by a surprise first strike, and that neither has a logical motive to be the first to attack in a time of crisis, or to set his retaliatory weapons on a “hair-trigger automatic launch-on-warning” mode, then we have a situation of mutual and stable deterrence in a crisis. In general, mathematical models will indicate that crisis stability is enhanced by having large numbers of retaliatory weapons. There is a second type of stability, concerned with armaments policy in peacetime, rather than with action and reaction in a crisis. This has to do with the logical motivation to build new weapons systems as a result of the appearance of new systems on the other side. A measure will be stabilizing or destabilizing for arms control depending on whether it stimulates the opponent to acquire new systems. Some developments, such as the placing of intercontinental rockets in hardened underground silos, call for no offsetting developments by the opponent, unless he is seeking a first-strike capability. Others, such as the deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, do motivate the opponent to build more retaliatory weapons, or otherwise offset the increased threat to his retaliatory capability. In the case of conventional weapons for defence, most improvements on one side, whether offensive or ­defensive, provide a rational motive for the adversary to make offsetting improvements. Whereas the crisis stability of mutual deterrence is enhanced by large numbers of retaliatory weapons on each side, there are logical reasons to limit the numbers. These include the total damage that could be done in the event that deterrence fails and the weapons are used, the fear that large numbers increase the probability of an accident that could lead to an unintended war, and the cost of acquiring and maintaining the weapons. It is difficult to figure the first two considerations into a mathematical model. Having calculated the number of weapons needed to ensure stable deterrence, based on logical assumptions, how does one then determine the probability that one of the players will not behave according to logic? And how does one deduce the probability of accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon, followed by the unintentional escalation to a nuclear exchange, especially when neither event has ever occurred? The costs of the weapons can be estimated, but it should be noted that they are not large in comparison to the total defence budgets of the nuclear powers. About all that can be done as a guide to policy

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is to establish the minimum number of weapons systems that appear to provide a very high assurance of stable deterrence. The importance of strategic nuclear deterrence is so great, and the magnitude of damage to be expected in the event of a nuclear war is so alarming, that even though far more resources are being devoted to conventional forces than to nuclear forces, the attention of strategists is focused more on nuclear than [on] conventional weapons, and more on deterrence than on defence. And, in the case of nuclear forces, arms control gets as much attention as force structure. Mathematical Models of Deterrence and Arms Control [L.F.] Richardson postulated a mathematical model of an arms race in the form of linear differential equations.30 He examined the conditions under which equilibrium can exist, and whether the equilibrium is stable or unstable. He also produced data from some historical arms races, including a record of economic trade between the adversaries. [K.E.] Boulding,31 [T.L.] Saaty,32 [Partha] Chatterjee,33 [M.C.] McGuire,34 and many others have studied other variations of arms competitions, of alliances, and of armed conflict from the same general point of view. Many of the central aspects of deterrence can be put on a mathematical basis. If the sanction deterring war is destruction of population or of industry, an estimate needs to be made of the level of destruction considered adequate: in 1967 [US] Secretary of Defence [Robert] ­McNamara estimated [it to be] one-fourth of the Soviet Union’s population and one-half to two-thirds of its industrial capacity. Knowing the capacity of the weapons intended to inflict this damage, the necessary number delivering their warheads can be calculated. If they must be able to perform this function after being subjected to a counterforce first strike by the opponent’s weapons, then the force must have sufficient numbers to ensure survival of enough to be able to inflict the calculated damage. If this deterrence is to be mutual, the calculations must be repeated in reverse. If it is to be stable, there must be a margin of security beyond the minimum necessary numbers, lest either side be tempted to take advantage of a (real or imagined) opportunity.35 Because of considerations such as these, capacities often wrongly ­labelled as “overkill” are needed in order to ensure mutual and stable ­deterrence. It is not necessary to be able to kill everyone several times over, although critics often charge that defence planners have this as their objective. What is necessary is to be able to endure the worst

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possible surprise counterforce first strike, and still have enough weapons survive to be able to destroy a significant fraction of the population or other assets of the aggressor. Moreover, the opponent must be convinced that this is the case. Behind the various international negotiations over arms control there are analyses attempting to establish the relative capabilities of the different parties, to determine whether deterrence exists, and if so, whether it is mutual and stable. Each new proposal needs to be analysed, and forecasts should be made regarding possible countermeasures or other developments that could alter the balance in the future. In the case of novel weapons or applications, such as various basing schemes to make the MX survivable, or such as weapons to be orbited in space, the calculations are subject to huge uncertainties. Also associated with the analysis of arms-control proposals is the problem of verification of agreements,36 including calculation of the precision with which numbers of permitted weapons can be estimated, of the probability that a violation will not be detected, and of the likely time delay before a significant violation would be detected. Summary and Conclusions Operational research, whose early development occurred during World War II, was applied with great success to many of the tactical and strategic problems arising during that conflict. In the post-war years, applications of operational research expanded into the industrial world, and continued to be important for development of military tactics, operations, logistics, and manpower policies. The great postwar programs for selection and development of large weapons systems called up another type of scientific support, better described as systems analysis. This continues to be vital for the major decisions regarding procurement. Until recent times the systematic study of strategy concentrated on the military dimension. Other than war gaming, there was little application of the methodology now associated with operational research. But today the scope of global strategy extends well beyond military considerations to include the political, economic, ideological, and psychological aspects of international relations. Although strategy still involves the military conduct of conventional war, the contents of modern strategic studies (whether national, alliance, or global) tend to be directed towards strategic nuclear deterrence, nuclear warfighting, the nuclear

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and conventional balance, and arms control, as well as to the more non-­ military aspects such as détente and trade. The contribution of systems analysis, operational research, and allied disciplines to the more conventional aspects of global strategy has tended to be peripheral. Some initial progress has been made towards the construction of mathematical socio-economic global models. Efforts to put forecasting and futures studies on a scientific basis are still in their infancy. Statistical studies of war have revealed a few interesting facts, but little that is applicable to the problems of defence policy today. Data are available pertaining to the relative power of the nations of the world, but there are real problems in converting these into usable rankings or drawings of power balances. The theory of games has proven to be quite intriguing for its intellectual content, but of doubtful direct applicability to the solution of practical problems of global strategy. War gaming and simulation can and do make a useful contribution, but their validity is highest for the lower levels of military combat. At higher levels, and when political and other non-quantitative factors are involved, war games can provide training and insight, but are of limited value for prediction. Attempts to express the details of military combat in mathematical form have encountered serious difficulties, especially in the areas of land warfare, involving the complications of terrain, morale, surprise, and many other factors difficult to quantify. The major thrust of global strategy at the present time is towards questions of nuclear deterrence and of arms control. These can be discussed in political terms, but are also amenable to quantitative analysis. Mathematical models of arms races have been rather inconclusive, but quantitative treatment of the effectiveness of weapons and of the vulnerability of retaliatory systems is central to the determination of policy for both armament and arms control.

1986

The Strategic Significance of Changes in the Offence/Defence Balance

As a strategic analyst for the Canadian defence establishment, George Lindsey conducted a considerable amount of research into the effect of military technologies on the global balance of power. He wrote this paper as chief of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment in February 1986, three years after the ­announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by the Reagan administration in March 1983.1 Also known as “Star Wars,” the SDI program aimed to develop a sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system capable of preventing missile attacks from other countries, specifically the Soviet Union. Cognizant of the implications of Canada’s geographic position across the most direct missile route from the Soviet Union to the United States, Lindsey studied the effect of SDI on Canada’s security policy and position in the North Atlantic security partnership. Introduction The state of the balance between offence and defence and changes to that balance produced by developing technology have profound significance for military planning and for the calculations needed to assess the security of nations and of alliances. Current concern over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the stated objective of which is to determine whether an effective defence can be offered against the hitherto irresistible offensive power of the nuclear-armed ballistic missile, has caused attention to be directed towards the offence-defence balance as it may affect the security of the North Atlantic Alliance during the coming decades. Since Canada’s security policy relies on the collective strength of the Alliance, we will join with our Allies in assessing the effects of changes in the security of the Alliance as a whole. However, it is possible that some

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aspects of possible changes may have a special significance for Canada, perhaps because of our geographical position. Accordingly a comprehensive study of the problem should be approached with special emphasis on Canadian aspects, as well as from the more general point of view of the Alliance as a whole. Offence and Defence, 1914–45 Although the American Civil War produced evidence of the defensive power of the machine gun and of field fortifications, the major military achievements of that war and of the Prussian campaign in Europe were successful offences. On the eve of World War I it was supposed that the combination of cavalry, artillery, and well-armed infantry, backed up by the highly developed rail network of Europe, would allow a few major offensive battles to conclude a campaign fairly quickly. The German ­ Schlieffen Plan intended to accomplish this by an early major offensive against France, led by a strong right wing penetrating to the north of Paris, to be followed later by transfer of the victorious troops to attack the Russians on the Eastern Front. In the event, some of the troops were taken from the right wing on the Western Front to reinforce the defence on the Eastern Front, and once the French and British held the Germans on the Marne, the Western Front stabilized into a line of trenches and barbed wire defended by machine guns. For four years defence frustrated offence in a dreadful war of attrition. The attempt to open a new and more fluid front failed when the amphibious attack at Gallipoli was defeated by determined Turkish defence. While the tank achieved some local offensive success, its range and speed were insufficient to break through defences held in depth. World War I demonstrated supremacy of the defence. Between the wars a few farsighted leaders conceived of offensive tactics using armour and air support to break defences and motorized infantry to develop and exploit the breakthrough. The German army used these “Blitzkrieg” tactics in Poland and France, achieving complete offensive success. The French, who had relied on the defences of the Maginot Line, found it bypassed. Other examples of offensive success followed, as airborne assault was developed, and then amphibious assault. Having been thrown off the European mainland, the Allies were obliged to adopt an offensive strategy in order to return. In the Pacific, it was overextension rather than defence which brought Japanese conquest to a halt, and a long and successful campaign of amphibious offence which ended the war.

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In the air, the offence also had the better of the defence, although an important exception was the Battle of Britain. Although strategic bombing did not achieve the decisive results expected by its proponents, most of the bombers usually got through the defences and did damage. At sea, the German submarine offensive against Allied merchant shipping was very successful until 1943, and the US submarine offensive destroyed virtually all of the Japanese merchant fleet. Overall it could be concluded that World War II showed the supremacy of the offence. Offence, Defence, and Strategic Stability In a period when technology favours the defence it should be easier for countries to discourage armed aggression. A would-be aggressor would need to have a significant numerical advantage over his opponent in order to carry out a successful offensive. During several of the disarmament negotiations prior to World War II there were efforts to identify for reduction those types of armament necessary for offence. The difficulty is that defence usually requires the same type of weapons as does ­offence. Also, the most effective means of defeating an offensive is usually to counterattack, once the initial attack has spent its force and expanded into exposed positions. Fortifications and fixed weapons of limited range can be properly classified as defensive, but most of the most effective weapons can be used for both offence and defence. Rather than trying to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, disarmament negotiations after World War II have attempted to ban “weapons of mass destruction,” presumably including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Another concept now much discussed is that of “stability.” If, in a time of crisis, neither opponent had a logical motive to strike the first blow, or if, after violence had broken out, neither had a logical motive to escalate the level of violence, then the situation could be described as stable. Detection systems which would provide warning of impending attack would be stabilizing, since the aggressor would be denied the advantage of surprise. Weapons or other assets that could be used for defence or retaliation would be more or less stabilizing according to their ability to survive a surprise attack – if their vulnerability invited destruction in a pre-emptive surprise attack, this would be destabilizing. “Stability” is also used with reference to the longer-term considerations of armaments building. A weapons system which provides a logical motive for the opponent to build a countervailing system is destabilizing

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for arms control. Thus, while defence still seems less dangerous and aggressive than offence, other terms and other categorizations may be more useful in judging the advantages and possible consequences of various armament and disarmament policies. Offence and Defence, 1946–70 Between 1945 and 1960, radical developments in military technology produced fundamental changes to the significance of offence and defence. The first was the invention of nuclear explosives. Used by the United States against Japan in 1945, and tested by the Soviet Union in 1949, the fission bombs multiplied the destructive energy that could be delivered by a bomber aircraft by a factor of thousands. Thermonuclear fusion bombs came a few years later, amplifying destructive power by another factor of the order of a thousand. Clearly, the offensive had become immeasurably stronger. Soon after World War II the radius of action of bomber aircraft was extended to intercontinental distances, greatly aided by the development of aerial refuelling by special tanker aircraft. Although the first fission and fusion weapons were large and heavy, it soon became possible to design them so that carrier-based attack aircraft or comparatively small land-based fighter-bombers could carry one or more. Great efforts were made to improve defence against the bomber, but these never came close to achieving 100 per cent protection. Since the successful delivery of one thermonuclear bomb could virtually annihilate a city, a defence that failed to stop all the bombers was of little value for the protection of population. Under these changed circumstances a nation fearing attack by nuclear-­ armed bombers could consider two logical alternatives. One was to disarm the opponent by attacking his bombers on the ground, in a surprise first strike. The other was to deter him from attacking by promising to retaliate against his undefendable [sic] cities. But for the second strategy to be credible, it would have to be evident that the bombers needed to carry out the retaliatory second strike would not be destroyed by the opponent’s first strike. The survival of a substantial number of bombers could be assured provided that sufficient early warning could be given for them to save themselves by “flushing” off their bases before the attack had been delivered. Throughout most of the 1950s, the United States possessed enough long-range bombers and enough nuclear weapons to be able to threaten catastrophic damage to any enemy and hence to proclaim a strategy of

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deterrence through massive retaliation. The Soviet Union did not have the means to deliver nuclear weapons to intercontinental ranges until the latter half of this decade. But by about 1958 they could offer a serious threat to air bases in North America. Early warning against the approach of bombers to North America was provided during the late 1950s by the construction of forward-based radar chains, land-based where this was possible, and extended over the sea by airborne radar, picket ships, and offshore Texas tower platforms. This early warning had a strong stabilizing influence on the situation, as it made the unlikely prospects of a successful surprise counterforce first strike unappealing to a potential aggressor. This situation was soon overtaken by the development of ballistic missiles to the stage that they could deliver a thermonuclear warhead to intercontinental range. No prospect of an effective defence was seen, at least for some years. Accuracy was adequate to destroy a city, and to have a high probability of damaging a soft target such as the bombers on an air base, or unprotected missiles. Such a development was extremely destabilizing. One countermeasure to this new threat was to provide warning, which could not be as “early” since the missiles approached with twenty times the speed of the aircraft. A proportion of the bomber aircraft could be kept airborne, or in a state of very high readiness, allowing them to flush with no more than a few minutes’ warning. Another was to place ICBMs in hardened underground silos, spaced far enough apart that no single well-placed nuclear explosion could destroy more than one target. The early experiments with long-range nuclear-armed missiles were not confined to land-based ballistic missiles. But the development of cruise missiles was suspended once ballistic missiles achieved great success. Major programs were carried out to send ballistic missiles to sea. After the techniques of submerged launching had been mastered, attention was diverted from surface ships and successive generations of SLBMs were produced. Because submerged submarines were not vulnerable to a surprise first strike, and because the missiles were less accurate than ICBMs, the SLBM came to be regarded as the most stabilizing of the three components of the strategic triad. It was, however, true that the SLBM posed a threat to bomber bases, having times of flight that could be short. Tracking of approaching missiles, which could only be for a very few minutes at best, could not be carried out by the [ballistic missile early warning system] radars, and required new coastal radar installations. At this stage, about 1970, the strategic situation could be described as stable. There was no effective defence to oppose the offensive powers of

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the ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers, and no possibility of protecting populations against a countervalue attack once launched. However, sufficient offensive weapons could be expected to survive a surprise counterforce first strike to be able to deliver unbearable retaliation against the population of the aggressor who had made the first attack. It could be assumed that all the SSBNs at sea would be available for retaliation, and those bomber aircraft which had flushed on warning. Some ICBMs would be destroyed, but in a ratio no greater than one for each missile attacking. By the late 1960s, research on active defence against ballistic missiles had reached the stage that deployment was being planned and great debates were raging about its technical practicality and strategic desirability. However, no effective defence was in place by 1970. Offence and defence had also been affected at the theatre and tactical battlefield levels by developments in weapons between 1945 and 1970. Advances in guided missiles had strengthened air defence, whether based on land, sea, or in the air, and also anti-tank defence. Intelligence collection by photographic and electronic satellites had made tactical surprise harder to achieve, at least on a large scale. On the other hand, a variety of tactical nuclear weapons were deployed, probably more likely to aid offence than defence, especially if used first by the offence. Offence and Defence, 1971–85 A technological development giving significantly more advantage to the offence, and first deployed on ICBMs in 1970, was the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV). The accurate guidance of each individual warhead allowed one launch vehicle to attack several hard targets (such as ICBMs in their silos). The possibility arose of a first strike destroying nearly all of the opponent’s ICBMs, a destabilizing change. MIRVs soon appeared on SLBMs as well as ICBMs, but did not threaten their counterpart SLBMs and were not accurate enough to pose a serious threat to ICBMs. The deployment of MIRVs was related to the imminent prospects for an active ballistic missile defence (BMD). A defence able to intercept and destroy a single incoming warhead could be saturated and overwhelmed if a number of warheads all arrived at the same time. Although accurate MIRVs posed a threat to the opponent’s ICBMs, a destabilizing influence, less accurate MIRVs increased the capability of a few ICBMs or SLBMs to be able to inflict great damage on cities, even if defended, a factor which enhanced the certainty of assured destruction.

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In the circumstances of the 1970s, ballistic missile defence was destabilizing for arms control, since its appearance on one side would provide a strong motive for the adversary to strengthen his offensive force in order to overcome the defence. It was realized in the negotiations of SALT I,2 which lasted from 1969 to 1972, that limitations on strategic offensive weapons would be very difficult to achieve in the absence of some corresponding curb on defensive systems. Other objections to BMD included its doubtful effectiveness and considerable cost. SALT I was concluded by a treaty to limit BMD and a temporary agreement to hold the total number of ballistic missile launchers at the level reached in 1972. SALT I did not restrict the deployment of MIRVs, and these were produced in large numbers and made more accurate through the 1970s. SALT II,3 negotiated between 1975 and 1979, set limits on MIRVs and on heavy bombers, and some temporary limits on cruise missiles, but did not address defensive systems at all (while leaving the ABM Treaty in force). Long-range cruise missiles, to which little attention had been paid once ballistic missiles had proven successful, reappeared on the scene in the late 1970s and are entering service in the 1980s. The air-launched version helps bomber aircraft to offset the increasing effectiveness of air defence. Once dispersed from its home base, the mobile, ground-launched cruise missile would be difficult to target in a first strike. The sea-launched cruise missile can be fired from the ordinary torpedo tubes of a submarine or surface ship. Although not invulnerable to air defences, cruise missiles offer smaller, lower-altitude targets than do aircraft. They represent a further strengthening of strategic offence over defence. Two technological developments which strengthen the capabilities of continental air defence are over-the-horizon (OTH) radar and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). OTH radar can detect aircraft at any altitude, well beyond horizon range, thus overlooking an area much greater than that within the scope of an ordinary “line-of-sight” radar. There are limitations, since the radar is blind in a large area close to the station, and operation can be disturbed by ionospheric activity such as the Northern Lights. AWACS consists of a powerful radar mounted on a large aircraft, equipped with good communications and the means to control interceptors. Its two great advantages over ground-based radar are its worldwide mobility and its ability to track aircraft flying at low altitude. The last fifteen years have seen great progress in the use of space for military (as well as other) purposes. The most important military applications have been for surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications. Improvements to those three vital functions could be used for offence

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or defence, but are on balance stabilizing for behaviour in a crisis. Good surveillance makes it harder to achieve surprise or to conceal breaches of arms-control agreements. Good communications enhance the dissemination of early warning and the control of forces in a crisis. But it is also true that ocean reconnaissance satellites could be used to direct submarines, aircraft, or missiles in a surprise attack on a surface fleet, and that an electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellite could reveal gaps in radar cover. Some work has been done on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, but there is a fairly widespread belief that their further deployment would be destabilizing. On the theatre and tactical battlefield level, some of the recent technological developments have favoured the defence. Anti-­aircraft missiles demonstrated their effectiveness in the Middle East and Indo-China, and anti-tank missiles in the Middle East. However, the Falkland Islands showed how vulnerable surface ships are to anti-ship cruise missiles. One nuclear device, the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (or neutron bomb) would be effective against massed tanks, but its deployment has been prevented for political rather than military reasons. Other nuclear weapons, particularly surface-to-surface missiles, probably favour the offence. Improved reconnaissance devices coupled with weapons able to home [in] on tanks and other vehicles may allow the defender to interdict the battlefield against the movement of reinforcements needed to sustain an attack. Finally, interest in ballistic missile defence has been resurrected in the 1980s. Developments in space technology, directed-energy-beam weapons, sensors, and computers make several rather different forms of BMD technically conceivable. But the advances that would be needed to make any one of them demonstrably and economically practicable depend on long and expensive programs of research, development, testing, and evaluation occupying many years. To summarize, at the beginning of 1986 there is no effective defence against the ballistic missile or the cruise missile. Whether such can be built will not be known for many years. Forms of defence against aircraft, tanks, and anti-ship missiles do exist, but are far from perfect. Strategic Defence of North America, 1946–86 During the first half of the twentieth century, geographical separation and the strength of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy made defence against direct attack on North America virtually unnecessary. But the development of the intercontinental bomber, and in particular of the Soviet Bear and Bison, able to carry nuclear bombs, ended the

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isolation. The techniques of air defence, depending on interceptor aircraft, AA guns, and a ground-based radar network, had been developed during World War II, and were now applied and improved for defence of North America. Jet-propelled interceptors replaced the propeller-driven models, and guided missiles replaced guns. Such a defence would have been sufficient to discourage repeated attacks, hut not able to prevent the successful delivery of a considerable number of nuclear weapons by a force of any substantial numbers. The Western strategy of nuclear deterrence depended on the bombers of the United States Air Force, based on airfields themselves vulnerable to nuclear attack. Enough of these were in the United States to make it certain that any attempt at an effective disarming first strike would have to include an attack on the bases in North America. Since the flight time of bombers making the transit from the USSR to the USA would be many hours, most of them spent over international waters or Canada, the opportunity existed to obtain early warning by placement of radar in the appropriate locations. Given early warning, a considerable number of aircraft could flush from their bases and survive the attack. Warning would serve other useful purposes, such as alerting the national leadership and the defence forces. When the ballistic missile became a threat to North America, early warning was again a prime requirement, but new means were required and far less warning time could be expected. Two systems were deployed: BMEWS (ground-based radars in Alaska, Greenland, and England) and satellite-based detectors in geostationary orbits able to sense the heat from rockets launched on land or sea. Additional radars on the American coasts provided tracking of submarine-launched missiles. Bomber aircraft had to be ready to flush on much shorter warning. Anti-submarine surveillance was strengthened in the waters off the coasts of North America. The first US plan for active BMD, labelled “Sentinel,” would have placed anti-missile batteries to cover most American cities. A later scheme, “Safeguard,” gave priority to the defence of ICBM bases. SALT I permitted two sites, one to defend retaliatory bases and one for the national capital, and the US proceeded to deploy radars and anti-missile batteries at Grand Forks, ND. Nothing was sited for the defence of Washington, and a protocol to the ABM Treaty, signed in 1974, prevented more than one BMD complex. The US soon deactivated the missiles at the Grand Forks site, retaining only the Perimeter Acquisition Radar. Once the ballistic missile threat had superseded the bomber threat, the priority of the air defence of North America was reduced. The number

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of immediately available interceptor aircraft, which had reached a peak of 2,600 in the early 1960s (when the number of Soviet long-range bombers was less than a tenth of this figure), is less than 300 today. All of the anti-aircraft missiles and guns have been deactivated and the radar network is greatly reduced from its peak, although the surveillance capability has been enhanced by OTH radar and AWACS. The tremendous power of space vehicles for photographic and electronic surveillance and for rapid worldwide communications has given them a key role in aerospace defence. NORAD assembles information from all sources to provide early warning of attack, whether by missile or aircraft. It is necessary to monitor the movements of all objects in space, including debris from past launchings and satellites now defunct, and to examine new objects in order to determine their function. The Canadian Contribution to Strategic Defence, 1946–85 The biggest contribution by Canada to the strategic defence of North America was made while the first continental air defence system was being deployed in the 1950s. Geography put Canada across the approach routes when the major objective was the interception of bombers, and the response was to build the Pinetree Line of ground control radars in southern Canada, 28 manned by Canadians, and to deploy about 200 CF-100 all-weather interceptors on five Canadian bases (Bagotville, St-Hubert, Ottawa, North Bay, and Comox). When the requirement was for early warning of bomber approach, geography indicated radar lines across the north of Canada. The DEW Line was built along the northern edge of the Canadian mainland, with the extremities in Alaska and Greenland. The Mid-Canada Line, designed, financed, and operated by Canada, was installed along the 55th parallel of latitude, extending from Alberta to Labrador. To exchange intelligence, identification, and warning information, and to conduct efficient interception of incoming aircraft, the operations of the United States and the Canadian air defence systems needed to be very closely coordinated. In 1958 the North American Air Defence Command was established, providing for full integration of the operations on both sides of the border. Although Canada designed an air-to-air missile (Velvet Glove) and a supersonic interceptor aircraft (Arrow), the eventual successor to the CF-100 was the CF-101B Voodoo, armed with the nuclear (Genie) as well as conventional air-to-air missiles. In addition to the interceptors, a line of eight batteries of the BOMARC surface-to-air cruise missile was

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deployed across the continent, two being in Canada (at North Bay and La Macaza). The electronic SAGE [semi-automatic ground environment] system for processing air defence data was installed in North Bay. The rundown on the air defences saw the closure of the Mid-Canada Line in  1964,  BOMARC removed in 1972, and deactivation of 11  ­Pinetree radars. However, the DEW Line is still required, and a thorough modernization of this will take place in a program labelled the North Warning System (NWS). The Voodoo interceptors have been replaced by a smaller number of CF-18s, some of which will operate from forward bases, enabling interceptions to be made within the cover of the northern radar or of AWACS. In summary, Canada’s roles in the strategic defence of North America have been determined by geography. Although cities and industrial facilities formed the first assets to be defended, these were soon replaced by strategic bomber bases and, later, ICBM fields. All of those military locations were in the United States, but the trajectories to them for aircraft and missiles originating in the USSR lay across the Arctic and the Canadian North. Early warning of bomber approach required radar in Canada, backed up by the ability to intercept. Theatre and Strategic Defence for NATO Outnumbered, and with no aggressive intensions, NATO has always adopted a defensive posture in the European theatre. It faces certain fundamental disadvantages, including limited depth through which troops could retire before losing most of their territory and being driven back to the sea, and the need to bring the major portion of their reinforcement and resupply across the Atlantic Ocean. Flexible response, basically a defensive strategy since it consists of reacting to enemy initiatives, requires the availability of theatre nuclear weapons, although it is by no means clear that their use by both sides would provide a net advantage to the defence on the battlefield. Much of NATO’s nuclear strength rests with its tactical aircraft, housed on a limited number of air bases which are extremely vulnerable to attack by Soviet nuclear missiles. If new conventional weapons such as precision-guided munitions prove to give a net advantage to the defence (which is by no means certain), it is quite possible that stocks would soon be exhausted and further successful defence would depend on rapid and continued ­resupply, much of it across the Atlantic. Whether industry would be able to produce ­sophisticated weapons at the necessary rate, and whether

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the anti-submarine and anti-air strength of NATO’s escort forces would be sufficient to deliver the equipment and manpower to maintain an extended campaign is at best uncertain. These uncertainties regarding the success of conventional defence, and of flexible response short of recourse to strategic nuclear weapons, underline the value of the penultimate deterrent offered by the longrange theatre nuclear forces, and of the ultimate intercontinental nuclear deterrent. The time to stop a war in Europe is before it starts: the way to do this is to make the punishment for starting it inescapable and unbearable. But to make retaliation inescapable, the necessary weapons must be able to survive a surprise counterforce first strike. Thus the ultimate dependence is on offensive weapons, against which no defence exists today. But the weapons must be survivable against the opponent’s offensive weapons, against which no defence exists today. In the case of NATO’s long-range theatre nuclear weapons, the [groundlaunched cruise missile], and the Pershing II, survivability is sought by making the weapons mobile, a strategy which will only work if the orders to disperse are given before the attack is delivered. A question generated by the Strategic Defense Initiative is how NATO would be affected if ballistic missile defence were shown to be practicable. However, it is not possible to answer the question without knowing what kind of BMD should be postulated. This will not be known until SDI has been pursued for several years. It is, however, possible to postulate several different kinds of BMD, and try to deduce the strategic consequences if one were deployed. Examples would be: a. imperfect defence of the hard targets in a limited area i. in North America ii. in Europe b. highly effective defence of the hard targets in a limited area i. in North America ii. in Europe c. partially effective defence of soft targets over a considerable area i. in North America ii. in Europe There are many other conceivable degrees of BMD, extending from completely ineffective to 100 per cent protection, but the three listed above are as probable as any. Separation into North America and Europe is made not only because the strategic significance would be different,

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but because there well may be technical reasons why effective defence might be possible at intercontinental range but not within theatre range. Imperfect defence of the hard targets in a limited area, which may well prove to be the most feasible technologically, could be very significant for the preservation of an assured capability for retaliation. If such defence were possible in North America but not Europe, the main consequence would be to increase NATO’s reliance on the ultimate strategic deterrent, in particular on the ICBMs based in the United States. There are enough of these, and they are sufficiently separated, that they present hundreds of separate targets. The certain survival of a considerable fraction of them would allow unbearable retaliation, even without the sea- and air-based components of the triad. Some other hard targets could be built and protected, such as pens for submarines in port, and command-and-control centres. Such a situation could improve the prospects of arms control on offensive strategic weapons, since a smaller total would still suffice to provide deterrence. The importance of coupling of deterrence in western Europe to the central deterrent in the United States would be increased. If imperfect defence of hard targets in western Europe were also possible, it could be used to improve the survivability of command-and-­ control centres and the bases for GLCMs and Pershing II, especially if they were hardened. However, these do not constitute many separate targets, and a major nuclear attack by the USSR delivered before the missiles had been dispersed would almost certainly allocate several weapons to each, enough to penetrate an imperfect defence and destroy all of the facilities. Air bases belong in the category of soft targets for nuclear attack, but in any case the [Warsaw Pact] possesses enough long-range nuclear missiles to allocate several to each major NATO airfield. Thus, imperfect defence of hard targets has far more to contribute to the central deterrent based in the United States, which presents hundreds of hard targets, than to the European long-range nuclear deterrent, which is concentrated on only a few targets. If highly effective defence of hard targets became feasible, it would enhance the certainty of assured destruction and remove any incentive to attempt a disarming first strike. It would, however, require that defences against cruise missiles and bombers as well as ballistic missiles be achievable. This could encourage reductions in the intercontinental missile force, and possibly deactivation of long-range bombers. If possible in western Europe, one could expect certain key facilities, such as command-and-control centres and long-range missile bases, to be hardened and defended. The effect would be stabilizing.

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Partially effective defence of soft targets over a considerable area would have little real strategic value. A determined attack in which one nuclear weapon penetrated to each targeted city would be quite sufficient to wreak unbearable damage. If such protection were provided to the United States but not western Europe, the perception could grow that the USA was distancing itself from the risks entailed in collective defence, or that the USA might try a disarming first strike in the hope that American cities could be protected against the weak retaliation possible by the decimated [Warsaw Pact] forces. Should the Soviets deploy BMD [that was only] partially effective against American missiles, it might be fully effective against the smaller British and French deterrent forces. Partially effective defence of soft targets over a considerable area would be destabilizing for arms control, as it would provide an incentive to increase the quantity and improve the quality of offensive weapons. Highly effective defence of large areas against ballistic missiles, which is a stated objective of the Strategic Defense Initiative, would have limited strategic significance unless accompanied by equally effective defence against cruise missiles and bomber aircraft. If it became possible to defend populations against any kind of long-range nuclear attack, then the ultimate sanction of the strategic nuclear deterrent would disappear. NATO would still face superior conventionally armed [Warsaw Pact] forces, and both sides would still possess tactical nuclear weapons. Whatever systems had been devised to defend against long-range ballistic missiles might be able to intercept missiles of intermediate range, but could not stop short-range rockets or artillery shells. Systems able to intercept long-range cruise missiles might or might not be able to stop aircraft or short-range cruise missiles. Without the ultimate deterrent, NATO would have to face the increased probability of having to fight a conventional or tactical nuclear war. Canada and Strategic Defence, 1995 ... The extent that Canada’s security differs from that of NATO as a whole is related to its geographical position. For hostilities in Europe, C ­ anada and the United States are participants on the ground and suppliers across the Atlantic Ocean, with little need for strategic defence of their own territory. But for maintenance of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the United States is the base and Canada lies across the routes along which ballistic missiles and aircraft would come to attack that base. When the threat was from bomber aircraft only, Canadian geography was vital for the siting of air defence, first for interceptor aircraft and

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then for early warning radar. Against ICBMs, the first need was for early warning. Once the equipment was installed, ICBMs would be detected by satellites, soon after launching in the USSR, redetected over the Arctic by a fixed radar beam from one of the BMEWS stations in Alaska, Greenland, or England, and followed for some distance by a BMEWS tracking radar. Although a good part of the trajectories would be over Canada, all that could be done was to alert NORAD and flush the bomber aircraft on the US bases, as well as offering to the Soviets the threat of launching ICBMs on warning. When the United States was planning the Sentinel BMD system in the late 1960s, and later Safeguard, all of the installations were to be in American territory, with Perimeter Acquisition Radars close to the borders and batteries of anti-missile missiles accompanied by Missile Site Radar distributed throughout the country. The longer-range Spartan anti-missile missiles could intercept a southbound ICBM warhead over Canadian territory, including one whose impact would be a short distance north of the border. Canada conducted some of the research and development for the BMD program, erecting an advanced aeroballistics range at Valcartier, but was not asked to participate in the deployment. The US conducts surveillance of objects in space from a network of ground-based instruments scattered about the world. Canada provided sites for two Baker-Nunn cameras (at Cold Lake, Alberta, and St  ­Margarets, NB), telescopic devices providing very accurate tracking of objects in orbit. The need for these is being superseded by more advanced instruments in other locations. Whether a future BMD system resulting from the SDI would benefit from installations in Canada depends on what type of system it is, and which assets it is designed to defend. A terminal defence system intended to protect hard targets in a limited area could resemble Safeguard, with the installations all in US territory in the vicinity of the strategic targets which they would be defending. But technological developments subsequent to Safeguard, and central to the SDI program, suggest that some of the components of an effective modern BMD system should be in orbiting satellites, or possibly projected into space at the time of the ­attack. It is therefore possible that a BMD will require installations on the  ground sited far up-range of the targets that are being defended. These could be ground-based sensors, ground-based weapons, launch sites for sensors, or readout or command stations for sensors in space. Since the incoming missiles will pass over Canada, the host place for some of these ground-based installations could well be in Canada. This may be

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the case even for a terminal phase BMD, since activation of the system, allocation of interceptors, and separation of decoys from warheads will require tracking over a considerable part of the missiles’ trajectories. It is possible that denial of use of Canadian territory could prevent deployment of an effective BMD, though this is by no means certain with the present state of knowledge. A new offensive threat to North America is developing in the form of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). The principal effects are to r­educe the exposure of the attacking aircraft to the air defences and to allow one aircraft to attack a large number of widely separated targets in a single sortie. The defences have several possible tactics to combat this threat: a. detect, intercept, and identify the aircraft before it releases its ­missiles, then i. destroy the aircraft before it releases its missiles, or ii. follow the aircraft until it begins to release its missiles, and then destroy it, or iii. watch for ALCMs and destroy them in flight. b. without having intercepted the aircraft, detect and destroy the ­ALCMs in flight. The ability to execute (a) depends on having a system capable of detecting and intercepting aircraft in an area beyond the range from which ALCMs can reach their targets. The North Warning System will not be able to conduct interceptions beyond about 2,200 km north of the most northerly ICBM fields. AS-15, the new Soviet ALCM carried by the Bear II strategic bomber, is estimated to have a range of 3,000 km. It should be possible for a Bear II to release many if not all of its missiles before entering the radar cover of the NWS. If some other surveillance system capable of detecting and tracking aircraft, such as OTH radar, AWACS, or a space-based sensor, were in place, it might give warning of the approach of the Bear, perhaps before or perhaps after it had entered C ­ anadian airspace, but it is unlikely that a sure identification could be made. Detection of the launching of missiles, and tracking their independent flight paths, would require a system of surveillance considerably more sensitive than that required to detect aircraft. The design of a defensive system able to detect, track, intercept, and ­destroy ALCMs in flight would be a formidable undertaking. The technical problems are not as daunting as for the SDI, but a brute force ­approach such as simply increasing the power of radars designed to track

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aircraft is likely to involve very large costs. As with defence against ballistic missiles, it may prove practical to provide a measure of defence to a few selected targets covering no more than a small area, but impractical to defend an entire territory. It is also possible that selective defence of key targets would require some sort of alerting system up-range of the targets. It seems highly probable that if defence against ALCMs is desired for targets in North America, then there will lie a requirement for installations in Canadian territory. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are also likely to pose a threat to North America. If their targets are confined to strategic installations in the United States, few of the trajectories are likely to be over Canada, and most of the defensive systems would be in the USA or over the oceans. Anti-submarine surveillance – which has become less urgent against SSBNs as SLBM ranges increase and the launching submarines withdraw to more distant waters, but which remains necessary against attack submarines threatening the sea lines of communication – would acquire new priority once SLCMs were perceived as a threat. Not only do SLCMs have a much shorter range than SLBMs, but their accurate delivery depends on their making a precise approach to the coast, so that the submarine will need to come fairly close to the shore for the launching. Thus, Canada’s role in anti-submarine surveillance would acquire increased importance. Summary: Offence, Defence, and Deterrence World War I started with a German offensive which came close to a quick victory, but when the offensive was contained, the military technology of the day showed defence to be stronger than offence. Had the participants known in August 1914 the long war of attrition that awaited them, there would have been no such war. Defence stabilized the conflict, but only after it had gone too far to be stopped. The tactics and equipment of Blitzkrieg and of amphibious assault gave the advantage to the offence in World War II, although to be successful the offence had to marshal large and properly prepared forces. After World War II the long-range bomber, the intercontinental ballistic missile, and the nuclear weapon multiplied the power of the offence to the point that effective defence was impossible. The strategy of deterrence was produced not because it was inherently attractive, or stabilizing, but as a desperate response to the unstoppable superiority of the offence. Once adopted, the means of deterrence were redesigned to establish a state of stability.

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SDI will investigate the possibility of defence against ballistic missiles. At first sight this would seem to be an attractive prospect, in that nuclear destruction would be less probable. But nuclear destruction can be delivered by other means, including cruise missiles and bombers. So, presumably, an effective BMD would need to be accompanied by effective defence against cruise missiles and aircraft. But, if this were physically possible at affordable cost, what would it do to deterrence? The logical answer is that strategic nuclear deterrence would disappear, and an aggressor would contemplate an attack without having to face the prospect of losing his cities to nuclear destruction. If conventionally armed offence has the advantage over defence, the well-armed aggressor could hope to win without having to endure unbearable punishment. Tactical nuclear weapons such as artillery shells and short-range missiles would be unlikely to change the balance, unless held in very unequal numbers. Thus, under these circumstances, if NATO wished to deter the possibility of aggression, it would have to muster superior forces or seek technological means of establishing the superiority of defence (whether at the conventional or the tactical nuclear level). It would have to substitute defence for deterrence. This argument follows an assumption that a fully effective BMD is possible and is deployed. A more probable outcome of SDI is that only a partially effective BMD is physically possible at affordable cost. A partially effective BMD would leave strategic nuclear deterrence in force, but the deterrence could be more or could be less stable than it is now, and could be accompanied by a smaller or by a larger inventory of offensive nuclear weapons. The geography of the northern hemisphere suggests that a BMD system to defend targets in the United States would probably require, or at least be made more efficient by, installations in Canada. A similar ­defence against ALCMs would be even more dependent on Canadian territory and cooperation. Most of the questions raised in this discussion cannot be answered without the information that is being sought in the SDI. In general, it can be said that the most direct form of deterrence depends on secure offensive strength. If technology makes offence substantially more powerful than defence, the only practical strategy may be one of deterrence. But the security of the offensive force may be provided by defensive force if this is technologically feasible. Deterrence and defence are not mutually exclusive.

1993

Taxonomy and Measurement in Arms Control

This document is the first of two papers that George Lindsey published through the Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS).1 Lindsey prepared the original version of this paper for the International Verification Workshop that took place at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario, in late June 1993. Sponsored by the LCMSDS, the workshop included sessions on multilateral verification, treaty provisions and inspections, and potential verification measures for biological and toxin weapons. Researchers, consultants, and government representatives from Canada, the United States, South Korea, and Germany, all with experience in the negotiation and verification of existing treaties, presented papers at the workshop.2 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991, Lindsey continued to research and write on nuclear weapons and the global balance. This paper examines the sustained impact of the nuclear arms race on international security in the early post–Cold War period, with particular attention paid to arms-control negotiations and atomic energy safeguards. In the course of negotiating an arms-control agreement, three of the most important things that must be clearly settled are (1) definitions of the categories of arms to be restricted, (2) stipulation of the numbers of relevant arms to be permitted (perhaps with conditions as to their location), and (3) specification of the provisions for verification of compliance with the agreement. Once the treaty has come into effect, a vital factor in its successful implementation is effective verification. The word “taxonomy,” best known to biologists, refers to the science of classification (for example, into genus, species, order, and so on). For arms-control agreements, definitions of categories of equipment can be qualitative and descriptive, referring to the functions that the equipment is

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supposed to perform. Or they can have quantitative aspects, specifying measurable characteristics, such as size, weight, and calibre of gun. For e­ xample, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty states that [t]he term “battle tank” means a self-propelled armoured fighting vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with a high level of self-protection, and which is not designed and equipped primarily to transport combat troops ... Battle tanks are tracked armoured fighting vehicles which weigh at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight and which are armed with a 360-degree traverse gun of at least 75 mm calibre. In addition, any wheeled armoured fighting vehicles entering into service which meet  all the other criteria stated above shall also be deemed battle tanks. (CFE Treaty, Article II)

Alternatively, they can list existing systems and assign them to agreed categories. The CFE Treaty contains a protocol with a list of existing types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the treaty. It begins with a list of twenty-four types of existing battle tanks. However, this method fails to address problems raised by modernization of existing types, or the appearance of new types. The CFE Treaty outlines procedures for updating the lists of such existing types. Verifying Numbers of Weapons Most arms-control agreements have concentrated on limiting the numbers of weapons of various categories. There is a fundamental difference between absolute prohibition of a specified weapon – where the limit is zero – and permission to have some number greater than zero, but no more than some maximum. In the case of absolute prohibition, verification consists of searching for the presence of any one of the prohibited items. Detection of a violation is likely to be unambiguous, and escaping detection over an extended period may be difficult. But when a certain number of a particular type of weapon is permitted, the ability to verify compliance or to detect non-compliance is likely to depend on several factors: Are the relevant weapons in fixed locations and impossible to move quickly to new sites? If they are movable, how long is it likely to take to displace them to a new location? Can the inspection process identify individual weapons and re-identify the same ones on subsequent observations? (Methods for this include “tagging”

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with individual serial numbers which cannot be forged or altered without the fact being evident.) How does the mobility of the weapons relate to the number and frequency of opportunities for the verifying agency to observe and count? What proportion of the total area can be observed at one time? Can a substantial number move to a new location between successive observations? Note the similarity to the problem of detecting the production of a restricted chemical which requires a process which takes a certain number of days to complete. Here we have a type of problem in statistical sampling, with the inferences probabilistic rather than certain. The agreement may combine partial permission with partial prohibition – a certain number allowed in specified areas, but none in other areas. In this case the provisions for verification may differ between permitted and prohibited areas. An example of this is the restriction of on-site inspections (OSIs) to declared areas. The probability of detecting a violation may depend on the choices and actions (that is, the strategy) of the verification agency. For ­example, scheduling of routine OSIs and challenge OSIs, or deciding the proportion of observations given to declared as compared to ­undeclared sites, constitutes a strategic choice by the inspecting party. Success may also depend on the strategy of the inspected party. For example, items in excess of the permitted number may be spread among many locations or concentrated in a few. Likewise, some items may be placed in prohibited areas where inspection effort may be weak, but where a single detection signals unequivocally a violation. As well, success may depend on chance factors such as cloud cover while sensors are overhead, or inadvertent exposure of weapons intended to be concealed. Yet another type of verification occurs in the case of the inspections by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to monitor the production and handling of potentially fissile material in nuclear reactors. When measurements, especially of large quantities of material, cannot be absolutely precise, some undetected diversion is always possible. Limitations on Characteristics Rather than Number of Weapons One of the non-numerical aspects of verification is the need to discriminate between treaty-limited items and “look-alikes” which, though perhaps superficially similar, should not be counted against the permitted total. A high degree of trust is involved when undertakings are made that there are “functionally related observable differences” between permitted and limited (or forbidden) armaments. A taxonomic problem arises in determining whether a modification to a weapon is a permitted

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modernization or has transformed it into a new type. It may be feasible to assess this in an OSI, but not by remote sensing. Discrimination may be based on a quantifiable characteristic that can easily be measured by an inspector (or even from a photograph or ­remote sensing image) – for example, the calibre of a gun. But it may also depend on some quantifiable characteristic that is not easily measured without special equipment, or perhaps without access to design or test data. For example, the weight of a tank, displacement tonnage of a ship, launch weight of a missile, or aperture-power product of the antenna of an ABM radar are difficult to measure, even on-site. Estimates may be possible based on more easily measured data such as external dimensions. The INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty3 includes provisions for perimeter portal monitoring – continuous monitoring of major facilities engaged in the manufacture of ballistic missiles – to ensure that no newly constructed missiles of a prohibited type are being shipped. This process even includes X-ray equipment that can measure the general shape and dimensions of articles inside containers that are being removed from the facility. START I4 [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] agreed that an ICBM or SLBM would be considered to be a new type if it had a different number of rocket stages; a different type of propellant; a 10 per cent change in the length of the first stage of the missile, of the entire missile, or of the launch weight; a change in diameter of 5 per cent; or an increase in throw weight of 21 per cent. Another type of quantitative limitation that cannot be measured ­directly is one applying to the total force rather than to its individual items. Examples include total displacement tonnage of the battleship fleet, aggregate throw weight of a missile force or presence of a chemical agent “in excess of the requirements for normal use.” Yet another type of quantitative limitation is represented by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty5 provision to restrict underground nuclear tests to energy yields of 150 kilotons TNT equivalent. The accuracy of measurements of yields was at one time subject to great uncertainties, but as sensitivity improved, increased confidence developed that smaller tests could be detected (if not accurately measured). Now, there are plans to establish a worldwide sensor network. Verifying Performance Characteristics of Weapons Instead of limiting such directly measurable characteristics as physical dimensions or weight, a ceiling may be placed on some aspect of

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performance, such as maximum range or throw weight. More indicative of effectiveness would be accuracy, warhead yield, and penetration aids. But these are not likely to be verifiable, except possibly by observation of testing. A field not yet introduced into arms control would be limitations on devices which have a function not directly destructive (such as detection, measurement of range, or discrimination of objects under observation), but which if given greatly increased ability to concentrate energy on a target would be able to damage or destroy it. Examples of such devices are lasers, particle beams, and active radars. Lasers can be used for detection and position measurement by transmission of a very small quantity of energy to be reflected from a target, or for communications by transmission of a very small quantity of energy to a suitable receiver. Particle beams could be used for investigating objects in space for nuclear material, or for estimating their mass (as would be useful for discriminating between re-entry vehicles and decoys). Active radar, essential for a host of useful functions, delivers a negligible amount of energy onto its targets. However, a huge increase in radiated energy (whether laser, particles, or microwave), focused into a highly directive beam, might make it possible to damage mechanisms inside the satellite or [re-entry vehicle], if not to crack or melt the basic structure. Hence, arms control may require setting an upper limit to the capability of lasers, particle beams, or microwave radiators, far above the levels needed for permitted applications, but well below the levels capable of inflicting damage on satellites or missiles. In calculating permitted limits, it would be necessary to decide whether it was most important to impede defence against satellites in [low Earth orbit], satellites in [highly elliptical orbit], short-range ballistic missiles, or intercontinental ballistic missiles. It may also be necessary to take into consideration the potential of directed-energy weapons for the destruction of aircraft and cruise missiles. Even if taxonomy and measurement can be satisfactorily established for the weapon inventories existing at the time that an agreement is concluded, invention and modernization are likely to raise new questions in future years. Designers may select characteristics intended to violate the spirit of the agreement, while complying with the extreme limits allowed by its letter. Lawyers may attempt to reinterpret or distort descriptions and stipulations. Arms control and its verification are not simply a matter of counting or estimating population sizes.

SECTION THREE Canadian Defence

1971

Canadian Security, Sovereignty, and National Development: Possible Contributions by the Armed Forces and the Defence Research Board

George Lindsey wrote this document as an internal report for the Defence Research Analysis Establishment of Canada’s Department of National Defence.1 Although his words do not necessarily represent the views of the DND, Lindsey provides enough information to offer insight into some of the more important institutional priorities of Canada’s defence department during the mid–Cold War period. He wrote this paper during a time of significant change at the DND, when the federal government was in the midst of reallocating national funds away from defence. Lindsey’s first-hand assessment of the value of operational research and strategic studies to serve not only the Canadian defence establishment, but also the national development of Canada, is of particular significance. In this document, he emphasizes the versatility of his profession and the flexibility and growth of defence science to meet the evolving needs of the Canadian state during the Cold War. Introduction Before discussing possible contributions to Canadian security, sovereignty, and national development, it may be worthwhile to devote some attention to the definitions and meanings of the three terms. They mean different things to different people, and are being used in new ways. Security The Oxford Dictionary2 defines “security” as “the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger.”

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In the sense used with reference to national defence and international affairs, there is a certain distinction between external and internal security. External security refers to dangers originating from foreign countries, such as physical invasion by military forces, and to less violent, but still intentionally malevolent activities such as espionage. It could include dangers unintentionally caused by nuclear testing or even pollution of the sea or air across international boundaries. Note, for example, the statement in the Canadian note handed to the United States government on 16 April 1970: “It is the further view of the Canadian Government that a danger to the environment of a state constitutes a threat to its security.”3 To extend the definition further, unintentional influences from abroad which tend to erode the loyalty and sense of identity of the citizens constitute a threat to national security. In John Holmes’s article on “Canada and the United States: Political and Security Issues,”4 he quotes Roger Swanson: “National security must, if it is to have any contemporary relevance, include survival of national identity and values ... Indeed, in a strategic sense, Canada is caught in a dilemma of Kafkaesque proportions. Among possible threats to national security are the United States and the USSR. The one force (United States) that guarantees Canada’s security and thereby eliminates a second possible security threat (USSR) itself then constitutes a national security threat of a different nature and magnitude, but no less relevant concerning Canada’s existence and identity.” Internal security concerns dangers originating within the country. It usually refers to threats intentionally caused by humans, such as riot, ­insurrection, subversion, or large-scale crime. But it could include ­natural dangers such as earthquakes, floods, fires, or pollution ­originating in the country. Sovereignty The exact meaning of sovereignty is not simple to establish. It is discussed at some length in Annex A [following the conclusion of this p ­ aper], with quotations from eminent authorities, both in general and with reference to the particular problems of Canada. In summary, most of the threats to the legal sovereignty of the f­ ederal government of Canada stem from the extension of international or ­supranational jurisdiction, or from internal constitutional problems with the provinces. They are essentially political problems. There are, as well, unresolved questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction in the waters of the Arctic and on the deeper portions of the continental

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shelf. These include the right of passage between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago, the width of the territorial sea around Canada’s coast, and the extent of the right to control pollution beyond territorial waters. There does not appear to be any challenge to Canadian sovereignty on the Arctic mainland or islands. The presence of a few US troops in Canada resulting from agreements on North American defence are not considered to affect Canadian sovereignty (at least in the legal sense), nor does the economic power and influence of US or international corporations or labour unions. These can reduce the power and independence of the Canadian government without removing its right to make the laws. National Development There does not appear to be much disagreement concerning the meaning of national development in the economic sense. It should be possible to extend the definition to include social and cultural development, using these terms in their broad sense encompassing strengthening of national identity, improvement of the administration of justice, welfare, and education, creation and dissemination of scientific knowledge, and many other activities related to the quality of life in Canada.

Relative Priorities of Security, Sovereignty, and National Development There is a current compulsion to place priorities on everything that we plan to do, although the precise significance of these priorities is not clear. Should we devote some resources to attaining the objective of lowest priority and more to those higher on the list? If so, how do we establish the proportion? Or should no effort at all be devoted to a low-priority objective unless all of those higher up are completely satisfied? For most objectives of concern to national defence (and to external affairs and several other government activities), the relative importance depends on the international situation. This is especially true for security, sovereignty, and national development. If a world conflict can only be prevented by great efforts towards ­deterrence, if one appears imminent, or if one does break out, security becomes the dominant objective. Sovereignty, national development, and most other objectives become luxuries to be put away for the duration. Indeed, any nation which faces a serious threat to its security but

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takes inadequate steps to protect itself may not survive long enough to enjoy the fruits of sovereignty or national development. Israel, the Soviet Union, and China are sacrificing national development in the interests of security, Egypt in the interests of sovereignty. Iceland, Austria, and Finland are sacrificing sovereignty in the interests of security. If there is no immediate threat to security, then resources can be transferred to national development. This occurred in the Western countries right after the two World Wars, and there is pressure to do the same today. The danger in making a complete transfer is that the institutions needed to provide security cannot be built quickly, although they can be dismantled almost overnight. Moreover, their absence offers an invitation for a threat to develop which had been kept in abeyance by their previous existence. Roles of Defence Establishments in the Past Up to the present century, the major countries of western Europe were faced with frequent serious problems of security and sovereignty. ­Armies and navies were used in the pursuit of external security, to deter or oppose invading armies, and also for territorial aggrandizement at the ­expense of a neighbour or in the establishment of colonies. Armed forces were needed to enforce sovereignty in captured territories, and also for the maintenance of the central authority at home. As law and order became better established, the functions of riot control, crime prevention, and law enforcement were transferred to civil police authorities, although some of the police forces in many European countries retain a paramilitary character. The organization of the Canadian government and defence forces followed the pattern of late-nineteenth-century Europe. However, the scale of the peacetime defence establishment before and after World War I was very low, since the security of Canada was not seriously threatened, and help could be obtained from Great Britain. The role of the small defence force was to serve as a training cadre for the larger army which would be recruited from the civilian populace in the event of war. It was assumed (and justifiably so in 1899, 1914, and 1939) that the war would be far away and long-lasting, allowing plenty of time to train green troops. The cycle of slow but far-reaching mobilization of the nation for war followed by rapid and nearly complete demobilization for peace was broken by the onset of the Cold War in 1949 and the Korean War in

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1950. This faced Canada with a new requirement, for professional armed forces large enough to put into the field without augmentation from the mobilization of non-professionals for an indefinite period. There is now, for the first time in a century, a direct threat to the security of Canada. The skills to maintain and fight with modern weapons have become increasingly demanding, and it can no longer be assumed that the time to train a civilian force to an adequate military standard will be available. During the two decades 1949–1969 the Canadian Armed Forces ­devoted virtually all of their efforts to external security. There were no important problems of sovereignty, and large strides were made in ­national development, especially on the economic side. Canadian prosperity owed a lot to the good economic cooperation with the US, probably encouraged by parallel cooperation in defence and other spheres. Possible Roles of the Canadian Armed Forces in the Future The character of the Canadian Armed Forces has been moulded by their historical origin and their recent roles. They have become highly skilled career professionals devoted to the objective of external security. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue about the importance of security, or to discuss the amount of effort which Canada should devote to external security. Let us take as a hypothesis that security is of fundamental long-term importance, but that the external threat to Canada and its allies is on a decreasing part of the cycle at the present time, so that an adequate response can be made with a reduced scale of effort. It is recognized that this assumption is highly debatable, and has been, is being, and will be debated. Let us also assume that the objectives of internal security, sovereignty, and national development are of increasing importance. This is less debatable, and, if accepted, increases the pressure to reduce expenditures on external security. The question then arises as to the possibility of transferring some of the activities of the armed forces away from external security and into internal security, sovereignty, and national development. Can they perform effectively in these other roles? Will it be possible to switch them back effectively to external security in future years if the cycle ­reverses again? Or should the armed forces be reduced and other agencies used to accomplish internal security, sovereignty, and national development? The chief of the Defence Staff has likened national defence to insurance. Unless and until disaster comes, and the money is claimed, the

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insurance funds are not left idle, but are usefully invested. To pursue the analogy further, a large insurance company relies on the statistics of large numbers to predict the probable rate at which claims will be presented. If too many claims were presented simultaneously, it might not be possible to liquidate the invested reserves and pay off. For this reason, the fine print at the bottom of the policy exempts the company from claims arising from insurrections, war, or acts of God. Unfortunately for the armed forces, these are precisely the circumstances under which they will be required to pay off. The expression “liquidate their reserves” is an unfortunate one in this context, but the analogy holds. There are distinct limitations to the extent to which personnel can be diverted from external security if a full capability to return to that function on short notice is to be retained. On the other hand, refusal to divert any activity may simply result in a permanent reduction with no capability at all for rapid return. Obviously the most efficient arrangement would be achieved if new roles supporting these three objectives could be identified, allowing the armed forces to use their present bases, equipment, and training. For control of riot and insurrection this may be possible for Mobile Command and other forces based in Canada. However, in this area, as in many others, prevention is better than cure. Prevention can best be done by social and economic development and by good police work. Crime prevention and law enforcement is another job for the police, although it might be possible to arrange for some support from the armed forces in special situations. However, the role of relief to areas stricken by natural disaster requires good organization and discipline, good transport and medical facilities, and large numbers of physically fit and courageous men. All of these qualities are possessed in abundance by the Canadian Armed Forces. They and Canada Emergency Measures Organization [CEMO] could prepare for disaster relief on an international as well as a national scale. It has been argued above that the threats to Canadian sovereignty (other than those of the supranational or a constitutional type) are all of a maritime nature. It is by no means clear that establishment of a twelve-mile territorial sea, a hundred-mile Arctic pollution zone, control over passages through the Arctic Straits, or the exclusive right to exploit the more distant portions of the Canadian continental shelf will need to be (or even could be) won by military means. However, laws that are opposed need to be enforced, and “historic rights” need to have some real history behind them. Claims to waters that are never sailed

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or commercial rights that are never exploited may be hard to defend in an international assembly or court. It would appear that there are activities suitable to Maritime Command in support of Canadian sovereignty. They may require nuclear submarines to go under the ice, submersibles and divers to operate on the seabed, and ships able to penetrate ice-­ infested waters, as well as long-range patrol aircraft and other instruments of surveillance. If there is a need for land or air forces to patrol and police the land in the north, this should be described as a contribution to national development or law enforcement, but not sovereignty. There may be important opportunities for the Canadian Armed Forces to contribute to economic, social, and cultural development in the north. This would probably require a clear government direction to approve the use of military airlift and construction engineering for projects which private enterprise would prefer to undertake if the rewards were sufficient. However, in an atmosphere of change, where the armed forces were being directed to make basic alterations to their objectives and activities, it should be possible to override the objections of contractors and labour unions in the interests of national development. There will be many activities useful to the economy which are already pursued by the armed forces for military purposes. Examples could include flying training, the control of air traffic, ice reconnaissance, mapping, the interpretation of aerial photographs, fire protection, provision of emergency communications, and the maintenance and repair of vehicles and electronic equipment. Once the armed forces were established in northern localities for sound economic reasons, their presence in small and impressionable communities could be used for social and cultural development as well. It would be important to arrange for cooperation with other government agencies active in the same location. Social and cultural development can take many forms, such as youth programs, adult education and training, medical, dental, and optometric services, encouragement of general physical fitness, and instruction in water safety and firearms. These are much less likely to be needed or appreciated in the large and sophisticated cities than in the small isolated communities which are the most suitable targets for economic development with the aid of the armed forces. It would be possible to select Indigenous communities for special attention.5 One result of a successful program could be to recruit young and healthy members of these communities into the armed forces.

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Search and rescue, already an important service rendered by the armed forces, is particularly important in isolated areas. Another dimension may need to be added with the arrival of commercial activity under water. If a serious redirection away from external security and towards internal security, sovereignty, and national development were made, the rather ­unappealing title of “Canadian Armed Forces” could be a handicap. It would still be important to retain a considerable proportion of the forces on the military duties necessary for external security, and one purpose would be to maintain the entire organization in a state readily convertible back to the external security role. However, the emphasis on arms would be reduced. Roles for the Defence Research Board Although there was some defence research in Canada at an earlier date, the history of the Defence Research Board (DRB) began with the Cold War. It has lived through only one phase of Canadian defence, that of the ­medium-sized professional establishment dedicated to external s­ ecurity. Most of the DRB research program was in support of the armed forces’ ­objectives, but as with most defence research, there was a considerable spinoff to the benefit of economic development.6 In addition, much of the research has contributed to general scientific knowledge, and could therefore be credited to cultural development in the broad definition of that term. If there were a serious effort to redirect the DRB program toward ­internal security, there would be opportunities in the areas of pollution and of natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and fires. The identification of the sources of pollution, whether airborne, waterborne, or in edible material, and the monitoring of safety levels require scientific techniques not yet developed, and could also need aircraft, ships, and a good communication system. A related activity would be the study of the benefits and dangers of pesticides. The study of the origins of and the methods of predicting earthquakes, floods, and fires may belong with [the federal departments of] Energy Mines and Resources, Forestry, or Agriculture, but the development of the techniques for minimizing and containing damage, and carrying out rescue and repair could be a task for the DRB, the armed forces, and Canada [Emergency Measures Organization]. Another task for which the same agencies have prepared in the context of a direct attack on Canada or the US, but which could suddenly assume great significance in the event of a nuclear war between the Soviet

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Union and China, is the monitoring of radioactive fallout and the taking of the necessary precautions in Canada. The measures for internal security involving malevolent or irresponsible behaviour, such as riots, insurrection, subversion, and crime, could benefit by the attention of psychological and sociological as well as physical, chemical, and engineering research. Development of devices and methods of crowd control should be pursued in close cooperation with the police and armed forces. Certain other public dangers, such as road or air accidents, probably fall into the jurisdiction of other government departments, but certainly do deserve continued research. Since the main threats to Canadian sovereignty are of a maritime ­nature, the DRB’s present work in support of maritime forces forms an excellent base for furthering the objective of sovereignty. Increased ­activity on diving and underwater photography could be useful, as could the development of devices for the detection of ships, submersibles, and activity on the sea bottom and the recovery of persons or vehicles ­following an accident. Improved knowledge of ice and weather conditions would be valuable. If Canada should procure submarines for use under the ice, a considerable program of research would be needed. The Science Council of Canada7 has identified six national goals as a framework for the establishment of a sound science policy intended to serve economic, social, and cultural development. These are: • national prosperity; • physical and mental health and high life expectancy; • a high and rising standard of education, readily available to all; • personal freedom, justice, and security for all in a united Canada; • increasing availability of leisure and enhancement of the opportunities for personal development; • world peace, based on a fair distribution of the world’s existing and potential wealth. DRB programs have already contributed to national prosperity with the airborne doppler navigation system, Arctic communication, components for electronic systems, improved electric batteries, and other developments pursued for military purposes. Lasers may soon be ­ ­another example. The Industrial Research Program is intended to foster economic development. It would obviously be possible to redirect DRB ­research further in this direction. Special emphasis could be placed on economic development of the Arctic or the seabed, or on reclamation of

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waste, since these would contribute towards enhancement of sovereignty and reduction of pollution. However, the DRB should not aim at the sane objectives as the National Research Council or other research agencies of the federal government, and should retain a significant r­ esponsibility for research in the area of external security. Considerable DRB contributions to physical and mental health have been made as a result of military programs, in such areas as the practice of medicine and the design of clothing for the Arctic; mass immunization and the control of epidemics; protection against insects; research on respirators; detection of, protection against, and treatment for exposure to radiation; and the study of group behaviour under conditions of stress, and techniques of crowd control. This type of research can be continued and extended, perhaps to include morale and motivation. Study of the effects of noise and means to abate it are being undertaken but could be extended. The military world faces a constant and heavy requirement for training and retraining in a wide variety of skills, including language, leadership, management, and many highly technical specialties as well as those needed for proficiency in combat. Not only the techniques of training, but also the testing of aptitudes, selection of recruits, and management of large numbers of instructors and pupils are involved. Systems analysis and computer science can be used to good effect. There is an obvious carryover to civilian problems of adult education and training. Military systems require elaborate and effective means for the collection, sorting, dissemination, and display of information. This applies to operational information such as the movement of ships and aircraft, but also to intelligence of a technical or strategic nature. There is a certain similarity to the requirements of police work, including crime detection, identification, and apprehension of criminals, as well as crowd or traffic control. Automatic intrusion alarms have both military and civilian uses. Improved communications, including wise choice of content as well as the technical means of transfer of information, can contribute to ­national pride and a sense of unity. So can the development of leadership and discipline, [as is] always stressed by the armed forces. In connection with the storage and retrieval of information, the increasing tabulation of personal and private records in central computers raises the possibility of the improper use of confidential information. The p ­ recautions necessary to ensure the responsible handling of these data are similar to those used to protect classified defence information. Defence science is not particularly directed towards personal development or the improved use of leisure time. However, a dedicated research

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scientist continues personal development throughout his career, and many persons associated with the armed forces have been able to pursue personal development in many ways, such as service in many parts of Canada and in foreign countries, learning of languages, and acquiring skill in sports and hobbies. Many outdoor sports such as rifle shooting, parachute jumping, and skiing have roots in military life, as do improvements in equipment and safety practices. The last goal of world peace takes us right back to the beginning: security. This has always been the prime goal of the armed forces and the DRB, although they have not addressed themselves to the Science Council’s goal of bringing about a fair distribution of the world’s wealth. Science can contribute to peace in a number of other ways, as well as increasing the effectiveness of our armed forces. For determination of defence and foreign policy, and to make ­helpful contributions in international councils, a background of research is necessary in strategic problems and international relations. This type of ­research is not done by physicists, chemists, and engineers in laboratories, but it is nonetheless defence research. This can include research into arms-control measures as well as improved weapons systems. Other research in the area of the social sciences includes sociological studies of communities in which peacekeeping operations are being, or may be, conducted, and of the basis of hostile relationships which may lead to conflict. Lessons learned by military units concerning such matters as diet and hygiene for varied climatic conditions are available for general use in the developing countries. One policy decision which would have to be faced, and which might require some change in the organization and procedure for establishing the DRB program, is whether the majority of DRB research should continue to be directly in support of the armed forces. It could be that the contributions of the forces and of the DRB towards the objectives of internal security, sovereignty, and national development would be most effective if pursued in different areas. Conclusions The main objective of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Defence ­Research Board has been to further external security, although this has not precluded contributions to economic development as a by-­product. If the world situation allows reduced Canadian effort towards the

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objective of external security during the next few years, and there are other objectives demanding increased resources, then a transfer of effort is indicated. A key decision then must be made as to whether the [armed forces] and/or the DRB should transfer some to their effort towards these other objectives, or should be reduced in size but continue to specialize in external security. In the second case, other agencies would need to expand in order to advance the other objectives. Three objectives which appear to be increasing in importance are ­internal security, Canadian sovereignty, and national development. Both the [armed forces] and the DRB have the facilities, skills, and personnel to make increasing contributions towards all three. Moreover, by selecting the new activities properly, it should be possible to retain the facilities, skills, and personnel which may be required on short notice in the event that a major effort towards external security should be required again. A transfer of this type will require important changes of attitude both inside and outside of the DND. The armed forces will have to accept ­responsibilities that will weaken their former individual concentration on external security and preparation to engage in various types of w ­ arfare on very short notice. Certain civilian interests may have to a­ ccept the presence of the defence department in activities from which they have formerly been excluded. A transfer of the objectives of DRB r­esearch should not pose difficult problems. General acceptance of such a redirection might be easier to obtain if certain titles and definitions were altered, broadened, or extended. ­Today “defence,” “security,” and “armed forces” suggest battles, ­bombings, and barbed wire. But there can be defence against subversion, crime, trespass, poverty, and ignorance. There can be security against injustice, floods, pollution, or intolerance. The forces to provide such defence and security may not need to be armed. As a final caution, however, the main justification for using the armed forces and the DRB rather than other agencies to further these objectives is to retain as much power as is needed to ensure external security today, and to retain the capability to redirect all of their ­resources back to external security, quickly and effectively, should this become necessary. However, this is not the only justification; in many roles the special skills and disciplines of the armed forces and the ­specialized research capabilities of the DRB could make them the logical bodies to undertake certain civil tasks on the grounds of efficiency and economy alone.

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Annex A

Sovereignty The Oxford Dictionary defines sovereignty as “supremacy in respect of power, domination, or rank; supreme dominion, authority, or rule.”8 The Encyclopaedia Britannica says that “the old distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign States has ceased to exist. A sovereign State is now obsolete. Even the United States is not absolutely sovereign. There is no State more rigorously bound by treaties.”9 Hans Morgenthau, in “Politics Among Nations,”10 has a chapter on sovereignty, certain key points of which will be outlined below. He begins with the statement that, “despite the brilliant efforts of a few outstanding scholars, there is much confusion about the meaning of the term, and about what is and what is not compatible with the sovereignty of a particular nation.” Morgenthau devotes much attention to the distinction between national and international law. In one paragraph he says: The doctrine of sovereignty has retained its importance throughout the modern period of history, and in the conception of popular sovereignty it has provided the national democratic state with a potent political weapon. Yet it has also been subject to reinterpretations, revisions, and attacks, ­especially in the field of international law. The source of these doubts and difficulties lie[s] in the apparent logical incompatibility of two assumptions that are of the essence of modern international law: the assumption that ­international law imposes legal restraints upon the individual nations and the ­assumption that these very same nations are sovereign – that is, the ­supreme law-creating and law-enforcing authorities – but not themselves subject to legal restraints. In truth, however, sovereignty is incompatible only with a strong and effective, because centralized, system of international law. It is not at all inconsistent with a decentralized, and hence weak and ineffective, international legal order. For national sovereignty is the very source of that decentralization, weakness, and ineffectiveness.

Discussing law enforcement, he says: “[O]n a given territory only one nation can have sovereignty – supreme authority – and no other state has the right to perform governmental acts on its territory without its consent. In consequence, all enforcement actions, provided for by international law, short of war, are limited to the exercise of pressure upon the recalcitrant government – such as diplomatic protests, intervention,

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reprisal, blockade – all of which leave intact the territorial sovereignty of the lawbreaking nation.” A section entitled “What Sovereignty Is Not” includes the statement: Sovereignty is not actual independence in political, military, economic, or technological matters. The actual interdependence of nations in those matters and the actual political, military, and economic dependence of certain nations upon others may make it difficult or impossible for certain nations to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies, but it does not normally affect their supreme law-giving and law-enforcing authority within their own territories – that is, their sovereignty. They may be unable, because of prevailing actual conditions, to enact and enforce the kind of laws which they would wish and which more powerful nations are able to enact and enforce. But the authority, within the limits of their obligations under international law, to enact and enforce the laws they please is not thereby abrogated. The actual inequality of nations and their dependence upon each other have no relevance for the legal status called sovereignty.

In a section headed “How Sovereignty Is Lost,” we find the following paragraphs: [S]overeignty points to a political fact. That fact is the existence of a person or a group of persons who, within the limits of a given territory, are more powerful than any competing person or group of persons and whose power, institutionalized as it must be in order to last, manifests itself as the supreme authority to enact and enforce legal rules within that territory ... [T]he [US] federal government is today sovereign within the territory of the United States; for there is no supranational authority which could challenge its power, nor are there sectional or functional authorities within its territory which could think of doing so. This sovereignty, no less than the sovereignty of the French monarchy in the sixteenth century, is the r­ esult of the actual distribution of power in the state. It is, therefore primarily the result of the Union’s victory over the Confederacy in the Civil War. If the ­supreme authority of the federal government within the territory of the United States were to be whittled down by political or economic organizations strong enough to legislate for themselves and enforce their laws without ­effective control on the part of the federal government, a situation might arise similar to the one that confronted the emperor of the Holy R ­ oman Empire when at the end of the Middle Ages the territorial states substituted their own supreme authority for his. The United States would then split

Canadian Security, Sovereignty, and National Development  147 up into a number of territorial or functional units that would be actually sovereign although the federal government might still for a time, like the ­emperor, retain the legal attributes and the prestige of the sovereign power. Effective international control of atomic energy, in view of its actual ­military and prospective economic and social importance, would make the power of the agency exercising the control paramount within the territory of its operation. As a matter of political fact, such an agency would exercise supreme authority within the territory concerned; its control would be ­supranational rather than international. The national governments, ­however great their autonomy might be in all fields other than atomic ­energy, would have lost their sovereignty. It has been said frequently ... that while the permanent members of the [United Nations] Security Council have retained their sovereignty, the other members of the United Nations have lost theirs ... [I]f a majority vote could put the instrumentalities of law enforcement of the individual states at the disposal of the United Nations to be applied against any recalcitrant member, then the Security Council would indeed have supreme authority over the member states who are not permanent members of the Security Council. It, instead of the government of those states, would be sovereign.

However, the author goes on to show that “the potentialities for s­uperseding the national sovereignties with the sovereignty of the ­Security Council ... [are] incapable of realization at present or in the foreseeable future.”

Canadian Sovereignty If the preceding points of view are accepted, any threats to the sovereignty of Canada appear to lie in the areas of federal-provincial relations, the waters of the Arctic, and the seabed on the continental shelf. Agitation for a stronger United Nations, stronger international law, and for supranational controls over such activities as arms control or control of nuclear energy are in opposition to the enhancement of Canadian sovereignty. Since these developments are supposed to be favoured by the Canadian government, it does not seem logical to place “enhancement of Canadian sovereignty” at the top of the list of overall national goals. The government press release respecting Canadian participation in NATO11 referred to sovereignty in two passages: “The precise military role which we shall endeavour to assume ... will depend in part on the role assigned to Canadian forces in the surveillance of our own territory

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and coast lines in the interests of protecting our own sovereignty.” And, in summary, “[w]e shall maintain appropriate defence forces which will be designed to undertake the following roles: the surveillance of our own territory and coast lines, i.e. the protection of our sovereignty.” In a statement in the House of Commons on Canadian sovereignty [on 15 May 1969],12 Prime Minister [Pierre Trudeau] used the following words: “I have already informed the House that Canada’s sovereignty over its Arctic regions, including the islands of the Arctic Archipelago, is well established and that there is no dispute concerning this matter ... ­Canada’s sovereign rights over the continental shelf in the Arctic follow from Canada’s sovereignty over the adjacent lands, and again there is no dispute on this matter. No country has asserted a competing claim to the resources in question; no country has challenged Canada’s claim on any other basis, and none can do so under international law.” However, note the following: “It is also known that not all countries would accept the view that all the waters between the islands of the Archipelago are ­internal waters over which Canada has full sovereignty. The contrary view is indeed that Canada’s sovereignty extends only to the territorial sea around each island. The law of the sea is a complex subject which, as can be understood, may give rise to differences of opinion. Such differences, of course, would have to be settled not on an arbitrary basis but with due regard for established principles.” The First Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development13 contained a section labelled “Arctic Sovereignty,” with the following paragraphs: Your Committee rejects the suggestion that an international waterway exists through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The Committee does not accept the assertion that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, which are ice locked and traversable by motorized vehicle for 7 or 8 months of the year, and through which no international maritime route, commercial or otherwise, has existed heretofore, are analogous to the waters of the Pacific Archipelagos or other areas of the world where international maritime trade routes have existed for centuries. The waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago lie over the continental shelf; the Arctic islands and the continental shelf are a geological extension of the Canadian mainland and the North American land mass ... Your Committee considers that the waters lying between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago have been, and are, subject to Canadian Sovereignty historically, geographically, and geologically ...

Canadian Security, Sovereignty, and National Development  149 Your Committee recommends that the Government of Canada indicate to the world, without delay, that vessels, surface and submarine, passing through Canada’s Arctic Archipelago are and shall be subject to the sovereign control and regulation of Canada.

Two bills now before Parliament bear on this subject. C-202, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Bill, is an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction for the prevention and control of pollution out to a distance of 100 miles from every point of Canadian coastal territory above 60°N. But it is not a claim to sovereignty.14 Bill C-203, the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act, extends territorial waters from three to twelve miles, and does therefore increase the area of Canadian sovereignty.15 In particular, note the statement: “The Canadian Government is aware of the USA interest in ensuring freedom of transit through international straits, but rejects any suggestion that the Northwest Passage is such an international strait”16 And from Secretary of State for External Affairs [Mitchell Sharp]: “Canada has always regarded the waters between the islands of the Arctic archipelago as being Canadian waters. The present government maintains that position; and ... there is no abandonment of these claims whatever in the legislation that has been put forward here.”17 And later: “What then is the effect of the 12-mile limit with respect to the Northwest Passage? It is known that the United States regards the waters of the Northwest Passage beyond three miles from shore as high seas. I think I have already demonstrated the weakness of the legal basis for such an assertion ... Since the 12-mile territorial sea is well established in international law, the effect of this Bill on the Northwest Passage is that under any sensible view of the law, Barrow Strait, as well as the Prince of Wales Strait, are subject to complete Canadian sovereignty.”18 Bill C-203 also provides for the extension of fishing zones in certain areas such as the Gulf of St Lawrence and Queen Charlotte Sound. The United States has objected to both of these bills. A press release states: “International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdictions on the high seas, and the USA can neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction.”19 Another difference of opinion concerning maritime jurisdiction, if not sovereignty, is brewing in connection with the rights to commercial exploitation of the seabed. Canada subscribes to the 1958 UN Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, which “recognizes that a coastal state has sovereign rights, for purposes of exploration and exploitation of natural resources, over its continental shelf defined as: ‘the seabed and the

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sub-soil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.’” A number of the members of the United Nations, led by Malta,20 have been pressing for a limitation to the national rights of the coastal states on the seabed, and a dedication of the major portion to the UN, with the economic proceeds to be shared among underdeveloped and landlocked countries. A very recent statement by President Nixon21 indicates that the US may also oppose extended jurisdiction by coastal states, but the implications are not clear. It seems clear that many disputes lie ahead regarding the law of the sea. As the prime minister said: “It is well known that there is little or no environmental law on the international plane and that the law now in existence favours the interests of the shipping states and the shipping owners engaged in the large scale carriage of oil and other potential pollutants. There is an urgent need for the development of international law establishing that coastal states are entitled on the basis of fundamental principle of self-defence, to protect their marine environment and the living resources of the sea adjacent to their coasts.”22 And, referring to sovereignty over Arctic passages, Professor Johnston says “the extent of national environmental authority over Arctic waters has generally been regarded as limited by the traditional principle of the freedom of the high seas. The propriety of this general assumption is now the subject of intensive debate among specialists on the international law of the sea.”23 Later, the same author writes: “Most of the Canadian Arctic sector consists of solid ice. The extent of Canadian sovereignty over the ice has long been the subject of debate among lawyers. Analogies with land and water have been placed in competition with common sense ... [T]he legal status of Arctic waters close to the Canadian land mass and islands has never been established beyond question in international law, and consequently it is not settled whether there has ever been a right of innocent passage in these areas.”24 To summarize, Canada does not seem to face any challenge to its territorial sovereignty on the mainland or the Arctic islands. But there is the prospect of considerable international opposition regarding sovereignty over the waters between the Arctic islands, jurisdiction over offshore ­waters for control of pollution, and jurisdiction on the deeper portions of the continental shelf. There is another area in which it is sometimes claimed that ­Canadian Forces are needed to protect sovereignty. A government statement

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[respecting Canadian participation in NATO] declared that, “[t]o the extent that it is feasible we shall endeavour to have those activities within Canada which are essential to North American defence performed by Canadian [F]orces.” It is not clear that this should be considered as a contribution to sovereignty, at least in the legal sense used above. In the same general sense, the extensive holdings in Canada of large American and international corporations is not a threat to our legal sovereignty, although it does represent great economic power beyond our national control. There are other examples, such as the affiliation of Canadian labour unions with American or international bodies, which represent the internationalization of many of the world’s important activities. ­Internationalism can be in conflict with nationalism without being a threat to legal sovereignty. This paper takes the view that sovereignty is essentially a legal concept. In the worlds of economic and military affairs, or even labour, social, and cultural affairs, it is more meaningful to speak of power and influence rather than sovereignty.

1972

Canadian Maritime Strategy in the Seventies

As chief of the Defence Research Analysis Establishment of Canada’s Department of National Defence, George Lindsey often directed and participated in OR studies concerning Canadian defence policy and Canada’s participation in i­nternational maritime activity. This paper does not necessarily represent the opinion of the ­Canadian defence establishment, but Lindsey does outline i­mportant military and non-military aspects of Canada’s maritime strategy prior to and during the 1970s.1 Collectively the detail Lindsey describes shows the breadth and diversity of C ­ anadian involvement with maritime affairs during the mid-point of the Cold War. Compared to the problems of British naval strategy or German navalism prior to WWII, or to American naval strategy subsequent to WWII, Canadian maritime strategy in the 1970s is a very minor and unimportant subject. It is unlikely to have much significance on the world stage whether it is conducted well or badly. But it could have very considerable significance for Canadians, and just possibly for all North Americans. Those professionally concerned with the planning of Canada’s ­maritime strategy are looking for all the help they can get from whatever source may be of use. I think it quite possible that history can be of considerable use. But it could be history of subjects that do not first suggest themselves in the context of naval strategy – perhaps the history of mankind’s search and conflict for sources of food and raw materials, or his quarrels over national boundaries, rather than the selection of the maximum tonnage of battleships. Or perhaps the history of the means by which national policies are altered under the British system of parliamentary government with an apolitical public service, rather than a blanket condemnation of militarism or of woodenheaded admirals. And it occurred to me during the extremely interesting discussion yesterday that if we are still discovering new material and struggling to

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resolve conflicting interpretations of events that occurred fifty years ago, we could afford a little charity toward the poor officers, officials, and politicians who are struggling to predict developments that have not yet happened at all. Naval Developments Prior to the Seventies Before discussing Canadian maritime strategy for the nineteen seventies, it is probably desirable to spend a few minutes recalling some of the main changes of the forties, fifties, and sixties. The main Canadian maritime role during World War II was anti-submarine protection of the North Atlantic convoys. The Royal Canadian Navy manned and operated a large number of small escort vessels,2 and the Royal Canadian Air Force flew maritime patrols. Canadian maritime forces also fought in the English Channel, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific, but the most important contribution was to the Battle of the Atlantic. Between 1946 and 1955, the Soviet Union built up the largest fleet of attack submarines ever seen. The member countries of the Atlantic ­Alliance prepared for another Battle of the Atlantic, equipped themselves with escort destroyers, maritime patrol aircraft, and escort ­carriers,3 and made plans for the control of merchant shipping and the sailing of convoys. The Canadian role was escort of convoys, for which we had an ­escort carrier, destroyers, and frigates. Our ships did not have sufficient speed to escort fast carrier strike groups. The versatile capabilities of the force are well described in a paragraph from the Naval Historical Section: For over three years these hard-working little ships joined their colleagues in the United Nations force and the [Republic of Korea] Navy in performing a great variety of tasks: maintaining a blockade of the enemy coast; ­protecting the friendly islands on both coasts from amphibious assaults and sneak raids; providing support for the coastal flanks of the United ­Nations armies; bombarding Communist installations, gun emplacements, troop concentrations and road and rail lines along both the east and west coasts; screening the United Nations carriers from the ever present threat of ­submarine and aerial attack; supporting the numerous friendly guerrillas and [South Korean] regulars in their unremitting harassment of the ­enemy mainland and islands; bringing aid and comfort to the sick and needy of South Korea’s isolated fishing villages; and performing the countless other tasks that fell to the lot of the UN destroyers serving in the waters around Korea.4

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During the interval from 1956 to 1963 doubts began to be felt concerning the plausibility of a long “broken back” war of attrition, in which the success of the NATO forces would depend on supplies fought across the Atlantic over a long period. It was not believed that the devastation of ­nuclear war could be endured for long, or that seaports and inland communication would remain able to move supplies even if the ships succeeded in reaching land. Also, the technical problems of convoy protection became more severe when they were threatened by nuclear weapons, delivered by air-to-surface missiles or ship-to-ship missiles. In order to prevent the loss of several ships to one weapon, it became necessary to increase the spacing between adjacent ships. This extended the perimeter of the convoy and made it easier for a submarine to penetrate the protecting screen unless the number of escort ships was greatly increased. And, to add to the vulnerability, the presence of a convoy at sea and its precise location were likely to be discovered by reconnaissance aircraft or satellites. The chief advance in anti-submarine technology came with improved sonar, including substantial advances in sonobuoys, which e­ nabled an aircraft to detect a submerged submarine by acoustic means. In 1956, the aircraft carrier HMCS Magnificent helped to transport the C ­ anadian contingent to the United Nations Expeditionary Force in Egypt. Between 1964 and the present day the probability that it would be necessary to protect large merchant convoys appeared to be further ­reduced. Nuclear-powered submarines appeared in large numbers, faster than the surface ships designed to fight them and not requiring to come to the surface for weeks on end. In addition to the usual anti-ship torpedoes, some Soviet submarines were armed with surface-to-surface missiles able to engage ships or land targets. But most important of all were the ballistic missile-firing submarines, which soon replaced the strike carriers as the main maritime weapons for strategic deterrence. Ship-based anti-submarine weapons were given greatly extended range by the use of rockets to propel torpedoes through the air to the vicinity of the target, after which they entered the water and homed on their target. And an even better weapon was the destroyer-borne anti-submarine helicopter, equipped with dipping sonar for detection and torpedoes for attack. Sonar mounted on the ship’s hull was supplemented by variable depth sonar, towed behind a destroyer at the best depth for the water conditions. The chief quarry of the Canadian anti-submarine forces now became the ballistic missile submarine instead of the attack submarine, and to an increasing extent the quarry was propelled by nuclear rather than diesel-electric engines.

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In 1964 the Canadian carrier HMCS Bonaventure helped to transport heavy equipment for the United Nations force in Cyprus, but in 1971 she was withdrawn from service. Three operational support ships were acquired, and three 0-class diesel attack submarines. About half of the destroyers were converted to carry anti-submarine helicopters. Necessary Areas of Canadian Maritime Activity The Defence White Paper of 19715 defined four major areas of activity for the Canadian Armed Forces: a. the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines, i.e. the protection of our sovereignty; b. the defence of North America in cooperation with US forces; c. the fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and d. the performance of such ­international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume. Maritime forces have roles to play in all four areas. To begin with the roles which are clearly military but nevertheless necessary in peacetime, there is the surveillance of waters (including ice-covered waters) for submarines or other foreign military activity, and the contribution to ­NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic. In the twilight between peace and war there is support of United Nations peacekeeping, maritime support of NATO flexible response, and the delivery and supply of an air/ sea transportable force to the NATO northern flank. In the event of war, it would be necessary to conduct surveillance and control of the waters in the vicinity of Canada for missile submarines, attack submarines, warships, aircraft, and hostile activities by trawlers. It would be necessary to provide protection for friendly shipping, including mine countermeasures, and to escort task forces. In peacetime there are a number of necessary non-military maritime activities to be conducted by the Canadian government, many of which are suitable for the military forces acting in concert with other departments. In this paper the term “Canadian maritime strategy” will be interpreted to include consideration of national maritime activities that may be essentially non-military. It is a considerable list, on which we find seaborne trade, fisheries, navigation, Arctic resupply, icebreaking, ice reconnaissance, provision of weather information, search and rescue,

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control of pollution, control of exploitation of the seabed, control of customs and immigration, cable repair, and oceanographic research. The principal non-military activities will now be discussed before ­returning to the military activities. Non-military Maritime Activities

Seaborne Trade and Commerce About half of all the goods produced in Canada are exported. About 35  per cent of Canadian exports and 29 per cent of imports are with countries overseas, nearly all being carried in ships. It is evident that a truly vital interest of Canada is that this trade be able to continue in a safe and efficient manner. We were told yesterday that in the 1920s Admiral Sir Herbert ­Richmond considered the basic requirement for fighting ships to be the protection of the merchant fleet. But in the 1970s it seems to be clearly in the interests of all the important powers that merchant shipping should operate unmolested. It seems probable that common interest will ensure that commerce flows at sea unless international disagreements reach a very dangerous state indeed. And those areas where interference with merchant shipping by armed force might occur in situations short of global war are so far from Canada that our own maritime strategy does not need to place much emphasis on protection of commerce except in the event of a major crisis involving our allies as well as ourselves.

Food from the Sea The ever-increasing population of the world produces a corresponding need for more food supply. Fish is a particularly desirable food because of its high protein content, an essential component of a healthy diet not easily or cheaply supplied through agriculture. Modern methods, i­ncluding scientific search for fish and the provision of large factory ships moving with the fishing fleet, enable enormous catches to be taken. Since 1938 the world fish catch has more than tripled. But the resources of the ocean are not limitless, and the continued harvest of fish of several important species is already endangered. It is evident that the overall well-being of mankind would be improved by controlling the locations, types, and quantities of fishing in such a way as to limit the catches to match the “maximum sustainable yield.” Efforts to arrange this by

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i­nternational agreement failed to save whales and the whaling industry, but progress is being made in fishing. It may be that the problem can be solved by ­international agreement. However, since some of the best fishing grounds in the world are close to Canada, though beyond territorial waters, our maritime strategy must take into account the need to protect the interests of our fishermen, who rank in the first three among world exporters. Support could take the form of action against fishermen of another country not recognizing rules established by Canada, or of joint ­action by an ­international force to enforce rules agreed by their members but disobeyed by individuals or by fishermen of non-signatory countries.

Prevention and Control of Pollution Oil pollution at sea is a cause of concern for Canada, especially with the discovery of oil in the Arctic, the dangers of Arctic navigation, and the delicate Arctic ecology. However, in addition to the problem of heavy pollution following an accident to a tanker or leakage from a submarine oil well, there is also a need to prevent the careless or intentional deposit of oil, garbage, or other pollutants from ships in coastal waters. Accidents may be prevented by insistence on adequate standards of construction and navigation, intentional transgressions by the expectation of identification and legal action. After an accident, prompt measures by properly equipped teams may prevent or greatly reduce pollution, or expedite the cleanup. All of these are maritime responsibilities, though not primarily matters for the Department of National Defence, and they have been increased in magnitude by the recent passing of the Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act, an initiative not approved by several of the world’s major shipping nations.

Control and Regulation of the Exploitation of Offshore Mineral Resources It is becoming increasingly evident that the valuable mineral deposits existing on and under the surface of the earth are distributed on continental shelves as well as dry land. The sequence of prospecting, drilling, mining, and removing of minerals may be more difficult and expensive on the seabed than on land, but it will be carried out with great economic profit in the coming years. Since there is a greater area of continental shelf adjacent to Canada than to any other country except the Soviet Union, we have a tremendous stake in the matter.

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At present, activities appear to be proceeding in accordance with ­ anadian law, with prospectors and drillers applying for government C ­licences. Their financial investments are so great that it would appear in their interests to obey all regulations meticulously as long as the costs are reasonable. However, questions may arise regarding jurisdiction in areas not clearly on the continental shelf, or disputed by two or more nations. If military installations are ever built on the seabed (such as depots for submarines), there could be an interaction between defence and civil activities, even to the extent of arms-control inspections being demanded by international bodies. Canadian maritime strategy must take account of the economic importance of the seabed, especially on our large continental shelf, and of the likelihood that international disputes are going to arise concerning jurisdiction on the ocean floor.

Other Non-military Maritime Activities Search and rescue, both on sea and land, occupies a considerable effort in flying time of aircraft and, on occasion, in diversion of ships. Operations are coordinated by the Department of National Defence and the Ministry of Transport. Some aircraft are specially equipped for this role. Several government agencies are involved in the safety of shipping, for which it is necessary to provide navigation aids, charts, meteorological information, wharf maintenance, dredging, and many other services. Icebreaking, Arctic resupply, and ice reconnaissance are other important services, which will probably need to be expanded considerably as activity in the Arctic increases. The regulation of customs and immigration is mainly a matter of enforcement on land, but is supplemented by a fleet of small vessels operated by the Marine Division of the [Royal Canadian Mounted Police]. Research and data collection for hydrographic, oceanographic, fisheries, and defence purposes is carried out by several departments. To date, oceanographic research cruises have not been subject to international restrictions, but there are moves on the part of some of the underdeveloped countries to control the extent of the surveys, which can only be done by nations possessing advanced equipment.

The Law of the Sea The law of the sea has developed over a long period in which the free movement of seaborne commerce was desired by nearly all important

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countries, and in which there were enough fish for everyone, although it might be necessary to go far from home to find them. In the future, it seems probable that a nearly universal wish for safe and easy passage of merchant shipping will continue. However, as has already been indicated, a number of new factors are emerging which are likely to cause serious conflicts of interest among nations. It may not prove possible to obtain international agreement to modified laws, and disputes are likely to arise regarding boundaries of jurisdiction. Of concern to Canada is the s­tatus of the passages between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago, the boundary of jurisdiction on the seabed between Newfoundland and St Pierre and Miquelon, and between Nova Scotia and Maine. Legal ­jurisdiction over ice floating on the sea is not certain. It is not suggested that Canadian claims will be established by winning naval battles. But it is suggested that when laws are in dispute it may be necessary to conduct surveillance and inspection in order to be aware of activities and to uphold claims by national presence with a capability for defence and enforcement. Military Maritime Activities

The Support of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence There can be little doubt that the central theme of Western military strategy, and very probably also that of Eastern, is the maintenance of stable strategic nuclear deterrence. The balance of deterrence depends on three offensive systems (bomber aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and missile-firing submarines) and four defensive systems (air defences, ballistic missile defences, anti-submarine defence, and civil ­defence). Air defences can use airborne early warning systems flying over the sea, and ballistic missile interception systems of the future may be based on ships or aircraft flying over the sea. However, the two systems of purely maritime character are the missile-firing submarines and the defence against the missile-firing submarines. The most effective missile-firing submarines are nuclear-powered and carry sixteen ballistic missiles (submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs) which can be launched underwater. These nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines are designated as SSBNs. They usually operate alone, and if some sort of protective escort were desired it would probably take the form of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Canada does not contemplate any role in the operation or escort of SSBNs.

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An interesting debate can be produced regarding the contribution of anti-submarine defence to the preservation of stable nuclear deterrence. It starts with the hypothesis that a state of mutual deterrence e­ xists if both opponents possess a force of offensive weapons sufficiently numerous, invulnerable, and effective that no matter what attack (the first strike) may be made on them, enough will survive to be able to retaliate (the second strike) against the attacker’s cities and industry to a degree ­beyond what could be endured. The mutual deterrence is also said to be stable if its existence would not be jeopardized by small changes in the forces (or the effectiveness of the forces) on either side, if neither side is required to launch on warning (i.e. before an attack has actually been delivered), and if neither side has any rational motive to attack first (i.e. a pre-emptive ­attack to prevent some action by the adversary). In general, steps to increase the certainty of retaliation in a second strike are stabilizing, while steps which might make it possible for a counterforce first strike to disarm the opponent and make it impossible for him to retaliate are destabilizing. The case against anti-submarine defence is based on the fact that ­SSBNs are such an effective weapon system for second-strike countervalue retaliation. Once at sea they are invulnerable to the opponent’s strategic offensive weapons. Since they are smaller and less accurate than ICBMs, SLBMs are less suitable for a counterforce strike against hardened-point targets such as ICBMs in their silos, but they are quite large and accurate enough to wreak unbearable damage on urban or industrial targets. Therefore, since SSBNs are better for retaliation than for a counterforce first strike, they are stabilizing, and measures to oppose them are destabilizing. The case can be elaborated by three additional arguments. First, there are more ICBMs than SLBMs, and there is not much defence against ICBMs. There is little value in trying to defend against a minor threat until something effective is available against the major threat. Second, submarines are difficult to locate and track, especially when they proceed slowly and silently. Third, even if defences succeeded in locating and tracking SSBNs, they cannot attack them in peacetime in international waters. And if a surprise first strike were launched at a predetermined instant, all the missiles would be gone in a few minutes, after which an attack on the submarine would be too late. The opposing argument is based on the high vulnerability of certain elements of the retaliatory system to surprise attack, the use they can

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make of early warning to reduce this vulnerability, and the fact that the trajectory of an SLBM is much shorter and lower than that of an ICBM, particularly if the submarine comes close to shore before launching. The elements in question are bomber aircraft, especially those based near the coast, and command-and-control centres. An SLBM burst above an airbase would destroy all the bombers on the ground. However, strategic warning (of days or hours) would permit dispersal of aircraft to many bases, mainly inland, while tactical warning (of a few minutes) would allow some of the aircraft to save themselves by taking off before the missile exploded. Command-and-control centres can also take steps to ensure the continuation of their function by such measures as dispersing key personnel to alternate posts (some may be airborne) or into protected locations. Then, if anti-submarine surveillance gives warning of a buildup in SSBNs off the coast or of movements towards the coast, steps can be taken to reduce vulnerability and ensure the capability to retaliate. Even prompt notice of missile launching can result in saving of retaliatory ­capability. So, of course, would the interception of SLBMs in flight or the destruction of SSBNs before they had launched all of their missiles. In answer to the other arguments, the proponents of anti-submarine defence point out that the current rate of building of Y-class SSBNs by the Soviet Union will take them well past the US total (656 SLBMs) by the mid-1970s, while ballistic missile defence will begin to oppose the unchallenged freedom of the ICBMs. And, while location and tracking of submarines is difficult, it is not impossible, and is likely to improve with research and experience. A study of the geography of the North Atlantic shows that most of the firing positions close to bomber bases are closer to the USA than to Canada, but that many of the likely transit routes to these positions come through waters closer to Canada than to any other country. It could well be that a sensible role on which Canadian maritime forces could concentrate would be surveillance and tracking of SSBNs transiting through these waters close to Canada. This function is clearly a stabilizing one, and one more easily done from Canadian bases than others. If effective surveillance in the deep ocean drove SSBNs to choose circuitous transit routes through shallow coastal waters, there would be a case for anti-submarine surveillance on the Pacific and Arctic as well as the ­Atlantic coasts. Surveillance under the Arctic ice could require the development of new techniques, which could be useful for civilian as well as military applications.

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Protection of Shipping: Supply and Resupply on the North Atlantic The great question to be asked in this connection is how likely is it that hostilities could remain at the very high level at which shipping on the North Atlantic was subject to non-nuclear attack, whether by submarines, aircraft, or surface ships, for a long period, without the situation escalating to full nuclear war? Once all-out nuclear war breaks out, it seems most improbable that hostilities will continue for a long period thereafter, with NATO’s fate depending on the maintenance of the Atlantic lifeline. Another non-nuclear Battle of the Atlantic would require a large force of escort vessels equipped for anti-submarine and anti-air warfare, and another force of mine countermeasures ships. Canadian ports and ­airfields would be very important. But it does not appear to be a very probable eventuality.

Limited Nuclear War at Sea The suggestion has been made that the most likely place for a war to escalate to the level at which tactical nuclear weapons are used in combat between military forces, but to remain at that level, is at sea. Here the line of demarcation between tactical and strategic use is fairly clear, the chance of inadvertent wholesale destruction of large communities is minimal, and the number of civilians endangered would not be large. The effectiveness of anti-submarine warfare would be significantly increased by the employment of nuclear weapons.

Support for NATO’s Flexible Response NATO’s plan is to rely on strategic deterrence to prevent general nuclear war, and to be able to produce a flexible response adequate to any provocation short of general nuclear war. Maritime forces are well suited to flexible response. However, it is likely to be in the European theatre that the response would be made, and the present Canadian maritime forces are not well suited to work in a hostile air environment or with fast carrier strike forces. We do, however, contribute a destroyer to SACLANT’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic; are committed to send by air a battalion group to Allied Command Europe’s Mobile Force Land if the latter is deployed to Denmark or Norway; and to send the balance of an air/ sea transportable combat group from Canada to the northern flank in

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the event of an emergency. With our present maritime forces, we could supply anti-submarine escort and air surveillance.

United Nations Operations The United Nations operations in the past have been primarily on land. It is not, however, impossible to imagine an operation against an island or other area largely dependent on supply by sea. Economic sanctions could take the form of a partial or complete maritime blockade. There is a precedent for this in the UN trade sanctions against Rhodesia, in which the Royal Navy has attempted to intercept tankers carrying oil for shipment through Beira to Rhodesia. The Present Strength of the Canadian Military Maritime Forces Professor [Donald M.] Schurman mentioned the importance of materiel in the development of naval strategy, and warned of the danger that, in the absence of a strategic doctrine, decisions will be dominated by questions of materiel. This is especially true in a small navy in times of austere budgets. Remembering the long lifetime of maritime equipment, it is inevitable that today’s forces are the result of a past strategy, and that it will be a long time before a change in strategy today can be reflected in forces with radically different equipment. The saving grace is that maritime forces are inherently versatile and flexible. For those not familiar with them, it may be worth a few minutes to sketch the structure of the present Canadian military maritime forces. There are twenty destroyers, displacing about 2,900 tons, rather slow, and primarily equipped for anti-submarine warfare. About half of them carry one Sea King anti-submarine helicopter, with a crew of four, and equipped with dipping sonar and torpedoes. All have the Limbo mortar for anti-submarine depth bombs, most carry anti-submarine torpedoes, and some have Asroc rocket launchers for anti-submarine torpedoes. Most have variable depth sonar. All have 3-inch automatic anti-aircraft/surface guns. Four new DDH-280-class destroyers will join the fleet in 1972–73. These are four-thousand-ton vessels, each carrying two Sea King helicopters, and also have Limbo, AS torpedoes, a five-inch gun, and Sea Sparrow close-range surface-to-air missiles. We have three Oberon-class diesel-powered attack submarines and one old Tench-class submarine. Two 22,000-ton Operational Support Ships carry three Sea Kings, two 3-inch AA guns, and Sea Sparrow. One 23,000-ton helicopter-and-supply ship carries six Sea Kings.

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A very important component of the Canadian maritime forces are the 32 Argus long-range patrol aircraft. With a 15-man crew and very long endurance, these carry large radar, sonobuoys, anti-submarine torpedoes, magnetic anomaly detectors, and other equipment for maritime reconnaissance. There are in addition shorter-range Grumman Trackers, initially procured for carrier use. They have a crew of four, and carry sonobuoys, torpedoes, and rockets. Possible Future Capabilities In its 1970 report respecting maritime forces,6 the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence recommended the following capabilities for Canadian maritime forces in the period 1973–83: • considerable surface and subsurface surveillance and identification capability; • limited surface and subsurface tracking and localizing capability; • limited surface and subsurface challenge and destruct capability; and • limited self-defence capability. In respect of new equipment, the committee recommended: • the continued maintenance of long-range airborne maritime patrol forces to provide considerable surveillance and identification as well as limited localizing, tracking, and challenge and/or destruct capabilities; • the maintenance of surface forces, with the emphasis on light and fast general purpose vessels to provide limited surveillance as well as limited localizing, tracking, and challenge and/or destruct capabilities; • careful consideration of the possibility of developing and deploying in appropriate locations in Arctic regions bottom-based systems providing these are found to be capable of effective surveillance and identification under ice; and • no acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, given the high estimated cost. Over the long term, our maritime strategy will depend on our a­ nswers to several major questions:

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• What part will Canada elect to play in opposing the missile-firing submarine? (Surveillance? Attack the submarine? Intercept the SLBMs?) • What will be the requirements for the maritime support of NATO? ○○ Is the transatlantic convoy, opposed by submarines, aircraft, and surface ships still an important possibility? ○○ Will there be a requirement to mount and protect smaller task forces? ○○ Will Soviet expansion into new areas, or perhaps the ­increasing ­dependence of developed Western countries on petroleum ­imports, create new naval tasks? • What will be the requirements for international missions such as UN peacekeeping, protection of nationals in time of insurrection, aid to small Commonwealth countries requesting assistance to restore ­order, etc.? • What will be the Canadian domestic requirements? • [More technically], should we continue to design a maritime force with special capabilities in the submarine role, or should we now aim at a more versatile general purpose force? These are many questions indeed. But it would take a real optimist to predict that a country with immensely long coastlines on three of the world’s great oceans will be able to maintain all of its rights and interests in the turbulent seventies, likely to see many clashes of interest on and under the sea, solely by the efforts of diplomats, lawyers, and disarmers, with no requirement at all for some type of sea-going policeman. Indeed, the work of the diplomats, lawyers, and disarmers is likely to be aided by the right type of maritime forces, including those of the smaller as well as the larger countries. The task before Canada’s maritime strategists is to identify the right type of force, and to persuade our authorities to create it in time.

1980

Operational Research and Analysis: Flexible Response to the Needs of Canadian Defence through the Post-war Years

This document is the original draft of an internal memorandum that George Lindsey wrote for the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE), Department of National Defence.1 He explains the operational research program carried out at National Defence by defining OR studies in relation to systems analysis, and highlights the seemingly ever-present budgetary concerns he and his colleagues endured following the unification of Canada’s armed services in February 1968. A salient feature present in many of the documents in this book is the underlying reality of defence spending in Canada during the mid–Cold War years. Operational researcher [scientists] studied cost-effectiveness in order to improve the efficiency of defence spending in Canada, but individual as well as collective job security was also at the fore of the task. Introduction In the early post-war years, while operational research was being ­expanded from its wartime base and applied to other fields, and while the OR societies and literature were just beginning, but before courses on OR were taught in universities, there were frequent debates about the definition of operational research. One, favoured by Philip Morse, the first chairman of the NATO Advisory Panel on Operational Research, was that “operational research is the activity carried out by members of the OR Society; its methods are those reported in our journal.”2 Inherent in Morse’s definition is an attitude of mind very typical of the wartime OR groups. Presented with problems by the military ­organization which they served or, very often, having discovered very real problems which had not been identified and presented to them, they did their best to solve them by whatever methods they could devise.

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Sometimes this required recourse to scientists or engineers with more specialized knowledge than happened to be possessed by members of the OR groups. The objective was to solve the problem, with no restriction on the techniques to be employed. In the Canadian Department of National Defence there has been a continuous effort to maintain this approach. As this paper will attempt to show, the problems presented to the OR groups, or identified by them, have changed in character over the years. The research organization serving the DND has altered in character too, and eventually found itself engaged in studies so different from those typified by the traditional operational research that we altered our name to “Operational Research and Analysis Establishment.” We do not waste time debating which of our projects are operational research and which are analysis. The defence departments of the various NATO nations have all had different experiences with their OR groups. Many groups have remained comparatively small and specialized. Most have retained the separation of army, navy, and air force. Many of the problems of the types not originally associated with operational research have been assigned to specialized groups completely disassociated from the OR groups. Much of the defence research is contracted to organizations in the private sector. In many (perhaps most) cases the policies are determined by institutional reasons particular to each country. This paper does not claim that the method evolved in Canada is the best one, but it is hoped that a brief account of it may be of some interest and possible value to those facing similar problems in the other NATO countries. The scope of the work in operational research and systems analysis in the Canadian Department of National Defence includes direct contribution to the selection and design of future military systems based on military performance, but extends to many other activities as well. However, in a number of cases the existence of the widely based research in the areas of logistics, manpower, economics, and general strategic studies has proven very useful to support the task of selecting and designing a major weapons system. Defence Research, 1939–65 During World War II, the Cold War, and into the 1960s, it was not necessary to ask what defence research was, or to engage in introspection about its objectives. We all knew that defence was concerned with the deterrence or defeat of a foreign enemy, who would use military force if it suited his purposes. Our defence research concerned itself with

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the invention, development, and design of the weapons needed by our armed forces, together with other equipment needed to support the forces. Operational research, in particular, was concerned with the selection of weapons and with improvement of procedures and tactics for the employment of the weapons. The sciences needed for defence research were mostly of the laboratory and equipment type, perhaps fairly characterized as “physical sciences.” Typical defence science symposia in the 1950s or 60s had sessions on explosives and armament, military medicine, military electronics, and sonar. The main concerns of the senior officers in our defence departments included similar subjects. They wanted better explosives and armaments, better military electronics, and better sonar. When the scientists made these things possible, they were developed, manufactured, and issued to the armed forces. No doubt there were problems of budgeting, finance, selection, and procurement, but these seemed to be solved without much publicity or concern. The objectives in most of the planners’ minds and, apparently, in the government’s too, were to get the best possible equipment into service as soon as possible. That was what defence research was all about. To carry it out we needed engineers, physicists, chemists, mathematicians, and doctors. Similarly the operational research on weapons and tactics called predominantly for analysts with background in the “physical sciences,” including mathematics and statistics. Important applications of economic and psychological warfare had been made between 1939 and 1945, and research on selection and utilization of manpower and on training methods continued in the aftermath [of the war]. Most of the researchers in these areas, and some in operational research, had professional backgrounds in economics, psychology, biology, or sociology. However, this type of defence research received low priority in the 1950s and 60s while the application of physical sciences to the design of weapons systems and their employment increased. Extensions to the Scope of Defence Problems and of Research for Defence By the advent of the 1970s it had become much less clear just what the main concerns of a defence department in a country such as Canada should be. More attention was being paid to such things as multitasking, formula financing, program planning budgeting, management by objectives, evaluation, accountability, performance measurement, and

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bilingualism. The acquisition of lethal hardware, although not forgotten entirely, had lost its former eminence. Defence had changed. Evidently the research appropriate for the solution of its problems needed to change too. The meaning of the words “defence” and “strategy” began to be broadened far beyond the tactics and equipment of active combat between highly organized armies on a well-defined battlefield. It began to cover international peace restoration and peacekeeping, preservation of national sovereignty, contributions of the defence establishment to national development, and consideration of the role and place of the soldier in society.3 From the mid-sixties through the mid-seventies, as the real purchasing power of the fixed defence budget shrank and as the amount of new military equipment obtained for our forces was reduced, the most serious decisions facing defence officials and their political superiors in the country had an increasing content of strategic policy and of finance and less of the selection of the products of the latest engineering technology. Questions of manpower and logistics assumed greater importance, those of new equipment and tactics were less and less prominent. The number of personnel in uniform shrank, and the inflating costs of personnel, operations, and maintenance were consuming nearly 90 per cent of the budget, leaving very little for capital acquisition. The importance of such concerns as mobilization, war resources, reinforcement and resupply, and operational readiness, which had assumed priority in the earlier years, faded into the background.4 During the 1970s there [were investigations] into the problems of international stability and into the rationale for Canadian defence forces. These produced a need for a new type of defence research, involving strategic and social studies, many of which have been undertaken by DND’s Operational Research and Analysis Establishment. It is questionable whether they should be described as operational research, but we consider them to be defence analysis. Then, late in the 1970s, the cumulative effect of equipment approaching obsolescence without replacement by modern systems put the ­armaments of the Canadian Armed Forces into a posture that could be neglected no longer. It was decided that substantial sums of new money would be made available for badly needed capital equipment, and that this would be selected and acquired through a carefully controlled and highly systematic planning process, including indexing for inflation. In support of these programs, ORAE found itself engaged in research ­better described as systems analysis than as operational research.

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Organization Prior to Unification of the Three Canadian Armed Forces Until the mid-1960s OR teams worked as a part of the headquarters staffs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Defence Research Board, and with many of the military commands. The largest team formed was the ­Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment. The Army ­preferred to concentrate its operational research in the national headquarters, while the Navy and Air Force chose to place OR sections with their major ­commands as well as in the headquarters. Task setting and daily direction were decentralized. The OR groups working with the military reported to specified senior staff officers. The provision of civilian scientists, however, was the responsibility of the ­ Defence Research Board, as was their personnel administration and ­career management. Small numbers of scientists were also posted to international military organizations and research centres such as the SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] Technical ­Centre or exchanged with allied establishments. In this way the ­scientists could be offered a varied career with opportunities for change and ­advancement; in fact most of them had worked with the staffs of two or even three services by the time unification of the three Canadian armed services became a reality in 1968. Post-unification Organization and Personnel

Organization Integration of the National Defence Headquarters, followed by unification of the three services, produced a far greater organizational upheaval in the Canadian Armed Forces than it did in the operational research community which served them. Integration of the HQ passed through a bewildering series of reorganizations between 1964 and 1968, by which time it became possible to structure the operational research community into a form able to work within the new integrated national HQ, and also to continue to provide personnel for the military commands. The objective of the new organization was to be able to provide a ­central service to any part of the national HQ needing operational ­research or systems analysis, as well as to supply suitable scientific personnel to man OR sections with the operational commands. But instead of simply supplying groups to work under the decentralized direction of

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those offices in HQ to which they reported, the scientists were held on the strength of a central Defence Research Analysis Establishment. They were organized into directorates for internal control, but tasks accepted by the establishment could be parcelled out to teams drawn from more than one of our directorates, as well as from other sources when this was appropriate. Some directorates did most of their work for one sponsor, others had programs responding to the requests of several.

Types of Scientist A common factor in many of the important advances in scientific ­research in the last two decades has been the combination of two or more ­disciplines, formerly considered to be self-contained and, if you like the word, “pure.” In many instances, the hitherto unexplored no man’s land between the specialties has turned out to be extremely p ­ roductive. Thus, in the physical sciences, we are now used to biochemistry and biophysics, and can even tell the differences between geophysics and physical geography. To a certain extent, a cycle which began with the pioneers of “natural philosophy” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has gone full circle. Natural scientists then became specialists, and scholarship divided into distinctly separate channels. But some of these channels are coming together again in the second half of the twentieth century, even in university departments usually considered to be the last bastions of purity and specialization. This combination of backgrounds and disciplines has been a ­natural feature of both operational research and systems analysis throughout their short histories. Some of the character of operational research was determined by the fact that the wartime OR groups were recruited mainly after the mobilization of most of the available chemists, physicists, engineers, and mathematicians for work on projects such as explosives, radar, sonar, weapons, and vehicles. Fortunately, the experience of scientists from fields such as biology or astronomy prepared them for many of the constraints of wartime operational research, including limitations to opportunities to design controlled experiments and to make observations, non-reproducibility of results, and the need to infer conclusions from small quantities of inadequately controlled data. “Systems analysis,” as defined by our organization, is associated with the planning, simulation, and comparison of future systems, whereas operational research is more concerned with existing systems, whose

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operations can be studied in actual practice. If systems-in-being are studied by simulation, the process is usually much simpler than it is for ­hypothetical systems of the future, since the former are constrained by the known capabilities of existing hardware. It is not helpful to try to draw a finer line of demarcation between ­operational research and systems analysis; laws of behaviour need to be deduced from existing systems and, suitably modified, applied to the ­design and analysis of future systems. Neither is it the purpose of this p ­ aper to extol the fruitful combination of the two disciplines of ­operational research and of systems analysis, but, rather, to describe the ­opportunity offered by both, in the sphere of defence research, to use the talents of a variety of the more basic academic disciplines. And, whereas in the 1940s and 1950s these featured mathematics, engineering, and physics, with an acceptance of other semi-quantitative disciplines such as chemistry or biology, now in the 1980s there are opportunities for economists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists. We have managed to preserve the category of “defence scientists” in the Canadian public service occupational groupings, which is highly desirable for our laboratories, and even more vital for the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment. In Canadian defence science it has been our experience that research positions can be filled with greater continuity, and with a consistently better quality of scientist, when the scientist belongs to a group which provides standards of quality and to a loose centralized organization that can match the individual to the task. This should be able to give a reasonable assurance of a varied and progressing career that may be highly specialized or very general, depending on the needs of defence and the preferences of the scientists.5 Activities Instituted in Recent Years

Logistics Analysis Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces offered opportunities to rationalize the supply system, formerly acquiring and feeding three ­ sets of materiel through three separate networks of depots. Quite apart from unification, logistics offers many problems very suitable for analysis, i­ncluding policies for maintenance, repair, and replacement,6 for inventory stocks,7 for handling of lifed [sic] items, and for the provisioning of an initial set of spare parts for a newly acquired ship, aircraft,

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tank, or other major system with a long expected life. In order to provide ­efficient inventory management, progress is being made in the use of automatic dating processing. When the purchase of major new systems is being contemplated, it is important to estimate the total expense likely to be incurred throughout the service life of the system, so that increasing attention is being paid to life-cycle costing.8 This type of logistical analysis has many parallels in industry, but ­important differences are present, too. While cost is a major consideration for any defence department, there is no profit to be made, and it is difficult to impute a realistic cost to a stockout or failure. The variety of items in the military supply system is simply enormous, and the rates of turnover cover a very wide range.9 There is a role for marginal analysis, so that the investment in spare parts can be wisely distributed with regard to risks and costs. This poses a special problem in the initial acquisition of spares for a large new system, when insufficient stocks may result in very large expenditures for reordering at a later date.

Manpower Analysis Rationalization of the supply system had a counterpart in manpower when the Canadian Armed Forces were unified. Many specialized trades could be merged among land, sea, and air, although this posed certain problems in training, rank structure, and pay grading. The number of personnel involved, the large number of highly standardized categories, and the importance of planning careers over a period of many years, all pointed to analysis by mathematical models,10 although the use of computers to deal with personnel problems was, until quite recently, anathema in some quarters. One significant advantage of a good model is to indicate the long-term consequences of an immediate change in policy.11 It may be particularly useful in an area where the system cannot await or tolerate the method of trial and error. Development of the theory of goal programming has been followed by very useful practical results in our analysis of manpower problems in the Canadian Forces.12 Once a good model has been worked out, it can be used to identify changes in important factors such as attrition and retention.13 Another application of analytic methodology to a practical problem in personnel administration has been made to the transfer of servicemen between posts in a particular trade group. Many factors need to be taken into account, with a certain limited degree of flexibility acceptable in most of them. For example, a radar crew established at a strength

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of eight could probably survive for a limited period with only six, but could u ­ sefully ­employ ten. A posting usually set for three years could be ­reduced to two or extended to four. Constraints may need to be applied to ­particular posts or particular individuals, perhaps on grounds of language or medical r­ equirements, whether of the servicemen or his dependents. In general the requirements of the organization can be put into the computer program, and its solution, perhaps specified to minimize moving costs, is then presented and subjected to human veto, which may be ­inserted on grounds of the requirements or particular circumstances of the i­ndividual. When a new constraint is added, the computer presents a new solution to be accepted or modified by the career manager. Another use of this program is to estimate the cost of the annual posting cycle.14

Strategic Studies Since Canada has decided to entrust its security to a policy of collective defence, with the USA in North America and with the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Western world, it is obliged to arrive at its policies for both armament and arms control against the background of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance and against developments tending to strengthen or weaken the stability of deterrence. Many of the analyses of these problems are carried out collectively by groups in the NATO capitals. As in the other capitals, the Canadian analyses involve defence scientists as well as military, diplomatic, and other personnel, including scientists from other government departments. Strategic studies of many types have been undertaken, including assessment of the NATO/WP military balance,15 identification of areas of the world likely to become centres of instability, and examination of competition for sources of energy.16 Attempts have been made to apply various new techniques of forecasting,17 and to investigate other activities in the areas of “futures studies.” Among the many subjects that have received attention should be listed nuclear proliferation, terrorism,18 low-intensity conflict,19 civil defence, Canada’s strategic situation,20 problems in the Canadian Arctic,21 and military use of space. Increasing attention is being directed towards arms control. Over the years Canada has made considerable contributions to the study of the verification of arms-control agreements, starting with extensive air sampling for above-ground nuclear testing and seismic monitoring for underground nuclear testing. Present activity includes analysis of past and present procedures for verification of agreements on numerical and geographical deployment of weapons and forces.22

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With the rise in public concern over the threat of nuclear war, increasing pressure is being generated for a number of measures to be taken which could weaken or destroy the ability of the North Atlantic allies to deter war or to defend against aggression. Many of the proposals, such as unilateral disarmament, no-first-use policy, nuclear-weapons-free zones, nuclear “freezes,” and forgoing of chemical weapons, contain logical fallacies not apparent to their proponents and often not well explained by the media or by academic writers. An increasing proportion of the energies of the strategic analysts within the defence department is having to be expended on public explanation of the point of view of the government, including simple exposition of basic concepts such as deterrence, stability, and balance.23

Economic Studies It has seemed to some of us that economists have neglected defence as a field for their research. Incredible efforts are expended by government analysts on the economic aspects of development, aid, welfare, fiscal policy, and inflation. Many of us are waiting hopefully, if increasingly impatiently, for the solutions to emerge. But defence is a large enough activity to weigh in the national economy, even in Canada, and to pose its own internal problems. This is not a matter of programming and budgeting, but of questions such as the difference between the bills paid by the ­defence department and the real net cost to the country, when allowance is made for taxes, employment, and spinoffs; or the true marginal cost or saving if one ship, aircraft, or other basic unit is added or deleted, while the basic overhead remains in place. ORAE has made studies of the economic contribution of a Canadian Forces base to the surrounding community,24 a subject often raised when consideration is being given to base closures, and of the contribution to the national economy when it absorbs highly trained ex-service technicians.25 At the moment we are involved in a complex study of the relationship between expenditure on capital equipment and on operations and maintenance.

Sociological Studies There are practical problems facing the armed forces that involve applied sociology. Some of the changes that are occurring, such as marriages at a younger age, increased presence of women and of married couples in the forces, and growing reluctance to subordinate the preferences of the

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family to the requirements of the service, are having significant effects on service life and on patterns of retention.26 There is a large ongoing study of the characteristics and problems of military families – that is, families in which the husband, the wife, or both are in the Canadian Forces.27 Studies have been made of the social effects of [Canadian Forces] bases on the surrounding communities,28 and of the reserve forces.29 Another study has investigated the significance of a variety of factors on morale and motivation in combat.30 And, outside the armed forces, we have attempted to identify various indicators that could be used to give warning of internal disorder and unrest. Continuation of Classical OR and Systems Analysis Finally, having traced the new developments through logistics, manpower, strategy, economics, and sociology, let us return to the original areas in which operational research began. ORAE still devotes a large proportion of its effort to the analysis of weapons systems, tactics, and operations, and much of this is done by small OR sections resident with the field commands. Systems analysis has been considerably expanded, in large part to support the major programs of capital acquisition.

OR for the Land Forces For a number of years one of the main activities in support of the land forces has been the research war game.31 At the level of brigade or battalion combat, there is too much fine detail to permit practical computer simulation. So we operate a game which models terrain, intervisibility, mobility, weapons performance, and a host of other factors, and which presents many decisions of human judgment. A great deal of research goes into the rules and probability tables used in the game. It has several variants, the most common being situations faced by a brigade opposing a Soviet armoured assault in Germany or Norway. Either present or future equipment can be assessed. The game can be, and frequently is, used for training instead of research, in which case it proceeds at a faster pace and without the need to keep detailed records.32 But war gaming is not our only activity in support of land forces. We are very much concerned with analysis of many problems concerning land force systems, such as: assessment of possible new tactics for armed helicopters in support of the land battle; development of simulation techniques to study the effectiveness of various ground-based air

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defence systems to protect both our airfields and land forces; studies of the best way to use our tactical aircraft – [reconnaissance], close support, interdiction; determination of appropriate roles for infantry in future ­armoured warfare, and trials of experimental equipment,33 such as in the NATO small-arms trials. These are some examples of problems that have to be resolved by studies or analyses other than war gaming, so that the resources involved can, among other uses, be properly used in the game.

OR for the Maritime Forces The two largest applications of maritime OR and [systems analysis] in recent years have been devoted to support of the acquisition of the long-range patrol aircraft [LRPA], culminating in the procurement of the Aurora, and of the Canadian patrol frigate [CPF], still under study. Planning for the LRPA began about fifteen years before initial delivery, and OR studies had a large part to play in refining the requirements and making the selection, especially as regards the type of avionic equipment to be acquired. Planning for the CPF began about twelve years ago when it was recognized that all the destroyer-type ships, except the four DDH 280 class, would reach retirement age within a span of about ten years. This seemed like an excellent opportunity to take an analytical look at the entire ­Canadian navy, to determine what kind of fighting ships it should comprise by the turn of the century, and if there was a logical and practical way of implementing such a fleet within a set of projected constraints such as money, manpower, [and] technology. The outcome of these early studies suggested that the date by which the first class of ships had to be replaced was so close at hand that there would be insufficient time available to consider anything other than a conventional hull-type ship. Thus, the basic characteristics of the current CPF were determined. Present studies associated with the CPF program are concerned with the types of equipment or systems that should be fitted to give the ship the best fighting capability possible for the money available. Analyses are also concerned with striking an appropriate balance between self-defence systems and attack systems. Looking ahead to the not-too-distant future ship replacement programs, the cramping constraint of time becomes less significant, so that we need not restrict ourselves to considering only conventional type hulls. The characteristics of the follow-on batches of ships are under investigation now in what we call the Future Ship Study,

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which is being conducted along the lines of a NATO long-term scientific study, and involves military (both technical and operational staff) and defence scientists (both laboratory and operational research scientists). Our maritime operational research analysts have also begun to devote some attention to the field of war gaming and to campaign analysis. In the latter activity a probabilistic approach is used, with much reliance on computer models. Some other studies are of a general nature, relating to the maritime roles.34

OR for the Air Force Much of the operational research for the air force has been carried out in the headquarters of Air Command and of the units responsible for air defence, air transport, and tactical air. However, ORAE studies cover subjects such as reconnaissance,35 intervisibility, and defence of airfields. The two main recent activities in OR and [systems analysis] applied to the air environment have been support of the acquisition program for the new fighter aircraft and analysis of search-and-rescue operations. The former has now been completed with the decision to purchase the CF-18A. In this area, attention is now concentrated on the selection of the weapons that the CF-18A should carry. Air search for downed aircraft or ships in distress is a classic problem for operational research,36 but now needs to be modified to take advantage of new devices such as emergency location transmitters, and the search-and-rescue satellite.37

Systems Analysis The activities just discussed in support of land, maritime, and air operations represent some examples of the type of work done by ORAE staff in Ottawa. To a large extent, the analysis done in this area of endeavour results in the production of information concerning future systems to enable the senior military decision makers to make enlightened decisions about future acquisitions. This is the type of work central to the theme of this seminar. The large capital acquisition programs dominate the decision-making process in the Canadian defence department, and are influenced by many factors beyond purely military consideration. The amounts of money are large enough to affect Canada’s balance of payments, ­offer ­opportunities to strengthen industries of strategic importance,

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and provide employment to depressed areas of the country. For these ­reasons it has been the practice to establish a project team with representatives from the different departments of the government charged with responsibility for these various factors. Normally the money to be spent on acquisition is fixed at an early stage. The defence department a­ pplies the techniques of systems analysis to compare the various ­candidate weapons systems from the point of view of military effectiveness in the various roles to be filled, life cycle costs, and logistical ­implications. But it could happen that a candidate rated less than the best, but still a­ cceptable from the military point of view, could be ­selected because of its desirability based on non-military economic and social factors. This is a classic case of suboptimization, using reliable analytical techniques, where full optimization is carried out by less ­systematic methods.

OR in the Field Commands The work done by ORAE staff at the command level is traditional or classical operational research, since it is concerned with the analysis of forces in being, to try to get the best out of what we now own and ­operate. Most, by far, of the OR done at [the] command level is in the area of maritime and air operations. In maritime operations, OR techniques are used to assess current operations and provide intelligence information; they are used to evaluate current weapons systems such as the Mark 46 torpedo now in service; they are used to schedule and control conversion training for the introduction of new systems such as the Aurora aircraft; they are used in the analysis and assessment of ASW exercises. In air operations, some of the problems which have arisen concern the analysis of aircraft attrition statistics; studies of maintenance operations at interceptor bases; development of requirements for an Air Operational Information System; analysis of exercises; development of tactics; and planning and scheduling airlift for operations and exercises. The small OR team co-­located with the headquarters of Canadian Forces Europe has recently been involved in interesting analytical studies concerned with assessing damage to airfields that could be sustained in an air raid;  with the methods and times required to repair damaged airfields; and with the analysis of personnel data to assist in planning of housing and other services. All of the command OR sections have been tasked with developing methodology to handle performance measurement for the respective command operations.

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As well as the research in these comparatively well-defined areas, there is a continuing series of trials and tests conducted by the Canadian Forces. These extend from comparison of the types of dental treatment to the selection of small arms for NATO forces. ORAE provides assistance for the design and analysis of some of these trials. Studies have been done on some of the problems of civil emergency (including both military and national threats),38 and a watch is kept on new analytical techniques to see whether they may be usefully incorporated with our research.39 Concluding Remarks The post-war history of OR and [systems analysis] in the Canadian d ­ efence department has mirrored the experience of the armed forces in many ways. A buildup of well-equipped forces in the fifties offered great scope for the classical type of analysis. The sixties saw the end of e­ xpansion and a growing concern for economy, the seventies brought ­reduction, retrenchment, a questioning of roles, strategy, and even r­ aison d’être, and a much more rigid and systematic approach to the ­major procurement decisions. Questions of logistics and manpower came to the fore, followed by analysis of international commitments, defence priorities, arms control, economics, and social concerns. Now in the eighties there is some sign of a return, part way at least, to re-equipment and training for modern combat. There is an ever increasing demand for ORAE’s services – the ­requirement for classical operational research never markedly diminished even during the period in which few weapons were being acquired. At the same time the growing need to economize on the support of the forces and the growing potential of computer modelling methods to ­allow economies to be effected have increased the number of areas in which analysis can be done, and in fact must be done if the new tools are ­going to be exploited. During the same period the demand for strategic, social, and economic analysis has steadily increased. There has been a change in the type of demand as well as an increase in number. ­Increasingly problems are arising that require quite a few scientist-years to effect solutions. It is still possible to solve some of the problems by the classic “back of the envelope” approach, but these are becoming fewer, perhaps because most of the simpler problems have already been solved. More typically now a group of two to four analysts may have to spend a total of one to four man-years on a problem, a significant percentage of which is invested in understanding the problem in detail and the complex methodologies likely to be needed for its solution.

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Defence science has a contribution to make to all of these matters. Some of the problems are primarily technical, but most require ­knowledge and understanding far beyond the boundaries of the l­aboratory or the textbook. As is the case in the defence laboratories, ORAE tries to ­develop not mathematicians, physicists, historians, or s­ociologists, but professional defence scientists, with a broad experience in the scientific problems of defence and the flexibility to respond to them, whether they are brand new or recognizable as a return of one we have seen before. Our experience in Canada has shown that a permanent group of ­defence scientists and military officers, large and versatile enough to ­apply operational research and systems analysis to many of the problems of a defence department, including strategic, social, economic, logistic, and manpower problems, as well as those of the operations on land, sea, and air, can make very useful contributions to the selection and design of future military systems. Some of the contribution is provided by ­analytical work applied directly to the selection and design of the system, but to this can be added the wide background of information, experience, and analysis collected through continued study of many of the aspects indirectly related to the complex problem of selecting and designing a major weapons system. [Author’s Note on] References The references to reports published by ORAE and its predecessor ­organizations represent a selected sample to illustrate the types of work completed. Only unclassified references have been chosen, leaving a large section of the work (especially in the areas of land, sea, and air operations and planning) unrepresented in the list.

1980

The Realities of Strategic Deterrence and Their Implications for Canada

In addition to his professional work, George Lindsey often presented research to military and public audiences outside the Department of National Defence. ­Researched and written while he was chief of the Operational Research and ­Analysis Establishment at the DND, Lindsey prepared this paper for a presentation to a Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies seminar on “Canadian ­Defence ­Policy for the Future,” given at the Canadian Armed Forces Staff College in Toronto in early May 1980.1 Of particular importance is Lindsey’s analysis of strategic deterrence and Canadian defence policy in relation to Canada’s international position in the North Atlantic security partnership. If strategic deterrence were to fail in western Europe, the consequences for Canada, Lindsey contends, might outweigh any potential gains, either political or strategic. His analysis is a grim r­ eminder of the global reach of Cold War hostilities and the danger posed to Canada. The Realities of Strategic Deterrence The basic strategy of the Atlantic Alliance depends on two concepts: strategic deterrence and flexible response. Strategic deterrence depends on the existence of a family of offensive nuclear weapons of intercontinental range. To be effective and stable in a crisis, these offensive systems need to be supported by defensive systems providing warning of attack, and they must be sufficiently invulnerable that a reasonable proportion of the offensive systems could survive the most effective counterforce attack within the capability of their opponents. One of the realities is that the American triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers, supported by warning and defensive systems and supplemented by comparatively small numbers of British and French

The Realities of Strategic Deterrence   183

offensive nuclear systems able to reach the western parts of the USSR, provide a level of nuclear deterrent power that is quite strong enough and invulnerable enough for the year 1980. Another of the realities is that developments in the technology of offensive nuclear weapons and in the indications of future deployments by the USSR are casting doubts regarding the future invulnerability of two of the three elements of the triad. These doubts would not be removed by ratification of SALT II,2 but could be allayed by certain programs in the current American defence plans. A further reality that has emerged in the 1970s is the condition of parity between Western and Eastern forces for strategic nuclear deterrence. The ability of the USA to inflict unbearable damage on the USSR, which has been unquestionable for at least twenty years, is now matched by an equally unquestionable capability on the part of the USSR against the USA. The consequence of the “essential equivalence” between the two superpowers in their capability to devastate each other has been a reduction in the span of situations for which a threat to use the deterrent would appear to be credible. The stakes involved in a minor or even medium-scale confrontation are unlikely to seem commensurate with the disaster of all-out nuclear destruction of population. The threat of what is figuratively described as “mutual suicide” is an inappropriate response to any challenge of less than the most extreme gravity because it would not seem rational that the challenger would not take it seriously, or be deterred from whatever action he was proposing. This does not mean that the ultimate level of strategic deterrence has ceased to exist, or to have significance. It remains as the very important top step in the ladder of escalation, and a caution against the escalation of violence up the lower steps of the ladder. If either side were perceived to have lost its capability for devastating retaliation, the adversary would attain an advantage of momentous proportions. But it does mean that other additional forms of deterrence are needed, suitable for lower levels of threat, and credible in circumstances where the ultimate sanction is not appropriate. It is for this reason that NATO has developed its strategy of flexible response. In principle, any form of aggression will be met and defeated at its own level. But if defence at the level of violence ­selected by the aggressor should fail to repel or hold the attack, then the defender should be able to threaten or to activate countermeasures at a higher level of violence. In order to fill in the lower rungs of the ladder of deterrence, and to be able to conduct flexible response at any level appropriate to the

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aggression, it has been necessary for NATO to build up both theatre nuclear and conventionally armed forces. And just because the strategy may succeed in holding an attack at a lower level of violence, it is necessary to prepare for a sustained defence over a considerable period of time, probably fought with conventional weapons against an attack confined to the use of conventional weapons. In any sustained defence by the North Atlantic Alliance, with approximately half of its economic power and manpower on each side of the Atlantic Ocean, success will depend on preservation of the sea lines of communication. If these sea lines are challenged by the Warsaw Pact, as seems certain when one considers their impressive naval buildup, and if strategic deterrence is successful in keeping the level of violence to that of conventional weapons, then the issue could be decided on the lines of communication, whether on sea or on land, no less than on the battlefield where the armies are in contact. The realities of strategic deterrence include the vital linkage of theatre nuclear to conventional forces, and to the maritime forces defending the sea lines of communication. The situation in 1980 is that the long-range theatre nuclear weapons of the Warsaw Pact greatly outnumber as well as outrange those of NATO, while NATO probably holds an advantage in theatre nuclear forces of medium and short range. The Warsaw Pact has conventional forces considerably outnumbering those of NATO in Europe, and probably better equipped for offensive warfare on the E ­ uropean central front. At sea, the realities are determined by geography as much as by the sizes and compositions of naval forces. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, the Atlantic Alliance depends on sea communications, and would die if they were severed. This might suggest that the naval forces of the NATO countries should be considerably larger than those of the Pact. In fact, they are slightly smaller as measured by number of vessels, though considerably larger in terms of gross tonnage. The Division of Effort in Providing Strategic Deterrence Before considering the implications for Canada of strategic deterrence, present and future, it is instructive to record some of the current facts regarding the numbers and locations of the major installations within the Atlantic Alliance which provide the offensive and defensive components. In addition, some remarks should be made regarding expected developments in the foreseeable future.

The Realities of Strategic Deterrence   185

The preponderant component of Western strategic deterrence is the American triad. All of the 1,054 American ICBMs are located in the continental USA. [Five hundred] of the Minuteman missiles are in North Dakota and Montana. The ballistic missile submarines, whose numbers have dropped (temporarily) from 41 to 33, are based in North Carolina and Washington State in the USA, as well as in Britain and Guam. They carry 320 Poseidon C3 and 224 Trident C4 missiles, all with multiple (MIRV) warheads. About half of the submarines are kept at sea, in locations within missile range of their strategic targets. [Three hundred and sixteen] long-range B-52 and 60 medium range FB-111 bomber aircraft are based in the USA, together with 615 tanker aircraft to refuel them in the air. Supplementing these intercontinental forces are four British and four French ballistic missile submarines (each one with 16 missiles), 18 French IRBMs [intermediate range ballistic missiles], and 56 British Vulcan, and 170 American F-111 medium-range bombers, based in the UK. All of these represent a direct threat to the western USSR, and are therefore “strategic systems” in Soviet eyes. The land-based theatre nuclear forces of shorter range, which supply an important component of flexible response, include aircraft such as British Buccaneers, French Mirages, and F-4s, Jaguars, and F-104s provided by the British, French, Belgian, German, Italian, and Dutch air forces, all capable of delivering either nuclear or conventional ­ordnance. Nuclear-armed short-range ballistic missiles with the NATO land forces include US- and German-manned Pershing I, French ­Pluton, and Lance, which is with the US, Belgian, British, German, Italian, and Dutch armies. And some of the artillery pieces of the US, British, ­Belgians, ­Germans, Italians, and the Dutch are able to fire shells with either nuclear or conventional warheads. In the category of defensive theatre nuclear weapons, Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles, which can be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads, and atomic demolition munitions, a form of landmine, are operated by the US and several of the European NATO countries. At sea, nuclear deterrence is provided by carrier-based aircraft, both A-6s and A-7s on American carriers, and Étendards on French carriers. The US Navy operates twelve attack carriers, of which two to four are likely to be available in European waters, while France has two. For their function of sea control, nuclear weapons are used for anti-submarine warfare (American [anti-submarine rockets] on ships, [submarine rockets] on submarines, [anti-submarine torpedoes], and both American and British air-delivered nuclear depth bombs), and for anti-air warfare (American Talos and Terrier [surface-to-air missiles]).

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A number of programs are under way to improve NATO deterrent forces, including important new initiatives for offensive nuclear ­weapons systems. The one receiving the most publicity is the MX [­Missile ­Experimental], a mobile ICBM, each one of which will be moved b ­ etween many shelters on a railway loop, so that an attacker would have to expend many warheads in order to destroy one missile. Probably the most important program is for a new SLBM, Trident I, with a range of 4,600 statute miles and armed with seven very accurate MIRVs. Each of the B-52G bombers is to be armed with twenty air-launched cruise missiles. [Four hundred and sixty-four] ground-launched cruise missiles with a range of 1,500 miles are to be deployed in several countries in Europe, as are 108 Pershing II 1,100-mile [medium-range ballistic missiles]. France is building two additional strategic submarines, and is replacing its SLBMs. The F-16, being deployed in Europe, will be armed with nuclear weapons. The American Tomahawk SLCM and Patriot SAM may be armed with nuclear as well as conventional warheads. NATO’s conventional arm of deterrence, probably in the greatest need of strengthening, is the object of a concerted program of improvement, with participation by all the allies already contributing forces, although it may not be sufficient to close the gap between East and West. Relative force size is much more significant for conventional than for nuclear forces, whereas with nuclear weapons, if a force is sufficiently invulnerable, a specified number of weapons may be adequate for a particular facet of deterrence, irrespective of the size of the opponent’s forces. Associated with conventional deterrence is the power and determination to keep open the North Atlantic and Mediterranean sea lines of communication. While the US Navy provides most of the larger ships and nuclear-powered attack submarines for this mission, important contributions of smaller warships and of maritime patrol aircraft are made by Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium. Finally, there are strategic defensive systems, some for surveillance and warning and some for active defence. The most important surveillance systems are space borne, providing photographic and electronic intelligence in considerable detail, but on a time scale better suited to general appreciation of the opponent’s defence programs than to ­urgent ­warning of imminent attack. The most important missile warning ­systems are also in space, able to detect and report the launching of large rockets, and also nuclear explosions on or above the surface of the earth. However, warning of missiles in flight, whether launched from land or

The Realities of Strategic Deterrence   187

sea, and of bomber aircraft, also depends on ground radars. All of the satellites and ground radars for missile warning are American, with ballistic missile early warning stations in Greenland and England as well as Alaska. However, ground radars for detection of approaching bombers are sited in the European countries, and there are two extensive lines across Canada in addition to stations in the continental USA, Alaska, and US bases overseas. As regards the strategic submarines which could launch missiles against NATO territory, surveillance is carried out by the NATO maritime forces, including a substantial contribution by Canada. However, the deployment of SS-N-8 missiles with a range of nearly 5,000 miles made it less likely that preparation for a strike, or a strike itself, need be associated with an approach by the submarines into the waters near the targets. Active defence against missiles in flight was severely curtailed by SALT I, and subsequently abandoned by the USA. But active defences against bomber aircraft are maintained, in the form of interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. In North America, American F-106, F-101, F-4, and F-15, and Canadian CF-101 fighter aircraft are operated, together with the radar systems, under NORAD, for the dual purpose of identifying and controlling penetrating aircraft in both peacetime and war. The Implications for Canada If strategic deterrence should fail, the implications for Canada are fully as serious as for the United States, and only marginally less serious than for the countries of western Europe. The loss of a major land battle in Europe, whether fought with conventional or nuclear weapons, would shatter the foundations of the Atlantic Alliance and of Western collective defence. The subjugation of friendly democratic countries would cast a terrible shadow over our own future. And, if there is an exchange of nuclear weapons between the USSR and the USA, Canada would be certain to suffer heavy casualties, from fallout if not from direct attack. The extent of damage would, naturally, depend on the precise nature of the exchange. But the presence of 500 Minuteman ICBMs in hardened silos in North Dakota and Montana, much more vulnerable to ground burst than to airburst nuclear weapons of large yield, ensures a deadly fallout hazard to the populated areas downwind, and to these would be added other military targets in both the USA and Canada, such as naval installations, military airfields for both bombers and interceptors, and command-and-control centres. In addition to the air defence

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installations and naval bases in Canada, there are bomber airfields in North Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, Michigan, New York, and Maine, together with a major base for strategic submarines in Puget Sound. And all of these dangers to the civil population would be dwarfed by the ­effects of the ultimate threat, a deliberate attack on population centres. Perhaps more plausible than any of these major military disasters is a creeping series of political setbacks for the West, perhaps accompanied by small to medium-sized military challenges which the Alliance is not well prepared or well placed to resist, and by developments undermining economic strength. Canada might not be one of the countries directly exposed to such pressures, but the effect of the progressive weakening of the West could only be damaging to all of us. It will have been obvious from information already presented that the major burden of providing the means of strategic deterrence is carried by the United States. American wealth, science, geography, and position of leadership in the Western world confirms that this is likely to continue. However, the limitations to what strategic deterrence can be expected to achieve against an opponent similarly equipped reveal the need for corresponding degrees of deterrence to be applied at the theatre nuclear and conventional level. These latter forms can only succeed if there is widespread participation by the other members of the Alliance. The precise forms of participation should be determined by the particular circumstances of each country. In the case of Canada, the factor of overriding significance is geography. Canada is very close to the United States (where the main means of strategic deterrence are situated), lies alongside the sea lines of communication between North America and Europe (which must carry the supplies to sustain operations in Europe), and is far from the European central front. Canada’s location across the great circle routes between the USA and the USSR gave it major strategic importance, both for air defence and for support of offensive bomber operations. However, the latter became less critical when bomber ranges were increased, and both decreased in relative importance when the missile threat became the dominant one. Nevertheless, a strategic warning system needs to detect approaching bombers, and deterrence would be weakened if military bases were open to unopposed air attack. The DEW Line, the Pinetree radar chain, and the associated ground-control installations are needed to warn of intrusion into North American air space, and the CF-101 interceptors, soon to be replaced by the CF-18A, to provide identification and control. Certain changes may be made, such as increased automation in the radars or

The Realities of Strategic Deterrence   189

even relocation of some of them, and when advancing technology makes it possible aircraft detection and reporting may be transferred to orbiting satellites. Increasing use can be made of AWACS to control ­interceptors against low-flying targets, and to substitute for ground ­radars which may be destroyed. But because Canada lies under the shortest bomber routes between the superpowers it is inevitably concerned with air defence. It is less certain that ballistic missile defence will demand use of ­Canadian territory. The most effective detection systems are in space. At present there are no active defences. Should they be deployed, they may be located very close to the defended targets. However, they will require some sort of system for tracking the attacking missiles, discriminating against decoys, and controlling the interceptor missiles. Depending on the design of these devices, it could be highly desirable to site some of them well up the path of the attack, possibly in Canadian territory. However, this is a problem that does not face us at present, and perhaps never will. The deployment of the new Ohio-class SSBNs with their Trident missiles in Bangor, Washington, brings a crucial element of strategic deterrence close to Canada. If the Soviets attempt to detect the emergence of these vessels through the Juan de Fuca Strait and to trail them into the Pacific with their own submarines, then there are going to be interesting anti-submarine operations close to Vancouver Island. The steady buildup of the Soviet Navy, with ever more emphasis on ships with long-range aircraft well-armed for anti-shipping operations and submarines with anti-ship missiles, suggests that they are planning effective interdiction of the Atlantic sea lanes. With the forces and stockpiles in Europe as they are, NATO could not fight for long without great tonnages of supplies, far more than could be moved by air. The USA and Canada will have to produce the materiel, transport it to the east coast seaports, load it into merchant ships, and protect them until they can make delivery in Europe. Halifax, Saint John, Quebec, and Montreal are important seaports, Halifax, Sydney, and St John’s are well-placed naval bases, and Greenwood, Summerside, Torbay, and Argentia are key bases for maritime aircraft. Geography gives Canada a central role in the assurance of NATO’s logistic supply. For this, the armed forces will clearly need Aurora aircraft, DDH-280s, Canadian patrol frigates, and follow-on replacements. Finally, although this discussion has focused on strategic deterrence, it is important not to forget the other end of the spectrum of deterrence. NATO will only succeed with conventional deterrence by the combined efforts of the member countries. The Canadian 4 CMBG

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[Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group] and 1 CAG [Canadian Air Group] on the European central front, a battalion for AMF(L) [Allied Command Europe Mobile Force-Land], aircraft for AMF(A), and the CAST [Canadian Air-Sea Transportable] Combat Group for the European northern flank together with airlift and sealift to move these forces, though not very large, contribute to deterrence. In conclusion, it should never be forgotten that the purpose of deterrence is to prevent war, not to fight and win it. Strategic deterrence should prevent nuclear war and discourage conventional war. To prevent conventional war and avoid its escalation to nuclear war, we need strong conventional forces. Canada’s stakes in deterrence are as high as any. Our geography allows us a certain choice in what contribution we elect to make to conventional deterrence in Europe. The technology of intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons makes it unnecessary for Canada to deploy them on its territory. But geography casts Canada in a prominent role in two other facets of strategic deterrence. These are defence of the major weapon sites, particularly through surveillance of the approaches to them, and defence of the sea link between North America and Europe.

1983

A Canadian Perspective on Canada-US Defence Relations

This document is the original draft of a paper George Lindsey wrote for Aerospace Defence: Canada’s Future Role? published in 1985 by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA).1 As co-author of the publication, Lindsey contributed the document provided here, but under the title “Defending North America: A Historical Perspective.” The CIIA partnered with the Centre for International Governance Innovation in June 2006 to form the Canadian International Council (CIC), the National Capital Branch of which has granted permission to republish this document. It is presented here under the original title, because the pre-published draft contains additional content not available in the 1985 CIIA publication. In this analysis of Canadian defence policy with regard to the United States, Lindsey focuses on geography and middle-power diplomacy. He delivered an earlier version of this paper at a meeting of the Western Social Science Association, Denver, April 1982. The final draft, as it appears here, dates from October 1983. Historical Background Although the partnership in defence between the United States and ­ anada seems very natural today, both in North America and in the C North Atlantic Alliance, it has come about in the last forty-three years. As seen from Canada, the United States was a distinct threat during the forty years following the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and certainly not an ally during the next century.2 American forces i­nvaded Canada during the War of Independence and in the War of 1812. ­Although the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, followed by the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817, which effectively demilitarized the Great Lakes, brought a permanent end to hostilities,3 one of the motivations which brought about Confederation

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among the Canadian provinces in 1867 was fear of the powerful Union army which had just won the American Civil War. During this period, from the Declaration of Independence in 1776 ­until just after Confederation, the defence against the United States of the British North American colonies which came together to form ­Canada was planned, led, and largely conducted by Great Britain. The contribution by Canadians was necessarily small, but during the two wars already mentioned included enthusiastic participation from French ­Canadians, English Canadians, some First Nations, and former residents of the United States who had chosen to remain under the British Crown as United Empire Loyalists. The period from the end of the War of 1812 to the Confederation of Canada in 1867 was not one of unalloyed or continuous hostility towards the United States. Indeed this period of roughly half a century could be viewed as one in which, progressively, the procedures and the habits of thought and action were developed which have led our two countries to seek resolution of our disputes by peaceful means, have allowed us to ­defend our common border with customs and immigration officials rather than soldiers, and led ultimately to the present close alliance.4 British garrisons withdrew from Canada in the period between 1871 and 1905, while Canada built up a very small permanent force backed by a larger militia. The military links between the new Dominion of Canada and Great Britain were strongly maintained in peacetime, and greatly developed during the South African War, to which Canada sent a contingent, and the two World Wars. The training, organization, and equipment of the Canadian military forces were virtually identical with those of the British until near the end of World War II. In 1914 and again in 1939, Canada went to war as part of the British Commonwealth. While the United States provided assistance to the belligerent Allies in the early years of both World Wars, it was not until 1917 and 1941 that the US became actually engaged. The battle deaths suffered by British Commonwealth forces between 1914 and 1918 exceeded those by US forces by a ratio of more than seven to one. After the Fall of France in June 1940 and until the German attack on the USSR in June 1941, the Commonwealth stood alone against the Axis. Throughout the whole of World War II the battle deaths of the Commonwealth again exceeded those of the United States. Against this historical background, it can be seen that Canada’s prime defence relationship was perceived to be with Great Britain and the British Commonwealth. The emergence of the United States as the main partner only came about in the aftermath

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of World War II, although strong bonds were being forged during that war, especially in their economies, in intelligence, and in nuclear and other scientific developments. Thus, in the Canadian perspective, the United States gradually transformed through the nineteenth century from an enemy to a p ­ otential threat to a neutral. During the twentieth century, the metamorphosis continued, with a few setbacks, through benevolent neutral to full-fledged ally. Geographical Background5 For the last hundred years, the United States and Canada have shared the important strategic asset of having their home territory located far away from all of their potential enemies. The Monroe Doctrine enunciated the determination of the United States to prevent interference in the western hemisphere by European powers. Until the advent of the long-range bomber aircraft and the ballistic missile, both territories could be protected from invasion by adequate sea power, and this was provided by the Royal Navy and the United States Navy, supplemented during the two World Wars and after the Second by not inconsiderable contributions from the Canadian Navy. A large ­advantage accrued to the weaker of the two countries, since it was clear to Canada that the United States would not tolerate threats by a ­European or Asian power to occupy territory in North America from which operations could be directed against the USA. The Canadian White Paper on Defence of 1964 stated: “It is, for the foreseeable future, impossible to conceive of any significant external threat to Canada which is not also a threat to North America as a whole. It is equally inconceivable that, in resisting clear and unequivocal aggression against Canadian territory, Canada could not rely on the active support of the United States.”6 Thus, Canadian security against aggression from outside of the continent is practically guaranteed by the proximity and the power of the United States. However, these same factors could be used to put virtually irresistible pressures on Canada to accede to demands felt to be vital to the USA, whether for security or other national interests.7 It is interesting to speculate what would be the situation today if the US had not negotiated the Alaska Purchase in 1867, a purchase which, incidentally, led to one of our most famous disputes – a dispute settled peacefully, but not without bellicose noises on both sides of the border. Although Alaska is closest to the Soviet Union, the vast land territory of Canada and the three seas to its west, north, and east could be regarded

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by the United States as a potential route for invasion when Britain was the threat, as a nearly uninhabited buffer zone when Germany and ­Japan were the threat, and as the fore field of the home defence of America when the threats are now Soviet bomber aircraft and ICBMs. Today the Canadian perspective differs from the American in regard to overseas defence relationships. Although Canada has troops in central ­Europe, a commitment to the NATO northern flank in Norway, and scattered UN peacekeeping forces, its overseas defence commitments are very small in comparison to those of the United States. There is no ­Canadian defence interest comparable to that of the US in Latin A ­ merica or the Far East, and a rather critical attitude towards US policy in Central America and the Caribbean. Although Canada sided with the US against Britain and France during the Suez Crisis in 1956, it gave only grudging political and no military support to the US during the Vietnamese War. Where the two countries’ interests and activities do converge are in North America and NATO. The Canadian perspective towards NATO is fundamentally similar to that of the United States, the differences being primarily due to the ­status of the US as the leading power and Canada as one of the smaller contributors. In particular, Canada’s policy is one of collective defence and of reliance on strategic deterrence for the prevention of war, a policy which demands appropriate contributions from every partner. Another geographical aspect of occasional significance to the United States is that Canada offers a huge expanse of nearly uninhabited ­Arctic and sub-Arctic territory, bearing a close resemblance to parts of the USSR, and offering a useful testing ground for equipment and activities designed for use in northern climates. The base at Fort Churchill was used for a number of experiments in the 1950s and 1960s, and it has been agreed that the territory in the vicinity of Cold Lake will be the scene of tests of American air-launched cruise missiles. Defence of North America The joint defence of North America against an outside power became the subject of serious planning in 1938.8 Statements made by the national leaders of the two countries represent policies equally applicable today: The people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire” (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Kingston, Ontario, 18 August 1938).9

A Canadian Perspective on Canada-US Defence Relations  195 We, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour, and one of these is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea, or air, to the United States across Canadian Territory (William Lyon Mackenzie King, Woodbridge, Ontario, 20 August 1938).10

In August 1940, after the Fall of France, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King met hastily in a railroad car in New York State and issued the “Ogdensburg Declaration,” which announced among other things plans for the establishment of a Permanent Joint Board on ­Defence.11 ­Initiated in 1941, this useful body with its links to the president and prime minister is still in active operation today.12 Soon afterwards a d ­ efence production sharing agreement was instituted, which is also still in effect. The developments which require arrangements to be made for the direct defence of North America13 were the hostile relations in the late 1940s between the Soviet Union and the West, leading to the Cold War, the appearance of heavy bomber aircraft capable of intercontinental range, and of the nuclear fission bomb, which gave one aircraft the ­destructive power formerly associated with hundreds. To reach most of the likely targets, considered in the early 1950s to be the large cities of the United States and Canada, bombers originating in the USSR would need to fly southward across Canada, or possibly over the sea close to the Canadian coast. The primary means of defence was by all-weather ­interceptor aircraft, directed by ground-based radar. In order to intercept the bombers before they could carry out their missions it was necessary to provide early warning stations and interceptor control radars in areas well forward of the likely targets, which meant that several lines of radar stations and a number of fighter bases had to be constructed in Canada, as well as throughout the United States.14 Joint planning of these activities was carried out by the Permanent Joint Board on ­Defence,15 its M ­ ilitary Cooperation Committee, and by the Canada-US Regional Planning Group, the latter organization being associated with NATO but dealing only with North American defence. The joint efforts for defence of North America against the threat of manned bombers have seen many developments between 1950 and 1983.16 Some of the radar stations and fighter bases in Canada were manned by USAF personnel. The advent of the thermonuclear bomb and of long-range jet-propelled bombers stimulated the building of the

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Distant Early Warning Line across Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, at latitude 70°N, and of the Mid-Canada Line at 55°N. Warning was extended over the sea by “Texas Towers” and radar-equipped aircraft patrolling from Greenland to the Azores, and from Alaska to Hawaii. A Canada-US Scientific Advisory Team was created to study the requirements for early warning. In 1958 the command and control of the air defence forces of both countries were placed under the North American Air Defence Command, which directed the operations of aircraft without consideration of the international border. The Canadian contribution to NORAD included over 160 Canadian-built CF-100 all-weather fighters in the 1950s and over 60 CF101B interceptors in the 1960s. In the later 1980s it will consist of 36 CF-18A fighter aircraft. As many as 28 surveillance and control radars ware operated by Canada, now reduced to 24, as well as a very large computerized control centre in the underground centre in North Bay. There are 17 DEW Line stations in Canada. The Mid-Canada Line has been dismantled. The chief value of NORAD is for efficient coordination of operations. The excellent communications and the cross-posting of officers ensure full understanding of what has to be done in an emergency. A ­ lthough NORAD devises plans for future systems on a continental basis, all the decisions and all the financial commitments are made by the two ­national governments. One can note, for example, that the new interceptor aircraft will be F-15s for the USAF but CF-18As for the Canadian Forces, although both types can be controlled by any part of the NORAD ground environment. Among the benefits which NORAD brings to Canada is access to a worldwide network of intelligence and information. Arrangements are made to pass information on the flight paths of civil aircraft in order to identify those approaching North America. Knowledge of air and other military activity occurring all over the world is available to NORAD, and used to evaluate the significance of detection made over Canada and the United States. Certain strains were put on the NORAD relationship during the ­Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the USA felt a more urgent need to place the continental defences on a high state of alert than did C ­ anada, and in 1963, over the status of the BOMARC surface-to-air missile. A  line of eight BOMARC sites across North America included two in ­Canada, and to be effective it was necessary to use a nuclear warhead. After ­considerable resistance and debate, Canada accepted the nuclear

A Canadian Perspective on Canada-US Defence Relations  197

warheads, and continued to man the BOMARC until they were withdrawn from service on both sides of the border about nine years later. The advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile brought about a considerable reduction in the priority given to continental air defence. As the size of the Soviet missile force grew and no offsetting defence against it materialized, there seemed less reason to devote large resources to defence against what rapidly became the lesser threat. Most of the installations of the air defence system were vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. The total number of radar stations in NORAD has declined from a peak of 256 to 84, the number of interceptors from 1,600 to 315, and the number of surface-to-air missile batteries (none of which were in Canada) from over 90 to zero. Although no active defences have been deployed in North America against the ballistic missile threat, several systems are in service to provide early warning. The most important ones are in orbiting satellites, many are based on the ground in several countries, but none are based in ­Canada. However, a feature of NORAD is that information is collected from worldwide sources and distributed to various centres in both countries. The ballistic missile threat to North America includes missiles launched from submarines. However, the most likely trajectories are from east and west, unlike those for ICBMs launched from silos in the USSR, nearly all of which would come from the north, across Canada. One of the roles of the United States Navy and of the maritime forces of Canada is to carry out anti-submarine surveillance of the seas off the North ­American coast. However, as the range of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles has increased to 5,000 miles and more, the submarines can remain far away. The maritime operations of the two countries are carried out in very close cooperation, and include surveillance of surface ships, anti-shipping submarines, and maritime aircraft. As well as providing warning of missiles in flight, the United States maintains surveillance of objects orbiting in space. Canada makes a modest contribution by the operation of optical tracking stations able to measure motions of objects in space with great accuracy. In the days when aircraft had shorter ranges, and before the advent of aerial refuelling, it was feared that a distant enemy might try to establish small lodgements in northern Canada which could be used as staging posts for clandestine activities or deeper incursions. For some years ­Canada maintained an airborne mobile strike force to counter such lodgements. Against larger threats, the ALCANUS agreement provided

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for joint US-Canadian forces to train and equip for warfare in the north, and subsequently for land force cooperation, when required, throughout North America. Periodic joint exercises are still held in Alaska and northern Canada. Every year there are exchanges of up to six small army units, and US marines have trained in Canada. There is no doubt that NORAD is the most important bilateral defence agreement between Canada and the United States. Prior to the most recent renewal, in 1980, an extensive study was made by the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National ­Defence, [which] concluded that “[t]he most efficient and cost-effective way for Canada to contribute to the defence of North American airspace while assuring the protection of Canadian sovereignty and r­ eaffirming ­Canadian commitment to the joint defence of the continent, is to r­ enew the NORAD agreement. Only one integrated command and control structure can ensure that cooperation between the two air defence forces in time of emergency is effective.”17 The committee ­ recommended greater Canadian participation in the AWACS operation and in spacebased surveillance. Strategic Deterrence When the air defences were first built in North America, during the 1950s, the primary purpose was seen as the defence of population and industry. Against bomber aircraft, such a task was very difficult, but not absolutely impossible. However, when the ICBM replaced the bomber as the principal threat, no means of direct defence was available, and the strategy shifted to deterrence. To quote the last Canadian defence White Paper : The only direct external military threat to Canada’s national security today is that of a large-scale nuclear attack on North America. So long as a stable strategic balance exists, the deliberate initiation of nuclear war between the USSR and the US is highly improbable; this constitutes mutual deterrence. It is far from being the theoretically ideal means of maintaining peace, but the Government, while continuing to participate in the arms control deliberations, remains convinced that there is nothing to replace it at present. Therefore, Canada must do what it can to ensure the continued effectiveness of the deterrent system … The Government concluded on its defence review that cooperation with the United States in North American defence will remain essential so long

A Canadian Perspective on Canada-US Defence Relations  199 as our joint security depends on stability in the strategic military balance. Canada’s objective is to make, within the limits of our resources, an effective contribution to continued stability by assisting in the surveillance and warning systems, and in the protection of the US retaliatory capability as necessary. Cooperation between Canada and the US in the joint defence of North America is vital for sovereignty and security.18

Speaking before the House of Commons Standing Committee on ­ xternal Affairs and National Defence in 1980, the minister of national E defence [Gilles Lamontagne] said: Canada’s involvement in collective defence and in the maintenance of ­NATO’s deterrent capabilities took on added relevance with the development by the Soviet Union of the means of delivering nuclear weapons on North America. This development ended the relative immunity from direct attack on its territory which Canada had long enjoyed. In strategic terms, Canada now became the geographical neighbour of one nuclear-armed ­superpower, lying between it and the other nuclear-armed superpower across the shortest and most advantageous routes for bomber or intercontinental ballistic missile attack by one upon the other. Our geographical location, ­although still affording us protection from attack by conventional means, now exposes us directly to large-scale nuclear attack. With this development, the principal objective of Canadian policy became the prevention of ­nuclear war. With the growing sophistication and capability of ballistic ­missile systems, against which there is as yet no satisfactory means of ­defence, the principal means for preventing the massive destruction which would result from a strategic attack on North America has been that of deterrence. It is likely that we will need to continue to rely on deterrence, at least until vastly greater progress in détente and disarmament becomes a real possibility.19

Canada does not possess any strategic offensive forces itself, and none of the US strategic bombers or missiles are based in Canada. Canadian airfields have been made available for the refuelling of American bombers,20 and, in the 1960s, the deployment of interceptor aircraft gave priority to the defence of approach routes threatening bomber bases. Today the priority is on early warning, which would enable the bombers to get off the ground before they were destroyed, a defensive measure which does not imply automatic counterattack on the Soviet Union. As the ICBMs become more vulnerable to attack by the highly accurate

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multiple warheads of the large Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ballistic missiles, the stability of strategic deterrence is becoming more, rather than less, dependent on the ability of the B-52s (and soon the B-1s of the US Strategic Air Command) to get off the ground quickly on receipt of adequate and reliable warning. Possible Options for North American Defence in the Future Development of new equipment has opened up possibilities for more effective anti-bomber and anti-missile defence of North America. The threat may become more difficult to counter, should the USSR deploy a new intercontinental bomber or fit long-range air-launched cruise ­missiles to its bombers. Canada and the USA have been studying these possibilities together. One new system of great value to anti-bomber defence is the ­Airborne Warning and Control System, an aircraft with a large radar able to ­detect airborne targets and direct interceptors. Among the advantages of AWACS are that it can track aircraft flying at very low altitude and that it can move to cover an area in which there is no ground radar, or where the ground radar is unserviceable or has been destroyed. Another new development is the over-the-horizon (OTH) backscatter radar, which enables aircraft to be detected far beyond the horizon. ­Using information from OTH for early warning, AWACS could leave the ground and fly forward to detect and track approaching bombers long before they reached their targets. However, OTH achieves its long range by reflection of its signals from the ionosphere, a layer of the u ­ pper ­atmosphere which becomes disturbed in northern latitudes and produces erratic operation of the radar. Visible evidence of this disturbance is the “Northern Lights,” seen in Canada at times of high sunspot activity. The maintenance and operation of a large chain of ground radar has ­always been extremely expensive in manpower, a problem particularly burdensome for the remote sites in Canada. Modern techniques now allow stations to be run by much smaller crews of operators and maintenance personnel, by using more automated equipment, remoting the data to a major centre, and making the equipment more reliable. Consequently, planners are now offered attractive choices for modernizing air defences. They can have more cost-effective radars on the ground, or they can put more flexible and less vulnerable radars into the air. And beyond this, there is promise of devices able to detect aircraft from orbiting satellites. Such systems would allow vast areas of the earth’s

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surface to be surveyed, including the most inaccessible regions of the Arctic. It will, however, need several more years of research development before these space systems are ready for use. The major options open to the planners are to modernize the present ground-based radars, which would present a fair-sized capital outlay but reduced running costs and little technical risk, to place a major responsibility on airborne radar, which would be expensive, but would offer greatly increased flexibility and reduced vulnerability, or to make an early move into dependence on space-based detectors. In the present decade this latter choice would incur unknown costs and high technical risk, but the uncertainties will be reduced as research and development proceeds. Further into the future, but beginning to attract more serious attention, are the possibilities of creating an effective active defence against ballistic missiles. This was planned21 in the late 1960s, but subjected to severe limitations by the ABM Treaty,22 part of the SALT I23 agreement of 1972. Here the technological uncertainties are so great that little can be predicted with high confidence. Much would depend on new types of weapons, such as particle beams, high-powered lasers activated by chemical or electrical energy, or X-ray lasers fired by small nuclear detonations. In order to cover large areas of the earth, and possibly in order to use radiations which would be absorbed or dispersed in the atmosphere, it may be advisable to place some of the sensors and weapons in space vehicles. It is, however, quite possible that ABM systems of the future would depend on ground installations and on weapons using nuclear warheads, chemical explosives, or simple mechanical collision at high velocity. With so much uncertainty it is not possible to estimate the ­importance of Canadian geography for the defence of strategic targets in the United States. Those components of an ABM system which are based in space vehicles may not be closely tied to any particular terrestrial territory. It is, however, highly probable that key activities would take place in areas of space above Canada and above the Arctic, and possible that they would require communications links to stations on the ground within direct line of sight. Even if technology does offer the possibility of economically feasible defence against bomber and missile attack at some time in the future, it is not clear whether these capabilities will or should be exploited. ­Mutual assured destruction provided the basis for stable deterrence at a cost of less than 20 per cent of the defence budgets of the superpowers, and very little for all other countries. If it were to be nullified by a

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heavy expenditure on strategic defence there would be demands for the ­expensive strengthening of other components of defence, such as theatre nuclear weapons or conventional forces, and an alteration in the ­balance of forces that could well be less rather than more s­ table. H ­ owever, construction of an effective strategic defence by one side would probably oblige the other to follow suit. The concerns involved in these questions go well beyond the scope of Canadian-American defence relations, and will be determined at the level of the two superpowers and the two alliances. Canada-US Defence Relations Outside of North America Between 1817 and 1942 the relations between Canada and the United States, as far as defence was concerned, were almost entirely confined to consideration of the North American continent. Before the end of the War of 1812 and the signing of the Rush-Bagot Treaty, many of the quarrels and problems were related to the situation in Europe. Although some concern had to be paid to the defence of North America during World War II, by far the most important operations were in distant theatres in which the Canadians were part of much larger Commonwealth formations. The major exception was in the Battle of the Atlantic, where a very significant proportion of Allied war supplies originated in Canada and were shipped from Canadian ports, and where the anti-submarine protection of the transatlantic convoys from both Canadian and US ports had to be organized by the cooperation of the Royal Canadian, the United States, and the Royal Navies. After the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949, the USA and Canada became two of twelve (later sixteen) independent sovereign partners in defence of their common territory. In fact, geography has made the USA and Canada the “Western pillar” of an alliance separated (and also joined) by the North Atlantic Ocean. The problems of transatlantic supply, so vital for the Allies in the two World Wars, are just as crucial for NATO, and although airlift will be able to transport men and small quantities of key equipment, the large tonnages of munitions, fuel, and food can only come by sea. Protection of the sea lines of communication across the Atlantic is in the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic [SACLANT], who assumes operational control of maritime forces from nine countries in the event of war. In about half of his total area (known as WESTLANT) the forces are normally provided by the USA and Canada.

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The principal threats to Atlantic shipping come from the aircraft, surface ships, and submarines of the Warsaw Pact. The most effective defence against aircraft and surface ships is provided by carrier battle groups, a specialty of the United States Navy. Canada has specialized in anti-submarine warfare, for which it operates maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine frigates. For many years the staffs and units of the US Navy and of the Maritime Command of the Canadian Forces have planned and exercised together. Similar cooperation occurs in the P ­ acific Ocean, although this is not under the aegis of SACLANT or NATO. Some Canadian Perspectives Some views which are held by Canadian defence planners and which have had a long-standing influence on their approach to joint problems of North American defence are outlined below.24 The greatest threat of large-scale destruction to Canadian population and possessions is a war in which the Soviet Union delivers a strategic ­nuclear attack on the United States. It is assumed that a countervalue attack would include Canadian as well as American targets. It is also ­assumed that while a counterforce attack might have nearly all (or ­possibly all) of its targets in the USA, the radioactive fallout from ground bursts directed against the ICBM silos in the northern United States would cause very severe casualties to Canadian population. As a consequence of the beliefs just outlined, the main objective of defence policy should be to prevent the outbreak of a major war. The best means to do this is thought to be strategic nuclear deterrence. It is not necessary for Canada to operate strategic nuclear weapons itself, but for reasons of geography it is well placed to play a significant part in the defence of the strategic systems located in the United States. The most probable way in which a nuclear war between the superpowers could come about is thought to be by an unintended crisis, originating anywhere in the world. A second means to reduce the probability of a major war is through stabilizing activities such as peacekeeping, usually in parts of the Third World and often in circumstances in which direct participation by troops from the United States or the Soviet Union would be unwelcome and unwise. Canada has participated in many such peacekeeping operations. Finally, Canada considers that a policy of arms control offers sensible hopes for the maintenance of security without having unbearable burdens of armament. However, security is the primary objective, and

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requires that arms-control agreements be adequately verifiable and produce stable balances of forces. It is in the best interests of Canada that the forces and weapons systems of the United States remain in a mutual and stable balance with those of the Soviet Union. [Author’s] Acknowledgment The author wishes to acknowledge the useful comments made by Mr  J.F.  Anderson, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), and Brigadier ­General C.G. Kitchen, Deputy CORAE [Canadian Operational Research and Analysis Establishment].

Additional Documents

1971

Managing the Expos to the World’s Championship

George Lindsey wrote this paper in October 1970 at the request of Stanley Mansbridge, who explains his purpose for the invitation in a brief prologue prior to the introduction. The paper reflects Lindsey’s enthusiasm for baseball and his keen ability to apply statistical data analysis and mathematical modelling to develop in-game strategy. The application of operational research techniques to baseball statistics allowed Lindsey to project possible outcomes well before modern developments in analytics and professional sport. His writings on baseball – documented here and in the notes to this paper – represent not only a pioneering contribution to the sport, but also Lindsey’s passion for baseball and the deep fascination he held for the intricacies of the game. This paper originally appeared in a 1971 edition of Optimum: The Journal of Public Sector Management, then published by the Canadian government’s Bureau of Management Consulting.1 The paper appears here with the permission of the current editorial team of Optimum. I learned in the fall of 1970 of the extraordinary mating, of eminence in ­Operations Research and passionate interest in professional baseball, which distinguishes Doctor Lindsey. Furthermore, I had enjoyed a reading of his earlier papers on the application of scientific principles to the game, to which reference is made in the following paper. I therefore proposed to Doctor Lindsey that he project himself forward to the end of the 1971 baseball season and show the readers of Optimum how the ­application of scientific management enabled the Montreal Expos not only to win a pennant but to triumph against all odds in the World Series – an accomplishment which eclipsed even that of the Mets of 1969.

208  Additional Documents Here is the resultant paper. Neither Doctor Lindsey nor I can be held responsible should the Expos fail to live up to the possibilities. Stanley H. Mansbridge

Introduction Optimum is devoted to the problems of management in the public sector. It seeks case studies wherein certain techniques or decisions of management were responsible for significant improvements. Examples are particularly interesting when a success has been achieved in a long-established activity seemingly too stereotype and routine to allow much room for change. One activity which is extremely public, although not run by the government, and which exposes its managers to pitiless public criticism, is professional sport. An unsuccessful season is usually followed by the discharging of the manager, even if the individual performances of his players have been so poor as to make success by his team impossible. There are probably few instances in the business world and fewer still in government where unsuccessful management produces so rapid and severe a punishment for the manager. Of all the sports, baseball is the one most amenable to recording of past data. In the past sixty years the rules have hardly changed at all, so that there is a vast bank of analyzable records. And yet when a crucial situation in a game presents the need for a strategic decision, no manual or handbook is available, and strong differences of opinion are heard throughout the park as to the proper choice by the manager. In these days of systems analysis and computers, it seems that one intensely competitive multimillion dollar business is still being managed by the historic methods of instinct and personal experience. In this paper we shall see the remarkable results that will be achieved in the 1971 season when the Montreal Expos put into practice for the first time in history scientific management of their field strategy. When the Expos win the World Series of 1971, the other teams will realize the formidable new weapon being used against them, and will make haste to master the same techniques in 1972. In subsequent years the Expos management will maintain their proud position by extending scientific principles into the areas of recruiting, training, and exchanging players. These methods will be kept confidential, and therefore cannot be revealed in this paper, which carries the dateline October 20, 1971.

Managing the Expos to the World’s Championship  209

The Regular Season in 1971 The Expos finished last in the Eastern Division of the National League in 1970, and were tipped to finish fifth in 1971 by the old-fashioned “experts.” However, their record of 73 wins and 89 losses had been a mere 16 games behind the winners, Pittsburgh, who won 89 and lost 73. By making the right decisions at crucial moments, 20 per cent of the games that would have been lost with 1970 strategy were converted into victories, and these 18 games were enough to put the Expos into first place. When one realizes2 that about 31 per cent of major league games are decided by one run (i.e., an average of 50 games per season for each team), it is clear that a small but consistent advantage used at the right times can make a vital difference. Some of the key decisions concerned the replacement of pitchers. An examination of past experience showed that certain starting pitchers such as Carl Morton had a consistent tendency to lose their effectiveness after making about one hundred pitches, so that it became a regular practice to warm up a relief pitcher as the seventh inning approached, and make the change at the first sign of tiring. Also, it was found that some of the pitchers were at their best right from the first pitch, while others did not reach peak effectiveness until they had made about fifteen deliveries. This knowledge was taken into account when deciding whether to relieve a pitcher who was in difficulty after his first few pitches. A factor which always has been used in making decisions regarding the use of pinch hitters is the preference by a right-handed batter for a lefthanded pitcher (with the symmetrical corollary). The new development was to reduce this difference to absolute numbers. For average players, an analysis of over 12,000 At Bats3 showed that the difference amounts to thirty-two points (i.e., .032) in the batting average. It follows from this that it is often, but not by any means always, wise to replace a batter simply to get the advantageous “handedness.” However, the E ­ xpos did not base their decisions on records averaged over hundreds of players, but on the individual performances of their own batters against rightand left-handed pitching. A corresponding analysis of the success of ­Expos right- and left-handed pitchers against the two kinds of batters was used as a factor in the decisions regarding relief of pitchers in crucial situations. As the season progressed, individual performances were analyzed for trends, for cyclic tendencies, and for any consistent difference between games in the daytime or at night, in hot or cold weather, at home and

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away, or against a particular opponent. For instance, it was noticed that [Steve] Renko was more effective in night games, that two of the older pitchers were often undependable on chilly nights, and that [Boots] Day hit better in Montreal than on the road. And several times batting “streaks” (or “slumps”) were identified as being statistically significant and the player consequently used more (or less) than in the normal sequence. Perhaps the clearest examples of scientific management came when the team was faced with strategic decisions with men on base. As a batter comes to the plate, the team faces one of twenty-seven basic situations, represented by the symbols [T,B], where T = [0,1,2] is the number out and B takes one of the nine values [0,1,2,3,12,13,23,F] corresponding to the occupation of the bases. An analysis4 of over 27,000 such situations met in major league play provided a table of the outcomes in terms of a function, P(r|T,B), representing the probability that exactly r more runs will be scored before the half-inning is over. For example, if we take the situation [0,F], i.e., bases full with none out, P(0|0,F) = 0.17, indicating that there is a probability of 17 per cent that no runs will be scored. [With] P(>2|0,F) = 0.39, there is a 39 per cent probability that more than two runs will be scored. With a full table of P(r|T,B), it was possible to compare the probabilities of the outcomes of various alternative strategies and to choose the best one in the circumstances. “In the circumstances” implies that the state of the game is taken into account – i.e., the inning and the score. For example, if the Expos were batting in the last half of the ninth inning with the score tied, their objective would be to get one run. Two are worth no more than one. But if they were two runs behind, their primary objective would be to get more than one run, and their secondary objective to get more than two. One is worth no more than zero, since both represent a lost game. Two ties the score, sending the game into extra innings. Three, or more than three, represents a win. The overall objective is to win the game, and a strategy that ­maximizes this probability in one circumstance may not do so in another, even with the same situation on the bases. Some concrete examples of decisions made on the basis of this information will be given from the World Series of 1971. The World Series of 1971 After the Expos had eliminated Cincinnati in the National League playoff, they met the 1970 champions, Baltimore, in the World Series. On

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the basis of the season’s performance, Baltimore eclipsed the Expos in both batting and pitching. They had won 110 games against the Expos’ 91. The forecast was for Baltimore to repeat their performance of 1970 and win the Series in four or five games. In fact, Baltimore used their formidable bats to win two games by wide margins and a third by two runs. Each of the Expos’ four victories [was] by a one-run margin, and turned on crucial decisions made by scientific principles. In the first game in Baltimore, the Expos were leading 3-2 when [Paul] Blair doubled with one out in the Orioles’ half of the seventh inning. With the powerful [Boog] Powell up next, many thought that he should be given an intentional walk, especially since he was a slow runner and might be erased in a double play. However, Expo manager Gene Mauch knew that P (>0|1,2) = 0.39, while P (>0|1,12) = 0.43. In other words, the probability that the Orioles would score would be increased by putting Powell on first. Morton got Powell to fly out, and Blair was left on base when Robinson5 grounded out. In the last of the eighth, the Orioles got men on second and third with two out, and then put in a pinch hitter for the pitcher. Again the observers urged Mauch to walk the batter intentionally to “set up a force play at any base.” But P(>0|2,23) = 0.33, while P(>0|2,F) = 0.35, so again the walk would increase the probability that Baltimore would score. [Claude] Raymond, who had relieved Morton, hit the next batter with his first pitch. This filled the bases, but would have forced in the tying run had the previous batter been walked. The next batter grounded out, to leave the score 3-2 going into the ninth inning. The Expos failed to score in their half of the ninth, and after one out a single and a double put [the] Orioles on second and third, with the redoubtable Robinson at bat. P(>0|1,23) = 0.73, while P(>0|1,F) = 0.69, so that in these circumstances an intentional base on balls does decrease the probability that the batting team will score. So this time Mauch ordered the walk. The next batter hit into a double play, short to second to first, to end the game. The second game was as close as the first. [The] Expos were leading 2-0 when Baltimore got men on first and third with none out in the last of the eighth. Mauch set his infield deep, and had the pitcher throw low curveballs. When the batter hit on the ground to [Bobby Wine], the shortstop initiated a second-to-first double play even though this allowed a run to score from third. P(>0|2,0) is only 0.07, whereas P(>1|1,12) = 0.27, so that it was worth allowing the one run to effectively

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kill the rally. But when the same situation presented itself in the last of the ninth, the score was now 2-1 and it was vital to prevent the tying run. This time the Expos infield drew in close, and when the batter grounded to [Wine], he threw home instead of to second. The catcher tagged the runner for a single out, leaving men on first and second with one out. P(>0|1,12) = 0.43, but the Expos were still ahead. A flyout and a strikeout ended the game. Baltimore won the next two games in Montreal to even the series. But with the fifth game tied at 3-3, the Expos got a man to first base with one out in the last half of the ninth inning. The home crowd urged Mauch to move the potential winning run to second base with a sacrifice. But P(>0|1,1) = 0.27, while P(>0|2,2) = 0.21, so that such a move would decrease the probability of scoring the winning run. The batter swung hard and singled, with the runner reaching third. The next man flied to deep centre field, and the winning run scored after the catch. When the teams returned to Baltimore, the Orioles evened the series and sent it into a seventh and final game. This found the Expos batting in the first of the ninth with the score 1-1, and the first batter, Day, drew a walk. If there was anything Mauch had ever wanted it was to get the runner home with the lead run. Day was a faster than average runner, but the Baltimore catcher had a good arm. Should Day be instructed to try to steal second? With Day on first, P(>0|0,1) = 0.40. If Day could steal second, P(>0|0,2) = 0.62, better than half a chance to score the precious lead run. But if he were thrown out in the attempt, P(>0|1,0) = 0.14. A  simple calculation shows that, if S is the probability of a successful steal, then 0.62S + 0.14(1–S)>0.40 if S>0.55; in other words, the probability of scoring will be increased by attempting a steal, provided that the probability of the attempt being successful exceeds 0.55. The average success for all attempts6 is about 0.59, and Day had done considerably better than that throughout the season. So Mauch sent him down on the first pitch, and he beat the throw. After two flyouts, a clean single allowed Day to score from second. The Expos held the Orioles scoreless in the last of the ninth, and thus won the deciding game 2-1. When the individual records were published the next day, Baltimore came out on top in batting, pitching, fielding, and total runs scored. Montreal led in only one column: number of games won. They were considered to have been incredibly lucky. The achievement of scientific management had been to make the worse team win!

2009

Operational Research: Remarks by George R. Lindsey

This final document is a transcribed speech George Lindsey gave at the Canadian International Council (CIC) Strategic Studies Working Group Tribute Dinner in Ottawa on 1 November 2009. Lindsey received the Brigadier-General George G. Bell Strategic Leadership Shield, an award given “in recognition of the qualities of outstanding intellectual leadership, inspiration in strategic studies and promoting public awareness of international security interests as exemplified by Brigadier-General George G. Bell, OC, MBE, CD, PhD, Soldier, Scholar and Founding President of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS).” 1 The George G. Bell Strategic Leadership Shield came into existence following the integration of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies into the CIC as the Strategic Studies Working Group in May 2008. Lindsey’s award speech appears here with the permission of the National Capital Branch of the CIC (original citation provided in notes).2 At the age of nearly ninety years, the periods which I have found to be the most interesting and exciting have been World War Two, post-war, and terrorism. When the war began in 1939, I was an undergraduate at [the] University of Toronto in mathematics and physics and had enlisted in the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps. A very serious effort was made for the member countries of the British Empire to make their most ­effective contributions to what was predicted (and proven to be) a long, costly, and demanding war. One of the requests for Canada was to identify university students of scientific subjects, of which the most important were those related to radio and other electric fields, and e­ ncourage them to earn their degree and then enlist in the armed forces. When we asked the British visitors what they wanted us to do, they said it was too secret but we would find out when we enlisted. In fact, the

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secret was radar, the new device which became a major factor in winning the war. After enlisting for active service in the Royal Canadian Artillery in early 1942, I was delighted to be given a very well-organized training in ­radar, ­especially designed for defence against aircraft. This was ­followed by a­ttachments to the National Research Council, the British Army ­Operational Research Group, and the Canadian Army Research Group. Most of the duties were related to ground-based defence against aircraft, employing studies of both exercises and actual military operations against enemy aircraft. Combined with similar research by other ­organizations of the army, navy, and air force against enemy air, land, and sea forces, this type of analysis became known as operational r­ esearch and gradually ­extended to many other activities. The general elements were using mathematical and other scientific methods to measure the effectiveness of what was being done, and calculate how the methods could be improved. The post-war situation, influenced by the notable success of the two nuclear weapons delivered on Japanese cities by American bomber aircraft, which brought the war [to a] rapid conclusion, made nuclear weapons the most important item for determining the strategies which have been chosen for the following years. While the end of the war left Germany, Italy, and Japan very weak, it left the USA, the British Empire, and western Europe, with their supremacy in long-range bomber aircraft, somewhat stronger than Russia, with its communist tendency and its neighbouring countries being assembled into the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union was quick to build a powerful long-range bomber air force equipped with nuclear weapons. The Canadian government was very generous in encouraging its war veterans to develop the capabilities for other useful employment, and undertook to support them for further education for a period as long as the time they had served during the war. I was struck off strength in 1945 and went to Queen’s [University] as a graduate student in physics, obtaining an MA degree, followed by four years of research in nuclear physics at Cambridge [University], financed by the Royal Commission of the Exhibition of 1851. Dr Omond Solandt, a Canadian who became head of the British Army Operational Research Group during the war, returned to Canada to become the first chairman of the Defence Research Board, created in 1947 as a fourth arm of the Canadian National Defence Department. Dr Solandt invited a number of scientists whom he had met during the war to enrol in various positions in the new Defence Research Board. In 1950

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I joined the Defence Research Board in Ottawa to pursue military operational r­ esearch, as a civilian. Then [I] followed roles ending as chief of the ­Operational Research and Analysis Establishment from 1968 to 1987. So, after spending nine years in universities and 41 years in defence, I have been allowed 22 years officially retired, but still active. How can one do something useful while retired but still active? One is to study what has been changing and try to forecast what is likely to be different before long. Fields with which I have had some recent as well as earlier studies include radar, sonar, and missile defence. After extraordinary contributions to detection, location, and tracking of targets in the air, the sea, and the ground achieved during World War Two, ­remarkable improvements are continuing, such as electronically scanned and ­synthetic aperture antennas with a capacity to present fine details or movements of the targets. Countermeasures against an opponent’s radars can be to jam his transmissions or to reduce the fraction of energy directly reflected back to him from his targets (a method usually described as stealth). Some of the things that radar is doing for us in the air, space, and to some extent on the ground are being matched by what sonar is doing in the sea and to some extent on the ground. Mines may be detected by active sonar. The transmission of sound through the water can be used to determine ocean depths, temperatures, and currents. In Arctic regions much can be determined about the location and movements of ice. Much can be learned from passive as well as active sonar, such as the tracking of surface ships, submarines, and torpedoes. While missiles, such as stones, bullets, artillery shells, air-launched bombs, and torpedoes have been available for many years, the last year of the Second World War saw the appearance of long-range guided missiles with the German V-1 and V-2, followed by a long (and still growing) series of many types of missiles based on the ground, on ships, submarines, aircraft, or even space vehicles. Their ranges extend from short to intermediate to intercontinental. Their damage and kill capabilities may depend on high-speed physical collisions, explosives, or poisons (which could possibly be nuclear). Defence against these missiles could be ­directed against their location before they were launched, in their boost phase just after they were launched, in the mid-course of their trajectory, or in the final phase as they approach their target or release smaller weapons. Of all the things that are changing here on Earth today, an outstanding one is the extension of the activities beyond the Earth’s atmosphere and into the huge and nearly empty dimensions of outer space.

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A ­momentous development is the launching of vehicles achieving velocities sufficient to send them into paths that keep them circling around the Earth i­nstead of soon re-entering it. This provides long periods of observation of huge areas of the Earth’s surface, especially if the information can be collected and returned to Earth quickly and without the need or management or judgment by humans located up in the space vehicles. The growing ability to obtain continuous control of the activities of unmanned aircraft is even more valuable if it can be provided for space vehicles, especially because of the much longer extent of their continuous time aloft. Many of the space vehicles will eventually become out of control (perhaps because of exhaustion of fuel, an irreparable fault, or old age), be demolished in tests or collisions, or discharge smaller weapons which subsequently scatter many fragments of targets which they have destroyed. While tiny particles floating in the upper layers of the Earth’s atmosphere will be slowed down and soon return into the lower and denser layers and melted, larger fragments may remain in orbit for a long time and present a danger of colliding with an operational space satellite. Both will be moving at high velocities and the satellite will probably be destroyed. Consequently, there will be an increasing need for the detection and subsequent tracking of these dangerous threats, as well as the tracks of the active spacecraft. Many of the problems that have just been described are likely to ­involve those countries occupying the largest areas on the earth and ­depend on their relative locations. The second largest of these is C ­ anada, likely to find itself deeply involved. This could be for missile defence of North America, for clearing space from the dangers of collision of important vehicles with debris scattered from previous activities, perhaps for collecting information useful for many purposes other than defence, such as weather forecasting, ice conditions, the state of crops, or [for] providing successful search and rescue following accidents on land, sea, air, or space. In addition to the reinforcement of national security and sovereignty, particularly in the Arctic, Canada may be able to assume a role in devising a new and as yet completely undefined UN-NATO partnership in an international peacekeeping activity, primarily directed against terrorist organizations other than nationally identified governments. Whether the primary objective is sovereignty, security, or ­peacekeeping, or even future prosperity, science and technology will be important, and the role of operational research could be critical. Overhead surveillance

Operational Research: Remarks by George R. Lindsey  217

of Canada’s enormous areas of land, nearby sea, overhead atmosphere, and outer space and a combination of space-based and airborne technologies may provide the solution. The challenge for operational research will be to develop a package which includes the use of existing assets, both government and commercial. Maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and security, and perhaps also its future prosperity, is likely to depend on its capability to provide effective overhead surveillance of what is happening in Canada’s enormous areas of land, nearby sea, atmosphere, and outer space. I hope that those older Canadians like me, who have been fortunate enough to have served in scientific research related to the type of problems described in the last few minutes, will continue to think about them and discuss them with those who are now in charge of solving them.

Afterword

In 2008 Shaye Friesen, of Defence Research and Development C ­ anada’s Centre for Security Science, published an article in Canadian Army ­Journal commemorating the previous year as the sixtieth anniversary of defence science in Canada.1 The article likened George Lindsey to a “Cold Warrior,” an oracle of Canadian strategy for defence and ­security. Friesen paid tribute to Canada’s operational research community by asking Lindsey to reflect on his experience and expertise in the field: “­Fortunately, the basic principles of policy and strategy formulation ­remind us that, when developing a strategy, it is important to create ­synergy by consulting a larger stable of experts to generate support and develop content … the knowledge and experience of senior members of the defence scientific community can be applied to provide meaningful context and clarification for today’s defence and security challenges.” Friesen used Lindsey’s knowledge to describe a set of four “high-level guidelines” for contemporary defence scientists working in military ­operational research. The guidelines focused on skills development for the strategic analyst, such as learning to synthesize information pertinent to emerging issues in defence, recognizing the importance and utility of interdisciplinary approaches to defence problems, and embracing a flexible and adaptable work ethic.2 Lindsey thought the skills of the ­defence scientist working in OR were best refined not just through experience, but also through a commitment to collaborative learning. Friesen took this approach as inspiration for the article, concluding that most effective OR activities derive from, and depend on, “strategic partnering” in the collection, assessment, and analysis of information important to ­defence and military affairs.

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The remarks Lindsey made in his interview with Friesen reflected his personal leadership style. He was pragmatic, observant, and direct during his government career. He paid close attention to the needs of the personnel under his direction and his clients in the armed services. He also worked to build professional networks, often including m ­ ilitary officers in discussions about operational research. Each OR section ­ in the Department of National Defence had military as well as civilian ­personnel. Scientists in OR worked on rotation to acquire experience with the army, navy, air force, and HQ. Canada also had OR field units in Europe and, for a period, Korea.3 For Lindsey the link between military science (the determination of the physically possible) and global strategy (the determination of what ought to be done) was inextricable.4 In relation to national security ­issues and strategy development, he thought OR was especially relevant to the design and selection of both offensive and defensive weapons systems. He considered OR important for developing strategy and managing the resources necessary to support the policies required to pursue strategic aims. The direction and scope of OR changed gradually but drastically during his professional career.5 As field exercises, war ­gaming, simulation, and mathematical modelling replaced real w ­ artime situations, planning for high-level operations took precedent over low-level problem solving. The introduction of systems analysis meant that the work performed by operational research scientists increasingly centred on ­futures research and forecasting. In Canada this meant the establishment and growth of units for anti-submarine warfare research in H ­ alifax and air defence research in St-Hubert, Quebec. At National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, the introduction of OR and systems analysis meant four strong research components for the army, navy, air force, and the Defence Research Board. Canada’s capacity for OR strengthened security and defence cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom. As Lindsey wrote when discussing the 1952 origins of the Operations Research Society of America, wartime cooperation among the North Atlantic ­ partners i­ncluded the loan and exchange of personnel and expertise in the post-war period.6 Through close cooperation in defence research, the ­Canadian defence community, according to Lindsey’s records, produced a strong “continental outlook” with regard to security during the Cold War. This reflected the practical reality of Canada’s geography, which, for Lindsey, was a constant consideration in strategic assessment. He related ­Canada’s national and international security concerns to

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the geographical position of the country, rigorously framing his analyses in a physical context. Although strategic issues evolved throughout the Cold War, Lindsey stayed true to this approach. When long-range ­nuclear-bomb-carrying bombers posed the primary threat during the early post-war period, Canadian geography was vital to North American air defence, first for the deployment of interceptor aircraft and then for the siting of early warning radar. The introduction of ballistic missiles in the late 1950s increased the need for early warning, and NORAD ­developed into a sophisticated network that was, and remains, deeply important for ­Canadian defence and security. Lindsey also employed geostrategic analyses to write about ­Canada’s international security concerns, often pointing to key differences ­ ­between Canadian security and that of NATO as a whole. When assessing the possible outbreak of mid–Cold War hostilities in Europe, for instance, he examined the implications of Canada’s geographic proximity to the United States. As participants on the ground and suppliers across the ­Atlantic Ocean, Canada and the United States, in the event of a ­European conflict, had little need for strategic defence of their own territory. The maintenance of a strategic nuclear deterrence was a different matter altogether. Canada lies across the routes along which ballistic ­missiles and aircraft would travel to attack the United States, and therefore Canadian security depended on a high degree of bilateral cooperation. Both during his career and in retirement, Lindsey spoke and wrote about the significance of strategic deterrence. The realist in him, cultivated by first-hand experience on the intelligence side of security and ­defence, saw no immediate end to the problem of nuclear stockpiles. In a world of rapidly evolving weapons, he turned to research and calculation to explain the role of technology in altering the strategic balance and shaping the global order. Data and accurate verification of incoming ­information was much more useable to Lindsey than any well-intentioned enthusiasm for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He believed C ­ anada should actively participate in practical arms-­control measures, such as the safe custody and dismantling or disposal of weapons and weapons-grade fissile material. He advocated for nuclear non-proliferation talks and agreements, and for improving international techniques and equipment to safely monitor and verify weapons and ­materials, both those already in existence and in production. Lindsey also believed greatly in the educational value of history and experience. As an avid student of Canadian defence and military affairs,

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he referenced the past with ease, often relying on history to inform his approach to contemporary issues and strategic planning.7 He also considered that the problems encountered by early operational research scientists in Canada reflected larger issues relating to Canadian security and defence. Lindsey stayed true to this mantra throughout his professional life. He was acutely aware of the restrictions that Canada’s limited defence budget imposed on Canadian OR, and he showed a steady concern for Canadian sovereignty that he based on a firm understanding of Canada’s geostrategic reality. Lindsey made his case for the need to include scientists in defence and military affairs in an internal 1972 Department of National Defence memorandum. Proper defence analysts, whether or not labelled scientists, he wrote, “must be highly qualified personnel capable of effective research and analysis, and it is desirable that most of them possess a deep knowledge of the world of defence as well as of political science, international relations, and operational analysis.”8 The realist in Lindsey was also quick to point out the limitations of his field. He praised p ­ hysical ­science and engineering for being able to meet the special requirements of Cold War defence and security. At the same time, he noted that ­science, including social science and economics, was unable to provide the international or national strategies necessary to solve the outstanding problems of the period. As a strategic analyst, Lindsey held a firm conviction for objectivity and scientific thinking, perhaps most reflected in his writings on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. He was quick to point out human, economic, and geopolitical factors when explaining the general causes of war. The maintenance of peace and security, he thought, depended on a proper balance of global strength. In this practical sense, Lindsey was against the complete elimination of nuclear armaments. “To try to persuade all states in the world to commit themselves to the total elimination of strategic nuclear weapons at this time would be misguided,” he wrote in 1999.9 “A goal that would be worth seeking during the next few years,” he continued with emphasis, “would be the removal of all nuclear weapons from the state of ready-use deployment, while retaining a capability for early reconstitution of small and very survivable retaliatory forces should circumstances so require.” In his mind, this logic offered a plausible approach to cooperation among the major nuclear powers. Lindsey often wrote about the importance of science to the maintenance of peace and security. Science, in his mind, could increase the effectiveness of Canada’s armed forces, help determine the direction

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and scope of defence and foreign policy, and make helpful contributions to international councils. Lindsey thought a research background was absolutely necessary for studying strategic problems and international relations. He advocated for the wide applicability and utility of defence research, stretching the bounds of traditional OR and continuously evolving the areas covered under the umbrella of strategic studies. Although the problems of defence and security today differ markedly from those Lindsey encountered during a career that spanned nearly the whole of the Cold War, there is a certain permanence and value to his work. Global strategy extends well beyond military considerations, and contemporary strategic analysts, depending on their field, consider political, economic, ideological, and psychological aspects of international affairs. In a world of rapid technological change and complex security challenges, Lindsey’s core beliefs and fundamental values in education, research, and analysis remain vitally relevant.

Notes

Introduction 1 George R. Lindsey, “Research on War and Strategy in the Canadian ­Department of National Defence,” Operational Research and ­Analysis Establishment (ORAE), Memorandum M113 (Ottawa: Department of ­National Defence, 1983), 5. Originally published in French by the ­Department of Anthropology of Université Laval, this paper first appeared in A ­ nthropologie et sociétés 7, no. 1 (1983): 213–29. 2 Ibid., 10. 3 Sandra Martin, “Nuclear Physicist George Lindsey Was DND’s ‘Best Mind,’” Globe and Mail, 25 September 2011. 4 Ibid. 5 For a list of achievements, military service record, and attestation papers for Lieutenant Colonel Charles Bethune Lindsey, see “Lindsey, Charles Bethune,” The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada Regimental Museum and Archives, available online at http://qormuseum.org/soldiers-of-the-queens-own/ lindsey-charles-bethune/, accessed 24 September 2015. 6 For records pertaining to the Lindsey family heritage, see The Mackenzie-Lindsey family fonds (Fonds F 37), Archives of Ontario. For a brief overview, see George R. Lindsey, “The Mackenzie-Lindsey Papers: A New ­Resource for Researchers,” Canadian Genealogist 3, no. 3 (1981): 157–60. 7 Letter from Casimir Lindsey (brother of George Lindsey) to June Lindsey (wife of George Lindsey), 21 September 2011, personal collection of June Lindsey. 8 This title was intended to fool the enemy, because the word “radar” was secret; see George Lindsey, “Some Personal Recollections of Army Operations Research on Radar in World War II,” Canadian Military History 4, no. 2 (1995): 69–74. The article has been reprinted in this book with the permission of Canadian Military History.

226  Notes to pages xvii–xix 9 Defined by Sir Robert Watson-Watt in 1957, operational research is “an ­investigation carried out, by scientific method, on actual operations, ­current, recent or impending, at the request of those responsible for the ­initiation or conduct of the operation, and explicitly directed to the better, more effective and more economical conduct of similar operations in the future”; see Robert Watson-Watt, “Three Steps to Victory,” Odham’s Press (London), 1957, 203, quoted in George R. Lindsey, “Operational Research and Systems Analysis in the Department of National Defence,” Optimum 3, no. 2 (1972): 44–54. 10 George Lindsey fonds (hereafter cited as GLF) MG0005, series 8 “­Biography and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 005 “Lindsey Curriculum Vitae,” MG 0005-8-55-005, Laurier Military History Archives (hereafter cited as LMHA). 11 Lindsey, “Operational Research and Systems Analysis.” 12 Ibid. 13 For a brief overview of British operational research during the Second World War, see Jason Ridler, “Leadership and Science at War: Colonel Omond Solandt and the British Army Operational Research Group, 1943–1945,” in Canada and the Second World War: Essays in Honour of Terry Copp, ed. Geoffrey Hayes, Mike Bechthold, and Matt Symes (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012), 173–98. 14 GLF, series 8 “Biography and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 005 “Lindsey Curriculum Vitae,” MG 0005-8-55-005, LMHA. 15 Upon completion of his MA at Queen’s University in 1946, Lindsey won The Exhibition of 1851 Overseas Science Scholarship, which helped fund his doctoral research at the Cavendish Laboratory from 1946 to 1950. Much of his graduate work in nuclear physics explored artificial radioactivity and radiation from light nuclei under proton bombardment. 16 Martin, “Nuclear Physicist George Lindsey Was DND’s ‘Best Mind.’” For further details on Lindsey’s hockey career at Cambridge, see GLF, series 8 “Biography and Personal History,” vol. 53, file 001 “Cambridge Ice Hockey,” MG 0005-8-53-001, LMHA; see also Records of the Cambridge University Ice Hockey Club, “Correspondence, Publications, and Photographs ­Belonging to George Lindsey,” SOC.76.8.7, Cambridge University Archives. 17 Jane Lindsey (daughter of George Lindsey), interview by ­Matthew S. ­Wiseman, 25 June 2015. 18 Martin, “Nuclear Physicist George Lindsey Was DND’s ‘Best Mind.’” 19 June Lindsey (wife of George Lindsey), interview by Matthew S. Wiseman, 18 February 2014.

Notes to pages xix–xxii  227 20 For an official history of the DRB, see D.J. Goodspeed, DRB: A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958). 21 The Defence Research Board and the Defence Scientific Service (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1953), 4. 22 Solandt was the second commander of AORG, having replaced Brigadier Basil Schonland; see Ridler, “Leadership and Science at War,” 174. 23 For an overview of Solandt’s contributions to Canadian defence in the early post-war period, see Andrew Godefroy, “Wartime Military Innovation and the Creation of Canada’s Defence Research Board,” in Hayes, Bechthold, and Symes, Canada and the Second World War, 199–218. 24 June Lindsey, interview by Matthew S. Wiseman, 18 February 2014. 25 James Digby, Operations Research and Systems Analysis at RAND, 1948–1967 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989). Americans such as Philip M. Morse and George E. Kimball were also significant early contributors to OR during the Second World War; called “operations research” in the US. 26 For an account of Canadian Second World War operational research, see Terry Copp, Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe (Waterloo, ON: Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2000). 27 Lindsey, “Operational Research and Systems Analysis.” 28 Ibid. 29 Jason S. Ridler, “Omond Solandt: Scientific Renaissance Man,” INFOR 46, no. 4 (2008): 227. 30 See George Lindsey fonds 87/253-II-24.3, box 5, file 8, “The Canadian-United States Scientific Advisory Team, 1953–1959 (CUSSAT),” Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter cited as DHH). 31 For more information on the Lincoln Summer Study Group, including the influential role of Lindsey, see Joseph Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: ­Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945– 1958 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987), 64–79. 32 Ibid., 79; see also Andrew Richter, Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950–63 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 41. 33 GLF, “Dr. George Lindsey,” series 8 “Bio and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 006 “Lindsey Publications,” MG 0005-8-55-006, LMHA. 34 GLF, series 8 “Biography and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 005 “Lindsey Curriculum Vitae,” MG 0005-8-55-005, LMHA. 35 GLF, “Dr. George Lindsey,” series 8 “Bio and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 006 “Lindsey Publications,” MG 0005-8-55-006, LMHA. 36 Ibid.

228  Notes to pages xxii–xxiv 37 GLF, series 8 “Biography and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 001 “GRL ­Public Correspondence,” MG 0005-8-55-001, LMHA. 38 Letter from R.J. Sutherland to G.R. Lindsey, 25 March 1963; acquired from June Lindsey, 19 September 2014. 39 For a brief yet detailed examination of the impact of both the Glassco ­Commission and the White Paper, see Jonathan Turner, “Politics and ­Defence Research in the Cold War,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the History of Science, Technology and Medicine 35, no. 1-2 (2012): 39–63. 40 “An Announcement by the Defence Research Board – DRB 3-67,” Record Group (RG) 24, vol. 10340, file DRB 1966-1967, 24 January 1967, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter cited as LAC). 41 Lindsey defined his understanding of “strategic studies” in a 1972 ­report ­published internally at National Defence: “Under the heading of s­ trategic ­studies, there is a broad compass of investigation extending from the ­technical analysis of the capabilities of opposing weapons systems to ­economic and political assessments in the area of international relations. Again, whether or not the people who conduct the studies should be labelled as scientists, they must be highly qualified personnel capable of effective research and analysis, and it is desirable that most of them ­possess a deep knowledge of the world of ­defence as well as of political ­science, ­international relations, and operational analysis.” See G.R. Lindsey, The Need for Scientists in Defence, ­Memorandum No. DRAE M33 (­Ottawa: ­Defence ­Research Analysis ­Establishment, D ­ epartment of National ­Defence, 1972), 11. 42 Ibid. 43 Martin, “Nuclear Physicist George Lindsey Was DND’s ‘Best Mind.’” 44 GLF, “Dr. George Lindsey,” series 8 “Bio and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 006 “Lindsey Publications,” MG 0005-8-55-006, LMHA. 45 “DRBC 570-1 (Cof P),” Robert James Uffen fonds, locator 5062, box 10, file 24, Queen’s University Archives (hereafter cited as QUA). 46 “From: Lieutenant-General E.M. Reyno,” Robert James Uffen fonds, locator 5062, box 11, file 4, QUA. 47 Ibid. 48 GLF, “Dr. George Lindsey,” series 8 “Bio and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 006 “Lindsey Publications,” MG 0005-8-55-006, LMHA. 49 James G. Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 1954–2009 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 63. 50 In 1968, a year prior to contributing to the Standing Committee on ­External Affairs and National Defence, Lindsey wrote a Canadian-focused North American aerospace defence plan for 1975; see Joseph T. Jockel,

Notes to pages xxiv–xxix  229

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62 63 64

65 66

67 68

69 70

Canada in NORAD, 1957–2007: A History (Montreal; Kingston, ON: McGillQueen’s University Press), 68. GLF, “Dr. George Lindsey,” Series 8 “Bio and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 006 “Lindsey Publications,” MG 0005-8-55-006, LMHA. Ibid. GLF, series 8 “Biography and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 005 “Lindsey Curriculum Vitae,” MG 0005-8-55-005, LMHA. “Arctic: Key Area for the Super Powers,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 March 1990. GLF, series 8 “Biography and Personal History,” vol. 55, file 005 “Lindsey Curriculum Vitae,” MG 0005-8-55-005, LMHA. Alan Schwarz, The Numbers Game: Baseball’s Lifelong Fascination with Statistics (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2004), 75. Ibid., 68. George R. Lindsey, “Statistical Data Useful for the Operation of a Baseball Team,” Operations Research 7, no. 2 (1959): 197–207. Lindsey, quoted in Jeff Blair, “Blair on Baseball: Stats Master, Draft Day, Deer Meat,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 11 June 2005. Schwarz, Numbers Game; for Lindsey’s contribution to baseball statistics, see in particular chapter 4, “Darwins of the Diamond.” Albert Legault and George Lindsey, Le feu nucléaire (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1973); and Albert Legault and George Lindsey, The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). Legault and Lindsey, The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). Ibid., 5–6. Donald H. Avery, The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology during the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). George R. Lindsey, ed., No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997). Letter from Omond Solandt to G.D. Lindsey (not to be confused with G.R. Lindsey, the subject of this book), 11 October 1955; acquired from June Lindsey, 19 September 2014. June Lindsey, interview by Matthew S. Wiseman, 18 February 2014. C.E. Law, G.R. Lindsey, and D.M. Grenville, eds., Perspectives in Science and Technology: The Legacy of Omond Solandt (Kingston, ON: Queen’s Quarterly, 1994), vii–viii. Ibid., 239. George R. Lindsey, “The Management of Science in the Defence R ­ esearch Board,” in Law, Lindsey, and Grenville, Perspectives in Science and Technology, 95.

230  Notes to pages xxix–xxxii 71 Law, Lindsey, and Grenville, Perspectives in Science and Technology, 239. 72 GLF, John Best, “Military Research ‘Gets the Boot,’” 18 September 1987, series 12 “Operational Research (history),” vol. 80, file 003 “OR Related Newspaper Clippings,” MG 0005-12-80-003, LMHA. 73 Quoted in “The JDW Interview,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 March 1990, 528. 74 Lindsey often reviewed drafts that related to his work prior to their ­publication. Perhaps most notably, he made important contributions to Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs; Richter, Avoiding Armageddon; and Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence. For manuscript drafts sent to Lindsey for review, see GLF, LMHA. 75 Other notable works that discuss Lindsey or work related to Canadian defence science and analysis include: Andrew B. Godefroy, Defence and Discovery: Canada’s Military Space Program, 1945–74 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011); Goodspeed, DRB; Jockel, Canada in NORAD; Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945–1988 (­Montreal; Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992); and Sean M. Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007). 76 Brigadier-General H. Peters (ret’d) refers to Lindsey as a “modest” ­person in a congratulatory letter written upon Lindsey’s retirement as chief superintendent of the Operational Research and Analysis ­Establishment in 1987. In the letter, Peters also refers to Lindsey as “a statesman among scientists” and “a patriot of high dedication”; letter ­acquired from June Lindsey, 19 September 2014. In an interview ­following Lindsey’s death, retired air force wing commander Ron Cleminson ­described his ­former ­colleague in arms control and verification studies as the DND’s “best mind” on strategic planning, as well as an “honest,” “­balanced,” and “kind leader who influenced others to achieve the [­desired] aim”; see Martin, “Nuclear Physicist George Lindsey Was DND’s ‘Best Mind.’” 77 Fraser McKee, “I Remember George Lindsey,” Globe and Mail, 28 September 2011. 78 Martin, “Nuclear Physicist George Lindsey Was DND’s ‘Best Mind.’” 79 Letter from Ross Graham to June Lindsey, 16 November 2012; acquired from June Lindsey, 19 September 2014. 80 In addition to his mentorship, Sutherland’s seminal paper, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” significantly influenced Lindsey and, ­consequently, much of Lindsey’s writings that appear in this book. See R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” International Journal 17, no. 3 (1962): 199–223.

Notes to pages 3–36  231 Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada 1 G.R. Lindsey, “Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada,” ­Operational Research Division (ORD) Informal Paper No. 67/P10 (Ottawa: ­Department of National Defence, 1967), GLF, series 1 “Government Publications,” vol. 1, file 011, MG 0005-1-1-011, LMHA. Operational Research for NATO’s Navies 1 G.R. Lindsey, “Operational Research for NATO’s Navies,” GLF, series 10 “Maritime and Naval,” vol. 68, file 011, MG 0005-10-68-011, LMHA. 2 It is probable, although not certain, that the abbreviation RAP stands for “Readiness Action Plan,” which is a commonly used term in reference to NATO. 3 Robert H. Smith, ASW: The Crucial Naval Challenge (Annapolis, MD: US ­Naval Institute, 1972), 132. 4 Ibid., 133. 5 B.B. Schofield Brassey, Annual Developments in Maritime Forces (1973), 245. 6 See, for example, P.M. Morse and G.E. Kimball, Methods of Operations Research (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1951); B.O. Koopman, Search and Screening (United States Navy Operations Evaluation Group, 1946); or C.H. Waddinton, O.R. in World War II: Operational Research against the U-Boat (­London: Elek Science, 1973). The Contribution of Operational Research at National Defence 1 G.R. Lindsey, “The Contribution of Operational Research at National Defence,” Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (hereafter cited as ORAE) ­Memorandum No. M101 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1979), GLF, series 1 “Government Publications,” vol. 3, file 014, MG 0005-1-3-014, LMHA. Early Days of Operational Research in Canada and the Founding of the Canadian Operational Research Society 1 G.R. Lindsey, “Early Days of Operational Research in Canada and the ­Founding of the Canadian Operational Research Society,” GLF, series 12 “­Operational ­Research (history),” vol. 79, file 004 “CORS,” MG 0005-12-79-004, LMHA. 2 See, in particular, GLF, series 12 “Operational Research (history),” vol. 79, files 11–13 “Harold Larnder,” MG 005-12-79-011 to MG 005-12-79-013, LMHA. 3 P.J. Sandiford, “The Origin and Growth of CORS,” Canadian Operational ­Research Society (CORS) Journal 1, no. 1 (1963): 1–13.

232  Notes to pages 37–68 4 N.W. Morton, “A Brief History of the Development of Canadian Military Operational Research,” Operations Research 4, no. 2 (1956): 187–92. 5 This is most likely a reference to Alexander Stepanovich Popov, the well-known ­Russian physicist, acclaimed by many in his homeland and across eastern Europe as the inventor of radio. 6 “Origin of O.R.H. Larnder,” taped at IFORS (International Federation of Operational Research Societies) 78, IFD 19, Audio Archives of Canada, Markham, ON. 7 Harold Larnder, “The Origin of Operational Research,” in Operational ­Research ’78: Proceedings of the Eighth IFORS International Conference on Operational Research, ed. K.B. Haley (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979), 3–12. 8 “Obituary Notices of Harold Larnder and John Abrams,” INFOR 19, no. 3 (1981): 2760–8. Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research on Radar in World War II 1 Reprinted with the permission of Canadian Military History. The original published citation is George Lindsey, “Some Personal Recollections of Army Operations Research on Radar in World War II,” Canadian Military History 4, no. 2 (1995): 69–74. The Linkages of New Technology to Strategic and Theatre Deterrence and Warfighting 1 G.R. Lindsey, “The Linkages of New Technology to Strategic and Theatre Deterrence and Warfighting,” GLF, series 4 “Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (NACD),” vol. 21, file 004, MG 0005-4-21-004, LMHA. The SALT Treaty from a Canadian Point of View 1 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Thirty-Second Parliament, First Session: No. 54-59 (17 February 1982), 58:5–58:15. 2 G.R. Lindsey, “The SALT Treaty from a Canadian Point of View,” ORAE ­Report No. R74 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1980), GLF, series 1 “­Government Publications,” vol. 4, file 002, MG 0005-1-4-002, LMHA. 3 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Thirty-Second Parliament, First Session: Volume 15 (29 April 1982), 16743–4. 4 United States, Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet

Notes to pages 68–96  233 Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II)” [­hereafter cited as US Department of State, SALT II Treaty], available online at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5195.htm, accessed 21 June 2016. 5 United States, Department of State, “Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I),” available online at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt1.html, ­accessed 21 June 2016. Systems Analysis and Global Strategy 1 For the revised draft of this paper, published in Italian, see George Lindsey, “Scienza Analisi dei Sistemi e Ricerca Operative,” La Rivista italiana di Strategia Globale 2 (1984): 191–214. 2 H.R. Alker, Mathematics and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1965); T.R. Gurr, Polimetrics: An Introduction to Quantitative Micropolitics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972). 3 C.L. Taylor and M.C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972). 4 Albert Wohlstetter, “Legends of the Strategic Arms Race Part I: The ­Driving Engine,” Strategic Review 2, no. 4 (1974): 67–92; idem, “Part II: The ­Uncontrolled Upward Spiral,” Strategic Review 3, no. 1 (1975): 71–86. 5 Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: Signet, 1972). 6 L.F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960); David Wilkinson, Deadly Quarrels: Lewis F-Richardson and the Statistical Study of War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). 7 Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2 v., abridged ed. (1942, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). 8 M. Small and J.D. Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1960 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982). 9 Wilkinson, Deadly Quarrels; L.F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960). 10 Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975). 11 K. Organski and A.F.R. Organski, Population and World Power (New York: Knopf, 1961). 12 R.J. Rummel, Peace Endangered: The Reality of Detente (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976). 13 F.H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1962). 14 R.S. Cline, World Power Assessment 1977 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977). 15 K. Tsipis, Offensive Missiles (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace ­Research Institute, 1974).

234  Notes to pages 97–106 16 The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies ­London (annual publication), available online at https://www.iiss.org/en/ publications/military-s-balance. 17 Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (­Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1968); Michael McGwire, “The ­Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” US Naval Institute ­Proceedings 106, no. 5 (1980): 154–83. 18 J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic ­Behaviour (New York: Wiley, 1964). 19 Melvin Dresher, Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1961); R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions: ­Introduction and Critical Survey (New York: Wiley, 1957). 20 Rufus Isaacs, Differential Games (New York: Wiley, 1965). 21 F.W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm (London: Constable, 1916). 22 J.G. Taylor, Force-on-Force Attrition Modelling (Arlington, VA: ORSA, 1980). 23 J.A. Engel, “A Verification of Lanchester’s Law,” Operations Research 2 (1954): 163–71. 24 T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Prediction, and War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979). 25 T.N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977). 26 T.N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980). 27 P.M. Morse and G.E. Kimball, Methods of Operations Research (New York: Wiley, 1951). 28 C.H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U-boat (London: Elek Books, 1973). 29 Alan R. Washburn, Search and Detection (n.p.: Operations Research Society of America, Military Applications Section, 1981). 30 Richardson, Arms and Insecurity. 31 K.E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962). 32 T.L. Saaty, Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament: Applications of Mathematical Structures in Politics (New York: Wiley, 1968). 33 Partha Chatterjee, Arms, Alliances and Stability (London: Macmillan, 1975). 34 M.C. McGuire, Secrecy and the Arms Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard ­University Press, 1965). 35 H. Afheldt and P. Sonntag, Stability and Strategic Nuclear Arms (New York: World Law Fund, 1941); A. Legault and G. Lindsey, The Dynamics of the ­Nuclear Balance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976). 36 Andrzij Karkoszki, Strategic Disarmament, Verification and National Security (London: Taylor and Francis, 1977).

Notes to pages 108–33  235 The Strategic Significance of Changes in the Offence/Defence Balance 1 G.R. Lindsey, “The Strategic Significance of Changes in the Offence/ Defence Balance,” GLF, series 9 “Missile Defence,” vol. 61, file 001, MG 0005-9-61-001, LMHA. 2 United States, Department of State, “Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I).” 3 US Department of State, “SALT II Treaty.” Taxonomy and Measurement in Arms Control 1 “Taxonomy and Measurement in Arms Control” (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS Press of Wilfrid Laurier University, 1993). The second paper Lindsey published through LCMSDS is “Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Fewer Would Be Better but Zero Would Be Imprudent” (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS Press of Wilfrid Laurier University, 1999). 2 For information on the workshop, see “Experts on Arms Control to Verification to Meet at WLU,” available online at http://images.ourontario.ca/Partners/ WLU/0023510191T.PDF, accessed 11 July 2016. 3 United States, Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty),” available online at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360. htm, accessed 11 July 2016. 4 United States, Department of State, “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I),” available online at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/ start/start1.html, accessed 11 July 2016. 5 United States, Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (and Protocol Thereto) (TTBT),” available online at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5204. htm, accessed 11 July 2016. Canadian Security, Sovereignty, and National Development: Possible Contributions by the Armed Forces and the Defence Research Board 1 G.R. Lindsey, “Canadian Security, Sovereignty, and National Development: Possible Contributions by the Armed Forces and the Defence Research Board,” Defence Research Analysis Establishment (DRAE) Report No. 23 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1971), GLF, series 1 “Government Publications,” vol. 1, file 015, MG 0005-1-1-015, LMHA. 2 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).

236  Notes to pages 134–53 3 Appendix to House of Commons Debates, 17 April 1970, 6027. 4 John W. Holmes, “Canada and the United States: Political and Security ­Issues,” Behind the Headlines 29 (March 1970); the quotation is from an ­article by Roger Swanson to be published in Behind the Headlines. 5 The original text reads, “It would be possible to select Indian, Eskimo, or Métis ­communities for special attention.” 6 R.J. Uffen, “DRB: Re-organization for Closer Ties with Canada’s New Forces,” Science Forum 1, no. 3 (1968): 6–10. 7 Science Council of Canada, “Towards a National Science Policy for ­Canada,” Report 4 (Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, October 1968). 8 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 9 Encyclopedia Britannica 21 (1949): 99. 10 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 9th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967). 11 House of Commons Debates, 18 April 1969, 7724–5. 12 House of Commons Debates, 15 May 1969, 8720. 13 Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, no. 38, 16 December 1969, 208–9. 14 House of Commons Debates, 16 April 1970, 5941. 15 Ibid. 16 “Summary of Canadian Note Handed to the United States Government on 16 April 1970,” Appendix to House of Commons Debates, 17 April 1970, 6028. 17 House of Commons Debates, 16 April 1970, 5948. 18 House of Commons Debates, 17 April 1970, 6015. 19 House Commons Debates, 15 April 1970, 5923. 20 Arvid Pardo, “Control of the Seabed,” Foreign Affairs (October 1968); ­reprinted in Survival 11, no. 18 (January 1969). 21 Globe and Mail, 28 May 1970. 22 House of Commons Debates, 8 April 1970, 5624. 23 Douglas M. Johnston, “Canada’s Arctic Marine Environment: Problems of Legal Protection,” Behind the Headlines 29, no. 5–6 (1970): 1–7. 24 Ibid. Canadian Maritime Strategy in the Seventies 1 G.R. Lindsey, “Canadian Maritime Strategy in the Seventies,” GLF, series 10 “­Maritime and Naval,” vol. 69, file 001, MG 0005-10-69-001, LMHA. 2 Sixty of the seventy RCN frigates and 106 of the 122 corvettes were built in Canada.

Notes to pages 153–73  237 3 The Canadian carrier had fighter as well as fixed-wing anti-submarine ­aircraft throughout the campaign. 4 Thor Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950–1955 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1965). 5 Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s: White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971). 6 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on ­External Affairs and National Defence, Tenth Report of the Standing Committee on ­External Affairs and National Defence Respecting Maritime Forces (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970). Operational Research and Analysis: Flexible Response to the Needs of Canadian Defence through the Post-war Years 1 G.R. Lindsey, “Operational Research: Flexible Response to the Needs of Canadian Defence through the Postwar Years,” ORAE Memorandum No. M103 (Ottawa: ­Department of National Defence, 1980), GLF, series 1 “Government Publications,” vol. 4, file 004, MG 0005-1-4-004, LMHA. 2 Philip Morse, “Trends in Operational Research,” Operations Research 1 (1953): 159–65. 3 Lindsey, “Canadian Security, Sovereignty, and National Development.” 4 G.R. Lindsey, “Operational Research in the Department of National ­Defence: The Position in 1968,” Canadian O.R. Society Journal 7, no. 1 (1969): 31–58. 5 G.R. Lindsey, “The Need for Scientists in Defence,” DRAE Memo M33 (­Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1972). 6 M.V. Potter, “Analysis of the Replacement Problems for Large Fleets of Land ­Vehicles,” DRAE Report No. 26 (Ottawa: Department of National ­Defence, 1971). 7 J.J. Alexander and R.L. Baglow, “Optimal Spares Policy for Two Indent ­Levels of Repairable Assemblies,” DRAE Report R31 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1972); P.A. Vincent, “METRIC 2: The Mathematical Theory of a Sparing Model for Repairables,” ORAE Memo M102 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1980). 8 R. Baglow, F. Fitch, G. Lafond, and J. Smarkala, “A Study to Aid the P ­ rocedure for the Acquisition of Capital Equipment by the Use of Logistic Models,” DRAE Memo M33 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1973). 9 W.D. Cook and S.A. Brightwell, “Studies of Certain Aspects of the Canadian Forces Supply System,” ORAE Project Report PR132 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1979).

238  Notes to pages 173–5 10 R.C. Dudding and W.L. Price, “Application Notes: A Flow Model for ­Manpower Management,” Canadian Journal of OR and Info Processing 13, no. 2 (1975): 208–14. 11 B. Marsh and D.S. Cotterill, “Impact of a Three-Tier Career Plan on the ­Specialist Officer Classification Manpower Modelling Analysis Methodology,” ORAE Project Report PR171 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1981). 12 W.L. Price and W.G. Piskor, “The Application of Goal Programming to Manpower Planning,” Canadian Journal of OR and Info Processing 10, no. 3 (1972): 221–31. 13 W.L. Price, “Attrition in the Canadian Armed Forces, 1970–1976,” ORAE ­Project Report PR83 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1976). 14 R.G. Bijoor, “Analysis of Moving Costs Based on Sample Survey for the Year 1979,” ORAE Project Report PR156 (Ottawa: Department of National ­Defence, 1980). 15 G.R. Lindsey, “The East-West Balance in Long Range Nuclear Weapons,” ORAE Memo M106 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1981). 16 J. Storr, E. Solem, and M. Cromie, “The Impact of Energy on Strategy: A ­Consolidated Report,” ORAE. Report R64 (Ottawa: Department of ­National Defence, 1977). 17 Erik Solem, “Futures of the International System: Reflections on ­Forecasting, ­Models, and the Future Evolution of the International System,” ORAE ­Project R ­ eport PR143 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1980). 18 N.A. Kellett, “International Terrorism: A Retrospective and Prospective Estimation,” ORAE Report R78 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1981). 19 D. Charters, D. Graham, and M. Tugwell, “Trends in Low Intensity ­Conflict,” ORAE Extra Mural Paper 16 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1981). 20 R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long-Term Strategic Situation,” International Journal 17, no. 3 (1962): 199–223. 21 R.J. Sutherland, “The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic,” in The Arctic Frontier, ed. Ronald St. J. Macdonald (Toronto: University of ­Toronto Press, 1966), 256–78. 22 A. Crawford, J. Lamb, D. Kaye, and E. Gilman, “Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals,” ORAE Report R81 (Ottawa: Department of ­National Defence, 1982). 23 J.S. Finan, “Arms Control and the Central Strategic Balance: Some ­Technological Issues,” International Journal 36, no. 3 (1981): 430–59;

Notes to pages 175–8  239

24

25

26 27 28

29 30 31 32

33

34

G.R. Lindsey, “Strategic Weapon Systems, Stability, and the Possible ­Contributions by C ­ anada,” Behind the Headlines 28 (1969): 7–8, also ­published as DRAE ­Report No. 9 (Ottawa: Department of National ­Defence, 1969); G.D. Kaye, “Arms Control and the Strategic Balance,” DRAE Memo M21 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1970). L.M. Lafleur, “The Economic Impact of CFB Cornwallis on Its ­Micro-Environment,” DRAE Report R38 (Ottawa: Department of ­National Defence, 1974); M. Cournoyer, “Input-Output Model of Base Impact: The ­Shelburne Case,” ORAE Project Report PR180 (Ottawa: Department of ­National Defence, 1982). B.G. McRoberts, “Canadian Forces Education as a Contribution to National Development,” DRAE Report R37 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1973). R.K.N. Crook, “The Armed Forces in the Context of Rapid Social Change,” ORAE Report R55 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1975). C.L. Player, “The Military Family in Canada: Some Characteristics,” ORAE/ DSEA Staff Note 1/79 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1979). M. Gian and S.H. Woodend, “An Interim Report on the Social Impact of ­Canadian Forces Bases upon Their Host Communities,” DRAE Report R48 (­Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1974). T.H. Goodfellow, “Reserve Force Study,” ORAE Report R61 (Ottawa: ­Department of National Defence, 1976). Anthony Kellett, “Combat Motivation,” ORAE Report R77 (Ottawa: ­Department of National Defence, 1981). W.P. Doyle, “Canadian Research War Game Methodology,” ORAE Project Report PR42 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1974). W.J. Fulton, “Development of Play of Real Time Training War Games in Support of Command Post Exercises,” ORAE Project Report PR185 (­Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1982). G.D. Kaye, “Trials of Fragmenting Weapons to Determine Their ­Operational Effect,” CAORE Memorandum M14 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1952). N. Tracy, “The Enforcement of Canada’s Continental Maritime ­Jurisdiction,” ORAE Report R44 (Ottawa: Department of National ­Defence, 1975); G.R. Lindsey, “The Future Of Antisubmarine Warfare, and Its ­Impact on ­Naval Activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic Regions,” ORAE Memo M73 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1976), also published in New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic, ed. Christof Bertram and Johan ­Jorgen Holst (Guildford, UK: IPC Science & Technology Press, 1977), 139–53; G.R. Lindsey, “The Place of Maritime Strength in the ­Strategy of

240  Notes to pages 178–91

35 36

37

38

39

Deterrence,” US Naval War College Review (Spring 1978): 26–33; D.A. Grant and A. Jesion, “A Look at the Major Ocean Rims,” ORAE/D Strat A Staff Note 81/9 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1981). D.J. Lamb, “A Visual Air-to-Ground Detection Model,” DRAE Memo M26 (­Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1971). S.L. Milligan, “Causes, Survival Rate, and Incidence of Poor Weather ­Affecting Distress Air Cases,” ORAE Report R57 (Ottawa: Department of National ­Defence, 1976). P. Hypher, E. Emond, and Captain O’Neill, “Analysis of Distress Air Cases in Relation to Crash Position and Intended Track: 1968–1973,” DRAE Report R51 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1974). W.P. Doyle, “Outline of a Proposed Emergency Decision Making Game for ­Emergency Planning Canada,” ORAE Project Report PR71 (Ottawa: ­Department of National Defence, 1976). W.D. Mitchell, “The Utility of Metagame Analysis,” DRAE Report R52 (­Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1974); Erik Solem, “An ­Evaluation and Some Future Uses of Analytical Forecasting,” ORAE Memo M81 (Ottawa: ­Department of National Defence, 1977).

The Realities of Strategic Deterrence and Their Implications for Canada 1 G.R. Lindsey, “The Realities of Strategic Deterrence and Their Implications for ­Canada,” GLF, series 9 “Missile Defence,” vol. 59, file 011, MG 0005-9-59-011, LMHA. 2 United States, Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and ­Compliance, “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of ­Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II),” ­available online at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5195.htm, accessed 21 June 2016. A Canadian Perspective on Canada-US Defence Relations 1 G.R. Lindsey, “Defending North America: A Historical Perspective,” Aerospace ­Defence: Canada’s Future Role? Wellesley Papers 9/1985, 9–18, ed. R.B. Byers, John Hamre, and G.R. Lindsey (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs), reprinted here with the permission of the National Capital Branch of the ­Canadian International Council (formerly Canadian Institute of International Affairs). 2 Bruce Hutchison, The Struggle for the Border (Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1955); Donald Creighton, Dominion of the North: A History of Canada (­London: Robert Hale, 1947), chap 4.

Notes to pages 191–9  241 3 Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958), 511–75. 4 Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the ­Superpowers (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977), chap. 1. 5 R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” International Journal 17 (Summer 1962): 199–223; Colin Gray, Canada’s Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1972), chap. 3. 6 Canada, White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1964), 13. 7 Roger Swanson, “The United States as a National Security Threat to ­Canada,” Behind the Headlines 29, no. 5–6 (1970): 9–16. 8 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), chap. 7. 9 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men, and Government: The War Policies of Canada, 1939–1945 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1970), 97. 10 Ibid., 98. 11 Ibid., 336–54. 12 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto: ­University of Toronto Press, 1972), chap. 6. 13 Ibid.; Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the ­Superpowers (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977), chap. 2. 14 R.J. Sutherland, “The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic,” in The Arctic Frontier, ed. R. St. J. Macdonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 256–78. 15 Melvin Conant, “A Perspective on Defence: The Canada-United States ­Compact,” Behind the Headlines 33, no. 4 (1974). 16 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on ­External Affairs and National Defence, “Second Report on NORAD,” Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 22 April 1975 (Issue 14), 3–24; Jon B. ­McLin, Canada’s Changing Defence Policy, 1957–1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); Colin S. Gray, “Canada and NORAD: A Study in Strategy,” Behind the Headlines 31, no. 3–4 (1972); Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing ­Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, “Testimony of ­Colonel F. ­Colosimone,” 4 March 1975 (Issue 4), 7–12; idem, “Third Report on ­NORAD,” 19 December 1980 (Issue 29), 3–30. 17 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, “Third Report on NORAD.” 18 Canada, Defence in the 70s (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), 25. 19 Canada, Defence Canada 1980 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1981), 1–3.

242  Notes to pages 199–213 20 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) 245–56. 21 G.R. Lindsey, “Strategic Weapon Systems, Stability, and the Possible ­Contributions by Canada,” Behind the Headlines 28, no. 7–8 (1969). 22 United States, Department of State, “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic ­Missile System,” available online at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/­treaties/abm/ abm2.html, accessed on 30 September 2015. 23 United States, Department of State, “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I),” available online at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt1.html, ­accessed 27 June 2016. 24 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on ­External ­Affairs and National Defence, “Testimony of G.R. Lindsey,” 17 October 1980 (Issue 14), 4–17; Colin S. Gray, “Canada and NORAD: A Study in Strategy,” B ­ ehind the Headlines 31, no. 3–4 (1972); Gray, Canada’s Defence Priorities: A ­Question of Relevance (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1972), chap. 7; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, “Testimony of LGen R.J. Lane,” 21 October 1980 (Issue 15), 5–11. Managing the Expos to the World’s Championship 1 The original publication source is George Lindsey, “Managing the Expos to the World’s Championship,” Optimum, no. 1 (1971): 23–8. 2 G.R. Lindsey, “The Progress of the Score during a Baseball Game,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 56, no. 295 (1961): 703–28. 3 G.R. Lindsey, “Statistical Data Useful for the Operation of a Baseball Team,” Operations Research 7, no. 2 (1959): 197–207. 4 G.R. Lindsey, “An Investigation of Strategies in Baseball,” Operations Research 11, no. 4 (1963): 477–501. 5 This reference could be either to Brooks Robinson or Frank Robinson, both of whom played for the Orioles in 1970–71. 6 Lindsey, “Investigation of Strategies in Baseball.” Operational Research: Remarks by George R. Lindsey 1 For details about the Brigadier-General George G. Bell Strategic Leadership Shield and Award Dinner, see Canadian Global Affairs Institute, “George Bell Dinner and Leadership Shield,” accessed 28 June 2016, available online at http://www.cgai.ca/ events.

Notes to pages 213–22  243 2 This document has been reprinted here with the permission of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian International Council (CIC). The original publication source is George R. Lindsey, “Operational Research: Remarks by George R. Lindsey,” Canadian International Council, accessed 28 June 2016, available online at https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/348/ attachments/­original/1413946859/Operational_Research_-_George_R._Lindsay. pdf?1413946859. Afterword 1 Shaye K. Friesen, “Note to File — Reaching into the Oracle: Reflection of a Cold Warrior on the Issues and Challenges in Defence,” Canadian Army Journal 11, no. 1 (2008): 113–20. 2 To be precise, the four guidelines were, as quoted in Friesen: 1) “adapt the skills of the analyst and use a multi-disciplinary approach to problem solving”; 2) “design capabilities with the widest possible objective in mind”; 3) “develop partnerships with non-traditional allies; solutions may not always involve the application of force”; and 4) “synthesize the ‘so what’ of emerging issues, concepts and technologies.” 3 N.W. Morton, “A Brief History of the Development of Canadian Military Operational Research,” Operations Research 4, no. 2 (1956): 187–92; R.H. Lowe, “Operational Research in the Canadian Department of National ­Defence,” Operations Research 8, no. 6 (1960): 847–56. For a complete list of OR organizations, both in and outside Canada, see G.R. Lindsey, “Four Good Decades of OR in the Canadian Department of National Defence,” Journal of the Operational Research Society 49, no. 4 (1998): 334. 4 See “Systems Analysis and Global Strategy,” in this volume. 5 For an overview of OR in Canada between 1950 and 1990, see Lindsey, “Four Good Decades of OR,” 327–35. 6 See “Early Days of Operational Research in Canada and the Founding of the Canadian Operational Research Society,” in this volume. 7 See “Canadian Maritime Strategy in the Seventies,” in this volume. 8 G.R. Lindsey, “The Need for Scientists in Defence,” Memorandum no. DRAE M33 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Defence Research Analysis Establishment, 1972), 11. 9 G.R. Lindsey, Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Fewer Would Be Better but Zero Would Be Imprudent (Waterloo, ON: Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 1999), 38.

Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey

This bibliography of works by George R. Lindsey is composed of publications written before, during, and after his professional working career with C ­ anada’s Department of National Defence. The editor has attempted to make this list comprehensive based on the information available at the time of publication, but the reader should be aware that information might be missing or incomplete. MA and PhD Theses 1946

“The Beta and Gamma Radiation from a Plane Sheet of Radioactive Indium.” MA thesis, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON.

1950

“Transitions from Excited States of Neon, Oxygen and Beryllium Nuclei.” PhD thesis, Cavendish Laboratory, Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge.

Books (Authored or Edited) 1973

Legault, Albert, and George Lindsey. Dynamik des nuklearen Gleichgewichts. Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag.



Legault, Albert, and George Lindsey. Le feu nucléaire. Paris: Éditions de Seuil.

1974

Legault, Albert, and George Lindsey. The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Rev. ed., 1976.

1995

Law, C.E., G.R. Lindsey, and D.M. Grenville. Perspectives in Science and Technology: The Legacy of Omond Solandt. Kingston: Queen’s Quarterly, Queen’s University.

246  Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey 1997

George R. Lindsey, ed. No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Government Publications and Reports 1958

“The Paths of Missiles and Satellites.” Air Defence Command/ Operational Research Branch (ADC/ORB) Memorandum 58/3. Ottawa: Department of National Defence (hereafter cited as DND).

1962

“The Geometry of Satellite Reconnaissance of the Earth’s Surface,” SACLANT ASW Research Center Technical Memorandum 8. La Spezia, Italy: NATO.

1965

“The Strategy and Economics of Intercontinental Missile Defence.” Operational Research Division (hereafter cited as ORD) Informal Paper 65/P1. Ottawa: DND.



“The Allocation of Resources in an Alliance.” ORD Informal Paper 65/P13. Ottawa: DND.



“A Resume of the Military Strategies in the Two World Wars.” ORD Informal Paper 65/P14. Ottawa: DND.

1966

“The Strategy and Economics of Intercontinental Missile Defence (U).” ORD Informal Paper 66/P23. Ottawa: DND.

1967

“Some Problems Met in the Allocation of Defence Resources in Canada (U).” ORD Informal Paper 67/P4. Ottawa: DND.



“Eighteen Years of Military Operational Research in Canada.” ORD Informal Paper 67/P10. Ottawa: DND.

1969

“Canadian Maritime Strategy: Should the Emphasis Be Changed?” Defence Research and Analysis Establishment (hereafter cited as DRAE) Report 5. Ottawa: DND.



“Strategic Weapon Systems, Stability, and the Possible Contributions by Canada.” DRAE Report 9. Ottawa: DND.

1971

“Canadian Security, Sovereignty, and National Development: Possible Contributions by the Armed Forces and the Defence Research Board.” DRAE Report 23. Ottawa: DND.

1972

“The Need for Scientists in Defence.” DRAE Memorandum M33. Ottawa: DND.

1974

With S.H. Woodend. “Application of Social Science to Defence Problems (U).” DRAE Report R42. Ottawa: DND.

Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey  247 1976

“The Future of Antisubmarine Warfare and its Impact on Naval Activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic Regions.” Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (hereafter cited as ORAE) Memorandum M73. Ottawa: DND.



“The Significance of Population Growth for Future International Relations.” ORAE Memorandum M78. Ottawa: DND.

1979

“NATO’s Antisubmarine Problems in a Changed World.” ORAE Memorandum M96. Ottawa: DND.



“The Contribution of Operational Research at National Defence.” ORAE Memorandum M101. Ottawa: DND.

1980

“The SALT Treaty from a Canadian Point of View.” ORAE Report R74. Ottawa: DND.



“Operational Research: Flexible Response to the Needs of Canadian Defence through the Postwar Years.” ORAE Memorandum M103. Ottawa: DND.



“Engines, Safety, Attrition, Costs and the NFA.” ORAE Memorandum M105. Ottawa: DND.

1981

“The East-West Balance in Long Range Nuclear Weapons 1960–1983.” ORAE Memorandum M106. Ottawa: DND.

1982

“The Battlefield of the 1990s.” ORAE Memorandum M110. Ottawa: DND.



“The Increasing Capabilities of the Soviet Navy.” ORAE Memorandum M111. Ottawa: DND.

1983

“Research on War and Strategy in the Canadian Department of National Defence.” ORAE Memorandum M113. Ottawa: DND.

1986

The Strategic Defence of North America. Ottawa: DND and Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

1991

With Sidney Graybeal, James Macintosh, and Patricia McFate. “Verification in the Year 2000.” Arms Control Verification Studies 4. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division.



With Alex Morrison. “Verifying Limitations on Military Personnel.” Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers 9. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division.

1993

With Paul Bender, Stan Isbrandt, G.D. Kaye, and Erik Solem. Futures Research in Government, Part One: Futures Research and Defence.

248  Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey Interdepartmental Committee for Futures and Forecasting Report 1. Ottawa.

With Sidney N. Graybeal, Patricia Bliss McFate, and D. Marc Kilgour. “Constraining Proliferation: The Contribution of Verification Synergies.” Arms Control Verification Studies 5. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division.



“Ballistic Missile Defence in the 1990s: Implications for Canada.” ORA Project Report PR 663. Ottawa: DND.



With George MacFarlane, G.E. Sharpe, L.T. Rowbottom, and Erik Solem. Futures Research in Government, Part Two: Canada, Space Trends and the Future, Interdepartmental Committee for Futures and Forecasting Report 2. Ottawa.



With Arnold Simoni. Prospects for a Multilateral Missile Defence Regime: A Research Report. Ottawa: DND.

1994

With Patricia McFate, Douglas A. Fraser, and Sidney N. Graybeal. “The Converging Roles of Arms Control Verification, Confidence-Building Measures, and Peace Operations: Opportunities for Harmonization and Synergies.” Arms Control Verification Studies 6. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (hereafter cited as DFAIT), Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division.

1996

With Patricia Bliss McFate, F. Ronald Cleminson, and Sidney N. Graybeal. “Verification in a Global Context: The Establishment and Operation of a United Nations Centre for Information, Training, and Analysis (CITA).” Arms Control Verification Studies 7. Ottawa: DFAIT, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division.

Articles, Book Chapters, and Papers 1949

With S. Devons. “Electron Pair Creation by a Spherically Symmetrical Field.” Nature 164 (1949): 539–40.



With S. Devons and H.G. Hereward. “Lifetime for Pair Emission by Spherically Symmetrical Excited States of the O16 Nucleus.” Nature 164 (1949): 586–7.

1950

With S. Devons. “g-Radiation from the Resonant Capture of Protons by 7Li Nuclei.” Proceedings of the Physical Society A63 (1950): 1202–7.

Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey  249 1952

“The Roles of Radar.” Canadian Army Journal 5, no. 11 (1952): 17–31.

1954

With S. Devons and G. Goldring. “Emission of Electron-Positron Pairs from Light Nuclei I: Monopole Transition in 16O.” Proceedings of the Physical Society A67 (1954): 134–47.

1956

“When Is Air Defence Worth While?” Royal Canadian Staff College Journal (1956): 30–2.

1959

“Statistical Data Useful for the Operation of a Baseball Team.” Operations Research 7, no. 2 (1959): 197–207.

1960

“Defence Against Ballistic Missiles.” RCAF Staff College Journal (1960): 41–9.

1961

“The Limitations of Military Space Vehicles.” RCAF Staff College Journal (1961): 58.



“The Progress of the Score During a Baseball Game.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 56, no. 295 (1961): 703–28.

1962

“Between the Quantitative and the Qualitative.” Canadian Operational Research Society Bulletin 1, no. 1. (1962): 3–5.

1963

“An Investigation of Strategies in Baseball.” Operations Research 11, no. 4 (1963): 477–501.

1964

“The Submarine Environment.” RCAF College Journal (1963): 65–72. Reprinted in Survival 6, no. 2 (1964): 69–76.

1965

With A. Berti. “Modello Meccannico per la previsione del moto dei satellite su orbite non distant della superficie della terra.” Ingegneria Meccanica 14, no. 9 (1965): 17.

1968

“Interception Strategy Based on Intermittent Information.” Operations Research 16, no. 3 (1968): 489–508.

1969

“Operational Research in the Department of National Defence: The Position in 1968.” Journal of the Canadian Operational Research Society (CORS) 7, no. 1 (1969): 31–8.



“Strategic Weapon Systems, Stability, and the Possible Contributions by Canada.” Behind the Headlines 28, no. 7 (1969); reprinted in Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 43 (13 May 1969) and 46 (21–22 May 1969).



“Correspondence Regarding ABM.” Canadian Forum (October 1969): 166.

250  Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey 1970

“The Stability of Countries of Various Sizes.” In Operations Research (OR) 69, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Operational Research, ed. John Lawrence, 181–91. London: Tavistock Publications.



With G.D. Kaye. “MIRVs and the Strategic Balance.” Nature 227, no. 5258 (1970): 696–7.

1971

“Managing the Expos to the World’s Championship.” Optimum 2, no. 1 (1971): 23–8.

1972

“Operational Research and Systems Analysis in the Department of National Defence.” Optimum 3, no. 2 (1972): 44–54.



“Deterrence and Defence – 1972.” EMO National Digest (June-July 1972): 1–6.



“Canadian Naval Policy since World War II: A Decision-Making Analysis,” by G.M. Dillon, with comments by G.R. Lindsey and Jonathan Wenk. Occasional Paper. Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.

1973

“Strategic Deterrence and North American Aerospace Defence.” United Services Institute of Ottawa 2, no. 3 (1973): 57–63.



With J.H. Trotman. “L’Enchevêtrement des systèmes de défense et l’impact des SALT sur la sécurité européenne.” In Choix: la sécurité européenne dans les années 1970–80, 37–45. Quebec City: Université Laval, Centre Québécois des Relations Internationales.

1974

With Albert Legault. “La logique de l’apocalypse.” Québec Science 12, no. 10 (1974): 28.



With Albert Legault. “Le feu nucléaire.” Politique étrangère 39, no. 1 (1974) : 113–15.



“A Useful New Role for the Canadian Forces in Europe.” Canadian Defence Quarterly 4 no. 1 (1974): 27–34.

1975

“Some Types of Nuclear Proliferation Are More Dangerous than Others.” Science Forum 8, no. 1 (1975): 10–12.



“In Defence of Defence.” Canadian Forces Staff College Newsletter (Spring 1975); reprinted in Maritime Affairs Bulletin 3 (1976), Navy League of Canada.



With D.P. Dexiel. “Professionalism and the Canadian Operational Research Society.” INFOR 13, no. 2, (1975): 215–21.

Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey  251

With John Sigler and John Gellner. “World Crisis 1975.” Behind the Headlines 34, no. 2 (1975).



“Is the World Safe for Democracy? Military Aspects.” Behind the Headlines 34, no. 2 (1975): 10–18.



“Canada’s Systems Analysts Get to Know Each Other.” Science Forum 46 (1975): 21–3.

1976

“Tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare: The Past and the Future.” Power at Sea, I, The New Environment, Adelphi Paper 122, 30–9. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

1977

“A Scientific Approach to Strategy in Baseball.” In Optimal Strategies in Sports, ed. S.P. Landany and R.E. Machol, 1–30. New York: North-Holland.



“Strategic Aspects of the Polar Regions.” Behind the Headlines 35, no. 6 (1977): 1–24.

1979

“Looking Back over the Development and Progress of Operational Research.” In Operational Research (OR) ’78, Proceedings of the Eighth IFORS International Conference on Operational Research. New York: North-Holland, (1979), 13–31.

1980

“Implications for Canada of Trends in Military Technology.” Canadian Defence Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1980): 6–11.

1983

“La recherche sur la guerre et la stratégie au ministère de la défense nationale du Canada.” Anthropologie et Sociétés 7, no. 1 (1983): 213–29.

1984

“Scienza Analisi dei Sistemi e Ricerca Operative.” La Rivista italiana di Strategia Globale, no. 2 (1984): 191–214.

1985

“Analytical Approaches to Problems of a Middle-Sized Defence Department.” omega: The International Journal of Management Science 13, no. 2 (1985): 107–13.



With R.B. Byers and John Hamre. Aerospace Defence: Canada’s Future Role? Wellesley Papers 9/1985. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs.



“Defending North America: A Historical Perspective.” In Aerospace Defence: Canada’s Future Role? Wellesley Papers 9/1985. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 9–18.



“Laser and Particle Beam Weapons.” Canadian Defence Quarterly 15 (1985): 9–14.

252  Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey 1986

“The Oceans, Air, and Space Between the North Atlantic Partners.” In Flådestrategier og Nordisk Sikkerhedspolitik [Maritime strategies and the security policies of the Nordic countries]. Copenhagen.



The Strategic Defence of North America. Issues in Strategy. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

1987

“Defense Technology.” Encyclopedia of Physical Science and Technology 4 (1987): 186–211.



“Supporting Role or Fourth Armed Service?” In Space Strategy: Three Dimensions, ed. Brian MacDonald, 51–8. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

1988

“Arctic Perspectives from Different NATO Viewpoints.” NATO’s Sixteen Nations.



“L’espace: rôle auxiliaire ou quatrième arme?” Études Internationales 19, no. 3 (1988) : 451–66.



“Technology, Society, and International Security since 1945.” In Men, Machines, and War, ed. Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson, 155–81. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1988.



“The Future of Naval Warfare.” In RCN in Transition, 1910–1985. ed. W.A.B. Douglas. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988.

1989

“Canada-United States Defence Relations.” In Conflict Resolution and the Future of NATO: The Canada-United States Experience, ed. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, 106–18. Athens: University of Georgia, Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law.



“Strategic Defence in the 1990s.” In Nuclear Strategy in the Nineties: Deterrence, Defence, and Disarmament, 30–45. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Toronto Seminar.



Strategic Stability in the Arctic. Adelphi Papers 241. London: Brassey’s for International Institute for Strategic Studies.



The Tactical and Strategic Significance of Stealth Technology. Quebec City: Centre québécois de relations internationales.

1991

“Preserving Military Capabilities in Times of Peace.” Defence Associations: National News Network 1, no. 13 (15 October 1991): 4.



“Space Surveillance and Canada.” Canadian Defence Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1991): 7–12.



“The Outlook for Canadian-American Defense Priorities,” Canada-U.S. Outlook: The Future of North American Defense 2, no. 2 (1991): 21–42.

Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey  253 1992

“Electrooptics and Computers in Defense Technology.” Encyclopedia of Physical Science and Technology 5 (1991): 803–18.



“Canada-US Defence Relations in the Cold War.” In Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defence Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg. ed. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel, 59–82. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992.



“Modernization of Weapons and the Qualitative Problems of Arms Control.” Working Paper 42. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.



“Surveillance from Space: A Strategic Opportunity for Canada.” Working Paper 44. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

1993

“Nuclear Testing.” Defence Associations National Network News 2, no. 3 (1993): 9.



With Arnold Simoni. Prospects for A Multilateral Missile Defence Regime: A Research Report. Toronto: York University, Centre for Strategic and International Studies.



“Taxonomy and Measurement in Arms Control.” Waterloo, ON: Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies (hereafter cited as LCMSDS).

1994

“Comments on Modelling Baseball.” In 1994 Proceedings of the Section on Statistics in Sports, 21–4. Alexandria, VA: American Statistical Association.



“Long-Term Planning for Defence.” The Defence Associations National Network News 3, no. 4 (October 1994): 3.



“The Impact of Military Technology on the Achievement of Minimum Deterrence.” In Minimum Nuclear Deterrence in a New World Order, ed. Peter Gizewski, 67–82. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security.

1995

“Ballistic Missile Defence in the 1990s.” Canadian Defence Quarterly (1995): 6–11.



“Judging the Past through Blinkered Hindsight.” Defence Associations National Network News 3, no. 7 (1995): 7–8.



“Some Personal Recollections of Army Operational Research on Radar in World War II.” Canadian Military History 4, no. 2 (1995): 69–74.

254  Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey

“The Management of Science in the Defence Research Board.” In Perspectives in Science and Technology: The Legacy of Omond Solandt, ed. C.E. Law, G.R. Lindsey, and D.M. Grenville, 85–95. Kingston, ON: Queen’s Quarterly, Queen’s University.



“Final Discussion and Summary.” In Perspectives in Science and Technology: The Legacy of Omond Solandt, ed. C.E. Law, G.R. Lindsey, and D.M. Grenville, 233–9. Kingston, ON: Queen’s Quarterly, Queen’s University.

1997

“A.G.L. McNaughton.” In No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II, ed. George R. Lindsey, 243–53. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.



“Canadian Wartime Operational Research.” In No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II, ed. George R. Lindsey, 207–10. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.



“C.J. Mackenzie.” In No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II, ed. George R. Lindsey, 254–6. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.



“C.D. Howe.” In No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II, ed. George R. Lindsey, 257–60. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.



“Omond Solandt.” In No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II, ed. George R. Lindsey, 264–6. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.



“Reminiscences of Operational Research on the Air Defence of Great Britain.” In No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II, ed. George R. Lindsey, 211–13. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.



“Some Anecdotes form the Development of Radar in Wartime.” In No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II, ed. George R. Lindsey, 263–7. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.



“How Much Nuclear Deterrence is Enough?” Defence Associations National Network News 4, no. 1 (1997): 8–9.



“Hunting and Hiding in the Deep Blue Sea.” Defence Associations National Network News 4, no. 2 (1997): 16–18.

Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey  255

“The Information Requirements for Aerospace Defence: The Limits Imposed by Geometry and Technology.” Bailrigg Memorandum 27. Lancaster University: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies.

1998

“De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons: Better than No First Use.” Defence Associations National Network News 5, no. 3 (1998): 21–2.



“Four Good Decades of OR in the Canadian Department of National Defence.” Journal of the Operational Research Society 49, no. 4 (1998): 327–35.



“Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Forces.” Defence Associations National Network News 5, no. 2 (1998): 15–17.

1999

“Should China Be Contained or Engaged? Defence Associations National Network News 6, no. 2 (1999): 21–4.



“Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Fewer Would Be Better, but None May Be Worse.” Defence Associations National News Network: 10th Anniversary Issue 6, no. 1 (1999): 21–3.



“Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Fewer Would Be Better, but Zero Would Be Imprudent.” Waterloo, ON: Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies.

2000

“Missile Defence: Theatre and National.” Defence Associates National Network News 7, no. 2 (2000): 21–4.

2001

“Asymmetric Competition.” Defence Associations National Network News 8, no. 3 (2001): 8–11.



“Canada, NORAD and National Missile Defence.” Defence Associations National Network News 8, no. 2 (2001): 23–8.



“National Missile Defence: Technological Feasibility and Strategic Implications.” Atlantic Council Paper 6/2001. Toronto: Atlantic Council of Canada.

2002

“Homeland Defence and Canadian Sovereignty.” Defence Associations National Network News 9, no. 2 (2002): 23–5.



“Weaponization of Space.” Defence Associations National Network News 9, no. 1 (2002): 16–18.

2003

With et al. “Canada’s Security Policies.” Behind the Headlines 60, no. 2 (2002-03).

256  Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey

“Potential Contributions by the Canadian Armed Forces in the Defence of North America against Terrorism: The Importance of Overhead Surveillance.” International Journal 58, no. 3 (2003): 309–34.

2004

“Canada, North American Security, and NORAD.” CIIA Occasional Papers, International Insights 2, no. 3 (2004).

2005

“A Practical Solution for Defence.” Diplomat and International Canada (July-August 2005): 21–2.



“The Role for the Canadian Armed Forces in the Defence against Terrorism.” SITREP: A Publication of the Royal Canadian Military Institute (May/June 2005): 13–16.

Book Reviews 1966

Review of Robert Kuenne, The Attack Submarine: A Study in Strategy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965), International Journal 21 (1966): 544.

1967

Review of Robert Kuenne, The Polaris Missile Strike: A General Economic Systems Analysis (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), International Journal 22 (1967): 685–6.

1968

Review of Earnshaw Cooke, Percentage Baseball. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968. Operations Research 16 (1968): 1088–9.

1969

Review of Nigel Calder, ed., Unless Peace Comes (London: Allen Lane, 1968), and Ralph Lapp, The Weapons of Culture (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), International Journal 24, no. 4 (1969): 828–9.

1970

Review of D. Bobrow ed., Weapons Systems Decisions: Political & Psychological Perspectives on Continental Defence (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1969), International Journal 25, no. 2 (1970): 431.

1975

Review of Ingemar Dorfer, System 37 Viggen: Arms, Technology, and the Domestication of Glory (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), International Journal 30, no. 2 (1975): 346–8.

1979

Review of Solly Zukerman, From Apes to Warlords: The Autobiography (1904–1946) of Solly Zukerman (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), International Journal 34, no. 2 (1979): 293–5.

1981

Review of William C. Potter ed., Verification of SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), International Journal 36, no. 3 (1981): 684–5.

Bibliography of Works by George R. Lindsey  257 1984

Review of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Nuclear Radiation in Warfare (London: Taylor and Francis, 1981), Études internationales 15, no. 1 (1984): 259–60.

1987

Review of Kenneth R. Whiting, Soviet Air Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), Études internationales 18, no. 2 (1987): 484–6.

1989

Review of Shelagh D. Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936–1950 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988), International Journal 44, no. 4 (1989): 942–3.

1992

Review of Joseph T. Jockel, Security to the North: Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the 1990s (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1991), Canadian Journal of Political Science 25, no. 1 (1992): 168–9.

Photo Credits

Page xxxix: Reproduced with the permission of the Lindsey family. Photographs Following Page 56 Photograph 1: Reproduced with the permission of the Lindsey family. ­Photograph 2: Library and Archives Canada/Army [Numerical] (R112). Credit: Capt. Alex M. Stirton/Department of National Defence/Library and Archives Canada/PA-130906. Photograph 3: Library and Archives Canada, RE/REC/ REA prefix (R112). Department of National Defence/Library and Archives Canada/PA-065954. Photograph 4: Library and Archives Canada/National Film Board of Canada, Still Photography Division [graphic material] (R119614-7-E). ­Photograph 5: CWM 20110107-010, George Metcalf Archival Collection, ­Canadian War Museum. Photograph 6: National Film Board of Canada/ Library and Archives Canada/PA-116060. Photograph 7: Library and Archives Canada/National Film Board fonds/e011177256. Photograph 8: Library and Archives Canada. Credit: Ted Grant/Ted Grant fonds/e010836558. © Library and ­Archives Canada. Reproduced with the permission of Library and Archives Canada (2017). Photograph 9: Reproduced with the permission of the Lindsey family. Photograph 10: Library and Archives Canada/Department of National Defence fonds/e010858611. © Government of Canada. Reproduced with the permission of Library and Archives Canada (2017). Photograph 11: Reproduced with the permission of the Lindsey family. Photograph 12: Library and Archives Canada/Department of External Affairs fonds/e002107854. © Government of Canada. Reproduced with the permission of Library and Archives Canada (2017). ­Photograph 13: George R. Lindsey, ed., No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997).

Index

Unless otherwise stated, all references are to Canada, Canadian branches of government, and Canadian research establishments and organizations. Abrams, John, 37–9, 41–4 aerial refuelling, 73, 90, 111, 197 aerospace defence, xxxi, 117, 191. See also North American Air/ Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Air Command, 178 air defence: of Britain, xvii–xviii, 47–9, 52, 54; enemy air defences, 74; of North America, xv, xviii–xxi, xxviii, xxx–xxxi, 4–6, 10–12, 16, 28– 32, 38–42, 60–73, 80, 96, 113–18, 121–3, 159, 178, 187–9, 196–200, 220–1. See also North American Air/Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); radar Air Defence Command, xxi, 4, 12, 16, 38, 40, 196 Air Force HQ (AFHQ), 5 Air Force Journal, xxvi Air Ministry, London, 40 Air Operational Information System, 179 Air Transport Command, 4, 12–13 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). See radar

aircraft: Argus, 5, 31, 164; Aurora, 31, 177–9, 189; Avro Arrow, 12, 117; B-1, 70, 74, 200; B-52, 70, 75–6, 185–6, 200; Bear, 70, 115, 123; Bison, 70, 115; CF-18, 118, 178, 188, 196; CF-100, 12, 117, 196; CF-101, 117, 187–8, 196; Étendard, 185; F104, 185; F-111, 185; helicopters, 5, 10, 23, 63–5, 155, 163, 176; interceptor, 11–12, 32, 60, 65, 114–23, 179, 187–9, 195–200, 220–1; Jaguar, 185; Lancaster, 53; Mirage, 185; multi-purpose, 13; strike and reconnaissance, 12, 60, 63, 80, 154; Tupolev TU-4, 15; Voodoo, 117–18; Vulcan, 80, 185 Aircraft Control and Warning System, 10 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). See cruise missiles air-to-air: combat, 13; missiles, 117; weapons, 12, 28, 47 air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM). See ballistic missiles Alaska, 76, 116–17, 122, 187, 193, 196, 198

262 Index Allied Air Forces Central (AAFCENT). See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), 19–23 Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, 9, 162, 190 Anderson, J.F., 204 anti-aircraft (AA): artillery, 47, 49; Command, 52; defences, 41; guns and gunners, xviii, 6–7, 52–4, 116, 163; heavy (HAA), 49–50, 52–4; light (LAA), 52–3; missiles, 60, 115, 117; naval, 28; predictors (Vickers and Sperry), 51; weapons, 7, 30, 103 anti-armour weapons, 103 anti-ballistic missile (ABM): ABM Treaty (1972), xxvii, 70, 114, 116, 201; radar, 129; system, 14, 108, 201 anti-missile: batteries and weapons, 28, 116, 128; defence, 28, 200; missiles, 122; Spartan, 122 anti-personnel weapons, 61, 103 anti-satellite (ASAT): operations and systems, 62–7; weapons, 115 anti-ship: missiles, 27, 31, 65, 115, 189; operations, 189; submarines, 197; torpedoes, 154 anti-submarine: barriers, xxii; carriers and cruisers, 65; convoy patterns, datum searches, and screens, 23; defence, 23, 159–61; depth bombs and torpedoes, 163–4, 185; detection, 5; escort forces, frigates and ships, 65, 96, 119, 154, 203; exercises, 24, 30; function, 65; helicopters, 65, 154–5, 163; hunter-killer/

anti-submarine warfare submarine (SSK), 23; NATO ASW Research Centre in La Spezia, xxii, 19, 89; operations, 26, 189; patrolling, 6; protection, 153, 202; radar, 6; rockets, 185; SACLANT ASW Rsearch Centre, xxii, 4, 19–21, 88; surveillance, 116, 124, 161, 197; tactics, 28; technology, 154; TTCP study group, xxv; warfare (ASW), v, xxiv, 6, 31, 42, 65, 101, 162–3, 185, 203, 220; warfare submarine, 23; weapons and weapons systems, 30, 32, 154 anti-tank: defence, 63, 67, 113; exercises, 30; mines, 61; missiles, 64, 115; operations, 7; weapons, 7, 9, 30 Arctic: Archipelago, 135, 148–9, 159; Canadian defence and security, xxv, 118, 174, 201, 216; coastal anti-submarine surveillance, 161; DRB military programs, 141–2; economic development, 141; islands, 150; Ocean, Straits, and waters, 134, 138, 147, 149–50; pollution, 149, 157; population, 138; radar, 122; regions and territory, 8, 118, 135, 140–2, 148, 164, 194, 201, 215; resupply, 155, 158; sovereignty, 148, 150, 216; under ice surveillance, 161 Argentia, Newfoundland, 189 armoured units and vehicles, 7–8, 63, 67, 127, 176–7 arms control: Canadian defence, security, and sovereignty, 147, 180, 203–4, 221; countermeasures, 78; détente, 79, 107; deterrence, 15, 105–7, 198; disarmament and

Index 263 non-proliferation, 15, 68, 222; international affairs, xxvii, 79, 96, 126; military technologies and weapons systems, 66, 111, 120, 143; NATO, 34, 174; Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, xxv; SALT, 66–9, 77, 80–1, 114; stability, 66–7, 104, 114, 121; theatre nuclear forces, 77; USSR, 80; verification, xxiii–xxv, 62, 115, 126–7, 130, 143, 158, 174 Army Operational Research Group (AORG): British, xvii–xviii, xix, xxix, 38, 49, 214; Canadian, xviii, 55 Army Operational Research Section (AORS), 54 artillery: anti-aircraft, 47, 49; field, 54; fire, 8; shells, 121, 125, 185, 215; weapons, 7, 63, 102, 109. See also Royal Canadian Artillery Atlantic Command, 4 Atlantic Ocean, xviii, 6, 96, 118, 121, 153–4, 161–2, 184, 186, 189, 202–3, 221 Atlas missile, 72 Azores, Portugal, 196 Bagotville, Quebec, 117 Baker-Nunn camera, 122 ballistic missile defence (BMD), xxi, xxiv–xxv, 14, 70, 113–16, 119–25, 159, 161, 189; Safeguard and Sentinel, xxi, 116, 122 ballistic missiles: accuracy of, 74; air-to-surface (ASBM), 70, 78; defence against, 113–14, 120–1, 124–5, 201, 221; development of, 112, 129, 221; displacement of, 60; Early Warning System (BMEWS), 14, 112, 116, 112; intercontinental

(ICBM), 14–15, 61–2, 66–87, 103, 112–18, 120–30, 159–61, 182–7, 194–9, 203; intermediate range (IRBM), 12, 185; Joint Ballistic Missile Defence Staff, NDHQ, xxi; land-based, 90, 112; mediumrange (MRBM), 14, 77, 81, 186; nuclear-armed, 108, 112, 185; sea/ submarine-launched (SLBM), 69–73, 78–81, 82–7, 90, 103, 112–13, 124, 129, 159–61, 165, 182, 186, 197; short-range, 130, 185; space, 15, 69. See also anti-ballistic missile (ABM); cruise missiles Baltic Sea, 75 Bangor, Washington, 189 Barnes, Colin, 39 Barrow Strait, 149 Battle of the Marne, 109 Belgium, 21, 186 Bernholtz, Ben, 42 Bertram, Christoph, xxiv biological weapons, 110 “Blackett’s Circus,” 38. See also Army Operational Research Group (AORG): British Blitzkrieg, 109, 124 BOMARC. See cruise missiles Boulding, K.E., 105 Britain. See United Kingdom Broomhead, June. See Lindsey, June Calgary, Alberta: Operational Research Society of, 46 Canada: Canada-US relations, xx–xxi, xxiv–xxv, 11, 14, 43, 69, 79–80, 109, 187–90, 191–204; Confederation, 191–2; continental defence, 117–18, 121–4, 140, 187–90, 194–8, 200–2; geography and geostrategic issues,

264 Index xxiv, xxxi, 15, 109–10, 116, 125, 187–90, 193–4, 216–17, 220–1; maritime defence, 6, 49, 152–65; military science, xvi, xix–xx, xxiv, xxix–xxxi, 166–81, 213–14, 219–22; national defence, xv–xvi, xix, xxi, xxiii, xxix, xxxi, 14, 121–4, 133–51, 166–81, 216–17, 220–2; North Atlantic Alliance, xxii, 21, 80, 109, 174; nuclear deterrence, 68–87, 182–90, 198–200; operational research capacity, 36–46, 48; possible target locations, 13; Regional Planning Group, 195; Scientific Advisory Team, 196; SALT, 68–87; sovereignty, 133–44, 147–51, 155, 169, 198–9, 216–17, 222; Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837, xvi; wartime science, xxvii–xxviii Canada Emergency Measures Organization, 138, 140 Canadian Air Group (CAG), 190 Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Combat Group, 190 Canadian Armament Research & Development Establishment (CARDE), 6, 14 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), xxiii, xxix, 3, 14–15, 29, 33, 137–40, 143, 155, 169–73, 182; unification, xxiii, 15, 29, 33, 166, 170–3 Canadian Army, xviii, xxiii Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment (CAORE), 4–5, 170 Canadian Army Research Group, 214 Canadian Army Staff College, 9 Canadian Forces (CF), xxiii, 10, 34, 147, 150, 173–80, 196–8, 203 Canadian Forces Europe, 179

Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ), xxiii, 5, 13 Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB), 8–9 Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), 191 Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security, xxv Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), xxv, 182, 213 Canadian International Council (CIC), 191, 213 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, 189–90 Canadian Military History (journal), xii, 47 Canadian National Railways (CNR), 42, 45 Canadian Officers’ Training Corps, 49, 213 Canadian Operational Research Society (CORS), xxvi, 29, 36–9, 43–6, 229 Canadian patrol frigate (CPF), 32, 177, 189 Casimira, Wanda (mother of George Lindsey), xvi–xvii Cavendish Laboratory (University of Cambridge), xviii Chalk River, xviii. See also National Research Council Chatterjee, Partha, 105 chemical warfare and weapons, 7, 110, 175, 201 Chief of Air Operations, 5 Chief of Operational Requirements, AFHQ, 5 China and Chinese: anti-aircraft missiles, 115; civil war, 94–5; nuclear forces and weapons, 69, 76, 81, 141; security policy, 136

Index 265 Cleminson, Ron, xxiii Cline, R.S., 95 cluster bombs, 61, 103 Cold Lake, Alberta, 122, 194 Cold War, xv, xxvi–xxvii, xxx–xxxii, 47, 126, 133–6, 140, 152, 166–7, 182, 195, 219–22 Colorado Springs, Colorado, 39 Commander-in-Chief, Channel Command, 20 Commonwealth, 165, 192, 202 communications: emergency, 139, 196; equipment, 114–15, 117, 130, 142, 201; intelligence, 15, 25, 59; lines of (LOC), 19, 65, 124, 184–8, 202; satellites, 67 Comox, British Columbia, 117 computer modeling and simulation, 6–7, 10, 14, 32, 90, 100, 176–8, 180 conventional forces, 60, 71, 105, 125–7, 177, 184, 190, 199, 202 conventional weapons, 9, 59, 61–7, 103–7, 117–21, 125–7, 184–90 cost-effectiveness studies, 7, 10, 17, 23, 166 Crabtree predictor, 51 cruise missiles: air-launched (ALCM), 62, 70, 74–8, 81, 123–5, 186, 194, 200; anti-ship, 65, 115; defence against, 120–1, 125, 130; development of, 81, 112; groundlaunched (GLCM), 51, 66, 75, 114, 186; long-range, 74, 77, 114; reference to, 60, 64–5, 69, 125; sea/submarine-launched (SLCM), 75, 124, 186; surface-to-air (BOMARC), 12, 117–18, 196–7. See also German V-1 flying bomb Cuban Missile Crisis, 196 Cyprus, 155

D-Day, 52 de Leevy, Dan, xxvi decoys, 14, 28, 61, 103, 123, 130, 189 Defence Operational Research Establishment (DORE), 5 Defence Research Analysis Establishment (DRAE), 133, 152, 171 Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), xxx, 219 Defence Research Board (DRB), xvi, xix–xxiv, xxviii–xxix, 4–8, 17, 37–9, 41–2, 133, 140–4, 170, 214–15, 220 Defence Research Group. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Research Medical Laboratories (DRML), 10 Defence Scientific Service Officers (DSSOs), 17 Defence Staff, xxiii–xxiv, 5, 137 Defence Systems Analysis Group (DSAG), xxi–xxii, 5 “Delphi technique,” 93 Delury, Dan, 42, 44 Denmark, 162, 186. See also Greenland Department of Defense, United States, xx Department of External Affairs (DEA), xxv, 81, 135. See also Standing Committee on External External Affairs and National Defence Department of Foreign Affairs and Internationl Trade (DFAIT): NonProliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, xxv Department of National Defence (DND): ballistic missile defence,

266 Index 14; Lindsey’s career with, xix–xxvi, 219–22; maritime policy, 157–8; operational research in, xx, 3–18, 29–35, 167–81, 220–2; White Paper (1964), xxiii, 13, 193; White Paper (1971), 155, 198–9. See also Defence Research Board (DRB); Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE) détente, 69, 79, 107, 199 deterrence: definition of, 71–2, 103–5; intra-war, 63; nuclear and strategic, xxiv–xxv, xxvii, xxx, 15, 59–62, 66–72, 74–81, 103–7, 112, 116, 120, 124–5, 135, 154, 159–62, 167, 174–5, 182–90, 194, 198–203, 221; post-outbreak, 64, 66; prehostilities, 66; in relation to arms control, 105–6; theatre, 59, 62–3, 74 disarmament: Canadian policy, 15, 68, 199; Lindsey’s perspective, 15, 68, 95, 222; negotiations, 110–11, 175; United Nations General Assembly devoted to, 68 Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. See radar drones, 9, 59 Dupuy, T.N., 101 Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance, The (book), xxvii Eastern Air Command, 39–40 Edmonton, Alberta: Operational Research Society of, 46 Electrical Methods of Fire Control (EMFC), xvii, 49 electronic countermeasures (ECM), xviii, 11, 60–1, 65, 67 electronic intelligence (ELINT), 59, 115, 186. See also intelligence

electronic warfare (EW), 24–8, 32, 61, 64–7 England. See United Kingdom English Channel, 153 enhanced radiation weapon, 115 espionage, 134 first strike, 61–2, 71–2, 75–81, 104–6, 111–21, 160 First World War, xvii, 94, 101, 109, 124, 136, 192–3, 202 fission bomb, 90, 111, 195 “flushing,” 111–13, 116, 122 forecasting and futures studies, 24, 92–4, 107, 174, 220 Fort Churchill, Manitoba, 194 “Forward Based Systems,” 76, 80–1 Foster, John, xx France and French: ballistic missiles, 185–6; carriers, 185; deterrent forces, 121; maritime, 185; monarchy, 146; nuclear forces and weapons, 69, 76, 81, 182–3; Second World War, 52–4, 109, 192, 195; Suez Crisis, 194; war involvement, 94 Friesen, Shaye, 219–20 Functionally Related Observable Differences (FRODs), 78, 128 fusion bomb, 90, 111 Future Ship Study, 177 game theory. See theory of games Gellman, Harvey, 42 Genie missile, 117 German V-1 flying bomb, xviii, 40, 52–4, 74, 215 Germany: maritime, 186; operational research, 4, 21; Second World

Index 267 War, 214; threat to Canada, 194; verificiation, 127; war gaming, 98, 176; war involvement, 94 Glassco Commission, xxiii Goodeve, Charles, 43 Grand Forks, North Dakota, 116 Great Britain. See United Kingdom Great Lakes, 191 Greece, 186 Greenland, 116–17, 122, 187, 196. See also Denmark Greenwood, Nova Scotia, 189 Grenville, David, xxix ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). See cruise missiles Gulf of Saint Lawrence, 149 guns: Bofors, 53; liquid-propellant, 27; machine, 7, 109; tail-gun, 53; terminal guidance, 27. See also antiaircraft (AA); artillery Gzowski, Casimir Sir (maternal great-grandfather of George Lindsey), xvii Hague, The, Netherlands, 19 Halifax, Nova Scotia: anti-submarine warfare, 42, 220; coastal defence battery, 49; Eastern Air Command, 39; naval base, 189; Operational Research Society of, 44, 46 Hartmann, F.H., 95 heavy anti-aircraft (HAA). See anti-aircraft (AA) Hellyer, Paul, xxiii HMCS Bonaventure, 155 HMCS Magnificent, 154 Holmes, John, 134 homing weapons, 74, 98, 103 Hopkins, Nigel, 43–4 hovercraft, 23

Howe, C.D., xxviii hunter-killer/anti-submarine warfare submarine, 23 hydrofoil, 6, 23, 31 Iceland, 136 Industrial Research Program, 141 Information Processing Society of Canada (INFOR), 45 Institute for International Affairs (IIA), xxv Institute of Management Sciences, The (TIMS), 43 intelligence: artificial, 51; battlefield and combat, 9–10, 27, 179, 193; electronic, 15, 59, 64, 113, 115, 186; strategic, 24, 26, 71, 92, 96, 117, 142, 196, 221 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). See ballistic missiles intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). See ballistic missiles Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987), 129 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 128 International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS), 38–9, 43–4 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), xxiv–xxv, 97 Italy, xxii, xxv, 19–21, 88, 186, 214 jammers and jamming, 28, 60, 103 Jane’s Defence Weekly (magazine), xxix Japan and Japanese, 54, 75, 94, 109–11, 194, 214 Johnston, Douglas, 150 Johnstone, J.H.L., 37

268 Index Kates, Josef, 42 King, Isabel, xvii King, John, xvii King, William Lyon Mackenzie (cousin of George Lindsey), xvii, 195 Kitchen, C.G., 204 Knorr, Klaus, 95 Kola Peninsula, 75 Korean War, 8, 94, 136 La Macaza, Quebec, 118 Lac St-Denis, Quebec, 40 Lamontagne, Gilles, 199 Lance missile, 185 Lanchester, F.W., 45, 100–1, 103. See also theory for aerial warfare Larnder, Harold, xx–xxi, 36, 38–9 laser beams and weapons, 27, 60–1, 115, 130, 141, 201 Laurentian Mountains, Quebec, 40 Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS): Laurier Military History Archives, xi–xii, xxxiii, 36, 126; Lindsey’s publications with, 126, 251, 253; research centre, 126 Law, Cecil, xxix, 43–4 Law of the Sea, 148–50, 158–9 Le feu nucléaire (book). See Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance, The Leese, Eric, 41–2 Legault, Albert, xxvii light anti-aircraft (LAA). See antiaircraft (AA) Lincoln Laboratory (MIT), xx Lincoln Summer Study Group, xx–xxi Lindsey, Casimir (brother of George Lindsey), xii

Lindsey, Charles (paternal great-grandfather of George Lindsey), xvii Lindsey, Charles Bethune (father of George Lindsey), xvi–xvii Lindsey, George: arms control research, xxiii, xxv, xxvii, xxx, 221–3; AORG, xvii–xviii; Award for Career Achievement in Defence Analysis, xxx; baseball, xxvi, 207; birth and youth, xvi–xvii; career, xv–xvi, xix–xxvi, 219–22; DRB, xvi, xix–xxiv; education, xvi–xvii; hockey, xviii; Italy, xxii; marriage and family, xvi–xix; military training and service, xvii–xviii; NATO, xxii, 221; NORAD, xx–xxi, 221; NRC, xviii; Order of Canada, xxx; publications, xxvi–xxx, 245–57 Lindsey, Jane (daughter of George Lindsey), xix Lindsey, June (wife of George Lindsey), xviii Lindsey, Robin (son of George Lindsey), xix lines of communication (LOC), 184. See also sea lines of communication London, United Kingdom, xvii, 40–1, 50–4, 59, 74 long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA), 31, 139, 164, 177 low Earth orbit, 130 Luftwaffe, xviii, 50–2 Mackenzie, C.J., xxviii Mackenzie, William Lyon (paternal great-great grandfather of George Lindsey), xvi–xvii Maginot Line, 109

Index 269 Mansbridge, Stanley, 207–8 Maritime Air Command, 4 Maritime Command, 139, 203 Maritime Exercise Analysis Steering Group, 26 Maritime Warfare School, 4–5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). See Lincoln Laboratory McGill Fence, xx. See also radar: MidCanada Line (MCL) McGill University, 37, 40, 45 McGuire, Bill, 42 McGuire, M.C., 105 McKee, Fraser, xxx McNamara, Robert, xx, 105 McNaughton, Andrew, xxviii Mediterranean, 153, 186 Mid-Canada Line (MCL). See radar military balance, 69, 174, 199. See also strategic balance Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), 195 mines: anti-personnel, 61; anti-tank, 61; detection of, 215; remote, 63–4; warfare, 6, 28 Minuteman missile, 72, 79–80, 185–7 Missile Experimental (MX), 75, 186 Missile Site Radar, 122 Mobile Command, CFHQ, 4, 13, 138 Mobile Striking Force, 8, 197 Monroe Doctrine, 193 Montebello, Quebec, 29 Montreal, Quebec, xxiv, 37, 40–6, 189, 210, 212 Montreal Expos, 207–12 Montreal Operations Research Club, 42, 44, 46

Morgenstern, Oskar, 97. See also theory of games Morse, Philip, 166 mortar bombs, 7, 54, 163 Morton, Carl, 209, 211 Morton, N.W. (Whit), 37–8, 41–2 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV), 62, 70, 90, 104, 113 multi-rod warheads, 103 mutual assured destruction, 183, 201 National Defence College, xxvii National Research Council, xvii–xix, xxviii, 142, 214 Nature (journal), xxvii Naval Armaments Group. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Naval Historical Section, 153 Navy League of Canada, xxx Netherlands, The, 21, 186 Neumann, John Von, 97. See also theory of games neutron bomb. See enhanced radiation weapon Newport, Rhode Island, 27 Nike: Ajax, 12; Hercules, 12, 185 Nixon, Richard, 150 No Day Long Enough (book), xxvii Norfolk, Virginia, 19 North American Air/Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), xx–xxi, 4, 11, 117, 122, 187, 196–8, 221 North Atlantic Ocean, 6, 153, 161–2, 186, 202 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): AAFCENT, 4, 39; Advisory Panel on Operational

270 Index Research, xxv, 166–7; Alliance, xv, xxii, 20, 69, 80, 108, 174–5, 182–4, 191, 202, 220–1; ASW Research Centre, xxii, 4, 19–21, 88; Canadian participation, xxx, 147, 151, 199, 221; Defence Research Group, 19, 22; deterrence, 120, 125, 162, 174, 199; forces, 14, 75–7, 96–100, 119–21, 125, 154, 162, 174, 177–80, 183–9, 194–9; Forward Based Systems, 81; naval, 19–28, 153, 162; Naval Armaments Group, 19; Nuclear Planning Group, xxv, 19; nuclear weapons, 74, 81, 118–21; SACLANT, 202–3; SHAPE, 4, 19, 170; Standing Naval Force Atlantic, 155, 162; UN-NATO, 216 North Bay, Ontario, 117–8, 196 North Downs, United Kingdom, 52 North Warning System (NWS). See radar Northern Lights, 114, 200 Northwest Europe, 9 Northwest Highway, 8 Northwest Passage, 149 Norway, 21, 162, 176, 186, 194 nuclear non-proliferation: Lindsey’s perspective, 68, 221–2. See also arms control; disarmament Nuclear Planning Group. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear weapons: airburst, 13, 61, 187; “enhanced radiation warhead,” 61, 63–4; free zone, 175; offensive, xxx, 115, 125, 154, 182–3, 186–7, 199, 214; strategic, 64, 68– 73, 96, 111, 116, 119, 126, 190, 203, 221–2; tactical, 8, 113, 121, 125, 162; theatre, 62, 118–21, 184–5, 202

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), 61, 64–5, 85, 113, 124, 159–61, 189 nuclear-powered submarine (SSN), 21, 23, 90, 154, 159, 164 Ogdensburg Declaration (1940), 195 1 Air Division, 4, 12 One Canadian Air Defence Sector, 41 Operational Evalution Unit, 4 operational research (OR): arms control, 15; ballistic missile defence, 14; Canadian Army, 7–10; Canadian field unit, Halifax, 39; civil defence, 13–14; fleet and force composition studies, 22–3; logistics, 15–16; management studies, 17; manpower analysis, 28–9, 33, 106, 167, 169, 173–4, 176, 180–1; mathematical modeling, 17; military use of space, 14–15; NATO, 19–28; naval warfare, 5–7, 20; nuclear weapons, 13; origins of term, xx, 38, 226n9; personnel studies, 16–18; RCAF, 10–13; tactical air studies, 4, 13, 178; wastage studies, 8 Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE), DRB, xxiii, 29–30, 34, 108, 166–72, 175–81, 204, 215 Operational Research Division (ORD), CFHQ, 3, 5 Operational Research Group (ORG), DRB, xix–xx Operations Research Society of America (ORSA), 37, 43, 45–6, 220 Operations Research Society of Toronto, 37, 42 Optimum (journal), xxvii, 207–8

Index 271 Ottawa, Ontario, xii–xiii, xvii–xxi, xxv, 5, 11, 37–9, 44–6, 49, 88, 117, 178, 213–15, 220 Pacific: Archipelago, 148; coastal surveillance, 161; Command, 4; Ocean, 75, 109, 153, 189, 203; Theatre, 55 paratroops, 8 Pauli, Alan, 42, 44 peacekeeping, 9, 143, 155, 165, 169, 194, 203, 216 Permanent Analysis Team, 26 Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), 195 Pershing missile, 119–20, 185–6 Perspectives in Science and Technology (book), xxviii Petrie, Bill, 38, 44 Pinetree Line. See radar Pluton missile, 185 Polaris missile, 73, 85 Poseidon missile, 73, 185 precision-guided munitions, 60, 63–4, 118 predictor, 49–53; Crabtree, 51 Prince of Wales Strait, 149 probability. See theory of probability Puget Sound, Washington, 188 Quebec City, Quebec: Operational Research Society of, 46 Queen Charlotte Sound, New Zealand, 149 Queen’s Own Rifles, The, xvii Queen’s University, xviii, 41, 226n15 queueing theory, 12, 17, 28, 34 radar: ABM, 129; air defence, xvii–xxi, 16, 48–9, 112, 116, 186–9,

195–6, 215; airborne doppler navigation system, 141; Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 60–6, 114, 117–18, 123, 189, 198, 200; aircraft, 53, 65; antisubmarine, 6, 164, 171; AORG, 49; artillery support, 54; ASW Research Centre, xxii; beams, 10, 27–8, 52–3, 60, 122, 130; Bistatic Doppler System, 11; BMEWS, 116; critical numbers system, 11; DEW Line, xx, 11, 117–18, 188, 196; early warning, 65–7, 80, 111–12, 116–18, 122, 159–61, 187, 195–200, 221; fire control, 49; gaps, 115; jamming, 60; Laurentians station, 40; lineof-sight, 114; Mid-Canada Line (MCL), xx, 11, 117–18, 196; Missile Site, 122; NRC, xvii; NWS, 118, 123; over-the-horizon (OTH), 114, 200; Perimeter Acquisition, 116, 122; Pinetree Line, xx, 117–18, 188; RAF, 48; RCAF, 10; Royal Canadian Artillery, xvii, 214; satellites, 65; Second World War, xvii–xx, 47–55, 214–15, 223n8; signals, 49–53, 59– 61; surveillance, 10, 12, 26–33, 38, 40, 54, 89, 102, 186–7; Texas Towers, 112, 196; TRE, 53; USAF, 12. See also North American Air/Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Radford, Jim, 43, 45 radioactive fallout, 13, 79, 103, 141, 187, 203 reconnaissance, 9, 12–15, 59–67, 77, 90, 114–15, 139, 154–5, 158, 164, 177–8. See also surveillance re-entry vehicle, 72, 130. See also multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)

272 Index Reyno, E.M., xxiv Richardson, L.F., 94–5, 105 Rivett, Pat, 42–4 Robinson, Patrick, 43–4 Roosevelt, Franklin, 194–5 Royal Air Force (RAF): Coastal Command, 25, 38–9; Fighter Command, 38; reference to 48, 51, 102 Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), xx–xxi, xxiii, xxviii, 10, 37–40, 42, 153; Air Defence Command, xxi, 38, 40 Royal Canadian Artillery, xvii, 49, 214 Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 49 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 158 Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), xxiii, 153 Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps (REME), 48 Royal Navy, 25, 48, 115, 163, 193 Rummel, R.J., 95 Rush-Bagot Treaty (1817), 191, 202 Russia. See Soviet Union Saaty, T.L., 105 Saint John, New Brunswick, 189 Sandiford, Peter, 36, 38, 42–4 satellites, 14–15, 26, 59–67, 70, 77–8, 90, 113–17, 122, 130, 154, 178, 187–9, 197, 200, 216 Schurman, Donald M., 163 Schwarz, Alan, xxvi Science Council of Canada, 141 scope photography, 11 sea lines of communication, 19, 65, 124, 184–8, 202. See also communications sea/submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). See ballistic missiles

sea/submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). See cruise missiles second strike, 71, 111, 160 Second World War: Arctic battles in Finland, 8; Battle of Britain, 12; Battle of Iwo Jima, 101; Battle of the Atlantic, 12; D-Day, 52; Fall of France, 192, 195; reference to, xv, xvii, xix–xx, xxiii, xxvii, 29, 37–41, 46–7, 60, 90, 95–7, 101–2, 106, 110–11, 116, 124, 153, 167, 192–3, 202, 213, 215; wartime operational research, 47–55, 225n8 Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE), 10, 118 sensors, 21, 25, 28, 59, 115, 122, 128, 201 Sharp, Mitchell, 149 Shelson, Bill, 42 signals: detection, 128; infrared, 7, 60–1; interference, 11; radar, 50, 200; radio navigation, 60; telemetry, 77 Singer, Joel, 94 Small, Melvin, 94 Smith, R.H., 25, 27 Solandt, Omond, xix–xx, xxvi, xxviii– xxix, 38, 42–4, 214 sonar, xxii, 5–6, 22, 25–31, 102, 154, 163, 168, 171, 215 sonobuoys, 5–6, 31, 154, 164 Sorensen, Eric, 42–4 South Korea and Korean, 126, 153 Soviet Navy, 75, 97, 189 Soviet Union: air bases, 22; ballistic missiles, 69, 108, 120–2, 185, 199–200; end of the Cold War, 126; NATO, 22, 197, 199; nuclear weapons, 111–12, 183, 198; SALT, 69, 73, 83, 74–81; Second World

Index 273 War, 192, 214; submarines, 153, 161; threat to Canada, 116–18, 134, 136, 157, 187–8, 194–5, 203–4; USSoviet relations, 71, 105, 108, 198 space: militarization/weaponization of, xv, xxv, 14–15, 106, 114–15, 122–3, 130, 174; solar system, 93; surveillance, 115, 122, 186, 189, 197–8, 201, 215; vehicles, 93, 117, 201, 215–17 Spinks, J.W.T., 37 St John’s, Newfoundland, 189 St Margarets, New Brunswick, 122 Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, xxiv, 68, 164, 198–9 Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 148 Stanley, John, 37, 40–2 statistical analysis, xxvi, 12, 25, 91–2, 95 St-Hubert, Quebec, xxi, 38, 40, 42, 117, 220 Strategic Air Command (SAC), United States, 200 strategic analysis, xxvi–xxvii, xxx Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), xxvii, 66, 68–87, 114–16, 183, 187, 201 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (1991), 129 strategic balance, xxiv, 66, 69, 75–7, 79, 198, 221 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), United States, 108, 119, 121, 122–3, 125 strategic stability, 69, 110–11 strategic studies, xxiii, xxxi, 34, 88, 106, 133, 167, 174–5, 213, 223, 228n41

submarine, 5–6, 21–7, 30–2, 60–5, 70–3, 74–9, 96, 99–102, 110–16, 120, 124, 139, 141, 149–50, 153–65, 185–9, 197, 203, 215. See also antisubmarine; cruise missiles submarine rocket, 185 Suez Crisis (1956), 194 Summerside, Prince Edward Island, 189 Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 20 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) surface-to-air missile (SAM), 6–7, 31, 65, 163, 185–7, 196–7 surface-to-surface missile, 9, 115, 154 surveillance: anti-submarine, 116, 124, 161–5, 197; electronic, 117, 139; maritime, xxi, 153–6; overhead and spaced-based, 198, 216–17; systems, 62, 66, 123, 186, 196–9; techniques, 59–67, 114–17, 122, 147–8, 155, 159, 186–7, 190; of units, 24; of vehicles, 10 Sutherland, Robert (Bob), xxii–xxiii, xxxi, xxxiii Sydney, Nova Scotia, 189 systems analysis, xvi, xx, 3, 30–5, 42, 88–107, 142, 166–72, 176–81, 208, 220 Systems Analysis Group, 5 Tactical Air Group, 4. See also operational research Talos and Terrier, 12, 185

274 Index tanks, 8–9, 30, 61, 103, 115, 127 Technical Cooperation Program, The (TTCP), xxv Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE). See radar Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act (C-203), 149 theory for aerial warfare, 101. See also Lanchester, F.W. theory of games, 28, 97–8, 107. See also Morgenstern, Oskar; Neumann, John Von theory of goal programming, 33, 173 theory of probability, 41–2, 104–6, 176, 210–12 theory of search and detection, 102 thermonuclear bomb, 111–12, 195 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), 129 Titan missile, 72 Torbay, Newfoundland, 189 Toronto, Ontario: Operational Research Society of, 44, 46; reference to, xvi–xvii, xxvi, 37, 42–6, 182 torpedo, 27, 114, 154, 163–4, 179, 185, 215 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990), 35, 127 Trident missile, 72–3, 77, 77, 81, 185–6, 189 Trudeau, Pierre, 148 U-boat, xviii, 102 Uffen, Robert, xxiv Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). See Soviet Union United Kingdom: ballistic missiles, 116, 122, 185–7; Canada-UK cooperation in operational research, 7, 43, 220; Canada-UK

relations, 136, 192–4; early warning and radar, 116, 122, 187; maritime, 186; nuclear weapons, 76; Royal Military College of Science, 47; SALT, 76; Second World War, xvii–xviii, 47–52, 95, 110; Suez Crisis, 194; TTCP, xxv United Nations: ACE Mobile Force, 13; Canadian membership of, 79; Cyprus, 155; Expeditionary Force in Egypt, 154; General Assembly on Disarmament (1982), 68; naval, 153; operations, 163; peacekeeping, 155, 165, 194; reference to, 91, 150, 153; Security Council, 147 United States: continental defence, xxi, 115–18, 121, 134, 145–9, 187–8, 191–204, 221; deterrence, 120–1; ICBMs, 120; long-range bombers, 111; operational research, xxi, xxvi, 46, 92, 127, 220; Second World War, 95, 111; Senate, 79; TTCP, xxv; US-Canada relations, xxi, 69, 79–80, 187–8, 191–204; US-Soviet relations, 76–7, 116. See also ballistic missile defence (BMD); Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) United States Air Force (USAF), 11, 75, 116, 195–6 United States Navy (USN), 25, 27, 115, 185–6, 193, 197, 203 University of Cambridge, xviii–xx, 41, 214 University of Toronto: Canadian Officers’ Training Corps, 48–9; Department of Industrial Engineering, 39; institutional reference to, xvii, xix, 44;

Index 275 mathematics, 213; physics, 39, 213; Trinity College, xvii University of Toronto Schools (UTS), xvii University of Western Ontario: operational research symposium, 45 Upper Canada College (UCC), xvii US Naval War College, 27 Valcartier, Quebec, 122 Vancouver, British Columbia: Operational Research Society of, 44, 46 Velvet Glove, 12, 117 verification, xxiii, xxv, 69, 74, 77–9, 106, 126–30, 174, 221 vertical and/or short take-off and landing aircraft (VSTOL), 23, 64–6 Vesey, J.R. (Jack), 25 Veterans Guard of Canada, xvii Victoria, Queen, xvi–xvii Vietnam War, 94, 194

Vladivostok Agreements (1974), xxvii V-1. See German V-1 flying bomb Walter, John, 42, 44 war gaming, 7–9, 88, 98–100, 103, 106–7, 176–8, 220 Warsaw Pact, 20–1, 24–5, 80, 96, 99, 120–1, 174, 184, 203 Washington, DC, xxi, 4, 116, 188–9 Watson-Watt, Sir Robert, 38, 226n9 Wilhelm, J.O., 37 Wilson, Peter, 42–4 Wilson, Tuzo, 37 Winnipeg, Manitoba, 36, 44, 46 Wohlstetter, Albert, 92 Wolsey, Gene, 42 World War I. See First World War World War II. See Second World War Wright, Quincy, 94 Yorkshire, United Kingdom, 39 Zero Energy reactor, xviii