The Seductiveness of Virtue: Abraham Joshua Heschel and John Paul II on Morality and Personal Fulfillment 9780567657008, 9780567669759, 9780567657015

Table of contents :
Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Contents
Preface to the Paperback Edition
Acknowledgments
Permissions
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
The question
Authors
Primary sources
Assumptions
Overview of chapters
1. The Meaning of Our Question
Happiness
Meaning
Freedom
Personal fulfillment
Good and evil
Doing
2. Heschel and the “Joys of the Mitsvah”
The search for meaning as universal and worthwhile
“The problem of needs”
“A commitment to Jewish law”
“The difficulties of moral living”
3. John Paul II and the Good We Must Do to Have Eternal Life
The search for meaning as universal and worthwhile
“If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments”
“If you wish to be perfect . . . sell your possessions . . . then come, follow me”
“With God all things are possible”
4. “Seeking What is True and Good”: A Comparison and Contextualization
Similarities and differences
The historical context: The influence of Aristotle, Maimonides, Aquinas, and Kant
The contemporary context: The work of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Peter Singer, and present-day psychology
Evaluating Heschel and John Paul II in light of these contexts
Conclusion: In defense of interworldview and interdisciplinary dialogue on our question
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Seductiveness of Virtue

The Seductiveness of Virtue Abraham Joshua Heschel and John Paul II on Morality and Personal Fulfillment By John J. Fitzgerald

T&T CLARK Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, T&T CLARK and the T&T Clark logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2017 Paperback edition first published 2018 Copyright © John J. Fitzgerald, 2017 John J. Fitzgerald has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. ix constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-0-5676-5700-8 PB: 978-0-5676-8247-5 ePDF: 978-0-5676-5701-5 ePub: 978-0-5676-6032-9 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

The Seductiveness of Virtue: Abraham Joshua Heschel and John Paul II on Morality and Personal Fulfillment

Contents Preface to the Paperback Edition Acknowledgments Permissions List of Abbreviations Introduction The question Authors Primary sources Assumptions Overview of chapters 1

2

3

ix xix xxi xxii

1 1 3 7 10 13

The Meaning of Our Question Happiness Meaning Freedom Personal fulfillment Good and evil Doing

17

Heschel and the “Joys of the Mitsvah” The search for meaning as universal and worthwhile “The problem of needs” “A commitment to Jewish law” “The difficulties of moral living”

51

John Paul II and the Good We Must Do to Have Eternal Life The search for meaning as universal and worthwhile “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” “If you wish to be perfect . . . sell your possessions . . . then come, follow me” “With God all things are possible”

95

17 23 27 32 36 46

51 53 68 77

95 98 113 121

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Contents

“Seeking What is True and Good”: A Comparison and Contextualization Similarities and differences The historical context: The influence of Aristotle, Maimonides, Aquinas, and Kant The contemporary context: The work of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Peter Singer, and present-day psychology Evaluating Heschel and John Paul II in light of these contexts Conclusion: In defense of interworldview and interdisciplinary dialogue on our question

Bibliography Index

137 138 154 161 182 185

191 202

Preface to the Paperback Edition With the publication of this paperback edition, there are many more individuals I want to thank, and some reflections I’d like to add. At Bloomsbury, Vivien Quick and Nick Stewart in the marketing department have been of much help, as have Sarah Blake, Abby Draycott, and Charlotte James in the production of this paperback. Furthermore, I am indebted to others who kindly have read and recommended this work, including Elliot Dorff, Andrea Florendo, John Grabowski, David Gushee, and Cathleen Kaveny. Also worthy of mention here are Jim Kruggel and Ashley Moyse, who both rendered assistance in perusing this new preface before publication. As well, I appreciate those who have taken the time to provide a full review of The Seductiveness of Virtue in scholarly journals—namely Daniel Ross Goodman,1 Matthew Petrusek,2 Clark West,3 and Jeremy Worthen4—and in my book’s spirit of dialogue, I would like to take this special opportunity to engage their remarks and to clarify and sharpen my position. (The reader may want to skip the rest of this preface until finishing my book in order to understand the context of what follows.) Of these four individuals, West, an Episcopalian chaplain, expresses the most significant reservations. In particular, he suggests I assume too readily that (A) Heschel and John Paul II mean more or less what I do by “happiness,” “meaning,” “freedom,” “fulfillment,” and related terms (49  n. 198);5 and (B) Heschel’s A Passion for Truth is consistent with the view that doing good leads to these realities. West contends that the latter assumption is undermined by A Passion for Truth’s sobering discussion of the Kotzker and Søren Kierkegaard, that I neglect this treatment of the latter thinker completely, and that in the end I “simply side hastily with a secondary source interpretation” (Harold Kasimow’s). 1 2 3 4 5

Journal of Jewish Ethics 4, no. 1 (2018): 101–02. Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 38, no. 1 (2018): 206–08. Practical Theology 11, no. 1 (2018): 108–09. Theology 121, no. 4 (2018): 313–14. Page cites in this preface in parentheses are to The Seductiveness of Virtue, and abbreviations for some other works are provided as per my “List of Abbreviations” (xxii).

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Regarding (A), I do say in the aforementioned footnote that I “have faith” that Heschel, John Paul II, and I “are generally talking about the same things” when using various key terms. But I don’t see why some measure of faith here is improper; all of us, scholars and otherwise, routinely make similar linguistic assumptions in our conversations with others—particularly where they do not appear to provide us with a transparent and consistent definition, like the rabbi and pope in certain cases (17–36). If we refused to make such assumptions, out of concern for safeguarding perfect precision, these communications would grind to a halt, which seems a rather high price to pay. Moreover, my own “faith” on these matters is backed by reason, since over the course of my first chapter I demonstrate substantial overlap between my definitions—which are largely based on common philosophical insights and major English-language dictionaries—and my authors’ apparent understandings.6 I think that there is common ground even when it comes to the elusive concept of “happiness,” which I interpret broadly as having both objective and subjective dimensions, thereby including Wojtyła’s emphasis on the “fullness of good” and Heschel’s attention to “certainty,” “peace,” “joy,” and “pleasant[ness]” (17–22).7 And so, especially after my close analysis of various passages where they speak about the relationship between our conduct and “happiness,” “meaning,” “freedom,” and/or “fulfillment” (or other presumably related terms), their understandings of these words seem sufficiently similar to mine, such that they are addressing my own question about this relationship (and are not essentially speaking about something else). Ultimately, West’s professed concern about semantics lacks real force—he does not identify any concrete instance where I misconstrue or misrepresent my authors when they use particular terms, nor does he clearly propose an alternative approach to mine. Perhaps he would prefer that I somehow only rely on my authors’ definitions rather than my own (which he calls “extrinsic”), but again, Heschel and John Paul II at times provide fuzzy ones (or none at all), and so such a tactic would be of limited assistance at best.

6

7

This is true even though (for reasons I explain in this chapter) my definitions leave aside some of my authors’ associations with certain terms. See also Heschel, GSM, 309–10 (which refers to “the joy, the pleasantness, the peace and the happiness” of Jewish practice). In fact, a closer look at a couple of additional excerpts reveals that Heschel also appears to nod to the objective dimension, and Wojtyła to the subjective one. Heschel, TS, 23 (equating the term menuha to both “happiness” and a “good life” with “no strife and no fighting, no fear and no distrust”); Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC, 236 (contrasting “peace and happiness” with “depression and despair”).

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As for (B), I have indicated that it seems Heschel was influenced somewhat more by the sunny Baal Shem Tov and the dour Kotzker (two fellow Jewish rabbis) than by Kierkegaard (a Christian philosopher), which is why I concentrated on the first two thinkers (89). To elaborate, Heschel’s own voice is especially evident in A Passion for Truth’s introduction—which addresses only how he has been impacted by the Baal Shem Tov and the Kotzker— and final chapter (“The Kotzker Today”)—which mentions just Kierkegaard and the Kotzker, but notes in passing that the former’s target audience was Christian while the latter’s was Jewish,8 and focuses more on the latter. Kierkegaard’s views are indeed described at length in the middle of the book, which summarizes both his legacy and the Kotzker’s as “depriv[ing] us of contentment and peace of mind.”9 Taking all of this into consideration, I reaffirm that A Passion for Truth opposes complacency, clarify that different aspects of personal fulfillment (including the maintenance of one’s own basic needs, the attainment of a likeness to God, and objective meaningfulness along with an optimistic sense that it can be achieved) nevertheless do seem to win a “narrow victory” over their opposites by the end of this book,10 and reiterate that Kasimow is justified in saying that “the greatest influence on Heschel has been the way of the Baal Shem. Still the influence of the Kotzker persists” (89–93).11 I don’t think I “simply side[d] hastily” with Kasimow here, since my analysis in this subsection of my book—and indeed, throughout Chapter 2—is supportive of his quite balanced assessment. In his brief review, West does not provide any further specific refutation of that analysis. In the end, I am confident that other readers will find that I

8 9 10

11

Heschel, PT, 317. Heschel, PT, 88; see also ibid., 129, 211. Indeed, the very last paragraph expresses the hope that humankind will set the truth free. Heschel, PT, 323; for other remarks near the end of this work that are confident about meaningfulness (and oppose discouragement and complacency), see ibid., 301–02. To be sure, the Kotzker himself experienced hope that God’s will would be achieved, although he also struggled with despair, ultimately destroyed his writings, and during his last twenty years almost completely isolated himself from others. Ibid., 144, 208, 211–12, 214, 233–35, 240–41, 243, 323. In a portion of his footnote that I did not quote in my book, Kasimow helpfully provides further clarification of this reasonable stance: “Although Heschel’s works and his life as a whole more closely resemble those of the Besht [Baal Shem Tov] . . . during the last years of his life Heschel was very much under the spell of the Kotzker.” Kasimow, Divine-Human Encounter, 13–14, n. 63. Kasimow is especially well-positioned to speak on this issue, given that he was a former student of Heschel’s and maintained close contact with him afterwards. Ibid., iii, vi. Heschel’s daughter goes so far as to claim that as she was growing up during the last years of his life, “he was never depressed, never moody or withdrawn or melancholy.” Susannah Heschel, “Introduction,” 25.

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carefully and evenhandedly “argue the point and engage the text,” as West would have me do.12 The other three reviews were more favorable. I appreciate that Petrusek, a Catholic ethicist who shares my interest in Saint Thomas Aquinas, believes that “[o]verall the book advances the conversation on the meaning and continued relevance of virtue in contemporary ethics,” and that I “provid[e] an excellent analysis of each thinker individually.” He does take me to task for my “reticence to engage in meta-ethical questions,” namely about “the existence and nature of God and the afterlife” (184–85), the answers to which would help better adjudicate among different claims regarding the relationship between morality and personal fulfillment. I did not think that this book was the place to address those formidable questions in any depth, but I am happy to reveal that I intend them to be the subject matter of my next book, which is in progress. Petrusek also maintains that when I say there are both “key differences” and “much common ground” between John Paul II and Peter Singer (174), I “understate the contrast.” I think that my assessment was fair and would point the reader to Charles Camosy’s Peter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization for a much more thorough explication of that common ground. Next, Worthen, another priest affiliated with the Church of England, graciously praises my “clarity, discipline and thoroughness” and adds that I do “convincingly build[]” my case that both Heschel and John Paul II perceive a general connection between morality and personal fulfillment. Worthen also opines that I could have attended further to the context in which my two authors were writing (i.e., the “sources” that influenced them and the “contemporary thinkers and developments” that preoccupied them) and to potential dialogue between them. He contends that this attention, in turn, might have shed light on whether there are “deeper” parallels between my two authors, and on ways they could edify each other and jointly witness to the “self-transcending nature of the human person against secularism’s flat denials.” 12

In fact, West’s own impassioned critique seems somewhat lacking in the measuredness he recommends. At a couple of other points, he laments that this book project was originally a “homework assignment” given to me by my dissertation board. Such a characterization is misleading at best. While this project did arise out of my dissertation (3), I came up with the topic, authors, and general approach (to definitions and otherwise) primarily on my own, with some assistance from outside Jewish scholars (Elliot Dorff and the late Byron Sherwin) who directed me to Heschel upon my informing them that I was interested in writing on a Jewish author.

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Here I can offer at least a little bit in reply to Worthen’s remarks. My book shows that Heschel and John Paul II have in common at least two notable sources: human experience and the Hebrew Bible. That said, they tend to focus on different passages when addressing the relationship between morality and personal fulfillment, with the notable exception of Psalm 119 (71–72, 88, 99). There doesn’t seem to be much overlap in terms of the specific thinkers that interest them, although they do both look to Kant on occasion (see, especially, 154–61). And as my book demonstrates in passing, they both pay heed to certain modern-day developments— namely, the loss of a sense of meaning and of God, the lure of materialism, and the shadow of war. Worthen’s suggestion regarding a conceivable joint witness is interesting, although it doesn’t directly tie in to the topic of my book; as he notes, maybe others will explore that possibility further. Lastly, on how the rabbi and pope might directly inform each other, I could have made that more explicit in the comparison section (137–54), or discussed this matter later when mentioning the discovery of wisdom as a benefit of interworldview dialogue (185–86). To be brief, I think that they would sometimes helpfully instruct each other where they diverge somewhat— for instance, by supplying each other with additional possible meanings of key terms and phrases (e.g., “meaning” as significance as per Heschel, and “doing good” as love in different forms as per Wojtyła), or by reminding each other of relevant biblical passages (e.g., from Proverbs or Genesis, given that my footnotes suggest that Heschel focuses more on the former and John  Paul  II on the latter). Along those lines, on the question of the extent to which religious commitment specifically does or should involve a certain lack of contentment or satisfaction, I imagine that Heschel would recall the pope to the struggles of Abraham and the prophets, and John Paul II would explain to the rabbi that Christians look to the examples of Jesus and St. Paul, who both professed joy in spite of suffering (83–85, 132– 36, 153).13 With other apparent disparities—including on whether doing good especially involves following Jewish law or Jesus, whether it’s virtuous to desire heaven, how divine grace is mediated, and whether redemptive

13

I discuss Heschel’s views on the prophets below. Note that the psychological literature I previously referred to directly addresses the impact of religious commitment on overall happiness and optimism, but not on “contentment” in particular (178–80).

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suffering is a real possibility—it would be difficult to decide whether one author possesses more insight without settling some broader issues about God, as Petrusek might also point out. Turning to the review of Goodman, a rabbi and fellow lawyer, I am very glad that he finds my book to be “an excellent contribution to the fields of interfaith dialogue, moral theology, and comparative ethics,” and that he also values my “interdisciplinary move” in the final chapter. Later, he questions whether “the pursuit of happiness is, and should be, the objective of life,” as Aquinas and others have suggested (1), and submits that the Hebrew Bible, the Mishnah, Maimonides, and the prophets undermine this idea. In response, I defended this pursuit as at least generally worthwhile in my introductory chapter, wherein I pointed to Deuteronomy 5–6 and other biblical passages that appear to encourage the quest for happiness, whether good fortune or eternal life (11–13, 17–22). Also, Maimonides does seem to think that our primary goal in life should be a kind of happiness or fulfillment—namely, the perfection of both knowing and imitating God (19 n. 12, 155–57).14 As for the prophets, I will concede (as per Heschel) that they were not preoccupied with their salvation,15 often felt distressed themselves,16 and challenged the contentment of others.17 In other respects, though, they were not opposed to happiness; they did not “indulge[] in self-mortification” (64), they largely avoided despair,18 and (according to a Talmudic passage beloved by the Baal Shem Tov) Elijah, in particular, emphatically approved of jesters who boosted others’ spirits.19 In the end, I do concur with Goodman that some Jewish sources plainly dissuade us from focusing too directly on achieving 14

15 16

17

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19

Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, pt. III, ch. 54. I should clarify that Maimonides here does not dismiss the importance of knowing God but concludes that a person’s ultimate perfection involves an “apprehension” of God that is necessarily accompanied by an imitation of his “lovingkindness, righteousness, and judgment.” On Maimonides’s linking of morality and fulfillment, see also ibid., pt. III, ch. 27 (stating that God’s law is designed for the well-being of our body and soul, and citing Deut. 6:24). Heschel, “The God of Israel and Christian Renewal,” in MGSA, 277. Heschel, PT, 10, 15, 201, 298; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 10–11 (citing Jer. 2:12–13 and Amos 6:6); Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 92; Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 129 (citing Isa. 8:22 and Hab. 1:2–4); Heschel, GSM, 368 (citing Isa. 8:22 and Hab. 1:2–4). Heschel, PT, 310; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 11; Heschel, “Depth Theology,” in IF, 124; Heschel, MNA, 233, 245, 258–59 (citing Amos 6:1, 4–6). Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 399; Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 130 (citing Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics); Heschel, “Sacred Image of Man,” in IF, 165. But see Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 129, 148–49 n. 38 (noting that the prophets did lose hope at times, and citing 1 Kings 19:4 and Jer. 20:4). Heschel, PT, 53.

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happiness—indeed, both of us, along with Heschel, quote the Mishnah on this point (70). At the same time, the reader should keep in mind that Heschel himself does encourage behavior that can bring us objective and subjective kinds of happiness, even if at the same time he recommends a kind of discontent (13, 93, 153). In the interests of maintaining consistency with the hardcover edition and avoiding any confusion, I have made a minimum of cosmetic changes inside the body of this work (by adding some citations and correcting a few minor typographical errors in the notes and bibliography), and no changes at all within the main text. If I had made any more substantive changes, I likely would have begun with the following. First, given that I devoted significant space to Heschel’s last book (A Passion for Truth), I would have attended more closely to John Paul II’s final book (Memory and Identity), which like Crossing the Threshold of Hope consists of a dialogue in which he responds to questions put to him.20 Here, near the end of his life, the pope confirms many of his ideas that are mentioned on the following pages of The Seductiveness of Virtue: our free choices shape us morally, and true freedom is that which is directed toward the good (31);21 the greatest good is God (38);22 while it would be wrong to adopt a utilitarian mindset that primarily focuses on achieving pleasure, doing good does go hand-in-hand with a deep joy (101–02, 127);23 following Christ leads us to personal fulfillment, including meaningfulness, although it is also possible for well-intentioned non-Christians to act in accord with God’s purpose (117–20);24 we do indeed have freedom of choice, although acting freely is not always easy (122–23);25 when we love our neighbor, we must include our enemies (126);26 in serving their country’s authentic common good, many Poles have achieved a noble significance in spite of their suffering (132);27 the pope’s faith was a source of inner peace for him, even in the moments and months following a 1981 assassination attempt that gravely wounded

20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27

John Paul II, Memory and Identity, xi. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 33–34, 42. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 38. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 35. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 98–99, 112–14, 151–52 (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 22 and 1 Cor. 15:45–49). John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 34, 37, 42, 74. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 133. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 63, 66–67.

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him (133 n. 233);28 and redemptive suffering can be a joyful experience (as per Col. 1:24), and the hardships of some can create an opening for others to show them love (133–35).29 In addition, the pope provides some pertinent reflections in Memory and Identity that expand upon what I previously discussed. For instance, he explains that following Christ specifically involves proceeding through the “purgative way” (complying with the commandments and thereby overcoming sin), “illuminative way” (cultivating virtues such as respect for life, purity, and truthfulness through that compliance), and “unitive way” (achieving union with God, beginning in this life). Through this process, he indicates, we realize a number of increases in personal fulfillment, including alleviation of the strain of fighting sin, a corresponding ability “to move with ever greater freedom within the whole of the created world,” joy in our appreciation of God, and a sense of hope for eternal life (cf. 117–19).30 Also, he maintains that we should develop an “amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui—love for God to the point of contempt for self.” On its face, this phrase might appear to call into question the connection between morality and personal fulfillment. However, it is uncommon in his work, and softer language immediately follows: “God bends down over man to hold out a hand to him, to raise him up, and to help him continue his journey with renewed strength.”31 On this matter, it might be apropos to refer to my discussion of some similarly difficult passages, including those on martyrdom (126–27, 131–33), given that a little later on Memory and Identity mentions Saints Maximilian Kolbe and Edith Stein as two individuals (among many) who died in the Nazi camps but provided an enduring witness for good against evil.32 Second, I would acknowledge a fine article by Grabowski that I previously overlooked.33 Here he supplements my explanation of the significance of the pope’s thought and actions (4–6),34 and he provides further support for the view that Veritatis Splendor’s moral vision is not excessively legalistic (41 n. 156). Rather, Grabowski contends, this encyclical highlights the “invit[ation] by 28 29 30

31 32 33

34

John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 159–66. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 167–68. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 28–30. Note that this is another place where John Paul II exhibits an appreciation of virtue, although again, we ought not overstate his focus on it (44). John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 6–7. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 19–20; see also ibid., 40. John S. Grabowski, “The Luminous Excess of the Acting Person: Assessing the Impact of Pope John Paul II on American Catholic Moral Theology,” Journal of Moral Theology 1, no. 1 (2012): 116–47. Grabowski, “The Luminous Excess,” 116–18, 122–23.

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Christ to transformation through the gift-call of discipleship.”35 Third, my conversations with Florendo have led me to see that while I briefly indicated that John Paul II upholds Mary (along with Jesus) as a role model for us (150), I could say a bit more about that. Specifically, according to the pope, through Mary’s special love and concern for others (including God, her son, and all of humanity), her life is exceptionally meaningful (objectively and subjectively) and free.36 In turn, I could compare the pope’s leading role models to Heschel’s. The latter would include the prophets, whom he asserts have achieved extraordinary meaning through serving the interests of God and their fellow humans and challenging us to do the same.37 Fourth, after recent thought-provoking discussions with fellow ethicists Meghan Clark, Andrew Kim, and Kevin Schemenauer on the moral life and grace, I’d clarify that according to Aquinas and others, our actions can assist growth in not only cardinal virtues but also infused theological virtues such as charity (cf. 23 n. 39).38 Accordingly, while a Catholic perspective would emphasize the role of God’s grace in our moral development, it also can countenance the Dalai Lama’s idea that each of us can take steps to help ourselves cultivate ethical dispositions, including love or compassion (164, 167).39 Fifth, I would add a thought not prompted by any particular secondary source or informal conversation. Recalling that my authors and I agree that freedom involves the ability to choose (29–31), I would specify that I think that ultimately they would grant something like the  following: doing good generally facilitates both liberation from selfish desires and a corresponding freedom to choose creatively from among certain morally good options (Wojtyła might add that 35 36 37

38 39

Grabowski, “The Luminous Excess,” 136, 139–45. John Paul II, EV, § 105; John Paul II, VS, § 120 (citing Lk. 2:19, 11:28; Jn 2:5). Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 390; Heschel, “Carl’s Stern’s Interview with Dr.  Heschel,” in MGSA, 399–400; Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 98; Heschel, “Protestant Renewal: A Jewish View,” in IF, 174, 178 n. 3 (citing Num. 11:29). Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. II-II, q. 24, aa. 2, 5–6; Fitzgerald, “No Woe to You Lawyers,” 111. And from such a perspective, “each of us” can include non-Christians. To be sure, Aquinas indicates that both correct faith in God and hope for eternal life are necessary for charity (in which we love God and our neighbor “for God’s sake”), and he includes mercy (which involves compassion for those in misery and motivates us to help them) as a more specific virtue that falls under charity. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 62, a. 4 & ad. 3; q. 65, a. 5; ibid., pt. II-II, q. 4, a. 7 & ad. 5; q. 17, aa. 2, 8; q. 25, a. 1 & ad. 3; q. 30, aa. 1, 3. But even if all of this is true, one could argue that non-Christians and non-believers can have an implicit faith (as John Paul II allows and the Catechism suggests), as well as an implicit hope, and therefore are also capable of possessing and advancing in virtues such as charity and mercy. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 65, a. 2; Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§ 183, 846–48; Fitzgerald, “No Woe to You Lawyers,” 111; John Paul II, CTH, 193–94.

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some options will be closed off by love as self-gift). Again, however, their views on the relationship between morality and freedom aren’t entirely clear (see, especially, 6–7, 86–87, 93, 127–30, 136). Sixth—and probably of most interest to many—when I provided the Chicago Cubs as an example of something diametrically opposed to happiness (17–18), I knew I was in a win-win situation. Most likely, my favorite baseball team would continue failing to win the World Series, in which case I’d remain correct. Or, they’d finally become world champions, in which case I’d be happy to be proven wrong—and indeed I was shortly after this book was finished in mid-2016. Accordingly, the reader should substitute the team the Cubs beat— the Cleveland Indians, who presently have not won the World Series since 1948—in what follows. May they, too, increase in happiness and fulfillment in general, alongside the rest of us. J. J. F. New York June 2018

Acknowledgments Like the achievement of personal fulfillment, the completion of a book relies greatly on the support of others. This particular work arose out of my 2008 dissertation, and so special thanks are still due to the director of that project, Dr. John Grabowski, and the other members of my dissertation board, Dr. Joseph Capizzi and Fr. Christopher Begg, all of whom provided invaluable feedback. I also would like to acknowledge once again the sponsors of the Dr. John Charles and Gertrude Pardieck Hubbard Endowment for their kind support of my dissertation research. As I underwent the lengthy process of transforming my dissertation into this book, a number of others assisted me as well. The Department of Theology and Religious Studies at St. John’s University granted me a teaching reduction for two semesters, my colleagues Christopher Denny and Paul Molnar offered valuable advice on the publishing process, and Bryan Hall in our philosophy department helped me navigate the deep waters of Immanuel Kant. Outside of St. John’s, Elliot Dorff provided expertise in discerning whether certain citations found in Heschel’s work were to a midrash (halachic or agadic), the Mishnah, and/or the Talmud. I am especially grateful to Miriam Cantwell and Anna Turton of Bloomsbury T&T Clark for their patience, encouragement, and guidance, and I appreciate the careful work of the Bloomsbury editing team, including Jayalakshmi Shankar, Grishma Fredric, Beth Williams, M.  S.  Sowmya, and R. Mohammed Raffi. Additionally, Sumithra Natesan prepared a comprehensive index, and Susan Parsons and David Albert Jones generously took the time to review the completed manuscript and offer some encouraging words. Many others provided love and support throughout my dissertation research and subsequent work on this book. In particular, I want to express my gratitude to my mother, father, brother, sister-in-law, and late grandmother. Finally, I owe much to my high-school English teacher, Mr. Edward Simpson, who always admonished our class not to conclude a paper without

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answering the question, “So what?” For the last couple of decades, I have tried to follow his advice in my writing. In addressing an issue that most of us find deeply important, and in maintaining that studies on this topic can help make a positive difference in the lives of interested readers, I hope this work adequately answers Mr. Simpson’s question. J. J. F. New York July 2016

Permissions Excerpts from God in Search of Man by Abraham Joshua Heschel. Copyright © 1955 by Abraham Joshua Heschel. Copyright renewed 1983 by Sylvia Heschel. Reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, LLC and Souvenir Press Ltd. Excerpts from The Insecurity of Freedom by Abraham Joshua Heschel. Copyright © 1966 by Abraham Joshua Heschel. Copyright renewed 1994 by Sylvia Heschel. Reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, LLC. Excerpts from Man Is Not Alone by Abraham Joshua Heschel. Copyright © 1951 by Abraham J. Heschel. Copyright renewed 1979 by Sylvia Heschel. Reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, LLC. An excerpt on the first page from Man’s Search for Meaning by Viktor E. Frankl. Copyright © 1959, 1962, 1984, 1992, 2004, 2006 by Viktor E. Frankl. Published by Beacon Press and Rider. Reprinted by permission of Beacon Press and The Random House Group Ltd. Excerpts from Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity by Abraham Joshua Heschel. Copyright © 1996 by Sylvia Heschel. Introduction copyright © 1996 by Susannah Heschel. Reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, LLC. An excerpt on the first page from the Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Copyright © 1947 RCL Benziger. Reprinted by permission of RCL Benziger. Excerpts from Veritatis Splendor by John Paul II. Copyright © 1993 by Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Reprinted by permission of Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Excerpts from Who Is Man? by Abraham J. Heschel. Copyright © 1965 Abraham J. Heschel. Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Stanford University Press, sup.org. All rights reserved.

List of Abbreviations AP CA CTH EV FR GSM IF LR MGSA MNA PC PT RH SD SRS TB TP TS VS WM

The Acting Person Centesimus Annus Crossing the Threshold of Hope Evangelium Vitae Fides et Ratio God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism The Insecurity of Freedom: Essays on Human Existence Love and Responsibility Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity: Essays Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion Person and Community: Selected Essays A Passion for Truth Redemptor Hominis Salvifici Doloris Sollicitudo Rei Socialis Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body The Prophets The Sabbath: Its Meaning for Modern Man Veritatis Splendor Who Is Man?

Introduction

All men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness. —Saint Thomas Aquinas1 [The] striving to find a meaning in one’s life is the primary motivational force in man. —Viktor Frankl2

The question What can we do to attain happiness and meaning in life? Most of us—men and women—would agree with the received wisdom that these are two things for which we long deeply.3 If, like so many of our contemporaries, we value our freedom very highly, no doubt we are interested in acquiring or sustaining a substantial amount of it as well. Moreover, those with at least a passing familiarity with modern psychology might consider the search for personal fulfillment to be particularly pressing, and would likely understand this concept to be somewhat related to happiness, meaning, and/or freedom. As for the extent to which we have achieved these realities, the data are mixed. A 2015 Gallup world poll found that over 70 percent responded affirmatively to each of the following questions: whether they felt enjoyment

1

2 3

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger, 1947 [c. 1274]), pt. I-II, q. 1, a. 7 (citing Augustine, De Trinitate, bk. 13, ch. 3). Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 99. While this claim should be fairly uncontroversial, some empirical support for it can be found in Sonja Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness: A New Approach to Getting the Life You Want (New York: Penguin, 2007), 14 (noting that studies show that in almost every country, individuals say that happiness is “what they want most in life”); Pew Research Center, “U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious” (November 3, 2015), 91, at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/11/201.11.03_RLS_II_ full_report.pdf (surveying about 35,000 U.S. adults and finding that 55 percent ponder life’s meaning and purpose “weekly or more,” 26 percent “monthly/yearly,” and only 17 percent “seldom/never”).

2

The Seductiveness of Virtue

over much of the previous day, and whether they smiled or laughed a good deal during it.4 On the other hand, in the 2016 World Happiness Report, published by an arm of the United Nations and based upon other recent Gallup world poll data, respondents averaged only a 5.35 when asked to rate the quality of their lives on a scale of 0 to 105—and a 2016 Harris Poll determined that just 31 percent of Americans were “very happy.”6 Similarly equivocal evidence emerges from different studies on meaning and freedom. In a 2007 Gallup world poll, over 80 percent of those surveyed claimed they had “an important meaning or purpose” in life.7 But a 2014 Gallup-Healthways study concluded that just 18 percent of the world was thriving in “purpose well-being,” which it defined as “liking what you do each day and being motivated to achieve your goals.”8 Finally, a 2013 Gallup world survey discovered that 79 percent of Americans were “satisfied with [their] freedom to choose what [they] do with [their] lives,” but also noted that this number had steadily fallen from 91 percent in 2006, and that in any case, the United States was significantly ahead of most countries in this regard.9 Ultimately, then, while the desires for happiness, meaning, and freedom are widespread, many—and arguably most—of us have fallen significantly short in one or more of these areas. And therein lies the justification for the 4

5

6

7

8

9

Jon Clifton, “Mood of the World Upbeat on International Happiness Day” (March 19, 2015), at http://www.gallup.com/poll/182009/mood-world-upbeat-international-happiness-day.aspx (summarizing results from about 147,000 respondents in 143 countries). The United States was ranked 25th. John F. Helliwell, Haifang Huang, and Shun Wang, “The Distribution of World Happiness,” in World Happiness Report 2016, Update, vol. 1, ed. John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard, and Jeffrey Sachs (New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2016), 14, fig. 2.1, at http://worldhappiness. report (reviewing responses from approximately 3,000 individuals in each of 157 countries). The United States was ranked 13th, at about a 7.10. Ibid., 20, fig. 2.2. Kathy Steinberg, “Latest Happiness Index Reveals American Happiness at All-Time Low” (July 8, 2016), at http://www.theharrispoll.com/health-and-life/American-Happiness-at-All-Time-Low. html (discussing data from 2,019 US adults). Note that this survey included various questions, one of which asked respondents to personally evaluate whether “at this time I’m generally happy with my life.” Eighty-one percent “strongly agree[d]” or “somewhat agree[d],” which the author says “suggest[s] that people may overstate how happy they really are.” Ibid. Steve Crabtree and Brett Pelham, “The Complex Relationship Between Religion and Purpose” (December 24, 2008), at http://www.gallup.com/poll/113575/complex-relationship-betweenreligion-purpose.aspx (referring to a poll of approximately 1,000 adults in each of 84 countries). Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, “State of Global Well-Being: 2014 Country Well-Being Rankings” (n.d.), at http://info.healthways.com/hubfs/Well-Being_Index/2014_Data/GallupHealthways_State_of_Global_Well-Being_2014_Country_Rankings.pdf (based on roughly 146,000 interviews over 145 countries and areas). Thirty-six percent of those in the United States were considered “thriving” in this area, placing the country at 22nd in this category overall. Jon Clifton, “Americans Less Satisfied with Freedom” (July 1, 2014), at http://www.gallup.com/ poll/172019/americans-less-satisfied-freedom.aspx (commenting on responses from about 1,000 individuals in each of more than 120 countries). The United States ranked 36th.

Introduction

3

present work (along with many others in recent years), which initially arose out of my doctoral dissertation10 and is concerned with the question of what we can do to achieve increases in each of the aforementioned realities. More specifically, given my own background as a moral theologian and the need to narrow our focus to a manageable area, this study will basically be concerned with that question to the extent that it intersects with ethics. In other words, I will focus my inquiry on the question of whether doing good (or evil), in particular, leads to increases (or decreases) in happiness, meaning, freedom, and/or personal fulfillment.11

Authors To further concentrate our discussion, I will primarily attend to how two prominent thinkers of the twentieth century—Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907–72) and Karol Wojtyła/Saint John Paul II (1920–2005)—would answer the question I have posed (even if they themselves do not explicitly raise it in those exact words). Given my interest in comparative religious ethics, along with my own Catholic background and familiarity with Judaism through many lifelong friendships, bringing these two faiths into dialogue seemed like a natural choice. In the end, I found myself especially attracted to Heschel and John Paul II. Born in Warsaw, Poland, the former was ordained a rabbi by twenty, escaped to the United States just prior to the onset of the Second World War, and from 1946 until his death served as Professor of Jewish Ethics and Mysticism at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, where he authored books on a wide variety of philosophical and theological topics while remaining independent from any particular branch of Judaism. As for the latter (and similarly prolific) thinker, he was born in the much smaller Polish 10

11

John J. Fitzgerald, “Doing Good (or Evil) and Personal Fulfillment in the Thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel and Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II” (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 2008). I recognize that some thinkers (notably Aquinas) would not technically consider this revised question to be any narrower than the original one, for the reason that all voluntary acts—even sipping water or mailing a letter, for example—have moral import. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 18, a. 9. That being said, as Charles Pinches explains, Aquinas agrees that “there are human acts that are morally insignificant, even if not morally indifferent, which can be given the label ‘moral minutiae.’” Charles R. Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002), 104–05. Suffice it to say that my revised question is relatively narrow insofar as it is not concerned with such “minutiae.”

4

The Seductiveness of Virtue

city of Wadowice, was ordained a priest just after the war, became a bishop and a professor of ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin in the 1950s, and was elected the 264th pope of the Roman Catholic Church in 1978.12 Why an entire book on these two particular figures? The answer is that they are notably compelling authorities on the subject at hand for a number of reasons. To begin with, Heschel and John Paul II were among the most significant thinkers of their time within their respective religious traditions. Samuel Dresner’s slim hagiographical work on Heschel refers to him as “the preeminent Jewish teacher of our generation,”13 and Shai Held’s “genuinely sympathetic and unapologetically critical” book acknowledges him as “one of the most influential religious figures of the twentieth century.”14 Avery Cardinal Dulles opines that “among the Catholic theologians of the second half of the twentieth century, John Paul II holds a place of special eminence. Perhaps more than any other single individual he has succeeded in comprehensively restating the contours of Catholic faith in the light of Vatican II and in relation to postconciliar developments in the Church and in the world.”15 And Charles Curran, a noted critic of some of the pope’s moral teachings, affirms that “all recognize the significant role that John Paul II . . . played in the life of the Catholic Church during his very long papacy.”16 Given that Heschel and John Paul II are also fairly recent authors who address the issues of their day in the language of both faith and reason, they speak relatively well to the concerns of a modern-day audience. 12

13 14

15

16

Two brief yet authoritative biographies of these figures are Susannah Heschel, “Introduction,” in Abraham Joshua Heschel, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Essential Writings (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011), 17–44 (Heschel’s only child, Susannah Heschel is herself a Professor of Jewish Studies at Dartmouth University); “Biographical Profile: John Paul II (1920-2005)” (April 27, 2014), at http:// www.vatican.va/special/canonizzazione-27042014/documents/biografia_gpii_canonizzazione_ en.html. Susannah Heschel remarks that while her father’s “life was saved by the Reform movement’s Hebrew Union College and he taught at the Conservative movement’s Jewish Theological Seminary, my father never identified with any of the movements, and he freely criticized all of them: they were insufficiently attentive to Jewish law or too strict in the wrong areas of religious observance.” Susannah Heschel, “Introduction,” 34. I have also relied on the following helpful overviews of these figures’ lives: Darrell J. Fasching, Dell deChant, and David M. Lantigua, Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach to Global Ethics, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 223–26 (on Heschel); John C. Merkle, Approaching God: The Way of Abraham Joshua Heschel (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2009), 1–12; Jeffrey Tranzillo, John Paul II on the Vulnerable (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 1–62. Samuel H. Dresner, Heschel, Hasidism, and Halakha (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 15. Shai Held, Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Call of Transcendence (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 1. Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., The Splendor of Faith: The Theological Vision of Pope John Paul II, rev. ed. (New York: Crossroad, 2003), 2. Charles E. Curran, The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 1.

Introduction

5

In addition, as well-respected thinkers and noteworthy public figures, they did not merely speculate but attempted to live what they wrote on ethical issues. Near the end of his life, Heschel immersed himself in social activism in opposition to the Vietnam War, on behalf of the American civil rights movement (literally alongside Martin Luther King in the Selma civil rights march, during which Heschel “felt my legs were praying”), and in support of the religious freedom of Russian Jewry. Accordingly, John Merkle comments on the “harmony of prayer, study, and action” in Heschel’s life.17 And John Paul II played an important role in the fall of communism through his support of the Polish Solidarity movement early in his papacy, actively spoke out in his travels on behalf of religious freedom and the sanctity of human life, publicly criticized the United States’ wars in Iraq,18 and suffered with dignity in the face of Parkinson’s disease at the end of his life. Here Derek Jeffreys’s words are worth quoting at some length (and would largely apply to Heschel, too): John Paul II not only reflects theoretically about ethics, but also embodies his ethic visibly. . . . Rarely do we encounter someone who has been both a philosopher and a powerful public figure. Public figures often completely ignore philosophical issues. When they do consider them, they are frequently dilettantes who pervert the philosophical treasures of the past with superficial analyses. Likewise, many philosophers eschew any serious involvement in public life. When they consider political matters, they often ignore their complexity, authoritatively pronouncing on difficult issues in an ignorant and arrogant manner. Thus . . . John Paul II represents a unique link between philosophy and power that has much to teach both philosophers and politicians.19

Finally, I believe a comparison between these two particular authors to be most appropriate, since while they themselves were not in dialogue,20 both of 17

18

19

20

Merkle, Approaching God, 10. On this harmony, see also Michael Marmur, Abraham Joshua Heschel and the Sources of Wonder (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 162–64. On this particular issue, which is not covered in the aforementioned biographical works, see Frank Bruni, “Pope Voices Opposition, His Strongest, to Iraq War” (January 14, 2003), at http://www. nytimes.com/2003/01/14/international/europe/14POPE.html. Derek S. Jeffreys, Defending Human Dignity: John Paul II and Political Realism (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004), 24–25. See also Tranzillo, John Paul II and the Vulnerable, 2 (noting that John Paul II “was able to teach the world this key lesson [that acting well in spite of great suffering can ‘bear tremendously good fruit in the end’] precisely because he lived it with unflagging conviction himself.”). One exception occurs in one of John Paul II’s apostolic letters, where he cites Heschel’s book The Sabbath. John Paul II, Dies Domini [“The Lord’s Day”] (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana,

6

The Seductiveness of Virtue

them were very interested in reaching out to the other’s religious tradition— and, in doing so, they generally were received quite well. Heschel was consulted by the Second Vatican Council as it deliberated on the Jews and met with Pope Paul VI, who told him that his books were “very spiritual and very beautiful, and that Catholics should read” them.21 Thirty years after Heschel passed away, Samuel Dresner remarked that “a token of the esteem in which Catholics held Heschel is evident from the fact that among the tributes accorded him after his death in 1972 was an entire issue of America magazine [a Jesuit Catholic weekly] devoted to his memory, unusual in any case and duplicated for no other Jew.”22 As for John Paul II, he made many Jewish friends as a young boy in Wadowice, witnessed firsthand the German occupation of Poland, and ultimately became the first pope to visit a Jewish house of worship since apostolic times, to oversee diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Israel, and to publicly ask forgiveness for anti-Semitic acts by Christians throughout history. In fact, a former adviser for the American Jewish Committee has declared that John Paul II was the “best pope the Jews ever had.”23 Considering all of these points, as well as the fact that I have been unable to uncover any major published articles or books that explicitly compare Heschel and John Paul II in depth on any issue, this book makes a unique contribution to the scholarly literature.24 Briefly, my argument is as follows: Heschel and John Paul II both believe that doing good (in particular, transcending our own needs and following religious

21 22 23

24

1998), § 15. To my knowledge, Heschel, who predeceased John Paul II by over thirty years, never referred to the latter’s early work. Susannah Heschel, “Introduction,” 31. Dresner, Heschel, Hasidism, and Halakha, 15. A. James Rudin, Christians and Jews—Faith to Faith: Tragic History, Promising Present, Fragile Future (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Pub., 2011), 193–96. A search of the American Theological Library Association’s Religion Database, its Catholic Periodical and Literature Index, and the Library of Congress’s catalog reveals only a single article and no books or book chapters that address both authors: Harold Kasimow, “Pope John Paul II: A Jewish Perspective on a Polish Catholic Saint,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 48, no. 3 (2013): 410–16. However, even this article only explicitly compares the pope to Heschel on a single page. Ibid., 412. Certainly, other fruitful comparisons of leading contemporary Jewish and Catholic thinkers on our topic remain possible. For example, while they are not primarily ethicists, both of John Paul II’s successors have reflected at some length (if not entirely systematically) in their writings and public addresses on the relationship between morality and religious commitment, on the one hand, and happiness and meaning in life, on the other. See, especially, Francis, Evangelii Gaudium [“The Joy of the Gospel”] (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2013); Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (Benedict XVI), God and the World: Believing and Living in Our Time: A Conversation with Peter Seewald, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002 [2000]). On the Jewish side, Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the Commonwealth from 1991 to 2013, has also covered this issue in some depth in his many works. See, especially, Jonathan Sacks, To Heal a Fractured World: The Ethics of Responsibility (New York: Schocken Books, 2005).

Introduction

7

law) generally leads to growth in happiness, meaning, freedom from selfish desires, and personal fulfillment, while committing evil distances us from them. But alongside many similarities, key differences between the authors also exist; for example, John Paul II more strongly emphasizes the relationship between acting well and attaining eternal life, whereas Heschel wrestles more openly with the possibility that religious commitment ultimately involves anxiety and sadness. I find that historical and contemporary analyses—such as the work of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, the philosopher Peter Singer, and present-day psychology—support Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views to an extent. However, whether one finds either author persuasive will depend in large part on one’s prior conclusions about the existence and nature of God and the afterlife. Overall, I seek to help my fellow ethicists and others come to more informed and even self-transformative conclusions regarding some of our deepest longings in life.

Primary sources For this study, I will focus on major works of prose by Heschel and John Paul II that pertain well to the general question posed by this study and clearly reveal an independent authorial voice.25 For example, I will not analyze Heschel’s poetry, his book on Israel, or his massive presentation of different ancient rabbinic views in Heavenly Torah: As Refracted through the Generations.26 Nor will I examine John Paul II’s poetry, theatrical writings, pre-papal book on the Second Vatican Council (Sources of Renewal), or the many minor individual talks he gave while he was pope.27 25

26

27

Note that in the case of both authors, this voice includes references to “man” and accompanying male pronouns, which traditionally were meant to refer to humans in general. In the interest of remaining true to the authors’ texts, I have preserved this language, although in order to be more gender-inclusive, I will often use feminine pronouns in my own commentary. Of the original Hebrew version of the latter book, Arnold Eisen remarks that while it is “a stylistic masterpiece which contains quite compelling individual chapters,” it “has perhaps been so roundly ignored even by readers of Hebrew because of its repetition, indirection and infuriating refusal to supplement extensive quotation with explicit argument.” Arnold Eisen, “Re-Reading Heschel on the Commandments,” Modern Judaism 9, no. 1 (1989): 2. I admit to a bit of a double standard here, since a number of selections in two books I do consult— Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity and The Insecurity of Freedom—are speeches given by Heschel. My reasons for analyzing Heschel’s speeches but not John Paul II’s (with the exception of a few excerpts highlighted in the secondary literature) are threefold. First, Heschel’s shorter works are particularly important aspects of his overall corpus. See Eisen, “Re-Reading Heschel on the Commandments,” 2–3:

8

The Seductiveness of Virtue

The works by Heschel on which I will concentrate include the five works in which he most fully presents his own ethical considerations: three books (God in Search of Man, Man Is Not Alone, and Who Is Man?) and two book-length collections of articles, lectures, and/or interviews (The Insecurity of Freedom and Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity). In addition, I devote attention to Heschel’s last book, A Passion for Truth, a treatise in which he presents the thought of three historical figures (the Baal Shem Tov, Menahem Mendl of Kotzk, and Søren Kierkegaard) and also offers some valuable personal reflections on his own wrestling with sadness and absurdity. Finally, I pay some passing attention to The Sabbath, whose book jacket review is not alone in heralding it as “clearly Heschel’s most beloved book,” and The Prophets, another fundamental work that arose out of his doctoral dissertation. The pre-papal texts by Karol Wojtyła on which I will focus include the following major works that address the topics of ethics and human action in general: two books (The Acting Person28 and Love and Responsibility) and a book-length collection of articles (Person and Community). The papal works He tended to write in units of sentences, at most paragraphs. Stylistic and substantive unity could not be maintained indefinitely. . . . The shorter pieces . . . are generally transcripts of addresses delivered to homogeneous audiences of Jewish professionals: rabbis, cantors, educators. Heschel, we might say, found his natural voice when speaking to the people charged with bringing American Jews back to God and the commandments.

28

Second, there are prudential reasons against analyzing John Paul II’s corpus of speeches. As Curran notes, on any typical day of his twenty-seven-year pontificate, he would give “a number of different talks and addresses.” Curran, The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II, 2. Third, as Curran points out, the great number of them indicate that the pope did not personally compose them all, a fact which somewhat mitigates their significance. In contrast, “without doubt, the pope is quite heavily involved in writing [encyclicals and other] authoritative documents.” Ibid. We can safely include here his lecture series on marriage and sexuality, which was already in the format of a book manuscript before he became pope. See Michael Waldstein, “Introduction by Michael Waldstein,” in John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), 7, 10. Regarding this notoriously challenging and frustrating work from 1969, one of the pope’s students remarked to him, “It’s a good first draft. Perhaps it could be translated first from Polish into Polish, to make it easier to understand for the reader—including me.” And a running joke was that Polish seminarians sent to purgatory for their sins were given the book as assigned reading. Jameson Taylor, “The Acting Person in Purgatory: A Note for Readers of the English Text,” Logos 13, no. 3 (2010): 77, 98, n. 4. I recognize that the official English translation of The Acting Person has been criticized frequently for certain inaccuracies. Accordingly, in the course of writing my dissertation and this book, I have referred to an unpublished corrected version that purports to adhere more closely to Wojtyła’s Polish text and is the same as that utilized by Kenneth Schmitz. Kenneth L. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 60, n. 6. Given the copyright of the official English translation and my impression that the controversial aspects of this text (e.g., the use of the words “ontic structure” in place of the term suppositum, and the rendering of the title as The Acting Person) do not directly impinge on my own discussion, I will simply cite to the official text throughout the present work. In a few instances, I will refer to The Acting Person’s footnotes, which the reader can keep in mind were not in the original Polish edition but were in any case ultimately sanctioned by Wojtyła himself. On this point, see Karol Wojtyła, The Acting Person, trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: D. Reidel, 1979), ix, xiv. And for further discussion

Introduction

9

to which I attend include his very first encyclical Redemptor Hominis (“The Redeemer of Man”), which Avery Dulles calls “the programmatic document of the pontificate”29; an encyclical that discourses on the search for the meaning of life (Fides et Ratio [“Faith and Reason”]); four of his encyclicals focusing extensively on ethics (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis [“On Social Concern”], Centesimus Annus [“The Hundredth Year”], Veritatis Splendor [“The Splendor of Truth”], and Evangelium Vitae [“The Gospel of Life”]); and his apostolic letter on suffering (Salvifici Doloris [“On the Christian Meaning of Human Suffering”]). Also, I touch briefly on his popular series of weekly lectures on marriage and sexuality (compiled and published under the name Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body), and the first book-length interview ever with a sitting pope (Crossing the Threshold of Hope). Note that I generally will refer to him simply as “the pope” or “John Paul II,” reserving “Wojtyła” for those places where I am exclusively addressing his pre-papal works. Throughout their respective writings, both Heschel and John Paul II demonstrate a fundamental consistency in their own views. Held, for instance, suggests that there is a “remarkable stability over time” in Heschel’s theology, quotes a few additional secondary sources in support of this point, and proceeds to regard his subject’s work “as a synchronic whole, freely integrating early writings and later ones in expositing or analyzing his ideas.”30 As for John Paul II, Richard Spinello emphasizes the constancy of his views throughout his pontificate,31 and Jeffrey Tranzillo points to a continuity between the themes of The Acting Person and Love and Responsibility on the one hand, and the pope’s later work on the other.32 Curran does claim that there is a certain disconnect between John Paul II’s social encyclicals (including Sollicitudo Rei Socialis and Centesimus Annus) and Trinitarian encyclicals (including Redemptor Hominis) in terms of their respective assessments of “where truth is found,” but his concerns do not appear to directly pertain to the pope’s considerations on the specific question posed by this study.33 And so, I myself will generally treat the

29 30 31

32

33

of these issues, see, generally, Taylor, “The Acting Person in Purgatory,” which is “both an apology for the English text and an indication of its limitations as a philosophical work.” Dulles, The Splendor of Faith, 13. Held, The Call of Transcendence, 25–26. Richard A. Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II: The Great Pope’s Moral Wisdom (Lanham, MD: Sheed & Ward, 2007), 183–84. Tranzillo, John Paul II on the Vulnerable, 18–19, 131. Similarly, Jeffreys makes the “working hermeneutical assumption . . . that there is continuity in John Paul II’s thinking that spans more than fifty years.” Jeffreys, Defending Human Dignity, 29. Curran, The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II, 19–20.

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rabbi’s and pope’s respective corpuses as two “synchronic wholes,” and hope that my frequent use of various sources to support points in the main text will reassure the reader of the legitimacy of this approach.34

Assumptions Before I move on to an overview of each chapter, note that I have made a few key assumptions. First, I have taken for granted that it is actually possible to achieve meaning in life and to be free. Of course, nihilists and some determinists would deny each of these possibilities, respectively, although I do not have room to adjudicate those disputes here.35 Second, I accept that happiness, meaning, freedom, and fulfillment are all generally good things to have. It is true that Saint Thomas Aquinas and many contemporary authors have pointed out that sadness should not be shunned under all circumstances, as it may improve our thinking abilities, make us more creative, motivate us to do something good, help us persevere, and protect us against threats.36 On the other hand, there is research that suggests that being happy can also lead to these benefits, as well as others such as improved health, increased productivity and chances of employment, and an enhanced social life.37 34

35

36

37

In both the footnotes and the bibliography, references to sources by the same author normally will be given in reverse chronological order. For some more discussion of such positions, including possible responses to them, see Timothy O’Connor, “Free Will,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, Introduction and § 3.3, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/freewill; Randolph Clarke and Justin Capes, “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), ed. Zalta, § 4, at http://plato.stanford. edu/archives/fall2015/entries/incompatibilism-theories (discussing arguments based on human experience, quantum mechanics, and possible neurological processes against the notion that our actions and other events are deterministically caused by phenomena external to us, and indicating that there is presently no definitive evidence either for or against this notion); Thaddeus Metz, “The Meaning of Life,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), ed. Zalta, § 4, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/life-meaning (citing, among other thinkers, Peter Singer, whose support of the possibility of a meaningful existence will be discussed in Chapter  4). And regarding the respective claims that either immortality or the lack thereof, or the non-existence of God, would necessarily make our lives meaningless, see Metz, “The Meaning of Life,” §§ 2.1, 2.2 (mentioning the rejoinder that our intuition suggests that even in the absence of a God and eternal life, the lives of such figures as Mother Teresa, Albert Einstein, and Pablo Picasso would still be meaningful), and note that even if we will live forever, we might still imbue our lives with meaning by alleviating some suffering in this world and/or assisting the eternal salvation of others. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 59, a. 3 & ad. 2–3; Sonja Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness: What Should Make You Happy, but Doesn’t, What Shouldn’t Make You Happy, but Does (New York: Penguin, 2013), 3–4, 197–98; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 277, 288. Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 194–96; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 24–26; Martin E. P. Seligman, Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being (New York: Atria, 2011), 200–08; Martin E. P. Seligman, Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology

Introduction

11

With regard to the value of freedom, some contemporary psychologists have indicated that having too many choices (e.g., of gourmet chocolates) can actually render us indecisive and make us more likely to regret any selection that we do make.38 From a more theological perspective, Romanus Cessario remarks that “human choosing in itself does not constitute an ultimate value for human existence.” In particular, as Cessario points out, the Catholic tradition has held that those who presently enjoy the vision of God in heaven have no choice but to be good, but that this vision will be experienced “as a moment of rapture, not of violence.”39 All of that said, I think it is safe to say that possessing a substantial amount of freedom, in this life at least, is still desirable and necessary for happiness.40 As for the drawbacks of having too much choice, these are primarily experienced by “maximizers” (who earnestly seek the “best possible choice”), not “satisficers” (who are satisfied with an option that is “good enough”), and there are steps one can take to shift from the former to the latter category.41 Third, I assume that it is basically fine to strive for happiness, meaning, freedom, and fulfillment. Some might question this by invoking the ancient notion of the “paradox of hedonism,” which is that if we do want to achieve happiness, we should not consciously chase it. But as the philosopher Dan Haybron has remarked: Yet never considering happiness also seems an improbable strategy for becoming happier. If you are choosing among several equally worthwhile

38

39

40

41

to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment (New York: Free Press, 2002), 37–44. My wording in this paragraph is mostly borrowed from my “No Woe to You Lawyers: A Virtue-Based Approach to Happiness within the Legal Profession,” Journal of Moral Theology 4, no. 1 (2015): 91. Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 101–02; Dan Haybron, “Happiness,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta (Fall 2011 Edition), § 5.2, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/happiness; Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 227–29; Seligman, Flourish, 283–84, n.; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 296–97, n. Romanus Cessario, O.P., Introduction to Moral Theology, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 106, 118. Cf. Dulles, The Splendor of Faith, 187 (acknowledging that those in heaven “cannot do other than love God” but arguing that they still “do so freely,” on the ground that “they see how lovable God is”). Wojtyła himself states that “man longs for love more than freedom—freedom is the means, whereas love is the end.” Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, trans. Grzegorz Ignatik (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2013 [1960, 2001]), 117—and for some empirical confirmation of this last point, see Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 132–34, 175–76. On the contribution of the “freedom to make life choices” to both “positive affect” and “life evaluations,” see Helliwell, Huang, and Wang, “The Distribution of World Happiness,” 16–19. Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 102; Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 228–31. Additionally, for some replies to the view that a God-given meaning would “degrade us,” see Metz, “The Meaning of Life,” § 2.1. Here I might add that if that God is omnibenevolent and omniscient, then his purposes would seem to be quite ennobling.

12

The Seductiveness of Virtue

occupations, and have good evidence that some of them will make you miserable, while one of them is likely to be highly fulfilling, it would not seem imprudent to take that information into account. Yet to do so just is to pursue happiness. The so-called paradox of hedonism is perhaps best seen as a vague caution against focusing too much on making oneself happy, not a blanket dismissal of the prospects for expressly seeking happiness—and for this modest point there is good empirical evidence.42

But one might still object (in a manner reminiscent of the philosopher Immanuel Kant) that consciously striving for happiness through ethical conduct would still be a problem, in that it would actually vitiate the goodness of otherwise moral behavior.43 In response, while it may be true that acting well is not so praiseworthy if one’s sole motivation in doing so is to promote one’s self-interest, without any genuine concern for the welfare of others, it doesn’t necessarily follow that complete self-disregard must be a prerequisite for ethical behavior, especially given that some degree of self-interest is perfectly natural and unavoidable. Indeed, the influential contemporary moral philosopher Peter Singer concludes that there is simply no good reason to “allow Kantian preconceptions to deter me from considering self-interested reasons for living an ethical life.”44 And from a more religious perspective, consider that the Hebrew Bible promises rewards for following the commandments (see Deuteronomy  5–6), and that Jesus appeals to the promise of heaven and the threat of hell to motivate us to serve God and neighbor (see, for example, Matthew 19 and 25, the former of which will be discussed at length in this book). In response to the notion that religious commitment motivated by a desire for heaven would be greedy, the Jewish philosopher George Schlesinger memorably responded that it would be “the manifestation of a noble greed that is to be acclaimed.”45 42

43 44 45

Haybron, “Happiness,” § 5.2. While Peter Singer thinks that there is some merit to the paradox, he also indicates that there is nothing wrong with the pursuit of happiness as long as we go about it in the right way: “We have forgotten the old wisdom that the way to find happiness or lasting satisfaction is to aim at something else, and try to do it well.” Peter Singer, How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995 [1993]), 20, 212–13; see also Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 291–92. On this possible objection, see Haybron, “Happiness,” § 5.1. Singer, Practical Ethics, 286. See also Singer, How Are We to Live?, 182–86. Alan Hájek, “Pascal’s Wager,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta (Winter 2012 Edition), § 5, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pascal-wager (quoting George Schlesinger, “A Central Theistic Argument,” in Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal’s Wager, ed. Jeff Jordan [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994], 85). See also Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. II-II, q. 17, aa. 1-2 (indicating that it is virtuous to desire heaven); Christopher Kaczor, The Gospel of Happiness: Rediscover Your Faith Through Spiritual Practice and Positive Psychology (New York: Image, 2015), 23–27 (suggesting that it is actually morally commendable to be solicitous of positive

Introduction

13

Note that these three assumptions seem reasonably consistent with Heschel’s and John Paul II’s overall perspectives. We’ll see in upcoming chapters that while the rabbi wants to discourage us from focusing too directly on attaining happiness, perfection, and eternal life, both he and the pope uphold the realities of meaningfulness and freedom in the face of challenges to these, and suggest that happiness and the search for meaning are worthwhile. Moreover, both thinkers clearly encourage us to engage in the sort of behavior that would lead to these realities, and to avoid the kind of conduct that would not.46

Overview of chapters Under the supposition that we cannot begin to answer our question without clarifying what the key terms in it actually mean, Chapter 1 explores them as understood by Heschel, John Paul II, and others. Mindful of ancient wisdom and contemporary concerns, I identify two key types of “happiness”— subjective (that which refers to a person’s psychological state) and objective

46

emotions, since they can help us to decide well, avoid evil, do good to others and bring cheer to them, and safeguard our own health); Ailbe M. O’Reilly, Conjugal Chastity in Pope Wojtyla (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), 7 (noting that Wojtyła’s own second doctoral thesis quotes the Council of Trent in affirming that it is morally permissible to act well and refrain from evil solely for the purpose of achieving heaven and avoiding hell) (citing Karol Wojtyła, Valutazioni sulla possibilità di costruire l’etica cristiana sulle basi del sistema di Max Scheler, in Metafisica della persona: Tutte le opera filosofiche e saggi integrative [Milan: Bompiani, 2003], 418), 40 (citing Mt. 6:20, Rom. 2:6-7, and 1 Pt. 1:9 as evidence of God’s “desire to reward our good works and his desire that we do these works for the sake of our eternal reward”), 52 (noting that “Jesus does not reprimand [the rich young man in Matthew 19] for having such an end [of achieving eternal life]. . . . In fact . . . Jesus . . . confirms this man’s motivation, i.e. his performing of good acts for the sake of entering the Kingdom of God.”). At any rate, as we shall see in Chapter 2, Heschel suggests that simply embarking on a particular deed can help distance ourselves from initially self-centered motivations—and the idea that we can “lose self-consciousness” while engaged in a particular task has also received support by psychologists. Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 181–82; Seligman, Flourish, 11, 16–17; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 114–19. (An earlier version of some of my thoughts in this paragraph can be found in my “No Woe to You Lawyers,” 91, n. 4.) O’Reilly provides a helpful discussion of the pope’s own thought on this point. First, O’Reilly suggests that the aforementioned doctoral thesis comes to the conclusion that we should “not aim at the reward [eternal happiness]; rather we accept it,” and that other early writings are compatible with this interpretation. O’Reilly, Conjugal Chastity in Pope Wojtyla, 8–13. But then, in analyzing John Paul II’s later text Veritatis Splendor, O’Reilly argues that “what is implicit throughout the entire Encyclical is that genuine self-interest, in the sense of pursuing one’s own best (supernatural) interests, through performing acts that are objectively good, is essential to the Christian life.” Ibid., 51–53 (citing John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor [Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993], §§ 9, 12, 16, 72–73, 120). In fact, as O’Reilly perceptively shows, the pope also appears to countenance striving for eternal happiness through ethical conduct in another work from around this time when he asks, “Is not hell in a certain sense the ultimate safeguard of man’s moral conscience?” Ibid., 7 (quoting John Paul II, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, trans. Jenny McPhee and Martha McPhee, ed. Vittorio Messori [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994], 186).

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The Seductiveness of Virtue

(that which is good for a person and does not pertain directly to his or her emotions)—and understand freedom in terms of the ability to choose. I also define the “meaning” of life, a predominately modern-day phrase, in terms of purpose and significance. Next, I introduce “personal fulfillment” as an umbrella term that includes (but is not necessarily limited to) happiness, meaning, and freedom as components. Finally, as per my two primary authors, I generally understand “doing good” in terms of transcending our own needs and following religious law. Chapters 2 and 3 each begin by underscoring the importance to both authors of the question posed by this study. Specifically, they both affirm that all of us are concerned with finding meaning in life, and that this search is a worthwhile one. These chapters then present in depth the various considerations raised by them that are relevant to the question at hand. In particular, Chapter 2 analyzes, in order, Heschel’s reflections on the following topics, each of which is phrased using his own words: “the problem of needs” (which figures most prominently in Man Is Not Alone), “a commitment to Jewish law” (which is discussed in particular depth in God in Search of Man), and “the difficulties of moral living” (which are addressed throughout Heschel’s works, most poignantly in A Passion for Truth). As I demonstrate, while Heschel does not think self-interest should be our primary motivation for acting ethically, he generally acknowledges that doing good does lead to increases in personal fulfillment, whereas committing evil does not. I also recognize that various Heschelian passages may appear to oppose this position. Overall, however, he holds that “the seductiveness of vice is excelled by the joys of the mitsvah.”47 As for the third chapter, its structure comes from Veritatis Splendor’s analysis of Mt. 19:16-26, where a rich young man asks Jesus, “Teacher, what good must I do to have eternal life?” Drawing from this encyclical and various other writings, this chapter discusses John Paul II’s thoughts under the following 47

In structuring Heschel’s thought in this manner, I am cognizant of Held’s reminder that Heschel himself is not a “systematic philosopher” or “linear writer,” but a thinker who makes extensive use of poetic and evocative formulations. That said, Held does concede that Heschel has a “coherent worldview” and (like Fritz Rothschild, John Merkle, and Edward Kaplan) sorts Heschel’s thoughts into an organized presentation. Held’s primary concern here seems to be that the commentator on Heschel should not lose sight of his “lyrical prose” and “ardent piety.” Held, The Call of Transcendence, 1–3, 26, 235, n. 3. In the chapters that follow, I have striven to give the reader a good sense of that style by quoting liberally from Heschel.

Introduction

15

headings: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” (Mt. 19:17); “If you wish to be perfect . . . sell your possessions . . . then come, follow me” (Mt. 19:21); and “With God all things are possible” (Mt. 19:26). Here I show that he generally believes that acting well—while relying on the grace of God and the assistance of the Magisterium (the teaching authority of the Catholic Church)—leads to greater personal fulfillment, and that engaging in evil does not. I also point out that John Paul II allows that the moral life can involve great sacrifice. In the end, though, he believes that even when this is case, we can choose to make our suffering redemptive and therefore meaningful, and that we will find our absolute fulfillment in heaven. On this note, he quotes Gregory the Great as saying that “one can actually ‘love the difficulties of this world for the sake of eternal rewards.’” The fourth and final chapter begins with an analysis of some noteworthy similarities and differences between the respective considerations of Heschel and John Paul II. For example, both of them defend the universal search for meaning and perceive a general connection between following religious law and achieving personal fulfillment. On the other hand, the pope is more willing to highlight the relationship between doing good and achieving eternal life (as per Matthew 19), whereas the rabbi is more preoccupied with the notion that angst, not fulfillment, is at the heart of true religion. Chapter 4 then considers the wider context of their views in two ways: (1) a discussion of how they were influenced by certain key predecessors (Aristotle, Moses Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant); and (2) an exploration of the relevant work of the fourteenth Dalai Lama (a Buddhist), Peter Singer (an atheist), and some present-day psychologists. I find that these historical and contemporary analyses do support Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views to an extent. And so, borrowing from one of Heschel’s aforementioned phrases, perhaps we can say that it is virtue that is truly seductive and attractive. However, one’s ultimate opinion of these two authors’ conclusions will no doubt be influenced by one’s prior beliefs about the existence and nature of God and the afterlife. Whatever one’s position on these matters, Chapter 4 concludes, future research on the question with which we began would do well to look to other worldviews (religious and secular) and disciplines. To justify this conclusion, I rely in part on the work of others—such as Charles Camosy, David Clairmont, Christine Gudorf, and Charles Mathewes—who have suggested

16

The Seductiveness of Virtue

various benefits of comparative ethics and interworldview dialogue. At the same time, I go further than these authors in my elaboration of the advantages of not just interworldview but also interdisciplinary dialogue on morality and personal fulfillment. With all of that said, let us begin to unpack each of these points in more depth.

1

The Meaning of Our Question

Before I discuss how Heschel and John Paul II would answer the question posed by this study, I’d like to specify more exactly what that question means. In particular, I want to explain what I mean by such terms and phrases as “happiness,” “meaning,” “freedom,” “personal fulfillment,” “doing good,” and “doing evil.” In the process, I will look to how they are understood by both the two aforementioned authors and other important sources, including some philosophical literature and a few major English-language dictionaries.

Happiness “Happiness” is a concept that is notoriously difficult to define. As Haybron points out: “The ordinary notion is something of a mess. We use the term to denote different things in different contexts, and often have no clear notion of what we are referring to.”1 In my own experience, students sometimes respond to the question, “What is happiness?,” by enumerating things that they believe lead them there (e.g., “family,” “friends”) rather than its essence.2 One good way to begin attempting to get at that essence is to find out what the root of the word—“hap”—literally means. Start with “hapless,” which many of us know refers to the quality of having bad luck. (For those who have some familiarity with professional sports, a reference to the Chicago Cubs— who as of this writing have managed to not win baseball’s World Series in 107 years, the odds of which one sportswriter has recently calculated as about one in 2343—as hapless is a good reminder.) And so, “good fortune” is the 1 2 3

Haybron, “Happiness,” § 2.2. On this sort of confusion, see also ibid., § 1.2. Rany Jazayerli, “Apples and Oranges, Bambinos and Billy Goats,” Grantland (March 17, 2014), at http://grantland.com/features/chicago-cubs-boston-red-sox-theo-epstein. But as of mid-2016, the Cubs are off to a strong start, and hope springs eternal.

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The Seductiveness of Virtue

literal meaning of happiness, and we see this parallel in non-English languages as well.4 Good fortune is a kind of what we might call objective happiness, which refers to what is good for us. Other possible types of objective happiness include health, the attainment of knowledge, and a life of virtuous activity. Subjective happiness, on the other hand, refers exclusively to our emotions, desires, and attitudes. This kind of happiness can include sensory pleasures and overall life satisfaction.5 Note that objective happiness is not necessarily independent of our psychological state. For example, it is possible that what is good for us is (at least in part) pleasure or satisfaction itself.6 Alternatively, what is good for us (e.g., virtuous behavior) could give us pleasure as a side effect.7 Throughout much of history, those who wrote on happiness understood it in the objective sense.8 For example, Aristotle holds that happiness consists in the lifelong exercise of virtue, since happiness is the “chief good,” the chief good for a person “seems to reside in [his or her] function,” and the function of a person (as distinct from that of an animal) is fulfilled when one consistently performs “actions accompanied by reason” in an excellent manner. He adds that good fortune can also be seen as a kind of happiness, given that “friends, or wealth, or political power” assist one in acting well and that it would be difficult to call someone entirely happy if he were childless, friendless, or very ugly.9 Finally, Aristotle’s understanding of happiness is not opposed to positive emotion; indeed, he holds that virtuous persons will experience great pleasure in performing their actions, for such activity is natural to them.10 Aquinas also conceives of happiness in primarily objective terms, albeit in a more theological way. He contends that perfect happiness is the “attainment of

4

5

6 7 8 9

10

Haybron, “Happiness,” § 1.1. So, for example, “happiness” is commonly translated into French as “bonheur,” which means “good chance.” On these two basic kinds of happiness, see Roger Crisp, “Well-Being,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta (Summer 2015 Edition), §§ 1, 4.3, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2015/entries/well-being; Haybron, “Happiness,” § 1.1. The labels “objective happiness” and “subjective happiness” for these two categories are my own. Crisp, “Well-Being,” §§ 4.1, 4.2; Haybron, “Happiness,” § 1.1. Haybron, “Happiness,” § 4.3. Ibid., § 1.2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 [4th century B.C.E.]), bk. I, pts. 7-8. See also Richard Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta (Fall 2014 Edition), §§ 2, 8, at http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-ethics. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, pt. 8; Haybron, “Happiness,” § 4.3; Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics,” § 4.

The Meaning of Our Question

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the Perfect Good” (which he names as God),11 and that “imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life” includes possessing knowledge and acting virtuously, which can involve a kind of unity with God, albeit only a partial one that can be lost.12 And for Aquinas, external goods (such as sufficient food and drink) are necessary for imperfect happiness, even though these goods are not happiness themselves.13 While he denies that happiness consists in pleasure,14 he maintains that “happiness is not without pleasure, for it is written: ‘Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end.’” Immediately afterwards, he expresses his agreement with Aristotle that virtuous activity is pleasurable.15 And for Aquinas, perfect happiness, which specifically involves attaining the vision of God in the next life, “fulfils every desire.”16 Finally, Aquinas allows that we can be imperfectly happy in this life insofar as we have “hope of obtaining happiness in the life to come.”17 Notwithstanding Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s cursory nods to some sort of link between pleasure and happiness, much of the above will no doubt sound foreign to many contemporary ears. Indeed, while the Oxford English Dictionary and Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary acknowledge “good fortune” as one definition of happiness, they also note this usage as “rare” and “obsolete,” respectively, and do not mention virtue.18 Today, it is much more common for people— including scientists who research happiness, the media, and laypersons—to conceive of happiness in the subjective sense.19 For example, Martin Seligman, one of the founders of positive psychology, understands happiness in terms of 11 12

13 14 15 16

17 18

19

Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 5, aa. 1-3. Ibid., pt. I-II, q. 3, a. 2; q. 5, a. 4. Here there is a parallel between Aquinas and Maimonides, who holds at one point that “true happiness . . . is the knowledge of the deity.” Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962 [1190]), pt. III, ch. 23. That said, as we will see in the concluding chapter, Maimonides seems to distance himself somewhat from this view by the end of this work. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 4, a. 7. Ibid., pt. I-II, q. 2, a. 6. Ibid., pt. I-II, q. 34, a. 3 & ad. 2 (quoting Ps. 15:11 and citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, pt. 8). Ibid., pt. I-II, q. 5, a. 3. Some might object to the traditional Thomistic view of happiness on the grounds that an everlasting beatific vision would, in fact, be interminable. Pope Benedict XVI has attempted to address this contention in a couple of his works, claiming that “eternity is not an unending succession of days in the calendar, but something more like the supreme moment of satisfaction.” Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2007), § 12 (citing Jn 16:22). See also ibid., §§ 10-11; Ratzinger, God and the World, 438. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 5, a. 3, ad. 1 (quoting Rom. 8:24: “We are saved by hope”). “Happiness,” Merriam-Webster.com (Merriam-Webster, 2016); “Happiness,” Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, 2016). Another major dictionary that adopts the “good fortune” definition does not include such a qualifier, although it, too, does not reference virtue. “Happiness,” Dictionary.com Unabridged (Random House, Inc., 2016). Crisp, “Well-Being,” § 1; Haybron, “Happiness,” § 1.2.

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The Seductiveness of Virtue

“positive emotion,” while clarifying that this is only one of many worthwhile goals in life.20 And fellow psychologist Sonja Lyubomirsky defines happiness as “the experience of joy, contentment, or positive well-being, combined with a sense that one’s life is good, meaningful, and worthwhile.”21 Contemporary English-language dictionaries also reflect this emphasis. Happiness is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “the state of pleasurable contentment of mind; deep pleasure in or contentment with one’s circumstances”; by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary as “a state of well-being and contentment; a pleasurable or satisfying experience”; and by Dictionary.com (based on the Random House Dictionary) as “good fortune; pleasure; contentment; joy.”22 What further light might Heschel and John Paul II shed on all of this? Beginning with the former, he clearly understands happiness in primarily subjective terms, but in an unexpected and unique way. He argues that “happiness . . . is not a synonym for either satisfaction, complacency, or smugness, but is essentially the certainty of being needed, of having the vision of the goal which is still to be attained. It is self-satisfaction which breeds futility and despair.”23 In another passage that repeats much of the aforementioned wording, he suggests that happiness involves “the maintenance and fanning of a discontent with our aspirations and achievements.”24 For Heschel, then, the experience of happiness is one that is secure in one sense (“the certainty of being needed”) but unsettling in another (“a discontent”). Elsewhere, Heschel associates happiness with various positive sensations. In his book on The Sabbath, he explains that menuha, the Hebrew word for rest, “is the same as happiness,” and also relates menuha to “tranquility,” “serenity,” “peace,” and “eternal life.”25 He also seems to view happiness as related to both 20 21 22

23

24

25

Seligman, Flourish, 9–29. Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 32. “Happiness,” Dictionary.com Unabridged; “Happiness,” Merriam-Webster.com; “Happiness,” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Abraham Joshua Heschel, Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1951), 257. For similar sentiments, see ibid., 194–95; Abraham Joshua Heschel, Who Is Man? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965), 58. Abraham Joshua Heschel, “Existence and Celebration,” in Abraham Joshua Heschel, Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity: Essays, ed. Susannah Heschel (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), 31; Heschel, WM, 86–87 (same quotation). Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath: Its Meaning For Modern Man (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1951; reprint, New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 22–23 (citing Genesis Rabba 10, 9 and Deut. 12:9); see also ibid., 31–32. Genesis Rabba is a midrash (pl: midrashim), a word whose root means “to investigate,” and which is defined by Michael Chester as “the method by which the ancient rabbis investigated Scripture in order to make it yield laws and teachings not at first apparent.” Michael A. Chester, Divine Pathos and Human Being: The Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel (Portland, OR:

The Meaning of Our Question

21

pleasure and joy. At one point he remarks: “Daily we pray: ‘Happy are we! How good is our destiny, how pleasant our lot, how beautiful our heritage.’ There is joy in being a Jew.”26 However, he does not hold that each of these realities is identical; indeed, sometimes his phrasing dramatically contrasts “joy” with “pleasure.” Specifically, being a Jew involves “the joy of discipline, not the pleasures of conceit,”27 and in today’s world, “we have easy access to pleasure, we forget the meaning of joy.”28 Ultimately, Heschel appears to believe that pleasure and joy are distinct, but not absolutely opposed to each other; the former involves the satisfaction of a need, whereas the latter is an emotion that includes pleasure but is centered on the other more than oneself.29 In contrast, Wojtyła seems to conceive of happiness more in an objective sense. He affirms that happiness is not a “sum of pleasures” or “delight alone”30; rather, it is the “fullness of good” for a person.31 In comparison, pleasure, which “occurs . . . as sensual satisfaction, as affective contentment, or as a deep and thorough joy,” is only “a good that is merely temporary.”32 As does Aquinas, the pope understands perfect happiness and the fullness of good as referring to God alone.33 However, he recognizes that “only people of deep faith” realize this, whereas others are liable to think that they can determine the fullness of good for themselves, based on their own desires.34 Elsewhere, Wojtyła comes close to other (seemingly objective) definitions for happiness. At one point in The Acting Person, he says that “to fulfill oneself is almost synonymous with felicity, with being happy.” Like happiness, felicity is conceived of as distinct from pleasure; the former is “structurally conjugated” with acting whereas the latter merely “happens” in us. However, he stops short

26

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28 29

30 31 32

33

34

Vallentine Mitchell, 2005), 206, 208–09. Rabba more generally refers to various agadic midrashim (commentaries on the non-legal aspects of the Hebrew Bible, in this instance the book of Genesis). Abraham Joshua Heschel, God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1955), 385. Heschel, “Teaching Religion to American Jews,” in MGSA, 150; Abraham Joshua Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in The Insecurity of Freedom: Essays on Human Existence (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1966), 236 (same quotation). Heschel, “Children and Youth,” in IF, 41. Heschel, GSM, 385–86 (citing W. R. Boyce Gibson, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. VIII, p. 152a). Wojtyła, LR, 150, 157. See, for example, ibid., 118–19, 127, 150, 167. Ibid., 16, 22. And yet, elsewhere Wojtyła suggests that the phenomenon of joy cannot be reduced “to the sensory categor[y] of pleasure.” Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays, trans. Theresa Sandok, O.S.M., ed. Andrew N. Woznicki (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 123–24. John Paul II, VS, §§ 9 (citing Mt. 19:17), 72; John Paul II, Salvifici Doloris (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1984), § 15; Wojtyła, LR, 120. Wojtyła, LR, 120.

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of equating felicity with happiness. Immediately prior to this statement, he maintains (without further explanation) that there is a “subtle distinction[]” between the two terms.35 In another place in an article not yet translated into English, he maintains that happiness is achieved “by becoming an ever better, an ever fuller man. Happiness is, in fact, already in this very ‘becoming,’ as Aristotle had surmised.”36 In the end, reducing happiness to a purely objective or subjective understanding would seem, well, unsatisfying. On the one hand, many of us intuitively appreciate that “good feelings” are not sufficient for well-being; faced with the choice of whether to plug into a hypothetical “experience machine” that would pump enjoyable (but unreal) experiences into us for the rest of our lives—winning the Nobel Peace Prize, traveling to Mars, or even watching the Chicago Cubs win the World Series—most of us would decline.37 On the other hand, many, if not most, of us would feel conflicted about ascribing the word “happiness” to a virtuous person blessed with relatively good fortune but inwardly pained and beset by spiritual darkness (Mother Teresa comes to mind here).38 Therefore, mindful of both ancient wisdom and contemporary concerns, I propose a fairly broad understanding of happiness for our purposes, one that acknowledges several legitimate aspects of it. And so, we will attend to objective kinds of happiness—including good fortune and health—and subjective ones— such as pleasure, satisfaction, and a sense of hope—that Heschel and John Paul II discuss (even if they themselves would not define “happiness” in all of those terms), and whether doing good (or evil) would lead to them. That said, one form of happiness that we will not concentrate on is a life of virtuous activity. While I do not deny that this kind of happiness is also important, the answer to the question of whether doing good leads to it seems much more obvious and less interesting—“Yes, of course!”—and not so worthy of further sustained reflection. As Aristotle plainly says: “We acquire the excellences [of character] through first 35 36

37

38

Wojtyła, AP, 174, 177–78. Andrew N. Woznicki, A Christian Humanism: Karol Wojtyla’s Existential Personalism (New Britain, CT: Mariel Publications, 1980), 33 (quoting “Wlasciwa interpretacja nauki o szczesciu” [The proper interpretation of the teaching on happiness], Tygodnik Powszechny, 36 [1957], 11). On our resistance to such an “experience machine” (a thought experiment famously proposed by the philosopher Robert Nozick), see Crisp, “Well-Being,” § 4.1; Haybron, “Happiness,” § 4.1. Mother Teresa, Come Be My Light: The Private Writings of the “Saint of Calcutta,” ed. Brian Kolodiejchuk (New York: Doubleday, 2007). Even pleasure is nontrivial, as Sonja Lyubomirsky has explained, for it leads to “upward spirals” that boost our health, insight, creativity, productivity, sociability, helpfulness, sense of meaningfulness, and ability to cope with adversity. Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 55, 194–96; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 259–65.

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having engaged in the activities . . . we become just by doing just things, moderate by doing moderate things, and courageous by doing courageous things.”39

Meaning While philosophers and theologians have reflected on the nature of happiness for millennia, it is only within the last hundred years or so that there has been substantial direct reflection on “the meaning of life.”40 As with happiness, care must be taken to try not to confuse what might lead to meaning (serving the poor, for example) with what “meaning” is in itself. And just as we can distinguish between objective and subjective forms of happiness, we can do the same with meaning. Objective meaning refers to the actual significance or purpose of one’s life. Those with reservations about granting that an evildoer—for example, Hitler or a present-day terrorist—is living a meaningful life might qualify that it is a good significance and purpose that is required for objective meaning.41 Subjective meaning, on the other hand, denotes one’s personal belief that her life has significance or purpose. Once again, objectivity and subjectivity are not mutually exclusive. In fact, some philosophers suggest that a life really is meaningful as long as the person thinks it is.42 We might add that having a truly meaningful life often naturally leads to one’s believing that his life is meaningful. While Aristotle and Aquinas may not have spoken in terms of “the meaning of life,” they do attend to the topic of one’s purpose. For Aristotle, that purpose is to fulfill one’s function, whereas for Aquinas, it would be to reach the beatific vision.43 These days, both objective and subjective kinds of meaning are matters 39

40

41 42 43

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. II, pt. 1. William Mattison interprets Aquinas to say that Christians cannot actually acquire the cardinal virtues, but only have them infused by God, a perspective which might seem to entail that doing good does not necessarily lead to a life of virtuous activity. However, he acknowledges that most contemporary commentators on Aquinas and virtue would disagree with him— and even if Mattison is correct about the matter, his understanding of Aquinas allows that our actions can facilitate growth in these virtues. William C. Mattison III, “Can Christians Possess the Acquired Cardinal Virtues?,” Theological Studies 72, no. 3 (2011): 558–85, especially 576–80. See also Catechism of the Catholic Church, rev. ed. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997), § 1805 (affirming that “the moral virtues are acquired by human effort. They are the fruit and seed of morally good acts . . .”). Leo Tolstoy’s A Confession, published in 1884, is often viewed as an early landmark in this regard, although it still took a while for the field to really get going. Thaddeus Metz remarks that the question of life’s meaning has received systematic attention from Anglo-American philosophers only in the last fifty years or so, and that not until the 1980s did “debate with real depth” emerge. Metz, “The Meaning of Life,” Introduction. For some discussion of this qualifier, see ibid., § 1. Ibid., § 3. Ibid., Introduction.

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of widespread concern. Philosophers tend to focus on whether life really is meaningful,44 whereas psychologists concentrate on whether we sense it to be so (without ignoring the fact that meaning can also be understood in objective terms).45 Modern-day English-language dictionaries also call attention to both aspects of meaning. On the one hand, Dictionary.com speaks of “the end, purpose, or significance of something,” and Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of a “significant quality.” On the other hand, the Oxford English Dictionary provides the following, more subjective definition: “Something which gives one a sense of purpose, value, etc., esp. of a metaphysical or spiritual kind; the (perceived) purpose of existence or of a person’s life.”46 Turning to the primary authors for the present study, we find that in Who Is Man? Heschel himself does associate the term “meaning” with “significant being.”47 But elsewhere in this work, he attempts to define meaning more comprehensively: “Meaning is compatibility with the preciously real; it is, furthermore, that which a fact is for the sake of something else; the pregnancy of an object with value. Life is precious to man. But is it precious to him alone? Or is someone else in need of it?”48 This is a cryptic passage, one that is not entirely clarified by the immediate context. However, it seems that Heschel is trying to distinguish between two different senses of the word “meaning.” The fact that he does have two distinct understandings of “meaning” becomes clearer after a look at his work as a whole. I will call Heschel’s first sense of the word “meaning”—“compatibility with the preciously real”—universal value. In this sense, objects in the world have meaning simply by existing. In Man Is Not Alone, Heschel elaborates as follows: “Being . . . is always endowed with meaning. . . . Expectedness of meaning, the certainty that whatever exists must be worth while . . . is at the root of all our thinking, feeling, and volition. . . . The world is resplendent with such preciousness.”49 Human beings are especially precious; in fact, Heschel 44 45

46

47 48 49

See the various philosophical positions outlined in ibid. See, for example, Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 215–19 (acknowledging both objective and subjective dimensions of meaning and explaining that he and other psychologists concern themselves primarily with the latter); Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 32, 264–65 (addressing our perception of meaning in life); Seligman, Flourish, 12, 17–18 (distinguishing between objective and subjective forms of meaning). “Meaning,” Dictionary.com Unabridged; “Meaning,” Merriam-Webster.com; “Meaning,” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Heschel, WM, 51, 63. See also Heschel, MNA, 28. Heschel, WM, 54. For similar language, see ibid., 63. Heschel, MNA, 28–29. See also Heschel, WM, 98.

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lists “preciousness” as one of our defining characteristics in Who Is Man?50 According to Heschel, only a human being is “supremely valuable . . . even if nobody cares for him.”51 But meaning has another sense for Heschel—“It is, furthermore, that which a fact is for the sake of something else. . . . Is someone else in need of [man’s life]?”—which I will call conditional significance. Man Is Not Alone describes a human being as a “fountain of immense meaning,” by which Heschel means that more than any other being, a human being has great potential to influence the course of events in the world.52 Who Is Man? adds that through “the satisfaction of a need,” a person can attain “ultimate meaning.”53 More specifically, “Significant being includes satisfaction of needs and desires, realization of one’s capacities as well as a craving transcending these; attainment of beauty, goodness, truth, love, and friendship as well as sensitivities that engender a sense of embarrassment rather than the shelter of self-contentment.”54 For Heschel, “There is no guarantee or assurance of attaining significant being” in such a sense.55 Finally, “ultimate meaning” also has a religious dimension for Heschel. In an address to the Twenty-Eighth World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem, he proclaims that “the ultimate meaning of existence is to be a religious witness,” and that this involves “compassion for God and reverence for man.”56 According to Heschel, then, all of us have meaning in the universal value sense (even if “nobody cares” for us), but only those who respond to the needs of others and are sensitive to the divine presence can attain meaning in the conditional significance sense. Note that Heschel seems to affirm that we are interested in having both actual significance and the subjective certainty of that. On the one hand, he says in Who Is Man? that “what we are in search of is not meaning for me, an idea to satisfy my conscience, but rather a meaning transcending me, ultimate relevance of human being.”57 But he also

50 51 52

53 54 55 56 57

Heschel, WM, 33–36. Ibid., 33. Heschel, MNA, 208–09. On this potentiality, see also ibid., 213; Heschel, WM, 39; Heschel, GSM, 284–85. Heschel, WM, 63. Ibid., 55–56. Ibid., 95. Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 53. Heschel, WM, 55–56.

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acknowledges here that all are looking for “certitude” and “a conviction that there is . . . something that outlasts life, strife, and agony.”58 Like Heschel, John Paul II frequently speaks of the search for the meaning of life, as we shall see. With regard to the meaning of “meaning,” the pope does not appear to consciously attempt a formal definition. In Evangelium Vitae, he does speak of “meaning” and life’s “value” in the same breath, although it is not clear whether he means to equate the two.59 In addition, Redemptor Hominis refers at one point to “the full dimension of its [the human spirit’s] humanity, or in other words . . . the full meaning of human life.”60 In his pre-papal work, Wojtyła provides a somewhat more systematic (albeit brief) treatment of what it means to have a “calling” or “vocation,” two words that would seem to be related to the question of the meaning of life (although he himself does not appear to explicitly make this connection). According to Love and Responsibility, “the word ‘vocation’ indicates that there exists a proper direction of every person’s development through commitment of his whole life in the service of certain values.”61 For Wojtyła, this course can be articulated in at least two ways. In this particular work, he explains that the vocation or goal of each person is to love, even when that involves self-sacrifice.62 In The Acting Person, our “first, fundamental calling” is understood more broadly in terms of the following imperative: “Be good as man—do not be bad as man.”63 Having considered what Heschel, John Paul II, and others have had to say about the meaning of “meaning,” we are now ready to articulate a working definition. As was the case with happiness, a purely subjective understanding seems insufficient. To see this, consider again the “experience machine”: Would someone who had plugged in for life and proudly felt that he had won the Nobel Prize, traveled to Mars, and hit a home run to help the Chicago Cubs win the World Series have led a truly meaningful life? I imagine most of us would have reservations about answering in the affirmative.64 On the other hand, while objective meaning may be sufficient for substantial meaning—consider, for instance, the case of Emily Dickinson, who toiled in relative obscurity for her 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

Ibid., 52–53, 62–63. John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1995), §§ 30–32. John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1979), § 11. Wojtyła, LR, 242. Ibid. Wojtyła, AP, 168. See also Metz, “The Meaning of Life,” § 1.

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entire life and received widespread acclaim for her poems only after death, when her younger sister Lavinia discovered dozens of notebooks full of them locked in a box—it seems preferable to not only lead a significant and/or purposeful life, but also to be aware of that fact. Therefore, I will understand meaning in an expansive sense, as having both objective components (namely, purpose and significance) and subjective aspects (in other words, one’s sense of having that purpose or significance),65 and ask whether ethical (or unethical) conduct would lead to them. Note that like Heschel, I see “meaning” in terms of objective and subjective significance, and like the pope, I concern myself with life’s goal or purpose. At the same time, I leave aside these thinkers’ association of meaning with value; as they acknowledge, we have value simply by existing, and therefore the answer to whether we can gain (or lose) this fundamental kind of meaning through our actions would appear to be a simple and straightforward “no.”66 And I have chosen not to adopt a specifically normative or religious understanding of meaning (e.g., where it is equivalent to good significance or “compassion for God and reverence for man”), since the answer to whether doing good leads to (or at least is generally necessary for) this type of meaning would seem to be similarly terse: “Yes, by definition.”67

Freedom With freedom, we return to a topic that has been explicitly discussed for millennia. And once again, I want to distinguish between two different senses

65

66

67

Alternatively (and equally validly, in my opinion), one could understand subjective meaning as falling under subjective happiness; consider Lyubomirsky’s definition of happiness in the previous section. I use the qualifier “would appear” since Aquinas, for one, does hold at one point that “sinners fall away from [their] dignity.” Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. II-II, q. 64, a. 2 & ad. 3 (relying in part on Aristotle and Ps. 49:21). However, Ps. 49:21 simply suggests that foolish persons are like animals in that they both die without being specially redeemed by God, and Aquinas’s infelicitous phrasing is tempered somewhat by his earlier statement that sinners are owed our charity, even when they are being put to death. Ibid., pt. II-II, q. 25, a. 6 & ad. 2. For an analysis of both passages that concludes that Aquinas, overall (and for that matter, John Paul II), thinks that sinners do maintain dignity, see Peter Karl Koritansky, Thomas Aquinas and the Philosophy of Punishment (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 185–90. I say “generally necessary,” for it is always possible that an evildoer might (unbeknownst to him) actually be fulfilling God’s purpose and/or ultimately making the world a better place. At any rate, my definition certainly does not exclude good purposes or good significance.

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of the term at hand. Freedom of indifference is the ability to choose between different options; whether or not we have this freedom is indifferent to what we actually choose, whether good or evil. Freedom for excellence includes this ability, but also choosing what is good: in other words, acting excellently.68 Philosophical discussion of choice, and of the ability to act or not to act, goes at least as far back as Aristotle.69 By medieval times two different views of freedom had crystallized: One, championed by the fourteenth-century philosopher William of Ockham, is the idea that the essence of freedom is bare choice, including even over whether or not to be happy or to sustain one’s own life.70 A second, proposed by Aquinas, is that while we necessarily will to be happy, we do have the ability to choose between different options (including good and evil ones), although the choice of evil manifests a defective kind of freedom.71 Contemporary philosophical discussions often focus simply on freedom as a power of choice, and therefore seem to lean more toward a freedom-of-indifference perspective (even if they themselves do not adopt this terminology).72 On the other hand, the late French Dominican theologian Servais Pinckaers’s work The Sources of Christian Ethics has renewed interest in the idea of freedom for excellence, particularly in Catholic moral theological circles.73 Current English-language dictionaries mostly reflect a freedom-of-indifference bent: Dictionary.com speaks of “the power to determine action without restraint”; Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of “the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action”; 68

69

70 71

72

73

For a good overview of these two types of freedom, see William C. Mattison III, Introducing Moral Theology: True Happiness and the Virtues (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008), 47–55. For a much fuller treatment (upon which Mattison himself relies), see Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 3rd ed., trans. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995 [1993]), 327–99. O’Connor, “Free Will,” § 3.2 (citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. III); Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 382–83. Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 327–53. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I, q. 82, aa. 1-2; q. 83, aa. 1-4; Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 354–99 (citing among other sources Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I, q. 62, a. 8, ad. 3, which analogizes an imperfect freedom that chooses sin to a defective intellect that engages in faulty reasoning). O’Connor, “Free Will.” While O’Connor himself does not use the terms “freedom of indifference” or “freedom for excellence,” he does briefly acknowledge that something like the latter has been common in theological thought dating back to Saint Paul and Augustine. Ibid., § 1.3 (citing Romans 6–8 and Galatians 5). See also Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§ 1731, 1733, which clearly espouses a freedom-forexcellence perspective. At the same time, the Catechism (along with many theists who defend God’s goodness in the face of evil) suggests that the ability to choose between good and evil is of some significant value, since it claims that God “permits [moral evil] because he respects the freedom of his creatures and, mysteriously, knows how to derive good from it.” Ibid., § 311. On this point, see also John Paul II, CTH, 64–65.

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and the Oxford English Dictionary of “the state of being able to act without hindrance or restraint.” However, the latter reference work does contain a nod to an additional “figurative” meaning of freedom: “Liberation from the bondage or dominating influence of sin, spiritual servitude, worldly ties, etc.”74 Additionally, our two primary authors have much to say about the topic at hand. As with the term “happiness,” Heschel arrives at an understanding of the word “freedom” in part by explaining what it is not. In “Religion in a Free Society,” he maintains that freedom is not “the ability to act without motive. Such action would be chaotic and subrational, rather than free.”75 Freedom also does not simply indicate the ability to act however we wish.76 Such an understanding of freedom undermines itself, failing to realize that our desires are frequently subject to influences themselves, and that choosing evil can enslave us to “forces which are extraneous to the spirit.”77 Rather, as God in Search of Man explains, freedom is characterized by “creativ[ity]” and not being bound by “necessity” or “circumstances.”78 However, “Freedom is not only the ability to choose and to act, but also the ability to will, to love.”79 To put it another way: “Is not the meaning of liberty contingent upon its compatibility with righteousness? . . . [T]here is no freedom without sanctity.”80 The mention of “sanctity” hints at a related point; for Heschel, freedom has an intrinsically spiritual dimension. As he puts it, “Freedom is the liberation from the tyranny of the self-centered ego. It comes about in moments of transcending the self as an act of spiritual ecstasy.”81 More specifically, freedom ought to be understood in terms of our carrying out what God asks of us.82

74

75

76 77 78 79 80

81

82

“Freedom,” Dictionary.com Unabridged; “Freedom,” Merriam-Webster.com; “Freedom,” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 14. See also Heschel, GSM, 411 (which contains a very similar quotation). Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 14; Heschel, GSM, 411. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 14–15. Heschel, GSM, 410. See also Heschel, MNA, 271. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 13–14. Heschel, GSM, 170. See also Heschel, “A Preface to an Understanding of Revelation,” in MGSA, 189 (which contains a very similar quotation). Further allusions to freedom’s dependence on goodness can be found in Abraham J. Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 243; Heschel, GSM, 411; Heschel, TS, 89–90. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 15–16. See also Heschel, GSM, 411 (which contains a very similar quotation). Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 15.

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Like Heschel, John Paul II takes pains to explain both what freedom is and what it is not. In his papal encyclicals, he notes that it is incorrect to reduce freedom to “instinct,”83 and that governmental coercion is inimical to the exercise of freedom.84 Rather, in the first place, The Acting Person says, freedom “is present and manifests itself in the ability to choose,” to transcend necessity.85 In other words, the “experience” of freedom can be captured at least partially in the following phrase: “I may but I need not.”86 However, while freedom includes “independence of the object,” it is not complete “‘ independence’ from all possible factors.”87 Indeed, “Freedom in its fundamental sense is equivalent to self-reliance.”88 The dependence on one’s ego distinguishes persons from animals, whose actions are not grounded in an ego and are mere manifestations of instinct.89 Another synonym for freedom, according to Wojtyła, is self-determination.90 This has two primary meanings. The first is, “I am the one who determines.” For Wojtyła, this meaning coincides with the statement “I may but I need not” (referenced above) and refers to the will as a “power.”91 The second meaning of self-determination is, “I am determined by myself ”; this refers to the will as a “property of the person.”92 Dulles explains these rather technical considerations well: In determining my own course of actions, I cannot dispense with motives. If choices were completely arbitrary, freedom would be meaningless and in the last analysis impossible. In my free actions I follow what I apprehend as good and worthy of being chosen, but the choice is not forced upon me. I consent to the attraction because my reason approves of it. In acting freely, I experience myself as the source of my own activity and as responsible for the results. My actions recoil to some degree on myself, and so make me to be 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

91

92

John Paul II, RH, § 16. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1991), §§ 25, 29. Wojtyła, AP, 132. See also ibid., 117, 183. Ibid., 100, 120 (same quotation), 121 (same quotation), 309, n. 38 (same quotation). Ibid., 118, 132. Ibid., 138. See also ibid., 120–21. Ibid., 117–18. Wojtyła, LR, 97; Wojtyła, AP, 115; Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in PC, 189–90; Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC¸ 234. For a comprehensive analysis of self-determination, see, generally, Wojtyła, AP, 105–48. Wojtyła, AP, 309, n. 38. See also Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in PC, 189–90. Wojtyła, AP, 309, n. 38. See also Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in PC, 191–92.

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what I am. Thus the freedom to determine one’s activity is at the same time self-determination.93

In particular, Wojtyła affirms, through our free actions we determine ourselves as morally good or bad.94 In other words, as Veritatis Splendor puts it, we cannot speak of freedom without speaking of its relationship to the good: “Freedom is not only the choice for one or another particular action; it is also . . . a decision about oneself and a setting of one’s own life for or against the good, for or against the truth, and ultimately for or against God.”95 In the end, “freedom is realized precisely through the willing and choosing of a true good,”96 and freedom “negates and destroys itself ” when we fail to take into account the needs of others and the fact that we are our “brother’s keeper.”97 For John Paul II, as for Heschel, freedom also has an intrinsically spiritual dimension: “The full meaning of freedom [is] the gift of self in service to God and one’s brethren,” patterned after Jesus’s example.98 Accordingly, “the death of true freedom” is “slave[ry] to sin.”99 Taking into account the foregoing, this book will understand freedom in terms similar to freedom of indifference (or, if you prefer, the first half of freedom for excellence): the ability to choose (the fact that “I may but I need not”). As we’ve seen, the view that choice is essential to freedom is supported by all of the foregoing sources.100 Note that while I do not wish to deny the possible merits of defining freedom as freedom for excellence—having options plus acting well—I have chosen not to do so for the purposes of this work. This is because the answer to whether doing good (or evil) manifests and opens the 93

Avery Dulles, “The Truth about Freedom: A Theme from John Paul II,” in Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral Theology, ed. J. A. DiNoia, O.P. and Romanus Cessario, O.P. (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1999), 131. 94 Wojtyła, AP, 98–99; Wojtyła, “Human Nature as the Basis of Ethical Formation,” in PC, 99; Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in PC, 191–92 (citing Thomas Aquinas). 95 John Paul II, VS, § 65; see also ibid., § 71. 96 Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC, 234. 97 John Paul II, EV, § 19 (quoting Gen. 4:9). See also John Paul II, Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 39 (citing Aristotle in claiming that “there is no freedom without truth. Freedom is an ethical category.”). 98 John Paul II, VS, § 87. See also John Paul II, EV, § 96; John Paul II, RH, § 21 (citing Gal. 5:1, 13). 99 John Paul II, EV, § 20 (quoting Jn 8:34). See also John Paul II, VS, § 66 (citing Gal. 5:1, 13). 100 O’Connor notes that some philosophers differentiate between freedom of will and freedom of action, with the idea being that sometimes we might freely decide to do something but are externally prevented from carrying that act out. O’Connor, “Free Will,” Introduction. However, this distinction is not clearly highlighted in the other literature I’ve consulted, particularly that of our primary authors, and so my own definition does not call attention to it. That said, I suppose I—and they— would understand “freedom” to generally include both our will’s freedom to choose in the first place and then the freedom to carry out that choice in action.

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way to this kind of freedom would seem to be relatively straightforward: doing good would be absolutely necessary, and committing evil would be an automatic bar.101 Finally, recall that I have understood happiness and meaning in not only objective but also subjective terms, and that Wojtyła refers to the “experience” of freedom. But while I do not dispute that there is value not simply in having freedom but also in being aware of that fact, in the interest of relative simplicity, my definition of “freedom” will refer directly to objective freedom rather than the subjective perception of it. Indeed, it seems that someone with the former will almost always possess the latter, as it is difficult to think of exceptions.

Personal fulfillment When it comes to defining personal fulfillment, we don’t have nearly as much to go by. Like “the meaning of life,” the phrase “personal fulfillment” seems to be a predominantly modern-day preoccupation. Aristotle and Aquinas, for example, do not appear to favor the term “fulfillment” in the sense of the fulfillment of a person.102 On the other hand, a number of highly popular works in recent years do, including those authored by reputable psychologists— Martin Seligman’s Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment and Tal Ben-Shahar’s Happier: Learn the Secrets to Daily Joy and Lasting Fulfillment come especially to mind. And yet, encyclopedias of philosophy and psychology tend to eschew systematic analysis of the term. For example, unlike the previous terms we have discussed, there are no entries for “fulfillment” or “personal fulfillment” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Nor are there separate listings for either of these terms in two of the foremost reference works for psychologists, the Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology103 and the American Psychological Association’s Encyclopedia of Psychology.104 101

Perhaps this is easier to see when we refer back to Pinckaers, who states that “virtue is a dynamic quality essential to freedom [for excellence], a habitus necessary for its development.” Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 375. See also Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1733. 102 Aquinas does remark at one point that our last end can be understood either as “happiness” or “the fulfillment of [a person’s] perfection.” Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 1, a. 7. 103 Irving B. Weiner and W. Edward Craighead, eds., Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology, 4th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010). 104 Alan E. Kazdin, ed., Encyclopedia of Psychology (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000).

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Seligman’s aforementioned book does provide a bit of guidance. He understands fulfillment as a “positive emotion[] about the past,” along with satisfaction, contentment, pride, and serenity.105 But in the preface, he also speaks of “the peaks of lasting fulfillment: meaning and purpose.”106 Of the three major dictionaries I have consulted for this book, the Oxford English Dictionary comes closest to a definition of personal fulfillment; under “fulfil,” it provides the following: “Of a person: to work out one’s destiny; to develop one’s gifts and character to the full.”107 Similarly, Dictionary.com and MerriamWebster’s Dictionary speak of “fulfill” in terms of “develop[ing] the full potential of.”108 In addition, our primary authors offer some food for thought. Heschel never attempts to formally define “fulfillment,” as far as I am aware, although he does use the term (and closely related words) occasionally. For example, as we will see in the following chapter, he holds that “fullness of being” can only be attained by offering service to others. Above, we saw that Heschel thinks that happiness entails a kind of disgruntlement; shortly after making this claim, he asserts that “true fulfillment” comes about only when we welcome the challenge to continually transcend ourselves.109 The implication here is that there is some sort of relationship between fulfillment and happiness. On the other hand, Heschel sometimes questions whether fulfillment is really a worthy goal. For example, at one point he cryptically states that “there may be aspects of one’s personality which do not deserve to be fully developed,” and which may not even be able to be in the first place.110 In any case, he is clearly opposed to the pursuit of false or harmful notions of fulfillment that do not involve self-transcendence: “Self-fulfillment is a myth which a noble mind must find degrading. All that is creative in man stems from a seed of endless discontent.”111 In his pre-papal philosophical works, Wojtyła provides a few brief (if not systematic) explanations of what fulfillment means. In The Acting Person, he 105

Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 62. Ibid., xii. 107 “Fulfil,” Oxford English Dictionary Online. 108 “Fulfill,” Dictionary.com Unabridged; “Fulfill,” Merriam-Webster.com. 109 Heschel, “Existence and Celebration,” in MGSA, 31; Heschel, WM, 86–87. 110 Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 65. As we shall see again in the next chapter, however, he also says on the previous page that “the ideal of the fullest possible development of the individual must be placed within the context of religious values.” 111 Heschel, WM, 86. See also the very similar statement in Heschel, MNA, 257–58. 106

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states that “the performing of an action is at once the fulfillment of the person. Here ‘fulfillment’ may be regarded as having a correlative meaning with ‘actualization’ and thus with the metaphysical meaning of the term ‘act.’”112 Elsewhere, he clarifies that only morally good actions lead to fulfillment, whereas morally evil actions do not.113 Along these lines, Tranzillo elucidates a few different senses of “fulfillment” in Wojtyła’s thought: “performance” of an act, “actualization” of a person, and “perfection” of that person.114 Wojtyła also indicates that fulfillment is related to happiness, meaning, and freedom. As shown above, he holds that “to fulfill oneself is almost synonymous with felicity, with being happy,” and equates the “full dimension” of our humanity with the “full meaning of life.” Other remarks on fulfillment also pertain to our understanding of meaning. He notes that fulfillment refers to the achievement of “the end proper to a human being,”115 and calls attention to “the objective closeness or perhaps even partial overlapping of . . . fulfillment and the person’s calling.”116 Finally, “the performing of an action, through the fulfillment it brings, is coordinate with self-determination.”117 More specifically, we fulfill ourselves through good actions that shape our character well. In his words, “to fulfill oneself is the same thing as to realize the good whereby man as the person becomes and is good himself.”118 Wojtyła also speaks of “an absolute sense” of fulfillment that he indicates cannot be attained in this life.119 Ultimately, as Peter Ryan has suggested, the pope seems to connect fulfillment to the beatific vision of heaven. In Gratissimam Sane, John Paul II quotes Saint Augustine’s famous line, “Our heart is restless until it rests in you,” and goes on to contend that we “reach[] fulfilment precisely by sharing in God’s life. The content of this self-fulfilment is the fullness of life in God, proclaimed by Christ (cf. Jn 6:37-40), who redeemed us precisely so that we might come to share it (cf. Mk 10:45).”120 112

Wojtyła, AP, 112. See also ibid., 151; Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in PC, 266. 113 Wojtyła, AP, 153. See also Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC, 235. 114 Tranzillo, John Paul II and the Vulnerable, 78, n. 42. 115 Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” in PC, 149. See also ibid., 157 (on “unfulfillment” as “nonrealization” of an end); Wojtyła, “The Family as a Community of Persons,” in PC, 321. 116 Wojtyła, AP, 168. 117 Ibid., 150–51. See also ibid., 156; Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in PC, 266. 118 Wojtyła, AP, 174; Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC, 235. 119 Wojtyła, AP, 311, n. 51. 120 John Paul II, Gratissimam Sane (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), § 9 (quoting Augustine, Confessions, bk. I, ch. 1); Peter F. Ryan, S.J., “The Desire for Fulfillment: Comments on

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For John Paul II, then, absolute fulfillment is understood in terms of perfect happiness. In the end, I will define personal fulfillment in terms of the development of our full potential, and assuming that this includes some substantial attainment of happiness, meaning, and freedom, my understanding of personal fulfillment will encompass each of these three realities. One might argue that personal fulfillment includes at least a few additional aspects—such as maturity and the manifesting of a likeness to God—and so I will account for these as well.121 Note that my definition has much in common with the various understandings discussed above. To begin with, the relationship between fulfillment and potential is echoed in each of the dictionary definitions I have cited, and in Wojtyła’s identification of fulfillment with actualization122— and Seligman, Heschel, and John Paul II all describe fulfillment in terms of happiness, meaning, and/or freedom. I would add here that Heschel speaks of our potential to imitate the holiness of God, which in turn “enhanc[es] our likeness.”123 Similarly, John Paul II states that those in whom “the divine image is restored, renewed, and brought to perfection” possess “the fullness of life.”124 That being said, there clearly are certain distinctions between my perception of fulfillment and that of each of my authors. For instance, I do not share Heschel’s reservations about striving for fulfillment, because his denigration of “self-fulfillment” appears to be aimed more at self-centeredness than at the pursuit of happiness, meaning, and freedom as I have understood it, and because he does not articulate what other concerns he might have. I also do not adopt Wojtyła’s conception of fulfillment as “the same thing” as “realiz[ing]

an Issue Raised in Pope John Paul II’s Letter to Families,” in Creed and Culture: Jesuit Studies of Pope John Paul II, ed. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. and John J. Conley, S.J. (Philadelphia, PA: Saint Joseph’s University Press, 2004), 215–16, 220–21. 121 Alternatively, one might argue that many or even all of these elements could be subsumed under happiness. For example, objective happiness (what is good for a person) could include being mature, displaying a likeness to God, living an objectively meaningful life, and possessing a good deal of freedom, while subjective happiness (a positive state of mind) could include having a sense that one’s life is meaningful. For example, as I already mentioned in the main text, Lyubomirsky suggests the latter point. That said, the literature I have reviewed tends not to conceive of happiness in such broad terms, and in any case I think that simply accounting for each of these much-sought-after elements is ultimately more important than deciding exactly which compartments they should go into. 122 See also Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” in PC, 149 (“Fulfillment reaches all the way to the potentiality of the person.”). 123 Heschel, “Symbolism and Jewish Faith,” in MGSA, 86. 124 John Paul II, EV, § 36.

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the good,” since while it may be defensible, such an understanding would seem to render the question posed by this study to be at least partly tautologous. Given the considerations in this section, we can restate the question this book is addressing in a more shorthand manner: Does doing good (or evil) lead to increases or decreases in personal fulfillment? Our task is now to explore the meaning of the other key terms in this question. Of course, “doing,” “good,” and “evil” are much more expansive terms than the ones we have already addressed. Since Heschel and (especially) John Paul II offer extensive reflections on the meaning of these words, and since I do not want to get further bogged down in their dictionary definitions (which tend to be both lengthy and vague) or in a general discussion of ethics (Aristotelian, Thomistic, or otherwise), for the remainder of this chapter I will focus on how our primary authors understand these three terms.

Good and evil Heschel can be coy about the definition of good. In God in Search of Man, he flatly declares that it is “impossible” to define “goodness” because it represents an idea that no definition can capture.125 However, in Man Is Not Alone, he does provide at least two characterizations of the word “good.” I will label the first as a “needs-based” conception of the good: “The right or the morally good is an end that surpasses our experience of needs.”126 To live rightly, we must be attentive not only to our own legitimate needs but also to “moral and spiritual demands.”127 Actions are good and right irrespective of whether they are expedient or socially approved.128 Perhaps Heschel means to draw a contrast to this “needs-based” conception of the good when he remarks that “‘Am I my brother’s keeper?’ and [the] implied negative response” is one of the “great fundamental evil maxims of the world.”129 Man Is Not Alone also understands good (and evil) as follows: “Evil is divergence, confusion, that which alienates man from man, man from God, 125

Heschel, GSM, 103. Heschel, MNA, 226. 127 Heschel, “Children and Youth,” in IF, 50. 128 Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in IF, 225, 228; Heschel, MNA, 188–89. 129 Heschel, “ The Reasons for My Involvement in the Peace Movement,” in MGSA, 224. On the centrality of “self-transcendence” in Heschel’s thought, see Held, The Call of Transcendence, 3–4, 37–46, 233. 126

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while good is convergence, togetherness, union.”130 Consider this Heschel’s “unity-based” conception of the good. While here he provides a sharp contrast between good and evil, another essay (fittingly entitled “Confusion of Good and Evil”) contends that the lines between them can be blurred: “In Jewish mysticism we often come upon the view that in this world neither good nor evil exists in purity. . . . Even Satan contains a particle of sanctity. In doing his ugly work as the seducer of man, his intention is ‘for the sake of heaven,’” for God brought him into existence with this in mind.131 In addition, God in Search of Man emphasizes what I will call a “law-based” understanding of good. Here “good” is synonymous with mitzvah (pl: mitzvot), which according to Heschel refers to Jewish law, the responsibility and act of carrying it out, and more generally to any godly deed, as well as “virtue.” He concludes that “it would be a tautology to say a good, meritorious, pious, or holy mitsvah.”132 While that might suggest that the good and the holy are also equivalent, Heschel elsewhere in this book takes pains to show that they are distinct, yet related. In particular, he emphasizes that “the holy is the essence, the good is its expression” and that holiness is necessary for goodness.133 This brings us once again to the connection between goodness and God’s law, for Heschel affirms that the path to holiness is precisely through the performance of the mitzvot that God gives his people.134 Recently, some commentators on Heschel have suggested that he understands doing good in terms of virtue. Joseph Woodill, for example, states that Heschel is a “virtue ethicist,” for he raises certain “questions of virtue: who we are, where we are going, and how to get there” and stresses the importance of character education.135 Similarly, Joseph Harp Britton maintains in the course of his book 130

Heschel, MNA, 120–21. See also ibid., 225. Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 134–35 (quoting Baba Bathra, 16a). Baba Bathra is part of the Talmud, which literally means “teaching” or “study” and refers generally to “the recorded teachings of the Babylonian and Palestinian teachers, presented in the form of a running commentary on the Mishnah.” The Mishnah, in turn, also means “teaching” and is a rabbinic commentary on the Hebrew Bible (or “essentially Oral Torah written down”), compiled near the end of the second century. Chester, Divine Pathos and Human Being, 206, 208–09. 132 Heschel, GSM, 361–62. On the relationship between the good and law, see also ibid., 298. Note that Heschel’s own work sometimes spells mitzvah as “mitsvah.” 133 Ibid., 17. See also ibid., 376; Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 129; Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 298. 134 Heschel, GSM, 376. 135 Joseph Woodill, The Fellowship of Life: Virtue Ethics and Orthodox Christianity (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 2–4 (quoting a few Heschelian passages, including WM, 29, which asserts that “to be human we must know what human being means, how to acquire, how to preserve it”), 12, n. 10. 131

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on Heschel and piety that “Heschel adopts an essentially Aristotelian attitude that ethics is more a matter of fostering an instinctively virtuous character in each individual, than it is of resolving the rightness or wrongness of specific actions,” and that piety is Heschel’s “governing virtue.”136 On the other hand, while as we saw above Heschel briefly remarks that mitzvah can be understood in terms of virtue as well as goodness, he does not speak of “virtue” very often. In fact, he actively resists this category when discussing the nature of piety.137 Therefore, the claim that Heschel should be regarded as a “virtue ethicist” may be somewhat overstated. Writing about thirty years after the rabbi’s death, Woodill himself admits that “no one has ever so identified Heschel” to his knowledge.138 Turning to John Paul II, I already have outlined some of his thoughts on the word “good” in my discussion of his understanding of “happiness.” Again, he believes that the “fullness of good” is equivalent to happiness and ultimately to God. Here I want to focus on how the pope builds on this point in Veritatis Splendor. He begins in Chapter I of the encyclical with the question a rich man (who is never named) poses to Jesus in a few of the Gospels:139 “Teacher, what good must I do to have eternal life?” (Mt. 19:16). Jesus responds, “Why do you ask me about what is good? There is only one who is good” (v. 17). The pope remarks that only God, who is perfect happiness, “can answer the question about what is good, because he is the Good itself.”140 In fact, John Paul II contends, God has already done so by writing the natural law in our hearts.141 The pope explains that as per Aquinas, the natural law refers to our God-given sense of how we ought to act.142 More specifically, it counsels us to “do good and avoid evil, be concerned for the transmission 136

Joseph Harp Britton, Abraham Heschel and the Phenomenon of Piety (New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 203, 223. See also ibid., 219–23 (noting that while Heschel does not “overtly” focus on virtue, he does state at one point that “a good person is not he who does the right thing, but he who is in the habit of doing the right thing”) (quoting Heschel, GSM, 345). 137 Heschel, MNA, 276–77. 138 Woodill, The Fellowship of Life, 12, n. 10. In fact, Who Is Man?, on which Woodill bases his argument, explicitly refers to a “virtue” only once (temperance), and even there only in a passing reference to an ancient Greek inscription. Heschel, WM, 18. 139 Namely, Matthew 19, Mark 10, and Luke 18. For purposes of simplicity, like John Paul II I will focus on the Gospel of Matthew, although note that the first chapter of Veritatis Splendor itself sometimes cross-references this biblical narrative to Mark and Luke. 140 John Paul II, VS, §§ 8–9. 141 Ibid., § 12 (citing Rom. 2:15). 142 Ibid. (citing Thomas Aquinas, In Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decem Legis Pracepta. Prologus: Opuscula Theologica, II, No. 1129, Ed. Taurinen [1954], 245; Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 91, a. 2; Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1955); ibid., § 40. On Aquinas’s influence on John Paul II’s understanding of natural law, see also ibid., §§ 43–44; Wojtyła, “The Human Person and Natural Law,” in PC, 183–84.

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and preservation of life, refine and develop the riches of the material world, cultivate social life, seek truth, practise good and contemplate beauty.”143 As John Paul II notes, Jesus himself goes on to tell the rich man (who is identified as a rich young man in the Gospel of Matthew), “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” (v. 17).144 Veritatis Splendor suggests that these answers are closely related; our reason, which understands what is good and evil, is assisted by what God has revealed, namely the commandments to Moses on Mount Sinai.145 The rich man counters by asking Jesus which commandments must be kept. Jesus lists several: the proscriptions against murder, adultery, theft, and false witness; the duty to honor one’s father and mother; and the duty to love one’s neighbor as oneself. As John Paul II points out, Jesus does not list every single commandment but rather those “belonging to the so-called ‘second tablet’ of the Decalogue, the summary (cf. Rom. 13:8-10) and foundation of which is the commandment of love of neighbour: ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself ’ (Mt. 19:19; cf. Mk 12:31).”146 That being said, as the pope clarifies, Jesus certainly does not mean to neglect the love of God,147 and so the first tablet is also relevant here. Veritatis Splendor summarizes these considerations by declaring that “the good is belonging to God, obeying him, walking humbly with him in doing justice and loving kindness.”148 However, Jesus does not mean simply to reiterate the Mosaic law but to bring that law to fulfillment. In other words, without abolishing the commandments, he “interioriz[es] their demands and . . . bring[s] out their fullest meaning” by demonstrating that they “must not be understood as a minimum limit not to be gone beyond,” but as a call to love and to make a gift of one’s self. For 143

John Paul II, VS, § 51 (citing Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 94, a. 2). Ibid., § 12. Ibid., § 44. John Paul II does not clearly distinguish between the actual content of the natural law and that of revealed law, and, in fact, he often seems to refer to these two types of law interchangeably. See, for example, ibid., § 52 (speaking of the “negative precepts of the natural law” and the “negative commandments”). At one point, he does acknowledge a certain difference while at the same time calling attention to the unity of various types of law. Ibid., § 45. 146 Ibid., § 13. Veritatis Splendor states, without further comment, that the parable of the Good Samaritan (in Lk. 10:25-37) in turn brings out the full meaning of the commandment of love of neighbor. Ibid., § 14. In Salvifici Doloris, the pope provides a longer discussion of the Good Samaritan, stating that he is someone who makes a full “gift of self.” John Paul II, SD, § 28. 147 John Paul II, VS, § 14 (citing Mt. 22:40, Lk. 10:25-28). On doing good as including the love of God, see also ibid., § 10 (citing Deut. 6:4-7). 148 Ibid., § 11 (citing Mic. 6:8). 144 145

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example, the commandment not to murder “becomes a call to an attentive love which protects and promotes the life of one’s neighbor.” In addition, as per the Sermon on the Mount, a person who is “angry with his brother” or who “looks at a woman lustfully” has already in a sense violated the commandments not to kill and not to commit adultery, respectively.149 Readers of a certain age may recall here President Jimmy Carter’s famous public admission in an interview with Playboy magazine: “I’ve looked on a lot of women with lust. I’ve committed adultery in my heart many times.”150 But the rich man continues to press Jesus: “I have kept all these: what do I still lack?” (Mt. 19:20). As John Paul II explains, the rich man craves something more than a merely “legalistic interpretation of the commandments.” Jesus responds as follows: “If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow me.’ ” (v. 21). For the pope, Jesus’s reference to the poor recalls the Beatitudes, the series of blessings that he pronounces in the Sermon on the Mount, and in particular the Beatitude of the poor, “Blessed are the poor in spirit.” In other words, “the Beatitudes are also relevant to the answer given by Jesus to the young man’s question: ‘What good must I do to have eternal life?’ ” The Beatitudes, which “speak of basic attitudes and dispositions in life” rather than particular rules, are not the commandments themselves. However, the Beatitudes are related to the commandments; the latter are “orient[ed] toward the horizon of the perfection proper” to the former. The Beatitudes are also “a sort of self-portrait of Christ,” and therefore “invitations” to follow him.151 According to John Paul II, Jesus’s call to serve the poor and the promise of treasure in heaven “are meant for everyone, because they bring out the full meaning of the commandment of love for neighbor.” On the other hand, his subsequent invitation—“Come, follow me”—is “the new, specific form of the commandment of love of God.”152 Following Christ does not simply involve obeying a law, but “holding fast to the very person of Jesus,”153 as well as imitating his example: “This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved 149

Ibid., § 15 (quoting Mt. 5:21-22, 27-28). Robert Scheer, “Hullabaloo Over Lust Lasts Twenty Years,” Los Angeles Times (December 17, 1996), at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-12-17/local/me-9919_1_jimmy-carter. 151 John Paul II, VS, § 16 (citing Mt. 5:3-12). Veritatis Splendor does not define what it means to be “poor in spirit”; the Catechism understands it in terms of “detachment from riches” and “voluntary humility.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§ 2544–47, 2556. 152 John Paul II, VS, § 18. 153 Ibid., § 19. 150

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you.”154 Loving as Jesus does means that we must be willing to deny ourselves and take up our own crosses, even to the point of giving up our lives for others.155 In summary, then, one way in which John Paul II conceives of the “good” is by referring to the commandments, which are summed up in the twofold commandment to love God and one’s neighbor. While he also points to giving up one’s possessions and following Christ, he reminds us that these actions demonstrate the full meaning of that commandment. I will call this conception of the good John Paul II’s “law-based” notion of the good.156 In Chapter II of Veritatis Splendor, however, John Paul II proposes an understanding of doing “good” that is not explicitly tied to Mt. 19:16-21: “Activity is morally good when it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the person to his ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action with the human good as it is acknowledged in its truth by reason.”157 And an act can only be directed to that ultimate end (in other words, God) when the “object”

154

Ibid., § 20 (quoting Jn 15:12 and citing Jn 13:14-15). Ibid. (citing Mt. 16:24 and Jn 15:13). 156 Several commentators on Veritatis Splendor have charged John Paul II for reading the New Testament too legalistically and failing to attend sufficiently to the non-legal aspects of it and/or of moral theology in general. See Charles E. Curran, “Veritatis Splendor: A Revisionist Perspective,” in Veritatis Splendor: American Responses, ed. Michael E. Allsopp and John J. O’Keefe (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1995), 231; Karl P. Donfried, “The Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” in Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics: Protestants Engage Pope John Paul II’s Moral Encyclicals, ed. Reinhard Hütter and Theodor Dieter (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1998), 45–46, 55; Andrew J. Goddard, “Veritatis Splendor: Human Freedom and the Splendor of Truth,” in The Legacy of John Paul II: An Evangelical Assessment, ed. Tim Perry (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2007), 170–73; Gareth Moore, “Some Remarks on the Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” in The Splendor of Accuracy: An Examination of the Assertions Made by Veritatis Splendor, ed. Joseph A. Selling and Jan Jans (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos Pub. House, 1995), 82; William C. Spohn, “Morality on the Way of Discipleship: The Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” in Veritatis Splendor: American Responses, ed. Allsopp and O’Keefe, 102. Such accusations are debatable. John Paul II does see the commandments as central to Christian morality, but in doing this he is certainly consistent with the New Testament. See Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 204–05 (discussing over a dozen passages in the New Testament that focus on the Decalogue). Also, the pope highlights the preeminence of love of God and neighbor and the relevance of internal dispositions, and he maintains that the Beatitudes and the call to follow Jesus are not reducible to (even if they are related to) the commandments. On the importance of extralegal considerations such as these in the moral vision of Veritatis Splendor, see also David Albert Jones, “John Paul II and Moral Theology,” in The Legacy of John Paul II, ed. Michael A. Hayes and Gerald O’Collins, S.J. (New York: Burns & Oates, 2008), 93; William E. May and E. Christian Brugger, “John Paul II’s Moral Theology on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran,” The Thomist 69, no. 2 (2005): 293–95; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “An Encyclical for the Future: Veritatis Splendor,” trans. Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P., in Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral Theology, ed. DiNoia and Cessario, 21–30; Adrian J. Reimers, Truth About the Good: Moral Norms in the Thought of John Paul II (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2011), 235; Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 205–06; Francis Michael Walsh, “The Moral Theology of John Paul II: A Response to Charles E. Curran,” Heythrop Journal 53, no. 5 (2012): 791–92, 794–95. 157 John Paul II, VS, § 72. 155

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of that action is not evil.158 The object, in turn, is not a “merely physical” phenomenon but “the proximate end of a deliberate decision.”159 Or as William Mattison succinctly puts it, “The object of an act is what is actually done.” And so, if a young lady drops some books and a young man picks them up for her, the object of his act is easily discerned: picking up the books. (His intention, on the other hand, is open to interpretation!)160 I will refer to the considerations in Chapter II of Veritatis Splendor as John Paul II’s “object-based” understanding of good: an action is good only if its object is acceptable. Note that he would see this account as consistent with his “law-based” conception: “The doctrine of the object as a source of morality represents an authentic explicitation of the Biblical morality of the Covenant and of the commandments, of charity and of the virtues.”161 If all of this is still rather vague, consider what it means for an object to be intrinsically good or bad. In the case of the young man’s picking up books, while his intention may be good (just wanting to help) or bad (only wanting other people to praise him), there is nothing intrinsically wrong with what he is doing. What would a bad object look like? Quoting the Second Vatican Council, Veritatis Splendor offers a number of examples of acts that undermine life and human dignity and are thereby “always seriously wrong by reason of their object,” such as suicide, murder, torture, slavery, and sex trafficking.162 Here we can see at least one clear example of the overlap between John Paul II’s law-based and objectbased conceptions of the good: the Fifth Commandment prohibits murder, and murder is always wrong by reason of its object. Veritatis Splendor contains John Paul II’s most extensive discussion of what it means to do good or evil. Occasionally, his other writings attempt 158

Ibid., §§ 72, 78 (citing Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 18, a. 6), 79. Ibid., § 78. Mattison, Introducing Moral Theology, 41–42, 49–50. 161 John Paul II, VS, § 82. As the pope acknowledges, it is also important to take into account the intention and circumstances when evaluating the morality of a particular act. Ibid., § 77. The Catechism clarifies that “a morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end [intention], and of the circumstances together.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1755. 162 John Paul II, VS, § 80 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Modern World Gaudium et Spes, § 27 and citing Rom. 3:8). See also ibid., § 81 (citing 1 Cor. 6:9-10; Augustine, Contra Mendacium, VII, 18: PL 40, 528; Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, IX, q. 7, a. 2; Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§ 1753–55). For arguments that John Paul II’s reliance on Scripture and/or Gaudium et Spes in support of the existence of “intrinsically evil” acts and inviolable commandments is misplaced, see Curran, The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II, 53–54, 59–60; Donfried, “The Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” 50–55; Moore, “Some Remarks on the Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” 92–96. For a claim that the Bible and Church tradition support the view that there are intrinsically evil acts and exceptionless commandments, see Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 207–08. 159 160

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to define moral good in general. In an article entitled “ The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” for example, Wojtyła repeatedly explains that “moral good is that through which the human being as a human being becomes and is good, and moral evil that through which the human being as a human being becomes and is evil.”163 As demonstrated above, Wojtyła perceives becoming and being good in terms of the fulfillment of the person. And so, “Moral good is that through which we fulfill ourselves in action, and evil the opposite.”164 Such a notion of moral good can be termed Wojtyła’s “fulfillment-based” notion—and this is closely connected to his alignment of the good with our conscience: In fulfilling an action, I fulfill myself in it if the action is “good,” which means in accord with my conscience (assuming, of course, that this is a good conscience, a true conscience). . . . The opposite would be an action not in accord with my conscience, a morally evil action. . . . In this case, the fulfillment of the action leads not to the fulfillment but to the unfulfillment of myself.165

And conscience, in turn, is essentially our “lived experience” of what is right and wrong,166 as well as “God’s herald and messenger” that “confronts man with the law,” but not infallible.167 Finally, in Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, John Paul II associates purity with moral good. Recalling Jesus’s denunciation of evil deeds such as blasphemy, murder, adultery, theft, and false witness as “defil[ing]” (Mt. 15:18-20), which extends the notion of purity beyond sexual issues, he contends that “every moral good is a manifestation of purity and every moral evil a manifestation of impurity.” Later, in the midst of a discussion of Galatians 5, the pope affirms that the Apostle Paul also suggests that “everything that is morally good is ‘pure,’ while everything that is morally bad is ‘impure.’ ”168

163

Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” in PC, 154, 159. For extremely similar wording, see ibid., 143–44, 146, 149. Ibid., 149. 165 Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC, 235. See also Wojtyła, AP, 160. 166 Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” in PC, 138. 167 John Paul II, VS, §§ 57–58 (citing Rom. 2:14-15 and quoting Bonaventure, II Librum Sentent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3, conclusion: Ed. Ad Claras Aquas, II 907b), 62–64. 168 John Paul II, TB, §§ 50:4, 53:4 (general audiences of December 10, 1980 and January 14, 1981). 164

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Given that the pope also identifies purity as a virtue in these passages and others,169 the question arises as to whether he can be understood as a virtue ethicist. The case here may be a little stronger than that for Heschel, for John Paul II does speak at length of the virtues of love and chastity in Love and Responsibility170 and solidarity in the encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis.171 In addition, Veritatis Splendor briefly nods to the cardinal virtues of temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence, as well as the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity,172 and also spends some time on the Beatitudes, which certainly resemble virtues. Moreover, as Edward Barrett points out, the pope’s view that “we are not only [the] cause of acting, but also its effect . . . is a core insight of virtue ethics.”173 On the other hand, a number of commentators have argued that virtue is not a primary ethical category for John Paul II,174 and I myself am wary about overstating the pope’s focus on it. Certainly, he does not structure his entire ethical theory around virtue,175 as do Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Aquinas’s Summa Theologica. At any rate, we can conclude that John Paul II characterizes moral good in at least five different (but not unrelated) ways in his works. These approaches can be categorized as law-based, object-based, fulfillment-based, conscience-based, and purity-based. Taking into account the aforementioned considerations of the rabbi and the pope, for the purposes of this work I will define good action in two ways: (1) doing that which surpasses our experience of needs, and (2) acting in accord with religious law, understood here as referring to God-given natural and revealed law, which can be summed up in the twofold commandment to love God and one’s neighbor. In contrast, evil deeds will be understood as those that involve acting in disregard of the needs of others or in opposition to the said religious law. Notice the substantial overlap of my definitions with the thought of our primary authors. In particular, these definitions reflect Heschel’s “needs-based” and “law-based” 169

See, generally, ibid., §§ 50–59 (general audiences of December 10, 1980; December 17, 1980; January 7, 1981; January 14, 1981; January 28, 1981; February 4, 1981; February 11, 1981; March 18, 1981; April 1, 1981; April 8, 1981). 170 Wojtyła, LR, 52, 58, 101–03, 106, 150–57. 171 John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1987), §§ 38–40. 172 John Paul II, VS, §§ 64, 93, 100. 173 Edward Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy: The Ethical and Political Thought of Karol Wojtyla/ Pope John Paul II (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 25. 174 Jones, “John Paul II and Moral Theology,” 105; Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 105; Spohn, “Morality on the Way of Discipleship,” 100. 175 For instance, Veritatis Splendor uses the word “virtue” (or variants of it) a dozen times, but “commandment” 126 times.

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perceptions of good, as well as John Paul II’s own “law-based” understanding. And while for Heschel, “needs” is a more central category than “love,”176 he does recognize that “above all, the Torah asks for love: thou shalt love thy God; thou shalt love thy neighbor. . . . To forget that love is the purpose of all mitsvot is to vitiate their meaning.”177 Furthermore, John Paul II speaks occasionally of “needs” in the context of the importance of transcending personal ones, and at one point explains how doing good and loving relates to fulfilling the needs of others: “Even an enemy ceases to be an enemy for the person who is obliged to love him (cf. Mt. 5:38-48; Lk. 6:27-35), to ‘do good’ to him (cf. Lk. 6:27, 33, 35) and to respond to his immediate needs promptly and with no expectation of repayment (cf. Lk. 6:34-35).”178 In addition, the inclusion of religious law should resonate more generally with Jews and Catholics who traditionally hold it in high esteem, and the references to overcoming selfishness and loving others should agree with the understanding of doing good generally possessed by people of good will, religious or not. Notice also what I have left out. I have not explicitly included Heschel’s “unity-based” understanding of the good, since he focuses comparatively rarely on ethical categories such as “convergence,” “togetherness,” and “union.” And at any rate, Heschel’s “unity-based” conception of the good overlaps with his “needs-based” conception, if one understands that true unity with others is achieved only through transcending one’s own needs. Note also that I have not relied upon John Paul II’s “object-based,” “fulfillment-based,” “consciencebased,” or “purity-based” perceptions of the good. Why? For one thing, outside of a relatively short section of Veritatis Splendor, he rarely focuses on the category of the “object” of an act.179 Similarly, he only addresses the virtue of purity in depth in a segment of A Theology of the Body. In comparison, he returns to the theme of the divine commandments (in particular the commandment to love) in several major works, including The Acting Person, Evangelium Vitae, Love and Responsibility, Person and Community, and Veritatis Splendor. As for 176

See, for example, Heschel, MNA, 179–296 (which contains thirteen chapter headings and subheadings including the word “need” or “needs,” but none including the word “love,” or “virtue” for that matter). 177 Heschel, GSM, 307. For other passages suggesting that when we follow God’s laws we manifest love, see ibid., 290, 300, 323; Heschel, TP, 265. 178 John Paul II, EV, § 41. On the importance of transcending selfish needs and meeting the needs of others, see also ibid., § 90; John Paul II, CA, §§ 41, 43. 179 John Paul II, VS, §§ 72–82. For an exception, see Wojtyła, “Human Nature as the Basis of Ethical Formation,” in PC, 98.

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Wojtyła’s “fulfillment-based” and “conscience-based” perceptions of the good, they are quite vague. Neither the view that the morally good is that through which a person becomes and is good, nor the view that the morally good is that which is in accord with a true conscience, tells us much at all about what the morally good actually is. Furthermore, adopting a definition of moral good in terms of “that through which we fulfill ourselves” would seem to render the question posed by this study to be tautologous. And where John Paul II does explain what a good conscience prescribes and proscribes, he tends to point to natural or revealed law,180 which is already included in my understanding of moral good. Lastly, in keeping with the reticence of my authors, my definition of good does not explicitly utilize the word “virtue,” although it does overlap with that notion in at least a couple of ways. For instance, my definition refers to ways of acting, and by repeatedly engaging in good deeds, we develop virtues, as Aristotle says. More specifically, as we’ve just seen, love can be characterized as a virtue, and as I’ll show in Chapter 3, that virtue in turn is related to those of solidarity and chastity. Finally, as I’ll demonstrate in Chapter 2, Heschel suggests that doing that which surpasses our experience of needs is a characteristic of piety, which at least one prominent commentator (Britton) argues is best understood as a virtue.181 Now that I have arrived at a working definition of “good” and “evil,” let us take a closer look at what exactly it means to “do” those things.

Doing According to Heschel, “doing” can refer either to an internal act, or an external act, or the conjunction of the two. For instance, he speaks of “acts that occur within the inner life of man”182 and “act[s] of the soul,” and notes that they may or may not be accompanied by “external performance.”183 For our purposes, however, it is important to know what Heschel means by “doing good” and 180

See, for example, John Paul II, EV, §§ 40, 70, 77; John Paul II, VS, §§ 57, 59, 60, 110. For a more explicit exploration of the connection between virtue and personal fulfillment, see my “No Woe to You Lawyers.” 182 Heschel, “Children and Youth,” in IF, 50. 183 Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in IF, 231–32; Heschel, GSM, 307–08. 181

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“doing evil,” in particular. Heschel does occasionally speak of evil internal acts; he mentions “sin in our hearts” and the “sinfulness of thoughts of suspicion and hatred.”184 At another point, God in Search of Man affirms that external acts can be good even when the corresponding intention is lacking.185 Here he gives two examples: (1) feeding a widow or orphan as a result of forgetting to remove a sheaf from one’s field and (2) accidentally dropping a coin that a poor man later finds.186 However, Heschel generally resists speaking of good (or evil) acts that are purely internal or external. “Thoughts, feelings ensconced in the inwardness of man, deeds performed in the absence of the soul, are incomplete. . . . A good deed consists not only in what but in how we do it.”187 External acts “verify” one’s inner stance toward God, and the appropriate inner disposition can come about as a result of good deeds.188 Therefore, the rabbi continues, Kant and his disciples are wrong to say that the value of an act is established entirely on the basis of the intention of the person performing it. In fact, a Kantian focus on intention and “the sense of duty” alone can actually undermine itself, in that an inordinate “concern with one’s own salvation and righteousness”—for example, to the point of refusing to break a promise even to save the world—is not a praiseworthy intention.189 In the end, “the basic problem is neither what is the right action nor what is the right intention. The basic problem is: what is right living? And life is indivisible. . . . Deed and thought are bound into one.”190 For Wojtyła, an “action” denotes a voluntary and conscious act, as distinguishable from what merely “happens” in us.191 In his pre-papal works, he sometimes distinguishes between external and internal actions. For 184

Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 298; Heschel, GSM, 364. I am not aware of any passages where he refers directly to good acts that are purely internal. Heschel, GSM, 295. 186 Ibid., 304, n. 4 (citing Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Sifra to 5:17, ed. Weiss, p. 27a). Here Heschel is citing a halachic midrash, which is a commentary on the legal part of the Hebrew Bible. Halacha will be discussed further in Chapter 2. 187 Ibid., 307–08. See also Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in IF, 231–32. 188 Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in IF, 232–33; Heschel, GSM, 296–97, 345. 189 Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 139–40; Heschel, GSM, 294–95. For another (implied) critique of this Kantian position, see Heschel, TP, 329. 190 Heschel, GSM, 296. To be sure, sometimes Heschel does emphasize the internal aspect in particular; see, for example, ibid., 309, 314–16; Heschel, “Teaching Religion to American Jews,” in MGSA, 149– 50; Heschel, “Israel and Diaspora,” in IF, 216. At other times, he specifically highlights the external aspect; see, for example, Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 140; Heschel, MNA, 175–76. 191 Wojtyła, AP, 25–27, 66–67. 185

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example, Love and Responsibility explains that the former can be detected by others, whereas the latter are “known only to the person performing them.”192 But “external acts” for Wojtyła presumably refer to deeds that are carried out with deliberate consent (unlike mistakenly dropping a coin, for example), since human acts are by definition voluntary. Indeed, a little further on, he distinguishes between acts that are “exterior or only interior.”193 To avoid semantic confusion, then, I should clarify that what Wojtyła generally means by an “external act” is the same as what I mean by “the conjunction of an internal and an external act”: namely, an act that is voluntary and involves physical movement. In any case, in the present work we want to focus on what he means by “doing” in the context of “doing good” and “doing evil.” Speaking of internal deeds in particular, Love and Responsibility states that they “possess a moral value, they are good or evil; and if they are evil, we call them sins.”194 In particular, external and internal acts may be “incompatible with the objective essence of love.”195 Wojtyła explains that the Sixth Commandment (which prohibits adultery) pertains to the former kind of deed, and the Ninth Commandment (which proscribes coveting the wife of one’s neighbor) relates to the latter.196 Ultimately, whereas Heschel expresses reservations about assigning a moral value to either purely internal deeds or purely external actions, it seems that Wojtyła only has qualms about calling the latter good (or evil) in themselves. Indeed, he would not even call them human “acts” in the first place. After reflecting on the foregoing, in this work I will take “doing” and “acting” to refer to the conjunction of an internal and an external act. This largely aligns with the tacks of Heschel and Wojtyła, since while they both recognize the possibility of purely internal acts (and while the former author also acknowledges deeds that are essentially external), in most cases when discussing human action, they rarely say they are referring to an internal or an external act alone.197 And so I will presume that just as our own speech about 192

Wojtyła, LR, 129. Ibid., 133. Wojtyła also blurs the line between internal and external acts in The Acting Person, stating that the former are still “an external manifestation of the person,” whereas the latter “remain[] to a certain degree immanent to the subject who performs it.” Wojtyła, AP, 114–15. 194 Wojtyła, LR, 145. See also ibid., 144. 195 Ibid., 136. See also ibid., 179. 196 Ibid., 130. On lustful internal acts, see also ibid., 173 (citing Mt. 5:28), 205. 197 Certainly this is the case when each author is speaking of “doing” in the context of personal fulfillment. In only a few places does Heschel suggest any relationship between personal fulfillment 193

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human action (“I went to the store today”) generally indicates the combination of an internal and external act (I mentally intended to go to the store and then actually carried that intention out), so too does that of our primary authors. For our purposes, then, “doing good” will refer to transcending our needs and observing religious law—both in our outward actions and in our hearts. Having thoroughly specified the question at hand, in Chapters 2 and 3 I will analyze how it has been answered by Heschel and John Paul II, respectively. I begin with the former author, if only because his life and religion somewhat predate that of the latter.198

and either internal or external acts alone. In God in Search of Man, he comments that feeding a helpless child is “meaningful” whether or not there is a good intention behind the action. Heschel, GSM, 296–97. Later, in a passage I have already referred to in the main text, he quotes a rabbi who says that if a person inadvertently drops a coin that a poor man picks up, God blesses the person who dropped the coin. Ibid., 304, n. 4. And as we shall see in the following chapter, in discussing piety Heschel observes that with “every deed, every incident of mind,” a person can “either build[] up or tear[] down his life, his home, his hope of God.” Heschel, MNA, 289. Ultimately, however, Heschel explicitly emphasizes that it is the conjunction of internal and external acts that leads us to personal fulfillment. On the one hand, “A deed without devotion . . . will leave the life of the doer unaffected. . . . A hero is he who is greater than his feats.” Heschel, GSM, 310. On the other hand, “How else can one learn the joy of loving-kindness, if not by enacting it? . . . ‘Man is affected by all his actions; his heart and all his thoughts follow the deeds which he does, whether good or bad.’” Ibid., 345 (quoting Rabbi Aaron Halevi of Barcelona, Sefer Hachinuch, mitsvah 20). (John Grabowski has pointed out to me that Heschel does seem sympathetic to the idea of virtue here.) A person’s “goal is to live that both ‘his heart and his flesh should sing to the living God,’” and he pays a high price if he does not: “The body without the spirit is a corpse; the spirit without the body is a ghost.” Heschel, GSM, 297, 341. As for John Paul II, he does not appear to delve into the relationship between personal fulfillment and either internal or external acts alone, although Veritatis Splendor does remark that “a good act which is not recognized as such does not contribute to the moral growth of the person who performs it; it does not perfect him, and it does not help to dispose him for the supreme good.” John Paul II, VS, § 63. This encyclical also briefly speaks to a related interesting question: the connection between fulfillment and evil external actions that are accompanied by a good intention. Here John Paul II is clear that these do not lead to perfection or “spiritual gain.” Ibid., § 78 (quoting Thomas Aquinas, In Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decem Legis Pracepta. De Dilectione Dei: Opuscula Theologica, II, No. 1168, Ed. Taurinen. [1954], 250). He adds that the failure to follow God’s law, even when done unwittingly, “damage[s] the communion of persons, to the detriment of each.” Ibid., § 51. 198 One somewhat confounding variable moving forward is that when our primary authors speak of an action leading toward or away from “happiness,” “meaning,” “freedom,” and/or “fulfillment,” what they each have in mind by these terms is presumably not identical to my own definitions. And so, my subsequent claims that Author X thinks that Action Y helps us achieve (or distances us from) these things (as I have defined them) will not be entirely exact. Still, I prefer to adhere to the definitions I have articulated, both because they are more precise on the whole than the understandings of our authors, and because in any case there is a good deal of overlap. In the end, I suppose I have faith that when they—and we—talk about happiness, meaning, freedom, fulfillment, and seemingly related terms, we are generally talking about the same things.

2

Heschel and the “Joys of the Mitsvah”

The particular question posed by this chapter is as follows: Does Abraham Joshua Heschel think that doing good (or evil) leads to growth or diminution in personal fulfillment? The first task of this chapter will be to underline the seeming importance of this question. Specifically, I will outline Heschel’s view that every human being searches for meaning in life, and that this search is, in fact, a worthwhile one. Next, I will proceed to analyze the various considerations raised by the rabbi (and rooted in both faith and reason) that are relevant to the question I have posed. As I will show, many of his reflections indicate that doing good helps one achieve increases in fulfillment (namely, in happiness, meaning, freedom, and the development of one’s full potential in general), and that doing evil distances one from such realities. But I will also acknowledge the existence of certain passages that seem to question the connection between morality and personal fulfillment, and offer some thoughts on how they might be reconciled (although perhaps not conclusively) with those that affirm this relationship.

The search for meaning as universal and worthwhile A fundamental aspect of human existence, according to Heschel, is preoccupation with the question of the meaning of life. At the outset of Who Is Man? he asserts that “man is a problem intrinsically and under all circumstances.  . . . [T]he problem expresses itself in anguish, in the mental suffering of man.”1 Even if on the outside, human beings might appear confident and untroubled, they are “essentially afflicted with a sense of 1

Heschel, WM, 3.

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helplessness, discontent, inferiority, fear.”2 Implicitly referring to Henry David Thoreau’s famous epigram, Heschel affirms that “it is, indeed, often ‘a life of quiet desperation.’”3 What causes this anguish, this suffering? It is the fear that life has no meaning.4 For Heschel, “the will to meaning . . . [is] as intrinsically human as the will to live and the certainty of being alive.”5 A human being cannot be entirely reduced to definitions that abstract from the “thirst for meaning”; an understanding that focuses solely on facts about him and his animal-like disposition is clearly inadequate.6 The meaning that we all long for is not just the meaning of individual actions, but that of the whole of life.7 “All men” express their will to meaning in ultimate questions such as: “What am I here for? What is at stake in my existence?”8 Such questions may be disregarded for a time, but we are all confronted by them eventually.9 We seek not only to justify our own existence but also to validate our contribution to the continuation of human life; why have children if our lives are ultimately meaningless?10 Writing in the 1960s, Heschel says that in light of the world’s current grim situation, brought on by events such as Auschwitz and Hiroshima, we are especially spurred on to ask questions about the meaning of life and the value of continuing it.11 Each person realizes how weighty such questions are; life is “dismal” and, indeed, a “nightmare” if she does not discover an adequate response.12 What about those who contend that the universal quest for meaning is absurd? On several occasions, Heschel firmly rebuffs such an allegation. For example, he claims that it is self-contradictory; positing that the quest for meaning is fruitless, as many today are wont to do, is itself an assertion of

2 3

4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Ibid., 15. Ibid. On the “loneliness” and “insecurity” that we all share, see also Heschel, “A Preface to an Understanding of Revelation,” in MGSA, 188; Heschel, “The Ecumenical Movement,” in IF, 180; Heschel, GSM, 101. Heschel, WM, 52–53. Ibid., 54; Heschel, MNA, 193 (same quotation). See also Heschel, “Symbolism and Jewish Faith,” in MGSA, 99; Heschel, “Sacred Image of Man,” in IF, 163. Heschel, WM, 20–25. Ibid., 54. Ibid., 13. See also Heschel, MNA, 44. Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 59; Heschel, GSM, 130. Heschel, WM, 53. Ibid., 13–14, 53–54; Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 292. Heschel, WM, 62, 66; Heschel, MNA, 198.

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meaning and a preoccupation with the pursuit of it.13 It is the rejection of the search for meaning that is truly mad; not only would it not heal us, but it would also cause us to “cease to be human; logical positivism’s gain would be humanity’s loss.”14 In the end, the “claim to the possibility of significant being” is rooted in all of us and transcends reason, and therefore that claim cannot be defeated by reason.15 No argument will ever dissuade us from our “irrepressible” search for meaning.16 Assuming that meaning is a good thing to strive for, does doing good or evil help us achieve it, along with other aspects of personal fulfillment? As noted in the previous chapter, this study will understand doing good and evil particularly in reference to surpassing our needs and following religious law. Therefore, what follows will focus on each of these two aspects in turn. At the same time, the organization of the material below reflects certain pertinent themes that are unique to Heschel.

“The problem of needs” The lure of selfish needs “The Problem of Needs” is the title of the eighteenth chapter of Man Is Not Alone, and it points to the fact that for Heschel, the “primary task” of living is “how to deal with needs.”17 According to the rabbi, a “need” is “an unsatisfied capacity corresponding to an unrealized condition,”18 and human beings today expend great energy to satisfy a “whole pantheon of needs.”19 Many of the needs we seek to gratify are implanted in us by advertisements, fashion, and jealousy.20 (Heschel first said this in the early 1950s, even before the American advertising boom chronicled in the Emmy-award-winning television show Mad Men; how much more vigorously would he have pressed this point in an 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20

Heschel, WM, 64; Heschel, MNA, 44–45. Heschel, WM, 65, 72. See also ibid., 98. Ibid., 64. Ibid., 55. See also ibid., 72; Heschel, MNA, 204. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 12; Heschel, GSM, 383 (same quotation); Heschel, MNA, 179–81 (same quotation). Heschel, MNA, 181. Ibid., 186; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 5 (same quotation). Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 409; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 6; Heschel, MNA, 182.

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age of unlimited cable channels and the Internet!) The pull of selfish needs is stronger than that of virtue; suffering appears to be associated with virtue, but pleasure and reward with vice. Therefore, we often tend toward selfish needs in our actions.21 However, Heschel reasons that living primarily in accord with selfish interests does not actually lead to personal fulfillment. For example, he claims that when people spend their lives in “frantic search of immediate comfort, instant pleasure, instant satisfaction, [and] quick achievement,” they “cease[] to be human.”22 “Even the divine image can become converted into a satanic image” in those who are insensitive to others.23 Heschel also makes a number of comments on the relationship between selfishness and both objective and subjective happiness. In general, experience teaches us that “absolute expediency” is a “fallacy,” since it leads only to “drastic failures” and to “disaster.”24 He observes that the clash of selfish needs often leads to a good deal of hostility between people, and even to war and “mutual extermination.”25 Given Heschel’s European background and the fact that he lived through both World Wars, we can surmise that he may well have them at the forefront of his mind here, although he does not name names. At any rate, he addresses the psychological consequences of selfishness as well; our “egocentric” needs can never be fully satisfied, as they always outpace our efforts to fulfill them.26 Focusing primarily on our own needs ultimately leads to “no happiness,” “futility,” “despair,” “misery,” “suffer[ing],” and “shame.”27 In fact, he claims, the perception that one is of no help to others “is the most common cause of psychoneurosis.”28 On the question of meaning, Heschel indicates that we will never discover the objective significance that we crave by abiding by the maxim, “Eat, drink,  and be merry!” because “ultimate relevance” is something that “the self . . . cannot furnish itself.”29 Moreover, he suggests that those who live a 21 22 23 24

25 26 27

28 29

Heschel, MNA, 184, 188, 221, 261. Heschel, “In Search of Exaltation,” in MGSA, 229. Heschel, WM, 101. See also Heschel, GSM, 283. Heschel, WM, 86, 99–100; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 22; Heschel, “Children and Youth,” in IF, 49. Heschel, WM, 85; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 5–6; Heschel, MNA, 182–83, 187–88. Heschel, MNA, 186. Ibid., 194, 212–13, 224, 257; Heschel, GSM, 402. See also Heschel, “To Grow in Wisdom,” in IF, 80–81. Heschel, WM, 58; Heschel, MNA, 194 (same quotation). Heschel, WM, 55–56.

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self-centered existence miss out on a “sense of significance.”30 Finally, with regard to freedom, Heschel refers a couple of different times in one paper to the “tyranny” of needs, and adds (using a phrase from which a book-length collection of his essays derives its name): “ The insecurity of freedom is a bitter fact of historical experience.”31 He elaborates as follows: “He who sets out to employ the realities of life as means for satisfying his own desires will soon forfeit his freedom and be degraded to a mere tool. Acquiring things, he  becomes enslaved to them. . . . We feel jailed in the confinement of personal needs.”32

Transcending our selfish needs Heschel’s answer to “the problem of needs” begins by taking seriously our intrinsic bonds with others. Living necessarily involves relations with others; even one who lives by herself is never truly solitary but “live[s], suffer[s], and rejoice[s]” with her contemporaries.33 While we are pulled toward selfish needs, we also constantly feel ourselves drawn (Heschel even says “coerc[ed]”) to satisfy needs other than our own.34 Indeed, we have a “need of being needed,” which is a desire to serve others more than ourselves.35 Perhaps the rabbi has this “need of being needed” in mind when he speaks of “authentic” needs and of the importance of distinguishing them from selfish, “artificial” ones.36 For Heschel, we can achieve gains in fulfillment through transcending our own needs. For example, he reflects on the fact that our progress from childhood to adulthood ought to be marked by a transition from acquisitiveness to serving others, and concludes that “man achieves fullness of being in fellowship, in care for others. . . . [A]nimals are concerned for their own needs; the degree of our being human stands in direct proportion to the degree in which we care for

30 31 32

33

34 35 36

Heschel, “Children and Youth,” in IF, 42. See also Heschel, WM, 79. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 7, 15, 18. Ibid., 7; Heschel, MNA, 189 (same quotation). For other places where Heschel claims that we can become “instrument[alized],” “dominated,” or “comp[elled]” by self-centeredness, see Heschel, WM, 61; Heschel, TP, 243 (citing Maimonides, Eight Chapters, ch. 8); Heschel, MNA, 214, 285. Heschel, WM, 44–45. See also ibid., 81–82; Heschel, “The Moment at Sinai,” in MGSA, 16; Heschel, GSM, 213–14, 216. Heschel, MNA, 140–41. See also ibid., 224, 293. Ibid., 214; Heschel, WM, 60 (same quotation). Heschel, MNA, 181–83, 186–89, 217, 220, 242, 262, 269. For Heschel, the term “needs” itself is “neutral.” Ibid., 181; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 12.

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others.”37 Furthermore, only through being attentive to needs other than our own can we find happiness in a subjective sense, more specifically “joy” and a corresponding lack of “disgust,” “despair,” and “loneliness.”38 Briefly alluding to the example of the nineteenth-century French novelist and playwright Honoré de Balzac, he suggests that we gain objective “significance” only when we overcome our “own private needs,” such as fame and wealth, and thereby become relevant to others.39 In addition, he claims that “the true meaning of existence is experienced” when we satisfy the authentic needs of others.40 As for the freedom to choose, one of Heschel’s essays affirms that “liberation from the tyranny of the self-centered ego” comes about only when we “sacrifice,” when we “step[] outside of the confining framework of routine reflexive concern.” Shortly thereafter, he contrasts those who do evil and are controlled by “forces which are extraneous to the spirit” (as mentioned in the previous chapter) with those who “go[] beyond all necessities” and are truly free.41 However, Heschel vigorously and repeatedly rejects the notion that our ultimate “purpose is to serve society or mankind” and that we are valuable only to the extent that we successfully do so. Here it is helpful to recall his understandings of universal value and conditional significance, which were discussed in Chapter 1. In response to the above notion, the rabbi first affirms that it is in tension with our inherent repulsion at being used solely “as a means to an end,” our belief that each person is “valuable in himself.” For example, “the old and sick [do not] expect help because of what they may give us in return.” In fact, the above notion would render even the lives of healthy individuals valueless, since our attempts to better humankind often 37

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40 41

Heschel, WM, 46–47. See also Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 26, 32; Heschel, GSM, 399; Heschel, MNA, 137–38, 219. Heschel, WM, 58; Heschel, “To Grow in Wisdom,” in IF, 83; Heschel, GSM, 399; Heschel, MNA, 194, 212. Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in IF, 229; Heschel, MNA, 218 (same quotation). See also Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 26; Heschel, MNA, 248. Heschel, WM, 61. See also ibid., 57, 118; Heschel, MNA, 214. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 15. See also Heschel, WM, 61; Heschel, MNA, 214. To take some more concrete examples, healing patients and fighting racism both lead to fulfillment, according to Heschel. Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 33–34 (affirming that “there is . . . no greater pleasure than to restore health,” stating that “the act of healing is the highest form of imitatio Dei,” referring to “the supreme nobility of [the doctor’s] vocation,” and stating that an improper focus on earning a high income can “poison[]” that vocation); Heschel, “Religion and Race,” IF, 87–88 (suggesting that experience shows that racial discrimination “hurt[s]” the person who engages in it, and enslaves him to hatred), 99 (pointing to the “great spiritual resources” of black people that have the potential to enrich everyone); Heschel, “The White Man on Trial,” in IF, 109 (stating that “the exodus from segregation” will result in “benefits and blessings” for all).

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fail. But Heschel also hints here that there is a sort of conditional meaning we are capable of attaining through our actions, a meaning that we achieve not simply through service to society: “Man has more to give than what other men are able or willing to accept. . . . Life comprises . . . mountains of dreams . . . towers of yearning, which can hardly be utilized to the last for the good of society. . . . Human existence cannot derive its ultimate meaning from society, because society itself is in need of meaning.”42 In the end, for Heschel, our “need of being needed” is not entirely met by society.

God and the solution to the problem of needs A complete answer to the “problem of needs,” then, must take into account more than society and other human beings. For Heschel, nature certainly does not meet our “need of being needed” since nature has no need of us in the first place.43 In fact, we cannot look anywhere other than God for the fulfillment that we seek. Heschel says that “the ideal of the fullest possible development of the individual must be placed within the context of religious values,”44 and an oft-repeated phrase of his is that “man without God is a torso.”45 According to Heschel, we can see this in the medical context; if a patient does not appreciate life’s sacredness, the doctor may not be able to help her.46 The rabbi points to the drug addict in particular as evidence that “man without God eventually becomes insane.”47 While these statements suggest that a person without God jeopardizes her objective happiness (namely, physical and emotional health), Heschel also speaks of an impact on subjective happiness; it is “the taste of utter loneliness” without God that causes us to desire to find him.48 42

43 44 45

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Heschel, WM, 58–59; Heschel, “To Grow in Wisdom,” in IF, 75–76; Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in IF, 224–25; Heschel, MNA, 195–96. See also Heschel, WM, 112–13; Heschel, MNA, 138, 214, 250, 285 (on the importance of treating other people as ends rather than means, and how not doing so leads to a loss of freedom, whereas doing so results in “the shift from the animal to the human dimension”). Heschel, WM, 60. See also Heschel, MNA, 213–14. Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 64. Heschel, “Existence and Celebration,” in MGSA, 32; Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 293 (same quotation). See also Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 26 (which contains a very similar quotation); Heschel, “The Meaning of This War (World War II),” in MGSA, 211 (where he suggests that living without God can lead to a failure to manifest the image of God). Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 26. On a sense of sanctity’s being “vital” to us, see also Heschel, “To Be a Jew: What Is It?,” in MGSA, 8; Heschel, “The Meaning of This War (World War II),” in MGSA, 211. Heschel, “In Search of Exaltation,” in MGSA, 229. See also Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 412. Heschel, “A Preface to an Understanding of Revelation,” in MGSA, 188.

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God in Search of Man adds that we cannot achieve meaning in our actions apart from God. Contrary to utopian hopes founded upon new technologies and social programs, the timeless wisdom of “prophets and saints” confirms that “there is a passion and drive for cruel deeds which only the awe and fear of God can soothe; there is a suffocating selfishness in man which only holiness can ventilate. Man is meaningless without God, and any attempt to establish a system of values on the basis of the dogma of man’s self-sufficiency is doomed to failure.”49 In an interview he gave just a couple of weeks before his death, Heschel suggests that an objective lack of meaning resulting from unbelief may well go hand in hand with a subjective appreciation of that loss: “My life would be poor [without faith in God]. . . . What kind of meaning of existence can I find in the fact that I can make a few dollars? . . . Here I am and tomorrow I’m gone.” And part of his response also touches on the issue of freedom of choice; without a humble awareness of God’s presence, Heschel suspects that he would often be unable to resist his “mean leanings” and unprepared to selflessly serve others.50 It follows that there is no solution to “the problem of needs” apart from God. We have a specifically “religious need” that is a “need to be needed” not only by others but also by God.51 For Heschel, the “central problem” of existence can be formulated: “What is required of me?” or more specifically, “What does God require of me?”52 To answer this question, one must first 49

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Heschel, GSM, 169; see also Heschel, “A Preface to an Understanding of Revelation,” in MGSA, 188 (containing a very similar quotation). Regarding this quotation, Held remarks, “In my view, Heschel never fully confronts the reality that the awe and fear of God can stir the human passion and drive for cruel deeds as much as it soothes them.” Held then quotes Shaul Magid’s article on reading Heschel in the light of the September 11 attacks: “The problem with our world may arguably be not the lack of God but too much God.” However, Held goes on to temper these remarks by noting, in agreement with Robert Erlewine, that “Heschel’s theocentrism hardly promotes a theocracy or religious violence. All theocentrisms are not the same and should not be treated as such.” Finally, Held argues that “Heschel’s political thinking changed over time to make more space for the secular . . . an important exception to the remarkable consistency Heschel’s writing tends to show over time.” Held, The Call of Transcendence, 238–39, n. 84 (quoting Shaul Magid, “The Role of the Secular in Abraham Joshua Heschel’s Theology: (Re)Reading Heschel after 9/11,” Modern Judaism 29, no. 1 [2009]: 144 and Robert Erlewine, “Rediscovering Heschel: Theocentrism, Secularism, and Porous Thinking,” Modern Judaism 32, no. 2 [2012]: 188). Turning directly to Magid, we see that in Who is Man?, published seven years before Heschel’s death, Heschel’s specifically God-centered and Jewish worldview is muted in favor of more ambiguous references to “being commanded.” Magid, “The Role of the Secular,” 150–54. As we will see, Heschel’s more direct focus on God and Judaism returned later on, notably in A Passion for Truth and in an interview he gave with Carl Stern shortly before his death. Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 411. Heschel, MNA, 247–48. See also Heschel, GSM, 291. Heschel, WM, 107.

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consider that, according to Heschel, God created each of us to be his “partner” on earth.53 Having done so, “God is now in need of man”; he has a need for righteousness on our part, and it is because of this that he made a permanent covenant with humankind.54 Accordingly, we are asked to have regard for other people’s lives, to put aside our own petty concerns, promote justice, and alleviate others’ distress.55 What God desires of us is encapsulated in the teaching of the Bible,56 and more specifically Deut. 10:12: “What does the Lord your God require of you but to stand in awe of the Lord your God, walk in His ways, love Him, serve the Lord your God with all your mind and heart, and keep the commands of the Lord and His statutes . . . for your good?”57 Heschel repeatedly maintains that this love of, and service to, God that is required of us is absolutely inseparable from the love of, and service to, our neighbor; the person who persecutes the poor is even guilty of blasphemy.58 In the end, answering God’s request, making his ends our own human needs, is the very essence of religion.59 But what should our internal disposition be as we serve God and others? To begin with, we can strive as best we can to avoid impure desires such as “envy,” “pride,” and “vanity.”60 In addition, our motive must not be to

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Heschel, MNA, 242. See also Heschel, “Faith,” in MGSA, 337; Heschel, WM, 75; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 16; Heschel, GSM, 238, 349. Donald Moore comments that “perhaps the richest and most comprehensive theme used to describe the relationship between the divine and the human in Heschel’s writings is that of partnership.” Donald J. Moore, S.J., The Human and the Holy: The Spirituality of Abraham Joshua Heschel (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989), 89. Heschel, MNA, 242–45. See also ibid., 215; Heschel, “Jewish Theology,” in MGSA, 159; Heschel, “The Mystical Element in Judaism,” in MGSA, 166–67; Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 397; Heschel, WM, 75, 110; Heschel, “Sacred Image of Man,” in IF, 160; Heschel, GSM, 292, 413. Held remarks that “God is in need of man” is “the sentence that appears in Heschel’s writings more than any other.” Held, The Call of Transcendence, 8. But as Harold Kasimow notes, Heschel’s assertion has been hotly debated among Jewish thinkers. Harold Kasimow, Divine-Human Encounter: A Study of Abraham Joshua Heschel (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979), 47. Abraham Joshua Heschel, A Passion for Truth (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973), 259; Heschel, WM, 107; Heschel, MNA, 248–49. Heschel, “A Preface to an Understanding of Revelation,” in MGSA, 186. Heschel, MNA, 246–47. Heschel, GSM, 375 (citing Prov. 14:31). See also Heschel, “Symbolism and Jewish Faith,” in MGSA, 85; Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 66; Heschel, “To Grow in Wisdom,” in IF, 70; Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 86, 99. Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 139; Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 409; Heschel, WM, 75, 110; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 8; Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 63; Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 198–99; Heschel, MNA, 175, 215, 241, 250. Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 140–41; Heschel, GSM, 402, 405.

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achieve “perfection,”61 to fearfully avoid divine punishment,62 or to attain salvation in the next life. With regard to that last point, relying on various biblical passages, Heschel does affirm belief in an afterlife, although he also says that the nature of it is largely inscrutable.63 That said, at a number of points he upbraids those who concern themselves with reaching it.64 Rather, according to Heschel, we should focus on “liv[ing] a good life,” and more specifically on serving God here and now.65 To illustrate his point, he tells the story of one rabbi who rejoiced upon being told he would not go to heaven, because he knew that then he could truly serve God completely out of love.66 All of that said, we do not have to be—indeed, we ought not to be— entirely self-effacing in serving the needs of God and of others. The purpose of religion, and of Jewish religious education in particular, Heschel says, is to help us “convert[]” and “assimilate[]” these needs into our own.67 In other words, we should not regard the needs of God and of others as “mere duties,” but ought to “feel” and even passionately “desire” these needs as our own.68 With regard to the issue of fulfillment, Heschel repeatedly states that authentically human living—as distinct from that of animals—requires an understanding of and a response to the divine “challenge” with which we are faced.69 In serving God’s ends for the right reasons, we will experience happiness understood as “joy,” “pleasure,” and “satisfaction” in this world:

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Heschel, “The Mystical Element in Judaism,” in MGSA, 179; Heschel, MNA, 268. Heschel, GSM, 76–77 (on the two meanings of yirah in the Bible—fear and awe—and on the second’s being more noble and manifested in the piety of Job). But cf. ibid., 78, n. 6 (noting that the former meaning occasionally surfaces). Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 370–78 (citing Pss. 23:4, 31:6, 49:14-15, 73:24, 139:112; Eccl. 12:7; 1 Sam. 25:29; Job 12:10; Dan. 12:2; Isa. 25:8); Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 411. Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 378; Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 86; Heschel, GSM, 355–56; Heschel, MNA, 233, 295–96. Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 382, 386; Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 411. Heschel, “No Time for Neutrality,” in MGSA, 78; Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 382–83. Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 409; Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 63; Heschel, MNA, 249. See also Heschel, GSM, 351. Heschel, WM, 75; Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 63; Heschel, GSM, 398–400; Heschel, MNA, 241, 249–51. See also Heschel, MNA, 234. Heschel, “Choose Life!,” in MGSA, 251; Heschel, “The God of Israel and Christian Renewal,” in MGSA, 275; Heschel, WM, 104–06. On religious commitment being necessary for authentic human

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[A religion of fellowship] rejects the idea that the good should be done in self-detachment, that the satisfaction felt in doing the good would taint the purity of the act. . . . [T]he heart rather than boycotting the acts of the will ought to respond in joy and undivided delight. Pleasure, though not the spring, may and ought to be the byproduct of moral or religious action. The good or the holy is not necessarily that which I do not desire, and the feeling of pleasure or gratification does not divest a good deed of its quality of goodness.70

In addition, she who responds to what God asks of her will eventually come to enjoy the vision of God in the next life.71 In fact, by trusting in God and being related to him, she can experience the hope of the life to come even now,72 although as suggested above, this hope should not preoccupy her inordinately. We also find meaning in our lives by transcending our own interests and realizing and carrying out the task that God sets before us: “This is the most important experience in the life of every human being: something is asked of me. . . . Meaning is found in responding to the demand, meaning is found in sensing the demand.”73 By “meaning” here, Heschel seems to have in mind significance: “Significant living is an attempt to adjust to what is expected and required of a human being.”74 Notice the apparent connection here to both objective and subjective meaning. On the one hand, we “find” meaning in the experience of fulfilling what God asks of us;75 on the other, meaning actually “is” (or as he says at another point, “depends on”) the act of doing so.76 Importantly, Heschel suggests that the happiness and meaning that one can

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existence, see also Heschel, “On Prayer,” in MGSA, 266; Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 295; Heschel, “Children and Youth,” in IF, 49; Heschel, “Depth Theology,” in IF, 125. Heschel, MNA, 250. Other comments on how serving others and acting in accord with God’s will lead to happiness and joy can be found in Heschel, “Faith,” in MGSA, 335; Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 142; Heschel, GSM, 357 (citing Ps. 84:6), 405–06. According to Heschel, “the only thing” we do know about the next life is that the “good people” will experience this joyful vision. Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 383. On our future in the afterlife being contingent on how we act in this life, see also Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 373, 378; Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 382–83. Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 372–73. Heschel, WM, 108. Ibid., 106. See also ibid., 104; Heschel, PT, 259. Heschel, WM, 74. See also Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 130; Heschel, “The God of Israel and Christian Renewal,” in MGSA, 278 (referring generally to the Hebrew Bible).

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attain in this life via doing God’s will is superior to that which can be reached in the next: It is precisely because of the task of fighting evil that life in this world is so preciously significant. . . . More precious . . . than all of life to come is a single hour of life on earth—an hour of repentance and good deeds. . . . This is why the Book of Ecclesiastes pronounced the dead lion less happy than the living dog.77

Finally, we liberate ourselves from the “tyranny” of needs “only when living in attachment” to God and his word.78 More specifically, as compared to the person who is a slave to his self-centered passions, the one who realizes that something is asked of her and responds appropriately is more free.79 However, on the question of whether we can achieve more freedom in this life or in the next, the rabbi is ambiguous. At one point, he intimates that we have a certain freedom of choice in doing God’s will in this life that we lack after death, upon which “man surrenders his freedom, and only God’s will is done.”80 However, almost immediately afterwards he states that “emancipation from selfish desires” can only be attained in the next life.81 While it may be difficult to fully reconcile these passages, at the very least it seems clear that he thinks it is possible to achieve at least partial liberation from self-centered cravings here on earth. On the other hand, Heschel indicates that we fall away from happiness— both subjective and objective—when we disregard our commitments to God. Ignoring or failing to understand what God asks of us, or even doing his will out of impure motives without any attempt to transcend them, leads to “anxiety,” “misery,” “despair,” and a “dead emptiness.”82 Moreover, he suggests, in a nuclear age we can see that attending to God’s wishes is crucial for “enjoyment of beauty, possessions, and safety in civilized society”83—and without that faithfulness, we miss out on both objective and subjective meaning. More specifically, one’s partnership with God “constitutes the essential meaning of 77

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Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 133–34 (citing Shabbat 30a). See also Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 374; Heschel, GSM, 378 (citing Abot 4:17). Abot (also spelled Aboth) is a treatise of the Mishnah, and Shabbat is part of the Talmud. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 18, 23, n. 3. See also Heschel, GSM, 170. Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 14–15. Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 374. Ibid., 375. See also Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 134. Heschel, WM, 103–04, 111–12; Heschel, GSM, 113. See also Heschel, GSM, 349. Heschel, MNA, 146–47. See also Heschel, “Faith,” in MGSA, 328; Heschel, WM, 111; Heschel, GSM, 113.

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his life,”84 and “the loss of the sense of significant being is due to the loss of the commandment of being.”85 Lastly, instead of enjoying the visio Dei of the next life, those who are “wicked” will enter the darkness of Sheol.86 In particular, those who “offend another person publicly” and those who do not “sanctify [themselves] to God” are barred from eternal life.87

A proper balance of needs At this point, it should be clarified that according to Heschel, the call to transcend our selfish needs does not mean that we should neglect our legitimate personal interests. On this issue, he explicitly argues from the standpoint of Jewish tradition, which he says does not affirm a doctrine of original sin and therefore has a particular appreciation for bodily needs.88 He contends that God asks each of us neither to abhor nor to needlessly sacrifice our life, but to sanctify it.89 More specifically, the biblical precept “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself ” explicitly contains a command to care for our own needs as well as those of others.90 Indeed, it is only through satisfying our bodily needs that we become capable of deeds of holiness.91 Heschel suggests that even while drinking or eating, as long as we do not focus exclusively on satiating ourselves but fervently keep God in mind, we can actually grow closer to him.92 Moreover, there is nothing wrong with seeking prosperity, for it is a “promised reward for good living.”93 Overall, we must take a balanced approach to our personal needs and desires; they are not intrinsically bad, but we must be wary of overindulging

84 85 86

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Heschel, WM, 102–03; Heschel, MNA, 211 (same quotation). See also Heschel, WM, 80. Heschel, WM, 98. Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 383; see also Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 370 (citing Ps. 49:14–15). Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 371; Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 88. In another place, however, Heschel refers to rabbis who say that incorrect beliefs—rather than wrong deeds— are what deprive us of rewards in the world to come. Heschel, GSM, 329 (citing Mishnah Sanhedrin, 10, 1). Heschel, PT, 253; Heschel, GSM, 398; Heschel, MNA, 263–64 (citing Eccl. 3:13). Heschel, “No Time for Neutrality,” in MGSA, 76; Heschel, GSM, 398–99; Heschel, MNA, 267. That said, if sacrifice is made not as an end in itself but as a form of submission to God’s will, “it is an imitatio Dei.” Heschel, MNA, 293. Heschel, MNA, 141. Ibid., 141, 263, 266; Heschel, GSM, 398. Heschel, MNA, 267. Ibid., 263. But see Heschel, PT, 174 (acknowledging that “self-imposed poverty” can be noble from a Jewish perspective).

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them.94 It is legitimate to be concerned for the self, but not to the point of ignoring the needs of others.95 In other words, a spirit of “fellowship” and “shar[ing],” where our will coincides with God’s, is to be preferred to “selfsatisfaction” or “self-annihilation.”96 For instance, Abraham was not motivated to sacrifice Isaac purely out of concern for himself, and Moses did not receive the Ten Commandments by selfish design.97 And it was “the prophets of Baal rather than the prophets of Israel [that] indulged in self-mortification.”98 All of this connects to personal fulfillment as well. As Man Is Not Alone memorably says, “A man entirely unconcerned with his self is dead; a man exclusively concerned with his self is a beast.”99 And shortly thereafter, the rabbi reminds us that God must also be included in the discussion: “The self, the fellow-man and the dimension of the holy are the three dimensions of a mature human concern.”100 To summarize, according to Heschel, in order to achieve fulfillment we must both satisfy our own legitimate needs and serve the needs of others and of God.

Manipulation, appreciation, celebration, and the sense of indebtedness Heschel’s concepts of manipulation, appreciation, celebration, and indebtedness bear brief mention here, since they are closely related to his analysis of the problem of needs. Who Is Man? explains that there are two basic stances that we can take toward the world. The first is manipulation, in which we act as if things in the world are designed to satisfy our own interests.101 The second is appreciation, in which we “acknowledge” and “admire” the value of that which is around us; without appreciation, there can be no companionship.102 Later in this work, Heschel adds that celebration is a kind of “inward appreciation,” which both transcends the “confines of consumption” and recognizes the spiritual dimension of our actions and the greatness of God.103 94

Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 34; Heschel, MNA, 263–64, 266. Heschel, MNA, 141. See also Heschel, PT, 98, 102; Heschel, GSM, 400. 96 Heschel, MNA, 141, 250. 97 Ibid., 233. 98 Heschel, GSM, 398. 99 Heschel, MNA, 137. See also Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 409. 100 Heschel, MNA, 139. 101 Heschel, WM, 76, 82–84. 102 Ibid., 82. 103 Ibid., 117–18. 95

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According to Heschel, one who celebrates experiences “great[] joy” in praising God.104 In addition, “the sense of significant being” is best found through celebration, not frivolous pursuits.105 On the other hand, a life centered on manipulation causes one to forfeit a sense of transcendence, and in turn to lose touch with “the essential truth of being human”106; we “may perish for lack of appreciation.”107 But mere appreciation is not enough; in his interview with Carl Stern, Heschel maintains that drug addiction is a consequence of the fact that people are living “shallow” and “stale” lives without celebration.108 Note that manipulation, appreciation, and celebration closely parallel Heschel’s “three dimensions of a mature human concern” (oneself, other human beings, and the holy, respectively), since it appears that none of them are intrinsically wrong and that they all conduce to personal fulfillment. Heschel notes that “for thousands of years authentic existence included both manipulation and appreciation, utilization and celebration, both work and worship.”109 Like celebration, the “sense of indebtedness” manifests concern for God. It is the understanding of being given life and owing something in return, of “having a task, being called” by God to rise above one’s needs.110 To suppress our natural sense of indebtedness would be to hinder our fulfillment; indebtedness is “an essential ingredient of existence,” and without an inkling of it, we lack “authentic existence” and the full dimension of our humanity.111 In addition, those who have preserved their sense of indebtedness experience that “the meaning of existence lies in reciprocity.”112

The pious man In analyzing Heschel’s description of “the pious man,” one can see how several of the strands in the above discussion might come together in the life of a particular individual. Britton goes so far as to say that piety is Heschel’s “core 104

Ibid., 117. Heschel, “To Grow in Wisdom,” in IF, 77. However, elsewhere Heschel suggests that “the secret of existence” is simply “appreciation.” Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 26. 106 Heschel, WM, 82, 84, 86. 107 Ibid., 83; Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 26 (same quotation). See also Heschel, GSM, 46; Heschel, MNA, 37. 108 Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 412. 109 Heschel, WM, 116. 110 Ibid., 108–09. See also ibid., 111; Heschel, PT, 259–60. 111 Heschel, WM, 86, 108–09, 111–12, 118. See also Heschel, PT, 259–60. 112 Heschel, WM, 118. 105

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ethical concept.”113 However, terms other than “piety” seem to figure more prominently in Heschel’s moral thought. In Man Is Not Alone, for example, only two chapters contain any subheadings that mention the word “piety”; in comparison, five chapters contain subheadings that mention the word “needs.” In God in Search of Man, no chapter subheading mentions piety, two mention “need” or “needs,” and four reference “law” or another term pertaining to Jewish law (halacha or mitzvah). At any rate, piety is certainly a key topic in Heschel’s moral reflection, and bears examining at some length. In Man Is Not Alone, Heschel notes at the outset of his full chapter on the pious man that to many moderns the word “piety” has negative connotations. Many believe that the pious life is a mentally and spiritually unhealthy one.114 As Heschel’s discussion unfolds, however, it suggests that the relationship between doing good and personal fulfillment is manifested almost perfectly in the life of the pious man. The rabbi begins by noting that piety’s antonym is “selfishness.”115 The pious man strives to transcend his own egotistical desires, and in doing so realizes that he is not the possessor of all things.116 However, the pious man also understands “the meagerness and insufficiency of human service.”117 His primary interest is “to place his whole life at the disposal of God”; he passionately seeks to fulfill God’s will through helping others, such as the poor.118 As such, his piety does not consist merely in the performance of external actions, but involves solicitude for such actions.119 The pious man does not focus on “his own perfection or salvation” or on any rewards he might receive, but rather on the will of God.120 But piety can also be characterized by a proper attention to one’s own authentic needs. While many pious people have striven to be poor, “the bitterness of poverty” can actually deform a person’s character and rob him of “the strength to serve and the means to give.”121 Heschel also suggests that the life of the pious man is one of appreciation and celebration; the pious man regards the world with reverence and is particularly sensitive to the value of all 113

Britton, Abraham Heschel and the Phenomenon of Piety, 202. Heschel, MNA, 273. 115 Ibid., 279. 116 Ibid., 277, 292. 117 Ibid., 279. 118 Ibid., 278, 294–95. See also ibid., 279–80, 283. 119 Ibid., 281. 120 Ibid., 279, 295. 121 Ibid., 293. 114

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persons.122 The pious man’s life is not always perfect, although even his failures are frequently occasions for a renewed passionate dedication to holy matters.123 Indeed, one is rendered pious not simply through “isolated acts” but through the constant “pursuit of a way.”124 This is not to diminish the importance of each of those acts: with “every deed, every incident of mind . . . man is at work either building up or tearing down his life, his home, his hope of God.”125 Does all of this mean that piety is a virtue? Heschel equivocates somewhat on this matter. At the beginning of his chapter on piety, when speaking of how many throughout the ages have wanted to be pious, he remarks that they were seeking “a real virtue.”126 But a few pages later, he explicitly argues that referring to piety as a virtue would fail to capture its elusive essence.127 Why? Heschel is cryptic on this point, but he seems to want to say that piety is more of a fundamental identity for a person than a particular virtue she possesses: “While it reveals itself in single attitudes such as devotion, reverence, or the desire to serve, its essential forces lie in a stratum of the soul far deeper than the orbit of any of these.”128 Heschel ultimately settles on labeling piety as “a perpetual inner attitude of the whole man” and as “a mode of living,” which “manifest[s] itself in particular acts.”129 Certainly this notion resembles virtue to some extent,130 although Heschel’s reluctance in this regard must also be acknowledged. Whether or not he really conceives of piety as a virtue, it is clear that Heschel sees it as a means to happiness. The pious man, through his gratitude and reverence toward God, experiences a sense of “joy” and “peace” that enables him to transcend any feelings of “grief,” “gloom,” and “loneliness.”131 Heschel also quotes different theological authorities (including the Talmud) that say that the “pious” and the “righteous” will receive their reward for good deeds in the next life.132 In addition, when transcending his own interests and living 122

Ibid., 286. Ibid., 280. 124 Ibid., 270, 277–78. 125 Ibid., 289. See also ibid., 270; Heschel, GSM, 301, 384. 126 Heschel, MNA, 273. 127 Ibid., 276–77. 128 Ibid., 277. 129 Ibid., 277–78. 130 I am indebted to John Grabowski for this point. 131 Heschel, MNA, 284, 286–88, 291. 132 Heschel, “The Mystical Element in Judaism,” in MGSA, 179 (citing Zohar III 59a); Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 198–99 (citing Berakoth 17a); Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 373 (citing Berakhot 18a); Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 132 (citing 123

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in accord with the will of God, the pious man also “finds the real meaning of life . . . the certainty that his life . . . is of some purpose in the great plan.”133 Once again, each individual act of the pious man is valuable and coincides with God’s purpose.134 Finally, the pious person manifests “mastery over self,”135 which suggests the achievement of a certain freedom from egocentric desires. So far, then, we have seen that Heschel often indicates that in transcending our own experience of needs—and more specifically in making God’s ends our own human needs—we realize an increase in personal fulfillment in general, and in happiness, meaning, and freedom in particular. Attending to our own legitimate personal interests, maintaining a sense of celebration and indebtedness along with appreciation, and cultivating piety also help us along the path to fulfillment. On the other hand, if we fail to respond to what God asks of us, ignore bodily needs, and/or define ourselves by an attitude of manipulation, we veer off that path. It is not entirely clear what Heschel’s ultimate position would be on those who fall somewhere in between, by serving their fellow human beings but not (at least not consciously) concerning themselves with God. Clearly, he thinks that those who ignore God are susceptible to deficiencies in fulfillment. But as we have seen, there are at least a few passages in his work that without directly mentioning God suggest that caring for the needs of other beings does lead to an increase in “the degree of our being human.”

“A commitment to Jewish law” Some basic terms Heschel’s analysis of the problem of needs and of piety cannot be detached from his discussion of Jewish law. As he states in God in Search of Man: “In Judaism allegiance to God involves a commitment to Jewish law, to

Berachoth 61b); Heschel, “The Ecumenical Movement,” in IF, 182. Berakoth/Berakhot/Berachoth refer to a tractate of the Talmud. The Zohar, meaning “illumination” or “brightness,” is “the classical work on the Kabbalah, containing revelations to Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai and his mystic circle (second century CE).” Chester, Divine Pathos and Human Being, 209. 133 Heschel, MNA, 294–95. 134 Ibid., 283. On the meaningfulness of individual good acts in “reducing distress and advancing redemption” (and the harmfulness of particular bad ones), see also Heschel, PT, 299; Heschel, WM, 119; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 9–10. 135 Heschel, MNA, 280.

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a  discipline, to specific obligations.”136 And as a couple of his other works put it, “Judaism insists upon establishing a unity . . . of piety and halacha. . . . [P]iety cannot subsist without a pattern of deeds. . . . Judaism is lived in deeds not only in thoughts.”137 Five terms are central to Heschel’s understanding of Jewish law and need to be addressed in turn: law, mitzvah, halacha, agada, and Torah. In God in Search of Man, Heschel explicitly poses the question, “What is law?” and broadly answers it as follows: “The law is an answer to him who knows that life is a problem.”138 But more specifically, the very next sentence is the one above that refers to “a commitment to Jewish law,” and, indeed, “law” is generally Heschel’s shorthand for Jewish law. In another article, he maintains that “the meaning of Jewish law,” in turn, is “how to be.”139 As for mitzvah, we saw in Chapter 1 that it refers to the law but also has a wider dimension. In fact, for Heschel, “the basic term of Jewish living . . . is mitsvah rather than law (din).” The law informs us “what is and what is not . . . a mitsvah,” but our actions are determined not only by our understanding of the law but also by our will.140 Heschel also speaks of the opposite of mitzvah: “sin or averah,” which means “not to do, to disregard, or to cross the fixed boundary.”141 Lastly, he points to a certain snowballing effect of both mitzvot and averah: one good or bad deed can engender more of the same.142 Two other terms that Heschel understands in relation to law are halacha and agada. As Michael Chester explains in his book on Heschel, halacha is “the legal side of Judaism,” while agada is “the aspect of Jewish (Talmudic) literature that is non-legal: history, ethics, philosophy, folklore, medine [sic], astronomy, proverbs, pious tales.”143 Heschel himself describes halacha and agada as follows: “Halacha represents the strength to shape one’s life according to a fixed pattern; it is a form-giving force. Agada is the expression 136

Heschel, GSM, 299. Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 140–41; Heschel, MNA, 176 (same quotation). 138 Heschel, GSM, 299. 139 Heschel, “Choose Life!,” in MGSA, 252. 140 Heschel, GSM, 362. 141 Heschel, “Pikuach Neshama: To Save a Soul,” in MGSA, 62–63 (citing Est. 3:3; Sifra, Kedoshim, 1); Heschel, GSM, 362–63 (citing Gen. 3:7 and Genesis Rabba 19, 17). “Sifra, Kedoshim” is a halachic midrash. 142 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 144 (citing Aboth, 4, 2); Heschel, GSM, 377 (citing Abot, 4:2). 143 Chester, Divine Pathos and Human Being, 203–04. 137

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of man’s ceaseless striving, which often defies all limitations. . . . Halacha deals with the law; agada with the meaning of the law. . . [H]alacha decrees, agada inspires.”144 In other words, halacha appraises us of “how much” we must do, while agada directs us to “how” we ought to do it, the “inward aspect of living.”145 Next, with regard to Torah, Chester orients us by explaining that it literally means “the teaching,” and that while it can refer to “the first five books of the Bible” (a.k.a. the Pentateuch), “the Hebrew Bible as a whole is referred to as ‘Written Torah,’ the Oral Torah being the rabbinic commentary on the written Torah.”146 Similarly, Heschel claims that Torah is “the comprehensive name for the revealed teachings of Judaism.”147 Explicitly tying this term into ones we have already discussed, he elaborates that it “comprises both halacha and agada.”148 In other words, the Torah refers to commandments God gives his people (248 positive and 365 negative, to be exact),149 and also to nonlegal aspects such as the books of the prophets, the Psalms, and various biblical commentaries.150 God, Torah, and Israel are considered “the three sacred entities” within Judaism; Heschel suggests that a person must not embrace one at the expense of another.151 Lastly, when speaking of terms pertaining to Jewish law, Heschel continues to stress the importance of avoiding impure motives. We should not use Torah as “a crown to magnify” ourselves or for any selfish reason.152 Similarly, we ought not to carry out mitzvot for the purpose of attaining eternal life; referring to the Mishnah (the written transcription of the Oral Torah), he counsels us to “‘ be like servants who serve the master without the expectation of the reward.’ . . . [D]o not be like those who expect eternity to follow the deed.”153

144

Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 49. Heschel, GSM, 336–38. On the meaning of agada, see also ibid., 324. 146 Chester, Divine Pathos and Human Being, 208–09. 147 Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 192. 148 Heschel, GSM, 323–24. 149 Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 130; Heschel, “The Mystical Element in Judaism,” in MGSA, 179. 150 Heschel, GSM, 324–26. 151 Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 191–92. See also Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 51. 152 Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 196, 204 (quoting Midrash Tehillim [ed. Buber], p. 240 ff.). See also Heschel, GSM, 391–92. 153 Heschel, GSM, 355–56 (quoting Abot 1, 3). 145

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Mitzvot, halacha, “ways of the Torah,” and personal fulfillment For Heschel, a mitzvah by definition is good (as I demonstrated in the first chapter), and through doing mitzvot and following Jewish law, we can achieve increases in personal fulfillment. Speaking to both objective happiness and fulfillment in general, he remarks that “loyalty to the mitsvot” and “Jewish observance . . . give[] us health and what is more: holiness.”154 In other words, the person becomes “refine[d]” and “ennoble[d]” through the holiness that mitzvot confer,155 and he “endows his soul with more life.”156 Moreover, following the law enables us to cultivate “discipline and self-control,” which help us grow toward “matur[ity]” and “human perfectibility.”157 In carrying out mitzvot, we both emulate and speak for God, and in doing so, we “enhanc[e] our likeness.”158 According to Heschel, the voice of our conscience is often muted and we cannot find every answer to life’s challenges on our own. Instead, we need the assistance of “tradition” and its “norms,”159 which God gives us out of love and mercy.160 Without halacha, in fact, the Jewish people are in danger of losing their identity and hence their “very existence.”161 Many of Heschel’s observations on Jewish law also pertain to what I have called subjective happiness. To “outsiders,” mitzvot might seem like “absurd[] chains of lifeless legalism . . . dreary, irksome routine.”162 However, Heschel cites the Psalms, various Jewish sources, and human experience in arguing that those who carry out mitzvot discover “fullness of joy” in God’s presence.163 In being able to serve God, they also avoid despair,164 grow closer to him, and thereby elude the loneliness characteristic of “the egoist . . . confined to himself, a spiritual recluse.”165 In addition, Heschel 154

Ibid., 360. Heschel, “Symbolism and Jewish Faith,” in MGSA, 93. See also Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 144; Heschel, GSM, 357 (citing Genesis Rabba, 44). 156 Heschel, GSM, 311 (quoting Exodus Rabba 36, 3). 157 Ibid., 300. 158 Ibid., 289; Heschel, “Symbolism and Jewish Faith,” in MGSA, 86–87 (citing Deuteronomy Rabba 1, 10 and 5, 9). 159 Heschel, GSM, 298. See also Heschel, MNA, 270. 160 Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 130; Heschel, GSM, 300; Heschel, MNA, 118, 148. 161 Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 48. 162 Heschel, GSM, 353. 163 Ibid., 355 (citing Pss. 86:4, 100:2). See also ibid., 383 (citing Ps. 119:54), 385 (citing Shabbat 30b; Ps. 119:77, 97; Midrash Tehillim, 112, 1; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Lulav 8:15). 164 Ibid., 378, 385. 165 Ibid., 287 (citing Gen. 5:24, 6:8-9), 312. 155

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maintains that mitzvot are our “defenders in the world to come.”166 That said, once again he downplays the fulfillment that our actions can lead to in the next life: “Eternity is in the deed, in the doing. The reward of a mitsvah is the mitsvah itself.”167 Heschel expresses basically the same thoughts when speaking of halacha and “the ways of the Torah.” Carrying out halacha should not be seen as a burden, the heart of which is in telling people what not to do, but as conducive to joy and celebrations.168 The connection between Jewish observance and happiness is nicely summarized in the following reference in God in Search of Man to the Book of Proverbs: “The ways of the Torah are ‘ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace. She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her, and happy is everyone that holds her fast.’”169 Moreover, the law is connected to objective and subjective meaning, as well as freedom. In Heschel’s words, mitzvot add “meaning to our existence” and can “convey the certainty that man is more than a mere speck in the universe; he is a priest who carries out God’s mission on earth.”170 Indeed, experience shows that mitzvot are “ways of evoking new meaning again and again.”171 Similarly, Heschel remarks that in following the Torah we are “ushered into the presence of spiritual meaning,”172 and that performing halacha gives us “ultimate significance” and a “sense of divine relevance of human deeds.”173 Finally, he clarifies that “the law . . . is not designed to be a yoke, a curb, a straitjacket for human action,” but rather an appealing call to love.174 Note that Heschel’s understanding of the link between the law and personal fulfillment extends to prayer, which he calls the “queen of all mitzvot.”175 Speaking from his own experience, Heschel suggests that while adhering to regular times of prayer is not always easy, it is ultimately a source of happiness (for it fulfills God’s will) and of inner peace (for it provides a sense of home 166

Ibid., 362 (citing Avoda Zara 2a). Avoda Zara is a tractate of the Talmud. Ibid., 356 (citing Abot 4, 2). Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 205. 169 Heschel, GSM, 309–10 (quoting Prov. 3:17-18). See also Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 195–96. 170 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 144; Heschel, “Israel and Diaspora,” in IF, 220. 171 Heschel, GSM, 354. See also ibid., 353. 172 Ibid., 283. 173 Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 205. 174 Heschel, GSM, 307. See also Heschel, “The Mystical Element in Judaism,” in MGSA, 181 (citing Ps. 119:54). 175 Heschel, “The Spirit of Jewish Prayer,” in MGSA, 114. 167 168

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amidst life’s difficulties). Moreover, prayer is significant because it “expand[s] the presence of God in the world.” On the other hand, the person “who has never prayed is not fully human.”176 But what does all this mean for non-Jews? Heschel recognizes that members of other religions (specifically, Christians and Muslims) respect God’s commandments,177 even if these people do not follow the whole of Jewish law. Christians, for example, believe it to be an “imposition” and done away with by Jesus.178 Can non-Jews, then, find as much personal fulfillment as those who observe Jewish law? There are at least two places in Heschel’s corpus that seem to say that the answer is no. In the passage just cited, he suggests that “Christians leave out the possibility and the greatness of the Mosaic Law,” and that they thereby miss out on a dimension of meaning available to Jews.179 At another point, he maintains that Judaism provides “every human person” with the moral compass and quality of existence that cannot be found elsewhere.180 However, immediately after the first excerpt, Heschel goes on to say that Jews ought to recognize that Christianity plays a part “in God’s plan for the redemption of all men”181—and we must consider the context of the second excerpt: part of a talk addressing the situation of contemporary Jews to an audience of Jews. Elsewhere, Heschel relies on the authority of Maimonides and another medieval Jewish physician, Judah Halevi, in emphasizing that God rewards the ethical conduct of all people of good will, even if they are

176

Ibid., 110, 113, 116; Heschel, “On Prayer,” in MGSA, 258–60; Heschel, “Prayer,” in MGSA, 342–44; Heschel, “Prayer as Discipline,” in IF, 256–57. I admit that much more could be said here regarding Heschel’s views on prayer and its relationship to fulfillment. For further reading, see Abraham Joshua Heschel, Man’s Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism (Santa Fe, NM: Aurora Press, 1998 [1954]); Held, The Call of Transcendence, 21–23, 198–228. A related issue is observance of the Sabbath, the day of rest, which Heschel calls “an epitome of all other commandments.” Heschel, TS, 90. For Heschel, keeping the Sabbath is a source of pleasure and inner peace in contrast to the anxiety of the days of the week and (in conjunction with labor) is a fulfillment of God’s purpose. It also involves freedom from “technical civilization,” the lure of money, and societal expectations. Finally, the Sabbath perfects human beings and is a foretaste of the “world to come.” Ibid., 18–24, 27–32, 65–68, 73–74, 87–88. Heschel himself once confided to a friend that “if it were not for the Sabbath, I do not know how I could get through each week.” Maurice S. Friedman, Abraham Joshua Heschel, Philosopher of Wonder: Our Thirty-Year Friendship and Dialogue (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 12. 177 Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 249; Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 298. 178 Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 386, 391. 179 Ibid., 386. 180 Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 194–95. 181 Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 387.

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unfamiliar with the Bible and rely simply on their reason.182 As he states in another talk given at a Christian institution, Union Theological Seminary in New York, Jews acknowledge the legitimacy of other paths to holiness. Here he cites Mic. 4:5—“Let all the peoples walk each one in the name of its god, but we will walk in the name of the Lord our God for ever and ever”—and adds that “all men have a share in eternal life if they attain according to their ability knowledge of the Creator and have ennobled themselves by noble qualities.”183 We can see one concrete example of this idea in Heschel’s eulogy for a dear friend, Reformed Christian theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, where he makes reference to Niebuhr’s “soul . . . entering life eternal, a beautiful princess.”184 And in a television interview with Carl Stern given right before his death, Heschel goes even further: “I would say God’s mercy is so great that He helps even those who don’t believe in Him”—although he quickly adds that from a nonbelieving perspective, it is more difficult to see why we should act well, particularly in those cases where we might think that doing so would not benefit us.185

“Judaism is not legalism” Although he affirms that people can achieve gains in personal fulfillment through following Jewish law, Heschel also repeatedly cautions against an overemphasis on law. “Judaism is not legalism,” he declares at one point.186 In particular, he insists that the law does not adequately account for the insights

182

Heschel, GSM, 295, 304, nn. 5–6 (citing Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, pt. III, ch. 17; Halevi, Kuzari, 1, III). However, Heschel here notes that a passage from Maimonides’s earlier Mishneh Torah seems to cut in the other direction. While Heschel only gives the citation of this passage, the full text of it suggests that only those non-Jews who accept biblical authority, and not those who merely rely on their “intellectual conviction,” will “merit a share in the world to come.” Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: A New Translation with Commentaries and Notes, trans. Eliyahu Touger (New York: Moznaim Pub. Co., 1989–2010 [1178]), Sefer Shoftim [“The Book of Judges”], Hilchot Melachim U’Milchamoteihem [“The Laws of Kings and their Wars”], 8:11. 183 Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 247–48 (the second quotation provided by Heschel here is actually from another source that is not directly attributed, although he gives the impression that it is from the Mishneh Torah). 184 Heschel, “Reinhold Niebuhr,” in MGSA, 302. Kasimow notes that “according to some Jewish thinkers, it is not possible for the Christian to be a righteous person since the first precept of the Noahide law is ‘not to worship idols,’ i.e., one must be a monotheist.” Kasimow, Divine-Human Encounter, 89. Of course, traditional Christians themselves have always considered their faith to be monotheistic. 185 Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 402. 186 Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in IF, 233.

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of the prophets or the spiritual reflections of Hasidic Judaism.187 And as already suggested in our discussion of mitzvot at the outset of this section, one must keep in mind that the law can only tell us what, and what not, to do. Along these lines, in a passage cautioning readers not to understand Judaism exclusively in terms of law, he maintains that halacha cannot give us the internal impetus to carry it out.188 Even where one is willing to fulfill the precepts of the law, several caveats must be kept in mind. First, as elsewhere, Heschel insists upon the conjunction of an internal act with an external one: “Halacha without agada is dead, agada without halacha is wild.”189 Second, in following Jewish law, one must guard against “the loss of the whole.” As with piety, what is important is not merely individual instances of observance but the lifelong “pursuit of a way” in which these “become a part of a complete pattern.”190 Third, the communitarian aspect of religious action is crucial. Recall that both Torah and Israel are “sacred entities” according to Heschel. And so, “Jewish existence is not only the adherence to particular doctrines and observances but primarily . . . the living in the Jews of the past and with the Jews of the present. . . . What we do as individuals may be a trivial episode; what we attain as Israel causes us to grow into the infinite.”191 Finally, one must be willing to tolerate the violation of the law on occasion; the laws of the Torah must not be “deified.”192 While Heschel himself followed the traditional kosher and Sabbath laws, his daughter Susannah describes his overall approach as being “lovingly observant” rather than “strictly observant.”193 On the one hand, as we saw above, he attests to the fact that each of our deeds is vitally important; additionally, in an essay on the Vietnam War

187

Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 198; Heschel, “Israel and Diaspora,” in IF, 217. For a good summary of Heschel’s thoughts on Hasidism, see Dresner, Heschel, Hasidism, and Halakha, 36–83. 188 Heschel, GSM, 338. On the general need to view life through nonlegal lenses as well as legal ones, see also Heschel, “Choose Life!,” in MGSA, 252. 189 Heschel, GSM, 337; Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 49 (same quotation). See also Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 385. As elsewhere, on the question of Jewish law Heschel sometimes emphasizes the internal aspect of a deed. Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 50–51; Heschel, GSM, 331–32. At other times, he specifically highlights the external aspect. Heschel, GSM, 343–44. 190 Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 133 (quoting Heschel, MNA, 270); Heschel, GSM, 301. 191 Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 191. 192 Heschel, GSM, 415. 193 Susannah Heschel, “Introduction,” 42.

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and elsewhere, he denounces utilitarian ways of thinking, such as that which would justify murder.194 On the other hand, he quotes a few rabbis in holding that one may break Jewish law for the sake of God (although “not for any impure motive”).195 For instance, one would be justified in violating Jewish law in order to save the entire people of Israel; here Heschel cites an instance where the Jewish queen Esther suggested a fast to save Israel from destruction at the hands of the Persians during a time when no fast was allowed according to the letter of the law.196 In fact, one may act against Jewish law even in order to save a single human life (unless it would entail committing idolatry, adultery, or murder).197 In addition, different historical conditions call for different applications of religious law.198 God in Search of Man refers to “a great Jewish authority” as holding that in the present day, Jews are not required to fulfill the laws of the Temple, and that in the time of Abraham, it was permissible to disregard various commandments.199 Heschel also discusses one contemporary situation where, in light of historical conditions, we must “act for God [and] set aside the Torah (or the uncompromising rigidity of some of our laws).”200 Many Jews, he explains, are estranged from their faith, and it is evident to him that the only way to win them back is to promote “a ladder of observance.” Even if such people only make a “modest effort” to follow the law, God will value that effort greatly. Ultimately, he counsels his fellow Jews to “observe as much as you are able to, and a little more than you are able to. . . . The level of Jewish living must never be stationary.”201 Overall, Heschel is not very specific on instances in which it might be permissible to break Jewish law; “the problem is not how much but how to observe.”202 Indeed, his ambiguity on this point has been noted by Jon Levenson, Arnold Eisen, and James Hyman, and explicitly criticized by the latter two for 194

Heschel, “Required: A Moral Ombudsman,” in MGSA, 219–21; Heschel, GSM, 337; Heschel, MNA, 109 (citing Mishnah Sanhedrin, 4, 5). Heschel, GSM, 342 (quoting Rabbi Mordecai Joseph of Isbitsa, Me Hashiloah, 14d–15a). See also Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 197 (citing Rashi to Berakoth 54a). 196 Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 203 (citing Yalkut Shimoni, Esther 1056). 197 Heschel, GSM, 326; Heschel, TS, 17, 121, n. 9 (citing Otzar ha-Geonim, Yoma, 30, 32). 198 Heschel, GSM, 272–75. 199 Ibid., 303. 200 Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 52. 201 Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 205–07 (citing Rabbi Isaac Luria and Isa. 54:1 on the need to “have understanding and sympathy for those who are poor in spirit”). See also Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 52–53. 202 Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 134. 195

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providing insufficient guidance to fellow Jews.203 Eisen further claims that in Heschel’s thought, “we are given an elaborate defense of the purposes served by the mitzvot—knowledge of God, meaning to life, escape from sin, entrée to eternity—but almost no insight into how particular mitzvot or aspects of mitzvot relate to those ends.”204 What we can affirm is that for Heschel, taking a middle road between strict adherence and non-observance is what best conduces to personal fulfillment—even if it is true that he does not pinpoint that road’s exact coordinates. On the one hand, he criticizes “ultra-Orthodox” Judaism for “building fences and walls instead of homes,” causing many to feel the practice of Judaism to be “a jail, not a joy.”205 In general, “extremism and severity do us great harm”; God himself recognized that mercy along with justice was necessary for the world to flourish.206 On the other hand, “Forgotten is the joy . . . to be experienced in Jewish observance. . . . Judaism is an anchor of ultimate significance to a tottering world.”207 To say that “everybody is a good Jew” is, in the end, an unhelpful bromide.208

“The difficulties of moral living” While much of the aforementioned discussion may suggest an easy link between acting well and personal fulfillment, Heschel also holds that “we must not underestimate the difficulties of moral living. It takes great courage, wisdom, defiance, and depth of faith to remain moral. We have been guilty of oversimplification.”209 With this statement in mind, my task in this next section is twofold. It seems clear that the conclusion that doing good leads to fulfillment presumes that we are able to do this good in the first place; I want to demonstrate that Heschel is cognizant of our difficulties in this regard. In addition, I will show that on occasion he seems to suggest that ethical action can lead to no increase (or to decreases) in personal fulfillment, and even that immoral deeds can help one grow in said fulfillment. 203

Jon D. Levenson, “The Contradictions of A.J. Heschel,” Commentary 106, no. 1 (1998): 38; Eisen, “Re-Reading Heschel on the Commandments,” 17, 25–26; James Hyman, “Meaningfulness, the Ineffable, and the Commandments,” Conservative Judaism 50, nos. 2–3 (1998): 98–99. 204 Eisen, “Re-Reading Heschel on the Commandments,” 25. 205 Heschel, “A Time for Renewal,” in MGSA, 52. See also Heschel, GSM, 302. 206 Heschel, “We Cannot Force People to Believe,” in MGSA, 45. 207 Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 205. 208 Heschel, “Israel and Disapora,” in IF, 220. 209 Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 58.

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Are we able to do good (and to do it for the right motives)? As I have demonstrated, Heschel indicates that we can achieve gains in personal fulfillment through serving the needs of others and of God, and specifically through following Jewish law. However, he is aware that many question whether we are even able to do good and to do it with the proper motives. The rabbi contends that all of us experience moments when we are ashamed of our selfish motives and actions (or at least wonder whether we should be) and that everyone at some point in her life does endeavor to transcend them.210 But do we succeed? In the previous chapter, we looked at Heschel’s general understanding of freedom; here let us focus specifically on whether he believes that human beings can possess it. We can begin with Who Is Man?, which confirms that one of the fundamental characteristics of humanity is the ability “to intend, to decide,” “not merely . . . to react.”211 We constantly choose one path of action over another, such that it is impossible to foresee what we will do in the end.212 In fact, as human beings, we cannot help but make free decisions; Heschel sometimes maintains that we are “forced to be free.”213 Our freedom extends to the ability to choose between good and evil actions, to reject selfishness and make others’ needs our own.214 The career paths that people take illustrate our ability to shape our wants: “Many people may have a mother-fixation, but essential is that one turns to poetry, the other to social work and another one to crime,”215 and many are able to sacrifice money, power, and fame for a higher good.216 For Heschel, Jewish belief is consistent with these empirical reflections; on this point he quotes the Book of Deuteronomy: “For this commandment (mitsvah) which I command thee this day, it is not too hard for thee.”217 On a related note, Robert McAfee Brown

210

Heschel, “The Holy Dimension,” in MGSA, 324; Heschel, WM, 4–5, 26–27; Heschel, GSM, 402; Heschel, MNA, 140, 212. 211 Heschel, WM, 42–43. See also ibid., 9, 83; Heschel, “The Moral Dilemma of the Space Age,” in MGSA, 216; Heschel, GSM, 410; Heschel, MNA, 204. 212 Heschel, WM, 37; Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 25–26; Heschel, MNA, 207. 213 Heschel, WM, 101; Heschel, MNA, 209 (same quotation). See also Heschel, “The Moral Dilemma of the Space Age,” in MGSA, 218; Heschel, WM, 97; Heschel, GSM, 412. 214 Heschel, “The Patient as a Person,” in IF, 26; Heschel, GSM, 397–98; Heschel, MNA, 265–66. 215 Heschel, GSM, 397. 216 Heschel, MNA, 140–41. 217 Heschel, GSM, 378 (quoting Deut. 30:11-14). See also Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 20; Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 144–45.

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claims that “there is probably no phrase that occurs more frequently in his writings and speeches than some variant of the phrase, ‘Some are guilty, all are responsible.’”218 This maxim, which Heschel maintains is suggested by the words of the prophets, means that while only some may be directly associated with a morally wrong deed, all have the ability—the freedom—to endeavor to make things right.219 All of this said, we are in need of God’s grace to do the good. Citing both experience (perhaps the threat of nuclear war, although he does not specify) and the Talmud, Heschel argues that if God and his word did not assist us, we would not be able to resist the lure of evil and all would succumb to “final disaster.”220 But fortunately, God’s grace helps us to answer what he asks of us and to live a life of piety.221 In fact, he has made provisions for our weaknesses; some of the precepts of the Torah, for example, “do not represent ideals but compromises.”222 God has even seen to it that noble endeavors, such as starting a family, “are shrewdly disguised” as tasks that are in our own interests.223 At the same time, Heschel holds that all of our endeavors are destined to “fail in redeeming the world,” an event that will only come with the arrival of the Messiah. Still, despite our failures, we need not despair, as God accepts us “in all our frailty and weakness. ‘For He knows our nature . . . He remembers that we are dust.’”224 But at this point another problem surfaces. As Heschel understands, being able to act well and to align our needs with those of others does not necessarily mean we can do so with a pure motive.225 In fact, he acknowledges

218

Robert McAfee Brown, “Some Are Guilty, All Are Responsible: Heschel’s Social Ethics,” in Abraham Joshua Heschel: Exploring His Life and Thought, ed. John C. Merkle (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 137. 219 Heschel, “Required: A Moral Ombudsman,” in MGSA, 220; Heschel, MNA, 289. For other references to this maxim in the context of such issues as the Vietnam War and racism, see Heschel, “The Reasons for My Involvement in the Peace Movement,” in MGSA, 225; Heschel, “A Prayer for Peace,” in MGSA, 231; Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 93; Heschel, TP, 17–19. 220 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 143; Heschel, “Sacred Image of Man,” in IF, 164; Heschel, GSM, 171, 365 (citing Shabbat 105b and Sukkah 52b), 374–75. Sukkah, like Shabbat, is a book of the Talmud. 221 Heschel, “The Moral Dilemma of the Space Age,” in MGSA, 218; Heschel, PT, 316 (citing a journal entry by the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard); Heschel, MNA, 294. 222 Heschel, GSM, 270. Heschel here cites Exod. 21:2ff as an authority, although he does not comment on this passage, which deals with the purchase of slaves. 223 Heschel, MNA, 224–25. 224 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 145 (quoting Ps. 103:14). See also Heschel, GSM, 378–79 (which contains a very similar quotation). 225 Heschel, GSM, 398.

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that “psychologically it seems inconceivable” to put self-interest aside in serving God.226 He also points out that the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah, as well as various noteworthy rabbis, suggest that we cannot free ourselves from unworthy intentions; Rabbi Elimelech of Lizhensk, for example, famously remarked to one of his followers that “I am sixty years old, and I have not fulfilled one mitsvah.”227 Perhaps, Heschel speculates, our good deeds are sullied by impure motives, either prior to the act, during the act (when we may experience “alien thoughts”), and/or even after the act (when “there is the danger of self-righteousness”).228 Even the “despair and disgust” that accompany egotistical actions might in fact be “self-indulgence in disguise.”229 But Heschel ultimately counters all of this by charging that those who say we cannot transcend our impure motives “disregard unquestionable empirical facts of human consciousness.” There is a key distinction between self-centered drives and the desire to overcome these: “Selfish interests are centripetal; freedom from selfish interests is centrifugal, a turning away from the self. The essence of man, his uniqueness, is in his power to surpass the self, to rise above his needs and selfish motives.”230 One important way in which we can cleanse our intent is to focus on the task at hand rather than on ourselves. For example, while a musician may be motivated somewhat by fame or fortune before a concert, during it, she becomes engrossed and the original impure intentions dissipate.231 At the same time, Heschel does acknowledge the difficulty of transcending selfish intentions. Only through “the sting of shame” are we able to do so, and even then only on occasion.232 But as with external actions, we can correct our motivations with God’s grace,233 although only those who first do their own part to purify themselves are given assistance by God and that “indwelling 226

Ibid., 387. Ibid., 391, 393–94 (quoting Rabbi Yaakob Aaron of Zalshin, Bet Yaakov [Pietrkov, 1899], 144 and citing Isa. 64:5, Jer. 17:9, Midrash Tehillim 6, 1; Toldot Yaakov Yosef [Lemberg, 1863], 150d; David Kimhi, Commentary on Isaiah ad locum); Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 138–39 (citing the same authorities). 228 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 138; Heschel, GSM, 388–89. See also Heschel, “To Be a Jew: What Is It?,” in MGSA, 6. 229 Heschel, GSM, 396–97. 230 Ibid., 397. See also Heschel, WM, 85; Heschel, MNA, 139. 231 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 140–42; Heschel, GSM, 403–06. See also Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 200; Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 97; Heschel, GSM, 345–46. 232 Heschel, GSM, 401, 407, 411. 233 Ibid., 407 (citing Rabbenu Yonah, Commentary on Alfasi, Berachot, 5, 1). 227

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or presence” of his known as the Shekinah.234 In fact, God calls us not to the “perfect purity” we cannot attain, but simply to continue striving to better ourselves, and so we need not despair.235 In summary, Heschel maintains that our actions and motives can be relatively good—albeit only with God’s assistance, and even then with much difficulty—and that we can find fulfillment through them: “This, then, seems to be the attitude of Judaism. Though deeply aware of how impure and imperfect all our deeds are, the fact of our doing is cherished as the highest privilege, as a source of joy, as that which endows life with ultimate preciousness.”236

Are doing good and personal fulfillment always connected? Up to this point, I have portrayed Heschel as affirming a tight connection between morality and fulfillment. However, it must also be recognized that several times he suggests either that (A) doing good may not lead to certain aspects of personal fulfillment, or (B) acting well, in fact, has a negative impact on them, or (C) immoral deeds actually contribute to them. I will address passages that pertain to each of these points in turn, and then give separate attention to Heschel’s final work, A Passion for Truth, in which he wrestled with sadness and absurdity most explicitly. And I quote these particular excerpts at length in order to fully acknowledge the extent to which they test my analysis above.

Passages in Group (A) Begin by considering the following direct quotations from Heschel: (1) Some of the basic theological presuppositions of Judaism cannot be completely justified in terms of human reason. Its conception . . . of prayer and even of morality[] defy some of [our] realizations. . . . The demands of 234

Ibid., 128–29, 133, n. 5 (citing Zohar, vol. I, 86b, 88a–b, 128b); 147 (citing Yoma 38b), 358 (citing Shabbat 104a), 407; Heschel, “The Mystical Element in Judaism,” in MGSA, 172; Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 194. Yoma is a tractate of the Talmud. 235 Heschel, GSM, 402. See also ibid., 297; Heschel, “No Time for Neutrality,” in MGSA, 76; Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 140. 236 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 142; see also Heschel, GSM, 406 (which contains a very similar quotation). Kasimow takes issue with this passage, noting that “Rabbinic and medieval Judaism” held that in the absence of the right intention “the performance of the mitsvot are worthless,” while also recognizing that Hasidic sources support Heschel’s interpretation. Kasimow, Divine-Human Encounter, 56, 58. As Kasimow acknowledges here, Heschel himself is aware of controversy on this matter. Heschel, GSM, 403, 408, n. 2.

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piety are a mystery. . . . In a technological society . . . piety . . . is an instrument to satisfy man’s needs. We must therefore be particularly careful not to fall into the habit of [thinking in this way]. . . . [The purpose of religious practice] is not to serve hygiene, happiness or the vitality of man; its purpose is to add holiness to hygiene, grandeur to happiness, spirit to vitality.237 (2) What constitutes the consciousness of good and evil . . . is the requiredness to act not for my own sake, to do the right even if no advantage would accrue to myself. The expediency of a good deed may serve as an incentive to carry out a moral obligation, yet it is certainly not identical with it.238 (3) True, there is no reward for good deeds in this world.239

The first challenging passage above provides some context for all of the ones that will follow. One could read everything in this chapter up to that point and come away with the impression that ethical conduct is (at least in part) rationally justified by the fact that it benefits the doer as well as the recipient. But Heschel here is warning us that religion in general—and morality in particular—are not always going to make complete sense, and, indeed, that we ought not to view piety (which we have already discussed at length) in terms of self-interest. Still, when read in context, this passage does not significantly undermine our previous analysis. To begin with, it does not directly affirm that doing good does not serve our own needs. And even if Heschel does mean to say this, remember that elsewhere he distinguishes between authentic needs (which are truly in our own interest) and artificial ones (which only appear to be), and here he may well have in mind the latter. In fact, only a couple of pages after this quote he asserts that “the purpose of religion is not to satisfy the needs we feel but to create in us the need of serving ends, of which we otherwise remain oblivious.”240 And the paragraph immediately prior to Passage (1) clarifies that “Judaism is concerned with the happiness of the individual as well as with the survival of the Jewish people,” although to be sure those depend on adherence to God’s will.241 Passage (2) goes a bit further by directly confronting the possibility that doing good in certain cases leads to “no advantage” for the doer. But once again, 237

Heschel, GSM, 349, 351. For very similar quotations, see ibid., 20; Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 136–37. 238 Heschel, MNA, 224. 239 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 133. 240 Heschel, GSM, 351. 241 Ibid., 349.

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Heschel seems to have in mind a selfish gain here; in the next sentence he uses the word “expediency,” a term which he elsewhere indicates is connected to selfish needs.242 And, in fact, later on in the same page as Passage (2), Heschel argues that “seen from the watchtower of history, the selfish usefulness of required deeds, the possibility of regarding them as instrumental to the attainment of one’s own selfish goals, is God’s secret weapon in his struggle with man’s callousness,” a statement that suggests that doing good (even for an impure reason) can be intimately connected with a degree of satisfaction of even our own egocentric needs, and, therefore, a sort of happiness.243 The third excerpt above is more jarring, as it flatly suggests that morality just does not benefit the agent in general. But as with the first two, a look at the immediate context largely dissipates any such notion. Passage (3) is immediately followed by the assertion that this world is merely a “vestibule” to and a “place of preparation” for the next life, “the banquet hall,” where there will be “freedom from every yoke.”244 Here we can see that Heschel affirms that doing good will result in some measure of fulfillment in the next life. And he quickly adds that happiness and meaning can be achieved even in this life through doing good, through words that we already saw above: “More precious . . . than all of life to come is a single hour of life on earth—an hour of repentance and good deeds. . . . This is why the Book of Ecclesiastes pronounced the dead lion less happy than the living dog.” So far, then, while some Heschelian passages suggest a certain disconnect between doing good and self-interest, they appear to be counterbalanced—and then some—when read in context.

Passages in Group (B) Notwithstanding what was just said, we have much more to grapple with. On various occasions, Heschel appears to indicate that in doing good, we actually suffer decreases in personal fulfillment, such as happiness: (4) The aim of Jewish piety lies . . . in the maintenance and fanning of a discontent with our aspirations and achievements, in the maintenance and fanning of a craving that knows no satisfaction. Thus, Judaism . . . teaches 242

Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 18–22; Heschel, “Children and Youth,” in IF, 41–42; Heschel, MNA, 189. Heschel, MNA, 224–25. 244 Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 134 (citing Aboth 4:22). 243

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man never to be pleased, to despise satisfaction. . . . It . . . teach[es] him to be content with what he has, but never with what he is.245 (5) Abraham was not going to sacrifice his only son in order to satisfy a personal need, nor did Moses accept the Decalogue for the sake of attaining happiness. The second commandment: “Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image,” has . . . defied rather than satisfied the “religious needs” of many people throughout the ages. . . . As long as man sees in religion the satisfaction of his own needs, a guarantee for immortality or a device to protect society, it is not God whom he serves but himself.246 (6) He [God] tortures our people for [hundreds of years] and then He gives them the assignment to conquer a very difficult land. . . . I tell you that I would have done it differently. . . . I want [Abraham] to be the father of a great people. “Here, go into the land and have it!” No, he has to go through pain and struggle. Why? This is the aspect of mystery in biblical understanding. . . . There is a great deal that we can understand and there is a great deal that God holds in store for Himself.247 (7) Nobody can explain rationally why he should sacrifice his life and happiness for the sake of the good. The conviction that we must obey ethical imperatives is not derived from logical arguments.248 (8) It is not a mechanical, lateral extension of the concern for oneself that brings about the concern for others. The concern for others often demands the price of self-denial. How could self-denial or even self-extinction be explained as a self-extension?249

Here we start with a quotation that indicates that piety leads to a certain lack of subjective happiness, in the sense of contentment or satisfaction with our conduct. This is, indeed, Heschel’s view, although it is also important to 245

Heschel, MNA, 257. For similar quotations, see Heschel, “On Prayer,” in MGSA, 265; Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 402–03; Heschel, WM, 86–87; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 13. And on the fact that those who are religious (including Jews and Christians) preserve a “sense of embarrassment” characterized by a degree of dissatisfaction with their behavior before God, see Heschel, “Yom Kippur,” in MGSA, 147; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 13; Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 240; Heschel, “Choose Life!,” in MGSA, 254; Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 297; Heschel, WM, 113–14. 246 Heschel, MNA, 232–33. See also Heschel, GSM, 350 (which contains part of this quotation). For other passages where Heschel argues that doing good can conflict with our own needs and interests, see Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 402; Heschel, “Religion in a Free Society,” in IF, 8, 14–15; Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 97. 247 Heschel, “Jewish Theology,” in MGSA, 161. On the fact that “religious existence is arduous and full of demands,” see also Heschel, “Protestant Renewal: A Jewish View,” in IF, 175. 248 Heschel, MNA, 167–68. 249 Ibid., 139. For similar reflections, see Heschel, “The Plight of Russian Jews,” in MGSA, 214; Heschel, GSM, 69–70.

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consider that he thinks that piety is generally conducive to “joy” and “peace” (as we saw above), that such dissatisfaction ultimately is overshadowed by joy,250 and that in any case there is a distinction between “anxiety” (which is “important to feel”) and “despair.”251 Moreover, he suggests that a discontented striving to better ourselves is actually necessary for “true fulfillment” and “greatness,” whereas the lack of this struggling would render us “machine[s]” and entail “the end of humanity.”252 The next two passages also suggest that religious practice results in a deficiency of happiness; the former addresses Jewish law, and both passages point to the example of Abraham. But note that Passage (5) does not deny that religion leads one to a blissful afterlife or promotes the well-being of society, but only maintains that a person should not be excessively focused on these things. And keep in mind Heschel’s distinction between authentic and artificial needs; the reference to “religious needs” (in quotation marks) suggests that he has in mind the latter here. In fact, on the page after Passage (5), Heschel asserts (in a quotation we already saw above) that we can convert false needs into true ones: “The purpose of religion is not to satisfy the needs we feel but to create in us the need of serving ends.” As for Passage (6), it does explicitly recognize that doing good can lead to suffering. At the same time, Heschel indicates in this quote that Abraham was able to attain objective meaning in life through being the “father of a great people.”253 And elsewhere, the rabbi intimates that we can achieve a subjective sense of happiness and meaning in this life even in suffering: “What others call readiness to suffer, willingness to relinquish, is felt here as bestowal of joy, as granting of greatness.”254 Next, Passage (7) continues the idea that doing the right thing may not always seem rational, and the allusion to martyrdom in this quotation and Passage (8) presents a particularly strong challenge to the view that doing good always leads to happiness. The fact that Heschel thinks that Jews are very rarely called to give up their lives (in cases where they must avoid very serious sins)255 does not completely eliminate this challenge. Certainly, it cannot be denied that “self-extinction” is incompatible with happiness in this world. That said, 250

Heschel, “On Prayer,” in MGSA, 265. Heschel, “Religion and Race,” in IF, 96. 252 Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 402; Heschel, WM, 87, 113. 253 See also Heschel, MNA, 248. 254 Heschel, “Faith,” in MGSA, 332. 255 Heschel, PT, 309. 251

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Heschel elsewhere indicates that martyrdom does lead to personal fulfillment, particularly objective meaning: “A martyr is a witness to the holy in spite of evil absurdity. . . . Jewish tradition would suggest as the formula for the greatness of man his capacity for kiddush hashem, readiness to die for the sake of God.”256 And, while Heschel does not speak of martyrdom in conjunction with the afterlife, given his belief in it, it is plausible that he would hold that dying for one’s faith leads to fulfillment there. On other occasions, however, the rabbi seems to fray the cord between doing good—namely, adhering to Jewish law and manifesting piety—and freedom: (9) Judaism calls upon us to listen not only to the voice of the conscience but also to the norms of a heteronomous law.257 (10) Whoever sets out on this way [of piety] soon learns how imperious is the spirit. He senses the compulsion to serve, and though at times he may attempt to escape, the strength of this compulsion will bring him back inevitably to the right way in search of the will of God.258

Passage (9) can be explained away relatively easily. Heschel clarifies immediately prior to it that selfish desires can overwhelm the voice of our conscience,259 and a couple of pages later he explains that a “degree of self-control” is actually necessary for “creative living” and “matur[ity].”260 Shortly thereafter, he adds that “the law . . . is a cry for creativity. . . . It is not designed to be a yoke, a curb, a strait jacket for human action.”261 In other words, Heschel seems to be saying that those who follow the divine law rise above their desires and are enabled to enjoy a wide-ranging, “creative” freedom. But Heschel’s perplexing reference to “compulsion” in Passage (10) still remains to be addressed. Certainly, one might reason that Heschel would recognize that the pious man both tames selfish desires and retains some “creative” freedom to select from among morally upright options. But even so, the pious person’s freedom to choose still appears somewhat limited in

256

Heschel, WM, 92. See also Heschel, “Jews in the Soviet Union,” in IF, 268 (suggesting that serving others despite “personal danger” is “the beginning of greatness”). 257 Heschel, GSM, 298. 258 Heschel, MNA, 294. See also ibid., 280. 259 Heschel, GSM, 298. 260 Ibid., 300. 261 Ibid., 307.

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this understanding, and in any case not clearly greater than the evil person’s (given that selfish compulsions are simply replaced by praiseworthy ones).262 An earlier reference to the relationship between piety and freedom in Man Is Not Alone only reinforces the ambiguity: “To the pious man . . . mastery over self is a necessity of life. . . . [H]owever, the pious man feels that he himself is not the autonomous master, but is rather a mediator who administers his life in the name of God.”263 In the end, Heschel’s thoughts do not entirely clarify this relationship. One final passage takes a markedly different tack, but one that arguably follows from the entire discussion of this chapter up to this point: (11) [There is a] polarity which lies at the very heart of Judaism. . . . Thus a mitsvah is both a discipline and an inspiration, an act of obedience and an experience of joy, a yoke and a prerogative. . . . Discrepancy, contention, ambiguity, and ambivalence afflict all of life . . . even the sages of the Talmud disagree on many details of the law.264

Here Heschel appears to simultaneously say that acting well both pleases and shackles us. And it is not as if this meditation on polarity is an isolated one in Heschel’s work; he returns to this idea at length in his final book, A Passion for Truth. We will turn to this work in just a moment, but for now, I want to make the case that in his other major treatises that address ethics, Heschel leans more toward the pole that affirms that morality and personal fulfillment are linked than the one maintaining that they are not, even if he is not fully planted right next to one of these poles. It should be clear that most of the Heschelian passages discussed so far in this chapter align more with the first pole, but I will add a couple of others that are apropos here. In replying to the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, who maintains that ethical conduct requires suffering, Heschel prioritizes joy over discipline: Jewish experience is a testimony to simhah shel mitsvah, “the joy in doing a mitsvah.” Everyone knows that out of suffering goes a way that leads to Him. 262

Cf. Heschel, MNA, 140–41 (where Heschel says that “in every soul there lives incognito a coercion to love”). However, it seems clear that he thinks that those who are self-centered can resist this inclination. 263 Ibid., 280. 264 Heschel, GSM, 341. See also Heschel, “Interview at Notre Dame,” in MGSA, 385 (which contains a very similar quotation); Heschel, “The Individual Jew and His Obligations,” in IF, 196 (which indicates that observant Judaism is both “a burden” and “a joy”).

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Judaism is a reminder that joy is a way to God. The mitsvah and the holy spirit are incompatible with grief or despair. The experience of bliss in doing the good is the greatest moment that mortals know. The discipline, sacrifice, self-denial, or even suffering which are often involved in doing the good do not vitiate the joy; they are its ingredients.265

And while Passage (11) speaks of a mitzvah as both “a yoke and a prerogative,” as we have already seen above, the rabbi explicitly says elsewhere that the law is not meant to be a yoke but rather a pleasing inducement to love. Let us drive the point home with one more quotation: “The psalmist did not feel as if he carried a yoke: ‘Thy statutes have been my songs.’”266 Again, the polarity at issue here has not been entirely resolved, but the needle in the middle has been nudged. And so, after reviewing several more passages that call into question the association between doing good and personal fulfillment, we see that they are largely (even if not entirely) mitigated when viewed in the light of Heschel’s work in general.

Passages in Group (C) Occasionally, Heschel suggests that doing evil could lead to more personal fulfillment than would doing good. In words that are echoed a few times in his corpus, God in Search of Man declares: (12) Does not goodness tend to turn impotent in the face of temptation? Crime, vice, sin offer us rewards; while virtue demands self-restraint, selfdenial. Sin is thrilling and full of excitement. Is virtue thrilling? Are there many mystery stories that describe virtue? Are there many best-selling novels that portray adventures in goodness?267

This quotation and variations on it acknowledge that vice can reward us with a rush of pleasure. Just a couple of pages later, however, Heschel maintains 265

Heschel, GSM, 385 (quoting Shabbat 30b and citing Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, 30; Midrash Tehillim, 112, 1; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Lulav 8:15). Similarly, during a dark period in his life, Maurice Friedman was informed by Heschel “that the joy of the Hasidim came precisely through suffering and not through the absence of suffering.” Friedman, Abraham Joshua Heschel, Philosopher of Wonder, 6. 266 Heschel, “The Mystical Element in Judaism,” in MGSA, 181 (quoting Ps. 119:54). 267 Heschel, GSM, 374. For similar quotations, see also Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 402; Heschel, “Idols in the Temples,” in IF, 58 (immediately after his aforementioned reference to the “difficulties of moral living”); Heschel, MNA, 184.

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that “the seductiveness of vice is excelled by the joys of the mitsvah.”268 In other words, he seems to be saying that doing good leads to a more substantial happiness, one that does not exclude pleasure (for as we saw in the previous chapter, joy includes pleasure). That said, he suggests that faith in God helps us to clearly see that virtue is preferable to vice and to remain committed to the former, although “God’s mercy is so great that He helps even those who don’t believe in him.”269 Perhaps Heschel would grant, then, that both believers and unbelievers can be led to understand that it is virtue that is most seductive.

What about A Passion for Truth? Heschel finished A Passion for Truth only weeks before his death in late 1972. The book is mostly devoted to relating the views of three figures—the eighteenth-century rabbi (and founder of Hasidic Judaism) Baal Shem Tov, the nineteenth-century Hasidic rabbi Menahem Mendl of Kotzk, and the nineteenth-century Danish Christian philosopher Søren Kierkegaard—the first two of whom had a particularly strong influence on Heschel’s own thought. Heschel’s personal reflections on the issues these two thinkers raised are mostly found at the beginning and end of the book. Broadly speaking, the Baal Shem Tov emphasized the sunnier aspects of Judaism, while “the Kotzker” preferred to brood on darker matters. Two passages from A Passion for Truth bear discussion here; the first, from Heschel’s soul-baring introduction to the work, merits extensive quotation. While these two quotations do not directly address the relationship between specific actions and personal fulfillment, they do speak to the question of whether the life of a faithful Jew in general is a fulfilled one. (13) Years later [after Heschel turned nine years old] I realized that, in being guided by both the Baal Shem Tov and the Kotzker, I had allowed two forces to carry on a struggle within me. . . . Was it good to live with one’s heart between the joy of Mezbizh [the Baal Shem Tov’s final home] and the anxiety of Kotzk? To live both in awe and consternation, in fervor and horror, with my conscience on mercy and my

268 269

Heschel, GSM, 376. Ibid.; Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 402.

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eyes on Auschwitz, wavering between exaltation and dismay? . . . I had no choice: my heart was in Mezbizh, my mind in Kotzk. I was taught about inexhaustible mines of meaning by the Baal Shem; from the Kotzker I learned to detect immense mountains of absurdity standing in the way. . . . The one reminded me that there could be a Heaven on earth, the other shocked me into discovering Hell in the alleged Heavenly places in our world. . . . The Baal Shem gave me wings; the Kotzker encircled me with chains. I never had the courage to break the chains and entered into joys with my shortcomings in mind. I owe intoxication to the Baal Shem, to the Kotzker the blessings of humiliation. The Kotzker’s presence recalls the nightmare of mendacity. The presence of the Baal Shem is an assurance that falsehood dissolves into compassion through the power of love. The Baal Shem suspends sadness, the Kotzker enhances it. The Baal Shem helped me to refine my sense of immediate mystery; the Kotzker warned me of the constant peril of forfeiting authenticity.270

Over three hundred pages later, and only three pages before the end of the book, Heschel even seems to sway somewhat in the direction of the Kotzker: (14) Gone for our time is the sweetness of faith. It has ceased to come to us as a gift. It requires “blood, sweat, and tears.” We are frightened by a world that God may be ready to abandon. What a nightmare to live in a cosmic lie, in an absurdity that makes pretensions to beauty.271

Beginning with Passage (13), note that even the Kotzker’s views are arguably compatible with certain dimensions of fulfillment in a person’s life; he insists that we must not “forfeit authenticity” and reminds us of the “blessings of humiliation.” And yet, it is pretty clear that doubts are cast here on whether the life of a Jew is compatible with subjective happiness, objective and subjective meaning, and freedom. Ultimately, Heschel’s last book does indicate a narrow victory in his “struggle,” one that is arguably consistent with his reflections elsewhere. Consider the concluding chapter: It affirms at the outset that the Bible states that “the satisfaction of man’s legitimate needs is a blessing” and

270 271

Heschel, PT, xiv–xv. Ibid., 320. See also ibid., 300–01.

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that “God meant man to delight in living.” But then Heschel points out that the Kotzker would retort: “How is it possible to be comfortably happy in the face of so much mendacity and cruelty?”272 Still, Heschel goes on to say that the Kotzker’s call for completely disinterested self-sacrifice contradicts our intuitions about human nature and God’s “love and compassion” for us.273 Instead, Heschel sees the Kotzker’s views as playing a valuable but limited role; his words serve as “shock treatment” for his listeners and are not an overhaul of Jewish doctrine but a “corrective only.”274 More specifically, the Kotzker’s value is in challenging our “complacency” in the face of dishonesty and the stagnant nature of our religious practice.275 And so, Heschel appears to say, a Jew is not necessarily asked to sacrifice a substantial degree of personal fulfillment, but mainly a superficial kind of satisfaction. But then, only a few pages before the end of the book, we have Passage (14), which takes a seemingly more comprehensive stand against “the sweetness of faith” and in favor of “blood, sweat, and tears,” and also raises the possibility that life could be meaningless. Here too, though, there are mitigating factors. For instance, the paragraph preceding Passage (14) focuses on complacency, so it is possible that Heschel intends to continue to concentrate on that topic, albeit in more sweeping language. After this passage, he clarifies that it is a world full of mendacity that will lead to a “nightmare”; the Holocaust in particular is the fruit of falsehood.276 And while not speaking directly to the issue of subjective happiness, the reflections that follow appear to confirm a relationship between doing good and personal fulfillment. Specifically, Heschel goes on to suggest that “Truth [is] a precarious virtue,” one “that raises the whole man to the level of the Divine.”277 He adds that those who strive toward truth enable “messianic redemption” to start to unfold.278 Lastly, an interview that Heschel gave only ten days before the end of his life279 conveys some of his final thoughts about the relationship between doing good and personal fulfillment. Heschel insists near the start of the 272

Ibid., 308–09. Ibid., 309. See also ibid., 205, 318. 274 Ibid., 310. See also ibid., 317. 275 Ibid., 311, 316–17, 319–20, 322. 276 Ibid., 320–21. See also ibid., 316. 277 Ibid., 322. 278 Ibid., 323. 279 I have relied on Dresner, Heschel, Hasidism, and Halakha, 2, for information on the precise date of this interview. 273

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interview that “I’m still an optimist,” and that “there is a meaning beyond mystery. That holiness conquers absurdity. And without holiness, we will sink in absurdity.”280 In the middle of the interview, in response to a question about “inner peace,” he indicates that it is important to correctly grasp this concept, attacks human complacency, and says that transcending the latter leads to “greatness.”281 Near the end of the interview, he suggests that a commitment to God is conducive to freedom from one’s “mean leanings.”282 And Heschel’s very last response in the interview, addressed to “young people,” confirms the possibility of achieving increases in fulfillment through worthy actions: “Remember that there is a meaning beyond absurdity . . . be sure that every little deed counts . . . and that we can, everyone, do our share to redeem the world in spite of all absurdities and all the frustrations and all disappointments. . . . And . . . remember that life is a celebration or can be a celebration. . . . [We] need[] exultation.”283 Ultimately, while Heschel’s A Passion for Truth at times sounds more pessimistic than his other writings, the sentiments of this work are basically consistent with what he says elsewhere. From his first major work dealing with “the problem of living” (the title of Part II of Man Is Not Alone, 1951) to the last words of his on the record (in late 1972), Heschel continuously argued—with only occasional apparent exceptions—that we are able to achieve increases in personal fulfillment through doing good and that we suffer decreases through doing evil. And so, I think that Merkle obscures an important point when he says that “Heschel never allowed either the Baal Shem or the Kotzker to prevail.”284 More precise is Harold Kasimow, who asserts that “the greatest influence on Heschel has been the way of the Baal Shem. Still the influence of the Kotzker persists.” Kasimow then appeals to not just Heschel’s writings but also his actions to support this point: Like the Kotzker, Heschel could not adjust to the falsehood (sheker) in the world. Yet, in fact, during the last years of his life, Heschel left his study more and more frequently to speak out against the falsehood and corruption he experienced around him. This action of Heschel’s shows his difference from 280

Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 398. See also ibid., 411. Ibid., 402–03. 282 Ibid., 411. 283 Ibid., 412. 284 Merkle, Approaching God, 2. 281

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the Kotzker most dramatically. The Kotzker left society because he was in despair over man’s nature and condition; he then turned his energies to do battle with God. Heschel, in the spirit of the Besht [Baal Shem Tov], never gave up on man.285

In the end, Heschel would point those searching for fulfillment—including objective and subjective happiness, objective and subjective meaning, and freedom—toward serving the needs of others and observing God’s commandments. But he would add a couple of caveats: (1) we should strive to purify our motives and not be too focused on any reward, (2) an ethical life goes hand in hand with a certain lack of satisfaction (with one’s behavior and of one’s preconceived needs), and (3) doing good and religious commitment can lead to a sense of compulsion and even great pain and suffering in some cases. At the same time, he would clarify that discontent and suffering are compatible with a greater satisfaction (both in this life and the next) and conducive to a meaningful existence, and that the compulsion to do good comes with freedom from one’s selfish desires. Let us now turn to John Paul II’s thoughts on these matters.

285

Kasimow, Divine-Human Encounter, 13, n. 63. See also Heschel, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Essential Writings, 75 (expressing his preference in a previously unpublished manuscript to live by a maxim of “to despair is to betray; at the end his mercy will prevail,” rather than “abandon all hope, ye who enter here”); Susannah Heschel, “Introduction,” 18, 25 (“He never despaired—despair is forbidden, he used to say; God is everywhere and never gives us a task without also giving us the strength to carry it out. He was a person who knew how to rejoice. . . . Our family home was filled with laughter, jokes, playfulness.”); Moore, The Human and the Holy, 192–93 (“It would seem that he [Heschel] identified more closely with the Baal Shem [than the Kotzker].”) Of course, as Kasimow acknowledges, the Kotzker never fully left Heschel’s side. One student of Heschel’s comments: The day before he died, I heard him sigh in despair, “While I am absorbed in the writing of a book, I forget myself, engulfed in the overwhelming presence of God. But as soon as I step out of this room, I can hardly bear the burdens of the world around me. Oh, what a tragic world it is.” Jacob Y. Teshima, “My Teacher,” in No Religion Is an Island: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Harold Kasimow and Byron L. Sherwin (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991), 66.

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We now turn to John Paul II’s understanding of the relationship between morality and personal fulfillment. As in the previous chapter, I will begin by highlighting the apparent significance of this question, here by presenting the pope’s contention that all of us look for meaning in life and that such a quest is far from frivolous. Then, I will go on to examine the many considerations put forth by John Paul II (and grounded in both faith and reason) that bear upon the question at hand. In doing so, I will demonstrate that he frequently suggests that doing good does lead to various aspects of fulfillment (including happiness, meaning, freedom, and the development of our full potential in general), while doing evil steers us away from them. While some of his reflections may appear to undermine this position by pointing to the suffering that can result from doing good, ultimately he holds that “with God, all things”—including finding fulfillment in suffering—“are possible.”

The search for meaning as universal and worthwhile At the outset of his encyclical Fides et Ratio, the pope succinctly surveys the history of our search for meaning: A cursory glance at ancient history shows clearly how in different parts of the world, with their different cultures, there arise at the same time the fundamental questions which pervade human life: Who am I? Where have I come from and where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life? These are the questions which we find in the sacred writings of Israel as also in the Veda and the Avesta; we find them in the writings of Confucius

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and Lao-Tze, and in the preaching of Tirthankara and Buddha; they appear in the poetry of Homer and in the tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles as they do in the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle. They are questions which have their common source in the quest for meaning which has always compelled the human heart.1

The universal pursuit of the meaning of life is also reflected in Christian revelation, according to the pope. Veritatis Splendor claims that the rich young man’s question for Jesus—“What good must I do to have eternal life?”—is also about the meaning of life and is “an essential and unavoidable question for the life of every man.”2 Our search is a broad one, looking beyond limited truths toward a purpose for living “in every moment, at life’s most important and decisive times as well as more ordinary times.”3 At the same time, John Paul II refers to a “crisis of meaning” as a distinctive aspect of today’s world. The spread and exchange of so many different worldviews and viewpoints have made it truly difficult to find an answer to the question of meaning.4 Many people, doubting that the real meaning of life can be found, satisfy themselves with “partial and provisional truths.”5 The dizzying array of information in our world has even caused some to ponder whether there is any point to inquiring about the meaning of life in the first place; indeed, many have decided to give up doing so.6 The contemporary challenge to the search for life’s meaning is put forth by not only philosophers but also many laypeople.7 But ultimately, John Paul II suggests that while both of these groups of individuals attempt to stifle the question of the meaning of life, they cannot fully avoid it.8 Our “daily experience of suffering” and knowledge of our impending deaths render this question inescapable.9 In fact, everyone not only asks it but also formulates at least an implicit answer. As the pope explains: “All men and 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

John Paul II, Fides et Ratio (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998), § 1. See also John Paul II, CTH, 78 (citing Second Vatican Council, Nostra Aetate, §§ 1–2); John Paul II, VS §§ 1, 30 (where he comments that people in general long for “true happiness” in addition to “meaning and purpose”), 33; John Paul II, CA, § 24; John Paul II, RH, § 11. John Paul II, VS, §§ 7–8. John Paul II, FR, § 33, n. 28. Ibid., § 81. Ibid., §§ 5–6. Ibid., §§ 5, 81. Ibid., § 5. Ibid., § 27. Ibid., § 26.

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women . . . are in some sense philosophers. . . . In one way or other, they shape a comprehensive vision and an answer to the question of life’s meaning; and in the light of this they interpret their own life’s course and regulate their behaviour.”10 This is a startling claim. In my undergraduate courses, I ask for a show of hands each semester to see who consider themselves philosophers. Usually one or two students, at most, will raise their hands (philosophy majors or minors, perhaps). And yet, the pope suggests that even those who despise philosophy cannot avoid engaging in it as they plot their life’s course: “Whether we admit it or not, there comes for everyone the moment when personal existence must be anchored to a truth recognized as final.”11 The search for the meaning of life is not only universal but also worthwhile, according to John Paul II. He states that our natural inclination to achieve something suggests that that thing actually exists; for example, scientists who have not yet found an explanation for a given phenomenon do not give up the search, but rather stand by their initial sense that an explanation must exist. Similarly, he says that human beings should not forsake the search for answers to “ultimate questions” and, in fact, have “at least an outline” of those answers in their hearts.12 John Paul II’s line of reasoning here recalls C. S. Lewis’s argument for the existence of heaven: just as the cravings for food and sex indicate that these things actually exist, so too does the longing for something beyond our terrestrial existence.13 The pope adds that the fact that many people have arrived at responses similar to ours should strengthen our confidence in our own answers. On the other hand, to snub these questions that are so ingrained in each of us “would cast our existence into jeopardy.”14 Granting once again that we ought to pursue meaning, does ethical practice or the lack thereof assist us in attaining it, along with other dimensions of fulfillment? While the analysis below will address both transcending our own needs and observing religious law, as did Chapter 2, my arrangement of the material here will closely adhere to that of the first chapter of Veritatis Splendor.

10 11 12 13 14

Ibid., § 30. Ibid., § 27. See also ibid., § 29. Ibid., § 29. C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperCollins, 2000 [1952]), 136–37. John Paul II, FR, § 29.

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In other words, I will be using Jesus’s conversation with the rich young man in Mt. 19:16-21 as a template.

“If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” Adherence to the commandments In Chapter 1, I noted several features of the pope’s understanding of religious law: (1) the natural law is closely related to the commandments of Sinai; (2) these commandments include the duty to honor one’s mother and father as well as injunctions against murder, adultery, and false witness; (3) the commandments can be summed up in the directive to love God and neighbor; and (4) Jesus brings out the fullest meaning of the commandments by “interiorizing” them. Here I want to demonstrate that John Paul II often indicates that we can achieve various measures of personal fulfillment through adherence to these commandments. For example, commenting on Jesus’s response to the rich young man—“If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” (Mt. 19:17)—Veritatis Splendor emphasizes that “in this way, a close connection is made between eternal life and obedience to God’s commandments: God’s commandments show man the path of life, and they lead to it.”15 Shortly thereafter, the pope discusses a similar biblical passage, wherein a scholar of the law, like the rich man in the Gospel of Matthew, asks Jesus how to attain eternal life (Lk. 10:25). As John Paul II explains, “Jesus refers him [the scholar] to the two commandments of love of God and love of neighbour (cf. Lk. 10:25-27), and reminds him that only by observing them will he have eternal life: ‘Do this, and you will live’ (Lk. 10:28).”16 For the pope, this “eternal life” refers to sharing in God’s life, our “definitive happiness in

15 16

John Paul II, VS, § 12. See also ibid., § 72. Ibid., § 14. Note the word “only” here. Gilbert Meilaender worries that by speaking of the commandments as a “condition of salvation,” rather than as a “description of being on the way of fellowship with God,” the pope wrongly downplays the importance of grace. Gilbert Meilaender, “Grace, Justification through Faith, and Sin,” in Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics, ed. Hütter and Dieter, 64–65 (quoting John Paul II, VS, §§ 12, 72). For a similar concern, see Goddard, “Veritatis Splendor: Human Freedom and the Splendor of Truth,” 173–76. However, as Spinello points out, the Gospels do often speak of the commandments as a “necessary condition” for salvation. Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 204 (citing Mt. 19:16-20; Mk 7:8-13, 10:17-22, 12:28-34; Lk. 18:18-21). And as we will see, John Paul II believes that grace is also such a condition, and therefore upholds its significance as well.

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union” with him, a state in which there is no suffering, and “in faith . . . a source of meaning” even in this life.17 In addition, the pope affirms the relationship between following God’s law and achieving earthly happiness, as well as fulfillment in general. For example, he remarks that the law is bestowed “to restore man’s original and peaceful harmony with the Creator and with all creation,”18 and is associated in the Psalms with delight and joy.19 Furthermore, both the natural law and the commandments conduce to our “perfection” and enable us to become “conformed to the image of [God’s] Son.”20 Moreover, John Paul II quotes Augustine as saying that “the beginning of freedom” involves avoiding violations of God’s commandments, although “perfect freedom” from our weaknesses is available only in the next life.21 More specifically, the person who adheres to divine law is governed by herself, and not by “blind internal impulse or merely external pressure.”22 Although those who live “by the flesh” sense God’s law as a hindrance to their freedom, those who are filled with love for others “feel an interior urge—a genuine ‘necessity’ and no longer a form of coercion” to carry out the commandments fully, and, with God’s assistance, achieve “full freedom.”23 In general, he maintains that obedience to God’s law should be considered not a “heteronomy” but rather a “participated theonomy.” In other words, God’s law does not contradict our freedom and self-determination, but calls for our sharing in his “wisdom and providence.” We do so by recognizing his commands through our reason and divine revelation.24 Through such participation, “the value of man . . . is most manifested.” Love and Responsibility contrasts this position with Kant’s autonomism, which holds that we truly exhibit our value when we create our own laws for ourselves, but is undermined by the fact that we are not our own cause to begin with.25 17 18 19 20 21 22

23

24 25

John Paul II, VS, § 12; John Paul II, SD, § 15. See also John Paul II, EV, §§ 37–38, 52. John Paul II, VS, § 10 (citing Lev. 26:12). Ibid., § 44 (citing Ps. 1:1-2); John Paul II, EV, § 52 (citing Psalm 119). John Paul II, VS, §§ 15 (citing Col. 3:14), 45 (quoting Rom. 8:29), 51. Ibid., §§ 13, 17 (quoting Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, 41, 10: CCL 36, 363). Ibid., § 42 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes, § 17). Ibid., § 18 (citing Rom. 8:21). See also ibid., §§ 45 (citing 2 Cor. 3:17), 107; John Paul II, FR, § 68; John Paul II, EV, § 49. John Paul II, VS, §§ 40–41. Wojtyła, LR, 232–33. For other passages that point to a harmony of divine law and human freedom, see John Paul II, VS, §§ 17 (citing Gal. 5:13), 35, 45.

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What about those who disregard God’s law? Veritatis Splendor contends that those who “freely and consciously reject[] God . . . in a direct and formal way, in the sins of idolatry, apostasy and atheism; or in an equivalent way, as in every act of disobedience to God’s commandments in a grave matter” commit a mortal sin and lose “eternal happiness” even if they still possess faith.26 The encyclical also indicates that when we fail to obey the natural law, we hinder our fulfillment in this life by “damag[ing] the communion of persons, to the detriment of each.”27 While the pope does not provide a specific example here, recall from the first chapter that he believes the natural law instructs us to “cultivate social life.” Here he is relying on Aquinas, who further specifies that this law involves “avoid[ing] offending those among whom one has to live.”28 To appreciate the pope’s point, consider a society (similar to that portrayed in the movie The Invention of Lying), in which nobody tells a lie, but everybody speaks everything on his or her mind, resulting in some rather uncomfortable situations on dinner dates and in conversations with coworkers. Those who offend others with overtly frank speech in such a society would no doubt ultimately suffer themselves, thanks to the fractured relationships they have left in their wake. While this is a hypothetical and extreme scenario, of course, perhaps it begins to flesh out the pope’s idea that violations of the natural law “damage the communion of persons, to the detriment of each.” Finally, John Paul II quotes Augustine as saying about the commandments that “to the extent to which we serve God we are free, while to the extent that we follow the law of sin, we are still slaves” to our sinful desires.29 The pope adds that secular attempts to achieve a “freedom without law” sometimes lead people to the other extreme of a “law without freedom,” as seen in a worldview that idolizes the natural world and restrains even reasonable alterations to it. In other words, “the loss of contact with God’s wise design” can actually leave each of us “in ‘fear’ of his freedom.”30

26

27 28 29 30

John Paul II, VS, §§ 68, 70 (quoting John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, § 17). Note that Catholics believe they can be forgiven such sins through the sacrament of penance and reconciliation. Ibid., § 51. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 94, a. 2. John Paul II, VS, § 17 (quoting Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, 41, 10). John Paul II, EV, § 22.

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Adherence to the commandment of love: A further exploration With Jesus, the pope maintains that the heart of the commandments is love, as noted above. But what about his pre-papal work on this topic? While Wojtyła does have some reflections on the commandment to love in the concluding chapter of The Acting Person and in passing in Person and Community, he appears to say nothing directly in either of these works about the commandment’s relationship to specific aspects of personal fulfillment. In fact, The Acting Person explicitly distances itself from “the purely ethical content” of this commandment, preferring to dwell in a general manner on what it means to “act[] and exist[] ‘together with others.’ ”31 However, Love and Responsibility does engage in an “ethical analysis of love”32 and offers some pertinent food for thought on the twofold commandment to love God and neighbor. It is to this work that we now turn. To begin with, Wojtyła closely relates this commandment to the “personalistic norm.” This norm has both a negative and positive aspect. The former is that “the person is a kind of good that . . . may not be treated as an object of use and, in this sense, as a means to an end”; this particular imperative is essentially borrowed from Kant’s thought.33 As Adrian Reimers explains, using a person “is an attempt to negate his personhood, whether it be done by the KGB, the former-suitor-turned-stalker, the manipulative work supervisor, or the temperamental child.”34 The latter part of the personalistic norm is that “the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature relation.”35 Wojtyła notes that the personalistic norm is the “ground” for the commandment to love, that the positive aspect of the 31

32

33

34 35

Wojtyła, AP, 295; cf. ibid., appendix, 352. See also ibid., 271–72, 283–84; cf. ibid., appendix, 328–29, 340. The editor of this volume, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, states that she worked with Wojtyła on revisions to the previous chapters, but that the latter was unable to review the “only very slightly edited” final chapter because of his election as pope. She claims that the revisions here are consistent with those to other chapters, although she also includes the unrevised version of the last chapter as an appendix. Ibid., xxiii. At any rate, my claim in the main text is substantiated by the revised and unrevised versions of this chapter. Note that Wojtyła also claims to focus on the “pre-ethical level” of the commandment of love in Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation?,” in PC, 203. This is the title of Part Three of Chapter II (Wojtyła, LR, 101–22), although, as we will see, various other parts of the book also raise ethical considerations. Wojtyła, LR, 24–25; see also ibid., 156. For Wojtyła’s acknowledgment of his debt to Kant here, see ibid., 11, 21, 23; John Paul II, CTH, 200–01; Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in PC, 267. Reimers, Truth About the Good, 170–71. Wojtyła, LR, 25; see also ibid., 156.

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norm and the commandment are worded very similarly, and that the negative aspect and the commandment are incompatible with utilitarianism, which holds that the right action is one that maximizes beneficial consequences, specifically pleasure.36 At the same time, the commandment deals with the “supernatural relation to God and people” and thereby transcends the norm, which is not explicitly religious.37 After the bulk of these reflections on the relationship between the commandment of love and the personalistic norm, Love and Responsibility engages in an extensive analysis of the nature of love itself. Wojtyła commences with the idea that “love is always some reciprocal relation of persons,” and later elaborates that love is a virtue that upholds the value of the person.38 He then discusses the significance of the title of his work; love involves responsibility, a “concern for the true good of the person.” Indeed, love grows as one’s “sense of responsibility” expands, and a love devoid of this sense is mere egoism.39 Wojtyła’s book also addresses the “metaphysical” nature of love, which he says “permeate[s]” (and is permeated by) its ethical nature, “so that in no way can we penetrate one of them without involving the [other].” While he is specifically interested here in the love between a man and a woman, he also says that the elements of love he will be discussing are found “in every kind of love.”40 We will concentrate on those that he substantially connects to the topic of personal fulfillment. For instance, there is love as desire, which he says is manifested in the following statement: “I want you, because you are a good for me.” Such a love is a “longing,” but it is not merely sensual; those who love in such a manner will ensure that lust does not overshadow their attitude toward the other

36 37

38 39 40

Ibid., 19–20, 24–28. Ibid., 197–98. For other references to the personalistic norm in John Paul II’s work, see O’Reilly, Conjugal Chastity in Pope Wojtyla, 80–82 (citing John Paul II, “The Spirit Writes in Your Hearts the Law of God on Marriage,” Homily in Madrid, February 11, 1982, para. 5; Wojtyła, “The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics,” in PC, 289). O’Reilly himself thinks it is better to understand the personalistic norm as a general rule that applies in “99% of all cases,” rather than as an absolute one, given the existence of rare cases in which “the other person may be put to the service of an end to which he does not agree, provided this can be done without the person acting against his conscience and provided that the end of the principal agent is an objectively good end.” Here he offers the examples of asking a communist to deliver a letter whose contents (unbeknownst to her) are anticommunist, and of God’s “us[ing] the Scribes and Pharisees ‘as blind tools’ in the mystery of Redemption.” Ibid., 92–95, 106–08, 117. Wojtyła, LR, 57, 106. Ibid., 112–13. Ibid., 57, 78.

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person. While the person longed for is, in some sense, “useful” to the person longing, this “is different from being an object for use.” Therefore, genuine love as desire is consistent with the personalistic norm and does not lapse into utilitarianism. Such a love is not limited to love between man and woman, but can also be found in one’s love and longing for God.41 However, love between persons is stunted if it is purely limited to love as desire; one must long first and foremost for the other person’s good. At this point in his analysis, Wojtyła (relying on Aquinas) introduces “love as benevolence,” in which there is a lack of concern for the self. This form of love is “most pure” and is encapsulated in the following statement: “‘I do not long for you as a good,’ but ‘I long for your good.’ ”42 Still, Wojtyła recognizes that human beings by nature are not able to be fully disinterested,43 and love between a man and woman, in particular, will necessarily include some desire. But also, wherever there is authentic desire, there must be at least a semblance of benevolence, since desiring someone else as a good for oneself includes the wish that that person genuinely be a good.44 And so, the two forms of love can not only peacefully coexist—“Y can long for X as a good for himself and at the same time long for a good for X”—but, indeed, necessarily do so.45 This mixture (so to speak) of love as desire and benevolence is indeed authentic love, for the fact that love is inextricably intertwined with self-interest need not undermine it.46 In an essay commenting on Veritatis Splendor, John Giles Milhaven offers some interesting considerations that bolster what Wojtyła is saying here. Arguing that self-love is an important aspect of love in “Catholic Christianity,” Milhaven notes that Christian martyrs ultimately gain their lives through self-sacrifice, and adds that “modern Christian exalting and urging of

41 42 43 44 45 46

Ibid., 64–65. Ibid., 66–67. Ibid., 188. Ibid., 67. Ibid., 69, 78. Ibid., 188. Admittedly, Wojtyła is somewhat unclear on the place, if any, of self-interest in love. In fact, earlier on this page, he remarks that “tenderness can be completely disinterested,” although he immediately adds that “this disinterestedness recedes” in light of “the need to satisfy one’s affectivity.” Consider also Wojtyła’s earlier declaration in an article not yet published in English: “Love excludes self-interest; love is disinterested in its very essence.” Woznicki, A Christian Humanism, 33 (quoting “Problem bezinteresownosci” [The problem of disinterestedness], Tygodnik Powszechny, 34 [1957], 7). For further discussion, see O’Reilly, Conjugal Chastity in Pope Wojtyla, 7–36.

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‘selfless love’ leave me bewildered.”47 Still, Wojtyła says, love should continually strive toward benevolence.48 Wojtyła eventually moves to discuss a final form of love: “spousal love.” This “consists precisely in the fact of giving oneself, of making one’s nontransferable and incommunicable ‘I’ someone else’s possession.”49 It involves the choice of another person in a manner that respects her value and is not simply dictated by “sensual and affective” reactions.50 Wojtyła suggests that marriage must involve such spousal love if it is to abide by the commandment of love and the personalistic norm.51 And while spousal love strives even further on behalf of another than other elements of love, it can only develop in conjunction with them, notably benevolence.52 As for particular manifestations of spousal love, Love and Responsibility maintains that marriage is certainly a primary one.53 But Wojtyła also explains that a decision to remain a virgin in order to commit oneself to God also exhibits this kind of love.54 He is not entirely clear on the question of whether spousal love can also be found in other relationships (e.g., mother/ child, doctor/patient, teacher/student, pastor/soul); at the least, he allows the possibility that these relationships can reflect a “full self-giving” love.55 At any rate, when it comes to virginal spousal love and, indeed, any “great love,” God’s grace or assistance is necessary to make that possible.56 What does all of this have to do with personal fulfillment? For Wojtyła, love in general causes our “potentiality [to be] actualized most fully” and “fully develops the existence of the person.”57 In addition, a mature love that affirms the value of another person and is not just based on emotional experiences 47

48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

John Giles Milhaven, “The Nature of Christian Love,” in Veritatis Splendor: American Responses, ed. Allsopp and O’Keefe, 245. Wojtyła, LR, 67. Ibid., 80. See also ibid., 111. Milhaven critiques Veritatis Splendor for focusing on the giving aspect of love but not on the important element of reciprocity. Milhaven, “The Nature of Christian Love,” 245–50. However, Evangelium Vitae, A Theology of the Body, and Love and Responsibility all show that John Paul II is cognizant of the dimension of reciprocity. John Paul II, EV, § 81 (“The meaning of life is found in giving and receiving love.”); John Paul II, TB, § 17 (general audience of February 6, 1980); Wojtyła, LR, 67–71. Wojtyła, LR, 111, 113–16. Ibid., 81–82. Ibid., 78, 82–83. Ibid., 81. Ibid., 237. Ibid., 80–81. Ibid., 121–22, 237. Ibid., 66.

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leads to subjective happiness; the person is “free[d]” from “anxiety” and becomes “peaceful and certain” by focusing on the other rather than oneself.58 Love and Responsibility also suggests that such a love leads to meaning in life, for it provides “some sense of the ‘absolute’. . . . Indeed, love is the highest moral value.”59 The “sense of responsibility” inherent in true love may be “at times full of concern, but it is never in itself unpleasant or painful,” because it leads to one’s “enrichment and expansion.”60 A love that includes benevolence, in particular, “perfects its object . . . [and] develops most fully both his existence and the existence of the person to whom it turns.”61 And “love-virtue” that combines desire with benevolence proves to be stable and therefore a “source of peace and joy.”62 Spousal love, especially, enables one “to exist more fully,” even more so than any other kind of love.63 In other words, a person who donates himself fully to another discovers “paradox[ically]” that he “is not in the least destroyed or devalued, but on the contrary, is developed and enriched.” To buttress this point, Wojtyła relies on the authority of Jesus’s words in the Gospel of Matthew: “Whoever wants to save his soul will lose it, and whoever loses his soul for my sake will find it.”64 In fact, both before and after becoming pope, John Paul II repeatedly affirms that through self-gift in general we “fully find” or “become[]” ourselves, often appealing to the Second Vatican Council in support of this point.65 In particular, the pope stresses that as per Jesus’s vivid imagery in Matthew 25—wherein the sheep are those who carry out good works and are rewarded with eternal life, while the goats neglect these and are sent to hell—it is “essential” for entry into heaven to make a gift of self that is patterned after that of the Good Samaritan.66 He also contends that we have a “need to give [ourselves] to another person,” implying that such an act 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66

Ibid., 116. Ibid., 120–21. Ibid., 113. Ibid., 67. See also ibid., 70. Ibid., 69–70. Ibid., 108. Ibid., 79–80 (quoting Mt. 10:39). Ibid., 242; John Paul II, Gratissimam Sane, §§ 11 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 24), 16; John Paul II, SD, § 28 (quoting the same passage); Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in PC, 194 (quoting the same passage); Wojtyła, “The Family as a Community of Persons,” in PC, 321–22 (quoting the same passage). John Paul II, SD, §§ 28, 30 (citing Mt. 25:34-36, 40, 45).

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leads to earthly satisfaction as well.67 Pointing to the example of martyrs, he suggests that self-giving helps one manifest “the truth about life” and achieve “a fullness of certainty and security” regarding it—or in other words, we might say, realize some measure of subjective meaning (albeit fleeting in this life in the case of martyrs), as well as objective significance.68 In Evangelium Vitae, he is more explicit, contending that “love, as a sincere gift of self, is what gives the life and freedom of the person [its] truest meaning,” and that “authentic freedom” is “actualized” and “realize[d]” through this gift69—and in Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła confirms that our calling or purpose in life involves the willingness to engage in a loving donation of self.70 In summary, then, John Paul II often affirms that love and, especially, selfgift lead to certain increases in happiness, meaning, and fulfillment in general. (It is not as clear whether he thinks such love leads to an increase in freedom, as we will see below.) On the other hand, a lack of love leads us away from said fulfillment: “Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it.”71 Referring to the relationship between a man and a woman in particular, he states that a person who sees another only as a means to an end (thereby violating the personalistic norm at the basis of the commandment to love) and disregards her value sets himself up for an inevitable “conflict of mutual interests” and “one of the greatest sufferings” when the structure of their relationship falls apart.72 To put it another way, the person who bases his relationship to another person on an “affective reaction” rather than that person’s true worth is susceptible to a “sense of disappointment” when that reaction fades.73 Finally, Wojtyła 67 68 69 70

71 72 73

Wojtyła, LR, 239. John Paul II, FR, § 32. John Paul II, EV, §§ 81, 92, 96. Wojtyła, LR, 242, 244. Although he explicitly acknowledges that both men and women are called to this kind of love, John Paul II has written at length on how women, in particular, “fulfil their deepest vocation” and make a significant impact on the world through their self-giving efforts, including those in the workplace and as mothers. John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1988), §§ 17–19, 21, 24, 27, 30–31; John Paul II, Letter to Women (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1995), §§ 2–4, 9–12. John Paul II, RH, § 10. Wojtyła, LR, 110. Ibid., 61–62. See also ibid., 112, 116.

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indicates that he who “fundamentally disposes himself toward securing his own egoism” sacrifices some freedom, for that person even begins to regard himself as “a means and a tool.”74 Before leaving the topic of love, it is worth briefly mentioning that John Paul II also connects it to another virtue, that of solidarity. In his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, he defines solidarity as “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good,” and goes on to explain that it calls for the “total gratuity, forgiveness and reconciliation,” as well as self-sacrifice, that is characteristic of true love of neighbor.75 When we possess the virtue of solidarity, we are enabled “to see the ‘other’—whether a person, people, or nation” not merely as a means to economic productivity “but as our ‘neighbor,’ a ‘helper,’ ” in the same way that Adam regarded Eve upon her creation.76 Through such an approach, tensions within society can be reduced, and a more peaceful society attained.77 Indeed, a “stable peace” without solidarity 74

75

76 77

Ibid., 23–24. Love and Responsibility also expounds at length on the relationship between traditional sexual morality and personal fulfillment, drawing from the author’s “indirect experience proceeding from pastoral work” with couples. Ibid., xxi. For instance, the virtue of chastity, which is related to the virtues of temperance and love, and involves the moderation of one’s sexual impulses, is “a difficult and long-term affair,” but also “a reliable way” to joy and “the true perfection of a rational being,” as well as to emancipation from impurity. Ibid., 127–29, 152–57. More specifically, relying on “medical sexology,” Wojtyła states that sex within marriage should be pleasurable for both spouses, involving mutual climax and a lack of “fear of a child.” On the other hand, sex outside of marriage, even if accompanied by “complete sexual satisfaction,” leads to such a fear, causes a “conflict with conscience [that] may contribute even to disturbing the natural biological rhythm,” and is not a dependable indicator of a lasting marriage. Ibid., 257–58, 261–62. Moreover, contraceptives can interfere with the pleasure of the sexual act and even be harmful to one’s health, and abortion “evokes an anxiety-depressive neurosis with a predominant sense of guilt” and can lead to resentment of the male partner who sanctions it. Conversely, natural family planning, even when accompanied by the difficulties of the period of sexual abstinence that it requires, is “healthy,” “free from all those neuroses,” and facilitates the couple’s love through concern for the other person’s dignity. Ibid., 223–24, 227, 266–69. I realize that much more could be said here regarding the pope’s views on sexual ethics and its relationship to fulfillment. For further reading, see John Paul II, CTH, 206–07 (contending that a pro-life perspective is also “pro woman” and that “the experiences of many counseling centers” demonstrate that women really do not want to abort); Wojtyła, “The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics: Reflections and Postulates,” in PC, 279–99 (e.g., 298–99, concluding that living in accord with Catholic sexual ethics “brings happiness”); Wojtyła, “The Teaching of the Encyclical Humanae Vitae on Love: An Analysis of the Text,” in PC, 300–14 (e.g., 305–06, 312, affirming that while marital fidelity is not easy, experience shows that “it is in some way a source of profound and lasting happiness,” and that through natural family planning “the spouses fully develop their personalities, being enriched with spiritual values” [quoting Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, §§ 9, 21]); John Paul II, TB (e.g., § 124.2 [general audience of August 29, 1984], which also quotes § 21 of Humanae Vitae, and §§ 128–29 [general audiences of October 24 and October 31, 1984], suggesting that self-control in matters of sex liberates a person from “inner tensions”). John Paul II, SRS, §§ 38, 40. See also John Paul II, CA, § 10 (speaking of solidarity in terms of “social charity”) (quoting Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, III); Wojtyła, AP, 283–85 (connecting solidarity to the common good but not explicitly to love); cf. ibid., appendix, 340–42. John Paul II, SRS, § 39 (citing Gen. 2:18-20). Ibid., §§ 39–40.

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“frequently proves to be illusory.”78 And so, the pope appears to affirm that solidarity fosters our own objective happiness.79

Adherence to the commandment “you shall not kill” Having investigated the commandments in general, and love as the heart of them, I now want to discuss a particular one that Evangelium Vitae examines in great depth: the proscription against murder. As the pope points out, this particular commandment is the first one that Jesus names in response to the rich young man’s query regarding which commandments he ought to follow.80 What exactly does it mean? Referencing Exod. 21:12-27 and 23:7, the pope explains that the commandment certainly prohibits the killing of innocents, but also that it was eventually understood by Israel to “prohibit[] all personal injury inflicted on another.” At the same time, the penal legislation of Israel still sanctioned capital (and extreme corporal) punishment.81 John Paul II contends that Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount further “refine[d]” the “sense of the value of life,” and he states that “the overall message” of respect for life “which the New Testament will bring to perfection” is simply, “You shall love your neighbour as yourself.”82 And particularly in light of increased security in modern prisons, instances in which the death penalty is permissible in order to defend society “are very rare, if not practically non-existent.”83 Evangelium Vitae also clarifies that it is difficult to abide by the commandment not to kill if one neglects “the other ‘words of life.’ ” And why does he say this? The idea is that if one begins to ignore God’s other commandments, one develops a mind-set that is tempted to make exceptions even to the one that forbids killing.84 For John Paul II, there is a correlation between following the commandment not to kill and personal fulfillment. Evangelium Vitae emphasizes that Jesus 78 79

80 81 82 83 84

John Paul II, EV, § 70. In his Letter to the Elderly, John Paul II specifically suggests that the elderly and their family members can “draw[] enrichment from the gifts and charisms” of each other through the practice of solidarity. Tranzillo, John Paul II and the Vulnerable, 290 (quoting John Paul II, Letter to the Elderly, § 10). For more on the (somewhat imprecise) nature of solidarity (e.g., as a virtue, a principle, and a duty) in the thought of John Paul II, and the necessity of it for achieving peace and being “fully human,” see Meghan J. Clark, The Vision of Catholic Social Thought: The Virtue of Solidarity and the Praxis of Human Rights (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), 24–33, 39–42. John Paul II, EV, §§ 41, 52 (citing Mt. 19:18). Ibid., § 40. Ibid. (quoting Lev. 19:18). See also ibid., § 41. Ibid., § 56. Ibid., § 48 (citing Acts 7:38).

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includes this commandment in the ones that the rich young man must follow to achieve eternal life.85 And noting that God’s law in general “serves to protect life,” the encyclical suggests that following this law can lead to earthly blessings (objective happiness, in other words) for people today, just as it did for the Israelites. On this point, the pope quotes Deut. 30:15-16: “If you obey the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you this day . . . then you shall live and multiply, and the Lord your God will bless you in the land which you are entering to take possession of.” Continuing on, he quotes Bar.  4:1 in remarking that adhering to God’s law enables us “to bring forth fruits of life and happiness: ‘All who hold her fast will live, and those who forsake her will die.’ ”86 And a few sections later, he reiterates that God’s law, “including the commandment ‘You shall not kill’ . . . is always a gift meant for man’s growth and joy.”87 The pope indicates in the same breath that respect for life leads to meaning and freedom. Reflecting on the “law of life,” which includes the commandment not to kill, he states that it should not be seen as onerous, for “life finds its full meaning” and “very purpose” in keeping this law.88 Additionally, abiding by the proscription of killing is “the start of true freedom.”89 The foregoing considerations are concisely summed up in the introduction to Evangelium Vitae: “Respect, protect, love and serve life, every human life! Only in this direction will you find justice, development, true freedom, peace, and happiness!”90 It follows that if we disregard the law of life, “it is altogether impossible for life to remain authentic and complete.” The person who does not respect and protect life is “condemn[ed] . . . to meaninglessness and unhappiness.”91 Furthermore, “to claim the right to abortion, infanticide and euthanasia, and to recognize that right in law, means to attribute to human freedom a perverse and evil significance: that of an absolute power over others and against others. This is the death of true freedom: ‘Truly, truly, I say to you, every one who commits sin is a slave to sin.’ ”92 And while respecting life leads to eternal life, the pope notes 85 86 87 88 89

90 91 92

Ibid., §§ 52, 54 (citing Mt. 19:16-19). Ibid., § 48. Ibid., § 52. Ibid., § 48. Ibid., § 76. See also ibid., § 75 (citing Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, 41, 10: CCL 36, 363). Ibid., § 5. Ibid., § 48. Ibid., § 20 (quoting Jn 8:34). See also ibid., § 96.

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that Jesus ominously states that killing or even simply being angry with another makes one “liable to judgment,”93 and that the apostle John similarly affirms that “anyone who hates his brother is a murderer, and you know that no murderer has eternal life abiding in him.”94 That said, as John Paul II acknowledges, God somewhat spared the first murderer, Cain; while he is forced to become “a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth,” he also has a mark placed upon him so that no one might murder him in turn, even out of righteous vengeance.95

The inviolability of the commandments A final aspect of John Paul II’s understanding of the Ten Commandments is his belief that they are fundamentally inviolable. Addressing the positive ones, Veritatis Splendor affirms (along with the Second Vatican Council) that they are “universally binding” and “unchanging.”96 In particular, “it is right and just, always and for everyone, to serve God, to render him the worship which is his due and to honor one’s parents as they deserve.” That being said, the pope does allow some flexibility with the positive commandments; more specifically, “coercion or other circumstances” can prevent a person from doing particular good actions.97 While the pope does not provide a concrete example here, we can consider one in order to see more clearly what he might have in mind. According to Catholic teaching, the Third Commandment (which calls for people to keep the Sabbath, or rest, day holy) obliges Catholics to attend Mass on Sunday, but church law also recognizes that one can be excused from this obligation “because of lack of a sacred minister or for other grave cause.” No “other grave cause” is specified in the text of this law, although an English-language commentary to it notes that 93 94 95

96 97

Ibid., § 41 (quoting Mt. 5:21-22). Ibid., § 54 (quoting 1 Jn 3:15). Ibid., § 9 (quoting Gen. 4:14-15 and citing Ambrose, De Cain et Abel, II, 10, 38: CSEL, 32, 408). One additional commandment discussed by John Paul II is the commandment to rest on the Sabbath. While I will not be addressing this one in depth, note that he also joins it to personal fulfillment. More specifically, he says that in celebrating this day (which Catholics and other Christians observe on Sunday, the day of Jesus’s resurrection), one experiences the joy with which the apostles encountered their risen Lord, fulfills her calling to witness to others that Jesus triumphs over death, and “is led towards the goal of eternal life.” John Paul II, Dies Domini, §§ 1 (citing Ps. 118:24 and Jn 20:19–23), 26, 55–58, 61, 75. At the same time, he also recognizes the value of work, stating that through it (and the “virtue of industriousness”) a person contributes both to “earthly progress” and “the development of the Kingdom of God,” realizes her God-given purpose, and “achieves fulfillment as a human being.” John Paul II, Laborem Exercens (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1981), §§ 4, 9, 25–27. John Paul II, VS, § 52 (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 10). Ibid.

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“the sick, home-bound, prisoners, etc., who are unable to go to church” can be exempted (although in these cases watching a televised Mass may be a suitable alternative).98 The negative commandments, on the other hand, do prohibit certain actions under all circumstances, as section fifty-two of Veritatis Splendor makes particularly clear. While a person can be prevented from fulfilling positive obligations, he “can never be hindered from not doing certain actions, especially if he is prepared to die rather than to do evil,”99 as, indeed, many martyrs have done.100 As far as which particular negative commandments are exceptionless, the pope turns once again to the story of the rich young man: “As we have seen, Jesus himself reaffirms that these prohibitions allow no exceptions: ‘If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. . . . You shall not murder, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, You shall not bear false witness.’ ”101 For John Paul II, then, there is a close relationship between following exceptionless moral norms and achieving eternal life. The Church compassionately promotes the full moral truth, which includes these norms and contributes “to the growth of [our] freedom and to the attainment of [our] happiness.”102 In addition, the pope nods toward a connection between these unchanging rules and fulfillment in general: “Only by obedience to universal moral norms does man find full confirmation of his personal uniqueness and the possibility of authentic moral growth.” The Church’s defense of these norms is also a “service” to the wider community; when we respect them, we secure for our society “a just and peaceful human coexistence,”103 or in other words, an objectively happy way of being. On the other hand, a failure to protect

98

John M. Huels, O.S.M., “Sacred Places and Times,” in New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, ed. John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green (New York: Paulist Press, 2000), 1445–46 (on Canons 1247 and 1248). 99 John Paul II, VS, § 52. 100 Ibid., § 90. 101 Ibid, § 52 (quoting Mt. 19:17-18). See also ibid., §§ 76, 90–91 (citing Dan. 13:22-23), 95–97; John Paul II, EV, § 75 (quoting Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, 41, 10: CCL 36, 363 in saying that there are no exceptions to the laws against “murder, adultery, fornication, theft, fraud, sacrilege and so forth.”). 102 John Paul II, VS, § 95. See also ibid., §§ 85, 96; John Paul II, EV, § 75 (citing Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, 41, 10: CCL 36, 363). 103 John Paul II, VS, § 96. See also John Paul II, EV, §§ 71, 101 (citing Paul VI, Message for the 1977 World Day of Peace: AAS 68 [1976], 711–12).

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inviolable rights only leads to tensions between citizens and their government, and even “violence,” as manifested “by the totalitarianisms of this century.”104 Note that while John Paul II argues in favor of exceptionless moral norms, the concluding section of Chapter I of Veritatis Splendor does acknowledge that the understanding and application of religious law is an ongoing process in the light of “new historical and cultural situations.”105 Here is where the Roman Catholicity of John Paul II’s blueprint for achieving fulfillment comes through; he begins by skipping ahead to the end of the Gospel of Matthew, where Jesus assures his apostles, “Lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age” (Mt. 28:20). For the pope, this passage suggests that Jesus remains with his Church today, and together with Lk. 10:16—“He who hears you hears me”—indicates that the “task of interpreting” the commandments was given by Jesus “to the Apostles and their successors.”106 And in continuity with the Second Vatican Council, he confirms that today that task is entrusted to the Magisterium of the Church. Indeed, by correctly teaching on matters of morality, the Magisterium facilitates the salvation of souls and human freedom.107 And so, John Paul II ultimately suggests that to achieve different dimensions of personal fulfillment, it is important to not only follow the exceptionless commandments but also rely on the assistance of the Magisterium in interpreting them. Commenting on these papal reflections, William Spohn contends that Veritatis Splendor proposes neither a Christonomous nor a theonomous, but a “hieronomous,” ethics.108 It is true that this encyclical does reserve the final word on moral matters to the Magisterium; the pope maintains that the Church is not a democracy.109 However, Veritatis Splendor also makes room for 104

John Paul II, RH, § 17. John Paul II, VS, § 27. Ibid., §§ 25, 27. 107 Ibid., § 27 (citing Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, § 10; Code of Canon Law, Canon 747, 2). See also ibid., §§ 64, 110. For example, as we have begun to see, Church teaching interprets “you shall not kill” as proscribing abortion, euthanasia, and (generally) the death penalty, but as allowing self-defense. Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§ 2263–67, 2270–83. 108 Spohn, “Morality on the Way of Discipleship,” 102; see also Curran, “Veritatis Splendor: A Revisionist Perspective,” 239–40. Along these lines, Curran here and other authors suggest the Magisterium would do well to adopt a more humble approach in its moral proclamations given previous reversals on the issues of religious liberty and lending money at interest, respectively, both of which the Church now accepts. See Dennis M. Doyle’s remarks in Lawrence S. Cunningham et al., “Veritatis Splendor,” Commonweal 120, no. 18 (1993): 13–14; Theodor Dieter, “Conscience and Magisterium in Veritatis Splendor,” in Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics, ed. Hütter and Dieter, 154–55. For attempts to show that the Church has not contradicted itself on its teachings on these issues throughout history, see Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., “Religious Freedom: A Developing Doctrine,” in Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., Church and Society: The Laurence J. McGinley Lectures, 1988-2007 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008 [2001]), 348–59; May and Brugger, “John Paul II’s Moral Theology on Trial,” 284–92. 109 John Paul II, VS, §§ 110, 113. 105 106

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a bottom-up approach to Church teaching; with the Second Vatican Council, the encyclical holds that the Holy Spirit guarantees that “the universal body of the faithful” is infallible “when, ‘from the bishops to the last of the lay faithful,’ it expresses the consensus of all in matters of faith and morals.”110 While the pope does not provide an example of this approach in action, one would be the Immaculate Conception; in the 1800s, a wide swath of Catholic faithful began believing that Mary was conceived without original sin, and noticing this groundswell of support, Pope Pius IX effectively rubberstamped it as official Church teaching.111 Veritatis Splendor also maintains that theologians can assist the Magisterium in explaining its teachings to a contemporary audience.112 But while the joint effort “to discover the most adequate formulation for universal and permanent moral norms in the light of different cultural contexts” is important, these norms do “remain valid in their substance.”113 There are certain objective truths that transcend given historical situations; to hold otherwise “would not only conflict with common experience, but would render meaningless Jesus’ reference to the ‘beginning’ ” early in Matthew 19, in which he asserts that the custom of divorce contradicts God’s original intent.114

“If you wish to be perfect . . . sell your possessions . . . then come, follow me” The Beatitudes At any rate, the commandments are not the only word in biblical morality for John Paul II. Recall from Chapter 1 that after Jesus tells the rich man to keep all of the commandments, the man presses on further: “I have kept all these; what do I still lack?” And Jesus responds, “If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow me.” And as I mentioned in Chapter 1, the pope contends that this mention of the poor brings to mind the Beatitudes (toward which the commandments are ultimately oriented), and in particular the 110

Ibid., § 109 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium, § 12 and citing 1 Jn 2:20, 27). 111 Avery Dulles, The New World of Faith (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 2000), 99–100. 112 John Paul II, VS, § 29 (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 62). 113 Ibid., § 53. 114 Ibid. (citing Mt. 19:1-9).

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Beatitude of the “poor in spirit.” While Veritatis Splendor only briefly discusses the Beatitudes (and does not actually name any others), the encyclical does take care to demonstrate their connection to eternal life. Specifically, John Paul II states that they too answer the young man’s original question (“What good must I do to have eternal life?”); “each of [them] promises . . . that very ‘good’ which opens man up to eternal life and indeed is eternal life.”115 In A Theology of the Body, the pope mentions a second beatitude, “Blessed are the pure of heart,” which he says refers to the virtue of purity116 (which I briefly discussed in Chapter 1). Elsewhere in these talks, he clarifies that “purity” includes “keep[ing] [one’s] own body with holiness and reverence.”117 According to the pope, purity is also connected to personal fulfillment, for it “signifies being free from every kind of sin or guilt” and involves “find[ing] joy.”118 While he does not specifically elaborate on the relationship between other particular Beatitudes and fulfillment (eternal or otherwise), a look at the full list in the Gospel of Matthew both confirms and expands upon the aforementioned reflections: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are they who mourn, for they will be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the land. Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be satisfied. Blessed are the merciful, for they will be shown mercy. Blessed are the clean of heart, for they will see God. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. Blessed are they who are persecuted for the sake of righteousness, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you when they insult you and persecute you and utter every kind of evil against you [falsely] because of me. Rejoice and be glad, for your reward will be great in heaven. (Mt. 5:3-12, New American Bible, rev. ed.)

Serving authentic needs While Mt. 19:21 calls for selling what one has, and while John Paul II elsewhere explicitly points to the importance of sharing one’s possessions,119 115

Ibid., § 16. On how the poverty of spirit manifested by the elderly can provide a meaningful “witness” to others, see William Brennan, John Paul II: Confronting the Language Empowering the Culture of Death (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2008), 120 (quoting “Sunday 30 November: To the Elderly in the Home of the Little Sisters of the Poor,” L’Osservatore Romano, December 9, 1986, 23). 116 John Paul II, TB, § 50:1 (general audience of December 10, 1980) (quoting Mt. 5:8). 117 Ibid., §§ 54:1-3 (general audience of January 28, 1981) (quoting 1 Thess. 4:3-5), 55:5, 7 (general audience of February 4, 1981) (citing 1 Thess. 4:4 and 1 Cor. 12:18-25); 57:2 (general audience of March 18, 1981) (quoting 1 Thess. 4:3-5). 118 Ibid., §§ 58:4, 7 (general audience of April 1, 1981). 119 John Paul II, CA, § 30 (citing Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, § 22 and Aquinas).

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he also acknowledges that it is legitimate to satisfy certain individual needs. For instance, it is important for people to have sufficient and proportionate material goods.120 There is also “a true right to self-defence,” based on the Gospel command to “love your neighbor as yourself,” although in light of the Sermon on the Mount’s counsel to “turn the other cheek” (Mt. 5:38–40, New American Bible, rev. ed.), one can heroically renounce this right.121 That said, Centesimus Annus clearly distinguishes between “principal and authentic needs” and “individual and secondary needs”; it says that the former “ought to regulate the manner of satisfying” the latter.122 The proper orientation of work is not only to one’s own needs but also to “the needs of his family, his community, his nation and ultimately all humanity.”123 Elsewhere, the encyclical borrows a similar dichotomy from the philosopher Gabriel Marcel when it criticizes an approach to the world that “is directed towards ‘having’ rather than ‘being’ and which wants to have more not in order to be more, but in order to spend life in enjoyment as an end in itself.”124 The art of “being” is not limited to the divestment of certain possessions for the purpose of serving the “essential needs” of another, but includes promoting development through such measures as investment and a “change of life-styles.”125 Ultimately, he asserts, “personal interest and the interests of society” must be balanced in a “fruitful harmony.”126 For John Paul II, striking this balance conduces to our own fulfillment. On the one hand, securing basic goods for ourselves is certainly “a necessary condition for human existence and . . . help[s] make [our] lives truly human.”127 On the other hand, the underprivileged among us provide “an opportunity for showing kindness and a chance for greater enrichment.”128 More concretely, promoting the interests of the poor, including employment opportunities, can contribute to the “moral, cultural, and even economic growth of all humanity.”129 In addition, the “essential meaning” of the “kingship . . . over 120

Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in PC, 268. John Paul II, EV, § 55. 122 John Paul II, CA, § 41 (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 26). 123 Ibid., § 43. 124 Ibid., § 36. See also John Paul II, SRS, § 28; John Paul II, RH, § 16 (acknowledging his debt to “a contemporary philosopher”); Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in PC, 268 (crediting Marcel). 125 John Paul II, CA, §§ 36, 58; John Paul II, RH, § 16. 126 John Paul II, CA, § 25. 127 Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in PC, 268. 128 John Paul II, CA, § 58. 129 Ibid., § 28. 121

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the visible world” to which we are “call[ed]” is in “the primacy of the person over things.”130 Finally, John Paul II suggests that detachment from worldly goods leads to eternal life. Veritatis Splendor quotes Mt. 19:29 to this effect: “Every one who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or children or lands, for my name’s sake, will receive a hundredfold and inherit eternal life.”131 Conversely, a failure to maintain the aforementioned balance is counterproductive to our own interests. For instance, the pope speaks of those “who do not succeed in realizing their basic human vocation because they are deprived of essential goods.”132 And he suggests that if society does not make sufficient allowance for personal interests and, instead, implements “a burdensome system of bureaucratic control which dries up the wellsprings of initiative and creativity,” this will not only restrict our freedom but also jeopardize societal stability.133 At the same time, consumerism hinders people from “experienc[ing] their personhood in an authentic and concrete way,” particularly when abetted by media “which impose fashions and trends of opinion through carefully orchestrated repetition.”134 One “striking example of artificial consumption contrary to the health and dignity of the human person . . . is the use of drugs . . . [which] implies a . . . destructive ‘reading’ of human needs.”135 Moreover, those who ignore the legitimate economic needs of others may invite retaliatory violence, as demonstrated by “many wars,” in contrast to those who promote the “spiritual and human development of all” and find peace as a result.136 Other dimensions of fulfillment are also incompatible with materialism. The pope speaks to a deprivation of not only objective but also subjective happiness; he claims that our shared human experience points to a “radical dissatisfaction” with “pure consumerism,” because the inordinate craving for material goods is simply insatiable.137 Drawing from one of Jesus’s parables, wherein God chastises a rich fool who believes he is set for life after accumulating many 130

John Paul II, RH, § 16. John Paul II, VS, § 12. See also ibid., § 66. 132 John Paul II, SRS, § 28. 133 John Paul II, CA, § 25. 134 Ibid., § 41. See also ibid., § 36; John Paul II, SRS, § 28. 135 John Paul II, CA, § 36. While the pope does not directly make this connection here, it would seem that the drug addict would also be a good example of how doing evil can enslave a person to sin. 136 John Paul II, SRS, § 10 (quoting Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, § 76). 137 Ibid., § 28. See also ibid., §§ 26, 33 (citing Mt. 16:26). 131

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possessions, John Paul II asserts that the person who is excessively preoccupied with material goods fails to appreciate the “real meaning” of life.138 The pope also affirms that those focused on “possessing and enjoying” fall subject to the whims of their passions and lack freedom, in contrast to the person who submits to “the truth about God and man” and properly “order[s] his needs and desires” accordingly.139 In the end, he says, a society that is overly focused on material goods “is a civilization of the ‘death of humanity,’ ” for unlike works of “truth, goodness, and beauty,” those goods do not last.140

Following Christ As Veritatis Splendor points out, after the call to “give[] up one’s own wealth and very self,” we come to the end of Jesus’s conversation with the rich man: “Come, follow me.”141 As we saw in Chapter 1, to follow Jesus is to abide by the commandment to love God, as well as Jesus’s own commandment to love one another as he has loved us. But it also involves “holding fast” to, and imitating, him, particularly his example of self-sacrificing love. In doing so, the pope maintains, we are able to achieve personal fulfillment. In general, “all who commit themselves to following Christ are given the fullness of life: The divine image is restored, renewed, and brought to perfection in them.”142 And perfect happiness is ultimately bestowed upon them: “We wish to look toward him—because there is salvation in no one else but him, the Son of God— repeating what Peter said: ‘Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life.’ ”143 Following Christ also leads to a strong “hope of salvation” in this life, in which “eternal life already springs forth and begins to grow.”144 And if we serve others as Jesus did, the pope indicates, we can achieve a measure of objective happiness in this life: “Faith assures us that the Father ‘who sees 138

John Paul II, EV, § 32 (citing Lk. 12:20). John Paul II, CA, § 41. See also ibid., § 55; John Paul II, SRS, § 28; John Paul II, RH, § 16. 140 Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in PC, 272 (citing M. J. M. Domenach, “Sytuacja kultury europejskiej” [“The Situation of European Culture”], a paper presented at the Third Symposium of European Bishops and published in Ateneum Kaplanskie 69 [1976]: 288; Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, §§ 57, 59). 141 John Paul II, VS, § 19. 142 John Paul II, EV, § 36. See also ibid., § 86; John Paul II, FR, § 102; John Paul II, VS, § 21 (citing Eph. 3:17). 143 John Paul II, RH, § 7 (quoting Jn 6:68). See also John Paul II, EV, §§ 37 (citing Jn 3:15, 6:40, 6:68), 38 (citing Jn 11:25-26); John Paul II, VS, §§ 66 (citing Mk 8:35 and referring to “the Gospel parables of the treasure and the pearl of great price”), 120. 144 John Paul II, EV, §§ 32, 38. 139

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in secret’ not only will reward those actions but already here and now makes them produce lasting fruit for the good of all.”145 Entrusting oneself to Christ also leads to subjective happiness, objective and subjective meaning, and freedom, according to John Paul II. Only Christ “can grant peace to [one’s] conscience,”146 and only by following “the lofty vocation which the faithful have received in Christ” can “the desire of the human heart” be fulfilled.147 Those who accept “the truth communicated in Christ’s Revelation” (which includes his suffering, death, and resurrection) see that this truth is the “word which is the absolutely valid source of meaning for human life,” for these events in Jesus’s life once again make “divine life” in us possible.148 In support of this point, the pope cites the experience of many younger people who were under Marxist regimes and whose quest for meaning was satisfied in Jesus.149 Indeed, the pope confirms that “one of the constant reference-points of my teaching” is that “Christ . . . fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling.”150 Lastly, John Paul II repeatedly reaffirms (especially in Veritatis Splendor) that the imitation of Christ and his total gift of self leads to true freedom.151 In turn, those who follow God and exhibit such freedom thereby reveal “an outstanding manifestation of the divine image in man.”152 On the other hand, John Paul II asserts that the rejection of God results in a diminishment of personal fulfillment. For instance, he says that such a turning away “deforms the image of God in [our] own person[s].”153 Speaking of the first World Day of Prayer for Peace in Assisi, Italy, in 1986, which brought together leaders from various world religions, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis suggests that the attainment of “peace . . . and the development of the whole person and of all peoples . . . depends on our fidelity to our vocation as men

145

Ibid., § 27 (quoting Mt. 6:6). John Paul II, VS, § 120. 147 Ibid., § 7. 148 John Paul II, FR, § 12. 149 John Paul II, CA, § 24. 150 John Paul II, FR, § 60 (quoting John Paul II, RH, § 8, which in turn quotes Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 22). For other passages where John Paul II intimates that there is a connection between following Christ (including his example of self-sacrificing love) and attaining meaning, see John Paul II, FR, §§ 32–33; John Paul II, EV, §§ 25 (citing Gen. 1:27, 2:18-24), 51 (citing Mk 10:45; Jn 15:13; Rom. 5:8); John Paul II, SRS, § 48; John Paul II, SD, § 31 (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 22). 151 John Paul II, VS, §§ 66, 85, 87 (citing Mt. 26:46), 89; John Paul II, RH, § 12. 152 John Paul II, VS, §§ 34, 38–39 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 17 and citing Sir. 15:14). 153 John Paul II, EV, § 36. 146

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and women of faith. For it depends, above all, on God.”154 In reiterating the words of Augustine—“You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you”—he also indicates that a life without God suffers from a lack of subjective happiness.155 For the pope, contemporary experience supports this notion; Marxism had attempted to “uproot the need for God from the human heart, but the results have shown that it is not possible to succeed in this without throwing the heart into turmoil.”156 In addition, he believes that a failure to acknowledge God leads to a loss of meaning, for such a worldview entails that human beings are mere things and no longer have the exalted purpose of caring for divinely sanctified life.157 The pope also comments that “freedom is not realized in decisions made against God,” for it is impossible to be genuinely free if one detaches oneself from the source of his “self-realization.”158 Ultimately, in continuity with the Second Vatican Council, the pope declares that those who disregard God are “impoverished”;159 indeed, “God . . . alone is goodness, fullness of life, the final end of human activity, and perfect happiness.”160 Before moving on, we should take note that John Paul II clearly thinks that Jesus’s aforementioned blueprint for salvation and other aspects of personal fulfillment—adhering to the commandments, being poor in spirit, and following him—applies not just to the rich. The pope states that “in the young man . . . we can recognize every person who, consciously or not, approaches Christ the Redeemer of man and questions him about morality.”161 Later, he maintains that the appeal to divest oneself of one’s possessions on behalf of the poor is “meant for everyone” and that “it is also clear that every believer is called to be a follower of Christ.”162 In fact, as Dulles shows, John Paul II

154

John Paul II, SRS, § 47. John Paul II, EV, § 35 (quoting Augustine, Confessions, I, 1). 156 John Paul II, CA, § 24. 157 John Paul II, EV, §§ 22 (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 36), 36. 158 John Paul II, FR, § 13. See also John Paul II, EV, § 96. 159 John Paul II, VS, § 39 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 36). 160 Ibid., § 9. Noting Veritatis Splendor’s emphasis on how “lov[ing] others as God does” benefits us, Milhaven argues that the document encourages self-love but “explicates [the nature of love of others] hardly at all.” Milhaven, “The Nature of Christian Love,” 245–47. However, as shown above, the encyclical does to some extent attend to this topic, in showing that love of neighbor is manifested in respect for the other commandments (in our actions and hearts) and in the story of the Good Samaritan and Jesus’s own example of self-sacrificing love. In addition, as we have seen, Love and Responsibility also raises pertinent considerations. 161 John Paul II, VS, § 7. 162 Ibid., §§ 18–19 (citing Acts 6:1). 155

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displays a “strongly Christological” bent in his thoughts on other religions, which the pope believes have “good and salvific” aspects but also “limitations” that render them somewhat inferior to Christianity.163 With that said, some of the paths to fulfillment that the pope articulates— for instance, loving one’s neighbor and respecting life—would certainly be open to nonbelievers as well. In fact, at the outset of Veritatis Splendor, he recognizes that non-Christians can also live morally good lives that can lead them to heaven: It is precisely on the path of the moral life that the way of salvation is open to all. The Second Vatican Council clearly recalled this when it stated that “those who without any fault do not know anything about Christ or his Church, yet who search for God with a sincere heart and under the influence of grace, try to put into effect the will of God as known to them through the dictate of conscience . . . can obtain eternal salvation.” The Council added: “Nor does divine Providence deny the helps that are necessary for salvation to those who, through no fault of their own, have not yet attained to the express recognition of God, yet who strive, not without divine grace, to lead an upright life.”164

His book-length interview Crossing the Threshold of Hope contains especially kind words for Judaism. The pope notes that Christians share part of their Bible with Jews and that the two faiths therefore enjoy an especially close relationship, that both religions “pray[] to the same God,” and that he himself has befriended a number of Jews from his childhood to his papacy.165 Some commentators have taken issue with aspects of the pope’s expansive vision. Gareth Moore, for example, points out that in Mt. 25:31-46, Jesus outlines a path to salvation that appears to be directed toward all people and does not explicitly mention any prohibitive commandments, but, rather, the corporal works of mercy, which include feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, clothing the naked, sheltering the homeless, visiting those in prison, and taking care of the sick. Moore adds that it is obvious that the call 163

Dulles, The Splendor of Faith, 221–22. John Paul II, VS, § 3 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium, § 16). See also ibid., § 73, n. 123 (suggesting that non-Christians “of good will” can also fulfill God’s purpose) (quoting Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 22); John Paul II, CTH, 193–94. But for passages suggesting that atheists can be responsible for their lack of belief, see John Paul II, FR, § 19; John Paul II, VS, § 70. 165 John Paul II, CTH, 95–100. For other positive remarks about different religions, see ibid., 80–83, 91–94. One exception here is his treatment of Buddhism, which he criticizes for being overly “detach[ed]” from and “indifferent” to this world. Ibid., 84–90. However, as we will see in the following chapter, the Dalai Lama’s particular conception of Buddhism is very much characterized by compassion, generosity, and peacemaking. 164

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to give one’s money to the poor cannot be meant for the poor themselves. He continues that all of this is ratified by the response Jesus gives to another person, a lawyer, who poses the same question about eternal life in Luke 10: Jesus confirms that the conditions are to love God and neighbor, but does not refer to any of the negative commandments or ask the lawyer to sell what he has and give it to the poor. And so, Moore concludes, Jesus’s words in Mt. 19:16-30 are really directed toward the rich.166 However, Moore’s analysis does not substantially undermine the pope’s, for a couple of reasons. First, Moore concedes that Jesus asks the lawyer who is not explicitly designated as rich to love his neighbor in order to go to heaven. But certainly, love of one’s neighbor is only possible if one abides by the commandments not to kill, commit adultery, steal, or bear false witness. Indeed, John Paul II himself points out that the commandments are the “basic condition” for and “proof ” of love of neighbor, for those commandments protect the essential goods of others.167 Second, regarding Moore’s claim that Matthew 19’s call to give what one has to the poor can only conceivably apply to those who are relatively well off, consider that Jesus praises a poor widow who donates the last few coins she has to the treasury (Mk 12:41-44; Lk. 21:14). And at any rate, John Paul II is more focused on the importance of being poor in spirit, which earlier in the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus clearly links to the attainment of heaven without specifically addressing those who are rich.168

“With God all things are possible” Jesus’s call to relinquish possessions and follow him seems to the rich man to be more than he can bear. As John Paul II relates the biblical narrative, “When the young man heard this, he went away sorrowful, for he had many possessions” (Mt. 19:22). Not only the rich man but the disciples themselves are taken aback by Jesus’ call to discipleship, the demands of which transcend 166

Moore, “Some Remarks on the Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” 74–78. For other, briefer statements that Mt. 19:16-30 pertains specifically to the rich, see Curran, The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II, 52; Spohn, “Morality on the Way of Discipleship,” 91. 167 John Paul II, VS, § 13. Moore himself appears to recognize this basic point later in his article, although he does object to jumping straight from this to the notion that these commandments are exceptionless. Moore, “Some Remarks on the Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” 87, 89. 168 See also Donfried, “The Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” 41–42 (questioning Moore’s and Spohn’s analyses and claiming that Mt. 19:16-30 is meant to be read more broadly); Jones, “John Paul II and Moral Theology,” 91–92 (also suggesting this in response to Curran and Moore).

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human aspirations and abilities: “When the disciples heard this [note that Jesus had also remarked that “it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for one who is rich to enter the kingdom of God” (Mt. 19:24, New American Bible, rev. ed.)], they were greatly astounded and said, ‘Then who can be saved?’ ” (Mt. 19:25). But the Master refers them to God’s power: “With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible” (Mt. 19:26).169

Along these lines, a key strain in John Paul II’s thought is that despite threats to our freedom, with God’s grace we are able to do the good to which he calls us. In addition, the pope affirms that even when doing the good seems exceedingly difficult, it does, indeed, lead to personal fulfillment in the end, particularly within a Christian worldview.

Are we able to do good (and to do it for the right motives)? John Paul II recognizes that any discussion about doing good must presuppose freedom. On this point, he quotes the Second Vatican Council: “It is only in freedom that man can turn to what is good.”170 But he also acknowledges that our experience reveals “a certain tension between” human freedom and our emotions and inner drives.171 In particular, it is difficult for us to freely choose what is good. Christian revelation bears witness to the reality of original sin, which “constantly draws [us] toward evil.”172 Indeed, people often turn away from the fullness of good, God himself, in favor of “finite, limited, and ephemeral goods” or even the desire to establish themselves as final authorities over good and evil.173 And the presence of certain circumstances—such as destitution, stress, intolerable suffering, and the oppression of women—often makes the protection of human life an extremely challenging endeavor.174 For John Paul II, human weakness in doing the good is definitively confirmed by both “universal and daily experience” and Scripture. The Israelites often struggled to keep God’s laws, and Saint Paul famously commented that “I do 169

John Paul II, VS, § 22. The excerpt in brackets is from the New American Bible (rev. ed.) translation. Ibid., § 34 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 17). See also Wojtyła, LR, 30. 171 Wojtyła, AP, 123. 172 John Paul II, CA, § 25. See also John Paul II, VS, § 17 (citing Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, 41, 10). 173 John Paul II, VS, § 86 (citing Gen. 3:5). 174 John Paul II, EV, § 11. 170

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not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. . . . I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want.”175 Ultimately, “we find ourselves always between good and evil, between fulfillment and unfulfillment” and must strive to resist the internal drives and external pressures that hinder that fulfillment.176 As John Paul II notes, some people, pointing to the fact that our decisions are often conditioned by such drives and pressures, deny the very existence of freedom.177 However, he believes that such a view does not give “due attention to the experiential nature of choice,” which demonstrates that there is a difference between mere influences and irresistible causes.178 In addition, he alludes to a tension manifest within modern society, which questions, but also champions, autonomy.179 And so, in spite of such skepticism about freedom, he often affirms that it is a fundamental aspect of human existence.180 Through observing the actions of a human being, we see that she is free181; indeed, “selfdetermination . . . so far as the grasping of the will is concerned, seems to be the most elemental experience of all.”182 This self-determination and capacity to choose distinguishes persons from animals.183 Furthermore, “an essential part” of what it means to be made in the image of God is to possess freedom,184 and God himself declares that Adam is free when the latter is given permission to eat from various trees in the garden.185 In particular, it is possible “to subordinate . . . [our] actions to the recognized truth.”186 At the same time, the pope does make “appropriate allowance . . . for the understanding of human weakness”; he states that it is proper for a person to admit to her shortcomings and request God’s mercy accordingly. He adds that we must not use our failings as an excuse to lower the bar of morality but ought always to strive to act consistently with it. In the Gospel of Luke, 175

Ibid., § 49 (citing Jer. 2:13, 19:4; Ezek. 22:2-3, 24:6, 9; Amos 2:7); John Paul II, VS, § 102 (quoting Rom. 7:15, 19). See also John Paul II, VS, §§ 1 (citing Jn 8:44; Rom. 1:25; 1 Thess. 1:9), 86 (relying upon “rational reflection and daily experience”); John Paul II, RH, § 14 (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 10, which alludes to Romans 7). 176 Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC, 236. 177 John Paul II, VS, § 33; Wojtyła, AP, 133. 178 Wojtyła, AP, 133–34, 140. 179 John Paul II, VS, §§ 32–33. 180 See, e.g., Wojtyła, AP, 158, 182–83; Wojtyła, “Human Nature as the Basis of Ethical Formation,” in PC, 98. 181 Wojtyła, “On the Dignity of the Human Person,” in PC, 178. See also Wojtyła, LR, 30. 182 Wojtyła, AP, 132. 183 Wojtyła, LR, 6. 184 John Paul II, VS, § 86. 185 Ibid., § 35 (citing Gen. 2:16-17). 186 Wojtyła, AP, 158.

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for example, the tax collector’s recognition of falling short of God’s demands (“God, be merciful to me a sinner!”) is morally superior to the “‘self-satisfied’ conscience” of the Pharisee.187 And in the Book of Genesis, Cain is subject to temptation but “remains free in the face of sin. . . . ‘Its desire is for you, but you must master it.’ ”188 But in order to spurn sin and be fully capable of doing good, we need God’s gift of grace. Reinhard Hütter frets that Veritatis Splendor asserts that “it is precisely through his acts that man attains perfection,” and wonders whether the pope has adequately accounted for the necessity of grace in transcending sin.189 But elsewhere in the encyclical, the pope relies on both the Bible and Augustine in firmly maintaining that “love and life according to the Gospel . . . are possible only as a result of a gift of God who heals, restores and transforms the human heart by his grace.”190 This grace comes through various means—“the saving Cross of Jesus . . . the gift of the Holy Spirit . . . [and] the Sacraments”—such that those who continue to sin have only themselves to blame for not accepting God’s assistance.191 More specifically, with God’s grace we find that the commandments are “easy” and “not burdensome,” and that we are able to follow the law in its “fullness” out of “an interior urge” and “no longer a form of coercion.”192 In addition, the Holy Spirit assists us in adhering to the commandment “you shall not kill,” “even in its more positive aspects of respecting, loving and promoting human life.”193 Love and Responsibility also insists that grace helps us to love others,194 and both Veritatis Splendor and Evangelium Vitae further specify that it aids us in following Jesus’s example of heartfelt self-giving love.195 In the end, John Paul II generally suggests that with the assistance of grace, we are able both to do the good and to do it for the right motives. It is true 187

John Paul II, VS, § 104 (quoting Lk. 18:13). See also ibid., §§ 95, 103, 120. John Paul II, EV, § 8 (quoting Gen. 4:7). Reinhard Hütter, “‘God’s Law’ in Veritatis Splendor: Sic et Non,” in Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics, ed. Hütter and Dieter, 103 (quoting John Paul II, VS, § 71). 190 John Paul II, VS, § 23 (citing Jn 1:17; Rom. 3:27; Augustine, De Spiritu et Littera, 19, 34: CSEL 60, 187). See also ibid., §§ 11, 24. 191 Ibid., § 103. See also ibid., §§ 5 (referencing both the sacraments and prayer as means of grace), 107 (granting particular importance to the Eucharist); John Paul II, SRS, § 48 (also highlighting the Eucharist). 192 John Paul II, VS, §§ 18, 102 (quoting Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Decree on Justification Cum Hoc Tempore, Chap. 11 and citing Mt. 11:30, 1 Jn 5:3). See also ibid., §§ 15, 103 (citing Andrew of Crete, Oratio I: PG 97, 805–06). 193 John Paul II, EV, § 77. See also ibid., §§ 49 (citing Jer. 31:34 and Ezek. 36:25-26), 105. 194 Wojtyła, LR, 121–22, 243. 195 John Paul II, EV, §§ 51, 76; John Paul II, VS, §§ 15, 17, 21, 22 (citing Rom. 5:5), 107, 118–19 (citing Ps. 104:30). 188 189

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that at certain points—for example, in Love and Responsibility, as mentioned above—he suggests that it is impossible for human beings to completely purify themselves from self-interest.196 Despite any such difficulties, however, we can still achieve fulfillment: The Gospel . . . proclaims to [sinners] God’s mercy, which is constantly at work to preserve them both from despair at their inability fully to know and keep God’s law and from the presumption that they can be saved without merit. God also reminds sinners of the joy of forgiveness, which alone grants the strength to see in the moral law a liberating truth, a grace-filled source of hope, a path of life.197

Ultimately, as he says earlier in Veritatis Splendor, “the promise of eternal life is thus linked to the gift of grace.”198

Are doing good and personal fulfillment always connected? But is the moral law always “a liberating truth, a grace-filled source of hope, a path of life?” At times, John Paul II, like Heschel, seems to indicate that there is a disconnection between doing good and personal fulfillment. Below I will examine whether the pope ever proposes that (A) acting well may not lead to certain realities of personal fulfillment, (B) doing good can actually hinder them, and/or (C) unethical actions facilitate them. As in the chapter on Heschel, I excerpt liberally in order to highlight the challenges that these passages pose.

Passages in Group (A) The pope does not really focus on particular situations in which doing good appears to have no effect on personal fulfillment. About the closest times he comes to doing so are in the following passages:

196

See also John Paul II, CA, § 25. John Paul II, VS, § 112. 198 Ibid., § 23. See also Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 35–36 (“John Paul steers a middle position between Pelagian optimism about human nature and pessimistic, predestinarian forms of Protestantism.”). 197

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(1) This gift [of self] has a disinterested character, which is why it fully deserves the name gift. If it were to serve some “interest”. . . [i]t might perhaps be beneficial and even useful, but it would not be gratuitous.199 (2) Even an enemy ceases to be an enemy for the person who is obliged to love him (cf. Mt. 5:38-48; Lk. 6:27-35), to “do good” to him (cf. Lk. 6:27, 33, 35) and to respond to his immediate needs promptly and with no expectation of repayment (cf. Lk. 6:34-35).200

However, there is no clear indication in either of these excerpts that we actually do not receive any benefit or repayment. In fact, the first passage is immediately preceded by a recognition that “self-fulfillment is realized through the mutual gift of self.”201 And with regard to the second passage, Lk. 6:34-35 states in pertinent part: “Love your enemies and do good to them, and lend expecting nothing back; then your reward will be great and you will be children of the Most High” (New American Bible, rev. ed., emphasis added). Moreover, this same section of Evangelium Vitae also quotes Mt. 19:16-17 on the link between keeping the commandments and attaining eternal life.

Passages in Group (B) Sometimes, John Paul II does call attention to the negative consequences that can result for a person as a consequence of her doing good. For example, in his pre-papal work he recognizes the following: (3) [It is] often require[d] that action be taken in the name of bare truth about good, in the name of values that are not felt. It even may require that action be taken against one’s actual feelings.202 (4) It is known that sometimes what is truly good, what morality and conscience command me, is accompanied precisely by some pain and demands forgoing some pleasure.203 (5) We must not forget that man’s love must also contain certain elements of struggle—struggle for precisely that man, for his true good.204

199

Wojtyła, “The Family as a Community of Persons,” in PC, 322. John Paul II, EV, § 41. 201 Wojtyła, “The Family as a Community of Persons,” in PC, 322. 202 Wojtyła, AP, 233. See also ibid., 249. For some basic aspects of Wojtyła’s critique of “emotionalism” (the view that feelings alone can determine value), and particularly that of the German philosopher Max Scheler, see Jeffreys, Defending Human Dignity, 45–48, 51–54. 203 Wojtyła, LR, 21. 204 Ibid., 189. 200

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Each of these passages points to an uncontroversial truth: that doing good can involve a certain lack of subjective happiness, a degree of discomfort. But they must also be read in context. Immediately after Passage (3), Wojtyła quickly qualifies that “the spontaneous ability to feel values” is both prevalent and important, for it facilitates devotion to them.205 And shortly after that, he explicitly aligns himself against Kant’s bifurcation of emotion and will, and proposes, instead, that we can “gradually” integrate them as we learn to become attracted to doing good and repelled by doing evil (and thereby become virtuous).206 As pope, he makes a similar point with explicit reference to the religious dimension of human action; as I mentioned above, he contrasts those who have learned to “feel an interior urge” toward the good with others who find pursuing that good difficult. And in addition to the many instances discussed earlier where John Paul II affirms a connection between acting morally and finding subjective happiness, on several occasions his prepapal work suggests that doing good in general leads to the “joy,” “spiritual contentment,” “spiritual bliss,” “satisfaction,” and “peace and happiness” that accompany the following of one’s conscience, whereas doing evil can cause “guilt,” “gnawing remorse,” a “difficult and even painful” internal turmoil, and “depression and even despair” because of the violation of one’s conscience.207 Finally, note the qualifiers “some” and “certain” in Passages (4) and (5), respectively, and Passage (5)’s suggestion that out of struggle one can actually achieve one’s own “true good.” Putting all of these considerations together, it seems that John Paul II wants to say that in the long run, acting morally and lovingly tends to lead more toward subjective happiness than away from it, particularly for the person who is habituated to doing good. However, a fuller look at one of the quotations just referenced reveals another test of the link between morality and fulfillment: (6) Those who live “by the flesh” experience God’s law as a burden and indeed as a denial or at least a restriction of their own freedom. On the other hand, those who are impelled by love and “walk by the Spirit” (Gal. 5:16), and who desire to serve others, find in God’s law the fundamental and necessary way in which to practise love as something freely chosen and 205

Wojtyła, AP, 234. Ibid., 250, 253. See also Wojtyła, LR, 135. 207 Wojtyła, AP, 177, 239; Wojtyła, “The Problem of Experience in Ethics,” in PC, 123–24; Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” in PC, 139; Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC, 236. 206

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freely lived out. Indeed, they feel an interior urge—a genuine “necessity” and no longer a form of coercion—not to stop at the minimum demands of the law but to live them in their “fullness.” This is a journey . . . made possible by grace, which enables us to possess the full freedom of the children of God (cf. Rom. 8:21).208

While this quotation suggests a harmony between acting well and positive emotions, it also indicates a tension between doing good and freedom. More specifically, the reference to “those who are impelled by love” feeling “an interior urge—a genuine ‘necessity’ ” seems to imply that allegiance to the commandments results in a certain reduction of freedom, even for individuals accustomed to them. But John Paul II clearly wants to show that genuine freedom is compatible with such an urge and necessity; he states in the same breath that those individuals “freely” observe God’s law, are not subject to “coercion,” and ultimately possess “full freedom” (a look at Rom. 8:21 reveals that the freedom spoken of here is freedom from “corruption”). These latter sentiments are reinforced by later sections in the encyclical that have already been referenced above: those who abide by God’s law do not sacrifice their self-determination and are freed from “blind internal impulse.” A similar unresolved duality is present in an article Wojtyła wrote before becoming pope, in which he comments that the experience of duty involves an “inner coercion,” albeit one that is “from one’s own self ” and is consistent with “contingency.”209 Discussing the pope’s thought, Spinello suggests that “thanks to his or her reason, the morally mature person apprehends what is objectively good and worthy of being chosen, and he or she makes this choice freely, without compulsion or impulse.”210 However, this does not account for the fact that John Paul II speaks of the morally mature person precisely as one who experiences a certain compulsion. In the end, the relationship between doing good, internal inclinations, and freedom of choice in John Paul II’s thought is not entirely clear. In contrast to the ambiguity of the sixth passage, John Paul II elsewhere does explicitly acknowledge a certain tension between freedom and doing good. For example, in Veritatis Splendor, the pope’s language indicates that our freedom under the law is limited:

208

John Paul II, VS, § 18. Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” in PC, 152, 157. 210 Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 107. 209

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(7) With this imagery [in Gen. 2:16-17] Revelation teaches that the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to man, but to God alone. The man is certainly free, inasmuch as he can understand and accept God’s commands. And he possesses an extremely far-reaching freedom, since he can eat “of every tree of the garden.” But his freedom is not unlimited: it must halt before the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil,” for it is called to accept the moral law given by God.211

In other words, John Paul II here gives the impression that those who make a decision to follow God’s law experience—immediately upon making that commitment, and as long as they stay true to it—at least a voluntary restriction of the capacity to exercise unrestrained choice. At the same time, he maintains that doing good is consistent with an “extremely far-reaching freedom.” And immediately after the seventh quotation, he adds that “human freedom finds its authentic and complete fulfillment precisely in the acceptance of that law.”212 A few sections later, he says that “the moral life” actually involves “creativity and originality.”213 As Spinello elaborates: The law is not meant to squelch spontaneity and creativity. . . . Rather, it gives order and direction so that creativity can flourish. A creative dancer must still follow the general rules of the dance. Only within the rules of the dance can the tango dancer be spontaneous and creative. Similarly, life without moral order is not creative or spontaneous; it is merely chaotic and undisciplined.214

Spinello’s point about moral order being entirely consistent with creativity is well taken, although he does not clarify why exactly “life without moral order” would be less creative: Could not one simply create or follow an immoral order or “dance,” as he puts it? And so, while we saw earlier that the pope repeatedly contends that following God’s law leads to an increase in freedom, at least a couple of passages in his work are more murky on this point. Love and Responsibility complicates matters further by stating that love leads to both a limitation and even a “relinquishing” of freedom:

211

John Paul II, VS, § 35. See also ibid., §§ 17, 40–41; John Paul II, FR, § 68. John Paul II, VS, § 35. 213 Ibid., § 40. 214 Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 107. See also Dulles, “The Truth about Freedom: A Theme from John Paul II,” 137–38. 212

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(8) Love consists in a commitment of freedom because, after all, love is selfgiving, and to give oneself means precisely to limit one’s freedom on account of the other person.215 (9) Love makes the person want precisely to give himself to another person . . . to stop being his own exclusive possession and to become the possession of the other. It signifies a certain relinquishing of that sui iuris [being master of himself].216

It seems that Wojtyła is suggesting here that love as self-gift does lead to a certain restriction of our capacity to exercise choice, even if that restriction is not literally absolute and allows for some creativity. (We might think of marriage as a prime example here; the couple who enter into it understand that they are no longer free to date other people and must often make decisions with their life partner’s wishes in mind.) On the other hand, as pope, he appears to move away from this idea. Recall that in Veritatis Splendor, John  Paul  II states that imitating Jesus (and in particular his total gift of self) leads to genuine freedom, and that Evangelium Vitae affirms that “authentic freedom” is “actualized” and “realize[d]” via such a gift. In summary, then, Passage (6) indicates an unresolved tension between doing good and freedom, and Passages (7), (8), and (9) explicitly acknowledge a certain conflict in this regard. At the same time, these quotations must be read in the context of other comments John Paul II makes that suggest that there is no such tension. Despite this ambiguity, we can safely claim that he thinks acting well enables us to avoid slavery to sin and selfish desires, as some of the earlier quotations in this chapter suggest. Furthermore, he would maintain that any losses in freedom through doing good are outweighed by corresponding gains in personal fulfillment. Love and Responsibility remarks immediately after Passages (8) and (9) that limiting one’s freedom through the gift of self is, in fact, a “positive, joyful, and creative” experience and causes the “expansion and enrichment” of the person. This is because “freedom is for love, for through love man most fully participates in the good. . . . Man longs 215 216

Wojtyła, LR, 117. Ibid., 108. An earlier translation of this passage may make the tension between self-gift and freedom more clear: when a person loves in a self-giving way, “this means the renunciation of its autonomy.” Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1981), 125.

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for love more than for freedom—freedom is the means, whereas love is the end.” On the other hand, freedom that is not put in the service of love produces “a sense of emptiness and unfulfillment.”217

Passages in Group (C) John Paul II never appears to seriously suggest that doing evil can lead to more personal fulfillment than does doing good. To be sure, Evangelium Vitae frequently states that crimes against human life are often committed by people in the name of their freedom or well-being.218 However, as I have shown, the encyclical maintains that those who disobey the commandment not to kill actually enslave themselves to sin and suffer other losses in fulfillment. Otherwise, Salvifici Doloris does briefly allude to the following: (10) The difficulty of understanding why the wicked prosper and the just suffer.219

The pope comments in a footnote to this passage that the authors of the Books of Psalms and Ecclesiastes grappled with this issue,220 but does not discuss further the apparent prosperity of those who are evil. At any rate, the foregoing discussion in this chapter should show that John Paul II thinks that doing evil ultimately does not lead to true prosperity or fulfillment.

What about Salvifici Doloris (and martyrdom)? Still, the idea that the just suffer necessitates further examination, for Salvifici Doloris meditates at length on the difficulties that Christians and others face throughout their lives. One passage bears special mention here: (11) Christ did not conceal from His listeners the need for suffering. He said very clearly: “If any man would come after me . . . let him take up his cross daily,” and before his disciples he placed demands of a moral nature that can only be fulfilled on condition that they should “deny themselves.” The way that leads to the Kingdom of heaven is “hard and narrow,” and Christ contrasts it to the “wide and easy” way that “leads to destruction.” On various occasions Christ also said that his disciples and confessors would meet with much persecution, something which—as we know—happened not 217

Wojtyła, LR, 108, 117. See, for example, John Paul II, EV, §§ 4, 12–13, 16–17, 19–20, 23. John Paul II, SD, § 6. 220 Ibid., n. 14 (citing Ps. 73[72]: 3-14 and Eccl. 4:1-3). 218 219

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only in the first centuries of the Church’s life under the Roman Empire, but also came true in various historical periods and in other parts of the world, and still does even in our own time.221

Surely this passage indicates that the relationship between living a fully Christian life and achieving personal fulfillment is—and always has been— especially tenuous? Not necessarily. Begin by noticing that the preceding remarks actually lend some support to this relationship; in following Christ, one avoids “destruction.” Furthermore, the pope immediately goes on to show that after Jesus warns the disciples of their impending tribulations, he adds: “But not a hair of your head will perish. By your endurance you will gain your lives.”222 Indeed, in undergoing such hardships they manifest an especially close resemblance to Christ.223 The pope then closes with Jesus’s words: “I have said this to you, that in me you may have peace. In the world you have tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world.”224 Ultimately, then, this particular section of Salvifici Doloris suggests that following Christ does lead to increases in fulfillment, including the manifestation of one’s likeness to God and the achievement of a measure of objective and subjective happiness. But what if the imitation of Christ leads one all the way to martyrdom? Can the sacrifice of one’s very life somehow conduce to fulfillment? John Paul II provides an extended discussion of martyrdom in Veritatis Splendor, and there his answer to this last question is yes. In particular, he indicates that martyrdom is an act that endows one’s life with great significance: it “bears splendid witness both to the holiness of God’s law and to the inviolability of the personal dignity of man.”225 In doing so, it “makes an extraordinarily valuable contribution to warding off . . . the confusion between good and evil,” which jeopardizes “moral order” within society.226 Even non-Christians who die for the sake of “moral good” can fulfill an important purpose through their witness. John Paul II says that “the words of the Latin poet Juvenal apply to all: ‘Consider it the greatest of crimes to prefer survival to honor and, out of

221

Ibid., § 25 (quoting Lk. 9:23 and citing Mt. 7:13-14). See also John Paul II, CTH, 222–23; John Paul II, VS, §§ 20 (citing Mt. 16:24), 89 (citing Lk. 9:23). 222 John Paul II, SD, § 25 (quoting Lk. 21:12-19). 223 Ibid. (citing Jn 15:18-21). 224 Ibid. (quoting Jn 16:33). 225 John Paul II, VS, § 92. 226 Ibid., § 93. See also John Paul II, EV, § 47.

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love of physical life, to lose the very reason for living.’ ”227 In an article before becoming pope, he also makes reference to the history of his native Poland, in which many achieved significance by suffering and even dying on behalf of the country’s common good.228 But John Paul II suggests that martyrdom leads not only to a meaningful existence but also to eternal life. He refers to various saints, such as John the Baptist and Stephen, who were martyred for proclaiming the truth or refusing to commit a serious sin and have since been revered on earth and understood to be with God in heaven.229 Indeed, Christians in general are “called . . . to a sometimes heroic commitment,” in which they are “sustained by the virtue of fortitude, whereby—as Gregory the Great teaches—one can actually ‘love the difficulties of this world for the sake of eternal rewards,’ ” and thereby experience the happiness of a sense of hope.230 Finally, the pope says that martyrdom leads to the fulfillment of one’s potential in general, in that this act is “the exaltation of a person’s perfect ‘humanity’ and of true ‘life.’ ”231 On this point, he quotes an address of Saint Ignatius of Antioch to his fellow Christians: “Let me arrive at the pure light; once there I will be truly a man. Let me imitate the passion of my God.”232 As I have demonstrated in my analysis of certain excerpts from Salvifici Doloris and other papal writings, when discussing instances of difficult Christian witness, John Paul II is quick to show how they can lead to increases in personal

227

John Paul II, VS, § 94 (quoting Satirae, VIII, 83–84). Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in PC, 250. John Paul II, EV, § 47 (citing Mk 6:17-29, 8:35; Acts 7:59-60); John Paul II, VS, § 91 (citing the first and third of these passages). 230 John Paul II, EV, § 47 (citing Mk 8:35); John Paul II, VS, § 93 (quoting Moralia in Job, VII, 21, 24: PL 75, 778). 231 John Paul II, VS, § 92. 232 Ibid. (quoting Ad Romanos, VI, 2–3: Patres Apostolici, ed. F. X. Funk, I, 260–61). 228 229

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fulfillment.233 Furthermore, Salvifici Doloris proposes that suffering itself can be endowed with meaning (objective and subjective) and offset by joy when one consciously chooses to share in the redemptive suffering of Christ. This idea is first highlighted in the letter’s opening paragraphs, where the pope draws from the following words of Saint Paul: “Now I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I am filling up what is lacking in the afflictions of Christ on behalf of his body, which is the church” (Col. 1:24, New American Bible, rev. ed.). Here John Paul II comments that “this joy comes from the discovery of the meaning of suffering” and affirms that people today can experience the same.234 The fifth part of Salvifici Doloris, entitled “Sharers in the Suffering of Christ,” is where John Paul II most fully develops this theme. According to the pope, anyone is able to “become a sharer in the redemptive suffering of Christ.”235 What exactly does this entail, practically speaking? A common tradition among Catholics is to “offer up” their suffering for the benefit of themselves and others.236 And so, for instance, if Tom gets the flu, or is being ridiculed for defending an unjustly accused friend, he can pray as follows: “God, I offer up this suffering, in union with yours on the Cross, for the forgiveness of my sins and the health of my ailing mother.” In attaching his own travails to Jesus’s, Tom hopes that just as Jesus’s suffering saved people from their sins, Tom’s own suffering will be beneficial, both to himself and to any others he wants to assist. Alternatively or in addition, Tom might have offered up his struggles on behalf of his dearly departed grandmother, with the idea that she might be in purgatory and 233

Elsewhere, he states that faith enables a suffering person to stay true to her vocation and to trust that God’s purpose will prevail. John Paul II, EV, § 31 (citing Job 42:2); John Paul II, CA, § 59. Also, in at least one work near the end of his life (from 1999), John Paul II reflects on how his faith has provided him with personal fulfillment in spite of adversity: Despite the limitations brought on by age, I continue to enjoy life. For this I thank the Lord. It is wonderful to be able to give oneself to the very end for the sake of the Kingdom of God! At the same time, I find great peace in thinking of the time when the Lord will call me: from life to life!

Brennan, Confronting the Language Empowering the Culture of Death, 121 (quoting John Paul II, Letter to the Elderly, § 17). See also Joaquín Navarro Valls, “The ‘Voice’ of John Paul II,” in Stories about Saint John Paul II: Told by His Close Friends and Co-Workers, trans. Michael J. Miller, ed. Wlodzimierz Redzioch (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2015 [2014]), 89 (where John Paul II’s Vatican spokesman emphasizes that the pope “had a very good disposition. . . . In his outward expression, he smiled readily, but . . . because of the muscular rigidity due to Parkinson’s disease, that outward smile eventually disappeared. In contrast, joy always quivered in his heart. He was not only an emotionally optimistic man; he was truly happy”). 234 John Paul II, SD, § 1. 235 Ibid., § 19. 236 Discussions of this tradition in contemporary scholarly literature are surprisingly few and far between. For one thoughtful reflection, see Elizabeth Scalia, “Offering It Up,” First Things (May 10, 2011), at http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2011/05/offering-it-up.

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undergoing the painful process of purification from sins, and that God might deign to ease that process and facilitate her entry into heaven more quickly. Through such a process, the pope holds, a person can find various measures of fulfillment. For example, relying on several biblical passages, he maintains that a person who joins in the redemptive suffering of Christ experiences subjective happiness, namely a sense of hope that she (like Jesus) will be raised from the dead, and a corresponding “comfort” and absence of “despair.”237 This hope also reassures her that in the face of suffering, she will preserve her dignity, “a dignity linked to awareness of the meaning of life,” which involves loving as God does.238 Those who suffer also can exhibit “moral greatness” and “spiritual maturity.” Here the pope refers to the examples of Christian martyrs, who have lived in accordance with Jesus’s admonition to “not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul,” and non-Christians who suffer and die for a noble cause.239 Ultimately, by participating in Jesus’s sufferings, we become “worthy” to enter “the kingdom of God.”240 In the sixth part of Salvifici Doloris (“The Gospel of Suffering”), the pope clarifies why exactly sharing in the suffering of Christ directly leads to meaning and happiness. The person who engages in redemptive suffering is “carrying out an irreplaceable service” by “clear[ing] the way for the grace which transforms human souls” and thereby facilitating “the salvation of his brothers and sisters.” The awareness of all of this, in turn, is a “source of joy,” as it was for Saint Paul, for it “transforms th[e] depressing feeling” that one’s suffering is pointless.241 Moreover, the pope claims that the examples of Saint Francis of Assisi, Saint Ignatius of Loyola, and numerous other saints demonstrate that suffering can bring a person into a special relationship with Christ. This, in turn, helps that individual to not only appreciate that suffering can be redemptive but also “become[] a completely new person” and “discover[] a new dimension . . . of his entire life and vocation,” including a dignified witness to others. Of course, all of this is a process; we naturally resist suffering and question it, and “Christ does not answer directly and he does not answer in the abstract.” And yet,

237

John Paul II, SD, §§ 20 (quoting 2 Cor. 1:5; 2 Cor. 4:8-11, 14), 21 (citing Phil. 3:10-11), 22 (citing Rom. 8:17-18; 2 Cor. 4:17-18; 1 Pet. 4:13). 238 Ibid., § 23 (citing Mk 8:35; Lk. 9:24; Jn 12:25). 239 Ibid., § 22 (quoting Mt. 10:28). 240 Ibid., § 21 (quoting Acts 14:22; 2 Thess. 1:4-5). 241 Ibid., § 27 (citing Col. 1:24).

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as we unite our own suffering to his, we “gradually” discover the redemptive meaning of suffering, “interior peace,” and “spiritual joy.”242 The seventh section of Salvifici Doloris (“The Good Samaritan”) points out another aspect of the meaning of suffering. Each person is called “to do good by his suffering and to do good to those who suffer.” In other words, Christians ought to not only engage in redemptive suffering, but also serve others whom they see suffering. With reference to the parable of the Good Samaritan, the pope explains that “suffering is present in the world . . . in order to give birth to works of love towards neighbour, in order to transform the whole of human civilization into a ‘civilization of love.’ ”243 And so, for John Paul II, any suffering that we experience (whether through doing good or through some other cause) can be tempered not only by the various realities of personal fulfillment that we achieve if we choose to join our struggles to Christ’s, but also by the meaningful opportunity our suffering gives to others to manifest virtue. Salvifici Doloris concludes by echoing some of the themes discussed directly above, along with one of the key refrains of the pope’s teaching in general: In it [suffering] the person discovers himself, his own humanity, his own dignity, his own mission. . . . The Second Vatican Council [affirmed that Christ] “fully reveals man to himself and makes his supreme calling clear.” . . . [T]hese words . . . refer in a very special way to human suffering. . . . It also happens—as experience proves—that this [revealing] can be particularly dramatic. . . . “Through Christ and in Christ, the riddles of sorrow and death grow meaningful.”244

Overall, while this apostolic letter does not dismiss the harsh reality of human suffering, the reader is reminded that it is temporal and that Jesus’s main goal is to defend us against “definitive evil [damnation] and against definitive suffering.”245 In other words, while the Gospel is, indeed, a “paradox of weakness and strength,” the pope emphasizes Jesus’s resurrection from the dead and

242

Ibid., § 26. Ibid., § 30. Ibid., § 31 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 22). 245 Ibid., § 14. 243 244

4

“Seeking What is True and Good”: A Comparison and Contextualization

My first task in this concluding chapter is to compare the reflections of Heschel and John Paul II that bear on the question raised by this study. More specifically, I will discuss various similarities and differences between their reflections on the following subjects: the terms and phrases pertaining to that question, our search for meaning, the relationship between doing good (or evil) and personal fulfillment, our ability to do good (and to do it for the right motives) in the first place, and apparent exceptions to the relationship between morality and fulfillment. Veritatis Splendor emphasizes the importance of “seeking what is true and good” in order to properly form one’s conscience.1 In the interest of “seeking what is true and good” about the answers provided by the rabbi and pope to our question, my next task in this chapter is to consider the historical and contemporary context of their views. I will begin my contextualization by examining their debt to a few major philosophers who came before them: Aristotle, Moses Maimonides, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant. Next, I will present a couple of contemporary comparisons (to the views of the fourteenth Dalai Lama and the moral philosopher Peter Singer, along with recent pertinent findings in psychology), and briefly address the question of the ultimate persuasiveness of the relevant thoughts of Heschel and John Paul II. I will conclude by reflecting upon the benefits of interworldview and interdisciplinary dialogue in thinking about the question at hand.

1

John Paul II, VS, §§ 62–63.

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Similarities and differences On the terms and phrases pertaining to the question posed by this study Happiness, meaning, freedom, and personal fulfillment Both the rabbi and the pope agree that happiness (and joy, for that matter) cannot be reduced to mere sensory gratification. In other words, Heschel states that happiness is not a synonym for “self-satisfaction” or “complacency,” while Wojtyła maintains that happiness is not simply enjoyment. That being said, they define happiness quite differently. Heschel’s definition appears to be more subjective in that it pertains to a person’s mental state: “the certainty of being needed, of having the vision of the goal which is still to be attained.” The pope’s understanding of happiness is more objective in that it refers to what is good for us: ultimately, God himself. As for the two thinkers’ respective understandings of the term “meaning,” Heschel relates it to “significant being,” but John Paul II does not as clearly connect these two particular terms. The rabbi also understands meaning in terms of life’s “value”; the pope sometimes speaks of meaning in conjunction with life’s value or “full dimension” but does not fully explain the relationship between these realities. For Heschel, significance encompasses love, goodness, and self-transcendence, and for the pope, one’s calling or vocation is also understood in such terms. Turning to freedom, while both figures acknowledge that it is manifested in the ability to choose, they also are clear that genuine freedom is not mere independence. Heschel maintains that freedom is actually impossible without motives, and Wojtyła contends that freedom is self-reliance, without which there is mere instinct. More specifically, then, freedom involves independence from slavery to sin or selfish desires. Heschel adds that freedom refers to liberation from the “tyranny of the self ”; John Paul II also understands tyranny as inimical to freedom insofar as he recognizes that autocratic regimes jeopardize the liberty of their citizens. And both thinkers hold that true freedom involves choosing to do good, to love, and to transcend ourselves. Indeed, there are no clear contradictions between their respective conceptions of freedom, although there are different emphases. For example, Wojtyła views freedom in terms of “self-determination” and “self-reliance,” words that are not prominent

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in Heschel’s work. Finally, while Heschel speaks of genuine freedom in terms of our response to God’s request, John Paul II more specifically states that true freedom is manifested via self-gift according to the example of Jesus. To the extent that Heschel provides any clue to the meaning of fulfillment, he indicates that it cannot be attained without surpassing our own selfish interests, a view with which John Paul II would agree. Heschel also seems to view fulfillment as related to happiness, and Wojtyła indicates that the two words are “almost synonymous.” On the other hand, Wojtyła understands fulfillment in terms of “actualization” and “self-determination,” terms that do not explicitly figure in the rabbi’s conception. Finally, Wojtyła suggests that absolute fulfillment cannot be achieved in our earthly existence; similarly, Heschel himself wonders whether the full development of our personality is possible, and believes that final redemption will not be achieved until the coming of the Messiah.

Good and evil: Heschel’s understandings As I explained in Chapter 1, Heschel understands the good as “an end that surpasses our experience of needs.” Although John Paul II does not as explicitly understand “good” in this manner, there are a number of important parallels between the two thinkers on this “needs-based” conception of the good. Both recognize that we are tempted toward “artificial” needs that a consumerist society attempts to implant in us. On the other hand, the rabbi suggests that we have a “need of being needed” (a desire to serve others), and Wojtyła claims that each of us has a “need to give [ourselves] to another person.” Both authors state that we ought to transcend our own needs and put first those that are “authentic.” For each writer, we are our “brother’s keeper.” Moreover, like Heschel, the pope recognizes that attention to the needs of others ought to be balanced somewhat with concern for our own needs. For example, John Paul II acknowledges that everyone requires a certain level of material goods in order to live a fully human life and that there is “a true right to self-defence” founded on the biblical exhortation to “love your neighbor as yourself.” He also claims that there ought to be a “fruitful harmony” between our own interests and those of society; his remarks on the peaceful coexistence of desire and benevolence in love are pertinent here as well. In addition, the concepts of manipulation, appreciation, celebration, and indebtedness (which, as I maintained in Chapter 2, seem connected to “the

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problem of needs”) are echoed in some papal thoughts that I have not yet discussed. For instance, Evangelium Vitae speaks of the “manipulation” of nature in negative terms; in particular, it criticizes the attitude in which “life itself becomes a mere thing.”2 In contrast, the encyclical affirms, faith enables us to “appreciate the almost divine dignity of every human being.”3 It also repeatedly speaks of “celebrati[ng] the Gospel of life,” which entails taking on a religiously sensitive (rather than possessive) mind-set and recognizing divine grandeur,4 all of which are characteristics of Heschel’s notion of celebration. Finally, there are some parallels to what Heschel describes as the “sense of indebtedness” in the thought of Wojtyła. Love and Responsibility discusses the idea of “justice with respect to the Creator,” which refers to the fact that all human beings “owe their existence” to God. While we are not the equal of God and hence cannot fully repay our debt to him, we are obligated to respect the value of other human beings and can yield ourselves to him out of love.5 The aforementioned similarities notwithstanding, Heschel emphasizes certain points with regard to “the problem of needs” that are not prominent in the thought of the pope. First, as a general matter, the term “needs” (in the sense that the rabbi uses it) appears only occasionally in the writings of John Paul II. Second, Heschel specifically says that we should be attentive to not only the needs of others but also those of God. As I noted in a footnote in Chapter 2, Heschel’s contention that God “needs” human beings is a controversial one among Jewish thinkers; I would add here that it is one that John Paul II does not explicitly share.6 Third, Heschel places more accent on the goodness of satisfying our own (authentic) bodily needs than does the pope. Finally, and quite surprisingly, Heschel’s discussion of piety has very little equivalent in the major works of John Paul II consulted for this study.7 2 3 4

5 6

7

John Paul II, EV, § 22. Ibid., § 25 (citing Jn 3:16). See also Wojtyła, LR, 155. John Paul II, EV, § 83 (citing Ps. 139:14; John Paul II, CA, § 37; Paul VI, Message for Christmas 1967: AAS 60 [1968], 40). On celebrating the Gospel of life, see also ibid., §§ 28, 79, 84–86, 93, 105. Wojtyła, LR, 231–33, 236. Indeed, it is one that he would likely reject. For a brief discussion of John Paul II’s conception of certain divine attributes (including self-sufficiency), see Dulles, The Splendor of Faith, 26. As far as I can tell, the word “piety” (or “pious”) occurs only three times in the following works (and then only in passing): The Acting Person, Centesimus Annus, Evangelium Vitae, Fides et Ratio, Love and Responsibility, Person and Community, Redemptor Hominis, Salvifici Doloris, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, and Veritatis Splendor. See John Paul II, CA, § 57; John Paul II, SRS, § 49; John Paul II, RH, § 20. Piety is also briefly mentioned in connection with purity in John Paul II, TB, §§ 57:2-3, 58:7 (general audiences of March 18, 1981 and April 1, 1981), and in the context of devotion to the Virgin Mary (which he clarifies is not merely “sentimental” and therefore consists of more than piety) in John Paul II, CTH, 212–16.

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As we have seen, Heschel also understands good as “that which unites man within himself, which unites man and man, man and God,” and evil as “divergence, confusion, that which alienates man from man, man from God.” Here I also want to point out that Heschel suggests that “the confusion of good and evil is the central problem of history.”8 While John Paul II does not have an explicit “unity-based” understanding in mind, he does maintain that the Beatitudes are “invitations . . . to communion of life with Christ,”9 and as mentioned previously, he says that the failure to adhere to the natural law “damage[s] the communion of persons.”10 He also confirms that the “confusion between good and evil” is “the most dangerous crisis” we face.11 Next, as I explained in the first chapter, both Heschel and John Paul II possess a “law-based” understanding of the good; here their considerations can be profitably compared on a number of points. First, while John Paul II does not use terms and phrases such as mitzvah, halacha, agada, and Torah when discussing the legal side of morality, both authors have a sense of the importance of the letter and spirit of the law. Second, like the rabbi, the pope cautions against a purely legalistic mentality in the domain of morality, although the latter author sometimes attempts to relate seemingly nonlegalistic aspects of religious practice (such as the Beatitudes and following Jesus) back to the divine commandments. Third, as discussed above, Heschel conceives of the religiously observant life as “the pursuit of a way,” albeit one in which individual acts carry great significance. As it happens, Veritatis Splendor speaks in very similar terms, highlighting obedience to the commandments as a “way in which to practise love” and a “path involving a moral and spiritual journey towards perfection,”12 but also emphasizing the gravity of particular deeds.13 Fourth, each thinker appreciates the wider communitarian dimension of religious action. In Chapter 2, I noted that Heschel states that Jews should live in solidarity with other Jews of the past and present. Analogously, Evangelium

8 9 10

11 12 13

Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 134. John Paul II, VS, § 16. On neglect of the Gospel’s “moral obligations” leading to the impairment of “the unity of the Church,” see also ibid., § 26 (citing 1 Cor. 5:9-13). Ibid., § 93. See also John Paul II, EV, § 24. John Paul II, VS, §§ 15, 18. See also ibid., §§ 12, 112. Ibid., §§ 66–68, 70. See also Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 189–90 (on the pope’s understanding of the “significance of each moral choice, which quite often influences future choices and attitudes”).

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Vitae frequently exhorts a “people of life and for life” to work together to transform contemporary culture.14 Fifth, there are differences at least in emphasis when it comes to the flexibility of religious law. As we have seen, both thinkers affirm that religious law needs to be continually interpreted in light of new historical situations, although John Paul II is also clear that moral norms “remain valid in their substance.” And while Heschel advocates “a ladder of observance” for Jews not accustomed to following the law, Veritatis Splendor firmly avers that “understanding [human weakness] never means compromising and falsifying the standard of good and evil in order to adapt it to particular circumstances.”15 That said, it is difficult to pinpoint a direct conflict between the two authors on this issue. It would seem that in advocating a certain flexibility, Heschel has the whole of Jewish law in mind; Chapter 2 discussed a justifiable historical instance of disobeying the rules of fasting. At the same time, it seems he would affirm the inviolability of at least some of the commandments of the Decalogue: namely, those concerning idolatry, adultery, and murder (which were also mentioned in Chapter 2), and also the desecration of God’s name.16 And in refusing to countenance exceptions, John Paul II himself seems specifically concerned with the basic negative commandments of the Decalogue, as was noted in Chapter 3. As a final aside, recall from Chapter 1 that when discussing mitzvot, Heschel speaks of the good and the holy in conjunction. Similarly, John Paul II states that God himself is both good and holy, and that as such he is the “ ‘model’ for moral action.”17 And for the pope, God’s law is not only the answer to our “question about what is good” (as we also saw in the first chapter), but also something that is “holy.”18 Unlike the rabbi, however, he does not plainly identify shades of difference between the good and the holy. 14 15

16

17 18

John Paul II, EV, §§ 6, 78–79, 91, 95, 101. John Paul II, VS, § 104; see, generally, ibid., §§ 102–05. See also John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1981), § 34 (promoting “the law of gradualness,” which refers to a constant striving to adhere to the moral law, and opposing “the gradualness of the law,” which indicates that there are “different degrees or forms of precept in God’s law for different individuals and situations”). Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 195 (stating that “the sin of desecrating God’s name” is “more severe” than “idolatry, adultery, and murder” and citing Leviticus Rabba 22:6; Midrash Tehillim 27:2). On the intolerability of murder, see also Heschel, “Death as Homecoming,” in MGSA, 376. John Paul II, VS, §§ 10–11. Ibid., §§ 41, 91–93, 102–03.

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Good and evil: John Paul II’s understandings There are also some important similarities and differences between John Paul II’s own conceptions of good and Heschel’s relevant considerations. With regard to the pope’s “law-based” notion of the good, Heschel does not have an explicit understanding of “natural law” (in a moral sense) in any of the major works consulted for this study. In fact, he often contrasts the “natural” to that which is good and holy.19 On the question of revealed law, the rabbi does acknowledge that Jews and Christians “share a commitment to many of [God’s] commandments,”20 and as we observed earlier he adds that “above all, the Torah asks for love: thou shalt love thy God; thou shalt love thy neighbor.” On the other hand, Heschel believes that “Christians leave out the possibility and the greatness of the Mosaic Law,” and he clearly would not concur with John Paul II that Jesus brings that law to fulfillment by “interiorizing” its demands. Still, there seems to be some parallel between the pope’s assertion here and Heschel’s conception of agada, which, as I explained above, pertains to the “inward aspect of living” that goes beyond the letter of the law. In Chapter 3, I expanded on John Paul II’s understanding of the commandment of love. Love and Responsibility’s notion of this commandment as based on the “personalistic norm” (and of love itself in terms of desire, benevolence, and spousal love) does not substantially overlap with Heschel’s thought. That being said, Heschel does call attention to some of the same themes that are present in Love and Responsibility. While he does not appear to articulate an understanding of love as “spousal” in terms of a person’s loving either God or a fellow human being, he does speak positively of the pious who give themselves fully to God, as we perceived above, and additionally of the betrothal of Israel to the Sabbath.21 And Heschel also understands the importance of responsibility; recall his mantra—“some are guilty, all are responsible”—and note here that he understands piety and even the “essence of Judaism” in terms of a responsibility to God.22 Moreover, the rabbi, like Wojtyła, indicates that a “love” that consists entirely of self-interest is not really love at all.23 Lastly, the pope’s attention to solidarity as a virtue 19 20 21 22 23

Heschel, MNA, 240, 248, 287–88. Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 240. Heschel, TS, 51–52, 126–27, n. 4. Heschel, MNA, 241–42, 289–90. Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 409; Heschel, TP, 265.

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connected to love has some parallel in Heschel’s thought. One of the defining characteristics of human beings in Who Is Man? is “solitude and solidarity”; the latter term is described as something we all innately yearn for, and as manifested in recognition of the dignity of others and in compassion.24 And different essays in Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity explicitly call for “solidarity” with one’s Jewish ancestors, members of other religions, and God.25 I have also remarked that John Paul II highlights the commandment “You shall not kill” and suggests that it is related to the commandment to love and is universal and unchanging. Heschel does not write as extensively on the issue of the commandment not to kill, although as I observed directly above, he does appear to acknowledge the absolute proscription of murder; here I would add that he maintains that murder is one of the “three cardinal sins” (along with idolatry and adultery), and that God “condemn[s] above all” the killing of innocent people.26 That said, there is no notion of a pope or Magisterium that is divinely ordained to interpret the commandments in the thought of Heschel, or, indeed, in contemporary Judaism generally. While there are chief rabbinates in various countries (including Israel and Great Britain) that tend to espouse traditional interpretations of Judaism, their authority is hotly contested by Jews who disagree with those understandings. Interestingly, the United States has never even had a chief rabbi, individual American cities have never had one for long, and the only chief rabbi of Heschel’s eventual home of New York City (Rabbi Jacob Joseph) was imported from presentday Lithuania in the late nineteenth century by the fleeting Association of American Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, served a stormy tenure of only a few years, and was never replaced.27 At any rate, Chapter 1 outlined some additional ways of doing good that are tied to the commandments, albeit somewhat more loosely. The pope mentions 24 25

26

27

Heschel, WM, 44–45. Heschel, “To Be a Jew: What Is It?,” in MGSA, 9; Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 142; Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 238; Heschel, “On Prayer,” in MGSA, 266. Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 195, 200 (quoting Yerushalmi, Hagigah, 1:7 (76c); Ekah Rabbathi, Pesiktha 2); Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 400. The former cite in “God, Torah, and Israel” is to the Mishnah and the Talmud, and the latter cite is to an agadic midrash. On these chief rabbinates, see Jonathan D. Sarna, “Why America Has No Chief Rabbi,” The Jerusalem Post (January 30, 2013), at http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Why-America-has-nochief-rabbi.

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that the commandments find their perfection in the Beatitudes, the first of which refers to the “poor in spirit,” and remarks that Jesus’s call to give away our possessions on behalf of the poor helps “bring out the full meaning of the commandment of love of neighbor.” John Paul II also comments that Jesus’s appeal, “Come, follow me,” is “the new, specific form of the commandment of love of God.” Heschel himself does not uphold the New Testament’s Beatitudes as a guide to moral action, although his aforementioned reflections on piety (as “a mode of living” and “a perpetual inner attitude”) could be compared to John Paul II’s view of the Beatitudes (as “basic attitudes and dispositions in life”). The rabbi also stresses that possessions can afford a person “the strength to serve and the means to give” and that prosperity is a “promised reward for good living.” Still, he seems to have a certain appreciation for a kind of spiritual poverty when he recommends “the yielding of all aspirations to God” over “clinging . . . tenaciously to [one’s] ambitions and intellectual goods.”28 More broadly, both thinkers repeatedly praise helping the poor.29 Otherwise, Heschel obviously does not believe that doing good consists specifically in following Jesus’s example of love, although as we’ve seen, he does have some appreciation of martyrdom and sacrifice. As for John Paul II’s other understandings of good, first, Heschel does not explicitly adopt an “object-based” understanding. However, given his firm condemnations of murder, adultery, and idolatry, he would seem to agree with the pope that at least some actions are wrong regardless of the intention or circumstances. Second, Heschel does not explicitly equate the “moral good” with “that through which we fulfill ourselves in action” (as does Wojtyła), although, of course, the rabbi does think that “fullness of being” is attained through transcending our own needs. Third, unlike John Paul II, Heschel does not have an overt understanding of the “good” as that which aligns with a true conscience, and he stresses more strongly the fact that conscience’s voice is “vague, faint, and inward” and that we need the Bible and tradition to inform us about the right path.30 28 29

30

Heschel, MNA, 292–93. See, for example, Heschel, “Symbolism and Jewish Faith,” in MGSA, 85 (citing Prov. 14:31); Heschel, “The Reasons for My Involvement in the Peace Movement,” in MGSA, 224; Heschel, “Reinhold Niebuhr,” in MGSA, 301; Heschel, “Carl Stern’s Interview with Dr. Heschel,” in MGSA, 403; Heschel, GSM, 375 (citing Prov. 14:31); Heschel, MNA, 295; John Paul II, EV, § 87; John Paul II, CA, §§ 57–58. Heschel, “A Preface to an Understanding of Revelation,” in MGSA, 189; Heschel, “Required: A Moral Ombudsman,” in MGSA, 219–20; Heschel, “A Prayer for Peace,” in MGSA, 232; Heschel, GSM, 171, 298.

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Lastly, Heschel does appear to see the good as closely linked to the pure. As he puts it in one essay, “By purification is meant the elimination of evil from good.”31 In particular, both authors view purity as related to piety.32 The pope steadfastly affirms that purity is “possible and accessible . . . even in the state of hereditary sinfulness,”33 whereas the rabbi tends to emphasize the difficulty of sustaining “perfect purity” in this life.34

Doing Both Heschel and Wojtyła refer to acts that are performed internally; they agree that such acts can have an ethical value, although as a footnote at the end of Chapter 1 explained, they do not focus on the relationship between such deeds and fulfillment. The rabbi speaks of purely external (i.e., accidental) good acts and indicates that they can lead to a certain fulfillment; Wojtyła, on the other hand, would not consider such deeds human acts in the first place. Rather, for Wojtyła, an “external act” is an act that is intentional and involves physical motion; such a deed can have a moral quality. In general, both Heschel and John Paul II rarely refer specifically to either internal or external acts alone; as Heschel notes, “A good deed consists not only in what but in how we do it.”

On the search for meaning as universal and worthwhile Both Heschel and John Paul II affirm that everyone is concerned with the question of life’s meaning. The former author claims that we thirst for the meaning of all of life and not just of particular actions, while the latter writer contends that we seek a reason for living “in every moment” and not only at certain times. The rabbi and the pope suggest that even if some people attempt to avoid the question of meaning, in the end they cannot fully succeed; our acquaintance with suffering constantly presses the question upon us. For each thinker, the human being, as someone who is preoccupied with his destiny, is more than a mere animal. On this particular issue, however, they diverge somewhat. While John Paul II states that the human being is an “animal 31 32

33 34

Heschel, “Confusion of Good and Evil,” in IF, 137. In addition to the cites above to A Theology of the Body, see Heschel, “Symbolism and Jewish Faith,” in MGSA, 86; Heschel, MNA, 279–80, 295. John Paul II, TB, § 58:5 (general audience of April 1, 1981). In addition to the relevant passages discussed in Chapter 2, see Heschel, GSM, 364 (citing Prov. 20:9).

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rationale” who is concerned about the meaning of life, Heschel sharply criticizes this Aristotelian identifier on the grounds that “it fails to account for the infinite dissimilarity between man and the highest animal below him.”35 With regard to the issue of whether striving for meaning is worthwhile, the rabbi and the pope do recognize the presence of a certain “crisis” or “fear” among people on the subject. In particular, both writers indicate that many people (both philosophers and laypeople) question whether such a meaning can be found. However, Heschel and John Paul II insist that the search for meaning is sensible, although their reasons in support of this view differ slightly. John Paul II suggests that the fact that we have an inkling of a meaning and search for it indicates that such a meaning exists, while Heschel argues that those who attack the possibility of meaning contradict themselves. That being said, both authors agree that our very existence would be put at risk if we were to disregard the question of life’s meaning.

On the relationship between doing good (or evil) and achieving personal fulfillment Doing that which surpasses our experience of needs As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Heschel asserts that we distance ourselves from happiness, meaning, freedom from selfish desires, and fulfillment in general (including our likeness to God) by being overly attached to artificial “needs” (i.e., living by “absolute expediency”), and, in particular, by disregarding our obligations to God. On the other hand, he affirms that happiness (such as the joy of eternal life), meaning, freedom from egotistical whims, and fulfillment in general (including maturity) result from doing that which surpasses our own experience of needs, and, more specifically, from responding to what God asks of us and serving his ends. Finally, Heschel believes that maintaining a proper balance of needs and of manipulation, appreciation, and celebration; preserving the sense of indebtedness; and living a pious life conduce to our fulfillment. While John Paul II does not as frequently conceive of doing good in terms of “needs,” he does express certain similar sentiments. Like Heschel, the pope indicates that primarily focusing on one’s own interests leads to a loss 35

Heschel, WM, 21, 23; John Paul II, FR, § 88.

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of fulfillment, including a lack of meaning in life and a slavery to sin. The rabbi claims that people who are overly attached to material pleasures have “cease[d] to be human”; similarly, Wojtyła states that a society characterized by materialism “is a civilization of the ‘death of humanity.’ ” On the other hand, Wojtyła claims that love “develops [a person] most fully” and “enriche[s]” her, and Heschel argues that “the degree of our being human stands in direct proportion to the degree in which we care for others.” In addition, the pope speaks to the specific connection between responding to God’s requests and personal fulfillment, stating that “God asks us to be holy as he is holy, to be—in Christ—perfect as he is perfect,” and that when we strive to answer this call with his assistance, we make progress toward “fullness of life.”36 And if one leaves “houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or children or lands” in response to Jesus’s invitation, she will be rewarded in the life to come. One salient difference between the two authors does emerge at this point; Heschel believes that we should not be too focused on the world to come, while John Paul II does not appear to make any such qualification.37 As for those who disregard God, both the rabbi and the pope generally agree that such persons experience certain losses in happiness, meaning, freedom, and fulfillment in general (including an obscuration or “deform[ation]”—as the pope puts it—of the divine image). And interestingly, the two thinkers concur that our lives are “poor” or “impoverished” without God. Finally, John Paul II does not concentrate as much as does Heschel on the relationship between personal fulfillment and a proper balance of needs (including attention to our own legitimate ones); an appropriate equilibrium of manipulation, appreciation, and celebration; a sense of indebtedness; and piety. However, he does acknowledge that meeting our own basic needs “help[s] make [our] lives truly human”; he also indicates that a society that ignores self-interest is one in which freedom and stability are lost. At another point, he suggests that “heroic actions,” which are “the most solemn celebration of the Gospel of life, for they proclaim it by the total gift of self,” help us achieve fullness of life.38 In the end, it seems that both the rabbi and the pope would maintain that a combination of a relationship to others, a connection to 36 37

38

John Paul II, VS, § 115 (citing Lev. 19:2 and Mt. 5:48). More precisely, as discussed in the Introduction, he moves away from any such idea after some early pre-papal work. John Paul II, EV, § 86.

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God, and at least some level of concern for oneself best conduces to personal fulfillment.

Following religious law (which is summed up in the twofold commandment to love God and neighbor) The pope believes that those who adhere to God’s commandments, which can be encapsulated in the mandate to love God and one’s neighbor, are able to achieve eternal life, as well as a certain this-worldly happiness, emancipation from self-centered cravings, and fulfillment in general (including being “conformed to the image of [God’s] Son”). On the other hand, those who reject the commandments only hurt themselves; in particular, they can lose “eternal happiness” and are enslaved to sin. More specifically, he maintains that a love that includes such aspects as benevolence, an affirmation of the value of the person, a “sense of responsibility,” and the gift of self helps one attain increases in fulfillment. On the other hand, a lack of love (and, in particular, egoism) leads one away from said fulfillment. And with regard to the particular decree “You shall not kill,” John Paul II holds that by following it, we can realize happiness (in this life and the next), meaning, and freedom, whereas disrespect for the “law of life” causes us to be unfulfilled. In general, such “universal” and “unchanging” laws direct us to different aspects of personal fulfillment, as do the Beatitudes and the imitation of Christ. Heschel, like John Paul II, believes that following God’s commandments leads to happiness, meaning, freedom, and fulfillment in general (including “enhancing our likeness” to God), while disregarding God’s law can entail a lack of fulfillment. While the rabbi does agree that the “good people” who respond to what God asks of them will experience joy in the next life (and says that “the wicked” will enter Sheol), unlike the pope he does not stress the connection between adhering to religious law and achieving eternal life. Indeed, Heschel makes clear that mitzvot ought not to be performed for the sake of the life to come. Otherwise, as we’ve seen, Heschel joins the mitzvah of prayer, in particular, to the achievement of happiness, meaning, and fulfillment in general. Similarly, John Paul II states that prayer is significant for “it constitutes the easiest way of making God and His redeeming love present in the world.”39

39

John Paul II, CTH, 24.

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He adds that praying the Christian Rosary is an occasion of joy (particularly when meditating upon the Joyful and Glorious Mysteries), can promote world peace, and can enhance our likeness to Christ as it encourages us to learn from the virtuous deeds of Jesus and his mother Mary.40 As for the commandments to love and not to kill, Heschel does not stress the connection between following them and attaining personal fulfillment. But as mentioned above, he has in mind the gift of self and false love when he speaks of piety and self-interest, respectively, and he does believe that the latter two impact our level of fulfillment. In fact, as we saw in the preceding chapters, both thinkers affirm that the person who acts egotistically is reduced to being a “tool” or a means for gratifying her own desires. Heschel also acknowledges a division “between those to whom the sword is the symbol of honor and those to whom seeking to convert swords into plowshares is the only way to keep our civilization from disaster.”41 On the other hand, in a manner reminiscent of John Paul II’s reference to God’s (partial) sparing of Cain, the rabbi remarks that God will “show[] indulgence” and even (in the case of Israel) “excuse[]” those who commit murder (but not those who “desecrat[e] God’s name” or “despis[e] the Torah”).42 In general, as I noted above, Heschel is not necessarily less rigorous than John Paul II regarding adherence to the commandments of the Decalogue. That being said, as was demonstrated above, the former author prefers to stress that fulfillment is achieved via a middle ground between “severity” and non-observance; the latter thinker chooses to highlight that fulfillment (including eternal life) is reached by firm obedience to inviolable norms.

40

41

42

John Paul II, Rosarium Virginis Mariae (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2002), §§ 6, 15, 20, 23, 39–40. Note, too, that both Heschel and John Paul II connect observance of the day of rest to personal fulfillment, and hold that both rest and labor fulfill God’s purposes, as indicated in the footnotes to Chapters 2 and 3. Heschel, “A Prayer for Peace,” in MGSA, 231. On the relationship between unlawful killing and a lack of fulfillment, see also Abraham J. Heschel, “The Moral Outrage of Vietnam,” in Robert McAfee Brown, Abraham J. Heschel, and Michael Novak, Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience (New York: Association Books, 1967), 53 (“The absurdity of this war is tacitly admitted by almost everyone. Our presence in Vietnam has become a national nightmare, our actions are forced, we dislike what we do; we do what we hate to do.”). Cf. John Paul II, CA, § 52 (which, upon decrying the Persian Gulf War, declares that war “throws into upheaval even the lives of those who do the killing and leaves behind a trail of resentment and hatred, thus making it all the more difficult to find a just solution of the very problems which provoked the war”). Heschel, “God, Torah, and Israel,” in MGSA, 195, 200 (quoting Leviticus Rabba 22:6; Midrash Tehillim 27:2; Yerushalmi, Hagigah 1:7 (76c); Ekah Rabbathi, Pesiktha 2).

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Next, as I explained above, the concepts of the Beatitudes and of following Jesus, which the pope states are connected to the commandments but also transcend them, have little parallel in Heschel’s thought. As for whether fulfillment is linked to being spiritually or materially poor (“Go, sell your possessions and give the money to the poor”), as we have seen, the rabbi avers that “the bitterness of poverty” can hinder our quest for the good. On the other hand, he warns that “one may become easily bewitched by what one owns” and “thereby forfeit[] his freedom.”43 And he adds that the pious man is “engaged in fulfilling purposes” when attending to others, including the poor.44 In fact, “the yielding of all aspirations to God” is an imitation of “the divine Giver.”45 Finally, each writer is clear that adherence to the entire body of Jewish (or Christian) law is not necessary for salvation. Heschel puts forth the view that “all men have a share in eternal life if they attain according to their ability knowledge of the Creator and have ennobled themselves by noble qualities.” To be sure, John Paul II shows that Jesus tells a scholar of the law that he must follow the twofold commandment to love God and neighbor to be saved, and contends that a “free[] and conscious[] . . . act of disobedience to God’s commandments in a grave matter” causes us to lose eternal happiness. However, he also quotes the Second Vatican Council as stating that nonChristians and even non-believers who “search for God with a sincere heart and . . . try to put into effect the will of God as known to them through the dictate of conscience . . . can obtain eternal salvation.”

Some apparent difficulties Are we able to do good (and to do it for the right motives)? Heschel and John Paul II affirm the reality of human freedom. That being said, both thinkers appreciate the difficulties that we face in doing good. For the pope, original sin “constantly draws [us] toward evil.” Heschel does not subscribe to the idea of original sin, but, nevertheless, recognizes human weakness in avoiding evil. He is also very concerned with the problem of whether our motives in doing good can be pure, whereas the pope seems more

43 44 45

Heschel, PT, 175–76. Heschel, MNA, 295. Ibid., 293.

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preoccupied with the question of whether we can do good in general. In any case, both authors suggest that we are able to do good and to do it out of proper motives at least to some extent, but need the assistance of God’s grace. While Heschel holds that God’s aid is mediated through his word, John Paul II states that grace comes through “the saving Cross of Jesus . . . the gift of the Holy Spirit . . . [and] the Sacraments.” But here there is an interesting parallel between the two authors in light of the fact that for Christians, Jesus is the Word of God. In the end, both figures contend that despite our frail human nature, God’s mercy enables us to discover joy and avoid despair.

Are doing good and personal fulfillment always connected? Several passages in the writings of Heschel and John Paul II, at least initially, seem to say that doing good will not lead to personal fulfillment or even that doing evil will result in fulfillment. For example, both authors firmly hold that we should act well without expecting an “advantage” or “repayment.” At the same time, they indicate that through good deeds we are, in fact, rewarded with happiness, and, particularly, with eternal life. Another parallel between the authors is that while they agree that doing what is good can cause a certain degree of pain (or a denial of our preconceived needs), they also think that we can develop an attraction to and a need of doing good. In particular, both authors agree that while “outsiders” (to use Heschel’s term) sense God’s law to be a burden, those who live by God’s law find it pleasing or attractive. On the issue of whether following the law leads to freedom in the sense of a capacity for choice, however, both thinkers would appear to have reservations. As noted above, they suggest that in following the law, we possess a certain freedom from bondage to sin. At the same time, they both explicitly recognize that our freedom under the law is at most a limited one. Heschel speaks of the law as a “cry for creativity,” but at other times he suggests that a mitzvah is a “yoke” and that God’s law is “heteronomous.” John Paul II explains that ethical conduct involves creativity, that obedience to the law is a “participated theonomy” and not a “heteronomy,” but also that our freedom is “not unlimited” under that law. Both authors go further at certain points, asserting that those who are accustomed to acting well sense a “compulsion” or “necessity” to do so. In addition, Wojtyła goes so far as to indicate that self-giving love leads to a “relinquishing” of freedom, although as I discussed above, he appears to

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have distanced himself from this idea after becoming pope. Ultimately, neither Heschel nor John Paul II completely clarifies the connection between doing good and freedom, at least as I have conceived of it. The gap between the two authors seems wider on the issue of whether doing good leads to contentment. As noted above, Heschel maintains that Judaism “teaches man never to be pleased, to despise satisfaction . . . to be content with what he has, but never with what he is.” Moreover, the rabbi indicates that the life of a religious person is even characterized by a “sense of embarrassment”: “Far from being satisfied with his conduct, [a religious man] prays three times daily: ‘Forgive us, our Father, for we have sinned.’ ”46 This particular notion does have some counterpart in Veritatis Splendor, which discusses the parable of the tax collector and the Pharisee in Lk. 18:9-14, and holds up the former (who exclaims “God, be merciful to me a sinner!”) as a role model, while cautioning readers to avoid the example of the latter and his “ ‘self-satisfied’ conscience.” But then the pope immediately goes on to suggest that the recognition of our need for God’s assistance ultimately results in “joy and gratitude,” as it did for Saint Paul.47 And in general, he tends to speak of the religious person as one whose heart is “satisf[ied]” by knowing the Gospel and following Christ.48 Ultimately, then, Heschel’s ideal person seems to be somewhat more discontent than John Paul II’s. With regard to the question of the “the Christian meaning of human suffering,” the two authors clearly diverge. The rabbi does not say (as does the pope) that in our suffering we can exhibit a resemblance to Christ, “be of good cheer” in knowing that he has “overcome the world,” find various aspects of fulfillment by uniting our suffering with him, or realize meaning by knowing that our suffering is “present in the world . . . in order to transform the whole of human civilization into a ‘civilization of love.’ ”49 That being said, with the pope, Heschel appreciates that while the purpose of suffering can often seem mysterious, the one who suffers can achieve a certain “joy” and “greatness.” And the rabbi, like the pope, grants that martyrdom is not pointless but, 46 47 48 49

Heschel, WM, 113–14. John Paul II, VS, §§ 104–05 (citing Rom. 7:24-25). Ibid., § 7; John Paul II, FR, § 38. Interestingly, Heschel does allude to a prophetic reference to God’s intent to allow Israel to suffer in order to make amends for the sins of others. Heschel, “Faith,” in MGSA, 337; Heschel, MNA, 171. However, in the major works consulted by this study, he does not appear to explicitly support the possibility of “redemptive” suffering here and now.

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rather, an extremely meaningful witness. However, while John Paul II suggests that accepting martyrdom leads to eternal life, Heschel does not clearly do so, although it is reasonable to believe he would agree. Finally, both authors note that evil people can appear to prosper, although Heschel raises this point more often than John Paul II. In the end, however, both thinkers hold that the fulfillment we can reach through doing good is greater than that achieved through committing evil. In summary, both Heschel and John Paul II point to a connection between doing good and various aspects of personal fulfillment. Heschel strongly emphasizes the element of “polarity” in Judaism (particularly in A Passion for Truth), and, indeed, struggles more openly than the pope with the possibility that a properly religious existence ultimately involves meaninglessness and sadness. In the end, however, he asks us to “remember that there is a meaning beyond absurdity . . . [and] that life is a celebration or can be a celebration.” Similarly, while the pope acknowledges the “paradox of weakness and strength” in the gospel, he adds that “I can do all things in him who strengthens me.” For both authors, then, optimism has the last word. Having thoroughly outlined and compared the relevant considerations of Heschel and John Paul II, I now reflect more fully on their wider context— both historical and contemporary.

The historical context: The influence of Aristotle, Maimonides, Aquinas, and Kant The influence of Aristotle, Maimonides, and Kant on Heschel Up to this point, it might seem that Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) and Moses Maimonides (c. 1135–1204) had little influence on those considerations of Heschel that are pertinent to the question posed by this study. My discussion in Chapter 2 contained no explicit references to Aristotle and only a few to Maimonides: on the joy that is involved in performing mitzvot, on how nonJews can find a certain fulfillment through their actions, and on how sinful behavior leads to a loss of freedom. In general, Heschel seems reluctant to embrace Aristotelian thought; as shown earlier in this chapter, the rabbi does not accept the philosopher’s characterization of the human person, and

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elsewhere maintains that “our guides in this critical age are the prophets of Israel, not Aristotle, not Karl Marx, but Amos and Isaiah.”50 In comparison, he voices a definite sympathy for the teachings of Maimonides: The endeavor to integrate the teachings and aspirations of the past into our own thinking will enable us to be creative, to expand, not to imitate or to repeat. Survival of Israel means that we carry on our independent dialogue with the past. Our way of life must remain to some degree intelligible to Isaiah and Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai, to Maimonides and the Baal Shem.51

In addition, one of Heschel’s essays that I have not yet examined addresses both Aristotle and Maimonides, and it is germane to the topic at hand. In “The Last Days of Maimonides,” Heschel discusses Maimonides’s famous Guide of the Perplexed. Earlier in this text, Heschel says, Maimonides adheres closely to Aristotle in identifying two kinds of human perfection—material/moral and intellectual. In the Guide’s framework, the former, which provides “serenity of mind,” is merely a means to the latter, which is our “ultimate perfection,” “consists only of knowledge,” and “is alone the source of eternal life.”52 However, in the concluding chapter of the Guide, Maimonides addresses Jer. 9:23-24, which relays God’s declaration that a person ought not to “glory in his wisdom” but in the fact that God “practice[s] kindness, justice and righteousness . . . for in these things I delight.” Maimonides reasons that this passage suggests that knowledge is not our “most noble end,” and that God’s true purpose for us is to manifest moral characteristics and thereby imitate him. And so, as Heschel indicates, Maimonides has redefined our ultimate perfection in ethical terms.53 Heschel also suggests that this shift in tone near the end of the Guide mirrors Maimonides’s own late-life transition from a life of contemplation to one of extremely busy medical practice. As Heschel puts it, Maimonides’s “life-long search for personal perfection seems to have found fulfillment in the imitation of God . . . in human deeds.” Note that Heschel does not mean to say that Maimonides eventually abandoned the contemplative life, but, rather, that he 50

51

52

53

Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 240. On the “spiritual insight” of the prophets that is lacking within the ancient Greek philosophers, see also Heschel, GSM, 14–15. Heschel, “To Be a Jew: What Is It?,” in MGSA, 9. For comparable sentiments, see Heschel, “Toward an Understanding of Halacha,” in MGSA, 142 (which contains a very similar quotation); Heschel, “Pikuach Neshama: To Save a Soul,” in MGSA, 64. Heschel, “The Last Days of Maimonides,” in IF, 290–91 (quoting Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, pt. III, ch. 27). Ibid., 291–92 (quoting Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, pt. III, ch. 54).

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was able to achieve a certain “simultaneity” by attending to other people while meditating about God.54 “The Last Days of Maimonides” is basically a biographical piece; in it, the author does not explicitly acknowledge his own debt to Maimonides or indicate his opinion of Aristotle. That said, the sentiments of the last chapter of the Guide of the Perplexed are consistent with Heschel’s aforementioned view that “Judaism is lived in deeds not only in thoughts,” his position that we attain fulfillment through serving others and God, and his own evolution into a political activist near the end of his life.55 And while there were a couple of citations in Chapter 2 to Maimonides’s other masterpiece, the Mishneh Torah, a number of additional passages from this work also happen to correspond closely to Heschel’s insights. For example, in the section entitled “The Laws of Repentance,” Maimonides affirms a connection between good deeds (and, in particular, following the laws of the Torah) on the one hand, and objective happiness and eternal life on the other. He concludes: If you serve God with happiness and observe His way, He will grant you . . . blessings . . . [and] you will merit two worlds, a good life in this world, which, in turn, will bring you to the life of the world to come. [Conversely,] if you have abandoned God . . . He will bring . . . curses upon you . . . [and] you will forfeit two worlds for when a person is occupied in this world with sickness, war, and hunger, he cannot involve himself with either wisdom or mitzvot which allow him to merit the life of the world to come.56

54 55

56

Ibid., 286, 288–90 (citing Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, pt. III, ch. 54). While noting that Heschel is not always sympathetic to Maimonides on theological issues, Michael Marmur argues that “the decision to place the figure of Maimonides at the very peak of Heschel’s social agenda, as the finale of The Insecurity of Freedom, is no coincidence. He clearly found this example of the progression from the seclusion of study and reflection to engagement with people in society a potent source of personal inspiration.” Marmur, Abraham Joshua Heschel and the Sources of Wonder, 73. However, Marmur curiously goes on to suggest that according to Heschel, “contemplation wins out over ritual and ethics” in the Guide. Ibid. But as we’ve seen in the main text, Heschel clearly does claim in The Insecurity of Freedom that the Guide’s emphasis ultimately moves from contemplation to practice. The confusion here may be due to the fact that Marmur also draws from a much earlier (1935) version of Heschel’s remarks here, which places the emphasis on the Guide’s commitment to contemplation. Ibid., 77. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Sefer Madda (“The Book of Knowledge”), Hilchot Teshuvah (“The Laws of Repentance”), 9:1 (citing Deut. 6:11-12, 28:47-48). See also ibid., 8:1 (citing Num. 15:31; Deut. 22:7), 8:6-7 (citing Isa. 64:3 and noting, like Heschel, that we don’t know much about the world to come); Mishneh Torah, Sefer Madda, Yesodei Ha’Torah (“The Laws [Which Are] the Foundation of the Torah”), 5:1-3 (acknowledging, like Heschel, that the right thing to do can result in martyrdom, and specifically limiting instances where one should sacrifice one’s life rather than violate a commandment to those where the Jew is asked to pay homage to other gods, engage in prohibited sexual activity, or murder).

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But, like Heschel, he is quick to add that we should not be motivated by the promise of a reward, but strive to do “what is true because it is true, and ultimately, good will come because of it.”57 Finally, it seems that Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) had some influence on those thoughts of Heschel that are relevant to the question posed by this study. On the one hand, as we saw in Chapter 2, Heschel criticizes Kant for holding that the goodness of an act is determined solely by the intention and “sense of duty” of the person performing it. On the other hand, Heschel suggests that we should treat other people as ends rather than means, which is certainly Kantian language, although he only appears to explicitly mention Kant’s maxim pertaining to this idea once.58 And at one point, Heschel includes the famous philosopher in a list of figures whom he praises as “a source of inspiration to many Jews.”59

The influence of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant on John Paul II In his reflections that are pertinent to the question addressed by this book, John Paul II explicitly relies on Aristotle infrequently, although there were two important exceptions in Chapter 1 (his citations of Aristotle’s understandings of happiness and freedom), and the pope does speak generally about the “treasures” of Aristotle’s thought in Fides et Ratio.60 In comparison, John Paul II is more heavily influenced by Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), and refers to his work in discussing self-determination, the natural law, the object of a human act, love as benevolence, and the importance of sharing our possessions. In general, the pope clearly has a great deal of respect for Aquinas; Fides et Ratio reiterates the Church’s frequent praise of him “as a master of thought and a model of the right way to do theology.”61 57

58

59 60 61

Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Sefer Madda, Hilchot Teshuvah, 10:2. See also ibid., 10:1, 10:4 (citing Deut. 11:3 and Ps. 112:1), 10:5 (stating that engaging in good deeds can ultimately purify our motives so that we learn to act well for God’s sake and not our own). And cf. Mishneh Torah, Sefer Madda, Hilchot De’ot (“The Laws of Personality [Development]”), 1:4, 2:7, 3:1–3, 4:1 (maintaining that one “should be quietly happy” and not “overly elated” or morose, and that it is legitimate to care for one’s own basic bodily needs and that not doing so is sinful). Heschel, MNA, 194 (where he qualifies Kant’s maxim by stating that it does not apply to ourselves, for if we treat ourselves as ends, then we are liable to “use others as means”). Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 243. John Paul II, FR, § 43. Ibid. See also ibid., §§ 44, 78. Edward Barrett provides a good overview of the impact of Aquinas’s thought on the pope in Persons and Liberal Democracy, 27–31.

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The pope also has a fairly strong debt to Kant. For example, Chapter 3 noted that in discussing the personalistic norm, Wojtyła relies on Kant’s categorical imperative holding that we should never use another person solely as a means to an end. This parallel is underlined in an essay in Person and Community, which claims that this anti-utilitarian imperative reflects “a conviction that Christianity has always maintained.”62 On the other hand, John Paul II maintains that Kant’s thought suffers from certain deficiencies as well. According to Crossing the Threshold of Hope, Kant’s imperative by itself is insufficient: “The commandment of love is not limited to excluding all behavior that reduces the person to a mere object of pleasure. It requires more; it requires the affirmation of the person as a person.”63 And, as explained above, Wojtyła criticizes Kant’s “autonomism” and his effort to detach doing good from our emotions. One pre-papal writing that I have not yet mentioned addresses Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant and is also germane to the topic at hand. “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics” outlines Wojtyła’s views on these philosophers’ respective positions on “perfectionism,” which refers to the idea that “a good action essentially perfects the person performing that action,” while a bad action “devalues that person’s humanity.”64 He explains that according to Aristotle, “human fulfillment” is achieved via “moral perfection,” which involves the “possession of virtues” and a corresponding lack of egoism. Such a perspective is consistent with a biblical outlook and, in fact, was later adopted by Aquinas, who held that good actions lead to “the moral perfection of our being,” while evil actions “devalue[]” and “corrupt[]” us.65 Wojtyła then remarks that Kant does not directly explicate what “moral good” is but that he appears to link it with “that act of consciousness that is pure duty,” which is accompanied by “the experience of freedom or selfdetermination.” In other words, Wojtyła suggests that Kant’s views are “perhaps 62

63

64

65

Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,” in PC, 267 (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, § 24). John Paul II, CTH, 201. O’Reilly contends that the English translation of “object of pleasure” from Polish is incorrect in this passage, and that a more accurate rendering would be “object of use,” which could include (in O’Reilly’s words) “using others to obtain power, fame or money.” O’Reilly, Conjugal Chastity in Pope Wojtyla, 102. Wojtyła, “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics,” in PC, 45–46. In this article, Wojtyła also discusses the views of Max Scheler. In the interest of brevity, I will not discuss Scheler, particularly given that he is not as prominent a thinker as the other three and seems to have had no influence on Heschel regarding the question posed by this study. For thoughtful and accessible discussions of Scheler’s considerable influence on John Paul II’s work, see Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 21–24; Jeffreys, Defending Human Dignity, 33–66. Wojtyła, “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics,” in PC, 47 (citing Mt. 5:48), 49.

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. . . a distant echo of perfectionist views in ethics,” in that here morality and the perfection of experiencing one’s freedom go hand in hand.66 Ultimately, however, Kant is unable to construct a truly perfectionistic ethic, because “the perfection of a being can be apprehended only through an analysis of that being . . . [and] the complete human being is a being and not just a consciousness.”67 Wojtyła’s own opinion of perfectionism is fairly clear in this article; he concludes that it holds an “inviolable position in ethics.”68 In fact, his description of perfectionism sounds very similar to his “fulfillment-based” notion of the good, which was described in Chapter 1. Love and Responsibility is a bit more explicit about his approval of both Aristotle and Aquinas on this issue, stating that their perfectionistic ethics “agree[] with the fundamental orientation of the Gospel expressed in the well-known words: ‘Be perfect.’ ”69 In addition, there are specific passages from Aquinas’s Summa Theologica on the relationship between morality and fulfillment that would concur with John Paul II’s insights. For example, the Summa explicitly affirms that “happiness is the reward of works of virtue” (in union with Aristotle, although Aquinas himself has in mind eternal happiness here),70 loving God leads to joy and performing good deeds is “a cause of pleasure,”71 happiness does not consist in wealth,72 and sin (including violating the divine commandments) leads to “remorse of conscience” and divine punishment (hell in the case of mortal sin).73 Aquinas also recognizes that while following God’s commandments is pleasurable for “a righteous man,” it can feel “burdensome” to someone not habituated to 66 67 68 69

70 71

72 73

Ibid., 50–51. Ibid., 54–55. Ibid. Wojtyła, LR, 152–53 (quoting Mt. 5:48). See also Woznicki, A Christian Humanism, 32 (“It is not difficult to agree that ethics, indirectly, guides man on the way to happiness. Ethics was so understood by Aristotle—and it was similarly understood by the Gospel.”) (quoting “Wlasciwa interpretacja nauki o szczesciu” [The proper interpretation of the teaching on happiness], Tygodnik Powszechny, 36 [1957], 11). Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 5, a. 7 (citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, pt. 9). Ibid., pt. II-II, q. 28, aa. 1-2; ibid., pt. I-II, q. 32, a. 6 (quoting Aristotle, Politics, bk. II, pt. 2 as saying that “it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers”). Aquinas explains in the latter article that this is so because we consider the well-being of those we love and of ourselves to be bound together, because we anticipate a reward from others or from God, because assisting another “arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a share,” and because serving others simply feels natural to us once we make it a habit. See also my “No Woe to You Lawyers,” 118 on this point. Finally, see Chapter 1 on the relationship between virtue and pleasure in Aristotle’s thought, and Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics,” § 4 (stating that Aristotle “assumes that evil people are driven by desires for domination and luxury, and although they are single-minded in their pursuit of these goals, he portrays them as deeply divided, because their pleonexia—their desire for more and more—leaves them dissatisfied and full of self-hatred”). Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt. I-II, q. 2, a. 1. Ibid., pt. I-II, q. 87, aa. 1, 3, 6.

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them,74 and that one supreme “act of virtue” is martyrdom, which necessarily involves death but is also an important “witness to the truth.”75 On the other hand, if we turn to Kant’s famous Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, we see an apparent contrast to John Paul II’s view that morality and personal fulfillment are closely tied together. More specifically, Kant suggests here that the cheerful philanthropist or “friend of humanity,” who “find[s] an inner gratification in spreading joy,” is not acting morally, for he helps others merely out of natural sympathy. But the gloomy philanthropist, who is “by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others,” is acting morally, for he “do[es] the action without any inclination, solely from duty.”76 Peter Singer comments that Kant’s perspective here entails that “we can never succeed” in “bring[ing] about harmony between the moral law and our desires.”77 On the other hand, Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton note a controversy over the interpretation of this aspect of Kant’s ethics, and state that Kant’s defenders have argued that his point is . . . [that] the motivational structure of the agent should be arranged so that she always treats considerations of duty as sufficient reasons for conforming to [moral] requirements. . . . Having a good will . . . is compatible with having feelings and emotions of various kinds, and even with aiming to cultivate some of them in order to counteract desires and inclinations that tempt us to immorality.78

Moreover, Kant elsewhere does indicate that pleasure and happiness can occur as a consequence of doing one’s duty.79 But at the very least the Groundwork certainly suggests, in a much stronger way than the pope does, that doing good

74 75

76

77 78

79

Ibid., pt. I-II, q. 107, a. 4. Ibid., pt. II-II, q. 124, aa. 1, 3-5. For accessible defenses of the view that the Bible and Christian tradition have generally (although not always) linked morality and the spiritual life with happiness, see Mattison, Introducing Moral Theology, especially 25–27; James Martin, Between Heaven and Mirth: Why Joy, Humor, and Laughter are at the Heart of the Spiritual Life (New York: HarperOne, 2011), especially 4–5, 31–85, 135–41, 212–17. For more in-depth scholarly arguments to this effect, see Ellen T. Charry, God and the Art of Happiness (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2010), especially 25–117, 126–53, 170–250; Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, especially 8–27, 104–323. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, rev. ed., trans. and ed. Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012 [1786]), 13–14 (first section). Singer, How Are We to Live?, 182–86, 249, n. 19. Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), ed. Zalta, § 2, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/ entries/kant-moral. Note that as per Johnson and Cureton, for Kant, acting well includes fulfilling religious obligations in particular. Ibid., § 1. For this point, I am indebted to Bryan Hall, along with the entry on “happiness” in Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 221–23.

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doesn’t necessarily make a person feel good, and that a philanthropist may well just be perpetually gloomy, at least in this life.

The contemporary context: The work of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Peter Singer, and present-day psychology Preliminary comments on the lack of direct contemporary critique If we turn to the contemporary secondary literature on Heschel and John Paul II, we find surprisingly little pertinent material to engage with here. In general, Held notes the “uncritical adoration or overly facile dismissal” of most of the secondary literature on Heschel,80 and Eisen suggests that there has been a special dearth of insightful examination of Heschel’s ethics: Disciples and admirers, rarely taking the trouble to criticize Heschel’s failings, have tended to bury his thought in mounds of undifferentiated praise. Critics have focused either on the difficulties of Heschel’s style and manner of argument or on his notoriously problematic notion of divine pathos. They have paid remarkably little attention to other principal themes in Heschel’s oeuvre, and indeed have utterly ignored entire portions of his work.81

This is especially remarkable given that Heschel, after all, was a Professor of Jewish Ethics and Mysticism.82 And when Heschel’s perspectives on the relationship between morality and personal fulfillment are acknowledged, they are generally presented briefly and with little analysis.83 80 81 82

83

Held, The Call of Transcendence, 1–2. Eisen, “Re-Reading Heschel on the Commandments,” 1. Eisen’s critique, which appeared in 1989, could be tempered in light of recent books that do address Heschel’s ethics, for instance those of Held, Merkle, and, especially, Britton (who thoroughly examines Heschel’s understanding of piety). Still, even Britton, writing in 2013, remarks that Heschel’s corpus in general “has received relatively scant systematic analysis” and that “the significance of piety [in Heschel’s thought] has not been overtly acknowledged, being overshadowed instead by the centrality of pathos.” Britton, Abraham Heschel and the Phenomenon of Piety, 12, 18. See, for example, Britton, Abraham Joshua Heschel and the Phenomenon of Piety, 209; Held, The Call of Transcendence, 39–40, 88–89, 234; Merkle, Approaching God, 71–72. Hyman does argue that Heschel’s support of Jewish law implies that Jews ultimately ought to “abandon personal autonomy” to rabbinic authority. Hyman, “Meaningfulness, the Ineffable, and the Commandments,” 87–88, 91, 97–98. But it is questionable whether Heschel would go this far. As we have seen, he considers the law to be a “cry for creativity” and criticizes “ultra-Orthodox” interpretations, and in a previously unpublished manuscript he adds that “creative dissent” in Judaism is actually an “act[] of renewal.” Heschel, Abraham Joshua Heschel: Essential Writings, 106. Even assuming that Heschel does think that Jews should relinquish at least some of their freedom to official interpreters of the law, Hyman’s critique does not undermine Heschel’s aforementioned point that embracing that law does lead to freedom from selfish desires.

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As for John Paul II, his ethics have provoked considerable debate. Indeed, as the notes and bibliography of the present work make clear, there are multiple booklength collections on Veritatis Splendor alone, not to mention ones on other papal encyclicals on moral issues. That said, when it comes to the pope’s understanding of the connection between morality and fulfillment, we tend to find the same sort of uncritical (and not overly original) treatment as on Heschel’s pertinent views.84 However, there are a few exceptions. For instance, John O’Keefe and Gilbert Meilaender, influenced by Augustine and Martin Luther, respectively, have suggested that the pope may be too optimistic about the extent to which we can liberate ourselves from sinful urges in this life.85 The merits of this claim are debatable; as noted in Chapter 3, Veritatis Splendor does say that “grace . . . enables us to possess the full freedom of the children of God,” but also (relying on Augustine himself) that only partial freedom is possible in this life.86 At any rate, neither O’Keefe nor Meilaender goes so far as to explicitly argue that we achieve no increase in freedom from selfish desires through doing good. Other observers, namely Richard McCormick and Tom Beauchamp, worry that John Paul II’s vision of morality entails a constriction of our freedom to dissent or to choose against certain norms that he considers inviolable, respectively.87 But when John Paul II affirms that doing good leads to freedom, he does not have in mind those freedoms but rather—as I have repeatedly emphasized—our liberation from slavery to sin. Concerning “liberation from precepts,” Veritatis Splendor notes that while Saint Paul assures us that we are “called to freedom,” [he] immediately adds, “only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love be servants of one another.” The firmness 84

85

86

87

See, for example, Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 26; Carson Holloway, The Way of Life: John Paul II and the Challenge of Liberal Modernity (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008), 11–13, 15–16, 19–23, 25–26, 28; Jeffreys, Defending Human Dignity, 73–76; Reimers, Truth About the Good, 185, 191–92; Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II, 106–08; Tranzillo, John Paul II on the Vulnerable, 64–65, 78, 80–81, 84, 222, 235–38, 243–44, 255–56, 266, 270–73, 286, 288–90. Gilbert Meilaender, “Grace, Justification through Faith, and Sin,” 69, 80–81; John J. O’Keefe, “No Place for Failure? Augustinian Reflections on Veritatis Splendor,” in Veritatis Splendor: American Responses, ed. Allsopp and O’Keefe, 26–27. On how both Luther and Veritatis Splendor acknowledge that our freedom in this life is subject to a “tension between ‘spirit’ and ‘flesh,’ ” see Hütter, “God’s Law in Veritatis Splendor,” 110. Tom L. Beauchamp, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Response to Edmund Pellegrino,” in Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae, ed. Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J. and Alan C. Mitchell (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 256–58 (arguing for the permissibility of physician assistance in dying); Richard A. McCormick, S.J., “Some Early Reactions to Veritatis Splendor,” in John Paul II and Moral Theology: Readings in Moral Theology No. 10, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1998 [1994]), 29–30.

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with which the apostle opposes those who believe that they are justified by the law has nothing to do with man’s “liberation” from precepts. On the contrary, the latter are at the service of the practice of love.88

The encyclical later maintains that public dissent “cannot be seen as a legitimate expression . . . of Christian freedom,” for it attacks the unity of the Church and fails to understand that true moral doctrine is not arrived at through a mere democratic process.89 None of the aforementioned critiques, then, directly attack John Paul II’s specific views bearing on the question posed by this study.

The fourteenth Dalai Lama Given the relative lack of contemporary analysis of Heschel’s and John Paul II’s pertinent views, we must turn elsewhere to illuminate their merits.90 Up to this point, the present work has focused on two Western religious traditions,91 and neglected Eastern spiritual insights. Of all the present-day thinkers who have put these forth, perhaps the most famous is Tenzin Gyatso, also known as the fourteenth Dalai Lama, a monk and spiritual leader of the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism. Born in Tibet in 1935, as a young adult the Dalai Lama fled to India during a political uprising, and eventually won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 for his efforts to assist the nonviolent liberation of his home country from the Chinese.92 To date, he has published two English-language books on general ethical issues: Ethics for the New Millennium and Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World. Note that both of these books purport to put forth not a 88 89

90

91

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John Paul II, VS, § 17 (quoting Gal. 5:13). See also ibid., §§ 35, 40–41; John Paul II, FR, § 68. John Paul II, VS, § 113. See also Goddard, “Veritatis Splendor: Human Freedom and the Splendor of Truth,” 176–77 (suggesting that even from an evangelical Christian perspective, the “control” exerted by “an authoritative Magisterium” is at least somewhat offset by the benefit of a more “unified, faithful and distinctive Christian witness”). I should state at the outset of what follows that I will not be concentrating on the merits of their claim that the search for meaning is universal, although in light of the Pew Research Center study referenced in the Introduction, a better descriptor might be “widespread” or “near-universal.” I realize that much more could be said here, for instance, with reference to non-Catholic Christian views. For an accessible, thoughtful, and wildly influential contemporary perspective of a Southern Baptist Protestant pastor on the relationship between religious commitment and personal fulfillment, see Rick Warren, The Purpose Driven Life: What on Earth Am I Here For?, expanded ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2012). In particular, Warren contends that purpose and significance are achieved not through materialism but through serving the material and spiritual needs of others, and that each of us is “shaped” (through our “spiritual gifts,” “heart,” “abilities,” “personality,” and “experience”) to serve in different ways. See, for example, ibid., 225–68, 279–94. “His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet: Brief Biography,” at http://www.dalailama.com/ biography/a-brief-biography; “The Dalai Lamas,” at http://www.dalailama.com/biography/thedalai-lamas.

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distinctively Buddhist morality, but, rather, an inclusive ethics that can appeal to individuals of various religious (and non-religious) perspectives. That said, as the author himself acknowledges, the two works do draw quite a bit from Tibetan and Buddhist insights.93 In addition, both books dwell at great length on the question posed by our study, thereby meriting some brief consideration here. Ethics for the New Millennium and Beyond Religion clarify that ethics encompasses not just the external manifestations of an act, but also internal motivation (kun long in Tibetan); both of these should be positive in order for an entire act to be good.94 The most fundamental moral category of both works appears to be compassion (nying je, which also signifies love and affection), which is understood as “a desire to alleviate the suffering of others and to promote their well-being.”95 Generosity, in turn, is the actual acting on this desire, and according to classical Buddhism includes the offer not only of material goods but also of love.96 Another important “ethical value” for the Dalai Lama is contentment (chogshé), which refers to “knowing [what is] enough” and moderating one’s desires—particularly one’s cravings for consumer goods—accordingly.97 He clarifies that it is not necessarily immoral to care for our own needs, but becomes so “only when we are excessively selffocused.”98 Finally, it bears mentioning that he supports non-violence and affirms the prohibition of killing found in all major world religions.99 Acting ethically in the aforementioned ways leads to fulfillment, according to the Dalai Lama. The general idea here, which is grounded in Buddhist teaching but also accessible via reason and experience, is that “interdependence [is] . . . a key feature of human reality,” such that whatever is in the interest of other people is also in our own interest100—and so, acting compassionately is actually “wise selfish.”101 Drawing from his own personal experience, he notes that compassion 93

Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World (Boston: Mariner Books/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), xiii–xiv, 19–20; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999), xiii, 19–20. 94 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 71; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 29–33, 148. 95 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, xi, 53, 55, 157; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 73–74, 123–24. 96 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 149–50. 97 Ibid., 144–45. 98 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 47. See also Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 13, 235–36. 99 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 87–89; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 29, 150, 201–02. 100 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 19; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 36–37, 41, 47, 164–65. 101 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 48.

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can successfully distract us from our own pains and sufferings.102 More positively, he argues that both modern science and common sense show that compassion leads to “genuine happiness and joy” (including health benefits and a feeling of connectedness to others), as well as a “sense of purpose” in serving a greater good than one’s own needs.103 But he also indicates that compassion can lead to an achievement of objective meaning; he points to the example of those who courageously assisted Jews within Nazi Germany, and states that if we have compassion, each of us can engage in “similar acts of heroism.”104 As for generosity, it is gratifying and comforting to know that what we give to others helps them, whether it is wealth or simply a kind attitude.105 And an attitude of contentment enables us to “free ourselves from the sense of insecurity and insufficiency born of incessant craving” and helps us find true satisfaction, as recognized in the Tibetan maxim, “at the door of the miserable rich man sleeps the contented beggar.”106 That said, attending to our own basic needs (for instance, food, water, and housing) is also necessary for happiness.107 And non-violence and disarmament, not war, are the true means for achieving lasting peace.108 Despite all of these rewards for acting ethically, the Dalai Lama clarifies that we should not be focused on them but, rather, on benefiting the other.109 Lastly, it is worth mentioning that while he does not focus much on the potential hardships of doing the right thing,110 he does think that it is possible to reduce any suffering we may encounter by reflecting on the fact that adversity can improve our character, as well as on a maxim of the eighth-century Buddhist thinker Shantideva: “If there is a solution, Then what need is there for dejection [i.e., worry]? If there is no solution, Then what point is there in dejection?”111

102

Ibid., 45–46. See also Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 61–62. Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 36–37, 39, 45–46; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 234. 104 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 54. See also Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 174. 105 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 151–53; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 113. 106 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 144–45. See also Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 165–66. 107 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 33. 108 Ibid., 87–88; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 201–04, 206. 109 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 150; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 114, 125. 110 He does note that dealing with afflictive emotions (such as anger and envy) “is a lifelong struggle,” albeit one that becomes easier with effort. Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 86, 119. 111 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 139–41; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 104, 138–39, 142–43. 103

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On the other hand, the Dalai Lama holds that doing evil detracts from our overall fulfillment. If a person acts in a self-centered fashion and harms others, any “temporary satisfaction” she might gain will likely be outweighed by loneliness (because of a loss of genuine friends), dissatisfaction in the long run, and a lack of objective meaning since that person did not make the world a better place and is “not much missed” after death.112 A certain amount of income is important for happiness, as poverty can cause “profound mental distress.”113 But referencing his exchanges with many prosperous individuals over the years, the Dalai Lama adds that wealth (kunga dondhup) beyond the fulfillment of basic necessities does not “guarantee” happiness, for our money is never fully secure, and, in fact, it “creates a kind of cocoon around people which often brings loneliness.”114 In addition, a materialist attitude, in which one is always striving to obtain more, leads to anxiety and dissatisfaction, as well as “slave[ry] to money.”115 The following quotation from Ethics for the New Millennium sums up much of the foregoing well: “Happiness arises from virtuous causes. If we truly desire to be happy, there is no other way to proceed but by way of virtue: it is the method by which happiness is achieved. And, we might add, that the basis of virtue, its ground, is ethical discipline.”116 While the Dalai Lama thinks that an ethical life is crucial to achieving personal fulfillment, he also believes that it is not absolutely necessary to be religious in order to be compassionate, to manifest other moral qualities, or to achieve happiness. This is because we are biologically inclined to care for others, can recognize that everyone naturally desires happiness and has a right to it, and can reason that being good benefits us as well. Furthermore, even those who are religious are not always good people.117 Still, he says that the aforementioned dispositions “are most easily and effectively developed within the context of religious practice.” Because of this and the fact that people of faith have special resources for sustaining their spirits in the midst of suffering, he concludes that religion “is an extremely effective

112

Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 53–54, 89–90, 95. See also Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 47–48. Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 146; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 56. 114 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 32–34. See also Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 50. 115 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 91; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 5–9. 116 Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 121. 117 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, xiv, 5–6, 13, 45, 52–53, 56, 174; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 19–20, 22, 27–28, 220, 234. 113

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instrument for establishing human happiness.”118 But he notes that although he himself has found Buddhist practice helpful in cultivating compassion, other individuals may find other worldviews better suited to their own temperaments, just as different patients may find different medicines beneficial.119 Much of what the Dalai Lama says overlaps with the thinking of Heschel and John Paul II, notably the idea that morality includes both the external and internal aspects of a deed, the emphasis on love and transcending one’s own needs, the recognition that it is legitimate to attend to one’s own basic necessities, the promotion of non-violence, the belief that doing good in the aforementioned ways leads to various realities of personal fulfillment (including objective and subjective happiness, objective and subjective meaning, and freedom from selfish cravings), and the conviction that happiness (or at least an absence of despair) is possible even in the face of suffering. At the same time, the Dalai Lama’s reasoning for these conclusions is often different; he relies not on the Bible, and not just on general human experience, but also on personal anecdotes, Buddhist notions such as interdependence,120 and the findings of modern science. Also, the Dalai Lama certainly emphasizes more than the rabbi and the pope that religious belief and commitment are not necessary to live a good and fulfilled life, and that there are specific ways we might cultivate certain ethical qualities such as compassion.121

118

Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 220. See also ibid., 223; Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 16. 119 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 185; Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 21, 225–27, 229–30. Elsewhere, I have addressed the Dalai Lama’s views on environmental responsibility and how it, too, is in our own interests (and does not require religious belief). See my “Together Again, Naturally? Pope Benedict XVI and the Fourteenth Dalai Lama on Our Environmental Responsibility,” Journal of Catholic Social Thought 11, no. 2 (2014): 483–86, 497–98. 120 That said, at least at one point, Heschel emphasizes the interdependence of all people as well, and claims that “whenever one man is hurt, we are all injured.” Fasching, deChant, and Lantigua, Comparative Religious Ethics, 228 (quoting Heschel, “No Religion is an Island,” in MGSA, 237–38). 121 Dalai Lama XIV, Beyond Religion, 107–10 (providing a “basic toolkit to help us in our daily effort to live ethically,” including heedfulness or bhakyö or an “overall stance of caution,” mindfulness or drenpa of our “core values and motivation,” and awareness or sheshin of our actions), 124–34 (on “adopting a stance of opposition toward our destructive emotions” such as greed, reflecting on their irrationality, and “catching ourselves” before we act out on them), 155–83 (on mental cultivation or meditation, and tips for engaging in it, such as considering that another person we have trouble relating to also desires to be happy and not to suffer, thinking about a role model, or reflecting on the fact that our enemies are “actually our greatest teachers” and that we should be grateful to them for affording us an opportunity to improve our character); Dalai Lama XIV, Ethics for the New Millennium, 120 (on taking a few minutes in the morning and at night to contemplate the value of acting ethically and then to discern how well we have done so that day).

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Moreover, while the two aforementioned books do not really discuss karma, reincarnation, nirvana, or Buddhahood—notions that are not accepted by Heschel or John Paul II—elsewhere the Dalai Lama explains that karma is the inexorable mechanism by which “good actions lead to happy states and bad actions lead to painful states,” in this life and the next, that we exist within “a seemingly endless cycle of death and rebirth,” that nirvana (which for Buddhists is a more desirable goal than reincarnation and involves “liberation from cyclic existence”) is “peace” and “ultimate happiness,” and that Buddhahood is the ultimate goal that involves “be[ing] of greatest service to others” who have not yet achieved nirvana. Accordingly, he counsels his readers to (1) steer clear of unethical activity (such as killing and covetousness) in order to avoid being reborn as an animal, a “hungry ghost,” or a “hell being”; and (2) be compassionate to achieve a more desirable rebirth as a human or even god. He adds that wisdom helps us attain nirvana, while hatred and other negative emotions distance us from it, and that love and compassion help us achieve Buddhahood, which involves the achievement of various “Buddha bodies.” There is no place for a creator God in this Buddhist framework, he explains, adding that the problem of evil sheds doubt on such a being’s existence (if it is also posited to be all-good and all-powerful).122 In sum, a close analysis of the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s work on ethics demonstrates that it corroborates many of Heschel’s and John Paul II’s reflections on morality and personal fulfillment, despite some notable divergences.

Peter Singer To more fully inform ourselves on the question at the heart of this study, however, we can also turn to a more formally non-religious perspective. Of today’s secular atheist thinkers on moral issues, the most prominent is arguably Peter Singer, a professor of philosophy at Princeton University. Born in 1946 in Australia, he first achieved worldwide recognition through his work on behalf of animal rights, although he has also written extensively on 122

Dalai Lama XIV, Becoming Enlightened (New York: Atria, 2009), viii, 9–10, 42–43, 75–78, 92–94, 100, 103–04, 106–11, 133, 146, 188, 220–22. Note that Catholic teaching explicitly opposes the possibility of reincarnation; see Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1013 (citing Heb. 9:27). All of this said, the notion that love and compassion lead to an especially close resemblance to the Buddha perhaps has some kinship to Heschel and John Paul II’s idea that the religiously committed manifest a likeness to God (or Jesus).

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bioethics and fundamental ethical issues. He has written widely on the topic of the relationship between morality and personal fulfillment, most notably in How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest (which deals with that relationship throughout), the final chapter of Practical Ethics (a book that provides an excellent overview of his thought and is, therefore, perhaps his most essential work), and the ninth chapter of The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically (his most recent work to address our topic in depth). For Singer, ethics is not primarily about rules, such as the Ten Commandments. Sometimes it is wrong to follow a moral law, he explains; for instance, he claims that it would “surely be right” to lie to a Nazi guard about sheltering Jews in one’s attic. And rules do not cover all the situations and moral quandaries we may be faced with in life. That said, rules are helpful to an extent, “not as repositories of absolute moral truth, but as generally reliable guides for normal circumstances.”123 Singer adds that ethics is certainly not based on religion, noting that “everyday observation” shows that non-religious people can act morally well, and also that those who are religious do not necessarily do so.124 So what does ethics boil down to? As Singer demonstrates, philosophical and religious thinkers from ancient times to the present—such as various ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, Moses, Jesus, Kant, Adam Smith, utilitarians, John Rawls, and Jean-Paul Sartre—have reasonably held that the essence of ethics involves taking a universal point of view, or in other words, considering interests other than those of ourselves or of a group we may belong to. In Practical Ethics, Singer maintains that it is a short step from this perspective to a school of moral philosophy known as “preference utilitarianism,” which holds that “we should do what, on balance, furthers the preferences of those affected.”125 However, in The Most Good You Can Do, he indicates that he has shifted to a slightly different view, that of “hedonistic utilitarianism,” which contends that “we should always do what will maximize pleasure, or happiness, and minimize pain, or unhappiness.” This very recent work also commends what he calls “effective altruism” and provides the following definition: “A philosophy and social movement which applies

123

Singer, Practical Ethics, 2; Singer, How Are We to Live?, viii–ix, 171–73, 175. Singer, Practical Ethics, 3–4. 125 Ibid., 11–15. See also Singer, How Are We to Live?, 174–75, 232. 124

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evidence and reason to working out the most effective ways to improve the world,” one that shares the concerns of utilitarianism but is not necessarily tied to it.126 At any rate, Singer believes that ethics is concerned not so much with rules and inner motivations as it is with goals.127 These general considerations entail various specific conclusions, according to Singer. Among these are that those in affluent countries have a duty to assist those who are suffering as a result of extreme poverty; he suggests a progressive scale in which nine-tenths of individuals living in wealthy countries would donate somewhere from one to five percent of their income, a proposal that if followed perfectly would raise 1.5 trillion dollars each year, or eight times the amount that a 2000 United Nations task force projected could cut extreme poverty in half, rescue six million lives per year, and provide complete primary schooling to children all over the world.128 Singer also puts forth a number of hedonistic and preference utilitarian considerations against killing a person: it takes away that person’s future happiness, can cause others to worry about being killed, frustrates the victim’s desire to continue living as well as his future plans, and can desensitize us to death and thereby lead to further murders that are unjustified.129 However, for Singer, persons do not include fetuses and newborn babies, who are similar to nonhuman and nonperson animals in terms of their “rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, and capacity to feel,” and abortion and infanticide can be morally justifiable if “done as painlessly as possible.”130 In addition, voluntary euthanasia is consistent with both of the above forms of utilitarianism and is permissible.131 When we engage in good conduct, it benefits us in turn, Singer says. He concedes that some forms of happiness and meaning may be unavailable to us, namely the perfect happiness of heaven (the existence of which he says has not been convincingly demonstrated) and a God-given purpose.132 But he also points out that countless philosophers before him—including Socrates, 126

Peter Singer, The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 4–5 (quoting Wikipedia, “Effective Altruism” [April 15, 2014], at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism), 79, 198, n. 10; Singer, Practical Ethics, 13. 127 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 5; Singer, Practical Ethics, 2; Singer, How Are We to Live?, 173. 128 Singer, Practical Ethics, 199–215. See also Singer, How Are We to Live?, 222, 225. 129 Singer, Practical Ethics, 76–81, 84–85, 273. 130 Ibid., 134–41, 151–54. 131 Ibid., 170. 132 Ibid., 2–3, 287, 291; Singer, How Are We to Live?, 186–88.

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Aristotle, Baruch Spinoza, and Georg Hegel—have upheld the relationship between morality and happiness in this life, although he acknowledges that philosophers are not empirical scientists and have been known to make factual errors. And so, Singer turns to “positive psychology,” which as he notes is a branch of psychology that “explores the sources of happiness,” along with a number of recent empirical studies. These include ones that find that those who give to charity are 43 percent more likely to be “very happy” and 68 percent less likely to feel “hopeless,” and another that says that those who donate organs rate their overall experience as a 9.8 (out of 10) and their future willingness to donate as a 10. He does grant that showing a correlation between morality and happiness is not quite the same as demonstrating that the former causes the latter, and that the latter can actually cause the former (in that people who feel good are more motivated to help others). However, he then refers to other studies that indicate that ethical behavior can, in fact, lead to happiness; one of these discovered that when participants gave money to a food bank, their brains’ “reward centers” were activated as a result.133 Moreover, in response to nihilistic concerns, Singer suggests that ethics can lead us to both objective and subjective meaning: We should not . . . think of our efforts as wasted unless they endure forever, or even for a very long time. . . . We can . . . make . . . [our] world a better place by causing there to be less pointless suffering in one particular place, at one particular time, than there would otherwise have been. As long as we do not thereby increase suffering at some other place or time, or cause any other comparable loss of value, we will have had a positive effect on the universe.134

Singer also points to the lives of a number of individuals to substantiate his claim. Toby Ord, a fellow Australian philosopher and the founder of Giving What We Can (an international organization focused on poverty relief), found his decision to live on £18,000 (about $30,000) per year was more than compensated by his sense of doing his part to improve the condition of our world. Similarly, Holden Karnofsky, a cofounder and executive director of GiveWell (an organization that evaluates charities), told Singer that he finds his current job more “interesting,” “exciting,” and “motivating” than his previous 133 134

Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 99–101; Singer, Practical Ethics, 287–88. Singer, How Are We to Live?, 231. See also ibid., 218, 222, 235; Singer, Practical Ethics, 293–94.

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position working for a hedge fund.135 But more than on any other individual, Singer’s writings focus on the late animal rights activist Henry Spira, who was able to maintain an upbeat attitude knowing that he was doing all he could to “push[] the peanut forward.”136 At the end of his life, Spira memorably responded as follows to a question about what had motivated him during his life: I guess basically one wants to feel that one’s life has amounted to more than just consuming products and generating garbage. I think that one likes to look back and say that one’s done the best one can to make this a better place for others. . . . [W]hat greater motivation can there be than doing whatever one possibly can to reduce pain and suffering?137

Conversely, acting immorally draws us away from personal fulfillment, Singer argues. Relying on the work of the psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley, he acknowledges that psychopaths, who are “asocial and indifferent to the welfare of others,” may find their unethical conduct to be pleasurable, guiltless, and liberating. On the other hand, Singer (as per Cleckley) speculates that their capricious and even irrational behavior (many will carry out a “petty and easily detectable crime”) suggests that they are fundamentally bored and lack any long-term purpose (such as marriage, family, or achievement in one’s career). Even shrewd egoists who have such a purpose, which involves fulfilling their own wants, do not live lives of real significance and find happiness elusive because their material needs are never fully satisfied.138 In general, Singer explains, studies show that once people have met their basic needs, increases in wealth cause little to no boost in happiness. Interestingly, even people who win lotteries quickly adapt to their new circumstances and revert to their original level of happiness. (We could add to Singer’s commentary that Americans caught up in the excitement of Powerball, notably the January 2016 $1.5 billion jackpot, would do well to keep this in mind.) The analogy that Singer and contemporary psychologists use to illustrate this point is a treadmill; when we race toward material goods thinking they will make us happier, we end up in basically the same psychological spot where we started.139 Finally, Singer 135

Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 15–18, 97. Singer, How Are We to Live?, 220–23. 137 Singer, Practical Ethics, 294–95. See also Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 102. And for a much more thorough treatment, see Peter Singer, Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights Movement (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). 138 Singer, Practical Ethics, 289–90, 292. 139 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 98; Singer, How Are We to Live?, 50–52. 136

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argues that when we use violence, it rarely brings about the goals we seek, and even when it does, it is possible we could have achieved them through a more peaceful approach.140 Once again Singer puts forth individual case studies in support of these points. He reminisces about coming to New York in 1973 to join the faculty of New York University, and socializing with well-off professors who admitted to attending daily psychoanalysis to address their feelings of unhappiness and meaninglessness. Singer observes, “I wanted to pick them up and shake them. . . . If these able, affluent New Yorkers had only got off their analysts’ couches . . . and gone out to do something about the real problems faced by less fortunate people . . . they would have forgotten their own problems and maybe made the world a better place as well.” He also notes how Michael Milken, the former Wall Street trader whose infamous peddling of “junk bonds” to investors in the 1980s catapulted him to billionaire status, was described as deeply unfulfilled by multiple acquaintances, one of whom stated that “he is the most unhappy person I know. He never has enough.” And Ivan Boesky, Milken’s contemporary who eventually pled guilty to insider trading, was distraught upon learning in the early 1980s that he had made it only to the bottom of Forbes magazine’s list of richest Americans, and profusely apologized to his wife.141 Lastly, when Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, and Al Qaeda have engaged in terrorist activity, it has not furthered their own interests, but merely strengthened the resolve of their adversaries.142 Singer also provides some considerations regarding the difficulty of acting well. In response to the claim that we are “biologically determined” to behave in self-centered ways, Singer notes that evolutionary theory holds that living beings strive to pass their genes on to future generations, which in turn suggests that we would be biologically motivated to care for our children and other kin.143 And he does acknowledge (albeit briefly) that ethical commitment does not always benefit us, but then adds that even in the case of Oskar Schindler, a German businessman who protected over a thousand Jews from the Nazis (and could not have foreseen any reciprocal benefit to himself

140

Singer, Practical Ethics, 273–74. Ibid., 293; Singer, How Are We to Live?, 204–07. Singer, Practical Ethics, 274. 143 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 76; Singer, How Are We to Live?, 88–93, 105. 141 142

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in doing so), some of those Jews assisted him when he struggled financially after the war.144 How do these reflections compare to those of Heschel and John Paul II? All three of these thinkers broadly agree on the value of altruism and serving others (including the poor), the importance of not being overly preoccupied with our own needs, the ethically problematic (to say the least) nature of killing persons, the notion that doing good leads us to happiness and meaning in this life (and that doing evil distances us from these realities), and the fact that we are able to do good in the first place. On the other hand, unlike the rabbi and the pope, Singer downplays rules and religious commitment in his ethical framework, is sympathetic to utilitarianism, explicitly permits some forms of direct killing (such as abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in certain situations),145 dismisses the possibilities of heaven and a God-given purpose, relies to a significant extent on individual case studies and scientific research in support of his claim that morality and fulfillment are connected, incorporates evolutionary theory into his argument that we are able to do good, and does not dwell much on the fact that acting well can be painful sometimes. Overall, while there is much common ground between Heschel, John Paul II, and Singer on the relationship between morality and fulfillment, there are also key differences.

Present-day psychology While I will not attempt to adjudicate all of the aforementioned claims of Heschel, John Paul II, the Dalai Lama, and Singer (such as those on the nature of ethics and our ability to do good),146 there is certainly more we can say to help us gauge the merits of their views on the relationship between morality and fulfillment. As we have seen, both the Dalai Lama and (especially) Singer rely on science in substantiating these views, and the latter 144

Singer, How Are We to Live?, 163, 167–68. Heschel does not mention any of these; John Paul II is opposed to all three, as we saw in Chapter 3. 146 Note that Singer’s position on lying to the Nazi guard seems at odds with Catholic teaching, which unequivocally condemns lying but calls for “being silent about what ought not be known or for making use of a discreet language” when necessary to protect others. Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§ 2482–86, 2488–89. For a perspective in line with the Catechism that discusses the case of the Nazi guard and how one might strive to protect the Jews without lying, see Christopher O. Tollefsen, Lying and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 30, 163–64, 171–72, 175–80. 145

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thinker looks toward positive psychology, in particular. Let us now more fully explore this field, which emerged in the 1990s and was spearheaded by the efforts of Martin Seligman, the then president of the American Psychological Association. Seligman felt that for decades, psychology had focused so much on alleviating mental illness that it had ignored the crucial study of how people can achieve happiness and a sense of meaning in their lives. In his words: People want more than just to correct their weaknesses. They want lives imbued with meaning. . . . Lying awake at night, you probably ponder, as I have, how to go from plus two to plus seven in your life, not just how to go from minus five to minus three and feel a little less miserable day by day.147

Seligman’s new branch of psychology quickly caught the attention of his fellow academics and the wider public, and today it continues to maintain a center at his home institution of the University of Pennsylvania. Among the most prominent psychologists who have been active in this specific field are Jonathan Haidt, a professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business, and (formerly) Sonja Lyubomirsky, a professor at the University of California, Riverside.148 How does each of these thinkers add to our understanding of the issues we have discussed? As a preliminary matter, they clarify that there is only so much we can do to alter our own happiness levels, since they also depend on factors outside of our control. More specifically, according to Lyubomirsky, genetics accounts for 50 percent of differences in happiness among people, a statistic researchers arrived at based on studies of twins. Life circumstances account for 10 percent of these differences, and the remaining 40 percent is 147

Seligman, Authentic Happiness, ix; see also Seligman, Flourish, 182–83. For Seligman’s account of the birth of the field of positive psychology, see Seligman, Flourish, 5–9; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 17–29. He has more recently clarified that he now sees positive psychology as concerned more broadly with “well-being” or “flourishing,” which includes “happiness” (understood in a limited sense of positive emotion or life satisfaction) but also “meaning,” “engagement,” “positive relationships,” and “accomplishment,” although he also suggests that the last of these elements may not always be desirable. Seligman, Flourish, 9–29. 148 On Haidt’s involvement, see Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, x. For a brief description of one of Lyubomirsky’s early associations with positive psychology, see Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 19. She does not presently consider herself a “positive psychologist” (she finds the term to be limiting), although her stated focus (“how happiness changes over time and what strategies can increase happiness”) certainly overlaps with that of positive psychology. Elizabeth Weil, “Happiness Inc.,” New York Times (April 19, 2013), at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/fashion/happinessinc.html. Moreover, her most recent book explicitly draws from research in it. Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 3. Note that increasing freedom is not a direct concern of these psychologists, and so I will not be addressing that topic in this section.

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under our control, meaning that we are often able to avoid simply adapting and reverting to our previous level of happiness.149 Both Lyubomirsky and Seligman offer various strategies for improving our happiness, at least some of which are clearly morally significant: kindness, gratitude, forgiveness, savoring pleasures, exercising, and others.150 They add that different people will benefit from different approaches; Lyubomirsky offers a “person-activity fit diagnostic” test to help her readers determine what strategies will work best for them, and Seligman provides a “signature strengths test” to assist his readers in identifying the qualities they should strive to use more often in order to find fulfillment.151 The first of the strategies I named above—kindness—is the one that most clearly pertains to the thought of Heschel and John Paul II. Like Singer, Lyubomirsky and Haidt explain that while there is, indeed, a correlation between helping others and happiness, that does not automatically entail that the former is the cause of the latter.152 However, in recent years, that causal relationship has been established; for instance, Haidt comments that the psychologist Jane Piliavin has discovered that giving blood does cause people to “feel good, and good about themselves.” More broadly, Piliavin finds that volunteer work generally benefits the volunteer, but that this effect depends on the individual’s age. Adolescents do not show marked increases in “self-esteem or happiness,” although adults who volunteer achieve gains in “happiness and well-being” for the duration of their volunteering, and the elderly reap even more benefits (including “improved health and longer life”). Haidt mounts a credible explanation for this phenomenon: This pattern of age-related change suggests that two of the big benefits of volunteer work are that it brings people together, and it helps them to construct a . . . life story. Adolescents are already immersed in a dense network of social relationships, and they are just barely beginning to construct their life stories, so they don’t much need either of these benefits. With age, 149

Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 90–94; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 20–22, 48–68; Seligman, Flourish, 281, n.; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 45–61. On the importance of all three of these factors, see also Haybron, “Happiness,” § 3.2; Helliwell, Huang, and Wang, “The Distribution of World Happiness,” 12–13. 150 See, generally, Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 88–254; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 62–121. 151 Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 73–77; Seligman, Flourish, 38–40, 243–65; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 140–61. 152 Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 173; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 126.

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however, one’s story begins to take shape, and altruistic activities add depth and virtue to one’s character. In old age, when social networks are thinned by the deaths of friends and family, the social benefits of volunteering are strongest (and indeed, it is the most socially isolated elderly who benefit the most from volunteering). Furthermore, in old age, generativity, relationship, and spiritual strivings come to matter more, but achievement strivings seem out of place, more appropriate for the middle chapters of a life story; therefore, an activity that lets one “give something back” fits right into the story and helps to craft a satisfying conclusion.153

Lyubomirsky’s own experiments have also confirmed that acts of kindness can increase our happiness, although she adds that this seems to hold only when we strive to do more than we usually do within a given limited time frame (e.g., one day a week), and when we vary the kinds of acts we engage in (e.g., volunteering to assist with a particular task, calling or writing a loved one, and being kind to a stranger). Also, she explains that as with all happiness strategies she discusses, certain individuals may reap greater rewards through caring than others (since we each have different “needs, interests, values, resources, and inclinations”). Her own rationales for why kindness feels good include the following: it alleviates guilt, diverts us from self-pitying thoughts, gives us a sense of importance, and leads to others’ offering help in return and even befriending us.154 At the same time, Lyubomirsky acknowledges that sometimes doing what is noble (for instance, caregiving for relatives) can lead to depression and harmful physical effects, and, moreover, that evil acts (such as violence, stealing, and defrauding) can be accompanied by a burst of pleasure. To deal with the first dilemma, she suggests equipping oneself with coping strategies, which include both behavioral methods—for example, giving oneself a “breather” by turning to an enjoyable pastime—and cognitive approaches—for instance, looking at the situation in a more favorable light (such as reflecting on the fact that suffering can serve as a means for personal benefit), coming to accept it, or discovering comfort in religion. And, in general, suffering naturally 153 154

Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 174–75. Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 69, 127–31, 133–34, 266–70. Seligman would also appear to hold that some individuals can benefit more from helping than others; one of the signature strengths on his list is “kindness and generosity,” which he understands as a “route” to achieve the virtue of “humanity and love.” Seligman, Flourish, 251–52; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 133, 148. On the influence of generosity on both “positive affect” and “life evaluations,” see also Helliwell, Huang, and Wang, “The Distribution of World Happiness,” 16–18.

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diminishes over time via our “psychological immune system.”155 As for the second issue, she claims that an evildoer’s happiness “will not endure” (since “sinful pleasures” are not “hard won”) and that he may be susceptible to “guilt or other negative feelings” as well.156 Next, the research shows that there is a correlation between religious commitment and happiness, particularly if that commitment goes beyond mere belief. For instance, as Lyubomirsky explains, “47 percent of people who report attending religious services several times a week describe themselves as ‘very happy,’ versus 28 percent of those who attend less than once a month.” Moreover, those who are religious tend to be healthier and cope better with adversity than those who are not.157 What exactly is causing religious individuals to be happier? At least three explanations have been proposed: it is the belonging to a supportive social network, it is the ethical and healthy behavior that religious systems encourage, and/or it is religion itself (particularly a sense of relationship with God) that gives people a feeling of inner peace, hope, and purpose in life. Seligman and Lyubomirsky themselves point out that religions do promote various dispositions (such as moderation, charity, compassion, forgiveness, and gratitude) that lead to happiness and health. Ultimately, both authors are especially sympathetic to the last explanation; Seligman himself refers to a study by Sheena Sethi Iyengar that demonstrates that the “hope found in [religious] sermons, liturgy, and stories”—rather than social support—leads to greater optimism among religious adherents. As for concrete religious activities people can engage in, Lyubomirsky’s suggestions include attending church and/or a Bible study group, donating one’s time to a particular religious cause, praying, reading or listening to material with religious content, and discussing faith with others. She also indicates that participating in such activities can help stimulate genuine interest in religious practice.158 155

Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 7–8, 202–05; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 135–36, 152–60. Similarly, in Man’s Search for Meaning, the twentieth-century Austrian psychiatrist Viktor Frankl discusses how a person can find a sense of meaning in the midst of suffering: if a person “knows the ‘why’ for his existence, [he] will be able to bear almost any ‘how.’ ” Frankl’s theory was grounded in his own experience in a Nazi concentration camp, during which his desire to write what became Man’s Search for Meaning sustained him. He himself believed that “the meaning of [my] life is to help others find the meaning of theirs.” Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, xiv, 79–80, 104, 111–22, 146, 165. 156 Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 265–66, 337, n. 11. 157 Ibid., 228–29, 234. 158 Ibid., 228–32; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 59–60.

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However, Lyubomirsky adds a couple of caveats: (1) belief in a “distant and punitive” God and in original sin can actually cause depression, poor health outcomes, and a sense of shame; (2) a spirituality without belief in God that “sanctif[ies] ordinary things on earth” (such as one’s job or children, or love) can also give one a sense of satisfaction and meaning; and (3) as with all “happiness-enhancing activities,” some will find religious and spiritual practice more natural and beneficial than others would.159 Along these lines, while Seligman and Lyubomirsky claim to have found much fulfillment through engaging in work that helps others flourish and through applying their recommendations to their own lives, respectively, they explicitly describe themselves as non-religious (the latter calls herself “the least spiritual person I know”).160 Also, Haidt identifies as an atheist; he suggests that belief in God is only one way to find happiness and a sense of meaning in life, and that “love, work, and a connection to something larger” in general are effective paths.161 I am not aware of any sizable body of research on the question of whether committing to religious law in particular conduces to personal fulfillment. Certain research findings could be read (albeit somewhat speculatively) to bear on this issue. For example, in referring to the Iyengar study, Seligman explains that “the more fundamentalist the religion, the more optimistic are its adherents”; Orthodox Jews and fundamentalist Christians are much more optimistic and less “depressive” than Reform Jews and Unitarians.162 Haidt comments that in the late nineteenth century, Emile Durkheim found that “Protestants, who lived the least demanding religious lives at the time, had higher suicide rates than did Catholics; Jews, with the densest network of social and religious obligations, had the lowest.” With a nod to more recent studies as well, Haidt observes that people need “social constraints, bonds, and obligations” (including “rules of conduct”) in order to find meaning and fulfillment in their lives: “An ideology of extreme personal freedom can be dangerous because it encourages people to leave homes, jobs, cities, and marriages in search of personal and professional fulfillment, 159

Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 232–39. Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 248–49; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 282–83; Seligman, Flourish, 2, 232; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 257–60. 161 Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 183, 215–29, 238–39. 162 Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 60. 160

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thereby breaking the relationships that were probably their best hope for such fulfillment.”163 While not referring to religious law in particular, he notes that “anomie” (or “normlessness”) “breeds feelings of rootlessness and anxiety.”164 What about the relationship between money or materialism on the one hand, and fulfillment on the other? It turns out that money can, indeed, buy you happiness, but only to a point. As all three of the aforementioned psychologists explain, people who are struggling to meet basic needs such as food and shelter are not as happy as those who have these goods to a sufficient degree. Once a person has satisfied these primary needs, however, further increases in material wealth are correlated with only modest happiness gains, at best. This correlation can be explained in part by the fact that an increased income leads to boosts in conveniences, health care and nutrition, status, security, and autonomy, although the causal arrow also points in the other direction (those who are happy tend to appeal more to their superiors, to channel their positive feelings into high levels of productivity, and ultimately to earn more money). Furthermore, the aforementioned gains are only slight, at best, because of our tendency to adapt to new circumstances (the aforementioned “treadmill” phenomenon, which applies especially in this case), in addition to the possibility of more working hours and correspondingly less time spent with family and friends. And so, in the words of Lyubomirsky, “those earning more than ten million dollars annually report levels of personal happiness only slightly greater than the office staffs and blue-collar workers they employ,” and lottery winners are no happier than others. The nationwide statistics are even grimmer: Americans’ self-reported happiness has diminished slightly since 1940 despite an explosion in real monthly income and available consumer goods. Even given that wealth does contribute somewhat to happiness, Seligman and Lyubomirsky clarify, it improves one’s stated “life satisfaction” rather than day-to-day positive mood (Lyubomirsky herself claims that the daily anxiety and anger of the affluent are actually greater).165

163

Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 132–34. Ibid., 175–76. 165 Ibid., 88–89; Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 145–48, 168–69; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 21, 42–45, 48–50, 140–41, 318, n. 23; Seligman, Flourish, 223–27, 237, 280–81, n.; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 49, 53–54. See also Haybron, “Happiness,” § 3.3; Helliwell, Huang, and Wang, “The Distribution of World Happiness,” 12. 164

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In the end, it is our approach to the money that we have that has significant implications for our happiness. Those who spend money on “experiences” rather than possessions (which are more static) are less likely to adapt, and they benefit especially when those experiences involve others, such as vacations with family and friends. And spending money for others (e.g., gifts or charitable causes) leads to happiness for the same reasons that kindness in general feels good. On the other hand, those who have a materialist attitude, in which they crave and pursue ever more money and consumer goods, “report less satisfaction and meaning in their lives, have emptier social relationships, are more insecure, and are less liked by others than people who are not materialistic,” in Lyubomirsky’s words—and Haidt adds that they are not as healthy. Lyubomirsky herself chalks all this up to the fact that materialism inhibits us from savoring the present, connecting with others, and serving the greater good.166 Seligman’s, Haidt’s, and Lyubomirsky’s analyses seem to largely confirm the conclusions of Heschel and John Paul II. All of these authors agree that transcending one’s own experience of needs (while also striving for a proper balance of needs) conduces to happiness, that religious commitment fosters happiness and meaning in life, and that a self-centered or materialistic attitude leads to unhappiness.167 Like the rabbi and the pope, Lyubomirsky also points to the psychological benefits of prayer, although she clarifies that these may be greater in the case of meditative and thankful prayer than petitionary prayer.168 That said, the findings of contemporary psychology do reveal key insights that are missing or underdeveloped in the thought of the rabbi and the pope, including that we only have a certain amount of control over our own happiness because of biological and environmental factors, and that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to happiness (and so some may benefit more from ethical and religious practice—or other happiness 166

Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 94–95, 98–101; Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 152–54, 171–76; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 43–44, 350, n. 19; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 55. 167 Lyubomirsky and Seligman also discuss how our work can lead to fulfillment, a claim which echoes Heschel and John Paul II. Lyubomirsky, The Myths of Happiness, 115–43; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 165–84. None of the books by Haidt, Lyubomirsky, or Seligman that I’ve consulted directly address the relationship between traditional sexual morality and personal fulfillment, but I may have an opportunity to evaluate John Paul II’s thoughts on that topic in a future work. For now, I will briefly note that one aspect of the pope’s views here—abortion can have negative effects on a woman’s mental health and relationship with her partner—has received some recent support with some unsettling data collected by Charles Camosy from the Medical Science Monitor and the British Journal of Psychiatry. Charles C. Camosy, Beyond the Abortion Wars: A Way Forward for a New Generation (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2015), 126–27. 168 Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 233, 237–39.

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strategies—than other individuals would). In addition, Lyubomirsky more clearly emphasizes that the support of others, particularly family members, friends, and colleagues, is invaluable in helping us both cope with adversity and engage in activities that are likely to increase our happiness.169

Evaluating Heschel and John Paul II in light of these contexts Our discussion up to this point has brought Heschel and John Paul II into dialogue with Aristotle, Maimonides, Aquinas, Kant, the Dalai Lama, Singer, Seligman, Lyubomirsky, and Haidt. As we’ve seen, from their varied philosophical, religious (Western and Eastern), and psychological perspectives, almost all of these nine other historical and contemporary thinkers—with only the possible exception of Kant—broadly agree with Heschel and John  Paul II that morality leads to personal fulfillment, particularly happiness and meaning. And even Kant allows that doing good and experiencing positive emotions may go hand in hand, and that (as per Wojtyła’s reading of him) morality and freedom are somewhat intertwined.170 On the other hand, contemporary psychology indicates that there is only so much that we can do to increase our happiness, and that some may benefit more from morality than others.171 In addition, there is substantial 169

Ibid., 139–40, 270–73. To be sure, as suggested above, Heschel and John Paul II would acknowledge that some people find doing good more appealing than others do, and that certain circumstances (such as the call of Abraham or religious persecution) can impose more suffering on a person than is normal. However, the two thinkers do not directly analyze the biological, environmental, and dispositional influences on our quest for happiness. 170 One example of a clearly dissenting philosopher regarding the relationship between doing good, religious practice, and personal fulfillment would be Friedrich Nietzsche, who held that fulfillment could be achieved precisely through an overhaul of traditional morality, including the commandments. See, for example, Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody, trans. Graham Parkes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 [1883]) (e.g., 170– 88, where Nietzsche demands, “Do not spare your neighbour!”). In his own life, Nietzsche seemed conflicted; in one of his notes, he remarks, “There is a false saying, ‘Whoever cannot save himself— how could he save others’? But if I have the key to your chains, why should your and my lock be the same?” Ibid., 294, n. 171 Perhaps these insights from psychology shed some light on the curious case of Mother Teresa, referenced in Chapter 1. It is possible that her failure to find much pleasure and satisfaction in her good works was at least partly the result of her natural constitution and/or life circumstances (e.g., God testing her). Of course, this is all speculative. But at any rate, it is worth pointing out that while Mother Teresa may have been noticeably lacking in subjective happiness for much of her life, her humanitarian efforts and religious convictions clearly led to objective meaning (as recognized by the bestowal of the Nobel Peace Prize upon her in 1979), subjective meaning (her sense that she was called to engage in redemptive suffering), a brief respite of comfort at the very end of her life, and (from a religious perspective) entry into heaven. See, for example, Mother Teresa, Come Be My Light, 208–34, 331–33.

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disagreement as to whether morality leads to a specifically religious kind of fulfillment. Along with Heschel and John Paul II, Maimonides and Aquinas believe that doing good will lead to eternal happiness. But Singer explicitly disavows the possibilities of an afterlife and God-given purpose, and the three contemporary psychologists we’ve referenced also do not appear to personally accept these. The Dalai Lama rejects the existence of God as well, but adds karma, reincarnation, nirvana, and Buddhahood as possibilities. Next, most of these nine other thinkers (once again, with Kant as an apparent exception) do not seem to dwell as intensely as John Paul II and (especially) Heschel on the fact that doing good (and/or religious commitment) can sometimes entail prolonged suffering and even death. That said, at least some of the nine acknowledge this phenomenon, none of them actually deny it, and (like the rabbi and the pope) the Dalai Lama and Lyubomirsky point out that suffering can be reduced or tempered given a proper perspective on it.172 Finally, from what we’ve seen, at least eight of the nine provide support for Heschel and John Paul II’s view that acting immorally (e.g., materialistically) does not make us happy in any lasting sense and, in fact, can cause great misery.173 (We have not delved far enough into Kant to determine whether it would be unanimous on that point.) When it comes to the particular relationship between religious engagement and finding fulfillment, like Heschel and John Paul II, Maimonides and Aquinas uphold this relationship, although once again Kant is not so clear. Aristotle and Singer do not consider any sort of specific religious practice to be necessary for happiness,174 and the Dalai Lama explicitly and repeatedly says that such practice is not required. While contemporary psychology suggests that religious commitment (and even following religious law) can be a good path to happiness and meaning, this discipline has also proposed that some may benefit more from this path than others. Indeed, Seligman and Lyubomirsky themselves have not taken it and indicate that they have found a high measure of fulfillment, 172

For more on ways in which one might find consolation in the midst of suffering, specifically in a health care context, see my “Can Philosophy of Religion Be Pastoral? The Problem of Evil and the Ethics of Comforting the Sick,” Journal of Spirituality in Mental Health 16, no. 4 (2014): 249–56. 173 Coming back to the example of Hitler, whom I also briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, his evil may have led to objective meaning, at least in the expansive way I have defined it (as “significance,” whether good or bad). But certainly by the end of his life he was severely lacking in various other dimensions of fulfillment, even a subjective sense of meaning, as he holed up in his bunker, watched his grandiose plans crumble, and eventually committed suicide. For a dramatized reenactment of his final days, see the movie Der Untergang, dir. Oliver Hirschbiegel (Germany: Constantin Film, 2004). 174 At least, not in the ordinary contemporary sense of the said practice. Aristotle does refer to “the pleasure felt by a human being who engages in theoretical activity and thereby imitates the pleasurable thinking of god.” Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics,” §§ 8, 10.

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nevertheless. There’s certainly a difference here—at least in emphasis—between all of these contemporary thinkers on the one hand, and Heschel and John Paul II on the other, although perhaps the gap is closed somewhat by the rabbi’s and pope’s respective acknowledgments (however fleeting and underdeveloped) that non-believers can be benefited by God as well. Finally, although Lyubomirsky points to a negative correlation between belief in original sin and happiness, one suspects this connection only holds for those with an unreasonable and excessive focus on their inherent sinfulness. In summary, historical and contemporary analyses from multiple disciplines do support—to a substantial extent—Heschel and John Paul II’s view that morality and fulfillment are connected. Or in other words, to return to the title of this book, we can see that virtue is powerfully appealing, for in developing and exercising it, we can benefit both others and ourselves. That said, whether one finds either author persuasive will depend in large part on one’s prior conclusions about the existence and nature of God and the afterlife. If the rabbi and pope’s conceptions of a good God and blissful afterlife are basically correct, for example, then these thinkers are right to affirm that doing good can fulfill God’s purposes and that morality can lead to happiness not only in this life (and not simply naturally but perhaps also as a direct reward from God175), but the next as well. And if Heschel’s Judaism is a more accurate worldview than John Paul II’s Catholicism, the former author’s considerations (for instance, on adhering to Jewish law) are especially on point, whereas if the pope is correct that the fullness of truth inheres in Catholicism, his thoughts (e.g., on following Christ and relying on the guidance of the Magisterium) will be particularly compelling. But if the Dalai Lama’s Buddhism is the “right religion,” so to speak, then all divinely provided purposes drop out of the picture, although good deeds still bring fulfillment in our next life, and thanks to karma, the bond between morality and happiness in this life may be as strong or even stronger than it would be within a Jewish-Christian worldview. And what if all of these 175

As the introductory chapter suggested, the Old Testament promises divinely bestowed rewards for following the commandments, although the extent to which Heschel and John Paul II would affirm this notion is not entirely clear. We’ve seen that the pope at one point indicates that God directly rewards good behavior “already here and now,” and that the rabbi speaks of prosperity as a “promised reward for good living.” However, the latter thinker also holds that “there is no reward for good deeds in this world.”

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religions are fundamentally mistaken and something like Singer’s atheism more accurately reflects reality? In that case, transcending our own needs may still increase our subjective happiness (as empirically demonstrated by contemporary psychology), fulfill our own purposes, and lead to some temporary significance. However, without God and an afterlife, the relationship between traditional morality and personal fulfillment is somewhat less secure; there is no question of achieving an omnibenevolent and omniscient being’s purposes, a martyr’s existence ends definitively at the moment of her death, a psychopath or egoist can experience many sinful pleasures while escaping ultimate retribution, and nothing that anyone does will last or be remembered billions of years from now.176 Of course, the question of which worldview— religious or otherwise—is closest to the truth is a topic that cannot be resolved or even explored here, but it is one that certainly merits the utmost attention.177

Conclusion: In defense of interworldview and interdisciplinary dialogue on our question Whatever one’s position on these matters, future research on the question with which we began would do well to look to other worldviews (religious and secular) and disciplines. In recent years, various scholars—including Charles Camosy, David Clairmont, Darrell Fasching (with his coauthors Dell deChant and David Lantigua), Christine Gudorf, Charles Mathewes, and Mari Rapela Heidt—have pointed to several benefits of comparative ethics and interworldview dialogue. First, through inquiry into different perspectives, we can exercise and improve our critical thinking skills.178 Second, we can discover valuable wisdom, 176

For a discussion of considerations along some of these lines, see Metz, “The Meaning of Life,” §§ 2.1, 2.2 (drawing from Leo Tolstoy and William Lane Craig, among others). 177 For good introductions to this question, see, for example, Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger, Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); William Lane Craig and Walter SinnottArmstrong, God? A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). While clearly a believer himself, Heschel is skeptical of arguments that attempt to demonstrate God’s existence. See, for instance, Heschel, GSM, 108–10; Heschel, MNA, 51–55. However, he is concerned with defending against claims that the Bible and its prophets are untrustworthy. Heschel, GSM, 218–48. Similarly, while arguments for and against the existence of a traditional God are not a dominant theme for John Paul II, he occasionally addresses them. See, for example, John Paul II, FR, §§ 22, 76; John Paul II, CTH, 27–31, 37–41, 60–68. 178 Christine E. Gudorf, Comparative Religious Ethics: Everyday Decisions for Our Everyday Lives (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013), 4.

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regarding both life’s deeper questions and the “surprising or heretofore underappreciated aspects” of our own tradition, in Mathewes’s words.179 Heschel himself maintains that one goal of interreligious dialogue is “to share insight and learning.”180 In his book bringing Peter Singer and Christian ethics into dialogue, Camosy spends some time on the question posed by the present study, and concludes that “both Singerites and Christians could engage in productive debate . . . about which principles and norms are best for producing happiness and flourishing.”181 And so, perhaps a Catholic reading Heschel (or a Jew exploring John Paul II) would develop a keener awareness of the compatibility of fulfillment with adherence to moral laws and even with suffering. Third, we (as individuals and larger communities) can become morally transformed as well; as Clairmont puts it, “Final motivations for acting are not bound exclusively to the framework of one’s own religious tradition, precisely because one’s own religious tradition can become too comfortable, too familiar—at best, a dull goad requiring the moral whetstone of comparison.”182 Accordingly, a Jew might possibly be inspired by John Paul II’s eloquent discussion of love as self-gift, or a Catholic by Heschel’s poetic emphasis on serving the needs of others. Heschel indicates something along these lines when he says that Jews and Christians can lead each other to be more faithful to the exhortations of the Psalms and the prophets.183 Similarly, John Paul II suggests that the “fidelity to prayer” of Muslims might serve as an inspiration to Christians who are not particularly observant.184 Fourth, we can be led to joint action on important issues. Camosy notes that Christians and Singerites “can work together on many important issues of ethics and public policy,” such as consumerism and poverty relief, which have

179

Charles Mathewes, Understanding Religious Ethics (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 6–7. See  also David A. Clairmont, Moral Struggle and Religious Ethics: On the Person as Classic in Comparative Theological Contexts (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 4; Gudorf, Comparative Religious Ethics, 1. 180 Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 249; Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 300 (same quotation). 181 Charles C. Camosy, Peter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7, 243. 182 Clairmont, Moral Struggle and Religious Ethics, 12, 193–94, 208–09. See also Fasching, deChant, and Lantigua, Comparative Religious Ethics, 7, 83; Gudorf, Comparative Religious Ethics, 11–12; Mari Rapela Heidt, Moral Traditions: An Introduction to World Religious Ethics (Winona, MN: Anselm Academic, 2010), 1. 183 Heschel, “No Religion Is an Island,” in MGSA, 249–50; Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 300. 184 John Paul II, CTH, 93.

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been touched upon in the present study as well.185 In fact, both Heschel and John Paul II encourage joint efforts in favor of peace and social justice.186 Fifth, on a more personal level, such dialogue and collaboration can diminish fear of those with different worldviews, promote compassion toward them, and even lead to new friendships.187 Here we might think of the many fulfilling personal relationships Heschel developed with Christians, and John Paul II with Jews.188 But I want to go a bit further and highlight the advantages of not just interworldview but also interdisciplinary dialogue on the relationship between morality and personal fulfillment. For example, we need theologians and (especially) philosophers to help us to precisely define and understand happiness, meaning, freedom, fulfillment, and doing good and evil. In writing the first chapter of this book, I drew, and learned, from a number of entries in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy—and psychologists Seligman, Lyubomirsky, and Haidt rely on Aristotle in discussing such topics as happiness and virtue.189 As we’ve seen, both Heschel and John Paul II themselves are in dialogue with particular philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Maimonides, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Scheler, and the pope specifically acknowledges in Fides et Ratio that “the teaching of the great masters of theology . . . often adopt concepts and thought-forms drawn from a particular philosophical tradition,” and that freedom and the moral law are two such terms “which are in part defined by philosophical ethics.”190 Philosophers and theologians can also be helpful in phrasing relevant conclusions in a particularly powerful way. Haidt, for instance, uses memorable quotations from great thinkers of the past in his lectures in order to assist his students in learning about the “big ideas in psychology.”191 Finally,

185

Camosy, Peter Singer and Christian Ethics, 7, 250–52. See also Fasching, deChant, and Lantigua, Comparative Religious Ethics, 5, 7–8; Mathewes, Understanding Religious Ethics, 254–56. 186 Heschel, “What We Might Do Together,” in MGSA, 300; John Paul II, CTH, 93 (citing Second Vatican Council, Nostra Aetate, § 3). 187 Camosy, Peter Singer and Christian Ethics, 254; Fasching, deChant, and Lantigua, Comparative Religious Ethics, 346; Rapela Heidt, Moral Traditions, viii–ix. 188 Susannah Heschel, “Introduction,” 28–34; John Paul II, CTH, 96–98. 189 Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 156–57, 160–61; Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 2, 32; Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 112, 130, 132–33, 137, 289–90. Seligman’s more recent book, which conceives of happiness in terms of “positive emotion,” distances him from Aristotle’s view that “all human action was to achieve happiness” (in Seligman’s words). Seligman, Flourish, 9, 16. However, his earlier reliance on the philosopher’s ideas on virtue, from which emerged Seligman’s notion of “signature strengths,” seems unchanged. 190 John Paul II, FR, §§ 65–66. 191 Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, x.

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theologians can communicate enduring scriptural and traditional insights that might ring true even for those outside the religion. For example, some might discover wisdom in the Book of Proverbs, which shows us (in the words of the Episcopalian theologian Ellen Charry) that “cautious living may be pedestrian, but it is essential for civil concord, social stability, and personal flourishing.”192 Others, like the agnostic biblical scholar Bart Ehrman, might gravitate toward the Book of Ecclesiastes, which confirms that money does not grant lasting meaning to our lives, and that in the absence of an afterlife, the connection between morality and personal fulfillment is not always secure: “There are righteous people who perish in their righteousness, and there are wicked people who prolong their life in their evil doing.”193 Along these lines, Heschel avers that while philosophy may be skilled at asking the right questions, it does not have all the answers, particularly in an age where we are faced with “tremendous emergencies.”194 Similarly, Wojtyła asserts that philosophy on its own cannot “give a fully adequate interpretation of moral norms or of the so-called theological virtues,”195 and Fides et Ratio contends that “the philosopher who learns humility will also find courage to tackle questions which are difficult to resolve if the data of Revelation are ignored— for example . . . the question of the meaning of life.”196 And yet, philosophy and theology can only take us so far. We need psychologists in order to discern whether the claims of particular philosophers and theologians stand up to the test of scientific evidence. Moreover, as I have shown, contemporary psychologists have contributed pertinent insights of their own; they have demonstrated with precision that a number of factors— biological, environmental, voluntary, and dispositional—can bear on the question of how far along a particular person’s doing good can lead her to fulfillment. Heschel and John Paul II themselves are broadly conversant with 192

Charry, God and the Art of Happiness, 219. See, generally, ibid., 216–29. And see also Kalman J. Kaplan, Living Biblically: Ten Guides for Fulfillment and Happiness (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2012), especially 136 (where the author, a Jewish psychologist, concludes with the hope that his biblically based suggestions for human relations—including interactions with spouses, children, self-destructive persons, and misfortune—“will provide a blueprint for the reader and for all people interested in living a fuller and more meaningful life”). 193 Bart D. Ehrman, God’s Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most Important Question—Why We Suffer (New York: HarperOne, 2008), 193 (quoting Eccl. 7:15). See, generally, ibid., 189–96. 194 Heschel, “Jewish Theology,” in MGSA, 156; Heschel, GSM, 4, 11. 195 Wojtyła, “Ethics and Moral Theology,” in PC, 105. 196 John Paul II, FR, § 76.

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psychology,197 although, of course, they did not have the opportunity to avail themselves of the voluminous literature on religion and fulfillment that has appeared in recent years. At the same time, these thinkers remind us that psychology cannot fully illuminate the meaning of life and how we ought to act, issues that transcend a descriptive approach.198 We might add here that on any specific issue where sufficient empirical evidence may be presently lacking—for instance, the relationship between following religious law and fulfillment, or the benefits of engaging in redemptive suffering—our best bet may be to trust the insights of philosophers and religious thinkers, who themselves (like the rabbi and the pope) reflect deeply on human experience, often including their own. When studies on the question we have considered in this book do take into account the insights of various different worldviews, philosophy, theology, and psychology, they can make an important contribution, not just to the academic world but also to the life of any interested reader searching for happiness, meaning, freedom, and fulfillment. The person who is exposed to and informed by such wisdom may well find it easier to achieve these realities than would the individual who is not, other things being equal. At the same time, the contribution of such studies to the lives of their readers is necessarily limited. An article or book can only suggest what its reader should do to attain fulfillment. She must then play her own part by judging that advice in the light of other relevant information available to her, and then (if she ultimately deems the advice worthwhile) carrying it out as best she can, cognizant of the assistance of God’s grace and/or a supportive community, which can include friends, family, and others. Heschel and John Paul II no doubt recognized that their own writings on personal fulfillment could help change many lives for the better, but were capable of taking their readers only so far. Eager to 197

See, for example, David Barnard, “Abraham Heschel’s Attitude toward Religion and Psychology,” The Journal of Religion 63, no. 1 (1983): 26–43 (collecting from various works of Heschel, demonstrating that he is often critical of psychology’s “reductive” tendencies toward ethics and religion, and proposing some avenues for dialogue between religion and psychology); Wojtyła, LR, 84–100 (putting forth a “psychological analysis of love”). 198 Heschel, “Jewish Education,” in IF, 227–28, 238; Heschel, MNA, 221–23; John Paul II, VS, § 112; Wojtyła, “The Problem of Experience in Ethics,” in PC, 111; Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” in PC, 141–42. On how Christians can learn from positive psychology, while remaining cognizant of its limitations, see also Sidney Callahan, Called to Happiness: Where Faith and Psychology Meet (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011), 14, 71–75, 133–52; Kaczor, The Gospel of Happiness, especially 13–18, 40–48, 181–85.

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communicate the benefits of religious law, the rabbi also acknowledges: “The law does not create in us the motivation to love and to fear God, nor is it capable of endowing us with the power to overcome evil and to resist its temptations, nor with the loyalty to fulfill its precepts. It supplies the weapons, it points the way; the fighting is left to the soul of man.”199

199

Heschel, GSM, 338. On the importance of both learning and effort for achieving happiness, see also Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness, 273–74.

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Index abortion 107 n.74, 109, 170 Abraham (Biblical character) 64, 76, 84, 85 absurdity 90–2 The Acting Person (Wojtyła) 8, 45 on “calling” or “vocation” 26 on commandment of love 101 on felicity and happiness 21–2 on freedom 30 on fulfillment 33–4 action and agent’s intent 47, 78, 79–81, 124–5, 145, 151–2 Dalai Lama XIV on 164 internal and external acts 46–9, 75, 146, 164, 167 notion of 48–9 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis 14–15, 48 n.197 actualization fulfillment vis-à-vis 34, 35, 139 adultery proscription against 39, 40, 43, 48, 98, 111, 121, 142, 145 agada 75, 141, 143 notion of 69–70 age and benefits of volunteering 176 altruism 169–70, 173 America (periodical) 6 appreciation Heschel on 64, 65, 66, 147 John Paul II on 140, 148 Aquinas, Thomas, see Thomas Aquinas, St. Aristotle 15, 23–4, 32, 44, 155, 171, 182, 183 Heschel’s rejection of 154–5 influence on John Paul II 157 influences of 187 notion of freedom 28

notion of happiness 18, 186 n.189 on perfectionism, Wojtyła’s reading of 158, 159 on purpose of life 23 on virtue 18–19, 44, 158 Augustine, St. 99, 100, 119, 124, 162 Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment (Seligman) 32, 33 autonomism 99, 158 averah (sin) 69 Baal Shem Tov 8, 155 influences on Heschel 88–90, 92–3 Balzac, Honoré de 56 Barrett, Edward 44 Beatitudes 40, 44, 113–14, 141, 145, 151 Beauchamp, Tom 162 Benedict XVI, Pope 19 n.16 benevolence 103–4, 105, 149, 157 Ben-Shahar, Tal 32 Berdyaev, Nikolai 87 Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World (Dalai Lama XIV) 163–4 Boesky, Ivan 173 Britton, Joseph Harp 37–8, 46, 65–6, 161 n.82 Brown, Robert McAfee 78–9 Buddhahood 168 Buddhism 163, 164, 184 Cain (Biblical character) 110, 124, 150 Camosy, Charles 15, 185, 186 Catholics/Catholicism 184, see also Christianity “offer up” suffering 134–5 sexual ethics 107 n.74 view of Heschel 6 view on lying 174 n.146

Index celebration Heschel’s notion of 64–5, 140 John Paul II’s notion of 140 Centesimus Annus [“The Hundredth Year”] (John Paul II) 9 distinction between principal and authentic needs 115 Cessario, Romanus 11 Charry, Ellen 188 chastity 107 n.74 Chester, Michael 69, 70 notion of midrash 20 n.25 Chicago Cubs 17, 22, 26 Christ, see Jesus Christianity, see also Catholics/Catholicism Heschel on 73–4 and martyrdom 132–3 and self-love 103–4 Clairmont, David 15, 185 Cleckley, Hervey 172 commandments, see Ten Commandments comparative ethics 16, 185–6 compassion (nying je) 164–5 complacency 91, 92 A Confession (Tolstoy) 23 n.40 conscience and moral good 43, 45, 46 contentment (chogshé) 164, 165 Crossing the Threshold of Hope (John Paul II) 9 on Judaism 120 on Kant 158 Cureton, Adam 160 Curran, Charles 4, 8 n.27, 9 Dalai Lama XIV, see Tenzin Gyatso, Dalai Lama XIV death penalty 108 deChant, Dell 185 Dickinson, Emily 26–7 divorce 113 doing evil, see also evil Dalai Lama XIV on 166 Heschel’s notion of 46–7 and Hitler 183 n.173 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis 131 pleasure in 88–9, 177 prosperity vis-à-vis 131, 154 St. Paul on 122–3 Wojtyła’s views on 48

203

doing good 3, 6–7, 23 n.39, see also good/ goodness apparent decreases in happiness by 83–5 apparent disconnection between personal fulfillment and 81–93, 125–31, 160 apparent disconnection between personal fulfillment and, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views compared 152–4 apparent lack of benefits in 82–3 Beatitudes as guide to 145 difficulties in 77–81, 122–5, 173 difficulties in, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views compared 151–2 eternal life through 7, 12, 14–15, 148, 156, 183 and freedom (ability to choose) 78–81, 86–7, 122–5, 127–9 grace of God for 79–81, 124–5, 152 internal and external acts 46–9, 146 motives for 78, 79–81, 124–5, 151–2 negative consequences of 126–30 notion of 14, 49 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis 14–15, 48 n.197, 51, 66, 159–60 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views compared 147–9 polarity in 87–8, 154 and suffering 84, 85, 131–2, 183 Dresner, Samuel 4, 6 drug use/addiction Heschel on 65 John Paul II on 116 Dulles, Avery Robert 4, 9, 30–1, 119–20 Durkheim, Emile 179 effective altruism 169 Ehrman, Bart 188 Eisen, Arnold 7 nn.26–27, 76–7, 161 Elimelech of Lizhensk, Rabbi 80 Esther (Biblical character) 76 eternal life 72 exclusion from 63 and non-Jews 74 through adherence to Beatitudes 40, 114

204

Index

through adherence to commandments 108–9, 110–11, 126, 149 through detachment from worldly goods 116 through doing good 7, 12, 14–15, 148, 156, 183 through following Christ 117 through martyrdom 133 ethics, see comparative ethics; virtue ethics Ethics for the New Millennium (Dalai Lama XIV) 163–4 euthanasia 109, 170, 174 Evangelium Vitae [“The Gospel of Life”] (John Paul II) 9, 45 on appreciation 140 on attainment of eternal life 125 on celebration 140 on communitarian dimension of religious action 141–2 on freedom 130 on love 106 on manipulation 140 on meaning of life 26 on personal fulfillment vis-à-vis doing evil 131 on respect for life 109–10 evil 3, 7, 12 n.45, see also doing evil Heschel’s notion of 37, 141 notion of 44 Wojtyła’s notion of 43 Fasching, Darrell 185 felicity and fulfillment 34 and happiness 21–2 Fides et Ratio [“Faith and Reason”] (John Paul II) 9 on Aristotle 157 on philosophy’s influence on great masters of theology 187 on universal search for meaning of life 95–6 Francis of Assisi, St. 135 Frankl, Victor 178 n.155 freedom contemporary dictionaries’ definition of 28–9 and fulfillment 34

Heschel’s notion of 29 and Jewish law 86 limitation of 86–7, 128–30, 136, 152–3, 162 notion of 14, 27–8, 31–2 notion of, comparisons of Heschel’s and John Paul II’s 138–9 as self-determination 30–1 and selfish needs 55 as self-reliance 30, 138–9 spiritual dimension of 29, 31 surveys on 1–3 Thomistic view of 28 through service to God 62 value of 11 vis-à-vis adherence to divine law 99, 127–9, 152 vis-à-vis doing good 78–80, 86–7, 122–4, 127–9, 162 vis-à-vis love 11 n.39, 129–30, 152–3 vis-à-vis piety 86–7 Wojtyła’s notion of 30–1, 138–9 freedom for excellence 31–2 notion of 28 freedom of indifference 31 notion of 28 fulfillment 32, see also personal fulfillment “absolute sense” of 34 and happiness 33, 34–5 Heschel’s notion of 33, 35, 139 identification with actualization 34, 35, 139 and moral good 42–3, 45, 46 Seligman’s views on 33, 35 Wojtyła’s notion of 33–4, 35–6, 43, 139 generosity 164, 165, 177 n.154 God and good/goodness 38–9 grace of, for doing good 79–81, 124–5, 148, 152 imitation of 56 n.41, 155 love for 40–1, 45, 117–18, 121, 143 man without God 57–8, 119, 148, 185 needs of 58–60, 140 power of 121–2

Index rejection of 118–19 service to 57–63 God in Search of Man (Heschel) 8, 14 on doing evil 88–9 on doing good 47, 49 n.197 on freedom 29 on God and meaning of life 58 on good/goodness 36, 37 on happiness vis-à-vis Jewish observance 72 on Jewish law 68–9 on law 69 on piety 66 on violation of Jewish law 76 good fortune 17–18 notion of 18 good/goodness, see also doing good “conscience-based” conception of 43, 45, 46 “fulfillment-based” conception of 42–3, 45, 46, 159 as happiness 21, 38 and the holy 37, 142 “law-based” conception of 37, 38–41, 44–5, 141–2, 143 “needs-based” conception of 36–7, 45, 139–40 notion of 44–6 notion of, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s compared 139–46 “object-based” conception of 41–2, 45, 145 “purity-based” conception of 43–4, 45, 146 “unity-based” conception of 37, 45, 141 in terms of virtue 37–8 goods external or material goods 19, 115–17, 139, 148, 166, 172–3, 183 Good Samaritan (parable of) 39 n.146, 105, 119 n.160, 135 Gratissimam Sane (John Paul II) 34 Gregory the Great 15 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant) 160 Gudorf, Christine 15, 185 Guide of the Perplexed (Maimonides) 155–6

205

Haidt, Jonathan 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 187 halacha 71, 72, 75, 141, see also Jewish law notion of 69–70 Halevi, Judah 73 happiness 35 n.121 apparent decreases in 83–5 Aristotelian view of 18, 19 contemporary dictionaries’ definition of 20 differences amongst people 175 and fulfillment 33, 34–5 goodness as 21, 38 Haybron’s notion of 17 Heschel’s notion of 20–1, 138 notion of 17–18, 22–3 notion of, differences between Heschel’s and Wojtyła’s 138 piety as means to 67 pursuit of 11–12 Seligman’s view of 18–19 strategies to enhance 175–6 surveys on 1–3 Thomistic view of 18–19 types of 13, 18 value of 10 vis-à-vis adherence to divine law 99 vis-à-vis compassion 164–5 vis-à-vis ethical conduct 11–12, 170–2, 182–3 vis-à-vis Jewish observance 71–2 vis-à-vis kind acts 176–7 vis-à-vis religious commitment 177–8 vis-à-vis service to God 60–2 vis-à-vis sharing in redemptive suffering 135 Wojtyła’s notion of 21–2 Haybron, Dan 11–12 notion of happiness 17 heaven attainment of 105, 121 existence of, argument for 97 fulfillment and beatific vision of 34 promise of 12, 40, 114 and Satan 37 way to 131 way to, for non-Christians 120

206 Hebrew Bible 12, 21 n.25, 37 n.131, 70 hedonistic utilitarianism 169 Hegel, Georg 171 Held, Shai 4, 9, 14 n.47, 58 n.49, 59 n.54, 161 hell John Paul II on 13 n.46 threat of 12 way to 105, 159 Heschel, Abraham Joshua 3, 187, see also God in Search of Man; The Insecurity of Freedom; Man Is Not Alone; Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity; A Passion for Truth; The Prophets; The Sabbath; Who is Man? contemporary critique of 161 and Dalai Lama XIV compared 168 and despair 93 n.285 on drug addiction 65 influences on 15, 89–93 on interreligious dialogue 186 and John Paul II compared 4–7, 15, 137–54 Kant’s influences on 157 Maimonides’ influences on 156–7 on philosophy 188 and present-day psychologists compared 181 as public figure 5 recognition of other paths to holiness 73–4 rejection of Aristotle 154–5 and Singer compared 173–4 on Vietnam war 150 n.41 as “virtue ethicist” 37–8 works of 8 Heschel, Susannah 4 n.12, 75 Hitler, Adolf 23, 183 n.173 How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest (Singer) 169 human beings distinction from animals 18, 30, 60, 123, 146–7 “three dimensions of mature human concern” 64, 65 and ultimate meaning 25

Index human perfection 155 human weaknesses 79–81, 122–5, 142, 151–2 Hütter, Reinhard 124 Hyman, James 76–7, 161 n.83 Ignatius of Antioch, St. 133 Ignatius of Loyola, St. 135 Immaculate Conception 113 indebtedness 65, 140 infanticide 109, 170, 174 “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics” (Wojtyła) 158–9 The Insecurity of Freedom (Heschel) 8 intention(s) for doing good 47, 78, 79–81, 124–5, 145, 151–2 Kantian focus on 47, 157 interworldview dialogue 16, 185–6 Isaac (Biblical character) 64 Isaiah (Biblical prophet) 80, 155 Israel 70, 75, 108 Iyengar, Sheena Sethi 178, 179 Jeffreys, Derek 5 Jeremiah (Biblical prophet) 80 Jesus 14, 34, 105 on adherence to the commandments 39–41 call to follow 40, 41, 117–18, 121–2 call to serve the poor 40, 120–1, 145, 151 imitation of 117–21, 130, 131–2 promise of heaven 12, 40 proscription against murder 108–10 sharing in redemptive suffering of 133–6 on suffering 131, 132 Jewish law 66, 70, see also halacha; mitzvah; Torah cautions against overemphasis on 74–5 commitment to 14, 68–9 flexibility of (violations of) 75–7, 142 and freedom 86 “ladder of observance” 76, 142 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis 71–4

Index Jews “joy in being a Jew” 21 and personal fulfillment 89–91 view of John Paul II 6 John Paul II, St. and Pope 3–4, 187, see also Wojtyła, Karol; Centesimus Annus; Crossing the Threshold of Hope; Evangelium Vitae; Fides et Ratio; Gratissimam Sane; Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body; Redemptor Hominis; Salvifici Doloris; Sollicitudo Rei Socialis; Veritatis Splendor Aquinas’s influences on 157, 159–60 Aristotle’s influences on 157 contemporary critique of 162–3 and Dalai Lama XIV compared 168 and Heschel compared 4–7, 15, 137–54 influences on 15 and present-day psychologists compared 181 as public figure 5 and Singer compared 173–4 speeches of 8 n.27 as “virtue ethicist” 44 works of 9 Johnson, Robert 160 John, the Apostle 110 John, the Baptist, St. 133 Joseph, Jacob, Rabbi 144 Judaism 69, 184, see also Jewish law; mitzvah authority of chief rabbis 144 Heschel’s view of 156 John Paul II on 120 purpose of 82 recognition of other paths to holiness 73–4 “the three sacred entities” of 70 Juvenal 132 Kant, Immanuel 15, 47, 99, 101, 127, 183 influences on Heschel 157 influences on Wojtyła 158 on perfectionism 158–9 on personal fulfillment vis-à-vis morality 160, 182

207

karma 167–8, 184 Karnofsky, Holden 171 Kasimow, Harold 59 n.54, 74 n.184, 81 n.236, 92–3 Kierkegaard, Søren 8, 89, 187 kindness 176–7 King, Martin Luther 5 knowledge 19, 155 Lantigua, David 185 “The Last Days of Maimonides” (Heschel) 155–6 Law, see also Jewish law; religious law Heschel’s notion of 69 Levenson, Jon 76 Lewis, C. S. 97 life, meaning of, see meaning of life love as benevolence 103–4, 105, 149, 157 as desire 102–3 and freedom 11 n.39, 129–30 for God 40–1, 45, 117–18, 121, 143 metaphysical nature of 102 of neighbor 39–41, 45, 63, 121, 135, 143, 150 and personalistic norm 101–2, 143 spousal 104, 105, 143 as virtue 46 Love and Responsibility (Wojtyła) 8, 44, 45 distinction between internal and external acts 47–8 on freedom and divine law 99 on freedom and love 11 n.39, 129–30 on love 101–7, 143 on meaning of life 26 on perfectionism 159 on self-interest 124–5 Luther, Martin 162 Lyubomirsky, Sonja 20, 23 n.38, 35 n.121, 175, 182, 187 on doing evil 177 on happiness vis-à-vis kindness 177 on happiness vis-à-vis money/ materialism 181 on happiness vis-à-vis religious commitment 178, 183

208

Index

Heschel and John Paul II compared to 181 person-activity fit diagnostic test 176 on prayer 181 on suffering 177, 183 Magid, Shaul 58 n.49 Magisterium and interpretation of the commandments 112, 113, 144 Maimonides 73, 154, 182, 183, 187 on eternal life 74 n.182, 156–7 Heschel on 155–6 on human perfection 155 influences on Heschel 156–7 Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body (John Paul II) 9 on moral good 43–4, 45 on purity 114 manipulation Heschel on 64, 65 John Paul II on 140 Man Is Not Alone (Heschel) 8, 14 on evil 37 on good/goodness 37 on meaning of life 24–5 on meaning of life vis-à-vis selfish needs 54–6 on piety 49 n.197, 66 on piety vis-à-vis freedom 86–7 “the problem of needs” 14, 53–68, 139–40 on religious needs 55–6, 58–9 Marcel, Gabriel 115 Marmur, Michael 5 n.17, 156 n.55 martyrdom eternal life through 133 Heschel’s views on 84, 85–6, 153–4 John Paul II’s views on 154 of non-Christians 132 and personal fulfillment 132 and self-love 103–4 and sharing in redemptive suffering 134–5 Marxism 119 materialism 115–17, 139, 148, 183 Dalai Lama XIV on 166 and present-day psychology 180–1 Singer on 172–3

Mathewes, Charles 15, 185 Mattison, William 23 n.39, 42 McCormick, Richard 162 meaning of life Aristotelian view of 23 as “calling” or “vocation” 26 conditional significance sense of 25, 56–7 contemporary dictionaries’ definition of 24 “crisis of meaning” 96 and fulfillment 34 Heschel’s notion of 24–6 John Paul II’s notion of 26 and love 104–5 notion of 13, 23, 26–7 notion of, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s compared 138 and sharing in redemptive suffering 135 surveys on 1–3 Thomistic view of 23 universal search for 15, 51–2, 95–7 universal search for, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views compared 146–7 universal value sense of 24–5, 56–7 and value 27 vis-à-vis ethical conduct 171–2 vis-à-vis selfish needs 54–6 vis-à-vis suffering 178 n.155 worthwhileness of search for 52–3, 97–8, 147 Meilaender, Gilbert 98 n.16, 162 Menahem Mendl of Kotzk 8 influences on Heschel 89–91, 92–3 menuha (rest) 20 Merkle, John 5, 92 Metz, Thaddeus 23 n.40 Milhaven, John Giles 102, 119 n.160 Milken, Michael 173 mitzvah/mitsvah 70, 71–3, 141, 142, 149, see also Jewish law and goodness 37, 38, 45 joy in 87–8 notion of 69, 71 Moore, Gareth 120–1 Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity (Heschel) 8 on solidarity 144

Index moral living, see also doing good difficulties of 14, 77 happiness vis-à-vis 11–12, 171–2 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis 82, 83, 160, 166–7, 182–4 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis, interdisciplinary dialogue on 187–9 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis, interworldview dialogue on 185–7 and sacrifice 15 and self-interest 12, 81–2, 165 Moses (Biblical character) 84 The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically (Singer) 169 murder proscription against 39, 40, 42, 43, 98, 108–10, 111, 144, 149, 170 natural law 143 adherence to 98, 99 Thomistic view of, John Paul II’s reading of 38–9, 157 violations of 100 needs authentic needs 55–6, 58–9, 82, 85, 114–17, 139 balanced approach to 63–4, 115–16, 148 bodily needs 63, 140 Dalai Lama XIV’s views on 164, 165 of God 58–60, 140 Heschel’s notion of 53 and moral good 36–7, 45 problem of 14, 53–7, 139–40 problem of, solution to 57–63 selfish needs 54–7, 63, 67–8, 147 Niebuhr, Reinhold 74 Nietzsche, Friedrich 182 n.170 nirvana 168 object (of an act) and moral good 41–2, 45 objective happiness 35 n.121, 93, 138, 167 Aristotelian notion of 18 notion of 13–14, 18, 22, 138 and selfish needs 54

209

Thomistic notion of 18–19 vis-à-vis adherence to divine law 109, 111–12, 156 vis-à-vis imitation of Christ 117–18, 132 vis-à-vis Jewish observance 71 vis-à-vis service to God 57, 61–3 vis-à-vis solidarity 107–8 Wojtyła’s notion of 21–2 objective meaning of life 23–4, 93 and doing evil 165–6, 183 n.173 and Hitler 183 n.173 and mitzvah 72 and Mother Teresa 182 n.171 notion of 23, 26–7 and suffering 133 vis-à-vis compassion 165 vis-à-vis ethics 171 vis-à-vis in doing God’s will 61 vis-à-vis martyrdom 86 vis-à-vis religious commitment 85 O’Connor, Timothy 28 n.72 freedom of will differentiated from freedom of action 31 n.100 O’Keefe, John 162 Ord, Toby 171 O’Reilly, Ailbe M. 13 n.46, 102 n.37, 158 n.63 paradox of hedonism 11–12 A Passion for Truth (Heschel) 8, 14, 81, 89–93, 154 Paul VI, Pope 6 Paul, St. 122–3, 134, 135, 153, 162 Pentateuch 70 perfectionism Aristotelian views on 158 Kant’s views on 158–9 notion of 158 Thomistic views on 158 Wojtyła’s views on 158–9 personal fulfillment 1 apparent disconnection between doing good and 81–93, 125–31, 160 apparent disconnection between doing good and, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views compared 152–4 contemporary dictionaries’ definition of 33

210

Index

Dalai Lama XIV’s views on 166–7 decreases in 83–5 increases in 89–93 for non-Christians 120, 132 for non-Jews 73–4 notion of 13, 32, 35–6 and proscription not to murder 108–9, 149, 150 and purity 114 and sexual ethics 107 n. 74 vis-à-vis adherence to commandments 149–50 vis-à-vis doing evil 88–9, 131 vis-à-vis doing good 14–15, 48 n.197, 51, 66, 159–60 vis-à-vis doing good, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views compared 147–9 vis-à-vis imitation of Christ 117–21, 131–2 vis-à-vis Jewish observance 71–4 vis-à-vis love 104–7, 150 vis-à-vis martyrdom 132–3 vis-à-vis moral living 82, 83, 160, 166–7, 182–4 vis-à-vis moral living, interdisciplinary dialogue on 187–9 vis-à-vis moral living, interworldview dialogue on 185–7 vis-à-vis religious commitment 166–7, 178–9, 183 vis-à-vis selfish needs 54, 55–7, 64 vis-à-vis service to God 60–1 vis-à-vis sharing in redemptive suffering 134–5 personalistic norm 101–2, 104, 143 violation of 106 Person and Community (Wojtyła) 9, 45 on anti-utilitarianism 158 on commandment of love 101 Peter, the Apostle 117 philosophy 187–8 piety 150 and freedom 86–7 Heschel’s notion of 37–8, 46, 49 n.197, 65–8, 82, 140 subjective happiness vis-à-vis 83–5 Piliavin, Jane 176 Pinches, Charles 3 n.11 Pinckaers, Servais 28, 32 n.101

pleasure in doing evil 88–9 and happiness 18–19, 20–1, 60–1 and joy 21 Wojtyła’s views on 21 poor call to serve the 40, 113, 120–1, 145, 151 positive psychology 174–5, 189 Seligman’s notion of 175 n.147 Singer’s notion of 171 poverty 66, 151, 166, 170 Practical Ethics (Singer) 169 prayer Heschel on 72–3, 149 John Paul II on 149–51 Lyubomirsky on 181 preference utilitarianism 169 “The Problem of the Theory of Morality” (Wojtyła) 43 The Prophets (Heschel) 8 prosperity 63, 131, 154, 166 purity and moral good 43–4, 45, 146 and personal fulfillment 114 “purpose well-being” notion of 2 Rapela Heidt, Mari 185 Redemptor Hominis (John Paul II) 9 on meaning of life 26 Reimers, Adrian 101 reincarnation 168 religious commitment and desire for heaven 12 happiness vis-à-vis 177–8 Heschel’s views on 7 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis 166–7, 178–9, 183 religious law, see also Jewish law; natural law; Ten Commandments flexibility of 142 John Paul II’s understanding of 38–41, 98 observance of 44–5 personal fulfillment vis-à-vis 15 Ryan, Peter 34 Sabbath observance of

73 n.176, 110–11

Index The Sabbath (Heschel) 8 on happiness 20–1 sacrifice 56, 78, 84 imitatio Dei 63 n.89 and moral life 15 sadness 11, 90–1 salvation 117–18, 119–20, 151 and commandments 98 n.16 Salvifici Doloris [“On the Christian Meaning of Human Suffering”] (John Paul II) 9 on evil vis-à-vis prosperity 131 on martyrdom 132–3, 134–5, 136 on sharing in redemptive suffering 133–6 on suffering 131–2 Satan 37 Scheler, Max 126 n.202, 158 n.64, 187 Schindler, Oskar 173 Schlesinger, George 12 Second Vatican Council, see Vatican Council II self-determination 157 freedom as 30–1, 123, 138–9 fulfillment and 34, 139 self-interest 124–5, 150 and doing good 12, 14, 79–82, 147–8 in love 103 n.46 selfish needs 54, 139, 147 and freedom 55 and meaning of life 54–5 psychological consequences of focusing on 54 transcendence of 55–7, 63, 67–8 self-love 103–4 Seligman, Martin 32, 175, 182, 187 on fulfillment 33, 35 on happiness 18–19, 186 n.189 on money and materialism 181 notion of positive psychology 175 n.147 on personal fulfillment vis-à-vis religious commitment 179 signature strengths test of 175–6 sexual ethics 107 n. 74 Shantideva 165 significant being 25, 53, 61–2, 63, 138 and celebration 65

sin

211

109, 159, see also averah original sin 122, 151 violations of divine law as 100 Singer, Peter 12, 15, 160, 168, 182, 183, 186 on altruism 169–70, 174 on difficulties in doing good 175 on essence of ethics 170 on happiness vis-à-vis ethical conduct 170–2 Heschel and John Paul II compared to 174 on immoral conduct 172 on materialism 172–3 notion of positive psychology 171 works of 168–9 social activism 5 society service to 56–7 Socrates 170 solidarity Heschel’s notion of 144 John Paul II’s notion of 107–8, 143–4 Sollicitudo Rei Socialis [“On Social Concern”] (John Paul II) 9, 44 on rejection of God 118–19 on solidarity 107–8 The Sources of Christian Ethics (Pinckaers) 28 Spinello, Richard 9, 98 n.16, 128, 129 Spinoza, Baruch 171 Spira, Henry 172 Spohn, William 112 spousal love 104, 105, 143 Stephen, St. 133 Stern, Carl 58 n.49, 65, 74 subjective happiness 91, 93 lack of 119 and Mother Teresa 182 n.171 notion of 13, 18, 19–21, 22, 35 n.121, 138 vis-à-vis authentic needs 55–6 vis-à-vis doing good 126–7, 167 vis-à-vis entrusting oneself to Christ 118 vis-à-vis God 57, 119 vis-à-vis Jewish observance 71–2 vis-à-vis love 104–6 vis-à-vis materialism 116–17 vis-à-vis piety 83–5

212 vis-à-vis selfish needs 54 vis-à-vis service to God 61–3 vis-à-vis sharing in redemptive suffering of Christ 134–5 subjective meaning of life and Hitler 183 n.173 and Mother Teresa 182 n.171 notion of 23–4, 27 vis-à-vis entrusting oneself to Christ 118 vis-à-vis moral living 171 suffering and Christian life 131–2 Dalai Lama XIV on 165, 183 and ethical conduct 87–8 Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views compared 153–4 meaning of life vis-à-vis 177 n.155 redemptive suffering of Christ 133–6 vis-à-vis doing good 84, 85, 183 Summa Theologica (Aquinas) 159–60 Ten Commandments adherence to 98–100, 141 adherence to, eternal life through 108–9, 110–11, 126, 149 adherence to, flexibility in 110–11 adherence to, Heschel’s and John Paul II’s views compared 149–51 against adultery 48 against coveting of neighbor’s wife 48 against murder 108–10, 124, 144, 149, 150 and good/goodness 39–41, 45–6 and love 101–7, 121, 143, 150, 151, 158 inviolability of 110–13 on Sabbath 110–11 violations of 100 Tenzin Gyatso, Dalai Lama XIV 7, 15, 174, 182, 183 on an act to be good 164 biographical sketch of 163 on Buddhahood 168 on compassion 120 n.165, 164–5 on contentment 164, 165 on doing evil 165–6 on generosity 120 n.165, 164, 165

Index on happiness vis-à-vis religious commitment 166–7, 183 Heschel and John Paul II compared to 168 on karma 168 on nirvana 168 on personal fulfillment 165–7 on reincarnation 168 rejection of existence of God 168, 183 on suffering 165 on wealth 166 works of 163–4 Teresa, Mother 22, 182 n.171 Thomas Aquinas, St. 32, 44, 182, 183 on fulfillment vis-à-vis morality 159–60 influences on John Paul II 157, 159–60 on moral minutiae 3 n.11 notion of freedom 28 notion of happiness 18–19 on natural law 38–9, 100 on perfectionism, Wojtyła’s reading of 158, 159 on purpose of life 23 on sadness 10 on sinners 27 n.66 on virtue 19, 22–3, 44, 159–60 Thoreau, Henry David 52 Tolstoy, Leo 23 n.40 Torah 70, 72, 75, 76, 141, 156 Tranzillo, Jeffrey 9, 34 utilitarianism 76, 102 hedonistic utilitarianism 169 preference utilitarianism 169 Vatican Council II 6, 7, 42, 105, 110, 112, 119, 136, 151 Veritatis Splendor [“The Splendor of Truth”] (John Paul II) 9 on adherence to commandments 110–11, 141 on Beatitudes 113–14 critique of 41 n.156, 103–4, 112–13, 162 on detachment from worldly goods 116 on eternal life vis-à-vis God’s grace 125

Index on freedom 31, 162–3 on freedom vis-à-vis adherence to divine law 128–9 on good/goodness 14–15, 38–43, 45 on human weakness 142 on imitation of Christ 118, 130 on interpretation of the commandments 112–13 on martyrdom 132–3 on need for God’s grace 123–4, 153 on personal fulfillment of nonChristians 120 on personal fulfillment vis-à-vis action 14–15, 49 n.197 on search for meaning of life 96 on violations of divine law 100 on virtues 44 virtue(s) 15 and goodness 37–8 and happiness 18, 19 John Paul II on 44 love as 46 Mattison’s reading of Thomistic view of virtue 23 n.39 piety as 67 virtue ethics and Heschel 37–8 and John Paul II 44

213

vocation 26, 56 n.41 volunteering 176–7 Warren, Rick 163 n.91 Who is Man? (Heschel) 8 on appreciation 64 on celebration 64–5 on freedom 78–80 on manipulation 64 on meaning of life 24, 25 on solidarity 144 on universal search for meaning of life 51–2 William of Ockham 28 witness 132, 133, 153–4, 160 Wojtyła, Karol, see also John Paul II, St. and Pope; The Acting Person; “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics”; Love and Responsibility; Person and Community; “The Problem of the Theory of Morality” Kant’s influences on 158 on philosophy 188 works of 8–9 Woodill, Joseph 37, 38 Yochanan ben Zakkai, Rabbi 155