The Salvador Option: The United States in El Salvador, 1977-1992 1107134595, 9781107134591

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The Salvador Option The United States in E l Salvador, 19 7 7 - 19 9 2 The civil war between the government of El Salvador and M arxist guerril­ las began in 1980 and endured for 12 cruel years. The conflict took roughly 75,000 lives and displaced more than a million people in this tiny, impover­ ished Central American nation of 5 million. Unwilling to tolerate an advance of apparent Soviet- and Cuban-backed communism in its backyard, three successive U.S. administrations provided more than $6 billion in military and economic aid to the Salvadoran gov­ ernment in order to check the most formidable guerrilla insurgency in Latin America’s modern history. This effort was America’s largest counterinsurgency campaign after Vietnam and before Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to formally ending the war, the 1992 peace agreement brokered by the United Nations reduced the Salvadoran military’s size and transformed the guerrillas from a Marxist insurgency into a political party. To backers, the U.S. campaign to save El Salvador represented a dramatic success of Cold Warera U.S. counterinsurgency. The Pentagon even gave it a name: the Salvador Option. Critics, on the other hand, have contended that U.S. support for a bloodthirsty Salvadoran regime resulted in untold violence and a moral black stain for Washington. Despite the important lessons its story holds for understanding U.S. foreign policy past and present, the Salvador Option is largely forgotten today. Relying on thousands of documents from U.S. and Salvadoran archives as well as inter­ views with participants on both sides of the war, The Salvador Option offers a thorough and fair-minded third way interpretation of the available evidence. If success is defined narrowly, there is little question that the Salvador Option achieved its Cold War strategic objective of checking communism. Much more difficult, however, is to determine what human price this “ success” exacted a toll suffered almost entirely by Salvadorans. Russell Crandall is a professor of American foreign policy and international politics at Davidson College in North Carolina where he has received its two student-selected teaching awards. His previous books include America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 17 7 6 to the War on Terror (Cambridge, 2014); The United States and Latin America after the Cold War (Cambridge, 2008); Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); and Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy toward Colombia (Lynne Rienner, 2002). Interwoven with his academic career, Crandall has held various U.S. government appointments, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, and the National Security Council at the White House. He is a writer for The American Interest magazine, editorial board member at America’s Quarterly magazine, and contributing editor and book reviewer for the London-based journal, Sur­ vival: Global Politics & Strategy.

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The Salvador Option The United States in El Salvador, I 977~I 992

RUSSELL CRANDALL Davidson College

|S § C a m b r i d g e ^ 0

U N IV E R S IT Y P R E S S

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C a m b r id g e

U N IV E R S IT Y P R E S S

32 Avenue of the Americas, New York,

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10 0 13 -2 4 7 3 ,

u sa

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cam bridge.org/9781316500644 © Russell Crandall 20 16 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 20 16 Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books, Inc

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Crandall, Russell, 1 9 7 1 - author. The Salvador option : the United States in El Salvador, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 / Russell Crandall, Davidson College. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. i s b n 9 7 8 -1-10 7 -13 4 5 9 -1 (hardback) - i s b n 978-1-316-50064-4 (paperback) 1. United States - Foreign relations - El Salvador. 2. El Salvador - Foreign relations - United States. 3. Military assistance, American - El Salvador. 4. El Salvador - History - 19 7 9 -19 9 2 . 5. El Salvador - History, Military - 20th century. I. Title. E184.S15C73 2 0 15 327.730728409;04-dc23 2 0 15 0 2 8 17 2 is b n is b n

9 7 8 -1-10 7 -13 4 5 9 -1 Hardback 978-1-316-50064-4 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of u r l s for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

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To Britta, my forever love

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“ Nothing is black and white, darling,” Alice remarked. “ Not even in so just a cause. Here, too, those confused grays appear that cloud everything.” - Novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, The Dream o f the Celt When you go digging in the past, you always find what you’re looking for. -Journalist Elizabeth Stoker Bruenig

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Contents

List o f Figures

page xi

List o f Organizations

xiii

Acknowledgments

xvii

1 Introduction

1

PART ONE.

EL SALVADOR IN THE COLD WAR

2 Farabundo Martí, La Matanza, and a Stolen Election

15

3 The United States in Latin America

25

4 American Military Mission in El Salvador

36

5 A Divided Nation: Military Traditions, Democratic Third Way, and Liberation Theology

46

6 Guerrillas Are Born

65

PART TWO.

JIMMY CARTER

7 Revolution and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala

79

8 Mass Organizations

90

9 Carter Arrives

102

10 Carter and the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, i 979

ii4

11

12 2

An October Coup

12 Carter Engages Salvador

i3 2

13 Archbishop Romero

i40 vii

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viii

Contents

14 Land 15 The American Churchwomen

149

16 Arming the Rebels

16 7

17

160

Guerrilla Final Offensive, January 19 8 1

17 6

18 Death Squads

183 part t h r ee

19

.

ronald

reagan

Reagan Arrives

201

20 Reagan and Salvador

213

2 1 El Mozote

223

22 Another Vietnam

232

23

Solidarity

239

24 Troop Cap and Certifying Human Rights 25 Reagan Gambles on Elections, 1982

251 261

26 The Shultz Doctrine

275

27

Human Rights

287

28 Henry Kissinger

300

29

Contras

306

30

“ Elections Yes, Dialogue N o,” 1984 Presidential Election

3 i La Palma 32 Esquipulas

317 331 340

33 Counterinsurgency I

346

34 Counterinsurgency II

362

35 Zona Rosa

371

36 Air War 37 Jose Napoleon Duarte

377 382

38 Iran-Contra

397 part fo u r

.

geo rge h

.

w.

bush

39 Elusive Justice 40 Pessimism

4°5 409

4 i Bush Arrives 42 Bush, Cristiani, and the 1989 Vote

415

43 Guerrilla Second Final Offensive, November 1989

431

4 21

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Contents

ix

44 Jesuit Killings

442

45 SAMs 46 United Nations and Peace

453 461

47 Demobilization

472 part fiv e

.

po stw ar

48 Postwar Salvador

487

49 Concluding Thoughts

496

Notes

507

Bibliography

645 677

Index

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List of Figures

4 .1 5.1 5.2 6.1 7 .1 7.2 8.1 8.2

11.1 1 3 .1 1 5 .1 16 .1 18 .1 18 .2 19 .1 19 .2 2 1 .1 2 1.2

Map: Guerrilla Fronts in El Salvador Father Rogelio Poncel Graduating Cadets in Full Uniform Salvadoran Revolutionary Left Classified Map of Guatemalan Guerrilla Fronts, Early 1980s Exhumation at a Mass Grave Near Comalapa, Guatemala, 2003 Bodies of Murdered Civilians Collecting Contributions for Families of the “ Disappeared” in Front of the Metropolitan Cathedral Members of the Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador Archbishop (Oscar Romero Exhumation of Four American Churchwomen, December 1980 Map: Clandestine Arms Shipments to the FM LN in El Salvador, 1982 Roberto D ’Aubuisson Death Squad Victim Map: Lampooning U.S. Conservatives’ View of the Soviet Threat “ Si, President Duarte” El Mozote, Morazan Province, December 19 8 1 Radio Venceremos

page 37 59 62 67 85 87 96

100 13 0 144 163 173 189 193 205 208 226 2 31

xi

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xii 22 .1 2 3 .1 23.2 2 5.1 26.1 2 7 .1 29.1 3 1.1 3 1.2 3 3 .1 33.2 34 .1 34.2 3 7 .1 37.2 37.3 4 2 .1 42.2 42.3 4 3 .1 46.1 46.2 4 7 .1 47.2 47.3 48.1 48.2 49.1

List of Figures Foreign Correspondents Peace Pledge Guerrilla Medical Brigade FM LN Fighters Elliott Abrams, Richard McCormack, and George Shultz Jeane Kirkpatrick and Thomas Pickering Map: The Contra War, 1980s Rebels at La Palma Journalists Covering the Peace Talks Dead Rebel Fighter Atlacatl Battalion Wife Mourns Her Dead Husband Soldier Salvador Soldiers in Combat Jose Napoleon Duarte Duarte Sketch Jose Napoleon Duarte and Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora Anti-war Rally in Chicago Roberto D ’Aubuisson and Alfredo Cristiani, 1989 Guerrilla Fighter, San Salvador, 1989 Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Alvaro de Soto Ceasefire Day in San Salvador Weapon Disarmament Ceremony Guerrilla Fighters in a “ Zone of Concentration” Ambassador William Walker in Rebel Territory Joaquin Villalobos FM LN Leadership Romero Assassination Anniversary March

236 246 248 273 278 292 3 11 335 338 351 353 365 369 384 386 395 422 426 427 434 465 470 477 478 479 492 494 506

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List of Organizations

Anti-communist Liberation Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Lib­ eración Anticomunista - Guerra de Eliminación, FALANGE) Anti-Imperialist League (Liga Antiimperialista de las Americas, LADLA) Armed Forces of El Salvador (Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador, FAES) Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion, FAL) Armed Forces of National Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de la Resisten­ cia Nacional, FARN) Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio de Oposicion, FAO) Central American Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Centroamericano, PSOCA) Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Cristiano, PDC) Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (Comite en Solidaridad con el Pueblo de El Salvador, CISPES) Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista Salvadoreüo, PCS) Communist Party USA (CPUSA) Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democrática, CD) Democratic Revolutionary Front (Frente Democrático Revolucionario, FDR) Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Marti Para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN) Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, PGT) Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP) xiii

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xiv

List of Organizations

Labor Party (Partido Laborista de El Salvador, PLES) Military Youth Movement (Movimiento de la Juventud Militar, M JM) National Broad Front (Frente Amplio Nacional, FAN) National Commission for Reconstruction (Comisión Nacional de Restauración de Areas, CONARA) National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliacion Nacional, PCN) Nationalist Democratic Organization (Organizacion Democrática Nacionalista, ORDEN) National Liberation Front (Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional, MLN) National Opposition Union (Union Nacional Opositora, UNO) National Republic Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, ARENA) National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional, RN) National Revolutionary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG) Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragiiense, FDN) People’s Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberacion Popular, MPL) Popular Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion “ Farabundo M artí,” FPL) Popular Leagues of February 28 (Las Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero, LP-28) Popular Liberation Forces (Movimiento de Liberacion Popular, MLP) Popular Revolutionary Block (Bloque Popular Revolucionario, BPR) Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, FAR) Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses (Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas, CRM) Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador (Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, JRG) Revolutionary Movement 13th November (Movimiento Revolu­ cionario 13 Noviembre, M R -13) Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (Organizacion Revolu­ cionaria del Pueblo en Armas, ORPA) Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Partido Revolu­ cionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos, PRTC)

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List of Organizations

xv

Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (Partido Revolu­ cionario de Unificación Democrática, PRUD) Salvadoran Anti-communist Army (Ejercito Salvadoreüo Anticomu­ nista, ESA) Salvadoran Institute for Agrarian Transformation (Instituto Salvadorefio de Transformacion Agraria, ISTA) Salvadoran National Security Agency (Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Salvadorefia, ANESAL) Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional, FSLN) Treasury Police (Policía de Hacienda, PH) Unified Popular Action Front (Frente de Accion Popular Unificada, FAPU) White Warriors Union (Union Guerrera Blanca, UGB)

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Acknowledgments

There are so many friends, colleagues, and students who made this book immeasurably better. The errors, omissions, and otherwise lapses in good judgment are of course mine. I am once again deeply grateful to my wife and Davidson colleague, Britta Crandall, who never com­ plained when I asked her to read yet another draft of the manuscript. Our children Dane, Nolan, and Eliot were all very patient over the course of the writing that took away from more play time with them than all of us would have liked. Former Davidson student Andrea Becerra was my indispensable research assistant during the second half of this project. She did a splendid job on every aspect of the manuscript: copy editing, proof­ reading, fact-checking, and researching, whether she was in Arizona, Spain, or Colombia. She also completed the index. I can only wonder how many more years this book would have taken had Andrea not been at my constant (albeit virtual) side. While she was an undergrad­ uate at Davidson, Caroline McDermott accompanied me on my first research trip to El Salvador. Both during this trip and the summer fol­ lowing, Caroline’s moxy and superhuman organizational and research skills helped lay out the foundation that I then spent the rest of the research project engaging. There are also a number of current or former Davidson students who worked as research assistants on the project: Francisco Morales, Hunter Williams, Pete Benbow, Drew Tucker, Iain Addleton, James Atkins, and Lincoln Davidson. Students in my upperlevel seminars on American grand strategy participated in role-playing xvii

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xviii

Acknowledgments

simulations that were derived from the research in this book. I am grateful for their feedback even if some students were disappointed to be assigned the role of, say, Secretary of State George Shultz instead of the far sexier guerrilla commander Joaquin Villalobos. I am indebted to several friends, colleagues, and former students who read parts or all of the final draft of the manuscript; each pro­ vided specific and copious feedback that helped me look far smarter than I am. If you discover any wisdom in the book it more likely came from one of the following: Amy Klett, Pamela Dykstra, Dan KurtzPhelan, Ralph Levering, Dane Erickson, Paul Ream, Brian Orland, Chris Chivvis, Michael Shifter, Richard Feinberg, Michael Mandelbaum, Diana Negroponte, Adam Garfinkle, Dana Allin, Hal Brands, Peter Roady, Guadalupe Paz, William Crandall Jr., Allen Wells, Chris Sabatini, Riordan Roett, Marshall Worsham, and Andrew Rhodes, who also drew the excellent Contra War map. For more than 15 years I have relied on Davidson library colleagues who once again have helped out this project immeasurably. Special thanks go to my dream team: Jill Gremmels, Jean Coates, James Sponsel, Joe Gutekanst, and Susanna Boylston. The Smith Richardson Foun­ dation’s Nadia Schadlow helped facilitate that organization’s generous grant that covered my research expenses and allowed me to take a (wide grin) full academic year sabbatical in 2 0 14 -15 . Davidson colleagues Lindsay Voegele, Meredith Mumma, Linda Ray, Wendy Raymond, Verna Case, Linda Shoaf, Ken Menkhaus, Brian Shaw, Shelley Rigger, John Kuykendall, Carol Quillen, and Chris Alexander helped this project in one way or another. Davidson’s McNeil faculty fund provided steady support for research trips over the life of this project. The McDonough family graciously hosted this vagabond professor yet again in Takoma Park for my Washington, DC-based research. I’m not sure why my extraordinary literary agent and dear friend Gillian MacKenzie continues to keep me on as a pro bono case, but the benefit is entirely mine. In El Salvador, many col­ leagues and friends went well above the call of duty to accommo­ date my research trips: Daniel Burgos, the entire Alas family, and Lucy Castro. The generous and patient staffs at various archives and libraries included Susan Francis at the National Archives at College Park, M ary­ land; the entire staff at special archives at the “Jose Simeon Cañas”

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Acknowledgments

xix

Central American University in San Salvador; and Jennifer Mandel (Reagan), Amanda Pellerin (Carter), and Rachael Medders (Bush) at the presidential libraries. On the production side, Patterson Lamb once again did an outstanding job on the final copy edit. Amandeep Kaur and Cambridge’s Mark Fox deftly managed the production phase. Cambridge’s inimitable Lew Bateman has been a loyal editor of my scholarship for more than a decade. I was unfortunate to lose my mother, Janet Crandall, over the course of the final months of writing this book. In fact, I wrote more than one chapter while sitting alongside her and my father William, who is also in the last stage of his life. I hope this book might be one more little way to express my immense gratitude for their unconditional love. T. Henry Wilson, Jr. Field, Davidson, North Carolina, M ay 2015

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1 Introduction

Winning the Cold War is not a pretty thing when you look into it. -Jefferson Morley, novelist and Washington Post correspondent, 19 9 2 1

“ Unimaginable Sight of a Sea of Black-and-Red Guerrilla Flags”

The civil war between El Salvador’s government and Marxist guer­ rillas began in 1980 and endured for 12 cruel years. Even for Cen­ tral America’s violent ways during the Cold War, the Salvadoran conflict was exceptionally bloody; it took roughly 75,000 lives and displaced more than a million people in this tiny, impoverished Cen­ tral American nation of 5 million. Unwilling to tolerate an advance of apparent Soviet and Cuban-backed communism in its geopoliti­ cal backyard in what turned out to be the last phase of the Cold War, three successive U.S. presidential administrations (Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush) provided more than $6 bil­ lion in military and economic aid to the Salvadoran government. The goal was to check the most formidable guerrilla insurgency - col­ lectively known as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN) in Latin America’s modern history. This effort was America’s largest counterinsurgency and nation-building campaign after Vietnam and before Iraq and Afghanistan.

1

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2

The Salvador Option

At a 19th-century castle in Mexico City on January 16 ,19 9 2 , after a couple years of exhausting and sporadic UN-led negotiations, the Sal­ vadoran government signed a peace deal with the Marxist rebels. To the surprise of many observers, the 1992 peace pact led to a complete ceasefire and demobilization over the next year that formally ended the civil war. Equally striking, the agreement reduced the Salvadoran mil­ itary’s size and budget and authorized the guerrillas’ transformation from a Marxist insurgency into a democratic political party. Because many of the key measures of the peace agreement involved drastic reforms to the Armed Forces of El Salvador (Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador, FAES) and state intelligence services as well as the guerril­ las’ acceptance of the democratic system they had fought against, the Salvadoran peace agreement was dubbed a “ negotiated revolution.”2 This propitious outcome was even more dramatic in the aftermath of a ferocious guerrilla offensive in late 1989 that led many observers to conclude that the brutal war had no end in sight.3 In San Salvador in January 1992, foreign correspondents described the theretofore-unimaginable sight of a sea of black-and-red guerrilla flags and supporters filling the main plaza in front of the Metropolitan Cathedral to celebrate the peace accord. Most journalists reminded their readers that although it was now a symbol of peace and rec­ onciliation, the cathedral had been the site of often violent anti­ government protests and harsh security force reprisals during the late 1970s, leading up to the start of the civil war.4 The cathedral itself was “ adorned with an enormous banner” of the murdered Archbishop (Oscar Romero, revered around the world for his gospel of non-violence amid El Salvador’s savagery.5 A few weeks later, in the ceremony to mark the beginning of the ceasefire, guerrilla commanders and army officers together sang the Salvadoran national anthem.6

“ Today El Salvador Is a Whale of a Lot Better”

Given the Salvadoran civil war’s remarkable resolution, it is easy to understand how many concluded that El Salvador appeared to be an American victory in one of the last battles of the Cold War. Washington had spent a decade and large sums in aid to the Salvadoran govern­ ment to ensure that the Marxist guerrillas did not seize power. But to what degree can the outcome in El Salvador be attributed to American

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Introduction

3

intervention? And what lessons can be learned about the effectiveness and limitations of U.S. intervention in Third World proxy wars during the Cold War? A decade later, these questions became more than the subject of his­ torical interest. In the darkest days of the Iraq War, U.S. policymakers and commentators looked to the lessons of El Salvador to provide a path forward in the face of a vicious insurgency that seemed to be winning. To Vice President Dick Cheney and many others, the U.S. campaign to save El Salvador represented one of the most dramatic successes of Cold War-era U.S. counterinsurgency and nation-building. In this telling of the story, not more than a few dozen U.S. military non­ combat advisors in El Salvador at any given time helped professional­ ize the once hapless Salvadoran military, resulting in reduced human rights abuses and “ ultimate success” on the battlefield against the guer­ rillas.7 In addition, Washington aggressively pushed political and eco­ nomic reforms, including a series of “ free elections endorsed by the majority of the people,” which demonstrated to the world that Marxist insurgents had little support and that the Salvadoran government was legitimate.8 Economic policies, such as support for bank nationaliza­ tion and an ambitious land reform program were surprisingly “ leftist” given that Washington’s impetus for becoming involved in El Salvador was to save it from communism. These sorts of reforms, the interpre­ tation goes, are what ultimately forced the guerrillas to “ seek victory through a political solution” because a military victory was no longer possible. Indeed, the campaign in El Salvador was seen as such a suc­ cess that it became the “ anti-Vietnam” template: using a light U.S. mil­ itary presence to train the indigenous forces to do the actual fighting while simultaneously legitimizing the local client government through economic reforms and democracy.9 And the Pentagon even gave it a name: the Salvador Option. This book uses the term “ Salvador Option” as easy shorthand to describe U.S. policy in El Salvador from the late 1970s until the early 1990s when the war officially ended. This is not intended, however, in any way to endorse the U.S. military’s subsequent understanding of it as a successful counterinsurgency and nation-building model. Given how successful some observers perceived this model to be, it is not surprising that many military experts believed that the ele­ ments of the Salvador Option could be exported to far-flung and

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4

The Salvador Option

seemingly incongruous theaters like Iraq. One of the Iraq War’s most visible intellectual advocates, M ax Boot, wrote that the Salvador Option was “ tremendously successful” and therefore the model for Washington to follow in Iraq.10 Boot also attempted to obliquely address some of the controversy over the legacy of U.S. involvement in El Salvador: “ I can tell you what is not meant by the El Salvador option, death squads.” 11 Eliot Cohen, a military historian and State Department official in the George W. Bush administration, agreed, “ We did counterinsurgency very well in Salvador.” 12 During his Octo­ ber 5, 2004, vice-presidential debate with Democratic candidate John Edwards, Cheney responded to a question about the status of the seem­ ingly dire situation in Iraq by referencing the Salvador Option: Twenty years ago we had a similar situation in El Salvador. We had a guerrilla insurgency [that] controlled roughly a third of the country, 75,000 people dead, and we held free elections. I was there as an observer on behalf of the Congress. The human drive for freedom, the determination of these people to vote, was unbelievable. And the terrorists would come in and shoot up polling places; as soon as they left, the voters would come back and get in line and would not be denied the right to vote. And today El Salvador is a whale of a lot better because we held free elections. The power of that concept is enormous. And it will apply in Afghanistan, and it will apply as well in Iraq.13

“ The Sick-Sweet Stench of Carnal Refuse”

In contrast to Dick Cheney’s rosy interpretation, many critics of the Salvador Option told a much less honorable tale, one filled with some of the worst stories of Cold War atrocity and abuse.14 From this view­ point, the United States either knowingly supported or conveniently overlooked the barbaric Salvadoran government’s death squads that hunted down innocent civilians. Instead of pushing for a negotiated settlement between the warring factions that could have ended the war soon after it broke out, Washington embraced a “ military solu­ tion” that made the violence and suffering worse. Via often nefari­ ous and deceptive means, U.S. officials took what was a domestic and popular insurgency fighting a repressive Washington-backed govern­ ment and painted it as a Moscow-and Havana-manufactured com­ munist insurgency.15 Any positive outcomes of the Salvador Option, they contended, occurred despite U.S. policies. If anything, Washington

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Introduction

5

took credit for developments that its policies - until perhaps the very end of the war - in fact had little to do with. They also charged that U.S. officials claiming victory failed to consider that the cost of “ success” was the deaths of 75,000 Salvadorans and an untold level of human suffering. Considering this human toll and the belief that U.S. policies were directly or indirectly responsible, Robert White, former ambassador to El Salvador, called the Salvador Option “ one of the most disgraceful chapters in the history of U.S. foreign policy.” 16 Not surprisingly, years later these same critics condemned reports of the Pentagon endorsing the Salvador Option as a model for Iraq.17 One of these critics, Christo­ pher Dickey, wrote in 2007: Having watched the slaughter in El Salvador first hand during the 1980s, hav­ ing lost many friends and acquaintances to the butchers there - among them nuns, priests and an archbishop who will someday be sainted - and having been targeted myself, I have something of a personal interest in this notion. I’m not about to forget the bodies lying unclaimed in the streets, the fami­ lies of the victims too afraid to pick them up lest they become targets as well. When I heard talk of a Salvador Option [for Iraq], I can’t help but think about El Playon, a wasteland of volcanic rock that was one of the killers’ favorite dumping grounds. I’ve never forgotten the sick-sweet stench of carnal refuse there, the mutilated corpses half-devoured by mongrels and buzzards, the hol­ low eyes of a human skull peering up through the loose-piled rocks, the hair fallen away from the bone like a gruesome halo.18

In 2005, another writer, Jason Rowe, took issue with Cheney’s asser­ tions in the vice-presidential debate: “As years of continuing abuses attest, the 1984 Salvadoran elections Cheney praises were little more than an attempt to provide window dressing for one of the world’s most repressive regimes, giving it a veil of fake democratic respectabil­ ity. Many opposition leaders were already imprisoned, exiled, or murdered, leaving them unable to mount much of an electoral campaign.” 19 Writing in the Catholic magazine America for commem­ oration of the 25th anniversary of Archbishop Romero’s assassination by rightist death squads, Rowe further reflected: To both American Catholics and Americans in general, the witness of these martyrs revealed the dark underbelly of the policies pursued by the United States in Latin America. As the region’s poor suffered extreme deprivation and inequality, the United States lent its support to their oppressors, backing the

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6

The Salvador Option

dirty wars, coups and human rights abuses of some of the world’s most repres­ sive regimes. These sobering realities, to which people like Romero testified, cut through the popular American mythology of the cold war, in which the United States stood as a beneficent beacon of freedom in a world darkened by the threat of totalitarian Communism. It was not the Soviet Union that was on the scene in El Salvador, but the poor. For years, the United States sup­ ported a Salvadoran regime that threatened both those in need and those who ministered to them in the name of God.20

In addition to this criticism that Washington’s policies in El Salvador were morally reprehensible, others contended that they simply did not work. An April 2005 editorial in the left-of-center N ew Republic mag­ azine explained how “ contrary to conservative conventional wisdom,” U.S. policy in El Salvador was “ ultimately ineffectual” other than “ con­ tributing to the death of tens of thousands of civilians.”21 According to this school of thought, it was the winding down of the Cold War and the mutual understanding of the Salvadoran military and the Marxist guerrillas that neither side could win outright that was responsible for the ultimate outcome. We must also remember what a massive and controversial role “ Sal­ vador” held in American society at the height of the war in the early to mid-1980s. It divided Congress and the American public into pro and con camps at a time when the wounds of Vietnam had still not healed. Churches and other solidarity groups became mobilized and influential. Indeed, El Salvador was a Rorscharch test for seeing where people came out on post-Vietnam foreign policy. Partly because Sal­ vador never became the next Vietnam, the Salvador Option, other than receiving a surge of attention at one dire moment in the Iraq War, is mostly forgotten today - despite the many important lessons its unfiltered story holds for understanding U.S. foreign policy past and present.

The Least Worst Salvador Option

So which Salvador Option narrative is right? Dick Cheney’s shining model of U.S. steadfast resolve or the critics’ moral shame and strate­ gic dud? Given how oppositional these two competing descriptions appear, it would seem that only one or neither could be correct. This book attempts to get beyond these incomplete and rigid polar positions

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Introduction

7

to better understand the reality of the Salvador Option. This thirdway interpretation does not aim to simply split the difference between the two conventional narratives; rather, it offers a thorough and fairminded evaluation based on the available evidence. Washington’s lengthy campaign in El Salvador rested on the perva­ sive belief that sustained U.S. involvement there would bolster moder­ ate civilian and military elements at the expense of the rightist oligarchs and death squads on one side and the Marxist insurgents on the other. For its proponents, this grin-and-bear it approach - what can be called “ engagement” - was seen as a “ least worst” option compared to a host of unappealing alternatives that included a direct U.S. combat mission or disengagement to leave El Salvador to its own devices. And, by the same token, it was the winding down of the Cold War in 1989-90 that led the Bush administration to seek to disengage from what it increas­ ingly viewed as its Central American ulcer. This is not to say that this engagement was always effective or appropriate morally or strategically; yet understanding its Cold War logic - a dichotomous, “ we-they” logic axiomatic to most officials dur­ ing these three presidencies - allows us to put the Salvador Option in the necessary historical, ideological, and even psychological context over this protracted period.22 This book argues that much of the actual implementation of U.S. policy in El Salvador was in fact carried out in a largely ad hoc fashion in country without strategic guidance from Washington. Yet, while the Salvador Option was never an actual “ strategy,” if this is defined as a specific plan of action, U.S. involvement occurred within the over­ arching Cold War-era anti-communist frame of reference that we call containment. The Salvador Option was also squarely part of the postVietnam era - where even the U.S. military was wary of repeating such a protracted, expensive, and controversial war - which helps explain why Washington opted for the light footprint, counterinsurgency, and nation-building by proxy versus a full-scale campaign. Yet, as we will see, there was much that various key U.S. officials and agencies did not agree on in terms of how the Salvador Option should be implemented. Skeptics were not convinced by Washington’s self-serving pronouncements to justify raw U.S. ambition, what French leader Charles de Gaulle called “ power cloaked in idealism.”23 Ambas­ sador White once asked rhetorically about El Salvador: “ How can a

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8

The Salvador Option

country the size of Massachusetts - where you can see the entire coun­ try from 9,000 feet from a helicopter - how can a homegrown revo­ lution in that country threaten the security of the United States?”24 It is a legitimate question, and one that could have applied to numerous cases of American involvement in putative geopolitical sideshows dur­ ing the Cold War. But the answer in part is that, rightly or wrongly, legions of American policymakers believed that the “ Salvadors” of the world mattered to U.S. global strategic interests - and especially so close to home in the Western Hemisphere. If we define success nar­ rowly, there is little question that the Salvador Option achieved its Cold War strategic objectives. Much more difficult, however, is determining at what human price - a toll suffered almost entirely by Salvadorans, not Americans. Another key argument is that, contrary to what is sometimes assumed by both supporters and critics alike, U.S. policy in El Salvador was not solely military, even during the relatively hawkish years of the first Reagan administration. In addition, the Carter administration’s hastily formulated policy to engage El Salvador but stay well short of a full-scale American commitment endured through the end of the war in 1992. In Pentagon lore, the Salvador Option is remembered as a mission where U.S. advisors beat into shape the formerly listless “ 9-to-5” Sal­ vadoran military. Yet, ironically, the self-imposed and congressionally mandated severe restrictions on U.S. military (and especially combat) involvement - born out of the fear that El Salvador would become another Vietnam - meant that the U.S. military campaign was far less significant than the viceroy-like diplomatic and political role played by a series of American ambassadors and other civilian officials. That is, the real story of the Salvador Option is the tremendous significance of the involved U.S. civilian officials - what I label “ imperial diplo­ mats” - when compared to what was in fact a limited U.S military advisory mission carried out by “ imperial grunts.” It is also the case that U.S. imperial diplomats and imperial grunts, often acting quite independently or extemporaneously, represented more of the totality of the Salvador Option than was normally understood. Some leading U.S. officials and private actors and groups did not always cooperate with the engagement, which they viewed as anti­ thetical to their beliefs. In some cases influential anti-war solidarity organizations circumvented what they viewed as immoral U.S. policies

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Introduction

9

by protesting and sending humanitarian funds directly to the FMLN. Conservative political circles in Washington that most visibly included Republican Senator Jesse Helms worked directly with hardline conser­ vative politicians - at least one of whom was linked to death squad activity - to encourage them to ignore U.S. pressure on human rights or economic reforms. Public acceptance of U.S. engagement was hin­ dered in the early years by the Reagan administration’s often muddled rhetoric describing its Salvador policy - sometimes even by Reagan himself - which implied a more singularly militarized and unyielding approach than what it eventually settled on.25 Part of this stems from the fact that, on El Salvador at least, Rea­ gan’s hardliners were either eventually sidelined or were never as influ­ ential as their public bluster suggested. That these same foreign policy hawks successfully pursued a more aggressive approach toward the Marxist “ Sandinista” regime in Nicaragua has sometimes allowed us to assume that they were equally hawkish on Salvador policy. Make no mistake, the Reagan administration’s moderation on El Salvador did not mean that it had somehow abandoned its broader anti-communist ideology or goals of preventing Marxism’s spread in Central America. Rather, echoing Carter’s conversion to a more hawkish foreign policy in Central America late in his administration, Reagan’s “ Cold Warrior” advisors tacked the opposite way, from hardline to moderate - or sim­ ply vanished from the debate - and came to see engagement as the most preferable means of achieving its goal of containing communist expansion in Central America.

Undemocratic Means to Save Salvadoran Democracy

One of the main critiques of U.S. policy in El Salvador was that throughout the decade Washington intentionally ignored opportunities for “ honorable and constructive engagement” that could have ended the war sooner. In this depiction, epitomized in an opinion piece in the Washington Post in 1992, from the beginning rebel leaders made “ repeated offers” to negotiate only to have the Reagan administration reject them as “ attempts by guerrillas to shoot their way into power.”26 We will see, though, that the Reagan administration in fact both privately and publicly acknowledged the need for a political solution to the war even in its initial more hardline years. The rub, however, was that Reagan’s (and Carter’s and Bush’s) concept of negotiations

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10

The Salvador Option

and peace was drastically different from the concept held by the guer­ rillas and their supporters inside and outside El Salvador, which made progress virtually impossible. And ultimately, the format of the UN­ brokered negotiations that led to the w ar’s dramatic resolution entailed the guerrillas giving up their long-standing demand for power sharing and instead competing for political power through elections - exactly what Washington had insisted on from the beginning as a precondition for a settlement. A related finding is that much of the most controversial involvement came in the political and economic - not military - realm. For example, contrary to what we might otherwise assume, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) covert operations did in fact attempt to bolster centrist Salvadoran political forces at the expense of what at the time could be considered the country’s death squad or oligarchic right. Parts of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy even repeatedly resorted to “ undemo­ cratic” means to save Salvadoran democracy. Thus, America’s centuryold paternalism in the Western Hemisphere was alive and well in El Salvador - but in a way that unexpectedly promoted moderation over rightist and leftist ideology and violence. Another point of consideration is whether it could indeed be the case that Washington’s decision to engage El Salvador meant that while the Salvadoran military never totally eliminated its abusive ways, U.S. involvement helped to dampen its reflexive and deeply held authoritar­ ian tendencies. A related element in the Salvador Option story is that over the course of the 1980s, the growing dependence on U.S. assis­ tance combined with first episodic but then more sustained pressure on human rights helped belatedly tear the reformist elements within the Salvadoran military away from the oligarchy’s most intransigent actors. Despite what it at times appeared to be, engagement was never solely about defeating the FM LN militarily but rather preventing it from taking over the country, as the ideologically aligned Marxist insurgents had successfully accomplished in neighboring Nicaragua in 1979. As one U.S. diplomat pithily put it during the war’s early years, the U.S. campaign was to “ save the economy, stop the violence, have the elections and ride into the sunset.”27 It is important also to understand that the Salvador Option was not solely an American story. Too often the undeniably deep U.S. involvement is given credit for either causing or hindering peace

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Introduction

ii

and democracy in El Salvador when in fact other indigenous or exoge­ nous factors were at play. Take, for example, the negotiated peace set­ tlement. Washington’s actions and efforts aside, the end of the Cold War helped sap the guerrillas’ once ironclad Marxist revolutionary ide­ ology - and by extension their ability to seize power through war. Also, some of the rebels’ once stalwart allies - namely, the Marxist regimes in Nicaragua and Cuba - were either out of office or out of cash. Yet, it is misleading to somehow conclude that these factors operated inde­ pendently of Washington’s substantial influence in El Salvador. Related to this, observers have fallen into the trap of giving Washington all the credit for the things that went well in El Salvador and none of the blame when they went wrong - and vice versa. Paradoxically, the Salvador Option’s biggest threats came not from the Marxist rebels - as we would have certainly suspected at the outset - but from several high-profile atrocities committed by the very military Washington was backing. Indeed, crimes of the Salvadoran security forces - like the 1980 rape and killing of four American churchwomen, the 19 8 1 massacre of hundreds of civilians in the mountain hamlet of El Mozote, and the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests - did far more political damage to the Salvador Option than any rebel military offensive. These sorts of heinous acts that res­ onated sharply with Americans reinforced the criticism that the United States was backing a bloodthirsty government and military - Viet­ nam redux in their estimation - and the very opposite of the Salvador Option’s central premise that U.S. training and aid was making the dire situation better.

Considerations for Our Story

The remarkable story of U.S. Cold War counterinsurgency and nation­ building (long before it was called that) in its geopolitical backyard has been seriously under-studied - and poorly understood. Much of the existing analysis and understanding of U.S. policy in El Salvador actu­ ally focuses on the acerbic and well-publicized policy disagreements in Washington and tends to disregard the large-scale counterinsurgency and democracy-building effort carried out in the country. Time and again, we will see U.S. officials contend that evidence indicated the situation was improving - and thus U.S. policy was

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12

The Salvador Option

working. Critics looked at the same evidence and concluded the opposite. Further complicating this glass half-full/half-empty dilemma, both sides often looked at different evidence to make their cases. In studying what was a many-layered political, ideological, and military war, the use of rigid ideological lenses inclined toward confirma­ tion bias often made understanding the Salvador Option especially complicated - both then and now. If journalists wrote the first draft of history in El Salvador, then this story might be the second but certainly not definitive account. For example, scholars still do not have access to Top Secret U.S. Depart­ ment of Defense files that remain (in this author’s estimation, need­ lessly) classified. We also do not know the full extent of U.S. anti­ guerrilla and Cuba/Nicaragua pro-guerrilla covert involvement in the war. Yet, this book benefits from tens of thousands of pages of declas­ sified CIA, State Department, and White House documents and a siz­ able number of Salvadoran sources. To be sure, it is impossible to escape all of my ideological and methodological biases, and any claim of full objectivity would be simple pretense, but I nonetheless attempt to provide an unvarnished examination of this influential but poorly understood chapter in U.S. Cold War foreign policy. I assume that all of the relevant actors - both Salvadoran and foreign, individual and collective - have a reasonable sense of agency and were thus capable of committing both good and bad. I also attempt to apply a scholarly dose of skepticism to all actors’ rhetoric, knowing full well that, like us, they were capable of saying one thing and thinking or doing another. As is almost always the case, details and evidence matter to getting a more accurate story. Readers versed on the broad outlines of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America during the Cold War may wish to skim Chapters 3 and 4, which are otherwise essential to the lay reader in terms of broader historical context. The same logic goes for the brief chapters on U.S. involvement in Guatemala and Nicaragua - key context in what constitutes the “ trinity” of U.S. Cold War involvement in Central America - but also not necessary if one is solely interested in the Salvador case.

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PART ONE

E L S A L V A D O R IN T H E C O L D W A R

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2 Farabundo Martí, La Matanza, and a Stolen Election

Cuando la historia no se puede escribir con la pluma, hay que escribirla con el fusil. (When history cannot be written with a pen, it must be done with a gun.) -A gustín Farabundo Marti, Salvadoran communist, 19 3 0 s1 Coffee growers should not anguish over the situation in El Salvador today; there was a similar one in 19 32, and it was solved then [and] it can be now. - Representative of the Frente Unido Cafetalero (United Coffee Union, plantation owners), March 19 80 2 El Salvador - the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America - presents a classic setting for social and political unrest. - U.S. Department of State Bulletin, January 19 80 3

El Salvador’s history has revolved around its scarcest commodity: land. From the time the Spanish conquistadors arrived in the early 16th century and through the turbulent decades of the late 20th century, rural land and agriculture lay at the core of the country’s tumultuous and deeply inequitable social and economic history. El Salvador’s sear­ ing legacy of unequal distribution can be linked back to the Spanish colonial system whereby land ownership was vested in the crown. The land now known as modern El Salvador was ruled before the Spanish Conquest by an assortment of indigenous civilizations, includ­ ing the Aztec and Maya; the local Pipil nation was active in the area at the time of Spanish exploration in 1524. Lacking precious !5

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16

The Salvador Option

metals and mineral resources, El Salvador was a backwater in Spain’s colonial empire. Under the formal administration of the captaincygeneral of Guatemala during this time, local landowners held de facto sway.4 Along with the rest of Central America, in 18 2 1 El Salvador declared its independence from Spain. It was initially incorporated into newly independent Mexico and then joined the United Provinces of Central America - a failed attempt to create a federal republic mod­ eled on the United States.5 In 18 4 1, El Salvador declared itself an independent country. The smallest country in Central America, El Salvador’s early inde­ pendence was marked by considerable political tumult. Filled with large plantations owned by a tiny elite, El Salvador’s first key cash crop was indigo. Between the 1870s and 1930s, however, another export crop replaced the ebbing indigo: coffee.6 The new crop pro­ vided enormous profits that only served to reinforce the oligarchy’s grip on the rural economy. The coffee industry grew more than 1,000 percent between 1880 and 19 14 , providing over half the government’s revenue during these years.7 Most histories contend that the priori­ ties of the coffee industry dictated a shift in the mission of the embry­ onic armed forces from defense of the national territory to the mainte­ nance of internal order. The formation of the National Guard (Guardia Nacional, GN) in 19 1 2 epitomizes this evolution as it became respon­ sible for providing security on the coffee estates. In fact, most coffee plantations enjoyed the services of their own guard units posted on the grounds; estate owners ensured the continued loyalty of the guards­ men by routinely compensating regional commanders.8 In this sense, suppression of rural dissent was subtle and institutionalized.

“ His Lover Was the Struggle” During the 1920s, a young Salvadoran intellectual from a wealthy fam­ ily named Augustin Farabundo Martí Rodriguez - the namesake of the guerrillas who would take up arms decades later - worked tirelessly to organize Salvadoran workers. Often wearing a red star as his lapel pin, the redoubtable Marti earned the ire of El Salvador’s oligarchy and military who saw him exactly as he was - a communist rabblerouser. Marti was educated at the University of El Salvador, commonly called the National University, where he was deeply influenced by

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Farabundo Martí, La Matanza

17

Karl M arx and other communist writers. He was an original member of the Central American Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Centroamer­ icano, PSOCA) founded in Guatemala in 1925. Arrested repeatedly and ultimately exiled to Guatemala, the man known as “ el negro” for his dark complexion even spent some time in New York City where he worked with anti-imperialism groups and met relatives of Nicaraguan freedom fighter Augusto Sandino, who later gained fame fighting U.S. Marines in the mountains of his native country. Marti and Sandino apparently fell out over the latter’s unwill­ ingness to incorporate more Marxist elements into his nationalist cru­ sade against the American occupation of Nicaragua.9 When Marti attempted to teach communism to Sandino, the Nicaraguan stopped him, “ If you think that you will seduce me with your ideas, do me a favor and don’t stay here one more minute. I am not a communist.” 10 M arti’s ethic in the name of revolution was legendary. According to Salvadoran communist and Marti contemporary Miguel Marmol, “ Marti didn’t know a wife or children. His lover was the struggle. I knew him well. He was a practical man, a dedicated revolutionary man. It was right out here, in the back of this house [gesturing toward a cemetery], where they executed him.” 11 Dedicated Marxist ideologues, such as Marti and Marmol, would set a precedent for the future insurgency in El Salvador in the 1970s and ’80s. While Marmol was never a key wartime guerrilla leader, he was nonetheless one of the revolution’s initial ideological founders. A shoemaker, fisherman, union leader, and founding member of the Com­ munist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista Salvadoreüo, PCS), Marmol was born into poverty in 1905. By the age of 13 he became a soldier, but abuses by the military turned him into a leftist militant. Marmol recalled his ascetic life committed to revolution: “ I was lead­ ing strikes in February of 19 2 1 when I was 16. Our youths were [spent] in the struggle. There were no sports for us, no movies, nothing but the progress of the movement.” 12 In a surprising democratic moment in 19 3 1, a wealthy landowner with populist instincts, Arturo Araujo, ascended to the presidency as part of the Labor Party (Partido Laborista de El Salvador, PLES) despite opposition from distrusting coffee growers.13 With coffee export prices plunging as the Great Depression’s contagion reached Latin Amer­ ica, Araujo’s popularity plummeted and even his support from the

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18

The Salvador Option

impoverished rural farmers eased. In office only nine months, Araujo was ousted by his sitting vice president, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, in a December 19 3 1 coup.14 While personally drawn to the fascist models of Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, Martinez supported the Allied war effort during World War II, a move that won him favor in Washington. The conservative landowning class came to love him for his fervent anti-communism, but it also looked askance at Martinez’s humble ori­ gins and routine admonitions that poverty needed to be addressed so that communism would not flourish. In fact, contrary to his “ mano dura” (strong armed) historical legacy, Martinez promoted some mod­ est social reforms, including a government welfare program.15 In addi­ tion to being a tyrant with a populist tinge, Martinez was also quite odd. He was nicknamed “ El Brujo” (The Witch Doctor) for his belief in telepathy and reincarnation, and once remarked, “ It is a greater crime to kill an ant than a man, for when a man dies he becomes reincarnated, while an ant dies forever.” 16 Despite Martinez’s dubious beginnings, the military (FAES) effectively controlled the country for the next half­ century until a revolution-like event occurred in 1979. Returning to El Salvador in the early 1930s, the revolutionary M arti’s objective had moved from organization to revolt, which led to the first communist insurrection in the Western Hemisphere.17 Sup­ porters contended that the PCS was formally established in 19 30 in order to participate in the electoral system but that the govern­ ment’s refusal to recognize its victories in the January 19 3 2 municipal and legislative elections prompted the shift to armed conflict.18 The deep discontent sparked by the plunge in coffee prices led a grow­ ing number of Salvadorans to embrace Marxist organizations like the PCS or the Anti-Imperialist League (Liga Antiimperialista de las Americas, LADLA). Martí lived in the mountains of western El Salvador, where he was able to rally El Salvador’s multitude of impoverished farmers to rise up against their exploitive masters. The January 19 32 revolt was in part fomented by Communist Party militants attempting to take advantage of indigenous peasant unrest in the country’s western provinces.19 It was also the first communist revolution in Latin America. Some schol­ ars believe that the legacy of what came to be known as the La Matanza (The Massacre) was unrivaled over the next half century: “ Indeed the

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Farabundo Martí, La Matanza

19

whole [subsequent] political labyrinth of El Salvador can be explained only in reference to the traumatic experience of the uprising and the Matanza.”20 As it unfolded, peasants armed with machetes and rusty shotguns began to attack municipalities of the country’s Depression-plagued coffee-growing region. The rebellion did not gain much traction in San Salvador as communist leaders had been rounded up during the first hours of the uprising. With their operation lasting just a few days, the rebels controlled only scattered towns and provincial cities. In some instances, the poorly organized rebels took over villages, killing dozens of political opponents in the process. Having come to power just six weeks earlier in a coup, Martinez crushed the embryonic revolt by unleashing his military against the largely defenseless, mostly landless farmers who were even more vul­ nerable with the plunge in coffee prices.21 Martinez ordered General Jose Tomas Calderon to lead the repression that only lasted around a week, killing an estimated 20,000-30,000 Salvadorans.22 The unenvi­ able task of burying the dead was left to local officials. Fearing future trouble that the Salvadoran leftists could cause, Hernandez Martinez had Marti arrested and subsequently executed by a firing squad.23 In only three days, the rebellion had been almost entirely quashed. In the revolt’s aftermath the military promoted the creation of paramilitary militias - Civic Guards (Guardia Civica, GC) - that functioned like “ brotherhoods,” holding fascist ceremonies and unleashing unrelent­ ing terror on the population.24 Communist conspirators were hunted down in San Salvador and elsewhere and executed in droves, leav­ ing the nascent party in tatters. A chilling thought from one of La Matanza’s proponents captures the impetus of these events: “ Commu­ nism is a tree shaken by the wind. The moving tree causes the seeds to fall; the same wind carries the seed to other places. The seed falls on fertile soil. To be done with communism it is necessary to make the ground sterile.” 25 Another saying attributed to the disturbing social calculus of the era was “ Muerto el perro, se acabo la rabia” (Kill the dog, the rabies are gone). As part of the initiative to prevent future communist uprisings, in the aftermath of La Matanza eighteen rebellion leaders were put before firing squads. Marmol survived to tell the story. He recalled the bullets hitting his body and then lying still in his blood and another man’s

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20

The Salvador Option

gore. “ The firing squad shot seven times. The fourth shot got me in the chest, and the seventh got me in the head. I fell. But minutes later I was still alive. The blood was in my mouth and made me want to cough.”26 As some soldiers examined the bodies to kill the survivors, one of Marmol’s dying companions shouted, “ Long live the Communist Party!” Another shouted, “ Death to Gen. Hernandez Martinez!”27 But Mar­ mol remained quiet. His captors left Marmol for dead, but he “ lived on to bedevil strong military dictatorships for another 50 years.” If it had not been for the clumsy firing squad, Marmol likely would have been “ just another forgotten victim” of La Matanza slaughter.28 For Martinez and his fellow military officers, the lesson from La Matanza was simple: never again tolerate communist agitation. Another outcome was that the Salvadoran military and oligarchy were inclined to see the peasant rebellion as a result of an international com­ munist conspiracy rather than a symptom of domestic poverty and desperation.29 This resulted in the tendency for rightist elements to label all forms of social and political reform as thinly veiled communism. What is so hard to decipher is whether they knew this was not the case but acted as they did to facilitate their desire to quell peaceful social reform in the country. Paradoxically, soon after the massacre ebbed, Martinez “ wooed the masses” - especially in the tumultuous western provinces - with “ promises of reform and protection from vengeful local elites.”30 After he was ousted from power in 1944, Martinez fled to Hon­ duras where 12 years later the former strongman was stabbed to death by his driver, “ the son of one of many thousands of Salvado­ rans Hernandez Martinez had caused to be murdered.”31 Martinez’s downfall led other military leaders to take his place officially under the military-dominated and far-from-democratic Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática, PRUD), an electoral vehicle it used to legitimize its rule through presidential “ elections” every five years. Contrary to the lasting stereotype that the military simply did the landed oligarchy’s bidding during these years, these military regimes implemented both Martinez-style reform and repression.32 In 1960, though, reformist officers once again seized power and established a civilian-military junta that included Dr. Fabio Castillo,

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Farabundo Martí, La Matanza

21

a strident supporter of the Cuban Revolution a year earlier. However, this democratic sprout did not last as the junta was removed in a coun­ tercoup; in 1962, the ruling military party became the National Concil­ iation Party (Partido de Conciliación Nacional, PCN) and the ostensi­ bly “ liberal” anti-communist Colonel Julio Rivera was elected. Deeply rattled by Cuba’s stunning revolution and a perception that Havana was now exporting revolution in the hemisphere, the John F. Kennedy administration praised Rivera as a loyal ally in the fight against com­ munist subversion.33

“ These Thugs Brutalized Any Peasant Who Challenged Them”

As was true of most of its Central American neighbors, El Salvador’s “ stability” rested on a powerful alliance between the country’s oli­ garchies and its military. Both of these groups feared another 1932like rural uprising that would lead to their demise. For that rea­ son, they organized rural paramilitary groups - the most notorious of which was known as the Nationalist Democratic Organization (Organizacion Democrática Nacionalista, ORDEN) created in 1962. Known by the Spanish acronym for “ order,” ORDEN relied on retired military officers and roughly 60,000 recruited conservative peasants. As a “ pro-government, military-sanctioned civilian force,” O RDEN’s primary purpose was to afford the government a “ disci­ plined organization” in the countryside that could “ teach the peas­ ants the fundamentals of democracy, indoctrinate them against the ‘dangers of communism,’ and provide social services and assistance to the poor.”34 A 1979 classified U.S. State Department report indi­ cates that many peasants joined the group because it protected them from arrest and allowed them to carry weapons - a sign of machismo.35 The presidential-run intelligence outfit Salvadoran National Secu­ rity Agency (Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Salvadoreüa, ANESAL) helped consolidate an era of military hegemony in El Salvador, sow­ ing terror selectively among alleged subversives identified by the intel­ ligence services. Through both O RDEN and ANESAL, the military’s domination over civilian society was consolidated through official and unofficial repression.36

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22

The Salvador Option

An American diplomat active in the 1970s and ’ 80s described this dynamic: The right maintained control. In rural areas a local power structure developed. In many places what most resembled a gang of thugs developed, perhaps aided and paid by the large landowners. These local enforcers were loosely organized on a national basis in something called O RDEN. These thugs brutalized any peasant who challenged them or the landowners. Sometimes the thugs were members of the local police, but in many cases they were on a volunteer aux­ iliary police or military, usually with some link to the military but not on any military organization chart. The main role of ORDEN at the national level appears to have been to keep the various local ORDEN groups from fighting each other.37

Here is how the CIA explained the rural justice to Salvador Option-era policymakers in a 1985 report: Control over society was handled by the military government and civilian elites largely through paramilitary constabulary forces, regular Army units, and numerous official and private vigilante organizations. The historical record shows that, given the inherent weakness of the formal judicial process, these security bodies would often function at the local level as judge, jury, and exe­ cutioner of individuals perceived to be criminals or subversives.38

El Salvador’s traditional security forces - as well as the Treasury Police (Policía de Hacienda, PH) and National Guard - enforced the “ law ” through repression and exclusion. And in addition to their politi­ cization that resulted in defending conservative policies, these insular agencies were simply not very good at policing.39 That is, they had very poor investigative training and lacked the most basic skills for protecting, recording, and using evidence. They also depended heav­ ily on extrajudicial confessionals extracted by torture and abuse to gain convictions.40 Part of El Salvador’s social dilemma resulted from the demo­ graphic boom underway in the decades after World War II. The Massachusetts-sized country’s population in 1950 was 2 million and jumped to 3.5 million by 1970. A decade later the country housed 4.5 million citizens, making it the most densely populated country in the Americas at that time. Neighboring Honduras increasingly served as a safety valve for El Salvador’s exploding and largely impov­ erished population, a phenomenon that strained bilateral relations.

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Farabundo Martí, La Matanza

23

In 1969, after two World Cup qualifying soccer matches in June, boiling tensions erupted in war two weeks later. While the fighting only lasted 100 hours, it represented a victory for El Salvador, espe­ cially for the military officers who cast themselves as the heroes of the invasion.41

“ Where Were You Guys 10 Years Ago?”

During the late 1950s and ’60s, sustained economic growth that included light manufacturing helped spark urbanization and expand the size of the once pitifully small Salvadoran middle class. Yet, poverty, unemployment, and political disenfranchisement continued to tear at Salvadoran society.42 During the 1960s, new political organizations began to test El Salvador's long repressive political system. Deeply influenced by the Catholic Church’s powerful teachings on social jus­ tice, the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) emerged as a vocal advocate for reform. The 19 72 presidential elections proved to be a watershed as the Christian Democratic leader and former three-term San Salvador mayor Jose Napoleon Duarte and his democratic socialist vice-presidential running mate, Guillermo Ungo, campaigned on an umbrella ticket under the National Opposi­ tion Union (Union Nacional Opositora, UNO) against the military’s handpicked PCN candidate, Colonel Arturo Molina.43 Interestingly, Duarte had entered politics because he was worried that the oligarchy's reactionary policies were making a communist revolt more likely exactly what John F. Kennedy had feared. Seeing how easily the Notre Dame University-educated Duarte had taken the rural and urban vote, the military ordered a news blackout immediately after the polls had closed. Three days later the regime's official election board announced that Molina had in fact been elected president. Duarte described the fraud in a 19 8 1 interview: We knew that the official party [the PCN] would try to cheat us, and they did, but they made a miscalculation. They had brought in polling experts, just like you have in the United States. The experts said that we would get about 200,000 votes, so they figured their cheating on that basis. They thought 300,000 would give them a great victory. But we got 324,000, so they just took 9,000 away from us and gave it to themselves. When my people found out what happened, they gathered in the streets. One word from me, and they

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24

The Salvador Option

would have burned down the city, but I told them, “ I believe in democracy. I don’t believe in turmoil or violent solutions. You must be patient.”44

Implicated in an aborted coup by officers sympathetic to the cheated opposition, Duarte unwisely made a radio broadcast calling for sup­ port of an attempted pro-democracy coup in May 19 72 (apparently not an oxymoron in El Salvador in this dire moment) that had failed.45 Duarte was quickly arrested and tortured (his face was severely bro­ ken) before ending up in exile in Venezuela for the next seven years.46 Colonel Armando Molina emerged as the “ victor” from the 19 72 vote and in fact implemented a mild land reform measure (in 1973 and again in 1976) and a renewed push for industrialization that would lessen the country’s chronic reliance on landed estate agriculture. Inter­ estingly, Molina also used ORDEN to rally the rural peasantry in his favor.47 Yet, Molina’s successor, General Carlos Humberto Romero, would prove far more repressive.48 Romero’s designation as the offi­ cial military candidate in the rigged 19 77 elections signaled the end of Molina’s progressive programs. Romero’s oppression earned him a bad reputation both locally and abroad, and as he began to lose his grip on power he called for a “ national dialogue” that could bring back democracy.49 But the desperate attempts at mollification proved too little, too late as Romero antagonized both military elements and the increasingly mobilizing leftist opposition. In 1982, Duarte remarked to a group of foreign correspondents who had arrived to cover national elections, “ Where were you guys 10 years ago?” Indeed, one must wonder how differently El Salvador’s history would have turned out if the reformist Duarte had been able to gov­ ern legitimately before the country turned into a bloodbath later in the 1970s. For many on the left, any possibility of peaceful reform ended with the 19 72 fraudulent elections, even if the event did not receive much attention outside of El Salvador. One future guerrilla leader quipped that “ The dictatorship had shut the space for partic­ ipation [with the 19 72 fraud].” 50 Another guerrilla stated a quarter century later that after 19 72 she concluded, “ either we take the strug­ gle into the open on the mountains, or they’ll kill us here in the city.” 51

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3 The United States in Latin America

[Washington] will not be able to hurt us if all of Latin America is in flames. - Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro1 [Latin America] reminds me of an active volcano. - Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet Premier, i9 6 0 2

Examining the evolution of the Cold War is essential in grasping the ideological and geopolitical factors that underlined the sustained American engagement in El Salvador in 1980. El Salvador was an unexpected locale for deep U.S. involvement during the Cold War since, unlike many of its neighbors, it was not seen as especially prone to a victorious Marxist revolution until the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, though, El Salvador had seemingly overnight become the most likely candidate for America’s “ next Vietnam.” While it never ended up becoming the American tragedy that unfolded in Vietnam, El Sal­ vador nonetheless shared many characteristics with this Southeast Asian country - at least from the standpoint of U.S. involvement. In both instances, the United States attempted to guard against what it believed was a looming expansion of global communism. What is clear is that America’s strategic and political debacle in Vietnam that officially ended in 1975 strongly influenced how the United States engaged El Salvador. America approached the country with a hefty dose of caution, given the palpable fears that El Salvador could be one 2 5

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26

The Salvador Option

more “ slippery slope” resulting in a militarily maximalist, yet strate­ gically and morally dubious, U.S.-led effort to “ hold the line” against communism. But before we can fully appreciate the United States in El Salvador in the 1970s and ’ 80s we must first turn to two broader his­ torical threads: the emergence of the United States’ “ Big Stick” in the first half of the 20th century, when the U.S. reserved the right to inter­ vene in the affairs of a country it deemed in disarray; and successive Cold War presidential administrations, which strove to achieve victory over communism through counterinsurgency and economic and polit­ ical development.

Rise of the Big Stick After easily defeating in Cuba what by this time was a sclerotic Spanish empire, in 1898, over the following decades the United States inter­ vened frequently in political and economic affairs, often to combat “ chronic instability” as Spanish American war veteran and president Theodore Roosevelt would characterize it while in office. The swollen confidence following the victory over Spain, as well as its own emerg­ ing economic and military muscle, drove U.S. leaders to continue to broaden their nation’s influence over the region. In May 1904, Roo­ sevelt’s former secretary of war Elihu Root expanded on this strategic thinking that came to be known as the “ Roosevelt Corollary” : “Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendliness. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it fear no interference from the United States.”3 Unlike the Monroe Doctrine from almost a century earlier that simply told European imperial powers to stay out of the hemisphere, Wash­ ington now reserved the right to intervene in the internal affairs of “ recalcitrant” countries to address instability. But many nations in the Caribbean basin did not heed Root’s call, leading Roosevelt and suc­ cessive presidents to act. At times this entailed not simply diplomatic or economic pressures but, echoing the 1898 war with Spain over Cuba, actual American boots on the ground. Indeed, Washington had discov­ ered that military force was an effective way to determine outcomes in a region increasingly under its dominion.

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The United States in Latin America

27

For the next three decades, barely a year went by when the United States was not conducting some sort of intervention in a Central Amer­ ican or Caribbean country, although El Salvador was one that never made that dubious list. Despite what is sometimes assumed, these Big Stick interventions ranged widely in both scope and duration. Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico were all on the receiving end of American interventionism that involved Washington dispatching diplomatic and military forces to supervise elections, build infrastructure, enforce debt payments, quell insurrec­ tions, and hold elections. It is safe to say, though, that U.S. occupations did not lead to the lasting political and economic institutions they had sought to establish. Part of this failure might have been the instability endemic in these societies before the Big Stick arrived to take care of matters. Many interventions initially took on a familiar shape: large-scale deploy­ ments of U.S. forces for short periods of time, followed by short-term occupations that addressed the political and economic issues in a man­ ner favorable to Washington. In part influenced by its self-generated image of a selfless promoter of liberty and not an “ Old World” imperial power, the United States often departed after these short-term objec­ tives were accomplished. After 19 12 , though, the occupations were more sustained. And in some instances, such as the occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s and into the 1930s, the United States failed to achieve its objectives (in this case, quelling the insurgency led by nationalist “ bandit” Augusto Sandino), and it was U.S. domestic polit­ ical pressure more than another easy Big Stick success that precipitated the withdrawals. In office from 19 13 to 19 2 1, President Woodrow Wilson’s mission­ ary zeal led him to detest colonial rule, yet he wound up readily employ­ ing military forces. In fact, Wilson intervened more often - and his occupations ended up lasting much longer - than his two predecessors, William Howard Taft (19 0 9 -19 13 ) and Theodore Roosevelt (19 0 1­ 1909). To be sure, Wilson wanted democracy and stability, or as he put it in 1 9 1 3 , “ to teach the South American republics to elect good men.” In a speech in Mobile, Alabama, before the Southern Commercial Congress in October 19 1 3 , Wilson promised that “ the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.

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28

The Salvador Option

She must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity.”4 But when confronted with repeated cases of instability right off America’s shores, Wilson put security and the advancement of democracy before non-intervention, a pri­ oritization that led him to several interventions in Mexico and the Caribbean basin. In a sense, Wilson was acting in a manner consistent with future Cold War presidents, such as John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, who also prioritized national security despite their lofty rhetoric of freedom. This sort of Wilsonian rhetoric was on display on March 10 , 19 8 3, when President Reagan made a speech on Central America at a trade association’s annual meeting: “ Thousands of people have already died and, unless the conflict is ended democratically, millions more could be affected throughout the hemisphere. The people of El Salvador have proved they want democracy. But if guerrilla violence succeeds, they won’t get it.”5 If there is a constant geopolitical and ideological thread linking Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson in the Big Stick era and John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan during the Cold War, perhaps it is that these presidents did not want to establish colonies in the Caribbean basin or even deeply meddle unless it was necessary to ensure America’s strategic interests. When they did meddle, the inter­ vention was done through diplomatic jawboning, dangling of loans to pliant governments, siding with one group of political elites against another, and by arming and training indigenous constabularies.

A Good Neighbor

By the end of the 1920s, America’s priorities had shifted significantly since the dawn of the Big Stick era in 1898. Following the carnage of World War I, anti-imperialism and isolationism had become increas­ ingly popular among the American public - and by extension their elected governments. Thus, these at times costly or poorly understood interventions were increasingly scrutinized; as satirist Will Rogers put it, “ Why are we in Nicaragua and what the Hell are we doing there?”6 The Great Depression that began in 1929 further forced Washington

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The United States in Latin America

29

to look inward to find ways to reform its shattered economic institu­ tions. It was a ripe time for a less intrusive strategy in the Caribbean basin - and Latin America more broadly - a development that led to the era of the “ good neighbor.” Although the beginnings of this relatively non-interventionist phase began in the late 1920s when Herbert Hoover was still in the White House, President Franklin Roosevelt is largely credited for creating the formal Good Neighbor Policy.7 Upon taking office in 19 3 3 , Roosevelt and his advisors remained committed to the goal of non-intervention, a position aided by the lack of immediate security threats in Latin Amer­ ica. At his inaugural address on March 4, 19 3 3 , Roosevelt stated, “ In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor - the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others - the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.” 8 The Good Neighbor Policy emphasized trade, cooperation, and, most important, non-intervention in the hemisphere over unilateral military intervention and occupation. It broadly defined U.S. policy in the Caribbean basin for the next two decades. Roosevelt’s first move in the direction of non-intervention was completing the withdrawal of American troops from Nicaragua in 19 33. He did not, however, switch to entirely pacific means to achieve his policy goals. For example, later that year, widespread instability and protest broke out in Cuba and Roosevelt came close to using U.S. troops to address the problem. As the 1930s progressed, the Roosevelt administration eyed the gathering threat of Nazism and fascism, which appeared to be spreading to Latin America. Paradoxically, the onset of World War II reinforced a softer American approach toward its back­ yard. Washington needed allies in its war against fascism, and Latin America’s proximity made it the logical place to look for them. With the advent of the Good Neighbor Policy, the United States appeared to finally set aside the Big Stick as a way of achiev­ ing its desired results in its neighboring countries. Yet, non­ intervention contributed at times to political vacuums in these “ banana republics” - often the ones like Nicaragua and the Dominican Repub­ lic where the United States conducted sustained interventions - where

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3o

The Salvador Option

unaccountable and venal strongmen emerged. That is, for America sim­ ply being a good neighbor did not ensure that the neighborhood was democratic or just.

“ Quacks Like a Duck” Soon after World War II, the United States found itself inextricably involved in a global struggle against Soviet-backed communism. Urged on by a Truman administration eager to bolster anti-communist pillars close to home, in 1947 all 21 independent hemispheric nations estab­ lished a mutual defense treaty known as the Rio Pact and created the Organization of American States (OAS) a year later.9 After a whirlwind tour of the region in 1950, the storied American diplomat George Kennan offered a pessimistic assessment of the fight against communism in Latin America. Assessing the communist foe as a vicious one, Kennan argued that the United States should act forcefully: But where [democratic governments] do not exist, and where the concepts and traditions of popular government are too weak to absorb successfully the inten­ sity of the communist attack, then we must concede that harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure; and that such regimes and such methods may be preferable alternatives, and indeed the only alternatives, to further communist successes.10

The Good Neighbor era might have ended following Kennan’s visit to Latin America. His dire warnings of communist expansion resonated in a Washington increasingly terrified of communism’s seemingly inex­ orable spread across the globe. The expansion took over North Korea, East Germany, and several nations in Eastern Europe shortly after World War II; communist victories followed in populous China in 1949 and in North Vietnam in 1954. It was only a matter of time, U.S. offi­ cials believed, before Latin America would be under siege. The first real instance of the Big Stick in its Cold War, anti­ communist form took place in Guatemala. President Dwight D. Eisen­ hower, a moderate Republican, initially looked to pursue many of the same multilateral policies as Harry S. Truman had done. While his sec­ retary of state John F. Dulles contended that the United States did not

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The United States in Latin America

31

support “ interference in the internal affairs of any republic,” Eisen­ hower was clear that the administration would not tolerate the pres­ ence of “ political institutions which serve alien masters.” 11 Diplomat Richard Paterson set a benchmark for intervention with his “ quacks like a duck” test, whereby regimes that resembled the Soviet Union ide­ ologically but were not openly pro-Soviet still represented a significant security threat to the United States.12 Eisenhower’s fear about leftist governments in the Caribbean basin came to a head after the election of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1950. While Arbenz himself was not a communist, at least not publicly, his advocacy of land reform, his nationalization of economic interests, his voting with the Soviet bloc in the United Nations, and the number of Guatemalan communists in the inner cir­ cle of his government greatly worried a Washington sick with anti­ communist fever. The last straw for U.S. officials was Arbenz’s decision to procure weapons from communist Czechoslovakia. By then, Arbenz was a communist duck and had to go. Because it was a covert operation conducted largely by local proxy forces, the American-backed coup in Guatemala provides an interest­ ing twist on the traditional U.S. Big Stick interventions in Latin Amer­ ica. In this case, a small group of anti-Arbenz fighters led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas entered the country from Honduras. Backed by CIA bombing and psychological operations, and benefiting from the refusal of the Guatemalan army to support the government against the U.S.-backed rebels, on June 17 , 1954, Arbenz resigned from his post and went into exile. Not surprisingly, the new military government was neither democratic nor reformist, but it satisfied Washington’s demand for strict anti-communism. Given the precipitous way Arbenz had fallen and Washington’s abil­ ity to keep its hands clean from conducting regime change in its back­ yard, Eisenhower was inclined to believe that such “ success” could easily be replicated elsewhere. Washington’s intervention by proxy in Guatemala proved to be deeply unpopular in Latin America. Despite American disavowal, governments across the region complained bit­ terly about what they contended was thinly veiled Yankee interven­ tionism. In a visit to Venezuela in 1958, Vice President Richard Nixon’s motorcade was pelted by irate crowds throwing stones at the represen­ tative from the American empire.13

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32

The Salvador Option “ The Most Dangerous Area of the World”

Latin America, somewhat surprisingly, became a major issue for John F. Kennedy as he ran for president in 1960. Before he defeated Nixon in November of that year, the stunning success of Fidel Castro’s over­ throw of Cuban strongman Fulgencio Batista irrevocably altered the geopolitical landscape in Latin America. Now the American back­ yard contained a pro-communist regime aligned with Moscow that sat roughly 90 miles from America’s shores. Kennedy deftly used his pre­ decessor’s alleged weak approach to Latin America, noting that Eisen­ hower had failed to prevent Castro’s rise to power. Calling Latin America the “ most dangerous area of the world,” Kennedy believed that his first priority was to check the anti-U.S. revo­ lutionary tide in the region and secure the United States against exter­ nal threats. While attempting to show deference to Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, the young president announced that if “ any Latin country be driven by repression into the arms of the Communists, our attitude of non-intervention would change overnight.” 14 Kennedy used his first State of the Union address on January 30, 19 6 1, to reinforce his view that the United States could not tolerate “ another Cuba” : Communist agents seeking to exploit that region’s peaceful revolution of hope have established a base on Cuba, only 90 miles from our shores. Our objec­ tion with Cuba is not over the people’s drive for a better life. Our objection is to their domination by foreign and domestic tyrannies. Cuban social and eco­ nomic reform should be encouraged. Questions of economic and trade policy can always be negotiated. But Communist domination in this Hemisphere can never be negotiated.15

In April 19 6 1, only three months after taking office, the inexperi­ enced president was dealt the humiliating setback of the failed Bay of Pigs mission. The CIA-led covert operation to overthrow Fidel Castro was originally hatched in the final months of the Eisenhower administration. Like the overthrow of Arbenz in 1954, the Bay of Pigs was an example of attempted regime change by proxy rather than the direct military adventures of earlier times. Washington supported and financed the operation, but the ranks consisted of Cuban exiles. Contrary to what Kennedy had expected, Castro held much stronger

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The United States in Latin America

33

support on the island than government officials had estimated, and his well-trained troops easily defeated the invading forces.

Foco Theory

The unexpected ease with which the Cuban revolutionaries overthrew U.S.-backed strongman Fulgencio Batista in 1959 led them to conclude that the same thing could and should be done in other countries in Latin America. Revolutionary hero Fidel Castro told the crowds gath­ ered at a rally in Havana on January 2 1,1 9 5 9 , that the time had come to liberate the hemisphere: How much America and the peoples of our hemisphere need a revolution like the one that has taken place in Cuba! How much America needs an example like this in all its nations. How much it needs for the millionaires who have become rich by stealing the people’s money to lose everything they have stolen. How much America needs for the war criminals in the countries of our hemi­ sphere to be shot.16

In what certainly frustrated American policymakers for the next three decades, Fidel Castro was unwilling to stop his efforts after such a stun­ ning success in Cuba - even if he was not yet a full-blown communist. Rather, the Cuban ruler quickly embraced a policy of exporting Cubanstyle revolutions to Latin America. By the mid-1960s, Cuba had con­ solidated its communist regime in Havana, and Cuba-inspired focus (foco) insurrections had emerged across the region, most extensively in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Guatemala. The doctrine held that a general revolution could be prompted by small, quick-striking guerrilla vanguards that created a “ focus” (hence, foco) of discontent with the status quo. Influenced by Chinese communist revolutionary Mao Zedong’s writings from three decades earlier, Che Guevera and fellow Cuban leaders believed that other revolutionaries could simply follow a straightforward textbook that could teach them how to become suc­ cessful revolutionaries. In fact, by 1960 Che had authored a tome enti­ tled Guerrilla Warfare that became requisite reading for budding revo­ lutionaries across the hemisphere.17 Che believed that “ a hard core of thirty to fifty men [was] enough to initiate armed revolution in any Latin American country.” Based on the experience in Cuba, he

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34

The Salvador Option

highlighted three strategies for a successful revolutionary war. First, Che contended that this small band of committed fighters could take revolution into their own hands, providing the spark for mass revolt rather than waiting for another precipitating event to occur. Second, he posited that popular forces could win against a regular army. Guerrilla warfare, waged with the support of civilians, could bring a conven­ tional army to its knees by wearing down its ability and its resolve to fight. Third, he maintained that in the Latin American context, the best place to center subversive activity was in the countryside, where, due to often horrible working conditions and a skewed distribution of land, “ class contradictions are at their most violent.” 18 These three tenets constituted the heart of foco theory.19 While Moscow was somewhat hesitant about exporting armed revolution lest it provoke Washington in its own backyard, Havana was bent on creating, as Che Guevara wrote in 1967, “ many Vietnams” in the Americas.20 In a 1959 article, Guevara wrote that “ the guerrilla is fundamen­ tally . . . an agrarian revolutionary. He interprets the desires of the great peasant masses to be owners of land, owners of their own means of production, of their livestock, of all that for which they have fought for years, for that which constitutes their life and will also be their cemetery.”21 Che dismissed social reform through the ballot box as hopelessly naive: Washington and its corporate cronies would never allow real reform to take hold. One only had to look to leftist pres­ ident Jacobo Arbenz’s ouster in 1954 by the CIA to realize that the yanquis would not tolerate an outcome that did not ensure their mil­ itary and economic control of the region. The only effective path to social justice and equality, then, was violent revolution.22 In hindsight, we now know that foco warfare was a relatively short­ lived and unsuccessful footnote in the history of war. One of Che’s fundamental miscalculations was a failure to ascribe the stunning suc­ cess of the Cuban revolt to factors largely exclusive to Cuba. The sto­ ried Cuban revolutionaries were fighting against the widely hated and illegitimate tyrant Batista, which made it infinitely easier to win over the support of both rural and urban populations. In other countries in Latin America where Cuba-style focos were attempted, the govern­ ments in power typically were partially democratic and legitimate. Nonetheless, given the level of repression in Latin America - the very fuel of foco - it is surprising that almost none of the insurgencies

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The United States in Latin America

35

in these countries succeeded, largely because of the failure of the popu­ lation to rise up with the rebels in a general insurrection, as had taken place in Cuba. The miscalculations seem especially stark because the Cuban revolutionaries did realize that their victory had come far faster and far easier than the leftist takeovers in China in 1949 and Russia in 19 17 . That its proponents expected Latin America to go the way of Cuba, and not of these other two examples, demonstrates how far removed foco theory was from the particular social, economic, and nationalistic contexts of different Latin American countries. Another dimension in which foco theory erred was in its overes­ timation of the importance of the countryside. Much of the success of later leftist revolutions in Latin America came when the insurgents threatened major metropolitan areas, as when the Sandinistas seized Leon and Managua in Nicaragua, or when the FM LN took positions in the mountains around San Salvador in the summer of 1983. Granted, foco did acknowledge the crucial role of urban universities as hotbeds of anti-regime sentiment that could then be channeled to the broader society. Indeed, these “ foquista” revolutionaries expected that many newly sensitized university students would flee the cities for the hills and mountains to start revolutions. Often, as in the early stages of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in the 1970s and throughout the Salvadoran Marxist insurgency the following decade, when these van­ guard intellectuals - the notorious guerrilla universitaria - did head for the countryside, the result was often their dismal failure and death at the hands of counterinsurgency forces.23

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4 American Military Mission in El Salvador

“ This Hemisphere Intends to Remain the Master of Its Own House”

It was perhaps inevitable that Cuba would be at the center of this dra­ matic scaling up of low impact counterinsurgency. A classified SECRET U.S government intelligence report published in 19 6 1 highlighted the perception of Cuba’s key role as an incubator for revolution in the region: Castro’s Cuba has become to much of the Latin American community a living example of the radical breakup of traditional social and economic patterns. For many of these who seek to upset the status quo in their own countries Havana has developed into the mecca of revolutionary inspiration and conspir­ acy. . . . Castro’s shadow looms large because social and economic conditions throughout Latin America invite opposition to ruling authority and encourage agitation for radical change.1

Indeed, by 1962 Cuba had become the primary source of manpower and resources for igniting insurgencies throughout the Western Hemi­ sphere. As stated in a 1964 State Department report, “ The primary danger we face in Castro is . . . the impact the very existence of his regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin American coun­ tries__ The simple fact is that Castro represents a successful defiance of the U.S., a negation of our whole hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half.”2 In principle, the core of the U.S. response to guerrilla insurgen­ cies during the Cold War involved three wide-ranging objectives for 3

6

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American Military Mission in El Salvador

37

f i g u r e 4 .1. Map of El Salvador included in a classified 1982 U.S. government document indicating the reported locations of the different Marxist guerrilla fronts that were fighting the Washington-backed central government in the 1980s. M ap prepared by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Cartography Lab©. Reprinted with permission.

“ client” (or target) countries: democratization, economic development, and security. This three-pronged approach began during the Kennedy administration and endured as the primary model in U.S. policy, mili­ tary doctrine, and practice, although U.S. responses at different times often emphasized one objective over the others. Most of the time secu­ rity was the priority, but this is not to say that the pro-democracy and economic modernization goals were cut out of the picture. The Kennedy administration believed that America’s mission included robust support for democracy across the globe. Americans had to oppose the “ powerful destructive forces... challenging the uni­ versal values that for centuries have inspired men of good will in all parts of the world.”3 The hallmark of Kennedy’s “ peace revolution” strategy was the Alliance for Progress, a planned 10-year program of massive economic investment and assistance to promote sorely needed political, social, and economic reform in Latin America. The idea was

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38

The Salvador Option

that the funds would help the Latin Americans implement better tax schemes, promote massive land reform efforts, and give the poor and disenfranchised a stake in these reformist governments. For Kennedy, the Alliance would allow “ us again to transform the [hemisphere] into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts.”4 In Kennedy’s word­ ing in his inaugural address on January 19 6 1, To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge - to con­ vert our good words into good deeds - in a new alliance for progress - to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.5

While still idealistic, at their core Kennedy’s democracy-building ini­ tiatives were primarily about using non-coercive methods to stop communism. As part of the spirit of the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy administration also did not oppose socially progressive non­ communist reformers, such as Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela and Jose Figueres in Costa Rica. Despite his efforts, the Alliance failed to produce the democratic, stable Latin America that Kennedy had hoped for. This failure resulted from a number of political and economic fac­ tors, not least of which was that the number of reformist leaders with whom Kennedy could work remained small. Most countries had few democratic institutions and were often ruled by militaries. The political imperative of anti-communism undermined what was hoped to be the “ Marshall Plan” for the Americas. Kennedy often found it necessary to support stable regimes, which were at times repressive, to ensure that communism did not advance. Whatever chance of success Kennedy’s “ revolutionary dream” had for Latin America was cut short by his assassination in Dallas, Texas, in November 1963. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the presidency and at first his ascension seemed to have little effect on Latin America, as anti-communism continued to dominate policy­ making. Yet under the surface, a major shift had occurred. Despite his public affinity for impoverished peoples, Johnson had little inter­ est in Latin America, focusing mostly on events in Asia. Moreover, even though many of Kennedy’s key advisors remained in the Johnson

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American Military Mission in El Salvador

39

administration, the idealism from the Kennedy years had largely dissi­ pated. For example, the conservative pragmatist Thomas Mann took charge of Latin America policy and competed for influence with Kennedy’s more liberal advisors, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and encouraged Johnson to move away from the Alliance for Progress. But events in the Dominican Republic prevented Johnson from com­ pletely ignoring Latin America and the Caribbean basin more specif­ ically. In April 1965, Johnson ordered more than 20,000 American troops into the capital city of Santo Domingo. The intervention, the first instance of American boots on the grounds in the Caribbean since the 1930s, appeared to signify a shift back to the traditional Big Stick. Yet, Johnson’s only real concern for a country as seemingly irrelevant as the Dominican Republic centered on the strategic imperative of keep­ ing communists out of America’s backyard.

Maintain “ Internal Security”

Deeply influenced by the unfolding efforts to counter communist insur­ gency in Southeast Asia, Kennedy had ordered U.S. civilian and mili­ tary officials to embark on a significant effort to train Latin American military and police forces so that they could defend American allies from communist subversion. The administration increased military aid to Latin America, and by 1963 these levels were almost 50 percent higher than the assistance levels of the Eisenhower years. Starting in 19 6 1, the Kennedy administration also placed Special Forces Groups (SFGs) in vulnerable Latin American countries, such as Guatemala and Colombia. Some of these groups, such as the 8th SFG led by Colonel B. J. Pinkerton, had previously conducted clandestine operations in Laos. Throughout the 1960s and ’70s, hundreds of U.S. military offi­ cers were deployed in the region to teach their Latin American col­ leagues how to combat internal and external subversion. The United States also began training Latin American military offi­ cers and soldiers at U.S. institutions, such as the School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. Here they were instructed in organizational command, counterinsurgency tactics, covert and psychological oper­ ations, military intelligence, and interrogation techniques.6 Between 1962 and 1970, roughly 22,000 military men were trained in such schools - 9,000 in 1962 alone.7 Another 100,000 police officers were

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4o

The Salvador Option

given American training in their home countries. Secretary of Defense Robert A. McNamara announced that U.S.-trained Latin American military leaders had an obligation to maintain “ internal security” and to combat “ domestic subversion.” 8 Washington also established Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) to be stationed throughout the region. Then if a Latin Amer­ ican country came to be considered “ hot,” SFGs were dispatched to help with all sorts of counterinsurgency work: civil affairs, psycholog­ ical operations, intelligence, and interrogation. These deployments of combat-seasoned Green Berets and embassy-based MAAGs were often almost identical to the counterinsurgency models being tested at the same time in Vietnam.9 However, this new American counterinsurgency strategy brought its own problems. Whatever its counterinsurgent efficacy might have been, U.S. training and materiel often served to bolster abusive Latin American militaries and governments. Whether the U.S. approach to Latin America after the mid-1960s made bad situations better or worse is an open debate, but there is no question that it became irrevoca­ bly associated with militaries that often used “ internal security” as an excuse to terrorize civilian populations and stifle the very type of reform that Kennedy and others embraced so passionately during these Cold War years.

An Ambassador Recalls...

Murat Williams served as the American ambassador to El Salvador from 19 6 1 to 1964 and recalled in an interview decades later his tele­ phone conversation with President John F. Kennedy soon before start­ ing his new posting. “Ambassador, I am glad that you are going to El Salvador. That is our number one problem.” 10 Williams assumed that Kennedy was referring not simply to El Salvador but also to Latin America or Central America. Whether he meant El Salvador or the region more broadly, Kennedy’s marching orders to Williams further reveal how seriously the United States took instability in its geopoliti­ cal backyard.11 As would be the case two decades later, although on a much larger scale, U.S.-led efforts to push social and economic reform in El Sal­ vador in the 1960s ran into opposition from the oligarchy. A Rhodes

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American Military Mission in El Salvador

41

Scholar and career diplomat, Ambassador Williams often infuriated the Salvadoran oligarchy who considered him a communist sympa­ thizer just as they would view subsequent ambassadors like Robert White and Thomas Pickering in the 1980s. Here is how Williams recalled the injustices that resulted in the communist-led revolt in 1932: El Salvador’s problems are deeply rooted in centuries old injustice. A very few people own the great majority of land, of the wealth of the country. They were protecting that position by the military, which was well under their control. There had been in 19 3 2 in El Salvador a big uprising, which was attributed to the communists, which was called the communist conspiracy to overthrow the country. Well, I don’t believe Moscow, itself, was necessarily behind this revolt, but it did not take Moscow to tell the Salvadoran peasants of 19 32 that they were hungry. They were hungry and they did rise up and demand a better life. . . . That created a very strong fear among the wealthy people of El Salvador that once again there might be an explosion from the unrest of the peasants.12

In a July 1980 letter to the magazine Christianity Today, former ambas­ sador Williams described how the Kennedy administration’s “ change in attitude” in El Salvador in the early 1960s was so great that a renowned Salvadoran economist told him, “ The Fourteen Families (the oligarchy) are alarmed. They have always depended on the army, the church, and the American Legation [military mission]. You make them afraid.” 13 Some American diplomats were not pleased with the shift from development to security under Johnson. According to Williams, “ Mr. Johnson’s policy of using a strong arm resulted in building up the mili­ tary missions, which I had been opposed to and ultimately as the years passed it meant more and more American advisors taking part. From the standpoint of the people of those countries, certainly those peo­ ple in El Salvador, they look upon us as their enemy.” 14 Williams also recounted how he had maintained a low-level aerial photograph of San Salvador in his office in the U.S. Embassy. Williams pointed out to all of his visitors the image’s “ alarming juxtaposition” of the “ pala­ tial residences of the oligarchy” and the “ cardboard box slums, teem­ ing with El Salvador’s poor.” For Williams, the photograph suggested that an “ explosion was inevitable” without social reforms.15 Williams contrasted this urgency with the caution of some of his State Depart­ ment colleagues. One former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador told him,

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The Salvador Option

“ Murat, you are making a mistake. You should cultivate better rela­ tions with the [Fourteen] Families. After all, they have the power.” 16 For Williams, though, American goals were “ way too much influenced by wealthy [Salvadoran] families.” 17 An unabashed supporter of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, Williams believed that actual reform was at hand during these brief years. His sense was that El Salvador was exceptionally fortunate given that Kennedy and other social reformers were in charge in Washing­ ton. Moreover, their new military president Julio Rivera, elected for a five-year term in 1962 after leading a coup in 19 6 1, supported progres­ sive reforms.18 Time magazine noted in 1962 that El Salvador was one of the Alliance’s “ shiniest reforms” under the prodding of a “ reform minded military man, Colonel Julio Rivera.” It added that Rivera was “ loosening the control of ‘the 14 ,’ a group of land and banking families who have ruled the country since Spanish colonial days.” 19 In fact, Kennedy and Rivera knew each other and got along well. Some believed that Rivera’s reformist zeal might have stemmed from his stint as a young officer studying at the Protestant college in the provincial city of Santa Ana where he came under the influences of a “ remarkable American woman Baptist missionary” to whom he often referred.20 Thus it is possible that more Alliance for Progress-style reforms might have precluded the civil war that erupted the following decade. Murat Williams, for one, strongly believed that one key cause of the war was the “ blindness of U.S. policymakers to [the] power of the forces that demanded social change.”21 However, even though El Salvador was the site of the first com­ munist uprising with the Farabundo Marti-led communist revolt in 19 3 2 , by the 1960s and ’70s U.S. officials did not consider El Sal­ vador a likely spot for a formidable Marxist revolution. What is readily apparent from reading the oral histories of American diplomats serv­ ing in El Salvador at the time is that there was a real difference of opinion on whether the United States should be a reformist or status quo power. Williams expressed frustration that U.S. diplomats were inclined toward the latter option: “ U.S. policy [in the 1960s] was too much influenced by the wealthy families. The wealthy families scared too many U.S. policymakers into believing that there was a real dan­ ger of communism there__ I think U.S. policymakers took the short term view of believing in oppression rather than in positive economic

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American Military Mission in El Salvador

43

development, the elimination of social injustice.” As for American mil­ itary personnel based at the U.S. Embassy, Williams recalled: “ I don’t think they [the U.S. military assistance groups] were negative. I just think there were too many of them.”22 Washington began providing military assistance to El Salvador beginning in the 1930s; but, contrary to Williams’s recollection, the amounts were not especially significant. In 1970, for example, the U.S. military mission totaled 17 personnel. The U.S. government provided less than $ 17 million from 1946 to 1979 - an amount that put El Sal­ vador at the bottom of the Central American countries in terms of U.S. assistance.23 In fact, the the Salvadoran regime under Romero rejected the aid in 19 77 in response to the Carter administration’s criticisms of the government’s record on human rights.24

“ It’s as if You Were a Bull”

During the 1980s and afterward, critical depictions of U.S. involve­ ment circulated in the media. For instance, the editors of Progressive magazine in 1984 wrote the following: The rising level of political violence in El Salvador and the increasing mil­ itary involvement of the United States began making front-page headlines in this country about five years ago. B u t... the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon set their intervention in motion much earlier. They have been actively aiding official terror in El Salvador for more than two decades - often in violation of U.S. law, always in violation of Washington’s pious rhetoric calling for an end to the violence.25

The allegations about U.S. complicity in the rising tide of violence were given credence by evidence that came from death squad leader Colonel Jose Alberto Medrano, who revealed his close ties with President John­ son and the CIA during hours of interviews by foreign journalists in the early 1980s.26 Medrano described how he traveled frequently to the United States to consult with the CIA during the tense years of the Cold War when Washington was using economic development and counterinsurgency to stem another Cuba in its own hemisphere. In July 1968, he even received a medal from President Johnson, report­ edly in “ recognition of your exceptional service merits.” According to Medrano, Johnson told him, “ I know everything about you, Medrano.

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The Salvador Option

You’re doing a good job. I know your pedigree. It’s as if you were a bull!”27 Were U.S. training and doctrine intended to create and bolster intelligence and security agencies, or were they meant to encourage death squads? Elements of the former unquestionably ended up in the latter, but it is harder to determine whether this is what the U.S. gov­ ernment wanted. What Medrano had done to merit such accolades from the Ameri­ can president, was, he recalled, to “ establish a rural network (ORDEN) whose function was to indoctrinate the campesinos with respect to the advantages of a democratic system and the disadvantages of a commu­ nist system.”28 ORDEN had the double missions of preventing commu­ nism and compiling information on individuals considered suspicious. Medrano indicated that you could “ discover a communist by his way of speaking. Generally, they criticize Yankee imperialism, speak against the oligarchy, against the military. We can discover them easily.”29 Once the individuals were identified, the information would be passed to O RDEN’s central office where roughly 100 people worked. From there the intelligence would end up at the presidential spy agency ANESAL where, according to Medrano, we “ would study it and pass it to the [military] President, who took the respective measures.” He added, “ In this revolutionary war, the enemy comes from our people. We don’t provide them with the Geneva Protocol. They are traitors to the country. What are the soldiers supposed to do? When they find them, they kill them.” 30 Medrano would subsequently publicly reveal that ORDEN and ANESAL were “ suggested by the Department of State, the CIA, and [U.S. Army] Green Berets during the time of [John F.] Kennedy. We formed those specialized agencies to combat international ter­ rorism__ We were preparing the team to combat communism.”31 Medrano also contended that Arthur Simons, the U.S. colonel in charge of the Green Berets at the time, was key to the creation of ORDEN.32 O RDEN’s size meant that 1 in 50 Salvadorans nationwide was a “ gov­ ernment snitch or enforcer, usually helping to repress members of their own social class.”33 Out of the rural networks emerged one of the most infamous death squads, “ Mano Blanca” (White Hand). The short-lived 1979 reformist junta abolished ORDEN and ANESAL because of their gross human

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American Military Mission in El Salvador

45

rights abuses.34 Death squad mastermind Roberto D ’Aubuisson pub­ licly denounced the junta’s move, indicating that while ORDEN had ceased to function in name, its “ principles are alive and well and are serving the fatherland” via a new political organization that he led.35 Some historians contend that ORDEN was one case where “ such training and fortification directly led to the emergence of a dense, Central America-wide network of death-squad paramilitaries.”36 Indeed, the death squads that subsequently appeared “ were essentially appendages of the very intelligence systems that Washington helped create or fortified.”37 ORDEN and ANESAL unquestionably became part of the death squad fabric that began to ravage El Salvador by the late 1970s. It is also the case that the United States played a hand in the creation of these two organizations. Yet, it is far more difficult to deter­ mine from the available evidence whether this very U.S. involvement is what led these groups to morph into shadowy death squads. As we will see, there were other key developments and factors that influenced the formation and spread of what soon became wanton state-sponsored killing of suspected leftist subversives.

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5 A Divided Nation Military Traditions, Democratic Third Way, and Liberation Theology

[It was in the] “ Third World,” that the Church would discover what it really was and what it really had to do. - Enrique Krauze, Mexican historian1 The rebels spared no effort to impress the American visitors, providing ample meals of steak, fresh orange juice and baked bread, as well as beds, a video television screen and trucks for transportation. A wellknown revolutionary priest, Miguel Ventura, offered a mass in the bulletpocked local church. A rebel chorus sang hymns of liberation theology. The first song began: “ Christ, Christ Jesus, identify yourself with us. Have solidarity with us, not with the oppressor class, with us.” -Ja m e s LeMoyne, N ew York Times correspondent, reporting from guerrilla-controlled territory, 19 8 5 2 Once you had to be a colonel to get rich, now even the lower ranks steal. -Joaq u in Ventura, retired Salvadoran Army captain, December 19 89 s

Las Catorce The decades leading up to the civil war were a tumultuous time that up-ended El Salvador’s relatively predictable and stable political cli­ mate. To give a full sense of this harrowing story, this chapter addresses several key actors and movements that emerged on the left, right, and center of Salvadoran politics and society in the 1960s and ’70s. It seems

46

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A Divided Nation

47

appropriate to begin with the power that stood the test of time in this tiny Central American country - the oligarchy. When foreign journalists during the war years wrote about the Sal­ vadoran oligarchy, they almost invariably used the term “ las catorce” for the fourteen families that were said to rule the country. The revolu­ tionary left also described the oligarchs in such terms. According to one guerrilla leader interviewed in Havana in 1980, “ Some 14 families own most of the land in El Salvador. These families are also linked to North American capital through the interests they have in the Americancontrolled industries.”4 While the term las catorce was widely used, there were in fact around 10 0 clans that were the effective owners of Salvadoran indus­ tries and land. But even that number was suspect as some contended that it was in fact much larger, even if a tiny fraction compared to the country’s total population. According to Jorge Sol Castellanos, a 66-year-old businessman and minister of the economy, “ It’s different from an aristocracy, which we also have. It’s an oligarchy because these families own and run almost everything that makes money in El Sal­ vador. Coffee gave birth to the oligarchy in the late 19th century, and economic growth has revolved around them ever since.”5 In 19 6 1, a civil-military junta enacted taxes and agrarian reforms in an attempt to relieve rampant inequality in El Salvador. In the view of the oligarchs, the reforms “ were ‘soak-the-rich’ moves in design and intent, were badly thought out and, finally, that the people most affected were not consulted before the reforms were decreed.” 6 With an ancestry of wealth and power, it was hard for the oligarchy to accept any interference of their socioeconomic prestige. Up until this time, they had enjoyed limitless influence under the laws of the nation, but due to these reforms “ the traditionally close ties between the wealthy class and the Government [had become] strained almost to the breaking point.”7 Despite this threat to their sovereignty, the oligarchs continued to enjoy their wealth and power throughout the 1960s and ’70s. A 1963 N ew York Times article titled “ Oligarchy Strong” analyzes the power dynamics in El Salvador with las catorce holding much of the clout. “ In few Latin nations is an economic oligarchy more deeply entrenched than in El Salvador, where a small number of families con­ trol a top-heavy share of the country’s wealth and exploit most of its

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48

The Salvador Option

2.7 million people.” 8 At this time, President Julio Rivera was in the midst of pushing for an income tax of at least 65 percent, the highest in Latin America. While some members of the oligarchy accepted the fact that times were changing, others were reluctant to relinquish the reins. Among those fighting reform was Tomáis Regalado, who criticized any attempt at amending the status quo: “ I think you Americans should stop building schools under the Alliance. Our economy is not strong enough yet to support such social projects.”9 Regalado, like others in his position, strongly believed that their power and influence was cru­ cial for the growth of the country. The Salvadoran oligarchy consid­ ered itself the architects of El Salvador, whose industriousness allowed them to create something out of nothing in this tiny, overpopulated Central American country. “ Our entrepreneurial spirit is the country’s only natural resource,” a wealthy matron commented. “ Without us the country will sink into the grave.” 10 By the 1970s, the rise of a generation of younger priests in the Catholic Church transformed what was once the “ staunchest defender” of the oligarchy into an organization that denounced the rightists as “ exploiters and murderers.” While actual numbers aren’t apparent, in response some oligarchs joined Protestant churches despite their Roman Catholic upbringing.11 The rift between the Catholic Church and the oligarchs was exemplified by Archbishop (Oscar Romero’s murder in 1980. In response to a question about his murder, one businessman stated, “ How could the army tolerate a man in his position telling the soldiers not to obey orders; lay down their guns, rather than shoot?” 12 Remarkably, after a century of “ unchallenged, highly profitable” rule, by the early 1980s El Salvador’s close-knit oligarchy hit hard times. This was a result of the disintegration of the “ antique fabric of social relations” that had bolstered its control for such a long time. Under the pressure of the revolutionary struggle, an increasingly hos­ tile Roman Catholic Church, and a U.S. government pushing despised economic reforms, the oligarchy began to crumble.13

A Salvadoran “ Third Way” During the decades of the 1960s and ’70s, the Christian Demo­ cratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) rose up as a unique

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integration of both leftist and rightist ideals, making it a moderate voice in El Salvador’s struggle to find its political identity. The con­ flict was not a binary one between the rightist oligarchy and military on one side, and the Marxist revolutionaries on the other. Christian Democracy emerged as a significant and controversial “ third w ay” in Salvadoran society. Its impact on the course of the war is undeniable, no matter how much proponents of hyper anti-communism or Marxist revolution denied its legitimacy throughout the war. The rise of the Christian Democrats in Latin America in the 1960s began as an attempt to provide a democratic alternative to the seem­ ingly inexorable march of armed Marxist revolutions throughout Latin America in the heady aftermath of Cuba’s successful insurrection in I 9 59.14 The movement seemed to come out of thin air. Although the oldest parties, those in Uruguay and Chile, were of an earlier origin, most of the Christian Democratic parties were founded in the years following World War II. By 1964, the year of the first Christian Demo­ cratic election victories in El Salvador, there were similar parties in 16 of the 20 Latin American republics. Eduardo Frei’s 1964 election victory in Chile made him the first modern Christian Democratic pres­ ident in the region. For many supporters, Frei’s victory signaled a new era in Latin America, where political power would humanely pro­ mote wide-scale social welfare and not simply preserve the prerequi­ sites of the rich.15 Even some revolutionaries who found communism reprehensible embraced the Christian Democratic “ gospel,” which was readily backed by the New Frontier progressive reformers in the Kennedy administration. Given its name and sectarian ties, many observers mistakenly con­ cluded that Christian Democracy was a political wing of the Roman Catholic Church in these countries. While formally politically inde­ pendent, Christian Democracy gained much of its philosophical struc­ ture from the church’s social doctrine, especially as seen through Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum in 18 9 1. While criticizing both Marxism and laissez-faire capitalism, Leo acknowledged the overlap between socialism and the teachings of the Gospel. Nevertheless, he did not endorse the violent revolution that some Marxists in Europe and around the world were promoting in this era of heightened social divi­ sions and labor unrest. Unlike the communists, though, Leo described private property as a natural right, although it needed to be held in a

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The Salvador Option

socially just way. He endorsed the rights of workers while also touting the preservation of such traditional social institutions as the church and family. More than 30 years later, Pope Pius X I reinforced Leo’s teachings in his Quadragesimo Anno (19 3 1), another condemnation of unregulated capitalism and support of workers’ organizations.16

Revolution The word “ revolution” often appeared in the political literature of the nascent PDC in El Salvador. In fact, in 1966 the PDC declared that revolution in the country was unavoidable. Yet, this would be a peaceful, Christian revolution marked by a drastic “ structural” change of society, but categorically not the “ violent, materialist” revolution espoused by the Marxists and their supporters. For many of the Chris­ tian Democratic leaders, change was essential for a better society but it could not be done hastily, as the Marxists desired. PDC leader Jose Napoleon Duarte likened the Christian Democrats to a “ chain reac­ tion in a nuclear reactor” - there would be great energy but it would be controlled and predictable.17 In an interview in 19 8 1, as head of the ruling government junta, Duarte described his embrace of Chris­ tian Democracy in 1960: I began comparing what was being said with what I believed and with what I saw around me. In this country, which then had a population of 3,000,000, fewer than 100,000 had any privileges at all. There were fewer than 2,000 teachers in the entire country. From that time I decided to form a political force to look for a solution to the country’s problems. That force turned out to be the Christian Democratic party. Its model was the reformist capitalist parties of that name in Western Europe. You must realize that until then there were no political solutions, no real political parties in El Salvador, only coups d’etat. The Christian Democrats represented an electoral solution. All the polit­ ical intellectuals said we were crazy, but we decided to take part in the elections of 19 62 against the whole machinery of government. They got 450,000 votes, we got 37,700 ... something like that. We didn’t give up. We kept working and in 1964 tried again. We won 37 mayors’ offices, including San Salvador, which I won by 500 votes.18

Later in this same interview, Duarte recalled his time as mayor of San Salvador in the 1960s and how difficult it was to pursue meaningful reform past an entrenched oligarchy. A close-up look at his country’s

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financial statements revealed to Duarte that one of the richest families in the country, the Regalado Duefias family, had failed to pay both their garbage and water taxes for the last 30 years. Duarte took it upon him­ self and the PDC to collect this tax money from other wealthy families like Duefias, who had defaulted on their dues. This, of course, created a rift between Duarte and the oligarchs: When I was running for my second term, Tomds Regalado [father of Ernesto who was kidnapped by leftist revolutionaries in 19 7 1] invited me to his house. I had never been there before. No one I knew had. Three of four of the richest men in the city were there. They gave me a big drink, and we talked for a while. Then Don Tomds asked me to come upstairs with him. He said he wanted to show me a painting, but what he wanted to do was to talk to me about how I could serve them - the oligarchs. How much did I want to resign and take a job with them? Whatever I needed they would give me. They would ask only one thing: that I drop out of politics. I said, “ Thank you for the offer, but no.” ... I left the house and I never went back.19

The PDC’s insistence that the old barriers to reform needed to be removed elicited fears and suspicions among the oligarchy.20 What, the right asked, actually distinguished the Christian Democrats from the communists who sought total revolution? And even if the Christian Democrats were entirely peaceful and democratic, wasn’t it likely that the communists at some point would simply push them out? Rightist fears aside, the PDC espoused anti-communist rhetoric, crit­ icizing leftist uprisings in neighboring countries. At the party’s first national convention in San Salvador in 19 6 1 the Christian Democrats condemned the Cuban revolution as a “ betrayal” of the Cuban peo­ ple’s fight for liberation and warned of the threat of Soviet domination in the Caribbean.21 Not surprisingly, the radical left denounced the PDC for rejecting communism, which kept the Christian Democrats squarely in the middle of rightist and radical leftist’ contempt. While firmly anti-communist, the Salvadoran PDC also repudiated U.S. colonialism, denouncing the United States’ controversial interven­ tion in the Dominican Republic that supporters had believed necessary to prevent a potential communist victory. The PDC’s middle-ground stance effectively made it the Salvadoran “ third way,” or as a N ew York Times article from October 1965 put it, the party that offered a “ grow­ ing organizational strength and a reformist ideology that few other political groups in Latin America [could] offer as an alternative.”22

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The Salvador Option The Unofficial “ War T ax”

While the Christian Democrats became a reformist response to the extreme inequality in El Salvador, other groups began to take mat­ ters into their own hands in their resistance of the oligarchy. A clan­ destine leftist revolutionary organization calling itself “ El Grupo” kid­ napped the young progressive businessman Ernesto Regalado Duefias on February 1 1 , 19 7 1. The incoming U.S. Ambassador Henry Catto recalled the episode in an interview decades later: There had been one murder before I arrived. The son of a wealthy family - a very progressive, liberal-minded young businessman, had been kidnapped, ran­ som demanded, ransom offered - a large amount I can’t remember the amount but it was a lot - but apparently the kidnappers panicked and shot him and killed him, left his body in a bag by the side of the road. That was the first hint that there was serious trouble to come.23

Regalado’s body was found a week later with two .45mm caliber bul­ let shots to his head. Regalado had apparently been killed before the multi-million dollar ransom was collected, although some claimed it had been paid. El Grupo was made up of university students, some con­ nected to the Salvadoran Communist Party. In time, El Grupo would constitute part of the guerrilla movement united in late 1980 as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN). For his many admirers, and especially in conservative business cir­ cles, Regalado represented one of the most dynamic and dedicated advocates for Salvadoran industry and culture. In the aftermath of the Regalado murder, kidnappings for ransom and hit-and-run attacks on government buildings and other targets became increasingly com­ mon in San Salvador. Many of the groups taking credit for most of these operations were radical spinoffs of El Grupo. Over the next 10 years, roughly $50 million was surrendered to kidnappers, almost all of whom were on the revolutionary left.24 Clyde Taylor, an economic officer in the U.S. Embassy in the mid1970s, recalled the serious threat facing these tycoons: It was frightening to see how the devolution occurred, how fast it occurred. Two weeks after we left [in 1975] the first Salvadoran official I met, who was a little young and president of the tourist institute, was kidnapped. He came from a very wealthy commercial family. I think the ransom was $11,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,

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A Divided Nation

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something like that. The family paid it, and they got a cadaver. Two weeks later, the Foreign Minister was kidnapped. The family put up, I believe, $13,000,0000 and they got a cadaver. So you could see you were dealing with people who didn’t even take the usual approach to kidnapping. And so the sense of class conflict, the insecurity, arose very quickly, and things went down­ hill very quickly.25

One Salvadoran oligarch described how he attempted to get his kid­ napped younger brother released. “After months of negotiations, we handed over $4 million in cash. Luckily we didn’t have to mortgage any farms to raise it. Now we don’t expect any more trouble. We’ve paid our ‘taxes.’ ” Yet this being El Salvador, it was never apparent if “ the kidnappers were guerrillas, common criminals or moonlighting mili­ tary officers,” who also extracted their “ war tax” from the oligarchs.26 Twenty years later, some demobilizing guerrilla leaders reflected on their past kidnapping ways, including the beating and summary mur­ der of Regalado. “ We did some awful things,” said one. “ We were very young and very ideological back then. To us, Regalado was an oligarch - an enemy of the people who deserved to die. We now rec­ ognize that was a mistake, but that’s what happened.” 27 The manner of Regalado’s killing helped convince the country’s hardline businessmen to support retaliatory operations that grew into the “ planned massacre” of thousands of guerrillas, their supporters, and the multitudes of Salvadorans who were somewhere in between.28 In short, Salvadorans saw death squads as revenge. Many conservative Salvadorans considered February 1 1 , 19 7 1 - the day Regalado was kidnapped - as the effective beginning of El Salvador’s 20-year war. Even after the 1992 peace agreement had been signed, one business­ man whose close relative was killed by guerrillas in the early 1970s was not optimistic about the future: “ I doubt anyone will shake their hands when they return to the capital. They will have to be careful that someone does not shoot them.”29 For the Salvadoran right, the Regalado episode was equivalent to the left’s reaction to the murder of Archbishop (Oscar Romero in March 1980: something from which there could be no turning back.

“ Preferential Option for the Poor” In accordance with Pope John XXIII (1958 -19 6 3 ) and Pope Paul V I’s “ Vatican II” (19 6 3-19 6 5), the Catholic Church began to increase its

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The Salvador Option

focus on human rights and social justice. Part of the impetus for this shift was the assessment that violent revolution was inevitable in some of the world’s most impoverished countries if social inequities were not addressed. The church also began to identify economic development as a key element of social justice. In the view of many Catholic leaders, poverty itself was an affront to humanity and God. The movement that emerged from this initial concern with social justice in the Vatican II became, as Peruvian priest Gustavo Gutierrez dubbed it, “ liberation theology.” While the Vatican leadership later criticized liberation theology for its politically activist orientation, the movement gained currency among Latin American theologians. Essen­ tially, it argued that God has a special preference for the marginalized and posited the Christian figure of Jesus as the liberator of humanity from injustice and oppression. In 1968, the Second General Conference of Latin American Bish­ ops took place in Medellin, Colombia. The seminal gathering reflected the growing influence of liberation theology within the church, espe­ cially among bishops in Latin America. One of the central topics of discussion at the conference was the idea that “ violence” should be classified into various types, and that some were worse than oth­ ers. For many adherents, the worst form of violence was “ institu­ tional violence,” which was composed of the “ structural” conditions of poverty and injustice. To correct this violence the church needed to focus more aggressively on the excluded and downtrodden in society. While firmly rooted in Catholic social teachings, liberation theology was also influenced by the Marxist views of Latin Amer­ ica’s inequalities - views that had become pervasive following the Cuban Revolution.

“ The Cause of All Our Problems Is the Oligarchy” While both Marxism and liberation theology were core philosophical undercurrents in the Latin American revolutions in the latter half of the 20th century, it would be a mistake to consider them indistinguish­ able. Liberation theology’s subscribers were not necessarily Marxists (or Marxist guerrillas) and vice versa. A more productive way to under­ stand the two is to see liberation theology as a set of observations and principles that overlapped with Marxism’s secular diagnosis of the

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A Divided Nation

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same problems. The outcome, however, is that the principles of libera­ tion theology often appeared indistinguishable from Marxist rhetoric, especially for those predisposed to make this connection. Both liberation theology and Marxist groups contended that Latin American society was highly unjust and exploitative. And both believed that lasting justice could come only through radical social and economic change. The following description by Archbishop Romero reflects the outlook that liberation theologians and Marxist shared on the root of El Salvador’s ills: “ The cause of all of our problems is the oligarchy. It prevents the peasant and worker unionization since it considers it dangerous to its economic interests. So the repres­ sion against the people is transformed into a necessity in order to increase profit margins. This is the root of the structural violence in our country.”30 While Marxist and liberation theologians viewed El Salvador through the same lens, their approach to rectifying the country’s injus­ tices differed. Marxists tended to believe that this change required armed revolution. The liberation theologians, on the other hand, were inclined to hold that change should come from non-violent forms of protest. Yet, at least to some extent, liberation theology’s interpreta­ tions and prescriptions provided religious sanction for violent revolu­ tion. And the guerrillas were certainly smart enough to realize that the church’s endorsement of their view of the social order helped to bolster the legitimacy of the rebels as political actors. As one would expect, the line between Marxist revolution and lib­ eration theology was not always sharply drawn, if it existed at all. Some priests were sympathetic to the guerrillas, whether implicitly or explicitly. Others were avowed Marxists, though in fact, many Marxist priests refrained from advocating violence. A critical question is how much each group influenced the other. According to Humberto Belli, in his book Christians under Fire, “ In practice the revolutionary Chris­ tians do not preach to Marxists in order to attract them to Jesus Christ, but to Christians in order to attract them to Marx. The conversion of Christians to Marxism is indeed the main evangelical thrust.”31 As mil­ itary and rightist violence increased in the 1960s, a certain proportion of liberation theology adherents concluded that the preferred, peace­ ful road to revolution had been ruthlessly closed. The only option left, they believed, was to join the guerrillas in the mountains and do with

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The Salvador Option

solidarity and succor - and even at times the barrel of a gun - what had seemed impossible through civil protest.

“ The System Caused This” The radical transformation of the church in El Salvador inspired by liberation theology took root in the 1960s with the establishment throughout the countryside of a variety of community-level organi­ zations, or base communities, dedicated to economic and social wel­ fare. During the 1970s these base communities continued to grow in response to persistent socioeconomic inequalities.32 Working in the urban shantytowns and countryside, energized theologians promoted the “ conscientization” of the masses - a clear notification that their hunger, underemployment, and desperation were not “ God’s will or the result of their own failures.”33 This pastoral work included the dis­ cussion of biblical passages, which were related to the daily lives of the community members and implemented in some form of social action.34 Sister Joan Petrik was a North American Maryknoll nun who worked in El Salvador in the 1970s; as she recalled, “ When I first arrived in Tamanique, every time a child died the family would say, ‘It’s the will of God.’ But after the people became involved in the Christian commu­ nities, that attitude began to change. . . . They began to say, ‘The system caused this.’ ”35 And now when a worker or a “ campesino” (peasant) concluded that the system had caused the misery, the options for fighting back included the still clandestine guerrilla groups and their supporters. One resident outside the town of Tierra Blanca recounted the organizing efforts in the 1970s: “ I studied pastoral work for several months at the centers and went to seminars in Jiquilisco, San Marcos Lempa, El Triunfo, and Coyolito. I worked as a catechist for ten years. But the rich were killing people so I joined the BPR [radical leftist group] in 1976 as a way to fight back.”36 Another activist interviewed after the war ended in 1992 described his evolution: “ Here there were people work­ ing for the emergence of the Frente [FMLN]. It is correct to mention the Catholic Church and the university of the campesinos. Strategically, the [peasant training centers] taught with the Bible in hand, but in truth the purpose was to orient us to our own reality. These people moved about under the cover of the church itself; they were the beginnings

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of the FM LN .”37 Indeed, the FM LN relied upon “ two main sources” for its guerrilla fighters and “ rear guard” supporters: the Commu­ nist Party and these religious activists “ radicalized” through libera­ tion theology.38 Yet, while these two campesinos and thousands more like them might well have joined an armed Marxist insurgency, most guerrilla fighters remained Catholics who “ understood revolution in the language of religion.” In the end, religion in El Salvador became both an agent and a victim of what one observer called the “ civil war’s corrosion.”39

“ Christians Are Not Afraid of Combat” The rigged 19 77 election that resulted in the victory of strongman Carlos Humberto Romero (no relation to (Oscar Romero) marked the beginning of more systematic attacks on what the right (including the military) considered the church-led agitation and subversion. The right also perceived the priests as overseeing the intellectual formation of a “ new generation of Communist youth” in the Jesuit-run Universi­ dad Centroamericana Jose Simeon Cañas (Jose Simeon Cañas Central American University, UCA). Over a two-year period, all seven of the country’s bishops had signed pastoral letters denouncing human rights violations, revealing the church’s level of public opposition. Having concluded that the church had reversed its traditional role and was sup­ porting the communists, the right began to target “ subversives” that included priests, nuns, the archbishop himself, and “ anyone associated with the left wing of the Church.”40 It began with a series of arrests and expulsions of foreign priests belonging to the Jesuit, Maryknoll, and Benedictine orders.41 Over the course of the entire war, death squads killed at least 17 priests and nuns.42 Around this time the White Warriors Union death squad (Union de Guerreros Blancos, UGB) issued the flyer “ Be Patriotic-Kill a Priest.”43 The group also presented to the press its “ War Bulletin #6” in which it accused 46 Jesuits of “ terrorism” and ordered them to depart the country; after that date their death would be “ immediate and system­ atic.”44 These sorts of blatant threats caused the new archbishop of San Salvador, (Oscar Romero, and his fellow bishops to boycott the inau­ guration of President Romero on July 1 ,1 9 7 7 . The violence also drew foreign attention, particularly in U.S. Catholic communities. Rattled by

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The Salvador Option

the negative press reports, General Romero ordered a reduction in the anti-church operations and even placed soldiers in Jesuit residences and made an ostentatious pledge for their safety.45 Even General Romero seemed to understand that El Salvador was becoming known for killing priests; as a contemporary writer observed, this reputation “ ill became the only country in the world named after Christ.”46 After the moderate (Oscar Romero became archbishop of San Sal­ vador in 19 77, he began to speak out against rightist violence.47 For Romero, “ The fear of Marxism keeps many from confronting the oppressive reality of liberal capitalism. Before the danger of a system clearly marked by sin, they forget to denounce and combat the reality implanted by another system equally marked by sin.”48 The Salvadoran archbishop even argued that the oppressive conditions made certain forms of violence acceptable. “ Christians are not afraid of combat; they know how to fight, but they prefer the language of peace. However, when a dictatorship seriously violates human rights and attacks the common good of the nation, when it becomes unbearable and closes all channels of dialogue, when this happens, the Church speaks of the legitimate right of insurrectional violence.”49

From Priesthood to Insurrection Rogelio Poncel, a tall Belgian Roman Catholic priest who had been in El Salvador since 1970, had been a fierce critic in a Salvadoran Catholic church that he believed had refused to condemn social injus­ tices. By the end of the decade Poncel had become “ intimately involved with leftist movements,” including the guerrillas. The firebrand Poncel even attacked Archbishop Romero for being overly cautious in the face of government repression. Poncel was in hiding by 1980, then he joined Joaquin Villalobos’s rebel faction in mountainous Morazan. “ On Christmas Day three years ago,” Poncel recalled in a 1984 inter­ view, “ after a bomb exploded in our rectory, I realized I had only one option left if I wanted to stay in El Salvador. I traveled that day to northern Morazan.” 50 Poncel described his years providing “ spiritual comfort” to rebels linked to Villalobos’s People’s Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolu­ cionario del Pueblo, ERP), one of the key FM LN military factions. He revealed how he had met up with the guerrillas on Christmas Day of

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f i g u r e 5 .1. Father Rogelio Poncel in FMLN-controlled territory, 1988. By the end of the 1970s, the Belgian priest had become “ intimately involved with left­ ist movements” in El Salvador that included the emerging guerrilla insurgen­ cies. Followers of liberation theology like Poncel believed that religion should both identify and resist societal inequities - a theology that overlapped with secular Marxism’s diagnosis of economic exploitation. Image and permission courtesy of Jeremy Bigwood.

1980, just a few weeks before the rebels launched their failed Jan­ uary 19 8 1 final offensive. He remained with the guerrillas until the war ended a dozen years later. Here is how he justified his pastoral work within an organization committed to violent revolution: “ The Bible confronts the established order. It must be seen from the point of view of the poor, and Christ was poor.... A Christian, a priest, must of necessity be a revolutionary. How can we conform what we preach with a system that oppresses and exploits?” 51 Although Poncel saw many reasons for taking a violent stance, he did not carry a weapon, but he admired those who did. The priest had

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The Salvador Option

ministered to hundreds of people killed in the massacre in El Mozote and some surrounding villages by Salvadoran army troops. “ It made me want to pick up a gun,” he commented, “ but the comrades told me there were lots of fighters but not very many priests.” Poncel stayed with the ERP until the peace treaty was signed, and as of 2010 was based in a church in the town of Perquin, in the mountain department of Morazan, which served as the ERP’s base during the war years.52

Military Officers as a Caste As El Salvador’s conflict began to escalate, the role and influence of the armed forces in the country began to expand. Like many of its Latin American counterparts, the FAES was traditionally split between those geared to defend national territory and those maintaining inter­ nal order. The first group included the Navy and Air Force, each with only a couple hundred men, and the Army, which was roughly 23,000-men strong in 1983, and grew to 55,000 by the end of the war. The second group included the National Guard and National Police, both with at least 3,000 men, and the Treasury Police with half that number. To provide readers with some necessary background on the institu­ tions and episodes lurking under the surface of El Salvador’s protracted war, foreign correspondents often wrote about the infamous graduat­ ing classes of the army’s military academy.53 Writing for the Atlantic Monthly magazine in 1983, reporter Shirley Christian described first­ hand the notorious Military Academy Capitan General Gerardo Bar­ rios (Escuela Militar Capitan General Gerardo Barrios, EM) named after a Salvadoran commander who headed the effort to defeat Amer­ ican filibuster William Walker in the 19th century. Christian described a “ place of waxed tile floors, fresh paint, tropical flower beds, and polite cadets.” 54 Another journalist on the same campus six years later wrote: “At first glance, [it] could be the athletic complex of a large Midwestern university. Instead of trophies, there are polished brass shells and the seals of Army units. Along one wall, the framed face of each academy comandante stares implacably from behind his pane of glass: Prus­ sian and Chilean officers dominated during the early years, then came Americans, and finally Salvadorans.” The reporter also observed a

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61

plaque that commemorated the 50th anniversary of the school’s 1936 class - the very soldiers who fought alongside Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez to suppress the Farabundo Marti-led communist rebellion that left roughly 20,000-30,000 peasants dead.55 In 1944, rival offi­ cers ousted Martinez and so started the “ 35-year coup-begets-coup cycle that until this decade defined Salvadoran politics.” It also gave the military academy its nickname “ School of the Presidents,” given how many of its graduates ended up running the country.56 The military academy was a place where the instructors “ talk of rewards that come with loyal service to the nation,” and the cadets learned that the “ welfare of the Army and the welfare of the father­ land are indistinguishable.” 57 Contrary to what was often assumed, the cadets came largely from lower middle-class families who often strug­ gled to pay for their children’s high school education in the hopes that they would pass the rigorous entrance examinations for the tuition-free “ Gerardo Barrios.” Becoming an officer was the best way to rise socially for an “ intelli­ gent, earnest young man lacking family means.” This ascension would never put him in the same social circles as the Salvadoran aristocracy, but it at least provided the imprimatur of respectability in a country where that was “ denied to all but a few.” And while many entered the academy, few finished. Cadets were forced to endure marches, beat­ ings, and other ordeals intended to trim the class to a “ hardened core” of officers. In one telling, the “ soft boys from the good families” went first, followed by the “ scholars” - those most able to succeed outside the military. “ This left the survivors cloistered in the academy, iso­ lated from a civilian world they are taught to view as decadent, amoral and corrupt.” 58 Now around one-fourth the size of the entering class, “ unbreakable alliances” had formed among the survivors.59 As Shirley Christian wrote about the graduates, “ Though their paths may cross only occasionally in the years during which they move to seniority and power, none forgets his classmates.” Together they com­ prised what Salvadorans called a tanda. While literally translated as “ round,” a better word might be “ caste,” each graduating class a sub­ caste of the larger caste. Having produced officers for over 30 years, the tandas were notorious for their insularity and willingness to tolerate abuses by members of their ranks.60 Tanda officers would often serve as godparents to one another’s children. For one observer, “ If among

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62

The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 5.2. Graduating military academy cadets in full uniform, 19 83. Amer­ ican military advisors believed that the Salvadoran military academy’s insular culture helped perpetuate a rotten FAES leadership corps based on nepotism and fear rather than excellence and merit. This perceived dysfunction is one reason why the United States wanted to train Salvadoran soldiers away from the corrupting influences - an effort with mixed results. Photo and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

them [the tanda] there proved to be embarrassing incompetents, not to mention murderers, rapists and thieves, then those men were shielded by their classmates, and defended ferociously.” 61 And if a class mem­ ber deviated too much from this hard-to-define line, he could wind up “ drumming on a desk in a cubbyhole at a Salvadoran embassy in some country that hardly knows El Salvador exists.” The corrupt nature of the tandas was one reason the U.S. military was so eager to train the Salvadoran soldiers outside of this perverted system. According to one theory behind their corruption, each tanda sent its most capable officers toward the brigade commands; there, relatively unobstructed, they could accumulate material wealth through routine graft. This money could then be shared with allied tandas in an effort to guarantee “ each clique enough firepower to survive changes at the

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A Divided Nation

63

top.” 62 As one American diplomat recalled in 1989, “ When I left in 19 7 7 , corruption was so prevalent, it was just about inconceivable that an officer would rise to a senior level without being corrupt.” 63 Most of the officers who wielded great power during the civil war in the 1980s graduated in classes of one to two dozen men in the late 1950s and ’60s. In addition to presidents, some would become ministers of defense or heads of the armed forces. The grad­ uates often received additional training at the army’s own school of command or in the United States and other anticommunist countries like Taiwan, Argentina, and Chile. By Salvadoran law, a professional military career lasted 30 years from the day a young man entered the academy, which meant that graduates usually retired before they were 50. Throughout the 1970s, military officers not only controlled the presidency, but through the National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliación Nacional, PCN), had a “ virtual monopoly on the country’s discourse.” 64 Looking forward in our story, American involvement in the civil war increased over the 1980s; U.S. advisors encouraged a rapid expansion of the officer corps, hoping this would “ dilute institutional corruption” by weakening the power of each tanda. In the previous decade, 600 Salvadoran officers had commanded 15,000 troops. Now more than 1,000 new officers were pulled from the enlisted ranks and trained by Americans in the United States and Panama, a large group given the small number of U.S. advisors allowed in El Salvador at the time. Graduates of these “ quickie officer candidate schools,” the expecta­ tion was, would flood the army with new professional leaders and thus begin to eliminate the corrupt, incestuous patterns of the past. Yet, despite these efforts, the tanda-based patronage system remained alive and well. As one officer commented late in the war, “ You’re see­ ing second lieutenants with BMWs.” In fact, one reporter concluded that by the end of the 1980s, “ the Tammany Hall-style rituals [had] become even more refined.” 65 The armed forces made up one component in this complex conflict. As we have seen, key actors in the 1960s and ’70s emerged across the broad span of Salvadoran politics. In this jumble of ideologies, as with all political identities, the divide stemmed from each faction contend­ ing that their approach would best serve the interests of El Salvador.

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The Salvador Option

Add to this the rampant violence from the death squads, kidnappings, mass poverty, and a general hunger for power, and passions quickly swelled, making it harder for groups to meet somewhere in the middle and igniting the impetus for civil war.

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6 Guerrillas Are Born

The aristocratic dominance was in fact a marriage between the mili­ tary and the aristocracy so that the military arranged to provide the President and the aristocracy the direction and money. So you had an insurgency and a reform movement coming out of a tremendous thirst for change. - American ambassador to El Salvador1 We know very little about who exactly is out there in the hills__ We know that they receive arms through Nicaragua. But beyond that I don’t know very much. - U.S. Diplomat official, San Salvador, 19 8 2 2 The insurgency was a many-headed thing - as most of these things [Marxist insurgencies] were. You had the hard core real communists and you had the other guys who were land reformers and maybe naive to go along with the really tough guys but who wanted change and who felt that the only way to change that system was to do it through violence. - Roger Fontaine, Reagan administration official3

“ The Revolution Had Begun” At the time of the fraudulent presidential election in 19 72 that denied the presidency to Jose Napoleón Duarte, the only guerrilla organi­ zation was the Popular Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion “ Farabundo M arti,” FPL), which limited their operations to kidnappings. Thus, while there were formidable Cuba-style focos next6

6 5

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The Salvador Option

door in Guatemala and Nicaragua, for most of the 1970s El Salvador was devoid of these insurgent forces - at least in their more formal role as armed guerrilla groups. A dozen young communists, including for­ mer seminarian Salvador Cayetano Carpio, founded the FPL in 1970 as a breakaway revolutionary faction of the Communist Party. Carpio went on to become the group’s top commander. The doctrinaire Carpio (or Commander Marcial, his assumed name) enjoyed being referred to as the Ho Chi Minh of Central America. While other radicals were focused on an insurrection-style effort sim­ ilar to the successful Cuban revolution in 1959, Carpio opted for a Ho-style “ prolonged struggle” in order to win a war of attrition against the despised military. By 1980, the FPL had swelled to around 2,000 troops operating in the single mountain province of Chalatenango, a locale where they remained for the war’s duration. For Carpio, El Salvador’s revolution would have to be Marxist-Leninist and repre­ sent the “ triumph of the worker-campesino alliance.” And this par­ adise would have to come through a “ prolonged popular w ar” of lowintensity fighting by well-trained militia units.4 Deeply influenced by the 19 32 massacre, Carpio’s revolt would actu­ ally stem from the lower classes as opposed to university students. Interestingly, the son of a poor shoemaker and future member of a union of bread bakers, Carpio was one of the few FM LN leaders born into poverty. The FPL’s main revolutionary activity during the 1970s was to use its clandestine cells of highly disciplined operatives to carry out selective bombings and kidnappings, and increasingly the execu­ tions of important rightist politicians and businessmen.5 In the sum­ mer of 19 77, for example, within a span of weeks the FPL executed the military regime’s 87-year-old foreign minister, ex-military president Colonel Osmin Aguirre, the two senior military commanders in Chalatenango, and Dr. Carlos Alfaro Castillo, a large landowner and uni­ versity rector.6 A year later, when all the guerrilla groups were combining to launch one raid per week, over two weeks the FPL killed six policemen, attacked the U.S. Embassy, blew up an electricity plant, destroyed the Bayer factory in San Miguel, and planted more than 40 bombs in San Salvador.7 The revolution had begun. In a sense, at least initially, these “ political military fronts” that became guerrilla groups were

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The Salvadoran Opposition (FMLN-FDR)

67

GUERRILLA GROUPINGS

POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS

CIVILIAN PARTIES

f i g u r e 6 .1. The Salvadoran revolutionary left. United under the FM LN umbrella in 1980, the fractious guerrilla groups were the military component of a broader revolutionary effort that included the civilian Democratic Revolutionary Front (Frente Democrático Revolucionario, FDR). The line between FM LN and FDR - and insurgency and political organizations - was difficult to decipher. Image prepared by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Cartography Lab©. Reprinted with permission.

68

The Salvador Option

not always fully distinguishable from mass organizations active in the same years.

“Another Arm of the Imperialist Police” Another critical element in the emerging revolutionary left in the fateful decade of the 1970s was the PCS under Schafik Handal, a Salvadoran whose parents had emigrated from Palestine and become successful merchants.8 In 1980, the PCS determined that it needed to join the armed struggle or risk being left out of the Marxist revolution. Led by Handal, the communists’ guerrilla group was formed in 1980 as the Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación, FAL). Handal serve as a valued conduit to the Soviet Union over the course of the war. Following the peace agreement in 1992, Handal maneuvered to become one of the FM LN ’s top politicians, eventually running for president on the FM LN ticket in 2004.9 He was secretary general of the PCS from 1973 to 1994, a remarkable two decade tenure that included the entire internal war. Government and paramilitary repression and repeated electoral fraud - especially in the 19 7 2 presidential election - had radicalized many on the left, swelling guerrilla ranks. The second large guerrilla group to emerge that same terrible year was the People’s Revolu­ tionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo, ERP), comprised of radicalized converts from the disillusioned ranks of the relatively centrist Christian Democrats. The group inducted vaunted essayist and revolutionary poet Roque Dalton into its leadership ranks; even­ tually, though, the renowned communist poet and two other guer­ rillas were accused of working as CIA spies. Following a kangaroo trial in 1975 they were convicted of treason and were subsequently executed. While the negative response to Dalton’s summary execution from other revolutionary factions was categorically critical - Fidel Castro denounced the ERP as “ another arm of the imperialist police” - the episode eased the way for Joaquin Villalobos (nom de guerre Coman­ dante Atilio) to assume leadership of the teetering group. The son of a middle-class family who had studied economics before joining the guerrillas, the young and brilliant Villalobos opted for a Cuba-style foco strategy hatched from the isolated and under-populated mountain

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Guerrillas Are Born

69

province of Morazán to promote a rapid revolution through popular insurrection. In his words, “ Who would have thought that, with a few attacks on some barracks, Somoza would have fallen? And the same was true in Cuba. You have to seize the moment.” 10 For most of the war, the ERP remained based in Moraztin, and under Villalobos’s command it became the most powerful military ele­ ment within the FM LN - Latin America’s largest and most formidable Marxist insurgency during the Cold War. The dramatic overthrow of Nicaragua’s Somoza in 1979 only served to fuel Villalobos’s preference for spontaneous insurrection over the Maoist-supported protracted warfare strategy.11 As early as 1980, the ERP conducted extraordi­ nary raids that indicated to both San Salvador as well as the other FM LN components that it could achieve greater than its weight on the battlefield. As both the FPL and ERP continued to grow in strength, several offshoot insurgent groups - such as the Armed Forces of National Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional, FARN) that broke away from the ERP in 1975 after the Dalton execution - also began to organize, although they never rivaled these two organizations. The FARN was known for its political targets, such as its kidnap­ ping in early December 1978 of Japanese, Dutch, and British business­ men - brazen and lucrative acts that provided the revenue to maintain its clandestine operations.12 After the death of its leader Ernesto Jovel in a suspicious plane crash, the FARN made an awkward rec­ onciliation with Villalobos’s ERP. Although they shared the same enemy, the relationship between these incipient guerrilla groups was always complex.13

Through Managua in an Old Taxi In October 1979, guerrilla leader Ana Guadalupe Martinez was in an old Nicaraguan taxi in Managua on her way to the Cuban Embassy. Martinez needed to speak with Cuban officials to convince them to incorporate her guerrilla group, the ERP, into the secret negoti­ ations unfolding in Havana to unite the fractious Salvadoran rebel groups. For months the Cuban government had been mediating these discussions in which it considered the other guerrilla factions to be more formidable - and thus more deserving of Cuban training and

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7o

The Salvador Option

materiel. Following the ERP’s murder of “ wayward” communist poet Roque Dalton, Havana had severed ties with the fledgling Salvadoran rebel group. Yet some ERP members had fought alongside the Sandinistas to help overthrow Somoza, a move that did not hurt Martinez’s pitch to the Cubans.14 The young Salvadoran revolutionary eventually arrived in Cuba where she continued to make her case; her first meet­ ing was with Manuel Pinera - better known as Barbaroja for his red beard - the Cuban most actively involved in Havana’s revolutionary efforts in Latin America.15 The roots of the Salvadoran insurgents were mostly domestic, not externally pushed by Moscow, Havana, or post-1979 Managua. The FPL and ERP were also intense rivals, which explains why they had not naturally merged into one coordinated insurgency. Within days of seizing power in Managua in 1979, Sandinista leader Tomas Borge hosted the first of a series of meetings with the Carpio-led FPL to dis­ cuss support for the revolution in El Salvador. That same year and months before the reformist coup of October 1979, Havana was bro­ kering talks among the Salvadoran insurgent groups.16 Interestingly, the Carter administration released a classified report in July 1979 that Havana had apparently concluded by the fall of 1978 that “ prospects for revolutionary upheaval in Central America over the next decade or so had markedly improved.” 17 Various Salvadoran guerrilla leaders supposedly met with Fidel Cas­ tro in Cuba in the following year to address the guerrillas’ impasse. Castro was apparently more concerned about the Sandinistas’ survival in Nicaragua than the internal jealousies of the Salvadoran revolution­ aries. Eager to resolve their divisions and similar to the provisions he had established before arming the disparate Nicaraguan insurgents, Castro apparently made Cuban military and political support condi­ tional on a united Salvadoran guerrilla front, which led to the creation in October 1980 of the FM LN .18 By the end of 1980, in addition to their 6,000-8,000 guerrilla fighters, the united FM LN claimed over 1 million sympathizers, including 100,000 militia members. The latter provided food, storage, refuge, intelligence, and rearguard support in military operations.19 A circulating rumor was that in one of the meetings in Cuba Barbaroja symbolically placed a machine gun on the negotiating table and

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Guerrillas Are Born

71

told the Salvadoran rebels, “ It’s yours if you are together.”20 In a 2007 interview with historian Andrea Ohate, Villalobos responded to a ques­ tion about the veracity of this episode by commenting with a smirk, “ We weren’t idiots; it was blatantly clear that Cuba wanted us to unite and that if we did we could count on the island’s full backing. There was no need for such insinuations; Cuba’s stance was explicit.”21 Over the course of the war, Havana never sent combat troops to fight alongside its Salvadoran comrades as it had in Africa in the 1970s but it did provide significant logistical, intelligence, strategic, and military assistance to the FMLN. Yet, this largess over the course of the war did not mean that the Salvadoran guerrillas were financially dependent on Havana. Instead, the FM LN ’s kidnappings for ransom, bank robberies, “ war taxes” in territory it held, and funds from sympathetic political groups in the United States and Western Europe kept the money flowing.22 All told, the group accumulated hundreds of millions of dollars to fund the insurgency.23 While the FM LN was not financially dependent on Havana, Cuba’s influence in uniting the various groups under the FM LN, and both the ideological and weapons support from the Eastern Bloc, brings up the key question of whether the guerrilla movement originated inter­ nally or was created by foreign support and ideology. On the one hand, few dispute that domestic grievances and antipathies in El Sal­ vador drove the conflict. But dogmatic Marxist ideology added fuel to this swelling conflagration. As the U.S. National Intelligence Esti­ mate (NIE) summed up the rising tide of insurgencies in a 1964 report: “ Backwardness is not in itself a spur to revolution, but rising con­ sciousness of deprivation is.”24 Aside from Salvadoran Communist Party leaders like Handal who maintained close ties with the Russians, the “ FM LN leadership dealt with Havana and not the Soviet Union.”25 As one FM LN comman­ der reflected, “ The USSR never understood revolutionary movements in Central America, they never understood Che Guevara and they never understood us. The initiative in Cuba’s relations with the FM LN was Cuban and the Soviets . . . stayed out of it and let the Cubans do their thing.”26 In an indication of how polarized the issue of Soviet involvement was both then and now, contrast this perspective with the writings of

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The Salvador Option

commentator Peter Kremp in the conservative magazine The Spectator in July 1982: In Central America, as in Africa, Cuba has been acting as Russia’s satel­ lite__ There has been turbulence in Central America since Mayan times. It has been perpetuated by the wide gap between rich and poor and the indiffer­ ence of the former, until recently, to the plight of the latter. What the Cubans have done is to exploit genuine grievances, hinder as much as possible any attempts at reform, and work to unite the various guerrilla organizations and coordinate their activities to serve Cuban, and therefore Russian, ambitions.27

Proof and speculation of Soviet ties to revolutionary efforts in Central America, and more specifically to the insurgent forces in El Sal­ vador, would become a continuous narrative throughout the decadelong conflict. “ Fidel Is a Commander, a Military Man, a Man of War” Cuban aid in the immediate months after the FM LN ’s creation came in the form of training camps established on the Caribbean island nation where guerrilla soldiers received special operations training. In one instance, elite troops from Villalobos’s ERP received training for 45 days in Cuba in preparation for a commando attack on the Ilopango Air Base, outside of San Salvador, in February 1982. This raid destroyed six U H -1B helicopters, three C-47 planes, and five Frenchbuilt Ouragan aircraft, and damaged five other aircraft - 70 percent of the FAES Air Force.28 In the preparation for this attack, the Cubans used a Vietcong military tactic and built a facsimile of the base to ensure a successful raid. Fidel Castro was apparently most interested in the military aspects of the FM LN ’s operations, a preference that explained his deepen­ ing relationship with the also military-minded Villalobos. Villalobos recounted, “ Fidel is a commander, a military man, a man of war. He likes war strategy much more than the political and ideological aspects of revolution.”29 Villalobos also claimed that Castro would make a surprise appearance to meet him on all of his trips to Cuba. All told, the two revolutionaries met numerous times, “ poring over maps of El Salvador and developing military strategies” ; this contin­ ued right up to the FM LN ’s military offensive in late 1989. Villalobos contended that he received $500,000 from Castro to finance the 19 8 1

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Guerrillas Are Born

73

“ final offensive” and almost double that for the November 1989 offen­ sive in San Salvador. He added that every time he received Cuban funds Castro would remind him, “ remember that people in Cuba don’t have toothpaste,” or “ remember that we suffer economic limitations on the island.” For Villalobos, “ It was as though with every payment, he was giving me a part of his soul.”30 Considering how fractured these disparate groups were during the prior decade, the Havana-led creation of the FM LN was an enor­ mously significant achievement. It is likely that the combination of the intensified operations decimating the FAES ranks, euphoria over the Marxist revolution in Nicaragua, and intense Cuban pressure com­ bined to unite the factions.31 Soon the world would understand the Salvadoran guerrillas to be the “ FM LN ” ; yet on the ground and cer­ tainly in military operations the various groups routinely fought sep­ arately. In the January 19 8 1 “ final offensive,” for one, the FARN did not participate and the ERP refused to share its weapons.32 Amazingly, this factionalism would last for years following the end of the war in late 1992 when the FM LN would become a political party contesting local and national elections. After their fateful visit to Cuba to seal the guerrilla alliance, most of the now “ united” Salvadoran guerrilla leaders headed to Managua to meet with Sandinista officials who offered them a “ headquarters” and “ all measures of security” in Nicaragua.33 Schafik Handal, by contrast, departed Havana for Moscow where he met with Mikhail Kudachkin, an official of the Soviet Party Central Committee. The Soviets instructed Handal to travel to Vietnam to seek arms from this anti-imperialist nation. In Vietnam, Handal met with Le Duan, the sec­ retary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and other highranking and military officials. Hanoi offered a “ first contribution” of 60 tons of arms, sufficient to arm an entire combat battalion. Over­ whelmingly, the equipment was of American Vietnam War-era manu­ facture, including 1,620 M -16 automatic rifles and 1,500,000 rounds of ammunition.34 Handal also visited the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslo­ vakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The East Germans promised Handal that they would divert medical supplies already en route to Nicaragua as well as train Salvadoran guerrillas. Because they did not pos­ sess suitable Western arms that would allow the FM LN to maintain

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The Salvador Option

plausible deniability about the weapons’ true source, East Germany and Hungary raised the possibility of exchanging Soviet-bloc for Western-manufactured arms with Ethiopia or Angola.35

Solely a Political Alliance Another key development in April 1980 was the creation of the leftist political entity, Democratic Revolutionary Front (Frente Democrático Revolucionario, FDR), which came to serve as the incipient FM LN ’s political wing.36 The FDR consisted of an amalgamation of mass organizations like the Popular Revolutionary Block (Bloque Popu­ lar Revolucionario, BPR) as well as scores of trade unions, church per­ sons, students, smaller leftist political parties, and the National and Catholic universities. It became the largest “ political movement” in the country.37 Many of the FD R’s leadership had served in the Christian Democratic-led junta government, including FDR president Guillermo Ungo (who was also Duarte’s running mate in 1972). The charismatic socialist Ruben Zamora was also one of its key members.38 Throughout the war, the FDR played an instrumental role as the FM LN ’s international mouthpiece. Zamora and Ungo made numer­ ous trips to the rest of Latin America, Europe, and the United States to advocate radical social reform in El Salvador. In fact, only a few months after their formal alliance with the FM LN, FDR delegations toured Europe and Latin America in what was considered a successful effort to secure international sympathy and political support for the group.39 The FD R’s main contention was that the successive demo­ cratic governments in the 1980s were in fact not representations of the people’s will - an argument that played especially well with the leftist Mexican government and social democratic parties of Western Europe. In July 1 9 81 , for example, newly elected French Socialist pres­ ident Francois Mitterrand supported the Salvadoran insurgency: “ It’s a question of people refusing to submit to misery and humiliation,” he said. Two days later the French Socialist Party pledged to the FDR dele­ gation “ all possible support for the struggle.”40 On the other end of the ideological spectrum, conservative observers in the United States con­ tended that the FDR was a thinly veiled “ propaganda organization” whose principal function was “ to throw the cloak of respectability, especially abroad, over the violent activities of the guerrillas.”41

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Guerrillas Are Born

75

Within weeks of the FD R’s official link to the FM LN in late Novem­ ber 1980, the FDR national leadership was holding a nighttime meeting at a Jesuit high school in the capital when the building was surrounded by armed men in civilian dress. The next day, the mutilated bodies of six FDR leaders, including dissident landowner and FDR president Enrique Alvarez, were discovered at Ilopango, right outside San Sal­ vador.42 The death squad, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Anti-Communist Brigade, took credit for the attack, having just two weeks earlier announced its intention to eliminate “ communist thieves and prostitutes.”43

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P A R T TW O

JIM M Y C A R T E R

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7 Revolution and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala

The duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution. - Che Guevara, 19 6 2 1 There are some indications that Fidel Castro is planning to increase his support of the Guatemalan insurgency, perhaps to the point of dispatch­ ing a small force of guerrillas now undergoing training in Cuba. - U.S. classified intelligence report, 1960s2 If you [the Guatemalan people] are with us, we’ ll feed you; if not, we’ll kill you. - Guatemalan General Rios Montt3

This chapter explores in particular depth the significant but chill­ ing case of Marxist insurgency and military counterinsurgency in Guatemala - and the American reaction to it. This episode is especially salient as Guatemala’s internal war, unlike the war in El Salvador, took place largely without U.S. involvement. It thus provides an interesting historical counterfactual in terms of what could have happened in El Salvador had the United States not gotten involved. More specifically, starting during the Carter administration in the late 1970s, Washington lost influence over the Guatemalan state, espe­ cially the military. Contrary to what is often assumed, the Guatemalan government suspended American military assistance, not the other way around. This unprecedented act ensured that U.S. military trainers and materiel did not enter into Guatemala, as was the case in El Salvador.

79

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8o

The Salvador Option

Yet, the absence of American advisors did not prevent the Guatemalan military from launching a genocidal, scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign against Marxist guerrillas - or, more specifically, against the civilian and desperately poor Mayan population believed to be sup­ porting these guerrillas. Six years after the CIA-hatched Operation PBSUCCESS in 1954, junior army officers in Guatemala attempted a coup against the ruling authoritarian regime headed by General Jose Miguel Ramón Ydigoras, who had taken power after Washington-backed strongman Castillo Armas had been murdered. Interestingly, the revolting officers were upset that the CIA was using Guatemala to train anti-Castro Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs operation.4 When the uprising foundered, a few of these officers retreated to the hills to organize a guerrilla insur­ gency, which they believed would be the surest avenue to radical social and economic change. Not surprisingly, they soon established con­ tact with Havana. This incipient insurgent group became the Havanabacked Revolutionary Movement 13 th November (Movimiento Rev­ olucionario 13 Noviembre, M R -13), founded in 1960 with its base in the mountainous oriente (east) - in and around villages, such as Zacapa, whose names would become synonymous with the campaign of terror and atrocity that the country’s unfolding conflict would pro­ duce. This group became the nexus of the insurgent forces that engaged in armed insurrection against the Guatemalan government for the next four decades. In addition to M R -13, which soon integrated into the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, PGT), a motley alphabet soup of revolutionary acronyms, such as Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP), the Revolu­ tionary Organization of Armed People (Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas, ORPA), and the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, FAR) comprised the total guerrilla force attempting to spark “ another Cuba” in Guatemala. Over the next several decades, all sorts of communists, workers, activists, and other leftists joined these guerrilla bands. The groups often conducted economic sabotage and targeted gov­ ernment buildings and officials for assassination or kidnapping. By the late 1960s, the Marxist insurgents began bolder operations, includ­ ing the 1968 killing of U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein after he resisted a kidnapping attempt. That same year, insurgents also killed

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two U.S. embassy military attaches in the capital of Guatemala City. Two years later, rebels assassinated the West German ambassador when the Germans rejected their demands of $700,000 in ransom and the release of 25 political prisoners. Carlos Arana assumed the presi­ dency in 1970 and, supported by American military advisors, further escalated the counterinsurgent pressure against the disparate Cubaninspired guerrilla groups. The Death Squads In 1966, Guatemalan troops entered Zacapa, hunting for M R -13 fight­ ers. Quickly and meticulously, soldiers eliminated approximately 400 guerrillas. They also killed more than 1,000 villagers. Following the operation, each member of the involved brigade received a “ ZACAPA” badge as an honorary military decoration. Tragically, the Zacapa mas­ sacre foreshadowed what became a horribly long and bloody coun­ terinsurgency war. When the war formally ended in 1996, an estimated 200,000 Guatemalans had been killed out of a population of fewer than 10 million. And in a firm indication of the Guatemalan army’s scorched-earth strategy, 95 percent of the deaths came at the hands of the country’s security forces. During these years, dozens of paramilitary terrorist groups, or death squads, went into action to eradicate what the Guatemalan state con­ sidered a scourge of leftist subversion. Operating under such names as the White Hand, the Purple Rose, or the New Anti-Communist Orga­ nization, the groups would often distribute leaflets bearing the names and sometimes the photographs of their prospective victims, whose corpses - and those of many others - were later found grotesquely mutilated: deceased men with their eyes gouged out, their testicles in their mouths, without hands or tongues, and female victims with their breasts cut off. The brutality shocked Guatemalans and the interna­ tional community, and it prompted Guatemala’s Catholic bishops to write in 1967, We cannot remain indifferent while entire towns are decimated, while each day leaves new widows and orphans who are victims of mysterious struggles and vendettas, while men are seized in their houses by unknown kidnappers and detained in unknown places or are vilely murdered, their bodies appearing later horribly disfigured and profaned.5

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The Salvador Option “ Scorched Communists”

By the 1960s, Latin America was awash in foco guerrilla insurgencies. Yet Washington considered Guatemala to be the hottest case, or at least the one for which a Cuba-like outcome was most likely. For exam­ ple, a secret U.S. intelligence report predicted that it was Guatemala where “ the short-term opportunities for the insurgents now seem the most promising - because of the weaknesses of the government rather than the strength of the insurgents, who are few in numbers and divided by factional rivalry.” 6 In response, the Pentagon deployed Spe­ cial Forces teams to serve as military trainers and advisors. Between 1966 and 1968, more than 1,000 Green Berets served in the country, attempting to teach their Guatemalan counterparts the ins and outs of counterinsurgency warfare. All told, 28 American soldiers died during their deployments, mostly in skirmishes with guerrillas. Yet American efforts did not lead to the defeat of the Marxist rebels; instead, new groups, such as the Cuban-inspired EGP organized themselves to con­ tinue armed revolution in the country. By the early 1970s, the Green Berets had helped to develop the Guatemalan army into a much more serious counterinsurgency force, one increasingly able to stem guerrilla advances in the country. Yet U.S. military operatives on the ground had little sense of the strategy behind the army’s efforts other than to stop communism. One young Amer­ ican advisor, who later became a U.S. Army general, stated in a later interview with the author, We did not have a strategy.... We had little or no leverage on the Guatemalans. Our approach of our advisory effort was tactical rather than even operational or strategic. [Our message was that] the guerrillas are really bad and we’ ll potentially be good. That was about as strategic as we got. The Cold War’s “ domino thesis,” it was a different era, and perhaps the results, the absence of a strategic content to our security assistance [to Guatemala].7

This absence of strategy had a number of important consequences for the situation in Guatemala and for American interests. One was that the country remained unstable, with the guerrillas attempting all sorts of bold missions, such as targeting foreign ambassadors. Another consequence, which American policymakers and military advisors did not fully realize, was that Washington was helping to create a sort of

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“ Frankenstein” military in Guatemala. Guatemalan commanders were happy to have U.S. supplies, but they resisted advice and training. A CIA report in 1970 labeled the government led by Carlos Arana, of Zacapa massacre infamy, to be “ the most extreme and unyielding in the hemisphere.” The “ client” government in the fight against commu­ nist insurgents was becoming an embarrassment for American policy­ makers. The consequence of this drift is that the United States became “ half involved” in Guatemala: not deep enough to significantly influ­ ence the increasing bloodthirsty counterinsurgency campaigns but also just enough to be sullied by the long-standing association with this repressive regime. Adding to this sense of the misalignment of U.S. and Guatemalan aims was the brutality of the Guatemalan government and paramili­ tary factions. In a candid confidential to his superiors written in 1968, American diplomat Viron P. Vaky worried about “ counter-terror” in Guatemala because it was “ indiscriminate.” “ We cannot rationalize that fact away,” he wrote confidentially. “ The official squads are guilty of atrocities. Interrogations are brutal, torture is used and bodies are mutilated.” Vaky saw this as a serious political and moral problem for U.S. objectives: One can easily see there how counterterror has blurred the question of Com­ munist insurgency and is converting it into an issue of morality and jus­ tice. . . . We are associated with this tactic in the minds of many people, and whether it is right or wrong so to associate us is rapidly becoming irrele­ vant. . . . Have our values been so twisted by our adversary concept of politics in the hemisphere? Is it conceivable that we are so obsessed with insur­ gency that we are prepared to rationalize murder as an acceptable counter­ insurgency weapon?8

Given the Guatemalan army’s growing barbarity, it is perhaps not sur­ prising that its commanders, for their part, were not eager to have American officials scrutinizing their actions. In one stark example of how Guatemalan and American expectations diverged, when the Carter administration threatened to cut off military aid to Guatemala to protest its human rights abuses, Guatemalan officials preemptively rejected the aid even before Carter was able to suspend it. The country’s foreign minister told American diplomats at the time, “ Guatemalans had to protect their vital interests” and that meant breaking out of

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Washington’s orbit if necessary.9 At the same time, Guatemalan gen­ erals and the conservative business class heaped scorn on Carter for having gone soft on communism and abandoning the United States’ natural ideological ally in Guatemala.10 A U.S. Senate report in 19 7 1 summarized U.S. policies in Guatemala from 1954 to 1970 and revealed that what seemed like an appropri­ ate counterinsurgency response in the 1960s had turned into a major headache because of the actions of the Guatemalan military. The report noted the wisdom of the adage that it’s easier to get into a bear trap than to get out.11 Guatemala’s counterinsurgency war had always been bloody. But in the late 1970s, it became something much more horrific. In fact, by the time the final peace accords emerged in 1996, a United Nations report labeled the Guatemalan security forces’ actions “ genocidal,” given that the killing was directed so much toward the country’s indige­ nous Mayan population. In only two years in the early 1980s, 100,000 Guatemalans were killed, mostly as part of the ruthless counterinsur­ gency campaign.12 The brunt of this widespread killing came in the late 1970s and early ’ 80s when the Guatemalan army adopted the even more aggressive strategy to fighting the guerrillas. Whereas before, the “ Zapaca strategy” had involved relatively isolated incidents, now it had become institutional military doctrine. As is often the case, the army’s logic was simple: eliminate the civilian support for the guerril­ las and they will wither away. In the early 1980s, rebel fighters organized the National Revolution­ ary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG) to bring together the various guerrilla groups under one command. Gen­ eral Fernando Romero Lucas García, who had become president in 1978, responded with harsh measures, including the escalation of the rapid counterinsurgency campaign that disproportionately targeted the Mayan indigenous population. Critics alleged that Lucas García ordered the deaths of more than 75 political leaders as well as thou­ sands of other extrajudicial executions. Despite the military onslaught, the now united URN G rebels remained resilient, considerably stronger than they had been during the previous two decades. In fact, they were able to levy “ war taxes” and issue “ travel passes” just outside the capital.

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7 .1. Classified U.S. intelligence map of Guatemala from the early 1980s indicating location of various fronts of the Marxist insurgency, Guer­ rilla Army of the Poor (Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP). Map pre­ pared by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Cartography Lab©. Reprinted with permission. f ig u r e

Then, in March 1982, junior military officers demanding an end to electoral fraud and corruption led a coup against Lucas García and his handpicked successor, General Angel Anival Guevara. The coup leaders asked retired general Efrain Rios Montt, now an evangelical

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The Salvador Option

pastor, to lead a three-member military junta that subsequently annulled the 1965 constitution and dissolved Congress. Despite imple­ menting a smattering of human rights reforms, cleaning up the noto­ riously corrupt Guatemalan state bureaucracy - he helped publicize his campaign by requiring public officials to wear pins that said, “ I don’t steal, don’t lie, don’t abuse” - and bringing some indigenous political figures into his government, Rios Montt remained committed to using a heavy hand to quell the insurgency.13 For Montt, the con­ flict was total, and victory would come at any cost: “ I must do what I must__ We here are fighting the Third World War.” In late 1982, Rios Montt famously denied accusations that his government was conduct­ ing a dirty war: “ We have no scorched-earth policy; we have a policy of scorched Communists.” Rios Montt soon declared a state of siege and launched an assault on the URNG. One major problem the military faced was that the guer­ rillas, who occupied villages and towns throughout rural Guatemala, would often flee before the army (now doubled in size to 30,000 men) attacked, leaving the local villagers to bear the brunt of the violence. Cold-blooded counterinsurgency logic was at play. Don’t target the fish but instead take away the sea. Hundreds of Mayan villages simply van­ ished; beheadings, garrotings, immolations, and summary massacres were conducted throughout the alleged guerrilla strongholds.14 Rios Montt also wanted to bring the predominantly Mayan rural population more fully under state control. In a program known as “ beans and guns” (frijoles y fusiles), the government established reset­ tlement “ strategic hamlets” to relocate Mayan peasants away from guerrilla influence. Once again, resettlement became an integral com­ ponent of a harsh counterinsurgency strategy. As one American offi­ cial noted: “ Those who are perceived to support the government are rewarded with food for work, housing if they have been dis­ placed, and other forms of government largesse. Those perceived not to be in support of the government are met with whatever force is considered necessary.” 15 Another critical element in Rios Montt’s plan was the establishment of Self-Defense Patrols (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, PAC). In this effort, local villagers received food, water, employment, and health care if they worked on local militia patrols. In the end, roughly 1 million

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f i g u r e 7.2. Comalapa, 2003. Forensic anthropologists exhume the remains inside a mass grave at a former Guatemalan military base near Coma­ lapa, Guatemala, September 7, 2003. The Guatemalan military employed a scorched-earth strategy aimed at eliminating a variety of M arxist insurgencies during the 1960s, ’70s, and ’ 80s. The strategy targeted the country’s majority but politically and economically marginalized Mayan Indian population, who were accused of training guerrilla bands and enabling the small Cuba-inspired insurrection. Photo and permission by Victor J. Blue.

peasants from 850 villages served in the PACs. Rios Montt was clear about this strategy, “ If we close our eyes, increase the number of sol­ diers and policemen, and we attack the subversives, we can do it [defeat the guerrillas]__ Security does not consist of arms, tanks, and air­ planes. This is not even five percent of the requirement for a national security policy. Security lies in the relationship between the State and the people.” 16 This turned out to be very “ successful” counterinsur­ gency policy, for the PACs eventually helped to eliminate the URNG as a guerrilla force. Interestingly, the hawkish Reagan administration hesitated before restoring military assistance to the Guatemalan military even though many top officials sympathized with Rios Montt’s predicament.17

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Administration officials might not have been thrilled with the Guatemalan military’s indiscriminate operations, but they were also fearful of “ another Nicaragua” following the successful Cubaninspired Marxist revolution in 1979. The irony, though, was that the Guatemalan army’s scorched-earth successes helped to ensure that Washington would not become more deeply involved in this horribly violent counterinsurgent war. On August 8, 1983, Rios Montt was ousted by his own minis­ ter of defense, who contended that “ religious fanatics” were ruining the country. With a new constitution promulgated in 1985, elections ensued and Vinicio Cerezo, a Christian Democrat, was elected and became the country’s first civilian president in 16 years. To the dis­ may of many human rights activists and families of victims, Cerezo granted amnesty to members of the army that gave them immunity from prosecution for former human rights abuses. Contrary to what is often assumed, Guatemala’s counterinsurgency was at its dirtiest precisely when American influence was at its low­ est point since the overthrow of Arbenz in 1954. This fact does not free the United States from any culpability in Guatemala’s tragic inter­ nal war and repression. If anything, it reinforces the simple but often overlooked reality that local client governments and militaries do not necessarily hold the same objectives as U.S. policymakers. This mis­ alignment of aims has proven to be one of the major obstacles in U.S. counterinsurgency experience since the middle of the 20th century. In this case, the Guatemalan state adopted a “ by any means necessary” approach to winning the war, one that went far beyond what Wash­ ington believed appropriate. As a result, the hallmark of U.S. action in Guatemala became almost the opposite of what it had been in the 1950s. The United States adopted a low-impact counterinsurgency support strategy, which had an analogue in the counter-foco operations against Cuban-style revo­ lutions across Latin America. This approach became a central feature of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine after Vietnam and until the turn of the century, and the lessons of Guatemala influenced the character of subsequent counterinsurgency interventions. But perhaps most impor­ tant, the United States learned that low-impact involvement does not always work. Guatemala’s 30-year war (which ended with a negotiated

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agreement in 1996) was by far the longest in the Western Hemisphere’s history, and the fact that it ultimately averted a communist over­ throw may have been more a result of the Guatemalan government’s brutality and the eventual collapse of global communism than of American efforts.

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8 Mass Organizations

We’re not talking about pragmatic Sandinistas. This is a Pol Pot Left. - E l Salvador News Gazette, April 27, 19 8 0 1 The largest of the three peasant-worker-student coalitions [BPR], has grown to 30,000 members in the past four years despite, or because of, frequent repression. -A la n Riding, N ew York Times correspondent, 19 79 .2

“ Guerrilla Universitaria” Travel writer Paul Theroux was visiting El Salvador in the late 1970s to deliver a lecture at the National University in San Salvador on “ little known books by famous American authors.” With the literary event concluded, it occurred to him that he had “ nothing more to do in San Salvador.” He then had a question for his local hosts that no one seemed to have a good answer for: why was there a mural of M arx, Engels, and Lenin in the university during the rule of a right-wing dicta­ torship?3 Theroux had visited the National University at a time when it was actually open. In 19 72, the military regime forcibly closed it using tanks and artillery and kept it shuttered until 1974. In 1980, the military/civilian junta once again moved troops onto the campus, leaving dozens dead and offices and classrooms destroyed. The government did not open the university for four years.

90

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American novelist and literary journalist Joan Didion described the state of the campus after visiting in 1982: A few classes were being held in storefronts around San Salvador, but no one other than an occasional reporter had been allowed to enter the campus since the day the troops came in. Those reporters allowed to look had described walls still splashed with the spray-painted slogans left by the students, floors littered with tangled computer tape and with copies of what the National Guards­ men in charge characterized as subversive pamphlets, for example, a reprint of an article on inherited enzyme deficiency from The N ew England Journal o f Medicine.4

Another foreign correspondent described the government’s justifica­ tion for closing the university: “ It claimed, with some plausibility, that it was a recruiting and training ground for rebels. Some of us sneaked onto campus soon after the closure and found some classroom black­ boards still covered with diagrams for bomb-making.” 5 The paradoxes that Theroux and Didion experienced lay at the heart of El Salvador’s emerging ideological and eventually armed insurrection. As was the case on campuses throughout Latin America at the time, the National University was a hotbed of ideological and political indoctrination and organizing. And contrary to what even the most astute observer might have assumed, these universities often continued to enroll students opening the eyes of future generations of students to communism and revolution - despite being active in a country ruled by military dic­ tatorship. While it makes sense that the military regime loathed the National University during the 1970s, the Christian Democratic-led junta also eyed the institution warily. One might see the National University as part of what has been called guerrilla universitaria - the post-Cuban Revolution phe­ nomenon whereby Latin American students, often from relatively priv­ ileged backgrounds, embraced revolution in the urban, at times presti­ gious universities.6 From there it was an easy jump to the mountainous countryside hills to put the revolution into practice. Countless numbers of these well-educated students-turnedguerrillas would be eliminated by counterinsurgency sweeps or incarcerated and tortured in prisons. There were three “ principal breeding grounds” for the armed revolution in El Salvador: labor

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unions, Christian base communities, and academia - universities and, in some cases, even high schools. Indeed, various coalitions of students, peasants, and political parties formed the basis of radical agitation in the 1970s. The National University was the movement’s effective and symbolic “ coordinating center” during the years it was actually open.7

Organizaciones de Masas The decade of the 1970s marked a turning point for El Salvador’s left. Disillusioned and frustrated members of the PCS believed that the party was ineffectively addressing the problems of the country. Some of these differences stemmed from disparate views on strat­ egy. For a successful revolution, the PCS deemed it necessary to ally with reformist elements in power, seeing insurgency as a last resort.8 But an emerging line of thinking held that effective revolution would come with the coordination of mass movements and political-military organizations. This new divide “ between the old-line Communists and a vocal minority faction of firebrand revolutionaries” would define the uprisings of the 1970s.9 During this decade, young activists came together, “ determined to undertake both mass organization and armed struggle.” 10 The three main mass organizations established in the 1970s were the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Popular Revolucionario, BPR), the Unified Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular Unifi­ cada, FAPU), and the Popular Leagues of February 28 (Las Ligas Popu­ lares 28 de Febrero, LP-28).11 No formal alliances or agreements were signed between mass organizations and armed groups. In the case of the BPR, the mass organization formed on its own and subsequently established a relationship with the FPL; for others, the guerrilla group formed the mass organization, as happened with the ERP, which served as the military arm of the LP-28.12 Each of the umbrella mass organiza­ tions had a similar structure, with seemingly no centralized command. And while each one comprised various combinations of students, labor unions, peasants, and other groups committed to non-violent or vio­ lent agitation, each mass organization had a stronghold on one of these groups; the BPR with the peasants, the FAPU with the urban working class, and the LP-28 with the students.13

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The BPR and Its “ Brazo Armado” The BPR was formed shortly after a student uprising went awry and security forces shot and killed 20 students on July 30, 19 7 5 .14 In response, 70 mourners from various organizations gathered at the San Salvador cathedral, a meeting that led to the creation of the BPR. Stu­ dents, teachers, professors, slum dwellers, workers, and peasants all came together under the umbrella of the BPR, which, with 60,000 to 80,000 people, would emerge as the largest organization by the end of the 1970s.15 At the time of its founding, several members of the BPR were closely linked to key leaders of the FPL. For instance, Melida Anaya Montes, “ Comandante Ana M aria,” was a part of the FPL leadership in 1974 until transferring her “ masterly profession” to the BPR.16 Facundo Guardado, who served as the secretary-general of the BPR, was also a covert leader for the FPL.17 While never having a formal alliance, the two organizations were considered closely linked. The FPL-BPR relationship highlights the dif­ ficulty for even the most astute observers to accurately define the ties between guerrillas and the emerging mass organizations during this tumultuous decade in El Salvador. Some members of these groups were directly tied to guerrilla groups; others simply shared a general ideol­ ogy of radical socialist transformation but did not embrace the armed revolution. The line between the mass organizations and the armed groups that would emerge more fully in the late 1970s was often blurry or nonexistent.18 Even the terminology to describe the FPL and BRP relationship varies widely, further emphasizing the murky connection between the two. A 1982 article in the N ew York Times, reflecting on the rise of the FPL during the 1970s, characterized the BPR as the guerrilla’s “ front organization.” 19 In other instances, the FPL has been described as the BPR’s “ brazo armado” (military arm), or the BPR as an “ autonomous movement” with “ complex origins and covert ties to the FPL.”20 Other words used to depict their relationship varied from formal terms such as “ alliance,” to looser descriptors such as “ closely tied” or “ linked.” While there were certainly BPR members who acted as advocates for the FPL, some members in the BPR dissociated themselves from the guerrillas, so it would be more accurate to describe this relationship in more nuanced terms. For instance, Julio Enrique Flores, a 23-year-old

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teacher and BPR member who had been a former leader in the FPL, stated in 1979, “ We recognized the fundamental instrument for revo­ lution is the armed struggle, but that is not our role. We have no links to the guerrillas, we are not a clandestine organization.” At the same time, Flores condoned violence: “ Popular violence must inevitably grow, but we must never lose the mass nature of the bloc.”21

“ It Was Necessary to Create a Broad Class Alliance” While the BPR was the largest and most powerful of the leftist organi­ zations, other mass organizations like FAPU and LP-28 also had their respective military arms. Unlike the BPR, FAPU and LP-28 were estab­ lished by their corresponding guerrilla groups. In 1974, FAPU was formed to organize grassroots mobilizations on behalf of the National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional, RN). “ In the eyes of the Resistance militants [RN], the Salvadoran military regime was in the process of escalating fascism, and in order to defeat it, it was necessary to create a broad class alliance, represented by the FAPU.”22 It’s important to note that FAPU was the first of its kind, created before the BPR and much earlier than the LP-28. Its origins can be traced back to the impetus of Fermim Cienfuegos, who in 1970 had gone from being an active member of the student movement to becom­ ing a member of the shadowy outfit known as El Grupo, a group that as much as any other defined the guerrilla universitaria era. With its small number of fighters receiving support from Castro’s Cuba, El Grupo became one of the first revolutionary cells to carry out “ politicalmilitary” operations. Over the next several years, Cienfuegos became the leader of the RN. Here is how this former university student described the armed struggle: Sooner or later the forces of change will take power in El Salvador.... There is something which keeps imperialism from opening its eyes to the march of history: it is the steadfast, narrow bond that it inevitably maintains with the oppressive and exploitative forces of the dependent capitalist countries. This makes imperialism the number one public enemy of Humanity. The march of history never stops El Salvador Will W in!!!23

Similar to the R N (which would later become FARN) and the FPL, the ERP believed that revolution was an all-encompassing goal, which

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could be reached via the collaboration of both an armed faction and organized local protests. According to the ERP, as with the rest of the insurgent groups, these protests were driven by the rampant poverty and injustice that plagued the region at the time. As Ana Guadalupe Martinez, second-in-command of the ERP, reflected, “ I believe that [the war] did not begin as a guerrilla struggle, but as a social struggle. Because in its beginning, the basis and the strength for development into an armed struggle came from the activities of the unions, the teachers, the university youth, but most of all the teachers, the teachers’ struggle.”24 In February 19 77, the ERP created LP-28, named after a massacre that killed dissidents gathered at Plaza Liber­ tad to protest the election of General Romero in what Jose Napoleon Duarte had deemed the “ most blatant fraud that El Salvador has ever known.”25

“ Poder Popular Local” As a mass organization, the BPR’s main responsibility was to organize “ poder popular local” (community councils). These councils would in turn coordinate strikes and protests for a variety of issues, including higher wages and land redistribution.26 In response to the BPR’s grow­ ing popularity, a priest in 1978 concluded, “ The success of the bloc is that it addresses itself to real needs and immediate issues rather than offering long-term solutions. It campaigns for increased wages or a lowering of the price of fertilizer or seeds.”27 For instance, in November 19 7 7 ,1,5 0 0 BPR members seized the Labor Ministry Headquarters for three days, holding 86 workers in the building hostage. The hostages were promptly released after the ministry signed an agreement that it would look into wage increases for farm laborers.28 FAPU and LP-28, similar to the BPR, also organized protests to con­ test government policies or voice their support for their guerrilla com­ rades in the mountains.29 While neither FAPU nor LP-28 garnered as much support as the BPR, they did enough to make headlines and stir unrest. In 19 75, FAPU demonstrators in San Salvador, including dis­ creetly armed militants, were gunned down during a mass protest, one of the most repressive responses to protestors in the country’s history.30 Years later, on February 5 ,19 8 0 , the LP-28 made news when 20 mem­ bers of the mass organization took the Spanish embassy “ without a fight,” holding the Spanish ambassador and eight others hostage and

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f i g u r e 8 .1. San Salvador, 1979. Bodies of executed civilians in and around San Salvador, 1979. The mass movement organizations that erupted through­ out the 1970s - the “ tiempos de locura” that preceded the formal civil war posed a severe threat to military and oligarchic rule in El Salvador. Image and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

demanding the release of four LP-28 members who had been arrested a few days earlier.31 Given the rise of numerous leftist factions, it was very difficult to discern between a more “ civic” non-violent mass organization, such as a labor union, versus a mass group that adhered to all of the same rev­ olutionary ideologies and goals as the rebels in the hills but abstained from openly using arms or wearing uniforms. And the more the secu­ rity forces repressed and effectively neutered the mass movements, the more these adherents were inclined to join the armed revolution. For instance, a Catholic woman from Tierra Blanca who had worked closely with BPR joined its military arm, the FPL, after three catechists had been killed by security forces.32

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In April 1979, San Salvador’s Archbishop Romero warned of the groups’ growing militancy. “ When I returned from Rome, I found the bombs in the cathedral. Our popular groups have been taken over by the far left. They want the Church to support everything, not only jus­ tice but all their strategies.” 33 One month later, on M ay 9, 1979, 150 peaceful protestors demanding the release of five of their leaders were caught on film. Carrying red and yellow flowers symbolizing the colors of the BPR, they were recorded seizing the Metropolitan Cathedral in San Salvador. Suddenly, government security forces opened fire, leaving more than 22 dead.34 A 23-year-old mechanic, Andres Flores, recalled how security forces “ mowed us down like chickens.”35 In response to the repression that followed these protests, a radical leader of the mass organizations described their goals: Our objective is to unite the people in a revolutionary movement. The enemy has tried to destroy our movement by killing and wounding hundreds of peo­ ple. People have been shot, bombed, and burned to death. Many have been brutally tortured, and an unknown number have simply disappeared. But none of this has stopped the popular demonstrations. We are committed to a pro­ tracted revolutionary struggle. Our aim is to create a people’s revolutionary government which will build socialism, a socialism based on a firm alliance of workers and peasants.36

In short, the population was being radicalized through two simultane­ ous developments: the guerrilla groups were encouraging mass-based organizations to take to the streets and protest at the same time that repression from the military government and paramilitaries was radi­ calizing members of the mass organizations.

“ The Two Superpowers Had No Direct Impact on the Beginning of Our Revolution” In the years leading up to the first “ final offensive” in early 19 8 1, mass organizations continued to coordinate large-scale protests in the major cities, especially San Salvador. For instance, on January 22,19 8 0 , 100,000 citizens marched in the capital to commemorate the 19 32 massacre almost a half century earlier.37 For a while, it seemed as though these aggressive marches would spark some sort of wider upris­ ing against the Christian Democratic junta. Yet the popular movements

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never turned into the urban “ shock troops” that many guerrilla lead­ ers camped in the mountains hoped they would become. Sadly for the revolutionary left, there would not be another urban insurrection as had been the case in neighboring Nicaragua. As Christian Democrat scion Jose Napoleon Duarte later commented, “ The Left was counting on a broad-based uprising, not a guerrilla victory. At that time [the late 1970s], the tiny guerrilla cells had no hope of defeating the Army. They were capable only of destabilizing the government.”38 The clandestine revolutionary groups understood that it was bet­ ter for the popular groups to organize and agitate in their stead since this looked less like armed revolution and more like civic disobedience against a repressive regime. The international media coverage of El Salvador at the time focused on the security forces’ repression against what appeared to be civilian opposition.39 At times this depiction was accurate in what was unequivocal repression of peaceful protests and political activity. At other times, though, the reality was more nuanced and more closely resembled an undeclared civil war fought in the streets of San Salvador and other cities. Further complicating the matter, in 19 77 the military government passed a law that removed most impediments to government violence against civilians. The regime could now “ legally” declare a broader set of actions as subversive. Some of what the military repressed was indeed leftist subversion, but much of it was not. For the military regime and its allied death squads, such distinctions were far less important than ensuring that the scourge of communist agitation did not lead to another Nicaragua. According to one guerrilla commander, “ During this stage we on the armed left adopted a deliberate strategy of avoiding, insofar as possible, armed confrontations with the army.”40 The problem with this strategy, though, is that the guerrillas created enough violence to provoke the ultraconservative right into unleashing the death squads that by the end of the 1970s had largely decimated the left’s urban revolutionary networks. In this interpretation, these revolutionary mass organizations, most visibly the 60,000 to 80,000 members of the BPR, represented the first failed attempt at leftist revolution.41 The inability of the mass orga­ nizations and guerrillas to spark a broader uprising led to the adop­ tion of “ general w ar” beginning with the first “ final offensive” in the

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1980s.42 Moreover, the popular movements’ ability to organize effec­ tively was stymied by internal divisions and incessant death squad repression from emerging paramilitary death squads and government security forces. Both during and after the war, guerrilla commanders publicly insisted that their armed struggle did not begin in 19 8 1 with the final offensive; rather, it had started during the early 1970s when the mass movements played a key role in this diverse political opposi­ tion. According to one commander, Although the armed conflict began in 19 7 1, the same year in which the war in Nicaragua to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship began in earnest, it [Sal­ vador’s war] was different from the others__ In the case of El Salvador, unlike in Nicaragua, the two superpowers had no direct influence on the beginning of our revolution in the decade of the 19 70 s__ True, the two superpowers, locked as they were in a Cold War, later played roles on both sides of our conflict, but they did not at the start of it.43

A key related element that must be confronted is the extent to which the military arm of the mass organizations instigated violence in the 1970s that triggered the death squad rampages. The depiction is some­ times of an El Salvador in the 1970s where an increasingly vocal and mobilized but still non-violent and democratic left was targeted and summarily decimated by the death squads. What might compli­ cate this interpretation is that former leftist militants and guerrillas revealed then and now that as early as 1970, they were in fact ini­ tiating violent acts in what they considered a mostly urban revolu­ tion, such as bombings, killing police officers, and kidnapping political figures and businessmen.44 And while mass organizations supported non-violent protest, the fact remained that they had strong links to the guerrillas.

“ Popular, Democratic, and Anti-Oligarchic” The mass movements received a jolt in early 1980, the very moment when these groups were further uniting, following Archbishop (Oscar Romero’s call for the Salvadoran people to back these groups to help “ preserve the liberation process.” For the right, Romero’s endorsement of the mass organizations only reinforced their belief that sympathiz­ ers within the church were inseparable from the guerrillas - proving

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8.2. San Salvador, 1979. Collecting contributions for families of the “ disappeared” in front of the Metropolitan Cathedral. Salvadorans suspected of subversive activity were often targeted for rightist repression in what was El Salvador’s undeclared urban “ dirty w ar” that began before the formal guerrilla offensive in early 19 8 1. Image and permission by Susan Meiselas/ Magnum Photos. f ig u r e

that, by extension, liberation theology priests like Romero were noth­ ing more than thinly veiled communists.45 In early 1980, the mass organizations united to form the Revolu­ tionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses (Coordinadora Rev­ olucionaria de Masas, CRM). The C R M ’s manifesto called for nation­ alized housing, land reforms, and literacy campaigns, all as part of a revolution that would be “ popular, democratic, and anti-oligarchic.”46 The successful overthrow of Nicaragua’s Somoza, an effort that involved similar urban opposition groups in addition to more tradi­ tional guerrilla factions, motivated the CRM , and in turn Marxist left­ ists, to be more confrontational. This was El Salvador’s “ tiempos de locura,” the season of madness between Somoza’s ouster in July 1979 and the failed guerrilla offensive in January 19 8 1.47 The CRM also played a key role in the mass marches during the funeral of Archbishop

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Romero that, on March 2 4 ,19 8 0 , erupted into bloodshed and mutual recriminations, when each side had provoked the other.48 The October 1979 coup that saw progressive military officers depose the hated General Romero was supposed to put an end to tiempos de locura via the implementation of broad reform. Yet this attempt might have simply been too little, too late, given the hatred and polarization between the anti-communist right and the Marxist left. Although there were peaceful protestors, the two extreme sides had embraced violence against each other as the way for each to defend and expand its political goals, making it harder to legitimize or make room for a moderate voice. It is worth wondering if reconciliation and moderation could have won out had the reformist coup taken place, say, a year earlier. Yet at this point there had been no example of a strongman Somoza falling to prompt the young Salvadoran officers to oust their own strongman Romero.49

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9 Carter Arrives

Can a Nicaraguan-type crisis happen again? And, if so, what are we doing now to prevent similar crises? The simple answer is that it can happen again, and is likely to in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. The conditions that gave rise to the crisis in Nicaragua exist in these countries, only in a more advanced state. In a few years, if we don’t address the underlying problems in Central America, the Nicaraguan crisis of 1978 will seem easy in comparison. - Robert Pastor, White House aide, writing to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, October 23, 19 7 8 1 The advancement of human rights is more than an ideal. It, too, is an interest. Peaceful gains for freedom are also steps toward stability abroad, and greater security for America. - Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, March 27, 19 802 He may be an S.O.B., but he’s our S.O.B. - President Franklin Roosevelt describing dictator Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic3

The painful debacle in Vietnam that officially ended in 1975 led many Americans to conclude that the United States should avoid fighting in far away jungles and swamps alongside dubious local allies in the name of defeating global communism.4 Growing inflation sparked by Vietnam War spending and the first “ oil shock” in 19 7 3, and the sear­ ing Watergate domestic political scandal that brought down Richard Nixon’s presidency were two of many other factors that weakened the 10 2

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American public’s confidence in their government’s competence and honesty. Most notably in the 1975 hearings chaired by Democratic sen­ ator Frank Church, congressional revelations about the CIA’s involve­ ment in seemingly morally dubious covert operations that unseated sitting governments in countries from Iran (1953) to Chile (1973) only further weakened Americans’ self-given identity as a beacon of free­ dom and transparency. The United States endured a period of “ imperial presidency” fol­ lowing World War II when anti-communism fears inclined Congress to defer to presidential prerogatives in places like Vietnam. Now, by contrast, it was as if an imperial Congress sought to use its powers to check the Executive Branch. One way Congress attempted to redress these excesses was to focus on the internal nature of regimes receiv­ ing American aid, especially military. The thinking was that if America stopped indulging abusive and often dictatorial governments and lead­ ers with lavish amounts of military aid while overlooking their tyranny, there would be far fewer negative consequences later - especially com­ munist revolutions that exploited this tyranny and desperation among the masses.5 To this end and relying on the power of the purse to influence for­ eign policy run by the Executive Branch, a reform-minded Congress passed a variety of human rights acts in an effort to correct what was believed to have led to the Vietnam disaster. Two amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 19 6 1 became the basis for linking human rights to American foreign aid laws.6 Sponsored by Iowa Democratic congressman Tom Harkin and passed by Congress in 19 75, Section 1 1 6 stated that no economic aid could go to countries engaged in “ gross violations” of human rights, “ including torture or cruel, inhu­ man, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention with­ out charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person,” unless the aid would directly benefit the people in need.7 Section 502(b) prohibited military aid to countries engaged in “ a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” unless the president determined that such aid was vital to U.S. national security.8 The language of the ban on military aid indicated Congress’s will­ ingness to grant the Executive Branch flexibility in implementing these human rights obligations.9 Of course, the key question would be to

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define the criteria that would determine whether such aid was in fact vital to America’s national security. In an effort to bolster oversight over what were seen as controversial Executive Branch covert opera­ tions, the Senate created a Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in M ay 1976. The House established its own oversight committee the following year.

“ Because We Know That Democracy Works” Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 19 7 7 believing that he had a clear mission to reorient America’s foreign policy around fundamental values of human rights, transparency, and self-determination. A poly­ math with strong and public religious convictions, the incoming Carter argued that previous administrations “ had been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries.” The best way to remedy this fateful mistake, he believed, was to lead by example, not solely by force.10 Carter explained the logic behind his position at a commencement address in Notre Dame University in May 1977: “ Because we know that democracy works, we can reject the arguments of those rulers who deny human rights to their people. We are confident that democracy’s example will be compelling and so we seek to bring that example closer to those from whom in the past few years we have been separated and who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind of life.” 11 In his commencement - in part known to history for his often mis­ understood reference to an “ inordinate fear of communism” - Carter injected an element of optimism into his human rights as good foreign policy doctrine: Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I’m glad that that’s being changed. For too many years, we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adver­ saries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through failure we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence.12

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Carter Arrives

I0 5

To back up his lofty rhetoric, Carter endorsed a number of classified policies, such as the National Security Council Directive 30 signed in February 1978, which listed the key mechanisms of his human rights policies. The memorandum ruled out the use of military power, instead listing private and public diplomacy, foreign assistance tied to human rights performance, and public denunciations of abusive regimes as ways to influence repressive governments.13 Given the amount of attention that Jimmy Carter’s human rights agenda received, it is easy to conclude that it was America’s previ­ ous excesses that drove his agenda. Yet while the ghost of the Viet­ nam defeat and revelations about American support for “ our S.O.B.s” throughout the Third World influenced Carter’s administration, other developments that reinforced the threat and challenges of relations with Moscow also shaped U.S. foreign policy. Vietnam was a moral and military fiasco, but less remembered was the subsequent percep­ tion that the rapid fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos provided dire evidence to some that the domino theory of communism was in fact a reality.14 Making matters worse, the Soviet Union appeared to have gained “ strategic nuclear parity” by the early 1970s, and by the time Carter became president in 19 77, it was estimated that the Soviets had sur­ passed the United States in nuclear power.15 So even while the Vietnam War, Watergate, and tales of CIA scandals rocked Washington, commu­ nist movements remained active. Another blow to America’s sense of security and prowess took a hit following the seizure in early Novem­ ber 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by radical Islamist students. This action precipitated the “ Iran Hostage Crisis” when 52 American diplomats and citizens were held hostage for 444 days, a period that extended through Carter’s presidency and his administration’s disas­ trous covert operation to rescue them in April 198o.16 In April 19 75, Castro’s Cuba began its “ bold foray” into Africa with the assistance of hundreds of Soviet military advisors in Angola; their purpose was to back the anti-colonial Popular Movement for the Liber­ ation of Angola (MPLA) that had led the war of independence against Portugal. With Angola’s independence looming, the MPLA came under siege from two rival groups, both sponsored by South Africa and Wash­ ington. By July and with Soviet logistical support, Cuba launched a

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The Salvador Option

massive operation to land 36,000 troops to prevent the capital of Luanda from falling into South African hands.17 Cuba also aided Ethiopia in its war with non-communist Somalia. Afghanistan, histor­ ically a neutral buffer state, came under communist rule after a coup in April 1978. Three months later a new South Yemeni regime gained power with Cuban, Soviet, and East German assistance.18 Communist forces claimed these and other gains as victories on the global Cold War chessboard, where Third World countries served as pawns. Emboldened, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev emphasized in early 1976 that supposed lessening of tensions from detente with Wash­ ington embraced by presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford did “ not abolish or alter the laws of class struggle.” 19 While his admin­ istration would become more hawkish by its end in early 19 8 1, even Carter as a presidential candidate in March 1976 had made clear that the Soviets were actively fomenting subversion. Carter claimed that Moscow saw detente as “ an opportunity to continue the process of world revolution without running the threat of nuclear w ar” and as a means of combining “ surface tranquility in Europe ... with support for wars of national liberation elsewhere.”20 Thus, the former governor of Georgia contended, detente must be more than “ a one-way street” from which communists gained. Carter’s increasingly vocal conserva­ tive critics believed that Moscow and its satellites appeared strong and aggressive while the United States seemed weak.21 We must also not underestimate the influence of key members of Carter’s administration, especially the preference of some to adopt stronger resistance against Soviet-backed advances. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the son of a former Polish diplomat, was said to relish his role as the “ first Pole in 300 years in a posi­ tion to really stick it to the Russians.”22 And as the administration’s term wore on, Brzezinski and his more hawkish side of the Carter team became increasingly frustrated with Cuba. In the spring of 1979 and clearly influenced by Havana’s machinations in Africa, Brzezinski asked the intelligence community to conduct an evaluation of CubanSoviet cooperation around the world. In a twist of bad luck, this task led to the discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba, a revelation that became a serious domestic political issue. Carter’s critics were apt to compare the Soviet combat brigade crisis to thei962 missile crisis,

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despite the fact that the brigade posed no “ plausible threat to the United States.”23 The political uproar of the Soviet combat brigade ended up “ break­ ing the stalemate” between the more dovish Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Brzezinski over Cuba policy. The gloves would come off. On October 4, 1979, a sobered Carter signed off on Presidential Directive/NSC-52, outlining an effort to “ contain Cuba as a source of violent revolutionary change.”24 The directive detailed a set of mea­ sures, including a “ program of economic and military assistance for the Caribbean and Central America to reduce opportunities for Cuban subversion.”25 The Carter administration soon made an extremely dif­ ficult yet significant decision to back a fledgling government in El Sal­ vador. It appears that the motive to do so was driven as much by Havana- and Moscow-assisted global geopolitical threats and domes­ tic electoral politics (1980 was an election year) as it was by any specific elements inside El Salvador’s unfolding hellhole.

“ We Will Not Act Abroad in Ways That We Would Not Tolerate at Home” Eager to live up to his lofty rhetoric, Jimmy Carter began his presi­ dency attempting to avoid moves that would entail direct military force in Latin America, especially tumultuous Central America and the Caribbean. His hope was that if diplomacy was done right, there would be far less reason to fight a Vietnam-like war in America’s back­ yard. Carter continued Nixon’s effort to renegotiate ownership of the Panama Canal, spending significant political capital to get Congress to ratify the eventual handover of the canal to Panama. He also pushed for a more conciliatory stance toward Castro’s Cuba - advocating a loosening of travel and trade restrictions - before the shift toward a harder line stance following Cuba’s Africa campaigns. Considering the level of human rights abuses in Central America at the time and the impunity with which they were conducted, it is not surprising that this region became the focus of the Carter administra­ tion’s novel effort to recast America’s priorities abroad.26 On April 14 , 19 7 7 , Carter spoke before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), where he contended that his country must

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The Salvador Option

respect the “ individuality and sovereignty of each Latin American and Caribbean nation__ We will not act abroad in ways that we would not tolerate at home, in our own country.” 27 Eighteen months later, State Department official Hodding Carter clarified that a pro-human rights position could also exist with non-intervention, something of particular sensitivity to Latin American nations used to being on the receiving side of Yankee interference. “ Our policy remains one of non­ intervention in the domestic politics of other countries. . . . We are not in the position of suggesting the overthrow or downfall or anything else of any government.” Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christo­ pher backed this up a month later when he told the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, “ We are firmly committed to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of our Latin Neighbors.”28 Yet the Carter administration came to believe that, like elsewhere in the world, radical social change was brewing in the region. Testifying before a congressional committee, the State Department’s Viron Vaky laid out the sobering larger picture at work: A great part of Central America - especially the north - is subjected to strong pressures of change, terrorism and potential radicalization__ Even without Nicaragua the situation would be explosive__ The basic question is not whether this change is going to take place but whether it will be violent and radical or peaceful and evolutionary, preserving individual liberties and demo­ cratic values. . . . The geographical proximity of Central America means that the U.S. has a special interest in the fact that the region enjoys peace, prosper­ ity, and cooperation.29

“ Considerable Resentment” While senior Carter administration officials continued to publicly pro­ mote the government’s policies of once again being a “ Good Neigh­ bor” in Latin America, the U.S. intelligence community was confi­ dentially reporting how governments and citizens in the region were responding to these policies. A CIA report dated M ay 1 1 , 19 77, con­ cluded that Carter’s human rights initiatives had aroused “ considerable resentment” in several Central and South American countries ruled by military regimes that felt threatened by the White House’s actions.30 These military juntas were denouncing American rhetoric and poli­ cies as “ unwarranted and unacceptable interference in strictly internal

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affairs.”31 Military governments in Argentina and Uruguay rejected all U.S. military assistance after the Carter administration linked aid cuts to human rights violations in both countries. The Brazilian mili­ tary, already angered by Washington’s diplomatic pressure to modify its nuclear pact with West Germany, condemned the State Department’s report on its human rights practices as an “ affront to its sovereignty” and subsequently renounced a 19 52 military assistance agreement.32 Latin American reactions to Carter’s admonitions were not wholly negative. Venezuela and Costa Rica, two of the region’s few standing democracies, “ strongly endorsed” the Carter initiatives, and “ expres­ sions of support” came from the Mexican and Bolivian governments.33 The military regime that ruled El Salvador was another case where a repressive regime was all too eager to show the Carter administration the door lest it be forced to address its human rights record.34

“ Yet Another Headache for the White House” Following his disputed election in February 19 77, General Carlos Humberto Romero’s ascension to the presidency of El Salvador - pre­ cisely the type of president who would challenge Carter’s human rights initiatives - provided yet another headache for the Carter White House. Having one hated “ Somoza” to deal with in Nicaragua was enough, and Carter officials worried that General Romero’s tyranny would result in the very sort of deep societal hatred and agitation that was unsettling Nicaragua - and just two years later would result in a leftist revolution. To this end, the Carter administration treated General Romero “ frostily” due to his abysmal human rights record; the U.S. ambassador had already been recalled before Romero took office a few months after his dubious election. For his part, fed up with Carter administra­ tion criticisms of his human rights record despite just being “ elected,” in March 19 77 Romero summarily refused U.S. military assistance. The Salvadoran ruler instead declared that Washington had no busi­ ness meddling in the sovereign affairs of his country. General Romero’s military then turned to Brazil, Israel, France, Yugoslavia, and West Ger­ many for military materiel that included various aircraft and enough rifles to re-equip its infantry.35 General Romero’s rejection of military aid echoed similar responses by authoritarian regimes in Brazil, Argentina, and Guatemala. Despite

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his fiery refusal, the Salvadoran ruler eventually lifted the state of siege that he had imposed after his fraudulent election, offered to pro­ tect Jesuits from death squad threats, and invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit the country and observe conditions.36 The Carter administration expressed its tentative approval of Gen­ eral Romero’s apparent moderation by authorizing a $90.4 million loan for the country at the Inter-American Development Bank.37 Iron­ ically, one reason the Carter team believed it could pressure Romero on human rights without jeopardizing security interests was simply because El Salvador wasn’t seen as problematic compared to its tumul­ tuous neighbors like Guatemala and Nicaragua. However, while his international image had improved somewhat - and thus his ability to gain favor from the Carter White House - Romero once again ramped up repression at home. In late 19 77, the Legislative Assembly of El Sal­ vador passed the “ Law for Defense and Guarantee of Public Order” that legalized security force repression of social or political movements opposed to the regime.38 But then Romero did another about face. Confronted with con­ tinued pressure from the Carter White House, which feared that he would be to El Salvador what Somoza had been to Nicaragua, in 1979 General Romero announced a 20 percent wage increase, lifted the state of siege imposed after the assassination of the education min­ ister in May, announced that political exiles could return to the coun­ try, and promised electoral reform to allow opposition parties to com­ pete freely.39 To get a sense of how delicate the El Salvador issue had become, a special interagency committee on human rights, chaired by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, had the final word on each decision regarding U.S. assistance to the General Romero regime considering whether the rejection or continuation of American aid would best serve U.S. interests in the country.40 El Salvador was rapidly becoming a crisis case for Washington. It merits mentioning that, contrasted to the deep dependence of Somoza and his National Guard on American approval, the Salvado­ ran armed forces were historically suspicious of U.S. motives, some­ thing that spiked when the Carter administration, touting human rights, came into office. FAES commanders also knew that they could play off the inescapable fact that Jimmy Carter’s sudden attention to

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Carter Arrives

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El Salvador stemmed from geopolitical concerns - read, anti­ communism - not human rights or death squads.41 Thus, Carter’s lever­ age over military assistance was more limited than was apparent to some at the time. What’s more, the $7.4 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds provided between 19 50 and 1979 was relatively trivial compared to what Washington was providing to other allied militaries around the world.42 El Salvador’s leaders had seen that the Guatemalan military had balked at U.S. military aid and lived to tell about it.

“ Somoza Today, Romero Tomorrow” The stunning July 1979 Sandinista victory in neighboring Nicaragua had an enormous impact in El Salvador. Slogans appeared in city streets pronouncing, “ Somoza today, Romero tomorrow.”43 In fact, the Carter administration had been worried about the “ domino effect” Somoza’s fall would have on neighbor El Salvador even before the Nicaraguan dictator was ousted. On June 2 5 ,19 7 9 , nearly a month before the Sandinistas took power, Defense Secretary Harold Brown sent Carter a memorandum titled “ Limiting the Consequences of a Sandinista Vic­ tory.” Brown warned that “ a Sandinista victory will strengthen the left­ ist insurgents and increase the likelihood of left-right confrontations in the neighboring countries.”44 For Brown, Romero, while not appeal­ ing, was still “ one of the very few” Salvadoran military leaders who would be “ receptive” to American “ suggestions” for “ internal political liberalization.” Thus, since Washington could not “ reasonably expect” a better government in El Salvador, “ our near term efforts should be directed toward maintaining Romero in power.” Brown added that this support might require “ providing him assistance” and “ looking the other way somewhat, if, to offset the [leftist] terrorists, he takes steps that also violate rights in the country.”45 In this instance, at least, it appeared that one senior official of the initially dovish Carter administration had decided that it was time for Washington to back “ our S-O-B” in El Salvador. Then on July 20 ,19 79 - just three days after Somoza hastily “ resigned” and fled Nicaragua National Security Council Latin America aide Robert Pastor sent his boss Zbigniew Brzezinski a memo responding to Brown’s recommen­ dations to the president. Pastor opened the note by asking a central

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question for the Carter administration: “ How can we keep Nicaragua from becoming another Cuba, and how can we keep the rest of Central America from becoming another Cuba?”46 Pastor argued that Brown’s recommendation to “ abandon our human rights policy” was based on a “ weak and perhaps erroneous premise” : that American support is “ necessary and sufficient” to sta­ bilize Romero’s regime. Pastor warned that “ if we decide to look the other way to acts of repression, we will be merely boarding a sink­ ing ship.” Pastor countered that the real issue was the “ increasingly widespread alienation” of the population and “ wholesale delegitimiza­ tion of narrow-based military governments.”47 At the same time, Pas­ tor acknowledged that he did “ agree wholeheartedly with Brown that we should not let our human rights policy drag us into a policy of with­ drawal or disassociation.” Pastor instead called for the United States to take “ some bold steps,” and “ to counter everything the Cubans do.”48 Surprisingly, given that Romero’s repression was so glaring and that the Carter administration would tacitly endorse the coup that ousted him only weeks later, Pastor told Brzezinski that “ it makes sense to bring [Romero] up here [to the White House] but I think we should save the President [from receiving Romero] until we really need him, and we will.”49

“ What Is President Carter Saying about This?” In the weeks following Somoza’s downfall on July 19 ,19 7 9 , U.S. offi­ cials were reading internal intelligence reports that underscored the sig­ nificance of Somoza’s demise in El Salvador. “ The fall of Somoza,” one commented, “ is widely viewed in El Salvador as opening the way for a Sandinista-assisted upswing in this country’s terrorism and violence of the extreme left, [which] could easily and quickly take on serious new dimensions.” 50 Amid the turmoil in Nicaragua, military man Romero maintained a hard line. Security force and paramilitary activity intensi­ fied once again. In March and April 1979, around 13 0 people vanished at the hands of one death squad and at least 50 members of the Pop­ ular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Popular Revolucionario, BPR) linked to the guerrillas were killed by ORDEN.51 Then on M ay 4, members of the BPR occupied the embassies of Costa Rica and France to demand the release of five BPR leaders

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who had gone missing, an effort that culminated on May 9 with 300 protestors gathered outside the metropolitan cathedral.52 Secu­ rity forces responded by firing on the demonstrators, killing around two dozen marchers who rushed to find safety inside the church. This number was far less than in February 19 77 when regime forces sealed off the central plaza and used snipers to selectively kill demonstra­ tors. Yet the M ay massacres were captured on film - the first images of the deep violence rampant in El Salvador to be seen on the world media stage. A few days later, 10,000 marchers walked in a funeral pro­ cession across the city chanting “ the fight is constant” ; one protestor asked a foreign journalist, “ What is President Carter saying about this? This is the same as [Somoza in] Nicaragua and [Ugandan dictator] Idi Amin.” 53 Despite General Romero’s last-ditch moves that suggested mod­ eration, the Carter administration entertained more activist efforts to address the deteriorating situation in El Salvador - which they believed was a result of Romero’s excesses.54 NSC aide Robert Pas­ tor expressed concern, saying that “ my guess is that El Salvador is headed for a full-scale [leftist] insurrection by perhaps as early [as] this Fall__ [W]e need do something dramatic n o w ... that will give the non-Communists a chance.” 55 Carter’s Policy Review Committee adapted a “ quid pro quo strategy” with Romero whereby the United States “ would extend economic and security assistance in return for human rights improvement and progress toward meaningful elections.” 56 By October, however, Pastor concluded that the strategy had failed primarily because of Romero’s “ weak, indecisive” leadership. Senior U.S. diplomats Viron Vaky and William Bowdler separately visited San Salvador to make the case for reform in person. Yet while Romero indi­ cated some willingness to give ground, he refused to move forward on the elections as Washington had urged. Making the cauldron even hot­ ter, popular mobilization only intensified in September and October, this time taking the form of demonstrations, sit-ins, attacks on govern­ ment buildings, and the burning of buses.57

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10 Carter and the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, 1979

If any nation, whatever its political system, deprives its people of basic human rights, that fact will help shape our own people’s attitude toward that nation’s repressive government [W]e should use our tremendous influence to increase freedom, particularly in those countries that depend upon us for their very survival. - President Jimmy Carter during the 1976 presidential campaign1

In the early morning of January 10 , 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a prominent Nicaraguan political figure and head of the opposition newspaper La Prensa, was driving in Managua when a green Toyota truck suddenly swerved in front of him. Two men leaped out of the truck and fired shotgun blasts at Chamorro’s vehicle, then jumped into a waiting car and sped away. Chamorro was rushed to a nearby hospi­ tal but died on the way. Nicaragua’s strongman, Anastasio “ Tachito” Somoza, the second son of the Somoza who killed the nationalist guer­ rilla Sandino and seized power in the early 1930s, claimed that the assassination had been perpetrated by opposition members themselves to implicate the increasingly despised regime. Few Nicaraguans believed this version of the story. Instead, they blamed Somoza for the extrajudicial killing, and their eagerness to get rid of the dynastic dictatorship increased significantly. In the after­ math of Chamorro’s public funeral, youth in cities across the country tossed homemade bombs at military jeeps and shot at the Nicaraguan National Guard (Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua) posts with hunting rifles. In their first coordinated anti-Somoza move, business leaders 114

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Carter and the Sandinista Revolution

11 5

called a national strike demanding that Chamorro’s killers be found and tried.2 Chamorro’s death became the spark for the conflagration that sealed Somoza’s dramatic downfall and initiated a Marxist revo­ lution in Nicaragua. Many focos were attempted in Latin America during the 1960s and ’70s, from Guatemala to Venezuela and down to Bolivia and Argentina, but almost all failed at the hands of counterinsurgent forces, often trained and funded by Washington. Despite this trend, the Sandinistas took inspiration from the Cuban foco thesis that a small group of highly dedicated insurgents could spark a triumphant national rev­ olution. Given this historical context, the revolution was deeply influ­ ential for Marxist guerrillas operating in the jungles and mountains across the region - most notably in El Salvador and Guatemala - who witnessed the Sandinistas’ rapid and total victory over what was long believed to be an impregnable Somoza regime.3

Sandino Lives On Following Sandino’s execution in February 1934, the rebel’s mythical and ideological influence remained strong in Nicaragua. His revolu­ tionary legacy became embodied in the idea of sandinismo, a combi­ nation of nationalism, popular power, anti-imperialism, and principles of radical social change along Marxist lines.4 Middle-class Nicaraguan university students and other intellectuals gave these ideas political expression when they founded the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) in 19 6 1. The Sandinistas, as they were called, operated primarily as a guer­ rilla vanguard, though their forces were only a fraction of the size of their counterparts in Guatemala. They received backing from Fidel Castro following the 1959 revolution and Havana’s decision to support foco insurgencies across the region, and they were led by figures, such as Tomáis Borge and Carlos Fonseca. The Sandinistas aspired to finish the rebellion their beloved martyr had attempted back in the late 1920s and early 1930s. However, the Somozas’ security forces were strong, and few observers gave the Sandinistas any chance of overthrowing the dictatorship. After the initial foco had faltered, Borge and Fonseca led the Sandinistas back to the mountains to establish a peasant network, an effort that would require much more time to bear fruit.

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The Salvador Option

U.S. officials were not very concerned when the Nicaraguan guer­ rillas first appeared. In 1964, the CIA reported that the FSLN was a “ Cuban-supported and Communist-infiltrated subversive group” but was not “ a serious threat to the [Nicaraguan] government.” 5 At this point Washington was far more concerned about Guatemala “ going red.” In fact, despite Washington’s heavy hand in Nicaraguan affairs after the Sandino chase four decades earlier, only a few dozen Ameri­ can military advisors served in Nicaragua during the 1960s, while more than a thousand did so in neighboring Guatemala. The United States did provide roughly 13 percent of Somoza’s annual defense budget, and while this amount was not vital for its survival, U.S. support became a symbol of legitimacy and power for the regime. The Somoza regime and successive Washington administrations maintained strong ties in the first decades of the Cold War. Luis Somoza, the eldest son of the Somoza dynasty’s founder, ruled the country from 19 57 to 1967, on a strongly pro-American platform. He realized that, at that time, American support for his regime was critical to his ability to maintain his grip on power. The same view informed the government of Luis’s younger brother, “ Tachito,” who had him­ self elected president in 1967. Notably, the Somozas required all of the National Guard officers to spend one year training and studying at the U.S. Army-run School of the Americas in the Canal Zone. In the 1950s and ’ 60s, this military school trained more officers from Nicaragua than from any other country in Latin America. Forced back into the countryside after the first foco collapsed, the Sandinistas found it difficult to stay alive, much less to organize a coherent revolution. For one, Somoza's notorious National Guard con­ tinued to hound the weakened rebels in the countryside, forcing them to relocate and recuperate each time they began to develop a foothold in one region. For another, the well-educated, urban Sandinista leaders perpetually struggled with their inability to connect with the poor and uneducated rural campesinos (farmers), who were supposed to serve as the “ masses” for the revolt. By the early 1970s, all signs indicated that the Sandinistas would soon join the ranks of so many other failed foco insurgencies. But a series of breaks during the 1970s played into the Sandinistas' hands. The first event, a devastating earthquake that hit Managua in late December 19 72, raised the ire of many Nicaraguans against the younger Somoza, as they watched his cronies steal much

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117

of the relief aid. The Sandinistas deftly used the earthquake to rein­ force their contention that Somoza was an immoral and venal leader, one willing to allow his countrymen to suffer while he became richer and richer. On its own, the earthquake was not enough to give the Sandinistas the upper hand; even by 19 77, they were not nearly in a position to threaten Somoza’s rule. Bitter factional disputes within the group hindered its ability to maximize its military and political prowess. Moreover, the Sandinistas did not actually control any territory at this point; it had no “ zones of liberation” within which to train guerrillas and sensitize the local population. However, the second (grimly) for­ tuitous event, Chamorro’s assassination, helped change that as more disgusted citizens flocked to the guerrilla ranks. Desperate to maintain control, Somoza ordered brutal attacks by National Guard troops in poor, urban barrios, executing young men with submachine guns at point-blank range. With scores of dead youth as early martyrs of the Sandinista cause, young recruits began to flock to the FSLN ranks.6 At the same time that the Sandinistas were resurrecting themselves, a broad coalition of anti-Somoza political parties, unions, and social organizations created the Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio de Oposición, FAO). The FAO’s creation reinforced the reality that a crit­ ical mass of Nicaraguan society had turned against the hated regime.

“A Revolution without Frontiers” On August 22, 1978, two dozen Sandinista commandos led by com­ mander Eden Pastora seized the Nicaraguan National Palace where the Congress was in full session. For two days the commandos held the entire legislature hostage while Pastora - known by his guerrilla nom de guerre, “ Comandante Cero” - negotiated with the despised Somoza. Fearing the death of several of his relatives, Somoza conceded to Pastora’s demands, which included a $500,000 ransom and the release of 58 political prisoners, including Tomas Borge. Somoza also granted Pastora’s commandos safe passage out of the country, with most head­ ing to Cuba. The raid’s success sparked an uprising against the regime in the slums around Managua, which Somoza attempted to quell using his U.S.-supplied air force.7 More important, however, the bold move showed the Nicaraguan people, Somoza, and officials in Washington

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that the Sandinistas were a formidable guerrilla outfit - one capable of dramatic and successful operations. Shortly after seizing the palace, the Sandinistas issued their longawaited call to national insurrection on Nicaragua’s airwaves and throughout national newspapers, proclaiming “A free fatherland or death!” 8 In September, the Sandinistas carried out a major military offensive in the style of the Cuban barbudos twenty years earlier. The guerrillas attacked National Guard garrisons in Managua, and the mountain cities of Esteli and Chinandega, among other targets. The National Guard hit back hard, but their actions often served to alien­ ate the civilian population, leading them to shift their allegiance to the opposition.9 Demonstrating the growing depth of their regional sup­ port, both the non-Marxist Panamanian and Venezuelan governments began providing arms and training to the Sandinista insurgents. Somoza’s popularity inside and outside Nicaragua continued to deteriorate. The influential Catholic Church increasingly opposed Somoza’s rule. Many priests throughout rural Nicaragua had witnessed the National Guard’s “ institutional violence” firsthand; they were now eager to see him overthrown and more than a few men of the cloth joined the rebel forces. A visiting U.S. congressional delegation con­ cluded that Somoza was the “ Idi Amin” of Latin America.10 Once a dependable “ ally” to Washington, Somoza was now an embarrassing liability for Carter’s progressive vision of the region. The Carter administration remained torn over what to do about Nicaragua. U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua Lawrence Pezzullo noted in a memo that the FSLN-led revolution was “ an authentic Nicaraguan phenomenon” and “ a pluralistic movement, led by people with a wide range of backgrounds.” 11 At the same time, Carter and his advisors were terrified that Nicaragua could turn into another Cuba. The Carter White House kept holding out for a compromise approach that would depose Somoza and replace him with someone more moderate than the Sandinista leadership. But after a majority of Nicaraguans had turned against the regime, the Carter administration cut off military aid in January 1978 and imposed sanctions in Febru­ ary 1979. It then moved to a more neutral position, which helped the Sandinistas by further delegitimizing Somoza’s teetering regime. Carter was sincere in his belief that the United States needed to resist the temptation to become too involved in Nicaragua’s unfolding

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revolution. He had earlier expressed hope “ that our days of unilateral intervention such as occurred in Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Domini­ can Republic are over.” 12 Now, the test case was Nicaragua; a country located squarely in America’s “ backyard” where Washington had his­ torically been quick to act in interventionist and controlling ways that it would not so readily consider in other parts of the world. Yet, in his desire to deal with the Nicaragua dilemma in a new way, Carter failed to take into full account two perhaps paradoxical realities. First, while American disengagement might have been morally and pragmatically persuasive, it did not ensure a strategic success for American interests. Second, given America’s deep involvement in Nicaraguan affairs, the new human rights approach was itself a potent form of intervention.13 In M ay 1979, the Sandinistas launched a “ final offensive” - o r “ hour of the overthrow,” to use the phrase of its clandestine radio broadcast. It proved a tremendous success.14 FSLN bands hit National Guard gar­ risons throughout the country. They also called for a general strike that crippled the country’s economy. The rebels established their own pro­ visional capital in the provincial city of Leon; they even threatened to take Managua, though two weeks of fighting pushed them back to the nearby city of Masaya. This represented a remarkable turn of fortune for the Sandinistas, given that the National Guard had virtually wiped them out less than a decade before. Interestingly, not all of the guerrilla attacks against the National Guard were actually perpetrated by the Sandinistas. Instead, hatred of Somoza and his personalistic police force at times led to spontaneous revolts. These impromptu insurrections reinforced the notion that the opposition to Somoza was much greater and more widespread than the Sandinista revolution. Even significant parts of the Nicaraguan busi­ ness class had turned against Somoza. And, as in the general insurrec­ tion that helped oust Batista in Cuba two decades earlier, it is highly unlikely that the Sandinistas would have seized power had a strong majority of Nicaraguans not opposed the regime. Remarkably, at the time, the CIA was still informing U.S. policy­ makers that the Sandinistas would not be able to defeat Somoza’s forces. Dennis P. McAuliffe, the top officer at the U.S. Southern Com­ mand in Panama, told a congressional committee that Sandinista operations were solely “ hit and run” attacks and “ not very signifi­ cant.” 15 By July, Somoza had fled the country and a new five-member

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Provisional Junta of National Reconciliation, which included both Sandinista and non-Sandinista opposition figures, had been estab­ lished. The entering regime enjoyed almost universal support within Nicaragua as well as from the international community. The Carter administration attempted to pressure the opposition to allow more non-Sandinistas into the junta, but U.S. officials had lost considerable credibility by taking so long to withdraw their support for Somoza. Washington still held enormous power vis-a-vis Nicaragua, but its ability to influence events in the Central American country had ebbed considerably. Before long, the Sandinistas had pushed out the more moderate members of the junta and consolidated their Cubainspired rule over Nicaragua, making themselves, one contemporary noted, “ the real winners of the revolution.” 16 Over the ensuing years, two brothers, Daniel and Humberto Ortega, became the public leaders of the Sandinista movement, much as Fidel Castro and his younger brother Rafil had done in Cuba. Sons of a Managua businessman who served as one of Augusto Sandino’s orig­ inal guerrillas, the Ortegas had headed a Sandinista faction known as the Terceristas, which had become the dominant revolutionary group both militarily and politically in 1978. Daniel consolidated his posi­ tion as the head of the new revolutionary government while Humberto became the minister of defense. At the same time, despite its continued enthusiastic support in public settings for human rights, the Carter administration was increasingly concerned about the threat of a communist advance in Nicaragua via the Sandinistas. Within days of the July 1979 victory, senior Ameri­ can intelligence officials predicted that “ the hard-core Marxists in the regime will quickly begin trying to neutralize the influence of the junta’s more moderate members and seize control.” 17 That year, Carter was shown high-altitude photographs and other intelligence that confirmed that the Sandinistas were sending arms shipments to El Salvador. In 1979, Washington provided the fledgling government almost $25 million in emergency relief and recovery aid, including food and med­ ical supplies, in an effort to influence the Sandinistas through develop­ ment assistance. By January 19 8 1, when the Carter team was leaving office, direct U.S. assistance to Managua reached $ 1 1 8 million; yet the effort did not work.18 Rather, the FSLN’s rhetoric of calling for a “ rev­ olution without frontiers” shocked officials already worried that the Sandinista regime was showing its true radical colors.

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In early 1980, President Carter signed a classified intelligence “ find­ ing” that authorized the CIA to promote “ democratic elements” in Nicaragua. This support took the form of money funneled to oppo­ sition parties to pay for expenses and propaganda. No money was provided for armed actions.19 Nonetheless, Carter’s finding served to move the United States away from its hands-off approach to dealing with revolutionary change in Nicaragua. Thus, even before the conser­ vative Ronald Reagan took office, Jimmy Carter had become a relative hawk on Nicaragua. Behind the scenes, a consensus was beginning to emerge among American policymakers and politicians that Managua was actively supporting the embryonic insurgency in El Salvador, the FM LN. We now know that this assessment was correct; Sandinista commanders began discussions early on about arming their Marxist companeros in Guatemala and most critically, El Salvador, to expedite a repetition of the outcome in Nicaragua. However, this emerging storyline clashed with Carter’s public message of support for post-Somoza Nicaragua, foreshadowing a difficult reconciliation of Managua’s policies on the ground with the newly proclaimed ethos of non-interventionism in American foreign policy.

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11 An October Coup

We don’t want to be in the business of endorsing coups, but we are in the business of facing reality. - U.S. diplomat, October 19 7 9 1 This government is having a difficult birth. But the alternative is collec­ tive suicide. - Civilian member of Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador, November 19 79 2

Black September In M ay 1979, a small number of Salvadoran officers began to meet secretly to discuss pressing matters. They saw a growing internal leftist revolutionary movement that not only was raising large sums of money from kidnapping wealthy Salvadorans or foreign businessmen but also could put 200,000 demonstrators in the streets at one time via the allied mass organizations. They also looked at Nicaragua, where the Somoza dynasty was in its death throes, and saw the Carter administra­ tion was not rescuing the Nicaraguan National Guard, a rough equiv­ alent to their own armed forces. They also believed that ruling strong­ man General Romero was fatally isolated from senior army officers as well as out of favor with the Carter administration because of what an American journalist called the “ growing number of bodies turning up in trash cans and along the roads.” 3 These officers soberly concluded that the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas and their supporting organizations 12 2

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could overthrow the Romero regime by the end of the year, so they decided to act before this “ nightmare became a reality.”4 Writing for the U.S. magazine Newsweek in late September 1979, journalists Steven Strasser and Stryker McGuire provided a sense of El Salvador’s dire situation.5 The country had marked its independence day only a week before, but there “ was little to celebrate” due to the widespread violence and fear. Leftist opponents of the General Romero dictatorship promised that the month would be “ Black September,” during which the agitation against the regime would swell. This is some of what journalists reported: The air of confrontation in El Salvador is the thickest since last spring, when 19 demonstrators were killed by police during a sit in at a San Salvador cathe­ dral. In this month’s boldest attack from the left, two gunmen barged into the home of the President’s brother, retired professor Jose Javier Romero, and mur­ dered him as he watched television. Later, youths wielding shotguns and pistols killed three policemen in San Salvador’s outskirts; a fourth was murdered in a separate incident. Apparently in retaliation for the leftist offensive, masked members of a right wing vigilante squad - including some off duty police offi­ cers, according to the left - ambushed a car carrying militant students to the beach and killed seven of them.6

While “ Black September” was occurring, leaders of the radical Uni­ fied Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular Unificada, FAPU) announced a full-scale insurrection against the two-year-old Romero regime even when “ most diplomats thought their boast premature.”7 Back in Washington a concerned Viron Vaky had told Congress that “ insurrectional violence” in El Salvador might be near and that “ the central issue is not whether change is to occur but whether that change is to be violent and radical or peaceful and evolutionary.”8

Telex Machines around the World On October 12 ,19 7 9 , the unrest finally reached its tipping point when the Salvadoran Air Force staged a coup against Romero, promising to install a new government to restore order in a country where order was rapidly deteriorating due to both rightist death squads and leftist protests. The rumors that the White House wanted Romero gone were only given more credence in late September when the special American envoy, William D. Bowdler, known as the “ undertaker” for his role in

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The Salvador Option

“ burying” the Somoza regime, arrived in San Salvador and met with opposition figures.9 Aware of a disillusioned Carter administration and realizing that he had little support among the military ranks, Romero fled to Guatemala without a shot being fired.10 Given how smooth the ouster was, most Salvadorans weren’t even aware that a coup had taken place - “ traffic and business were reported normal in the capital” according to one foreign media report.11 The coup plotters consisted of two factions. The first was older, more senior and conservative; they sought to forestall a Sandinista-like insur­ rection. Its leaders were colonels Abdul Gutierrez and Jose Guillermo García and included former supporters of Romero. The other faction was younger and more socially oriented; some were members of the Military Youth Movement (Movimiento de la Juventud Militar, M JM) led by Colonel Adolfo Majano.12 Interestingly, these young officers, who represented the reformist wing of Romero’s ousters, contacted the conservative Colonel Gutierrez and invited him to participate in the putsch only a few days before it took place. Within days of the October coup a new five-man “ first” junta was formed. It consisted of the two military officers who participated in the coup, Majano and Gutierrez, and three civilians: Guillermo Ungo, the socialist who had unsuccessfully run as vice president in the 19 72 sham election; Roman Mayorga Quiroz, rector of the “Jose Simeon Cañas” Central American University (Universidad Centroamericana “Jose Simeon Cañas,” UCA); and Mario Andino, an unaffiliated busi­ nessman who managed a local Phelps Dodge subsidiary.13 After years of military rule and repression, within days of oust­ ing General Romero the leaders of the junta promised to aggressively address El Salvador’s glaring social problems. Telex machines abroad “ tapped out the text of the ‘Proclamation of the Armed Forces of El Salvador’ ” - a document that indicted Romero on human rights abuses, sowing “ economic and social disaster,” and besmirching the name of the armed forces and fatherland.14 The pronouncement iden­ tified the root cause of these abuses to be the “ inadequate social, eco­ nomic, and political structures” stemming from the “ ancestral privi­ leges of the dominant class.” 15 They pledged radical changes in the country’s “ social and economic structures,” political pluralism, and an “ immediate end” to military corruption and repression of the left and peasants. In contrast to its mostly socialist prescriptions, the document

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recognized private property as inviolate provided it had a “ social func­ tion.” 16 In return, the junta asked for “ patience, understanding, and the confidence of the Salvadoran people.” 17 In the same vein, a few days after the junta was organized, San Salvador’s Archbishop (Oscar Romero used his homily to call on Salvadorans to give the new gov­ ernment a chance. Beyond the junta leaders themselves, the “ coalition of officers, lib­ eral technocrats, and reformist politicians” entering into the new gov­ ernment was strongly skewed to the left. In fact, more leftist parties held ministerial posts than did the centrist Christian Democrats. The Communist Party even entered the government through its control of the Ministry of Labor. A week after the coup, Salvadoran Commu­ nist Party chief Schafik Handal dismissed claims that the coup had been Washington-backed as “ simplistic and unilateral.” He added that, despite criticism, the coup and new government were “ not the expres­ sion of a homogenous current” and that there was space to build an alliance with progressive sectors of the armed forces as had been attempted in 19 7 2 .18

“ Quitar Banderas” Within weeks of the coup, the new junta announced a radical new pro­ gram that included nationalization of banks, land reform, and greater state control of the export crop sector that included coffee. It also called for the dissolution of the controversial ORDEN, enacted a gen­ eral amnesty for exiles and political prisoners, and pledged to support free elections. The junta soon appointed a new cabinet that included opposition representatives and independents. Colonel Gutierrez named Colonel Guillermo García defense minister, whose association with the Romero regime angered a few Catholic groups and young army offi­ cers in Santa Ana.19 Nevertheless, the junta’s call for reform came with a promise to officially end “ violence and corruption.”20 Part of the motivation for reform, for the military officers at least, was the understandable fear that avoiding social change would ensure that the Salvadoran military would end up defeated like Somoza’s National Guard. Some officers also worried that they could not rely on the dovish Carter administration to come to their aid if an insur­ rection broke out. Thus, it was better to reform now than lose out later.

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For the two legitimately leftist civilians in the officially called Rev­ olutionary Government Junta of El Salvador (Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, JR G ), Mayorga and Ungo, the coup had been the “ revolu­ tion” they had long sought and they were thankful it had not come through the barrel of the gun. Instead, for the first time in its history, the Salvadoran government had committed to radical social change. For some supporters, it would also be a way to “ quitar banderas” (liter­ ally, steal flags, or steal the limelight) from the radical left that claimed reform must come through armed revolution.21

“ To Fight for Total Liberation” Some revolutionaries now doubted their previous view that a “ rev­ olution” could only come from armed struggle.22 But most guerrilla leaders were convinced that they would gain far more through war than by trying to influence the new junta. With their heady proxim­ ity to victory, it seemed only a matter of time before they repeated the Sandinistas’ success in toppling Somoza. Even though all the guerrilla groups shared a similar disappoint­ ment with the new reformist junta, their means of achieving a Sandinista victory didn’t necessarily align. The People’s Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo, ERP), for one, rejected the new government by calling for an insurrection and setting up barricades in San Salvador’s suburbs.23 Based in the remote Morazim province, the ERP initiated battles across the country that caused scores of fatalities.24 Other guerrillas, such as the hardline FPL described the ERP’s call for insurrection as “ suicidal” but also rejected the new progressive junta as an “American-hatched conspiracy.”25 While guerrillas in the mountains organized themselves, the urban scene quickly became a hotbed of riots and bloodshed. Previously banned political and social groups could now freely organize, leading to frenetic activities, such as strikes, protests, and land seizures that placed the government under tremendous pressure. It simply could not control the chaos that was a combination of peaceful and vio­ lent activities. Making matters worse, and despite the junta’s protes­ tations, the conservative wing of the business community and mili­ tary elements took matters into their own hands by unleashing another wave of death squad activity that surpassed the worst excesses of the Romero regime.26

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A mere four days after the coup, the military high command ordered its subordinates to “ resolve any unforeseen situation,” which led local commanders to order their troops to take over all of the factories being occupied by workers. This move was aimed to hit back against a key urban union organization that had held a series of occupations. Troops attacked the workers of the Arco, Apex, and Lido factories, among oth­ ers, killing 10 and arresting scores more. Three of the factories were badly damaged. In a span of 12 days after General Romero’s ouster, security forces had committed at least four acts that critics character­ ized as massacres.27 Extreme leftists began to turn against any faction that supported what they saw as a U.S.-hatched government. When the military wel­ comed the exiled Christian Democratic leader Jose Napoleon Duarte to join the budding junta he was received by 100,000 supporters. At the same time, a throng of angry leftists hurled rocks and eggs at the crowd and held up signs reading “ pro-imperialist traitor.”28 Journalist Karen DeYoung deemed the surprising backlash against Duarte a part of “ what was rapidly becoming a reorganization of sides in a continu­ ing political battle.”29 As protestors continued unabated, their message expanded to include dissatisfaction with the United States and its role in the ongo­ ing conflict. On October 30, a crowd of around 15 0 leftists staged an hour-long protest on the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, shouting phrases like “ Down with Imperialism” before being repelled by Sal­ vadoran security forces.30 Then in December, Marxist guerrillas took as hostages 25-year-old American Peace Corps social worker Debo­ rah Loff and eight Salvadorans, holding them in a market in San Sal­ vador for 10 days.31 In the thick of this disorder, the State Department decided to very quietly reduce the number of official U.S. personnel in the beleaguered country from roughly 190 to 14 5 .32 At the same time, the State Department insisted that the withdrawals were being carried out for security reasons and did not reflect any underlying lack of confidence in the reformist junta. Despite the junta leaders’ lofty rhetoric about reform and justice, El Salvador appeared to be mired in a Black October. In light of the unrest that erupted after the coup, it’s important to consider the extent to which far left groups aimed to escalate their activities so as to provoke government repression that had “ won them so much support over the past three years.”33 While this was likely a

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The Salvador Option

component of the chaos, the right’s exploitation of the overthrow to unleash its death squads was also a factor in this boiling cauldron. The fact is, politics in El Salvador at this time was severed by an extreme left and right, with the left fighting what they considered an illegitimate government and the right resorting to repressive measures to quell any hopes of an overthrow.

“ Real Question of Who Rules This Country” The optimism that emanated from reformist political circles in the aftermath of the October 1979 coup was soon eclipsed by contin­ ued violence - and what appeared to be business as usual in El Sal­ vador’s slow-moving horror. After the coup, in a span of one year El Salvador became a bloodbath marked by the deaths of 9,000 people, mostly unarmed civilians, at the hands of security forces.34 The follow­ ing excerpt written by journalist Larry Rohter in late February 1980 recounts one of many violent confrontations that ensued in El Salvador at this time, The shoot out at Christian Democratic headquarters was only one in a series of violent incidents last week that seemed to be propelling Central America’s smallest but most densely populated nation toward civil war. The same day, five high school students were shot to death by state security forces during a protest march in downtown San Salvador. The killings raised the death toll from the country’s factional fighting to about 200 during the past two weeks alone.35

Under these circumstances, in February 1980 Archbishop (Oscar Romero denounced the “ unscrupulous military” and pleaded for the Christian Democrats to stop using the junta as “ cover for repres­ sion.”36 That same month Romero also sent a letter to Carter demand­ ing that the United States cease military, economic, and diplomatic intervention in El Salvador. Once again, the Carter administration voiced its strong approval despite the still chaotic situation. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wrote to Archbishop Romero on March 12 and stated: We believe that the reform program of the Revolutionary Junta offers the best prospects for peaceful change to a more just society. The United States will not interfere in the internal affairs of El Salvador. Nevertheless, we are seriously

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concerned by the threat of civil w a r... which might endanger the security and welfare of all the Central American region.37

Amid the turmoil, the military junta was also beginning to break down, losing members after only three months in existence. In December, the moderate Colonel Adolfo Majano fled into exile after being expelled from the junta while Duarte was sworn in as president of what was now technically the “ fourth” junta. In a concession to conservative elements, hardline Colonel Abdul Gutierrez became vice president.38 Citing the repression by government and paramilitary forces, on Jan­ uary 3 ,19 8 0 , the civilian members of the junta, almost all the members of the junta’s cabinet-level officials, and most civilian “ subministers” resigned.39 One official, former education minister Salvador Samayoa, convened a press conference to explain why he had resigned: to fight for “ total liberation,” he explained. Samayoa then picked up an AK-47 and walked out of the room with two “ masked gunmen.”40 All told, the situation was so tense that Ambassador Robert White told the media “ right now there is a real question of who rules this country.”41 Duarte had become the country’s first civilian president in 49 years, yet it was clear that his ascension had depended on the U.S. government and support of the FAES. As Duarte himself noted, “ The only reason I am in this position is because I have the support of the army.”42 Duarte later reflected that his impetus for joining the junta was his sense that he could more effectively influence the military than the guerrillas.43 Nevertheless, his leadership was overshadowed by other members of the junta, including Gutierrez, who for many was the real power behind the government. In this interpretation, the implosion of a truly reformist government meant “ Marxist guerrillas actively resumed their fight, popular orga­ nizations staged demonstrations and committed acts of civil disobe­ dience and the government security forces continued their own acts of terrorism.”44 It is worth noting that in addition to their usual tar­ gets of suspected leftists, the death squads were now also going after legions of PDC members. Even Duarte himself writing in his memoirs would wonder if he had made the right decision. “At this time [late 19 8 0 ]... thousands of people were being dragged into the night, tor­ tured and killed. . . . Why did I stay in a government that allowed such things to happen?”45

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The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 1 1 . 1 . San Salvador, 1979. Members of the Revolutionary Govern­ ment Junta of El Salvador (Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, JRG ). Left to right: Mario Antonio Andino, Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano, Guillermo Manuel Ungo, Roman Mayorga Quiroz. For many on El Salvador’s political left, the 1979 coup was the “ revolution” they had long sought. Some radical leftists dismissed the supposedly reformist junta as simply window dressing for continued oligarchic and military rule. Photo and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

Duarte’s Dilemma Over the course of its years in power the junta struggled to define itself on the political spectrum. Was it a strong reformist element, as Duarte and U.S. diplomats contended, or was it simply a thin veneer to mask military and oligarchic control? Duarte wrote in his memoir that “ No one seemed to be in control, neither the Junta, the security forces nor the leftists. The Army officers were fighting among themselves__ They had staged a coup, but they could not control the Army or the gov­ ernment. Nor did the government control them. [After October 1979] there was a power vacuum.”46 What was still unclear at this point was how significant the junta shuffling would be for both El Salvador’s war and U.S. policy over the next 12 years. U.S. policymakers saw the more military-oriented junta

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as a clear indication of reform while critics contended that any chance at a legitimate government was truncated when the civilian reformers resigned.47 The FM LN and its political allies dismissed the “ genocidal Christian Democratic military regime” that had no “ national or inter­ national credibility.” According to FM LN leader Fermtin Cienfuegos, predicting the junta’s imminent collapse in 19 8 1, “ Only one thing still holds up this government and it is the same thing that props up pup­ pet regimes: imperialism’s dollars and the political alliance of the most backward sectors. The attempt to make a leader out of Duarte only adds a touch of melodrama to a situation that is clearly untenable.”48 Part of Duarte’s dilemma as head of the junta was that the oligarchy and military distrusted him for being a communist, and the revolution­ ary left accused him of being a rightist. As one guerrilla commander characterized it, “ The ‘leadership’ of Duarte is nothing but an expres­ sion of the most abject and treasonous sellout, a systemic genocide designed to assure maintenance of the circuits of capital accumula­ tions.” A foreign diplomat privately revealed his sense that the mili­ tary ruled the country: “ Duarte is an adornment.”49 On the other end, the far right saw the Christian Democrats’ participation, and Duarte especially, as clear evidence that the government was a thinly veiled ver­ sion of radicalism. In fact, a Salvadoran businessman concluded that the only difference between Duarte and the leftist revolutionaries was that he was “ a communist who happens to believe in God.” 50

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12 Carter Engages Salvador

The private sector is in its “ final offensive.” ... [They are] the biggest threat to the junta. - Jose Napoleon Duarte, Junta president, July 19 8 1, referring to conservative businessmen attempting to scuttle land reform and bank nationalization programs1

The Carter Option Given the fear of “ another Nicaragua,” the October 1979 coup came as a deep relief to the Carter administration. As ambassador in El Salvador at the time, Frank Devine, stated, “ The finest hour that El Salvador had in its memorable history was that coup of October 15 , I 9 7 9 .”2 Yet, while clearly eager to see General Romero go, declassified cable traffic from San Salvador seeking guidance on how to respond to the coup reveals that American officials had only limited prior knowl­ edge of the putsch. The United States did, however, move quickly to help the new government. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter told the press that the new leaders appeared to be “ centrist and moderate” and that the direction they had laid out for the new govern­ ment was “ encouraging.”3 Ambassador Devine later recounted that the coup members’ program “ emphasized the correction of past wrongs, respect for human rights, release of all political prisoners, return of political exiles, and the implementation of a program of thoroughgoing

13 2

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reform of the nation’s antiquated economic, social and political struc­ tures.”4 The big threat to America’s interests, Devine contended, was that the far left would undermine the new junta. “ [It is] increas­ ingly clear that [the] extreme left will continue its violent effort to undermine [the] new junta and at some point [the] very survival of [the] latter might depend on greater outside assistance to cope with these elements.” 5 Two weeks after the coup, U.S. officials announced that Washing­ ton would provide the new government with “ significant” military aid as well as moderate amounts of “ nonlethal” riot control and mil­ itary gear as an inducement to get the junta to implement further reforms. However, there was no consensus among the senior officials. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for example, feared that greater aid and more training would lead to even higher levels of U.S. involve­ ment, creating a “ quagmire effect” similar to what had happened in Vietnam.6 The Carter administration was also concluding privately that the Salvadoran right wing was obsessed with “ what they perceive as a well-orchestrated Havana-Moscow infiltration of their basic institu­ tions. They were convinced Nicaragua was serving as a training and logistical base for future military operations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.”7 Thus, if things were left to their own devices in El Salvador, in addition to the guerrilla threat, the right would continue to unleash a dirty war against all who were considered guerrilla sym­ pathizers. In another memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski, this one dated February 14 , 1980, Robert Pastor laid out the administration’s “ consensus” policies for El Salvador: We want to find all effective ways to: bolster the Junta (coalition of Christian Democrats and moderate military) by ourselves and with multilateral support; divide the left and try to get leading groups and individuals (like Archbishop Romero, the [leftist political group] M N R , Jesuits) to leave the left and support the Junta; and prevent the right from staging a coup or undertaking measures to destabilize the reform elements in the junta.8

This delicate and imperfect balance in the aftermath of the 1979 coup became the template for the engagement that endured through three U.S. presidential administrations.

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The Salvador Option “ Weaning the Military off the Teat of the Oligarchy and onto Ours”

Toward the end of 1979 and through 1980, the Carter administra­ tion took a series of controversial steps to deepen its commitment to the governing junta that deposed General Romero. Part of this was driven by the U.S. Embassy’s increasingly alarmist confidential report­ ing back to Washington. In one secret cable sent on December 2 7 ,19 7 9 , the embassy urged the Executive Branch to send three military train­ ing teams given the FAES’s low morale. It added that “ underlying these recommendations is our belief that we face a deteriorated situation and an uphill struggle. Relatively bold action is called for. . . . Indeed, tan­ gible indication of USG [U.S. government] commitment in El Salvador may give pause to Marxists in Nicaragua and Cubans who then must calculate cost versus benefit of aggressive tactics by their leftist-terror allies in El Salvador.”9 To this end, and despite internal disagreements, in the fall of 1980 the once dovish, pro-human rights, and now more hawkish Carter administration approved the Pentagon-dispatched logistic advisors and “ survey teams” to begin the process of, as one U.S. official put it, “ wean[ing] the military off the teat of the oligarchy and onto ours.” 10 The five-man U.S. Army Operational and Planning Assistance Teams (OPAT) supported Salvadoran counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the code-named Operation Gold Harvest that aimed to protect the upcoming coffee harvest from rebel attacks. The outgoing Carter team was betting on a dubious Salvadoran government, especially the mili­ tary that had dominated the country for so long. In December 1980, Carter approved a compromise military assis­ tance package that included the modest provision of a small mili­ tary training program. Only weeks later, Carter suspended all aid to the junta after revelation of the murder of the four American church workers. Then on January 10 , the FM LN launched a massive military offensive that rattled the outgoing Carter White House officials, who appeared to accept the reality that El Salvador was perhaps in greater peril than they had imagined. On January 1 4 ,1 9 8 1 , the Carter admin­ istration went back to funneling several million dollars in military assistance - including M -16 rifles and ammunition, grenade launchers, and Huey helicopters - and a team of six military advisors, citing the

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need to “ support the Salvadoran government in its struggle against left-wing terrorism supported covertly... by Cuba and other Commu­ nist nations.” 11 A few days later it announced $ 10 million in emer­ gency aid and the deployment of three more advisor teams.12 With these moves, the outgoing Carter team’s “ good guy” in El Salvador had become the precarious military-civilian junta that critics said was a fiction of reform. The fateful decision to engage the Salvadoran military was built on the calculus that any stable environment would require a reformed security force. But it also reflected the depressing reality that the Salvadoran military called most of the shots in Salvadoran politics. According to one U.S. official, “ military assistance is an essential com­ ponent of any strategy in El Salvador. They [the Salvadoran military] are the center of power, and most of what you want, you have to get from them or with their approval.” 13 The question quickly became whether Washington should back this perhaps fatally wounded moderate junta or attempt to pressure or isolate it because it was also military dominated and repressive. One moment the U.S. government was supporting a democratic rev­ olution and the next it was criticized by the visible San Salvador Archbishop for supporting a murderous regime. Yet, given the regional anti-communist imperatives combined with global geopolitical con­ siderations provoked by recent setbacks in Iran, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua, there was little room to question whether the United States would support the new junta. The junta’s ascension also paved the way for Washington to reen­ gage the abusive Salvadoran military only two years after General Romero’s regime defiantly rejected U.S. military aid. Shortly after the coup the armed forces issued a statement criticizing Romero’s regime of “ violating human rights, fomenting corruption and creating ‘a true economic and social disaster’ in the country.” 14 The statement empha­ sized the importance of supporting actions, such as land reform and job opportunities - an unlikely focus for the military, but a sign of changes to come. Interestingly, a few months after the junta was seated, Carter administration officials had publicly denounced what were widespread rumors of a coup from disgruntled conservative elements. In an unusual step, a high-level State Department official held briefings on

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The Salvador Option

the situation for two consecutive days. Under orders from Secretary of State Vance, the anonymous official issued a warning to “ most people who might be involved” in a coup - landholders, business groups, and military brass - that the exclusion of civilians and the continuation of human rights abuses would result in the United States cutting off economic and military assistance.15 Rightist elements had in fact targeted the government twice in 1980. In February, the U.S. Embassy reported that “ powerful right wing forces,” seeing their “ interests as doomed,” believed that the junta had “ transformed itself from a joke to a real menace to their vital inter­ ests.” Thus, in the name of these interests, rightists were “ actively plot­ ting a coup” and seeking approval from Washington.16 The embassy reported that it “ sought out all conceivable participants in a rightist coup, particularly the military” to “ forcefully reiterate our support for” the government.17 Another plot slated for M ay 5 under the com­ mand of rightist Roberto D ’Aubuisson and more than two dozen con­ spirators was intended to end with an announcement that his group had effectively halted a left-wing coup by Archbishop (Oscar Romero and the newly appointed ambassador Robert White, among others.18 The governing junta was able to quell the rightist coup attempts, but its inability to successfully prosecute the plotters reinforced the rightists’ strengths.19

Disaster of Cataclysmic Proportions The Carter administration reluctantly concluded that the fledgling junta was worth supporting, at least compared to a more rightist and abusive military rule, or the looming possibility of Marxist insurrec­ tion. Annual economic aid to the country shot up to $58.3 million, five times the amount it had been in any of the previous three years.20 Washington also helped the junta obtain $45 million in loans from multilateral development banks.21 Conservative critics jumped on the Carter team’s engagement approach. Georgia Democrat Larry McDonald, “ uncontestably the most conservative member of Congress,” commented in June 1980: The disaster of cataclysmic proportions known as the Carter administration foreign policy is beginning to reap the whirlwind in Central America. The

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revolutionary turmoil and terrorism now attacking El Salvador is the result of the administration’s appeasement policies toward the Soviet Union, its satel­ lites, and client states...... Under the guise of protecting human rights, this administration began a campaign of destabilizing anti-Communist govern­ ments in Central America which were reliable free-world allies.22

Republican Senator Jesse Helms joined in with the disillusioned con­ servatives grumbling that Carter’s “ engagement” was in fact support for the junta’s radical leftist economic policies. When Carter appointed Robert White in 1980, a career diplomat with a reputation as a social reformer, the Senate subjected White to what the N ew York Times called a “ mean-minded hazing” led by Helms.23 The senator held up White’s ambassadorial confirmation for six weeks, accusing the career diplomat of supporting “ murky proposals to turn El Salvador’s eco­ nomic system toward socialism.”24 Liberal Democrats also criticized Carter’s policy toward El Salvador. Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, for example, condemned Carter’s sup­ port for El Salvador after October 1979, arguing that the new junta had not changed the pattern of government-supported human rights abuses.25 According to a liberal columnist, the aid would simply “ legit­ imate what has become dictatorial violence.”26 Even Murat Williams, President Kennedy’s ambassador to El Salvador, argued in the New York Times that U.S. military aid would merely be used “ to maintain the status quo” and “ to thwart El Salvador’s social progress,” leading to “ greater carnage” rather than needed social change.27 Religious groups were especially critical of Carter’s policy of aid­ ing the junta. In March 1980, for example, a representative of the National Council of the Churches of Christ claimed that the Salvado­ ran junta was “ anything but moderate.” He argued that a “ major mas­ sacre seem[ed] to be in progress... annihilating popular movements that are neither radical nor Marxist but simply seeking a tolerable gov­ ernment with popular support.”28 Over these same months, the Carter administration was internally acknowledging this swelling opposition to its Salvador gamble. An April 30, 1980, memo from a senior State Department human rights diplomat to acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher revealed how the Carter administration would respond: “ Nongovernmental orga­ nizations [are] strenuously opposed and are not reconciled to our

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decision to provide security assistance to El Salvador. We justify our assistance as intended to advance human rights.”29 An intense debate over El Salvador policy erupted within the Carter administration and career policymakers. When some believed that the priority had shifted away from human rights toward a military solu­ tion, dissenters in the administration circulated a bootleg copy of their own policy preferences. The “ Dissent Paper” contended that the U.S. government was incorrectly portraying the junta as centrist and noted that many American allies, also skeptical of this depiction, refused to recognize it.3° The State Department denounced the report as a “ spu­ rious” and “ unofficial” document; others subsequently claimed that it was a fabrication drafted by leftist critics intended to embarrass the White House over its Salvador policy.31 Incoming ambassador White reinforced the Carter administration’s official position when he sup­ ported the goal of turning El Salvador’s deteriorating and horrific crisis into a “ clean counterinsurgency war.”32 At the same time, Henry E. Catto Jr., who served as ambassador from 19 7 1 to 19 7 3, argued that “ we were justified in our assistance. One has only to look at the spiritual and physical devastation, revealed by the Soviet Union’s collapse, in Red-ruled Eastern Europe and Rus­ sia .. . to realize that these guerrillas were moral lepers, not the libera­ tors pictured by liberation theologians.”33 Some observers believe that Washington’s myopic embrace of the Salvadoran military had catastrophic consequences. Historian John Coatsworth concluded that the Carter administration’s “ successful” efforts to avoid the collapse of the FAES and secure the installation of a “ reliably pro-U.S. civilian [junta]... pushed El Salvador into fullscale civil war.”34 Thus, Washington’s prioritization to bolster the teetering Salvadoran security forces ensured little support of a “ less violent resolution” of the internal war. More specifically, Coatsworth contends, Washington could have “ made significant demands for [mil­ itary] reform” at three critical moments during 19 8 °: when the first “ most reformist” junta collapsed in January; three months later when the second junta collapsed; and in December in the aftermath of the churchwomen killings. Instead, Carter “ acquiesced” to an effective “ silent coup” as the military consolidated its power behind the pup­ pet Duarte government.

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We will, of course, never know if more pressure by the Carter admin­ istration could have made a difference, particularly one as significant as preventing the civil war. However, it is worth considering the extent of American influence in El Salvador at this time, especially given how low the amount of military funding was at the time. General Romero, for one, felt comfortable cutting off U.S. military assistance rather than dealing with the Carter administration’s “ harassment” on human rights. Another key question is whether a civil war had already effec­ tively broken out in El Salvador as many participants on both the left and right have subsequently corroborated. That is, was the genie already out of the bottle? And are we giving Washington too much influence for being able to correct this reality? It is certainly correct that what appeared to be the breakout of the civil war started in the months and years following the October 1979 progressive coup. Yet this more visible manifestation of the insurgent war is not automatically synonymous with its actual inception. What is also noteworthy about the Carter administration’s policies is that they ended up being very interventionist, as seen by the overt and covert pressure on General Romero to leave office in mid-1979 - and then welcoming the reformist coup that ousted him in October 1979. There is also significant diplomatic cable traffic and media reporting that describe various ways the U.S. Embassy was backing the junta and warning the oligarchic right, including pressuring it in the aftermath of the American churchwomen’s killings in December 1980. One confi­ dential source indicated that U.S. officials had “ urged the Junta to insti­ tute reforms” and “ warned that U.S. economic and military aid would be withheld in the event of a rightwing military coup.” But when the Carter team announced a $58.3 million assistance package to support the junta’s “ deep and economic and social reforms,” Salvadorans of “ various persuasions” condemned Washington’s “ interference in local affairs.”35 Possibly U.S. officials were privately doing some or most of what Coatsworth believed would have staved off civil war, but it simply did not work.

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i3

Archbishop Romero

It would be sad if there were not priests among the victims in a country where such horrific murders are being committed. They are the testi­ mony of a church which embodies the problems of the people. - Archbishop (Oscar Romero1 It is beyond doubt that the people are rising to the times, each day becoming increasingly conscious and more organized, and beginning to summon the ability to direct, to take charge of the future of El Salvador. - Romero in February 1980 letter to President Carter2

Archbishop (Oscar Romero’s strident message of social justice came as a surprise to many. His appointment as archbishop in 19 77, succeeding the progressive Luis Chavez y Gonzalez, had been generally attributed to his doctrinal conservatism, a view that was reinforced when the mil­ itary government applauded the appointment while leftists and M arx­ ists expressed deep dissatisfaction.3 A classified U.S. government com­ munication reported the consensus thinking, which was that Romero would prove docile toward the oligarchy and military. One journalist described the unassuming Romero as “ a diminutive, shy-looking man who was 60 when he assumed the archbishop’s post, [and] looked and acted like the last person in the world who would be a burr in the blanket of the military or aristocracy.”4 Born in a small town in the province of San Miguel in eastern El Salvador in 19 17 , Romero was the son of a telegraph operator.5 After attending seminary in San Miguel, Romero became a priest in his local 140

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region. “ I could have been called a conservative,” he reflected. “ But I followed the principles of Vatican II with considerable interest and noted the changes we were being asked to make.” 6 Gaudium et Spes (Joy and Hope in Latin), one of the main texts that came from Vatican II, legitimized the use of the Catholic faith as a base for human rights.7 Romero became secretary to the bishops’ conference in San Salvador and then bishop in the village of Santiago de Maria from 1974 to 1976. He described living a “ very private life - anonymous, you might say.” But it was in Santiago de Maria where Romero “ became close to the problems of the campesinos and the repression their organizing efforts aroused.” 8 It is important to note that this new Vatican also had the effect of decentralizing the power of the church, which in the case of Latin America gave bishops more responsibility.9 This, coupled with Gaudium et Spes, provided them with a greater sense of moral and social purpose - a mission to “ sanctify the world.” 10 In 19 7 7 , liberation theology proponent father Rutilio Grande was brutally murdered by an operative who used a type of bullet only issued to the armed forces. Radicalized by the murder of his trusted colleague and in a show of retaliation, Romero suspended all Sunday masses for a month except for the National Cathedral. In this same year, the shadowy death squad, the clandestine White Warriors Union (Union Guerrera Blanca, UGB), threatened that all Jesuits who had not left the country within 30 days would be killed. Witnessing the oppression and corruption in his country, Romero became impassioned by the cause to end violence and enhance social justice in El Salvador. The church-operated YSAX radio station became Romero’s main avenue for broadcasting his Sunday homilies and prop­ agating his message to the masses. Forty-seven percent of the urban population and 73 percent in the countryside tuned in to hear the archbishop, creating one of the largest audiences for any broadcast in El Salvador save for soccer matches.11 A Washington Post article described the role of YSAX in El Salvador as a channel for unvarnished news: “ While government controlled stations transmit official com­ muniques, station YSAX, owned and operated by the Archdiocese of San Salvador, digs out the news.” 12 The influence of Romero’s sermons threatened the extreme right, which led to at least 10 attempted bomb­ ings of the station, until finally, shortly before his death, the station was destroyed.13

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In addition to hostility and even violence from the rightist death squads, Romero also faced divisions within the church hierarchy. While a strong majority of parish priests supported Romero, four of the other five bishops in the country were inclined to characterize his positions as “ encouragement to communist elements bent on manipulating the church and overthrowing our constitutional government.” 14 Such a split over liberation theology was common in Latin America at the time; Romero once addressed such differences by responding, “ I would rather say there is pluralism within the church.” 15 In spite of the divisions in the church, Romero remained an avid supporter of human rights and civil liberties. In M ay 1979, he traveled to the Vatican to provide the pope with seven dossiers stuffed with reports and documents regarding El Salvador’s horrifying condition. Romero subsequently returned to El Salvador where he continued to call for social justice and an end to violence. Almost a year later in a chilling foreshadowing of his pending death, Romero told a journalist, “ You can tell the people that if they succeed in killing me, that I forgive and bless those who do it. Hopefully, they will realize they are wasting their time. A bishop will die, but the church of God, which is the people, will never perish.” 16 Romero’s increased visibility abroad likely helped lead to his nom­ ination in 1978 for the Nobel Peace Prize. Among those nominating him were 23 members of the U.S. Congress who in their letter to the Nobel committee wrote: “An individual of unsurpassed courage and integrity, Romero has not allowed government prosecutors to frighten him into silence or submission. He has remained a forthright and com­ pelling advocate of human rights, nonviolence and social progress setting a standard in defense of human liberty which can be applied not only in Latin America but throughout the world.” 17 Romero also received the Peace Prize of the Swedish Free Churches and honorary doctorates from two Catholic universities, Georgetown in Washington, DC, and Louvain in Belgium.18

A Letter to Carter In early 1980, and only weeks after two key civilians had resigned from the junta, Romero asked President Carter in a letter to halt even non­ lethal military aid that was “ being used to repress my people.” 19 Unlike

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the preferences of the junta and Washington, Romero insisted that the popular organizations (either formally or otherwise linked to the guer­ rillas) be recognized in any negotiation to end the nation’s conflagra­ tion.20 “ It is beyond doubt that the people are rising to the times, each day becoming increasingly conscious and more organized, and begin­ ning to summon the ability to direct, to take charge of the future of El Salvador.” The archbishop subsequently publicly announced that the ruling junta did not effectively govern the country.21 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance responded in Carter’s name to the letter. Vance wrote that Romero and the president both embraced the “ advancement of human rights,” but that the United States believed the junta’s reform program “ offers the best prospect for peaceful change toward a more just society.”22 Vance added, “ We understand your concerns about the dangers of providing military assistance given the unfortunate role which some elements of the security forces occa­ sionally have played in the past.” Critics jumped on the use of the qualifying language of “ some” and “ occasionally” given the height of repression at the time.

“ May God Have Mercy on the Assassins” On March 24, 1980, Archbishop Romero was assassinated while cel­ ebrating mass at the small chapel of the Divine Providence Hospital where he lived. A professional assassin fired a single .22 caliber bullet from a red Volkswagen. The bullet hit the archbishop, rupturing his aorta and causing severe bleeding. Romero’s last words were reported to be, “ M ay God have mercy on the assassins.”23 In his Lenten homily a day earlier, the archbishop had appealed directly to Salvadoran soldiers:I I would like to appeal in a special way to the men of the army, and in particular to the troops of the National Guard, the Police, and the garrisons. Brothers, you belong to your own people. You kill your own brother peasants; and in the face of an order to kill that is given by a man, the law of God should prevail that says: Do not kill! No soldier is obliged to obey an order counter to the law of God. No one has to comply with an immoral law. It is time now that you recover your conscience and obey its dictates rather than the command of sin. The Church, defender of the rights of God, of the law of God, of the dignity of the human person, cannot remain silent before so much abomination. We

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The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 1 3 . 1 . Archbishop (Oscar Romero, 1979. Romero’s outspoken theolog­ ical views made him a hero to many Salvadorans as well as a growing foreign audience, especially in the United States. His enemies thought him a danger­ ous apologist for the armed left subverting the nation. Photo and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

want the government to seriously consider that reforms mean nothing when they come bathed in so much blood. Therefore, in the name of God, and in the name of this long-suffering people, whose laments rise to heaven every day more tumultuous, I beseech you, I beg you, I order you, in the name of God, to stop the repression!24

American officials told journalists that Romero’s assassination repre­ sented one of the worst blows to stability that El Salvador had experi­ enced. Cyrus Vance stated, “ We are deeply shocked by this deplorable criminal act,” calling Romero “ a man who embodies the basic princi­ ples of compassion and concern for all the citizens of El Salvador.” 25 The brazen assassination caused deep consternation within the Carter administration, but critically it did not derail Carter’s commit­ ment to the military/Christian Democratic junta.26 To this end, Carter officials continued to emphasize the broader stakes at play in El Sal­ vador. For example, they contended that Cuba was directly assisting an operation to send arms into the country from Honduras and train Sal­ vadoran guerrillas to spark an insurrection.27 State Department official John A. Bushnell stated that there was “ evidence that mountainous and

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145

sparsely populated areas of Honduras territory were being used for the illegal smuggling with Cuban support of insurgents and weapons into El Salvador.”28

“ Consecration of the Civil War” A week after his murder, tens of thousands of Salvadorans attended Romero’s funeral at the National Cathedral.29 Here is an observation by an American Catholic priest, and one of the 50 foreign guests who were present: The day of the funeral ceremony - Palm Sunday - ushered with it glimpses of keen expectation as we made our way to the Cathedral through streets over­ flowing with people__ It was obvious that most were peasant families, some of them having walked overnight to render homage to their beloved pastor. There was a distinct mood of sober joy in the air. “ We have had six days to weep,” a priest told us. “Now we anticipate the Resurrection Day.” The square in front of the Cathedral throbbed with people, 80,000 of the faithful. They were singing, waving palm branches and holding up little pictures of the Arch­ bishop snapped up from enterprising street children. Cool water was served, gratis, by the Baptists, in the shade of large umbrellas.30

The procession turned chaotic when unidentified gunmen opened fire on the mourners, killing and wounding dozens. The government and security forces claimed it was the protestors who instigated the vio­ lence to provoke a backlash. The images of unarmed demonstrators and mourners being gunned down on the steps of the National Cathe­ dral had a large impact abroad, especially in the United States; it rein­ forced the impression that the government was repressing its people.31 In fact, similar to the 19 72 presidential election, Romero’s brutal mur­ der galvanized many on the left, leaving them to conclude that the arch­ bishop’s message could only be realized through the barrel of a gun. Former guerrilla leader Gerson Martinez commented in a 2008 inter­ view with the author that “ this assassination was the consecration of the civil war.”32 “Activities of Combat Networks” Soon after Romero’s murder, rightist firebrand Roberto D ’Aubuisson made a speech in which he indicated that he was pleased with the killing even though he denied his involvement.33 D ’Aubuisson is

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The Salvador Option

believed to have presided over a meeting of active duty military per­ sonnel when they drew straws to see who would kill the priest. A few months after the archbishop’s assassination, D ’Aubuisson was arrested at the San Luis estate - along with at least a dozen active and retired military personnel and a similar number of civilians. They were accused of plotting to overthrow the government through a coup. The raid uncovered weapons and documents that implicated the group in death squad activity, including Romero’s killing. The most sensational item recovered was the diary of former military captain Alvaro Rafael Saravia, which contained information on the Romero assassination. The “ Saravia diary” referenced the purchase and delivery of arms and munitions, some of which were the same as the ones used in the Romero assassination. Another key document was titled “ General Framework for the Organization of the Anti-Marxist Struggle in El Salvador” and apparently reflected the views of those meeting at the estate. The manifesto included the goal of seizing power in El Salvador, and their political plan called for “ direct action,” so-called activities of combat networks, including “ attacks on selected individuals.”34 The arrests against the plotters - and likely masterminds of the Romero murder - sparked a wave of rightist terrorist threats and other pres­ sures on government officials that culminated in D ’Aubuisson’s return from exile in Guatemala. In April 2010, Saravia revealed in an inter­ view with the Salvadoran newspaper E l Faro that D ’Aubuisson had given the order to murder Romero.35 D ’Aubuisson also likely ordered the same men to murder Atilio Ramirez Amaya, the judge investigating the archbishop’s murder. Aided by a team of doctors, Judge Ramirez had used plastic bags to recover the fragments extracted from the archbishop’s body; Ramirez was also the only person to inspect the body from head to toe. A few days after the murder, junta chief Colonel Adolfo Majano announced on television that the perpetrators would be apprehended and that INTERPOL had given his government the names of the men, which would be delivered to the investigating judge - that is, Ramirez. Not surprisingly given the wanton violence at the time, this pub­ lic recognition quickly resulted in death threats being sent to Ramirez and his family. Shortly thereafter, armed assassins entered his house to murder the investigating judge. They failed in their attempt and fled, but Ramirez’s maid was killed in the process. While he was engaged in

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a firefight with the killers, Ramirez thought to himself, “ Shit, they’re going to kill me like they killed Mario Zamora,” a chilling reference to the junta government’s murdered attorney general.36 The next day when he asked for special protection from the Supreme Court of Jus­ tice, Ramirez was told dismissively, “ Don’t invent ghosts, Atilio.”37 On Sunday, March 29, just a week after Romero’s assassination, Ramirez fled in exile to Costa Rica. For many more years, Ramirez continued to have horrible nightmares linked to the horrendous and fateful episode of March 1980. In retrospect, the Romero assassination might have informally started El Salvador’s “ irredeemable horror” that was the internal war.38 Violence toward key figures like Ramirez during these early years of the conflict led people either to flee the country or to join the swelling guer­ rilla ranks in the countryside. Others claim that it had already begun, or got under way only after the FM LN ’s January 19 8 1 final offensive. At the same time, the failed judicial investigation did reveal that amidst all of the oligarchy- and military-fueled violence and impunity, elements within fledgling government institutions were attempting to uphold at least some semblance of the rule of law. So, for example, D ’Aubuisson and his conspirators were indeed arrested for their coup plotting, even if they were not convicted. And an investigation into the Romero assassination was opened, even if the judge in question was almost killed and fled the country. Did this attempt to find jus­ tice represent progress as the nation mourned for its fallen hero? This question raises the broader point about the extent to which El Salvador had changed since the reformist officers’ coup of 1979. But this space for non-violent and democratic social reform and justice was always narrow, and the ceaseless bloodbath of the death squads and security forces drove the revolutionary left to a more militant, armed response which perfectly suited the incipient guerrillas’ ideological and material backers in Havana and Managua.

“ Overwhelmed Congressional Offices” Coincidentally, on March 25, 1980, less than 24 hours after Romero was murdered, a House subcommittee was to start hearings on the Carter administration’s request for $5.7 million in non-lethal military aid to the Salvadoran armed forces.39 This sparse funding

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The Salvador Option

quickly became a test of Jimmy Carter’s El Salvador policy. Critics said that even this symbolic amount of non-lethal aid was counter­ productive since it would “ legitimate what has become dictatorial vio­ lence.”40 A leading Catholic spokesman stated: “Any military aid to El Salvador... ends up in the hands of the military and paramilitary right­ ist groups who are themselves at the root of the problems of the country.”41 To influence the congressional vote, Protestant and Catholic Church organizations “ overwhelmed congressional offices” with let­ ters, telegrams, and visits. “ They had one message: stop military aid.”42 Yet even congressional Democrats had reservations about stopping the aid. Florida representative William Lehman (D) lamented, “ We have seen in other countries that one form of violence, repression, tyranny, can too often be succeeded by even worse violence and repres­ sion and tyranny. . . . I dread the alternative that can come out of the left.”43 Representative Matthew McHugh (D, NY) said, “ If this junta falls, the repressive elements of the government will be in control[;] that will be followed by a civil war, and I do not see how that benefits the El Salvadorean [sic] people.”44 In what suggested the increasing inten­ sity of El Salvador policy despite the minor amount of aid at stake, McHugh revealed that his yes vote on the Salvador aid was the tough­ est of his career.45 Congress subsequently approved the assistance.46

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i4

Land

Agrarian reform was an attempt to instill in the populace a belief in the war against the guerrillas for the peasantry’s hearts and minds. - RAND Corporation report1 The most revolutionary land reform in Latin American history. - Robert White, U.S. Ambassador, 19 80 2 Externally armed guerrillas cannot be stopped by fertilizer alone. -Jo h n Bushnell, American diplomat3

“ This Democratic and Anti-Oligarchic Revolution” One night in March 1980, a “ slightly built man wearing glasses and the three gold stars of a full colonel in the Salvadoran army” announced on television to the nation that more than 200 of the largest private farms would be expropriated as part of the government’s effort to pro­ mote social and economic justice in this desperately poor country. In El Salvador, less than 2 percent of the population owned more than half of the arable farmland; 40 percent of the rural population owned no land at all and worked as sharecroppers on large estates or on the land of absentee owners. The next day army troops “ led by officers waving the new decree” arrived at the farms to establish the new cooperatives that would be run by the peasants. Over the next weeks, in a makeshift army command center, an officer monitored the expropriations by placing pins on a wall map 149

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15 °

The Salvador Option

indicating the designated farms. Militaries in Latin America were his­ torically aligned with the oligarchy - and this was certainly true for much of El Salvador’s history. So it was especially ironic that the mil­ itary was considered the critical institution for implementing the land reform given that “ power and security” were certainly needed - some­ thing impossible for a civilian agency.4 After the October 1979 coup, the military had benefited from the purging of around 20 percent of the entire corps - which according to the CIA had the effect of “ neu­ tralizing many corrupt senior officers and their subordinates who had long ago been co-opted by rightist civilian elites.” 5 Now with the army backing reform, the “ political and economic power of the oligarchy was quickly reduced.” 6 The sweeping land reform was promulgated with the “ Basic Agrar­ ian Reform Law, Decree i 5 3 ” in March 1980 and had three fundamen­ tal components. Phase I (Decrees 154 and 842) included the expropria­ tion of landholdings of all persons controlling more than 500 hectares.7 The owners were permitted to retain 10 0 -15 0 hectares and the remain­ ing was to be farmed through an agricultural cooperative established by a committee elected by the workers and a co-manager provided by the government. Phase II was to extend the same process of expropri­ ation to owners of more than 100 but fewer than 500 hectares. This proved to be the most critical decree since it affected most of the coffee estates, which held the richest soil; nevertheless, it was never imple­ mented.8 Phase III (Decree 207), also known as the Land to the Tiller program, stated that ownership of land that was leased, rented, or sharecropped would be transferred to the tiller of the soil, up to seven hectares. This phase was based in part on Japan’s agrarian reform but also reflected the notion prominent in rural Latin America that land should belong to those who cultivate it rather than to a renter class. Under Land to the Tiller, tenants and sharecroppers could file claims and become owners of the plot they rented.9 Given the implications of the land reform for those owning land, the junta announced a state of siege the day after it announced the new law.10 Despite the looming tumult expected to accompany this precipitous and unprecedented program, Christian Democratic leader Jose Napoleon Duarte - although not yet having joined the junta was enthusiastic in describing the significance of this moment: “ For

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Land

151

twenty years we have been fighting for that day when an agrarian reform would be carried out that would take power from the oligarchy and give it to the people. Now we have accomplished the beginning of this democratic and anti-oligarchic revolution.” 11

“ Small Capitalist Rabbits” The U.S. government’s economic development wing was strongly behind the land reform effort. In fact, the University of Washington’s Roy Prosterman, known for his land reform efforts during the war in Vietnam, was actively involved in the endeavor. The thinking behind the reforms was that granting farmers land and creating cooperatives would produce legions of “ small capitalist rabbits” who would have a stake in the government’s stability. Or, as one Salvadoran develop­ ment official commented, “ The purpose of the land reform was not to help the poorest because they were poor. But to keep them from joining the left.” 12 According to Robert White, the incoming American ambas­ sador, “ The Salvadorans used to get amused at Prosterman sometimes. His frequent allusions to Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam. That’s not Central America; he didn’t know anything about Central America.” 13 Soon after its initial implementation, critics began to contend that the entire effort was working out to be far less than advertised. One article cited the view that Phase I affected less than 15 percent of the arable land and that many of these estates had the least fertile farm­ ing acreage. It added that the phase was accompanied by a “ state of siege” carried out by government security forces who, with or without the consent of their superiors, “ used it as an opportunity to conduct military operations against the peasants in regions with a history of leftist sympathies.” 14 Allegedly, the number of peasants killed by secu­ rity forces in 1980 was also the highest in areas affected by Phase I affirmation that the program was making matters worse, not better.15 In a sense, the fox was guarding the henhouse, critics contended. Nearly 36,697 Salvadoran heads of household benefited directly from Phase I. Most of these lands were expropriated by the govern­ ment and formed into 3 17 cooperatives. Yet, despite the large num­ ber of cooperatives, the “ initial impetus was soon lost” and “ violence escalated.” By the end of 1985, only approximately 15 of the 3 17

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The Salvador Option

cooperatives were able to pay their debts. Many lacked money to buy fertilizer, facing steadily declining yields.16 In Phase III, initial estimates were that beneficiaries of this phase would be granted up to seven hectares of farmland, but by 1987, the average beneficiary had received title to fewer than two hectares. And of the estimated 117 ,0 0 0 peasant families that would have benefited from the program, only 56,188 beneficiaries applied for the title to 79 ,14 2 parcels of land. Due to inefficiencies and lack of budgeting for the program, many of these new landholders received provisional titles in lieu of definitive titles.17 Rather than a “ substantial redistribution of land” from the large estates to peasants, the “ immediate result” was a “ transfer of property rights on paper, a massive movement of troops across the countryside, and considerable apprehension on the part of the peasants, who in the majority of cases refrained from taking pos­ session of their new property out of fear.” 18 The government’s slogan for the controversial program was “ The Reform Is for Everyone.” Yet it was also clear to many observers that the program had been hastily devised. On March 3, 1980, for example, there was little word of the program, but then the next day the long-dormant Salvadoran Institute for Agrarian Transformation (Instituto Salvadoreño de Transformación Agraria, ISTA) was revived and the law passed two days later.19 One ISTA technician leading the reform described the chaotic nature unfolding in certain locales: “ The troops came and told the workers the land was theirs now. They could elect their own leaders and run the co-ops. The peasants couldn’t believe their ears, but held elections that very night. The next morn­ ing the troops came back and I watched as they shot every one of the elected leaders.”20 The program was also dealt a blow when only a few weeks into its implementation the deputy minister of agriculture resigned; in his resignation letter to the junta, he wrote: During the first days of reform - to cite one case - five directors and two presidents of the new campesino organizations were assassinated and I am informed that this repressive practice continues to increase. Recently, on one of the haciendas of the agrarian reform, uniformed members of the security forces accompanied by someone with a mask over his face, brought the work­ ers together; the masked man was giving orders to the person in charge of the troops and campesinos were gunned down in front of their co-workers.21

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Opponents argued that the reformist junta’s “ paralysis” destroyed any possibility for reconciliation with the radical left already fleeing to the mountains in droves to take up the mantle of armed revolution. In March 1980, although Archbishop (Oscar Romero was in favor of the land reforms, he was against the manner in which they were being implemented, calling them “ reforms bathed in blood.”22 What land reform proponents and critics could more likely agree on was that these were political programs at their core. In a more cynical interpretation, this meant that “ for the Salvadoran government, it was a way of satis­ fying U.S. demands for reform without alienating rightist officers like Defense Minister García who held the real reins of power.” And for Washington, the critique went, it was “ proof - indeed, the only proof that the government of El Salvador was truly as moderate and reformist as the Administration portrayed it.”23 For the Carter administration, land reform was paradoxically a revolutionary tool to counter the increasingly formidable and armed revolutionary left.24 Senior diplo­ mat William Bowdler indicated the extent to which the Carter admin­ istration had placed its hope, technical expertise, and money on the land reform stemming revolution: We are convinced that if the Government doesn’t move drastically to under­ cut the popular attractiveness of the Radical M arxists’ solutions to the grave economic and social problems in El Salvador through means of a significant program of reforms, the result will almost certainly be a bloody civil war with a subsequent victory of the radical left.25

The Carter administration even explained to an increasingly con­ cerned Congress its paradoxical logic regarding the impossibility of expropriating large holdings without an enhanced security presence in the countryside: The principle [sic] obstacle to the reform ... is that the extremists from both the left and right are intent on dividing the Government and preventing the con­ solidation of a powerful moderate coalition which it will attract to its program if it is allowed to prosper.... I want to emphasize that contrary to a common misconception, our proposals for security assistance are not disconnected nor contrary to our support for reform in El Salvador. The redistribution of land would not be possible if it wasn’t for the protection and security provided by the Salvadoran army to the new property holders.26

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The Salvador Option

To this end, American support for the Salvadoran military’s “ protec­ tion and security” amounted to $500,000 worth of military supplies and the deployment of a six-person Mobile Training Team (MTT). On March 4, 1980, the Carter administration also utilized $5.7 million in military credits for trucks, radios, and tear gas for the Salvadoran government.27 In just the six months since Romero had been ousted in October 1979 and the reformist junta had taken over, Washington had provided more military aid than during the entire Military Assis­ tance Program (MAP) between 1950 and 1969.28

“ Sweeping Processes of Democratic Land Reform” While Roy Prosterman might have not had much previous exposure to Latin America, his plan for El Salvador set forth one of the region’s most aggressive yet imperfect land reform programs in its modern his­ tory despite all of its clear failings. His contention, backed by the Carter administration, was that landless peasants had provided the “ rank and file support” for most of the major 20th-century revolutions, such as those in Mexico, Russia, China, and Vietnam. Thus, giving peasants land was, above all, politically expedient as seen in the “ sweeping pro­ cesses of democratic land reform” the United States supported in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in the decades after World War II as well as in South Vietnam in the early 1970s. With El Salvador in 1980 having the highest ratio of landless families to total population in Latin Amer­ ica, with a total of 1,800,000 landless people constituting one third of the total population, the country was ripe for revolution or reform. A major problem was the general lack of enthusiasm for the land programs within the Salvadoran government, so the burden of push­ ing the reforms forward fell on U.S. officials. Key reforms like land to tiller “ had to be shoved down their [the Salvadoran government’s] throats.”29 Yet U.S. interests in using the land reform to stave off radi­ cal armed revolution took precedence over any of the Salvadoran gov­ ernment’s concerns. Starting with the Carter administration and con­ tinuing through the Reagan years, Washington was meddling deeply into Salvadoran internal affairs. On reflection, like so many of the key developments in El Salvador’s painful war years, people holding various ideologies saw the issue

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of land reform from entirely different standpoints. Not surprisingly, Prosterman saw the effort as an enormous success: With considerable courage, and against what seemed all the odds, they have carried out one of Latin America’s most extensive land reforms. Its very suc­ cess has subjected it to attack from both extremes of the political spectrum: the extreme right attacks the land reform because it strikes at their power and privileges, while the revolutionary left attacks it because it threatens their abil­ ity to attract peasant support. Both extremes find those willing to echo their attacks in the domestic U.S. debate over Salvadoran policy. But the land reform is a reality.30

Ambassador Robert White was also a strong supporter of El Salvador’s land reforms. Conservative Republican senator Jesse Helms was decid­ edly less enthusiastic about the land reform program than his State Department counterpart.31 In fact, the senator had delayed for six weeks confirming Robert White as ambassador to El Salvador. Helms believed that “ the nomination of Mr. White [was] like a torch tossed in a pool of oil.”32

“ Eliminated the Latifundia as We Know It” Not surprisingly, some of the most recalcitrant opposition came from the conservative landowning elite. Former National Guard major Roberto D ’Aubuisson who had been forced into retirement follow­ ing the October 1979 coup, criticized the reforms as evidence of “ U.S. imposed socialism.”33 Jumping forward in our story, abolishing land reform became a rightist rallying cry during national electoral cam­ paigns in 1982 and 1984. The 1982 election led to a majority for the right-wing coalition that proceeded to reverse key aspects of the sweep­ ing agrarian program. Ironically, it was the democratic process (e.g., the right winning at the ballot box) that undermined the very land reform that its adherents believed was critical to building El Salvador’s democracy.34 Here is how in 1984 then-presidential candidate Roberto D ’Aubuisson characterized the reform program: Let us speak of justice that, being already undermined, has become a factor in the violence: the expropriations. Is it fair to expropriate violently? I think not, because if the government had felt secure and sure of popular support, it could

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The Salvador Option

have proceeded gradually in implementing its intention better to distribute the land. However, when a government feels unstable and follows foreign instruc­ tions it behaves in this way, and that does not constitute justice or compliance with the law. If you vote... A R E N A ’s [rightist political party] position... it will be our obligation to correct those errors.35

At the peak of land reform in the early 1980s, roughly 23 percent of the rural population had benefited, a figure that had dropped to 17 percent by the end of the decade. And after 10 years of land reform, critics noted that by 1990, 80 percent of farmland still belonged to the original owners.36 At the same time, the vital Phase II that targeted medium-sized estates was never implemented, and the right-wing coalition voted into power in the 1982 election reversed many of the key components of the land reform. On the other hand, Salvadoran socialist Ruben Zamora acknowledged in an interview with the author three decades after the fact, that despite its many faults, land reform was a momentous development. “ Make no mistake the agrarian reform in the early 1980s eliminated the latifundia (large estate) as we know it.”37 Another disputed legacy is the extent to which land reform served to undermine popular support in rural areas for the guerrillas as they geared up for their final offensive to seize power in early 19 8 1. Some contend that this link is undermined by the fact that the FM LN ’s “ major setbacks” came in the cities, not the countryside. In this inter­ pretation, even though most of the violence was concentrated in rural areas, killings by the death squads and FAES in the cities became the biggest deterrent to the success of the wide-scale insurrection. Through its “ lavish brutality” the military failed to distinguish between “ dis­ senters and revolutionaries” ; many of those killed were not linked to the guerrillas, but enough were that the FM LN ’s “ political infrastruc­ ture” was decimated. Thus, the guerrillas “ simply did not have enough allies left alive in San Salvador to organize a general strike” - a key element of the revolution.38 It is worth considering whether this can fully explain the FM LN ’s lack of popular support for the insurrection given other factors, such as the reformist October 1979 coup and the controversial junta’s social and economic policies that at least rhetorically were quite similar to what the guerrillas and mass organizations were calling for. Another

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question is why the guerrillas were so confident about their final offen­ sive if their political infrastructure had been destroyed. Despite contentions that land reform debilitated the guerrillas, con­ servatives in both Washington and El Salvador despised land reform, deeming it a socialist effort. Nevertheless, the incoming Reagan admin­ istration used the massive land reform to explain why the guerrillas failed in the offensive. Top U.S. diplomat for Latin America, Thomas Enders, argued that land reform had worked, albeit imperfectly: In 1980 the new Salvadoran Government - after its predecessors had for years ignored pressing socioeconomic problems - had started a program to benefit the poor. The reform addressed key issues that the insurgents had hoped to exploit as their own. Every passing day was demonstrating that the guerrillas’ premises - that they were dealing from strength at home and abroad - were wrong. . . . The issue is no longer whether land reform is advisable or not. The issue now is how to consolidate and perfect what has been done.39

At the same time, Enders justified the Reagan administration’s deci­ sion to also send military assistance. “ But when trained guerrillas with outside backing take up machineguns, mortars, and recoilless rifles, no amount of fertilizers, schools or clinics can prevent them from sowing terror or attempting to seize power by force.”40

“ Look at That Son of a Bitch Viera” Sometime after 10 p.m . on the night of January 3, 19 8 1, Americans Michael Hammer and Mark Perlman and the Salvadoran labor official Jose Rodolfo Viera arrived to eat dinner in the Sheraton hotel’s restau­ rant in San Salvador. Hammer and Perlman were serving in El Sal­ vador as agrarian advisors for the U.S. government-supported Ameri­ can Institute of Free Labor Development (AIFLD). As head of the government land agency, Viera was helping coordi­ nate the land reform policies. Viera’s political enemies were vehemently opposed to land reform and viewed him as a dangerous adversary. In M ay 1980, the death squad known as the Secret Anti-Communist Army (Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista, ESA) called Viera a “ commu­ nist traitor” who should be eliminated by the “ patriots” who were fighting for a government that would respect “ private property.” There

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The Salvador Option

were two separate attempts to murder him in this same year, efforts that might have been conducted by the National Guard - part of the government’s security apparatus.41 Coincidentally, rightist businessman Hans Christ, National Guard officer Rodolfo López Sibrian, and Salvadoran Army captain Eduardo Avila, the latter two of whom had been arrested along with D ’Aubuisson in M ay 1980 on suspicion of coup plotting, had arrived at the same restaurant earlier to dine. Christ immediately recognized Viera and commented to his companions, “ Look at that son of a bitch Viera, he has let his beard grow. I wish he were dead.”42 Soon after, in the hotel parking lot, Lopez Sibrian ordered his two National Guard bodyguards to go inside and kill the three men. Armed with a 9-millimeter Ingram submachine gun and another .45millimeter submachine gun, the guards entered the hotel and opened fire, killing Viera and his two foreign companions. The two soldiers fled the hotel immediately and escaped in Sibrian’s vehicle to a house.43 The investigation into the Sheraton hotel murders initially did not advance very far despite intense pressure from the U.S. Embassy - and by extension a U.S. Congress already up in arms over the killing of four American churchwomen a month earlier.44 Back in the United States, what became known as the “ Sheraton murders” quickly became part of the heated debate over El Salvador.45 Critics of the Reagan administration’s policies contended that the grisly killings were more evidence that, similar to the American mission in Vietnam, the U.S. campaign in El Salvador was destined to escalate into further violence. Less discussed at the time, however, was the motivation behind the cold-blooded murders: the Americans and their Salvadoran counter­ part were pushing for land reforms that the country’s oligarchy viscer­ ally despised. In 1984, Senator Edward Kennedy (D, MA) put forth an amend­ ment to cut off additional military aid to El Salvador until the Sal­ vadoran government began the prosecution of the perpetrators behind the assassination of the two American labor advisors. Kennedy was vehemently against the aid: “ We are being asked to provide a blank check for the future of El Salvador when it may elect a president... tied to the people who have committed some of the grossest violations of human rights that we have seen.”46 Although the amendment did not pass, the following year the investigation was reactivated and on

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February 14 , 1986, two National Guard enlistees were convicted of the murders and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Despite the convicted gunmen’s detailed testimony implicating two army officers, the officers were not tried.47 A spokesman for the AIFLD, Jack Heberle, despon­ dently characterized the situation: “ The convictions are unfortunately further evidence that Salvadoran Army officers are immune from pros­ ecution for even the most heinous crimes.”48 In late December 1987, the two soldiers were released under an amnesty act - foreshadowing a war that would become mired in unresolved murders and injustices.

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i5

The American Churchwomen

In this house are Communists. Everyone who enters here will die. Try it and see. - A threatening letter received at a Catholic parish house, December 19 8 0 1 Those who work on the side of the poor suffer the same fate as the poor. - Archbishop (Oscar Romero2 I hope you come to find that which gives life a deep meaning for you. Something worth living for, maybe even dying for. - American Sister Ita Ford writing to her teenage niece3

“ They Were Never Ours to Lose” American nuns Ita Ford and Maura Clarke were members of the Maryknoll order, which specialized in international mission work. In 1980 they were working in the Salvadoran mountain town of Chalatenango assisting in a project for the resettlement of refugees fleeing the unfold­ ing violence. Sister Dorothy Kazel, an Ursuline nun, and Jean Donovan, a lay volunteer, were conducting similar work for a parish in the coastal town of La Libertad. Jean Donovan had previously worked at an accounting firm in Cleveland, Ohio, but in 19 77 she quit her job and joined the Maryknoll Lay Mission, a Catholic order. Donovan was sent to El Salvador where she worked as an accountant. Not surprisingly, Donovan greatly

160

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admired Archbishop Romero and even worked with him. She regularly baked him chocolate chip cookies and dropped them off after Sunday mass.4 Although increasingly terrified as violence levels escalated in the late 1970s, Donovan continued her work: “ Things are so much worse, it’s unbelievable,” she reflected to a friend in May 1980. “ People are being killed daily. We just found out that three people from our area had been taken, tortured, and hacked to death.” Not long after, two close friends were murdered immediately after walking her home. She considered returning to the United States. “ I almost could,” she wrote, “ except for the children, the poor, bruised victims of this insanity. Who would care for them? Whose heart could be so staunch as to favor the reasonable thing in a sea of their tears and loneliness? Not mine, dear friend, not mine.” 5 Dorothy Kazel and Maura Clarke also revealed their fears through their writing but, like Donavan, neither could bring themselves to leave El Salvador. In a letter to a friend, Kazel wrote, “ We talked quite a bit today about what happens IF something begins. And most of us feel we would want to stay here__ We wouldn’t want to just run out on the people.” 6 In a graphic recounting of what drove these fears, shortly before her death Maura wrote, “ M y fear of death is being challenged constantly as children, lovely young girls, old people, are being shot, and some cut up with machetes, bodies thrown by the road and people prohibited from burying them.”7 And finally, Sister Ita was “ generous to a fault” and gave away “ vir­ tually everything she had except what was on her back.” She also had her own political convictions of the U.S. role abroad. “ Sometimes the United States has to realize it does not own Central America or any other part of the w orld... [and] that people have the right to shape their own destiny, to choose the type of government they want. We don’t lose Cuba, we don’t lose Nicaragua because they were never ours to lose. The sooner we accept this, the better.” 8

“ Tengo Instrucciones” In the early evening of December 2 ,19 8 0 , Ford and Clarke were return­ ing from an annual Maryknoll meeting in Managua. Kazel and Dono­ van drove their white Toyota van to meet them at El Salvador’s inter­ national airport situated near La Libertad, an hour’s drive from the

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The Salvador Option

capital. The airport was packed with foreigners arriving to attend the funeral the next day of the civilian leaders of the leftist Democratic Rev­ olutionary Front (Frente Democrático Revolucionario, FDR) who had been kidnapped and murdered by death squads the previous week.9 The four Americans met and, while waiting for their luggage, chatted with a group of Canadian church workers. A Salvadoran official on duty at the airport saw Sister Kazel and Donovan arrive on the Man­ agua flight and phoned his superior officer, Sergeant Luis Antonio Colindres Aleman, who was in charge of the National Guard detachment at the airport. Earlier that day, Sergeant Colindres had ordered four National Guardsmen to wear civilian clothing and accompany him to the airport. Colindres told the men that they had a “ special mission” involving the “ capture” of four persons arriving from Nicaragua.10 When the four churchwomen left the airport, the National Guards­ men followed their van in a military jeep. When the Guardsmen stopped the churchwomen’s vehicle, Colindres interrogated the churchwomen and instructed his subordinates to take them to an isolated place. One Guardsman later reported that he saw Sergeant Colindres make a telephone call and heard him say “ muy bien” (very well) as if he was receiving orders. After that call, Colindres ordered the Guardsmen to kill the women. One of the Guardsmen asked if there was a writ­ ten order, to which Sergeant Colindres replied, “ tengo instrucciones” (I have instructions). The next morning on December 3, Father Paul Schindler, an Ameri­ can citizen living in La Libertad, informed Salvadoran authorities that the four women did not arrive as expected. After spending the day searching for the missing women, Schindler discovered their Toyota van at about 8 p.m . that night on a road 10 miles northwest of the air­ port. The vehicle had been stripped of its license plates and destroyed by fire; it was burned so badly that only the engine number could con­ firm its identification. That same morning, a villager discovered the bodies of the four women along a rural road near the village of Santiago Nonualco, 15 miles northeast of the airport and 20 miles from the site of the burned van.11 All of the women had been beaten, raped, and shot in the head execution style.12 The underwear of three and bloody ban­ danas were found alongside their bodies. Locals dug a common grave for the corpses. One woman was found nude below the waist and out of respect, a local farmer replaced her pants before the hasty burial.13

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f i g u r e 1 5 . 1 . Unearthing of four assassinated American churchworkers from unmarked graves, Santiago Nonualco, December 1980. The grisly killings prompted the Carter administration to suspend all economic and military aid to El Salvador. Yet, within days, Carter resumed the economic aid and, faced with the formidable FM LN offensive in January 19 8 1, he also restored military aid. Photo and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

It was not until the morning of December 4 that U.S. Ambassador Robert White was informed by a parish priest that the bodies of the “ blond foreigners” had been located.14 White immediately headed out to the gravesite where Father Schindler joined him after also being con­ tacted by the priest. Salvadoran and foreign journalists soon started arriving at the crime scene. A Salvadoran coroner on the scene gave permission for the bodies to be removed from the shallow grave.15 When asked why the women were targeted, White replied, “ In the eyes of the military, identification with the poor was the same as identifica­ tion with revolution.” Standing over their gravesite, White promised himself, “ The bastards won’t get away with it.” 16

“ Leading Perpetrator of Violence” Within hours of the crime’s discovery, President Carter received a classified briefing indicating a “ high probability” that the Salvadoran

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The Salvador Option

National Guard had perpetrated the heinous act - the first security forces’ killings of Americans. The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador con­ fidentially reported that the “ leading perpetrator of violence on the government side is the Guardia Nacional.” 17 Less than 24 hours after the women’s bodies had been pulled from the shallow dirt grave, the indignant Carter administration announced that it was suspending all economic and military aid to El Salvador.18 On December 13 , however, the administration announced a resumption of the economic aid and three days later approved a new $20 million international loan for eco­ nomic development. The justification was that a new junta led by Jose Napoleon Duarte merited the assistance.19 Carter officials added that military aid would not be restored until the FAES took greater steps to improve the human rights situation.20 The churchwomen’s killings immediately became one of the most salient episodes in the still limited but soon expanding American involvement in El Salvador’s internal war. At the time, critics of U.S. policy concluded that this was more conclusive evidence of the nefar­ ious nature of the Salvadoran security forces. And President Carter shared this disgust, as shown by the summary decision to stop assis­ tance to El Salvador. At the same time, the outgoing Carter adminis­ tration would quickly have to reconsider the strategic limitations of suspending aid for its symbolic importance. For U.S. policymakers the dilemma was whether the most effective way forward was to punish the Salvadoran government by suspending aid versus staying engaged even if the aid was not substantial. What is more, no matter the level of disgust at the cold-blooded murders of the churchwomen, Carter still prioritized the broader anti-communism strategy. This deeply embed­ ded ideology would quickly come to complicate a series of key deci­ sions regarding El Salvador.

“ Get to the Bottom of These Murders” Under swelling pressure from critics who contended that the U.S. gov­ ernment was covering up the crime since it could undermine Carter’s support for the junta, American diplomats in San Salvador pushed much harder to get a conviction.21 In a secret cable written for senior officials back in Washington, the embassy recounted its dealings with National Guard chief Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova:

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In the course of breakfast, Vides made plain his viewpoint that the natural strategic interests of the U.S. and El Salvador should take priority over con­ cerns of a secondary importance such as the two investigations [one being the murder of the U.S. churchwomen and the other the killing of American land reform experts] currently under way. Charge [Charge d’ affaires or acting ambassador] and DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission, or second-in-command at the Embassy] used every opportunity to convince the two officers that this was a misunderstanding of the situation and that accumulating impatience in the U.S. with the dilatory action of the Salvadoran armed forces to get to the bot­ tom of these murders could jeopardize our economic and military assistance.22

Under this advisory by the American patrons, Jose Guillermo García promised to punish the perpetrators; on M ay 9, 19 8 1, he announced the detention of six security force members in connection with the churchwomen’s murders.23 This was certainly welcomed by the Carter administration that was worried about the Duarte junta’s survival. Carter’s National Security Council (NSC) aide Robert Pastor’s positive spin on the junta’s improvements suggested that they were eager to interpret the situation positively. In explaining its decision to resume a “ modest flow” of non-lethal and lethal military aid so soon after it had been summarily suspended, Pastor wrote, “ The Salvadoran govern­ ment took a number of added steps in the investigation of the killings of the American nuns, and dismissed a prominent officer associated with the repression.”24 Yet within weeks, the killings of two Ameri­ can land reform officials by the security forces would shock the Carter administration once again. As the investigation unfolded that spring of 19 8 1, controversy erupted on March 24 when the incoming Secretary of State Alexan­ der Haig explained to Congress that the murders were an accident caused by fidgety soldiers who “ misread the mere traveling down the road [of the nuns’ van] as an effort to run a roadblock.”25 This was after incoming Reagan official Jeane Kirkpatrick had told the Tampa Tribune, “ I don’t think the government [of El Salvador] was respon­ sible. The nuns were not just nuns; the nuns were political activists. We ought to be a little more clear-cut about this than we usually are. They were political activists on behalf of the Frente and some­ body who is using violence to oppose the Frente killed them.” 26 These comments were widely cited in subsequent congressional meetings, but Kirkpatrick contended she was taken out of context. A logical

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The Salvador Option

question is whether Haig’s and Kirkpatrick’s remarks were an expres­ sion of official Reagan administration policy or something more spon­ taneous and unofficial.27 Whatever two of Reagan’s top diplomatic officials were saying in public, it appeared that the U.S. foreign pol­ icy bureaucracy continued to work behind the scenes to pressure the Salvadorans to get convictions. After years of delay and controversy, in late M ay 1984 five lowranking members of the National Guard were convicted of the mur­ ders.28 No higher-ranking officials were held accountable. Ballistic and fingerprint evidence analyzed by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investiga­ tions (FBI) proved instrumental in the convictions.29 This represented the first successful prosecution since 1979 of anyone in the Salvado­ ran military for such crimes.30 Yet many observers, including family and friends of the murdered women, believed that the United States had not done enough. In a N ew York Times special report released in 2014, a friend of one of the churchwomen contended, “ How the United States handled this case was one of the gravest damages. The signal was not sent that you cannot do this.”31 Years later information emerged that senior Salvadoran officers had indeed attempted to cover up complicity of higher-up officers by, among other things, tampering with evidence.32

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i6

Arming the Rebels

This revolution goes beyond our borders. - Tomás Borge, Sandinista commander1

Sandinista Support for Armed Struggle El Salvador in 1980 had guerrillas but no guerrilla war - at least not in the formal sense of an organized insurgency. Thus, paradoxi­ cally, the “ civil w ar” likely started earlier than we have often imag­ ined despite the fact that the formal guerrilla insurgency began in early 19 8 1. Indeed, until this point the revolutionary forces were eager but “ fragmented into competing factions.” And they still lacked a unified command and heavier, more lethal weaponry.2 This was all about to change. In fact, at least according to inherently biased U.S. intelligence reports written in the mid-1980s, captured FM LN documents revealed that only days after Somoza’s ouster in July 1979, Salvadoran guer­ rilla representatives met in Managua to discuss Sandinista support for armed struggle in El Salvador.3 Yet it apparently took over a year for external support to get fully under way, something expedited by the Havana-led unification of the disparate Salvadoran guerrilla factions into the FM LN in late 1979 and early 1980.4 In mid-October 1980, Havana was the site where alleged repre­ sentatives of communist parties in Central American and Mexico met and agreed to establish a network to control the provision of materiel for the Salvadoran insurgency. The rendezvous, originally slated for 167

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The Salvador Option

Managua, was moved to Havana at the request of the Sandinistas to obscure their involvement in the transhipments. During this same month, U.S. intelligence observed a sharp increase in flight frequen­ cies that suggested a marked rise in the flow of military equipment into Nicaragua from Cuba. Augusto C. Sandino international airport was closed for regular flights between 10 p.m . and 4 a .m . for several weeks to allegedly “ accommodate cargo planes ferrying arms and other equipment from Cuba” - and thus possibly onward to El Salvador.5 These sorts of reports prompted an exasperated Carter adminis­ tration to send a demarche [formal diplomatic representation of the official position] to the Sandinista government indicating that arms shipments to El Salvador would jeopardize the recently approved $75 million in economic development funds from the United States. The Sandinistas responded that while some Nicaraguans might have been involved in such activity, it was not government policy. The Sandinistas held up transhipments for roughly a month despite FM LN requests to keep the arms flowing. Another Sandinista leader later quipped, “ They [the United States] say that we are sending weapons to El Salvador but they have not offered any real proof. But let us suppose that weapons have reached El Salvador from here. This is possible.” 6 Then in November, and soon after the second tranche of the spe­ cially enacted $75 million of U.S. assistance was authorized for dis­ bursement, the Nicaraguans enacted a new series of even larger ship­ ments by sea and air. In a captured longhand letter, the FM LN logistics coordinator in Managua informed the FM LN general staff that 12 0 tons of equipment were still located in Nicaragua await­ ing transfer to El Salvador. He added that around 300-400 tons of materiel would arrive in Cuba by mid-November and soon be ready for transfer to El Salvador via Nicaragua. The logistics officer contended that El Salvador was becoming “ the first revolution in Latin America in which they have committed themselves unconditionally with assis­ tance before the seizure of power.”7 The letter urged the Salvadoran guerrillas to do more to absorb the arms shipments, pointing out that some communist nations around the world had doubled their promised aid. By mid-December, FM LN leaders began to operate Radio Lib­ eración, a clandestine radio station that broadcasted from Nicaragua with the help of Cuban technicians. Soon after, a second clandestine

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station, Radio Vencerémos, began broadcasting in the vicinity of the Honduras-El Salvador border.8 According to an American diplomat, the arms shipment issue was a “ hot potato for them [the Sandinistas]” since this “ firm first step” placed them squarely at odds with the Carter administration.9 Their reason for participating in the transhipments was likely due in part to the “ pressure they were feeling from Cuba.” Another factor was that Nicaraguans assumed that the arms shipments would allow them to gain influence with Salvadorans, especially once the revolution was victorious.10 Moreover, the CIA contended that Managua viewed the Salvadoran insurgency as a “ key element” in its own survival, which according to a U.S. intelligence report “ explains Nicaragua’s wideranging support activities for the insurgents since the Sandinistas took power in July 1979 and the high level of arms shipments during the period of October 1980-January 19 8 1 - despite the prospects that such activities could embroil relations with the United States.” 11 The CIA also reported that Salvadoran guerrillas were receiving “ basic instruction” in Nicaragua to prepare for more “ advance courses taught in Cuba.” 12 On the U.S. side, subsequent classified reporting from El Salvador to Washington expressed concern not just about the arms deliveries but also the “ return of battle-seasoned [Salvadoran guerrilla] veterans who have been fighting with the Sandinistas.” There was also the fear of “ the possible arrival here [in El Salvador] of Sandinistas ready to pay off their debts, flushed with victory, and imbued with a sense of mis­ sion to liberate and ‘democratize’ Central America.” American diplo­ mats argued that in the “ worst of cases” they would witness “ an influx of Cuban advisors and those other ‘foreign brigades’ who apparently helped swell Sandinista ranks.” 13 On December 1,19 8 0 , NSC advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sent Carter a Top Secret “ daily report” with the headline, “ Soviets Seek Ways to Support Revolutionary Left in El Sal­ vador.” 14 The aide described Moscow as “ seeking indirect ways” to funnel aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas “ without provoking U.S. inter­ vention.” Brzezinski had already informed Carter in an earlier memo that M oscow’s aid to the insurgents would come “ by way of East European countries.” 15 Brzezinski ended the note with this pessimistic prediction: “According to the CIA, Soviet policy toward El Salvador,

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[and] the recent visit to Moscow by a high-level Nicaraguan delega­ tion ... indicate that the Soviets are now attempting to develop a more activist policy in the hemisphere.” 16

“ Conclusive Proof” On January 2, 19 8 1, CIA aerial photography captured images of a C-47 cargo plane on a short airstrip at Papalonal, 25 miles north­ west of Managua and “ just a short hop” across the Gulf of Fon­ seca to El Salvador. The CIA watched the field change from a dirt strip of 800 meters used for agricultural purposes in July 1980 to a graded strip 50 percent longer with turnarounds and storage build­ ings by December.17 Existing infiltration routes on land could not han­ dle the growing volume of arms for the planned FM LN final offen­ sive scheduled for January 19 8 1. Thus, and relying on Cuban sup­ port, the Sandinistas acquired a “ more direct role” and started airlift­ ing arms from airfields in Nicaragua. Nicaraguan Air Force comman­ der Rafil Venerio Granera and a Cuban advisor reportedly directed the operation.18 At times the Sandinistas received Soviet-bloc weapons from Cuba but then sent their own stockpiles of Western arms to El Salvador in one more attempt to hide their origin. In echoes of the Cuban Missile Crisis almost two decades earlier, the “ pattern and speed” of construction convinced American technicians of their mili­ tary capabilities. The CIA then combined the Papalonal airfield images with a “ vast quantity” of new intelligence collected over the previous month to pro­ duce a report sent to the White House on January 6, 19 8 1, just days before the guerrilla final offensive.19 For NSC aide Robert Pastor, this was the first time there was “ conclusive proof” that Managua was “ providing significant amounts” of “ more sophisticated” aid to the FM LN through “ massive shipments.”20 Now the CIA was reporting to U.S. officials that the “ quantity and quality” of guerrilla weaponry had “ grown rapidly” in recent months, but that the weapons were unevenly distributed among the FM LN factions, and the guerrillas lacked suffi­ cient training and experience in using them.21 In this analysis done for the very U.S. policymakers working on Salvador policy, the report con­ cluded that during 1980 “ perhaps only twenty percent” of the FM LN fighters carried German HK G-3, American M -i Garand, or Belgian

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FN FAL semi-automatic rifles. In contrast, by August, guerrillas had begun to employ bazookas, shoulder-fired anti-tank rockets, recoilless rifles, rifle grenades, and a Chinese version of the Soviet RPG-2 that was apparently used during a September 16 , 1980, attack on the U.S. Embassy. The report added that the guerrillas also possessed Ameri­ can M-79 grenade launchers, “ traced to a 1974 U.S. shipment to Viet­ nam.”22 Traces run on the serial numbers of over 1,600 M -16 rifles captured from FM LN insurgents in 1 9 8 1 indicated that two-thirds had been originally sent to South Vietnam.23 On January 7, 1 9 81 , three days before the offensive that U.S. pol­ icymakers suspected was imminent, the Carter team instructed the U.S. ambassador in Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzullo, to “ deliver a stiff demarche to Sandinista officials.”24 Two days later Pezzullo reminded Sandinista leader Tomáis Borge of Managua’s promises not to become actively involved in the Salvadoran war; he also warned his Nicaraguan counterpart that U.S.-Nicaragua relations would be the “ first casu­ alty” of such behavior.25 As his government had done with the pre­ vious demarche a few months earlier, Borge contended that arms ship­ ments were not officially sanctioned, but that Managua was “ acting responsibly” as seen through the seizure of a truckload of arms pass­ ing through Nicaragua en route to El Salvador from Costa Rica. In Robert Pastor’s recollection, Borge was “ slow to realize that his cover story had been blown away” since the Americans held the incriminat­ ing intelligence images of the Papalonal airstrip. Pezzullo demanded that the Sandinistas stop using Papalonal and close down Radio Liberacion, although it was not until February 6 that the station conceded to U.S. pressures.26 In another move to respond to the weapons ship­ ments, the Carter administration sent a diplomat, Jon Glassman, to El Salvador to help the Duarte junta prepare a case at the Organization of American States (OAS) forum in Washington against Nicaraguan violations of its sovereignty.

“ We Sincerely Thank the Vietnamese People” U.S. estimates of the FM LN ’s external assistance came in part from droves of captured FM LN internal documents that the FAES had thought worthless. The keen and fortuitous analysis of these docu­ ments revealed legions of FM LN efforts to exploit external support,

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The Salvador Option

such as commander Schafik Handal’s clandestine trip to Eastern Bloc countries to obtain promises for arms deliveries from these ideolog­ ically predisposed allies.27 Another revelation was the integral role that Vietnam was playing in assisting the poorly equipped Salvado­ ran rebels. Sandinista ruling member Daniel Ortega traveled to Hanoi in March 1 9 8 1 and in a speech there commented, “ We sincerely thank the Vietnamese people and highly value their support for the heroic Salvadoran people__ The fierce and bloody struggle in El Salvador requires the support of all progressive nations and forces throughout the world.”28 While U.S. revelations were relegated to classified intelligence reports, in El Salvador the existence of clandestine arms shipments was an open secret. In fact, guerrilla commanders were forthcoming in revealing where they were getting their increasingly sophisticated arms. ERP leader Joaquin Villalobos admitted that external assistance through Honduras - and the cross border sanctuaries the guerrillas called “ bolsones” (large purse) - was as important to the FM LN as the Ho Chi Minh Trail was to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong during the war in Southeast Asia.29 In El Salvador, popular support for the FM LN was never great, but the guerrillas enjoyed a strong back­ ing within the refugee camps located inside Honduras that housed Sal­ vadorans fleeing the war. One fascinating counterfactual is whether the FM LN would have launched its fateful final offensive had it not received so much war materiel, mostly through Nicaragua. The guerrillas might have been able to arm their ranks sufficiently through the acquisition of FAES weaponry, something they did throughout the war to supplement their externally provided stocks. If there had not been a final offensive, per­ haps the guerrillas could have been able to negotiate with the Duarte junta. Or it could have been the case that the Salvadoran armed forces and death squads would have continued to annihilate the leftist groups, only reinforcing the military’s grip on the country.

“ Your Place Is in El Salvador” Writing three decades later, the Associated Press correspondent in El Salvador in early 1 981 described what led him to dismiss the U.S. and Salvadoran government claims about the arms shipments. At that point

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f i g u r e 1 6 .1 . Map from a 1982 classified U.S. intelligence document indicat­ ing clandestine arms shipment routes to El Salvador’s Marxist guerrilla group, the FM LN. Cuba was a main source of the FM LN ’s weapons although ship­ ments also came from sympathetic communist regimes, such as those in Viet­ nam and Czechoslovakia. Vocal critics of the Reagan administration contended that the U.S. government intentionally inflated the threat of external com­ munist support to Salvadoran guerrillas in order to justify a military anti­ communist strategy in El Salvador - and Central America more broadly. Map prepared by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Cartography Lab©. Reprinted with permission.

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The Salvador Option

San Salvador claimed to be in control of the entire country, a claim he knew was false since “ those of us working in rural areas knew that was hooey” as the guerrillas controlled at least one departmental capital. Thus, when the U.S. Embassy announced that the Salvadoran military had recovered boats used by the Sandinistas to smuggle arms to the FM LN, the report “ was met with a collective yawn.”30 The Sandinistas also vehemently denied the accusation of arms shipments. “ This is a lie against the Nicaraguan revolution because everyone knows the position of the Nicaraguan government,” contended Miguel d’Escoto, the U.S.-born Maryknoll priest who served as the Sandinistas’ first for­ eign minister. Years later, however, a well-published scholar of guer­ rilla warfare in El Salvador, (Oscar Martínez Peñate, described the route for these shipments: they “ left Nicaragua, passed through the Gulf of Fonseca, and arrived at a [Salvadoran] beach near Tamarindo,” allow­ ing them to evade the radar searching for blips on a screen. “ These weapons were picked up by the guerrillas near that beach and trans­ ported by foot to Guazapa, Chalatenango, Morazim, and Usulatan,” all FM LN strongholds.31 Over time, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and Nicara­ gua would all provide weapons to the FM LN. Some of these ship­ ments might have even been controlled by Moscow, but Havana was the main provider.32 Guerrilla leader Joaquin Villalobos recalled that when he explained to Fidel Castro that FM LN members wanted him to visit Moscow to obtain weapons provisions, the Cuban rev­ olutionary’s response was, “ Chico! What are you going to do in Moscow? Your place is in El Salvador, with the combatants. I’ll take care of Moscow’s support.”33 Weapons given by third parties like Czechoslovakia were brought to Cuba on commercial boats or air­ planes. From the island, the weapons were often sent to Nicaragua the effective “ warehouse” in this sophisticated arms operation. From there, in addition to the overland route from Honduras, arms would be smuggled into El Salvador using Nicaraguan fishing boats that would cross the Gulf of Fonseca. The FM LN would often conduct a nearby operation in order to divert the FAES while the arms were unloaded and quickly transferred to guerrilla-controlled areas in the mountains.34 The FM LN coveted the supplies from Hanoi since these often included U.S. weapons abandoned in the final days of the long Vietnam conflict. Another viable way to procure high-quality

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weapons was simply to buy the mostly U.S.-provided arms from Salvadoran soldiers.35 U.S. officials were also reporting in late 1982 that the FM LN and its political wing, the FDR, were receiving monetary aid from “ soli­ darity activity” in the United States and Western Europe, including a payment of two million marks from West German groups for arms and medicines. Villalobos’s justification for these myriad sources and types of assistance was that the arms were critical for an insurgency that up until this point lacked any way to fight, “ We had nothing then [before the shipments], we were a social movement that was unarmed, all our military personnel were a few guerrillas.”36 The unfolding revelations of significant amounts of arms shipments to the FM LN began to influence the political debate on El Salvador back in Washington. After receiving a briefing on the topic, Democratic Senator Paul Tsongas stated, “ Those of us who are opposed to the policy accept the fact that there is indeed Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador.”37 And for many on both sides of the aisle in Washington, these reports of external aid bolstered the case for a concerted U.S. effort to strengthen the Salvadoran government. In the early years of the conflict, the Reagan administration made much of the external support to the FM LN, especially coming from Cuba and Nicaragua. In fact, Managua’s alleged arms shipment to the FM LN is what first prompted the Reagan administration to provide covert assistant to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua. Many journalists and other observers claim that the issue of aid to the FM LN had been greatly exaggerated in order to justify greater U.S. military intervention and make events in El Salvador fit the Reagan team’s ide­ ological prism. While a case can be made that Carter and Reagan officials did exploit the issue politically, there is no question that the FM LN ’s receipt of sizable external arms shipments was a critical fac­ tor in its growing prowess - and that this funding source was up and running shortly before the failed final offensive in early January 19 8 1. In retrospect, the Sandinista defense minister lamented the decision to arm the FM LN given the fury it caused in Washington: “ we paid a heavy price for our international romanticism.”38

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17 Guerrilla Final Offensive, January 1981

This country is going to have violence, a massacre that has not even begun. Who did this? Communists? Capitalists? Oligarchs? Who knows? Nobody ever knows. - A Salvadoran comments after his father’s death, January 1 9 8 1 1 Mao said that the guerrillas live among the people like fish in water. But here it is the reverse, the army that lives with the people. - Colonel Ricardo Pena, January 1 9 8 1 2

OnJanuary 1 0 ,1 9 8 1 , the recently united FM LN announced the launch of its “ Final Offensive” that lasted over the next three weeks: At 5:00 this afternoon the offensive was launched. The enemy is lost; we have him surrounded. Popular injustice is at hand__ The General Command sum­ mons the people to set up local powers throughout the country, alternatives to the municipal authorities, and to erect barricades and to provide water to the popular combatants__ People of El Salvador, we have begun the national liberation. The moment has come to take to the streets. . . . The decisive hour has come to initiate the decisive insurrectional battles for the seizure of power.3

More than 2,500 poorly trained guerrillas and a few hundred Cubans initiated scores of attacks against FAES positions. This was roughly the same number of forces that the Sandinistas had when they unleashed their operation to oust Somoza. Swollen with optimism after witness­ ing their comrade Sandinistas’ dramatic victory in Nicaragua less than two years earlier, the FM LN scheduled the offensive for early January 176

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so that they would be able to seize power before the hawkish Reagan administration took office a few weeks later.4 Bolstered by several months of receiving clandestine shipments from Nicaragua, the guerrillas were now employing a variety of arms “ never before used in El Salvador,” including M -16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers. According to the dubious State Department, “ they were a far cry from handguns, hunting rifles, shotguns, and home­ made explosives,” which before had supposedly been the base of the guerrilla arsenal.5 Within the first hours of battle on January 10 , four San Salvador radio stations had been captured; the guerrillas used them to broadcast a taped message to rally the Salvadoran people behind their revolu­ tion, announcing that junta leader Jose Napoleon Duarte would soon be assassinated. “ Hit-and-run street actions” appeared to be “ every­ where,” one witness recalled. In the cities, buses were burned; in the countryside, rebels stopped buses and exhorted passengers to join the revolution.6 The cities of San Salvador, Santa Ana, Chalchuapa, Chalatenango, and Zacatecoluca came under especially heavy fire. Santa Ana officials described the city as “ under siege.” The country’s main civil­ ian airport an hour’s drive outside of San Salvador was closed, access roads cut off.7 The FM LN occupied 82 cities and villages, including four department capitals. Security forces’ ruthlessness had already won the “ battle” in San Salvador.8 Despite the tumult the FM LN caused in the cities, they still had to reckon with the armed forces and also face the challenges that came with being a newly formed organization. The various guerrilla fac­ tions still remained suspicious of each other, which hampered tacti­ cal and strategic coordination. While only a garrison-like outfit at this point, the 8,000 FAES and 5,000 military policemen proved capable of repelling the guerrilla raids. In a key indication that FAES morale survived the offensive, military troops mutinied in only one garri­ son although troops had to withdraw from numerous small outposts and garrisons.

“ Terrorism Is Not Liberation” Expecting a repeat of Nicaragua, the rebels assumed that the offen­ sive would spark a full-scale popular insurrection, leading to the “ total

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The Salvador Option

breakdown of the government and immediate victory. This did not happen because the overwhelming majority of the Salvadoran popu­ lation ignored the guerrillas’ appeals.”9 Guerrilla leaders also believed that their allied popular organizations in the cities were being deci­ mated by rampant death squad activity. According to one FM LN com­ mander, “ If we didn’t go on the offensive, the military was going to finish us off.” 10 One theory behind the failure of the anticipated wide-scale insur­ rection claimed that it was a “ consequence of the murder of thou­ sands of people in the preceding months” by the FAES and death squads. Through their “ lavish brutality,” the military and death squads failed to distinguish between “ dissenters and revolutionaries” ; many of those killed were not linked to the guerrillas, but enough were that the FM LN ’s “ political infrastructure” was decimated. Thus, the guerrillas “ simply did not have enough allies left alive in San Salvador to organize a general strike” - a key element of the final offensive.11 There might be other factors that explain the failed insurrection, especially the reason so few Salvadorans heeded the rebels’ message to take up arms. What the guerrilla leadership likely had not fully appre­ ciated was that El Salvador’s “ Somoza” in the form of General Romero had already been ousted in the 1979 officers’ coup. Duarte’s precarious junta was deeply hobbled, and death squad and security force abuses were rampant; but despite their many privations, not many Salvado­ rans were convinced by the guerrillas’ rhetoric that revolution was the only option. And the ambitious but stymied national land reform pro­ gram launched nine months earlier was part of this. Fulgencio Batista had been the Cuban revolutionaries’ foil in late 1959; Somoza had played the part in Nicaragua in the late 1970s. But where was the S-O-B in El Salvador? The guerrillas claimed it was the oligarchy’s lackey Duarte, yet this was complicated by the scorn that he elicited from the right. All told and in contrast to heady guerrilla predictions, only about two dozen factories closed and 20,000 public employees did not go into work in support of the rebel offensive.12 The government also helped itself by declaring a strict curfew in face of the imminent attack as well as militarizing utilities and detaining some key labor and political leaders who might have collaborated with the insurgents.

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Shocked by their stalled insurrection, FM LN leaders quickly claimed that it was not in fact a “ final” offensive but a more general operation. Seeking to make up for their losses, the guerrillas carried out a series of urban attacks starting in late February 19 8 1. The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador was rocketed twice and strafed several times over the next few months. Some within Salvadoran civil society criticized the guerrillas’ deci­ sion to unleash the offensive. One senior Catholic Church official stated, “ The groups on the left have made violence an absolute end in itself and magnified their adherence to Marxism. That is why most of the public has turned its back on them__ Terrorism is not liber­ ation.” 13 The church statement reinforced one of the central dilem­ mas of this unfolding war: was violence a legitimate means given El Salvador’s violent and unjust reality or did any reform need to come through peaceful means? In subsequent months and years, the FM LN characterized the offen­ sive as a military setback but a political victory “ because there was a strong international reaction in favor of third-country mediation as the sole alternative to what was otherwise feared would be an inevitable bloodbath.” 14 This was a surprisingly accurate assump­ tion of the American public’s worrisome response to this seemingly Vietnam-like “ inevitable bloodbath” that was unfolding before every­ one’s eyes. Once again, it appeared, America might be backing the los­ ing side in a struggle against Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. In response to the offensive, an American diplomat in San Salvador notified Washington in a secret correspondence that the FM LN oper­ ation had taken place “ with major Cuban and other foreign support.” The offensive had “ changed the character of the conflict to a mili­ tary struggle between the legitimate government of El Salvador and Marxist-Leninist guerrillas backed by Cuba, Nicaragua, and Sovietbloc supplies.” 15 The issue of Sandinista and Cuban support to the FM LN became a fundamental and controversial justification for why the United States needed to support the FAES. Right after the failed final offensive, the U.S. Embassy cabled Washington contending, “ the notion that the USG [U.S. government] should not sell any military equipment to the legiti­ mate government of El Salvador while the guerrillas arm themselves

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with foreign military support is ludicrous.” 16 Ambassador Robert White alarmingly claimed that “ approximately 100 men landed from Nicaragua” as a rationale for U.S. arms aid, a statement he retracted in congressional testimony a few months later.17 On January 16 and only days before his presidency ended, a dis­ tressed Carter signed a presidential determination authorizing military assistance to El Salvador, declaring that “ the U.S. will not refrain from selling military supplies to the legitimate government of El Salvador” in its struggle against “ Marxist-Leninist guerrillas backed by Cuban, Nicaraguan and Soviet-bloc supplies.” 18 Now the administration was pledging to “ support the Salvadoran government in its struggle against left-wing terrorism supported covertly... by Cuba an other Commu­ nist nations.” 19 Over these same days in mid-January 19 8 1, the out­ going Carter administration invoked special executive powers to first reinstate “ nonlethal military equipment” and then to increase military assistance to the Salvadoran government to the amount of $5 million in lethal aid, the first such aid since 19 77 when General Romero refused the assistance.20 The package also included an infusion of advisors consisting of three mobile training teams (MTTs), comprising approx­ imately three dozen soldiers. Shortly after witnessing the aftermath of the churchwomen’s killings, Robert White who just weeks earlier had condemned Nicara­ guan intervention now admonished U.S. policymakers, “ If we escalate our military assistance, we run the grave danger that countries sym­ pathetic to El Salvador’s left will escalate their assistance - with the resulting grave danger that Central America and El Salvador in par­ ticular will become an international battleground between communist countries and the United States.”21 Yet he also acknowledged that the international left was using the guerrilla offensive to “ up the ante” in El Salvador and therefore “ we [the United States] can’t stand idly by and watch the guerrilla movement receive outside assistance.” 22 Critics were quick to claim that these sorts of nebulous conditions were simply political cover for the Carter administration’s backing of a brutal regime. The liberal N ew York Times editors argued, To make clear its displeasure with the Duarte junta’s performance, the Carter administration only a few weeks ago suspended military aid, at least until it was satisfied that Government forces did not conspire in the murder of opposition

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leaders and American Catholic missionaries. No fair inquiry seems to have been held, yet suddenly the aid was restored. It was the wrong signal at the wrong time and is bound to encourage more killing.23

In a sense of where U.S. policy was headed in the aftermath of the final offensive, a month later the new Reagan administration dropped the U.S. insistence on an investigation into the American churchwomen’s killings as a condition for providing economic and military aid to El Salvador.24 Like its decision to continue sending non-lethal aid in the immedi­ ate aftermath of Archbishop Romero’s murder, Carter’s move to send small amounts of lethal aid and a few dozen military advisors was only significant politically.25 Still reeling from the searing setbacks with the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the outgoing Carter was pushing for a middle path “ between terror­ ists on the right, who seek to restore an old tyranny, and terrorists on the left, who seek to create a new one.”26 Many on the Ameri­ can left, however, were not pleased with Carter’s last-minute rever­ sal on military aid. Once again, the N ew York Times editorial page was scathing. “ Of the legacies of the Carter Administration, surely the sloppiest is its policy in El Salvador. The decision, in its last days, to resume the shipment of combat weapons to a besieged and divided junta made a hash of whatever political objectives Washington once had there.”27

“ Prevent Funny Business” In the aftermath of the final offensive that the White House believed had been armed by Cuba via Managua, Carter approved instructions to U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo to inform the Nicaraguans that “ their continued support of the Salvadoran rebels could lead to a rup­ ture in relations.”28 Even though the final offensive occurred in El Sal­ vador, Carter nonetheless had a wary eye on the Sandinistas. He even used the diplomatic carrot of economic assistance to achieve some sort of accommodation with the Marxist government. Robert Pastor wrote that the Sandinistas promised to close Radio Liberación, which they did on January 20 and to take “ strong measures” to prevent “ funny business” at the airfields and other “ unofficial activities.” Despite these

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types of moves, though, Carter cut off remaining aid [$15 million approved in M ay 1980] to the Sandinistas.29 Carter later reflected, I had no alternative but to cut off aid to the Sandinistas before I left office, because there was evidence that was clear to me that the Sandinistas were giving assistance to the revolutionaries in El Salvador, and the law required me to stop the aid. I was very eager to give the people of Nicaragua economic aid after the revolution, but it was not possible under those circumstances.30

Two months later, the incoming Reagan team decided that further mea­ sures were necessary and increased the number of U.S. military train­ ers from 19 to 45 and authorized an additional $25 million in mili­ tary assistance in addition to what had already been budgeted for El Salvador in fiscal year 19 8 1.31 What is abundantly clear during these initial years of the engagement strategy is that El Salvador had turned into a hellhole with rightist death squad excesses and Marxist insur­ gencies armed by Nicaragua and Cuba well before the United States became deeply enmeshed in the conflict.

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It is almost a rare thing to die a natural death in this country. It is almost a miracle. - Auxiliary Bishop Gregorio Rosa Chavez, late 1983 after announcing that that 6,096 people had died of violence in El Salvador that year1 If you had communists in the United States destroying your Golden Gate Bridge and your factories, you’d also hate the communists. - Hugo Barrera, rightist politician2 Terrorism cannot be fought with conventional methods. The only answer is, destroy it. [And to accomplish this] you need excellent intel­ ligence. D ’Aubuisson is excellent on that. He’s U.S.-trained. - Guillermo “ Billy” Sol, businessman and rightwing political activist and one of D’Aubuisson’s earliest backers3

“ Once You Identify Your Enemy, He Will Probably Die” We have seen that the relationship between the military and the oli­ garchy dated back at least to the 1930s with a sense of common inter­ est: stopping communism and other threats to their privileged place in Salvadoran society. One explanation for the rise of death squads in the 1970s is that officers realized they did not need the oligarchy to remain in power - and at times social reform was in the military’s inter­ est. So the oligarchs created their own paramilitary forces - or death

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squads - closely or loosely tied to government security forces, most notably the military, often employing off-duty soldiers desperate for a “ second income.” These death squads shared such a deep antipathy for the revolution­ ary left that they aggressively targeted them starting in the late 1970s. The CIA reported in 1985 that death squads were in fact a function of the small “ extreme right” versus the “ mainstream right.” Both camps were nationalist and anti-communist but only the extremists were char­ acterized by a “ willingness to confront that change with active subver­ sion of the constitutional system and with violent terrorism.”4 Inter­ estingly, the CIA explained to U.S. officials that the “ extreme right” did not “ predominate in any one social, economic, or political sector. Rather, it is a fanatic fringe drawn from all elements of society.” 5 This can be explained by the fact that, while few Salvadorans were active in death squads, many more from “ all economic classes,” including rural peasantry, quietly condoned their behavior since they thought it was working against the revolutionary left - “ however repugnant the methods used.” 6 Critics countered that the real power behind the death squads was the military, not the oligarchy. “ The ‘extreme right’ is just a convenient term for [sic] sort of this government unto itself.” Yet it could have been the case that the military was simply the “ violent arm of the so-called extreme right.”7 Some of the death squads grew out of the vigilante groups used to quash dissent in the countryside. Some of these, like the infa­ mous ORDEN, were officially sanctioned national organizations; oth­ ers were more ad hoc and localized. As we have seen, these groups believed that killing and threatening suspected subversives would take care of the communist threat. As pointed out by conservative politi­ cian Alberto Bondanza, who helped found the conservative National Republic Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, ARENA) out of rightist paramilitary groups, “ If the Americans think that this is a war of one army against another, they are mistaken. This is not a conven­ tional war. The only form of fighting is the form that they [the left] implement. Once you identify your enemy, he will probably die. For­ tunately, the military is with us. Those that are fighting are the death squads.” 8 Given that they were operating under many different labels, another difficult question to answer was the size and number of death squad

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leaders. One U.S. official contended that the individuals used so many varied labels “ as a way of pretending, of trying to present an image that they are large, that they are many.” Yet, he believed, “ It is the same people, using different names. We have estimated, to put it in numbers, at first we thought there were about 100 but the truth is, I would say there are not more than 25.” And even of these numbers, “ maybe five were leaders. The rest are [often off-duty] soldiers.”9 The dilemma U.S officials faced in their role to “ save” El Salvador from communism in these early years was supporting the official gov­ ernment and security forces that had a tacit and even direct involve­ ment in death squad activity. So one question is whether the United States was guilty by association. Did the robust American assistance and advice make the death squad situation better or worse? Another problem was that the death squads’ lethality against the guerrilla cells in the cities was making the left more convinced that a national war was the only way to affect revolution - something that would immeasurably complicate Washington’s ability to draw the line against communism in El Salvador.

$40 per Month and Life Insurance Similar to what was occurring in Guatemala at the same time, by the late 1970s death squads adopted chilling names, such as the White Warriors Union or the Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade in an effort to sow terror among the population, especially the students and urban workers who were most likely to be sympathetic to the guer­ rilla cause.10 Priests advocating the radical tenets of liberation theology were also routine targets. With their ranks often consisting of military conscripts or retired officers, operatives were privately paid by shadowy death squad spon­ sors around $40 per month and sometimes even given life insurance. According to a civilian member of the Christian Democratic junta, the death squads usually included poorly educated non-commissioned officers - sergeants, for example. So when they kill unarmed civil­ ians, “ They really think they’re killing communists.” 11 The funding sources were often murky; businessmen eager to check communist sub­ version were one likely group. Related, wealthy Salvadoran families living in Miami or Guatemala City were some major financial backers,

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although their personal involvement in the death squad organizing and administering is not clear.12 The death squads made public pronouncements championing their anti-communist cause and denouncing enemies. A 1975 note from an emerging death squad called Anti-communist Liberation Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Anticomunista - Guerra de Elimi­ nación, FALANGE) read: We will have the advantage of acting outside the law like the Communists. This is the only way to destroy the Communist beast. We will support the security forces by killing the judges, the law clerks or the corrupt lawyers that want to prosecute them for the deaths of communists or useful fools. . . . The people must understand that this organization will act outside the limits of the law for the good of the population itself, and for its freedom.13

In 1980, the Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade printed the “ Communique from a Death Squad,” in the San Salvador newspaper E l Diario de Hoy: [The Brigade calls] on the national conscience not to be intimidated by false prophets who say nothing when communists destroy businesses, burn coffee sheds, kill peasants, and cruelly assassinate military personnel, security agents and soldiers, but react profusely when communists are executed. . . . [The lead­ ers of the Catholic Church] said nothing when South African Ambassador Dunn was killed, when progressive industrialists were kidnapped or when peasants were massacred in San Pedro Perulapdn and San Esteban Catarina, where the communists had imposed their will by force. In those cases, there was no clamor for respect for human rights, nor was there any [cry of] injus­ tice. In those cases, no defenders were forthcoming from those humble sons of the people, however, the church leaders come out in defense of human rights. That is hypocrisy.14

As the death squad activity continued at its relentless pace in 1980 the State Department appointed a new ambassador in San Salvador, the veteran diplomat Robert White. White had been ambassador to Paraguay, where he staunchly advocated civil liberties and clashed with strongman Alfredo Stroessner. Given his reputation, White’s selection reinforced the Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights in El Salvador and Central America. White quickly got to work. In a speech to the Salvadoran-American Chamber of Commerce in late March he suggested that businessmen were funding the death squads. This

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prompted one landowner to comment, “ Next the USA will just send in the marines to kill anyone in a three piece suit.” Another lamented, “ Now we are made to fear the Yankees as much as the communists. We thought the USA would defend free enterprise.” 15 Rightist protestors were even known to dismissively chant, “ White is Red!” 16

“ El Salvador Is a Nightmare Beyond Comprehension” The death squads were, of course, a harrowing social phenomenon in El Salvador. The international attention they garnered also proved salient for U.S. policy since many Americans skeptical of U.S. efforts abroad connected the gruesome activities by death squads to U.S. mil­ itary assistance. Here is how one correspondent in 1980 portrayed the setting of a violent evening in El Salvador for readers: The popping sounds would usually start at night. Foreign guests staying at San Salvador’s luxury hotel might think that they were hearing the hollow explosions of firecrackers off in the distance. But these were not firecrackers but the sounds of gunfire as the “ escuadrones de muerte” (death squads) made their chilling nightly rounds looking for suspected subversives or anyone else who might be on their hit list.17

FPL commander Carpio recounted, “ In December [1980], disfigured bodies began to appear with signs that read, ‘Merry Christmas, people. We are ridding you of terrorists.’ ” 18 These are the sorts of images and language that are inextricably tied to our memory of El Salvador during its internal war. Journalist Mark Danner described the gruesome scenes in these early years of violence: Sometimes the bodies were headless, or faceless, their features having been obliterated with a shotgun blast or an application of battery acid; sometimes limbs were missing, or hands or feet chopped off, or eyes gouged out; women’s genitals were torn and bloody, bespeaking repeated rape; men’s were often found severed and stuffed into their mouths. And cut into the flesh of a corpse’s back or chest was likely to be the signature of one or another of the “ death squads” that had done the work.19

Death squad activity became so common and lethal that one foreign correspondent concluded, “ For an outsider, even one conditioned over a decade to the standard savageries of Asian wars and African rebel­ lions, El Salvador is a nightmare beyond comprehension.”20 Another

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analysis by an award-winning 1983 article from the Albuquerque Jour­ nal exposed the origins of the death squads, “ In recent years, the United States has allied itself with some of the darkest forces [in El Salvador]. But the worst has been the tolerance of clandestine terror driven by the powerful Salvadoran oligarchy.”21

“ Infiltrated by Marxist Officers” As we have seen, the officers’ reformist coup of 1979 shocked El Sal­ vador’s repressive political, economic, and social structures. If there were particular political losers in the aftermath of the coup, it was the oligarchy; while still powerful it no longer held an iron grip on the country’s economy. Yet there was also an element of hardline military officers who stood to lose in the new junta-led era. These Salvadoran military officers considered the junta to be “ infiltrated by Marxist offi­ cers, which could be fatal for the independence and freedom of the Salvadoran fatherland if the anti-communists in the population fail to act.”22 One way these elements would fight back was through pressur­ ing the junta to jettison leftist members. Another method was death squad violence that targeted relatively moderate Christian Democrats that had embraced the junta. The intellectual and operational head of this informal anti-junta officer network was former Major Roberto D ’Aubuisson Arrieta. D ’Aubuisson was born on August 23, 1943, in Santa Tecla, a large town close to San Salvador. He was the son of Roberto D ’Aubuisson Andrade, a salesman, and Joaquina Arrieta Alvarado D ’Aubuisson, a career civil servant. The family’s paternal roots were French, a legacy that began in El Salvador in the 19th century; one of its forebears was a Frenchman who worked for the de Lesseps Company in its failed quest to build a canal across the isthmus. The young D ’Aubuisson studied at the Salvadoran military academy and later served in the rightist National Guard as an intelligence offi­ cer. D ’Auibuisson was also a protege of Alberto Medrano, former CIA liaison and architect of the paramilitary outfit ORDEN and the state’s intelligence agency. Medrano affectionately referred to D ’Aubuisson and two other young officers as “ my three assassins.”23 As a bud­ ding officer, D ’Aubuisson studied intelligence and security in various American military schools and took a communications course at the

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f i g u r e 1 8 .1 . Roberto D’Aubuisson at a 1987 press conference at A REN A headquarters. The fiery Salvadoran’s involvement in death squad activity proved to be a headache for the U.S. engagement strategy that began in the final months of the Carter administration. Conservative American political groups embraced D’Aubuisson as a stalwart anti-communist. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

U.S. Army School of the Americas. He also observed police operations in Uruguay and Taiwan, two military-ruled countries, and trained with the U.S. Special Forces in Panama. One recurring question is whether U.S. training was instrumental in turning D ’Aubuisson into such a maniacal anti-communist killer. In the mid-1970s, D ’Aubuisson, known as “ chele” (light skinned), directed the White Warriors Union, one of the most notorious of the first wave of death squads.24 Then a major, he was dismissed from the military following the reformist October 1979 coup. While no longer on the inside of the government’s intelligence apparatus and funding, D ’Aubuission’s fiery charisma allowed him to draw sizable financial support from the country’s oligarchy who feared their economic inter­ ests were threatened by the junta’s expansive reform policies. Shortly after Archbishop (Oscar Romero’s murder in March 1980, D ’Aubuisson’s U.S. visa was revoked due to his death squad activities. Nevertheless, D ’Aubuisson managed to slip into the United States to

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meet with conservative allies, including the American Legion and some congressional Republicans. In a secret cable, the U.S. Embassy reported that D ’Aubuisson even bragged that his political party was in “ direct contact” with Republican legislators in Congress.25 Returning to El Salvador, D ’Aubuisson also taped an upbeat mes­ sage for his supporters in the Salvadoran military: “ We have spoken with various senators in the capital and they asked us that we maintain until November.... The Reagan Republicans will win, [and] our luck will change.”26 D ’Aubuisson also chided U.S. diplomats for pursuing a naive policy [i.e., engaging the Duarte-led junta] that would lead to a communist takeover in El Salvador. What was needed was an iron first approach that would stamp out the subversive threat once and for all. One month after his visit to the United States, while most of the country was mourning Archbishop Romero’s death, D ’Aubuisson made a speech distributed on videocassette celebrating the assassination.27 Shortly before his murder, Romero had publicly denounced D ’Aubuisson as a “ liar, torturer, and murderer.” In the taped speech D ’Aubuisson made an effort to delegitimize the reformist government that he despised, accusing moderate governing junta members of sub­ version, the civilian Jose Antonio Morales Ehrlich of having links to the guerrillas [in fact, Ehrlich’s son was a member], and Colonel Adolfo Majano of being a member of the Mexican Communist Party.28

“ Viva Jesse Helms!” After attempting his own coup against the governing junta in May 1980, D ’Aubuisson was arrested along with other implicated officers and civilians and accused of conspiracy, but he was released by a mili­ tary judge.29 Before his release, though, wealthy families gathered out­ side the U.S. ambassador’s residence calling for D ’Aubuisson’s release, chanting “ Viva Reagan!” and “ Viva Jesse Helms!” Upon his release, D ’Aubuisson held a news conference where he repeated his charges against the juntas’ Majano and Morales Elrich before departing to a “ boisterous and temporary” exile in Guatemala.30 A few days after D ’Aubuisson’s arrest for an attempted coup in M ay 1980 against the ruling junta, it is likely not coincidental that seven of the most notorious death squads in the country declared their unification under the title Salvadoran Anti-communist Army (Ejercito

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Salvadoreño Anticomunista, ESA). The proclamation also urged right­ ist political groups to unite the death squads with the military.31 Over the next several months, death squad activity would reach its most ferocious pace - around 1,000 killings per month - in the history of this clandestine, quasi-official war against Marxist subversion.32 One Salvadoran political analyst put the surge in killings in perspective: “ It is one thing for the death squads to go after several hundred peasants in a decade [as was the case in the 1950s and ’ 60s]; it is another thing to kill more than 12,000 people in one year, as happened in 19 8 1.”33 In subsequent years, D ’Aubuisson, the “ godfather of the politics of hate” as journalist James LeMoyne called him, continued to simulta­ neously conduct both death squad work and politics.34 D ’Aubuisson was well trained and perfectly placed to provide the link between the Salvadoran oligarchy and the shadowy network of security forces and intelligence services. To his supporters, he was simply the single most effective leader to prevent a left-wing takeover of El Salvador an outcome that many in the oligarchy found unacceptable. And for D ’Aubuisson, the method of choice was the illegal use of force; indeed, in his view, “ an eye for an eye, tooth for tooth” was needed to root out the communist scourge. During his brief exile in Guatemala following his arrest for the failed coup in 1980, D ’Aubuisson made contacts with internationally linked anti-communist networks and individual anti-communists. From his perch in Guatemala, D ’Aubuisson also continued to plan and direct numerous death squad attacks in El Salvador. On his return to his native country, he maintained access to sources that kept him per­ manently supplied with abundant, up-to-date intelligence information from most armed units or territorial districts, and found other leaders who shared his political views. They offered him logistical support for his activities, sending troops for his personal protection and supplying weapons. The former major routinely appeared on rightist television programs to castigate the governing junta and other political oppo­ nents. In August 19 8 1, D ’Aubuisson openly promoted the need to kill 200,000 to 300,000 people to restore peace in El Salvador.35 D ’Aubuisson boasted about the National Agency of Special Ser­ vices of El Salvador (Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Salvadoreña, ANESAL), the intelligence agency that he led before it was disbanded after the reformist coup. ANESAL had served as an umbrella “ civil

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organization” to back the security forces politically and maintain mili­ tary intelligence capacity.36 Following the coup, D ’Aubuisson founded the National Broad Front (Frente Amplio Nacional, FAN), a civil organization that consisted of private business outfits, such as cof­ fee growers, cattle ranchers, and young executives. It also included women’s and youth organizations - all elements that would later form part of a rightist political party led by D ’Aubuisson. What lurked beneath the more visible FAN, though, was an “ underground net­ work of civilian-military death squads.”37 Some of these adherents might have sworn a “ blood oath” dedicating their souls to the struggle against communism.38 Ricardo Paredes, a founding leader of the FAN described its man­ date as being “ counterparts to the army, giving it information [about persons ranging] from the peasant to very high-up people” to help defeat the guerrillas. “ It is not a civil war, an open war, a legal war, we don’t want to fight a fair war. We have to go and beat their pants off.” He continued, “ If you destroy the [civilian] organization, the guerril­ las will starve up in the mountains.”39 Or as D ’Aubuisson explained, “ Because the ultimate leadership of the communist organizations is always hidden, the intelligence services must be turned into ‘services of combat’ to ‘uncover the secret brain’ and destroy it.”40 One point made by many observers is that a “ dirty little secret” shared by those committed to preventing an FM LN victory - which included both the Salvadoran security forces and Washington - was that the “ death squads worked.” That is, the scale of killing annihi­ lated the left - especially in the urban areas - so that by, say, the 19 8 1 final offensive, the guerrillas in fact never had a realistic chance of tak­ ing power. This interpretation is used to explain why the death squad activity dropped precipitously by the mid-1980s: there was simply no one else to kill.41

“An Inspiration to Freedom-Loving People Everywhere” Robert White, the American ambassador from 1980 to 19 8 1, famously said that Mr. D ’Aubuisson had a “ sick mind” and was a “ pathologi­ cal killer.”42 Over the 1980s, the unapologetic anti-communist vehe­ mently organized death squads and contended that his accusers were communists or puppets of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is ironic

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f i g u r e 18 .2 . Death squad victim Herbert Ernesto Anaya Sanabria, leader of the Salvadoran non-governmental Human Rights Commission, October 26, 1987. The gruesome images of mutilated bodies left in streets helped reinforce the impression that El Salvador was a bloodbath. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

that D ’Aubuisson would come to despise the CIA given that both were stridently anti-communist. This might also reveal that the Salva­ doran right was closer to, say, Jesse Helms’s ideology than that of the CIA’s. Despite the embarrassment of Carter and Reagan administra­ tion officials, D ’Aubuisson remained a hero to the U.S. far right. In December 1984, roughly a dozen conservative organizations honored D ’Aubuisson in Washington with a plaque and dinner attended by 12 0 guests at the Capitol Hill Club. The plaque expressed appreci­ ation for D ’Aubuisson’s “ continuing efforts for freedom in the face of communist aggression which is an inspiration to freedom-loving people everywhere.”43

Anti-Communism, Laissez-Faire Capitalism, and Country In late 19 8 1, as elections for the new provisional government were shaping up, the rightist political party AREN A was created, led by

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D ’Aubuisson and committed to opposing the ruling junta led by Chris­ tian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte. Apparently two years before the late 19 8 1 founding, a meeting took place in the tony headquarters of Guatemala's ultra right-wing National Liberation Front (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, MLN) in Guatemala City, a political outfit founded by Mario Sandoval Alarcon.44 Originally established in the 1950s as a paramilitary group, the M LN only later turned into a polit­ ical party.45 Sandoval told this audience of young Salvadoran business­ men, concerned about the leftist direction their country was adopt­ ing [under the reformist military/civilian junta], that they would have to make enormous sacrifices in order to establish the equivalent of the M LN in their country. Sandoval advised the nascent AREN A and may have even “ loaned” his advisors to train his Salvadoran counter­ parts in clandestine “ countersubversion” techniques. Sandoval claimed that he gave the M LN slogan, “ Dios, Patria y Libertad” (God, Father­ land and Liberty) to AREN A.46 The core ideology of A R EN A ’s adher­ ence was a fervent blend of anti-communism, laissez-faire capitalism, and patriotism: They believe in Jeffersonian Democracy and death squads. Their colors are red, white, and blue. They are strident Salvadoran nationalists who have built the country's second-largest party from a violent anti-communist network. And in perfect English they learned in American schools, they defend the killing of thousands of civilians necessary to preserve democracy and the free market. In short, they are fighting for what Americans cherish most with the methods Americans value least.47

In perhaps a different interpretation of the rightist party's birth, the Los Angeles Times reported that, separate from Guatemalan influ­ ences, D'Aubuisson's motive for founding AREN A might have first hatched at a Washington dinner party in March 19 8 1 attended by one of the retired officer’s closest associates. Sixteen conservative opera­ tives attended the dinner, including aides to Senator Jesse Helms. These individuals might have encouraged their Salvadoran counterparts to establish their own political party. When AREN A first made its appearance, the charismatic D ’Aubuisson would lead rallies with AREN A ’s song, “ Tremble, Tremble, Communists.” He would amuse supporters by slicing a

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watermelon with a machete. He would then tell the crowd that the watermelon was Duarte: green (the Christian Democrats’ color) on the outside but red on the inside. Throughout the war years, D ’Aubuisson vehemently denied that he was linked to death squads.48 In 1983, he said that these accusations were “ a work orchestrated [by the Left] who have their own plans of disinformation abroad and it’s working.”49 All this time, AREN A was a political movement that, according to the CIA would “ cooperate with and direct some terrorist groups.” The CIA concluded that although A R EN A ’s “ inter­ nal terrorist network” was but one part of a broader death squad network, the party influenced “ extremist perspectives” that led to the illegal wanton violence. Behind A R EN A ’s “ legitimate exterior” lay a “ terrorist network led by D ’Aubuisson henchmen and funded by wealthy Salvadoran expatriates residing in Guatemala and the United States.” 50

“ The United States Has Come Here to Conduct Alien Experiments” By 1984 D ’Aubuisson’s already low estimation of the U.S. government engagement policies had only continued to deteriorate. He explained his thinking to an audience during his presidential campaign in 1984: As a nationalist I want to offer in this most important forum what members of A REN A feel. Let us not delude ourselves regarding the situation we are expe­ riencing. The problem that is facing El Salvador is not [only] that this country is a target of international communism. We are guinea pigs. The two great world powers have come here to confront one another. The United States, the defender of our freedom, has come here to carry out alien experiments without even asking us if we wanted to be part of those experiments. . . . They are sup­ plying the weapons and the money for this confrontation, and unfortunately we Salvadorans are supplying the blood and the destruction of our people and of our fatherland. Based on this reality, we must respond to those two currents that are confronting each other here and that are playing and experimenting with us.51

D ’Aubuisson on the campaign trail spoke of A R EN A ’s vehement resis­ tance to government reforms, including land reform. Many Salvado­ rans did vote for AREN A and D ’Aubuisson in particular. He served as head of El Salvador’s Constituent Assembly in 1982 and 1983 and

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received 40 percent of the votes for president in 1984 (Duarte won with 59 percent).52

“ I Took Photos of the Body” Foreign journalists and other observers usually described death squad activity in graphic detail. Thus, the horrors of El Salvador were reach­ ing a global audience. Not surprisingly, these accounts, often firsthand, influenced public opinion, most critically in the United States given Washington’s deep involvement in the conflict. In a sense, both the death squads and international reporting on the death squads were two key and overlapping phenomena in the Salvador saga. Terry Troia, a doctoral candidate at Union Theological Seminary in New York City, spent six months in 1984 traveling throughout Cen­ tral America and spoke at universities and churches in the United States upon her return. Troia described one episode where she was looking for a pastor from a Catholic parish “ somewhere on the outskirts of San Salvador.” “ Nobody in El Salvador, not even the most faithful of churchgoers, will tell you the name of their pastor. Not that they don’t know. It’s just that handing over a name to a stranger is treason in El Salvador.” 53 Finally, after an arduous search, she found him in time for their meeting. But what she found was a distressed pastor, who with “ weary eyes” informed her of the death of “ one of our people.” She took off on a search for the body with the help of a young boy sell­ ing newspapers, who reluctantly told her where to go. The following excerpt describes what Troia witnessed that day:I I followed a dirt road. Houses lined one side, an empty lot with garbage on the other side. In the middle of the street, people were gathered around a station wagon. She was there in the midst of them, lying in the back of the car. Her face was calm and relaxed. Her features were like those of the indigenous people, with soft, mocha-colored skin and thick black hair pulled back, much like my own hair. She had bled from a bullet wound right above the eye, and the blood had trickled down the side of her face. Her cotton pants had been torn from the knee down. Whether she had been macheted or machine-gunned in the knee was difficult to tell; I couldn’t find the knee in the midst of this sea of blood. The crowd backed away quietly as, between my own heart beats, I took photos of the body.54

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197

In Troia’s estimation, this sort of violence further revealed the depravity of Washington’s policies in El Salvador. “ Neither President Reagan, nor the members of Congress who voted to continue this madness, will ever meet her. But I met Idalia [the dead girl] in the back of a station wagon. And I know the truth that her death tells.” 55

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PART TH REE

RO N ALD REA G A N

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1 9

Reagan Arrives

It isn’t just El Salvador. What we are doing is going to the aid of a gov­ ernment ... to halt the infiltration into the Americas by terrorists... who aren’t just aiming at El Salvador but... who are aiming at the whole of Central and possibly later South America, and, I’m sure, eventually, North America. - Ronald Reagan, March 6, 1 9 8 1 1 Let us show the world that we want no hostile communist colonies here in the Americas - South, Central, or North. - President Ronald Reagan, televised address to the nation, M ay 9, 19 842 We know who the guerrillas in El Salvador are, where and how they get their arms, what their plans are, who their friends are. - Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, April 22, I9 8 3 3

No Room for Additional Cubas Events across the globe deeply influenced the mood in America lead­ ing up to the November 1980 presidential election between Republican challenger Ronald Reagan and incumbent Jimmy Carter. In 1978, the Panama Canal - “ long the great symbol of U.S. say in Central Amer­ ica” - was transferred by treaty to full Panamanian sovereignty.4 The Iranian revolution in 1979 resulted in the removal of a regime in

20 1

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Tehran that had long been well inside the American orbit. A national humiliation ensued when Iranian radicals held U.S. Embassy staff hostage for over a year.5 By July 1979, the Sandinistas had overthrown the Somoza dictatorship in nearby Nicaragua. Five months later, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. For the rising tide of American foreign policy conservatives, these events were viewed as a step backward for the United States. The root cause of this perceived impotence was a Carter administration paralyzed into inaction by fear of another Vietnam-style morass. In the summer of 1980, Ronald Reagan stood before his fellow Repub­ licans in Detroit, Michigan, where he accepted his presidential nom­ ination in a convention filled with foghorns and the whistles and cheers of a wild crowd. He told his audience when “ we cast our eyes abroad . . . [a]dversaries large and small test our will and seek to con­ found our resolve, but we are given weakness when we need strength.” 6 American might, Reagan contended, would restore freedom and world peace. The next month, Roger Fontaine, a foreign policy advisor to presi­ dential candidate Ronald Reagan, told the Miami Herald that the Rea­ gan administration would “ act a good deal more aggressively in pre­ serving what’s left of, and preserving what opportunities are left for, democracy.” When asked whether this might involve direct U.S. mili­ tary action, he replied, “ The use of force is an option any nation, in terms of its vital interests, has to maintain a possibility.”7 On October 28, 1980, more than 10 0 million Americans watched their TVs to witness the single debate of the campaign - the moment that “ both sides agreed could be decisive of the tight race.” 8 The diver­ gent ideologies - from which Central American foreign policy and more specifically U.S. engagement in El Salvador seemed to hinge would be defined in the debate. In the topic of “ war and peace,” for instance, one of the panelists profiled Reagan and Carter as each other’s paradox: You’ve [Carter] been criticized in the give-and-take for responding late to aggressive Soviet impulses, for an insufficient buildup of our Armed Forces, and a paralysis in dealing with Afghanistan and Iran. Governor Reagan, on the other hand, has been criticized for being all too quick to advocate the use of lots of muscle, military action, to deal with foreign crises such as I mentioned.9

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In the closing statements Carter noted that the views Reagan espoused in the past, “ to inject American military forces in places like North Korea, to put a blockade around Cuba this year,” as “ typical of his long-standing inclination, on the use of American power, not to resolve disputes diplomatically and peacefully, but to show that the exercise of military power is best proven by the actual use of it.” 10 Reagan took the clear lead after the debate. His election on Novem­ ber 4, 1980, was viewed by many as an opportunity to regain U.S. influence abroad. Now the unapologetic Reagan would overcome the “ Vietnam syndrome” of defeat and humiliation.11 Power and resolve would restore America’s lost prestige and influence. And what better place to do this than America’s traditional backyard in Central Amer­ ica and the Caribbean?

“ Dictatorships and Double Standards” According to his biographer Lou Cannon, Reagan’s “ mental pictures” of the world were formed when the Nazi threat was escalating in Europe and imperial Japan was advancing in China. Reagan saw the world “ through WWII eyes,” learning from the lessons of his gener­ ation that weakness invites aggression. For Reagan, “ appeasement” contained connotations of “ surrender.” He believed that the Ameri­ can military might was a vital pillar of global peace.12 Reagan also loathed communism and believed in the axiomatic power of freedom. He was convinced that communist systems were “ antithetical to the will of God and the highest aspirations of humanity.” 13 Legions of critics were inclined to see Reagan’s ostensibly principled anti-communism as dangerous and amoral militarism. Meanwhile, his supporters’ key policy advisors contended just the opposite: that it demonstrated the necessary clear-headed trade-offs in a tumultuous and high-stakes struggle that was the Cold War. Jean Kirkpatrick, the only woman and registered Democrat in the original Reagan cabi­ net, was an articulate and steely former college professor whose views epitomized the conservative line and deeply influenced the new presi­ dent. In provocative language that immediately became controversial, Kirkpatrick was scathing in speaking of what to her were unmitigated Carter failures, “ now clear to everyone except its architects, and even they must entertain private doubts, from time to time.” 14

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Made famous by her publication of the 1979 essay “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Kirkpatrick revealed the thesis that under­ pinned her blistering critiques of post-Vietnam liberal foreign policy. These Moscow-backed “ armed intellectuals citing M arx” would never turn out to be “ agrarian reformers, or simple nationalists, or demo­ cratic socialists.” 15 However, incomprehensible it might have been to the American left, Marxist revolutionaries were not “ contemporary embodiments of the Americans who wrote the Declaration of Independence.” 16 Thus, “ violent insurgency headed by Marxist revolutionar­ ies” was unlikely to lead to anything but “ totalitarian tyranny.” 17 For these reasons and more, Kirkpatrick inferred, “ a posture of continu­ ous self-abasement and apology vis-a-vis the Third World is neither morally necessary nor politically appropriate.” 18 In fact, contrary to the liberals’ “ self-abasement,” her most signif­ icant argument was that the United States should actually tolerate abusive anti-communist regimes if that meant checking the more perni­ cious communist ones.19 Kirkpatrick defended this stance by contend­ ing that in previous instances American efforts to “ impose” reforms on a government confronted with violent internal opposition not only failed but assisted the ascension of regimes where “ people enjoy fewer freedoms and less personal security” than under the previous right­ ist regime.20 These new communist tyrannies, Kirkpatrick concluded, were also vehemently hostile to American “ interests and policies.”21 And because of her hawkish lens, she saw Carter behaving “ not like a man who abhors autocrats but like one who abhors only right-wing autocrats.”22 Kirkpatrick reserved special venom for those she deemed especially vulnerable to naive supporters of leftist revolution: Nowhere is the affinity of liberalism, Christianity, and M arxist socialism more apparent than among liberals who are “ duped” time after time into supporting “ liberators” who turn out to be totalitarians, and among Left-leaning clerics whose attraction to a secular style of “ redemptive community” is stronger than their outrage at the hostility of socialist regimes to religion.23

“ Dr. Kirkpatrick” Versus “ Dr. Dodd” Kirkpatrick’s ideology concerning U.S. foreign policy in El Salvador in the late 1970s and early ’80s was a textbook case where American

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f i g u r e 1 9 .1 . This circa 1980s map lampooned U.S. conservatives’ view of the Soviet threat in Central America. Map prepared by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Cartography Lab©. Reprinted with permission.

moral equivalence would lead to disaster for America’s geopolitical interests in its backyard: resolve, not self-hate and utopianism, would eventually lead to greater freedoms - and by extension American secu­ rity. Contrast that to Kirkpatrick’s many critics who saw El Salvador in decidedly different terms. For them, the conflict was a result of mil­ itary and oligarchy indifference and excesses that drove the desperate people to take up arms as the only way to achieve dignity and justice.24 Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd, for one, criticized the Rea­ gan administration for not acting on this. “ Instead of trying to do something about the... factors which breed revolution,” Dodd com­ mented in a televised speech in April 1983, “ this Administration has

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turned to massive military buildups at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.”25 So in a sense, you had two “ doctors” - say, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Senator Dodd - looking at the same sick patients (El Salvador and Central America) and while seeing the same symptoms, coming up with entirely different diseases. The differences between Kirkpatrick and Dodd were likely generational as well as ideologi­ cal. Eighteen years Dodd’s senior, Kirkpatrick (like Reagan) came of age in the 1930s and ’40s when the United States stood up to Hitler and Stalin. Dodd, by contrast, became an adult during the civil rights movement in the 1960s. He also witnessed endemic poverty while an idealistic Peace Corps volunteer in the Dominican Republic, an expe­ rience that made him a “ different person” and eventually a deep critic of U.S. foreign policy, especially in Vietnam.26

“ We Would Pass Up No Opportunity to Challenge the Soviets” The Reagan team’s controversial approach in Central America was shaped by its broader global priorities and challenges. During Reagan’s presidency, Washington offered significant aid to anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Thus, for these same officials, backing an anti-communist government in El Salvador was both logical and necessary. Robert Gates, who served as deputy direc­ tor of the CIA in the early 1980s, later summed up the “ practical mean­ ing” of the Reagan Doctrine. “ We would pass up no opportunity to challenge the Soviets and make life hard for them in the Third World until they [withdrew], or negotiate[d] a settlement satisfactory to us, or change[d] their behavior.”27 One State Department Reagan appointee, Peter Rodman, lamented the unrest and death toll in Central America, but he was a staunch believer that containing the spread of communism was “ more precious than peace.”28 He would later defend the Reagan Doctrine as a “ strate­ gic rationale and a morale justification for U.S. actions.”29 In this view, even in the first year in office, Reagan officials were pushing the line that the United States “ could not play favorites with its human rights policy” and that “ our credibility depended on our being committed to democracy in the case of rightist regimes as well as leftist.”30 Rod­ man insisted this moral compass and even-handedness was a “ central

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feature” of Reagan’s Central America policy - even if it was “ blatant Yankee interventionism.” 31 In addition to the anti-Soviet expansion rhetoric, the Reagan admin­ istration’s private deliberations reveal that it took the communist threat in Central America very seriously. For example, the classified TOP SECRET National Security Directive 100 (NSDD 100), signed by Rea­ gan on July 28, 1983, provides an inside look at this perceived real­ ity. “ The increasing threat to U.S. national interests in Central Amer­ ica requires that we strengthen our diplomatic and security efforts in the region__ The consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua, committed to the export of violence and totalitarianism, poses a significant risk to the stability of Central America.”32 For Reagan and his advisors, this steely vigilance was as much a moral objective as it was a strategic imperative. When addressing the British Parliament in June 1982, he said that Marxism-Leninism would be left “ on the ash-heap of history,” an outcome he very much expected. Two years later in a 1984 speech to the Irish Parliament, Reagan con­ tinued the moral tone. “All across the world today, in the shipyards of Gdansk, the hills of Nicaragua, the rice paddies of Kampuchea, the mountains of Afghanistan, the cry again is liberty.” 33

“ Reaganauts” Key Reagan administration officials, who viewed everything through the lens of their conservative foreign policy ideology, were quick to worry about negative intelligence and diplomatic cables from San Salvador. Senior policymakers like Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and CIA Director William Casey were all Cold War foreign policy hawks and thus generally dis­ posed to believe the worst when it came to deciphering Cuban and Soviet motives in El Salvador. Critics derided them as “ Reaganauts” whose thick anti-communist ideology led them to see Soviet expansion on display in Central America. Secretary Haig, for one, kept busy by pushing the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, to shed light on the brewing revolution in Central America: “ I raised the question of the transhipment of Soviet arms through Nicaragua to the insurgents in El Salvador. ‘All lies,’ said Dobrynin. ‘Photographs don’t

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f i g u r e 19 .2 . “ Si, President Duarte.” Cartoonist Pat Oliphant’s 19 8 1 draw­ ing reflected the pervasive sense among the American public that Washington was backing an abusive Salvadoran military. Oliphant had previously won a Pulitzer Prize for Editorial Cartooning for his 1966 Vietnam War cartoon, They Won’t Get Us to the Conference T able... Will They? Oliphant © Universal Uclick. Reprinted with permission.

lie,’ I replied. ‘The United States is profoundly disturbed by Cuban activities in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the world.’ ”34 And in these early months, the fear of El Salvador turning into another Cuba or Nicaragua made the alarmist voices resonate in the Reagan administration. For example, Haig’s saber-rattling talk led Michael Deaver, a close White House aide to Reagan, to quip, “ It cer­ tainly had a good effect on me. It scared the shit out of m e... scared the shit out of Ronald Reagan, too.”35 Not surprisingly, the FM LN and its political and propaganda wing, the FDR, denounced the incoming Reagan administration as warmongers. A few months after Reagan took office, guerrilla chief Ferman Cienfuegos said, “ The U.S. govern­ ment today is at the head of an adventure that is directed by the most fascist circles of the Reagan administration. The U.S. Pentagon today controls the Salvadoran Army from the military point of view.”36 Whether one thought they were extreme or not, the incoming Rea­ gan hardliners were unquestionably convinced that the Soviets and

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Cubans were gaining in Central America at the expense of the United States’ interests and allies. At the same time, many remaining in pow­ erful positions within the foreign policy bureaucracy - and to a lesser extent fellow political appointees - held more moderate views on what needed to be done to stop communist advances in Central America, and El Salvador in particular.

The Reagan Rhetoric As was so often the case for American presidents during the entire Cold War and even initially dovish Jimmy Carter, the new Reagan adminis­ tration believed that its credibility lay at the core of its bipolar rivalry with the Soviet Union. As one policy advisor said during the 1980 elec­ tion, “ El Salvador itself doesn’t really matter. We have to establish cred­ ibility [there] because we’re in very serious trouble [elsewhere].” 37 Or, as Haig described this imperative in his memoirs: Soviet diplomacy is based on tests of will. Since Vietnam, the United States had largely failed these tests. Like the assiduous students of tactics and Western vulnerabilities that they are, the Russians would send out a probe - now in Angola, again in Ethiopia, finally in El Salvador - to test the strength of Western determination. Finding the line unmanned, or only thinly held, they would exploit the gap. From the unstable situations of this kind, routs develop. It was time to close the breach and hold the line.38

Given this hardline rhetoric, it is easy to see how critics concluded that the Reaganauts’ stance entailed support for murderous rightist regimes willing to fight on America’s side in the Cold War struggle. There were ample times when Reagan’s rhetoric or policy suggested this very approach. In early 19 8 1, for example, the incoming president told his national security aides, “ We don’t throw out our friends just because they can’t pass the ‘saliva test’ on human rights.”39 Indeed, the Reagan team deemphasized using human rights and elections as a lit­ mus for whether the United States would support a regime. Yet whether this meant abandonment of human rights is another question. There were certainly voices on the American far right that wanted Reagan to do just this. Contrary to his subsequent legacy, at the beginning of his presi­ dency few opinion-makers viewed Reagan as a visionary statesman.

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Liberals were unsettled by what they saw as his charged anti­ communist rhetoric and tended to believe that his lofty claims were a thin cover for more pernicious motives. In an example of his response to such critics, in 1982 Reagan spoke before the Organization of Amer­ ican States (OAS) about U.S. intentions in Central America: A determined propaganda campaign has sought to mislead many in Europe and certainly many in the United States as to the true nature of the conflict in El Salvador. Very simply, guerrillas, armed and supported by and through Cuba, are attempting to impose a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship on the people of El Salvador as part of a larger imperialistic plan. If we do not act promptly and decisively in defense of freedom, new Cubas will arise from the ruins of today’s conflicts.40

Conservatives, on the other hand, were excited that there was finally a president who would unabashedly proclaim publicly what they had long been saying in Washington think tanks.41 Both liberals and con­ servatives agreed that Reagan was genuine in his anti-communism. One military expert wrote that the United States was “ now speaking to the Russians in the same way the Russians have been speaking to the U.S.”42 As his two-term presidency unfolded over the next eight years, how­ ever, and contrary to what was often believed both then and now, Rea­ gan had a tendency to pursue policies that were more pragmatic than his strident Cold War anti-communist rhetoric suggested. Although policy in Sandinista-controlled Nicaragua tended to match the admin­ istration’s hardline stance, he once quipped to an aide about conserva­ tive intellectuals urging him to take a harder line against Nicaragua’s Sandinista government, “ Those sons of bitches won’t be happy until we have 25,000 troops in Managua, and I’m not going to do it.”43 In his final years in office, Reagan’s lack of ideological conviction got him into trouble with influential “ neo-conservative” foreign policy intellec­ tuals who compared the Republican president to the British “ appeaser” Neville Chamberlain. The incoming president’s caution drove him to spurn Secretary of State Haig’s advice that he “ go to the source” and blockade Cuba to prevent weapons from flowing to Nicaragua and onward to Salvado­ ran guerrillas. Yet this caution was not pacifism or non-intervention.

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Reagan might not have agreed with Haig’s pledge to turn Cuba “ into a fucking parking lot” but he nonetheless strongly shared the conser­ vative view that Soviet moves had made the Third World a “ crucial battleground,” and El Salvador was the first major test of the Reagan administration’s ability to hold the line against communist aggression. In his words, “ El Salvador is a good starting point__ A victory there could set an example.”44 President Reagan was also less assertive as a decision maker than his rhetoric - or subsequent legacy - might have implied. According to one observer, “ On the stump he was a missionary who sought to spread the gospel of freedom. In the Situation Room he was often a cautious and uncertain leader who was tugged first one way and then another by conflicting advocates of competing factions who claimed to speak in the authentic voice of Reaganism.”45 Thus, despite the aggressive categorical rhetoric that suggested a singular foreign policy, the Rea­ gan administration in fact exhibited less ideological and policy consis­ tency. Fighting words, it turned out for Reagan, did not always mean actual fighting. In El Salvador, for one, administration policy was ini­ tially rhetorically hardline but operationally more moderate. These fighting words against Soviet expansion remained consistent throughout Reagan’s presidency, solidifying his image as a stalwart anti-communist. For instance, well after his Salvador policy had taken a moderate turn, on M ay 9 ,19 8 4 , Reagan addressed the United States, urging citizens to understand the importance of Central America. He emphasized its regional proximity and the threat of crumbling under Soviet sway with the oft-cited quote about Central America’s signifi­ cance to the United States: America’s economy and well being is at stake. Right now in El Salvador, Cubansupported aggression has forced more than 400,000 men, women, and children to flee their homes__ If the Soviet Union can aid and abet subversion in our hemisphere, then the United States has a legal right and a moral duty to help resist it. This is not only in our strategic interest; it is morally right. It would be profoundly immoral to let peace-loving friends depending on our help be overwhelmed by brute force if we have any capacity to prevent it. . . . The sim­ ple questions are: Will we support freedom in this hemisphere or not? Will we defend our vital interests in this hemisphere or not? Will we stop the spread of communism in this hemisphere or not? Will we act while there is

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still tim e?... It’s up to all of us, the administration, you as citizens, and your representatives in Congress__ We Americans should be proud of what we’re trying to do in Central America, and proud of what, together with our friends, we can do in Central America to support democracy, human rights, and eco­ nomic growth, while preserving peace so close to home.46

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20 Reagan and Salvador

I think Mr. Reagan will find an irreversible situation in El Salvador by the time he reaches the presidency. - Fermdn Cienfuegos, FM LN leader1 I think we are now observing a stalemate. And in that kind of war, if you are not winning, you are losing. - Lieutenant General Wallace Nutting, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, 1 9 8 1 2

Tiny El Salvador represented one of the largest foreign policy chal­ lenges when Reagan entered the White House. In an indication of the attention El Salvador was getting, television reporter Walter Cronkite began his interview with the new president by asking, “ Mr. President, with your administration barely six weeks old, you’re now involved in, perhaps, the first foreign policy crisis... much concern about El Sal­ vador and our commitment there. Do you see any parallel in our com­ mitting advisors and military assistance to El Salvador and the early stages of our involvement in Vietnam?”3 Later in the same interview Reagan explained that Soviet expansionism was at the core of the con­ flict. “ Without actually using Soviet troops, in effect, the Soviets are, you might say, trying to do the same thing in El Salvador that they did in Afghanistan, but by using proxy troops through Cuba and guerril­ las.” Reagan added that he was “ watching very carefully” to see if the Sandinistas were sending arms to the FM LN.4

2 13

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Earlier that same month, at one of President Reagan’s first press con­ ferences on March 6 ,19 8 1, he was asked, “ How do you intend to avoid having El Salvador turn into a Vietnam for this country?” 5 Reagan’s complaint back to reporters was, “ I didn’t start the El Salvador thing. I inherited it. And the previous administration, which probably was as vociferous as anyone in talking about my threat to peace, they [the Carter administration] were doing what we’re doing: sending aid to El Salvador.” 6 When the president was charged for leading the nation into war in Central America, he joked, “ I’ve been here more than six weeks now and haven’t fired a shot.”7

The Haig Approach Upon taking office on January 2 0 ,19 8 1, the victorious Reagan admin­ istration wasted no time in reinforcing its campaign rhetoric by taking a harder public stand against communist intrusion into the hemisphere. Behind the scenes, however, there was far less certainty on the next steps of Salvador policy, leaving room for the self-assured Secretary of State Alexander Haig to push his hawkish strategy, while those around him decided whether to go the Haig way or the moderate way. The day after his inauguration, Reagan called a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), the president’s most senior foreign policy group, to dis­ cuss the Iran hostage crisis, Libya, and El Salvador. Haig later recalled that the topic of El Salvador “ did not arouse high passions” but that there was a “ sober understanding” that it represented a “ serious esca­ lation of Soviet and Cuban adventurism in the hemisphere.” 8 Haig saw plenty of room for U.S. involvement in Central America, encouraging Reagan to make El Salvador an early test of his steely resolve. “ Mr. President, this [El Salvador] is one you can win.”9 Haig’s solution for El Salvador was to focus on Cuba since it was supplying the FM LN via Nicaragua.10 For Haig, any approach that didn’t “ go to the source [Cuba]” was too weak.11 Backed by CIA Director William Casey, Haig had ideas on Central America “ that went far beyond diplomacy.” He would draw an anti-communist line in the “ Central American dust.” Haig’s scheme was to squeeze Managua and the FM LN by blockading Cuba. He told State Department political appointee Robert McFarlane, “ You get a band of brothers from CIA,

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Defense and the White House and you put together a strategy for top­ pling Castro. And in the process we’re going to eliminate this lodgment in Nicaragua from the mainland.” 12 McFarlane put together a team that included Nestor Sanchez, Casey’s deputy for Latin America; Francis “ Bing” West, the assis­ tant secretary of defense for international security affairs; and Gen­ eral Paul Gorman, assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who later led the U.S. Southern Command in Panama. This “ band of brothers” quickly concluded that Haig’s strategy was “ ‘not a sensible thing to try’ either politically or militarily.” 13 When McFarlane relayed this to Haig, the secretary of state chastised him at a staff meeting, “ This is just trash, limp-wristed, traditional cookie-cutter bullshit.” 14 Haig instructed McFarlane to try again. The group ultimately produced an eight-point report, promoting military aid and economic devel­ opment assistance to allied nations in Central America. Haig was again disappointed and did not pass the recommendations along to the White House.15 Reflecting on the majority sentiment, National Security Advisor Richard Allen believed Haig’s policies could “ best and most fairly be described as folly.” 16 Haig’s motion soon “ died for a lack of a sec­ ond.” 17 Even more “ averse than Reagan to military risks,” Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger also opposed the blockage of Cuba or any sort of commitment of U.S. combat forces in Central America. Weinberger had been appalled at the domestic backlash against the U.S. military after Vietnam and didn’t want to repeat this horror movie in Central America.18 Even Haig later acknowledged in his memoir that he was “ virtually alone” in his preference to immediately pressure Cuba to cease arms shipments to the Sandinistas - and by extension the FM LN - although he contended this did not entail military action. While the Reagan administration in time would be “ amply stocked with [foreign policy] firebrands” willing to promote armed conflict toward Nicaragua, Reagan’s initial inclinations on El Salvador were cautious. At his first two NSC meetings, Reagan listened “ almost without comment” when Haig argued that Reagan should make El Salvador a “ test case” of its willingness to resist Soviet and Cuban imperialism.19 The majority of advisors, on the other hand, “ favored a low-key” and “ step-by-step” strategy of limited amounts of military

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21 6

The Salvador Option

and economic aid to El Salvador.20 As one administration official described it, We’re not talking about tanks and missiles. There’s not even any plan at this stage to send American combat advisers there. What’s involved is small arms, ammunition, maybe some helicopters and coastal patrol boats. It’s a game we can buy into relatively cheaply, and there’s a consensus emerging within the administration that the risks are worth the potential payoff.21

Not surprisingly, Reagan’s critics were not mollified and instead pre­ dicted dire outcomes.22

Reagan’s Truman Doctrine At this time, the initial focus of the administration’s policy in Cen­ tral America - and by extension, the controversy - was El Salvador, not Nicaragua. This was largely the case because, unlike Nicaragua where the Marxist revolution had already been consolidated, El Sal­ vador appeared to be up for grabs, leading to fears that it could become a Vietnam-like experience for the United States. The Reagan team decided to significantly expand the American commitment to El Sal­ vador despite the fact that the White House saw Central America as a “ political loser” for Reagan. Over the next weeks and months, the administration conducted a series of NSC meetings that led to “ a new policy of increased sup­ port” for the Duarte junta as well as a suspension of aid to Nicaragua in response to its arms deliveries to the FM LN.23 With Haig the odd man out, and as often happened, the administration’s Salvador policy “ quickly retreated to the lowest common denominator of agreement” in this case, continued Carter-style economic and military assistance for the Duarte junta.24 On February 27, 19 8 1, Reagan agreed to send $25 million in new military aid, a sum almost twice the amount sent to El Salvador from 1946 to 1979 and more than any other Latin American coun­ try received in 19 8 1.25 Of these funds, $20 million were to be sent immediately without congressional approval, using the same special emergency power Carter had used in office. Combined with $63 mil­ lion in economic aid, the U.S.-controlled aid (including international loans) to El Salvador totaled $523 million for 19 8 1, compared to $18 4

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million in 1980 and $89 million in i9 79 .26 A country the size of M as­ sachusetts was now receiving the largest aid budget of any Latin Amer­ ican country. This new aid was combined with 20 new military “ trainers” tasked with direct military training (the term “ advisors” was shunned given the negative connotation it earned during Vietnam). Interestingly, before leaving office in January, Carter had not authorized the posting of fresh trainers to El Salvador - a perfect example of how ideologi­ cal differences led to varying policy measures. Once these additional advisors were deployed, the U.S. military contingent in the country went up to 54 personnel.27 One key mission would be to train crack “ rapid response” battalions from the ranks of the Salvadoran armed forces who could quickly react to ambushes from leftist insurgents. In a sign of its significance on the ground in El Salvador, National Guard Chief Vides Casanova gratefully declared, “ the new administration is giving us everything we need.” In early March Reagan also signed a “ Presidential Finding on Central America” that provided roughly $20 million for CIA covert operations in support of Sandinista opponents and the Salvadoran government. Devised by CIA Director Casey, the program included regional political efforts and a paramilitary compo­ nent intended to “ interdict” supplies pouring into El Salvador from Nicaragua and Honduras.28 While the Reagan administration increased the level of aid and U.S. activity in the tiny Central American country, this was a rela­ tively soft approach when compared to U.S. military commitments in Southeast Asia in prior years. Despite deep congressional qualms about Salvadoran government-backed death squads, Reagan garnered the support from Congress to expand military and economic efforts to aid San Salvador. Even in the post-Vietnam era, Congress found it “ hard to say no” to a president seeking military aid to prevent a com­ munist takeover.29 In light of U.S. efforts in his country, junta chief Duarte admon­ ished the administration, “ Washington should not send too many advi­ sors here. Otherwise this will soon be seen as America’s war.”30 More­ over, critics charged that Reagan’s policies strengthened the Salvadoran military to the extent that Duarte would “ never again be in a posi­ tion where he could give instructions to the [Salvadoran] military.”31 Within weeks, however, the Salvadoran leader would be requesting

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even more equipment given his perception of the FM LN ’s unexpected swelling military potency. And as evidenced by Reagan’s funding and training efforts, Reagan, like Carter, had placed his money on the Duarte junta, a risky bet in the best of circumstances.

A Moderate Approach To help put his own imprimatur on Central America policy, Haig replaced Ambassador Robert White within days of taking office. Within a few weeks of being recalled from San Salvador by Haig, White painted a dire picture of El Salvador’s prospects in front of a congres­ sional subcommittee, “ When you can see we are headed for a new Vietnam situation, you have to take a stand.” 32 In a preview of the pes­ simism that he would espouse for the next decade, White described the embryonic Salvadoran insurgency as a weak military threat and thus new aid to the Salvadoran government would only allow the security forces to “ assassinate and kill in a totally uncontrollable way.” 33 The Salvadoran security forces, he explained, “ have been responsible for the deaths of thousands and thousands of young people, and they have executed them on the mere suspicion that they are leftists or sympathize with leftists.”34 The Reagan administration quickly and publicly countered White by contending, “ Where we disagree [with White] is where the immedi­ ate, principal threat is coming from. He seems to think it is coming from the right. We think it is coming from the leftist insurgents.”35 It is easy to see why some observers have concluded that White’s removal was a result of the Reaganauts new hardline Salvador policy that would not tolerate dissent. At the same time and as an example of an administra­ tion steadying a swaying ship, Haig’s recommendations were ignored by a cautious Reagan team beset by domestic political imperatives and not wanting to create its own quagmire in Central America. Like the Carter administration, both hardliners and moderates in the Reagan team believed that avoiding a Marxist guerrilla takeover remained paramount for U.S. interests. Reaganaut hardliners had rou­ tinely criticized Carter’s Salvador policies on human rights and land reform as “ destabilizing” and “ wreaking havoc,” and saw winning the war as their priority.36 Yet, despite political divisions with the out­ going administration, some State Department officials responded to

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the initial decisions out of the White House by privately calling the Salvador policy “ Carter plus.”37 Reagan’s top human rights official, Elliott Abrams, argued, “ To acquiesce in this, to withdraw our support from the Government of El Salvador, would make a mockery of our concern for human rights.”38 Needless to say, the legions of critics con­ sidered comments like that as reflecting the Reagan administration’s lip service on human rights. Another key factor at play was that, whatever hardline alterna­ tives were considered at the White House, the U.S. diplomatic bureau­ cracy continued to operate in the Carter-designed engagement strategy despite the white-hot rhetoric coming from Haig and others. For exam­ ple, a diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador to Foggy Bottom in early February 19 8 1 revealed this moderate approach. The memo acknowledged that the Reagan hardliners were portraying El Salvador as being “ in the middle of a major struggle to preserve its very existence from the threat of a terrorist insurgency supported from the outside.” At the same time, the memo asserted that this “ imme­ diate focus” on security-related measures “ does not and should not distract attention from the fact that the fundamental problem that we face in El Salvador is to maintain the pace of economic and social progress in the face of deliberate efforts by the left-wing insurgents to disrupt that progress to force the government into a preoccupa­ tion with security concerns.”39 The embassy urged that the United States be a “ consistent and reliable ally of the Duarte government [what was still an unelected junta] as it works to implement polit­ ical, agrarian, and economic reforms to end the violence from all sides which has plagued that country.” Of critical note, the classi­ fied correspondence cautioned that the strategy needed to “ convey our concerns privately, not through the press.”40 That is, the U.S. government would work to promote reform but this would be an internal process. An instance of this “ public-private” approach occurred in Septem­ ber 19 8 1, when Duarte was visiting Washington. In a confiden­ tial memorandum, a senior administration official (not named) was briefed to use a luncheon meeting to “ impress upon Duarte the importance of taking firm steps to control acts of violence against non-combatants__ [These atrocities by] right wing ‘death squads’ and elements of the security forces continue to sap the [Salvadoran]

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government’s domestic and international support.”41 The memo urged the official to raise the issue in front of the Commander of the National Guard, Colonel Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, who accompanied Duarte to the luncheon. “ Since the National Guard is suspected of perpetuating a number of offenses, it will be useful to raise this in his presence.”42

“Another Case of Indirect Armed Aggression” On February 23, 19 8 1, the State Department issued the White Paper claiming that the chaos unfolding in El Salvador was in fact indirect aggression caused by the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Vietnam, and other communist-bloc countries.43 The White Paper’s evidence was based in part on two captured guerrilla “ caches,” both found by Sal­ vadoran police in San Salvador - one in November 1980 behind an art gallery and the second in January 19 8 1 behind a false wall in a grocery store.44 The report appeared to leave little room for doubt since there was “ definitive evidence” of the communist-bloc assistance and Havana’s “ central role” in the “ well-coordinated, covert effort” of another underhanded invasion in El Salvador - and by extension the United States.45 It added, “ Over the past year, the insurgency in El Sal­ vador has been progressively transformed into another case of indirect armed aggression against a small Third World by communist powers acting through Cuba.”46 Venezuela’s foreign minister Jose Velasco called the document an attempt to “ transfer its confrontation with the Soviet Union to Latin America.”47 Soviet diplomats denied that Moscow was supplying arms to the FM LN. In Moscow’s words, “ The Soviet Union is not concerned with arms shipments to El Salvador and that’s a statement of fact. The Soviet Union is not involved and you can’t pin it on us.”48 At home, critics like sociologist James Petras immediately jumped on the report, writing in The Nation, “ The White Paper fails to provide a convincing case__ [I]ts evidence is flimsy, circumstantial, or nonexistent; the rea­ soning and logic is slipshod and internally inconsistent; it assumes what needs to be proven; and, finally, what facts are presented refute the very case the State Department is attempting to demonstrate.” Petras concluded that the document “ in a word, has the aura of a political frame-up in which inconvenient facts are overlooked.”49

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The report’s credibility further suffered when leading newspapers ran extensive articles profiling the alleged errors. On June 8 and 9, 19 8 1, the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post ran front-page arti­ cles disputing the ostensibly “ incontrovertible” evidence of the White Paper.50 The Washington Post described the White Paper as the Rea­ gan administration’s “ first significant [foreign policy] initiative,” but said that the report and supporting evidence contained “ factual errors, misleading statements, and unresolved ambiguities.” 51 The widespread claims surrounding the White Paper’s veracity served to reinforce critics of the incoming Reagan administration’s approach to El Salvador. The credibility gap was growing and it would only widen the next year following the administration’s initial denial of massacres conducted by U.S.-trained Salvadoran security forces in December 19 8 1. Four months after the White Paper’s initial pub­ lication, in mid-June the Reagan administration issued a follow-up 25-point report to respond to the criticism, especially to the claim that the captured documents were fakes.52 The controversial White Paper suggested that the Reagan administration was providing cover for its planned massive escalation of U.S. involvement in El Salvador.53

In Fear of a “ McGovernized” Party Even though public comments on both sides often suggested a more acerbic climate, congressional support for the Reagan administration’s policies on El Salvador remained constant. And while Congress often pushed conditions, such as congressional notifications on human rights progress, it never cut off aid until 1989 when the George Bush Sr. administration supported the move. The broad outlines of the engage­ ment strategy - elections, economic reforms, and military professional­ ization to simultaneously build democracy and check the insurgency united a big tent of ideologically and politically diverse supporters from Duarte to moderates and hardliners in the Reagan Executive Branch, and even some liberal Democrats. A Pentagon-sponsored report pub­ lished later in the war described the incipient strategy as follows: Fully aware that Salvadoran society was one of the sickest and most repres­ sive in Latin America, American military advisers, diplomats, and policymak­ ers recognized the necessity of a two-pronged policy: fortify the Salvadoran

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armed forces to wear down the rebels in combat and bolster democracy so as to weaken the rebels’ claim to political legitimacy.54

Democratic Senator J. James Exon described the dilemma of moder­ ate supporters when he lamented, “ If we turn down additional aid, we could be helping the Communist guerrilla takeover of the country. But on the other hand, we’ll be aiding a government we’re not happy with. The bottom line is: which is the lesser of two evils?” 55 Based on their votes, it was clear that a majority of congress members had decided that the engagement strategy represented the lesser evil. House Major­ ity Leader Jim Wright helped solidify support of moderate Democrats for Reagan’s policies. “ I agree with the administration position and I very actively oppose any effort to withhold assistance to the moderate government of Duarte.” 56 This relatively harmonious agreement was a stark contrast to the bitter debates and mistrust over Nicaraguan pol­ icy in subsequent years when the Reagan administration aggressively supported the “ contra” insurgent forces in order to topple the Sandinista regime in Managua. Despite the disagreements between mostly liberal members of Congress and the administration, Wright supported continued aid to El Salvador and privately told fellow Democrats that he feared the party would become “ McGovernized” (lose political support due to its dovish views on foreign policy) if it opposed further assistance.57 Wright was also persuaded by the argument that a U.S. retrenchment would help ensure a communist takeover in El Salvador. In this sense, Wright’s view lined up with hardliners on Reagan’s team but also with El Salvador’s Duarte, who at this moment pleaded for American mili­ tary aid to continue in order to “ defend democracy, and stop the com­ munists and rightist totalitarians.” 58

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21 El Mozote

El Salvador’s Atlacatl Battalion begins a 6-day sweep against guerrilla strongholds in Morazdn. - From the U.S. Embassy “ Chronology of Events,” December 1 1 , 1 9 8 1 1

As part of the Reagan administration’s military assistance to train rapid response units, the Atlacatl Battalion was activated in March 1, 19 8 1, under the command of the daring and ambitious Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa Barrios.2 Monterrosa had been in the same tanda class at the Salvadoran military academy as Roberto D ’Aubuisson and had taken courses at the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas in 1966. The Atlacatl was the first specialty battalion trained for counterinsurgency warfare in the Salvadoran armed forces. Under the watch of U.S. Army Special Forces advisors in El Salvador, the battalion completed its training in early 19 8 1.3 The battalion grew to around 1,000 soldiers and became notorious for its violence and lack of discipline. U.S. trainers were privately enthusiastic about its combat potential.4 In early December of this same year, the battal­ ion participated in Operación Rescate (Operation Rescue), an attempt to corner and annihilate the FM LN training camp at a locale called La Guacamaya.5 Almost a year before Rescate took place, a company of the Atlacatl Battalion, commanded by Captain Juan Ernesto Mendez, had initiated a counterinsurgency mission in the northern zone of Morazan - the 223

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base of operations of Joaquin Villalobos’s formidable ERP wing of the now united FM LN. The unit came under heavy guerrilla attack and quickly retreated. This deeply embarrassing setback for the brand new “ Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalion” elicited jokes by officers of other units who nicknamed it the “ Rapid Retreat Infantry Battalion.” 6 The ignominious retreat might help explain at least some of the fury that accompanied Atlacatl’s Rescate operation in December.

Revenge Would Be Enacted On December 9, 19 8 1, skirmishes took place between FAES forces and FM LN guerrillas in the village of Arambala, deep in the Morazan Department. That same day, a company of the Atlacatl Battalion entered Arambala and rounded up the population in the town square, separating the men from the women and children. Accused of being rebel collaborators, several villagers were blindfolded, tortured, and killed. Atlacatl was smelling blood and its revenge against leftist insur­ gents would be enacted on the villages and villagers whom they believed were abetting the enemy. On the afternoon of December 1 0 ,1 9 8 1 , units of the Atlacatl Battal­ ion arrived in the village of El Mozote, two miles from Arambala. The village consisted of about two dozen small houses situated on open ground around a square. Facing onto the square was a church and behind it a small building known as “ the convent,” used by visiting priests to change into their vestments when they came to the village to celebrate mass. When the troops arrived in the village, they found, in addition to the residents, other farmers who were refugees from the mountain regions. They directed everyone out of the houses and into the square where they were searched facedown on the ground. The soldiers then ordered the villagers to shut themselves in their houses until the next day, warn­ ing that anyone coming out would be shot. The soldiers remained in the village.7 At 5 a .m . on the morning of December 1 1 , soldiers of the 3rd Section of the 5th Company of the Atlacatl Battalion began to take residents of the village of El Mozote out of their houses, grouping them by gender and age in the town plaza. They then locked up the various groups

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in the church, convent, and various houses. Throughout the morning, they interrogated, tortured, and executed men in various locations. At midday, they began removing the women from the different groups and executing them with machine gun fire. One group of chil­ dren locked in the convent was machine-gunned through a window. In deliberate and systematic form, the Salvadoran troops executed hun­ dreds of men, women, and children. According to survivors, soldiers slitting throats of children shouted, “ You are guerrillas and this is jus­ tice. This is justice.” 8 After killing most of the villagers, the soldiers burned the buildings. Scores of women were raped before being shot in the head. One wit­ ness said that a soldier told a superior that he would not kill children. The superior said, “ Which son of a bitch says that?”9 He then went into the group of detained children, grabbed a small boy, threw him up in the air and impaled him on his bayonet on the way down. The killing at El Mozote lasted all day and into the evening. The troops stayed in El Mozote through the night. The following day they advanced to the nearby village of Los Toriles where they committed another round of summary executions. Unlike in El Mozote where the dead were left unburied, in Los Toriles surviving villagers laid the dead into hastily dug graves. Atlacatl conducted similar operations in nearby villages over the course of four days. All told, the FAES killed more than 800 civilians in what came to be known to the world as the “ El Mozote massacre” even though roughly half the executions took place in other villages. More than 400 of the victims were children under 18 years of age, with some only a few months or days old.10 Years later, UN investigators found 143 skeletons in a common grave, including 1 3 1 children with the average age of six.11 A subsequent ballistics investigation examined over 250 cartridge cases recovered from the El Mozote execution site. Of these sam­ ples, 184 had discernible headstamps, identifying the ammunition as having been manufactured for the United States government at Lake City, Missouri. Thirty-four cartridges were sufficiently preserved for the analysis of individual as well as class characteristics. All of the pro­ jectiles except one appear to have been fired from U.S.-manufactured M -16 rifles.12

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2 1 . 1 . Victims of the El Mozote massacre. The U.S.-trained Atlacatl Battalion committed one of the most searing and lethal massacres in the area in and around the town of El Mozote in the remote Morazdn province. The Reagan administration came under fire for what critics alleged was a coverup of the crime perpetrated by its client military. Image and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos. f ig u r e

“ No Evidence Could Be Found” Eager not to waste a propaganda opportunity after this heinous event, the FM LN broadcast its own account of the events through its vaunted Radio Venceremos: This genocidal military method is no happenstance. Vietnam represents its his­ torical precedent. The U.S. Congress and people, as [does] the world public opinion[,] probably remember the massacre of M y Lai, which had a profound impact on the U.S. people, the U.S. Army itself, and all countries around the murder. . . . Those responsible for these murders are the same as those at My Lai. . . . Imperialism admits having carried out the design and supervision of genocide in El Salvador.13

U.S. ambassador in San Salvador, Deane Hinton, told a religious group that Radio Venceremos was not a reliable source, just propa­ ganda. What Hinton failed to understand was that while Venceremos

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227

was undoubtedly a propaganda organ, this did not make its claims of a massacre in this instance any less true. In fact, other reports on El Mozote would soon surface and reiterate the events as told by Radio Venceremos. In late January 1982, foreign correspondents R ay­ mond Bonner of the N ew York Times and Alma Guillermoprieto of the Washington Post, who had been traveling in guerrilla-controlled areas, began reporting on the massacre.14 Guillermoprieto’s article relied on the testimony of three survivors and was titled, “ Salvadoran Peasants Describe Mass Killing: Woman Tells of Children’s Deaths.” 15 At the same time the news articles were appearing, the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador sent a confidential cable to Washington labeled “ Report on Alleged Massacre,” concluding that “ civilians did die dur­ ing the Operation Rescate, but no evidence could be found to con­ firm that government forces systematically massacred civilians in the operation zone, nor that the number of civilians killed even remotely approached [the] number being cited in other reports.” 16 Likely influenced by the initial skeptical reporting from the embassy in San Salvador, back in Washington senior Reagan administration offi­ cials held to the line that a massacre did not take place. Echoing the confidential cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, State Department senior Latin American official Thomas Enders stated pub­ licly, “ There is no evidence to confirm that government forces system­ atically massacred civilians in the operations zone, or that the number of civilians even remotely approached the 733 or 926 victims cited in the press.” 17 Enders also implied that the two U.S. embassy officials dis­ patched to investigate the potential massacre had actually arrived and investigated the operations zone. In fact, the two men were not able to get closer than three miles away and only saw El Mozote from their helicopter 2,000 feet above before it was fired on.18 Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams told a Senate committee that the reports of mass killings at El Mozote “ were not credible” and that “ it appears to be an incident that is at least being significantly misused, at the very best, by the guerrillas.” 19

The Other Side of the Story Despite these initial Reagan administration claims that the reports of mass atrocities were false, the overwhelming evidence proved

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The Salvador Option

otherwise, a fact that became increasingly known to the public. Like the White Paper that had come out earlier in the year and had been largely dismissed as blatant lies or obfuscation, the denials on El Mozote only deepened the U.S. government’s growing “ credibility gap.” Interviewed by the author in 2008, Guillermoprieto recalled: I think the massacre of El Mozote consolidated my own view that U.S. involve­ ment in the Salvadoran conflict was criminal: I had seen Deane Hinton busily trying to cover up Salvadoran government atrocities before El Mozote, and now I saw again how not only Hinton but the State Department as a whole made every effort to discredit what Ray Bonner, Susan Meiselas [a photogra­ pher] and I had seen with our own eyes.20

As the controversy over the killings continued to roil, American conser­ vative opinion writers criticized reporters like Guillermoprieto for their allegedly pro-guerrilla sympathies. Writing in the magazine Human Events, Daniel James criticized the N ew York Times and the Wash­ ington Post for being “ newspapers [that] are generally favorable to the FM LN guerrillas and unfavorable to both the junta and the United States.” He pointed out that in Guillermoprieto’s article titled “ Behind the Lines in El Salvador,” she portrayed the rebels as “ peasant fight­ ers” holding territory “ with populations that are self-sufficient, sta­ ble and loyal.”21 Similarly, the Wall Street Journal editorial page crit­ icized the American press coverage of the war, mentioning N ew York Times correspondent Ray Bonner in particular, who was described as “ overly credulous.”22

“ Central Parable in the Cold War” Mark Danner wrote in the N ew Yorker magazine over a decade later that, more than the killings themselves, El Mozote “ came to be known and how it came to be denied was a central parable in the Cold War.”23 In this estimation, much of this parable is the central lesson of not just the savagery of the massacre itself but also the brazen denials and lies by U.S. officials eager to cover up the story. That the Reagan administration “ certified” the Salvadoran security forces’ gains on human rights only days after news of El Mozote broke exacer­ bated the already pervasive view of a massive Vietnam War-style sham being committed.

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El Mozote

229

Given the scale of the killings and false rhetoric by U.S. government officials, it is not surprising that much of the historical understand­ ing of U.S. policy in El Salvador addresses the El Mozote massacre. It is beyond doubt that the U.S.-trained Atlacatl Battalion commit­ ted the El Mozote massacres. Yet it is harder to pinpoint a number of related factors that have also become part of the historical legacy. Did, for example, U.S. training make the Atlacatl more disposed to commit these heinous war crimes? Did Hinton, Enders, and other top U.S. government officials know that the massacre had taken place but knowingly lie to cover up the crimes? Or were these same officials mis­ led by inaccurate reporting from the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador? If it was inaccurate reporting, was this also intentionally erroneous? Or did the embassy simply get its facts wrong? What is especially interesting about these questions is that the Reagan administration’s easily refuted denials were a significant political setback. And these same denials have been seared into the historical memory of the Salvador Option. In other words, the biggest propaganda victory the FM LN obtained from the massacres came when the Reagan officials played the part of obstinate imperialists by denying the murders carried out by those forces trained and armed in its name. Another important observation is that El Mozote was not the only massacre committed by FAES forces, yet its story became the most telling in the civil w ar’s history. Jump back half a year to May 14 ,19 8 0 , when civilians from Chalatenango began crossing the Sumpul River in an attempt to reach Honduras and avoid the flying bullets of the armed forces. The Salvadoran National Guard and paramilitary out­ fit ORDEN, with the assistance of the Honduran Army opened fire at these unarmed people crossing the river. “ Women tortured before the finishing shot, infants thrown into the air for target practice, were some of the scenes of this criminal slaughter.” In the aftermath of the mas­ sacre, no fewer than 600 unburied bodies were the prey of animals for several days. Others drowned in the river’s strong current. A Honduran fisherman discovered five bodies of children in his fishtrap.24 Why does history remember El Mozote but not other massacres, like the Sumpul River killings, committed by the same security forces? Might it be related to the inescapable fact that Atlacatl was U.S.-trained and equipped? Certainly, the power of the El Mozote example lies in suggested or confirmed American complicity in the crime.

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230

The Salvador Option Commander Monterrosa

In a chilling postscript on Atlacatl Battalion commander Monterrosa, in the years following the massacres the Salvadoran officer became best known for his efforts to win the hearts and minds of the vulnera­ ble rural populations. Under his command, the FAES enjoyed a much greater success against the FM LN in their traditional stronghold of Morazan. There were even reports that the guerrillas had to resort to forced conscription in this region, a telltale sign of desperation. Mon­ terrosa took full advantage of U.S.-provided helicopters that drasti­ cally increased his troops’ mobility in this rugged mountain region. The Atlacatl commander was in fact adored by his troops despite his involvement in the El Mozote massacre. After he sent some troops on furlough after a difficult operation in the Department of Morazan in 19 8 3, two soldiers sang him a song they had written in his honor. Monterrosa bade the soldiers goodbye and told them to do what they wanted at home but not in uniform. “ You can buy a tonel [keg] of brandy and lie under it and let it drip down your throat all night if you want,” he said, licking his lips and swallowing to demonstrate. “ Verga! Verga!” came the responses, using a lewd term to express their excite­ ment. The troops then asked permission to fire in his honor. “ Solo dos, solo dos,” he told them, “ only two rounds each.” More than 100 M16s blew off dozens of rounds each in a rapid-fire burst.25 One thing that Monterrosa hated in particular was the elusive Radio Venceremos that spouted guerrilla propaganda. Initially broadcast in 19 8 1 from a peasant village in Guacamaya, by 1985 Radio Venceremos was broadcasting four times a day. It reported on the battles, played music, aired propaganda, and often used witty satire - usually aimed at President Reagan, the U.S. ambassador, and Salvadoran government leaders. It also once provided instructions on “ how to make a Molo­ tov cocktail.”26 Some claimed that up to 60 percent of the population listened to the broadcasts - one major reason the FAES wanted to smash it. In 1984, the cagey guerrilla commander Villalobos began to sur­ mise, “ Monterrosa will be coming after us [in order to get the Vencer­ emos transmitter]. He will use those helicopters to attack the com­ mand post.”27 Villalobos then had his troops booby trap a fake radio transmitter and had it placed where Monterrosa’s men would find it.

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El Mozote

231

f i g u r e 2 1.2 . Radio Venceremos broadcasting in rebel territory. Venceremos was well known for its pro-guerrilla propaganda as well as broadcasts of soap operas and other entertainment. Image and permission by Susan Meiselas/ Magnum Photos.

When they did, Monterrosa arrived to accompany the transmitter on the helicopter ride to San Salvador. Once the helicopter was in flight, guerrillas detonated the device, bringing down the helicopter and killing Monterrosa. A few days after his death, foreign correspondent Julia Preston, who described the lieutenant colonel as an “ elite war machine,” wrote, “ Monterrosa’s career exemplified the recent efforts [in 1984] of Sal­ vadoran army officers to overcome - and sweep aside - a past tainted by violence, and to try to rise to the task of taming a tough guerrilla insurgency.”28 Indeed, Monterrosa did change his strategy to win more peasant hearts and minds, and even spoke to a crowd in Moraziin a few years after the massacre: “ I know that I am part of the reason why there are guerrillas in this province.”29 But despite Monterrosa’s acknowl­ edgment of the past, in the years after his assassination, the FAES high command would refuse to investigate the violence that transpired in Morazan and would repeatedly deny that the massacre occurred.30

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22 Another Vietnam

El Salvador is Vietnam in Spanish. - Bumper sticker from the 1980s1 The Reagan administration, particularly Reagan - had two rules - one, the insurgents weren’t going to win, but secondly we were not going to introduce combat troops to El Salvador or anywhere else in Central America. - Roger Fontaine, NSC Director of Inter-American Affairs, 19 8 1 - 19 8 3 2 It should be clear to anyone who reads newspapers that our side is not winning this war. - Michael Barnes, Democratic Congressman of Maryland, 19 8 3 3

Not Anything More Than Carter Plus As the situation in El Salvador continued to take shape under Rea­ gan’s administration, the growing chorus of skeptics remained focused on the hardline public rhetoric suggesting that the United States would stop communism at any cost, even if it violated democracy or human rights. Marked increases in military and development aid and stri­ dent rhetoric during Reagan’s initial year in office in 19 8 1 were just the first steps on a slippery slope of what would be a massive U.S. military involvement in El Salvador. Beneath the surface though, and certainly from what the U.S. Embassy was recommending, the Reagan Doctrine in El Salvador remained Carter plus. Even Reagan 232

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Another Vietnam

2 33

himself argued that his approach was a continuation of what his pre­ decessor had started. “ They [the Carter administration] were doing what we’re doing [in El Salvador]: sending aid ... of the same kind we’re sending.”4 In a separate speech to the Organization of Ameri­ can States (OAS), Reagan forcefully defended America’s right to stop the communist threat in El Salvador, but added, “ We will not walk away from human rights problems.” 5 At the same time, a mounting chorus of critics interpreted Reagan’s initial responses to El Salvador, and more broadly Central America, as inherently radical. One critic wrote in 19 8 1: A nation of virtually no inherent strategic or economic interest to the United States, El Salvador, has suddenly become a symbol - a vehicle through which the Reagan Administration hopes to set the tone, by dint of example, for its whole foreign policy. Because the war in El Salvador looks like an easy victory, it provides a perfect opportunity for the new administration to demonstrate its willingness to use force in foreign affairs, its intent to de-emphasize human rights, and its resolve to contain the Soviet Union. In short, the conflict in El Salvador is a splendid little war, made to order for an administration deter­ mined to repudiate much of its predecessor’s foreign policy.6

Part of what made Reagan’s approach to El Salvador so pernicious, this scholar contended, was that the White House was betting on the “ survival of one of the weakest, most brutal, and least popular govern­ ments in the hemisphere.”7 Thus, like Vietnam two decades before, the Central American nation was cast onto “ the world’s center stage” and the “ process of investing blood and treasure in this exemplary case provides its own rationale for incremental escalation.” And as with Vietnam again, U.S. policymakers had been “ seduced” by the view that “ just a little more aid, a few more advisors, or one additional reorga­ nization of the government” would lead to victory, “ even if it has to destroy the country to save it.”8 Despite the growing chorus of critics, some unexpected voices on Capitol Hill supported Reagan’s approach. Democratic Senate Minor­ ity Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia acknowledged, “ I fully agree with President Reagan that Cuban interference and arms supplies to the country [El Salvador] are totally unacceptable.”9 Democratic Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill did not take a public stand on Rea­ gan’s aid requests for El Salvador, preferring to “ keep his powder dry”

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2 34

The Salvador Option

for the daunting budget battles to come. When Democratic represen­ tative Gerry Studds of Massachusetts, one of the most vocal oppo­ nents of administration policy, introduced a bill to cut off military aid, even the senior liberals on the Foreign Affairs Committee would not back it, as they did not want a confrontation with the new president at that moment.

“A Striptease of Our Humanism” In the first few years of the guerrilla war, the American public’s grow­ ing view was that Reagan’s El Salvador policy was failing. In partic­ ular, their expressed fear was that U.S. assistance to El Salvador was becoming the same slippery slope that led to the gradual escalation of America’s military involvement in Vietnam. A Newsweek poll in March 1982 found that 74 percent of the American public familiar with the conflict in El Salvador believed that it could turn into the Viet­ nam of the 1980s. Eighty-nine percent of these respondents said that the United States should not provide troops.10 Two years later, a CBS News poll indicated that 57 percent of Americans thought “ the greater cause of unrest in Central America [is] poverty and lack of human rights in the area, [as opposed to] subversion from Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union.” 11 A year later, only 8 percent of respondents saw an improvement in El Salvador’s human rights situation even though it was not nearly as bad as in the dark days of the late 1970s and early ’80s. In October 19 8 3, a letter to the editor in the N ew York Times reflected the concerns of many: “ The situation in Central America is deteriorating rapidly. Our options are eroding. What we witness there today has become for us what Sartre once called the Algerian war, a ‘striptease of our humanism.’ ” 12 Another published letter echoed similar fears that the American people were seeing the same horrible movie again, only this time in Spanish, [The] government in El Salvador lacks respect for the basic human and civil rights of its people__ It seems to me that by militarily supporting the present Salvadoran government and now by training Salvadoran soldiers in the United States we are contributing to the repression that already exists__ United States military involvement in El Salvador has increased so rapidly. The parallels

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Another Vietnam

2 35

between our involvement in Vietnam and our present policy toward El Sal­ vador are uncanny.13

This fear of another Vietnam in El Salvador led Americans to organize anti-war and other sorts of protests on a scale not seen since the last years of the Vietnam conflict a decade earlier. One rally in Washington in March 1983 drew an estimated 23,000 protestors; they chanted, “ No draft, no war, U.S. out of El Salvador,” and protest banners read, “ The Rebels Want to Talk. Let’s Listen,” and “ U.S. guns killed U.S. nuns.” 14 One hospital attendant from Detroit commented to a reporter that she opposed U.S. policy because “ They’re [the guerrillas] trying to gain their freedom so there won’t be the kind of poverty and exploitation that exists now. If they want to have a revolution, it’s their right to have one.” 15 In M ay 19 8 1, roughly 100,000 Americans protested outside the Pentagon near Washington, DC, in opposition to El Salvador policy.16 In an indication of how the Salvador issue had penetrated the Amer­ ican psyche, Democratic Congressman David Bonior, who represented blue-collar autoworkers residing in the Detroit suburbs - and likely more than a few Vietnam veterans among them - commented, “ The primary concern of my constituency is the economy; but close behind is this El Salvador issue. A lot of people are worried about their kids fighting a guerrilla war. Vietnam is fresh in their minds.” 17 Critics echoed the public’s skepticism. Noted journalist Hedrick Smith wrote in the N ew York Times that the Reagan administration had “ yet to score visible gains in its drive to oppose Soviet and Cuban adventurism, especially in El Salvador.” 18 Reflecting years after the fact, Alma Guillermoprieto, who helped break the news of the El Mozote massacre in late 19 8 1, had then held the growing view that the U.S.backed side was losing the war: “ In the early stages of that [El Sal­ vador] conflict, it seemed obvious to us [correspondents] that the guer­ rillas would win in El Salvador. . . . I think many of us thought in the early days that this would be a good thing.” 19 Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski direly pre­ dicted, “ By the coming spring [1982], it is quite likely that the gov­ ernment currently in power in El Salvador will be under increasing pressure and largely on the defensive.”20 Another vocal critic who

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The Salvador Option

2 2 .1. Foreign correspondents covering the war. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood. f ig u r e

remained influential throughout the Salvador debates was Carter’s for­ mer ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White. During his tenure as ambassador, White supported the Salvadoran junta’s objectives against the guerrillas, but later he contended that the introduction of military advisors “ emphasized a military solution and strengthened precisely the wrong group.”21 In March 1 9 8 1 , the U.S. Catholic Conference called for an end to American military aid to El Salvador. A month later, Salvadoran Arch­ bishop Arturo Rivera y Damas sent Massachusetts senator Edward Kennedy a letter with a similar appeal to stop U.S. assistance and to support peace talks. These sorts of pronouncements deeply influ­ enced mostly Democratic members of Congress who were more pre­ disposed to questioning U.S. motivations and actions in the Central American country. A delegation of House representatives, including liberals Barbara Mikulski from Maryland and Gerry Studds from Massachusetts, reported that “ by far the greatest responsibility for violence and ter­ rorism rests with those forces now receiving U.S. guns, helicopters,

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Another Vietnam

2 37

grenades, and ammunitions.”22 Freshman Massachusetts Congress­ man Barney Frank expressed his view that “ to ally ourselves with the government of El Salvador is the stupidest anti-communist activity that I have ever seen.”23 Many of the criticisms rested on the assumption that providing military aid and training was an inappropriate solution to a conflict that needed to be resolved politically. Democratic senators Christopher Dodd and Paul Tsongas warned that the “ intensification of military assistance” to El Salvador was leading the United States into a “ Vietnam-like quagmire.”24

“ Dark Tunnel of Endless Intervention” Critics and defenders of the Vietnam War shared a “ troubled con­ science.” For critics, the American campaign was a tragic misappli­ cation of military power for goals that were never clear. For defenders, Vietnam represented a “ failure of nerve, a capitulation to ill-informed, naive even un-American liberal and radical domestic critics, a sellout of anti-Communists in Indochina and elsewhere.”25 It is remarkable how much this Vietnam divide was replayed in the early years of the Salvador conflict. In response to an April 1983 op-ed piece on El Sal­ vador by Jeane Kirkpatrick, one reader wrote: “ If there is a parallel between our present involvement in Central American and our Viet­ nam experience... [it] is that the [Reagan] administration, now as then, has chosen to so aggressively sell an obviously flawed policy.”26 Iowa Republican Congressman Jim Leach blasted the Reagan administra­ tion for providing Congress with “ overly optimistic reports” of the Salvadoran government and military progress, a “ haunting reminder” of Vietnam when the presidency took on “ the role of cheerleader rather than analyst.”27 Or as vocal administration critic Senator Christo­ pher Dodd lamented, “ The American people know that we have been down this road before - and that it only leads to a dark tunnel of endless intervention.”28 The drumbeat of the “ El Salvador as Vietnam” interpretation only continued in the early 1980s. Journalist Tad Szulc warned that if Wash­ ington maintained its present policies in El Salvador, it would become stuck “ in an endless, Vietnam-style guerrilla war in the Salvadoran mountains and jungles... [a] scenario for absolute disaster.”29 George Ball, one of President Lyndon Johnson’s few top aides who argued

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The Salvador Option

against an escalation of the Vietnam campaign, stated that El Sal­ vador’s “ music and words sound like plagiarization. I have the feeling that we’ve heard it all before but in another setting.”30 Representative Stephen Solarz of New York fretted that “ the American people do not want any more Cubas in Central America, but neither do they want any more Vietnams.”31 One member of Congress conceded that in any consideration of Salvador policy, Vietnam was a “ ghostly presence; it’s there in every committee room, at every meeting.”32 On the defensive, the Reagan administration went out of its way to deny the Vietnam similarities, claiming that there was “ no compari­ son with Vietnam and there’s not going to be anything of that kind [in El Salvador].”33 One White House official acknowledged, “ We can’t help it if there are similarities. That does not mean we should not act in this case.”34 There were other voices on America’s right who declared that the risk in El Salvador was abandoning U.S. allies and interests, as had been done in South Vietnam. Reagan supporter Ernest Lefever voiced this view - that the effect of inaction in Vietnam was one reason the Reagan administration wouldn’t make the same mistake.35 Lefever mentioned Greece after World War II as a more apt compar­ ison when the Truman administration successfully backed the right­ ist Athens government against communist guerrillas without resort­ ing to American combat troops. Norman Podhoretz, longtime editor of the neo-conservative Commentary magazine, wrote that “ fighting a war on the cheap is a sure formula for defeat. . . . [If American military might is called for and we] fail to use it effectively we will have revealed ourselves as a spent and impotent force.”36

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23 Solidarity

The FM LN of El Salvador is a people’s army comprised of campesinos, workers, students, teachers, and professionals. The success of the FM LN can only be explained by one thing: the massive and continued support of the population. - From a flyer announcing a 19 8 1 protest at the White House, organized by the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)1 There is a well organised support network for the Salvadoran guerrillas; some of its components operate openly, like the “ Committee of Solidar­ ity with the Salvadoran People” [CISPES], but most of the activity has been underground. - Conservative magazine, The Spectator, 19 8 2 2 Unfortunately for El Salvador, the U.S. is likely to continue that war until more people in this country take a strong moral stand against it. - Letter to the editor, N ew York Times, by Eric Arnesen, history professor, Yale University, June 27, 19 8 5 3

As we have seen, U.S. involvement in El Salvador created a contro­ versial and polarizing split between those who viewed the commit­ ment as necessary and those who saw it as amoral and ineffectual; this split was further exacerbated with the assumption that a deeper involvement in El Salvador was inevitable. One less studied story of the Salvador Option is the role that “ solidarity groups” - most saliently in the United States - played in influencing both the perception 2 39

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The Salvador Option

of what was occurring in El Salvador and how Washington should respond. Not surprisingly, many of the American activists opposing U.S. policies in El Salvador concluded from the Vietnam experience that those who spoke up, protested, and even engaged in civil dis­ obedience would be vindicated by what could become an illegal and immoral war. So, in effect, the Vietnam solidarity playbook became the Salvador playbook. Critics, on the other hand, believed that the lesson from Vietnam was how the North Vietnamese had won the propaganda war in American public opinion. They cited a North Vietnamese cadre who reflected on their efforts to influence the debate in America. “ There were, as all political cadre learned by heart, three currents of revo­ lution... in every people’s war. The first two currents are the ever­ growing international socialist camp and the armed liberation move­ ment within the country in question. The third is the progressive move­ ment within the colonial, or neo-colonial, power.”4 Until the balance of military power decisively favored the revolution, it was this third current that had to draw the most energy. In this case, it was American public opinion - the minds and hearts of the people - that had to be motivated and exploited. An example of how the Salvador case was distinct from Vietnam was El Salvador’s proximity to the United States. If they didn’t already live in the United States, guerrilla-affiliated Salvadoran politicians and sometimes even military leaders - routinely visited to testify before Congress or give lectures at universities or church groups. Advocacy groups also published translated versions of books by famed guerrilla commanders like Ferman Cienfuegos.5 El Salvador solidarity groups came in all shapes and sizes; some, for example, focused on the human rights situation in El Salvador while others criticized or attempted to influence U.S. policies. Some were more radical or actively pro-FMLN than other more apolitical groups. Founded in October 1980, at the same time that disparate guerrilla groups had united under the FM LN umbrella, the Committee in Sol­ idarity with the People of El Salvador (Comite en Solidaridad con el Pueblo de El Salvador, CISPES) was one of the largest and, given its sup­ port of the newly formed guerrillas, was one of the most controversial solidarity organizations. CISPES’s founding statements indicated that it “ support[ed] the self-determination of the Salvadoran people” and

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241

thus “ declared its solidarity” with the FM LN and FDR, the “ politi­ cal military vanguard” in El Salvador. Quickly sprouting more than 400 chapters across the nation, CISPES also opposed U.S. government “ imperialist intervention” as “ an instrument of the genocide of the Sal­ vadorean [sic] people.” 6 In another echo of Vietnam, one of the leaders of CISPES claimed that its role on the “ North American front” was to garner support through U.S. public opinion and legislation, compara­ ble to the work of the North Vietnamese who ultimately won the battle of public opinion in the United States. Its inaugural manifesto ended with the slogans, “ United in combat until the final victory! Long live a free El Salvador!”7 Throughout the war, CISPES focused on pressuring Congress through letter-writing campaigns, visits to offices of congressional and Executive Branch officials, promoting local resolutions regarding El Salvador, and (at first) criticizing the Carter and Reagan administration policies through newspaper advertisements and fact-finding trips to the country, which had the potential to “ return and generate publicity and support.” 8 It also involved blockading federal government office buildings.9 Within its first year, CISPES helped organize a national demonstration of 100,000 marchers in Washington to protest Reagan administration policies. In an October 1983 issue of Alert!, a national newspaper published by CISPES, the organization stated, “ The groundwork has been laid for a larger and stronger movement that can contribute to the defeat of the U.S. and the victory of the FMLN. Now we must build that movement.” 10

“A Factor in Slowing Reagan’s Hand” Investigative journalist J. Michael Waller contended that Shafik Handal, general secretary of the PCS, dispatched his brother, Farid Handal, to the United States to set up a political and financial network in North America. According to this account, Salvadoran authorities allegedly captured Farid’s travel diary, which revealed that the main goal of his trip was “ the creation of the International Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador” - in effect, CISPES. Farid supposedly met in New York City with representatives of Cuba’s intelligence ser­ vice and members of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), including one of its visible leaders, Sandy Pollack.11 From this encounter, Waller

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The Salvador Option

concluded, Farid and Pollack then collaborated to establish CISPES with Pollack serving on its board. In 19 8 3, Pollack visited El Salvador where she met with the FMLN. A biography written about her speculated, “ If the [Salvadoran] gov­ ernment authorities had known of her quiet visits [to El Salvador], this leading architect of U.S. support for the Salvadoran guerrillas likely would have been tortured and killed. But she eluded the armed forces and death squads.” 12 In January 1985, Pollack was in Havana to present an essay denouncing American imperialism. She then departed on a Cubana airline flight for Managua that crashed right after take­ off and killed all aboard. She was buried in Cuba; Fidel Castro laid a wreath at her grave that read, “ To Sandy, from the Commanderin-Chief.” ^ Writing in the mid-1980s, CISPES leaders Barton Meyers and Jean Weisman described the impact of the solidarity groups’ “ mass, military mobilization” on Reagan’s Central America policies: During the early days of the Reagan administration, marked as it was by the crudely bellicose threats of Haig, Kirkpatrick, and Reagan against El Salvador and Nicaragua and by the invasion of Grenada, the solidarity movement was at its peak in its ability to attract activists and resources and to mobilize people for its activities. There is every reason to believe that this mass, military mobi­ lization was a factor in slowing Reagan’s hand in pursuing military measures yet more extreme than the ones chosen in El Salvador.... Now with the use in large part of surrogate troops, the decision to wage “ low intensity conflict” in Central America, the institution of “ democratic” reforms in El Salvador and Guatemala as a cover for continuing militarist policies, and a generally lower profile in Washington for Central American Policy, there has been a decline in visible protest. In part the current size [relatively small] of the solidarity move­ ment is a measure of its success in previously slowing the U.S. juggernaut.14

Also consider CISPES’s own history, which was published on its web­ site in 2005 during the twentieth anniversary of its founding: “ In the 1980s, we helped prevent a full-scale U.S. invasion of Central Amer­ ica.” 15 It is noteworthy that, as is so often the case in our examination of the Salvador Option, we once again have several interpretations of the key factors at play. Instead of attributing the lack of deeper Amer­ ican military involvement to the solidarity movements’ pressure, Rea­ gan officials would have likely contended that the United States didn’t

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need to pursue a militarized solution since the light footprint of pro­ fessionalizing the military and bolstering democracy ensured that the Salvadoran people would buy into the reforms.

A Government on the Side of the People In the early years of the war, some of the most heated opposition to U.S. policies came from an unexpected source: labor unions. During the Vietnam War, unions generally supported the war policies of suc­ cessive presidential administrations. With El Salvador, however, a sharp divide emerged between the leadership ranks that backed Carter and Reagan’s policies and the rank and file who opposed them. Here is how CISPES’s Meyers and Weisman describe the root of this opposition: “ The violation of the basic rights of Salvadorans to organize unions, the bombing of all major union halls, and the murder of thousands of trade unionists by government-supported rightwing death squads deeply affected North American trade unionists.” 16 This awareness led to mobilization and action. In California in 19 8 1, for example, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) announced they would not load any military equipment headed to El Salvador.17 Labor activists critical of the union leaders’ general support for the Reagan administration’s actions in El Salvador forced the “ first major debate” in four decades to take place at an AFL-CIO convention. Kenneth Blaylock, president of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), gave a speech at the convention after having visited El Salvador in a labor delegation. As we condition our support for military aid in El Salvador in this resolution, we fail to mention that the activities and the campaigns of terror by the death squads have been replaced by military action, planned, supported and connived by military advisors in El Salvador and our embassy in El Salvador. As I sat in the military commander’s office last February, he glibly told us that “We will have this little war wrapped up in six months, because we have adopted a policy and a strategy of sanitization.” Now for those of you who do not know what in military terms sanitization means, it means with foot soldiers, with artillery and with aircraft you completely run all of the people out of an area. As I sat in a church late one night and listened to mothers who had come down from those areas tell about the atrocities being perpetrated against them and their families by this technique of military operation, it would literally bring

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tears to your eyes__ I would like for one time for my government to be on the side of the people, not on the side of the rich dictators living behind the high walls.18

A few weeks after the AFL-CIO convention, seven national union pres­ idents and more than 100 local union representatives sponsored a tour of the United States by six labor leaders from Central America in an attempt to swell American support for unions abroad and to advo­ cate against U.S. military aid and the alliance between Washington and right-wing factions in their region.19

“ I’ve Never Been Arrested Before” Generally less ideologically and politically charged than, say, CISPES, church groups became especially active on El Salvador policy following the 1980 murders of Archbishop (Oscar Romero and the four Ameri­ can churchwomen. The InterReligious Task Force in El Salvador, for one, was formed in 19 8 1 and expanded to 350 local committees in the United States. Its members included 20 leaders of religious denomina­ tions, such as Presbyterians, Methodists, Roman Catholics, and Quak­ ers.20 The following excerpt written by a member of the task force characterizes their impact: The solidarity groups can be written off as leftists by the public because they take a political stance. The church’s position, which is not talking right or left, is harder to argue with. It is especially important because the [Reagan] administration is trying to use theological rhetoric to justify its position. The work in the religious community is the most important because it is the largest and most credible opposition.21

The InterReligious Task Force played many roles in opposing U.S. mil­ itary involvement in El Salvador, from hosting panel discussions on Salvadoran policy with state leaders to organizing sanctuary for Sal­ vadoran migrants in churches across the United States. Churches offer­ ing sanctuary became safe havens for migrants escaping the violence in El Salvador and also provided a means for religious groups to protest U.S. denial of political asylum to Salvadorans who sought it.22 As the director of New York’s InterReligious Task Force said, “ The United States does not want to recognize them as refugees because that would call into question United States policy, which has created war, death,

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and destruction throughout Latin America.”23 By the mid-1980s and likely a reflection of El Salvador becoming less controversial and Nicaragua gaining importance as the decade wore on - the group had changed its name from Task Force in El Salvador to Task Force in Cen­ tral America.24 The Pledge of Resistance One of the most important protest documents during the opposition to the Vietnam War, published in 1967 and entitled “A Call to Resist Ille­ gitimate Authority,” called American participation in the war “ uncon­ stitutional and illegal.” Several thousand citizens signed the “ call” ; the government prosecuted five of them in a high-profile trial in Boston in 1968 - including the famed pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock - on the claim that they “ unlawfully, willfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other, and with diverse other persons... to commit offense against the United States.”25 These alleged crimes were to “ aid and abet” resistance to the military draft. The ruling against the defendants was reversed on appeal.26 The (Central American) Pledge of Resistance was based on the ear­ lier Vietnam War call. At the time of the war in El Salvador, the draft was no longer in effect, so the acts of resistance were to be illegal acts of non-violent protest and at times limited only to “ acts of legal protest.”27 The pledge form read in part: If the United States invades, bombs, sends combat troops, or otherwise signif­ icantly escalates its intervention in Central America, I pledge to join others to engage in acts of nonviolent civil disobedience as conscience leads me at Con­ gressional field offices, the White House, or other pre-designated U.S. federal facilities, including federal buildings, military installations, offices of the Cen­ tral Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department, and other appropriate places. I pledge to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience in order to prevent or halt the death and destruction which such U.S. military action causes the people of Central America.28

The first “ mass public signing” of the pledge took place in San Fran­ cisco in October 1984. Within a year, more than 68,000 people had signed the pledge. It is interesting that, unlike a few years earlier, most of the concern in 1985 was to conduct civil disobedience if the

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f i g u r e 2 3 .1 . Peace pledge. Basing their efforts on actions used during the Viet­ nam War, a vocal anti-war community urged Americans to resist U.S. policies in El Salvador with non-violent civil disobedience. Image prepared by the Uni­ versity of Wisconsin-Madison Cartography Lab©. Reprinted with permission.

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United States invaded Nicaragua. Proponents claimed that the pledge led to demonstrations in such places as Bangor, Maine, and Decatur, Georgia, locations “ not traditionally associated with military protests.”29 The following are testimonies by pledge signees cited in solidarity literature: “ I’m a pastor and as a person of faith I’m called to live out what’s called the good news, that is the good news of God’s peace and justice. I feel that by signing this pledge of nonviolent resistance that’s one small embodying of the good news.” 30 “ I’m a veteran of two wars. I’m not sure about the morality of those wars, but I’m very sure of the immorality of this war that’s going on now in Cen­ tral America. I’ve signed the pledge of resistance, and I’m going to stand behind it.” 31 “ I’ve never been arrested before. I’m signing the pledge not just for the people of Central America, but also for the people here in this country. We’ve got to wake people up to what is being done in our name all over the world.” 32

“ FM LN Propaganda Almost Defeated Us by Itself” Another key element of the solidarity groups' efforts was the provision of “ material aid” to El Salvador, often in the form of humanitarian assistance directly to guerrilla-controlled areas. The thinking was that these funds would go straight to the people and bypass the “ profoundly corrupt” government “ antagonistic to the interests of the masses.”33 The group Medical Aid was one of the first to provide material aid, distributing upwards of $700,000 for medical supplies for the “ vic­ tims of the war,” mostly in guerrilla zones. The money was intended for purchasing neurosurgical kits and for training brigadistas (medics with knapsacks of medicine and medical instruments active in the guerrilla zones).34 Medical Aid participated in a dramatic mission involving guerrilla commander Nidia Díaz who was captured and wounded by the Sal­ vadoran military in 1985. Because of the apparent refusal of the Sal­ vadoran government to allow surgery on her wounded hand, per­ manent paralysis was a real danger. After intensive pressure from solidarity groups and members of the U.S. Congress, the Salvadoran authorities allowed Medical Aid to send a surgical team to operate on

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23.2. FM LN medical brigade in Perquin, Morazan. American solidar­ ity groups raised money to send to FMLN-conducted humanitarian efforts as a way to help the Salvadoran people but not the repressive government. Critics countered that anyone was naive who believed the funds sent to the guerrillas would not bolster the rebels’ war effort. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood. f ig u r e

the wounded guerrillera prisoner. Accompanying the medical group was an observer, Mike Farrell, the actor who portrayed a military surgeon in the television series M'*A*S'*H. Supporters reported that because of the controversy, no local surgical aide would join in, so Farrell was pressed into last-minute service to assist in what was a suc­ cessful surgical operation.35 In addition to solidarity groups, guerrillas largely relied on their political wing, the FDR, to present their case in international settings, especially the United States. And like the sabotage operations, the guer­ rillas proved effective in pushing their view of the conflict outside El Salvador.36 President Jose Napoleón Duarte readily admitted that the

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brilliantly coordinated FM LN propaganda campaign almost won the war for the guerrillas: “ Overall, we [the Salvadoran government] were being crushed under the avalanche of international press coverage. We had been totally unprepared for it. If there had been some structure to handle the press, some capacity to investigate charges and demonstrate what was true or false, we might have done better.” As it was, “ FM LN propaganda almost defeated us by itself.”37 Interviewed by the author in 2008, former guerrilla leader Ana Guadalupe Martinez cited the enormous political significance of the North American support groups: “ We had 400 committees of solidarity in the United States.”38

“ They Were Funding Some of the Violence They So Hated” Some critics countered that this ostensibly humanitarian aid was in fact funding the armed insurgency. One American diplomat recalled in an interview: M y guess is that a major part of it [the aid] came from church groups. It’s hard to count it since they were not particularly anxious to have it counted. I think most of it was donated by people who really felt that if you said, “This is only going for humanitarian stuff, it is not going for military stuff,” that that would happen. O f course it is a nonsense proposition. If you give money to the FM LN, it is really stupid to think they even have the accounting skills, let alone the will, to segregate the funding. Money is money. . . . Those people who hated the U.S. government’s Salvador policy because we were supporting a government they didn’t approve of, and because we were supporting a war which they didn’t approve of either, concluded that since they had failed for a long time to defeat the policy and the aid in Congress, they would countervail with their own contributions to the other side. But countervailing did put them into a morally ambiguous situation because they were funding some of the violence they so hated.39

While in the minority in terms of public opinion - given how unpop­ ular U.S. involvement in El Salvador was in the 1980s - conservative opinion makers lambasted the solidarity groups, especially the radical ones like CISPES. According to writer Mario Rosenthal, Rarely has psychological warfare been as successful as it has been against the people of El Salvador. The myth of an oppressed people rising up to vindi­ cate injustices by military death squads and voracious oligarchs makes for

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great copy, but it isn’t true__ [T]he U.S. media had cooperated wholeheart­ edly in blackening the image of El Salvador, often championing the guerril­ las as “ muchachos” - patriots seeking the liberation of an oppressed peo­ ple__ Equally important was the influence of different religious organizations that poured money into front groups that gave comfort and support to the enemy. Donations intended for the poor by misguided Roman Catholic, Protes­ tant, and non-denominational congregations were invested in arms purchases for the FM LN guerrillas. During the current [FMLN] offensive [in 1989], many individuals who had been working for and directing these groups came out of the closet, brandishing AK-47s and fighting alongside the guerrillas.40

Another critic contended that these groups’ real influence was hard to detect: “ There is a well organized network for the Salvadoran guerril­ las; some of its components operate openly, like the ‘Committee of Sol­ idarity with the Salvadoran People,’ but most of the activity has been underground.”41 Another opponent cited an alleged Radio Vencere­ mos broadcast from 1983, “ We have organized a large solidarity appa­ ratus that encompasses the whole planet, even in the United States, where one of the most active centers of solidarity exists.”42 In a criticism late in the war, a conservative Wall Street Journal edito­ rial page attacked Iowa Democratic Senator Tom Harkin for appearing “ ready to oblige” to the FM LN ’s 1989 peace plan. The editorial called Harkin’s plan - to place 50 percent of U.S. military aid (then about $85 million/year) in escrow until human rights and peace negotiations progress - a “ full blown propaganda offensive against El Salvador.”43 The article emphasized the role of CISPES in having “ [turned] up the volume” to help the FM LN “ win in Congress what it can’t win on the battlefield__ The guerrillas may prefer Capitol Hill because back in El Salvador democracy is proceeding without them.”44 A former Ameri­ can ambassador’s milder estimation was that the “ majority of the peo­ ple” in the solidarity movement against U.S. policy in El Salvador were “ sincere and well meaning people ignorant of any of the movements’ ties to the FM LN guerrillas and, at most, have only a vague sympathy to the FM LN .”45

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24 Troop Cap and Certifying Human Rights

The militarizing of that region is warmongering, it’s provocative and it’s the wrong way to go. - Reverend Jesse Jackson, civil rights leader and Democratic candidate in the 1984 presidential campaign1 You can’t fight Congress and public opinion and an enemy at the same time. That’s why Vietnam was the crime of the century. - Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, 19 8 4 2 For three and a half years an army of 22,000 has been outfought by a force of about 7,000 guerrillas. The advisers’ mission is to transform that army into a winning team, and to do it quickly. - N ew York Times article on El Salvador, July 19 8 3 s

While he was ready and willing to assist the Duarte government and denounce the leftist guerrillas who sought to overthrow it, President Reagan downplayed the significance of the American commitment to El Salvador. In an interview with the Washington Post on March 27, 19 8 1, he called the Salvadoran rebels “ terrorists” who were part of a “ revolution being exported to the Americas, to Central America and further south,” and in response to this threat the United States would “ be of help to this [Salvadoran] government.”4 Yet Reagan added that the trainers were “ in garrison, simply training recruits.” Once again this balance between hardline ideology and practice imple­ mentation entailed both a promise of U.S. commitment and restricted 251

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troop engagement.5 A few weeks earlier he had responded at length to explain why this troop deployment was so limited: Now, you use the term “ military advisers.” You know, there’s sort of [a] techni­ cality there. You could say they are advisers in that they’re training, but when it’s used as “ adviser,” that means military men who go in and accompany the forces into combat, advise on strategy and tactics. We have no one of that kind. We’re sending and have sent teams down there to train. They do not accom­ pany them into combat. . . . And as a matter of fact, we have such training teams in more than 30 countries today, and we’ve always done that - the officers of the military in friendly countries and in our neighboring countries have come to our service schools - West Point, Annapolis, and so forth. So, I don’t see any parallel at all.6

During a press conference in early 1982, Reagan responded to a ques­ tion concerning the conditions he would consider for sending U.S. com­ bat troops to El Salvador, “ Well, maybe if they dropped a bomb on the White House, I might get mad.”7

The Unofficial Strict Cap Amid the growing controversy about the Reagan administration's response to El Salvador, the issue of American combat troops being deployed took on a special significance. Given the plethora of Viet­ nam War comparisons and the administration's immediate move to double the advisory mission to 54 soldiers, this was not surprising. In response, Virginia Senator Robert Byrd introduced an amendment to the War Powers Resolution on March 8 ,19 8 2 , that would require con­ gressional concurrence before U.S. combat troops could be sent to El Salvador.8 The administration countered such congressional efforts by contending that, as White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes phrased it, there was “ no plan to send combat troops to El Salvador or any­ where else.”9 Policymakers in the Reagan administration and members of Congress also knew full well that the notion of expanded direct mil­ itary involvement in El Salvador was deeply unpopular. In turn, this sober realization also made officials pursue policies that were less likely to end up with American boots on the ground. As one senior

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Reagan official recalled, there was sort of a “ Vietnam line” in terms of what could be attempted in El Salvador. In this sense, the morass of Vietnam helped prevent a similar morass in El Salvador.10 Millions of Americans and many members of Congress were wor­ ried about another Vietnam in El Salvador. They listened to the Rea­ gan administration’s announcement about sending military “ trainers” and making sizable increases in military assistance and assumed the worse. Less understood at the time was that, as we saw with the circum­ spect Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger when considering Alexan­ der Haig’s plan to target Cuba, U.S. policymakers and military leaders had also been seared by Vietnam and were eager to not repeat the expe­ rience. Thus, El Salvador policy continued to be developed in ways to avoid another Vietnam, such as eventually embracing a “ troop cap” on the number of military advisors deployed in El Salvador. In March 1983 both the House and Senate had moved to establish a maximum number of personnel; that same August, though, the Reagan adminis­ tration responded to the looming legislative-mandated cap by telling Capitol Hill that it would not raise the number of American mili­ tary advisors above 55.11 So an unofficial cap of 55 was born, even if the Reagan administration had adhered to that level since its initial increase in advisors in early 19 8 1. The U.S. soldiers in El Salvador operated under conservative rules of engagement dictated by the U.S. military group at the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Southern Command in the Panama Canal Zone. The strict rules were put in place to lessen the chance that soldiers would be caught in actual fighting and classified as “ combat troops,” which would have violated the War Powers Resolution, the 1973 law intended to check the Executive Branch’s ability to wage war without congressional approval. They were stationed in San Salvador and a few regional gar­ risons with authorized day trips no farther than 5 kilometers from the garrisons to conduct training.12 The soldiers were also prohibited from accompanying the units they trained into combat. The no-combat rule, for one, helps explain why there were no American advisors present when the U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion unleashed its killing force around the town of El Mozote in early December 19 8 1. The cap applied only to the number of military advisors in El Salvador, meaning officials involved in other capacities, such as the

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2 54

The Salvador Option

Military Group at the U.S. Embassy or as medical advisors in FAES hospitals did not count against the cap. In addition, numerous 12man Special Forces “A-Teams” conducted six-week-long training clin­ ics throughout El Salvador and immediately departed the country so as not to count against the cap.13 The U.S. military would also train Sal­ vadoran soldiers outside the country, mainly in Honduras, as another way to avoid being counted.14 In February 1985, for instance, the U.S. government acknowledged that it often had up to 12 0 soldiers in El Salvador but claimed that it was not in violation of the 55person congressional limit since the “ surplus” soldiers were handling other duties or were in the country for less than two weeks of tem­ porary duty.15 Critics claimed these were simply schemes that, while perhaps technically correct, violated the spirit of the informal cap. And at times, the actual number of soldiers was considerably over the limit, for example, exceeding 15 0 in 19 87.16 The United States also relied on other Latin American governments - democratic (Venezuela) and military-ruled (Argentina) - to provide FAES training. One State Department “ eyes only” cable to Washington reported Argentina’s rul­ ing military junta had indicated, “All we have to do is tell them what to do.” 17 The troop cap was one more way that Congress could indirectly influence the implementation of Reagan’s Salvador military strategy. One Special Forces officer summed up the troop cap when he quipped that it was “ the most watched figure in the war.” 18 This might also be an example of policies being carried out in El Salvador that were sub­ optimal at best and counterproductive at worst.19 Many proponents of the cap assumed that it prevented the U.S. military from doing what it would otherwise do: insert combat troops that would only lead to calls for even more troops. Not surprisingly, many military planners and operatives on the ground were not happy with the limit, believ­ ing that it hampered their critically important mission of profession­ alizing their Salvadoran counterparts. Yet there were also many in the U.S. military who thought that while the troop cap was entirely arbitrary, it forced them to maintain a light footprint, thereby forcing the Salvadoran military to assume responsibility for the w ar’s success or failure.20 One former American military trainer recalled that he and his col­ leagues “ would bang [their] heads against the wall on that limit - but

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it kept [the U.S. military at] a very low profile, and probably kept the advisory effort alive. There were enough pressure groups to get the advisor groups out of the country, that it could have soured very quickly on us.”21 Another advisor commented to the author, “At the time I felt somewhat constrained, but in retrospect it was probably a good thing. The political objectives have to override what the military guys on the ground want to do.”22 While the troop cap and War Powers Resolution restrained mili­ tary action abroad, the danger soldiers faced would serve to challenge the confines of these rules. A U.S. military communications technician was injured by guerrilla gunfire during a helicopter mission in early 19 8 3, which made him the first American soldier wounded while on duty in El Salvador. As the years of the war progressed and no slip­ pery slope appeared, new “ relaxed” rules meant that American advi­ sors were allowed to carry automatic weapons while in combat zones. Yet the informal troop cap endured until the end of the decade, even though at that point the number of advisors had dropped well below the 55-man limit. One salient historical counterfactual is how many troops would have been deployed to El Salvador had the 55-person cap not been in place? A U.S. military planner based at the U.S. South­ ern Command in Panama had been developing a plan for 250 advisors that would have entailed training down to the company level, but with memories of Vietnam still fresh, he was told by his superiors that this plan was politically untenable.23 Ironically, the administration’s ambivalent embrace of the troop cap in the short term only served to increase the worries about deepening U.S. military involvement in El Salvador. Another irony was that one of the initial architects of the engagement strategy, the by-then retired and former ambassador to El Salvador Robert White, was now vocifer­ ously denouncing the U.S. advisory effort. For example, addressing the House Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations on February 25, 19 8 1, the outgoing ambassador placed particular emphasis on the consequences of U.S. military operations, from which he had sought to dissociate himself: As the civilian responsible for the implementation of United States foreign pol­ icy in El Salvador over the past year [1980] I would be at a loss as to how to define the mission of military advisors in El Salvador. You know, the security

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forces in El Salvador have been responsible for the deaths of thousands and thousands of young people, and they have executed them just on the mere sus­ picion that they are leftists or sympathize with leftists. Are we really going to send military advisors in there to be part of that kind of machinery?24

“ El Salvador Would Be Undergoing a Social Revolution” With its control of the purse strings necessary to fund the Executive Branch’s foreign policy operations, Congress is often tempted to apply conditions to the provision of these funds. And El Salvador in the 1980s was no exception to this tendency.25 Senator Christopher Dodd (D, CT), Representative Stephen Solarz (D, NY), and Representative Jonathan Bingham (D, NY) worked together to provide a mechanism that skeptical liberals in the U.S. Congress would use to ensure that they could at least nip around the edges of a Reagan strategy that they saw as woefully obtuse to the dire human rights situation.26 The approved legislation required President Reagan to “ certify” that the Salvadoran government was making “ a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights” and “ achiev­ ing substantial control over all elements of its armed forces, so as to bring to an end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens by these forces.”27 The administration provided its first report to Congress in late Jan­ uary 1982. It contended that the Duarte junta had made a “ concerted and significant effort” to respect human rights. As a result, $25 million in military aid and $40 million in economic assistance was disbursed.28 The certification language was also an attempt to pressure the Reagan administration to focus reform on El Salvador’s internal ills, not just external Soviet-bloc subversion. According to one congressional sup­ porter, “Although I do not deny that there is an international dimension to the conflict... its roots are internal. Even without the flow of arms aid from Communist nations to the guerrilla insurgents, El Salvador would be undergoing a social revolution.”29 While the Reagan admin­ istration would come to bristle at the bi-annual certification that lasted until 19 8 3, some congressional liberals were attempting to abolish mil­ itary aid to El Salvador altogether. According to liberal representative Gerry Studds (D, MA), “ The time has come... to stop the killing and start the talking.”30 In a snarky editorial titled “A Communist Victory,” the conservative Wall Street Journal wrote: “ Communist forces are not

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winning the war in El Salvador, despite a continued flow of arms from Cuba and a capacity to shoot up the American Embassy now and then for sport. They are, however, having a modicum of success in the U.S. Congress.”31 The State Department’s first certification report in late January 1982 came at an inopportune time for the Reagan administration given that there had been a rash of reporting on political violence and human rights abuses occurring in El Salvador. On January 26, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Americas Watch, two activist orga­ nizations, released a report alleging that the Salvadoran government was involved with “ some 200 politically motivated murders a week,” and “ the widespread use of torture by all branches of the nation’s security forces.”32 Most critically, on January 27 and 28, the Wash­ ington Post and N ew York Times published articles describing the El Mozote massacre, further highlighting the need to curb the excesses of the Salvadoran military units. Certainly, these congressional adher­ ents believed, there was simply no way that the Reagan administration would be able credibly certify that progress was being made in this Central American cauldron. The Reagan administration justified the certification by citing the challenges of balancing the administration’s desire to show progress with the inescapable reality that the human rights situation remained dire: “ The Salvadoran government, since the overthrow of General Romero [October 1979], has taken explicit actions to end human rights abuses. The paramilitary organization ‘O RDEN’ has been outlawed, although some of its former members may still be active.”33 While con­ servatives praised the report, 55 House liberals sent a letter to Reagan claiming that the certification was “ contrary to the documented facts” and requested that he revoke it.34 Gerry Studds even declared Rea­ gan’s certification null and void and attempted to suspend military aid. Despite their efforts, however, there were simply not enough votes to defund or otherwise block the White House’s approach to El Salvador, emphasizing the fear of “ abandoning El Salvador” at this trying time. This condition forced the administration to positively certify El Salvador’s progress every six months, and it ended only after Rea­ gan vetoed the legislation in late 19 8 3.35 According to Reagan official Elliott Abrams, Congress demanded the time-consuming reports even though it was never prepared to actually stop the aid. “ But Congress

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didn’t cut off aid, because it didn’t want to risk being blamed, if the guerrillas won as a result, for ‘losing’ El Salvador. Instead, they required certification - which is to say, they agreed to fund the war while reserv­ ing the right to call us Fascists.”36 The now departed U.S. ambassador to El Salvador Deane Hinton was even more critical when he sug­ gested that Congress “ didn’t want to take the responsibility to deny the resources to the government of El Salvador and on the other hand they didn’t want to endorse it, so they created a certification procedure and made the rest of us jump through the hoop, and the president had to certify it.” The certification process, for Hinton, was “ a political cop-out by a lot of congressmen.” 37 Jeane Kirkpatrick objected that certification was “ undermining the confidence of vulnerable allies.”38 A State Department official took a more moderate reflection: “ Certifi­ cation was time consuming, frustrating, but a net good as it forced us to keep at the human rights issue.”39 Administration critics, however, argued that Executive Branch cer­ tification held the administration's feet to the fire on the deplorable human rights situation in El Salvador. The most perplexing issue in this debate that repeated itself every six months was not so much the level of violence in the country; rather, the disagreement focused on whether the agreed-upon horrible situation was improving or worsening. Con­ gressman Jonathan Bingham (D, NY) called the certification “ fraud, pure and simple,” adding that “ we should not allow the Reagan admin­ istration to swear a duck is an eagle in order to support repression in the name of anti-Communism in El Salvador.”40 The vocal Christopher Dodd returned from one visit to El Salvador and declared, “ Certifica­ tion is a farce, it’s irrelevant. We’ve spent $748 million there in three years... and what do we have to show for it?”41 Other more strident critics contended that the Reagan administra­ tion was using certification to cover up America's involvement in a dirty war. The director of Americas Watch argued, “ What the Reagan Administration did was embrace the principle of human rights and then conduct warfare over the facts. The fight over El Mozote exem­ plified this.”42 New York Congressman Stephen Solarz went a step fur­ ther, decrying the “ Orwellian tones of this certification.”43 Rather than a serious component of El Salvador policy, certification became a “ Beltway football” of accusations that the Reagan adminis­ tration's supporters and critics tossed back and forth. Nonetheless, the

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Troop Cap

2 59

administration soon realized that the routine certifications gave it some leverage over the Salvadoran security forces, which were becoming quite accustomed to the sizable U.S. aid and training packages. Elliott Abrams admitted that “ the good cop, bad cop routine with Congress was very effective” as it created a credible threat of a cessation in aid.44 Indeed, Washington’s leverage over the Salvadoran government and military continued to increase over the course of the 1980s until the Salvadorans were entirely dependent on U.S. largesse to fund its war and economy. This was an unexpected yet welcomed development as U.S. policymakers continued the Carter-era “ grit-your-teeth” policy of supporting reforms despite the weakness and abuses present in their Salvadoran counterparts.

Inclination of the United States to Intervene in Endless Wars As the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union hard­ ened in the 1980s, the idea of “ low-intensity conflict” began to take hold within U.S. policy and military circles.45 Low-intensity conflict was guided by the belief that the Soviet and Cuban “ wars of national liberation” needed to be confronted in a way that produced outcomes favorable to U.S. security and avoided wasteful quagmires.46 In the words of Reagan’s second secretary of state, George Shultz, in a 1983 speech, “ We must be prepared to commit our political, economic, and if necessary, military power when the threat is still manageable and shown its prudent use can prevent the threat from growing.”47 Rea­ gan’s hawkish foreign policy posited that, contrary to Carter’s ambiva­ lence about using military force to check leftist revolution, Washington should unabashedly but sparingly offer assistance and deploy forces to promote U.S. interests. Not surprisingly, many critics believed that low-intensity conflict was a new term for the inclination of the United States to intervene in “ endless wars.”48 One worrisome development for the United States’ unfolding effort to bolster the Salvadoran state and military was that despite the embar­ rassing failure of its final offensive, the FM LN was quickly becom­ ing an extremely powerful fighting force in a conflict where Reagan had pledged there would be no U.S. combat presence. In late Jan­ uary 1982, a guerrilla commando raid on the Ilopango air base out­ side San Salvador destroyed six U.S.-supplied helicopters and 1 1 other

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The Salvador Option

aircraft. Well-armed guerrilla forces were now camped out around the Guazapa volcano, also situated unnervingly close to the capital, which reinforced the sense that the guerrillas were now operating with much greater impunity and confidence. One FM LN comman­ der subsequently bragged, “ If the United States withdrew its support, we could topple the junta in just a few months.”49 Junta president Duarte lamented, “ We are losing the fight with the guerrillas in the countryside.” 50 The Reagan administration now realized that its sig­ nificant increase in aid during its first year in office had not produced a quick turnaround.51

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25 Reagan Gambles on Elections, 1982

With a fascist dictatorship [the Christian Democratic/military junta] the only way to get them to understand anything is with force. Sadly, the Reagan administration sustains this dictatorship. - Ferman Cienfuegos, FM LN commander1 There is no mistaking that the decisive battle for Central America is under way in El Salvador. - Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs2

In late February 19 8 1, soon after the White House had announced its expanded military and economic aid to the embattled Salvadoran gov­ ernment, the FMLN/FDR invited the Reagan administration to engage in direct negotiations to end the war. This guerrilla overture might have been a result of the failure of the January 19 8 1 final offensive to seize power, but also the FM LN might have decided to support negotia­ tions as a “ tactic” allowing them to gain “ time and diplomatic advan­ tage.” Whatever the motivations, the FM LN pursued “ negotiations as a strategy.”3 The State Department quickly rejected the rebels’ invitation, coun­ tering that “ if the insurgents want to talk, they should address them­ selves to the Government of El Salvador.”4 And it was not only the guerrillas who were pushing negotiations. In the wake of a massacre of 30 civilians, orchestrated by the infamous Treasury Police, in the town of Soyapango in March, Democratic senators Paul Tsongas and 261

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The Salvador Option

Edward Kennedy, both of Massachusetts, contended that talks were “ essential to end the military escalation and pursue a political solution to this conflict.” 5 Little over a year later, the House of Representatives voted to urge the Reagan administration to press for “ unconditional discussions between the guerrillas and the Salvadoran government.” 6 Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders’s much-discussed speech on July 16 ,1 9 8 1 , at the World Affairs Council in Washington appeared to provide the possibility of negotiations that the administration had theretofore resisted. Enders, scion of a patrician Republican family from New England, epitomized “ the best and brightest” of his gener­ ation. In the 1960s, the towering six foot eight Enders had supported civil rights at home and the Vietnam War overseas. Enders’s height meant he towered over CIA director William Casey and President Rea­ gan. “ His intellect was equally imposing,” Reagan’s biographer Lou Cannon wrote, and might have intimidated other policymakers.7 Enders attributed the conflict to deeply rooted “ domestic Salvado­ ran political and socioeconomic problems.” 8 Yet, in rhetoric that could have been written by Haig or Kirkpatrick, Enders contended, “ Cuba helped Marxist groups to unify and has been backing them with mil­ itary training, arms, and propaganda__ Had the United States not responded to El Salvador’s appeal for help, no country in the area could have considered itself safe from Cuban-backed violence.”9 Based on information from captured FM LN documents, Enders also added that the FM LN was considering using negotiations “ as a delaying tactic while the insurgents attempted to regroup militarily.” He believed that U.S. assistance was needed because a “ political solution” could only be achieved if the guerrillas realized they could not “ win by the force of arms.” 10 Enders’s carefully worded address appeared to indicate that the administration had at least opened the door to a “ political solution” while resoundingly rejecting the rebels’ call for “ power sharing.” And by political solution, the administration increasingly came to mean elections. In short, the battle came down to the FM LN ’s insistence on power sharing through negotiations versus the Salvadoran and U.S. government’s view that gaining power could only come through the ballot box. According to Enders, a key architect of the unfolding engagement strategy, “ We should recognize that El Salvador’s leaders

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will not - and should not - grant the insurgents through negotiations the share of power the rebels have not been able to win on the bat­ tlefield. But they should be - and are - willing to compete with the guerrillas at the polls.” 11

Mediation of “ Two Belligerent Forces” In contrast to Washington’s approach as articulated by Enders, the FM LN and its political wing active in Western Europe and the United States, the FDR, made a different public argument. According to com­ mander Ferman Cienfuegos in a 19 8 1 interview, “ What we have pro­ posed is mediation” given the reality in the country of “ two belligerent forces,” the FAES and the guerrillas. Cienfuegos made it clear to the Reagan administration and the Duarte junta that the appropriate con­ ditions would have to be in place before any talks of mediation: “ The condition or the political climate that would guarantee the negotia­ tion process between the belligerent forces must exist because there are fascist sectors that must first be ousted and punished.” 12 In fact, on October 7 ,1 9 8 1 , about six months before the key elections, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega presented an FMLN/FDR peace proposal before the UN General Assembly in which the Salvadoran guerrillas reiter­ ated their stance that the peace talks had to include the “ fundamen­ tal aspects of the conflict.” The statement also described the reasons behind the revolution with which many observers around the world increasingly sympathized: If today our people are waging an armed struggle under the leadership of its organizations, the FM LN and FDR, this is because oppressive and repressive regimes have closed all peaceful avenues for change, thus leaving our people with only armed struggle as the sole and legitimate means to attain their libera­ tion, thereby exercising the universal and constitutional right to revolt against illegal and repressive authorities.13

To the FM LN and FDR, the key components of any talks had to be end­ ing the war and establishing a “ new political and economic order that will guarantee the Salvadoran people the full exercise of their rights as citizens and a life worthy of human beings.” 14 A few months later, on January 18 , 1982, the FM LN even sent a letter to President Reagan

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condemning American involvement and once again calling for negoti­ ations and an understanding of the domestic roots of the war: Your Administration has not only sent war materiel and military advisers to the [Duarte] Junta, but is also participating in designing and implementing the military strategy of exterminating our people__ By means of this “ scorchearth” [sic] strategy, the civilian population has become a military target, espe­ cially those civilians living near the war fronts, without regard for their sex, creed, or condition as non-combatants__ Trying to define the Salvadorean conflict in terms of the confrontation between your government and the Soviet Union seems to us totally detached from reality. It is misery and the repres­ sion imposed by the oligarchy and the military which makes thousands of Sal­ vadoreans involve themselves in the struggle.15

Not surprisingly, administration hawks were not convinced by the guerrilla overtures on negotiations. Alexander Haig told Reagan in 1982 that among other deceptions, the Cubans were simply “ trying to buy time for the Salvadoran guerrillas.” 16 By March 1982, the CIA was reporting that Havana’s “ growing interest” in negotiations on El Salvador reflected Castro’s “ chagrin over the failure to win a military victory [in the 19 8 1 offensive], and a belief that maintenance of the status quo there is not to the guerrillas’ advantage.” Negotiations, the secret report contended, provide time for the rebels to “ regroup and rebuild.” It concluded with this gloomy assessment: “ Neither the guer­ rillas nor Cuba and its allies have altered their fundamental assessment that power ultimately can only be won through military strength.” 17 On reflection, it remains an open question as to how sincere both sides were in the desire for negotiations. Moreover, as is often the case in such talks, both sides had entirely different understandings of what negotiations entailed. Further complicating matters is that our percep­ tion of these policies is largely derived from the public pronouncements at the time.

“ Vote in the Morning, Die in the Afternoon” In March 19 8 1, junta president Jose Napoleón Duarte appointed an independent election council to prepare for the following year’s national election to select a constituent assembly tasked with appoint­ ing an interim government, drafting a new constitution, and setting a date for future presidential elections. The government used slogans

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such as “ Your Vote, Your Solution” and “ Because El Salvador has changed, your vote will be respected” in order to convince the skeptical Salvadoran population that this would indeed be the first free election in 50 years.18 U.S. agencies active in El Salvador like the U.S. Agency for Inter­ national Development (USAID) and the labor organization Ameri­ can Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to bolster government efforts intended to help ensure an orderly process. On the covert side, the CIA helped fund the production of campaign materials and radio and television commercials in order to boost the fortunes of the centrist Christian Democrats at the expense of the guerrillas and the right-wing ARENA. In one CIA “ psychological operation” intended to create support for the Christian Democrats, flyers were distributed that showed on one side an oligarch with money spilling out of his pockets and on the other side, a guerrilla wearing a red bandana and carrying a rifle.19 Remarkably, contrary to, say, the CIA’s involvement in overthrowing Guatemala’s democratic president Jacobo Arbenz in 19 54, in El Sal­ vador the CIA was working secretly to bolster democracy, however fledgling. Heading up to the 1982 elections, the junta government declared that the FM LN could participate in the vote if they first laid down their arms. This was an especially bold demand given that 1982 had started out very similar to 19 8 1: a powerful guerrilla offensive that sent the FAES reeling. The guerrillas quickly dismissed the offer to participate in the vote, positing that power sharing must precede any elections. The guerrillas also promised that they would disrupt the illegitimate elec­ tion and warned Salvadorans not to partake or risk the consequences. Guerrilla commander Fermtin Cienfuegos explained the FM LN ’s view that this supposed “ electoral solution” (read, March elections) would “ little by little fall apart because no one can believe that free elections could be held with the same genocidal men of ’72 and ’77 [fraudulent elections] in power.” He added, “ With such prece­ dent, these elections cannot be held, given that the genocidal men are not in favor of any political solution. At the same time, we believe that their scheme of ‘pacification and then elections’ does not have any possibility of succeeding.”20 Cienfuegos also told a Washington Post correspondent in Managua that the FM LN would call for a

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“ popular uprising” in which “ there will be no public transport, in addi­ tion there will certainly be no electricity in the country, business will have to come to a stop, there will be no traffic on the highways and we will have encircled several of the nation’s cities.”21 Another FM LN commander advised on guerrilla radio that “ the people are to build barricades in the countryside to prevent free movement; the people must remain at home [during the elections].”22 Media reports mentioned the appearance of guerrilla graffiti across the country that warned residents, “ Vote in the morning die in the after­ noon.” Skeptics dismissed this line as convenient hyperbole by election opponents and sensationalist journalists - both in Washington and San Salvador. In a fit of saber-rattling intended to provide a preview of what election day would be like, a few weeks before the elections the guerrillas conducted raids across the country, including one in the capital.23 After “ massive new shipments of arms for the insurgents began arriving in December,” the U.S. Embassy began secretly notifying Washington that the FM LN was “ mounting a major attempt to block elections in El Salvador for March 28 [1982].”24 The embassy indi­ cated that the guerrilla operations were being planned at the same time that the FM LN ’s civilian wing, the FDR, was telling American audiences that the guerrillas would not disrupt the vote.25 “ Reagan Is Not Letting El Salvador Be El Salvador” Given the almost complete absence of true democracy in El Salvador’s recent history, critics in the United States remained dubious about the election’s merits. One particular point of controversy was the planned role of the FAES in helping to protect voters and polling stations. Peace activist Colman McCarthy wrote in the Washington Post: It’s an odd way for the government of El Salvador to prepare for next month’s election: by turning the army loose to massacre the voters. In the annals of voter-registration drives, the West has seen nothing quite like it. Presumably there will be no ballot initiative on whether citizens suspected of disloyalty pre­ fer to be decapitated, shot behind the ear, or slain by strafing from Americansupplied helicopters. All three methods have been perfected by the Americanadvised Salvadoran army.26

The FD R’s Ruben Zamora published an editorial piece in the Wash­ ington Post a week before the election criticizing President Reagan’s

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support of a fraudulent democracy. He began his piece by pointing out that the president sanctioned the communist Polish government’s declaration of a state of siege and the cessation of labor strikes while launching a campaign with the slogan “ Let Poland be Poland,” with the clear message that the Warsaw government was the guilty party. Zamora insisted that Reagan was “ not letting El Salvador be El Sal­ vador.”27 Zamora also distilled for the American public the central critique of U.S. policy toward the upcoming elections:

Reagan and his secretary of state are trying to make the U.S. public believe that the dilemma is either supporting the Salvadoran junta or letting El Salvador fall into Soviet hands. In this perspective, it does not matter how undesirable it is to provide military aid to a brutal and repressive regime such as the junta of El Salvador; this is thought to be a lesser evil than an FM LN-FDR victory. As presidents Johnson and Nixon did during the Vietnam years, Reagan is now attempting to conceal the repressive character of the Salvadoran junta by means of “ elections” in order to be able to affirm that he supports a “ demo­ cratically elected” regime.28

Zamora contended that the Salvadoran government was in fact illegiti­ mate and that press censorship and human rights abuses were rampant. What would Reagan have done, Zamora wondered, had the conditions of the 1980 American presidential elections been like El Salvador’s?29 By contrast, and in an indication of how differently the various ideolo­ gies and actors viewed the elections, the Salvadoran ambassador to the United States published an article titled “ Birth of a New Democracy” extolling the unprecedented democratic strides unfolding.30 Challenging Zamora’s assertions about a sham election, a month earlier El Salvador’s Catholic bishops published an open letter tacitly endorsing the upcoming vote: “ For the church, the basis of guidance and inspiration is the integral well-being of the people. The majority of the people of El Salvador reject violence, whether it be from the left, the right or abuses by elements of the armed forces and security guard.”31 In a separate letter, the bishops took an even more forceful stance: “ We seek in the elections for a constituent assembly... a hope, a possible beginning of a solution to the current crisis. . . . Because of the special circumstances we are facing, we wish to remind all Catholics of their moral obligation to go to the polls. In this way, we can know the will of the Salvadorans.”32

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Leading up to the vote, the small right-wing National Concilia­ tion Party (Partido de Conciliación Nacional, PCN) - the militarydominated political party participating in the elections - purchased newspaper advertisements in the conservative press. One publication depicted the Christian Democrat candidate, Duarte, as a vulture, wad­ dling across a map of a country “ laying skull-shaped eggs.”33 Another ad depicted Duarte as “ pathetic, terrifying, apocalyptic, offensive, emo­ tional, dramatic, melodramatic, exhausting, comical, waggish, festive, foolish, grotesque, ridiculous, laughable, hilarious, ribald, and satiri­ cal.”34 As one journalist observed, it was rather a lot.35

“ Exceeded Our Most Optimistic Expectations” In late March 1982, just three days before the election in El Sal­ vador, Senator Christopher Dodd addressed the Senate, observing that “ no one could predict with any certainty” the outcome. He termed the effort “ something of a high stakes ro ll... a real diplomatic crapshoot.”36 He was right: this was a gamble for both the Salvadoran junta and the Reagan administration, which initially had not embraced elec­ tions as a key solution to the conflict. When the voting finally took place on March 28, international and domestic electoral observers were stunned by what they witnessed. Defying the guerrilla calls to stay away, over 1.5 million Salvadorans went to the polls, which rep­ resented roughly 80 percent of the electorate. Despite their chilling predictions, the FM LN did not significantly disrupt the voting process. Bipartisan congressional delegations also witnessed the election. Republican Senator Nancy Kassebaum led an observer delegation that included fellow congressmen, church officials, and election experts. In a post-election news conference, the delegation declared that after “ having personally visited a number of polling areas around the country,” they believed that the elections had been “ free and fair.”37 An ecstatic Ambassador Dean Hinton cabled back to Washing­ ton that “ the results of this election have exceeded our most optimistic expectations__ Thousands of Salvadorans walked overnight through guerrilla strongholds, waited hours in line to vote, and are now walk­ ing back home through the same strongholds.”38 Secretary of State Haig called it a “ military defeat for the guerrillas quite as much as a political repudiation.”39

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The hundreds of foreign correspondents who had traveled to El Sal­ vador to cover the election were particularly surprised at the events given that coverage of the war to date had been so negative. Dan Rather of CBS declared on national news, “ It’s a triumph! A million people at the polls.” N BC ’s Tom Brokaw said it was “ one of the most remarkable election days anywhere.”40 The Washington Post editorialized, “ The United States gambled on elections and won.” President Reagan appar­ ently loved receiving reports of Salvadoran farmers standing for hours in the baking sun, telling anecdotes about it months and years after the election.41 When the votes were tallied, the Christian Democrats garnered 35 percent of the vote, assuring them 24 of the 60 deputies in the assem­ bly. The rightist AREN A did surprisingly well, though, taking second place with 26 percent. This shocked the U.S. Embassy and other pro­ ponents of engagement who hoped the vote would have marginalized the rightist party. Some Reagan hardliners, on the other hand, were not as surprised by this rightist achievement. A good part of A R EN A ’s strong showing could be attributed to the fact that the economy was in tatters and the Christian Democrats were blamed since the incumbent Duarte headed the junta. Tasked with electing a new provisional presi­ dent, the Christian Democrats balked when it appeared that A R EN A ’s Roberto D ’Aubuisson would be elected due to support from smaller rightist parties that constituted a majority.42

“ Help Us to Help You” According to CIA internal reporting, ARENA was a political move­ ment that “ cooperate[d] with and direct[ed] some terrorist groups.” The CIA concluded that the party’s “ extremist perspectives” con­ tributed substantially to the widespread illegal violence. Behind A R EN A ’s “ legitimate exterior” lay a “ terrorist network,” led by D ’Aubuisson henchmen and funded by wealthy Salvadoran expatri­ ates residing in Guatemala and the United States.43 It is at this point that U.S. diplomats began to apply significant pres­ sure on selected Salvadoran politicians to ensure that D ’Aubuisson did not win the vote. With severe arm-twisting from the U.S. Embassy that lasted for a month, the military high command imposed a more acceptable solution in the form of independent businessman

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Alvaro Magaña to assume the interim slot.44 Despite intense pressure in America led by Ambassador Hinton, AREN A would not acqui­ esce, arguing, not without technical merit, that they had played the Washington-imposed game of democracy and won. On three occa­ sions, AREN A scheduled Constituent Assembly meetings to elect D ’Aubuisson as provisional president.45 The impasse finally broke when on April 20 the American envoy, General Vernon Walters, delivered a letter from Secretary of State Haig warning that the political standoff was jeopardizing U.S assistance. “ Help us to help you,” Walters told his FAES high command counter­ parts.46 Ambassador Hinton allegedly provided the FAES with a list of nine possible presidential candidates that the United States could sup­ port. Fearful of losing its now indispensible lifeline of military aid, the high command subsequently made it clear that its horse in this “ elec­ tion” was Alvaro Magaña, the “ apolitical mortgage banker” known to be close to the military.47 On the day of the vote for the provi­ sional president, AREN A supporters in the legislative gallery passed out leaflets denouncing Magaña as a “ little Jew.” Yet, their march­ ing orders from the FAES leadership were clear, and despite accurate AREN A protestations that the military was putting “ a gun to our head,” the legislature elected him as provisional president.48 It appeared that the America diplomats had stopped D ’Aubuisson “ on the one yard line,” as Hinton colorfully phrased it.49 Or as one State Department official put it, “ [Ambassador] Hinton jammed Magaña down D ’Aubuisson’s throat.” 50 Amazingly, the Salvadoran military was intervening to produce an outcome that antagonized the right and bolstered the U.S.-backed political center. Inferring that more than just diplomatic pressure was used to secure the deal, one U.S. diplomat remarked, “ That’s not [U.S.] intervention. That’s money talking.” 51 Denied the presidency, D ’Aubuisson still ended up as president of the National Assembly, a sharp setback to Washington’s approach predicated on both reforms and reformers, not on pathological killers winning elections and running the country. D ’Aubuisson and A R EN A ’s newfound electoral influence was made abundantly clear when one of the rightist-controlled assembly’s first acts was to repeal parts of the controversial U.S.-supported land reform program - something that infuriated Christopher Dodd and other liberals on Capitol Hill.

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“ One Could Get the Idea That We’re in the Business of Supporting Dictators” The stunning success of the March 1982 elections galvanized Presi­ dent Reagan and his administration. In fact, the event was likely a key catalyst in the development of the anti-communist and pro-democracy platform known as the Reagan Doctrine. In June, Reagan spoke to the British Parliament, citing the struggle of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the rot of the Soviet Union: Since the exodus from Egypt, historians have written of those who sacrificed and struggled for freedom - the stand at Thermopylae, the revolt of Spartacus, the storming of the Bastille, the Warsaw uprising in World War II. More recently, we’ve seen evidence of this same human impulse in one of the devel­ oping nations of Central America__ Day after day we were treated to stories and film slanted toward the brave freedom-fighters battling oppressive gov­ ernment forces on behalf of the silent suffering people of that tortured coun­ try. And then one day those silent, suffering people were offered a chance to vote. . . . Suddenly the freedom-fighters on the hills were exposed for what they really are - Cuban-backed guerrillas who want power for themselves, and their backers, not democracy for the people.52

Indeed, the Salvadoran election greatly influenced Reagan’s global for­ eign policy outlook. It helped frame the fiery debate back in Washing­ ton over El Salvador policy. Liberal Democrats might have argued that El Salvador was not democratic enough, but few politicians wanted to go on record suggesting that an FM LN victory was preferable to an imperfect democracy.53 At the same time, the stunning 1982 election results - tangible evidence of democratic yearning in El Salvador might have helped sway some Reagan administration officials to embrace engagement. In other words, the Reagan team pushed elec­ tions as a core element of its approach to El Salvador even though key advisors had been dubious of this idealistic Carter-like tactic. Even the once-skeptical Jeane Kirkpatrick came to embrace the elections, although she saw them as more evidence of the administration’s moral clarity: The character of El Salvador’s struggle is no more ambiguous than that of Nicaragua’s government. Since the elections of March 1982, nobody even pretends that the FM LN enjoys popular support, is “ really” a bunch of agrar­ ian reformers, or a coalition that would, if victorious, usher in a more perfect

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The Salvador Option

democracy. The fictions with which communist insurgents have conventionally clothed their conquest of power are not available to the partisans of the FM LN. The pretense that the FM LN is an indigenous guerrilla movement without sig­ nificant foreign support has also largely been abandoned. Too many truck­ loads, planeloads, boatloads of arms from Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Eastern bloc have been found; too many documents have been captured, too many pictures taken, too many bold announcements made from Managua. . . . [The FM LN] is a professional guerrilla operation directed from command and con­ trol centers in Nicaragua, armed with Soviet bloc arms delivered through Cuba and Nicaragua, bent on establishing in El Salvador the kind of one-party dic­ tatorship linked to the Soviet Union that already exists in Nicaragua.54

At the same time that Kirkpatrick saw the March vote in such categor­ ical terms, critics of Reagan’s policy contended that the elections could not paper over the abusive and illegitimate regime in San Salvador. In a letter published in the Washington Post, a reader argued that the first elections revealed their truly “ undemocratic character” and with the new “ right wing government” there is “ only increased violence and continuing injustice.” With human rights abuses increasing since the vote, the reader claimed, the Reagan administration “ committed an error that has proven fatal for countless Salvadoran civilians.” 55 Other critics denounced the vote as simply window dressing - or “ demonstra­ tion elections” - to bolster the Reagan administration’s existing poli­ cies in El Salvador. That is, the Salvadoran election was not “ an exer­ cise in democracy,” but its opposite, “ a means to deny Salvadoran self­ determination and to justify U.S. intervention.” According to this critic: For most Salvadorans the election ritual is meaningless and participation is compulsory. Voting is a means of keeping alive for another day.... It is for us, the citizens of the United States, that this election is conceived, written, staged, and interpreted. It is for us that the fine words of “ democracy” and “ self-determination” are scripted. It is for us - not the Salvadorans - that this election is called “ free.” 56

“ The Guerrillas Are Not Embattled Peasants Armed with Muskets. They Are Professionals” While there were many vocal critics who thought otherwise, the seem­ ingly pacific elections themselves - and the even more important pos­ itive international press coverage of these elections - undermined the

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f i g u r e 2.5.1. FM LN fighters associated with a regional propaganda and media center in the town of Perquin in Morazdn province. The guerrillas are looking at photographs of themselves that the foreign photographer just took. For most of the war, foreign correspondents had ready access to the guerrillas a reality that frustrated Salvadoran and U.S. officials. Image and permission by Linda Hess Miller.

liberal Democratic view that the guerrillas maintained widespread pop­ ular support and should thus be involved in negotiations. The vote also allowed the Reagan team to more easily make the case that it was sup­ porting self-determination in El Salvador. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders told Congress in April 1982, “ The massive turnout in El Salvador irrefutably repudiated the claim of the violent left that it has the people behind it.” 57 A few months later he told an audience in San Francisco that the FM LN ’s “ overconfidence in their appeal” led to the “ militarization” of its revolutionary strategy as seen by the January 19 8 1 final offensive that “ failed disastrously.” And then following their failed effort to disrupt the 1982 elections, the guerrillas were “ revealed as a destructive minority rejected by Salvadoran society.” Enders con­ trasted this illegitimate force with the country’s “ nascent democratic institutions” that at long last provided “ an alternative to violence as a means of political expression [in El Salvador].” 58 President Reagan himself also continued to highlight the elections as an unequivocal sign of El Salvador’s nascent democracy. A little more

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The Salvador Option

than a year after the Salvadoran elections, on April 27, 1983, Rea­ gan reminded both houses of Congress of the consequences of this historical vote in El Salvador, which proved that “ the Salvadoran peo­ ple’s desire for democracy will not be defeated. The guerrillas are not embattled peasants armed with muskets. They are professionals.” 59 Reagan’s public rhetoric on the elections occurred 12 months after the CIA was privately reporting that the “ successful election” dealt a “ major psychological blow to the insurgent cause” even if this might prove temporary.60 The CIA wrote in a special intelligence estimate in June 1982 that Moscow “ seemed to have been impressed by the Reagan administra­ tion’s reaction to the situation in El Salvador” and appeared concerned that the March 1982 election outcome “ may have significantly less­ ened the immediate prospects of the revolutionary left.” The report added that the Soviets hoped that abuses “ taken by the political right” in El Salvador would undermine the U.S.-backed Salvadoran govern­ ment. However, the Soviets took comfort in Western Europe’s reluc­ tance to endorse the elections. The Soviets also hoped that actions by the political right in El Salvador would further complicate Wash­ ington’s “ efforts to mobilize Congressional support for additional military and economic support.” The report’s conclusion was pes­ simistic: “Although the Soviets appear less sanguine about the [Sal­ vadoran] insurgents’ short-term military prospects, they probably still believe that the insurgents can seize power through a prolonged armed struggle.” 61

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26

The Shultz Doctrine

If you’re going to have the ballot box free and open, there must be a shield behind which the people can participate. - George Shultz, Secretary of State, citing Senator Henry Jackson, 1 9 83 1 El Salvador, my small country, is an example of a newborn democracy defending its blood . . . against a totalitarian Communist regime. - Alvaro Magaha, Salvadoran president, to President Reagan, Washington, DC, 19 8 3 2

While not very apparent at the time, a significant shift in President Rea­ gan’s El Salvador policy came when George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig as secretary of state in July 1982. Asserting that American for­ eign policy no longer reflected “ consistency, clarity, and steadiness of purpose,” Haig had serious differences of opinion with NSC Advisor William Clark and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger over Israel’s 1982 incursion into Lebanon.3 It is also likely that White House Chief of Staff James A. Baker urged Haig to resign.4 Shultz served in the top diplomatic posting for six and a half years - the longest tenure since Dean Rusk in the 1960s. Like his predecessor, Shultz saw the Central America issue as a clear case of global communist aggression, reflecting in his memoir: “ The old forces of dictatorship had taken a new form: that of a command economy, a self-appointed elitist vanguard, and guerrilla warfare. Nicaragua had become its base, all of Central America its 2 75

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The Salvador Option

target. El Salvador was first on the list.” 5 Unlike Haig, though, Shultz believed that there were deep structural forces at play in the conflict. He told a House subcommittee in March 1983 that there were “ legit­ imate social, economic, and political grievances” fueling the conflict. Yet, given the continued external assistance to the FM LN from Cuba and the Soviet bloc, the United States could not simply focus on the underlying inequalities. Rather, the United States had to help alleviate suffering through political and economic reform as well as “ counter a Communist strategy which seeks to aggravate and exploit these prob­ lems and so to seize power by force of arms.” 6 It appeared that Shultz had become the engagement strategy’s pro­ ponent par excellence, developing a grin-and-bear-it attitude in balanc­ ing the contradictions in American foreign policy in Central America. In his memoir, he recalls this challenge: The governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala contained and tolerated many unsavory characters. Still, serious people in those governments were engaged in a stalwart effort to move toward democracy and the rule of law. The American left would have us leave those governments to struggle on their own and not worry whether communism came to prevail. The American right would have us support the anti-Communists no matter how outrageous their behavior.7

Despite his clear-eyed view of the divided perspectives in Washing­ ton, this secretary of state had his own strong convictions. While he advocated a moderate approach, Shultz was still inclined to take the occasional jab at critics of Salvadoran policy, in one instance cri­ tiquing “ churchmen who want to see Soviet influence in El Salvador improved.” 8 As has been made clear throughout this book, foreign pol­ icy in Central America stirred great passions in Washington and across the country; like many of his colleagues, Shultz occasionally adopted a defensive stance on El Salvador policy.

Framing Engagement As secretary of state, Shultz began to shape U.S. ties with El Salvador to reflect his moderate stance toward the region. In November, he sent Reagan a “ scene setter” memo to help the president prepare for his first

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meeting with interim Salvadoran president Alvaro Magaña slated for early December. He told Reagan that “ over the past eighteen months [roughly since the new administration came in] Salvadorans with our help have made considerable progress militarily” and have put into place a “ democratic government.” Shultz indicated that as a result of U.S.-backed reform, the “ momentum [had] shifted away from the foreign-supported guerrillas.” The memo continued that human rights abuses remained “ serious” but had subsided somewhat. It warned omi­ nously that “ politicians and military officers of the far right” were obstructing the government’s efforts in “ implementing land reform” and “ in bringing to justice those implicated in the murder of U.S. citi­ zens.”9 Shultz described the meeting as an opportunity for Reagan to praise Magaña’s moderate approach, acknowledge El Salvador’s needs, and emphasize U.S. expectations: Your expressions of concern for further progress on human rights and in the administration of justice for the slain U.S. citizens will give Magana the oppor­ tunity to re-emphasize our policy to other key leaders. . . . You can reassure Magana that as long as El Salvador continues its counterinsurgency effort, maintains its support for domestic reforms, and improves human rights con­ duct of its military forces, the U.S. will maintain its support for El Salvador.10

Shultz suggested “ talking points” for Reagan: “ You have our complete support in our effort to defeat the guerrillas” and keep the “ reform and reconciliation process moving forward.” Another one was that M agaña’s “ military effort” should be “ complemented” by an “ amnesty to all guerrillas willing to lay down their weapons.” Last, addressing the touchy issue of negotiations: “ We are hopeful that the [Magaña inaugurated] Peace Commission will soon begin its work [in pursu­ ing negotiations].” 11 Given Shultz’s apparent, strong support of engagement, it is impor­ tant to consider whether his ascension at Foggy Bottom indicated that the balance of power on El Salvador policy within the administration had shifted in that direction. It is also worth asking whether the State Department’s bureaucracy - that is, the often more ideologically flexi­ ble career Foreign Service Officers - influenced Shultz’s evolving views on El Salvador.

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f i g u r e 2 6 .1. Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams briefs Secretary of State George Shultz at the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1988. The young, brilliant, and polarizing Abrams was an unabashed member of the “ neo-conservative” wing inside the Reagan administration. A circumspect Shultz recalled in his memoir that Abrams was “ someone always preoccupied with the contras.” Standing between Abrams and Shultz is Richard McCor­ mack, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS in Reagan’s second term. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

Two-Track Approach The year 1983 began with more surprises on the negotiations front. In March, in what was a deft move that placed the onus on the White House, the guerrilla-aligned FDR urged the Reagan administration to take part in negotiations not as a mediator but as an active participant: “ Because of its role in providing economic, political, and military sup­ port to the Salvadoran regime . . . we consider the Reagan administra­ tion as a belligerent party directly confronting [the FM LN ].” 12 While it once again and predictably refused to take up this offer, the Rea­ gan team nonetheless continued to pursue the “ two-track” approach to Salvador: “ [One] would embrace negotiations with the Salvadoran left, while the other would continued funding and reinforcing the forces fighting against it.” 13

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Reagan hardliners were not happy with this decision - more or less a deeper commitment to what Enders had laid out in his July 19 8 1 World Affairs Council speech - but congressional pressure for the administra­ tion to get behind negotiations was growing. In April, hardliners at the White House attempted to torpedo Enders’s strategy by leaking it to the Washington Post, which described the internal divide as a “ lively policy battle.” 14 Administration hardliners were not the only ones displeased with the two-track strategy. One leftist critic suggested that the policy’s motivation was more cynical: “ [The] goal of this two-track approach was less to move toward the bargaining table at that moment than to get the money from Congress needed to move at all.” 15

“A Plan to Create a Communist Central America” The Reagan team’s schizophrenia on U.S. policy in El Salvador deep­ ened in the spring of 1983 when UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick returned after a 10-day tour of Central America. Her findings, the Washington Post reported, “ reinforced her opinions about the misdirection of [a two track] policy under Enders.” 16 Considered by White House insid­ ers to be “ the most militant figure in the Administration on Central America,” Kirkpatrick quickly conveyed her misgivings to Reagan.17 In Kirkpatrick’s view, progress for the Salvadoran government and mil­ itary, weak to begin with, was hindered by the uncertainty of U.S. aid and training commitments. To top it off, the White House requests to Congress for aid - both economic and military - were woefully inad­ equate. Kirkpatrick also told the president that his Central America policy was “ lacking in vigor” and that Enders was “ pursuing a stale­ mate rather than a victory.” She added that the region’s leaders were personally suspicious and resentful of Enders.18 As the Washington Post reported at the time, “ This picture of Enders spawning resentment in Latin America struck a sympathetic chord in a White House already suspicious of an ambitious patrician seen as patronizing and arrogant. Enders rapidly lost what had been almost a monopoly over Central America policy, and by May [1983] he lost his job.” 19 With Enders gone in an ouster backed by NSC Advisor William Clark, was engagement dead? If Kirkpatrick’s April 3, 1983, article

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The Salvador Option

in the Washington Post was any indication, a hawkish strategy was on the rise: “ It’s almost unbearably unfashionable [in the largely liberal Northeast] to say so, but there is a plan to create a com­ munist Central America which, if successful, will have momentous consequences for our security... and for the unfortunate people of Central America.” The short-term plan of the Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Soviet leaders, Kirkpatrick posited, was to bring to power in El Sal­ vador the type of Moscow-aligned dictatorship that she saw next door in Nicaragua.20 She would even later claim that “ there are people in the U.S. Congress... who would actually like to see the Marxist forces take power in El Salvador.”21 In an action that seemed to be approval of what might be called the Kirkpatrick doctrine for El Salvador, on April 27 Reagan announced before a joint session of Congress his intent to secure a doubling of annual military aid, which amounted to over $ 13 6 million.22 Yet, con­ trary to what the doubling of aid implied to some skeptical observers, Reagan refined but did not jettison the two-track approach crafted, ironically, by an assistant secretary of state who was on his way out. Reagan reminded Congress that American support for El Salvador started with his predecessor: “ President Carter did not hesitate. He authorized arms and munitions to El Salvador. The guerrilla offen­ sive failed, but not America’s will.”23 He called for increased economic and military assistance to “ bolster human democratic systems” and responded to the “ military challenge from Cuba and Nicaragua, to their deliberate use of force to spread tyranny.” Reagan said that land reform “ is making thousands of farm tenants, farm owners. In a little over 3 years, 20 percent of the arable land in El Salvador has been redis­ tributed to more than 450,000 people. That’s one in ten Salvadorans who have benefited directly from this program.”24 Most significantly, Reagan at least rhetorically endorsed negotiations, although the term meant something entirely different to the guerrillas: “ We will support dialogue and negotiations - both among the countries of the region and within each country.”25 Reagan’s embrace of the Shultz/Enders line did not mean that he would abandon his sense of the broader ideological and even existen­ tial issues at stake in El Salvador and Central America. Thus, Reagan used his inimitable rhetorical flair to raise the specter of Nazi U-boats torpedoing Allied ships in the Caribbean in World War II, the threat

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of the Soviet combat brigades still in Cuba, and the menace of Libyan arms shipments to Nicaragua. Yet, the president posited, the greatest threat of all was that, having put America’s prestige and credibility on the line, there would be a serious setback if America did not contain communist aggression: If Central America were to fall, what would the consequences be for our posi­ tion in Asia, Europe, and for alliances such as NATO? If the United States can­ not respond to a threat near our own border, why should Europeans or Asians believe that we’re seriously concerned about threats to them? If the Soviets can assume that nothing short of an actual attack on the United States will provoke an American response, which ally, which friend will trust us then?26

“ Raise Hell about Human Rights” The White House tapped a Republican Party fundraiser, Langhorne “ Tony” Motley, to replace Enders as chief diplomat for Latin Amer­ ican affairs.27 In an ouster that was made public on May 27, 1983, Enders was reassigned as ambassador to Spain. One White House official indicated that Reagan’s decision to remove Enders was based more on “ process” than “ policy.”28 The next day the White House also removed career ambassador Deane Hinton.29 At the announcement of Hinton’s replacement, career diplomat Thomas Pickering, Shultz indi­ cated that the reassignments of the two key postings did not presage any policy shift. In fact, he “ lavished praise on Mr. Enders, who had been a principal architect of the administration’s Latin American poli­ cies.” Interestingly, in Enders’s final public address in his Latin America position he told the Council of the Americas business group that “ [in El Salvador] there will not be peace without negotiations,” even if talks could not entirely substitute for military and diplomatic pressures on opponents.30 Shultz then instructed Pickering in private to “ raise hell” about Salvadoran human rights abuses.31 As we will see, Pickering car­ ried out his boss’s orders with alacrity. Observers then and now have logically concluded that the removal of Enders and Hinton represented the influence of the hardliners’ emphasis on the “ military campaign.” In this reading, Enders’s public support for negotiations between San Salvador and the FM LN “ forced him out of his job.”32 The potential irony, though, is that Enders and Hinton were not really “ moderates,” but instead simply less hawkish

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than their hardline colleagues. That is, while they supported elections and negotiations, they were also unyielding in believing in Cuban and Nicaraguan subversion in El Salvador. What’s more, the hardliners’ ousting of Enders and Hinton was not alone persuasive evidence that the overall policy toward El Salvador had become more hawkish, even if that is how it looked to most observers at the time. Another key factor to consider is the extent to which Reagan him­ self endorsed the Shultz/Enders doctrine or the Kirkpatrick doctrine for El Salvador. Given the administration’s colorful and polarizing pub­ lic rhetoric on El Salvador, it is not surprising that observers some­ times concluded that the true thrust of the strategy was hawkish. A single quote by hardliner Kirkpatrick or moderate Shultz might sound stern and determined, but one comment does not, in itself, indicate decided policy. After all, El Salvador’s situation differed from year to year, meaning perspectives also shifted, thus making it challenging to pinpoint an official’s overall view. In the face of the developing situation in El Salvador, skeptical hard­ liners continued to question the benefits of negotiation. In a speech on September 12 , 1983, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle suggested that a military solution was the only legitimate response: “ We can no more negotiate an acceptable political solution with these people than the social democrats in revolutionary Russia could have talked Lenin into giving up totalitarian Bolshevism__ You have to defeat these ‘rule or ruin’ forces militarily.”33 Yet if, say, the continued (albeit “ flexible” ) adherence to the restrictive troop cap was any indication, engagement was alive and even deepening despite Kirkpatrick’s alarmist warnings to Reagan. In short, where was Fred Ikle’s hardline policy? Along these lines, given an increase in the assistance package, the oppor­ tunity for a more hawkish strategy was present, yet it is not fully clear what the hardliners had in mind. That is, with little appetite for U.S. combat troops from any corner of the administration, and especially following the stunning 1982 Salvadoran elections, hard­ liners might have been more on board with engagement than their rhetoric suggested. Before NSC Advisor Frank Carlucci made sweeping changes after the Iran-Contra scandal broke in late 1986, key White House foreign policy positions were often occupied by what Reagan biographer Lou Cannon has called “ self-important advocates of covert action who

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were contemptuous of congressional opposition and American public opinion.”34 According to Cannon, these aides, along with CIA Direc­ tor William Casey, believed “ that the resources of the West should be mobilized to fight Communists with their own methods.” One of the most dogged of these hardliners was Constantine Menges, who served for two years as one of Casey’s national intelligence officers for Latin America until the “ old-boy CIA professionals tired of his lec­ tures” and sent him to the White House. In October 19 83, Menges became a special assistant to Reagan for Latin American affairs. White House and State Department critics dubbed him a “ constant menace.” Yet Cannon, who covered the White House at the time, wrote that he was in fact a “ principled conservative” who believed that Washington should “ suppress right-wing death squads and promote land reform in Central America as vigorously as it fought the Salvadoran rebels and Sandinistas.”35 While the rough outlines of Salvador policy appeared to be work­ ing - or at least not failing - Menges and his fellow hardliners had turned their attention to Nicaragua in what was becoming a much more controversial and polarizing strategy of using the proxy contra insurgency to overthrow the Sandinistas. That is, albeit for very differ­ ent ideological reasons, the hardliners were attempting to accomplish with the contras in Nicaragua what the FM LN sought in El Salvador: regime change.

“ This My Government Would Never Commit” Presidents Reagan and Magaha spoke to the press after their June 17 , 19 8 3, meeting in Washington. Reagan commended the “ coura­ geous” Magana for making “ admirable progress” in the tough task of “ moving El Salvador toward democracy” while coordinating a defense against the Marxist-led guerrillas “ who would turn his coun­ try into a Cuban-style dictatorship.”36 Reagan stated that Magaña was “ deeply involved” in preparations for the presidential elections and was attempting through the Salvadoran government’s Peace Commis­ sion to “ encourage the participation in the electoral process of all Sal­ vadorans, including the extreme left. This is the true path of peace for that country.” And in moderate rhetoric, that could have been uttered by Jimmy Carter, Reagan added, “ We discussed the military situation

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in El Salvador. President Magaña also detailed his government’s reform efforts, including the land reform program and the recently announced plan for judicial reform. He reaffirmed his government’s commitment to human rights.”37 Given the success of the March 1982 vote (plus some decidedly undemocratic post-vote manipulation by U.S. officials) that brought Magaña into the presidency, it is not surprising that the Salvadoran leader told reporters that elections were an indispensable part of his country’s growing democracy. Echoing Reagan, Magaña stated that his “ peace program ... rests fundamentally upon the electoral process__ I reaffirm that the solution to the problem of violence should be essen­ tially democratic. Accordingly, elections with participation by all Sal­ vadorans without distinction, constitute the only means to obtain a definitive and permanent peace in order to establish a pluralist sys­ tem that insures democracy.” Responding to the guerrillas’ calls that a negotiated settlement must come through power sharing, not elec­ tions, the Salvadoran president was unequivocal: “Just as the essence of democracy consists of the right of the citizens to elect their leaders and to confer political power on their representatives, negotiating away a portion of this political power would be a divestment and betrayal of the electorate. This my government would never commit.”38 From these two presidents’ public comments, it appeared that the White House and the fledgling government in El Salvador had agreed on a way forward. Yes to negotiations, but negotiations had to be an outcome of democratic elections. Had the 1982 vote turned into the disaster that many expected or hoped for, would the Reagan adminis­ tration have embraced the ballot box as a pillar of its Salvador Option? In fact, at the same time as the Reagan-Magaña meeting, press reports noted that administration officials were continuing to publicly oppose talks that would allow for “ negotiations without preconditions” as the FM LN had insisted upon in late 1982, but were privately “ moving qui­ etly” toward talks with the insurgents “ aimed at inducing them to stop fighting and take part in planned elections.” 39

“ Elections Are Not a Solution to the War” With the congressional pressure for negotiations mounting, in early M ay 1983 Reagan appointed former Florida senator Richard Stone as

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a special Central America envoy to, among other tasks, seek a negotiated settlement to the Salvadoran civil war.40 Scholar William LeoGrande has argued that NSC hardliners appointed ideologically conservative Stone to the envoy post “ as an antidote to Enders’ paci­ fism.”41 This might have been the motivation, but it did not appear to result in Stone’s adopting a hawkish stance in his deliberations in El Salvador. What’s more, whether the hardliners realized it or not, Enders was not a pacifist. In early February 19 83, for example, he warned that in El Salvador, “ if we allow a government that is reforming itself... to be knocked off by guerrillas who don’t have the people with them, then no Government in the isthmus will be safe.”42 Trying to scare Capi­ tol Hill into providing continued military aid, a month later he told Congress that the Salvadoran army had reached a point where “ there are no bullets available.”43 The White House had already sent Stone, a Democrat with close ties to his state’s Cuban community and considered an ideological conser­ vative, to El Salvador on a special mission to encourage Magaña to move up the presidential elections “ preferably no later than” October or November of 1983 instead of the scheduled March 1984 date.44 Contrary to what one might have expected from an envoy sent by hawkish NSC advisor William Clark, Stone urged Magaña to move up the elections rather than suspend them and have the military take over. Even some of the hawks, it appeared, were singing the praises of elections. In June 1983, the FMLN/FDR simultaneously released a commu­ nique in Mexico and Washington indicating that it had sent a letter to Stone requesting “ a direct dialogue... to discuss the ways to achieve a political solution to the conflict in El Salvador.”45 Amazingly, the letter suggested that the talks be held in the United States “ in the presence of witnesses from the U.S. Congress.” Once again the guerrillas stated that Stone would not be seen as a mediator but instead as a represen­ tative of a “ belligerent party.”46 Early the following month Stone abruptly canceled his Central America trip after failing to meet in San Jose, Costa Rica, with FDR leader Guillermo Ungo.47 According to Costa Rican leftists close to the rebel negotiators, Ungo and his delegation were upset by Stone’s position that he would participate in the meeting only to pass along Salvadoran government proposals and foster discussions between

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the guerrillas and the government’s Peace Commission “ to facilitate rebel participation in [upcoming] elections.”48 Guerrilla military chief Joaquin Villabos explained on Radio Venceremos why negotiations with Stone failed to take place earlier that July: “ We have made it very clear that elections are not a solution to the war. The solution lies in the recognition of the political-military forces of the FM LN in the estab­ lishment of a new government, the formation of an army in which the FM LN is incorporated and the end of U.S. intervention.”49 Over the course of August and September 1983, Stone met with various actors on the Salvadoran left on an “ open agenda, including two meetings in Costa Rica.” 50 Stone’s overture proved somewhat of a public relations dilemma for the White House, which had main­ tained that it would not engage in direct talks with the rebels but instead “ only facilitate their conversations with the Salvadoran gov­ ernment.” 51 While these discussions did not lead to any concrete com­ mitments or declarations, it was still an unexpected development, and the motivations were unclear for having Stone talk to the guerrillas or vice versa. Afterward, Stone would only say that the meetings had “ broken the ice.” 52 A guerrilla spokesman, however, was less posi­ tive: “ Richard Stone’s talks with the [rebel] diplomatic commission are aimed at a military solution. We don’t believe the United States is interested in a political solution.” 53 Back in the United States, some critics believed that Stone’s diplo­ matic shuttling was more related to Capitol Hill imperatives - namely, to earning goodwill on the negotiations front to ensure that Congress would continue to cut checks for the Salvador endeavor. Rather than “ searching for opportunities to bring the two sides together,” one scholar has argued, the talks demonstrated that the guerrillas did not want to participate in the presidential elections - foreshadowing con­ tinued years of conflict and bloodshed.54

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27 Human Rights

It is clear that the United States won’t permit the left to take power in El Salvador. I don’t think there is any way [for the United States] to manage this war without a direct confrontation. - FM LN spokesman, April 19 8 4 1 The masas [civilians who support the insurgency] are the same as the guerrillas. They are not innocent. - Captain Luis Mario Aguilar Alfaro, FAES Chiefs of Staff spokesperson, March 19 842 Journalists, Tell the Truth! - Pro A REN A Bumper Stickers in San Salvador, 19 8 2 -19 8 3 3

As President Reagan’s first term in office wore on, the United States’ effort to bolster El Salvador’s precarious democracy and abusive and inept military did not appear to be succeeding. The bad news out of El Salvador just kept coming. For example, on September 23, 1983, the Salvadoran Air Force indiscriminately bombed the small town of Tenancingo, leaving 50 civilians dead - a grisly episode that deeply frustrated U.S. military trainers. Of critical concern to the robust and still bitter debate in Washington over U.S. policy, El Salvador continued to be a “ disaster zone” for human rights, although the numbers of reported disappearances and massacres had ebbed from the height of a few years earlier.4

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Key Reagan officials’ comments and actions periodically revealed ambivalence if not outright hostility to human rights. This often occurred when Reagan officials claimed that the death squads were shadowy forces and thus very difficult to control. For example, Rea­ gan’s top diplomat for human rights, Elliott Abrams, in August 1983 stated, “ We don’t know who is behind the death squads.” 5 Even more than security force abuses or embarrassments, such as the Tenancingo bombing, the wanton killings by the death squads were a public relations nightmare for the Reagan administration, which had decided to embrace the grin-and-bear it approach and focus on reform and elections to save El Salvador from communism.6 A dif­ ficult question, though, is whether the increased rhetoric on human rights that began in late 1982 and early 1983 was in fact genuine or just more appetite suppressant for a Congress obsessed with human rights when in fact officials’ key concern was checking the Marxist guerrilla advance.7

“ The Gorillas of This M afia” On October 29, 1982, Deane Hinton, the U.S. ambassador in El Sal­ vador who had replaced Robert White the previous year, gave a speech to the deeply conservative Salvadoran-American Chamber of Com­ merce in San Salvador. Up until this point Hinton had been “ privately outspoken and publicly cautious” on the issue of human rights. But on this day, the crusty career diplomat told his stunned hosts, “ In the first two weeks of this month, at least 68 human beings were murdered in El Salvador under circumstances which are familiar to everyone here.” He added that the “ mafia [rightist death squads] must be stopped. Your survival depends on it. The gorillas of this mafia, every bit as the guer­ rillas in Morazan and Chalatenango, are destroying El Salvador.” 8 While many Salvadoran conservatives predictably slammed Hin­ ton’s patronizing language and tone, some moderate businesspeople expressed support. According to one, the ambassador’s message needed to “ get through” to the oligarchy.9 The U.S. Embassy told reporters that it believed the speech had given “ at least a psychological boost” to reform groups like the Christian Democrats and progressive senior military officials.10 Some of the foreign press focused not on Hinton’s

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remarks but instead on the out-sized viceroy-like role he (as well as Pickering, White, and others) played in Salvadoran wartime society. For example, Marlise Simons wrote in the N ew York Times in Novem­ ber 1982: In San Salvador, Mr. Hinton’s every appearance, move or remark are widely analyzed, repeated, and commented. The discussion includes a lighter side his cigar smoking, poker playing and fiancee, a woman nearly half his age from a prominent Salvadoran family.... The importance of the United States ambassador has become crystalized in the use of the language. He is referred to only as “ the” Ambassador, just as the Salvadoran taxi drivers refer to “ the” embassy.11

As news of Hinton’s unprecedented remarks began to circulate in El Salvador and Washington, a small controversy erupted over whether the Reagan administration had approved the remarks. The U.S. Embassy claimed that the administration had signed off on the speech.12 While two unnamed White House sources rebuked Hinton’s comments, he was not removed from his post - unlike his predecessor Robert White who was ousted after aggravating Secretary of State Haig in early 19 8 1.13 Hinton later explained his reasoning for the speech, “ They [the White House officials] thought it was not in keeping with a quiet diplomatic approach. They thought it was a little loud, pub­ lic diplomacy. I thought the basic policy is quiet diplomacy but there is provision for exception. I decided the time had come to go public, and I went public.” 14 The Reagan officials’ split reaction to the speech in late 1982 occurred because there were still deep divisions between moder­ ates like Hinton and his bosses Thomas Enders and George Shultz in Washington, who were actively promoting Carter-era engagement, and the more hardline anti-communist Reagan appointees.15 Around the time of Hinton’s stunning comments, far right groups in El Salvador became increasingly critical of the United States’ deep involvement in the country. It is also likely not a coincidence that the comments came immediately after rightist political circles suffered a bitter loss when the U.S.-orchestrated election “ fix” in March 1982 kept Roberto D ’Aubuisson from the presidency. In one instance, in early 1982 a full-page advertisement in the rightist newspaper Diario de Hoy, placed by the ARENA-linked Women’s Crusade for Peace and

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Work, accused the United States - and Hinton more specifically - of “ blackmailing us with your miserable aid, which only keeps us subju­ gated in underdevelopment so that powerful countries like yours can continue exploiting our few riches and having us under your boot.” 16 By October of that year, advertisements appeared in San Salvador dailies alleging a “ betrayal” of the fatherland by the military who were now seen as “ lackeys” of the United States.17

“ The Right Wing Will Be Blamed for It” The following year, in July 1983, Hinton was relocated to a post in Pakistan. One interpretation of Hinton’s reassignment in 1983 was that his unvarnished remarks to the Chamber of Commerce conflicted with a hardline Reagan policy that wanted either not to acknowledge the death squad issue - or at least to address it privately. In an indi­ cation of the heat Hinton might have received for his comments to the businessmen, he said to a reporter, “ I thought six months ago that I might be changed.” 18 At the same time, Secretary of State George Shultz told Hinton’s replacement, Thomas Pickering, to “ raise hell” on human rights.19 While this might mean that Hinton was not dismissed from his post for his public outcry on human rights, it also demon­ strates the mixed messages that came from Washington, perhaps in an attempt by the Reagan administration to maintain a delicate balanc­ ing act in U.S. engagement. Whatever the motivation for his removal was, Hinton’s successor, Pickering, wasted no time in picking up where his predecessor had left off. By late September of that year Pickering was sending cables to the State Department that there appeared to be a “ resurgence” of “ rightist terrorism.”20 In late November 19 83, Pickering, not coincidentally, reserved some of his most caustic admonitions for the Chamber of Commerce: “ The essential stumbling block to democracy in El Salvador remains extrem­ ist terror. . . . No one wants to live in a country where no efforts are made to find who dumps bodies in gas stations and parking lots__ [The death squads were] murderers, torturers, and kidnappers” who merited “ nothing less from society than open and honest punish­ ment for such crimes.”21 Pickering singled out the business commu­ nity for their “ self-deluding belief that nothing is really known about

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the shadowy world of these individuals.”22 Most critically, Pickering stated that congressional aid cuts were at stake if the squads were not reined in. Yet some observers were contending that such threats were useless since - in its embrace of both land reform and the 1982 elec­ tions - Washington had “ zilch” in terms of leverage on D ’Aubuisson and the Salvadoran right.23 In fact, the observer wondered, did exas­ perated remarks like Pickering’s reveal that after spending “ $ 3 1 1 mil­ lion in military and economic aid this year [1982] to thwart a leftist takeover,” the United States found itself in the unexpected position of “ doing everything to prevent a rightist takeover” ? In what received far less media attention than his comments on death squads, the incoming Pickering also told the businessmen some­ thing with which they almost certainly strongly disagreed: “ Agrarian reform remains a cornerstone of U.S. policy since we believe it is essen­ tial to social and economic progress.”24 In language that could have been used by, say, the FD R’s Ruben Zamora or FM LN ’s Joaquin Vil­ lalobos, Pickering subsequently revealed his understanding of the roots of the civil war: “ The aristocratic dominance was in fact a marriage between the military and the aristocracy so that the military arranged to provide the President and the aristocracy the direction and money. So you had an insurgency and a reform movement coming out of a tremendous thirst for change.”25 Pickering’s very undiplomatic remarks demonstrated the Reagan administration’s new, apparently sterner line on human rights, at times undermined by public comments that indicated otherwise. One exam­ ple of the latter is the answer President Reagan gave to a high school student from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, which for human rights advo­ cates was a disturbing revelation: We’re doing everything we can, not only to help that Government deal with these right-wing death squads, but I’m going to voice suspicion now that I’ve never said aloud before. I wonder if all of this is right wing, or if those guer­ rilla forces have not realized that by infiltrating into the city of San Salvador and places like that, that they can get away with these violent acts, helping to try and bring down the Government, and the right wing will be blamed for it. Now, I’m not absolving the right wing. We know there are right-wing assas­ sins and murder squads and so forth, but we’re doing everything we can to control that.26

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f i g u r e 2 7 .1. Jeane Kirkpatrick and Thomas Pickering. In this April 12 , 1985, picture, former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick inspects a bombed-out cot­ tage in Santa Cruz Loma, El Salvador. She is accompanied by a guard (right) and U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas Pickering. Guerrillas had recently attacked the town Monday night, killing 20 people, mostly civilians. Kirk­ patrick was a one-time Democrat who switched to the Republican Party and embodied Reagan-era foreign policy conservatism. Image and permission by AP Images.

In another instance when this burgeoning human rights line lost its credibility, Reagan used a pocket veto on November 3 0 ,19 8 3 , to allow the bi-annual certification legislation to expire; language in the bill required advancement in human rights for additional U.S. military aid to be forthcoming. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill labeled the move “ a tragic error.”27 Defending his actions, Reagan said the bill had the inverse effect of increasing human rights abuses: “ If we have this thing of having to certify every few months to the Congress in order to get this aid there are people, both on the left and right, who know that if they step up the violation of human rights - the murders and so forth so that we can’t certify - they, from whichever side, are helping to win their battle against the democratic Government.”28 Shultz supported Reagan’s move, claiming that the certification process created a sit­ uation where individuals manipulated numbers to make them reflect

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an improvement on human rights “ without an intent to really carry through on the underlying method.”29 In any case, the human rights implications of the pocket veto stirred great controversy in Congress.30 A House member deemed the veto “ a direct contradiction of what the Administration has been saying recently in complaining about the Salvadoran Government’s refusal to take action against right-wing death squads.”31

The Riot Act By late 1983, even some Reagan officials had come around to the view that the death squad issue needed to be confronted head-on. Senior Pentagon official Fred Ikle traveled to El Salvador that November and denounced these “ rightist extremists” and “ fascists” whose brutality was serving the guerrillas’ violent interests.32 At the same time and in what revealed the Reagan team’s delicate balance, Ikle “ reserved the brunt” of his criticisms for Congress for providing too little assistance for El Salvador with too many human rights conditions.33 With Pick­ ering advocating a greater focus on human rights (under the advice of Shultz), senior officials opposed to berating the Salvadoran military and oligarchy were now unable to prevent the administration from moving forward more visibly with the new approach. Also, some of the Central America hawks like NSC Advisor William Clark had left the administration by the end of 1983 - and thus there was less resis­ tance to the Shultz/Enders/Pickering doctrine.34 The most visible manifestation that the moderates’ long-standing concern on rightist violence had been embraced came when Vice Presi­ dent George H. W. Bush visited El Salvador in December 1983. As Bush was arriving in El Salvador, the N ew York Times was reporting that the FM LN had extended its control in the eastern part of the country and seized a “ strategic area” surrounding the Cacahuatique volcano in Morazan.35 Sobered by such guerrilla advances despite the hundreds of millions of dollars that America had pumped into El Salvador in the past three years, Bush delivered the message that reform had to begin immediately.36 He provided a list to interim president Alvaro Magaña identifying members of the security forces known to be active in death squads who needed to be removed from command by early January. Bush’s message to the Salvadoran government also included reforms

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The Salvador Option

that needed to be enacted if U.S. assistance was going to continue (e.g., prisoners could only be held at known detention facilities). Bush also stated that Washington would take action against Salvadorans abroad who were financing the death squads. At a dinner hosted by President Magafia on December 1 1 , and, iron­ ically, echoing Ambassador Hinton’s very remarks that had ruffled the feathers of at least some White House officials a year earlier, Bush toasted his hosts with these undiplomatic words: I am not talking about a cowardly group of common criminals and murderers the death squads. These cowards... are the best friends the Soviets, the Cubans, and the comandantes and the Salvadoran guerrillas have. Like the communist terrorists, the members of the death squads are impotent when it comes to the many acts of defending and building. They can only kill and destroy. . . . I wish to convey to all Salvadorans what all of us have already discussed in private. That is, the grave risk the death squads pose to our continued cooperation in the defense of El Salvador from outside aggression.37

After the momentous speech, Christian Democratic leader Duarte com­ mented, “ The signals are that the United States doesn’t want death squads and I think it’s been a very good message.”38 Three days after the toast and what likely was not a coincidence, the FAES’s General Vides Casanova issued a general order requiring security force mem­ bers to be in uniform virtually at all times (the death squads usu­ ally operated without uniforms), to identify themselves while making arrests, and to notify the government and International Red Cross of such arrests.39 Bush’s comments were intended to warn the Salvadoran right and the FAES that there would be no more tolerance for abuses. A senior U.S. military officer recalled his reaction to the speech: “ It was the riot act and I think at that point the political and military leadership in the government recognized that we were serious and that they were going to have to really tighten up their act.”40 But it also reflected the Reagan administration’s belated realization that it not only needed to isolate the shadowy rightist forces responsible for so much bloodshed, but also to cajole and even threaten its putative allies, lest it see its still bipartisan-endorsed Salvador Option unravel in Washington. By 1984, the United States was fully vested in El Salvador and it seemed unwilling to see its engagement crumble through its association with

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undeniably heinous death-squad behavior. Yet Reagan’s embrace of human rights did not mean the far right American politicians and activists, such as Senator Jesse Helms and various conservative polit­ ical organizations came around to this view. Instead, they saw Wash­ ington’s human rights conditionality as a shameful betrayal of its allies fighting a heroic anti-communist war in El Salvador.

“ Virtually All - Including Rebel Supporters - Confirm the Sharply Downward Trend” Six weeks after his trip to El Salvador, Bush asked the CIA to deter­ mine the extent to which the Salvadoran authorities were indeed crack­ ing down on death squads. Titled “ El Salvador: Dealing with Death Squads,” the classified report concluded that these efforts to “ crack down on rightwing violence” had made “ little progress” and were aimed “ almost exclusively at placating Washington.”41 Roughly a year later in February 1985, however, the U.S. intelligence community was reporting that “ rightwing violence” had “ declined significantly” in recent months, “ only a fraction of the [activity in the] peak years” of 1980 and 19 8 1. (The 1984 rate would roughly be cut in half in 1987.) By 1985, after five years of “ insurgent war and transition toward democracy,” according to U.S. government evidence, an astounding 40,000 Salvadorans were estimated to have been killed in the wan­ ton violence.42 The intelligence community added that while statistics differed among observers, “ virtually all - including rebel supporters confirm the sharply downward trend.”43 Perhaps self-servingly, a key February 1985 CIA report attributed the sharp declines to “ warnings from Washington highlighted by the visit... of Vice President Bush.”44 This U.S. pressure attributed to “ dis­ ciplinary measures by the military high command” resulted in the ouster by the Salvadoran military of abusive officers. The report cited actions taken by the Salvadoran government on judicial reform “ to make extremists more accountable for their activities.” Interestingly, the classified document also attributed the reduction in killings to “ selfimposed constraints by rightists themselves” who perceived “ the tacti­ cal and political trends undermining support for the insurgents.”45 The report noted that even though “ resurgent rightist violence” might not again match levels of 1983, a “ potential rise in the political

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death rate would work against US policy interests in El Salvador.” That was because such an increase “ would be used by leftists in El Salvador and their propagandists abroad” to discredit the Salvadoran govern­ ment and “ generate public and official pressure in the United States to reduce its assistance to the country.”46 The report also cautioned that rightist violence was more likely to increase in light of Washington’s support for the government’s peace initiative that began in 1984. It concluded that “ extremists have publicly charged US agencies and the Embassy with imposing a harmful reform process and rigging [newly elected president] Duarte’s election in M ay 1984. We believe, therefore, that some rightwing fanatics may now be more willing to try to intim­ idate Washington directly by attacks against US personnel in order to weaken Christian Democratic policies.”47 While the number of death squad killings did drop, the death squads themselves did not disappear. Nor did the reporting of them by the international media, which complicated the Reagan administration’s contention that the situation had improved due to its policies. Here is James LeMoyne of the N ew York Times writing in October 1985: Right wing death squad killings have fallen dramatically but they are more fre­ quent than the government cares to admit. A teenager was found beheaded this week, a university lecturer was shot dead and three other men were found tied and shot through the head. Government security forces have largely stopped killing prisoners, but the police arrests of hundreds of suspects each month and detainees frequently say they are beaten or threatened with death. More than 300,000 Salvadorans are refugees from the war. Army troops have forced hun­ dreds of rebel supporters to leave their homes, burning their fields and ordering them to enter refugee camps.48

“A Strategic Leap on Human Rights” Despite these negative press stories showing clearly that the death squads were far from finished, State Department officials continued to press the human rights angle. One cable indicated that the “ indis­ criminate killings” by Salvadoran security forces “ continu[ed]” and were “ eroding public and Congressional support of the administra­ tion’s policies” in El Salvador. It added that if “ the [Reagan] Admin­ istration is to shore up congressional support” for the present pol­ icy, “ initiatives” must be undertaken to “ end such killings.” It urged

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sending a senior administration official to El Salvador who could “ speak with the authority of the president” on this sensitive topic.49 In another example of how the U.S. government was handling the human rights question internally, Ambassador Edwin Corr warned Secretary of State George Shultz through a cable in June 1988 that “ his most sensitive” meeting during his visit to the country would be with the military brass. It added, “ The ESAF [FAES] accomplished a great deal since 1979 in terms of its capabilities as a war-fighting force, in human rights, and in its support for the democratic progress.” Yet Corr was “ particularly concerned” that the human rights improve­ ments “ may have leveled off” and that “ we may even be slipping back­ wards.” Corr told Shultz that it was important that he “ not give the impression that you have called the military leaders together to chew them out. This meeting is not meant to be a repeat of the 1983 visit by Vice President Bush. We do not wish to threaten but as partners to describe why abuses are wrong and counterproductive.” 50 Below is one of the talking points that the embassy prepared for Shultz’s meeting with FAES commanders: I am concerned by reports that the ESAF [FAES] and the security forces are committing an increasing number of human rights violations. I do not presume that these charges are necessarily correct. The problem is that without genuine investigations of these charges the international community - and many in the U.S. Congress - will assume that the charges are true. And that worries me profoundly. We must find some way to make a “ strategic” leap on human rights. I assume it is obvious why such activities are morally wrong. Experience has taught us that mistreating civilians or captured combatants creates more guerrilla sympathizers than it eliminates.51

“ You Might Need to Kill Five or Six a Month” As we have seen before, the death squads had succeeded in decimating the ranks of moderate political parties and mass organizations, making the need for continued repression less pressing. A foreign correspon­ dent’s essay described this trend: “ The reformists were silenced and the guerrilla sympathizers moved to the countryside to take up arms.” 52 Or as one Western European diplomat observed in 1989, “ When there are 120,000 people demonstrating in the streets of San Salvador, as there were in 1980, you might find you need to kill 500 a month. When there

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are only 5,000-6,000 demonstrators, you might find you need to kill five or six a month.” 53 Roberto D ’Aubuisson revealed some of the death squads’ calculus at the time of El Salvador’s 1989 presidential elections: “ There was a time when we had to be hard, against a tremendous leftist aggression. Now we’re just adjusting to circumstances.” Such statements by visi­ ble and polarizing figures led many observers to conclude that, while decidedly better than the dark days of the early war years, “ there are definite limits to what political developments the [Salvadoran] military will tolerate.” 54 While this interpretation might be correct, it is also the case that external pressures, such as the cancellation or delay of U.S. military assistance and the haranguing by U.S. officials, might have had an impact in decreasing repression. For instance, during Bush’s visit to El Salvador in December 19 83, he warned President Magaña and Defense Minister Vides Casanova, “ If these [death squad] murders continue you will lose the support of the American people, and that would be a tragedy.” 55 A few days after Bush’s visit, Magaña and Casanova began to take several steps to curb the death squads, including retiring and exiling officers involved in death squad violence. After issuing a set of new reforms, Casanova warned members of the armed forces that “ all violations will be considered an attack on the military institution, as well as damaging to the country.” 56 A related issue is the extent to which the “ death squads” were autonomous actors funded directly by rightist politicians and oli­ garchs versus simply thinly veiled extensions of the government secu­ rity forces. Again, the truth is probably somewhere in between. For one, it merits clarification that the 57,000 troop-strong Salvadoran armed forces comprised the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the three security branches: the National Police, Treasury Police, and National Guard. Yet the line between military branch and security forces was vague or nonexistent. Nor were there clear mission or jurisdictional mandates. The Salvadoran Army and Air Force operated against urban guerrilla cells while the Treasury Police had its own combat unit.57 At times death squad activity entailed paying security force troops to do some gruesome “ overtime” work. Other times the violence stemmed from organized groups, such as the ORDEN network out in the countryside, which operated under orders from, say, local officials or a disgruntled

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landowner.58 There is no question that at times military officials con­ veniently denounced the killings as the work of lone death squads in order to deflect scrutiny from their own involvement or explicit or tacit awareness. This ambiguity added to the difficulty of cleaning up the armed forces, which at this point had become a vital pillar of the U.S. engagement.

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28

Henry Kissinger

If the reaction to the Kissinger report on Central America quickly bogs down into the Washington political community arguing over things like El Salvador’s willingness to hand in human-rights reports to its headmas­ ters in Congress, you might as well take that $8 billion aid package the commission is proposing and drop it from a plane over the Caribbean Sea. - Wall Street Journal, January 12 , 19 8 4 1 Kissinger is not a consensus-builder... he’s a lightning rod. - Anonymous White House aide, January 15 , 19 842

“ Strong and Legitimate Social and Political Order” U.S. engagement in El Salvador was predicated on the awareness that Salvadoran society was one of the “ sickest and most repressive” in the region. As a retrospective study noted, U.S. military advisors, diplo­ mats, and policymakers needed to both professionalize the Salvado­ ran armed forces to wear down the guerrillas and strengthen democ­ racy “ so as to weaken the rebels’ claim to political legitimacy.”3 The approach got a big political boost on January 10 ,19 8 4 , with the publi­ cation of the Report o f the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, soon called the Kissinger Report because former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was chairman.4 Pleasing to critics of U.S. policies, the report recognized that poverty, injustice, and a closed political system were key factors that had led 300

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Salvadorans to take up arms. It added, though, that these domestic causes had been taken advantage of by external forces. Thus, what was at stake was not simply El Salvador’s future, but in an echo of American presidents throughout the Cold War, “ our [U.S.] credibil­ ity world-wide__ The triumph of hostile forces in what the Soviets call the ‘strategic rear’ of the United States would be read as a sign of impotence.” 5 What was necessary, therefore, was for the United States to see the effort through, even though progress to date had been disap­ pointing and government abuses were still prevalent.6 The commission described the war as presently “ stalemated,” a condition that favored the FM LN. To remedy the situation, the commission recommended “ sizeable levels of military aid as quickly as possible” for better train­ ing, mobility, and firepower. The hook, however, was that this greater assistance be made “ contingent” upon San Salvador’s “ demonstrated progress toward free elections; freedom of association; the establish­ ment of the rule of law and an effective judicial system; and the termi­ nation of the so-called death squads, as well as vigorous action against those guilty of crimes and the prosecution to the extent possible of past offenders.”7 One of the Kissinger Report’s insights was that winning the war against the FM LN rested on a strong and legitimate social and polit­ ical order - especially considering that a weak and illegitimate social and political order had motivated many Salvadorans to pick up arms and join the Marxist guerrillas. On human rights, it claimed to be seeking to “ promote justice,” deeming it “ repugnant to support forces that violate - or tolerate the violation of - fundamental U.S. values.” 8 Echoing what presidents Reagan and Magaña had agreed upon ear­ lier, the Kissinger Report also claimed that “ a political solution must result from the free choice of the Salvadoran people expressed through elections.”9 At the same time, the report addressed the fact that the rebels did not view elections as a viable solution and instead believed that “ the Salvadoran people need a negotiated settlement between the government and the FMLN/FDR - to bring about peace; they do not need elections.” 10 The commission contended that this refusal revealed that the insur­ gents did not view “ power sharing as merely an interim measure needed in order to hold elections in which the left could participate

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The Salvador Option

with security.” Rather, the FM LN ’s power sharing was really a “ means of scrapping the existing elected governmental structure and armed forces and creating a provisional civil and military authority in their place in which the rebel leadership would have a major role - and in which they would eventually gain a dominant position well before the electoral ‘mechanisms’ were in place.” Not surprisingly, it was for these very reasons that “ power-sharing as proposed by the insurgents” was not considered a feasible alterna­ tive to elections. “ To install a mixed provisional government by fiat would scarcely be consistent with the notion that the popular will is the foundation of true government. It would tend to inflate the true strength of insurgent factions that have gained attention thus far through violence and their ability to disrupt the functioning of government.” 11 The commission did not point out the numerous episodes in the recent past, like Guatemala in 19 54, when Washington had helped insurgent movements overthrow existing, legitimate governments. While the Kissinger Report encouraged a deeper, yet conditional involvement in El Salvador, it argued that Washington should not “ impose its own administration” even for “ such laudable objectives” as implementing social and economic reforms. The United States also “ cannot place its own experts in each village and town to gather polit­ ical intelligence; and it cannot supervise the conduct of each soldier and policeman in all dealings with the population. For all these goals, the U.S. Government must rely on the abilities and good faith of the government under attack.” 12 The Salvadoran left assailed the Kissinger Report, calling it a “ pre­ scription for disaster” that would require the assistance of U.S. combat troops “ within months” to bolster the faltering Salvadoran military.13 The FD R ’s Ruben Zamora added that the commission had embraced “ the mistaken vision of El Salvador as an East-West conflict,” an error he attributed to the influence of Kissinger’s zero-sum, “ realpolitik” worldview.14 Over the ensuing months and years, Reagan repeatedly referred to the Kissinger Commission to justify increases in aid to El Salvador. During a M ay 1984 televised address to the nation, he said, As the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, chaired by Henry Kissinger, agree, if we do nothing or if we continue to provide too little help,

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Henry Kissinger

30 3

our choice will be a communist Central America with additional communist military bases on the mainland of this hemisphere and communist subversion spreading southward and northward. This communist subversion poses the threat that 100 million people from Panama to the open border on our south could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes.15

It is unclear to what extent the Kissinger Report simply repeated what the Reagan administration had decided upon - or vice versa. In a memo to his boss, Shultz told Reagan that the commission’s soft and hard recommendations were a breakthrough for El Salvador policy: Almost as soon as the Commission issued its report [January 1984], develop­ ments in Central America began to confirm the accuracy of its analysis and the soundness of its judgment. In early 1984, many in the United States, in Western Europe, and even in Latin America believed that El Salvador was caught in an endless war between the guerrillas of the left and death squads of the right. But the Commission saw a different tune. It saw electoral democracy, reform, and political dialogue as realistic alternatives to the antidemocratic violence of the extreme left and right - provided El Salvador’s democrats got the support they needed.16

What Shultz did not tell Reagan, however, was that the core of the com­ mission’s report was the very engagement approach started in the late Carter years and subsequently embraced, most visibly by Enders and Hinton - the very figures who had been antithetical to the Kirkpatrick hardliners. But now, in 1984, the Carter approach that had been deni­ grated by the incoming Reagan hardliners and reformed into a “ bipar­ tisan consensus” was endorsed by a paragon of America’s foreign policy establishment - Henry Kissinger. As we will see, the ascension of Jose Napoleon Duarte to the presidency later this same year would give the Kissinger Commission-endorsed engagement its reformist poster child. In a touch of irony, the chameleonic Kissinger was one of several commission members who signed a dissent appendix; in it, they con­ tended that, as the survival of the Salvadoran government was critical to U.S. interests, Congress and the administration should not “ inter­ pret conditionality” on military aid “ in a way that leads to a MarxistLeninist victory in El Salvador” - an argument that Jeane Kirkpatrick certainly would have applauded. During final deliberations, Kissinger supported the last-minute inclusion of language that would tie massive

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30 4

The Salvador Option

increases in military aid to improvements in human rights, but he was wary of applying such terms too tightly in the “ present precarious mil­ itary situation.” 17 The White House responded that it was “ inclined” not to follow the commission’s recommendations on explicit condi­ tionality, seeing this as counterproductive since it would limit the administration’s flexibility.18

“ Will Simply Reproduce All the Conditions That Drove Peasants and the Middle Class to Revolution” Critics of the Kissinger Commission’s findings questioned how the Salvadoran armed forces and far right would balance the U.S. gov­ ernment’s pressure to “ draw the line” against communism as well as reform - or otherwise suffer a cut in aid. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., a historian and former aide to President John F. Kennedy, argued in a N ew York Times opinion piece that the commission’s program was “ bathed in political unreality.” How could Washington promote a reform agenda when it also supported “ militarism” that entrenched “ the people most opposed to social change.” He continued, “ Peace restored by giving military victory to a crowd whose survival depends on the elimination of the democratic alternative - and who torture and murder their own democrats - will simply reproduce all the conditions that drove peasants and the middle class to revolution.” 19 Schlesinger warned that distrust of Washington ran deep. Thus, “ Why should any Central American believe we have democratic interests at heart?” Schlesinger acknowledged that “ victory for the revolutionaries” would be a setback for U.S. interests and “ it would not lead to Central Amer­ ican regimes of sweetness and light.” Rather than a military solution, which in his view would make social change impossible, Schlesinger called for negotiations. What Schlesinger did not acknowledge, how­ ever, was that “ negotiations” had already become an extremely politi­ cized concept, with both sides embracing entirely different notions of what they would entail. Liberal members of Congress were not impressed with a report they believed simply reinforced the status quo. Democratic senator Edward Kennedy commented that “ the Commission ignores the past lessons of military solution . . . and that the United States has intervened with too much frequency in the internal affairs of other nations in the

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Henry Kissinger

30 5

Hemisphere.”20 A N ew York Times editorial pushed the “ another Viet­ nam” angle: “ The same fears about impotence and credibility were the stuff of a thousand speeches justifying American involvement for a gen­ eration in the lost war in Indochina.”21 For more centrist Democrats, the commission’s bipartisan compo­ sition and ostensibly moderate recommendations provided political cover to continue to support the Reagan administration’s approach. Equally important, though, is that the Kissinger Report’s strong endorsement of aid conditional on humanitarian progress (as well as elections and land reform) further institutionalized the moderate strat­ egy at the expense of Reagan’s foreign policy hawks. Thus, while it is often associated with a hardline approach to El Salvador, the Reagan administration’s policy by early 1984 was decidedly in the moderate camp. This reality is what helped it gain congressional approval to fund new, large economic and military aid packages for El Salvador over the next several years.

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29 Contras

So, I guess in a way [the Nicaraguan rebels] are counterrevolutionaries, and God bless them for being that way. I guess that makes them contras and so it makes me a contra, too. - President Ronald Reagan, March 14, 19 8 6 1

A “ Disorderly M ix of Policies” The last time we touched on Nicaragua, we left off with a Carter administration whose attempts at influencing the new Sandinista gov­ ernment entailed direct U.S. development assistance amounting to $ 1 1 8 million by January 19 8 1. In spite of these attempts, it became clear via intelligence reports that Nicaragua’s goals for a “ revolution without frontiers” had not abated. Now it was Ronald Reagan’s turn to check perceived communist expansion in the hemisphere. Reagan’s administration watched as Managua began courting the global left. After signing a “ party-to-party” deal with the Soviet Union, Nicaragua began accepting shiploads of weaponry from Cuba, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union.2 But for the Reagan administra­ tion and even some Democratic members of Congress, the Sandinistas’ continued arms shipments to the FM LN in El Salvador would become the major sore point. In the summer of 19 8 1, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin Amer­ ica Thomas Enders met with Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega in an attempt to reach a deal that would end Nicaragua’s military assistance to El Salvador. Ortega became defensive against Enders’s seemingly 306

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30 7

imperialist tone, adding that the Sandinistas had no intention of ceas­ ing arms shipments to El Salvador. Ortega continued to his U.S. coun­ terpart that Managua had “ decided to defend our revolution by force of arms . . . and to take the war to the whole of Central America if that is the consequence.”3 Later that year, Reagan approved National Security Decision Direc­ tive 17 (NSDD 17), signaling a robust new attentiveness to the region, including an intent “ to assist in defeating the insurgency in El Sal­ vador, and to oppose actions by Cuba, Nicaragua, or others to intro­ duce... supplies for insurgents.”4 The plan continued the Carter-era support of “ democratic forces” in Nicaragua, but it also provided for the military training of indigenous units and leaders both in and out of the country who opposed the Sandinista government. Under NSDD 17 , Enders embraced the ongoing covert preparations to arm and train anti-Sandinista fighters, presenting them as “ a lowball option, a small operation not intended to overthrow.” 5 In reality, Enders envisioned support for anti-Sandinista forces as a “ bargaining chip” to pressure the Sandinistas to return to the negotiating table about El Salvador. At the end of the year, Reagan signed a new finding centered on the creation of a proxy force of Nicaraguan exiles reminiscent of those assembled by the CIA for Guatemala in 1954 and for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1 9 6 1 / The CIA would play a low-profile role in supporting anti-Sandinista forces, opting instead to have Argentina’s military conduct the training. This rightist military was in power in Buenos Aires and was conducting its own campaign of torture and disappearances against suspected leftists and communists. A July 1982 “ scope paper” submitted to the National Security Council outlined the specific activities undertaken by the CIA pursuant to the seminal December 19 8 1 presidential finding. Among these activ­ ities were “ financial and material support to democratic Nicaraguan leaders” and, more significantly, efforts “ to create a paramilitary poten­ tial... to effect changes in Nicaraguan government policies.”7 With this paper, the Reagan administration was expressing both a desire to get tough with communism in Central America and a post-Vietnam reluctance surrounding direct U.S. military or covert actions in these sorts of proxy wars.8 With new, post-Watergate and post-Vietnam reforms of the intelli­ gence oversight process, the CIA now had to inform select committees

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The Salvador Option

on Capitol Hill about its actions, including those in Nicaragua. Thus, the Reagan administration’s unfolding “ secret” war against Nicaragua was not as secret as many people now assume. Nor was it consistent in its objectives. As former Reagan official Robert Kagan reflected, the mix of new intelligence oversight, late Cold War dynamics, and histor­ ical involvement in Nicaragua made U.S.-Nicaraguan relations during the Contra War a “ disorderly mix of policies.”9 A House intelligence committee report in 1982 concluded that Man­ agua was “ helping train insurgents and [was] transferring arms and financial support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents” in El Salvador.10 The Sandinistas also provided “ the insurgents bases of operation in Nicaragua,” and Cuban involvement “ especially in pro­ viding arms” was “ also evident.” 11 Amazingly, the Sandinistas were not denying these claims. Tomáis Borge, now the head of the Sandinistas’ intelligence service, contended that it was their nation’s moral duty to support their revolutionary comrades in Central America. “ How can we keep our arms folded in the face of the crimes that are being com­ mitted in El Salvador and Guatemala?” he asked. “ If we are accused of expressing solidarity, if we are forced to sit in the dock because of this, we say: We have shown our solidarity with all Latin American peo­ ples in the past, we are doing so at present and will continue to do so in the future.” 12 Despite pressure to ease its support for the FM LN in return for a softer U.S. stance toward Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega con­ tended that his country was “ interested in seeing the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala triumph__ [It is] our shield - it makes our revolution safer.” 13 The scale of the continued arms shipments to the FM LN even pro­ voked Democratic Senator Paul Tsongas to remark after an intelligence briefing, “ Those of us who are opposed to the policy accept the fact that there is indeed Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador.” 14 U.S. officials and politicians were also coming to a related conclusion about the Sandinistas’ buildup of their own armed forces. In March 1982, the CIA released aerial reconnaissance photographs that purported to show the location of Managua’s new battalion of 25 Soviet-made T-55 tanks, two Soviet-made M i-17 helicopters, and four airfields being updated to accommodate fighter aircraft.15 If Washington was beginning to play hardball in Nicaragua, so were the Soviets. In fact, after a visit to Moscow in November 19 8 1, Minister

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30 9

of Defense Humberto Ortega, with the assistance of Cuban advisors, helped establish an intricate system of arms deliveries to his swelling military, including supplies from Algeria (an early supporter of the Sandinistas), Bulgaria, and Vietnam as well as from the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba.16 In a last attempt to salvage the deteriorating bilateral relationship, in August 19 8 1 the Reagan administration sent the State Department’s Enders to Managua for talks. Seeking to use “ the threat of confronta­ tion rather than confrontation itself,” Enders engaged the Sandinista leaders in a heated discussion of possible solutions. Enders warned that the United States would be inclined to involve itself militarily if the Sandinistas failed to halt the flow of arms to El Salvador, prompting one of Ortega’s advisors to yell, “All right, come on in! We’ll meet you man to man!” 17 At the end of the meetings, Enders proposed the Reagan administration’s bargain: in exchange for halting the export of arms and encouragement of insurrection in El Salvador and a reduc­ tion in Nicaragua’s armed forces, the United States would provide Nicaragua with continued security arrangements and economic aid.18 After a month of consideration, Ortega firmly rejected the offer. In hindsight, given the devastating contra war that followed, the offer might have benefited the Sandinistas more than they realized at the time. However, Sandinismo in its inception was an ideology of anti-imperialism - a belief that became ingrained in Nicaragua’s lead­ ership.19 By rejecting the U.S. offer, the Sandinistas stayed true to their ideology and, they hoped, solidified domestic support for their rule. After El Salvador’s highly publicized and surprisingly pacific na­ tional elections in March 1982, when an overwhelming percentage of the population came out to vote despite FM LN threats, the Reagan administration began to emphasize democracy and the rule of law as integral components of Nicaragua policy. This approach proved bene­ ficial over the long run with conservative Democrats in Congress who were wary of aggressive U.S. meddling in Nicaragua but were also con­ cerned about the country’s increasingly hardline Marxist direction.

“ The Contras Are Born” Shortly after Reagan took office, a disparate group of former National Guardsmen, former and now disgruntled Sandinistas, peasants, and

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The Salvador Option

Atlantic Coast Miskito Indians collectively known as the contras began receiving American assistance in Nicaragua.20 At first, the CIA’s involvement was indirect, as Argentine military officers trained and at times commanded the contras from camps inside Honduras. The total number of anti-Sandinista troops at the beginning of the U.S. covert program was around 2,000, half of them Miskito Indians.21 The most influential contra group was the Honduras-based Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, FDN). At this early point, the most “ visible and appealing” contra was a former Jesuit priest and university rector named Edgar Chamorro who became the spokesperson for FDN. At their height, the contras numbered roughly 15,000 soldiers, often pulled from the ranks of the rural campesinos. As the contras’ ambitions increased, so did those of the Reagan administration, which saw these budding “ freedom fight­ ers” as an integral part of its global anti-communist agenda. By 1982 and 1983, the anti-Sandinista guerrilla forces had become the Reagan administration’s only serious tool for influencing events in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas had to adapt to the unexpected strength of the con­ tra threat. Early on, the Sandinista army’s strategy had been to use militia to deal with the insurgents while holding the regular troops in reserve to protect key cities and military bases. But after a series of contra offensives startled the army leadership, it was forced to send out regular battalions to the front lines in the northern regions near the Honduran border. In an indication of how seriously Managua was taking this new force, a high-ranking Cuban general, Arnoldo Ochoa, arrived in 1983 to take charge of the war. Ochoa’s approach was to decimate the enemy using aggressive counterinsurgency tactics, cre­ ating a fascinating role reversal for the Cold War Cuban military: they and the Sandinistas were employing the very sort of counterin­ surgency strategy that the United States was promoting next door in El Salvador. The Cubans began training a special counterguerrilla battalion able to remain on patrol for extended periods of time. But the Sandinistas quickly learned that they would need greater mobility if this new strategy was to succeed. Moscow immediately provided fresh weapons and equipment, including 10 Mi-8 helicopter transports, more than 300 new trucks, two dozen armored fighting vehicles and tanks, and scores of rocket launchers known as “ Stalin organs.”22 U.S. intelligence

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f i g u r e 2 9 .1. The Contra War, 1980s. Map prepared by Andrew Rhodes. Reprinted with permission.

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The Salvador Option

officials estimated that Soviet deliveries to Nicaragua doubled in 1983, from 10,000 tons of materiel to 20,000. Moscow also increased the number of advisors in-country from 70 to 100, and the Cuban pres­ ence grew from 7,500 to 9,000, of whom more than 2,000 were mil­ itary and internal security advisors. Interestingly, during the Somoza era there had been no more than a few hundred secret police agents, while under the Sandinistas that number grew to more than 3,000.23

The Not-So-Secret War As news of the U.S. funding for the contras leaked out in the press over months and years in the early 1980s, Reagan administration officials were forced to defend a policy that was not supposed to be discussed in public. One senior official responded to a Newsweek article by con­ tending, “ We are not waging a secret war, or anything approaching that. What we are doing is trying to keep Managua off balance and apply pressure to stop providing military aid to the insurgents in El Sal­ vador.”24 In late 1982, Democratic congressman Tom Harkin referred to the same Newsweek article and commented that “ news reports of late . . . clearly indicate that we are becoming ever more mired in the jungles and swamps of Latin America__ The real mistake we are mak­ ing is not only in doing something that is clearly illegal, but in siding with perhaps the most hated group of Nicaraguans that could exist outside of the borders of Nicaragua, and I talk about Somocistas.”25 Another Democrat, Congressman George Miller, asked Congress to “ go on record in getting control of those agencies who have con­ vinced the White House to substitute covert action for policy, to sub­ stitute covert action for diplomacy, and take an action that without the express consent of this Congress is in fact illegal, unethical and against the best interests of this country.”26 This opposition yielded a highly ambivalent policy, reflected in U.S. assistance to the contras that waxed and waned throughout the 1980s, sometimes cut off completely. In April 1982, Democratic representative and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Edward Boland of Massachusetts, added a phrase to the secret annex of an intelligence authorization bill declaring that congressional funding could not be spent “ for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking an exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.”27

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However, this language focused solely on intent - not actions - leav­ ing tremendous wiggle room for the Reagan administration to pur­ sue its covert policies. It also allowed Boland and other congressional Democrats to escape the criticism that they had refused to prevent com­ munist expansion in Central America, without also being accused of supporting covert machinations against a sovereign government.28 The 1983 congressional session, however, saw a more concerted assault on Reagan’s contra policy. Another Boland amendment (offi­ cially the Boland-Zablocki amendment) struck a deal that cut off aid to the contras and increased aid to El Salvador and the other pro­ American governments in Central America by $80 million. The amend­ ment passed the house 228 -19 5 in what Secretary of State George Shultz called “ the worst legislative defeat of the Reagan administra­ tion to that date.”29 Soon after, though, the Senate rescued the covert program as the Boland amendment restrictions were dropped before the bill went forward.

Boots on the Ground: Low-Intensity Conflict in Action Meanwhile, operations on the ground in Nicaragua continued with lit­ tle regard for the funding disputes in Congress. As politicians contin­ ued to haggle over legislative language back in Washington, the CIA went ahead with its aid and training to the contras as well as direct paramilitary operations inside Nicaragua. In early October 1983, men in motorboats attacked piers at the Pacific port of Corinto, igniting fuel storage tanks that contained over 3 million gallons of gasoline. The explosion reportedly left the Nicaraguan government with less than a month’s supply of oil reserves. The CIA had supported the operation, which involved not contra forces, as many would have suspected, but so-called UCLAs or “ unilat­ erally controlled Latino assets” hired by the agency to carry out such secret missions. In some aspects resembling a mini-version of the Bay of Pigs, this operation was the closest that the United States came to a direct action against Nicaragua. The CIA also supported the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors to deter merchant captains and to delay or can­ cel oil shipments, a move that later erupted in controversy when the International Court of Justice voted 15 -0 to condemn the mining, with an American judge concurring. The UN Security Council discussed

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3i4

The Salvador Option

the issue for four days before Washington used its veto to prevent a censure. The reaction back in Washington was no warmer. The vice chair­ man of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Democratic sen­ ator Patrick Moynihan, resigned his position in protest; conservative senator Barry Goldwater sent a blunt “ Dear Bill” letter to CIA Direc­ tor William Casey. The letter stated, “ I’m pissed off__ I don’t like this. I don’t like it one bit from the president or from you__ This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I don’t see how we are going to explain it.”3° Just when it seemed the situation could not get any worse, in the last weeks of Reagan’s second presidential campaign the Washington Post revealed that the CIA had produced a manual for the contras that included instructions on how to “ neutralize” local Sandinista officials. Despite official rhetoric in Washington used to justify U.S. policy, anti-Sandinista military action on the ground often had little to do with the arms flow to El Salvador and centered instead on tactics of terror and destruction to coerce the hearts and minds of peasants in Nicaragua’s mountainous border regions to give their allegiance to the contras. On the morning of August 10 , 1983, 100 to 2 ° ° contras ambushed a bus carrying 18 civilians near the town of Jinotega, killing 15 of them.31 The same contra forces were reported to have later dyna­ mited a key bridge near Jinotega. Vivid reports of the incident surfaced in the following days, distinguished by front page photos in Sandinista newspapers of a nine-month-old girl who had been shot in the hip during the attack and whose 16-year-old mother had been killed.32 As State Department memos later reported, the trend of contra attacks on unarmed civilians, women, and children was well documented and valuable to Sandinista rhetoric. All told, U.S. support allowed the contras to conduct far more frequent and lethal operations against the Sandinista security forces and their civilian adherents than they had done previously. The con­ tras conducted the war ferociously, frequently destroying Sandinistarun agricultural cooperatives to undermine the regime’s popular sup­ port in the countryside. The contras often went into battle armed with U.S.-made M -i6s, Belgian FAL automatic rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, mortars, and other sophisticated equipment. In one largescale episode, a contra strike into the “ Las Minas” area of northern

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Nicaragua included thousands of combatants and caused considerable damage to local infrastructure. By the end of 1985, the Nicaraguan Ministry of Health estimated that more than 3,600 civilians had been killed, roughly 4,000 wounded, and about 5,200 kidnapped during contra raids.33

The Reagan Doctrine for Nicaragua, not El Salvador Undeterred by growing opposition in Congress, Reagan used his land­ slide victory in the 1984 presidential election against Democrat Wal­ ter Mondale to renew his public campaign for contra aid. For what was now being dubbed the Reagan Doctrine, the contras had become both a strategic and a moral issue. The United States, Reagan believed, needed to be on the side of freedom throughout the world; he even compared the contras to the Founding Fathers, which infuriated crit­ ics who pointed out the guerrilla insurgency’s repeated violations of both human rights and the laws of war. In fact, the contras’ violent ways became the new rallying cry for human rights, religious, and con­ gressional activists opposed to Reagan’s policies toward Nicaragua. What was lost in the acerbic debate in Washington was that the lion’s share of the contra aid was coming from other sources, such as Saudi Arabia, especially after the strict 1984 Boland amendment restric­ tions began to kick in.34 It was also easy for observers to assume that Reagan’s hawkish policies and rhetoric on Nicaragua confirmed that he was pushing equally militarized and controversial policies in El Salvador. In 1985, Congress approved two policies that underscored its ambivalence about Nicaragua. The first was for “ humanitarian” contra aid. The second was a trade embargo against Nicaragua, which made the country’s desperate economic situation even worse. CIA sabotage efforts, the trade embargo, and the Sandinistas’ inept fiscal and mon­ etary policies had turned the country into an economic basket case, undermining the ruling junta’s popular support. In 1982, roughly 19 percent of Nicaragua’s national budget went to defense; by 1988 it was closer to 40 percent and rising. The Sandinistas were also reel­ ing from sustained criticism from the Catholic Church, including Pope John Paul II as well as the opposition newspaper La Prensa, which went over a year without publishing an issue in 1986.35 After foreign

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pressure to end this censorship, the newspaper re-opened - replete with anti-regime venom. As author Stephen Kinzer wrote in 1988: “ Early every afternoon, as the first copies of the opposition newspaper La Prensa roll off the presses, Nicaraguans are treated to a new round of vitriol aimed at the Sandinista government.”36

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3o

“Elections Yes, Dialogue N o,” 1984 Presidential Election

The strong message of this [1984] election is that the Salvadoran people have declared their own political solution to the crisis that challenges the country. Three successful elections in two years are a clear repudiation of the insurgency. - U.S. election delegation1 These [U.S. aid to the election] efforts are being made for our [American] benefit and not in the interests of Salvadoran democracy. They should be seen for what they are: the props, script, and stage lighting for a shoddy farce. -A u th o r Frank Brodhead, 19 842 If the government and the imperialist power decide to hold the election in the midst of a war, that is their problem. If the war interrupts or molests the election, we are not going to stop it to protect this imperialist project. -Joaq u in Villalobos, FM LN military commander, 19 843

Over the first half of 1984 El Salvador once again braced for national elections, this time a historic presidential race under the new con­ stitution promulgated a year earlier. The two main candidates were strangers to no one, the Christian Democrats’ Jose Napoleón Duarte and A R EN A ’s Roberto D ’Aubuisson. For the Reagan administration, the presidential elections were a critical marker in demonstrating El Salvador’s progress as a democracy. On the heels of the stunning vote in 1982, there was much greater confidence that the 1984 vote

3 17

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The Salvador Option

would be successful. Yet, as in 1982, U.S. officials were deeply concerned that AREN A might win again - and this time “ winning” meant D ’Aubuisson taking the presidency - an unacceptable outcome for engagement. U.S. diplomats also missed no opportunity to remind Salvadorans that the United States would only work with Duarte’s party. As one official revealed, “ Everyone in the [U.S.] Embassy knew that if Duarte didn’t win that was the end of Reagan’s policy in El Salvador. But everyone also knew we couldn’t say that to the Salvadorans.”4 Despite this poorly kept secret about U.S. intentions, Secretary of State George Shultz told an audience that the United States would “ maintain a neu­ tral position regarding the results of the elections.” 5 Duarte’s centrist candidacy was complicated from the onset given that the country’s military brass was deeply skeptical of his commit­ ment to adequately maintain the counterinsurgency effort. On the other hand, as was the case when he joined the military-civilian junta in 1980, the FM LN and FDR ridiculed Duarte for being a lackey of the military and oligarchy.6 To help ensure that the election did not implode, the CIA relied on a 19 8 1 presidential authorization to con­ duct covert efforts to support centrist politicians and parties, most critically the Duarte campaign.7 The CIA pumped in an estimated $ i- $ 3 million in covert assistance to cover Duarte’s media and cam­ paign materials.8 In addition to the covert aid, Washington disbursed over $ 1 million in assistance through the various AIFLD-backed labor unions campaigning on Duarte’s behalf.9 The State Depart­ ment covered the $ 10 million costs of the election itself, and the embassy went to great lengths to encourage influential Salvadorans to promote a favorable “ democratic” outcome.10 Duarte also received external funds from Christian Democrat parties in Venezuela and West Germany. In short, as during the 1982 constituent assembly elections, Wash­ ington was using covert and deeply interventionist means to promote a “ democratic” outcome in El Salvador. Declassified Top Secret U.S. gov­ ernment documents recommended that the threats involved in the elec­ toral campaign required increased “ U.S. military assets in the region,” in order to “ increase intelligence collection and assist in improving security for the Salvadoran elections.” 11

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“ Dialogue Yes, Elections N o ” Similar to their response to the 1982 vote, the FM LN condemned the elections as a sham intended to legitimize the corrupt regime. Villalobos explained the FM LN ’s logic: “ We are certain that we have the people’s support, and this is obvious to everyone. We have no need to prove it on paper. No voting at the polls can be more eloquent or convincing than the facts of war.” 12 In towns throughout the country the FM LN painted this slogan on walls: “ Dialogue Yes, Elections N o.” The intent was to reinforce its contention that true democracy would come through immediate power sharing, not ballot boxes. The FD R’s Guillermo Ungo wrote in the N ew York Times on March 22, 1984, that “ the decision to hold this election was made in Washington, by Washington, and for Washington.” 13 Villalobos vowed that the rebels would expand the war “ before, during and after” the vote.14 The U.S. Embassy reported to Washington that leading up to the first round of votes in March, the rebels were burning ballots and stopping buses to search for and destroy identification cards necessary for vot­ ing. In the area of El Limon, guerrillas distributed leaflets that read, “ The peace and land that D ’Aubuisson and Duarte want is that of cemeteries.” 15 One rebel communique warned, “ Our decision to pro­ hibit all electoral activity in these towns must be respected or the local political leaders must be ready to face the consequences.” 16 An FM LN spokesman disputed these claims, insisting that only 5,000 documents were seized. “ If this was really a tactic to interfere with the elections,” he commented, “ we would have taken a half million or so.” 17

“ This Is a Dirty War” In addition to the FM LN threats, another unexpected but deeply sig­ nificant development in the months and weeks leading up to the elec­ tion was the electoral support the rightist party AREN A was gar­ nering across the country. Understanding this paradox was especially puzzling for the foreign observers flooding into the tiny nation to cover the upcoming vote, who assumed that most Salvadoran civil­ ians would reject the party of the death squads. AREN A, however, was well financed - by the Salvadoran right, not Washington - allowing it to

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spread the message it wanted the people to hear, and its leaders, includ­ ing D ’Aubuisson, were deft at projecting a folksy image. The follow­ ing excerpt written by a U.S. correspondent depicts an AREN A “ hell­ roaring” for the 1984 presidential elections in the sun-baked town of Ilobasco in the country’s arid tobacco region: Ancient trucks wheezed down from the rugged hills bearing farm workers to whom landowners had given a bag of tortillas and a pint of the local tan­ glefoot each - and a very strong suggestion that they attend. The candidate, Roberto D’Aubuisson, a boyish-looking, rakishly handsome man who oozed charm when he wasn’t having people killed, stood behind a bunting-draped podium. He was in rare form. He held up a watermelon and a machete. “ I call the Christian Democrats the ‘Watermelon Party,’ ” he shouted, referring to the opposing green-and-white party colors, and slammed the machete blade through the melon with a resounding thwack. “ GREEN on the outside! RED on the inside!” That’s about as gracious as it got in the rough-and-tumble race. While terror, bullets, and shrapnel laced through El Salvador as the election neared, the word war was almost as nasty.18

In another AREN A rally - this time in San Vicente where the vol­ cano looking over the town “ was swarming with guerrillas” - a speaker introducing D ’Aubuisson shouted to the crowd, “ The Chris­ tian Democrats are our enemies because they are communists. . . . We have proof that the [Christian Democratic] mayor in Santa Clara meets every night at midnight with the guerrillas.” 19 D ’Aubuisson also told Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, “ The loco Duarte and his party are the political arms of subversion. Christian Democrats and the guer­ rillas are two different tactics of Communism. The first one to get into power will call the other, and together they will give the country to the Soviet Union.”20 D ’Aubuisson also defended the military’s prosecution of the war, “ This is a dirty war. Human rights prohibits the army from winning against the subversives. . . . We are never going to negotiate, we are never going to dialogue, we are never going to surrender. We will only have peace through victory.”21 Not to be outdone by D ’Aubuisson, Duarte countered that his polar­ izing opponent was a “ fascist” and “ assassin.”22 He called AREN A the “ARE-Nazis” and made a pun on D ’Aubuisson’s name to suggest an association with the death squads, “ Roberto Escuadrón.”23 One AP correspondent recalled how campaign icons often played to the highly illiterate rural voters. On the first round of presidential

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voting, the names of the candidates were not even on the ballots. Instead, there were party symbols, which voters recognized as these had been stenciled and plastered “ across everything that didn’t move and some things that did.” Joseph Frazier reported the local flavor of the historic campaign: cars with scratchy loudspeakers prowled the streets telling people to “ vote the little fish” (the Christian Democratic sym­ bol) or “ vote the cross” (ARENA) or “ vote the handshake” (National Conciliation) or “ vote the little arrow” (the tiny moderate Democratic Action Party).24 The national constitution barred priests from making political statements, but Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas, successor to the fallen (Oscar Romero, exhorted parishioners “ to avoid building their houses on sand.” The Spanish term for sand is arena, the same as the rightist party’s acronym. Questioned later whether the mention was coincidental, the bishop smiled and said, “ You heard my words.”25 Conservatives contended that Rivera y Damas was, like Romero, a “ red bishop.”26 “ Electoral Confusion Appeared to Be General” Almost 1.4 million Salvadorans, nearly 78 percent of eligible vot­ ers, went to the polls in the first round on March 25. According to Ruben Zamora, voting to choose among the eight candidates did not take place in 89 of the country’s 261 municipalities.27 Nevertheless presidential spokesman Larry Speakes reported “ an extremely strong turnout,” which indicated that “ the Salvadoran people want free elec­ tions and an opportunity to vote, which leaves the rebels, the guerrillas, in a distinct minority there.”28 Eager to capitalize diplomatically on the event, an upbeat Ambas­ sador Thomas Pickering described the election as a “ striking display of Salvadoran voter determination” and a “ weapon against the insur­ rection.”29 Guerrilla representatives countered the sanguine interpreta­ tion with their view that the elections “ constituted the biggest political failure of the Reagan administration in El Salvador.”30 In one startling episode, presidential candidate Duarte said in an appearance on the CBS news program Face the Nation that he had intelligence indicating that “ some kind of death squad organized in Cuba has just arrived to make a suicide attempt to kill me.”31 Widespread reports of irregularities emerged within hours after the polls closed.32 Most of the glitches revolved around a new, untried

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The Salvador Option

electoral system whose “ layers of complexity” were intended to reduce fraud. A U.S.-funded voter registry was compiled especially for these elections and was based on the personal identity cards called cédulas that all adult Salvadorans were required to carry. While some U.S. offi­ cials believed the registry would be useful against fraud, others urged against using the new system. Ambassador Pickering acknowledged at a press conference that “ the [electoral] confusion appeared to be gen­ eral.”33 Once voting started at 7 a .m . on election Sunday, however, the registry turned out to be riddled with errors that left thousands of Salvadorans disenfranchised.34 Another issue was the inescapable fact that more than 50 percent of the country’s citizens were illiterate - a rate that spiked to over 70 percent in the countryside. Yet polling center locations for the entire nation were published in San Salvador news­ papers the previous weeks, information that was almost worthless to those voters unable to read.35

“ Whose Idea of Democracy Is That?” The many imperfections of the first round of elections did not prevent both the Reagan administration and Congress from using the elections as definitive evidence that the now “ bipartisan” strategy was working. Democratic senator J. Bennett Johnston from Louisiana visited El Sal­ vador soon after the first round and met with Duarte for more than six hours. “ We believe he [Duarte] can control the army, the death squads and the guerrillas - with our help.”36 An article in the N ew York Times from that same April, titled “ Salvador Runoff Called a Pivot Point for Aid,” cited an anonymous U.S. diplomat who predicted, “ Reagan will come on very strongly once he [Reagan] is back [from a trip before the M ay 6 runoff] and the election results are in.”37 Interestingly, the liberal N ew York Times editorial page - normally a sharp critic of Reagan’s Salvador policies - cautiously called the first round “ a stand­ off for democracy” but nonetheless proposed a surprisingly interven­ tionist approach for the Reagan White House to follow: “ Having pre­ scribed the election, the Administration should not hesitate to influence the result.”38 Yet others were not convinced. Ten days later, the N ew York Times published a letter from a reader in response to its editorial: “ Whose

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Elections Yes, Dialogue No

32 3

idea of democracy is that? The game plan seems to be to appease the American public and Congress by electing the ‘moderate’ Duarte. He cannot control the military or the death squads, but his election will permit the Administration to keep on arming them while continuing to do in Nicaragua [backing the insurgent contras] what it accuses Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union of doing in El Salvador.”39 A reader of Canada’s Globe and Mail commented in a forum titled “ Death Squad Democracy” that the real lesson from the election was “ that the United States’ power and influence in El Salvador also sup­ ports its death squad political process between elections.”40 A few days after the first round, the State Department’s deputy coordinator for Latin America published a letter in the N ew York Times encapsulating the engagement strategy’s interpretation of the elections. While acknowledging imperfections, he disagreed with an earlier reader who discounted the elections since voting was manda­ tory in El Salvador: The fact is that the people of El Salvador voted freely in what hundreds of inter­ national observers have described as one of the most open and fair elections in Latin American history. If there was a problem, it was that in the attempt to prevent any form of fraud the process became complicated and slowed the voting. Still, all Salvadoran political parties have acknowledged that the elec­ tions were a valid manifestation of the people’s will. N o one is arguing that El Salvador is a perfect democracy or that the election process did not have its flaws. But to seek to denigrate an event in which 70 to 75 percent of the eligible voters did cast ballots, displaying a degree of patience few of us could have had, is both unfair and a misreading of a very significant event.41

While strong opinions on the March 25 elections circulated in the press, a final decision on El Salvador’s presidency had yet to be made. The second round of elections was still on schedule for May, which provided one month of reflection on the blunders of the first round as well as additional time for AREN A and the Christian Democrats to sway the vote. “ Downright Phony” Policies Members of Congress who observed the first round of elections met with President Reagan after returning to Washington. Using language

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The Salvador Option

that was almost indistinguishable from that of Reagan’s team, Major­ ity Leader James Wright stated that that election had been “ valid” and “ impressive” and added, “ I’m going to do whatever is neces­ sary to provide the means for the people of El Salvador to preserve a democratic society.”42 Reagan reinforced Wright’s view: “ Those valiant people braved guerrilla violence and sabotage to do what we take for granted: cast their votes for president__ While the final vote count is not in, it looks like the turnout is another victory for freedom over tyranny, of liberty and courage over intimidation.”43 Echoing his ideological mentor Kirkpatrick (who returned to Georgetown in 1985 and became a Republican), Reagan also criticized people who express concern for human rights abuses “ while pursu­ ing policies that lead to the overthrow of less-than-perfect democra­ cies by Marxist dictatorships.” Such people, the president said, were “ nai've and/or downright phony.”44 A high-level State Department offi­ cial backed up this point in comments to the press: “ Our entire effort to prevent the growth of Soviet and Cuban influence in Central Amer­ ica will be undercut if the public and Congress get caught up in a furor over the death squads.”45 Hot on the campaign trail for the Democratic Party’s presiden­ tial primaries, three contesting presidential nominees blasted Reagan’s Central America policies, especially his recent move to use emergency measures to once again increase aid to El Salvador. Senator Gary Hart said the president was embarking on a “ foolhardy course” that the American people should reject. Reverend Jesse Jackson said the exec­ utive action was part of the administration’s “ state sponsored terror” in Central America. Jackson assailed the aid decision: “ It is just not right for our Government to cut aid to education in this country and increase aid to El Salvador. . . . The peasants who revolted are fight­ ing for a higher level of democracy and respect.”46 Walter Mondale, Carter’s vice president and eventual 1984 Democratic Party nomi­ nee, contended that the continued American military presence in the isthmus was counterproductive: “ Unless we can get some reforms on human rights and justice so we’ve got a strategy there that moves us toward stability and builds a middle ground, the lesson of the last two and a half years is that with every escalation of the military we end up further behind.”47

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Elections Yes, Dialogue No

32 5

“ We Must Stop the Tears from Coming to the Eyes of Salvadoran Mothers” Not unlike the first round of elections, the lead up to the second round was rife with tension. A great divide formed between those who sup­ ported the newly incorporated registry and those who wanted to go back to the old voting system, which allowed individuals with an iden­ tification card to vote wherever they pleased, marking their fingers with indelible ink. A bill sponsored by AREN A to end the use of the nation­ wide voter registry created a tense environment in the weeks before the M ay 6 presidential runoff between Duarte and D ’Aubuisson. Sal­ vadoran officials and USAID advisor John Kelley received a series of death threats in an apparent effort by far-right groups to force them to vote against the registry. The U.S. Embassy contended that Kelley had been threatened by phone and told to leave the country or be killed. The caller identified himself as a representative of the infamous right­ wing Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade.48 Days later the U.S. Embassy official who helped arrange security for Kelley, Joaquim Z ap­ ata, was assassinated. In the end, the electoral registry was eliminated and voting took place on M ay 6 using the old method. In spite of the rightist-led success in changing the electoral system, Duarte won with 54 percent of the vote compared to D ’Aubuisson’s 29 percent.49 The result was clearly influenced by the rightist PCN party’s candidate, Francisco Jose Guer­ rero, who declined to throw his support behind D ’Aubuisson in the second round.50 During the runoff campaign the charismatic Duarte had deftly gone for the emotional connection with voters reeling from so much violence and war. “ We must stop the spilling of blood, we must stop the tears from coming to the eyes of Salvadoran mothers,” he shouted at a rally. “ We must end the days when right-wing death squads break down the doors of houses and take away husbands and sons at night.” 51 The right had countered Duarte’s appeals by distributing a picture of Duarte with Guillermo Ungo, his 19 72 running mate and leader of the FM LN ’s political arm, the FDR.52 Radio Venceremos quickly denounced the results, claiming that 1.3 million unused or blank ballot votes of those who “ obeyed the FM LN ’s

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The Salvador Option

instructions” belonged to them. The U.S. Embassy reported that such logic should earn the FM LN “ high marks for sheer chutzpah.” 53 The guerrillas were not the only ones disappointed with the results: A R EN A ’s D ’Aubuisson claimed that he had in fact been the win­ ner. The controversial rightist politician even hinted at improprieties that favored the Christian Democrats, a thinly veiled stab at U.S. involvement that has been corroborated by subsequently released classified information.54 After the 1984 vote, Reagan would continue to highlight the role that elections were playing in El Salvador’s resilient democracy. In an October 7, 1987, address to the Permanent Council of the OAS he told the story of a woman who was injured by insurgent gunfire on her way to vote: “ She stood in line at the polls for hours but would not leave to have her wounds treated until after she had voted. And the grandmother who had been warned by the Communists that if she voted she would be killed when she returned from the polls. ‘You can kill me,’ was her defiant answer. ‘You can kill my family, kill my neighbors, but you can’t kill us all.’” 55

Leader of the Death Squads against Democracy Back in Washington, after Duarte’s May victory Jesse Helms fumed that the State Department and CIA had “ bought Mr. Duarte lock, stock, and barrel.” 56 While Helms contended that he backed President Reagan’s 19 8 1 authorization to use covert action “ to support parties being threatened by Marxist-Leninist insurgency,” at no time did the president authorize covert action “ on behalf of one democratic party [the Christian Democrats] to the detriment of other democratic parties [ARENA].” Alleging that U.S. operatives provided radio and televi­ sion studies and gave technical advice, Helms wondered, “ If the CIA programmed the computers, how can anyone trust the [electoral] num­ bers?” 57 Helms also accused U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering for acting as “ the death squads against democracy.” 58 The despicable comments about Ambassador Pickering aside, Helms had a legitimate claim in his contention that the 1984 election had American fingerprints all over it. This is not to claim, however, that the Christian Democrats would not have won the election without U.S. covert assistance and public cajoling. Yet clearly the U.S. government

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Elections Yes, Dialogue No

327

was meddling deeply in El Salvador’s affairs in order to preserve the event that now had so much riding on it. El Salvador went on to have a successful municipal election a year later, marking the fourth national election in as many years. Some on the Salvadoran right might have mistakenly concluded that Helms’s condemnation of Pickering meant that the ambassador did not have the backing of Washington. Whatever the case, American intel­ ligence uncovered a plot by associates of D ’Aubuisson to assassinate Pickering while he was accompanying president-elect Duarte around Washington, DC; because of this discovery, the ambassador and his wife received around-the-clock protection when they arrived in the capital city on M ay 20.59 Once again, Reagan administration troubleshooter Vernon Wal­ ters was tasked with addressing the crisis by confronting the losing presidential candidate, D ’Aubuisson, who vehemently denied knowl­ edge of the plot. According to one U.S. diplomat, “ General Walters read the riot act__ The message was that we knew what was going on and it had better not happen again.” Walters told D ’Aubuisson that the United States would hold him personally accountable if any­ thing happened to Pickering.60 Senator Helms, however, dismissed D ’Aubuisson’s involvement in the plot: “ I think it’s an absolute false­ hood.” 61 After a meeting on Capitol Hill with a dozen U.S. sena­ tors, D ’Aubuisson told the press that there had indeed been a plot but that he had “ helped avoid such a terrible thing” by publicly denouncing it.62 Interestingly, and despite the strong language used with D ’Aubuisson, in future months the U.S. Embassy shifted to a more conciliatory policy toward the Salvadoran firebrand in an effort to convince him that America was not eternally hostile. One Reagan official explained, “ It was to try to get him to be a good opposition leader. We told him, ‘Those days [of assassinations] are gone - they are gone permanently. You are to be recognized as a politician. And you have the right, as a politician, to go shopping in Miami.’” 63 Learning that D ’Aubuisson had been granted a visa, administration critics called the action “ reprehensible.” 64 In addition to his supporters on Capitol Hill, D ’Aubuisson also maintained a strong following in the broader United States despite his infamous reputation. Even after the plot to kill Pickering was

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The Salvador Option

revealed, in June 1984, the Young Americans for Freedom organized D ’Aubuisson’s press conference in Washington and accompanied his tour of the capital wearing AREN A T-shirts. When he made a subse­ quent trip that December, more than a dozen conservative organiza­ tions sponsored a dinner in his honor.65 “ Let Us Not Let That Democracy Be Stillborn” The elections also helped reinforce the Reagan administration’s policy of both anti-communism and democracy in El Salvador vis-a-vis its critics and skeptics. Influential House member Jim Wright from Texas personally witnessed the voting and told reporters that he would press his fellow Democrats to “ defend the freely chosen government in El Salvador.” Soon after Duarte’s election, Wright led 55 Democrats in approving most of President Reagan’s request for economic and mili­ tary aid, despite Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill’s opposition.66 “ This is an agonizing moment for me,” Wright told his colleagues. “And yet, I feel so very strongly that I am impelled to speak out. . . . We need steady, emphatic commitment to freedom in El Salvador - not a tenuous, tenta­ tive, hesitant or begrudging commitment. . . . I have seen this country of El Salvador go through the travail and the birth pangs of a democracy. Let us not let that democracy be stillborn; nor die in its infancy.” 67 In his post-election visit to Washington, the newly elected Duarte pleaded with Congress to support the continued aid: “ I am here to ask that you have faith in me.” 68 Duarte’s case was made easier by the rev­ elation that the National Guardsmen charged with killing the Amer­ ican churchwomen in 1980 had been convicted after a one-day trial in late M ay 1984. Moderate Democrats cheered this development, as they believed in building a broad base for a balanced Salvador policy. The politically astute Duarte even sent individual telegrams to mem­ bers of Congress reminding them of the importance of supporting El Salvador’s tenuous democracy. In a speech to Congress he offered a rationale for continued U.S. aid: On three occasions now the people of El Salvador have defied threats and freely voted in overwhelming numbers__ In order to avoid the disaster that has befallen our neighboring country which has seen its legitimate aspirations for democracy frustrated by a Marxist-Leninist takeover, we need adequate economic and military assistance__ Please help the people of El Salvador and contribute simultaneously to the security and stability of our hemisphere.69

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The successful presidential election that brought Duarte to power swayed the Democrats in Congress to favor the administration. If cutthroat D ’Aubuisson had secured the presidency in 1984, El Sal­ vador might have never received U.S. aid that year. As Speaker Thomas O’Neill put it, “ we wouldn’t even be debating these amendments” for aid to El Salvador; “ we’d be reassessing the whole thing.”70 The Rea­ gan administration reinforced the public line that the path to peace in El Salvador came through greater security and democracy, and with Duarte in power, most Democrats agreed. Only $29 million in 1980, U.S. military aid in the 1984 fiscal year was $19 6 million.71 Economic aid more than doubled this amount, making El Salvador one of the world’s largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid.72 Some liberal voices in Congress remained unconvinced that Duarte’s election would mitigate the challenge facing U.S. policy in the country. Representative James Shannon (D, MA) stated, “ When he was President before [until 1982] he did not run the country. It is the army which rules El Salvador.”73 “ Soft-Spoken Member of the Landed Gentry” Elections for the Constituent Assembly on March 3 1 of the follow­ ing year resulted in an upset showing by the Duarte-led Christian Democrats, who gained 34 of the 60 assembly seats and swept most of the country’s municipal offices.74 For the Reagan administration, this new election in 1985, unlike the 1984 vote, helped legitimize Duarte’s presidency.75 Once again, the CIA supported the election, a contempo­ rary American source noted, by “ intensifying its collection of intelli­ gence information about the guerrillas’ military plans and operations so as to help the Salvadoran military block anticipated efforts to dis­ rupt the voting.”76 Unlike the 1982 and 1984 vote, however, Duarte’s Christian Democrats did not require Yankee intervention to achieve a victory. International press coverage was glowing, suggesting a strong mandate for Duarte’s government. While it garnered far less international attention than the 1982 and 1984 votes, the 1985 National Assembly election also marked the beginning of increased negative international press for the guerrillas. In one account, a reporter described an increase of insurgent violence: “ Meanwhile, the guerrillas have blundered their way into political and military reverses unprecedented in the five-year insurgency. Attacking unarmed peasants in La Paz province, razing municipal halls in nearly

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33o

The Salvador Option

three dozen villages, executing two town mayors and kidnapping sev­ eral others, the insurgents have handed the government a series of unequivocal propaganda victories.”77 Yet the election’s biggest loser was D ’Aubuisson - the “ dark prince of the feudal right” - as many were concluding that “ his career as the oligarchy’s standard bearer is finished.”78 Battered by its stinging electoral defeat and loss of the conservative legislative majority in the March balloting, AREN A soon voted D ’Aubuisson out as leader of the party, replacing him with Alfredo Cristiani, whom one writer has aptly described as a “ soft-spoken member of the landed gentry... a sports-loving family man who grows and processes coffee and cotton.”79 D ’Aubuisson was named A R EN A ’s honorary president for life and kept his seat in the assembly.80 “Jesse Helms Will Love It” As Secretary of State George Shultz was one of Reagan’s chief archi­ tects on El Salvador policy, it is not surprising that he attended Duarte’s inauguration on M ay 3 1,19 8 4 - an event that included representatives from 43 countries. In his memoir, Shultz recounted that while wait­ ing for the ceremony to start in a government venue, he encouraged his aides to engage other dignitaries to promote the U.S. engagement. “ We have a point of view about Central America that is fundamentally bipartisan,” he said. “ So why not use this time to talk to the other dele­ gations.” 81 Shultz optimistically considered the inaugural proceedings a “ genuinely stunning” moment for El Salvador’s young democracy. “ Duarte was magnificent. I had the feeling the country was turning a corner.” 82 In the same pages, Shultz joked about his post-inauguration stop in Managua to meet Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega since he knew conservative Republicans on the Hill and some in the adminis­ tration were not pleased with his diplomacy: “ This [trip to Nicaragua] is going to be terrific. Jesse Helms will love it.” 83 Interestingly, except for a few vocal holdouts like Helms, Washing­ ton had come to a bipartisan consensus on Duarte’s “ democratic” El Salvador. Yet in this same period the Reagan administration continued to ramp up its controversial and at times illegal policies in Nicaragua, such as the CIA’s 1984 mining of Nicaraguan harbors. In El Salvador, in contrast, that same CIA was supporting ballot drives and get-outthe-vote campaigns.

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31 La Palma

Whatever cross their thoughts, leaders on both sides recognized, how­ ever briefly that, as Churchill once expressed it, talk, talk, talk is better than war, war, war. - Robert Pastor, Carter administration aide for Latin America1 We do not seek a military defeat for our friends. We do not seek a military stalemate. We seek victory for the forces of democracy. - Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense, September 19 8 3 2

“Auxiliary but Not Strategic Factor in Our Struggle” Both the Salvadoran military and guerrillas believed that they could defeat each other on the battlefield outright without negotiating away core ideals. The FD R’s Ruben Zamora told a foreign correspondent in 1984, “ In 19 8 1, the word ‘negotiations’ was not in our vocabulary. When you speak of negotiations, you speak of sharing. We thought before that total triumph was possible, but we have come to terms with reality.”3 Fundamental disagreements about what constituted “ negoti­ ations” and “ power sharing” hindered any semblance of compromise or progress in these early years of the war. In late 19 83, provisional president Alvaro Magana’s government appointed a peace commis­ sion that met secretly with the FM LN and FDR, but this did not result in a breakthrough. In the interim, backed by the swelling funds from Washington, the Salvadoran government bet on continued elections and strengthening the once inept fighting Salvadoran military to carry 331

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the day - as opposed to concessions at the negotiating table. U.S. offi­ cials also routinely cited ostensibly impartial observers to reinforce the fact that the guerrillas did not want peace. For example, in the sum­ mer of 1983 top diplomat Thomas Enders quoted Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas reflecting on the negotiations in March of that same year: “ The population wants there to be peace. I do not see that the guerrillas, who have progressed militarily and in experience, have pop­ ular support. . . . There have been about four or five offensives and who knows how many more to come. But the people want [peace].”4 It is not fully apparent what eventually led the guerrillas to the nego­ tiating table - although first in secret - by the end of 1983. One likely factor was a change to a guerrilla leadership more amenable to talks. Under Cayetano Carpio’s leadership, the FPL resisted not just negotia­ tions with the government but even greater military and political uni­ fication of the FM LN .5 Other factions like Joaquin Villalobos’s ERP regarded the FPL’s refusal to coordinate its military actions with other groups as the major reason for the failure of the March 1982 offensive to disrupt the national elections. In October 1982, the FPL’s secondin-command, Melida Anaya Montes (aka Ana Maria), supported the decision of the other FM LN factions to submit a negotiations proposal to the Magaña government. Carpio resisted but was forced to acqui­ esce when the other guerrilla groups threatened to proceed without his approval. By January 1983, Carpio was dealt another setback when the FPL accepted negotiations as an “ auxiliary but not strategic factor in our struggle.” 6 According to Facundo Guardado, a member of the FPL central com­ mand at the time, Ana Maria always attempted to “ break the rigid Leninist [Carpio].” In turn, Carpio perceived that he was losing control of the organization to his deputy. Almost three months later on April 6, 1983, in Nicaragua, Ana Maria was repeatedly and “ grotesquely stabbed to death” by some of Carpio’s closest comrades. An official communique by the FPL reveals that Cayetano, resentful of his “ polit­ ical and moral defeat” in the central command meeting, became “ the principal initiator responsible for the assassination.”7 Unofficial FM LN sources and foreign diplomats in Managua helped spread the rumor that Tomáis Borge, a leader of the Sandinistas’ National Directorate and Minister of the Interior, went personally to Carpio’s house three days after Ana M aria’s murder. Borge then told

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Carpió that he had to choose between suicide and public disclosure of his own and his comrades’ involvement in Ana M aria’s murder. Sui­ cide would assure that the murder would remain an internal FPL affair and Carpio selected this fateful option. Borge had originally denounced Ana M aria’s assassination as a “ CIA plot.” Whatever the case might have been, one outcome from the shocking murder/suicide episode was the “ deradicalization” of FPL under the new leadership of Salvador Sanchez Cerén - a guerrillero who - and it is virtually certain that none of his fellow rebels could have imagined this in 1983 - would become the democratic president of El Salvador in 20 14 .8 For the Reagan administration, negotiations continued to grow in appeal given that they offered a potential off-ramp for what was turn­ ing out to be a sustained and costly proxy commitment. One public opinion poll reported that three fourths of Americans opposed increas­ ing military aid.9 Since defeating the rebels outright was a remote possi­ bility, a political settlement was certainly one way to ensure that Wash­ ington did not send boots on the ground. Yet “ negotiations” still meant all things to all people.

“ We Cannot Offer Miracles” On October 8 ,19 8 4 , Salvadoran president Jose Napoleon Duarte used the occasion of his address at the UN General Assembly in New York to announce his plan to bring peace to his war-ravaged nation. Duarte subsequently explained that several months of working to amelio­ rate death squad activity had been necessary to “ get into [a favor­ able] position” for fruitful talks with the guerrillas. The biggest part of Duarte’s UN address - what he later called an “ audacious act” was to counter the FDR/FMLN’s repeated claim that it was fighting an illegitimate government: Unfortunately the FDR does not understand that we are experiencing a new reality, and therefore it is still trying to change things that no longer exist: a medieval agrarian structure, a financial structure at the service of the interests of a minority, an army at the service of a political system dominated by an economic elite In 1979 a profound process of change began, and it has been consolidated__ From this rostrum I ask those who advocate the ideology of armed subversion in El Salvador to change their strategies because of the new reality in my country. The El Salvador that they left in 1978 and 1979 is not

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The Salvador Option

the El Salvador that exists in 1984. Today your country is breathing the air of freedom. Political parties are respected and encouraged. The free people choose their leaders. Abuses of authority and violations of human rights have been reduced to the very minimum, and those who commit them are prosecuted and punished.10

Duarte’s first session of peace negotiations with the FM LN began on October 15 , 1984 - by coincidence or not, the fifth anniversary of the reformist coup that ousted General Romero’s regime in 1979. Duarte and his defense minister Eugenio Vides Casanova traveled to guerrillacontrolled territory to initiate the talks. Duarte would never have been able to make this bold move without the FAES leadership behind him. The FAES generals were not enthusiastic about the negotiations, but they were at least willing to let Duarte proceed with the effort. As Duarte’s personal assistant told a foreign correspondent, “ We have had to move slowly. The army has changed, and is changing, and is starting to accept Duarte. But some of them have problems with the dialogue, any dialogue.” 11 Duarte also made this move without waiting for a public endorsement from the Reagan administration, which served to reinforce the image that this was his and not Washington’s initiative. Weary of violence, the public’s expectations were high that an agree­ ment could be reached. Witnessed by Archbishop Rivera y Damas and two other bishops, the two sides initially met for five hours in the mod­ ern church in the mountain town of La Palma near the border with Honduras.12 Thousands gathered around the building to be near what appeared to be a historic moment. There was no military presence by either side in the town, a remote locale often held by the rebels. In fact, unarmed Boy Scouts provided “ security” for the meetings. A foreign journalist described the motley rebel delegation: “A good many we had seen in rebel uniforms there on earlier occasions lounged on sidewalks behind their knock-off Ray Bans, and there was no reason to assume that the army didn’t have its ringers in place as well.” 13 It quickly became apparent that the two sides were farther apart than many had believed. Each of the proposals presented was little more than a restatement “ of positions already advocated publicly.” 14 The guerrillas provided Duarte a list of 29 demands, including pay cuts for the president and military command and raises for junior soldiers. For his part, Duarte handed each of the five guerrilla representatives

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f i g u r e 3 1 . 1 . La Palma, 1984. Rebel delegates to the October 1984 peace talks in the mountain town of La Palma speak at a political rally. From left to right, Facundo Guardado, Guillermo Ungo, German Cienfuegos, Ruben Zamora, and Nidia Diaz. The La Palma talks took place amid much optimism among the Salvadoran population, yet failed to produce a lasting settlement. Image and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

a copy of what he called “ my bible” - El Salvador’s constitution and invited the rebels to lay down their weapons and compete for power through elections.15 “ We cannot offer miracles,” the Salvadoran president admitted afterward. “ Neither can we offer peace from morn­ ing to night.” “ It was a first step,” acknowledged FDR president and Guillermo Ungo (Duarte’s 19 72 running mate), “ but there are many steps to take” - and for the rebel negotiators this would mean power sharing before elections.16 At La Palma, the guerrillas once again resoundingly rejected Duarte’s call for them to enter into the existing political system. “ Democracy cannot be achieved with traditional parties,” argued Ferman Cienfuegos, commander of the forces of the Armed Forces of National Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional, FARN). He added, “ Parties always represent special interests. Our country needs a single front which represents national interests.” 17

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One journalist explained that the FM LN ’s preferred political model was “ not Duarte’s El Salvador but Fidel Castro’s Cuba.” 18 In the end, there were some minor agreements on the rules of war and evacuation of guerrilla prisoners, but the session “ didn’t get near the issues of the war itself.”19 Given Reagan’s initial rhetoric on El Salvador, it’s not surprising that the letter he sent to Duarte on October 16 commending him on the peace talks was not something the general public had anticipated. Note that Reagan’s understanding of negotiations and peace is predicated on the guerrillas entering the political system - exactly what FM LN negotiators had categorically rejected: On behalf of all Americans, I wish to congratulate you for the bold step you have taken for peace in El Salvador. Despite great personal risk to yourself and your advisers, you went to La Palma armed only with the support of the Salvadoran people and your fervent desire for peace and democracy. Your “ offer of peace” for the armed left to rejoin El Salvador’s political process, together with amnesty and an effort to assist those harmed by the war, is both historic and generous. I share your hope that the Salvadoran people will achieve their heartfelt desire for peace, pluralistic democracy and social jus­ tice. You have our hopes and prayers that this courageous initiative is the first step in a process that will bring a lasting peace through democracy to your nation.20

The Reagan administration quickly endorsed Duarte’s peace moves, although critics claimed it was only to soften Reagan’s image in the lead-up to the November 1984 presidential election.21 Secretary of State George Shultz stated, “ We strongly support President Duarte’s dialogue with Salvadoran guerrillas.”22 Yet, fearing that hardliner guer­ rilla elements would hijack any power sharing agreement, the Reagan administration’s support for the negotiations was generally qualified by the contention that any settlement would first need the FM LN to accept the legitimacy of the current political system.

“ Negotiations between Equal Participants in a Civil War” The two sides met again two months later in December 1984 in the town of Ayagualo, just outside San Salvador. During this round of peace talks, though, the FAES, fully armed, “ kept a vigil” on the grounds of the seminary where the negotiations took place.23 But

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once again deep fissures were hard to overcome. Duarte considered the insurgents outlaws - hence his insistence that the talks be held in churches the rebels would enter as if seeking refuge. Duarte attributed the FM LN ’s lack of sincerity at the negotiating table to the influence of hardline elements who had no interest in compromise, and in the after­ math of La Palma, they had returned to their long-standing “ thesis of unconditional surrender.” 24 Despite Duarte’s strong comments, Salvadoran officials appeared to allow for a sliver of hope. According to Duarte’s vice president, Rodolfo Castillo: “After they [the rebels] accept incorporation into the democratic process and decide to abandon violence as a method for obtaining power, then everything opens up.”25 The FM LN countered yet again that they viewed the peace talks as “ negotiations between equal participants in a civil war.”26 Over the next few years there were additional negotiations in various sites, but little progress was made in what appeared to be intractable divides between the two warring sides. After the FM LN boycotted a proposed round in Sensori, also just outside the capital, the rebel negotiator Guillermo Ungo, using acerbic language, revealed the mutual mistrust and pessimism: “ This confirms my view that Duarte started this as a propaganda game with no room for maneuver.” 27 This same day, Duarte punched back by accusing the guerrillas of boy­ cotting the talks “ because they don’t want to negotiate for peace. They want a dialogue of war.”28 The next couple of years saw a hardening of rhetoric on negotiations and a political settlement. Joaquin Villalobos told foreign reporters in mid-1985, “ We have no condition for laying down our arms because we are not prepared to give up our guns ever.”29 A few months later, Ungo warned of much more war to come: “ The Reagan administra­ tion no longer talks of a quick victory in El Salvador.”30 The contin­ ued attacks on Duarte broadcast by Radio Venceremos also reflected a hardening line that belied the apparent openness at La Palma. “ Duarte is not a simple executioner like Roberto D ’Aubuisson; he is the main enemy, the criminal of today only with a new style. It would be good for the Christian Democrats to remember the popular saying that ‘He who lives by the sword, dies by the sword.’ ”31 As hopes for negotiations waned, guerrilla tactics readapted to the military stalemate. Guerrilla commanders now “ reaffirmed their own

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f i g u r e 3 1.2 . Journalists James LeMoyne of the N ew York Times, Sam Dillon of the Miami Herald, and Julia Preston of the Washington Post reporting on the peace talks in San Francisco Gotera, November 1984. In the early years of the war many foreign correspondents believed that they were covering “ the next Vietnam” given the war’s ferocity and controversy back home. Ameri­ cans got their understanding of the apparent reality in the war-torn country through the reports of these journalists writing for key U.S. papers. By the mid-1980s, though, the number of foreign correspondents plummeted. “ Sal­ vador” began to fall from the headlines of American and world newspapers to the point where some dubbed it the “ #4 War.” Image and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

faith in a long term war of attrition, a war increasingly fought by roving terror squads planting Claymore mines and hurling grenades.”32 The once expected mass insurrection that underpinned early rebel military strategy, it seemed, was dead. The FAES, by contrast, was “ at once flush with new U.S. arms” as well as “ gleeful” over the “ political ineptitude” of the guerrillas’ “ return to terrorist tactics.” Sam Dillon soberly reminded his N ew Republic readers in June 1985 that “ peace talks, of course, are about war, a bloody showdown over which the army is confident as never before.” He quoted Defense Minister Vides who claimed to support the peace process but noted that pressure on the rebels would force them

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to make concessions that they otherwise would not: “ If we act with more military force every day, the subversives will adjust their ideas to reality.” Dillon concluded that “ with the major actors still committed to war,” the prospects for “ negotiated progress” appeared limited to prisoner exchanges.33

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32 Esquipulas

It is precisely that reality in which you are living that moved me to under­ take this journey. To be closer to you, children of the church and of countries of Christian roots, who suffer intensely and who are experi­ encing the scourges of division, war, hatred, social injustice, ideological confrontations that beset the world and that expose to conflict innocent populations yearning for peace. - Pope John Paul II, March 19 8 3 1 Speaking frankly, it is difficult in every civil war for the hatreds and passions to die. - President Jose Napoleon Duarte, November 19 8 4 2

“ Communists Win These Kinds of Negotiations” In an endeavor to bolster regional peace efforts in an isthmus racked by revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence, the foreign min­ isters of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela established the Contadora Group, named after the Panamanian island where the first meeting took place in January 1983. Under the informal leadership of Colombian president Belisario Betancur, five Central American gov­ ernments (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua) began talks under the Contadora auspices.3 Within a year, the Conta­ dora Group had come up with a draft treaty that focused on security and stability as opposed to domestic democracy. This version would

340

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have required the Sandinistas to end their aid to the Salvadoran guer­ rillas as well as evacuate Cuban and Soviet-bloc military personnel. Perhaps assuming that Managua would reject it, the Reagan admin­ istration reacted positively to the draft. Remarkably, though, within weeks, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega announced that his govern­ ment supported the treaty “ in its totality, immediately, and without modifications.”4 Citing that U.S. assistance to the contras as well as Nicaragua’s dependence on Cuban and Soviet military support under­ mined the treaty, the Costa Rican, Salvadoran, and Honduran govern­ ments failed to embrace the draft.5 By 1986, the Contadora process struggled to develop a credible pro­ gram that all the regional governments would endorse, but another accord, Esquipulas II, would come to fruition. Esquipulas II was named after the Guatemalan town where it was signed by the five Central American presidents in early August 19 8 7.6 Based on a plan created by Costa Rican President (Oscar Arias, Esquipulas II called for an end to hostilities, open elections, and the end of external assistance to irreg­ ular actors. Of particular significance to the Salvadoran case, Esquipulas II emphasized the “ incorporation of [the] region’s insurgents into the political process” through “ internationally supervised democratic elections.”7 Arias’s efforts on the Esquipulas II accord earned him the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize. As with so much on El Salvador, Arias’s Central America plan received a mixed reaction by the Reagan administration. George Shultz expressed his view of Esquipulas II to Reagan, relaying that the sign­ ing of the Central America-led accord was good news: “ It’s got a good thrust to it; it starts a process that will, with hard work, lead to democracy in Nicaragua... so it’s a victory.” 8 The administration tended to like what Esquipulas II said on paper about a political set­ tlement but was suspicious that the Sandinistas would not comply given that it would mean ceasing support to the FM LN. Neverthe­ less, Shultz reflected, “ I felt the plan had the potential to take us to a new level on Central America, where bipartisan support could allow a realist appraisal of the situation and a readiness to be forthcoming.”9 Echoing his secretary of state’s thinking, Reagan issued a statement, “ I welcome this commitment to peace and democracy by the five Cen­ tral American Presidents. . . . There is much work to be done by the parties involved.” 10

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Yet there were also senior officials who took a more circumspect approach to Arias’s plan for regional peace. Reagan appointee Elliott Abrams - whom Shultz described in his memoir as “ someone always preoccupied with the contras” - worried about the impact. “ I am very worried about this agreement. Communists win these kinds of negoti­ ations. This could be the end of our policy.”11 In what would have sur­ prised some observers, given his foreign policy team’s hawkish rhetoric and image, in late February 1983 Reagan signed a Top Secret National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) instructing the Executive Branch to “ make a concerted effort to ensure that the current Latin peace ini­ tiative [Contadora] does not turn against the U.S. but rather use this development as a means of furthering the process of democratization in Latin America.” 12 In a reflection that any interest in supporting the peace process meant abandoning the military angle, Reagan’s directive also mandated that the U.S. military presence in El Salvador “ be suffi­ ciently augmented to permit the U.S. to better influence the prosecution of the war.” 13 Two years later in early January 9, Reagan issued another secret directive that reiterated support for the “ resolution of regional disputes and conflicts” through “ dialogue and... negotiation.” 14 As we will see, by early 1989 the incoming George H. W. Bush administration found the Arias plan for regional peace to be well estab­ lished, thus making it easier to embrace. What’s more, the stipulation about ending external assistance would mean easing up on contra aid, a foreign policy ulcer that the Bush administration was eager to elim­ inate. But the Arias/Esquipulas II framework also meant that the Sandinistas would have to stop backing the FMLN.

“ Dialogue for Peace” In addition to the efforts of the Contadora group, and before Esquipulas II came into effect, there were other actors working together to begin the negotiated peace process in El Salvador. Throughout 1983, Archbishop Rivera y Damas, appointed by Pope John Paul II in March 19 8 3, pushed for dialogue to find a political solution to end the war. This plea for reconciliation was backed up by the pope who sent out a message in January 1983 called “ Dialogue for Peace, a Challenge for Our Time.” In response to the Vatican’s message, the San Salvador Archdiocese Commission for Justice and Peace organized a day of

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prayer on January 6, 1983, at which Rivera y Damas again pressed the government and guerrillas to begin negotiations.15 The pope’s visit focused on two objectives: to find unity within the church and seek reconciliation as a way to lessen the violence. Arch­ bishop Arturo Rivera y Damas announced that the visit was “ viewed as a source of hope for the Salvadoran people.” 16 In preparation for the visit, Christians in the FM LN “ zones of control” held meetings in which they formulated suggestions and requests and mailed them to the pope. The pope was received by the church hierarchy and the Salvado­ ran government led by elected provisional president Alvaro Magaña. The pope called for dialogue among opposing factions in the war, for reconciliation and peace. He called for a “ sincere dialogue” from which “ no one must be excluded.” 17 On a political note, the pope also indi­ rectly referenced the government’s announced presidential elections, which some took as an implicit endorsement of the Salvadoran govern­ ment over the rebels: “ The means announced and all other adequate means could contribute to ... peaceful progress.” 18 Contrary to what some had hoped for, the pope’s visit did not end the violence against the church community. Only weeks after John Paul Il’s visit to the war-torn country, on April 6, 1983, the National Police abducted, tortured, and murdered two members of a Christian base community in the town of San Ramon. Soon after, the National Police kidnapped two members of the Salvadoran Lutheran Church. In September, the Jesuit residence in San Salvador was bombed. Accord­ ing to the church-based human rights group Socorro Jurídico (Legal Aid), four members of the social secretariat of the archdiocese were kidnapped and held for 10 days before being released. Over these very same days, Rivera y Damas received a death threat. In October, the Anti-Communist Brigade murdered four people; the communique left with the bodies accused one of them of being in “ direct contact with Monsignor Rivera y Damas” and the Mexican Embassy to coordinate efforts to bring about negotiations.19

“ Deaths Attributed to Death Squads during the Month of October, 19 8 4 ” (Oscar Romero’s role in El Salvador’s war understandably received consideration, both then and now. Yet Romero’s towering legacy has

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tended to overshadow the roles that other key priests played in this remarkable story. And this was certainly true of Rivera y Damas, whose outspoken views earned him the ire of the far right. In one episode, a group called the Catholic Traditionalist Movement took out a fullpage advertisement in a San Salvador newspaper with veiled threats against Rivera (e.g., “ remember your predecessor” ) and accused the archbishop of “ sowing class hatred and supporting Catholic commu­ nist progressivism.”20 Back in the 1970s, then-archbishop Luis Chavez y Gonzalez and his auxiliary Rivera y Damas both actively supported the creation of Christian base communities. When Chavez retired in 19 77, the Vatican passed over Rivera y Damas, a decision that might have been influenced by his antagonism toward the military regime. Instead, the chosen archbishop was (Oscar Romero, who ironically, given his future path, had acquired a reputation as a conservative.21 While the gross abuses of citizens were not as rampant as in ear­ lier years, they did not disappear - despite the pope’s call for peace. The Catholic Church played an integral role in chronicling the killings. Archbishop Romero had started the justice monitoring agency called Socorro Jurídico that later became Tutela Legal. In late 1984, Tutela Legal issued Report No. 30, “ Victims of Political Violence: Deaths Attributed to Death Squads during the Month of October, 19 84.” The following excerpt from the report reveals both the continued irregu­ larity of security forces and death squad operations as well as the type of dogged and dangerous work that the archbishop’s office was doing under Rivera y Damas:1 1. REYNALD O ECHEVERRIA: 37, Graduate and Professor of Literature at the Universidad Centroamericana Jose Simeon Cabas (UCA), killed on October 3, 1984, as he arrived at his house in Colonia Metrópolis in the department of San Salvador. A gray-colored vehicle with tinted windows followed the afore­ mentioned individual, his wife, and daughter. A person armed with a G-3 gun got out of the above vehicle and fired several times at the said individual and subsequently fled down the street in the opposite direction. 2. UNKNOWN: [two bodies] found dead on October 2 ,19 8 4 , on the Panamerican Highway, in the territory of El Congo on Coatepeque, with gunshot wounds, with their hands and thumbs tied behind their backs, and without identity papers.

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3. LUIS DAGOBERTO RODRIGUEZ: 48, employed, killed by an unidentified paramilitary squad when he was taken from his house on October 8, 1984, by armed men in civilian dress, in Colonia Santa Maria in San Marcos, and found the same day in Reparto Bosques del Río in the district of Soyapango. 4. FRANCISCO ANTONIO REYES: 24, mechanic, found dead on October 29, 1984, on the coffee farm on the El Molino plan­ tation on the outskirts of Santa Ana near San Salvador in the vicinity of the cemetery; found nude with visible marks of blows and signs of strangulation, with two leather straps around his neck, and without personal identification papers; it is believed he died elsewhere and had his body left in the place described above, killed by an unidentified paramilitary squad.22 While this is only one report, it provides an important snapshot of the violence that ravaged El Salvador at this time. It would be a few years before Esquipulas II was signed into effect, and while negotiations were a priority for several actors, the war was still ongoing. These indis­ criminate deaths are one of many factors that made negotiations such a difficult process - providing justification for the FM LN to continue its armed struggle.

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33 Counterinsurgency I

If you spend your time chasing guerrillas, you do it forever and never get to the root cause of the insurgency. - U.S. military review of the war in El Salvador1 The Reagan administration complains about the death squads in El Sal­ vador. But its policy is for military victory, with negotiations only as window-dressing, and that doesn’t give any chance to human rights. It just encourages the far right. And the policy isn’t working. The “ mil­ itary progress” is fading away. So there will be more escalation, more American involvement. - Guillermo Ungo, FDR leader, October 19 8 3 2 Their [Salvadoran military] idea of counterinsurgency I suppose was to round up the peasants and shoot them - never identifying who the insur­ gents were. - Reagan administration official3 What do El Salvador and Costa Rica have in common? Neither has an army. - Langhorne “Tony” Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 19 8 3 4

Tubeless Artillery and Planeless Bombs With its sophisticated tactical and strategic doctrine and prodigious armaments acquired largely from sympathetic Marxist governments largely via Cuba and Nicaragua - the FM LN was quickly becoming 346

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the largest and strongest insurgency in Latin American history. A few years into the war, the guerrillas were now benefiting from finally being able to overcome their factional rivalries to launch coordinated strikes and share intelligence and resources. This allowed the rebels to launch operations that at times involved thousands of soldiers, a stun­ ning level of strength and sophistication for a guerrilla movement in Latin America. In 1982, the FAES captured a large cache of documents from an FM LN safe house in San Salvador. The secret documents revealed that Cayetano Carpio’s FPL faction had identified the use of elite com­ mando units as a key element of the insurgent strategy. The guerrillas believed that these crack troops would serve as the “ tubeless artillery” and “ planeless bombs” needed to carry out the stunning raids that would humiliate the Salvadoran military and remind the country of the guerrillas’ invincibility. FM LN soldiers had in fact started receiv­ ing training in Cuba as early as 1980. By 1983 these units were ready to go into action to strike at the heart of the FAES.5

“ Smoking Wreckages” Designed and built with American dollars, the 4th Brigade Head­ quarters at El Paraíso was one of the FAES’s most secure and impor­ tant military installations.6 For FM LN commanders, El Paraiso’s sym­ bolic value made it an optimal target for a massive guerrilla attack. Located along the highway between San Salvador and the mountain town of Chalatenango, the base lay in a valley surrounded by high peaks. Believing that small arms or homemade artillery would be out of range from these locations, the FAES had not fortified any positions on the hills and ridges above the base. The FAES did not anticipate the FM LN ’s ability to employ sophisticated massed artillery. Guerrilla spies inside the base were able to keep the FM LN planners abreast of FAES thinking and movements. Cleverly, guerrilla soldiers dressed as civilians strolled by the base located near the main road in order to observe defenses without rais­ ing suspicion. The guerrillas spent six months conducting surveillance before launching this unprecedented operation slated for late Decem­ ber 1983. One key bit of intelligence for the guerrilla planners in scheduling the attack was to know when the soldiers were on leave,

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when the base had the lowest number of troops inside. At this point in the war, FAES forces regularly took off weekends and holidays.7 On the night of December 30, the FM LN launched operations nearby in order to distract FAES forces and pull troops out of the base. Around 50 commandos gathered 500 yards from the base; dressed only in shorts and with bodies painted in camouflage, they were carry­ ing automatic weapons and U.S.-manufactured grenades. They began silently to cut holes in the barbed wire and to mark the minefields. Two hours later, the full assault element of 300 regular troops began to infil­ trate the base following the routes marked by the initial commando team. The penetrators’ initial explosions signaled to fellow guerrillas in the surrounding hillsides to begin the artillery barrage. The attackers utilized over 1,000 blocks of dynamite during the assault, resulting in the deaths of scores of stunned FAES troops. The heady guerrillas captured more than 500 M -16 rifles and even con­ ducted a secondary ambush on FAES reinforcements rushing to join the defenders. Days later, the scale of the raid became apparent with humiliating images of more than 10 0 FAES forces killed (they were buried in a mass grave) and “ smoking wreckages of what had once been one of the most modern military bases of El Salvador.” 8 In the years between 19 8 1 and 1984, the El Paraíso mission was only one of many large-scale operations that sent terror into the minds of Salvado­ ran officials and their American counterparts. “ Gave the Salvadoran Government Only Six Weeks to Survive” As the Salvadoran war rolled into its third and fourth years, the situ­ ation appeared increasingly bleak for the Salvadoran government and its American sponsors - a development not lost on foreign correspon­ dents. In July 1983, a N ew York Times reporter described the apparent wide gap in training and morale between the FAES and FM LN forces: Whereas the Salvadoran soldier looks, at best, young and earnest, the guerrillas encountered by Western correspondents are self-confident to the point of being cocky. The insurgents have solidified their control over most of the northern province of Chalatenango and brought a good part of the eastern half of El Salvador under their domination. The towns they hold are of little economic importance, but their number has been growing.9

Most critically, the guerrillas were taking the war to the cities, including San Salvador. Many at the time were concluding that the guerrillas

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were fighting for a cause while the government and military were more reluctant participants in the conflict. According to an embassy official, an FM LN fighter boasted that if he fought and died they would name a street after him, whereas a fallen FAES soldier would be consigned to oblivion.10 And there was a lot of anonymous dying going on, given that the FAES combat casualty rate at the beginning of the war was 50 percent - a rate U.S. officials claimed they helped reduce to 5 percent by end of the war.11 The guerrillas were also benefiting from the FAES policy of releasing prisoners after interrogation, an approach that provided the guerrillas with excellent intelligence on the Salvadoran military. While roughly three quarters of its arms came from Cuba, Vietnam, and other exter­ nal allies, the FM LN continued to reap the benefits of captured or purchased U.S.-provided FAES weapons. Overall, the Pentagon was reporting that the FM LN “ exhibited a tactical competence that repeat­ edly embarrassed Salvadoran forces in the field.” 12 Overwhelmed FAES forces repeatedly surrendered en masse, causing deep embarrassment to government officials. Stunned by the late 1983 El Paraíso raid described above and subse­ quent destruction of the critical quarter-mile long Cuscatlan Bridge, the U.S. military group located inside the embassy in San Salvador gave the Salvadoran government only six weeks to survive.13 Other Pentagon officials expected the FM LN to control most of the countryside in a matter of months or years, even if they had not yet seized power. These sorts of dire predictions were by no means exaggerated considering that by early 1984 the guerrillas controlled vast swaths of territory, especially in the mountainous third of the country. During these early years the FM LN largely avoided targeting civilians. More than 4,000 civilians were killed in 1983 alone, but fewer than 100 of these deaths were attributed to the FM LN. Most of the indiscriminate killing of civilians continued to be carried out by security forces and the illegal death squads.14

“ It Ain’t Low-intensity Conflict When They’re Shooting at You!” FM LN prowess was significant on its own, but it was magnified when compared with the undeniable reality that the FAES’s training, morale, and fighting skills were marginal at best. As an FAES soldier put it to U.S. Army Special Forces, “ It ain’t low-intensity conflict when they’re

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The Salvador Option

shooting at you!” 15 Stories of FAES incompetence, cowardice, or cor­ ruption were common both in El Salvador and back in Washington, where they were a constant source of frustration to the U.S. govern­ ment that was funding the Salvadoran military with a growing share of its budget. Back in the late 1970s before the war began, the FAES was effec­ tively “ a mission of 11,0 0 0 that had no mission.” 16 Interestingly, the FAES top brass had been studying counterinsurgency in at least some forms, but the lessons never sank in. Instead, its lightning victory over Honduras in the short-lived “ Soccer War” in 1969 helped perpetuate a conventional “ hammer-and-anvil” war doctrine geared to defeat exter­ nal enemies. When asked about the military’s understanding of coun­ terinsurgency, a lower-level FAES officer admitted, “ The only war our senior leaders ever fought was with Honduras.” 17 This reliance on a conventional doctrine meant, for example, that air strike capability was emphasized while internal troop mobility was not. The FAES’s culture and actions were also inextricably tied to the conservative business and landowning class in that the military was expected to stamp out leftist subversion in addition to defend­ ing the country from outside threats. If it could be considered to have one at all, the FAES’s loyalty rested on the institution of the military, rather than on an anti-communist ideology, as was the case with the Guatemalan military.18 In the first years of the war, one characterization was that FAES senior officers “ don’t even own fatigues” - a slap against this garrison­ like military leadership that rarely ventured near the battlefield. Those who ended up doing the actual fighting “ tended to be the total incompetents.” 19 Officers were often suspected of collecting salaries of nonexistent “ ghost soldiers” or leasing their troops to land and busi­ ness owners to work as security guards and laborers. Poorly educated Salvadoran youths were picked up from the streets and conscripted for two-year stints. For many desperate young men, military life was the only way to “ get their three squares.” One U.S. officer summed a generally held view that the FAES spent its time “ sitting in garrison or abusing civilians.”20 By the end of 1983, this “ 9-to-5 army” resorted to indiscrimi­ nate “ search-and-destroy” sweeps backed up by artillery and A-37 light attack aircraft supplied by Washington, an approach that was creating as many fresh guerrilla recruits as those killed in action.

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f i g u r e 3 3 .1. Guerrilla dragged through the street of the town of Cuscatlancingo, 1982. Image and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

Making matters worse, FAES enlisted soldiers were poorly led at all levels. Their officer corps was notorious for not caring about their sol­ diers, and they lacked a cadre of professional non-commissioned offi­ cers (NCOs). NCOs, whom the U.S. Army call “ the backbone of the Army,” play a crucial role in maintaining soldier welfare and are espe­ cially important in small-unit combat, being the primary leaders at any tactical point of decision.21

“ You Don’t Win People’s Support by Being Abusive” As we read about earlier in our story, the tandas were “ mafia families” who viewed promotion and personal enrichment as a military doctrine. In many ways, the training of FAES officers made them more corrupt and less trustworthy instead of the other way around. U.S. advisors understood that the tanda lay at the heart of the FAES’s problems. According to one advisor,I I remember one of our guys from the MilGroup [U.S. Military Group housed inside Embassy San Salvador] said to me the way to reform the officer corps in the long run was to take about six thousand pounds of TN T over to the

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The Salvador Option

military school and blow it away. By the time they get out of military school they know how to smuggle cars without paying any duty. And the idea that they are creatures beyond the law is already in them.22

Or as one U.S. military attache in San Salvador reflected, “ You’re not talking about simple training; you’re getting right down into military tradition.”23 The Pentagon attempted to address the tanda issue indirectly by training a new breed of junior officers outside of El Salvador, mostly in the United States or Panama. Apart from getting these budding offi­ cers away from their wretched institution in El Salvador, the external training locations were also necessary given that this effort required far more trainers than the 55-man cap would permit. The U.S. military even created a training base on the north coast of Honduras to help in this massive effort to entirely restructure the abusive culture and mili­ tary doctrine of El Salvador’s armed forces.24 In 19 8 1, the first group of 500 officer candidates traveled to Fort Benning, Georgia, to take the three-month basic officer training course.25 When U.S. advisors first started their training efforts in the early 1980s, they were in fact at times replacing advisors from other mili­ taries, especially those of Venezuela. The FAES had turned to Caracas and other Latin American governments to fill the void left when the U.S. suspended military assistance during the Carter administration. The state of the Salvadoran military shocked many of the incoming American soldiers. According to Luis Orlando who arrived in El Sal­ vador in 1983, “ I was a member of the Cuban army when Castro was in the Sierra Maestra. I saw the deterioration and breakdown of the military as they were supporting the dictator Batista. Salvador was the same movie.”26 The guiding principle of the U.S military effort was known as “ KISSSS” for “ keep it simple, sustainable, small, and Salvadoran.” These American “ imperial grunts” had learned from many bitter lessons in Vietnam and in other remote locales that the overarching counterinsurgency mantra required local forces to take responsibil­ ity for their own successes and failures. In the words of General John Galvin, the U.S. Southern Command commander from 1985 to 1987, the United States “ should not and would not commit its own soldiers to fight a war for other people who should fight for themselves.” 27

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f i g u r e 33.2. Survival training of the Atlacatl Battalion, Sonsonate, 19 83. Atlacatl was one of several rapid-reaction battalions that U.S. advisors helped establish and train. Critics saw the battalions as killing machines, most power­ fully manifested in the El Mozote massacre in late 19 8 1. Image and permission by Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos.

By the end of 1983, the U.S. military had trained more than half of the FAES officer corps - approximately 900 officers - all outside of El Salvador. American advisors often lamented that the positive training conducted outside the country would revert “ back to the old way of doing things with disturbing frequency once back in El Sal­ vador.”28 Another problem was that the FAES officers who had been trained in the traditional manner at the Salvadoran military academy looked askance at their compatriots who had become “ officers” in these far less demanding and shorter U.S. military courses, even if the U.S. schools where they took them were far superior. In addition to the officer training, U.S. advisors began preparing thousands of Salvadoran soldiers to enter battle with the surprisingly formidable FM LN fighters. With training beginning in earnest after the FM LN ’s final offensive in early 19 8 1, Pentagon officials were only five or six years removed from the searing experience in Vietnam. In this early stage, they knew that a stronger and more professional FAES

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was essential for preventing a Marxist takeover, but many feared that it was already too late given the dismal condition of the Salva­ doran military. As part of this professionalization, a U.S. Army Special Forces mobile training team began drilling the crack 600-man Atlacatl Bat­ talion to form “ immediate reaction battalions” to take the fight to the enemy in late 19 8 1. The battalion would eventually grow to 1,000 sol­ diers, divided into six units.29 This is the very battalion that later the same year massacred hundreds of civilians in cold blood inside and around the village of El Mozote. The connection between U.S. training and the Atlacatl’s later brutality led many critics to conclude that U.S. involvement had influenced these atrocities. U.S. advisors and diplo­ mats, on the other hand, contended that their influence was intended to improve what was already a rotten institution.30 U.S. officials often cited the statistics indicating that as the FAES transformed from a con­ stabulary force of 11,0 0 0 into a professional military five times that size, its rate of gross human rights violations dropped precipitously.31 In this favorable estimation, the advisors’ task of using such a lim­ ited American footprint to bolster the FAES’s professionalism repre­ sented the “ training paradox” in that much greater American involve­ ment might have made the situation better.32 “ The most effective way to curb the atrocities and abuse of civilians by the ESAF [FAES] com­ bat units was to have U.S. observers present during ground opera­ tions. However, this would require those observers to accompany ESAF [FAES] units into combat, which would certainly mean that eventually, there would be U.S. casualties.”33 U.S. advisors were often frustrated by the restrictions that prevented them from accompanying the FAES into combat. One advisor, Lieu­ tenant Colonel David Kinder, lamented that reforming the FAES with­ out being with his counterparts was like “ trying to coach a foot­ ball game from inside the locker room.” These same advisors also complained that their presence in the FAES barracks - despite their prohibition against accompanying the troops in combat operations allowed ideologically disposed journalists to link military abuses to “ U.S.-trained units.”34 According to U.S. officer James Steele, “ No one on the U.S. team sanctioned those; we did everything we could to get Salvadorans to recognize that you don’t win people’s support by being abusive. If we had been able to be more out in the field with them, even

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in very small numbers, we could have avoided some of those things happening periodically.”35 Believing that a more professional FAES was key to a successful counterinsurgency strategy, U.S. advisors had little patience for their Salvadoran counterparts who were suspected of tolerating abuses. U.S. advisors knew that an increasingly desperate FAES could very eas­ ily resort to “ scorched-earth” tactics to ensure that the FM LN did not seize power. The success of the Guatemalan military’s brutal yet extremely effective counterinsurgency was not lost on the FAES, U.S. advisors, or even the FMLN. Yet, in trying to promote a “ cleaner” counterinsurgency, U.S. advisors were confronted with all of the asso­ ciated paradoxical challenges of trying to win a war with less violence. An American advisor lamented in 19 8 1, “ If the solution here were to eradicate the guerrillas, fine, we could eradicate them. Villages sympa­ thetic to the guerrillas, for instance, could be relocated or - as indeed happens in some cases - destroyed. The point is that we won’t do it. We’ve all become humanists. We let the terrorists exist because what it would take to eradicate them would not be acceptable. Our hearts bleed too much.”36 Raymond Bonner, writing for the N ew York Times, suggested that the enormous effort to professionalize the FAES had failed. In Bonner’s words, In the four years since the coup of October 1979 the United States has poured in nearly $300 million in military aid, trained four Salvadoran battalions, and brought about 500 cadets to the United States for officer training. The money and training were accompanied by promises to the American public that they were being used as leverage to induce the Salvadoran military to improve its human rights performance and by stern lectures and warnings to the Salvado­ ran military commanders that they put an end to the indiscriminate violence. But in truth, not all the money, not all the public warnings, not all the stern private lectures, not, in short, all the might of the United States has had any significant impact on the Salvadoran military.37

Frustrations aside, the fact remained that allowing U.S. soldiers to accompany the Salvadorans into combat would have opened the door to having U.S. troops on the ground - an unlikely scenario in postVietnam U.S. Thus, even as the FAES continued to struggle, for Ameri­ can advisors there was no alternative other than to keep trying to make incremental gains in their training and arming efforts.

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The Salvador Option The Woerner Report

As previously mentioned, the U.S. military had no interest in escalating the “ counterinsurgency by proxy” campaign in El Salvador into the “ combat boots on-the-ground” as in Vietnam. The Woerner Report, named for the U.S. general who penned the document in late 19 8 1, con­ tended that a legitimate Salvadoran security force was vital: “ Unabated terror from the right and continued tolerance of institutional violence could dangerously erode popular support to the point wherein the Armed Forces would not be viewed as the protector of society, but as an army of occupation.”38 General Frederick Woerner was tasked with creating a doctrine out­ lining the best engagement for the United States in El Salvador, even though he recalled “ the anxiety of the realization [he had in El Sal­ vador] that he had become a brigadier general without knowing what strategy was.” Woerner would initially outline a military aid package of $350 million dollars over five years, which would be weighted toward the first two years. When Woerner reported this to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chairman remarked, “ You’ll break the bank!... [W]hat can you give me for $65 million?”39 Here was one of the key paradoxes of the Salvador Option: the Reagan adminis­ tration drastically escalated its military commitment in El Salvador, but at the same time this remained a relatively moderate, limited involvement compared to more maximalist campaigns like Vietnam or Korea. One stinging criticism of the advisors’ role was that the lack of a clear combat mission meant that many of the U.S. military’s best sol­ diers and trainers were not sent to El Salvador. As one advisor admit­ ted, “ We have the third team here.”40 Another recurrent complaint was that the American advisors received very little training other than a two-day general security assistance course before being tossed into the hugely difficult task of transforming the FAES into a cleaner and more effective military. As in Vietnam, American advisors only spent one year on the ground before rotating out of El Salvador, which meant that they normally mastered their craft only weeks or months before their departure. This reality begs the question as to whether more intensive training, made possible by significantly raising the troop cap number, would

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have allowed the U.S. military to more effectively transform the FAES. Despite these limitations, however, U.S. training and assistance helped the FAES grow from 16,000 troops in 1982 to 25,000 only a year later. And, unlike the lean years before massive U.S. assistance kicked in, when FAES troops were equipped with old G-3 rifles, these soldiers now had M -i6s and other modern weaponry. Despite these gains, 60­ 80 percent of these troops were deployed in static defense as opposed to the more necessary and lethal offensive combat operations.

“ Good Cop/Bad Cop” One of the war’s most significant developments was in effecting the informal split of the FAES from its long-standing ally, the Salvadoran oligarchy. As the war years passed, some FAES officers increasingly saw the oligarchy remove their capital and families from the country while the military was left to deal with the guerrillas.41 A more critical factor, though, was the FAES’s gradual dependence on massive amounts of U.S. military assistance.42 While initially the FAES had largely ignored any conditions connected to it, this aid came with strings attached and stern warnings about professionalism, human rights, and an end to links with death squads. Although some aspects of the FAES remained immutable, such as the tandas, the armed forces as a whole could no longer be seen as the monolithic entity of years past. As the FAES began to greatly fear a cessation of U.S. assistance, it also realized that the oligarchy’s reactionary views complicated the military’s ability to act more professionally. One of the first key fis­ sures occurred with Duarte’s ascension to the presidency, something that the FAES generally supported even though the right despised the Christian Democratic leader.43 In fact, D ’Aubuisson’s AREN A openly accused the FAES of committing fraud in its support of Duarte’s party in elections. With more than 50 percent of the Salvadoran government’s bud­ get coming from Washington, the amount of leverage U.S. officials could exert was significant. U.S. money paid for land reform projects and infrastructure, and it funded the massive effort that allowed the FAES to battle the FM LN. The United States’ ability to revoke mil­ itary aid made threats against FAES noncompliance more credible. Colonel John Waghelstein told one of his FAES counterparts that the

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United States had had 450,000 troops in Vietnam, but “ it would not take me long to put the 55 trainers [in El Salvador] on an airplane.”44 This is also one area where the U.S. Congress played a crucial role in its ongoing questioning of U.S. policy in that it allowed U.S. offi­ cials in El Salvador to use Capitol Hill in a “ good cop/bad cop” man­ ner. U.S. officials had to be careful, though, as they privately believed that a full cessation of U.S. aid would lead to a guerrilla takeover. They also feared that a U.S. withdrawal would result in the Salvado­ ran right and FAES adopting a more desperate yet chillingly effective Guatemala-like scorched-earth strategy. At the same time, what was seen by the Congress as a “ carrot-and-stick” control over aid to the Salvadoran security forces was viewed by the FAES as an “ unpredic­ table facilitation.”45 Sensing that U.S. officials or politicians could not stomach another Marxist takeover in Central America, some within the FAES and Sal­ vadoran right dismissed U.S. threats to cut off aid or withdraw mili­ tary advisors. Some of these more reactionary elements also believed that the FAES could easily defeat the guerrillas if the military was not shackled by counterproductive U.S.-imposed restrictions. That is, its politically sensitive American sponsors were effectively handcuffing the FAES. Although the FAES may at times have felt constrained by aid lim­ itations, U.S. officials also experienced moments of helplessness when military aid was not used to their liking. For instance, the U.S. mili­ tary group believed the FAES often used credits to make “ ill-advised” weapons and supply purchases, such as radios that did not include Spanish-language instructions. Included in these FAES purchases were lethal materiel, such as 105mm howitzers, 90mm recoilless rifles, and 40mm grenade launchers, which were of limited use in the world of “ hearts and minds” counterinsurgency and made the FAES overly reliant on firepower. Moreover, some in the FAES were aware of alternatives to funding from the United States, such as the Israeli government, which is exactly where the Guatemalan military turned after it rejected U.S. conditions on aid. Yet, this element never gained much traction and instead the FAES continued down its path of greater dependency on American aid and conditionality while moving away from its historical links with the oligarchy.

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Operation Well-Being In early February 1983, high-ranking U.S. officers joined U.S. Ambas­ sador Hinton for a visit to the FAES High Command where provi­ sional president Alvaro Magana and Defense Minister Jose Guillermo García were also present. The American delegation’s briefing was vitally important given the dire state of the war at this point. Loosely based on the ultimately successful counterinsurgency program (called CORDS) in the Vietnam War, the U.S. recommendation was for the cre­ ation of a joint civilian-military entity to plan and execute an extensive “ pacification” campaign in the departments of San Vicente and subse­ quently Usulutan.46 Known as the National Plan, the new strategy directed civilian gov­ ernment agencies to embark on agrarian reform and employment ini­ tiatives, infrastructure projects, and emergency humanitarian services to the war-weary population. The military angle emphasized the entry into San Vicente with light “ cazador” (hunter) battalions intended in classical counterinsurgency fashion to “ clear” the areas so that the civilian programs could “ build.” Another key element was the creation of a civilian defense force that, it was hoped, would keep the guerrillas out after the heavy military presence eased. Developed jointly in Wash­ ington, U.S. Southern Command in Panama, and the U.S. Embassy, the National Plan was initially resisted by the FAES for its needless empha­ sis on civilian and not military priorities. After a few months, most indicators suggested that the plan was pro­ ceeding well.47 By the end of 1983, Salvadoran officials claimed that the National Plan’s first phase, Operation Well-Being, had resulted in the FM LN largely withdrawing from San Vicente and the initiation of a wide range of development projects, including the reopening of 4 1 schools, the establishment of seven cooperative farms, and a successful vaccination campaign in dozens of communities. By July 1983, over 7,000 FAES troops were in and around San Vicente, even though some key FAES commanders wished they had instead been hunting guerrillas in the rebel hotbed departments of Chalatenango and Morazan. The following description of a civic program illustrates the multifarious approaches of winning hearts and minds: “ Clowns, a mariachi band and skimpily clad dancers perform between speeches by Salvadoran army officers and social workers calling on peasants to reject the guer­ rillas. Meanwhile, army barbers cut hair, and soldiers pass out rice,

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dresses and medicine.” As one U.S. soldier described this program, “ You see the army winning hearts and minds__ This is low-intensity doctrine in question.”48 The Salvadoran government agency, National Commission for Reconstruction (Comisión Nacional de Restauración de Areas, CONARA), implemented these efforts in four phases: planning, offen­ sive, development, and consolidation - an approach that strongly reflected the U.S. advisors’ belief that “ clear, build, hold” was a key component of a successful civilian-military strategy.49 Yet, while the initial results were encouraging, the National Plan soon began to floun­ der. The tremendous bureaucratic red tape in San Salvador forced the delay or cancellation of many planned projects. More critically, the FAES withdrew roughly half of its army force deployed in San Vicente, which was immediately followed by the guerrillas’ return. A foreign correspondent in San Vicente at the time observed that the FM LN quickly “ overran civil defense outposts, forced the closure of schools and clinics, subverted the cooperatives, and chased officials loyal to the Salvadoran government back to the safety of San Salvador.” 50 Another distressing result was the meager numbers of the civilian militias (initially 500 villagers instead of the expected 1,500) coupled with a tendency for the militiamen to sell their weapons to the guer­ rillas. The U.S.-supported effort to stand up a capable militia was also crippled by the large shadow of O RDEN’s violent role in the 1960s and ’70s as a civil defense that morphed into a death squad machine. While a civilian defense force was a key component of the strategy, U.S. advisors didn’t want a new “ Frankenstein” militia that would spin out of the FAES’s control. Making matters worse, FAES officers openly saw the civilian defense force as a “ gringo-imposed program” that was sim­ ply one of the prices of continued U.S. military aid.51 One U.S. trainer summed up the grim plight of the militias,

The hand-me-down rifle that the civil defender shares with several of his com­ patriots will likely be the only tangible support he receives in return for vol­ unteering__ He will receive neither a uniform nor pay. If his unit is attacked, he will discover that the local ESAF [FAES] commander has no plans to come to his rescue. If wounded, he will not be evacuated to a Salvadoran military hospital. . . . Volunteers for civil defense come from the ranks of those who fail to qualify for conscription: the aged, the lame, and the otherwise unfit.52

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The FAES and Salvadoran government had shown that it could clear and build, but the downfall came with the holding. Indeed, several years after the National Plan was implemented, guerrilla activity in San Vicente was about the same level as before the program had begun. The failure of the very plan intended as the template for effective counterin­ surgency throughout El Salvador was not overlooked by foreign corre­ spondents covering the war. Reporting on National Plan setbacks, the N ew York Times’s Lydia Chavez wondered, “ The question that hangs over the American counterinsurgency experts in El Salvador is whether any amount of training and cajoling and convincing can enable an unpopular military establishment to quell a leftist armed rebellion, and whether, in the end, the job once again will have to be taken over by American troops.” 53

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34 Counterinsurgency II

We are involved in a war and somebody has to win. - Sigfrido Ochoa, Salvadoran Colonel, 19 8 7 1 The guerrillas here have lost much popular support as a result of their three-year-old campaign of economic sabotage. - Clifford Krauss, Wall Street Journal correspondent, 19 842 For three and a half years an army of 22,000 soldiers has been outfought by a force of about 7,000 guerrillas. The advisers’ mission is to transform that army into a winning team, and to do it quickly. - Lydia Chavez, N ew York Times correspondent, July 19 8 3 3

In the previous chapter we provided an overview of the numerous chal­ lenges both U.S. officials and the FAES faced in the early 1980s in establishing a more formidable force to go against their FM LN adver­ saries. U.S. aid and equipment, an episodic commitment to decreasing human rights abuses, and a greater focus on counterinsurgency tac­ tics and effective battlefield strategy combined to make the FAES a much more capable force. This chapter provides an overview of this critical turning point in El Salvador, when the FAES’s new prowess propelled the FM LN to employ different, more aggressive tactics that in turn diminished the popular support they had counted on in the early 1980s.

362

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36 3

“ Señorita Casanova” The Salvadoran government’s fledgling effort to promote a more legit­ imate face, especially to the international community, took a signif­ icant turn for the better in 1984 when President Duarte appointed General Vides Casanova to replace Jose Guillermo García as defense minister. Vides was chosen since he appeared to be suitable to both A R EN A ’s Roberto D ’Aubuisson and key senior FAES officers. For frus­ trated U.S. Embassy officials, Vides’s record as commander of the abu­ sive National Guard suggested he would be a reactionary similar to his predecessor. In addition, Vides lacked experience commanding combat troops, which earned him the moniker “ Señorita Casanova” among FAES officers.4 Vides’s exposure to Mao Zedong’s military doctrine influenced his belief that the FAES needed to move toward a more concerted coun­ terinsurgency strategy.5 Even more important, though, and a surprise to U.S. officials, he came to believe that ongoing reform of the mili­ tary and security forces was crucial if the government was to continue receiving U.S. assistance, which was the only way that it could defeat the guerrillas.6 Along with new FAES Chief of Staff General Adolfo Blandón, Vides understood that “ improving our image is worth mil­ lions of dollars of aid for the country.”7 U.S. military group commander John Waghelstein developed a strong relationship with Vides. Accord­ ing to Waghelstein, after Vides became defense minister, the two men “ had an instantaneous Vulcan Mind Meld__ He [Vides] asked that I accompany him whenever possible, an impossibility during the tenure of his corrupt and inept predecessor Jose Guillermo García.” 8 Over a course of years, U.S. efforts to bolster the FAES were pro­ ducing results, even if the force was still not a crack counterinsurgency body. While the killing of civilians and other illegal abuses by the FAES decreased in fits and starts, the lessening of violence appeared to strengthen the military’s legitimacy just as the series of free elections had done for the government. According to one FAES officer, “As the [Salvadoran] Army became more professional, they had fewer human rights abuses, and when they had fewer human rights abuses, the guer­ rillas lost a lot of their propaganda value and a lot of their recruiting capability, simply because the Americans were changing things.”9

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By 1985, the work-in-progress transformation of the FAES into a more serious military force began to pay dividends. Most important, the FM LN ’s once very real threat of winning the war outright and seiz­ ing power was now far less likely. It was still not clear that the FAES could actually defeat the FM LN, but at least “ another Nicaragua” appeared out of the question. U.S. officials, and the Pentagon in par­ ticular, could also breathe a sigh of relief that El Salvador was also not going to be “ another Vietnam” with a massive deployment of Ameri­ can combat troops. Another key innovation was the new ability of the Salvadoran Air Force to provide troop mobility and close air support, two elements critical to shifting the advantage back to the FAES. The Air Force had suffered a devastating and humiliating setback following the FM LN ’s commando raid on the Ilopango Air Base that had destroyed six UHiB helicopters, three C-47 planes, and five French-built Ouragan air­ craft, and had damaged five other aircraft - 70 percent of the FAES Air Force.10 These losses turned out to be a blessing in disguise, how­ ever, as Washington provided more modern aircraft as replacements. The worn-out Ouragans, for example, were replaced by the much more effective A-37s. The FAES was also able to purchase 12 additional heli­ copters as part of the U.S.-led effort to promote what it called “ strategic air mobility.” 11 At its peak in the late 1980s, the FAES had around 60 helicopters (compared to 19 in 1984) that were able to transport troops in and out of situations at an unprecedented rate. In 1982, the United States delivered six A-37 light attack aircraft equipped with machine guns and 500 pound bombs; however, it would take several years of train­ ing (made more challenging with the U.S. troop cap) before Salvado­ rans could make a serious impact in the air.12 The Air Force conducted more than 200 A-37 air strikes in all of 1983. In June of 1984 alone, there were 74 A-37 strikes, a dramatic escalation that began to wreak havoc on guerrilla formations that were accustomed to roaming the mountain regions with impunity. In addition, the Air Force was now using the helicopters to transport small, elite units into remote areas that theretofore had been devoid of military presence.13 FM LN operatives began to privately admit that their ability to oper­ ate in large formations was increasingly difficult and that the new FAES tactics and hardware were having an impact on the war’s direction. In

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36 5

3 4 .1. Wife grieves over the death of her husband, an FM LN fighter, 1989. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

f ig u r e

fact, the FM LN responded by deploying its forces “ up next to the belts of the [FAES] soldier,” meaning attacking at ranges so short that friend and foe were indistinguishable, in order to reduce the FAES advantage in air power.14 The more precise artillery and airpower did help drive a reduction in the numbers of civilians killed in air assaults, but indis­ criminate killings remained a problem throughout the war. Increased air mobility had the effect of reassuring deployed troops that reinforcements would arrive; previously, fear of being left to fight in isolation had made them eager to flee combat. The rapid air evac­ uation of wounded FAES soldiers had a significant impact on troop morale. By far the FAES’s most professional branch, the Air Force played an indispensable role in the war despite enormous challenges. As one U.S. advisor remarked, “ They got an Air Force that is an insur­ ance policy. The ESAF [FAES] can’t win with it, but they can’t lose with

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The Salvador Option

it either.” 15 Interestingly, the U.S. military “ technical assistants,” who helped keep the Air Force in good shape, did not count against the 55-man cap.

A Deteriorating Insurgency With the FAES gains in the mid-1980s, reaching a number of approx­ imately 55,000 troops by 1986, it was easy for some to forget how formidable the FM LN had become in earlier years.16 Exerting control in one quarter of the country, the guerrillas had attained a maximum size of approximately 12,000 combatants at the end of 1983. Morale was very high throughout the guerrilla ranks at this time, and contin­ ued supplies of materiel from abroad combined with a seemingly lim­ itless supply of captured government weapons gave the FM LN exactly what was needed to arm its growing force. In 1982, for example, the FM LN killed around 800 FAES soldiers, a rate that jumped to 1,300 the following year.17 By 1985, however, the apparent decline of FM LN strength vis-a-vis the FAES was manifested by increasing supply and logistical problems that hobbled the guerrillas’ ability to replace used or broken materiel. The guerrillas also began to experience acute shortages of medicine and foodstuffs. The decreased military fortunes also sparked intense factional rivalries within the guerrilla ranks, and this further exacer­ bated sagging morale. A classified CIA report from 1986 stated that the FM LN ’s “ military fortunes, in our view, have declined apprecia­ bly in the last two years and are at or near their lowest ebb since the onset of hostilities in 1980.” A year earlier, the CIA had contended that the FM LN was having issues with recruitment and morale, in addition to dealing with a shortage of firepower because Cuba and Nicaragua “ [appeared] to have cut back their supply of arms to the insurgents.” 18 Had the U.S.-backed Salvadoran counterinsurgency mortally wounded the once formidable rebels? Realizing that a popular insurrection was out of the question for the time being and sobered by the FAES’s growing military prowess, FM LN commanders adopted a new strategy of prolonged warfare that would wait out San Salvador and the imperialist sponsors in Washing­ ton. Now the guerrillas would intentionally avoid direct contact with FAES forces and rely more on hit-and-run raids. The guerrillas also

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ramped up their kidnappings and assassinations in San Salvador and other cities in order to continue to influence political leaders. Most notably for the United States, in May 1983, U.S. Navy SEAL Lieutenant Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger, the second highest ranking U.S. officer in the country, was shot three times in the head while picking up his Salvadoran girlfriend at the University of Cen­ tral America. While the U.S. Embassy initially assumed that right-wing death squads were responsible, it soon became apparent that FM LN commandos had caused the U.S. military’s first fatality in El Salvador. The Popular Liberation Forces (Movimiento de Liberación Popular, MLP) - the most radical of the five guerrilla groups comprising the FM LN - claimed responsibility and said that it would send other U.S. advisors home in coffins one-by-one until the entire U.S. military mis­ sion was withdrawn.19 The deceased American serviceman was soon featured on the cover of Newsweek magazine under the title, “ The First Casualty.” Between 1980 and 1983, six Americans had been killed in El Salvador (the two labor union advisors and four churchwomen), but Schaufelberger was the first to be felled by the revolutionary left, signaling a strategic turn­ ing point for the FM LN.20 The CIA secretly reported that the FM LN was also vastly increasing its use of anti-personnel mines as the guerrillas had decided to “ satu­ rate roads and rural areas with mines, using explosive charges calcu­ lated to achieve maximum psychological impact by maiming rather than killing.”21 The guerrillas also targeted provincial political targets in an attempt to weaken the government’s ability to conduct its regular business. In the first half of 1985 alone, the guerrillas attacked 75 rural town halls, a jump from 12 attacks in all of 1984.22

Strategy of Sabotage The FM LN commanders did not fully appreciate at the time the effect of their shift in strategy. Their reluctant move to a more protracted struggle involving greater sabotage and attacks on government facili­ ties only further antagonized a rural populace that had never warmed to the guerrillas’ call to join the revolution. The CIA was secretly reporting to U.S. policymakers that the guerrillas’ popular support that had hovered around 15 percent in 1980 had dropped to only 5 percent

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The Salvador Option

in 1985. Making matters worse, reduced funding and recruiting prob­ lems pushed the FM LN ’s ranks to fewer than 10,000 fighters, a gradual loss of a third of its force. This in turn led the FM LN to adopt coerced recruitment of young Salvadorans, a desperate approach that further cost the insurgency popular support.23 The new emphasis on sabotage was seen as a necessary way to wear down the Salvadoran economy and infrastructure, and in response, the guerrillas expected that rural Salvadorans would increasingly move over to support their struggle. According to the FM LN ’s Joaquin Vil­ lalobos, “ The FM LN has obstructed the counterinsurgent economic plan with a strategy of sabotage. It has also destroyed dozens of cof­ fee, sugarcane, and cotton installations, including all of the largest and most important ones; and it has constantly interrupted the electri­ cal system in more than 80 percent of country.” 24 Villalobos strongly believed this steady pressure was exactly what was needed to break the back of the enemy: “ To beat an army it is not necessary to annihi­ late all its men, nor to capture all its arms, only to cause the collapse of its morale.”25 Reflecting Villalobos’s view, the FD R ’s civilian chief Guillermo Ungo said, “ Time is on our side. The economy is deteriorat­ ing badly. The longer the war goes on, the less stable the government will be.”26 The guerrillas indeed proved very effective at destroying what little infrastructure or industry existed in the country. Cotton, coffee, and sugar crops, for example, were reduced by a third to a half during the conflict, an effort helped by an international solidarity campaign to boycott Salvadoran coffee.27 During the mid-1980s, El Salvador’s already sclerotic economy was functioning at roughly 50 percent of capacity; more than half the adult population was unemployed.28 By the end of the war, both the decrease in exports and the damage to infrastructure had cost the battered nation over $2.2 billion.29 In June 1984, the FM LN attacked and seized the installations at Cerrón Grande, the country’s main hydroelectric dam. Carried out early in the morning, the attack destroyed the 135-megawatt gener­ ating substation, a loss estimated at $3.5 million.30 The FAES soon retook the facility after enduring four different ambushes, but the rebels’ propaganda victory was undeniable. During June alone of this same year, the guerrillas hit 28 electrical towers.31 Remarkably, the FM LN ’s ability to conduct sabotage operations with impunity and the

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f i g u r e 34.2 FAES soldiers in combat in San Pedro Nonualco after an FM LN raid on an armory, 1989. Once considered a “ garrison” or “ 9-to-5” military, by the end of the 1980s the FAES was a much more formidable fighting force. Yet, despite the billions of dollars in American aid and materiel, the FAES was unable to defeat the FM LN outright on the battlefield. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

tremendous destruction they caused never translated into a significant increase in popular support from the civilian population. If anything, many Salvadorans resented the guerrillas’ destruction, especially when later on, the Salvadoran government finally began to demonstrate that it could rebuild - funded, of course, by Washington’s fiscal largesse. The increased targeting of economic and political subjects by the FM LN reflected the continued evolution of their strategy. In this case, while the breadth of their activity made them appear more forceful, the move to the “ softer” targets was risky and in fact was a sign of the guer­ rilla group’s growing desperation. Knowing that, like its U.S.-backed enemy, it needed the hearts and minds of the rural and even urban populations, the FM LN had normally avoided operations that would antagonize civilians. Yet, faced by the increasingly capable FAES, the FM LN opted to bolster its use of indiscriminate landmines, car bombs, and forced recruitment, all of which cost them dearly in the critical eyes

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37o

The Salvador Option

of public opinion. Mr. Villalobos described this shift in the FM LN ’s tac­ tics as part of the “ war of attrition” where “ the question is who is able to destabilize and bleed the other side more.”32 While the FM LN was ostensibly merely changing tactics, many out­ siders viewed this new move as a desperate measure against the FAES’s growing military strength. As a Los Angeles Times article summed it up in 1986, “ The guerrillas are no closer to victory than in 1984, and if anything may be worse off against an army that is now more aggres­ sive and better-equipped, thanks largely to training and aid from the United States.”33

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35

Zona Rosa

The tentative optimism that had crept over the city has disappeared. Strict security measures are back in force. Businessmen wonder whether their investments will ever be safe. Activists with leftist leanings fear they will be caught up in a right-wing backlash. - Marjorie Miller, Los Angeles Times correspondent, July 5, 19 8 5 1

“ Find the Jackals” The Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Partido Rev­ olucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos, PRTC) was one of the political-military organizations linked to the FMLN. In June 1985, members of the group’s urban commando unit “ Mardoqueo Cruz” housed at an auto repair shop in San Salvador launched an operation dubbed “ Yankee aggressor in El Salvador, another Vietnam awaits you.”2 On the evening of June 19, six off-duty U.S. Marines responsible for security at the American embassy sat down at an outside table at the Chili’s restaurant in the tony nightlife neighborhood called Zona Rosa. The marines were regular customers and were known to the restaurant owners. After a while, two of the marines left the group to sit outside an adjacent restaurant. At around 9 p.m ., a white pickup truck parked out­ side the La Hola restaurant in Zona Rosa. A group of seven individuals got out of the truck and proceeded over to the Chili’s where they began firing rounds at the unarmed Americans, Thomas Handwork, Patrick 371

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The Salvador Option

R. Kwiatkoski, Bobbie J. Dickson, and Gregory H. Weber. While the commandos were firing at the United States marines, an unknown source returned their fire from inside Chili’s. Several Salvadorans and foreign bystanders, including American and Chilean executives from a multinational technology firm, were also killed. A total of nine civilians and four marines died at the Zona Rosa shooting. One Mardoqueo Cruz commando was wounded with a bullet and subsequently died at a medical clinic. Two days after the killings, President Duarte went to the Ilopango Airport in San Salvador to see the bodies of the U.S. Marines placed on a plane to be returned to the United States. On that occasion he offered this consolation: “ To the American people, on behalf of the Salvadoran people, to the U.S. Government; to President Rea­ gan; and to the relatives of these heroes, these marines, who are returning to their homeland today covered with the honor of the U.S. flag__ On behalf of my homeland and by the powers that the people have granted to me, I express my sincere condolences.”3 The FM LN ’s propaganda organ, Radio Venceremos, immediately jumped on Duarte’s remarks: The crocodile tears shed by Duarte, his hysterical lament at Ilopango Air­ port when he bid farewell to the bodies of several U.S. soldiers who came to make war on us, are understandable. Duarte has many reasons to cry for those invaders. They made him president. They breast-fed him and support him. During the sickening lament before his masters Duarte tried to justify his Armed Forces’ lack of capacity to protect the military advisers, U.S. soldiers, and CIA agents who were together when they met the justice of the people who repudiate them.4

Three days later, the PRTC took responsibility for the murders in a communique signed by organization leader “ Fernando Gallardo.” The FM LN General Command subsequently issued its own statement sup­ porting the operation and claiming that the four marines were legiti­ mate military targets. On July 19 , the U.S. government announced a reward of $100,000 for information on the attack. In August, Pres­ ident Duarte held a press conference to report on the conclusions of the investigation into what he called the “ Zona Rosa Massacre” and to say that three of the people responsible for the operation had been arrested.5

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Reagan promised to bring the killers to justice.6 “ We also have our limits,” said the American president, “ and our limits have been reached.”7 On June 22, Reagan told the families of the slain Ameri­ cans that the nation’s resolve would be steadfast: “ They say the men who murdered these sons of America escaped and disappeared into the city streets. But I pledge to you today, they will not evade justice on Earth any more than they can escape the judgment of God. We and the Salvadoran leaders will move any mountain and ford any river to find the jackals and bring them and their colleagues in terror to justice.” 8 In the days following the murders, staffs at the embassy in San Sal­ vador and the U.S. Southern Command even discussed the option of launching a U.S. air strike against the suspected FM LN units. Years later reports alleged that a special squad of U.S. Rangers conducted a retaliatory mission that destroyed an FM LN training camp, killing 83 people.9 Early the following month, Reagan signed a highly classi­ fied National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 176) concluding that the “ recent terrorist attack” against the civilian marines was “ clearly aimed at creating public antipathy in the United States toward our sup­ port for democratic institutions in Central America, in general, and El Salvador, in particular.” 10 To this end, Reagan proposed a new aid package for El Salvador designed to counter “ urban terrorism.” 11

“ Los Cheles” Two years after the trial against the three arrested suspects began, the defendants’ lawyer contended that the case should be dismissed due to the General Amnesty promulgated in 1987, that exonerated 425 political prisoners linked to the leftist insurgents.12 In January 1988, a military appeals court agreed with the request and dismissed all charges. Weeks later, President Duarte, who also held the position of commander in chief of the Armed Forces, overturned the military court’s decision on the grounds that the killings violated the 1979 Con­ vention on the Prevention and the Punishment of Crimes against Inter­ nationally Protected Persons. The Supreme Court of Justice confirmed the decision and in April 19 9 1, a Salvadoran court found the three defendants guilty.13 A subsequent United Nations investigation concluded that at least one of the accused, Pedro Antonio Andrade, the head commando,

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The Salvador Option

planned the attack. According to this report, Andrade confessed to having had prior knowledge of an attack planned against “ los cheles” (foreigners) and had arranged for a safe house and medical care in case any of the commandos were wounded in the operation.14 In 1989, lead­ ing up to the rebels’ final offensive, Andrade became a CIA informer against the very same guerrillas he once was part of. He proved to be an instrumental collaborator when he led Salvadoran intelligence officers to a construction shop, where he uncovered the largest cache of guer­ rilla arms seized during the 12-year conflict. In exchange for his work, Andrade was granted parole into the United States in 1990. While Andrade escaped prosecution, one year later, another PRTC defendant was sentenced to 25 years in prison for the massacre. Some years after Andrade had settled into a home in New Jersey, a N ew York Times arti­ cle reflected on the case, “ The story of how one of the reputed master­ minds of the Zona Rosa massacre became a highly paid informer for the Salvadoran armed forces reveals the contradictory impulses that guided the United States involvement in the Salvadoran civil war.” 15

A War Noted for Its Inhumanity The Zona Rosa massacre was a public relations disaster for the FMLN. A key strategic goal of the rebels was to convince the international com­ munity - especially concerned civilians and influential legislators - that they were a noble group reluctantly fighting a revolution in order to overthrow a repressive regime. For the American audience, and espe­ cially Capitol Hill, the Zona Rosa killings suggested otherwise. The criminal investigation and arrests were far from perfect but the fact that the leftist defendants were not “ disappeared” by death squads or security forces taking the law into their own hands (as would have been more likely in the late 1970s or early ’ 80s) and eventually received a trial was evidence of a somewhat functioning government. This was a light in the dark for a nation whose image had become synonymous with death squads and repression. Compared to the earlier years, in the aftermath of the Zona Rosa massacre, the foreign press took on a more critical view of the Sal­ vadoran guerrillas. A month after the killings, the N ew York Times ran an editorial in response to guerrilla claims that the unarmed marines had been a legitimate target because they were members of the armed

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forces, a party to the war. The article called this justification “ unsup­ portable” because the marines’ “ sole-duty was to guard the United States Embassy, and they took no part in hostilities.” 16 In fact, the Zona Rosa attack was one of many FM LN “ illegal” or “ terrorist” operations that helped spur a wave of negative press coverage. Writ­ ing in 1985, a N ew York Times correspondent described the “ sharp increase” in human rights abuses by the FM LN as a “ new develop­ ment” in a war “ noted for its inhumanity.” The article detailed the guerrillas’ actions, including the “ indiscriminate” mining of roads, two attacks killing 27 unarmed civilians, and the kidnappings of two dozen mayors.17 In response to these events, another article concluded that the guerrillas’ tactics had “ become especially disturbing.” 18 This sort of negative reporting lasted through the end of war. Here is a N ew York Times journalist writing in late 1989: “ The rebels are increasingly guilty of their own forms of autocracy and terrorism. They do not torture their victims. But they gave no warning before detonat­ ing car bombs on a street crowded with civilians, a health clinic and a restaurant in a flubbed raid on army headquarters in the capital in December. They killed three civilians, and wounded more than 30.” 19 It also appeared that the press had begun to report on the guerrillas from their defensive strongholds. According to one foreign writer, The era in which the guerrillas could be found just by going out on the highway had largely ended; the only certain way to spend time with them now was to cross into their territory from Honduras, through contact with the leadership in Mexico. This was a process that tended to discourage day-tripping and in any case it was no longer a war in which the dateline “ Somewhere Behind Guerrilla Lines, El Salvador” was presumed automatically to illuminate much at all.20

In addition to the changing tone of the war, noted writer Joan Didion, as early as 1983 claimed that journalists were now referring to El Salvador as the “ #4 war,” after still raging conflicts in Beirut and Iran-Iraq, and the aftermath of the Falklands War. In her words, So many reporters had in fact abandoned the Hotel Camino Real in San Sal­ vador [gone home for a while, or gone to the Intercontinental in Managua, or gone to whatever hotels they frequented in Guatemala and Panama and Tegucigalpa] that the dining room had discontinued its breakfast buffet, a fact often remarked upon: no breakfast buffet meant no action, little bang-bang, a

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period of editorial indifference in which stories were filed and held, and rare film rarely made the network news. “ Get an NBC crew up from the Falklands, we might get the buffet back,” they would say, and, “ It hots up a little, we could have the midnight movies.” It seemed that when the networks arrived in force they brought movies down, and showed them at midnight on their video recorders, Apocalypse Now , and Woody Allen’s Bananas.2I

Becoming the “ #4 w ar” was certainly not good for the careers of ambi­ tious war correspondents who had come to El Salvador to cover what appeared to be an unfolding Vietnam redux. Yet, with death squad activity down, a stronger FAES, three successful national elections throughout 19 8 2 -19 8 5 , and Duarte as the face of reform, U.S. engage­ ment might have been succeeding as seen by all of the shocking news headlines that were not being generated - or the number of cocktails not being served at the poolside lounge at the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador.

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36 Air War

I think what we’re seeing in El Salvador today are some of the best guer­ rillas, probably the best guerrillas, we’ve seen in this hemisphere to date. They are certainly better than anything we saw in Nicaragua or Cuba. - U.S. military advisor in El Salvador1 We are and will continue being friends of the people and governments of Cuba and Nicaragua, and it does not shame us. Completely to the contrary, we are proud to maintain relations with those people - bastions of the anti-imperialist struggle. The Reagan administration is not one to tell the FM LN who ought to be its friends and who its enemies. - Radio Venceremos, March 19 8 3 2 In 1979, we thought it would be easier to take power. The intervention of the United States has changed the circumstances. - Mario Lopez, FM LN leader, 19 843

“Just as It Did in Southeast Asia” Following the series of successful elections - and in particular the ascension of Jose Napoleon Duarte to the presidency - U.S. policy toward El Salvador became less controversial back in Washington. But in the mid-1980s, a disagreement broke out as to whether American aid and training were making the war worse. This referred to the socalled air war that critics alleged the Salvadoran Air Force was waging against civilians in FMLN-controlled areas. One critic received inter­ national attention when he described the air war as “ indiscriminate 377

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The Salvador Option

attacks” on “ defenseless civilians,” a war being waged by the Salvado­ ran military against villages “ suspected of being sympathetic” to the guerrillas. “ Just as it did in Southeast Asia, terror from the air has cre­ ated vast numbers of refugees in El Salvador.”4 The air war quickly turned from a military tactic to a political con­ troversy. Solidarity groups opposed to the U.S.-backed Duarte govern­ ment and their allies on Capitol Hill were focusing on the issue. Here is how one critic described the scorched-earth strategy in a letter to the N ew York Times: A secret air war is taking place in El Salvador. In U.S.-supplied aircraft, Sal­ vadoran pilots drop 500- and 750-pound antipersonnel bombs, as well as napalm and U.S.-supplied white phosphorus on the civilian population in the countryside. . . . The Catholic Archdiocese in San Salvador says U.S.-supplied AC-47 gunships - the most powerful weaponry in Central America -are in use against civilians. “ Thousands of noncombatants,” the human-rights group Americas Watch reported last March, “ are being killed in indiscrimi­ nate attacks by bombardments in the air, shelling and ground sweeps.” 5

These sorts of accusations sparked protests across the country as part of the “ Stop the Bombing Campaign.” In Seattle, activists constructed a mock Salvadoran village in the plaza of a federal building and promptly destroyed it to the recorded sounds of bombings and helicopters.6 One key part of the controversy was whether the bombings of civil­ ians was intentional. For critics, the tactic was a clear manifestation of a scorched-earth counterinsurgency. “ But whether discriminate or indiscriminate, depopulation of the countryside is a reality. Some have suggested that this is not a side effect but the very purpose of the bom­ bardment: Guerrilla fish cannot swim in an empty sea.”7 Responding to the criticism about these inhumane bombings, in September 1984, President Duarte imposed stricter rules on aerial engagement requiring “ that the military high command approve all air attacks and that targets be clearly identified as military objectives by army spotters. Civilians are not to be fired on.” 8 Yet for at least another year, foreign correspondents continued to describe scenes indi­ cating that the civilian targeting was still happening.9 Needless to say, these reports were deeply damaging to the Duarte government - and by extension to Washington. The FD R ’s Guillermo Ungo hinted that the guerrillas might have to up the ante in the war in order to repel the

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devastating air attacks. Speaking from Managua in 1985, he said: “ For the time being, we do not plan to acquire SAM-7 [shoulder-launched surface-to-air] missiles, but I don’t know if they will be necessary in the future.” 10 That same year a bipartisan U.S. congressional report expressed concern about the air war, but the reports of aerial targeting of civil­ ians did not stop.11 Foreign correspondent Julia Preston wrote that the Salvadoran Air Force fired “ an average of more than 30 rock­ ets a day.... These include rounds containing white phosphorus.” 12 M ary Jo McConahay of the Pacific News Service provided especially graphic descriptions in a three-part story based on her travels to these war zones: Air attacks and hunger are shrinking the civilian population of this mountain zone. The people here are guerrilla supporters, “ masas,” and this had long been a stronghold of the rebel FM LN __ The several thousand peasant “ masas” who remain are subject to bombing and gunfire from the air when there is no apparent combat situation. During five days here in February, two North American reporters were forced to take cover from air attacks on three occa­ sions. Peasants are finding it increasingly difficult to feed themselves. On walks through the area each lasting several hours, reporters observed fruit groves, a corn field and other pieces of land which appeared to have been recently burned. In several cases residents claimed that government troops had set fire to their fields deliberately. In some cases, they said, fires started after bombs fell. “ This is a war of attrition, and food - or an attempt at starvation-has become a weapon, too,” said a religious worker in San Salvador whose duties include interviewing peasants displaced from conflict zones such as this one.13

McConahay also described the failed attempts by the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide food for the two towns in the mountain zone. The Salvadoran army commander for the region allegedly prohibited these food deliveries, which could potentially feed the guerrillas. In her three-part story the author also provided graphic details of the air raids that were tainting Duarte’s human rights record. The following is an attempt to shed light on what was deemed by some critics an “ invisible w ar” : By the time the first jet appeared, screaming over the top of the mountain from the north, peasants here were already running for cover in every direc­ tion. “Juga!” yelled a 60-year-old named Joaquin, as he dived behind a wall of stones, using the local word for a U.S.-made “ ground assault” jet. At the same

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moment, the first bomb exploded close enough to shake the ground under the some 150 inhabitants of this hamlet, their faces pressed into the quaking dirt. Only about 50 miles northeast of the modern, bustling capital of San Salvador, a small nation-within-a-nation of pro-rebel civilians is trying to conduct its own separate systems of education, health care and farm production - all in dangerous accommodation with the air w ar.... To watch the peasants slapping additional layers of earth on their shelters in hope of protection against the army’s new Hughes 500 helicopter “mini-guns,” which spray some 6,000 bul­ lets a minutes, or to see them rush to snatch drying clothes from tree branches at the sound of approaching aircraft - which can pick out the colors that sig­ nal human habitation from thousands of feet - is to see that this fight has something of David and Goliath to it. Yet, after some two and a half years of escalating air war, peasants seem to have found a way to live with the giant.14

Duarte’s Rules of Engagement For some skeptics, the putative “ air w ar” was an instance that revealed the active propaganda coordination between the guerrillas and the more radical solidarity groups. In November 1985, U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, Edwin Corr, was in Washington for consultations when “ several congressman and their staffers complained to him about news of indiscriminate bombing of civilians” by the Salvadoran Air Force.15 Corr realized that this was against the “ strict rules of engagement” issued by President Duarte the year before to address the concerns of “ random bombing.” As Corr told the story, he then learned from this deputy in San Salvador, David Passage, that the embassy had been receiving telephone calls and cables all week objecting to the FAES’s deliberate attacks on civilians. Corr concluded that the timing could not have been simply coincidence as the complaints began on the same day of a large FAES bombing campaign of an FM LN base. That is, Corr continued, the protests were a coordinated effort to embarrass the Salvadoran armed forces into stopping the offensive. Corr backed this up by claiming that the protests both in San Salvador and Washing­ ton were “ echoing” the claim of hundreds of civilian casualties broad­ cast by the FM LN ’s Radio Venceremos. Corr wrote that he made an “ immediate and thorough” investigation and flew to the target area with a CBS reporter and film crew. There they found “ no evidence of the bombing of civilians.” 16 Corr contended that a similar episode occurred in early January 1986 following the FAES’s “ major ground offensive” near the Guazapa

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volcano. The “ panicked” guerrillas were apparently surprised by the ferocity of an attack they believed would only be cursory.17 In what constituted “ further evidence of the coordination between the FM LN and CISPES,” Corr wrote that his embassy staff was inundated with hundreds of calls from California protesting the Salvadoran Army’s “ terror and scorched-earth” campaign against the civilian residents around Guazapa.18 Once again, Corr personally investigated the accu­ sations, this time flying to the site by helicopters along with Reuters and BBC correspondents and Catholic Church representatives. And again they claimed to have found “ no evidence of any civilian casualties in the sparsely populated settled mountains.” 19 Like so many things linked to the Salvador Option, the motley facts surrounding the FAES’s air war were not only exceedingly dif­ ficult to ascertain, but they also could be used to support diverging claims. Once again, the various sides had wildly different interpre­ tations of the same conflict. For instance, McConohay’s three-party story illustrated the human rights abuses of the people on the ground, which in turn provided rationale for objecting to the air war. On the other hand, Corr’s account disproved claims by Radio Venceremos, which in turn gave supporters of the air war evidence to claim that accounts of human rights abuses were fabrications.20 Along these lines, the U.S. Embassy understood full well that Washington was deeply interested in the country and that the opposing sides had drastically varied understandings of the roots of the conflict and what current policy needed to look like. In one six-month period in the early 1980s, at least 30 congressional delegations traveled to El Salvador, all look­ ing to see the “ reality” in the tiny war-torn country. One embassy staffer reflected that both sides wanted their “ ideological prejudices validated.” This validation normally took the form of left-wing groups “ confirming their horror by visiting organizations sympathetic to the FM LN and rightist groups eager to visit sites where U.S. Special Forces were training their ESAF [FAES] counterparts.” In an effort to demon­ strate the intricacies of El Salvador’s situation, “ the Embassy talked to the left about government achievements and the dangers of a com­ munist victory and to the rightist delegations about land reform and human rights.”21

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37 José Napoleon Duarte

A CIA asset. - Robert White, former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, describing Jose Napoleon Duarte1 His power has come not from the barrels of the gun but from the plebiscites of the people. - Timothy O’Meara, university provost, 19 8 5 2

“ Taken a Shine to the Kid from El Salvador” In late 1986 the N ew York Review o f Books published a profile of Jose Napoleón Duarte. It described the Salvadoran president to its Ameri­ can readers as “ the son of a politically progressive tailor and a seam­ stress, a thoroughly middle-class boy.”3 Duarte’s parents were indeed “ moderately comfortable” - with the help of a lucky lottery ticket, they were able to send him and his brother to Notre Dame University in Indiana, although the future president spoke little English. The capable Duarte studied civil engineering and graduated in 1948. He returned to El Salvador, got married, and joined his father-in-law’s thriving con­ struction company. Before leaving for Notre Dame, Duarte had joined in political movements that helped overthrow the General Hernandez Martinez dictatorship in 1944; a year later a military regime’s ascen­ sion forced him into exile in Guatemala where he briefly worked in an opposition cell.

382

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José Napoleon Duarte

38 3

Duarte’s first real interest in politics took off after Notre Dame when he successfully ran for mayor of San Salvador in 1964 and subse­ quently served two more terms. His protests against the military regime in the aftermath of the stolen 19 7 2 elections led to his arrest at the National Police headquarters, where he suffered a smashed cheekbone, a black eye, and charges of treason.4 International pressure, including from Notre Dame president Reverend Theodore Hesburgh - “ who had taken a shine to the kid from El Salvador” - helped ensure Duarte’s exile to Venezuela. While in exile, Duarte severed three of his fingers in an industrial accident, an injury that would later be misconstrued as the work of police torturers.5 During his years in Venezuela, Duarte worked as a civil engineer while he “ awaited the call home that was sure to come.” 6

“ He Was Like Anwar Sadat” Duarte’s role as a moderate but decidedly anti-communist democratic reformer was essential for the evolution of El Salvador’s conflict. Most critically, he influenced the international community’s perception of the Salvadoran government’s commitment to reform. Duarte’s impeccable democratic bona fides gave him a credibility that no other Salvadoran politician could even begin to match.7 U.S. diplomats fully realized that “JN D ” (as they often referred to him) was the most effective salesman for American engagement. According to a young Foreign Service Offi­ cer, Kevin Whitaker, “JN D was the perfect face and, let’s face it, his perfect English didn’t hurt.” 8 Duarte’s initiatives, such as the peace process may not have always borne fruit, but his gestures unquestionably bolstered his standing in the eyes of Washington. Both Republican and Democratic politicians were supportive of Duarte’s efforts. The Salvadoran president’s nego­ tiating position on elections before concessions served to reinforce to the U.S. audience that the Duarte government had been legitimately chosen. In some respects, continued Democratic Party support for El Salvador policy became more about supporting Duarte than the Rea­ gan administration. As one congressional aide put, it, “ He [Duarte] was like Anwar Sadat [of Egypt]: tremendously popular outside of his country. He can do no wrong.”9 U.S. support for Duarte meant that El Salvador continued to receive large amounts of economic and military

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The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 3 7 .1. Jose Napoleon Duarte. The two-term Christian Democratic mayor of San Salvador was exiled by the Salvadoran military following the dis­ puted 19 7 2 presidential elections. Duarte returned to El Salvador and headed the military-civilian junta in 1980. In 1984 he was elected president after a run­ off against rightist candidate Roberto D’Aubuisson. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

assistance. In 1985, a bipartisan majority in Congress approved the Reagan administration’s request for yet another substantial increase in economic and military aid to El Salvador.

“ Trained for 50 Years to Do It the Other Way” To his supporters both in El Salvador and Washington, Duarte’s acknowledgment that much of the guerrillas’ stance stemmed from legitimate grievances made him a crucial reformist actor during the civil war. The following comments made by Duarte in 19 8 1 reveal his willingness to make public his understanding of the guerrillas’ point of view: This is a history of people starving to death, living in misery. For 50 years, the same people had all the power, all the money, all the opportunities. Those who did not have anything tried to take it away from those who had everything. But there were no democratic systems available to them, so they have radicalized

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385

themselves, have resorted to violence. And, of course, this second group, the rich, do not want to give up anything, so they are fighting.10

At the same time, though, Duarte was a staunch anti-communist who saw Marxism as a false utopia that would only bring more suffering to his country.11 He believed his “ obligation lay in freeing [his] country from the two totalitarian extremes: the Marxists and Fascists.” 12 Assuming the presidency in 1984, Duarte began to implement the reform agenda that he believed critical to legitimize the Salvadoran government in the eyes of the people. Not one to allow doubts to check his ambitions, Duarte explained the enormous challenges he faced, especially resistance from the security forces. “ I’m carrying out politi­ cal change; but I’m doing it intelligently, and it can’t be done overnight. The Army, as an institution, is willing to accept political solutions, but the others, the National Guard and the National Police, have been trained for 50 years to do it the other way, and it will take time to change them.” 13 Writing in 1983, Duarte made clear that in his esti­ mation land reform was the signature policy for legitimizing the Sal­ vadoran government in spite of the guerrillas’ claims to the contrary: The difference [in public support for the guerrillas today, versus a few years ago] was land reform. I spoke for it as long ago as when President Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress. The political concept is simple: to take away the power of the hacienda owners and give it to the campesinos. Both the extreme right and the extreme left tried to stop the land reform, but they failed and if you look at the places where the guerrillas are strong now, the regions along the Honduran border, you will see that these are also the places where there were few haciendas to expropriate.14

“A Communist Who Happens to Believe in God” Given his democratic bona fides and compelling personal story, Duarte became the topic of considerable foreign media attention after his election in 1984. Even Playboy magazine published a lengthy profile that year, which quoted him complaining that Washington called the shots in the war. In his autobiography, Duarte contended that he had worked hard to rein in his ambitious defense minister, Jose Guillermo García, who dominated the conservative wing of Duarte’s ostensibly reform junta. In his description, “ M y own position as president was getting weaker and weaker because the United States started dealing

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f i g u r e 37.2. Duarte violence curve. Jose Napoleon Duarte sketched this rough image on a sheet of presidential stationery to demonstrate the death squad killings spike in 19 8 1 followed by a decline in later years. Image pre­ pared by the University of Wisconsin-Madison Cartography Lab©. Reprinted with permission.

directly with Garcia. When military aid was conditioned to human rights improvements the U.S. ambassador became more powerful than I was as president. My complaints were less important than the ambas­ sador’s because he controlled the flow of money.” 15 It appears that the heavy involvement of American diplomatic and military officials cut both ways for Duarte. It was terribly frustrating and more than a bit humiliating to have U.S. officials at times still working directly with Salvadoran counterparts as opposed to working through the president. In the end, though, Duarte’s ascension helped established a bipartisan consensus in Congress on U.S. policy - even if it did not always look like that in Washington given the polarized rhetoric on both sides. Make no mistake, the means of deep involve­ ment by U.S. officials was decidedly undemocratic but it was also reformist. Here is how one American ambassador - taking on the med­ dling viceroy role of the Salvador Option - characterized these sorts of actions: The embassy involved itself closely in the internal politics of the Christian Democratic Party.... It also helped mediate and resolve Duarte’s clashes with

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the different sectors of the wider Salvadoran political community, including the right wing political parties, the private sector, and the labor unions__ The embassy advised Duarte and his cabinet on relations with Washington, show­ ing the Salvadorans how to avoid conflicts with the Congress and the White House, how to get what they needed, and generally how to understand the arcane but inevitably crucial [for Duarte] world of Washington politics.16

Duarte was also under tremendous pressure to show results on a num­ ber of high-profile crime cases involving American citizens. To this end, in 1984 Duarte formed a new U.S. government-financed unit, the Spe­ cial Investigative Unit, to solve the most notorious political killings: the 1980 murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero; the 1980 killing of an American journalist; the 19 8 1 Sheraton murders of the two American labor advisors and their Salvadoran counterpart; and several massacres in locales like Las Hojas in 1983 when 74 villagers were slain. Despite the infusion of U.S. money to support this effort, Duarte’s commission was dismantled 15 months later without achieving its objectives.17 In M ay 1984 a Salvadoran jury did convict five former National Guard troops for the murder of the four American churchwomen in 1980.18 But lasting gains in addressing justice and impunity were largely elusive for the new Salvadoran president. Nevertheless, while no officer had been brought to trial at this point, Duarte did remove several high-level FAES officers connected with death squad “ excesses.”19 Duarte’s efforts made it increasingly hard for critics on the left to accuse him of simply doing the oligarchy or military’s bidding. The Catholic Church, for one, made its view of Duarte’s role clear when in August 1985 Archbishop of San Salvador Arturo Rivera y Damas wrote in a pastoral letter that Duarte’s government enjoyed popular support while the FM LN “ resorts to violence and sabotage as an essen­ tial component of their struggle, thus placing themselves in a position of which we cannot approve.”20 Duarte was dogged in his contention that the Salvadoran govern­ ment had been democratically elected under a newly approved consti­ tution and that it had a legitimate mandate to govern. In the same UN address that opened the door to peace talks in La Palma, in October 1984 Duarte told his audience in New York: To those waiting in vain to be received as liberators each time they subju­ gate the people, to the comandantes whose ideals conflict with this reality,

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who made a mistake about the people and now confront the truth; to the comandantes who feel the historic error they are committing. I acknowledge that these revolutionaries may have had good reason for taking up arms when there was no hope of economic reform, social justice, or free elections under the tyranny of the oligarchy allied with the armed forces. El Salvador, however, has changed over the last five years. I am here to declare and proclaim that as President of the Republic and Commanding General of the Armed Forces, I can uphold, under a constitutional government, the means to permit you to abandon a stand that runs counter to the history of the political evolution of the Salvadoran people.21

While Duarte’s moderate message and progressive reforms increased his support at home and abroad, the FAES remained wary that their new commander in chief would go after them on grounds of human rights abuses. This was a key reason why they urged a general amnesty for these sorts of crimes. According to one FAES general, “ We [the Duarte government and military] will have to have a general amnesty in order to live together.”22 While not enthusiastic about his motives and reforms, the FAES also understood that Duarte’s good standing in the international community was indispensable for the FAES to continue receiving sizable amounts of U.S. aid. Interim president Alvaro Magaña characterized this delicate relationship: “ The military and [Duarte’s] government were like a married couple. They didn’t love each other, and they rarely talked. Sometimes they would sit and watch the same television show, but they mainly went separate ways. I’m afraid that the army has learned it likes that relationship and doesn’t want to change.”23 If the FAES was reluctantly going along with Duarte, the oligarchy continued to despise the Christian Democrats whom they believed were apologists for communism. One businessman lamented, “ Duarte is a communitarian. We have to convince the Americans and the army that he is ruining the economy, that we can’t negotiate with the govern­ ment until he resigns or changes his attitude toward the private sector. We’re not plotting a coup, but there’s no way that we can join this gov­ ernment with Duarte there.” Another member of the elite Salvadoran society summed up Duarte as “ a communist who happens to believe in God.”24 Shortly after joining the military-civilian junta, Duarte made comments to N ew York Times journalist Tom Buckley in 19 8 1 that revealed his own take on the situation: “ I think I was selected by my

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people to be president in 1972. Now I have a second chance. The situ­ ation is very different. I have more enemies, and much of the world is against me, but I think we will succeed.”25

“ Is It Perhaps, Mr. Duarte, That the Salvadoran People Do Not Have Human Rights?” On the afternoon of September 10 , 1985, President Duarte’s daugh­ ter, 35-year-old Ines Guadalupe Duarte Duran, was kidnapped. Ines was the oldest of six children and known to be especially close to her father. In fact, Ines had run Duarte’s presidential campaign the previous year. About six unidentified gunmen assaulted her while she arrived at her university campus where she was studying commu­ nications. The assailants fired at her bodyguards, leaving one dead and another severely injured.26 The kidnappers then pulled her and a female friend into a beige Toyota truck and drove off. News agencies reported that President Duarte suffered a “ slight heart attack” when he heard the news. Over the first 24 hours after the kidnapping, no group claimed responsibility. The guerrillas held Ines for ransom for six weeks in a locale - like so many places in the tiny country - not too far from San Salvador. During this time the government and guerrillas negotiated in El Sal­ vador and Panama for the release of the two women in exchange for the release of mostly FM LN prisoners. Salvadoran foreign minister and vice president, Rodolfo Castillo Claramount, issued a dramatic plea to the kidnappers to respect the women’s lives. On September 15 , the Pedro Pablo Castillo Front, a tiny fraction of the FM LN, took responsibility for the kidnapping.27 In their first pub­ lic statement since the operation, the kidnappers provided an exclusive interview to the United Press International outside San Salvador. They allowed a reporter to listen to a recording by Ines. “ Papa, today, M on­ day the 16th of September, your daughter, Ines Guadalupe, is speaking. I want to tell you, Papa, that I am fine, I am fine. Send greetings to the family.”28 Jeane Kirkpatrick published an article in the Los Angeles Times describing the significance of the kidnapping: “ It is a grim mes­ sage that reveals El Salvador’s guerrillas for what they are: a band of violent men bent on denying the people of that country the right to govern themselves.”29

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39o

The Salvador Option

Responding to Duarte’s address to the nation that same day, when he broke down in tears over concern for his daughter, the guerrillas lambasted the Salvadoran president: This morning the traitor Jose Napoleon Duarte cried when he spoke from Liberated Plaza to address the fatherland, which he is selling out to a for­ eign, imperialist power. With tears, the butcher Duarte tried to exploit the sentiments of the people. Duarte apparently thinks that our people have for­ gotten the repression he has unleashed in our fatherland. Duarte travels con­ stantly to the United States as the puppet of imperialism. Duarte has remained silent on the massacre of refugees . . . and continues to cover up the murder of Monsignor Romero. When Duarte speaks about the Salvadoran family he is thinking of the 14 oligarchic families__ We wish to refresh Mr. Duarte’s mem­ ory. What happens to our political prisoners? From the moment they are cap­ tured they are tortured, they are kidnapped, they disappear.... Mr. Duarte: Where are our sons? Where are our daughters? Our children, Mr. Duarte, where are they? Where are our brothers, Mr. Duarte? Why are so many Sal­ vadorans disappearing? Is it moral to torture? Is it moral to murder many fellow countrymen in the dungeons of the repressive forces? Is it perhaps, Mr. Duarte, that the Salvadoran people do not have human rights?30

On this same day, September 15 , the first contact between the govern­ ment and the kidnappers took place but communication was appar­ ently cut off when the guerrillas heard a helicopter motor in the back­ ground. Remarkably, most of the initial negotiations were conducted by two-way radios that the rebels insisted the government provide. One astute foreign journalist was able to temporarily monitor these radio conversations using a shortwave receiver.31

“ Inés Will Die” Part of the impasse in the negotiations was that the government was holding at least five key guerrilla leaders, including Nidia Díaz, the second-in-command of the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroameri­ canos, PRTC). Díaz was one of the rebel commanders who had sat down with Duarte in La Palma just one year earlier in 1984. Now she was recovering in a prison cell from several wounds as well as the surgery that had restored use of her right hand (an operation that took place after pressure from doctors and U.S. human rights groups).

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Diaz was injured after being shot five times by an FAES helicopter gunship that had ambushed her guerrilla patrol. It was said that her diary recording each side’s comments at La Palma was shot through with bullets.32 At any rate, Diaz’s influence among her fellow guer­ rillas complicated matters. Senior FAES officers insisted the demand for the top leaders like Diaz would be fruitless; in fact, they warned, “ Ines will die, because we will never release them.”33 However, there was a recent precedent for a prisoner swap. In 1984, the guerrillas kidnapped Colonel Eduardo Casanova, the brother of Defense Min­ ister Vides Casanova, which prompted secret discussions between the abductors and military, with the Catholic Church mediating. Eduardo was subsequently released and weeks later a top FM LN commander was freed from the La Esperanza prison.34 The saga took a turn after the head of the Panamanian Christian Democratic Party, Ricardo Arias Calderon, accused the civilian lead­ ers of the guerrillas (read, FDR) as being “ accessories in terror attacks,” namely, the kidnapping of Ines.35 FDR chief (and Duarte’s 19 72 run­ ning mate) Guillermo Ungo accused “ certain politicians” of “ vulgar opportunism” in trying to link him to the crime.36 In his words: We deplore it; we hope and expect that her life, her physical integrity will be spared; however, we cannot stop at this case but must regret the situations of dozens of thousands of fathers and mothers who have lost dozens of thou­ sands of children and many hundreds of other people who are experiencing the sorrow of having missing children. The FD R is not the political arm of the guerrillas, and the FM LN is not the military arm either. . . . It is an alliance, they are two bodies that share a political line__ It would be as if we tried to link Duarte’s administration and the Salvadoran Christian Democratic Party [PDC] with the murder of over 60,000 Christians and several thousand miss­ ing people, although Duarte is the Armed Forces commander in chief, while I am not.37

Also picked up by news outfits monitoring the radio waves, in early October 1985 President Duarte communicated to the kidnappers that he would release around 96 wounded fighters and 22 leaders, includ­ ing Díaz.38 Diaz immediately returned to her guerrilla unit while most of the wounded rebels were transported to Mexico and Cuba. Duarte’s willingness to agree to the guerrillas’ demands won the women’s release three weeks later, but it infuriated high-level FAES officers who saw this as more evidence that their president was weak. On October 25, Ines

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The Salvador Option

Duarte was reunited with her family in a “ tropical downpour” at the military academy. Overwhelmed with emotion, the speechless Duarte held his daughter in his arms. However, relieved at the development, Duarte acknowledged the likely consequences of his acquiescence: “ We know that these persons being released will pick up a rifle again and continue to possibly do harm to the nation. That is unfortunately some­ thing we cannot ignore.”39

“ With Great Humane Quality” Only hours before the release of Duarte’s daughter, Radio Vencere­ mos taped an interview (broadcast two weeks later) with Ines in which she spoke warmly of her captors and that she now saw them in a different light. When asked to describe her conditions in captivity, Ines responded, About this, I could say that in spite of the difficulties, their treatment was very humanitarian and respectful. Within the limitations they had tried to cover everything for us: food, clothing, and we had a doctor permanently with us__ Well, within this same attention that there was during the 45 days of my captivity, I could say that I must be very grateful for the treatment they gave us as it was really very respectful, and with great humane quality.40

The rebel interviewer then asked her about her surroundings and whether she had any contact with the local population. Ines responded, Well, it is true. There were no bombings in the area where we actually were [vicinity of Guazapa volcano near San Salvador]. However, between 17 and 19 October there were two bombings that were really very close to where we were. More or less, about 15 to 20 minutes. I can truly tell you this was horrible. I felt the bombs crashing nearby. To see the small plane, the one they call La Carreta [the wagon] see how it drops the grenades, I can tell you I was very afraid. It is a very sorrowful impression and very anguishing when one is not psychologically prepared for that. I think of the fear of the civilian population when they see those planes flying.41

The Salvadoran government promptly responded that she had been “ forced to make” these comments and pose for smiling photographs. During a radio press conference, President Duarte claimed that Ines was suffering “ nervous tension” after 44 days in captivity and three days walking to the transfer site. Ines left the country for a while so

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that she could be treated for what the government claimed was Stock­ holm Syndrome - whereby abductees come to identify with their captors.42 Regardless of the official claims the government made that Ines’s statement was coerced, her positive comments about the guerrillas rein­ forced the belief of the FAES and the political right that her father was a thinly veiled guerrilla sympathizer. Fiercely bitter over the humiliating abduction episode, President Duarte canceled a scheduled session of peace talks with the guerrillas.43 Yet this did not deter foreign correspondents from reporting that the kidnapping “ seemed to be a net gain for the rebel movement.”44 What is more, one reporter concluded, the episode had thrown Presi­ dent Duarte “ off balance, politically as well as psychologically.”45 Not only were the guerrillas able to divide Duarte and his backers in the mil­ itary and oligarchy, but the kidnapping operation itself and the com­ plicated management of negotiations also “ indicated a high degree of international diplomatic and logistical sophistication.”46 It appeared to be a score of FM LN one, JN D nothing.

A Symbol of Liberty Ironically, given the deep suspicion of Duarte’s reformism held by key administration officials like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Duarte became the face of Reagan’s Salvador engagement. At a state dinner hosted for Duarte on October 14 , 1987, the American president toasted his guest: This year is the 200th anniversary of the Constitution of the United States. It’s appropriate then that we have as our guest an elected leader who has laid the foundations for freedom in his country and whose courage and strength of conviction are an inspiration to us all. President Duarte, having fought the brutality and repression of left and right, has come to symbolize the struggle for democracy in this hemisphere. I have little doubt that our forefathers, who sacrificed so much to secure the blessings of liberty for the United States, would see President Duarte as one of their own. . . . As our Founding Fathers came to know, winning liberty and establishing democratic institutions are not without great personal sacrifice.47

At the time of Reagan’s toast, few could have imagined how precip­ itously Duarte’s political fortunes would decline. Economic problems were a key factor. The wrenching recession of the 1980s had eased but the economy continued to sag (per capita GNP languished at

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The Salvador Option

pre-1970 levels despite massive infusions of American aid) and Sal­ vadorans blamed Duarte’s government.48 El Salvador’s economic out­ put in 1987 was only 80 percent of its 1978 levels. The govern­ ment owed $88 million to foreign creditors in 1970, an amount that increased to $ 1.5 billion in 1986.49 His handling of his daughter’s kid­ napping only further lowered Duarte’s estimation in the “ eyes of an already skeptical ESAF [FAES] officer corps.” Duarte’s ascendency to the presidency in 1984 represented a water­ shed moment in El Salvador’s modern history. Yet, just because the Salvadoran people were able to elect their president in a free election did not mean that, despite the ongoing bloody war, they would not hold the new government accountable for job and personal security. That is, with the government receiving hundreds of millions of dol­ lars from Washington, they expected Duarte to deliver. Duarte had promised his nation peace, but so far the war’s end was nowhere in sight. By 1987 and 1988 many Salvadorans had grown weary of a government increasingly tainted by corruption scandals and its inabil­ ity to jump-start the country’s lagging economy, especially the stub­ bornly high unemployment rate. And this was despite the $2 billion of economic assistance since 19 8 1 that Washington had pumped into El Salvador to boost Duarte’s fortunes. What is more, although 75 per­ cent of America’s massive assistance had been used for the war, the government had yet to “ overcome” the insurgency.50 The FM LN ’s continued economic sabotage and political intimida­ tion efforts made it challenging for Duarte to use U.S. aid to address standard governing issues, such as education and job security. While in these years few believed that the guerrillas could seize power, they succeeded in making it extremely difficult for the Duarte government to actually govern, especially in the rural areas. The war’s momen­ tum appeared to be shifting again, this time back toward the guerrillas despite the FAES’s relative professionalization in the mid-1980s. Fearful of FM LN reprisals, in 1988 municipal governments did not operate in 55 of the country’s almost 300 towns; more than a hun­ dred mayors had received threats from the FM LN to stop governing or face dire consequences.51 These threats quickly became tangible with the murder of nine mayors, often in their own homes and in front of their family members. The killings were publicized by the under­ ground Radio Venceremos, which claimed that these officials were

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f i g u r e 37.3. Jose Napoleon Duarte with Defense Minister Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova reviewing troops at the Ilopango Air Base near San Salvador, 1988. Duarte had a tense relationship with the FAES leadership. Duarte is visibly ill from the cancer that took his life the following February. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

“ bloodstained with repression, and sullied with the dollars of corrup­ tion.” 52 On the economic front, guerrillas brought down more electric power pylons in M ay 1988 than in any other months in the war.53 The U.S. Embassy estimated that in the late 1980s the guerrillas caused nearly $2 billion in direct and indirect damage to the already anemic economy.54 Making matters worse, after a precipitous drop in death squad activ­ ity in the months and years after Vice President Bush’s December 1983 visit to El Salvador, rightist violence appeared to be ticking up, though still well below the rate of the late 1970s and early ’ 80s. Suspected left­ ists were even being pulled from their cars at stoplight intersections to be executed in open daylight, grisly acts that reinforced the perpetra­ tors’ sense of impunity.55 In June 1988, American doctors gave Duarte, stricken with stomach and liver cancer, only months to live.56 Before his death in 1990 at the age of 64, Duarte handed over power to his elected

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39 6

The Salvador Option

successor, the conservative Alfredo Cristiani, in the midst of a stinging electoral defeat for the Christian Democrats. Yet the controversial role that he and his Christian Democrats played in the evolution of El Sal­ vador’s civil war was highly significant. While Duarte’s illness thwarted any ambitions he had to run against Cristiani, perhaps most ironic is that the very democracy he worked so hard to protect also constitu­ tionally barred him from running for a second term.57

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38 Iran-Contra

I am down here as a job. I am not down here as a soldier, so this is not my war. I don’t believe it’s an American war. - Eugene Hasenfus, 19 8 6 1 You [Sandinistas] can’t beat the gringos at their own game__ The oppo­ sition will have the best U.S. campaign advisers behind it. They will clob­ ber you. - Cuban official speaking to Miguel d’Escoto, foreign minister of Nicaragua, 19902

Under Fire On Sunday, October 5, 1986, a C -123K cargo plane took off from Ilopango, El Salvador, and was flying low into Nicaraguan airspace, only 700 meters off the ground to elude Sandinista radar. Jose Fer­ nando Canales and Byron Montiel, two young soldiers just five months into their mandatory service in the Sandinista military had set up a portable land-air rocket deep in the jungle of the Chontales Depart­ ment. When they heard the engines of the unmarked cargo plane, Jose Fernando received the order to shoot. He aimed, fired, and within sec­ onds the plane exploded in the air and fell to earth in pieces; only the tail section remained intact. Twenty-four hours later, the Sandinista mouthpiece La Voz de Nicaragua (The Voice of Nicaragua)

397

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broke into its regular programming with a special bulletin that a plane belonging to the “ counterrevolution” had been hit by an “ arrow,” and perhaps more important, that “ North Americans” were among the crew. When Sandinista troops reached the crash site, they found 13,000 pounds of weaponry: 50,000 AK-47 rifle cartridges, 60 collapsible AK47s, a similar number of RPG-7 grenade launchers, and 15 0 pairs of jungle boots.3 The C -12 3K carried three Americans and one Nicaraguan. The pilot William Cooper, co-pilot Wallace Blaine Sawyer, and radio operator Freddy Vilches died in the crash. Eugene Hasenfus, in charge of drop­ ping the cargo, had been able to see the incoming rocket in time and jumped from the plane with a parachute given to him by his brother before leaving the United States. “ Give up, gringo, or we’ll blow you to hell!” reportedly shouted the pursuing soldier Rafael Antonio Acevedo, when he found Hasenfus in an abandoned hut, eating a squash and lying in a hammock he had made from his parachute.4 The American was armed with a pistol and a pocketknife, but immediately surrendered to the twentyyear-old Sandinista conscript. Days later Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega decorated the Sandinista soldiers involved with gold medals.5 During a broadcast from his trial in Nicaragua, Hasenfus claimed to be working for the CIA. In fact, the fuselage of the cargo plane was a “ flying file cabinet” that included logbooks with detailed descrip­ tions of previous covert supply flights from airports in El Salvador and Honduras, including the type and quantity of weapons dropped in each flight.6 A month later, the controversy deepened when reports revealed that funds for the contras were being illegally obtained through the sale of arms to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Several officials in the Reagan White House were impli­ cated, including National Security Council aide and Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. The White House was exposed in a clear endrun around Congress. President Reagan initially insisted that he “ did not - repeat, did not - trade weapons or anything else for hostages.”7 Within weeks, though, Attorney General Edwin Meese announced that his investigation into the matter had uncovered evidence suggesting that between $ 12 million and $30 million of the arms sales to Iran had been “ diverted” to the contras.8

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Iran-Contra

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The “ Iran-Contra” scandal represented America’s worst political scandal since Watergate. Sometime in 1986, North began overcharg­ ing the Iranians for the arms and using the surplus to fund the contra resupply operation that involved Hasenfus. Interestingly, former CIA official Felix Rodriguez, who had been at the Bay of Pigs in 19 6 1 and was present when Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia in 1967, had also been assisting the contra resupply effort. North relied on his colleague Richard Secord to transfer the funds and handle other logistical details. North was attempting to get around the Boland amendment’s restric­ tion on funding the contras. Secord and North netted over $ 16 million in profits from arms sales to Iran, though less than $4 million made its way to contra coffers; over the same period, Saudi Arabia contributed around $32 million.9 By the end of Reagan’s second term, even bona fide anti-communists like George Shultz wanted “ to get the Nicaragua problem resolved if only because it had become too painfully divisive for the country.” 10 What helped this “ extraction” along somewhat was the advent of the peace process in early 1987 led by Costa Rican president (Oscar Arias. As noted in Chapter 32, “ Esquipulas,” the Arias plan called for imme­ diate ceasefires in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala; the suspen­ sion of all outside support for insurgencies; and plans for future elec­ tions. Within two months after the agreement was signed, governments were to offer amnesty to guerrillas who had laid down their weapons to start a dialogue. While administration officials were not thrilled by the plan’s impli­ cations for its contra funding, they soon realized that the democratic procedures it required would be very valuable in undermining the highly undemocratic Sandinista government. As we read earlier, the Central American presidents met in Esquipulas, Guatemala, in early August 1987 and approved the Esquipulas II Accord, a slightly modi­ fied version of the Arias plan. The document did not call for an imme­ diate ceasefire, but it eventually laid the broad foundations for each country to address its internal conflict.11

Victory at the Ballot Box With the now long-standing U.S. insistence on democracy in Nicaragua combined with Arias’s Central America-wide peace process, there was

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great pressure for the Sandinistas to legitimize their rule. They were confident that they would win the vote handily, and set presiden­ tial elections for early 1990. In September 1989, the incoming Bush administration began efforts to provide funding for the elections. Offi­ cials insisted that the aid would be used for “ non-partisan techni­ cal support of the elections process” but the funding went almost exclusively to the anti-Sandinista opposition known as Nicaraguan Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositora, UNO). This coalition party, which spanned the ideological spectrum from conservative to communist, fielded as a presidential candidate Violeta Chamorro, the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the assassinated journalist and anti-Somoza leader. Chamorro’s credentials as a legitimate political figure were also burnished by her former role in the post-Somoza re­ volutionary government. The largely U.S. Congress-funded National Endowment for Democ­ racy (NED) provided the Nicaraguan opposition with $9 million, although a considerable amount of this money did not arrive until very late in the campaign.12 Despite U.S. funding, the Sandinistas remained confident of a pronounced victory at the polls. In fact, as the election neared, the Sandinistas invited even more international observers to witness their expected electoral triumph. Amazingly, at the same time, the Sandinistas began escalating their supply shipments to the FM LN in El Salvador in preparation for an offensive in late 1989. (The offensive ultimately failed, but it rattled Salvadoran authorities.) A month later, a small plane carrying arms from Nicaragua to the FM LN crashed in El Salvador. The shipment, recovered by Salvadoran security forces, included 24 Soviet-made SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), marking the first time that the Sandinistas had sent such heavy grade weapons to their Salvadoran allies. The Sandinistas’ delivery might have been a deliberate message to the Bush White House that they were still willing to cause problems for the United States in El Salvador if Washington continued to fund the contras. Publicly, Humberto Ortega dismissed the “ big fuss” that was being made because “ some arrows have turned up in El Salvador.” 13 The elections on February 2 5 ,19 9 0 , drew an estimated 700 official observers. By the end of the day, more than half of the almost 4,500 polling stations had been monitored by teams from the UN, Organi­ zation of American States (OAS), and former president Jimmy Carter’s

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Iran-Contra

401

private democracy organization. More than 2,000 unofficial observers and journalists were also in the country. Elliot L. Richardson, who oversaw the United Nations team of observers, was confident in the voting process: “ I don’t see any way of beating the system.” Mario Gonzales, in charge of the OAS observers, believed that “ the funda­ mental liberties necessary for a democratic process are there - the lib­ erty of expression, of organization, of movement.” 14 That night, the UN team’s “ quick count” of less than 10 percent of the vote showed Chamorro winning a decisive victory. Stunned, the Sandinista Directorate called a hasty meeting to decide its next moves. Within hours, an official from the Supreme Electoral Council read the initial results aloud, further indicating a stunning upset. When the dust had settled and all the votes were counted, Chamorro had taken 55 percent to Ortega’s 4 1 percent. Indeed, Nicaraguans of all walks of life had given the Sandinistas a clear mandate: it was time to go. The Sandinista revolution was over, killed in the end by the ballot box.15

Another “ Endless War” Concludes The Contra War resulted in the deaths of around 30,000 Nicara­ guans.16 Conservative U.S. officials and politicians argued that the Sandinistas’ ouster via elections was a vindication of the Reagan administration’s policies, especially as the contras kept pressure on an otherwise recalcitrant Managua. Liberals, on the other hand, con­ tended that it was only the Bush administration’s rejection of the hardline Reagan approach that had allowed for this relatively pacific outcome. Regardless, the conflict was a forceful iteration of century-long American influence in Nicaraguan affairs. Unlike Carter’s ambiva­ lence about using military force to check leftist revolution, the Rea­ gan administration’s commitment to confronting Soviet and Cuban wars of national liberation led to a policy that would unabashedly but sparingly be used to offer assistance and deploy forces to promote U.S. interests. In many ways, its outcome was a vindication, if not a justifica­ tion, of low-intensity conflict strategy. Not surprisingly, many critics believed that low-intensity conflict was a new term for the chronic inclination of the United States to intervene in “ endless wars.” 17 Over

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the course of almost a decade, American-supported contra attacks had decimated the economic infrastructure of Nicaragua and proved suc­ cessful in eroding support for a once-popular Sandinista regime. The covert nature of American involvement was critical; while support for the contras may not have remained out of the public eye, it largely avoided public control, and outcries among the American citizenry over repeated accounts of human rights violations often went ignored. There is no question that Washington also demanded that the Sandinistas pursue elections, which was something that a majority of Nicaraguans wanted as well. In fact, as mentioned in previous chapters, the Reagan administration had a tendency to pursue policies in Cen­ tral America, especially El Salvador, that were at times more pragmatic than its strident Cold War anti-communist rhetoric suggested. Nonetheless, this more modest project (in comparison to the U.S. involvement in El Salvador) was still a powerful form of interven­ tionism in that the United States effectively determined Nicaragua’s fate. Once the 1990s elections took place and the Sandinistas stepped down from power, Washington and the American people quickly for­ got about Nicaragua and the United States’ deep involvement just a few years earlier.

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PART FO U R

G E O R G E H . W. B U SH

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39 Elusive Justice

It says a lot about El Salvador that a decision to try anyone for murder is news. - N ew York Times editorial on the pending trial of five National Guardsmen for the December 1980 killing of the four American churchwomen, November 19 8 2 1 If there is any area where this country [El Salvador] has made zero progress, that’s the area of judicial reform and the administration of justice. There ain’t no justice here. - William Walker, U.S. Ambassador, 19 89 2

The Other War U.S. military assistance and advisors were the most controversial expenses of the enormous amounts of aid that Washington was send­ ing to El Salvador in the 1980s. No less significant, however, were the even greater amounts that the United States pumped into the Salvado­ ran economy. Between 1980 and 1989, economic assistance totaled $2.6 billion. With other sources of foreign financing reluctant to enter the war-torn country, this money was primarily used to reduce the Salvadoran government’s enormous debt burdens as well as provide cash reserves to purchase key imports. Another big portion went to development projects to repair infrastructure destroyed by the guerril­ las. For instance, according to the Central Bank annual report, repair­ ing the destruction caused by the FM LN offensive that began on 405 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 11 Jun 2018 at 08:00:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316471081.039

40 6

The Salvador Option

November 1 1 , 1989, cost $500 million.3 The remainder of the eco­ nomic funds went to cash transfers, food loans, food donations, among other types of assistance.4 The major frustration of many U.S. and Salvadoran officials work­ ing on these programs was that all of the spending was basically an attempt to return El Salvador to its status before the war began, leav­ ing it still a very poor and underdeveloped country. U.S. money also supported the troubled but massive agrarian reform initiative, which began soon after the 1979 coup that ushered in the reformist junta.5 Aid also went to education and rural health projects subtly intended to help win the hearts and minds of a traditionally neglected population susceptible to FM LN propaganda and recruitment.6 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, spent a total of $40 million for the construction and rehabilitation of roughly 1,000 rural classrooms that benefited 70,000 students. More than $70 mil­ lion was used to aid displaced persons, providing temporary jobs, daily food rations to 200,000 people, and medical visits to 400,000 people.7 Moreover USAID funds were used to pay for the salary of mayors, fix roads, build houses, and help stabilize the local currency, the colon.8 With the military aid factored in, El Salvador during the 1980s received more U.S. aid per capita than any country save Israel. While there were setbacks and much money wasted, over the years the U.S.-supported programs did allow the Salvadoran government to provide services that the FM LN simply could not match. Albeit highly imperfect and almost entirely reliant on U.S. funding, the elected Sal­ vadoran government was building while the guerrillas had been forced to resort to destruction, a fact not lost on the Salvadoran popula­ tion. Yet this reality was often ignored or not understood by U.S. offi­ cials who assumed that these “ other war” programs were failing. In a report written late in the war in 1989, the authors concluded, “ It should come as no surprise, then, that efforts in what U.S. advisors refer to as ‘the other war’, the coordination of civil and military activi­ ties to effective social reform - and ultimately win popular support have failed.”9 Close to one fifth of the entire Salvadoran population fled the coun­ try over the course of the war, with a majority going to the United States as illegal immigrants. Once established in American cities and suburbs like Los Angeles and Washington, DC, they sent back to their

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Elusive Justice

407

families and relatives sums of money that would have been impossible to earn had they remained in El Salvador. These immigrants eventually were acknowledged under the Voluntary Departure Status that allowed them to remain temporarily in the United States. The remittances came to over $2.5 billion in the last years of the war, roughly 15 -2 0 percent of the Central American country’s gross domestic product. It also kept the country from even greater economic turmoil despite the incessant guerrilla attacks and interruptions.10

“ Frustrate His Efforts to Investigate Right-Wing Terrorist Attacks” Given the dreadful state of justice in El Salvador at the time when the United States jumped feet first into the conflict in the early 1980s, U.S. officials realized that reforming the judiciary and addressing high-profile cases involving Americans was crucial to maintaining the engagement. Created by the State Department in 1984, the “ El Sal­ vador Judicial Reform Project” was the U.S. government’s key effort to address this pressing issue. In part due to pressure from affected families and human rights groups, the U.S. Congress earmarked $9.2 million to reform existing Salvadoran judicial institutions as well as create new bodies like the Special Investigative Unit, an elite civiliancontrolled police unit, and the Judicial Protection Unit, formed to pro­ tect participants in sensitive trials.11 The hope was that these sorts of reforms would both lessen future mistakes or abuses as well as address the body of outstanding and often highly controversial murder cases. In short, the expectation was that U.S. dollars and know-how would bring justice to El Salvador.12 Several years after these programs were implemented, a number of crit­ ics began to claim that they had failed miserably at addressing El Sal­ vador’s impunity for perpetrators of crimes and injustice for victims. And there was certainly evidence to back up these claims. A CIA report in February 1985 warned that the institutional reforms were under attack from “ rightist political factions” that emerged from legislative infighting to “ dominate judicial and legal appointments, complicating Duarte’s efforts to pursue legal solutions.” The report added that the “ rightist-dominated” Assembly was working to “ strip” Duarte’s judi­ cial reform commission of all funding as well as “ possibly frustrate” his efforts to “ investigate right-wing terrorist acts.” 13

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The Salvador Option

One oft-cited case came in 1986 when Salvadoran police discov­ ered a kidnapping ring run by army officers who had been seizing businessmen and holding them for ransom. One of the officers impli­ cated was Lieutenant Colonel Mauricio Staben, who commanded a U.S.-trained combat battalion. Edwin Corr, American ambassador at the time, called the case a crucial test of the ability of the Salvadoran justice system to convict military officers. After the arrests, however, two central witnesses died in police custody and a third was shot by a watchman who allegedly mistook him for a guerrilla. Staben refused to answer investigators’ questions, and the FAES sent a colonel to inter­ vene directly in the case with President Duarte.14 Without any evidence to corroborate the accusations, Staben was released and soon after resumed his position with the U.S.-trained battalion. Staben, like many officers in the 1980s, escaped court charges “ for any of the many non-combat killings attributed to the military.” 15 In 1986, remarking about high-ranking officers in El Salvador who had been privileged with impunity, Michael Posner, executive director of the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, commented to reporters: “ The government as a whole and the system as a whole has been unable to muster the political gumption to hold these military people accountable for their actions.” 16 The following year, in 1987, Senator Mark Hatfield (R) of Oregon and Representatives Jim Leach (R) of Iowa and George Miller (D) of California echoed the sentiment of the press by writing in a Washington Post editorial, “ While tremendous progress has been made in reducing human rights abuses in El Sal­ vador, not one officer had been prosecuted for the thousands of death squad killings.” 17 Despite what some critics contended given the plethora of nega­ tive evidence and attention, U.S. officials believed that the Salvado­ ran justice system did make some notable gains during the 1980s. The two gunmen who committed the Sheraton Hotel murders were con­ victed on three counts of aggravated homicide in 1986. In M ay 1984, a jury convicted and sentenced, to the maximum 30 years, all five of the National Guard troops implicated in the American churchwomen killings - “ the first time a jury had convicted any member of the armed forces for a slaying with political overtones.” 18

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Pessimism

Neither of his [President Reagan’s] major objectives - the overthrow of the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua and the military defeat of the leftist guerrillas in El Salvador - is likely to be achieved without the use of American troops. - N ew York Times correspondent, 19 8 4 1 We say we are here to fortify democracy. Well, hell, we could be doing that forever. -Am erican official, 19 89 2 Just as Marlow was confronted in Heart o f Darkness with the tragic absurdity of Kurtz’s claim that “ by the simple exercise of our will we can exert a power for good practically unbounded,” so the United States has become disillusioned with the role it has chosen to play in El Salvador. - U.S. military analyst, i 9 9 i 3

“ Those Plans Have Gone Nowhere” During the early years, American policymakers tended to be pessimistic on the Salvadoran government’s chances to win the war. These fears largely ebbed during the middle of the decade when it appeared that, through vigorous U.S. support, the government and FAES had the upper hand. Yet the outlook changed again by the late 1980s when even some of the most fervent supporters of U.S. engagement were conclud­ ing that it had failed. In November 1989, for example, a former Sal­ vadoran official surveyed the 10 years of American involvement in his 409 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 11 Jun 2018 at 08:00:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316471081.040

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The Salvador Option

country and concluded that “ the U.S. wanted to achieve three things: a measure of peace, the respect for human rights, and the institution­ alization of democratic processes. All three objectives have failed.”4 Speaking a year earlier, California congressman George Miller echoed a similar sentiment, observing: The failure of the Administration’s policy of building democracy in El Sal­ vador while defeating the leftist rebels militarily__ In 1984, we were told that the newly elected Government of Jose Napoleon Duarte, backed to the hilt by Washington, would represent a credible, effective, and moderate force that would implement genuine reform and bring peace to El Salvador. Those plans have gone nowhere.5

In 1988, a widely distributed evaluation based on field reporting by four U.S. military officers concluded that “ unhappily, the United States finds itself stuck with that war.” 6 Months later, a Congressional Research Service reinforced the growing belief that despite the massive American-backed effort, the war was stalemated: At this point, the eight year civil conflict in El Salvador appears to be dead­ locked; neither side shows signs of being able to defeat the other militarily or otherwise force an end to the war. Most observers believe that, barring an unexpected change in the circumstances supporting or causing the war such as a sharp drop in the level of US military assistance or an unexpected improve­ ment in the political or military situation, both sides in the war appear capable of carrying on the fighting at the present pace indefinitely.7

By the mid to late 1980s, the government and FAES’s apparent incom­ petence and unpopularity and the FM LN ’s ongoing activity led many in the media and elsewhere to conclude that despite billions in U.S. aid, the situation in El Salvador was dire. A Marxist revolution had been averted, perhaps, but the Salvadoran government and FAES now appeared locked in a bloody stalemate with the tenacious FM LN .8 The N ew York Times told its readers in early 1989, “ Things are getting worse in El Salvador, a trend that is etched as usual in blood - blood shed by guerrilla attacks, bombings and killings; more bloodshed by Army sweeps and death squad murders. After eight years of savage civil war, Salvadorans seemed enraged and saddened by the terrible normalcy such violence has acquired.”9 Another U.S. journalist evoked images of Saigon in the last days of the Vietnam War and reported

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411

that the well-guarded U.S. Embassy that housed U.S. diplomats, development experts, the Military Group, and certainly its fair share of spies, resembled “ a military bunker more than a diplomatic post.” A plaque commemorating the death of 14 Americans hung on one of the embassy’s walls, a reminder of U.S. sacrifices in the prolonged conflict.10 At this point, the usually skeptical foreign correspondents were not the only ones who believed the United States had a long way to go before its side would even have a shot at winning this war. In August 1987, the former commander of the critical U.S. Southern Command in Panama revealed his gloomy assessment: “ We have to face the hard facts, and we have to say this is going to be a war that will go 10 years. It might go 15 years, but it can be won. Then we have to get American commitment. . . . It’s difficult to convince people that in the long run democracy will survive only if we are willing to sacrifice in our own hemisphere.” 11 Members of the U.S. Congress expressed their concerns in late 1987 when a bipartisan group of congressmen published a report that called out the “ financing failure of the U.S. policy [in El Salvador] and the urgent need to reform it.” According to the report’s congressional spon­ sors, “ Congress and the [Reagan] administration should accept that the search for a military solution for the conflict in El Salvador has pro­ duced a stalemate.” Instead, it concluded, U.S. military aid should be the link to a resolution of the civil war.12 In further reflection of Wash­ ington’s fatigue on the Salvador Option, in January and February 1990, House of Representatives subcommittees held hearings titled, “ El Sal­ vador at the Crossroads: Peace or Another Decade of War?” 13

“ If Only Americans Act with Sufficient Dedication and Commitment” While they had failed to win the war, the guerrillas had effectively “ succeeded” in being “ felt everywhere in El Salvador.” 14 As in 1988, Defense Minister Ponce conceded that the war was far from over and “ the armed forces could be fighting the guerrillas for another ten years.” 15 Some observers even contended that the FAES was inten­ tionally not winning the war since that would mean the end of the

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The Salvador Option

multi-million dollar gravy train that was American military aid.16 Press coverage also focused on the amount of money that had been wasted on the vast number of development projects. As one foreign correspon­ dent wrote in a 1989 profile: “ In spite of more than $2 billion in Amer­ ican economic aid, infant mortality has risen, access to potable water has fallen and most rural health clinics do not have medicine. Nearly 10 0 embassy audits are now trying to trace how [Salvadoran] govern­ ment officials stole American aid money.” 17 Additional press coverage in the late 1980s reflects the pessimistic, impatient tone that had been widely adopted at this time. In Decem­ ber 1989, N ew York Times correspondent Joel Millman wrote that Washington still confronted a “ militarized El Salvador” that would not “ yield easily to civilian initiatives.” Millman quoted an American colonel, Robert M. Herrick, who followed the war: “ I love that word, ‘progress.’ We’ve had ‘progress’ every year since the war began. The war should have been over a long time ago.” He added, “ It’s the same mistake we made in Vietnam. Military aid is easy; all you have to do is give the bucks, and all they have to do is take them. But we got ourselves into a position where we have no leverage, so we have been acquiescing for years in corruption and methods of operations we don’t believe in, all because of the Realpolitik of winning the war.” 18 Remarkably, Herrick’s negative assessment echoed the views of the FD R ’s Ruben Zamora who posited that the United States had equated the professional armed forces with democracy. “ They’re not synony­ mous. What the U.S. has done is teach the Army it’s better to be owner of the country than a landlord of a building. Instead of their own party, they control the whole political system.” 19 One study sponsored by the Pentagon warned its American audience of relying on greater American know-how and resources as a solution: “ Everyone believes that if only the United States pushes hard enough, if only Americans act with sufficient dedication and commitment, the proper reforms will follow.”20 The author added that “ in El Salvador, as in Vietnam,” American help had been welcomed, but “ our advice spurned.” He added: That advice - to reform radically - threatens to alter fundamentally the posi­ tion and prerogatives of those in power. The United States, with its “ revolu­ tionary” means of combating insurgency, is threatening the very things its ally

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is fighting to defend. Those reforms that we have deemed absolutely essential respect for human rights, a judicial system that applies to all members of Sal­ vadoran society, radical land distribution - are measures no government in El Salvador has been able to achieve because they require fundamen­ tal changes in the country’s authoritarian culture, economic structure, and political practices.21

“ Today Those Numbers Are Reversed” Despite the growing chorus of dire prediction, U.S. officials in these same years pointed to the free elections and decline of human rights abuses as evidence that the situation had in fact improved. It appears as though within the Reagan administration there was a sense that its policies had succeeded. A classified National Security Directive boasted, “ In 1980 there were more dictatorships in Central America [than democracies]__ Today [1987] those numbers are reversed.”22 An earlier Top Secret directive from 1984 indicated that the Reagan administration believed in private what it said in public about how the Sandinistas, with Cuban/Soviet bloc support, continued to export subversion and insurgency through the region. Specifically, the docu­ ment reveals a concern for El Salvador’s stability, with the “ MarxistLeninist regime” in Nicaragua “ dedicated to the subversion and desta­ bilization of its democratic neighbors.”23 It warned that “ progress [in El Salvador] on improving democratic institutions, human rights, eco­ nomic development, and protecting internal reform is endangered by the growing, externally-supported insurgency.” 24 The Reagan administration’s classified policy guidance, addressing the Sandinistas’ aggressive subversion, was to “ support [El Salvador’s] democratization process and the existing reforms against attacks from the violent left and violent right.”25 These conclusions meant that the relatively moderate policies toward El Salvador would remain in place as the administration ramped up its aggressive efforts for the “ termination of Nicaragua’s support to Marxist/Leninist subversion and guerrilla activity in any foreign country.”26 Decades after these events, the declassified U.S. government documents and communica­ tions help reinforce the conclusion that objectives and policies in El Salvador and Nicaragua differed greatly - and that the Reagan admin­ istration remained committed to engagement in spite of conclusions

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4

i4

The Salvador Option

that it had failed miserably. As Los Angeles Times journalist Morris Blachman sums it up in 1988: “ the war is going badly,” yet the Reagan administration “ has insistently argued that U.S. policy is succeeding in El Salvador.”27

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Bush Arrives

Eight long years of political terror have turned this country into the Northern Ireland of Central America. -Ja m e s LeMoyne, N ew York Times correspondent, 19 8 9 1 There is no one in Salvador who does not recognize that D’Aubuisson is the best politician in the country. - William Walker, U.S. Ambassador, 19 89 2

Winning the November 1988 presidential election against Democratic challenger Michael Dukakis, Reagan’s two-term vice president George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency in late January 1989. Bush’s for­ eign policy team might have had a reputation (a considerable chunk of it self-described in subsequent memoirs) as pragmatic, but it was effectively as hawkish as the Reagan administration in its global out­ look, especially vis-a-vis Moscow. In the words of Bush and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft: “ The biggest thorn in U.S.-Soviet relations remained Central America, where the Soviets still supported their client Nicaragua and, through it and Cuba, the guerrillas in El Salvador.... [While] the Soviets may have ceased supplying weapons, the Cubans and East Germans had stepped in to replace them. When challenged, the Soviets complained that Castro was beyond their control.”3 Despite these concerns, however, the incoming Bush team was eager to bolster the White House’s relations with Capitol Hill over Central 415 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 11 Jun 2018 at 08:00:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316471081.041

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The Salvador Option

America policy. For incoming Secretary of State James Baker, the ongo­ ing war in Central America was kryptonite to domestic politics and an “ obstacle to the continued growth of democracy in all of Latin Amer­ ica__ Without doubt, it was my first priority.”4 To these ends, Bush’s Central America policy emphasized pragmatism and compromise over conflict and principle. The new administration meant “ the ball [was] back in Washington’s court, in part because key Central American lead­ ers [believed] that Bush [would] give more serious support than Ronald Reagan to negotiated solutions to their decade-old crisis.”5 At this time it was really Nicaragua as opposed to policy in El Salvador that was the true political thorn for the Bush administration’s “ Central Amer­ ica” policy. For instance, an article in the N ew York Times published shortly after Bush’s election in 1988, titled “ Bush Aides Speak of New Policy of Diplomacy in Central America,” homed in on engagement in Nicaragua, with no mention of El Salvador.6

“ Merited Serious Consideration” Having spent two terms as Reagan’s vice president, Bush was well versed in the evolution of policy in El Salvador. Bush officials immedi­ ately understood that Duarte’s fledgling government, the underwhelm­ ing combat performance (although notably better than in the early 1980s) of the FAES, and a spike in death squad activities was exactly what the country - and by extension U.S. interests - could not toler­ ate at this fragile moment in the war. According to Cresencio Arcos, a career diplomat assigned to Central American affairs at the time, “ Baker [incoming secretary of state] didn’t know much about El Sal­ vador. But he wanted the contras and the civil wars to go away. And this meant pursuing elections in Nicaragua [which led to the Sandinistas’ electoral defeat in 1990] and negotiations in El Salvador.”7 Or as Baker described it in his memoir, “ I knew the key to bipartisanship was to resolve the dispute over Central America.” 8 In the Bush administration’s estimation, a pragmatic line on El Sal­ vador meant continued engagement, even if many of its proponents had been marginalized over the course of the two terms. In a sense, as both Reagan and Bush administrations embraced engagement, the two did not differ greatly on policy in El Salvador, but the Reagan team’s initial rhetoric made it appear more hawkish.9 To this end, Baker contended

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that from the very first days of taking office in January 1989, the Bush administration “ looked for opportunities to signal our support for a negotiated settlement, particularly one related to elections and democ­ racy” in El Salvador.10 In fact, Baker publicly stated that the FM LN ’s February 1989 peace initiative “ merited serious consideration.” 11 The international and regional climate in El Salvador during the Bush years would make this peace more pressing and appealing. Both sides of the civil war, for example, were weary after a decade of costly conflict with no apparent winner. Moreover, the fall of the Berlin Wall less than a year after Bush came into office and the pre­ cipitous implosion of Soviet-backed communism meant that the new president did not have to confront in El Salvador the more “ existen­ tial” threats of Marxist takeovers that so perplexed the Carter and Reagan administrations. Revealingly, the Bush administration did not establish a high-level National Security Directive on El Salvador even though it did so for the Nicaragua/contras crisis and for Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, a standoff that led to the U.S. military invasion of Panama in late December 1989.12 In short, unlike earlier years, El Salvador was not a foreign policy “ crisis case,” despite some late shocking develop­ ments, most critically, the military’s cold-blooded murder of six Jesuit priests and two lay persons, and the FM LN ’s ferocious country-wide offensive and new possession of SAMs.

“ We Should Subject the Soviets to Chinese Water Torture” The Bush administration lost little opportunity to reinforce its tough line vis-a-vis Moscow and Havana. Speaking at the annual meet­ ing of the Organization of American States (OAS), Baker charged that Moscow’s support of freedom in Eastern Europe was not being matched in Central America. “ Soviet behavior toward Cuba and Cen­ tral America remains the biggest obstacle to a full, across-the-board improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.” 13 Within two months of taking office, Baker sent a cable to all American diplomatic posts clarifying that the new administration would not improve ties with Cuba despite its withdrawal from Angola, “ because Cuban behavior has not changed sufficiently to warrant a change in U.S. attitudes.” 14

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The Salvador Option

At Baker’s suggestion, Bush opted to make Central America a test of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s new foreign policy. Regard­ ing El Salvador specifically, Baker argued that the “ Soviet Union bears a special responsibility because its arms and money, moving through Cuba and Nicaragua, continue to support violence, destruction, and war. Shipments of Soviet rocket-propelled grenades to the [FMLN] are incompatible with the new thinking.” 15 And the best way for the Sovi­ ets to show good will would be to stop providing economic and mili­ tary aid to Cuba and Nicaragua. Baker told his boss, “ We should sub­ ject the Soviets to Chinese water torture on this subject.” He added, “ We’ll just keep telling them over and over - drop, drop, drop - that they’ve got to be part of the solution in Central America, or else they’ll find lots of other problems harder to deal with.” 16 At the same time that the Bush administration was supporting a multilateral approach to end the war in El Salvador, it continued to ramp up the pressure on Moscow to cut off military support for the Sandinista government in Managua. A few months earlier, Mikhail Gorbachev and Bush had exchanged New Year’s wishes, reflecting on the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, and on a successful effort by both countries in reducing the “ most terrifying weapons - nuclear weapons.” Gorbachev contended that this type of progress toward peace rested on the two nations working together, “ and I pray it will be safer still a year from now.” 17 A few months later, timed to coincide with Gorbachev’s visit to Havana in early April 1989, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater commented that “ [Gorbachev’s] words” were not matched by “ deeds which would give those words credence.” Fitzwater suggested worthy deeds could entail ending Moscow’s $500 million annual provision of military assistance to its Nicaraguan ally.18 It was noteworthy that Fitzwater acknowledged Gorbachev’s approval of the Washington-endorsed Esquipulas II peace process. Yet, he con­ tended, Gorbachev could have reinforced his support for Esquipulas II by cutting off military supplies to “ all irregular forces in the region,” including arms to the FM LN, just as, he claimed, the United States had ended military support for the contras.19 On March 27, 1989, Bush sent Gorbachev a letter relaying the U.S. government’s stance. It read, “ It’s hard to reconcile your slo­ gans . . . with continuing high levels of Soviet and Cuban assistance to Nicaragua.” If this did not cease, Bush warned, it would “ inevitably

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affect the nature of the [U.S.-Soviet] relationship.”20 A month later, Bush renewed the argument often made early in the Reagan years when he publicly commented, “ Soviet-bloc weapons, such as AK47s, are now being sent through Cuba and Nicaragua to the guerrillas fight­ ing the government in El Salvador.” Bush added that one critical step for peace entailed ending Nicaragua’s “ effort to export violent revolu­ tion.”21 Shortly after his public statement, Gorbachev sent Bush a letter indicating that it had stopped its arms shipments to Managua at the end of the previous year. And while this was a good sign, several offi­ cials found Gorbachev’s message to be somewhat ambiguous, leaving several skeptics to wonder if military aid would truly end.22 The CIA estimated that in 1988 the Soviet Union had supplied $ 5 15 million worth of military equipment to Nicaragua, the second highest tally since Moscow began shipping arms to the Marxist gov­ ernment in 1980. According to U.S. intelligence, the deliveries dur­ ing 1988 involved the arrival of 68 ships to Nicaraguan ports, about one every six days, carrying a total of 19,000 tons.23 In a bilateral summit in Washington in December 1987, when Reagan was still in office, Gorbachev had apparently already offered to cease aid to the Sandinistas on the condition - unacceptable to Washington - that the United States stop its aid to all Central American allies, including El Salvador.24 And while in 1989 U.S.-Soviet relations appeared to be warming, to the Bush administration it was unclear whether Russians and Cubans wanted to end the wars in Central America as much as they did.

“ Violence Must Be Condemned Whether It Comes from the Left or Right” Within two weeks of taking office on January 2 0 ,19 8 9 , Bush sent Vice President Dan Quayle to El Salvador - to represent the highest levels of the U.S. government - to deliver the incoming administration’s mes­ sage condemning violence. The secret-level briefing memo for Quayle’s meetings with Salvadoran counterparts reflects the complexity of the situation at hand: “ The ESAF [FAES] has done a first-rate job of bat­ tling the Marxist-Leninist insurgency. Incidents of human rights abuses by the ESAF [FAES] over the last five years have declined dramatically, but follow up on alleged abuses remains problematic. The ESAF [FAES]

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The Salvador Option

remains unwilling to permit investigation and prosecution of officers accused of human rights abuses.”25 In Quayle’s classified talking points for a meeting with ARENA party leader and presidential candidate Alfredo Cristiani, he was instructed to emphasize U.S. support in fighting the Marxist insur­ gency and in promoting the “ democratic process,” but also to criticize A R EN A ’s role in “ thwarting justice” in a key human rights case.26 In a meeting with the Salvadoran High Command and Defense Minis­ ter Vides Casanova, Quayle echoed then-Vice President George Bush’s message in late 1983 when he told his hosts, I am very aware that the FM LN is a Marxist-Leninist group, dedicated to ter­ rorism and financed from the outside__ Violence must be condemned whether it comes from the left or right. President Bush and I are hardliners on violence against innocent people. Some people in our country believe that El Salvador will not make it as a democracy. The same individuals are saying the clock will be turned back and are predicting more violence and abuses. President Bush and I want to prove them wrong - that democracy can survive, that human rights are sacred here.

Quayle also told the Salvadorans that U.S. aid would be jeopardized if the judicial case involving the October 1988 massacre of 10 civilians was not quickly solved.27 He believed it was both the “ right thing to do” and “ smart politics” to emphasize respect for human rights. Even the non-governmental Human Rights Watch called Quayle’s comments a “ strong message.”28 As a conservative, the vice president believed it was good politics to pressure the “ right-wing military,” given that he was expected to care only about “ threats to democracy that came from the left.”29 This type of balancing act was a critical component of U.S. engagement in El Salvador, especially as Washington had grown tired of the war and wanted violence from all sides to end.

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42 Bush, Cristiani, and the 1989 Vote

We say we are here to fortify democracy. Well, hell, we could be doing that forever. - U.S. Embassy official, 19 8 9 1 We have time. All the time it takes. - Fermdn Cienfuegos, FM LN commander, 19 89 2

“ Their Message Is No to Elections” In a notable development in the lead-up to the March 1989 pres­ idential vote, FDR members Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora returned to their country after eight years of self-imposed exile to run in the elections, which they did as part of the Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democrática, CD), an alliance of leftist groups. Inter­ estingly, the FM LN ’s increasingly aggressive tactics - including the escalated kidnapping of Christian Democratic mayors across the coun­ tryside - forced a rift with the nascent Convergence movement.3 The redoubtable Zamora commented, “ We believe the FM LN, the same as the Army, is obligated to abide by certain rules, such as the Geneva con­ vention, to protect civilians. Car bombs, attacks on houses of officials and killing mayors are not acceptable.”4 Convergence leaders also contended that the guerrillas’ efforts to disrupt the presidential elections were not effective, as evidenced by Salvadorans in recent history coming out to vote despite turmoil. For

421

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The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 4 2 .1. Convergence politicians Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora stump on the campaign trail, 1989. Ungo and Zam ora’s Convergence repre­ sented a number of leftist political groups but not the FM LN that continued as an insurgency. Convergence received less than 4 percent of the vote in the 1989 presidential election won by A R EN A ’s Alfredo Cristiani. Image and per­ mission by Jeremy Bigwood.

Convergence organizer Hector Silva, the FM LN was paying an enor­ mous political price for targeting the elections. “ Their [guerrillas’] mes­ sage is no to elections. They are talking insurrection, but the elections are going to take place. The FM LN must find meaning for what the vast majority of Salvadorans will be doing in two months - voting.” 5 In a sobering reminder of how the election was unfolding amid the ongoing war, the Convergence presidential candidate Guillermo Ungo campaigned wearing a bulletproof vest.6 Rattled by the Convergence’s participation in the elections, in late January the FM LN released a new peace plan that indicated the rebels would take part in the vote if it was postponed for six months and they were provided security guarantees. The deft plan put the Duarte administration in a bind since rejecting it would be categorically dif­ ficult now that the FM LN appeared to have dropped its demands for a power sharing government. As one Christian Democrat operative quipped, “ The proposal is politically brilliant. If the rebels shot as

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well as they write, they would have won the war a long time ago.”7 President Duarte’s response was especially delicate: “ For the first time in history, the FM LN has accepted that there is a method other than violence for reaching power - the democratic and electoral method.” 8 Nonetheless, and despite the U.S. Embassy calling the plan “ worthy of consideration,” Duarte rejected it, arguing that postponing the election would cause a constitutionally impermissible extension of his presiden­ tial term.9 In February, the U.S. intelligence community published a key classi­ fied report titled “ El Salvador: Government and Insurgent Prospects.” It stated that the FM LN ’s peace plan was “ clearly part of the strat­ egy” as the guerrillas intended for it to be rejected and thus “ legitimate the [guerrillas’] intensification of the war” as well as make the “ gov­ ernment appear rigid and duplicitous.” 10 The FM LN also aimed to “ shift the key political battle” to Washington, thereby “ reinvigorating US political opposition to continuing military and economic support.” It concluded that, while some guerrillas might have a genuine desire for peace, the FM LN ’s command intended to use the peace proposals principally to stave off military pressure.11 A month after rejecting the initial peace proposal, Duarte used a nationally broadcast television appearance to announce a surprise counteroffer: the elections would be held six weeks later than the scheduled date (rather than six months later as requested by the FM LN), and both sides must declare ceasefires before the direct talks would begin. Washington once again expressed support. The State Department called Duarte’s offer “ potentially the most significant opportunity ever for peace in El Salvador.” 12 During his stop in the country that January, Vice President Quayle urged “ heavily doubt­ ing Salvadorans” to consider the FM LN offer as a start for negotia­ tions. Secretary of State James Baker also advised “ Salvadoran author­ ities to explore carefully whether there is a chance for a cease-fire and peace talks.” 13 Meanwhile, the right criticized Duarte’s peace pitch for being too generous to the FM LN. Writing in the Washington Post when the rebel peace offer was still on the table, former Reagan official Jeane Kirk­ patrick blasted the proposal as the “ Marxists’ game in El Salvador.” 14 In another article, Kirkpatrick argued that the FM LN was simply using the “ peace” proposal as its fig leaf while it pursued a military

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4 24

The Salvador Option

solution. In an example of the separation between the engagement of the Bush team and that of the former Reagan hardliners, according to Kirkpatrick the FM LN ’s crafty proposal “ lured [the Bush administra­ tion] into a trap regarding El Salvador.” 15 The conservative Wall Street Journal editorial page attacked Iowa Democratic senator Tom Harkin for appearing “ ready to oblige” the FM LN ’s peace plan. It called Harkin’s plan to place 50 percent of U.S. military aid (then about $85 million a year) in escrow to bolster human rights and support the peace negotiations progress a “ full blown pro­ paganda offensive against El Salvador.” 16 The Journal also emphasized the FM LN ’s supporters in America of having “ [turned] up the volume” to help the guerrillas “ win in Congress what it can’t win on the bat­ tlefield.” In reference to the March presidential election, the Journal added that the guerrillas “ may prefer Capitol Hill because back in El Salvador democracy is proceeding without them.” 17 Interestingly, in a letter to the editor responding to the Journal’s scathing op-ed, Sena­ tor Harkin posited, “ I prefer to align myself with the vice president [Quayle]” in his support for a “ peaceful settlement” to the war.18 If this back-and-forth within the pages of the Wall Street Journal was any indication, a liberal Democratic senator and the incumbent vice president were allied on the Salvador Option.

“ Blow to Pieces or Consume with Flames” Despite the Salvadoran military’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire supposedly in support of the Salvadoran president’s offer, the guerrillas rejected Duarte’s peace counteroffer, and just weeks before the March election the once promising FMLN-initiated peace plan was dead.19 Leading up to the March 19 vote, in the midst of election campaign­ ing, the FM LN began using radio broadcasts to urge Salvadorans to boycott the election. They also claimed that the elections would be con­ sidered a declaration of renewed warfare by the government.20 Shortly before voting day, the FM LN threatened to “ blow to pieces or con­ sume with flames” any vehicles that violated its traffic ban.21 Guerrilla spokeswoman Ana Guadalupe Martinez acknowledged their election strategy in a radio interview: “ Our objective is to cause the maximum number of casualties to the army, to weaken its ability to . . . defend the elections.”22 In an especially brazen raid, days before the election

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FM LN operatives fired mortars at the presidential palace, although Duarte was not in the building at the time.23 Responding to the guerrilla campaign and echoing the historic 1982 and 1984 votes, the FAES mobilized all 54,000 of its active troops to guard polling places and monitor highway travel. In spite of these efforts, the military was unable to prevent the resignation of polling station committees in more than a dozen provincial towns after the committees received guerrilla threats.24 The government electoral body estimated that FM LN attacks, which affected roughly 15 percent of the polling stations, would reduce the turnout from an expected 1.2 million to around 900,000.25 Back in the United States a day before the momentous election, more than 1,200 people marched in Times Square in New York City to protest American involvement in El Salvador.26 Other protests planned to coincide with the presidential elections took place across the coun­ try. The Washington Post profiled marches in Washington, DC, and quoted local resident Omar Centurion who contended, “ Our coun­ try is at war, and these elections will do nothing to solve that cri­ sis. . . . Whether you support FM LN or not, you have to understand that they have the support of the people. So negotiations - honest nego­ tiations - with FM LN is the only way to solve the problems in El Sal­ vador. And we want the United States to support these negotiations.” Carmen Monico, an activist with the Salvadoran Refugee Committee in Washington, DC, called any elections without FM LN participation a “ fraud,” since the Christian Democrats and six other parties involved in the election are “ traditional parties that represent only some sectors of Salvadoran society.”27

The Ballot Box or Guns Soon after the polls closed on March 19 it became clear that A R EN A ’s Alfredo Cristiani had won a stunning 54 percent of the vote, handily defeating the Christian Democrat Fidel Chavez Mena (with 3 6 percent of the vote) and five other candidates, precluding the need for a runoff. Unlike 1982 when it meddled in the electoral process to ensure that the D ’Aubuisson right did not win the presidency, Washington was willing to stand aside this time around and let “ democracy” unfold. The White House used President Bush’s telephone conversation with

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42 6

The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 42.2. Chicago, March 1989. Protestors marching against U.S. involve­ ment in El Salvador. The demonstration on Michigan Avenue was organized by CISPES and a coalition of other leftist groups and coincided with the pres­ idential elections in El Salvador. Photo and permission by Linda Hess Miller.

victorious candidate Cristiani as an opportunity to reinforce its desire to see a negotiated accord. The press release read, “ The time has come to end the violence and secure an honorable peace that will protect the rights and security of all Salvadorans, regardless of their political views__ If the FM LN would embrace that goal, we are confident that this tragic war can come to an end.”28 The participation of the Convergence in the electoral process further undermined the FM LN ’s fundamental claim that Salvadoran systems excluded leftist candidates and voices. However, in an indication that even the civilian far left was not popular, the Convergence received less than 4 percent of the vote despite its confident predictions of hitting double digits. On a more encouraging note, despite having received scores of death threats from rightist elements, the Convergence suffered no casualties during the election.29 On June 1, 1989, a severely ailing Duarte handed over power to A R EN A ’s Cristiani, the Georgetown-educated millionaire busi­ ness conservative.30 Washington had invested billions on an engage­ ment predicated on moderate political figures like Duarte governing

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Bush, Cristiani, and the 1989 Vote

4 27

f i g u r e 42.3. Roberto D’Aubuisson and Alfredo Cristiani at an A REN A rally in Santa Ana, 1988. The Bush administration was eager to see the moderate, Georgetown-educated Cristiani lead the Salvadoran right instead of the polar­ izing figure of D’Aubuisson. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

the country. Yet the Salvadoran electorate had tired of the Duarte government’s failings and was willing to give the rightists a chance despite their association with death squads and the ruling business and landowning class. Bush received Cristiani at the White House on the morning of June 12 , 1989, where he contended it was not his Salvadoran counter­ part but instead the FM LN that was responsible for “ keeping peace from coming” to El Salvador. In echoes of the Reagan team’s hardline rhetoric in the early years of the war, Bush added that guerrillas con­ tinued to believe that they “ can use the gun to get what they should be willing to fight for at the ballot box.”31 Some observers contended that Cristiani’s victory was exactly what the FM LN had hoped for during its campaign to disrupt the elec­ tion, as having a rightist Salvadoran party in office would reinforce its claim that its struggle was against a repressive government.32 What­ ever the case, for supporters of U.S. policy the 1989 presidential vote provided more evidence on the role of elections in legitimizing El Sal­ vador’s political system. Dave McCurdy, Democratic representative

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from Oklahoma and member of the House Armed Services and Intel­ ligence Committee, had recently visited El Salvador and wrote in the Washington Post, “ This country never had a free election until 1982; it has had five since then.” 33 Adding to the legitimacy that the Salvadoran government had already gained in the eyes of Washington was the fact that the 1989 four-month campaign was marked by the lowest number of deaths in all five elections. That being said, atrocities still plagued the country at this time - such as the fatal shooting of a 14-year-old girl by guerrillas who fired at a bus in San Vicente province.34 These types of attacks on civilian targets, which continued after Cristiani’s election, complicated the push by some members of Congress to cut off aid. According to an anonymous staffer, “ Every time someone is blown away and it is blamed on the FM LN, we go underground for two weeks. We can’t talk about cutting aid. The FM LN does not understand the damage it does.”35 In many respects, though, Cristiani’s moderate inclinations were a blessing for U.S. officials who believed that as president he might be more a Duarte and less a D ’Aubuisson. According to one U.S. diplomat, “ We didn’t know if Tony [Cristiani] was just a pretty face and tool of AREN A and FAES dinosaurs and thus needed to be treated like D ’Aubuisson.”36 In a comparison with hawkish President Richard Nixon’s engagement with communist China in the 1970s, some observers even believed that Cristiani’s anti-communist bona fides would make it easier for him to negotiate a peace settlement with the FM LN. Another U.S. diplomat believed that Cristiani was commit­ ted to the peace process just as Duarte had been earlier in the decade.37

“ Mr. D ’Aubuisson Should Be Treated as a Pariah” In a sign of how seriously the Bush administration was taking El Sal­ vador at the time, in late June 1989 Vice President Quayle made his second visit to the tiny Central American country in six months. On his return to Washington, Quayle published a subtly revealing opin­ ion piece in the N ew York Times titled “ Get Tough on Salvador’s Killers,” which intended to demonstrate that the administration was pressuring both leftists and rightists, criticizing excesses and atrocities on both sides. Quayle’s most controversial meeting was with Roberto

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Bush, Cristiani, and the 1989 Vote

4 29

D ’Aubuisson who, due to his elected position in the National Assembly, was no longer “ blacklisted by the Embassy.”38 The U.S. Embassy had banned any diplomatic contact with D ’Aubuisson after it alleged that the former intelligence officer had plotted to assassinate Ambassador Thomas Pickering in 1985. Quayle explained that his decision to meet with D ’Aubuisson went “ to the heart of this Administration’s approach to human rights - an approach based not on posturing, but on engage­ ment, on hands-on involvement to seek change.”39 American conser­ vatives were pleased with Quayle’s meeting, yet others believed that it sent entirely the wrong message about U.S. priorities. Aryeh Neier of the Human Rights Watch stated, “ Mr. d’Aubuisson should be treated as a pariah by the United States and for the Vice President to dignify somebody of that sort by dealing with him ... is inappropriate.”40 During his visit, Quayle allowed himself to be pictured with a siz­ able cache of FM LN weapons and ammunition that the Salvadoran government alleged had been discovered in San Salvador the previous month. In preparing a background memo for Quayle on the subject just prior to his trip, the Pentagon indicated that the cache was the largest ever captured from the FM LN and comprised “ a wide variety of mod­ ern Soviet-designed small arms and over a quarter of a million rounds of ammunition” manufactured in Cuba. The memo added that “ the bulk of the arms and ammunition” used by the guerrillas “ continues to be provided by Cuba through Nicaragua. Managua's role consists primarily of providing transportation, warehousing, and coordination for deliveries of material bound for the insurgents.”41 Quayle also reiterated the view at the time that the FMLN's recent escalation in terrorist attacks was geared to provoke the rightist Cristiani government to overact and “ play into the hands of the FM LN ,” thus weakening congressional support for El Salvador. Quayle con­ tended that his broad message of democracy and human rights was not “ limited to D ’Aubuisson,” evidenced by his meeting with the Conver­ gence’s Ungo and Zamora. Or as Quayle characterized it: “ The high­ est level meeting an American official has ever held with these leaders of the guerrillas' political front.” Using carefully chosen words to describe the guerrillas' tactics, Quayle concluded that the FMLN's recent turn to “ assassination and killing” wasn’t very different from death squad terror. He added, in “ maintaining [its] armed struggle” the FM LN put itself in “ flagrant violation” of the Esquipulas II - the plan

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43o

The Salvador Option

for “ regional peace accepted by all Central American presidents.”42 By publicly linking the Salvadoran conflict to Esquipulas II, Quayle was attempting to isolate the FM LN politically. Yet in this effort Quayle also reinforced the emerging Bush policy of supporting a Central American process to finally put an end to this war - a war that would soon make its way from the mountainside to the very center of San Salvador.

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43 Guerrilla Second Final Offensive, November 1989

If the Cold War is over, why are we in El Salvador? - Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post columnist, December 19 89 1

Given their mutual hostility and suspicions, one might have assumed that the FM LN and incoming rightist Cristiani administration would not have talked peace. Yet it appeared that both sides still saw the value of at least sitting down at the negotiating table with their sworn enemy. In fact, the two ideologically polar sides agreed on church-moderated talks - the first since discussions broke down in 1987. The negotiations concerned an FM LN proposal that called for a permanent cessation of hostilities within three months, predicated on “ sweeping political reforms,” the demobilization of the rebel army, and the establishment of the FM LN as a legal party.2 The rebel proposal even called on the U.S. Congress to transform military aid to El Salvador into an assis­ tance plan aimed at the “ economic and social recovery of the coun­ try.” 3 The first meeting took place in September 1989 in Mexico City, followed by a second meeting a month later in Costa Rica, where talks failed to produce a ceasefire but both sides agreed to continue the meet­ ing in late November in Caracas, Venezuela. Any prospects of peace, however, were abruptly disrupted by renewed warfare. In June 1989, U.S. Army officer Larry Cline arrived in El Sal­ vador as part of an assignment with the 7th Special Forces Group to work with the FAES General Staff on communications issues. As Cline 4 3

1

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settled into his new position, he and some of his fellow American offi­ cers noticed that the FM LN had ratcheted up the snatching of teenage boys to add needed foot soldiers to the depleted guerrilla ranks, a prac­ tice that often began in the weeks and months before large rebel offen­ sives. What Cline did not fully realize at the time, however, was that the FM LN was on the verge of launching a massive operation with far more fury than had been attempted in the vaunted final offensive in January 19 8 1.4 Reflecting months of planning in consultation with Havana and relying on key logistical support from the Sandinistas, the FM LN ’s second “ final offensive” dubbed A l Tope y Punto (“ all at once to the maximum” ) began on the morning of November 1 1 when urban com­ mandos launched mortar attacks against National Guard installations and FAES General Staff headquarters in the capital.5 That same night thousands of insurgents launched simultaneous attacks on FAES posi­ tions throughout the country and struck at the presidential palace and Cristiani’s private residence in order to assassinate the Salvadoran pres­ ident - who happened to be outside the capital at the time. FM LN com­ mandos dispersed throughout San Salvador would wait inside houses, allow FAES troops to pass by, and then ambush the vulnerable soldiers. FM LN operatives also relied on pre-situated caches of weapons and supplies in San Salvador that allowed them to continue the offensive for three weeks. Here is the how the U.S. Embassy’s second-in-command official, William Jeffras Dieterich, described the guerrilla onslaught: I was in my residence and the Ambassador was in his, and around 8:30 or 9:00 one hell of a firefight broke out close to my house. We were used to hearing gunfire every now and then during the night, or hearing a telephone pole get blown up, so when it first started I thought that it was closer than usual but was not very worried. But it just kept going on and on. They had attacked all through the city and the guerrillas around my house were trying to get at President Cristiani’s house__ They really came close to getting into this house, but were finally driven off by a patrol of the Salvadoran army__ We [soon thereafter] found that much of the eastern suburbs of San Salvador were in guerrilla hands.6

FAES commanders were taken almost entirely by surprise by the offen­ sive’s ferocity and breadth. Complicating its response, the FAES had

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spent the past decade trying to more effectively transform into a coun­ terinsurgency capable of taking the fight to the guerrillas ensconced in the mountains. In November 1989, it was entirely unprepared to fight the type of urban battles that the guerrillas initiated in San Sal­ vador. In a classified post mortem on the offensive, the U.S. Embassy reported that after days of heavy fighting, desperate FAES commanders quickly requested that Cristiani approve the use of airstrikes within the city.7

“ Talking about Peace but Stepping Up the War” Within three days of the initial attack, the sheer numerical troop advan­ tage of the FAES and their relentless air forays against the guerrilla-held positions began to take their toll on the insurgents. A foreign corre­ spondent described the scene in the Salvadoran capital: [Today the FAES began] driving leftist rebels out of the city in block-by-block fighting that was laying waste to parts of the neighborhoods and turning thou­ sands of residents into refugees. In various sections of the city, people carrying white flags scurried along the streets, clutching their personal effects and head­ ing toward the houses of friends or family members or to refugee centers. Over­ head, C-47 cargo planes equipped with Gatling guns, helicopters with machine guns and small jets with rockets fired on neighborhoods where the guerrillas have holed up in houses, apartment buildings, abandoned schools and offices.8

With their president’s approval of selected urban targets, the FAES was able to use its A-37s and C-47s to go after guerrilla positions, espe­ cially in San Salvador.9 The problem, however, was that the guerrillas had intentionally occupied locales in upscale neighborhoods that it cor­ rectly believed the FAES would be reluctant to bomb given who lived there. The guerrillas also constructed trenches and tunnels in order to withstand the air attacks. Some of the tunnels where the rebels hid even linked houses to the city’s sewer system.10 Despite the guerrillas’ attempts to elude their attacks, the FAES did hit a number of neigh­ borhoods, a move that resulted in thousands of insurgent and civilian casualties and tens of thousands of destroyed buildings. Shortly after the offensive broke out, Cristiani announced that his government was still prepared to attend the peace talks slated for later that month in Caracas - a development that highlighted the

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The Salvador Option

4 3 .1. Rebel fighter, Zacamil neighborhood, San Salvador, November 12 ,19 8 9 . The ferocity and breadth of the FM LN ’s November 1989 final offen­ sive surprised many observers inside and outside Washington and San Salvador. The rebels’ ability to penetrate into some of San Salvador’s wealthiest neigh­ borhoods was seen as an especially embarrassing setback to the Salvadoran military. Yet, as was the case during the guerrillas’ original final offensive in January 19 8 1, the Salvadoran population did not rise up in support of them. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood. f ig u r e

long-standing tension between both sides, and the routine vacillation between peace and war. Yet he was emphatic that this full-scale offen­ sive had changed the terms of the negotiations: “ We will b e... less flexible and will demand that the talks be on the cessation of hostili­ ties before talking about anything else. We cannot play the game of the FM LN by talking about peace but stepping up the war.”11 The FM LN ’s Joaquin Villalobos, by contrast, emphasized not peace talks but the rebels’ military gains that included the establishment of “ popular gov­ ernments” in several “ liberated territories” throughout the country.12 “A Move of Desperation by the Guerrillas” A day into the offensive, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney appeared on NBC News television program Meet the Press and indicated that there was no chance of American involvement in the

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combat. He also highlighted the theme of guerrilla desperation that the Bush administration would posit throughout the siege of the capi­ tal: “ I think there’s a bit of a view that the attack on the city, basically, is a move of desperation by the guerrillas, that the FM LN is under a lot of pressure from the Salvadoran government, and that this is an effort to try to dramatize their posture.” 13 In San Salvador, U.S. Ambas­ sador William Walker stated in a press conference that the “ desperate” guerrillas were “ doing everything they can to hide behind the civilian population.” 14 A week later when the offensive was still unfolding, President Bush expressed a similar view during a conversation with journalists aboard Air Force One. When asked why the FM LN had launched the offensive, he replied: “ Desperation__ I think they see that their cause has very little following, as the world moves away from Marxism that they have as their creed.” 15 Some liberal observers were more inclined to view the guerrillas’ apparently formidable offensive not as desperation but rather as an unmistakable indication of their legitimacy among the population. One Washington Post reader responded to an opinion piece that Jeane Kirk­ patrick had written condemning the guerrilla action: While I do not approve of the FM LN ’s use of force, it does not take a col­ lege education to understand that when people are relegated to live in abject poverty and silenced into submission under the threat of being tortured or “ disappeared,” people will take to arms. This is why it should come as no sur­ prise to anyone that the FM LN has been able to launch and sustain such a massive offensive against the capital and numerous other cities in El Salvador. There can be no question that the FM LN has significant civilian support. How else could 1,500 guerrilla troops march into the capital undetected? Nor can there be any question that thousands of others have operated for a decade in a country the size of Massachusetts.16

“ Muzzle-to-Muzzle” Standoff A week into the fighting, media outlets were reporting that the rebels had largely been driven from the capital and surrounding areas.17 In an especially bold move, the FM LN conceded its setback in the poor areas of San Salvador, but nonetheless escalated operations against areas where the Salvadoran and Western elite lived. During the sec­ ond week of the offensive, FM LN commandos occupied positions in Colonia Escalón, one of the capital’s poshest neighborhoods. On the

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The Salvador Option

evening of November 2 1, backed up by about 10 0 -15 0 reinforcements, a dozen armed commandos infiltrated the Sheraton Hotel where they found the secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS), Joao Clemente Baena Soares as well as diplomats from vari­ ous countries and, biggest surprise of all, a dozen Green Beret soldiers belonging to the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Car­ olina.18 The Green Berets had just wrapped up a two-week training mission and were spending their last night at the hotel before depart­ ing from the international airport the next morning.19 Armed with M -i6s and grenade launchers, the U.S. Army Green Berets barricaded themselves on the fourth floor of the “ VIP tower” that the guerrillas had targeted and then occupied. The guerrilla com­ mandos and American Green Berets would now spend more than 24 hours in a tense “ muzzle-to-muzzle” standoff. While Ambassador Walker would later describe the American soldiers as “ hostages” in what was an “ irrational attack” by the guerrillas, the Green Berets themselves told foreign journalists while the impasse was still on that they were in control of the situation. “ This is our floor,” one soldier defiantly quipped, “ it’s always been our floor.”20 Walker subsequently defended his contention about the soldiers’ state: “ Were these people free to get up and go? No. That is my definition of a hostage.”21 One soldier, describing the situation to the same journalist, said the FM LN commandos thought they were seizing the building and instead got a “ Mexican standoff” with the highly trained American soldiers. Another Green Beret added, “ We made a deal with them. They don’t [expletive] with us and we don’t [expletive] with them. We said, ‘We don’t want a fight, we just want peace. We’re not terrorists, we’re not Salvadoran military. We’re Americans.’ They said, ‘Throw down your weapons.’ We said, ‘[Expletive] that.’ We were afraid for our lives.” The Green Berets contended that they did not fire any shots and that most of the guerrillas appeared to be teenagers. They still described their guerrilla adversaries as “ professional,” “ organized,” and “ gutsy.” When one of the journalists ask the Green Berets when they were leav­ ing the hotel, one especially jovial soldier replied, “ whenever check-out time is.”22 After the 28-hour standoff, the guerrilla commandos released all of the hotel guests through a truce made with the Salvadoran govern­ ment and mediated by the Catholic Church.23 The guerrillas slipped

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out in the middle of the night while the Red Cross secured a pacific end to the standoff, including the safety of the 17 civilians.24 The Green Berets, initially trapped on the fourth floor, exited the building the next morning after racing from the swimming pool patio area to the hotel’s main floor lobby accompanied by “ a pack of scrambling journalists.”25 According to one U.S. diplomat in San Salvador, “ The guerrillas sort of disappeared after they decided they had gotten into the wrong place and didn’t fight.”26 In the days that followed, the press began reporting that Washington had dispatched a rescue team that entailed the Army’s elite Delta Force counterterrorism unit, which flew from the United States in expecta­ tion of being ordered to free the trapped American soldiers.27 Appear­ ing to highlight his administration’s response to the “ hostage” crisis, President Bush told reporters on Air Force One that he had ordered the Delta Force team to El Salvador. He also mistakenly added that American and Salvadoran troops swept through the hotel to ensure there were no mines, anticipating that there might be opposition forces where the Green Berets were trapped.28 A Pentagon official subse­ quently clarified that “ elements” (by which he meant just a few indi­ viduals) of the Delta Force had arrived near the hotel and served as the “ eyes and ears” of the larger Delta Force set to raid the hotel if necessary.29 While not made public until the following year, a State Department cable from San Salvador to Washington sent during the standoff revealed that the U.S. government had spoken (possibly in Washington) with the FM LN “ to help ensure the safety of U.S. mili­ tary trainers who were trapped in the hotel.”30

“ We’ve Lost the War, Can You Get Me to Miami?” Late in the offensive, the FM LN broadcast that insurgent columns were on the skirts of the San Salvador volcano, Quetzaltepec, located right above the city. The rebels proposed a ceasefire, a move that a still rattled Cristiani called “ insincere.”31 As the offensive waned, on November 25, a plane carrying weapons from Nicaragua to the FM LN crashed in the south of El Salvador. The next day Cristiani broke diplomatic rela­ tions with the pro-rebel Sandinista government in Managua.32 Amid the unfolding chaos, U.S. military personnel were not surprisingly dis­ missive of the FAES’s ability to respond to this serious onslaught.

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The Salvador Option

According to one advisor, “ They [the FAES commanders] were just completely taken off balance. Most of the [U.S.] advisors were locked down, but two of us. They figured we could survive and get in and work with them at the Estado Mayor. We’re in there with the Salvadorans assuming the ESAF [FAES] would fold, who were saying, ‘We’ve lost the war, can you get me to Miami?’”33 An American diplomat work­ ing in El Salvador recalled, “ Heck, we had spent a billion on the ESAF [FAES] and the FM LN had walked into San Salvador.”34 The three-week insurgent offensive resulted in the heaviest fight­ ing of the war. By early December, the FAES had pushed the major­ ity of the rebel forces out of the capital. But large concentrations of insurgents remained just outside the city. Yet, believing the exagger­ ated reports of rebel formations, the tentative FAES remained on the defensive. It actually took prodding from U.S. advisors for the FAES to pursue the retreating guerrillas. Amazingly, the FM LN ’s focus on the wealthy neighborhoods, after their efforts had stalled elsewhere, forced the U.S. Embassy to evacuate a large number of its diplomats. The evacuation included the use of special aircraft to fly more than 230 American citizens out of the city to safety.35 Although a general revolt had failed to occur as planned during the 19 8 1 final offensive, FM LN commanders prayed that their show of force in San Salvador and other cities would spark a general upris­ ing in support of the guerrillas despite the short-term costs. Guerrilla spokeswoman Ana Guadalupe Martinez explained in an interview that these costs included the political effects of army attacks on the civilian areas in San Salvador and the exposure of cadres who were working clandestinely in legal “ popular organizations” like unions. “ The social costs have been very great,” she acknowledged. But she nonetheless argued that the offensive was vital to undermine the government’s view that the guerrillas were weak.36 This notion was corroborated by the impression among many that the offensive had shown that the hun­ dreds of millions of dollars in American aid and countless hours of training had still left the FAES entirely incapable of effectively han­ dling this sort of insurrection. In tactics that humiliated the FAES and terrified the civilian government, the FM LN had been able to effec­ tively move its troops and supplies through the cities, especially San Salvador.37 The offensive also startled El Salvador’s business elites who immediately realized that the FAES could not protect them.38

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Instead of the FAES taking the fight to the guerrillas in the moun­ tains, the FM LN had brought the war to the cities. Yet, less understood at the time was that another key factor behind the FM LN ’s decision to launch the offensive was its sober realization that its military standing had been severely diminished vis-a-vis the FAES. In this sense, the final offensive was a “ Hail M ary” to garner the people’s support in the city and spark the long awaited insurrection. And while some residents did help the guerrillas when they first entered San Salvador, many civilians fled the capital during lulls in the fighting. An American advisor on the ground at the time interpreted it this way: “As they moved into San Salvador itself, the FM LN was really expecting a lot of popular sup­ port. And they just didn’t get it, the pobrecitos [poor things]. They [the public] weren’t supporting the government forces either, they just told the FM LN to leave them alone. They [the FMLN] were just sort of press-ganging the public to join the cause . . . and the public just didn’t respond well.”39

“ Utter Failure of Nine Years of U.S. Policy” While the hoped for insurrection did not occur, the FM LN was able to continue the offensive, even though the intensity of the fighting ebbed after the first week; and the rebels benefited from the propaganda value of having foreign correspondents write about the “ Tet-like” climate in San Salvador for almost a month. Adding to the story of the failure of America’s proxy government was the FLM N ’s temporary capture of an American diplomat as well as its destruction of a U.S. Embassy official’s residence.40 The following is a sampling of the type of analysis that was pub­ lished on the battle for San Salvador. Journalist Douglas Farah writ­ ing in the Washington Post quoted a Western diplomat on the con­ flict: “ Propagandistically, the FM LN is winning because they are still fighting. They have been at a low level for a long time; they were per­ ceived as having been marginalized, and Cristiani was on top. Sud­ denly they have demonstrated they can hold the American-backed Sal­ vadoran armed forces at bay in the capital and various cities across the country.”41 Left-wing journalist Tommie Sue Montgomery wrote in late 1990, “ The offensive exposed the utter failure of nine years of U.S. policy. Apart from the armed forces’ incompetence, it soon

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The Salvador Option

became clear that ‘professionalization,’ teaching the army to respect human rights, and subordinating itself to civilian authority, was an illusion.”42 In 19 9 1, a key U.S. military analyst published a report to explain “ why American efforts in counterinsurgencies fail to deliver the results desired.”43 The report concluded, “ Ten years of limited progress and great frustration have revealed the limits of American power.”44 Another correspondent wrote that the guerrilla offensive had pulled El Salvador “ back to its awful past” of chaos and impotence.45 This foreign correspondent’s account only reinforced the broader pes­ simism swelling in recent years: For a decade, American military advisers, diplomats and reporters had been proclaiming that the Army had improved, that it was growing better able by the day to fight a difficult w ar.... After 10 days of fierce fighting in the capital, the Army managed to turn back the guerrilla offensive - but at a tremendous cost__ Despite the $ 1 billion in military aid the United States has given during the last decade, Washington could no longer claim that the Salvadoran military would be able to end the war soon.46

The final offensive reinforced the grim reality of the “ hurting stale­ mate” that had settled in El Salvador in the last years of the 1980s.47 In early 1990, for example, the CIA secretly reported that the failed guer­ rilla offensive had nonetheless given the FM LN political momentum.48 Paradoxically, the unprecedented scale of the fighting without a defi­ nite outcome reinforced the implausibility of either side winning a total military victory anytime soon. For the highly conservative Salvadoran elites, the offensive’s ferocity undermined their long held notion that they could annihilate the guerrillas and reinforced their belief that if the United States abandoned its insistence on “ low-intensity conflict” and its obsession with human rights the FAES could at least test the might of their full fury. The Salvadoran public emerged from the offen­ sive inclined to side, if anything, more with the government, a fact not lost on the FM LN commanders. And as the Berlin Wall came tumbling down in November 1989, El Salvador’s geopolitical significance for U.S. strategists and politicians also began to wane, something that had immediate consequences for the course of the war in the tiny Central American country. An official report on the state of the war requested by Democratic senator Edward Kennedy soberly concluded that as late as 19 9 1 two

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thirds of FAES forces were needed to guard military installations and economic infrastructure instead of conducting offensive operations.49 It appeared to most that the United States had spent billions of dol­ lars in El Salvador but had not proven that this money and training could make a significant difference. An earlier media profile of the FAES suggested that it had grown fat and happy off the deluge of U.S. largesse: “A picture emerges of an already powerful institution [the FAES] grown virtually untouchable on the spoils of a lucrative war.” 50 The November 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall might have sig­ naled that the Cold War was rapidly ending, yet, cruelly, El Salvador’s civil war appeared to be alive and well. When the final offensive com­ bat was still raging in San Salvador, reporter Chris McGreal of the British paper the Independent concluded, “ The great experiment in El Salvador has failed. A military and political body concerned primarily with its own power and wealth has rejected the U.S.-molded attempt to implant democracy.” 51

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44 Jesuit Killings

Listen, the problem of this country is not the problem of communism or capitalism. The problems of this country are problems of very basic wealth distribution, of very basic needs. But, when, in this country, you ask for the satisfaction of those needs, you become a subversive. - Father Ignacio Martín Barró, Jesuit priest murdered by FAES soldiers on November 16, 19 89 1 The low point of the Bush administration’s human rights policy toward El Salvador was its handling of the case of the six Jesuit priests. - Human Rights Watch, 19892

On November 1 1 ,1 9 8 9 , the first day of their offensive in San Salvador, FM LN commandos destroyed one of the main gates of the leafy Jesuitrun “Jose Simeon Cañas” Central American University (Universidad Centroamericana “Jose Simeon Cañas,” UCA) and sought refuge in the academic compound. Days later an FAES force searched the cam­ pus grounds and buildings looking for enemy fighters who might still be hiding out. After the search, a military detachment was assigned to record who entered and exited the UCA gates. The FAES also started prohibiting any individuals or vehicles onto the campus with­ out authorization. A few days later, FAES troops conducted another search to pursue what it believed were more than 200 guerrillas who were using the campus as a base from which to fire on the nearby military academy.3 While a private institution, the UCA had long been accused by many on the right or in the FAES of being a bastion of pro-guerrilla 442

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subversion or serving as “ advisors to the FM LN .”4 The UCA’s highly vocal rector, Father Ignacio Ellacuria, had been called by the right “ the most dangerous enemy that we have here against our people and the armed forces.” 5 Another rightist smear was that Ellacuria was “ the maximum representative of Marxism in the country.” 6 What almost no one disputed was that the university had long been a stronghold for vocal Jesuit priests and their unyielding gospel of radical social change. During a meeting on the night of November 15 ,19 8 9 , then head of the army’s joint chiefs of staff Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, in the pres­ ence of generals and colonels, ordered the head of the army’s military academy, Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides, to kill the despised Ellacuria and leave no witnesses alive. Just after midnight on a day that had seen heavy house-to-house fighting in the capital, Benavides then ordered Lieutenant Ricardo Espinoza to carry out this covert mis­ sion. Espinoza soon left the military academy compound with sev­ eral men in two beige vans and joined up with other soldiers outside the UCA. Espinoza told his fellow soldiers that he had received “ orders from above” to carry out this mission. Some troops broke off and hastily erected barricades to keep vehicles from entering the campus while the lieutenants and the rest of the troops headed up a winding hill to the central campus. Now in the early hours of the morning on Novem­ ber 16 , part of the unit attached to the elite Atlacatl Battalion then advanced to the quarters where the priests lived. Father Ellacuria let the soldiers in, recognizing two of the men from their search a few days prior. The soldiers then ordered five startled priests to move outside to the front courtyard where they were forced down and shot repeatedly in the head. One of the fallen priests, noted scholar Segundo Montes, had previously served as Espinoza’s teacher. Moments after, soldiers heard another priest, Father Joaquin Lopez y López, moving in the doorway of the dormitory and quickly shot him. When a soldier felt Lopez’s hand grabbing for his ankle, he shot him four more times. Five of the victims were Spanish, along with the Salvadoran López. Soldiers apprehended the residence’s cook, Julia Ramos and her 15-year-old daughter Celina who were located in a guest room. One of the soldiers heard the wounded mother and daugh­ ter writhing on the floor and called them “ toad” and “ Satan.” The offi­ cer then ordered a soldier to “ re-kill” them, which he did by shooting

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The Salvador Option

them repeatedly until their moans ceased. Ramos’s husband happened to be staying at their home that night and was not on the campus. The next day he found the bodies of his wife and daughter near the other six corpses. Soldiers then fired captured guerrilla weapons, M-79s and M-60s, and hastily painted pro-FMLN slogans (e.g., “ ‘The FM LN executed the enemy spies” or “ Victory or Death, FM LN ” ) on the walls to set up their ruse that the FM LN commandos had perpetrated the mas­ sacre. The entire operation lasted for roughly 45 minutes before one of the commanding lieutenants gave the order to fire a flare to signal the troops to return to the military academy. By 2:30 a .m . the troops were back in their barracks.7 One soldier later testified that he saw a depart­ ing soldier carrying a light brown valise, which the Jesuits believed contained $5,000 that had been given to Ellacuria a few days earlier in recognition of his work on human rights.8

“ Why Are We Killing People in El Salvador?” Initially, the Salvadoran government and the FAES blamed the guerril­ las for the atrocity. One government official, Ricardo Valdivieso, stated, “ The FM LN will have a tougher position vis-a-vis the government with its murder of the six Jesuit priests.”9 Another official condemned the FM LN as a “ collectivist murderous monster.” Some officials pointed to the AK-47 shell casings found throughout the campus grounds as evidence of guerrilla involvement. Others instantly assumed that A R EN A ’s D ’Aubuisson was surely the intellectual mastermind behind the atrocity.10 Chief State Depart­ ment diplomat for Latin America Bernard W. Aronson concluded that the guerrillas “ got what they wanted: the right-wing death squads probably did come out of the closet.” 11 Those who suspected the extreme right concluded that Cristiani’s government would lose credi­ bility. “ What is scaring me rigid is that the right wing is taking over,” a diplomat contended; “ I think Cristiani has lost control.” 12 Soon after news of the massacre broke, U.S. Ambassador William Walker publicly stated the U.S. response, “ Whoever committed this horrific act, whether it be leftist or rightist, is doing the work of the FM LN. They are traitors to their country . . . and making a great effort against the democratic process and damaging the cause of the

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constitutionally elected government.” 13 An American diplomat in San Salvador recounted two decades later, “ We were all horrifically shocked [by the Jesuits murders]. Not that we were their friends as they were very critical of U.S. policy. They were self-righteous, they were ideological, but they were not insurgents. By virtue of their intel­ lectual merits, while we could disagree in many aspects . . . we could never have imagined that this could have happened to them.” 14 Promising an immediate investigation and suggesting that it could have been the work of either guerrillas or the military, President Cristiani condemned this “ act of savagery” intended to “ hurt democracy and stop the peace process in El Salvador.” 15 Amid rising accusations from both the left and right Cristiani said, “ If there are people involved who turn out to be members of the armed forces, then the weight of the law must fall on them.” At the same time, he dismissed a witness’s statement describing the military uniform the killers wore: “ For me this is not categoric proof, because there are many others who do not belong to the armed forces who have uniforms.” 16 Cristiani also noted that the statement by the government radio implicating the FM LN in the attacks had not been authorized.17 With the emergence of new facts and a witness statement from that fateful night, more fingers began pointing to the military. Back in Washington pressure was mounting for the administration to denounce what increasingly appeared to be a military-led massacre. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said, “ We condemn in the strongest pos­ sible terms the outrageous murders.” 18 A few days later on Novem­ ber 20, Bush was at a fundraising luncheon in Chicago when two protestors interrupted the president’s remarks: “ Why are we killing people in El Salvador? In the name of God, stop the repression in El Salvador! In the name of God, stop the repression in El Salvador!” Bush would later respond to a question at the same function by emphasiz­ ing El Salvador’s democracy, “ President Cristiani told me on the phone that they will do everything they can to bring to justice, whether they’re from the right or the left, those who wantonly murdered those priests. But we must not pull our support away for a freely elected democratic government in Central America.” 19 That same day, the CIA contended that the killers could have been from the FM LN or “ rightist extrem­ ists” ; there was no mention of possible FAES involvement.20 Decades later, an American diplomat in El Salvador at the time of the Jesuit

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murders would reflect on the aftermath of the atrocity, revealing the uncertainty of the suspected perpetrators: Although much of the world was willing to jump to the conclusion that the Army had done it, the fact was, nobody really knew. Some of us, including me, entertained the idea that it also could have been the guerrillas. Remember, we had a conversation with people at the university who indicated they favored the peace alternative. It wasn’t entirely beyond my imagination that someone on the left had decided to get rid of these people.21

“A Pact with Killers” The Bush administration spokeswoman pushed the need for the Sal­ vadoran government to “ conduct a full and impartial investigation.” It then sent General Maxwell R. Thurman, head of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama, to deliver a stern message to his FAES counter­ parts: “ There is only one way out. If some of your people were involved in the Jesuit murders, cough them up.”22 During the ongoing investigation, Time magazine published an edi­ torial that laid out the widespread liberal critique of U.S. policy: “ Washington should cut off military aid unless travesties like the killing of six Jesuits are stopped__ El Salvador’s armed forces, nourished by American dollars, bear primary responsibility for the country’s scan­ dalous human rights record.”23 Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen argued that the killings exposed Washington’s morally corrupt policy in the country: The murder of the Jesuits, probably by the military or with its permission, is further evidence that elements in El Salvador will continue to go their own way. The Salvadoran right wing has always used the Communist threat to justify its barbarity, and we have used the same reasoning to justify our aid. With the Berlin Wall all but down, our policy in El Salvador stands exposed for what it has always been: a pact with killers. It’s time for the United States to go home.24

While critics believed the Jesuit killings proved that the U.S. role in El Salvador was futile, back in San Salvador, Ambassador Walker made a variety of public comments in support of the Cristiani administra­ tion.25 In the weeks following the killings he said, “ I mean, this is war. It’s fighting, it’s death__ I really think President Cristiani is under a

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barrage from all sides and all sorts of events. I think some things are happening that he would prefer not to happen.”26 The American diplo­ mat also highlighted the excesses of the “ violent left” that “ do very nasty things to people. . . . I will do everything I can to make sure it never comes to power here. I would prefer a weak and vacillating gov­ ernment that maybe isn’t all it should be [rather] than a FM LN gov­ ernment that will turn this place into another Cambodia.”27 At the same time Walker lambasted the FM LN, he also privately criticized the FAES for not taking more accountability on the Jesuit killings case.28 In January 1990, for example, Walker wrote back to Washington and called for the removal of defense minister Gen­ eral Ponce for mishandling the Jesuit case. Walker also recommended that the Bush administration suspend delivery of high priority items to the FAES, including the A H -i Cobra helicopters and armored personnel carriers.29 As more details of the killings that implicated the FAES began to rise to the surface, Secretary of State James Baker confidentially asked the CIA Director William Webster for his assistance in “ determining responsibility for the murder[s]” that is a matter of the “ highest pri­ ority to this Administration.” Baker added that as a “ complement to our efforts to ensure a vigorous investigation by Salvadoran author­ ities,” Webster needed to devote the “ maximum possible resources” to uncover the perpetrators.30 Bernard Aronson warned Ambassador Walker to speed up the investigations, arguing that allowing them to become protracted could result in impunity for the killers.31 While the facts were still fuzzy, the Bush administration found itself in a dilemma: it realized that the likely culprit - the FAES - needed to be investigated and punished, but it also knew that doing so could provoke a backlash within the military ranks - the very institution tasked with repelling a surprisingly robust guerrilla offensive. To this end, in these early days of the aftermath Aronson revealed a deep concern for keeping U.S. suspicions about the FAES involvement in the murders secret: “ I cannot stress enough the importance of building as solid a case as possible and then working closely with Cristiani on a strategy. We may be asking Cristiani to do what has never been done, actions which may involve moving against elements of his own party and perhaps even divide the Army. Please hold this information very closely.”32

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The Salvador Option “ Pouring Gasoline on a Burning House”

At the same time, the lack of progress in El Salvador, amplified by the Jesuit killings, embittered U.S. congressional leaders about the abu­ sive behavior committed by America’s ostensible ally, the Salvado­ ran military. While it did not become law, in January 1990, M as­ sachusetts Democratic senators John Kerry and Edward Kennedy introduced legislation to cease all military aid to El Salvador. That same month, House Democrats created a task force to monitor the Jesuit killing investigations chaired by Representative Joseph Moakley of Massachusetts. Moakley quickly became a dogged investigator of the killings and in an April 1990 interim report that became known as the Moakley Commission, he alleged that members of the army’s high command were linked to the murders.33 Interestingly, Moakley acknowledged that “ despite his criticisms” the Salvadoran judicial system was “ mak­ ing important progress” as evidenced by not just the Jesuit investiga­ tion but also the 1985 Zona Rosa case.34 Ironically, while his report helped move a fed-up U.S. Congress toward cutting off assistance, Moakley gave President Cristiani “ credit for encouraging the military to cooperate in this investigation and for the symbolic importance of his willingness to testify personally in the case.”35 Without Cristiani’s efforts, Moakley concluded, “ I do not believe that the most direct per­ petrators of the [Jesuit] crimes would ever have been identified.”36 A classified August 13 , 1990, State Department cable titled “ The Jesuit Case: Another Big Jolt” revealed intelligence that the U.S. Embassy had provided to Moakley for the investigation.37 According to the report, the decision to conduct the killings was “ made at the highest level.” Colonel Ponce “ took credit” for the murders, and Cristiani was briefed but took “ no action” on the matter.38 Representative Moakley’s efforts helped influence other members of Congress to consider cutting aid to the Salvadoran military.39 One such Democratic senator, Connecticut’s Christopher Dodd, stated that there were 300 members of Congress ready to cut aid “ if [Cristiani] loses control, if he doesn’t have political control, if he governs the coun­ try without exercising power.” In one immediate though unsuccessful effort to restrict military aid, Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy was able to garner 39 votes in favor, a sum far higher than most observers had

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anticipated.40 At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the killings, California senator Alan Cranston compared U.S. military aid to “ pouring gasoline on a burning house,” and that American interests resided in reducing the violence, not fueling it with more arms.41 As the Jesuit investigations - and concomitant political reactions to them in Washington - unfolded, the Bush administration found itself in a difficult position in El Salvador. It wanted to continue to support the civilian government but also realized that its credibility lay in perceived progress in Washington on the Jesuit killings. A few days after the atrocity, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger met with an ecumenical delegation led by the Jesuit presi­ dent of Georgetown University, Father Leo O’Donovan. In comments that diverged from Walker’s strong support of Cristiani, Eagleburger indicated to the group that the Jesuit case was a “ test for the Salvado­ ran government. If the Salvadorans failed the test, they would prove to be unsupportable.”42 Interviewed decades later, an embassy official, William Jeffras Dieterich, defended the investigation: “ We were under increasing pres­ sure from the local Jesuits, who were convinced we knew who did it, but wouldn’t tell them. The fact was, we didn’t know. The Salvadoran government knew things that it wasn’t telling us.”43 The career diplo­ mat elaborated: A lot of our problem in the Jesuit case was dealing with people who had an institutional stake in not trusting us, or saying they didn’t trust us. The whole Jesuit case was a classic example of the moving shoreline that we could never reach. The first thing we heard was “Well, we will never find out. We’ ll never really see the evidence of who did it. We know who did it, but we’ ll never find out, we’ll never see it.” Well we did, so then it was. “ Well, there will never be an indictment.” Well, there was. So then it was, “Well, there will never be a trial.” Well, there finally was and it took a huge amount of pressure and intervention on our part to make sure there was a trial.44

“ Not a Dime of Military Aid Should Go to El Salvador” Accusations and rumors about who might have been behind the killings circled around San Salvador and Washington for weeks after the incident. Then on January 2, 1990, American major Eric Buckland assigned to the U.S. Embassy belatedly disclosed to his superiors

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The Salvador Option

that he had been tipped off by an FAES officer that Colonel Carlos A viles had revealed to him in confidence that Benavides had ordered the murders.45 Within hours, Buckland, accompanied by U.S. officials, was in the office of Salvadoran Army chief of staff Rene Emilio Ponce, confronting an incredulous A viles.46 For the civilian diplomats inside the embassy, this belated disclosure was “ a real shock since it suggested that some on our team knew this was happening but unwillingly or unknowingly did not come forward.”47 Following the revelations, embassy officials immediately confronted the FAES High Command as well as President Cristiani. Likely not a coincidence, on January 7 Cristiani announced in a televised speech that 47 soldiers and two officers were being held for questioning in the Jesuit killings case. Many believed that Cristiani made this bold step over the wishes of the FAES leadership who had been working to cover up the crime. At this same time, a major break in the case came through with the examination of evidence recovered at the scene. The U.S.-trained Special Investigative Unit used ballistic analysis of shell casings to trace them back to the weapons used by members of the Atlacatl Battalion. Similar tracing was made with troop boot marks left in the mud, which suggested to some that this had been a very sloppily conducted setup. Investigators also used handwriting analysis to determine that FAES troops had written the pro-FMLN slogans on the walls.48 A U.S. official acknowledged that the “ Salvadorans, not us, developed the case after it broke [that FAES soldiers had perpetrated it].”49 In analysis that might have been influenced by the swelling contro­ versy over the killings, the Bush administration investigated whether the implicated Atlacatl Battalion had been trained by U.S. advisors. It concluded that, unlike in 19 8 1 when U.S. trainers had worked with Atlacatl in the months before it committed the El Mozote massacre, ensuing training interaction with the battalion had been episodic. Con­ sidering the battalion’s 60 percent troop personnel turnover rate, it could not be considered “ U.S. trained.” 50 In the 18 months that lapsed before the Jesuit murders investiga­ tion was concluded, Congress adopted various new conditions on for­ eign aid to El Salvador, cutting in half the proposed amount, from $85 million to $42.5 million, linking the assistance to the Salvadoran gov­ ernment’s earnest attempts to achieve peace and find the perpetrators of

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the Jesuit murders.51 Senator John Kerry had supported aid in the past but also expressed the frustration of many colleagues when he warned that “ not a dime of military aid should go to El Salvador” until the armed forces reformed. “ It’s our money,” he added; “ We have a right to decide what to do with it.” 52 Interestingly, some in the Bush administration came to agree that these budget cuts that represented the first time Congress had ever sig­ nificantly reduced aid during the entire war were an effective and nec­ essary way to pressure San Salvador.53 At the same time, this was also a difficult line to walk. While the aid cuts were a necessary heavy stick in promoting reforms, Bush officials feared that the cuts could make the Salvadoran military less able to check FM LN gains - the very stale­ mate they believed was the key to a negotiated settlement. The admin­ istration would spend a considerable amount of time negotiating with a fed-up Congress on whether and how military assistance should be modified. Yet, despite some clear differences and a White House prefer­ ence not to sanction the Salvadoran government, Bush officials began ramping up their efforts to promote the negotiated settlement. It was not lost on Cristiani and at least some in the FAES that both Congress and the Bush White House were more serious than ever about drastically reducing aid if reforms were not made. After a decade in which they had become totally dependent on American largesse, this was a terrifying development for the Salvadoran government and mil­ itary still reeling from the FM LN ’s stinging urban offensive. The intense focus of the U.S. Congress - and by extension the U.S. Embassy’s heavy-handed diplomacy - on this case pressured the Sal­ vadoran authorities to reach a satisfactory outcome. In September 19 9 1, after two years of pre-trial proceedings, a jury found Colonel Benavides and Lieutenant Yusshy Rene Mendoza guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism; they were sentenced to the maximum term of 30 years. For the first time in El Salvador’s history, a senior military officer was convicted of a human rights violation.54 The seven FAES soldiers, including those accused of actually doing the shooting, were acquitted since they acted on direct orders. Right after the trial, the presiding judge announced that he was fleeing El Salvador for his own safety. Following the verdict, U.S. officials publicly highlighted the unprece­ dented nature of the Salvadoran government’s efforts that resulted in

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The Salvador Option

the first conviction of Salvadoran military personnel for crimes com­ mitted while on duty. Many critics, however, contended that the inves­ tigation and trial were in fact intentionally designed to punish “ small fish” like Benavides while the real masterminds like Colonel Ponce, the FAES High Command, and even Cristiani and his civilian defense minister remained untouched.55

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45 SAMs

We have to seek our own conception for the war. The war may be low intensity for the United States ... but for us this is total conflict. - General Juan Orlando Zepeda, Salvadoran Deputy Defense Minister, October 19 8 8 1 In truth, my government is not engaged, and has not been engaged in, the provision of arms or other supplies to either of the factions engaged in the civil war in El Salvador. - Miguel D’Escoto, Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, April 2 1 , 19 8 4 2 She’s too much of a pacifist to agree to do it and she’s too smart to let someone else do it. - Reverend Debbie Roberts commenting on the charges against American Jennifer Casolo, December I9893

On November 24 ,19 8 9 , when the final offensive was still raging across El Salvador, Salvadoran police allegedly captured an FM LN gunrun­ ner, Fausto Gallardo Valdez, who confessed to knowing of a weapons cache located in the walled courtyard of the house of American church worker Jennifer Casolo from Connecticut. Casolo had been working in El Salvador leading informational tours for Christian Education Sem­ inars, a Texas-based ecumenical organization known for being non­ partisan. The authorities told the press that Gallardo did not name Casolo but instead described a foreign female that fit her description. The following night the police unearthed the trove of weapons and

453

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ammunition. The police initially claimed that the cache included 80,000 rounds of ammunition for assault rifles, but then cut the num­ ber to 22,000 along with 103 mortar grenades, 2 13 blocks of dynamite, 405 detonators, and 15 0 feet of slow-burning fuse.4 Casolo was soon charged with terrorism and harboring arms and was held under a 90-day investigative statute. Casolo’s lawyers, Ram­ sey Clark and Salvador Ibarra, contended that because she had only rented the house for six months and was frequently traveling that the weapons could have easily been buried without her knowledge. The case took another turn days later when the government released a 60minute videotape taken during the raid showing police discovering a photograph of Casolo, a cassette of American folk singer Tracy Chap­ man, and various other materials buried along with the weapons. Casolo’s supporters quickly dismissed the videotape, contending that in El Salvador it was common to bury important possessions due to the constant fear of violence. Casolo’s friends in the religious com­ munity - most of whom were vehemently opposed to U.S. policy in El Salvador - were especially incensed when a U.S. embassy official called the arrest “ a good thing.” Bush’s spokesman Marlin Fitzwater added to the growing rift when he told journalists, “ There are indica­ tions of her involvement, that’s for certain__ We’re talking about tons of equipment. . . . This is hardly a case of someone having a few things slipped in their shopping bag on the way home.” 5 President Bush’s first comments on the case were more judicious than his spokesman’s, say­ ing that he told President Cristiani that it was “ essential” that Casolo receive a fair trial. In early December, residents of her hometown of Thomaston, Con­ necticut, held a prayer vigil for Casolo during which they raised $1,000 for her defense. A few days later, 300 students from Brandeis Univer­ sity, Casolo’s alma mater, tied light blue sympathy ribbons around their arms in solidarity with the woman who had graduated six years ear­ lier. Sophomore student Ligia Dias was at the campus rally and told a reporter, “ I feel I want to show my support for Jennifer, just to say that we are behind her, even though we don’t know her personally.” 6 Reverend Jesse Jackson made similar comments during a prayer service in Hartford. He also vowed to travel to El Salvador to gain Casolo’s release. Casolo was not allowed to receive foreign visitors during her stay at IIopango Women’s Prison where she slept on a straw mat and in

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a cell so crowded that, as she subsequently described to the Los Angeles Times, “ you can’t turn over without hitting someone.”7

A Packed Cessna On the early morning of November 25, 1989, the day after the cache of arms had been unearthed from Casolo’s courtyard, residents in the rural town of Montelimar, Nicaragua, 35 miles south of Managua, awoke to sounds of engines from two planes taking off. Residents claimed that Sandinista soldiers had sealed off the 6,000-foot long airstrip built on the location of a former private beach estate belong­ ing to the dynastic Somoza family. The locals contended that the planes flew so low that, possibly from being so laden with fuel and cargo, one of the plane’s wheels clipped an electricity line over a nearby crop field.8 That same day a twin-engine Cessna 3 10 plane crashed in a soy­ bean field in El Salvador’s eastern countryside. Three passengers died in the crash and the fourth killed himself before his capture. Allegedly located amid the wreckage were 24 Soviet-bloc SA-7 SAMs, one U.S.made Redeye SAM, and three boxes of booster devices for the missiles. Given that its fuel tank was empty and that there was no fire on impact, Salvadoran officials concluded that the plane had run out of gas before crashing.9 Reconstructing the flight plan from the navigational plans and pilots’ notes found in the wreckage of the first plane, American author­ ities soon determined that the flight had originated in Montelimar, Nicaragua. Also located in the plane was a blank maintenance form from “ Servicios de Transportes Aereos S.A.,” an aircraft operator located in Nicaragua. Last, the plane’s tail number was painted over, but the letters Y N (Nicaragua’s international identification code) were imprinted on various parts of the Cessna’s communication equipment.10 In addition, in the pocket of one of the passengers, allegedly, was a photograph of a young woman, with a love message dated “ May 23, 1989 ... Havana.” 11 Salvadoran forces soon located the second plane that had appar­ ently landed at a separate airstrip where 60 FM LN guerrillas who had waited two days carried off in an oxcart what local witnesses described as “ green tubes.” The plane apparently became damaged on the land­ ing and was thus unable to take off. Therefore, the villagers contended,

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the guerrillas tried to bury the damaged Cessna and when that failed they burned the cockpit in order to avoid the plane’s detection.12

“ To Show the Whole World That Nicaragua Is Aiding the Insurgency” Just one month before the Cessna incident, Honduran authorities had seized a truck traversing Honduras on its way from Nicaragua to El Salvador packed with an arms shipment. Among the supplies were 74 Soviet assault rifles, over 300 grenade launchers, and an “ unidenti­ fied number” of explosive detonators and insurgency training manuals stamped “ FM LN .” 13 This, along with the mass of evidence implicating Managua in the Cessna shipments, was enough for President Cristiani to immediately announce the suspension of diplomatic relations with Managua, on November 26.14 Speaking to reporters at the scene of the first crash, Colonel Ricardo Alfonzo Casanova, commander of the Army’s 6th Brigade, said, “ This is what we have been waiting for for years, to show the whole world that Nicaragua is aiding the insurgency.” 15 U.S. officials quickly pounced on the glaring evidence of a smuggling phenomenon that they had long contended existed. The U.S. Embassy spokesman commented, “ For those looking for the smoking gun, we finally have the smoking airplane.” 16 On November 27, Cristiani sent Bush a letter urging him to com­ pel the Soviet premier to end the arms shipments to Nicaragua at the upcoming superpowers summit on the Mediterranean Sea. The same day, the Salvadoran president visited with Ambassador Walker and requested that “ U.S. naval vessels make an overt show of force in the Pacific Ocean, both in international and Salvadoran waters... [to] deter further Nicaraguan intrusion into El Salvador territory.” 17 Remarkably, over the next month Bush’s National Security Council, the highest deliberative body on foreign policy, discussed deploying a small naval task force to provide radar coverage for intelligence collecting.18 Gorbachev and Bush met in person in late December 1989 at a bilat­ eral summit on the Soviet ship Maxim Gorky cruising off the coast of Malta. Wall Street Journal political reporter Gerald Seib wrote that Bush hoped to convince his Soviet counterpart “ to see to it that Sovietbloc arms don’t find their way to the Salvadoran guerrillas.” The “ great unknown” of this approach, Seib believed, was whether Gorbachev

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would be willing to trade such concessions in America’s geopolitical backyard for an American pledge to stop arming guerrillas fighting the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan.19 In a reflection of how seriously his administration viewed Central America, Bush told his Soviet counterpart that Soviet support for Cuba and Nicaragua was “ the single most disruptive element” in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. “ Castro is embarrassing you. He’s detracting from your credibility, violating everything you stand for. The one thing, sir, you must understand is that America cannot accept your support for Havana and Managua.” Bush urged Gorbachev to cut support for Cuba, “ so we are not on opposite sides.”20 In the president’s own words: “ I knew I had to push Gorbachev at Malta to stop meddling in Central America. Incidents at the end of November [1989], such as the crash landing in El Salvador of a plane filled with Soviet ground-to-air missiles and other weapons and munitions, did not help matters.” A further sour note was the Soviet shipment of MIG-29 fighters to Cuba. Gorbachev responded to Bush’s pleas by contending that Moscow had indeed stopped the shipments to Cuba and Nicaragua. “ We need mutual understanding. We don’t want bridgeheads in Cuba or Central America. We don’t need that. You must be convinced of that.”21 The animated Bush told Gorbachev, “ I am convinced they [the Sandinistas] are exporting revolution. They are sending weapons. I don’t care what they have told you, they are supporting the FM LN .”22 While the two world leaders “ smiled and joked” in the post-summit briefing with reporters, Bush and Gorbachev did not agree about the wars in Central America. Gorbachev insisted that Moscow had “ ceased” arms shipments to the Sandinistas and that “ we have firm assurances from Nicaragua that no deliveries using certain aircraft actually were carried out.” Bush accepted Gorbachev’s claim but also expressed distrust in the Sandinistas: “ I don’t believe that the Sandin­ istas have told the truth to our Soviet friends__ I am saying they [the Sandinistas] have misled [Moscow] when they gave a specific repre­ sentation that no arms were going from Nicaragua to El Salvador.”23 Secretary of State Baker kept up the pressure during his appearance on CBS News’s Face the Nation and said, “ The Soviet Union has told us they are leaning on Nicaragua and Cuba not to send weapons to the FM LN, but that has not worked, so we are encouraging them to lean even harder.”24 In his memoir, Yuri Pavlov, the head of the Soviet

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The Salvador Option

Foreign Ministry’s Latin American division, recalled that the SAM shipments were “ a clear betrayal of Soviet policy” related to the Sal­ vadoran peace process.25

“ Take Them Inside [El Salvador] to the War Front” Less than a week after the two airplane crashes, FM LN officials in Managua confirmed that their fighters had obtained anti-aircraft mis­ siles but did not provide a source. At the same time, an FAES official said that the guerrillas had already fired the first SAM at an A-37 Drag­ onfly ground-attack jet, although it was not hit. FM LN spokesman Ricardo Montenegro commented in Managua that the rebels had the right to obtain whatever arms necessary and to “ take them inside [El Salvador] to the war front.” Refusing to answer a reporter’s question about the source of the high-tech SAMs, Montenegro countered that it was Washington that had “ turned Central America into a giant arms market in the last ten years.”26 Even before these new Sandinista deliveries, the FM LN had already fired two SAMs in an attempt to knock down FAES aircraft.27 The Sandinistas would later reveal in a communique that the SAMs sent to the FM LN were from a 1986 Soviet arms shipment.28 This led some observers to conclude that the Sandinistas had held off sending the SAMs until the late 1980s, fearing that this revelation would provide a pretext for the United States to invade Nicaragua. The Sandinistas also shipped General Dynamics FIM-43 “ Redeye” missiles that they had captured from the contras, which ironically had initially been provided to the contras by Washington.29 The FM LN ’s incipient use of SAMs and its clear desire to obtain many more came as a shock to the FAES commanders and their Amer­ ican advisors. The FM LN ’s ability to use these guided missiles to knock down scores of U.S.-provided helicopters and airplanes would dramat­ ically alter the w ar’s trajectory. It is also suggested that despite its series of setbacks in the late 1980s, the FM LN was far from finished and was in fact looking to escalate the war’s ferocity.30 Could the SAMs, Ameri­ can and FAES officials wondered, be the “ game changer” that tilted the hurtful stalemate in favor of the guerrillas? At the same time, one U.S. diplomat recalled that the embassy was somewhat relieved since the FM LN apparently did not take very good care of the SAMs, which

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limited their utility. Nevertheless, he acknowledged, “As a political tool, the SAMs were big stuff. If anything, we were shocked that the FM LN hadn’t received them [from the Sandinistas] years before.” 31 Since the war began a decade earlier, the FAES had enjoyed almost complete impunity in the air, something that the SAMs could now elim­ inate overnight. In particular, the FAES was confident that, while they had obtained possession of the man-portable SAMs, the FM LN did not have the ability to use them effectively. This confidence, however, changed rapidly a year later following an attack in November 1990 when the FM LN used a Soviet-made SA-14 missile to shoot down an A-37 attack jet, the Salvadoran Air Force’s cherished plane.32 Within a month, guerrillas used another missile to shoot down an AC-47 plane, which led observers to believe that this might only be the tip of the iceberg.33 In response to the unfolding SAM threat, Salvadoran military pilots began flying at higher altitudes, and less frequently during the day, which sharply reduced their combat effectiveness - a component at the heart of the FAES’s military strategy against the guerrillas. Vir­ tually overnight, the FM LN ’s use of SAMs had a direct impact on the course of the war.34

“ Revolutionary Justice” Whatever gains the FM LN had made with the use of SAMs took a turn on January 2 ,19 9 1, when a U.S. military UH -i “ Huey” transport heli­ copter piloted by three American airmen made a forced landing in the eastern region of San Miguel after it had been hit by guerrilla gunfire on their return to their base at Soto Cano, Honduras. Chief Warrant Officer Daniel Scott, the co-pilot, was killed in the crash, but the flight’s mechanic, Army private Earnest Dawson and pilot Lieutenant Colonel David Pickett survived. Nearby guerrillas moved to the crash site where they apprehended the American soldiers and summarily executed them. At first, the FM LN denied any involvement in the killings. Fearful of the damage to its already faltering reputation as a legitimate insurgent force, the FM LN soon announced that the two soldiers implicated in the murders would face “ revolutionary justice.”35 The guerrilla executions could not have come at a worse time for the FM LN. Only a year earlier, the FM LN had made great propaganda use of the Jesuit killings by Atlacatl soldiers, murders that had unleashed a

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The Salvador Option

firestorm on the Salvadoran government, the FAES, and their “ imperial sponsor,” the United States. The killings had resurrected the image of out-of-control death squads and abusive security forces associated with the w ar’s early years, which played perfectly into the FM LN ’s long­ standing contentions about the government’s true nature. Now, the FM LN ’s viciousness seemed to be on the upswing, which took atten­ tion away from the FAES’s excesses. According to the commander of the U.S. Military Group in San Salvador, the FM LN executions “ pretty well gave a lie to any remaining - I believe there was some in Wash­ ington - any remaining romanticism that we had a bunch of Robin Hoods running around being pursued by some fat Pancho Villa lookalike soldiers down there. That these [the FMLN] were mean people and just as capable of atrocity as anybody on the government side.”36 The killings of the American airmen prompted the Bush adminis­ tration to expedite the delivery of $48.1 million in military aid, and the U.S. Congress to restore $42.5 million in aid that it had suspended after the Jesuit killings.37 Whether initiated by Congress or the White House, the precipitous cutoff and restoration of aid was extraordi­ narily frustrating for the imperial grunts and imperial diplomats on the ground in El Salvador who had to immediately adjust to lowered or increased aid packages. According to the military group’s colonel, John Waghelstein, the U.S. government was conducting its El Salvador policy “ from atrocity [Jesuit killings] to atrocity [airmen execution],” which was certainly not the way to manage a massive nation-building and counterinsurgency project through a proxy government.38 Never­ theless, the release of the suspended aid came at a critical time for the FAES, given that it was running low on ammunition.

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United Nations and Peace

We had to face the reality that we could not win. - Gerson Martínez, FM LN commander1 It’s time to shed the myths about El Salvador, and come together behind a bipartisan policy based upon the truth. - Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State, October 19902 Cristiani deserves a gold medal, I respect him. He has done a great service to the country. - Salvadoran guerrilla, 19 9 a 3

“ The United States Would Not Abandon El Salvador” As we saw, the FM LN ’s stunning November 1989 military offensive led many observers to conclude, not illogically, that the FAES was in dire straits. Less reported, though, was that Washington’s restora­ tion of tens of millions of dollars in military aid amid the fallout from the Sandinista-delivered SAM revelations proved to be a blow to the FM LN ’s chest. What is more, the Pentagon displayed some saber rat­ tling in an attempt to disabuse the Salvadoran rebels from any notion that Washington had forsaken its client military in El Salvador. Accord­ ing to the U.S. Southern Command commander General George Joulwan, the renewed aid transformed the FAES into a different fighting force: “ [From January 19 9 1] they went to the field, and stayed in the field. They took the fight to the enemy but did it right, to include respect for human rights.”4 Moreover, Joulwan contended that the FM LN ’s 461

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The Salvador Option

increasingly lethal use of sophisticated weaponry - especially the SA14 man-portable air defense missiles (MANPADs) - was now effec­ tively countered by the expedited delivery of replacement aircraft and materiel. At one equipment transfer ceremony at Ilopango Air Base, Joulwan even publicly warned the FM LN that each FAES aircraft they destroyed would be replaced. Joulwan also sent training teams to El Salvador to teach maneuvers on evading ground-launched missiles. The net effect, Joulwan contended, was to show the FM LN that “ the United States . . . would not abandon El Salvador, and would support the democratic government of Cristiani.” 5 Joulwan’s sense of the FAES’s improving combat abilities despite the 1989 guerrilla offensive debacle was coupled with the Sandinista’s largely unexpected electoral defeat in 1990 that removed the FM LN ’s closest ally from power in Managua. As the Soviet Union unraveled in the early 1990s, Cuba, another key ally, began suffering its own with­ drawals after losing badly needed economic subsidies (an estimated $4 -$6 billion annually).6 Moreover, according to U.S. intelligence offi­ cer Fulton Armstrong, with the Sandinistas voted out of office “ the Cuban card [on Nicaragua] wasn’t worth anything anymore.”7 For years, firmly reliant on external funding and solidarity, now the FM LN was on its own. In addition, the Salvadoran government had held a series of elections that, despite the guerrillas’ best efforts, reinforced San Salvador’s contention that it was a legitimate government. Now, more than ever, an FM LN military victory seemed unattain­ able. Growing weary of the status quo, negotiations became increas­ ingly alluring. In the words of the FM LN leader Gerson Martinez, “ What [negotiations] started in the early 1980s as a distraction eventu­ ally became an imperative.” 8 At the same time, and as UN peace envoy Alvaro de Soto came to learn very well, there still remained a number of hardline guerrilla “ comandantes” who vehemently opposed negoti­ ations, continuing to prefer the military option.9 Many of the Salvadoran business elites were also sick of the war that had become a protracted battle of Salvadorans against Salvadorans and a drag on the national economy - and their pocketbooks. With the Cold War coming to a surprising global ending, as demonstrated by the shocking developments in the Soviet Bloc, the Bush administration had little desire to be mired in El Salvador’s strategically dubious civil war for another decade.10

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“ Washington Had Fatigued with Central America” The move toward talks was bolstered with the evolution of the Cen­ tral America-wide peace negotiations led by Costa Rican president (Oscar Arias. The core of Arias’s plan became the Esquipulas II Accord of 1987, which called for “ pacification and integration” of the war­ ring societies, including El Salvador. The “ pacification” entailed an end to military actions to be followed by “ integration” whereby guer­ rilla fighters would enter the political system. Remarkably, both the George H. W. Bush administration and Moscow would come to sup­ port the spirit of Arias’s plan that was the effective template for the UN-brokered talks. In many ways, the willingness of U.S. officials to get behind Arias’s approach to the region reflected the reality that by the end of the decade Washington had fatigued with Central America and by extension El Salvador.11 As incoming secretary of state James Baker puts it, “ On the one hand, we had to signal to the Salvado­ ran military that they must support a negotiated peace and a purge of human rights violators or risk losing U.S support. On the other, we had to convince hardline factions among the guerrillas that if they contin­ ued the war, the United States would not abandon El Salvador.” 12 Back in July 1989, the Bush administration introduced a resolution before the UN Security Council asking the Secretary General to use his best offices to support the Central American peace process.13 In early 19 9 1, the Bush administration even privately considered launch­ ing a “ diplomatic offensive” to create a “ pressure cooker” to achieve a negotiated settlement within a matter of months.14 In recognition that a “ New World Order” was emerging, Moscow supported the U.S.sponsored resolution. Some skeptical observers also contended that the main factor motivating the Bush administration’s “ peace” moves were renewed congressional efforts to cut military aid to El Salvador.15 In El Salvador, incoming conservative president Cristiani called for direct negotiations with the FM LN within days of his inauguration in 1989. Part of Cristiani’s dilemma was that he wanted to pursue a peace process but did not want to appear to his rightist support­ ers to be caving into pressure from either the guerrillas or the United States. Further complicating matters, A R EN A ’s more pragmatic busi­ ness wing that Cristiani was part of was increasingly wary of Roberto D ’Aubuisson’s militaristic platform and dogma and was now willing

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4 64

The Salvador Option

at least to consider a negotiated settlement. Indeed, and contrary to the common perception at the time that the Salvadoran right was a mono­ lithic block, the country’s conservative business class proved far more pragmatic than the fiery image personified by D ’Aubuisson.16

“ We Need This War to Go Away” It is difficult to accurately assess the psychological impact that the November 1989 final offensive had on both sides. Yet there is no question that the offensive’s ferocity and nebulous outcome reinforced to both sides that the war needed to come to an end. Only a few weeks after the offensive concluded in late November, Cristiani and the FM LN leadership separately asked UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to increase his organization’s support for the fledgling negotiations that many assumed were left for dead in the offensive’s bloody aftermath. FM LN commanders had also secretly met with UN envoy Alvaro de Soto when the final offensive was still raging, a fur­ ther indication of the guerrillas’ sober realization that the offensive had failed to spark the necessary insurrection. A month later in Jan­ uary 1990, Perez de Cuellar started several months of UN-led “ shuttle diplomacy,” including key talks in Geneva, Switzerland, which led to both sides agreeing to a more formal negotiating process.17 The first breakthrough came in April 19 9 1 when the two sides agreed on constitutional reform, a development that helped convince Washington that the FM LN was serious about negotiations. What complicated talks over the next year or so was the FM LN ’s unyield­ ing position that they could not accept a ceasefire unless they were guaranteed a political role in the post-conflict Salvadoran government. Indeed, and not surprisingly, over the course of the months of talks, almost the entire deadlock revolved around issues related to the future of the security forces and guerrilla demobilization.18 The government and the FAES believed that the FM LN could not have a political role so long as it was armed. By September 19 9 1, the negotiations moved to New York, in part to reinforce the U N ’s deep role in this negotiating process. Eager to see the talks succeed, the Bush administration actively supported the UN-led effort, including issuing visas to the guerrilla negotiators, so they could attend talks on Amer­ ican soil. Interestingly, though, while the U.S. diplomats observed the

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f i g u r e 4 6 .1. UN peace negotiator Alvaro de Soto and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in El Salvador. The career Peruvian diplomat de Soto met repeatedly with both sides to broker a peace agreement in what had been a “ hurting stalemate.” Key guerrilla leaders and negotiators came to trust Amer­ ican officials like Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson and Ambas­ sador William Walker and welcomed their participation in the broader peace process. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

many rounds of talks in various locales, senior officials became directly involved only very late in the process.19 What was also apparent is that the Bush administration’s policy was to put pressure on Cristiani to negotiate in good faith. In fact, Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson often called Cristiani via unofficial channels to reinforce Washington’s desire to see progress on a negoti­ ated settlement. According to one U.S. diplomat involved in the events, Aronson’s message to Cristiani was unequivocal, telling the Salvadoran president, “ We need this war to go away.”20 To this end, senior Bush administration officials traveled frequently to El Salvador to reassure the civilian conservative Cristiani but also to reinforce the need to get a deal.21 “A Moral Right to Render Assistance to the Guerrillas” In the aftermath of the Malta bilateral summit in December 1989, Washington and Moscow continued to cooperate on the search for

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a political settlement in El Salvador. And Bush and Baker continued to press the Soviets to get Havana to stop the arms shipments to Central America. The Bush administration might have in return even offered to improve relations with Cuba. Using its contacts with the Salvadoran Communist Party, Moscow likely directly pressured the FM LN to pur­ sue a comprehensive peace pact.22 Suggesting that Havana and M an­ agua were ultimately more salient in El Salvador than Moscow, Com­ munist Party chief and FM LN comandante Schafik Handal told the U N ’s peace envoy, Alvaro de Soto, that the Soviets had no sway over the guerrillas.23 When Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Cuba in October 1989, his host Fidel Castro indicated that whatever the Sovi­ ets’ preference to the contrary, Castro supported a political solution to El Salvador’s war; however, he would cease arms deliveries to Central America only if the Bush administration did the same. According to Soviet diplomat Yuri Pavlov, as long as Washington kept sending bil­ lions of dollars of aid to the Salvadoran government, in Havana’s view, “ Cuba had a moral right to render assistance to the FM LN forces when necessary and would not accept any unilateral obligation that would limit this right.”24 It also appeared that the Bush administration might have been willing to involve Cuba in the actual peace process had it proved helpful in expediting the end to the Salvadoran war.25 Another stick that Aronson and other U.S. diplomats used with their Salvadoran counterparts was that U.S. assistance “ was not going to continue forever” and thus, contrary to what some on the Salvadoran right believed, the government was better off cutting a deal now rather than thinking it could hold off indefinitely.26 Several American diplo­ mats recounted the intense pressure for progress on the peace process that the embassy was exerting on Cristiani on a weekly basis. At the same time, though, at least one U.S. official believed that the Salvado­ ran president was in a tight spot: “ Heck, one day he is talking about peace process and human rights and the next it’s all about winning the war outright.”27 One key breakthrough occurred in the months leading up to the move to New York when FM LN commander Joaquin Villalobos pub­ licly stated that the FM LN would no longer require the implementa­ tion of political reforms before a ceasefire, a development the guer­ rilla leader called “ transcendental.”28 Another key surprise was the

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4 67

FM LN ’s abandonment of its negotiating position that its fighting force be integrated into the FAES.29 Last, the FM LN increasingly felt that the U.S. government wanted a secure peace and not simply negotia­ tions that would cripple the guerrillas. Amazingly, Villalobos and other guerrilla commanders were beginning to trust the promises of the oncedespised U.S. government. That being said, throughout the negotia­ tions presidents Bush and Cristiani both expressed frustration that the UN appeared to treat the FM LN as an equal partner. James Sutterlin, a biographer of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, described Bush’s exhortation to the UN chief this way: “ I don’t understand, why these people, the FM LN, should have equal standing; the elections in El Sal­ vador were free and fair and Cristiani is doing his best. Why should the FM LN have the same standing at the table?”30

“ Tell Them to Their Faces That We Wanted to Make Peace” The talks in New York continued for several months in the fall of 19 9 1 until they hit their climax in late December. New Year’s Eve was Perez de Cuellar’s last day as secretary general, and there was tremendous pressure for the two sides to conclude an agreement. In the end, Perez de Cuellar postponed his departure from the UN headquarters in order to be present for the final agreement. Much to his delight, the two sides reached an agreement known as the New York Act only minutes before midnight. In fact, while it might be an apocryphal story, some participants recounted to the author that someone actually physically pushed the clocks back to gain a few extra precious minutes before the UN-imposed negotiating deadline ended. Whatever the exact time, the two parties officially signed the New York Act four minutes before midnight on December 3 1 , 1 9 9 1 , agree­ ing “ on all technical and military aspects relating to the separation of the warring parties and the cessation of the armed conflict.”31 The ceasefire would not take place until one month later on February 1, 1992, and the war would formally end on December 15 , 1992.32 On New Year’s Day 1992, after the historic moment in El Salvador’s painful history the previous night, Assistant Secretary of State Aronson and Military Group commander Mark Hamilton met with the guerrilla negotiators in FM LN commander Roberto Cabas’s New York hotel room. As Aronson related, “ I felt it would be useful to tell them to their

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The Salvador Option

faces that we wanted to make peace and support the accords__ And that we didn’t just view them as a necessary evil to end the war, that we believed in the reforms that had been negotiated.”33

“ Beginning of a Real Peace” Two weeks later on January 16 , 1992, representatives from the Sal­ vadoran government and the FM LN participated in a formal peace cer­ emony at the Castle of Chapultepec in Mexico City where they signed the Chapultepec Accords, containing the same terms as the New York Act.34 The combatants ended fighting the day after the ceremony, and the formal ceasefire began on February 1 . 35 In the presence of 12 heads of state at the ornate setting in the Mexican capital, President Cristiani told the audience, “ We under­ stand that what begins to happen now in El Salvador is not the re­ establishment of a peace that existed before, but the beginning of a real peace founded on social consensus.”36 Cristiani’s words reinforced that he had “ stepped away” from the extreme rightists who once sup­ ported him and reached out to the entire Salvadoran nation. In a clear attempt to concede the grievances of the revolutionary movement that just two years earlier had attempted to kill him, Cristiani acknowl­ edged that his country had been fighting a civil war with “ profound social, economic, and cultural roots.” Key among these, he added was the country’s “ absence of a truly democratic order.”37 Upon finishing his speech, the 44-year-old son of El Salvador’s wealthy, conservative elite fought back tears and walked down from the podium and for the first time embraced the guerrilla leaders “ who had fought tirelessly for his overthrow.”38 Interestingly, while the Cuban foreign minister Isidoro Malmierca and Nicaragua’s former Sandinista president Daniel Ortega attended the ceremony to support their Salvadoran comrades, foreign reporters noted that the guerril­ las’ “ distance from both former patrons” was evident.39 When the old communist leader Schafik Handal asked for a new “ respectful” relationship with the United States, Secretary of State James Baker appeared to “ nod approvingly” from his front-row seat.40 Incoming UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted the accords’ dramatic significance for El Salvador,

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It is no exaggeration to say that, taken together, and given their breadth and scope, these agreements constitute a prescription for a revolution achieved by negotiation. The armed forces are to be given a role, clearly subordinated to the civilian authorities, commensurate with their responsibilities as redefined in the new Constitution. The armed forces will be streamlined, reformed, and restructured accordingly.41

The Bush administration wasted little time to publicly endorse the peace agreement. Speaking in San Salvador when the ink on the Chapultepec Accord was still wet, Secretary of State Baker pledged Ameri­ can assistance to El Salvador “ to ensure that anyone who threatens the peace process through violence is prosecuted to the full extent of the law.”42 In reference to the rightist violence that transpired the day after the final agreement was reached at the UN headquarters, including the burning of two reporters’ vehicles and the pronouncement of a series of death threats, Baker said “ [These perpetrators] refer to themselves as Salvadoran patriots. In truth, they are traitors to the Salvadoran nation. They threaten El Salvador’s democratic hopes and future just as much as those who once advocated violence from the opposite polit­ ical extreme.”43

“ Let’s Show the World How El Salvador Loves Peace” Foreign reporters covering the reaction to the Mexico City signings provided their readers with numerous colorful accounts of how Sal­ vadoran society - and in particular the combatants - responded to peace in these uncertain initial days and weeks. The following account portrays the euphoric response to the government’s announcement of “ national day of peace” on January 17: When they heard peace was at hand, Oscar and a group of fellow guerrillas decided to come out of the hills and join the celebrations in the capital. . . . “ I’ d never thought I’ d see this,” Oscar shouted, still insisting on using his nom de guerre, as thousands of rebels and their civilian supporters cheered their new peace accord with the government and danced in one of San Salvador’s central plazas__ “ Thirty of my comrades fell fighting for this,” said the vet­ eran 37-year-old unit commander, wincing back tears as a one-armed slightly tipsy companion deliriously waved a rebel flag from the hood of their dusty truck. “ I did not expect to survive, none of us did. It’s so much . . . it’s emotional

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47o

The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 46.2. Ceasefire day in San Salvador, January 16, 1992. El Salvador’s main square is filled with mostly pro-FMLN people celebrating in front of the National Cathedral that had been the site of so many protests and security force reprisals before and during the civil war. At midday, the cathedral bells tolled to mark the start of the ceasefire. One of the rebels’ clandestine radio stations broadcast speeches from the square. Before this momentous day, sev­ eral top guerrilla commanders had not entered the capital in over a decade. Only two blocks away in the Parque de la Libertad, pro-ARENA supporters celebrated their own version of the ceasefire’s cause and significance. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

for me. It’s joy,” Oscar cried__ “ Okay, everybody, now let’s show the world how El Salvador loves peace,” shouted the potbellied leader of a rebel salsa combo opening another round of the pulsing beat that would echo till dawn. The stomping crowd hooted hoarsely, then formed gyrating conga lines that snaked to and fro across the plaza where 1 1 years before army sharpshooters gunned down pro-rebel demonstrators.44

Supporters of the Salvadoran government filled a neighboring plaza with their own peace celebrations. One might have expected violence to break out, as though the groups were two feuding gangs, yet the “ distinction seemed lost” on the hundreds of revelers at both fiestas. Indeed, the partygoers “ nonchalantly crossed checkpoints manned by

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teen-age guerrillas under the discreet gaze of armed government police­ men.” In another unimaginable moment after another, the parapets that used to hide security force snipers were now hung with guerrilla banners proclaiming “ Peace - a victory of the people.” And the “ bulletpocked cathedral - where screaming women and children once dived for cover as pieces of lead tore through their bodies tonight was draped in a huge banner emblazoned with the face of the executed founder of the Salvadoran Communist Party, Agustin Farabundo Marti - the namesake of the country’s rebel movement.”45 Guerrilla leader Juan Ramon Medrano, known as Commander Baltazar, told reporters that the plaza and cathedral steps where he stood had been the scene of “ many acts of repression and violence” at the onset of the conflict and deemed it a fitting place to “ complete the first great step in a modern revolution.”46 He added, “ We are ready for the end of the war and the reincorporation into national life.”47 To this end, the FM LN even started taking out ads in newspapers and on radio and television, announcing its upcoming arrival in the political process.48 Peace, it seemed, was at hand.

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47 Demobilization

I do not have any land, and the army is still full of people who want to kill me. - Miguel Angel, FM LN guerrilla, October 19 9 2 1 El Salvador will be the grave where the Reds meet their end. - A R E N A ’s campaign song during the war2

“Joaquin! Joaquin!” On February 1, 1992, only two weeks after the historic peace accord signings in Mexico City, the government and guerrillas sat down for a ceremony to begin the ceasefire, which 10 months later would mark the formal end of the 12-year civil war. In the next several days, the Salvadoran legislature approved a sweeping and controversial amnesty for “ politically motivated crimes” committed during the war. The 8 1-0 vote was a vital development given that it allowed the 8,000-person rebel army to disarm without fear of prosecution - a point that had been a key stumbling block. The legislation excluded certain special cases, including preventing the release of those convicted of the 1989 Jesuit murders.3 Symbolizing this new era in El Salvador’s history, the National Com­ mission for the Consolidation of Peace (Comisión de Paz, COPAZ) was inaugurated at the February ceasefire ceremony held in an audi­ torium in San Salvador and comprised government officials, former guerrillas, and civilian members from each political party.4 During the 472

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ceremony, guerrillas in newly purchased business suits stood next to uniformed military officers; rightist politicians stood beside leftists as the national anthem was sung. Later that same day, President Cristiani led the ceremonial lighting of a peace torch; military and police units attended masses in barracks around the country; and rebel supporters once again organized all-day parties in downtown plazas where ven­ dors sold newly manufactured FM LN T-shirts.5 As the ceremony began, Cristiani entered the auditorium sur­ rounded by his bodyguards and AREN A colleagues and received mod­ est applause from the 3,000 people in attendance. Joaquin Villalo­ bos, on the other hand, was greeted with loud applause and cheers of “Joaquín! Joaquin!” Villalobos then sat down at a table directly to the left of Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda, a senior FAES officer impli­ cated by the Moakley Commission as one of the “ intellectual authors” of the Jesuit killings. As one observer wrote, “ Even those who hoped for the end of the war probably never thought they would see these two men sitting together.” 6 Villalobos then stated, “ We surprised the world with our capacity to make war with a determination unique to Salvado­ rans. Now, we are surprising the world by finishing a war that seemed endless.”7 The only attendee who received applause “ equal in inten­ sity” to that accorded to Mr. Villalobos was Roberto D ’Aubuisson, who was “ immensely popular” with “ humble Salvadorans” as well as the oligarchy.

“ We Were Trying to Change a Whole Society” With members from the government, FAES, and FM LN, as well as UN and Salvadoran Catholic Church observers, COPAZ was tasked with the indispensable mission of verifying that both sides were doing what they had agreed to in the historic yet still very tentative peace accord. The work of COPAZ was formidable, largely because of the accord’s remarkable scope and depth. For starters, and very critical to the FM LN, the FAES would be drastically reduced in size and prowess and would be limited to a role of territorial security. In addition, the Salvadoran government would eliminate its notorious security forces, including the Treasury Police, National Guard, and National Intelli­ gence Directorate, replacing them with a new entity, known as the National Civil Police. The judiciary and electoral bodies would also

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The Salvador Option

be reformed, and land would be transferred to former combatants and guerrilla supporters who had occupied land during the war years.8 At last, a UN-sponsored “ truth commission” would be established to report on what actually transpired during the war, especially atrocities and human rights violations committed by either side. In return for these huge concessions, the FM LN agreed to terminate its insurgency and convert to a political organization that recognized the legitimacy of the Salvadoran constitution. Despite all sorts of defi­ ciencies, the warring sides had effectively agreed to a “ negotiated rev­ olution” inside El Salvador. The FM LN ’s participation in the accords meant that they would never take power through force. At the same time, the Salvadoran government and military had now agreed to pur­ sue many of the very reforms that the FM LN had long claimed only armed revolution could ensure. Most startling, the FAES’s participation in the peace process resulted in a drastic reduction of the budget and influence of this once mighty Salvadoran institution. As one UN nego­ tiator put it, “ We were trying to change a whole society,” not simply bring an insurgent war to an end.

“ To Let Them Know That the War Was Over for Us Too” Not surprisingly, there was strong disagreement about exactly who was responsible for this stunning development. The UN cited it as an unusually successful example of its mediation leading to not simply “ peacemaking” but rather to the much more difficult task of “ peace­ keeping.” U.S. officials, on the other hand, often resented what they felt was UN envoy Alvaro de Soto’s arrogance and eagerness to take credit for what was largely made possible by the Salvadorans themselves.9 The most important role played by the U.S. government was very likely the intense pressure applied on Cristiani late in the nego­ tiations, directly convincing the FM LN commanders that the United States also wanted reform in El Salvador. With two decades of hind­ sight, both senior U.S. officials and FM LN negotiators recalled that they had come to respect and even trust each other. This trust was also likely reinforced during secret discussions in El Salvador between U.S. ambassador William Walker and the FM LN ’s Villalobos.10 In one instance, Walker and Military Group comman­ der Colonel Mark Hamilton traveled with minimal security to the

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pro-FMLN town of Santa Marta in late August 19 9 1 to meet with regional FM LN commander Raul Hercules, a visit that involved the two Americans chatting and posing for photographs with teenage guer­ rillas.11 Or as Bush’s top political appointee for Latin America, Bernard Aronson, put it, “ It was important to let them [the guerrillas] know that the war was over for us too.” 12 In some instances, at least, the U.S. government attempted to extract a price from the FM LN for its desire to have Washington directly involved in the settlement negotiations. Former ambassador to El Sal­ vador and now American representative at the UN, Thomas Pickering, explained his decision to deny the FM LN a meeting with U.S. diplomat Joseph Sullivan in September 19 9 1, “ It was obvious that the FM LN wanted the meeting very badly and that it should therefore have to pay a price for it. The meeting idea could be left on hold for now. It could be cashed in later for something important that the GOES [gov­ ernment of El Salvador] wanted.” 13 One top FM LN commander, Nidia Díaz, recounted an episode when Aronson personally welcomed the guerrilla leaders including Vil­ lalobos at the newly constructed and highly secure U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. According to Diaz, Aronson told the stunned guerril­ las, “ Welcome to the building that was designed to keep you out.” 14 In yet another indication of U.S. officials playing proconsul to further engagement aims, Peter Romero, the acting American ambassador in 19 9 1, remembered, “ There was indeed trust [between U.S. diplomats and guerrilla leadership]. I was getting much more complete informa­ tion from the FM LN than my government counterparts who would take me to breakfast for three hours and not tell me anything. Of course, they [government officials] didn’t know I was in contact with the guerrillas.” 15

Serve as a Check on FAES Behavior What few could fully imagine at the time was how effective the peace accords would prove to be. Many observers feared that while the war might have officially ceased, a shadowy “ w ar” of reprisal and counter­ reprisal would soon emerge. Yet, very few political murders occurred in the ensuing years, despite the war’s shocking ferocity. Within a year, the United States was using its tens of millions of dollars of development

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The Salvador Option

assistance to fund programs that included workshops for former guer­ rillas and FAES officials to identify post-traumatic stress syndrome. There was even a Harvard University extension program “ that taught former FM LN leaders a sort of Politics 10 1 of how to set up a political party.” 16 A report on the effectiveness of U.S. training indicated that, con­ trary to what anyone could have imagined a few years earlier, some FM LN members “ expressed a desire to keep U.S. advisers in El Sal­ vador,” reportedly due to the guerrillas’ belief that this would serve as a check on FAES behavior.17 The historic Chapultepec Accords granted the FM LN roughly 20 percent of the 3,000 positions that would con­ stitute the newly created police force. Most of the FM LN candidates had been intelligence and logistical personnel, not combat troops. The first candidates were trained by U.S. police officers in Puerto Rico. By December 1993 and following six months of training, over 2,500 for­ mer FM LN personnel had graduated from the Police Academy and were eligible for the new force.18

“ To Eliminate the FM LN ’s Ability to Make War” Even before the ceasefire had been reached, the UN embarked on an ambitious and unprecedented mission to both monitor the ceasefire and promote the “ reconciliation” and “ integration” processes in which combatants would become civilians and politicians. Known as the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, or ONASUL, the ad hoc entity was officially tasked with overseeing the demobilization process but ended up attempting to facilitate the much more complicated restructuring of El Salvador’s security forces and other key reforms. The first peacekeepers were pulled from the U N ’s already sizable observer mission in neighboring Nicaragua. In this sense, ONASUL started out as a traditional peacekeeper, with a few thousand soldiers from roughly three dozen countries strewn across three regional offices. But its task soon turned to “ nation-building,” which entailed monitor­ ing the demobilization and abolishment of the National Guard, Trea­ sury Police, and National Intelligence Directorate. In addition to ensuring that neither side began offensive opera­ tions, UN soldiers engaged in the mundane yet crucial efforts of cre­ ating inventories of government and guerrilla weapons and other war

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f i g u r e 4 7 .1. Weapon disarmament ceremony in Morazan province, 1992. An FM LN combatant hands over an old bazooka as part of the UN-monitored dis­ armament and demobilization process. During the first phases of these oper­ ations, the FM LN gave up a collection of old and non-functioning weapons. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

materiel. Nonetheless, many weapons remained in the hands of ex­ combatants on both sides. Even decades later, estimates suggested that individuals retained over 300,000 small arms, many of them inter­ nal war-era relics.19 ONUSAL initially certified that the FM LN had destroyed or handed over all weapons. But an accidental explosion of an undisclosed arms cache in May 1993 and the discovery of large quantities of weapons indicated that the FM LN had been keep­ ing armaments away from UN inspectors. A chastened FM LN subse­ quently notified the ONUSAL about 14 other arms caches in El Sal­ vador, Nicaragua, and Honduras, which revealed the extent of the organization’s sizable stockpiles that included rockets, ammunition, grenades, and even SAMs. In total, and in what represented a successful UN effort to eliminate the FM LN ’s ability to make war, the guerrilla armaments that were destroyed included over 10,000 weapons, 140 rockets, 9,000 grenades, 5,000 kilograms of explosives, 74 SAMs, and 4 million rounds of ammunition.20

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The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 47.2. Guerrilla fighters in a “ zone of concentration” in Usulutan province during the UN-guided demobilization process, 1992. Image and per­ mission by Jeremy Bigwood.

While revolutionary changes were being adopted, peace was not easy for either side. Soon after the accord was signed in Mexico City in early 1992, various rank-and-file groups within the FM LN resisted the relocation into 15 “ concentration zones” in guerrilla-influenced regions as well as the relinquishing of their weapons to ONUSAL in preparation for their full demobilization later in the year.21 The noto­ rious National Guard and Treasury Police were disbanded, and the National Intelligence Department was abolished with a new civilian agency to take its place.

“ Damage the Armed Forces’ Prestige” Another critical effort, supported by the UN and the U.S. govern­ ment, was the delicate task of drastically reducing the FAES’s size and influence. In two years, the Salvadoran army, for example, went from 40,000 to 28,000 soldiers, an effort assisted by U.S. military advisors.22 Ultimately, instead of fully abolishing the National Guard

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f i g u r e 47.3. U.S. Ambassador William Walker visits FM LN forces north of the rebel stronghold of Guazapa a few days before the end of the Salvadoran civil war, 19 9 1. That the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador would be visiting FM LN fighters seemed unimaginable only a few years earlier when the civil war appeared locked in stalemate. U.S. officials maintained contacts with the guerrilla leadership even before the final peace agreement was implemented in 1992. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

and Treasury Police, as stipulated in the peace accords, the Salvado­ ran government integrated these organizations into the army and renamed them. The newly created National Civil Police was put under civilian supervision.23 An extremely delicate and controversial part of the UN ’s work with the security forces involved the efforts to evaluate and purge the officer corps. In M ay 1992, the U N ’s newly established Ad Hoc Commission began reviewing the records of several hundred officers, about 10 per­ cent of the FAES’s total officer corps. After three months of intense work, the commission presented its recommendation to the UN Secre­ tary General and President Cristiani. The report’s findings, which were never made public, called for the dismissal or transfer of more than 100 officers for their involvement in human rights abuses and other

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The Salvador Option

excesses, including most of the FAES’s colonels and generals as well as the removal of the minister of defense, General Ponce. Not surprisingly, the FAES High Command did not respond kindly to the report, believing that the FAES had been singled out for punish­ ment while the illegal guerrillas were largely unscathed. General Ponce said in early November that the formation of the Ad Hoc Commission was part of a plot instigated by left-wing armies to “ damage the armed forces’ prestige.”24 Ponce’s deputy, General Juan Orlando Zepeda thought to be the leader of the more hardline elements in the military added that “ Cristiani is carrying out what I would call a risky effort. He is risking the credibility and confidence the people have shown in him and in the government... because if we see the balance of the sit­ uation now, people feel surprised at how much he has ceded, and the FM LN has done very little.”25 Some press reports even indicated that the Salvadoran military believed Washington was too distracted with other global events to pay attention to its concerns with the purge. In a chilling reminder of El Salvador’s recent bloody past, in October 1992, the Maximil­ iano Hernandez Martinez Brigade issued its first statement in several years, declaring that it would soon “ begin carrying out death sen­ tences” against the FM LN. It also called the peace accords “ nefarious and unconstitutional.” The statement also targeted the UN operation: “ We also warn the white plague of the [UN peacekeeping forces] to leave the country, as well as the plague of foreign journalists who have invaded our country. National journalists, political traitors... and all who support the agreements should be willing to pay the consequences of nationalist, liberating justice.”26 In the end, the FAES’s opposition forced Cristiani to postpone acting on the recommendation until the FM LN had fully demobilized.27 Yet the tension in these remaining months of 1992 continued. Vice Pres­ ident Francisco Merino, who represented a hardline AREN A faction, warned in late October of an imminent guerrilla offensive and accused the rebels of plotting to assassinate their own commanders to have an excuse the resume the war. By contrast, the FM LN had to disarm before the purge of the military in order to gain legal political status. They saw this as “ evidence that the far right plans an extermination campaign once the rebels have no way to defend themselves.” 28

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In the end, though, the FM LN was officially demobilized as a fight­ ing force on December 15 , 1992, 1 1 months after the peace pact was signed in Mexico.29 Amazingly, by the end of 1993, there were only about 100 foreign UN-sponsored observers left in El Salvador, a clear signal that the mission’s formidable goals had been accomplished.30 In the years following the accords, there were surprisingly few political assassinations contrary to what many experts had predicted given the war’s intensity. Moreover, the ceasefire between the government and the FAES had not been broken. The war was over.

“ Objective Truth and the Hard Facts” An ongoing impasse over the implementation of the Ad Hoc Commis­ sion’s recommendations was eclipsed in early 1993 with the release of the UN Truth Commission’s report. Unlike the Ad Hoc Commis­ sion, the Truth Commission published detailed accounts of atrocities, and other crimes committed during the war years in order to find the “ objective truth and the hard facts.”31 A number of senior FAES and Defense Ministry officials resigned before the report came out with its scathing accounts.32 The report did not mince words when it concluded that the FAES had used “ a deliberate strategy of eliminating or terrifying the peas­ ant population where the guerrillas were active . . . The deliberate, sys­ tematic, and indiscriminate violence against the peasant population in areas of military operations went on for years.”33 The report also confirmed the widely held belief that D ’Aubuisson had ordered the March 1980 assassination of Archbishop (Oscar Romero and that for­ mer defense minister General Vides Casanova was involved in the coverup of the 1980 American churchworkers’ murders.34 The report also called out the FM LN for its murders of civilian may­ ors and the slaying of four unarmed U.S. Marines and nine civilians in the 1985 Zona Rosa massacre.35 Of the nearly 22,000 complaints registered, roughly 8 5 percent involved the military, security forces, or death squads.36 In its defense, the FAES claimed that it was now the first military in Latin America to have high-ranking human rights advi­ sors conducting training and that it had done “ more than any other institution to comply with the peace accords.”37

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The Salvador Option

The commission’s findings also revealed interesting evidence of the trend in gross human rights abuses. For one, in 19 8 1 there was a total of 325 “ direct” and “ indirect” source attributions of human rights abuses (per 1,000 military personnel) by the FAES, a force at that time of 9,000 men. By 1990, the FAES had quadrupled in size, and the number of human rights abuses had dropped to 8 (per 1,000 mili­ tary personnel). Abuses by death squads from direct sources went from approximately 1,800 violations in 1980 to almost none in 1990. Inter­ estingly, the abuse of “ paramilitary” forces also dropped precipitously although there was a significant spike in 1989 when the second final offensive occurred and violent urban combat ensued.38 Despite the controversial general amnesty, there were some devel­ opments in the justice realm in the months following the UN report. Under pressure from the UN and U.S. Congress, President Cristiani replaced 15 of the highest-ranking officers who had refused to step down, including Defense Minister General Rene Emilio Ponce.39 The FAES purged almost another 100 officers implicated in human rights abuses. While the UN report has become the quintessential source for human rights violations, of the 75,000 deaths from the conflict, 53,000 deaths remain unexplained. As the commission sums it up, “ inevitably, the list of victims is incomplete.”40 The investigations for the report, which began on July 13 , 1992, under the leadership of three commis­ sioners chosen by UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, were completed in the six months afforded by the Chapultepec Accords.41 In this limited time frame, the commission heard and read thousands of accusations and made thousands of conclusions based on the available evidence (with the caveat that much of this evidence was destroyed or remained confidential to protect witnesses).42 Invitations sent out through various paid media advertisements were “ extended to the Parties to testify without restriction.” While an imperfect report, lim­ ited by a short time frame and restricted to the testimonies of those who answered the invitation, among other constraints, it is to date the most comprehensive breakdown of the violence that ensued in El Salvador, and thus the closest we can get to an accurate depiction of the human rights violations that plagued the population during the civil war.43

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The Truth Commission report was immediately accepted by the FM LN, rejected by the government, and rebuked by President Cristiani who found that the “ binding” recommendations overstepped the mandates of the commission. More strident was the FAES’s General Ponce, who appeared with the entire military leadership in a primetime television address. Ponce blasted the UN report as “ unjust, incomplete, illegal, unethical, biased, and bold.”44 He also rejected the claim that he planned the Jesuits’ murders and pointed out that the report did not integrate the FAES’s evidence on FM LN crimes. Only a week after the report was made public, it triggered a con­ troversy that threatened Cristiani’s presidency. Ruben Zamora, now vice president of the Legislative Assembly, called Ponce’s appearance a “ technical coup d’etat.” While not thrilled with the report, Cristiani was being squeezed by his irate military brass, and it was unclear whether the president had authorized Ponce’s television appearance. What Ponce insisted on was a “ general and absolute amnesty” to immunize the military high command from prosecution that they believed was part of the negotiated settlement. The focus then turned to amnesty. Cristiani wanted something broad based, appealing to “ all forces of the country to support a general and absolute amnesty to turn that painful page in history.”45 The idea was that the amnesty would somehow lessen the violent consequences that the UN report might unleash. On March 20, the AREN A legislators voted to approve an amnesty law that provided immunity to all Salvadorans accused of carrying out human right abuses during the war. Within weeks, the amnesty led to the release of the two FAES officers convicted of the 1989 Jesuit mur­ ders.46 What is unclear is whether the FM LN supported such legisla­ tion, something that its leadership would also benefit from. According to the Salvadoran newspaper E l Diario de Hoy, “ speculation that the FM LN will also be accused... [means that] an amnesty for all con­ cerned would suit them too.”47 Critics of the amnesty claimed that its justification was simply cover for the government and military to wash its hands of their abuses perpetrated before and during the war.48 In any case, many viewed amnesty as a necessary evil, believing it was one way for the coun­ try to look forward and move past El Salvador’s painful history. As

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The Salvador Option

Herberto Jimenez, a mechanic put it, “ We had been fighting for 12 years, and a lot of blood was spilled here. I think this is the only way for us to turn the page. I just can’t tell you if I would feel the same way had my family been killed.”49

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P A R T F IV E

PO STW A R

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48 Postwar Salvador

This was not a peace of winners and losers and this was not a peace made out of weakness by any side, but out of strength of both sides. - Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State, February 19 9 3 1 What would I do over? I wish we [the U.S. government] had pushed for peace and negotiations sooner. There is a lot more we could have done. - General Frank Woerner, U.S. Army, Retired2

“A Victim of Dangerous Delusions” One especially significant element of the 1992 peace agreement was how quickly it appeared that the battle-scarred Salvadoran guerrillas had taken an “ enormous step” in jettisoning their revolutionary ideol­ ogy that kept them fighting in the hills for a decade. Part of their “ new thinking” was driven by the rapid developments in the once formidable communist world. Shocked by the implosion of communist regimes in Europe and the Sandinistas’ failure in Nicaragua, the FM LN faced a “ long military stalemate” at the very time when their “ ideology and allies” were in crisis. As one rebel leader conceded, “ There are people in the FM LN who would never have signed this accord if it had not been for the collapse of the socialist camp.”3 After having pledged in 1985 that the guerrillas would “ never” give up their guns, right before the January 1992 peace ceremony in Mexico City rebel chief Joaquin Villalobos admitted to “ errors” in tactics and “ spoke with apparent

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The Salvador Option

conviction of the need for a democracy based on fair laws, elections and social welfare.”4 He described the rebels’ conversion from revolu­ tion to democracy: “ Revolutionary movements were deformed by the struggle between the superpowers in the cold war. If I had it to do over, I would say that if you are going to take up arms, do it in the name of the Constitution and Christian principles.” 5 There were more than a few FAES officers and government officials convinced that the rebels had simply switched from military fatigues to civilian dress in their quest to seize power. And not surprisingly, some guerrillas held similar sentiments about their former foes. In yet another irony of peace, in February 1992, N ew York Times correspondent James LeMoyne described the continued “ striking changes” in the guerrilla thinking. “ While some Americans still sport bumper stickers demanding ‘U.S. Out of El Salvador,’ senior rebel offi­ cials say they now want the United States Embassy, and especially American military advisers, to remain in El Salvador.” 6 As FM LN leader Ana Guadalupe Martinez admitted: “ We think the U.S. military group can help in the transition to peace” (an unimaginable statement for most of the war).7 In another incongruous development, by June 1992 the former rebel Villalobos, “ long vilified in Washington,” was invited to speak before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Capitol Hill. Had his visit taken place a few years back, New York representative Stephen Solarz (D) said, “ I would have had him instan­ taneously committed to the local mental hospital as . . . a victim of dan­ gerous delusions.” 8

“ The Fact Is That Ten Years Ago the Government and Military Did What They Pleased” Rebel commanders returning to El Salvador under the amnesty quickly turned to the task of transforming the FM LN into a civilian political party. One pro-FMLN union leader told an audience of cheering sym­ pathizers at a political rally in San Salvador, “ We have spilled rivers of blood in our homeland to reach this day alive. Now we must organize, organize, organize.”9 A State Department spokesperson indicated that Washington would be watching its former military adversaries closely: “ The more the FM LN acts as a democratic political party, the more we will treat them as such.” 10 Other guerrilla veterans indicated to

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foreign reporters that they would attempt to “ rebuild personal lives” shattered by war after losing “ careers, marriages, and loved ones” in over a decade of “ clandestine struggle.” 11 As one would have expected given the lack of a military victory, both sides claimed to have won the war. Guerrilla leader Schafik Handal, now representing the FM LN ’s political party, pointed out, “ The heart of the accords is that the 60 year old rule of the Armed Forces is to be ended.” 12 An American citizen working in the once rebel-strong region of Chalatenango echoed Handal’s claim of a guerrilla victory when asked if FM LN supporters thought they lost the war: No, the Peace Accords are seen as a victory. The fact is that ten years ago the government and the military did what they pleased. At this stage, the govern­ ment has had to sit down and recognized the FM LN and now the guerrillas have formed political parties. The FM LN supporters are also astute enough to realize that great soldiers and leaders in war are not necessarily going to be great political leaders. Indeed, many who were respected in the field of bat­ tle now find themselves lost in politics. And politics in El Salvador is a very rough game.13

By contrast, James LeMoyne told his readers that while both made “ major concessions,” it was the guerrillas who “ changed ideology.” Indeed, he added, after years of “ spurning elections and demanding a direct share of power,” the rebels now “ recognized the legitimacy” of the government, accepted disarmament and demobilization, and orga­ nized into an official political party to compete in democratic elections.14 What LeMoyne’s interpretation might have overlooked was evidence suggesting that a significant part of the Salvadoran right had undergone a similar (albeit less noticeable) ideological conversion - or at least modification. Even the infamous Roberto D ’Aubuisson “ joined the call for peace,” telling his supporters that they must confront the guerrillas as “ political competitors in a democratic system.” 15 This apparent radical shift from one of the intellectual and operational mas­ terminds of the death squads was one more development that led UN chief negotiator on El Salvador, Alvaro de Soto, to label the accord a negotiated revolution.16 As commander turned politician, Villalobos concurred, “ The agreement signifies the first revolution on our conti­ nent based on consensus, on accords which unite rather than divide u s... and have the support of the United States.” 17

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49o

The Salvador Option “ We Boycotted Salvadoran Coffee”

Almost as soon as the peace accord was signed, observers began to dispute the reasons for - and by extension Washington’s controver­ sial role in - the dramatic pacific outcome. Just days after the ceasefire went into effect in February 1992, the “ El Salvador Public Information Campaign” took out a full-page advertisement in the N ew York Times. The ad’s bold-type headline was “ Democracy: It shouldn’t have to cost 12 years of war and over 75,000 lives.” More than 10 0 persons and groups were listed as signees, including various politicians like Demo­ cratic congressman Pete Stark of California, celebrities Danny Glover and Carlos Santana, and the advocacy group CISPES. The open letter stated that peace came in spite of Washington’s policies: To win just the right to democracy, the Salvadoran people had to triumph over years of U.S. support for military hardliners and the elite of Salvadoran society who use repression and terror to retain control. . . . Millions of Americans can be proud of our [the activists’] role. While the Bush and Reagan administra­ tions sent billions of our tax dollars to support a government that routinely murdered peasants, labor leaders, priests and nuns, we took to the streets and organized protests from town halls to the halls of Congress. More than 15 0 Congress people supported our stand against all war-related aid. Thousands of us travelled to El Salvador to see for ourselves what was really happening. We wrote songs and books. We made movies. We raised millions of dollars in real humanitarian aid. We boycotted Salvadoran coffee. And we will not stop now.18

Two decades later in 2010, on its official website, CISPES claimed it “ played an important role” in “ keeping the heat” on the U.S. and Sal­ vadoran governments. “ These protests, coupled with steady pressure on Congress, helped win major cuts in U.S. aid to El Salvador.” It added that one U.S. senator even echoed a CISPES slogan - “ Not a Dime for Death Squad Government” - during legislative hearings.19 Writing in the Washington Post opinion page at the same time, outspoken former ambassador Robert White provided a similar yet broader interpretation of what led to peace. Throughout the decade, he wrote, Washington “ steadfastly ignored” opportunities for “ honorable and constructive disengagement” that would have achieved the same result sooner.20 General Rafael H. Larios, defense attache at the Salvadoran Embassy in Washington responded in a letter

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491

to the editor that White had “ misrepresented” how peace was achieved. “ Mr. White,” Larios countered, “ wants to blame the Reagan adminis­ tration for the fact that the war lasted for 1 1 years. Maybe he would have preferred a quick military victory by the FM LN, with Soviet, Cuban, and Sandinista assistance, while the United States stood by and watched. The region would be in a much worse situation today if this scenario had materialized in the early 1980s.”21 Clearly, El Salvador’s peaceful outcome did not end the controversy over the war. President Reagan’s top diplomat for human rights in the early 1980s, Elliott Abrams, entered the fray of whom deserved credit for the seemingly pacific outcome. In Abrams’s estimation, the peace treaty constituted a “ great victory for Salvadorans, and for U.S. policy... In this small corner of the Cold War, American policy was right, and it was successful.”22 Abrams explained how the Carter administration had finally “ junked [its] foolish” Central America policy - which resulted in the provision of aid without which El Salvador could have fallen to “ a small, armed Communist group as Nicaragua had fallen in 19 79 .”23 Abrams contended that the Reagan administration’s policy en El Sal­ vador had two parts: (1) the guerrillas had to be prevented from a mil­ itary victory and (2) political reform was needed to prove to Salvado­ rans that “ grievances - against corruption, injustice, and oppression could be redressed within the system.”24

“ Space for Democratic Participation” Despite the controversies concerning U.S. engagement in El Salvador, the overall post-conflict situation appeared considerably improved. What startled many seasoned international observers of El Salvador’s demobilization and integration process was how quickly and com­ prehensively the effort took place. Writing five years after the peace accords, the UN concluded that the country had been “ largely demil­ itarized.” The FM LN ’s armed structure had “ disappeared,” and com­ batants were integrated into “ civilian life” ; the “ reduced” FAES “ respected the profound changes in nature” called for by the peace treaty. It continued: But the most notable development has been that the peace process has also allowed for the opening up of space for democratic participation. A climate

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The Salvador Option

4 8 .1. Former guerrilla commander Joaquin Villalobos is greeted dur­ ing the ceremony marking the FM LN ’s conversion from an armed insurgency into a political party, San Salvador, M ay 1992. Villalobos remained an FM LN political party member until 1995 when he and other leaders split to form their own centrist political party, the Democratic Party (PD). He subsequently moved to England where he became an advisor to governments on security issues and a fierce critic of radical leftist politics in Latin America. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood. f ig u r e

of tolerance prevails today, unlike any the country has known before. Since the signing of the peace agreements, no national sector has taken refuge in or supported violence as a form of political action.25

One observer wrote that the greatest change in Salvadoran society since the early 1992 ceasefire was the “ sea change in political culture.” That is, “ eliminating one’s opponent physically now carries a much higher political cost than in the past. The opposition can speak out and orga­ nize with less fear for their lives.”26 A travel writer described a similar positive transformation:

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Many changes have indeed occurred in three years: they were visible at once. In place of the fear that dominated the country before, there was now enthusiasm and hope for the peace process and for a true democracy. Everywhere we went, from Chalatenango to Ahuachapdn, we found the people excited and positive about the peace process and insistent that it work. No one seemed to fear that the country would slip again into civil war. Rather, the people everywhere hoped gradually to establish a democracy that could be an example to others, especially in the Southern Hemisphere.27

The hard-smoking and hard-drinking Roberto D ’Aubuisson died from throat cancer in February 1992 at the age of 48. He had made several trips to the United States to receive treatment. Many arch-conservatives in the United States had lauded the once army officer as a vigilant defender of liberty amid a communist onslaught. Announcing the news of their bitter adversary’s death, Radio Farabundo Marti, the clandes­ tine station of the guerrilla front, commented that D ’Aubuisson’s death “ seems to be an act of divine justice in this moment of national rec­ onciliation.”28 The reference was to the newly penned January 1992 peace accord intended to close the country’s decade of war.

Reconcile Their Anti-Systemic Past The FM LN ’s conversion to a political party was not without its chal­ lenges. For one, in the immediate years following the war it failed to compete effectively against its main political adversary, ARENA, in national elections.29 Part of this underperformance was due to the party’s internal disputes about ideology and political mission. Hard­ line factions supported maintaining the FM LN as a Marxist-Leninist organization. This clashed with the center-left wing that saw the party as a more social-democratic movement. Many FM LN party leaders struggled to reconcile their “ anti-systemic” past and their new position inside the formal political system they once sought to destroy. Accord­ ing to FM LN member Dagoberto Gutierrez, During the war the FM LN was always within a society and outside the system; after the war the FM LN was outside of society and into the system. The FM LN party was born after the war, and this was a different thing. It was already an instrument of the state, part of the democratic game, the game that is called democracy as understood in a bourgeois way. . . . The FM LN was no longer a revolutionary party when it came into the system.30

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The Salvador Option

f i g u r e 48.2. The leadership of the FM LN political party holds a press confer­ ence, 1992. From left to right (seated): Joaquin Villalobos, Salvador Sanchez Cerón, and Schafik Handal. Handal was the FM LN ’s presidential candidate in the 2004 election but lost in a landslide to his A REN A opponent, Antonio Saca. Sanchez Cerón became the first former FM LN guerrilla leader to become president following his narrow victory in 20 14 . Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood.

Despite Gutierrez’s sense, though, well into the 21st century the FM LN retained elements of its communist orthodoxy. It had yet to win national power as AREN A presidential candidates triumphed in 19 9 4 ,19 9 9 , and 2004.31 While thankful for peace, it seemed that Sal­ vadorans were reluctant to trust the FM LN with national power; the party garnered only a little over 20 percent of the presidential vote in 1994. And although this rate ticked up slowly, for the first two decades after the war the party could not triumph over A R EN A ’s monopoly of national politics. In fact, former Salvadoran Communist Party chief Schafik Handal was the FM LN candidate in 2004, but he lost in a landslide to his AREN A opponent, Antonio Saca. Starting in the late 1980s when it first won the presidency under Cristiani, AREN A adopted a highly orthodox “ neoliberal” economic platform, which years later, during the postwar era, established a

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495

virtual laboratory for “ Chicago School” -style laissez-faire economic policies, such as trade liberalization and fiscal austerity. In this sense, while the right never defeated the insurgent left on the battlefield, they did defeat them in presidential elections and by extension with eco­ nomic and social policies in the two decades following the war’s end. A R EN A ’s national electoral dominance came to a close in 2008 when the FM LN finally won the presidency through the victory of former journalist Mauricio Funes, who himself was not a former guerrilla unlike the FM LN ’s other postwar presidential candidates.32 Tragically, however, El Salvador’s unbelievable transformation from a war-torn, polarized society into a fledgling democracy was marred by the rise of common crime and insecurity, which gave the country the second highest murder rate in the world after South Africa in 2007. In 2009 the country suffered an average of 13 murders each day - a rate close to the 16 per day it had endured during the peak of the civil war. Due to the surge in “ apolitical” violence and crime, the Salvado­ ran government’s expenditures on security personnel and equipment increased considerably in the postwar era even though the FAES had been greatly reduced in size.33 The country’s justice and penal system also lagged behind the impressive guerrilla and security forces inte­ gration efforts. At the same time, the new civilian police force proved to be a major improvement over its nefarious predecessors. Painfully, the civil war’s evolution into negotiated revolution kept the country a democracy but could not bring social pacification.

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49 Concluding Thoughts

We learned a lot in El Salvador. All of us got a baptism by fire in the early 1980s. - Unidentified American diplomat1 Americans like their wars quick, dirty, and violent. -Jo h n Waghelstein, U.S. Army Colonel2

As we conclude our story of a searing episode of Cold War-era U.S. for­ eign policy in America’s geopolitical backyard, it is worth considering the relevance today of the Salvador Option that was a remarkable case of nation-building by proxy before nation-building became the over­ riding aim in two protracted American wars - Iraq and Afghanistan. It could well be that the Salvador Option’s significance will loom larger in the years ahead, simply because the United States endured long, unsatisfying wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans thus may be less likely to support major, boots-on-the-ground commitments, even as their nation continues to face threats from unstable societies. So fig­ uring out the truth of this seemingly paradigmatic case of the light footprint approach is all the more important. This study leads us to a set of essential related questions from the reality of the Salvador Option, questions that can be applied to other complicated counterinsurgency and nation-building situations. For starters, how does a powerful country balance out the broad

496

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Concluding Thoughts

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geostrategic imperatives with the often shorter-term suffering caused by the policies being implemented? An effective answer requires an accurate sense of the means behind those policies and what they led to something that is extraordinarily difficult to find in murky conflicts like El Salvador’s civil war. The declassification of tens of thousands of pages of documents and the enviable advantage of hindsight has allowed us to consider the Salvador Option with a perspective and depth unavailable to those trying to make sense of this wrenching episode as it was unfolding. U.S. foreign policy is, of course, not solely what is uttered publicly or described in newspaper accounts - and this was true in El Salvador; it also included the day-in-day-out churn of diplomatic cables, senior level officials’ talking points for meetings with Salvadoran counter­ parts, and other documents and conversations that were private in that period. At the same time, though, one finding of this study is that America’s actual day-to-day operational policies on the ground in El Salvador generally reflected an attempt to implement the publicly espoused policy of engagement - however, flawed that approach might have been. If anywhere, the Salvador Option’s hidden angle is likely found more in opaque “ pro democracy” schemes. That is, there does not appear to be, say, a secret set of U.S. policies to intentionally create or back death squads despite Washington’s public rhetoric to the contrary. For instance, Jesse Helms described his support for Roberto D ’Aubuisson during the elections of 1984, as “ a classic case of the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend.’ ”3 Nevertheless, at this time the United States had denied D ’Aubuisson a visa, to which a U.S. diplomat quipped, “ There is no clearer way of showing how a country feels” about him.4 In this case, at least, the larger engagement policy at play did not reflect the pro-rightist Helms agenda. Another key lesson from the Salvador Option is that the particu­ lar historical moments in which these American campaigns unfolded is crucial to understanding the motivations that drove not just policy­ makers but all the relevant actors - official and unofficial - to do what they did in El Salvador. And the American era that helped shape the Sal­ vador Option’s initial engagement was the still tense, uncertain setting of the Cold War in which U.S. officials remained committed to con­ fronting communism around the globe while being terrified of suffer­ ing another Vietnam. And it is this same tense climate that led so many

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Americans to care greatly about the Salvador Option - the far left was convinced it was an immoral and cynical quagmire while the far right saw it as another case of needing to back our ally in order to check Moscow- and Havana-hatched communist aggression. By late 1989, though, the precipitous end of the global communist movement and the zeitgeist of the seemingly ascendant “ New World Order” shaped the Bush administration’s desire to help end the war. One might ask whether one of the three U.S. presidential administra­ tions conducted the Salvador Option engagement more successfully either morally or strategically - than the others. Some observers, for example, have contended that the Bush administration’s more active support for the peace process reveals that its approach to El Sal­ vador was a drastic departure from the single-minded anti-communism stance of its Executive Branch predecessors. The problem with these exercises is that they compare apples and oranges. The circumstances that confronted the Carter and Reagan administrations when the Cold War was still raging, and its outcome far from decided, were entirely different from the almost post-Cold War era that characterized the Bush years. Bush’s stern message on Central America to Gorbachev at the Malta Summit strongly suggests that, had he been president in the late 1970s or earlier in the 1980s, he would have pursued an anti­ communist approach largely similar to the ones that Carter and Rea­ gan had followed.

Holding the Line in Salvador Our story in these pages does not attempt to definitively resolve the debate over U.S. involvement in El Salvador, which remains, especially among scholars, emotionally charged and polarizing. And given the complicated combination of war, politics, and diplomacy involving multiple factions in El Salvador and several other nations in addition to the United States, some aspects of America’s involvement may not be fully understood even when, in an ideal future, all U.S. documents are made available. This equivocal conclusion is not to dodge making broader judgments about the Salvador Option but instead reflects the inescapable reality that we are still far from a full understanding of this searing but mostly neglected episode in America’s Cold War diplomatic and military history.

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Concluding Thoughts

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Despite many suppositions based on drastically differing scenarios, we have little notion of what would have happened in El Salvador had the United States not engaged in the manner it did starting in the late 1970s. We can certainly speculate that the limited, non-combat advi­ sory role might have prevented a Vietnam-like slippery slope into a bigger U.S. combat mission; yet, on the other hand, a much larger U.S. military presence - and even the insertion of combat troops - might have meant fewer FAES abuses. Some recent accounts misleadingly assume that this question has been answered. For example, a 2013 article in Britain’s Guardian newspaper asserted that “ the arming of one side of the conflict by the US hastened the country’s descent into a civil war in which 75,000 people died, and 1 million out of a popu­ lation of 6 million became refugees.” 5 Yet, contrary to the Guardian’s apparent certainty, U.S. backing most likely made some things worse and some better - and this is before we ask whether those negative costs contributed to any lasting, positive outcomes. We cannot know what would have happened in El Salvador had the United States declined to hold the line against perceived com­ munist expansion. Again, the imperfect comparison with Guatemala’s scorched-earth counterinsurgency that involved much less U.S. involve­ ment is a bitter reminder that less U.S. involvement in El Salvador would not have automatically meant less violence and suffering. Not surprisingly, supporters of U.S. policy have contended that the country was destined to become another Cuba or Nicaragua had the United States not intervened. Liberal detractors, by contrast, have looked at the 1979 progressive military coup and concluded that there could have been a moderate leftist revolution had first Carter and then Rea­ gan been more forceful in pressuring the FAES to reform.6 Another key hypothetical question is this: what would have been the consequences for the United States had the FM LN won the war? It certainly could have been a Sandinista-style socialism, not Leninist tyranny. But it is also true that the FM LN might have pushed aside its ideological comrade, the civilian FDR, and governed in a more Fidel Castro-like dictatorial fashion. Like the diversity of opinions within the three U.S. presidential administrations, the Salvadoran guerrillas were never the monolithic entity they fought to become, a reality that complicates our ability to speak confidently about how their revolution would have turned out.

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As we have seen, echoing the thrust of all Cold War American presidencies, strategists in all three administrations were adamantly opposed to any policies that would have permitted an FM LN takeover. U.S. officials, although often torn, were ultimately supportive of engagement in El Salvador, and were simply unwilling to take a chance on an FMLN-controlled country. These three presidents certainly could have been mistaken in their assumptions, but each of them embraced engagement as an appropriate means to achieve the typical Cold Warera goal of seeking victory for pro-U.S., anti-communist elements in El Salvador’s wrenching civil war. Remarkably, in the end, it was rightist and official violence and not Latin America’s most formidable Marxist insurgency that most threatened to unravel the Salvador Option.

“ His Courage Cost Him His Jo b ” Following Robert White’s death in January 2015 at the age of 88, the N ew York Times ran an obituary of the vocal American ambassador to El Salvador. The article described the 1980 churchwomen’s mur­ ders when White conveyed to the Carter administration’s State Depart­ ment his suspicions that government death squads were complicit in the crime. It also explained that Washington “ was supporting the mili­ tary government” against leftist revolutionaries, and that after Ronald Reagan took office that January, White was “ dismissed by Alexander Haig for opposing a military solution in El Salvador.”7 The obituary added that White’s suspicions about the deaths were later confirmed by declassified State Department documents accusing the Salvadoran security forces of a coverup. After hastily leaving the Foreign Service in the early Reagan years, as quoted in his N ew York Times tribute, White said, “ I regard it as an honor to join a small group of officers who have gone out of the service because they refused to betray their principles.” It added that White lamented the fact that, following President Kennedy’s assassination in 19 6 3, Washing­ ton “ adopted a single-minded goal to thwart Communism, whether in Vietnam or in its half-century embargo of Cuba.” 8 The profile quoted scholar William LeoGrande, who described White as a hero: “ He stood up for his principles, which reflected the values of the American people - a belief in democracy and human rights. His courage cost him

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his job, but he never wavered, spending the rest of his life advocating for those ideals.”9 This Times obituary described a narrative of the Salvador Option that might be called the White doctrine. During the war and in the quarter century thereafter, there might not be anyone else whose anal­ ysis and quotations more influenced public discussion of the Salvador Option and its legacy. Yet the White doctrine oversimplified the moti­ vations of U.S. officials and the consequences of U.S. policies. All U.S. officials whose views appear in currently available records, including White himself, demonstrated a firm belief that the FM LN ’s insurgency was more than simply a “ homegrown” threat. Part of this depends, of course, on what we mean by “ homegrown.” The repression, exclusion, and desperate poverty that caused many Salvadorans to take up arms were all homegrown; but we also have listened to former guerrilla com­ manders readily acknowledge the role of external military and polit­ ical support - above all - from allied governments in Managua and Havana. This added knowledge makes possible a more nuanced - and hence accurate - analysis of the Salvador Option. What Ambassador White might not have fully appreciated is that his political idol, John Kennedy, was in fact a staunch Cold Warrior firmly committed to preventing “ another Cuba” in the Western Hemi­ sphere. In fact, after a bloodless coup in El Salvador, which reinstated the military-civilian junta in October i960, Kennedy said, “ Govern­ ments of the civil-military type of El Salvador are the most effective in containing communist penetration in Latin America.” 10 Thus, it is more likely than not that, like Carter, Reagan, and Bush, Kennedy also would have upheld engagement in the effort to hold the line in El Salvador.

A #4 War As observers, we can sometimes make the mistake of citing or con­ sidering only the apparent evidence that reinforces what is in fact an incomplete or biased interpretation of U.S. policies and motives in El Salvador. Often, the sole evidence used to demonstrate the Reagan administration’s impact on the war is, say, Secretary of State Haig’s jin­ goism or the precipitous drop in death-squad activity over the decade.

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Another error is to judge U.S. policy by the generally peaceful and constructive outcome - as in the Pentagon’s simplistic official history that labels the U.S. military involvement “ remarkably successful” with­ out examining the consequences of this intervention.11 It might well be that the “ White versus Haig,” dove-versus-hawk historical interpreta­ tion is needlessly polarized and ideological, whereas a more nuanced explanation of the failures and successes of U.S. engagement spanning three administrations represents the core of the what, why, and how of U.S. policy in El Salvador during the Cold War. Another challenge for our conclusions is that the undeniably vio­ lent and often bloody images we have from the war are key parts of the story but they are not the whole story. The El Mozote massacre, further tainted by the initial denials of the Reagan team, the 1980 mur­ ders of the American churchwomen, and the 1989 Jesuit killings have become salient references in our understanding of the civil war. Raising this issue is certainly not intended to justify these heinous excesses but to ask whether it makes sense to portray them as the entire story as opposed to part of it. The episode “ Backyard: 19 5 4 -19 9 0 ” in C N N ’s widely watched Cold War television documentary series, for example, depicts Reagan’s Salvador policies through film clips of the December 1980 churchwomen’s killings and violence at the National Cathedral in the aftermath of Archbishop (Oscar Romero’s assassination. These images are then juxtaposed with Haig’s early 19 8 1 testimony where he talked of the Soviet- and Cuban-hatched “ hit list” for Central Amer­ ica.12 It is a very convincing conventional depiction of U.S. involvement but is also potentially misleading. Make no mistake: the images in the CN N episode are legitimate, but when presented as the entirety of U.S. involvement they can reinforce incomplete narratives. Perhaps a more accurate documentary would explain how the murders of Romero and the U.S. churchwomen occurred in the domestic tumult of 1979 and 1980, dubbed the “ tiempos de locura” (times of madness) at the time; the conservative Reagan administration came into office the following year. In this more comprehensive depiction, the documentary would show FAES and death squad violence and the Reagan administration’s anti-communist rhetoric, but it also would consider evidence like Jose Napoleon Duarte’s attempts at reform or episodes of U.S. pressure to protect human rights and control death squads that would present a more positive picture of the anti-communist side. For if students of

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contested episodes in the past do not strive continuously to be fairminded in depicting the goals and actions of the people involved, their writings will obscure these episodes more than they illuminate them. All this being said, these atrocities were critical events in El Sal­ vador’s civil war, and while they should not be considered a complete depiction of what transpired in the conflict, they should still be scru­ tinized. In other words, is it enough to conclude that tragedies like El Mozote and the Jesuit killings were immoral? Or should schol­ ars examine these heinous acts in El Salvador’s tragic war through an objective lens, taking into account all of the facts to better under­ stand their occurrence - and especially the American role, direct or otherwise?

Electoral Civil War in El Salvador? The outstanding question of which side won the decade-long war - the U.S. backed government and military or FM LN rebels - was given new life in March 2014 during a political crisis that erupted in the aftermath of the close vote in the presidential election between A R EN A ’s Norman Quijano and FM LN ’s Salvador Sanchez Cerén. Claiming that 2,000 FM LN poll workers had voted twice, Quijano called Sanchez Cerén’s victory “ illegitimate” and refused to accept the results without a full recount, “ voto por voto” (vote by vote). After the electoral tribunal refused the recount, Quijano then called for the election to be annulled and urged his supporters to be on a “ war footing.” In what was incen­ diary rhetoric for a nation barely two decades out from its horrible civil war, Quijano warned, “ Our armed forces are keeping an eye on this fraud. They can’t play with the desires of the people, nor can they upend the foundations of our democracy. They can’t steal the legitimate triumph from my nation.” 13 Responding indirectly, Defense Minister David Munguia publicly declared that the armed forces would abide by the official determination, no matter which candidate won. “ We promise to wholeheartedly respect the sovereign decision of El Sal­ vador, expressed in the polling booths. In no way, at least on behalf of the armed forces, is a coup being plotted or another conspiracy.” 14 Four days after the vote, the national electoral tribunal announced that the former school teacher turned FM LN rebel Sanchez Cerén had won by the razor-slim margin of 6,364 votes (or 5 0 .11 to 49.89

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50 4

The Salvador Option

percent) out of roughly 3 million votes cast and that the outcome was “ irreversible.” 15 Quijano soon conceded the election and his FM LN opponent assumed the presidency. While the impasse did not turn to political violence, Munguia’s vocal endorsement of the official elec­ toral process might have been the most significant development since the close vote result was first announced. In 2014, as civilian defense minister, Munguia was part of the same FAES that fought the rebels (including the vaunted insurgent commando and ideological hardliner, the now gray Sanchez Cerén) to a bloody stalemate. In the heated 2014 presidential campaign, some on the right and center feared that having the ex-guerrilla Sanchez Cerén as president would unsettle the military brass who might have held residual grudges against their erstwhile bit­ ter enemies. Yet Munguia countered these fears: “ Don’t ignore the level of professionalism that the armed forces have achieved.” 16 The accuracy of Munguia’s claim aside, it merited asking whether the ascension of the same Sanchez Cerén (who adopted the pseudonym of Comandante Leonel Gonzalez during the war) signified a victory or a defeat for the Salvador Option. Some would certainly contend that for Sanchez Cerén to win the presidency represented the ultimate tri­ umph of the FM LN ’s social revolution - even if it took a few decades longer than first expected. On the other hand, the Salvador Option’s supporters would counter that because this former guerrillero ascended to power only through the constitutional process - as opposed to armed revolution - his election was an axiomatic signal that the U.S.backed side had won.

“ For Me, Romero Is a Man of God” On the days leading up to the 31st anniversary of Archbishop (Oscar Romero’s assassination in March 2 0 1 1, President Barack Obama vis­ ited the grave of the leader whose dedication to human rights has immortalized him throughout El Salvador. FM LN civilian president Mauricio Funes recognized the powerful symbolism of this visit in a letter to the White House: “ Monsignor is the spiritual guide of this nation, and the visit that you are going to carry out to the tomb of Monsignor implies for us a recognition of a leader, an international leader like President Obama.” 17 Despite the positive remarks and open arms that welcomed Obama, some observers in El Salvador and the United States believed that

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Concluding Thoughts

50 5

Obama could have done more to condemn past actions and consid­ ered it a “ missed opportunity” to acknowledge and denounce the U.S. role in the civil war. At the same time, in an indication that the slain Archbishop Romero continued to leave a sour taste in the mouths of some on the right, a member of AREN A ’s party commented that “ half of Salvadorans do not believe Romero is worthy of sanctifica­ tion” and that Obama “ should also go to the grave of Major Roberto D ’Aubuisson.” 18 A former AREN A presidential aide, Luis Lopez Por­ tillo, contended that the civilian FM LN had appropriated Romero’s legacy. “ The former rebels, the F M L N ... were saying this is our saint, this is the left’s saint__ It’s a terrible contamination of something reli­ gious by politics.” 19 He added: [For those on the right] Romero is also seen as a guerrillero dressed as a priest, a pastor who took sides with kidnappers, hid outlaws in his chapel, or told the poor that they should take what they could from the rich__ I have a friend whose father was kidnapped in 1978, and when the guerrillas finally got the ransom, freed him, Romero was with the ones that handed him back. M y friend says, “ I can’t take it that this man [who] participated with the guerrillas ... is becoming a saint.” 20

In the decades following the war, Romero remained the most revered man in El Salvador. Dr. Juan Romagoza, a former guerrilla and founder of a public clinic, commented: “ For many Salvadorans, Latin Ameri­ cans and people throughout the world, he is already a saint. He is Saint Romero of America.”21 In 2005, the Vatican opened the plodding beat­ ification process, the first step toward sainthood. The campaign had strong but not universal support. Some conservative Latin American clerics still said he was murdered not for his Catholic faith but for his political ideology, a distinction Romero did not make. In fact, while he was still alive some critical bishops began telling the Vatican quietly that Romero was “ politicizing the Church.” During an August 2014 in-flight press conference after a trip to South Korea, Pope Francis told reporters that Romero’s beatification process needed to “ move in haste” and that “ for me, Romero is a man of God__ But there has to be the process, and the Lord will have to give his sign [of approval]. But if He wishes, He will do so!”22 Romero was officially beatified in San Salvador on M ay 23, 2015. Arturo Viscarra from the School of the Americas Watch, an orga­ nization opposed to U.S. military training of Latin American armed

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4 9 .1. March in San Salvador on the 10th anniversary of Arch­ bishop (Oscar Romero’s assassination, 1990. Image and permission by Jeremy Bigwood. f ig u r e

forces, was less than a year old when his parents brought him to the United States from war-torn El Salvador in 1980 - the same year that Romero was murdered. Now commenting 3 5 years later, Viscarra said: “ There needs to be further accountability for those that committed these human rights violations, including the killing of Romero - and including the U.S., who bear responsibility for atrocities including this one. If you’re going to talk about a martyr, there should be discussion of who’s responsible for his murder.”23 The Salvador Option’s legacy appeared as disputed as ever.

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Notes

Chapter 1. Introduction 1. Jefferson Morley, “The Secret of the Skeletons,” Washington Post, Novem­ ber 15, 1992. 2. Terry Lynn Karl, “ El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 7 1:2 (Spring 1992); Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, “ Obsta­ cles to Peacebuilding,” Foreign Policy 94 (1994); Joaquin Villalobos, “A Democratic Revolution for El Salvador,” Foreign Policy 74 (1989); United Nations, E l Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace. New York: United Nations, 1992; the acronym ESAF, for El Salvador Armed Forces, is used in U.S. government documents. The author has chosen to use the acronym in Spanish, FAES. 3. I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” Global Review o f Ethnopolitics 1:1 (September 2001): 8-18. 4. Karl, “ El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution.” 5. Karl, “ El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution.” 6. Karl, “ El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution.” 7. Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History , Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 19 17 -2 0 0 3 . Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005. 8. Stewart, American Military History , Volume II. 9. Stewart, American Military History, Volume II. 10. Jonathan D. Tepperman, “Salvador in Iraq: Flash Back,” Council on For­ eign Relations , April 5, 2005. 1 1 . Tepperman, “Salvador in Iraq: Flash Back.” 12. Tepperman, “Salvador in Iraq: Flash Back.”

507

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Notes to Pages 4-7

13 . Also see Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 2. 14 . Robert E. White, “ Renewal in El Salvador,” Washington Post, January 16, 1992. 15 . White, “ Renewal in El Salvador.” 16 . White, “ Renewal in El Salvador.” 17 . Tepperman, “ Salvador in Iraq: Flash Back” ; Peter Maas, “ The Salvadorization of Iraq?” N ew York Times Magazine, M ay 1,2 0 0 5 ; Peter Maas, “ The Way of the Commandos,” N ew York Times Magazine, M ay 1, 2005; Robert D. Kaplan, “A Colombian Vision for Iraq,” Atlantic, April 30, 2008; Michael Hirsh and John Barry, “ The Salvador Option,” Newsweek, October 16 , 2007; Mark Engler, “ El Salvador No Model for the Future of Iraq,” Newsday, December 1, 2004; Larry Kaplow, “ The Fight That We Are in Now,” Newsweek, March 15 , 2008; Aaron Lobel, “ The Challenge of Counterinsurgency,” America Abroad, October 14 , 2006; N. C. Aizenman, “ Salvadorans Ambushed by Memories in Iraq,” Washington Post, March 25, 2006. 18 . Christopher Dickey, “ Death Squad Democracy,” Newsweek, October 16, 2007. 19 . Jason Rowe, “ Some Forgotten Lessons,” America, April 25, 2005. 20. Rowe, “ Some Forgotten Lessons” ; Tim Padget, “ The Other America,” America, March 8, 2010 . 2 1 . “ Flash Back,” N ew Republic, April 1 1 , 2005; beyond Iraq, the debate continued seven years later about whether and how the United States might support insurgents in Syria. As one observer explained, “ The Sal­ vador Option is a ‘terrorist model’ of mass killings by US sponsored death squads. It was first applied in El Salvador, in the heyday of resis­ tance against the military dictatorship, resulting in an estimated 75,000 deaths.” See Michel Chossudovsky, “ The Salvador Option for Syria,” Global Research, M ay 28, 2 0 12. 22. For more on the United States’ understanding of containment in this later era in the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Contain­ ment: American National Security Policy during the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, chs. 10 - 1 2 ; Henry R. Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan. Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1 7 1 - 2 0 1 ; Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 20 14 , 10 2-44 . 23. Dana H. Allin, “The Conservative Challenge,” in Benjamin W. Rowland, ed., Charles De Gaulle’s Legacy o f Ideas. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2 0 1 1 , 10 2.

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Notes to Pages 8—18

50 9

24. Sam Roberts, “ Robert E. White, Ex-Ambassador to Latin America, Dies at 88,” N ew York Times, January 16, 2 0 15 . 25. William M . LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 90. 26. White, “ Renewal in El Salvador.” 27. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, “ U.S. Stand Is Countered by Many in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, July 18 , 19 8 1.

Chapter 2. Farabundo Martí, La Matanza, and a Stolen Election 1. Quoted in John W. Lamperti, Enrique Alvarez Cordova: Life o f a Sal­ vadoran Revolutionary and Gentleman. Jefferson, N C: McFarland, 2006, 4 1. 2. Quoted in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 1986, xv. 3. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, The Official Monthly Record of U.S. Foreign Policy, Vol. 80, No. 2034 (January 1980), University of Illinois Library archive. 4. “ El Salvador,” Gale Encyclopedia o f World History: Governments, 1. Detroit: Gale, 2008. 5. “ El Salvador.” 6. Christopher M. White, The History o f E l Salvador. Westport, CT: Green­ wood Press, 2009. 7. “ El Salvador.” 8. For an excellent comprehensive summary of El Salvador’s 20th-century history, see Richard A. Haggerty, ed., E l Salvador: A Country Study. Washington, DC: The Division, 1990; Enrique A. Baloyra, E l Sal­ vador in Transition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. 9. Haggerty, E l Salvador. 10 . Alan McPherson, The Invaded: H ow Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations. New York: Oxford University Press, 20 14 , 2 15 . 1 1 . Quoted in Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 12 , 50. 12 . Quoted in Joseph B. Frazier, “ El Salvador’s Old Communist Warrior Never Says Die,” Associated Press, January 3 1, 1993. 13 . “ El Salvador,” Worldmark Modern Conflict and Diplomacy, ed. Elizabeth P. Manar, Vol. 1: 9 / 11 to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Detroit: Gale, 20 14 , 199-204; White, The History o f E l Salvador. 14 . Stewart Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Human Rights Quarterly 4 :1 (Spring 1982).

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5i°

Notes to Pages 18-20

15 . Howard I. Blutstein et al., E l Salvador: A Country Study, Area Handbook for E l Salvador: Department o f the Army Pamphlet 5 5 0 -15 0 . Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. 16 . Quoted in Keith Preston, E l Salvador: A War by Proxy. London: Black House, 2 0 13 , 22. 17 . Historian Eric Ching argues that the 19 3 2 revolt was much more indige­ nous and less communist-inspired than most accounts have contended. See Eric Ching, Authoritarian E l Salvador: Politics and the Origins o f the Military Regimes. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 20 14, 287-336. 18 . Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy.” 19 . “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5,” DNSA E L00132. 20. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, xvii; Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza: E l Salvador’s Communist Revolt o f 19 3 2 . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 19 7 1, 159. 2 1 . For more on El Salvador’s history from the 1930s until the 1970s, see Anderson, Matanza; David Browning, E l Salvador: Landscape and Soci­ ety. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19 7 1; Alastair White, E l Salvador. New York: Praeger, 19 73 ; Phillip Russell, E l Salvador in Crisis. Austin, TX: Colorado River Press, 1984; Haggerty, E l Salvador. 22. 10,000-30,000 deaths according to Charles O. Skipper, “ El Salvador after 1979: Forces in the Conflict.” Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984; 40,000 deaths according to Anderson, Matanza, 158 -6 2 . 23. Eric Ching, “ In Search of the Party: The Communist Party, the Comintern, and the Peasant Rebellion of 19 3 2 in El Salvador,” The Americas 55:2 (October 1998): 204-39. 24. Ching, Authoritarian E l Salvador, 287-336. 25. Quoted in James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Salvador. London: Verso, 1982, 29. 26. “ Miguel Marmol, Last of 1920s Salvadoran Leftists,” Los Angeles Times, June 26, 1993. 27. “ Miguel Marmol, Last of 1920s Salvadoran Leftists.” 28. In the 1970s Marmol attempted to join the groups organizing in the mountains that were guerrillas by everything except name. But he was rejected due to his age by the very Communist Party that he had helped to found in the 1930s. At the party’s insistence, Marmol fled to Cuba through Sandinista Nicaragua in 1980 and made frequent visits to Europe, Latin America, and in 1988 to the United States to champion the guerrillas’ cause. During his U.S. visit, more than 40 universities invited Marmol to speak. As part of the peace agreement, he returned to El Salvador in August of 1992 along with wounded Salvadoran rebels who had been

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Notes to Pages 20-23

Su

treated in Cuba. Until his death, Marmol contended that the guerrillas had won the war, citing the dissolution of the despised National Guard and Treasury Police. In his estimation, “ With the United States on top of it all there was no chance for a [guerrilla] victory. What could 13,000 of us do against 62,000 of them armed and trained by the gringos?” M ar­ mol died on June 25, 1993, of pneumonia and was buried behind his residence in San Salvador. See Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 29. 30. 3 1. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39.

40.

4 1.

5 0 -5 4 . Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Ching, Authoritarian E l Salvador, 345. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 5. Ching, Authoritarian E l Salvador, 345-50. Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy.” “The Nationalist Democratic Organization, ORDEN, Department of State Memorandum from Embassy San Salvador, April 2, 19 79 ,” DNSA ES00124. “The Nationalist Democratic Organization, ORDEN, Department of State Memorandum from Embassy San Salvador, April 2, 19 79 .” UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in E l Sal­ vador: Report o f the Commission on the Truth for E l Salvador, S/25500, 1993, 126. “John Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 19 7 7 - 19 8 2 ,” ADST. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5,” DNSA E L00132. The evolution of the internal security forces was linked to the conversion of El Salvador’s rural economy to privately owned coffee estates in the late 19th century. The notion was that these farms required security forces to persuade local farmers and Indians, more used to subsistence agriculture, to work the farms. In fact, the National Guard was established to enforce a new law against Indians unwilling to work for the estates. The Treasury Police was established at the turn of the 20th century to combat black market smuggling of the goods on which the government treasury received its tax revenue. George R. Vickers, “ Renegotiating Internal Security: The Lessons of Cen­ tral America,” in Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999, 393-94. Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy” ; William Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins o f the Soccer War. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1970; James Rowles, E l Conflicto Honduras-El Salvador y el Orden Jurídico Interna­ cional, 1969. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroameri­ cana, 1980.

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5 12

Notes to Pages 23-26

42. Barry Carr, “ El Salvador Insurgency,” Encyclopedia o f Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A N ew Era o f Modern Warfare, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 20 13, 156 -57. 43. The Christian Democrats, the professional and intellectual class National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolu­ cionario, MNR), and opposition National Democratic Union (Union Democrática Nacionalista, UDN) formed the UNO coalition in 1969. 44. Tom Buckley, Violent Neighbors: E l Salvador, Central America, and the United States. New York: Times Books, 1984, Ch. 6. 45. Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterin­ surgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 83. 46. Loren Jenkins, “ From Conquistadores to Comunistas: Why the Killing Will Never End,” Washington Post, August 16, 19 8 1; “ Central America at the Crossroads,” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session (Statement of Viron P. Vaky, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs); T. D. Allman, “ Rising to Rebellion,” Harper’s, March 1981. 47. John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus. New York: Twayne, 1994, 155. 48. Allman, “ Rising to Rebellion.” 49. Karen DeYoung, “Anxiety in El Salvador,” Washington Post, August 2, 1979. 50. Gerson Martinez, National Assembly Deputy for the FMLN and former guerrilla leader, interview with author, San Salvador, July 2008; Mauricio Gonzalez, director of the Office of Legal Guardians of the Archdiocese of San Salvador (Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador), interview with author, San Salvador, July 2008. 51. Ana Guadalupe Martínez, interview in “ Episode 19: Backyard: 1954­ 1990” segment of Cold War, CN N television documentary; Ana Guadalupe Martinez, author interview, July 2008.

Chapter 3. The United States in Latin America 1. Quoted in Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Har­ vard University Press, 2010, 41. 2. Quoted in Sewall Menzel, Dictators, Drugs, and Revolutions: Cold War Campaigning in Latin America, 19 6 5 -19 8 9 . Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2006, 145. 3. This historical section is adapted from Russell Crandall, Gunboat Democ­ racy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 9-34.

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Notes to Pages 28-34

513

4. Woodrow Wilson, “Address Before the Southern Commercial Congress” (Mobile, AL, October 27, 19 13 ). 5. Ronald Reagan, “ Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers,” Wash­ ington, DC, March 10 , 19 83. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/ speeches/1983/31083a.htm. 6. Quoted in Tony Lake, Somoza Falling. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1989, 64. 7. Franklin Roosevelt, “ Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View,” Foreign Affairs (July 1928). 8. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “ First Inaugural Address” (Washington, DC, March 4, 19 33). 9. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Pact, was signed on September 2, 1947, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at a conference attended by President Truman. The 19 original signers joined the pact: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Domini­ can Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Later, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Trinidad-Tobago joined. In 1964, the member nations voted to suspend Cuba, bringing the number of countries in the alliance to 2 1. See “ The Rio Pact at a Glance,” N ew York Times, April 2 1 , 1982. The OAS emerged from an earlier U.S.-sponsored international organiza­ tion for the Western Hemisphere, the Pan-American Union. It convened a series of nine Pan-American conferences from 1889-90 to 1948 to reach agreement on various commercial and juridical problems common to the United States and Latin America; “ Organization of American States,” http://www.oas.org. 10 . George Kennan, “ Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1950, Volume II. 1 1 . Crandall, Gunboat Democracy, 18. 12 . Crandall, Gunboat Democracy, 18. 13 . Crandall, Gunboat Democracy, 19. 14 . Crandall, Gunboat Democracy, 2 1. 15 . John F. Kennedy, “ State of the Union Address” (Washington, DC, January 30, 19 6 1). 16 . Quoted in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War. New York: Cam­ bridge University Press, 2007, 170. 17 . Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 18 . Quoted in Regis Debray, Strategy for Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, 42. 19 . Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 50.

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5i4

Notes to Pages 34-42

20. Che Guevara, “ Message to the Tricontinental: Create Two, Three... Many Vietnams.” Havana, Cuba: Executive Secretariat of the Organiza­ tion of the Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAALA), 1967. 2 1 . Quoted in Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. New York: Grove Press, 1997, 398. 22. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 50. 23. Westad, The Global Cold War, 179. Chapter 4. American Military Mission in El Salvador 1. “ Latin American Reactions to Developments in and with Respect to Cuba,” in Christopher Kojm, ed., Revolution and Subversion in Latin America: Selected U.S. Intelligence Community Estimative Products, 19 4 7 -19 8 7 . Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, September 20 10 , 39-47. 2. Quoted in William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Chan­ nel to Cuba. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 20 14, 404. 3. Quoted in Michael D. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms. Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 10 1. 4. Quoted in Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 148. 5. John F. Kennedy, “ Inaugural Address,” January 20, 19 6 1. 6. Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies. New York: Routledge, 20 0 1, 17 3 . 7. Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni­ versity Press, 20 10 , 59. 8. Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 59. 9. Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History o f American Hubris. New York: Harper, 20 10 , 14 3-4 4 . 10 . “ Murat Williams, Ambassador, El Salvador, 19 6 1-6 4 ,” ADST. 1 1 . “ Murat Williams, Ambassador, El Salvador, 19 6 1-6 4 .” 12 . “ Murat Williams, Ambassador, El Salvador, 19 6 1-6 4 .” 13 . Murat Williams, “ Kennedy and El Salvador,” Christianity and Crisis,July 2 1, 1980. 14 . “ Murat Williams, Ambassador, El Salvador, 19 6 1-6 4 .” 15 . Williams, “ Kennedy and El Salvador.” 16 . Williams, “ Kennedy and El Salvador.” 17 . Williams, “ Kennedy and El Salvador.” 18 . “Alianza Si, Progreso N o,” Time, March 16 , 1962. 19 . “Alianza Si, Progreso N o.” 20. Williams, “ Kennedy and El Salvador.”

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Notes to Pages 42-46

515

2 1 . Williams, “ Kennedy and El Salvador” ; Joseph Frazier, “Archbishop Wants New Investigation of Predecessor’s Assassination,” Associated Press, March 25, 1985. 22. “ Murat Williams, Ambassador, El Salvador, 19 6 1-6 4 ,” ADST; U.S. Army Mission to El Salvador, Program Report, San Salvador, June 30, 1964. 23. Kenneth Freed, “ Salvador Civil War Becoming Battle of U.S. Surrogates,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1989; Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, E l Salvador: The Face o f Revolution. 2nd ed. Boston: South End Press, 1982, 260. 24. Juan O. Tamayo, “Analysts Fear U.S. Aid to Salvador Poorly Timed,” United Press International, March 26, 1982. 25. Allan Nairn, “ Behind the Death Squads: An Exclusive Report on the U.S. Role in El Salvador’s Official Terror,” Progressive, M ay 1984. 26. Nairn, “ Behind the Death Squads.” 27. Quoted in Christopher Dickey, “ Behind the Death Squads of El Salvador,” N ew Republic, 1984; Los Escuadrones de la muerte en E l Salvador. San Salvador: Editorial Jaguara, 1995, 27, 176 . Author translation. 28. Quoted in Dickey, “ Behind the Death Squads of El Salvador.” 29. Quoted in Dickey, “ Behind the Death Squads of El Salvador.” 30. Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 , 6. 3 1. Dickey, “ Behind the Death Squads of El Salvador.” 32. Dickey, “ Behind the Death Squads of El Salvador.” 33. Dickey, “ Behind the Death Squads of El Salvador.” 34. Jefferson Morley, “ When Reaganites Backed D’Aubuisson, They Unleashed a Political Assassin: El Salvador: Washington’s right was so pleased with the politician’s anti-communism it was willing to overlook his abuse of human rights,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 1992. 35. Quoted in Dickey, “ Behind the Death Squads of El Salvador” ; Los Escuadrones de la muerte en E l Salvador, 27, 176 . Author translation. 36. Greg Grandin, Em pire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise o f Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan, 2006, 96. 37. Quoted in Dickey, “ Behind the Death Squads of El Salvador” ; Los Escuadrones de la muerte en E l Salvador, 27, 176 . Author translation. Chapter 5. A Divided Nation 1. Enrique Krauze, “ Chiapas: The Indians’ Prophet,” N ew York Review o f Books 46 (1999): 69. 2. Quoted in James LeMoyne, “ Salvador Rebel Vows to Spread War,” New York Times, July 7, 1985.

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516

Notes to Pages 46-51

3. Quoted in Joel Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself,” N ew York Times, December 10 , 1989. 4. “ El Salvador: Background of the Revolutionary Struggle,” Black Scholar, January-February 1980. 5. Paul Heath Hoeffel, “ The Eclipse of the Oligarchs,” N ew York Times, September 6, 19 8 1. 6. Paul P. Kennedy, “ Recovery Hopes Rise in Salvador,” N ew York Times, February 25, 1962. 7. Kennedy, “ Recovery Hopes Rise in El Salvador.” 8. Dan Kurzman, “ Oligarchy Strong: El Salvador Mixes Hope, Obstacles,” N ew York Times, April 14, 1963. 9. Quoted in Kurzman, “ Oligarchy Strong.” 10 . Hoeffel, “The Eclipse of the Oligarchs.” 1 1 . Hoeffel, “The Eclipse of the Oligarchs.” 12 . Hoeffel, “The Eclipse of the Oligarchs.” 13 . Hoeffel, “The Eclipse of the Oligarchs.” 14 . Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 14 5-4 8 ; Marc Cooper and Greg Goldin, “ Interview with Jose Napoleon Duarte,” Playboy, Novem­ ber 1984; Tom Buckley, Violent Neighbors: E l Salvador, Central America, and the United States. New York: Times Books, 1984, Ch. 6. 15 . Stephen Webre, Jose Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in Salvadoran Politics, 19 6 0 -19 7 2 . Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univer­ sity Press, 1979. 16 . Webre, José Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in Sal­ vadoran Politics, 19 6 0 -19 7 2 . 17 . Webre, Jose Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in Sal­ vadoran Politics, 19 6 0 -19 7 2 . 18 . Buckley, Violent Neighbors: E l Salvador, Central America, and the United States. 19 . Buckley, Violent Neighbors: E l Salvador, Central America, and the United States. 20. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 14 5-4 8 ; Cooper and Goldin, “ Interview with Jose Napoleon Duarte” ; on student organizing in the 1960s, see Victor Manuel Valle, Siembre de vientos: E l Salvador 19 6 0 -19 6 9 . San Salvador: CINAS, 1993; Rufino Antonio Quezada and Hugo Roger Martínez, 25 Anos de Estudio y Lucha: una cronología del movimiento estudiantil. San Salvador: n.p., 1995; Paul Almeida, Waves o f Protest: Popular Struggle in E l Salvador, 19 2 5 -2 0 0 5 . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008; Rafael Guido Vejar, E l ascenso del militarismo en E l Salvador. San Salvador: UCA, 1980; Rafael Guido Vejar “ La cri­ sis política en El Salvador (19 76 -19 79 ),” Estudios Centroamericanos 35:

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Notes to Pages 51-57

2 1. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 3 1.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

38. 39.

40.

517

469-470 (July-August, 1979): 507-26; Elsa Moreno, Mujeres y política en E l Salvador. San Jose: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1997; Marcelo German Posada and Mario Lopez, “ El Salvador, 19 50 ­ 1970: latifundios, integración y crisis,” Revista de Historia de America 1 1 4 (June 1993): 37-62; Italo Lopez Vallecillos, “ Rasgos sociales y ten­ dencias políticas en El Salvador (19 69 -19 79 ),” Estudios Centroameri­ canos 34 :372-373 (October-November 1979): 863-84. Webre, José Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in Sal­ vadoran Politics, 19 6 0 -19 7 2 . Henry Giniger, “ Salvador Weighs Role of Military,” N ew York Times, October 25, 1965. “ Henry E. Catto Jr. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1 9 7 1 - 7 3 ,” ADST. Hoeffel, “ The Eclipse of the Oligarchs.” “ Clyde Taylor, Economic officer in Embassy San Salvador, 7 2 -7 5 ,” ADST. Hoeffel, “ The Eclipse of the Oligarchs.” James LeMoyne, “ In El Salvador, Rebels with a New Cause,” N ew York Times, February 9, 1992. LeMoyne, “ In El Salvador, Rebels with a New Cause.” Quoted in LeMoyne, “ In El Salvador, Rebels with a New Cause.” Quoted in Charles Harper, “ Death and Hope Seen in El Salvador,” One World 57 (1980): 16 - 17 . Quoted in Michael J. Waller, The Third Current o f Revolution: Inside the ‘North American Front’ o f E l Salvador’s Guerrilla War. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 19 9 1. Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church,” Central American Bulletin 3:7 (1984). Patrick Lacefield, “ Liberation and El Salvador’s Bishop,” Christian Cen­ tury, October 1979. Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church.” Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni­ versity Press, 20 10 , 87. Quoted in Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in E l Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 100­ 10 1. Quoted in Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in E l Sal­ vador, 10 0 - 1 0 1; “ El Salvador’s Fallen Hero,” Christian Century, April 1980. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 189. Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterin­ surgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 87. Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 87.

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518

Notes to Pages 57-61

4 1. Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 87. 42. Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 , 10 8 -10 ; Lacefield, “ Liberation and El Salvador’s Bishop” ; Oscar Romero, “ The Church, Political Organization, and Vio­ lence.” London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, August 1978. 43. Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 87. 44. James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Sal­ vador. London: Verso, 1982, 109. 45. Dunkerley, The Long War, 109. 46. Dunkerley, The Long War, 109. 47. Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church.” 48. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit. New York: Times Books, 1984, 72; Tommie Sue Montgomery, “ Cross and Rifle: Revolution and the Church in El Salvador and Nicaragua,” Journal o f International Affairs (Fall 1982); Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church” ; Alan Riding, “The Cross and the Sword in Latin Amer­ ica,” N ew York Review o f Books, M ay 28, 19 8 1; Webre, José Napoleón Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in Salvadoran Politics, 1960­ 1 972 . 49. Quoted in Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, 69; Mauricio Gonzalez, Direc­ tor of the Tutela Legal Office of the Archbishop of San Salvador, inter­ view with author, San Salvador, July 2008; James Philip Werbaneth, “The Ideological Foundations of the Salvadoran Revolution.” Master’s thesis, Duquesne University, 1985. 50. Chris Hedges, “ Why Father Poncel Joined El Salvador’s Guerrilla M ove­ ment,” Christian Science Monitor, January 5, 1984. 5 1. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 10 8 -10 . 52. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 10 8 -10 . 53. Shirley Christian, “ El Salvador’s Divided Military,” Atlantic Monthly, June 19 83; Joel Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself,” N ew York Times, December 10 , 1989. 54. Christian, “ El Salvador’s Divided Military.” 55. 10,000-30,000 deaths according to Charles O. Skipper, “ El Salvador after 1979: Forces in the Conflict.” Marine Corps Command and Staff Col­ lege, 1984; 40,000 deaths according to Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza: E l Salvador’s Communist Revolt o f 19 3 2 . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 19 7 1, 158 -6 2 . 56. Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself.” 57. Norman J. Brozenick, “ Small Wars, Big Stakes: Coercion, Persuasion, and Airpower in Counterrevolutionary War.” Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, June 1998.

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Notes to Pages 61-66

519

58. Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself.” 59. Mark Moyar, A Question o f Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. 60. Brozenick, “ Small Wars, Big Stakes: Coercion, Persuasion, and Airpower in Counterrevolutionary War.” 61. Quoted in Mark Danner, The Massacre a tE l Mozote . New York: Vintage, 1993, 23. The 55,000 troop strong Salvadoran armed forces comprised the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the three security branches: the National Police, Treasury Police, and National Guard. It was not unusual for an officer to spend part of his career in the security forces and part in the army; also see “ Briefing Paper on Rightwing Terrorism in El Salvador,” CIA, October 1983, DNSA EL00110. 62. Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself.” 63. Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself.” 64. Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself.” 65. Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself.”

Chapter 6. Guerrillas Are Born 1. Pickering was interviewed in 2006. See “The Challenge of Counterin­ surgency,” America Abroad (transcript), October 14, 2006, http://www .americaabroad.org/radio/programs/documentaries/?prog=the_challenge_ of_counterinsurgency. 2. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and E l Salvador . New York: Times Books, 1984, 47. 3. “The Challenge of Counterinsurgency,” America Abroad (transcript), October 14, 2006. 4. In a shocking development, Carpio is believed to have committed sui­ cide in 1983 after revelations surfaced that he was behind the murder of the FPL’s second in command, Comandante Ana Maria, who dared to challenge his rigid military and political dogma. See Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That War. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 20 13, 14 4 -4 7; Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 86. 5. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 81, 189; Robert S. Leiken, ed., Central Amer­ ica: Anatomy o f Conflict. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. 6. James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Sal­ vador . London: Verso, 1982, 92; for evolution of the guerrillas, also see Ruben Zamora, La izquierda partidaria salvadoreha: entre la identidad y el poder . San Salvador: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales

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520

7. 8. 9. 10 .

11. 12 . 13 . 14 .

Notes to Pages 66-71 (FLACSO, 2003). See also Jorge Pinto, E l grito del mas pequeño. M ex­ ico City: Editorial Comete V. E. Montes, 1985; Miguel Castellanos, The Comandante Speaks: Memoirs o f an E l Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 19 9 1; Juan Ramon Medrano and Walter Raudales, N i militar ni sacerdote. San Salvador: Ediciones Arco Iris, 1994. Dunkerley, The Long War, 1 1 7 . Peter Kemp, “ Exporting the Revolution,” Spectator, July 3 1, 1982. Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 86. Quoted in Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: E l Salvador’s F M L N and Peru’s Shining Path. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998, 50. Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 86. Dunkerley, The Long War, 1 1 7 . Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 7. Andrea Ohate, “The Red Affair: FMLN-Cuban Relations during the Sal­ vadoran Civil War, 19 8 1-9 2 ,” Cold War History 1 1 : 2 (May 2 0 11) : 1 3 3 ­

54. 15 . Onate, “ The Red Affair,” 13 3 -5 4 . 16 . Interviews with former guerrilla commanders Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho, and Joaquin Villalobos are dis­ cussed in Onate, “ The Red Affair,” 150 ; “ US White Paper on El Salvador,” Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 19 8 1. 17 . Graham Hovey, “ U.S. Fears Unrest in Central America,” N ew York Times, July 2 1, 1979. 18 . The Communist Party formed its armed wing, the FAL, in 1980 and joined the ERP, FARN, and FPL in the Dirección Revolucionario Unificada (United Revolutionary Directorate, DRU). The unification was solidified when the PRTC joined the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (Farabundo Marti Front for the National Liberation, FMLN) in October 1980 uniting the FPL, ERP, RN , PCS and Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers, PRTC); Berne Ayala, A l Tope y Mas Allá: Testimo­ nio de la Guerrilla Salvadoreña desde la Ofensiva de 1989 a los Acuerdos de Paz. San Salvador: Cipitio Editores, 1996; Jose Angel Bracamonte and David Spencer, Strategy and Tactics o f the Salvadoran F M L N Guerril­ las. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. Other research indicates that the ERP and PRTC were the last to join. For guerrilla memoirs, see Schafik Jorge Handal, E l Salvador: Partido Comunista y guerra revolucionaria. Buenos Aires: Dialéctica, 1988. 19 . Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 19 1. 20. Quoted in Oñate, “ The Red Affair,” 139 . 2 1 . Quoted in Oñate, “The Red Affair,” i3 9 . The ties between Havana and the FM LN were led by two Cuban agencies: the Departamento America,

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Notes to Pages 71-75

22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30. 3 1. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

37.

38. 39. 40. 4 1. 42. 43.

5 21

headed by Piñera, and the Departamento de Operaciones Especiales (DOE). Ohate, “The Red Affair,” 144. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 144 -47. National Intelligence Estimate, “ Communist Potentialities in Latin Amer­ ica,” Foreign Relations o f the United States, 19 6 4 -19 6 8 2 1:2 4 (August 19, 1984). Obate, “The Red Affair,” 14 7. Odate, “The Red Affair,” 14 7. Peter Kemp, “ Cuban Subversion,” Spectator, July 24, 1982; also see Jorge Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. Robert D. Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and E l Salvador. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 89. Quoted in Onate, “ The Red Affair,” 142. Quoted in Onate, “ The Red Affair,” 144. Onate, “The Red Affair,” 13 8 . Michael E. Allison and Alberto Martin Alvarez, “ Unity and Disunity in the FM LN ,” Latin American Politics and Society 54 (2012): 95. U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Central America,” Special Report 13 2 (September 1985). U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Central America.” U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Central America.” Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 56. A three-day general strike in late June 1980 led to the military’s occupation of the National University, leaving 50 dead. The Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses (CRM) was created to unite various mass movements in January 1980. In April 1980, the CRM linked up with the Salvadoran Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Sal­ vadoreño, FDS) to create the FDR. Dunkerley, The Long War, 170 . Tommy Sue Montgomery, Revolution in E l Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, 1 1 1 . Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War, 58. Kemp, “ Exporting the Revolution.” Dunkerley, The Long War, 170 . Dunkerley, The Long War, 170 ; Guillermo Ungo later replaced Alvarez as FDR chief.

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522

Notes to Pages 79-90 Chapter 7. Revolution and Counterinsurgency in Guatemala

1. Quoted in Regis Debray, Strategy for Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, 1 1 3 . 2. “ Insurgency and Instability in Guatemala.” SNIE 82-68, Washington, December 19, 1968, in Christopher Kojm, ed., Revolution and Subver­ sion in Latin America: Selected U.S. Intelligence Community Estimative Products, 19 4 7 -19 8 7 . Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, September 2010 . 3. Quoted in Walter LaFeber, Invevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, 114 . 4. Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007, 85. 5. Norman Gall, “ Slaughter in Guatemala,” N ew York Review o f Books, November 20, 19 7 1. 6. “ Insurgency and Instability in Latin America,” 19 3. 7. General Fred Woerner, ret., U.S. Army, telephone interview with author, June 2008. 8. “ Memorandum from Viron P. Vaky to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, March 2 9 ,19 6 8 ,” Foreign Relations o f the United States (FRUS), 1964-68, U.S. Department of State, 1964, vol. 3 1. 9. Quoted in Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, M A: Har­ vard University Press, 20 10 , 17 7 . 10 . Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years. Berkeley: University of California Press, I9 9 G 5 9 . 1 1 . Quoted in Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions. New York: W W. Nor­ ton, 1993, 114 . 12 . Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 6. 13 . “ Briefing Book on El Salvador,” Non-Classified Report, April 23, 1983, DNSA ES03948. 14 . Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 206. 15 . Quoted in Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 208. 16 . Quoted in Luciano Silva, “The War in El Salvador: A Retrospective.” Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 15 , 1996. 17 . Richard Millet, “ Central American Paralysis,” Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 9 9 - 117 . Chapter 8. Mass Organizations 1. James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Sal­ vador. London: Junction Books, 1982, 13 2 .

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Notes to Pages 90-93

52 3

2. Alan Riding, “ Poverty’s Grip Outlasts Terror,” N ew York Times, M ay 27,

19 7 9 . 3. Joan Didion, Salvador. New York: Washington Square Press, 19 83, 8 1­ 84. 4. Didion, Salvador, 81-84. 5. Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 , 7. 6. Enrique Krauze, Redeemers: Ideas and Power in Latin America. New York: Harper Collins, 2 0 1 1 , 324. 7. Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterin­ surgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 86. 8. “ El Salvador: A Revolution Brews,” North American Congress on Latin America (newsletter), March-April 19 8 1. 9. “ Left-Wing Extremism,” in Howard I. Blutstein et al., eds., E l Salvador: A Country Study, Area Handbook for E l Salvador: Department o f the Army Pamphlet 5 5 0 -15 0 . Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. 10 . Diana Negroponte, Seeking Peace in E l Salvador: The Struggle to Recon­ struct a Nation at the End o f the Cold War. New York: Palgrave Macmil­ lan, 2 0 12 , 33; “ El Salvador: A Revolution Brews.” 1 1 . Before the foundation of the FM LN, there were five alliances of military and popular fronts (dates indicate year established): FPL (1970) and BPR (1975); RN (1975) and FAPU (1974); ERP (1972) and LP-28 (1978); PCS (1930) and UDN (1967); PRTC (1976) and the People’s Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Popular, MPL) (1979); Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernandez, and Barbara Hogenboom, Miraculous Metamor­ phoses: The Neoliberalization o f Latin American Populism. London: Zed Books, 20 0 1, 199. 12 . Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1. 13 . Paul Douglas Almeida, Protest by Invitation and Intimidation: Cycles o f Popular Contention in E l Salvador, 19 6 0 -19 8 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, 150. 14 . Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in E l Salvador. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 92-93. 15 . Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in E l Salvador: Origins and E vo ­ lution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982, 13 3 . 16 . Marvin Galeas, “A 2 1 anos del asesinato de ‘Ana M aría,’ ” Vértice, May 16, 2004. Author translation. 17 . Quoted in Margaret E. Ward, Missing Mila, Finding Family: And Inter­ national Adoption in the Shadow o f the Salvadoran Civil War. Austin:

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524

Notes to Pages 93-96

University of Texas Press, 2 0 1 1 , 257; also see Charles D. Brockett, Politi­ cal Movements and Violence in Central America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 18 . To make matters even more confusing, before becoming guerrilla groups, the radical leftists at times considered themselves “ political-military fronts.” These fronts sometimes had relationships with the many leftist political mass organizations. It is perhaps easier to consider the “ politicalmilitary fronts” as simply nascent guerrilla organizations. 19 . Rita Friedman, “ Resume for a Guerrilla,” N ew York Times, February 2 1, 1982; also see Timothy Brown, ed., When the AK-^ys Fall Silent: Revo­ lutionaries, Guerrillas, and the Dangers o f Peace. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2000, 12 3 ; Dunkerley, The Long War, 100; William Stan­ ley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in E l Salvador. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996, z5 7 . 20. Quoted in Ward, Missing Mila, Finding Family, 257; also see Brockett, Political Movements and Violence in Central America. 2 1 . Quoted in Alan Riding, “ Salvador’s Revolutionary Bloc Growing in Strength,” N ew York Times, M ay 13 , 1979. 22. Alberto Martin Alvarez and Eudald Cortina Orero, “ The Genesis and Internal Dynamics of El Salvador’s People’s Revolutionary Army, 19 70 ­ 19 76 ,” Journal o f Latin American Studies 46:4 (November 2014): 682. 23. Fermün Cienfuegos, Commander Ferman Cienfuego Speaks. Los Angeles, CA: Solidarity Committee, 1982. Following the war’s formal end in 1992, Cienfuegos became an FM LN deputy in the national assembly. 24. Quoted in Negroponte, Seeking Peace in E l Salvador, 3 2 -3 3. 25. Quoted in John W. Lamperti, Enrique Alvarez Cordova: Life o f a Sal­ vadoran Revolutionary. Jefferson, N C: McFarland, 2006, 13 3 ; also see Almeida, Protest by Invitation and Intimidation, 15 3 , 16 7; Oscar Mar­ tinez Pehate, E l Salvador del Conflicto Armado a la Negociacion 19 79 ­ 1989. San Salvador, El Salvador: Editorial Nuevo Enfoque, 1995, 28. 26. Negroponte, Seeking Peace in E l Salvador, 34; “ Left-Wing Extremism,” in E l Salvador: A Country Study; Alan Riding, “ Salvador’s Revolutionary Bloc Growing in Strength,” N ew York Times, M ay 13 , 1979. 27. Quoted in Alan Riding, “ El Salvador Moves to Suppress Unrest,” N ew York Times, M ay 3, 1978. 28. “ 1,500 in El Salvador End Takeover of Ministry and Free 86 Hostages,” N ew York Times, November 13 , 19 77. 29. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 189. 30. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 18 9 -9 1. 3 1. “ Right-Wing Releases El Salvador Hostages,” Associated Press, February 6, 1980.

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Notes to Pages 96-101

52 5

32. Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in E l Salvador. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 12 9 -30 . 33. James L. Buckley, “ Reprogramming Proposal for El Salvador,” statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of House Appropriations Committee. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State Bulletin 81:2046­ 57 (April 29, 19 8 1). 34. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, E l Salvador: The Face of Revolution. Boston: South End Press, 1982, 1 1 2 - 1 3 ; also see Alan Riding, “ Militants in El Salvador Undeterred by the Death of 22 ,” N ew York Times, M ay 10, 1979; Stanley, The Protection Racket State, ch. 4. 35. Quoted in Alan Riding, “ Militants in El Salvador Undeterred by the Death of 22 ,” N ew York Times, May 10 , 1979. 36. “ El Salvador: Background of the Revolutionary Struggle,” Black Scholar (January-February 1980); Jaime Barrio, “ Objective Prerequisites of Change,” World Marxist Review (October 1979). 37. Karen DeYoung, “ El Salvador Lurches toward Eruption,” Washington Post, August 2 4 ,19 7 9 ; Karen DeYoung, “ El Salvador: A Symbol of World Crisis,” Washington Post, March 8, 19 8 1. 38. Jose Napoleon Duarte, cited in M ax G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., E l Salvador at War: An Oral History o f Conflict from the 1979 Insurrec­ tion to the Present. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988, 47. 39. For an example of this sort of coverage, see “ Backyard, 19 5 4 -19 9 0 ,” C N N Cold War Series, Burbank, CA: Warner Home Video, 1998. 40. Brown, When the AK-^ys Fall Silent, 120. 4 1. Brown, When the AK-^ys Fall Silent, 12 3 . 42. See Harald Jung, “ Class Struggle and Civil War in El Salvador,” N ew Left Review (July-August 1980). 43. Brown, When the AK-^ys Fall Silent, 1 19 . 44. See, for example, Brown, When the AK-^ys Fall Silent. 45. The People’s Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), the United Front for Popular Action (FAPU), the Democratic Nationalist Union (UDN), the February 28 People’s Leagues (LP-28) and the People’s Liberation Movement (MPL) came together to form the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses (CRM). Within days, 200,000 marchers took to the streets of San Salvador to celebrate the union. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 56. 46. Gettlemen et al., E l Salvador, 202. 47. U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution Beyond Our Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Central America,” Special Report 13 2 (September 1985). 48. Clifford Krauss, “ Radical Unions Revive in El Salvador,” Wall Street Jour­ nal, September 24, 1985. 49. Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 78-79.

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526

Notes to Pages 102—104 Chapter 9. Carter Arrives

1. “ Memorandum from Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron),” FRUS 1:98 (1977-1980); A FRUS volume on the Central administration in Central America is being compiled and will be an excellent source for continued study on the Carter administration’s reaction to political and social tumult in Central America. 2. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, “ U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives,” Hear­ ings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, March 27, 1980. 3. Thomas Paterson et al., American Foreign Relations: A History , Volume 2: Since 18 9 5 . Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2010, 163. 4. An excellent overview of the Carter administration’s initial intellectual and policy deliberations is at FRUS, 19 77-19 8 0 , Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America . New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, 13. 5. An excellent overview of the Carter administration’s initial intellectual and policy deliberations is at FRUS, 19 77-19 8 0 , Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; Arnson, Crossroads, 13. 6. Quoted in Stewart W. Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Human Rights Quarterly 4:1 (Spring 1982). 7. Quoted in Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy” ; “ Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Hearings before Subcommit­ tee on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979. 8. Arnson, Crossroads, 13. 9. Arnson, Crossroads, 13. 10. Russell Crandall, Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Domini­ can Republic, Grenada, and Panama. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefied, 2006, 26. 1 1 . Quoted in Fontaine, Digiovanni, and Kruger, “ Castro’s Specter.” A sam­ ple of the Carter White House deliberations on human rights policy can be found at “ Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter,” JCPL, National Secu­ rity Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues - Mathews Subject File, Box 10, Human Rights: Presidential Directive, 12/77-12/78; “Memoran­ dum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski),” JCPL, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Sub­ ject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1977.

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Notes to Pages 104-108

527

12 . Jimmy Carter, “ University of Notre Dame, Address at Commencement Exercises, M ay 22, 19 7 7 ,” American Presidency Project: http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75 52. 13 . Crandall, Gunboat Democracy, 26. 14 . John Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 8:4 (Fall 2006): 5 7 -9 1. 15 . Gerald Segal, The Simon & Schuster Guide to the World Today. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987, 82. 16 . On April 24 ,19 8 0 , Operation Eagle Claw failed to rescue the hostages and resulted in the deaths of eight American servicemen, one Iranian civilian, and the destruction of two aircraft. See Russell Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 17 7 6 to the War on Terror. New York: Cambridge University Press, 20 14 , 457-58. 17 . William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The H id­ den History o f Negotiations between Washington and Havana. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 20 14 , 14 5 -4 8 ; Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Washington, Havana, and Africa, 19 5 9 -19 7 6 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 18 . LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba, 145-4 8. 19 . Quoted in Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” 59. 20. Quoted in Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” 67. 2 1 . Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” 5 7 -9 1; also see David K. Shipler, “ Moscow Is Said to Modify Expectations of Detente: U.S. Campaign Leads Moscow to Modify Detente Expectations,” N ew York Times, April 15 ,19 7 6 ; Joel D. Weisman, “ Carter Joins Crowd, Denounces Kissinger,” Washington Post, March 16 ,19 7 6 ; Murrey Marder, “WateredDown Detente Hit by Schlesinger,” Washington Post, April 14 , 1976. 22. LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba, 145-4 8. 23. LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba, 2 0 7 -10 . 24. “ Presidential Directive/NSC - 52,” October 4, 1979, JCPL. 25. LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba, 2 0 7 -10 . 26. Arnson, Crossroads, 13 . 27. Jimmy Carter, “ Organization of American States Address before the Per­ manent Council,” April 14 , 19 77, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb .edu/ws/?pid=-7347. 28. Quoted in Fontaine, “ Castro’s Specter” ; “ Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assis­ tant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski),” JCPL, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 19 , PD/NSC-30. 29. Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection; Series: Sub­ ject Files; Folder: Meetings - PRC 126, 8/2/79; Container 25, JCPL;

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30.

3 1.

32.

33.

34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39.

Notes to Pages 108—110 Meetings - SCC 18 3 , 7/17/79; Meetings - PRC 120, 8/1/79. Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Colletion; Series: Subject Files; Folder: Meetings - PRC 12 0 , 8/1/79; Container 25, JCPL; James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Salvador. London: Verso, 1982, 29. “ Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,” JCPL, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues - Bloomfield Sub­ ject File, Box 17 , Human Rights: Trends: 5/77-1/79. Secret; “ Report Pre­ pared by the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assis­ tance,” JCPL, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North-South Pas­ tor Files, Subject File, Box 55, Human Rights: 1-5/78. Confidential; National Archives, R G 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 19 7 7 -19 8 0 , Lot 8 1D 11 3 , Box 18, PD 30. “ Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,” JCPL, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues - Bloomfield Sub­ ject File, Box 17 , Human Rights: Trends: 5/77-1/79. Secret; “ Report Pre­ pared by the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assis­ tance,” JCPL, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North-South Pastor Files, Subject File, Box 55, Human Rights: 1-5/78. Confidential; National Archives, R G 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 19 7 7 -19 8 0 , Lot 8 1D 11 3 , Box 18, PD 30. “ Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,” JCPL, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues - Bloomfield Sub­ ject File, Box 17 , Human Rights: Trends: 5/77-1/79. Secret. “ Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,” JCPL, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues - Bloomfield Sub­ ject File, Box 17 , Human Rights: Trends: 5/77-1/79. Secret. David Binder, “ U.S. Wins Safeguards in German Nuclear Deal with Brazil,” N ew York Times, June 4, 19 75; Craig R. Whitney, “ Brazilians and West Germans Sign $4-Billion Nuclear Pact,” N ew York Times, June 28, 19 75; John Maclean, “ Would U.S. Fight Alongside Rebels? Politi­ cal Reality Still Outranks Human Rights,” Chicago Tribune, April 26, 19 77. CIA World Fact Book, Library of Congress Country Study: El Salvador. Statement of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State. “ U.S. Foreign Policy Objec­ tives,” Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, March 27, 1980. Stewart W. Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Pol­ icy,” Human Rights Quarterly 4 :1 (Spring 1982): 1-3 8 . John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus. New York: Twayne, 1994, 149. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 150 .

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Notes to Pages 110-113

529

40. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 150 . 4 1. Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterin­ surgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 84. 42. Haggerty, Richard A., ed., E l Salvador: A Country Study. Washington, DC: The Division, 1990, 223. 43. John Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 8:4 (Fall 2006): 80; Cable 17 2 2 5 2 Z Fm Amembassy San Sal­ vador to Secstate Washdc Subj: “ Capability for Sustained Combat of the Military Establishment in El Salvador,” July 17 , 1979. DNSA ES00174. 44. Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” 80; “ Meetings-SCC 18 3, 7/17/79” Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection; Series: Subject Files; Folder: Meetings - S C C 18 3, 7/17/79, Container 30, JCPL. 45. “ Meetings-SCC 18 3, 7/17/79” Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection; Series: Subject Files; Folder: Meetings - SCC 18 3, 7/17/79, Container 30, JCPL. 46. “ Meetings-SCC 18 3, 7/17/79” Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection; Series: Subject Files; Folder: Meetings - SCC 18 3, 7/17/79, Container 30, JCPL. 47. “ Meetings-SCC 18 3, 7/17/79” Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection; Series: Subject Files; Folder: Meetings - SCC 18 3, 7/17/79, Container 30, JCPL. 48. “ Capability for Sustained Combat of the Military Establishment in El Sal­ vador,” July 17 , 1979. DNSA EL00174. 49. “ Capability for Sustained Combat of the Military Establishment in El Sal­ vador,” July 17 , 1979. DNSA EL00174. 50. John Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 8:4 (Fall 2006): 80; Cable 17 2 2 5 2 Z Fm Amembassy San Sal­ vador to Secstate Washdc Subj: Capability for Sustained Combat of the Military Establishment in El Salvador,” July 17 , 1979. DNSA EL00174. 5 1. John Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 8:4 (Fall 2006): 80; Cable 17 2 2 5 2 Z Fm Amembassy San Sal­ vador to Secstate Washdc Subj: Capability for Sustained Combat of the Military Establishment in El Salvador,” July 17 , 1979. DNSA EL00174. 52. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, E l Salvador: The Face ofR evolution. 2nd ed. Boston: South End Press, 1982, 1 1 2 . 53. Dunkerley, The Long War, 12 7 -3 0 . 54. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 150 . 55. “ Meetings-PRC 120 , 8/1/79” Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection; Series: Subject Files; Folder: Meetings- PRC 120, 8/1/79; Container 25, JCPL.

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53o

Notes to Pages 113-120

56. “ Meetings-PRC 120, 8/1/79” Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection; Series: Subject Files; Folder: Meetings- PRC 120 , 8/1/79; Container 25, JCPL. 57. James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Salvador. London: Verso, 1982, 29; William M. LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robins, “ Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador,” For­ eign Affairs, Summer 1980. Chapter 10. Carter and the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, 1979 1. Quoted in Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 19 7 7 -19 9 0 . New York: Free Press, 1996, 29. 2. Stephen J. Kinzer, Blood o f Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. Cam­ bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, 37. 3. Edward Best, U.S. Policy and Regional Security in Central America. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987; Richard Millett, “ Central American Paral­ ysis,” Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 9 9 - 117 . 4. Kent Norsworthy, Nicaragua: A Country Guide. Albuquerque, N M : Inter­ Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1989, 1. 5. Quoted in Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. Rev. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, 222. 6. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 59. 7. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and Making Our Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 340. 8. Managua Domestic Service, “ Sandinistas Issue ‘War Communique,’ ” pub­ lished in Daily Report. Latin America, FBIS-LAT-78-165, 24 August 1989. 9. Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: E l Sal­ vador’s FM LN and Peru’s Shining Path. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998, 2 1 7 - 18 . 10 . McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 2 2 0 -1. 1 1 . Lawrence A. Pezzullo, “ Cable: Congressional Presentation on Nicaragua,” August 23, 1979, DNSA N I0 106 3. 12 . Quoted in Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 5 1. 13 . Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 53. 14 . Thomas X . Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 2 1s t Cen­ tury. St. Paul, M N : Zenith Press, 2006, 77. 15 . Quoted in Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling: A Case Study o f Washington at Work. Amherst, M A: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990, 2 13 . 16 . Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni­ versity Press, 20 10 , 186.

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Notes to Pages 120-124

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17 . Quoted in Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 12 5 . 18 . Lee H. Hamilton and Daniel K. Inouye, Report o f the Congressional Com­ mittees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. Washington, DC: U.S. Gov­ ernment Printing Office, 1987, 483. 19 . Quoted in Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 12 5. Chapter 1 1 . An October Coup 1. Steven Strasser, “ Coup in El Salvador,” Newsweek, October 28, 1979. 2. David Butler and Marlise Simons, “ Slaughter in San Salvador,” Newsweek, November 12 , 1979. 3. Shirley Christian, “ El Salvador’s Divided Military,” Atlantic Monthly, June 1983. 4. Christian, “ El Salvador’s Divided Military.” 5. Steven Strasser and Stryker McGuire, “ Black September,” Newsweek, September 24, 1979. 6. Strasser and McGuire, “ Black September.” 7. Strasser and McGuire, “ Black September” ; “ Relations with the GOES: Next Phase,” Cable State, April 30, 19 77, DNSA ES00018; “Agricul­ ture Assessment: El Salvador,” Report, August 19 77, DNSA ES00038; “The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America,” Report, October 25, 19 77, DNSA ES00041; “ National Assembly Passes Law of Defense and Guarantee of Public Order,” Cable San Salvador, Novem­ ber 25, 19 77, DNSA ES00044; “ Eagle International Labor Dispute: The Workers Version,” Airgram A-07, January 19 , 1978, DNSA ES00046; “ Key Members of the Armed Force-El Salvador,” Report, February 2 1, 1978, DNSA ES00048; “Alleged American Mercenaries,” Cable, M ay 10, 1978, Nicaragua Collection, N I00107; “ Description of Project Aimed at Providing Effective Development Services in El Salvador,” June 19, 1978, DNSA ES00067; “ El Salvador” Internal Paper, M ay 16, 1978, DNSA ES00064. 8. Strasser and McGuire, “ Black September.” 9. “ El Salvador and Guatemala: The Undertaker Calls,” Economist, Septem­ ber 29, 1979. 10 . “ El Salvador: The Colonels Blow the Wind,” Economist, October 20, 1979. 1 1 . “ Salvadoran Military Deposes President to ‘ Restore Order,’ ” Reuters, October 15 , 1979. 12 . John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus. New York: Twayne, 1994, 1 5 1 . 13 . Charles O. Skipper, “ El Salvador after 1979: Forces in the Conflict,” Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984.

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532

Notes to Pages 124-127

14 . Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 55. 15 . James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Sal­ vador. London: Verso, 1982, 12 9 -3 2 . 16 . Dunkerley, The Long War, 12 9 -3 2 . 17 . Karen DeYoung, “ El Salvador: A Symbol of World Crisis,” Washington Post, March 8, 19 8 1. 18 . Dunkerley, The Long War, 138 . 19 . Karen DeYoung, “ Salvadoran Junta Has a Hard Job Ahead,” Washington Post, October 2 1 , 1979. 20. Dunkerley, The Long War, 130 . 2 1 . Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterin­ surgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 78. 22. The Carter administration’s assistance package in early 1980 “ to help a Government under heavy assault from both left and right” was $49.8 million. See Graham Hovey, “ U.S. Is Planning $49.8 Million Aid Pack­ age to Beleaguered Salvadoran Regime,” N ew York Times, February 12 , 1980. 23. Gettlemen et al., E l Salvador, 19 1 ; also see Robert S. Leiken, ed., Central America: Anatomy o f Conflict. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. 24. Dunkerley, The Long War, 140. 25. Gettlemen et al., E l Salvador, 1 9 1; Leiken, Central America: Anatomy o f Conflict. 26. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 1 5 1 ; W. Lother, “ Props for a Tottering Junta,” Maclean’s 93 (February 2 5 ,19 8 0 ); Stephen Sywulka, “ Restore Christian Values, Junta Members Urge,” Christianity Today 2 4 :17 (1980); Jorge Lara Braud, “ The Gospel of Justice, Monseüor among His People,” Christianity and Crisis 40:8 (May 1980). http://www .globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SCO.htm. 27. Dunkerley, The Long War, 139 . 28. Karen DeYoung, “ El Salvador’s New Junta Troubled by Same Unrest as Ousted President,” Washington Post, October 28, 1979; also see “ San Salvador Leftists Who Are Holding 300 Are Firm in Demands: Leader Returns from Exile,” N ew York Times, October 27, 1979; Alan Riding, “ Unyielding Left Keeps Salvador in Turmoil: News Analysis Junta Wins Some Support,” N ew York Times, October 3 1, 1979; “ Violence in El Sal­ vador,” Washington Post, October 27, 1979. 29. DeYoung, “ El Salvador’s New Junta Troubled by Same Unrest as Ousted President.” 30. Leo J. Daugherty III, The Marine Corps and the State Department. Jeffer­ son, N C: McFarland, 2009, 2 2 1.

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Notes to Pages 127-131

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3 1. “ Deborah Loff: Freed Volunteer Home for Holiday,” Associated Press, December 23, 1979. 32. Graham Hovey, “ U.S. Reducing Staffs in Salvador as Unrest on the Left Continues,” N ew York Times, December 27, 1979. 33. “ El Salvador: The Middle Road Is Hardest,” Economist, November 3, 1979. 34. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 15 2 . 35. Larry Rohter, “ El Salvador: Another Step toward Civil War,” Newsweek, February 25, 1980; “ Learn from Somoza,” Economist, October 20, 1979. 36. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 56; William L. Wipfler, “ El Salvador: Reform as Cover for Repression,” Christianity and Crisis, M ay 12 , 1980. 37. Dunkerley, The Long War, 13 2 . 38. Also see Alan Riding, “ Salvadoran Leaders Plan to Name Civilian Presi­ dent to Replace Junta,” N ew York Times, December 1 1 , 1980; “ Salvador Junta Unifies Command,” Associated Press, December 1 1 , 1980; “ Sal­ vador Junta Member Is Named First Civilian President in 49 Years,” New York Times, December 14 , 1980; “ Man in the News: Salvador’s Civilian Chief,” N ew York Times, December 19 , 1980. 39. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 56. 40. Chryss Galassi and Larry Rohter, “ El Salvador: Moderation in a Bloody Cross Fire,” Newsweek, February 4, 1980. 4 1. Quoted in Dunkerley, The Long War, 166. 42. Quoted in Dunkerley, The Long War, 17 3 ; Graham Hovey, “ Envoy Losing Post after Policy Clash,” N ew York Times, June 28, 1980. 43. Jefferson Morley, “ Prisoner of Success,” N ew York Review o f Books, December 4, 1986; Nina M . Serafino, The Post-Election Situation o f Agrarian Reform in E l Salvador. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1982. 44. Stewart W. Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Human Rights Quarterly 4 :1 (Spring 1982): 1-3 8 . 45. Jose Napoleon Duarte, Duarte: My Story. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1986, 13 2 . 46. Duarte, Duarte, 1 1 5 . 47. John H. Coatsworth, “ Central America,” Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, January 10, 1984. 48. M ax G. Manwaring, ed., E l Salvador at War: An Oral History o f the Con­ flict from the 19 79 Insurrection to the Present. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988, 33. 49. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, “The Agony of El Salvador,” N ew York Times Magazine, February 22, 19 8 1; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation o f Human Rights in E l

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Notes to Pages 131-135

Salvador, OAS/Ser. 57:46 (1978); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979, Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, by the Department of State, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1980; “ Report of the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists,” reprinted in “ Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Hearings before Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979. 50. Paul Heath Hoeffel, “ The Eclipse of the Oligarchs,” N ew York Times Magazine. September 6, 19 8 1.

Chapter 12. Carter Engages Salvador 1. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 60. 2. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: US Policy and E l Sal­ vador. New York: Times Books, 1984, 14 5. 3. Robert Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Journal o f Policy Analysis and Management 3:2 (Winter 1984): 175 -9 0 . 4. Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 175-9 0 . 5. Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 175 -9 0 . 6. “ Props for a Tottering Junta,” Maclean’s, February 25, 1980; “ One Step Close to Anarchy,” Time, November 12 , 1979; “A Coup against Chaos,” Time, October 2 9 ,19 7 9 ; “ El Salvador: Next Nicaragua?” Economist,January 26, 1980; “A Ray of Hope for El Salvador,” America, November 3, 1979. 7. “ El Salvador’s Deteriorating Political Situation,” Confidential Cable, San Salvador, February 12 , 1980, DNSA ES00428. 8. “ Meetings-SCC 274, 2/16/80” Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Container 32, JCPL. 9. “ Department of State Telegram from Ambassador El Salvador to Secre­ tary of State, Subject: Military Assistance to El Salvador, SECRET, Decem­ ber 27, 19 79 ,” DNSA EL00649; U.S. Congress. “ Nomination of Robert E. White,” Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Report 9 6 -3 1, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, February 27, 1980. 10 . Quoted in William M . LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 44. 1 1 . Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 19 7 7 -19 9 0 . New York: Free Press, 1996, 164. 12 . John Beverley, “ El Salvador,” Social Text 5 (Spring 1982): 67.

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Notes to Pages 135—137

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13 . Karen DeYoung, “ El Salvador: Where Reagan Draws the Line,” Washing­ ton Post, March 9, 19 8 1. 14 . Quoted in Alan Riding, “ New Salvadoran Junta Promises Elections and a General Amnesty,” N ew York Times, October 17 , 1979. 15 . Graham Hovey, “ U.S. Warns against Rightist Coup in El Salvador,” New York Times, February 24, 1980. 16 . “ Cable 2 2 19 2 0 Z Fm Amembassy San Salvador to Secstate Washdc, Subj: Rightist Coup Imminent in El Salvador?” February 22, 1980, DNSA ES00457; “ Restraining the Right: M ajor D’Aubuisson” [Account of D’Aubuisson’s Visit to the Embassy], SECRET, Cable San Salvador, Febru­ ary 20, 1980. DNSA ES00449. 17 . “ Cable 2 2 19 2 0 Z Fm Amembassy San Salvador to Secstate Washdc, Subj: Rightist Coup Imminent in El Salvador?” February 22, 1980, DNSA ES00457. 18 . LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 47. 19 . “ Cable 2 2 19 2 0 Z Fm Amembassy San Salvador to Secstate Washdc, Subj: Rightist Coup Imminent in El Salvador?” February 22, 1980, DNSA ES00457. 20. Rose J. Spalding, Contesting Trade in Central America: Market Reform and Resistance. Austin: University of Texas Press, 20 14 , 43. 2 1 . Spalding, Contesting Trade in Central America, 43. 22. Albin Krebs, “ Rep. L.P. McDonald of Georgia among the Americans Lost on Jet,” N ew York Times, September 2, 19 83; excerpt quoted in Stewart Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Human Rights Quarterly 4 :1 (Spring 1982); for McDonald’s full speech see “ Remarks by Representative McDonald,” Congressional Record, E3075, June 1980; Cyrus Vance, “ Inter-American Challenges for the 1980s,” Speech at the OAS, October 23, 1979. Washington, DC: Bureau of Pub­ lic Affairs, Department of State; Memorandum by Robert Pastor to Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Aaron, Henry Owen, February 14, 1980, Meetings - SCC 274: 2/15/80 Folder, Box 32, ZBC, JCPL. 23. “Topics Envoy In/Bets Off; Advice and Contempt,” N ew York Times, March 1 1 , 1980. 24. Graham Hovey, “ Latin Policies of Administration Meeting Roadblocks in Congress,” N ew York Times, March 6, 1980. 25. Colman McCarthy, “ Sorrow in El Salvador,” Washington Post, March 27, 1980. 26. McCarthy, “ Sorrow in El Salvador.” 27. Murat W. Williams, “ Still More U.S. Arms Won’t Aid Salvador,” New York Times, April 17 , 1980. 28. Eugene L. Stockwell, “ Wrong U.S. Role in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, March 4, 1980.

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Notes to Pages 138-140

29. Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D 180, SHUM Policies 1980; FRUS, 19 7 7 -19 8 0 , Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 200. 30. Fisher, “ Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy” ; “ Dissent Paper on El Salvador and Central America,” Department of State, Novem­ ber 6, 1980; “ Re: SCC Meeting on El Salvador, 15 February 1980 - 4:00 p.m.” ; “ U.S. Aides Challenge Salvador Report,” N ew York Times, March 7, 19 8 1; Flora Lewis, “ El Salvador Plan Echoes Carter Proposals,” N ew York Times, March 7, 19 8 1; Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 58. 3 1. “ U.S. Aides Challenge Salvador Report.” 32. Quoted in Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 81. Also see LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 43-44. 33. Quoted in Henry E. Catto Jr., High and L ow Adventures o f a Diplomat. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998, 87-88. 34. John Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus. New York: Twayne, 1994, 15 6 -5 7 . 35. Interviewed by The Progressive magazine September 19 8 1 after he had been removed by Secretary Haig from his San Salvador post, Ambassador Robert White made an argument similar to Coatsworth - that more action could have prevented the ensuing chaos. “ Had the Carter Administra­ tion been more intelligent a year and a half, two years ago, instead - but this is what happens when you become captive of a weak, vindictive oli­ garchy and a brutal military.” In White’s estimation, if at the beginning of 1980, we had “ really made a commitment to negotiations and seeking out [Social Democrat Guillermo] Ungo and company, and bringing in Mexico, West Germany, Venezuela, and others, we could have brought about some sort of commonsense solution.” The question here is whether the Carter administration was actually captive to a brutal oligarchy and military. It is likely that the Carter administration would have been thrilled with a progressive non-revolutionary government isolated by the oligarchy and revolutionary left since that was the essence of its policies at the time. See Jeff Stein, “ Interview with Robert E. White, former ambassador to El Salvador,” Progressive, September 19 8 1; Robert E. White, “ El Salvador: Why Not Negotiate?” Washington Post, June 9, 19 8 1; Congressional Research Service, “ El Salvador from 19 3 1 to March 1982, Elections: A Chronological Study of Politics, Parties, and Conflicts,” Washington, DC: 1986.

Chapter 13 . Archbishop Romero 1. Quoted in Richard A. Howard, “A Wounded Church: Toward Reconcili­ ation in El Salvador,” Commonweal, M ay 8, 1992.

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Notes to Pages 140-143

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2. Oscar A. Romero, “Avoiding Bloodshed: A Letter to President Jimmy Carter,” E l Salvador Bulletin, December 1980. 3. “The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America,” Confiden­ tial Report, October 25, 19 77, DNSA ES00041; “ Discussion with Arch­ bishop Romero and His Advisors,” Secret, Cable San Salvador, February 22, 1980, D N SAES00455. 4. Patrick Lacefield, “ Liberation and El Salvador’s Bishop,” Christian Cen­ tury, October 3, 1979. 5. Lacefield, “ Liberation and El Salvador’s Bishop.” 6. Lacefield, “ Liberation and El Salvador’s Bishop.” 7. John Witte and John D. van der Vyver, ed., Religious Human Rights in Global Perspectives. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1996, 10 5-6 . 8. Lacefield, “ Liberation and El Salvador’s Bishop.” 9. Christian Smith, The Emergence o f Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 9 1, 98­ 100. 10 . Quoted in John Thavis, “ Forty Years Later, Vatican II Continues to Rever­ berate through Church,” Catholic News Service, October 12 , 2005. 1 1 . Jenny Pearce, Promised Land: Peasant Rebellion in Chalatenango. El Sal­ vador Latin American Bureau: London, 1986, 170 . 12 . “ Catholic Station Defies El Salvador Government,” Washington Post, February 2, 1979. 13 . Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 196. 14 . Quoted in Patrick Lacefield, “ Liberation and El Salvador’s Bishop,” Chris­ tian Century, October 1979. 15 . Quoted in Lacefield, “ Liberation and El Salvador’s Bishop.” 16 . Marie Dennis, Renny Golden, and Scott Wright, Oscar Romero: Reflec­ tions on His Life and Writings. Maryknoll, N Y : Orbis Books, 2000, 10 3. 17 . “ El Salvador’s Fallen Hero,” Christian Century, April 1980. 18 . “ El Salvador: Murder in the Chapel,” One World 56 (1980). 19 . The types of “ non-lethal” military assistance included tear gas, gas masks, and bulletproof vests. See John Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 8:4 (Fall 2006): 5 7 -9 1. 20. Jefferson Morley, “ Prisoner of Success,” N ew York Review o f Books, December 4, 1986; Oscar A. Romero, “Avoiding Bloodshed: A Letter to President Jimmy Carter,” E l Salvador Bulletin, December 1980. Key excerpts: “ It disturbs me deeply that the US government is leaning toward an arms race in sending military equipment and advisers to ‘train three Salvadoran battalions.’ . . . Your government, instead of favoring greater peace and justice in El Salvador, will undoubtedly aggravate the repres­ sion and injustice against the organized people who have been struggling

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Notes to Page 143

because of their fundamental respect for human rights. If it is that this past November, ‘A group of six Americans were in El Salvador supplying $200,000 worth of gas masks and protective jackets and giving training in their use,’ you yourself must know that starting at that time, the secu­ rity forces - with greater personal protection and efficacy - have used even greater violence with death-dealing weapons in repressing people. Because I am a Salvadoran and Archbishop of the Archdiocese of San Salvador, I am responsible to watch over the condition of the faith and justice in my country. I ask that, if you truly want to defend human rights, you: prohibit military aid; guarantee that your government will not intervene, directly or indirectly, with military, economic, or diplomatic pressure in determin­ ing the destiny of the Salvadoran people. In these moments our country is living through a grave economic and political crisis. It is beyond doubt that the people are rising to the ties, each day becoming increasingly con­ scious and more organized, and beginning to summon the ability to direct, to take charge of the future of El Salvador. No power other than the people is capable of overcoming the crisis. I hope that your religious sentiments and your sensitivity for the defense of human rights will move you to accept my please avoiding, with such acceptance, any greater bloodshed in this suffering country. Monsignor Oscar A. Romero.” 2 1 . Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 11 4 . A key excerpt from Romero’s historic final homily is this: “The Church doesn’t have inter­ ests. I do not have a single ambition for power, and because of that, I tell power, with all liberty, what is good and what is bad, and I also tell any political group what is good and what is bad. It is my duty.... The Church, the people of God in history, is not installed in any one social sys­ tem, in any political organization, in any party. The Church is not led on a hunt by any of these forces because she is the eternal pilgrim of history and is indicating at every historical moment what does reflect the king­ dom of God. She is the servant of the kingdom of God. . . . The Church preaches your liberation just as we studied it today in the Holy Bible. A liberation that holds, above all, respect for human dignity, the salvation of the common good of the people, and the transcendence that looks above all else to God, and from God alone derives its hope and its strength.” See Oscar Romero, “A Pastor’s Last Homily,” Sojourners, M ay 1, 1980. 22. “ El Salvador, 1/31/8 0 -112 /10 /8 0 ,” Folder Citation: Collection: Records of the Office of Hispanic Affairs; Series: Esteban Torres Subject Files; Folder: El Salvador, 1/31/80-12/10/80; Container 18; JCPL; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, “ Letter to Archbishop Romero,” Daily Bulletin. 23. Rose Marie Berger, “When the Gospel Gets under Your Skin,” Sojourners, April 2005.

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24. Reprinted as Romero, “A Pastor’s Last Homily,” Sojourners, M ay 1980; Jorge Lara-Braud, “The Gospel of Justice: Monsenor among His People,” Christianity and Crisis, M ay 1980. 25. “ Cyrus Vance to Archbishop Romero,” March 1 1 , 1980, 1/31/80 12/10/80 Folder, Box 18 , El Salvador, Records of the Office of His­ panic Affairs, Esteban E. Torres Papers, JCPL; Graham Hovey, “ Salvador Prelate’s Death Heightens Fear of War,” N ew York Times, March 26, 1980; “ Christmas Has Begun in El Salvador,” Sojourners, December 1980; “ Discussion with Archbishop Romero and His Advisors,” Secret, Cable San Salvador, February 22, 1980, DNSA ES00455. 26. Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights.” 27. For an example of the foreign press reporting on this see Graham Hovey, “ U.S. Study Says Cuba Plays Cautious Role in Nicaragua,” N ew York Times, July 4, 1979. 28. Quoted in Graham Hovey, “ Salvador Prelate’s Death Heightens Fear of War,” N ew York Times, March 26, 1980. 29. After Romero’s assassination in March 1980, the Vatican did not appoint a new archbishop immediately. Instead, it appointed Rivera y Damas as Apostolic Administrator of the Church. 30. Charles Harper, “ Death and Hope Seen in El Salvador,” One World, 1980; James L. Connor, “ El Salvador’s Agony and U.S. Policies,” America, April 1980. 3 1. Richard A. Haggerty, ed., E l Salvador: A Country Study. Washington, DC: The Division, 1990. 32. FM LN commander Gerson Martinez, interview with author, San Sal­ vador, July 2008. 33. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 13 3 ; Roberto D ’Aubuisson was also accused of plotting to kill but never carrying out hits against ambas­ sadors Robert White in 1980 and Thomas Pickering in 1984. 34. Anne-Marie O’Connor, “ Participant in 1980 Assassination of Romero in El Salvador Provides New Details,” Washington Post, April 6, 2010 . 35. O’Connor, “ Participant in 1980 Assassination of Romero in El Salvador Provides New Details.” 36. Carlos Martinez, “ El Juez al que (Oscar Romero exilio,” E l Faro, M ay 2 1, 2005. Author translation. 37. Martinez, “ El Juez al que (Oscar Romero exilio,” 2005; Patrick Lacefield, “ Oscar Romero: Archbishop of the Poor,” Fellowship, November 1979. 38. Martinez, “ El Juez al que (Oscar Romero exilió.” Inter-American Com­ mission on Human Rights, “ Irregularities in the Romero Investigation,” OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106,1999, Organization of American States, Washington, DC.

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54o

Notes to Pages 147-150

39. Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America . New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, 40. 40. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 4 1-4 2 . 41. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 4 1-4 2 . 42. Arnson, Crossroads, 4 1-42. 43. Arnson, Crossroads, 4 1-4 2 ; Richard Whittle, “ Congressional Leaders See Threat to El Salvador and Back Military Aid Pledge,” Congressional Quarterly , February 2 1, 19 81, 359. 44. Arnson, Crossroads, 4 1-4 2 ; Whittle, “ Congressional Leaders See Threat to El Salvador and Back Military Aid Pledge.” 45. Arnson, Crossroads, 4 1-4 2 ; Whittle, “ Congressional Leaders See Threat to El Salvador and Back Military Aid Pledge.” 46. Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterin­ surgency Lessons from Central America . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 87. Chapter 14. Land 1. Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Sal­ vador: The Frustration o f Reform and the Illusions o f Nation Building . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991, 44. 2. Lindsay Gruson, “ Land for Salvador’s Poor,” N ew York Times, September 28, 1987. 3. Quoted in William M. LeoGrande, Our O w n Backyard: The United States in Central America . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 13 1. 4. Shirley Christian, “ El Salvador’s Divided Military,” Atlantic Monthly, June 1983. 5. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 1985,” DNSA EL00132. 6. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 1985,” DNSA EL00132. 7. This was technically under the “ second junta” that had a few months ear­ lier replaced the reformist “ first junta” that had been unable to implement the land programs. 8. Of land impacted by Phase I, 69 percent had been used for cattle grazing instead of crop cultivation and only 9 percent was coffee acreage, the highest quality agricultural land in the country. See Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Salvador, 44-47. 9. Alberto Vargas, “ El Salvador Country Brief: Property Rights and Land Markets,” Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison, March 2003, 7-9.

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Notes to Pages 150-154

541

10 . James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Sal­ vador. London: Junction Books, 1982, 15 3 . 1 1 . Quoted in Dunkerley, The Long War, 15 3 -5 4 . 12 . “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5,” DNSA E L00132. 13 . Quoted in Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: US Policy and E l Sal­ vador. New York: Times Books, 1984, 19 5. 14 . William M. LeoGrande, “ A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador,” International Security 6 :1 (Summer 19 8 1). 15 . Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Salvador, 44-45. 16 . In M ay 1982, just six weeks after the successful election, the rightistdominated, newly installed Constituent Assembly voted to modify key elements of the land-to-the-tiller program enacted in 1980. Conservative politicians in the United States openly embraced the repeal. U.S. Senator Dodd vented his frustration, “They are out to kill it.” A Senate amendment threatened suspension of the remaining aid to El Salvador if El Salvador’s government “ modifies, alters, suspends, or terminates any provisions of the land reform program in a manner detrimental to the rights of the ben­ eficiaries under those decrees.” In the House, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablock (D, WI) stated, “ If the new regime in El Sal­ vador believes it can dismantle the land reform program with impunity, it’s sadly mistaken.” U.S. diplomats such as Ambassador Hinton also pres­ sured their Salvadoran counterparts, insisting that such setbacks on land reform would jeopardize American assistance. See Alberto Vargas, “ El Sal­ vador Country Brief: Property Rights and Land Markets,” Land Tenure Center, March 2003; LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 16 8 - 7 1; Senator Edward Kennedy, “ The Execution of Hammer, Pearlman, and Viera: No Justice in Sight,” Congressional Record 30: 42 (April 3 ,19 8 4 ): S3669-70. 17 . Vargas, “ El Salvador Country Brief,” 9. 18 . Quoted in Dunkerley, The Long War, 154. 19 . Dunkerley, The Long War, 154 . 20. Dunkerley, The Long War, 154 . 2 1 . Quoted in Dunkerley, The Long War, 15 5 . 22. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 56. 23. LeoGrande, “A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador.” 24. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Salvador, 45. 25. Dunkerley, The Long War, 15 2 . 26. Quoted in Dunkerley, The Long War, 15 3 . 27. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 224. 28. Between 1950 and 1969, military assistance was approximately $4.3 mil­ lion. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency,

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Notes to Pages 154-158 Foreign military sales and military assistance facts, Washington, DC,

19 7 9 . 29. Quoted in Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, 195-96. 30. Quoted in Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, E l Salvador: The Face o f Revolution. Boston: South End Press, 1982, 1 1 4 ; Roy L. Prosterman, Leffrey M. Riedinger, and Mary N. Temple, “ Land Reform and the El Sal­ vador Crisis,” International Security 6:1 (Summer 19 8 1). 3 1. Karen DeYoung, “ El Salvador: Where Reagan Draws the Line,” Washing­ ton Post, March 9, 19 8 1. 32. Graham Hovey, “ Latin Policies of Administration Meeting Roadblocks in Congress,” N ew York Times, March 6, 1980. 33. Mario Rosenthal, “ Salvadorans Want an End to Their ‘Prolonged’ War,” Wall Street Journal, June 16 , 1989. 34. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Salvador, 46; “ Salvadoran Land Program Is Criticized,” N ew York Times, February 15 , 1984. 35. Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, “ARENA: The Salvadoran Right’s Concep­ tion of Nationalism and Justice,” Statement presented to El Salvador’s General Electoral Council meeting at the Salvadoran Center for Legal Studies, January 24, 1984, in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports - Central America, Febru­ ary 22, 1984. 36. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Salvador, 48. 37. Ruben Zamora, interview with author, San Salvador, 2008. 38. Benjamin Schwarz, “ Dirty Hands,” Atlantic, December 1, 1998. 39. Thomas Enders, “ El Salvador: The Search for Peace,” Speech before the World Affairs Council, Washington, DC. Current Policy 296 (July 16, 19 8 1). 40. Enders, “ El Salvador: The Search for Peace.” 4 1. UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in E l Sal­ vador: Report o f the Commission on the Truth for E l Salvador, S/25500, I 9 9 3 , ! 3 6. 42. Frank Smyth. “ Consensus or Crisis? Without Duarte in El Salvador.” Jour­ nal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30:4 (Winter 1988-1989): 29- 52. 43. UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope, 13 7 . 44. Karen DeYoung, “ Murder Case Is Test for U.S. in El Salvador,” Washing­ ton Post, October 10, 1982. 45. John Crewdson, “ Salvador Officer Tied to Sheraton Killings,” Chicago Tribune, June 27, 1985. 46. Quoted in Michael Putzel, “ Reagan Says El Salvador Needs Urgent,” Associated Press, April 3, 1984; also see Martin Tolchin, “ New Attempts to Curb Salvador Aid Fail,” N ew York Times, April 4, 1984.

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Notes to Pages 159-162

543

47. UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope , 14 4-47; El Salvador: Country Development Strategy Statement, FY 82, USAID Mission to El Salvador, January 1980, USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse; Proposed Agrarian Reform Law for El Salvador, University of Wiscon­ sin at Madison, March 1980, USAID Development Experience Clearing­ house; El Salvador Agrarian Reform Sector Strategy Paper, USAID Mis­ sion to El Salvador, July 21,19 8 0 , USAID Development Experience Clear­ inghouse. 48. Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador , 262.

Chapter 15. The American Churchwomen 1. Quoted in William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 60. 2. Quoted in Brett Wilkins, “ ‘On This Day’ 1980: American Nuns Kid­ napped, Raped & Murdered by U.S.-Trained Salvadoran Death Squad,” Moral L o w Ground , December 2, 2010. 3. David Gonzalez, “Trial of Salvadoran Generals in Nuns’ Deaths Hears Echoes of 1980,” N ew York Times, October 2 1, 2000. 4. Wilkins, “ ‘On This Day’ 1980.” 5. Wilkins, “ ‘On This Day’ 1980.” 6. “Dorothy Kazel, O.S.U. (1939-1980),” National Women’s History Museum, May 17, 2005. https://www.nwhm.org/education-resources/ biography/biographies/dorothy-kazel/. 7. Joyce Hollyday, Clothed with the Sun: Biblical Women, Social Justice, and Us. Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1994, 99. 8. Wilkins, “ ‘On This Day’ 1980.” 9. Wilkins, “ ‘On This Day’ 1980.” 10. A sample of the press reporting: “The Metaphor of Salvador,” N ew York Times, December 24, 1980; John M. Goshko, “Salvadoran Junta Seen Not Linked to Nuns’ Killing,” Washington Post, December 12, 1980; “Memories of Chapman,” Washington Post, December 12 ,19 8 0 ; Christo­ pher Dickey, “ Envoy Assails Reagan Aides on El Salvador,” Washington Post, December 10, 1980; Marjorie Hyer, “ Four Murders Trigger U.S. Catholic Protests,” Washington Post, December 10, 1980; “ 2 Murdered American Nuns Buried in Salvadoran Town,” N ew York Times, Decem­ ber 7, 1980; Juan de Onis, “ U.S. Officials Fly to El Salvador to Investi­ gate Murders,” N ew York Times, December 7, 1980; “ Cauldron in Cen­ tral America: What Keeps the Fire Burning?” N ew York Times , Decem­ ber 7, 1980; “Television,” N ew York Times, December 7, 1980; Christo­ pher Dickey, “ U.S. Mission Arrives in El Salvador to Probe Killings of 4 Catholics,” Washington Post, December 7, 1980; Juan de Onis, “U.S.

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11. 12 . 13 .

14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 .

19 . 20. 2 1.

22. 23.

Notes to Pages 162-165 Suspends New Aid to Salvador till American Deaths are Clarified,” N ew York Times, December 6, 1980; Christopher Dickey, “ U.S. Envoy Ques­ tions Salvadoran Guard Actions after Killings,” Washington Post, Decem­ ber 6, 1980; John M. Goshko, “ U.S. Halts Salvadoran Aid,” Washington Post, December 6, 1980; “ Bodies of 4 American Women Are Found in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, December 5, 1980; Christopher Dickey, “ 4 U.S. Catholics Killed in El Salvador,” Washington Post, December 5, 1980. Amanda Smith, “ Case History: Ford et al. v. Garcia et al.,” Justice and the Generals, PBS (2002). “ Killed in El Salvador: An American Story,” N ew York Times, November 9, 20 14. William P. Ford et al., “ In the Supreme Court of the United States,” Octo­ ber Term, 2002. http://www.cja.org/downloads/Ford_v_Garcia_CERT_ PETITION_FINAL.pdf. Special Presidential Mission to El Salvador, “A Tragic Nuns’ Tale,” U.S. Department of State Press Release, December, 12 , 1980. Special Presidential Mission to El Salvador, “A Tragic Nuns’ Tale.” Sam Roberts, “ Robert E. White, Ex-Ambassador to Latin America, Dies at 88,” N ew York Times, January 16, 2 0 15 . “ Records Relating to the UN Truth Commission,” NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, Box 19. “ U.S. Sees Attempt to ‘Conceal’ Murders in El Salvador,” Unclassified Cable, December 2 4 ,19 8 0 , DNSA ES01074; also see “ Linkage of HumanRights Certification to Progress in United States Churchwomen and Sul­ livan Cases,” Letter, October 29, 1982, DNSA E S0 3551; “ FBI Assistance in El Salvador. Foreign Police Cooperation - El Salvador.” Chronology of Events in Churchwomen Case,” Secret, Internal Paper, 448-B, June 15 , 19 83, DNSA ES04061; “The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America,” Confidential Report, October 25, 19 77, DNSA ES00041; “ UN Human Rights Commission: El Salvador,” Limited Official Use, Cable, March 3, 19 8 1, DNSA ES01423. John Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 8:4 (Fall 2006): 88. John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus. New York: Twayne, 1994, 15 4 -5 5 . Ana Carrigan, Salvador Witness: The Life and Calling o f Jean Donovan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, 2 6 3 -3 17 ; Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 258. “ Cable San Salvador, April 19 8 1, 0 2 7 2 2 5 3Z ,” DNSA ES01623. James L. Buckley, “ Reprograming Proposal for El Salvador,” Security Assistance, Department of State.

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Notes to Pages 165-166

545

24. Robert Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Journal o f Policy Analysis and Management 3:2 (Winter 1984): 175-9 0 . 25. Arthur Jones, “A Look at Declassified State Department Documents,” National Catholic Reporter, September 23, 1994; Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, A Report on the Investigation into the Killing o f Four American Churchwomen in E l Salvador, New York, September 19 8 1. 26. Tampa Tribune, December 25, 1980. 27. Retro Report, “ Killed in El Salvador: An American Story.” N ew York Times, November 10 , 20 14. 28. Three were released by 2 0 1 1 for good behavior. All five were specifically not included under the 1993 general amnesty, which protected individu­ als implicated in political crimes. The murder of the churchwomen was classified as nonpolitical. “Justice in El Salvador: A Case Study. A Report on the Investigation into the Killing of Four U.S. Churchwomen in El Sal­ vador,” July 20, 1982, DNSA ES03266. The 1980 churchwomen’s case took another surprising turn in the late 1990s when it turned out that Jose Guillermo Garcia and Carlos Vides Casanova, minister of defense and National Guard chief, respectively at the time of the killings, had been living legally in the United States since 1989. The churchwomen’s families were alarmed to learn that the two generals had retired to Florida. “ None of us had any idea they were living in the United States,” Jean Dono­ van’s brother Mike stated. “ I guess our government had other priorities than resolving the murder of my sister.” The 1993 UN Truth Commission postwar report implicated Garcia and Vides in the churchwomen’s case. The two officers were cleared of charges in a 2000 suit brought by rel­ atives of the churchwomen. The relatives filed a $ 10 0 million suit under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992. This law permits victims or their survivors to pursue punitive and compensatory damages from per­ sons implicated in human rights abuses. The jury in this case decided that the two men did hold control over the soldiers who carried out the mur­ ders. The unanimous verdict “ shocked” friends and relatives of the women who during the trial had listened to the chilling accounts of the violence during the war. In a separate trial two years later, a federal jury ordered the two retired officers to pay over $54.6 million in damages to three Sal­ vadoran civilians tortured by the security forces. In 2009, attorneys at the Department of Homeland Security began proceedings against Garcia and Vides under a 2004 law aimed at making it easier to deport terrorists. In 20 14 , a U.S. judge in Miami found that Garcia took no measures to stop the atrocities that he “ knew or should have known” were occurring during his tenure as minister of defense from October 1979 to April 19 83. Two years earlier a Florida immigration court ordered the depor­ tation of Vides, a recipient of the U.S. Legion of Merit award given for

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546

29. 30. 3 1. 32.

Notes to Pages 166-167 “ exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services and achievements,” which made him the first high-ranking foreign official ordered deported under the same 2004 law that made it “ easier to expel human rights violators.” In 2014, both Garcia and Vides, aged 81 and 77, respectively, appealed his deportation order on the grounds that it was a war funded by the United States. According to Vides’s attorney, “The United States government was an active participant on the side of the El Salvadoran government.” In early April 2015, Vides was deported to El Salvador after U.S. immigration courts determined that the torture and killings took place under his command. See Larry Rohter, “ 4 Salvado­ rans Say they Killed U.S. Nuns on Orders of Military,” N ew York Times, April 3, 1998; “David Gonzalez, “Victim Links Retired General to Tor­ ture in El Salvador,” N ew York Times , June 25, 2002; David Gonzalez, “ 2 Salvador Generals Cleared by U.S. Jury in Nuns’ Deaths,” N ew York Times, November 4, 2000; David Gonzalez, “Trial of Salvadoran Gener­ als in Nuns’ Deaths Hears Echoes of 1980,” N ew York Times, October 21, 2000; David Gonzalez, “Torture Victims in El Salvador Are Awarded $54 Million,” N ew York Times , June 25, 2002; Linda Cooper and James Hoge, “ Former Salvadoran Defense Minister Faces Deportation from U.S. for Role in Killings, Torture,” National Catholic Reporter , April 17, 2014. The judge’s report can be found at Center for Justice and Accountability, “Written Decision and Orders of the Immigration Judge,” United States Department o f Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review , Febru­ ary 28, 2014; “ Salvadoran Cites U.S. Backing of Violence in Deportation Appeal,” Los Angeles Times , February 6, 2014; on the Legion of Merit award, see “ Salvadoran Cites U.S. Backing of Violence in Deportation Appeal,” Los Angeles Times , February 6, 2014; Julia Preston, “ General in El Salvador Torture and Killings Can Be Deported, Immigration Judge Rules,” N ew York Times , March 12, 2015; Julia Preston, “ U.S. Deports General Accused in ’ 80s Killings,” N ew York Times, April 9, 2015. “ Records Relating to the UN Truth Commission,” NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, Boxes 12, 19. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador , 259. Retro Report, “ Killed in El Salvador: An American Story.” UN Security Council, “ From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador,” ^ 5 5 ^ I993, 55. Chapter 16. Arming the Rebels

1. U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Central America,” Special Report 13 2 (September 1985).

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Notes to Pages 167-170 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10 . 11.

12 . 13 .

14 .

15 .

16 .

17 . 18 . 19 .

547

U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders.” U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders.” U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders.” U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders.” Quoted in Bohemia (Caracas, Venezuela), April 20-26, 19 8 1. U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders.” U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders” ; “ Cuba and Sandinista Aid to the Rebels,” INR/Frank McNeil to the Secretary, May 23, 19 85, DNSA EL00876; U.S. Congress, “ Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemisphere,” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter­ American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Congress, 2nd Ses­ sion, March 26, 27, April 16, 17 , M ay 14 , 1980, Washington, DC: Gov­ ernment Printing Office, 1980. Robert A. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, 185. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 185. “Nicaraguan Support for Salvadoran Insurgents,” Interagency Intelli­ gence CIA memorandum, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, March 19 8 1, 1. “Nicaraguan Support for Salvadoran Insurgents,” 4. John Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 8:4 (Fall 2006): 80; “ Cable 17 2 2 5 2 Z Fm Amembassy San Salvador to Secstate Washdc Subj: Capability for Sustained Combat of the Military Establishment in El Salvador,” DNSA ES00174. “National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski provides President Jimmy Carter with information on the following world events: Saudi abil­ ity to maintain an average oil production of 10.3 million barrels per day; Soviet efforts to support El Salvador’s revolutionary left; Costa Rican eco­ nomic problems.” Memo. White House. Top Secret. Issue Date: Dec 1, 1980, DDRS, #CK2349693824. “National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski provides President Jimmy Carter with information on the following world events,” DDRS CK2349693824. “National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski provides President Jimmy Carter with information on the following world events: South Lebanon’s approach to negotiations with Israel; information on Soviet military assistance to leftist insurgent groups in El Salvador; Israeli polit­ ical problems in connection with agricultural talks with the U.S.” Memo. White House. Secret. Issue Date: Apr 26, 1980, DDRS C K 2349721809. U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders,” 7. U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders,” 7. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 185.

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548

Notes to Pages 170-172

20. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 185. 2 1 . Central Intelligence Agency, “ Memorandum: El Salvador: Insurgent Arms, Stockpiles and Origin,” March 9, 19 8 1. 22. Central Intelligence Agency, “ Memorandum: El Salvador: Insurgent Arms, Stockpiles and Origin,” March 9, 19 8 1. 23. William Branigin, “Airstrip Links Sandinistas to Arms Flights,” Washing­ ton Post, December 4, 1989. 24. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 185. 25. “ El Salvador: Insurgent Arms Stockpiles and Origins, March 9, 19 8 1 ,” DNSA CO00993; Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 185. 26. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 18 5; “Nicaraguan Support for Sal­ vadoran Insurgents,” 5. 27. Karen DeYoung, “ War of Harassment in El Salvador,” Washington Post, March 14, 19 8 1; “ Your Luncheon for President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador, 12 :3 0 pm, September 2 1 , at the State Department Scope Paper,” Confidential, Memorandum, September 18, 19 8 1, DNSA ES02045. 28. “ Department Statement on Cuban and Nicaraguan Support for the Salvadoran Insurgency,” Unclassified State Department Cable, March 23, 1982, DNSA ES02793; also see “ Leftist Terrorism in El Salvador” [Chronology of Alleged Guerrilla Actions, from October 1979 to May 19 8 1], Report, M ay 2 1, 19 8 1, DNSA E S01738; “ Department State­ ment on Cuban and Nicaraguan Support for the Salvadoran Insurgency,” Unclassified State Department Cable, March 23, 1982, DNSA ES02793; “ U.S. Policy in El Salvador in Response to Guerrilla Offensive,” Secret, Cable State, January 1 8 ,1 9 8 1 , DNSA ES01228; “ Evolution of U.S. Policy toward El Salvador,” Confidential, Cable State, February 4, 19 8 1, DNSA E S01302; “ Press Conference for British Press by the Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of State,” Non-Classified, Press Briefing, February 27, 19 8 1, DNSA E S 0 14 13 . 29. M ax G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, “A Strategic View of Insurgen­ cies: Insights from El Salvador,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Papers 8 (May 1990); also see “ U.S. Embassy San Salvador cable, September 19 8 2 ,” NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, Box 1; U.S. Department of State, “ Communist Interference in El Salvador,” Special Report 80 (Wash­ ington, February 2 3 ,19 8 1) ; U.S. Department of State, “ Strategic Situation in Central America and the Caribbean,” Current Policy 352 (Washington, December 14, 19 8 1); U.S. Department of State, “ Caribbean Basin Initia­ tive,” address by President Reagan before the OAS, Current Policy 370 (Washington: February 24, 1982); U.S. Department of State, “ Update of International Developments,” Secretary of State Haig before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Current Policy 373 (Washington: March 2,

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Notes to Pages 172-177

30.

3 1. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37.

38.

549

1982); “ Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere,” Statement by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders, before Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Current Policy 376 (Washington: March 12, 1982). Quoted in Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13,10 4 ; (Oscar Martinez Penate, E l Salvador: His­ toria General. San Salvador: Nuevo Enfoque, 2007, 157. Quoted in Joseph Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 104; Pedate, E l Salvador , 157. Author translation. Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni­ versity Press, 2010, 198. Quoted in Andrea Odate, “The Red Affair: FMLN-Cuban Relations dur­ ing the Salvadoran Civil War, 19 8 1-9 2 ,” Cold War History 11:2 (May 20 11): 144. James LeMoyne, “ Out of the Jungle: El Salvador’s Guerrillas,” N ew York Times Magazine, February 9, 1992. Leonel Gomez et al., “ El Salvador: The Current Danger,” Foreign Policy 43 (Summer 1981): 71-9 2 . Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, ch. 4. “Department Statement on Cuban and Nicaraguan Support for the Sal­ vadoran Insurgency,” Unclassified State Department Cable, March 23, 1982, DNSA ES02793. Quoted in Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 19 7 7 -19 9 0 . New York: Free Press, 1996, 164. Chapter 17. Guerrilla Final Offensive, January 19 8 1

1. Quoted in Christopher Dickey, “ El Salvador’s Violence, Self-Perpetuating, Now Turns to Civil War,” Washington Post, January 16, 1981. 2. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, “ Salvadoran Village Gets a Taste of War,” N ew York Times, January 1, 19 81. 3. James L. Buckley, “ Reprogramming Proposal for El Salvador,” statement before the Subcommittee of Foreign Operations of the House Appropria­ tions Committee, Official Monthly Record o f United States Foreign Policy 81:2050 (May 1981). 4. Mark Moyar, A Question o f Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009, 173. 5. Robert A. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua . 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, 185.

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55o

Notes to Pages 177-180

6. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 185. 7. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 185. 8. “ U.S. Policy in El Salvador in Response to Guerrilla Offensive,” Secret, Cable State, January 18, 19 8 1, DNSA ES01228; Todd Greentree, Cross­ roads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 86. 9. U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders: Sandinista Intervention in Central America” U.S. Department of State Special Report, September 1985, 473; Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 185. 10 . Quoted in Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 90. 1 1 . Benjamin Schwarz, “ Dirty Hands,” Atlantic, December 1, 1998. 12 . Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention, 9 1. 13 . Buckley, “ Reprogramming Proposal for El Salvador.” 14 . Timothy Brown, ed., When the AK-47s Fall Silent: Revolutionaries, Guer­ rillas, and the Dangers o f Peace. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2000, 124. 15 . “ U.S. Policy in El Salvador in Response to Guerrilla Offensive,” Secret, Cable State, January 1 8 ,1 9 8 1 , DNSA ES01228; Andrea Obate, “ The Red Affair: FMLN-Cuban Relations during the Salvadoran Civil War, 19 8 1­ 92,” Cold War History 1 1 : 2 (2 0 11): 13 3 -5 4 . 16 . “ U.S. Policy in El Salvador in Response to Guerrilla Offensive,” ES01228; Onate, “ The Red Affair,” 1 3 3 - 15 4 . 17 . Another quote by Robert White demonstrating his support for U.S. aid: “ We will do everything we can to help El Salvador interdict the supply of military aid from coming in from outside,” quoted in Barbara Slavin Freudenheim, “The World in Summary: Salvador Junta Getting Fresh Aid from Washington,” N ew York Times, January 18, 19 8 1; Christopher Dickey, “ 100 Guerrillas Land on Beach in El Salvador,” Washington Post, January 15 , 19 8 1; Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America. New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, 5 °. 18 . Presidential Determination No. 8 1-8 2 of 16 January 19 8 1, “ Determi­ nation to Authorize the Furnishing of Immediate Military Assistance to El Salvador,” Federal Register 46:25 (February 6, 19 8 1): 1 1 , 225; John Soares, “ Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights,” Journal o f Cold War Studies 8: 4 (Fall 2006): 88. 19 . Arnson, Crossroads, 50. 20. Robert Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Journal o f Policy Analysis and Management 3:2 (Winter 1984): 175 -9 0 . 2 1 . Quoted in Dickey, “ 100 Guerrillas Land on Beach in El Salvador.” 22. Quoted in Dickey, “ 100 Guerrillas Land on Beach in El Salvador” ; “ US Policy to El Salvador,” Memorandum of Conversation, 22 December 1980, El Salvador File, Box 22, NSA-SM-PCR, JCPL.

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Notes to Pages 181-182

551

23. “Wrong Signals to Central America” (editorial), N ew York Times, January 2 i, 19 8 1. 24. Perhaps one indirect way to tell that January 19 8 1 was the time when the United States military believed it had become “ militarily involved” in El Salvador is that the U.S. Army only authorized the Combat Infantry­ man Badge (CIB, given to those who are personally involved in battle) for the Central American country between January i, 19 8 1, and Febru­ ary i, 1992. See U.S. Army, “ Effectives of Training, MTT, El Salvador,” Institute for Military Assistance, December 28, 1980; Robert L. Goldich and John C. Schaefer, “ U.S. Military Operations (Not including Vietnam), 19 6 5 -19 9 5 ,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 27, i994, 94-529 F; Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 58. 25. Graham Hovey, “ Carter’s Latin Policy: No Big Pledges but ‘Honest Con­ cern,’ ” N ew York Times, September 28, 19 77; Folder Citation: Collec­ tion: Records of the Office of Hispanic Affairs; Series: Esteban Tor­ res’ Subject Files; Folder: El Salvador, 1/31/80-12/10/80; Container 18, JCPL. 26. Quoted in Terence Smith, “ President Presses Reagan on Human Rights Policy,” N ew York Times, November 20, 1980; Graham Hovey, “ U.S. to Prod OAS to Give More Help to Its Rights Unit,” N ew York Times, June i0 , i9 7 7 . 27. “Wrong Signals to Central America,” N ew York Times, January 2 1 ,1 9 8 1 . 28. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 186. 29. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, 186; Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 175-9 0 . 30. Roger Miranda and William E. Ratliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas. Transaction, i9 9 3, i5 5 ; U.S. Department of State, “ Revolution beyond Our Borders,” Sandinista Intervention in Central America 13 2 (September 1985); Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition, i86. 3 1. “ U.S. Assistance to El Salvador - Fact Sheet,” Internal Paper, April i, 19 8 1, DNSA E S 0 15 12 ; also see “ Background Information on the Security Forces in El Salvador and U.S. Military Assistance” [includes statistics on U.S. Security Assistance], Report, March i, 1980, DNSA ES00477; “ U.S. Assistance to El Salvador,” Press Briefing, M ay 18 ,19 8 0 , DNSA ES00631; “ Security Assistance to El Salvador,” Secret Memorandum, January 8, 19 8 1, DNSA E S 0 115 3 ; “ Issues under the War Powers and Arms Export Control Acts Raised by U.S. Military Presence in El Salvador,” Non­ Classified Memorandum, February 2 3 ,1 9 8 1, DNSA ES0138; “ Meetings SCC 274, 2/15/80,” Folder Citation: Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Col­ lection; Series: Subject Files; Folder: Meetings - SCC 274, 2/15/80; Con­ tainer 32, JCPL; John A. Bushnell, “ Central American Review,” statement

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Notes to Pages 182-187

552

before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 5, 1981. Chapter 18. Death Squads 1. Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church,” Central American Bulletin (Berkeley, CA, 1984). 2. Reprinted in Spanish in Los Escuadrones de la muerte en E l Salvador . Salvador: Editorial Jaragua, 1995, 27, 39. Author translation. 3. Craig Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots,” Albuquerque Journal, December 18 -2 2, 1983. 4. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 1985,” DNSA EL00132. 5. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 1985,” DNSA EL00132. 6. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 1985,” DNSA EL00132. 7. Quoted in Karen DeYoung, “ El Salvador: A Symbol of World Crisis,” Washington Post, March 8, 1981. 8. Los Escuardrones de la muerte en E l Salvador, San Salvador: Editorial Jaragua, 2004, 32. 9. Quoted in Karen DeYoung, “A Salvadoran Who Finally Had Enough of the Killing,” Washington Post, April 8, 1984. 10. Raymond Bonner, “The Agony of El Salvador,” N ew York Times Maga­ zine, February 22, 19 81; Proceso . Central American University (San Sal­ vador) Special Archives, 1983, Nos. 9 5 -13 5 . 1 1 . Daniel Southerland, “ Salvador’s Morales Ehrlich: Can the Middle Hold?” Christian Science Monitor , March 18, 1981. 12. Margot Hornblower, “ Salvadorans Wait Out Their Brutal War in Miami,” Washington Post Post, March 22, 1981. 13. Quoted in Michael McClintock, The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in E l Salvador . London: Zed Books, 1985, 176. 14. Maximiliano Hernández Martinez Squad, “ Communique from a Death Squad,” printed in E l Diario de Hoy (San Salvador), December 1, 1980. Reprinted by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports , December 4, 1980. 15. Quoted in James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Salvador . London: Junction Books, 1982, 152. 16. Dunkerley, The Long War, 152. 17. Mark Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote . New York: Vintage, 1993, 26; also see Walter Knut and Philip J. Williams, “The Military and Democrati­ zation in El Salvador.” Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 3 5 :1

(1 9 9 3 ):

39- 88.

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Notes to Pages 187-191

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18 . Quoted in Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: E l Salvador’s F M L N and Peru’s Shining Path. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998, 39. 19 . Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote, 26; also see Knut and Williams, “The Military and Democratization in El Salvador,” 39-88. 20. Loren Jenkins, “ From Conquistadores to Comunistas: Why the Killing Will Never End,” Washington Post, August 16 , 19 8 1. 2 1 . Los Escuardrones de la muerte en E l Salvador, 27. 22. Quoted in UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in E l Salvador: Report o f the Commission on the Truth for E l Salvador. S/25500, 1993, 4 2 1. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ ElSalvador-Report.pdf. 23. Jefferson Morley, “ When Reaganites Backed D’Aubuisson, They Unleashed a Political Assassin: El Salvador: Washington’s Right Was So Pleased with the Politician’s Anti-communism It Was Willing to Overlook His Abuse of Human Rights,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 1992. 24. Phillip Berryman, “ Death Squad Was after the Jesuits in 19 7 7 ,” Philadel­ phia Inquirer, November 20, 1989. 25. “ Restraining the Right: Major D’Aubuisson,” [Account of D’Aubuisson’s Visit to the Embassy], Secret Cable San Salvador, February 20, 1980, DNSA ES00449; “ Discussion with Archbishop Romero and His Advi­ sors,” Secret Cable San Salvador, February 22, 1980. DNSA ES00455; Proceso, Nos. 9 5 -13 5 . 26. Morley, “ When Reaganites Backed D’Aubuisson, They Unleashed a Polit­ ical Assassin: El Salvador.” 27. Paul Heath Hoeffel, “ The Eclipse of the Oligarchs,” N ew York Times Magazine, September 6, 19 8 1. 28. John W. Lamperti, Enrique Alvarez Cordova: Life o f a Salvadoran Revolutionary and Gentleman, Jefferson, N C: McFarland, 2006, 207; also see Southerland, “ Salvador’s Morales Ehrlich: Can the Middle Hold?” 29. “ Restraining the Right: Major D’Aubuisson,” [Account of D’Aubuisson’s Visit to the Embassy], Secret, Cable San Salvador, February 20, 1980, DNSA ES00449. 30. Dunkerley, The Long War, 150 . 3 1. Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots” ; Los Escuardrones de la muerte en E l Salvador, 27, 76. 32. Joan Didion, Salvador. New York: Washington Square Press, 19 83, 1 5 ­ 16. 33. James LeMoyne, “ The Guns of El Salvador,” N ew York Times, February 5, 1989; also see James LeMoyne, “ El Salvador’s Forgotten War,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1989).

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554

Notes to Pages 191-196

34. Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterin­ surgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 148; LeMoyne, “ El Salvador’s Forgotten War.” 35. Loren Jenkins, “ El Salvador,” Washington Post, August 16 , 19 8 1. 36. ANESAL depended on funds from its civilian base to operate indepen­ dently of the military structure. Robert Gerald Kirby, “Agrarian Politics in El Salvador: 19 5 0 -19 8 4 .” Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1992, 243. 37. Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots.” 38. Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots.” 39. Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots.” 40. Quoted in Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots.” 4 1. Benjamin Schwarz, “ Dirty Hands,” Atlantic, December 1998. 42. Later on, Reagan administration officials said associates of D’Aubuisson had hatched a plot in 1984, never implemented, to kill the acting ambassador, Thomas Pickering. But D’Aubuisson was never convicted of this crime or any of the other grisly episodes that he likely master­ minded. 43. Joanne Omang, “ D’Aubuisson Honored by Conservatives at Capitol Hill Dinner,” Washington Post, December 5, 1984. 44. Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots” ; M ax Gordon, “A Case History of U.S. Subversion: Guatemala, 19 54 ,” in Jonathan Fried et al., eds., Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History. New York: Grove Press, i 9 83 . 45. Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots.” 46. Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriot.” ; also see Allan Nairn, “ Behind the Death Squads,” Progressive, M ay 1984. 47. Pyes, “ Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots.” 48. From UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope, 12 7 -3 0 ; also see “ El Salvador’s Deteriorating Political Situation,” Confidential, Cable, San Salvador, February 12 , 1980, DNSA ES00428. 49. Proceso, 9 5 -13 5 . Author translation. 50. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5,” DNSA E L00132. 5 1. Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, “ARENA: The Salvadoran Right’s Concep­ tion of Nationalism and Justice,” Statement presented to El Salvador’s General Electoral Council meeting at the Salvadoran Center for Legal Studies, January 24, 1984, in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports - Central America, Febru­ ary 22, 1984. 52. Lydia Chavez, “ Salvador’s Right Quits Vote Count,” N ew York Times, M ay 1 1 , 1984.

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Notes to Pages 196-203

555

53. Terry Troia, “ The Death of a Salvadoran Churchworker,” Sojourners, March 1985. 54. Troia, “ The Death of a Salvadoran Churchworker.” 55. Troia, “ The Death of a Salvadoran Churchworker.” Chapter 19. Reagan Arrives 1. “The President’s News Conference,” March 6 ,19 8 1, American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43 505. 2. U.S. Department of State, “ President Reagan’s televised address to the nation, Washington, DC, M ay 9, 19 84,” Current Policy 576. 3. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “ This Time We Know What’s Happening,” Washing­ ton Post, April 17 , 1983. 4. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 1986, 10. 5. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 10. 6. Ronald Reagan, “Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Detroit,” July 17 , 1980, American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25970. 7. Quoted in James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Salvador. London: Junction Books, 1982, 17 2 . 8. Adam Clymer, “ Carter and Reagan Meet Tonight in Debate that Could Decide Race,” N ew York Times, October 28, 1980. 9. “ 1980 Ronald Reagan/Jimmy Carter Presidential Debate,” October 28, 1980, Public Papers of Ronald Reagan. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ archives/reference/i0.2 8.80debate.html 10 . “ 1980 Ronald Reagan/Jimmy Carter Presidential Debate.” 1 1 . Hedrick Smith, “ Reagan Easily Beats Carter,” N ew York Times, Novem­ ber 5, 1980. 12 . Lou Cannon, President Reagan: Role of a Lifetime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 19 9 1, 289; also see Seth Rosenfeld, Subversives: The F B I’s War on Student Radicals and Reagan’s Rise to Power. New York: Picador, 2 0 13 . 13 . Cannon, President Reagan, 240. 14 . Jeane Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary 68:5 (November 1979): 34-45; Jeane Kirkpatrick, “ U.S. Security and Latin America,” Commentary 7 1 : 1 (January 19 8 1): 29-40; for a response to Kirkpatrick’s influential article, see Michael Walzer, “ Totalitarianism vs. Authoritarianism,” N ew Republic, July 4 and 1 1 , 19 8 1; Tom J. Farer, “ Reagan’s Latin America,” N ew York Review o f Books, March 19 , 19 8 1; Jeane Kirkpatrick, “ Human Rights in El Salvador,” statement, Third Com­ mittee of the 36th UN General Assembly, December 1, 19 8 1.

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556

Notes to Pages 204-206

15 . Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” 34-45. 16 . Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” 34-45. 17 . Another influential far-right group that called themselves the Committee of Santa Fe issued a report in M ay 1980 titled “A New Inter-American Policy for the 1980s.” “ The Americas are under attack. Latin America, the traditional alliance partner of the United States, is being penetrated by Soviet power. The Caribbean rim and basin are spotted with Soviet surrogates and ringed with socialist states.” Like Kirkpatrick, the report lambasted Carter’s “ ideologically motivated and selectively applied” pol­ icy of human rights as in fact “ detrimental to human rights properly con­ ceived.” By 19 8 1, two of its five principal authors were in senior positions in the Reagan administration. Its remedy for this self-inflicted disaster in the hemisphere was unequivocal. “ Only the United States can, as a part­ ner, protect the independent nations of Latin America from Communist conquest and help preserve Hispanic-American culture from sterilization by international Marxist materialism. America must take the lead. For not only are U.S.-Latin American relations endangered, but the very sur­ vival of this republic is at stake.” L. Francis Bouchey et al., “A New Inter­ American Policy for the 1980s,” Council for Inter-American Security, May 1980. 18 . Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” 34-45. 19 . Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” 34-45; also see Jeane Kirkpatrick, “ Summary Report; A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties,” Committee of Santa Fe, Washington, DC, 1980. 20. Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” 34-45. 2 1 . Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” 34-45. 22. Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” 34-45. 23. Kirkpatrick, “ Dictatorships and Double Standards,” 34-45. 24. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., “ Social Forces and Ideologies in the Making of Contemporary El Salvador,” in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 1986, 49-64. 25. “ Democratic Response to President Reagan’s Address to Joint Session of Congress,” Senate Congressional Record, M ay 19 , 19 83, p. 13 16 3 -6 4 . 26. Robert Friedman, “ Son of Dodd,” Esquire, August 19 83. 27. Quoted in Stephen Sestanovich, Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama. New York: Knopf, 20 14 , 228-29. 28. Stephen G. Rabe, review of More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World by Peter W. Rodman. American Histor­ ical Review 10 1:2 (1996): 593. 29. David C. Hendrickson, review of More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World by Peter Rodman. Foreign Affairs (March/April 1995).

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Notes to Pages 206-210

557

30. Peter W. Rodman, More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994, 266. 3 1. Rodman contended that another instance of a pro human rights approach was the “ relentless pressure” applied on Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet until he stepped aside in favor of free elections in 1988-90. Rod­ man, More Precious than Peace, 267. 32. Ronald Reagan, “ Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance for the Central American Region, NSDD 100, July 28, 19 8 3 ,” NAII, R G 273, Stack 250, Row, 7, Compartment 29, Shelf 6, Box 2. 33. Quoted in Stephen Sestanovich, Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama. New York: Knopf, 20 14 , 230. 34. Alexander M. Haig and Clare B. Luce, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and For­ eign Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1984, 10 3. 35. Quoted in Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History o f American Hubris. New York: Harper, 2 0 1 1 , 226; also see E l Salvador: Another Vietnam, directed by Glenn Silber and Tete Vasconcellos (19 81), Docu­ mentary. 36. Ferman Cienfuegos, Commander Ferman Cienfuego Speaks. Los Angeles, CA: Solidarity Committee “ Commander Ernesto Jovel,” 1982, 45. 37. Robert W. Tucker, “ Their Wars, Our Choices,” N ew Republic, October 24, 1983. 38. Haig and Luce, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, 95-96. 39. Hal Brands, What G o o d Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in Amer­ ican Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 20 14 , 2 13 . 40. U.S. Department of State, “ Caribbean Basin Initiative,” address by Pres­ ident Reagan before the OAS, Current Policy 370 (February 24, 1982); also see U.S. Department of State, “ Update of International Develop­ ments,” Secretary of State Haig before the House Foreign Affairs Com­ mittee, Current Policy 373 (March 2, 1982); U.S. Department of State, “ Caribbean Basin Initiative in Perspective,” address by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Stephen W. Bosworth before Dallas World Affairs Council, Current Policy 370 (March 11,19 8 2 ) ; U.S.Department of State, “ Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the West­ ern Hemisphere,” statement by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders, before Subcommittee on Security and Terror­ ism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Current Policy 376 (March 12 , 1982). 4 1. Cannon, President Reagan, 2 4 1. 42. Cannon, President Reagan, 240. 43. Quoted in Andrew Roman, “What Would Reagan Really Do?” Newsweek, July 9, 2010 .

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558

Notes to Pages 211-215

44. Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? 2.13. 45. Cannon, President Reagan, 29 1. 46. Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on United States Policy in Central America,” M ay 9, 1984, Public Papers of Ronald Reagan. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/50984h.htm; also see “ Remarks of the President to the National Association of Manufactur­ ers, Washington Hilton Hotel,” Washington, DC, March 10 ,19 8 3 , DNSA ES03808; Ronald Reagan, “ On Freedom, Regional Security, and Global Peace,” March 14 , 1986, Public Papers of Ronald Reagan. http://www .reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/31486d.htm. Chapter 20. Reagan and Salvador 1. William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 68. 2. George Russell, “ El Salvador, Death of a Thousand Cuts,” Time, Septem­ ber 7, 19 8 1. 3. Ronald Reagan, “ Excerpts from an Interview with Walter Cronkite,” March 3, 19 8 1. 4. A wealth of documents covering the Reagan administration’s policies in El Salvador can be found at NA, Subject Files on the Republic of El Sal­ vador, 0 1/20/1981-01/20/1989, N A Identifier: 6 2 1 1 3 1 3 , ARC Identifier: 6 2 1 1 3 1 3 ; Archived copies located: W HORM Subject Files: CO046 (El Salvador), RRPL. 5. Ronald Reagan, “ The President’s News Conference,” March 6, 19 8 1. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43 505. 6. “ The President’s News Conference” ; Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 19 7 7 -19 9 0 . New York: Free Press, 1996, 1 7 1 ; Ronald Reagan and Walter Cronkite, A Conversation with Pres. Ronald Reagan. New York: Encyclopedia Americana/CBS News Audio Resource Library, 19 8 1. 7. “ The President’s News Conference” ; Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 1 7 1 . 8. Alexander M. Haig and Clare B. Luce, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and For­ eign Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1984, 77. 9. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: Role o f a Lifetime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 19 9 1, 308. 10 . Cannon, President Reagan, 298. 1 1 . Quoted in Stephen Sestanovich, Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama. New York: Knopf, 20 14 , 229. 12 . Cannon, President Reagan, 299. 13 . Cannon, President Reagan, 298-302.

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Notes to Pages 215-216 President Reagan , 2 9 8 President Reagan , 2 9 8 C a n n o n , President Reagan , 2 9 8 C a n n o n , President Reagan , 2 9 8 C a n n o n , President Reagan , 2 9 9 C a n n o n , President Reagan , 2 9 8 . H a i g a n d L u c e , Caveat, 1 1 7 - 4 0 .

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302.

17. 18. 19. 20.

559

302. 308.

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22, 19 8 1; “Com ­

m u n i s t In t e r f e r e n c e i n E l S a l v a d o r , ” S p e c i a l R e p o r t N o . 8 0 , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , F e b r u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 8 1 ; A l e x a n d e r H a i g , “A m e r i c a n P o w e r a n d A m e r i ­ c a n P u r p o s e ,” W a s h in g t o n , D C : S ta te D e p a r t m e n t , A p r i l 2 7 , 1 9 8 2 ; F o r a s e n s e o f t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l f u n d i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s , se e U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , “ S i t u a t i o n in E l S a l v a d o r : T e s t i m o n y o f t h e A c t i n g A s s i s t a n t S e c ­ r e t a r y o f S ta te f o r In t e r a m e r ic a n A f f a ir s ( B u s h n e ll) a n d H e n r y B r a n d o n o f th e F e d e r a l B u r e a u o f In v e s t ig a t io n b e fo re th e H o u s e A p p r o p r ia t io n s C o m m it t e e , F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 8 1 , ” i n

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American Foreign Policy Current Doc­

a s h in g t o n , D C : G o v e r n m e n t P r in t in g O f f ic e , 1 9 8 4 , 1 2 5 5 ­

5 6 ; U .S . C o n g r e s s , “ F o r e ig n A s s is t a n c e a n d R e la t e d P r o g r a m s f o r F is c a l Y e a r 1 9 8 2 : H e a r i n g s b e f o r e t h e H o u s e A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m it t e e , S u b ­ c o m m it t e e o n F o r e i g n O p e r a t i o n s , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t S e s s io n , F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 8 1 ” ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C : G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 1 ), 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; U .S . C o n g r e s s , “ F o r e ig n A s s is t a n c e L e g is la t io n f o r F is c a l Y e a r 1 9 8 2 : P a r t 9 : M a r k u p , H o u s e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s C o m m it t e e , A p r i l 2 8 - 3 0 , M a y 5 - 7 a n d 1 2 - 1 3 , z 9 8 i , 9 7 th C o n g r e s s , 1 st S e s s io n ” (W a s h in g t o n , D C : G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 1 ), 3 8 - 8 1 ; U . S . C o n g r e s s , “ U . S . P o l i c y i n E l S a l v a d o r , ” H e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e S u b c o m m it t e e o n I n t e r - A m e r i c a n A f f a i r s , C o m m it t e e o n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t S e s s io n , M a r c h 5 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 9 8 1 . W a s h in g t o n , D C : G o v e r n m e n t P r in t in g O f fic e , 1 9 8 1 . 2 2 . W illia m M . L e o G r a n d e , “ A S p le n d id L it t le W a r : D r a w in g th e L in e in E l S a lv a d o r ,” 2 3 . H a ig

International Security , 6 : 1 Caveat, 8 ; J u a n d e

and Luce,

( S u m m e r 1 9 8 1 ). O n i s , “A d m i n i s t r a t i o n I s S a i d t o

A p p r o v e In c r e a s e i n M i l i t a r y A i d t o S a l v a d o r , ”

N ew York Times, F e b r u a r y

2 8 , 1 9 8 1 . O f th e $ 7 5 m illio n a p p r o p r ia t e d in 1 9 8 0 f o r N ic a r a g u a , r o u g h ly $ 1 5 m i l l i o n w a s r e m a i n i n g t o b e d is b u r s e d w h e n t h e R e a g a n a d m i n is t r a ­ t io n t o o k o f f ic e a n d m o r e t h a n $ 5 0 m i l l i o n w a s i n t h e b a la n c e s la t e d f o r N ic a r a g u a in 1 9 8 1 b e fo re th e f u n d s w e re c u t o ff. S e e C h r is t o p h e r D ic k e y , “ N ic a r a g u a F e a rs A id L o s s ,”

Washington Post, J a n u a r y

3 1 , 1 9 8 1 ; Ju a n

de O n is , “ U .S . H a lt s N ic a r a g u a A id o v e r H e lp f o r G u e r r illa s ,”

24. 25.

N ew York

Times, J a n u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 8 1 . C a n n o n , President Reagan , 2 9 8 - 3 0 2 . L e o G r a n d e , Our O w n Backyard , 8 9 .

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560

Notes to Pages 217-219

26. “Aid Memo: Total Aid Package for El Salvador M ay Reach $523 M il­ lion,” Center for International Policy (April 19 8 1): 1- 2 ; Michael Klare and David Andersen, A Scourge o f Guns: The Diffusion o f Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America. Washington, DC: Arms Sales M on­ itoring Project, Federation of American Scientists, 1996. 27. John Beverley, “ El Salvador,” Social Text 5 (Spring, 1982): 68. 28. Gail E. S. Yoshitani, Reagan on War: A Reappraisal o f the Weinberger Doctrine, 19 8 0 -19 8 4 . Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2 0 1 1 , 56. 29. Cannon, President Reagan, 320. 30. James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in E l Sal­ vador. London: Junction Books, 1982, 184-88. 3 1. Robert Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Journal o f Policy Analysis and Management 3:2 (Winter 1984): 180. 32. Juan de Onis, “ U.S. Bars Talks with Salvadoran Left,” N ew York Times, February 27, 19 8 1; John M. Goshko, “ In El Salvador, Reagan Is Draw­ ing a Hard Line against Communism,” Washington Post, February 22, 19 8 1. 33. John M. Goshko, “ Ousted Ambassador’s Testimony Disavowed,” Wash­ ington Post, February 27, 19 8 1. 34. Testimony of Robert White, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appro­ priations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 19 8 2, Hearings, Part 1, 97th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 8 1); Cynthia J.Arnson, E l Salvador: A Revolution Confronts the United States. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982. 35. Goshko, “ Ousted Ambassador’s Testimony Disavowed” ; the Wall Street Journal editorial page slammed Robert White: “ Bob White and the Bat­ tle,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 19 8 1. 36. David Wood, “ Kirkpatrick Calls Carter Foreign Policy ‘Havoc,’ ” Wash­ ington Star, January 8, 19 8 1; Jeane Kirkpatrick, “ U.S. Security and Latin America,” Commentary, January 19 8 1; Robert Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Journal o f Policy Analysis and Man­ agement 3:2 (Winter 1984): 175-9 0 ; LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 194. 37. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 94. 38. Quoted in Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 19 7 6 - 19 9 3 .2nd ed. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, 9 0 -9 1. 39. John A. Bushnell, “ Central American Review,” Current Policy 2 6 1 (Wash­ ington, DC, March 5, 19 8 1). 40. “ Evolution of U.S. Policy toward El Salvador,” Confidential Cable State, February 4, 19 8 1, DNSA E S01302; John Goshko and Don Oberdorfer,

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Notes to Pages 219-221

4 1.

42.

43. 44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

49. 50.

561

“ U.S. to Send More Aid, Advisers to El Salvador,” Washington Post, March 3, 19 8 1. Also see Central Intelligence Agency, “ Memorandum: El Salvador: Insurgent Arms, Stockpiles and Origin,” March 9, 19 8 1. “ Near Term Military Prospects in El Salvador,” Interagency Intelligence Mem­ orandum, M ay 6, 19 8 1, DNSA EL00064; “ Prospects for Stability in the Caribbean Basin through 19 84,” DNSA GU00802; “ Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, June 25, 19 8 2 ,” DNSA SE00561; “ El Salvador: Evaluation of the Perquin Operation,” Direc­ torate of Intelligence, July 15 , 1982; Freedom of Information Act Elec­ tronic Reading Room, Central Intelligence Agency. “ Your Luncheon for President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador, 12 :3 0 pm, September 2 1 , at the State Department,” Confidential Memorandum, September 18 , 19 8 1, DNSA ES02045; Also see Alexander M . Haig, “ El Salvador: The Search for Peace,” U.S. Department o f State Bulletin 81: 2046-57 (Washington, DC, September 19 8 1); Thomas Enders, “ Strate­ gic Situation in Central America and the Caribbean,” Current Policy 352 (Washington, DC, December 14 , 19 8 1). “ Your Luncheon for President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador, 12 :3 0 pm, September 2 1 , at the State Department” ; also see Haig, “ El Salvador: The Search for Peace” ; Enders, “ Strategic Situation in Central America and the Caribbean,” Current Policy 352 (Washington, DC, December 14, 19 8 1). “ Communist Interference in El Salvador.” Robert G. Kaiser, “ White Paper on El Salvador Is Faulty,” Washington Post, June 9, 19 8 1. “ Communist Interference in El Salvador” ; “ Press Conference for British Press by the Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of State,” Non­ Classified, Press Briefing, February 27, 19 8 1, DNSA E S 0 14 13 . “ Communist Interference in El Salvador” ; “ Press Conference for British Press by the Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of State.” Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 58. “ Soviet Envoy Denies Moscow Arms Supplies to Salvador Guerrillas,” N ew York Times, February 15 , 19 8 1; John M . Goshko, “ U.S. Prepares to Aid Salavdor in First Test of Reagan Policy,” Washington Post, February 14, 19 8 1. James Petras, “ Blots on the White Paper: The Reinvention of the ‘Red Menace,’ ” Nation, March 28, 19 8 1. Jonathan Kwitny, “ Tarnished Report? Apparent Errors Cloud U.S. ‘White Paper,’” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 19 8 1; Kaiser, “ White Paper on El Salvador Is Faulty.”

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562

Notes to Pages 221-225

51. Quoted in Haig and Luce, Caveat, 140; Don Oberdorfer, “ Using El Sal­ vador to Battle the Ghosts of Vietnam,” Washington Post, March 1, 1981. 52. “ Response to Stories Published in the Wall Street Journal and the Wash­ ington Post about Special Report No. 80,” Department of State, Special Report No. 1227, June 17, 1981. 53. Cannon, President Reagan , 298. 54. Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Sal­ vador: The Frustration o f Reform and the Illusions o f Nation Building . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991. 55. Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard , 157. 56. Steven B. Roberts, “ Rift on El Salvador Grows in Congress,” N ew York Times , February 4, 1982. 57. Margot Hornblower, “ Rumbles of War Give Hill the Jitters,” Washington Post, March 8, 1982. 58. Proceso, Universidad Centroamericana Special Archive Vol. 2-3, 1982. Author translation.

Chapter 2 1. El Mozote 1. Joan Didion, Salvador . New York: Washington Square Press, 1983, 37. 2. “ El Mozote: Lucha por la verdad y la justicia,” San Salvador, El Salvador: Oficinas del Arzobispado de San Salvador, 2007. 3. The informal “ troop cap” with Congress that limited U.S. military advi­ sors to 55 was not in place yet. There could have been 50 U.S. advisors training Atlacatl over the course of 1981. 4. “ Status of the New Atlacatl Battalion, Joint Chiefs of Staff Message Cen­ ter,” October 14, 19 81, DNSA EL00382. 5. “ El Mozote: Lucha por la verdad y la justicia.” 6. Quoted in UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in E l Salvador: Report o f the Commission on the Truth for E l Salvador . S/25500, 1993, 107. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ ElSalvador-Report.pdf. 7. For a comprehensive view of the El Mozote massacre, see UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in E l Salvador , 10 5 ! 5. 8. Quoted in Anthony Lewis, “Abroad at Home: The Whole Truth,” N ew York Times, December 6, 1993. 9. Quoted in Mark Danner, “The Truth of El Mozote,” N ew Yorker, Decem­ ber 6, 1993. 10. “ El Mozote: Lucha por la verdad y la justicia.”

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Notes to Pages 225-229

56 3

1 1 . Mark Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote. New York: Vintage, 1994, 77; Jefferson Morley, “ The Secret of the Skeletons,” Washington Post, November 15 , 1992. 12 . UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in E l Salvador, 1 1 0 . 13 . San Salvador Cable, January 1, 1982, NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, Box 19. 14 . For initial reporting on the massacre, see “ 22 Aircraft Reported Dam­ aged in Rebel Raid on Base,” N ew York Times, January 28, 1982; Alma Guillermoprieto, “ Salvadoran Peasants Describe Mass Killing,” Washing­ ton Post, January 27, 1982; Christopher Dickey, “ U.S. Envoy Expresses Doubts,” Washington Post, January 3 1, 1982; Raymond Bonner, “ M as­ sacre of Hundreds Reported in Salvador Village,” N ew York Times, Jan ­ uary 27, 1982; “With Salvador’s Rebels in Combat Zone,” N ew York Times, January 26, 1982. 15 . Alma Guillermoprieto, “ Salvadoran Peasants Describe Mass Killing,” Washington Post, January 27, 1982. 16 . “ Report on Alleged Massacre,” San Salvador Cable, January 1982, NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, Box 19. 17 . Quoted in Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and E l Salvador. New York: Times Books, 1984, 340. 18 . Christopher Dickey, “ U.S. Diplomats in Central America See Gap between Policy, Facts,” Washington Post, March 5, 1982. 19 . Danner, “ The Truth at El Mozote” ; Guy Gugliotta and Douglas Farah, “ 12 Years of Tortured Truth on El Salvador; U.S. Declarations of War Undercut by U.N. Commission Report,” Washington Post, March 2 1, 1993. 20. Alma Guillermoprieto, email interview with author, June 2008. 2 1 . Daniel James, “ The Media Crusade to Sink El Salvador,” Human Events, February 13 , 1982; also see Daniel James, “ Where Do Media Get El Sal­ vador Atrocity Stories?” Human Events, March 8, 1982. 22. Robin Andersen, A Century o f Media, a Century o f War. New York: Peter Lang, 2006, 9 1. 23. Danner, “ The Truth of El Mozote” ; for an expanded treatment, see Dan­ ner, The Massacre at E l Mozote; Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 , 76-77. 24. A Presbytery of Honduras, “ The Sumpul River Massacre,” in tes­ timony entered by Senator Edward Kennedy into the Congressional Record, S 13 3 7 5 -S 13 3 7 9 , September 24, 1980; also see Holly Burkhalter, “ Massacres in Cabahas and Chalatenango Departments,” Congressional Record, March 6, 1985, E787.

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564

Notes to Pages 230-234

25. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 77. 26. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 81, 270; “ Crocodile Tears,” For­ eign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports, June 24, 1985. 27. For more on Radio Venceremos, see Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, Broad­ casting the Civil War in E l Salvador: A Memoir o f Guerrilla Radio. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010. 28. Julia Preston, “ Salvadoran Officer Is Buried: Domingo Monterrosa Rel­ ished Combat, Raised Troops’ Spirits,” Boston Globe, October 27, 1984. 29. Quoted in Preston, “ Salvadoran Officer Is Buried.” 30. UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in E l Salvador, 1 1 2 - 1 3 .

Chapter 22. Another Vietnam 1. Greg Grandin, Em pire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise o f the N ew Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006, 100. 2. “The Challenge of Counterinsurgency,” America Abroad, October 14, 2006. 3. “ U.S. Advisers in El Salvador Relieved of Duty,” Associated Press, Febru­ ary 6, 1983. 4. Quoted in Karen DeYoung, “ El Salvador: Where Reagan Draws the Line,” Washington Post, March 9, 19 81. Also see Ronald Reagan, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, Vol. XX. Washing­ ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981. 5. “ Caribbean Basin Initiative,” address by President Reagan before the OAS. Current Policy, No. 370, U.S. Department of State, February 24, 1982. 6. William M. LeoGrande, “A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador,” International Security 6:1 (Summer 1981): 27. 7. LeoGrande, “A Splendid Little War,” 45. 8. LeoGrande, “A Splendid Little War,” 45, 52. 9. William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 92. 10. “ Many View El Salvador as Drawn-Out, No-Win Situation,” [Results of ABC, Gallup and Los Angeles Times Public Opinion Polls on El Salvador Attached], Memorandum, May 5, 1983, DNSA ES03977. For more of early Reagan policy deliberations, see “ Evolution of U.S. Policy toward El Salvador,” Confidential, Cable State, February 4, 19 8 1, DNSA, ES01302; “ Press Conference for British Press by the Honorable Alexander M. Haig,

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Notes to Pages 234-237

56 5

Jr., Secretary of State,” Non-Classified, Press Briefing, February 27, 19 8 1, DNSA E S 0 14 13 ; “ The Secretary’s Central America Speech ‘The Strug­ gle for Democracy in Central America,’” [Before the “ Dallas Salutes the World” Festival], Confidential, Memorandum, April 14, 19 83, DNSA ES03927; “ Your Luncheon for President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Sal­ vador, 12 :3 0 pm, September 2 1, at the State Department - Scope Paper,” Confidential, Memorandum, September 18, 19 8 1, DNSA ES02045. 1 1 . Mark Falcoff, “ How to Understand Central America,” Commentary, September 1984. 12 . David E. Apter, “ U.S. on a Disaster Course,” N ew York Times, October 23, 1983. 13 . Joseph Moakley, “ Objections to Training of Salvadoran Soldiers in the United States,” February 1, 1982, DNSA ES02524. 14 . Timothy M. Phelps, “ U.S. Role in El Salvador Protested,” N ew York Times, April 1 9 ,1 9 8 1 ; Caryle Murphy, “ 23,000 Demonstrate Role of U.S. in El Salvador,” Washington Post, March 28, 1982. 15 . Murphy, “ 23,000 Demonstrate Role of U.S. in El Salvador” ; Don Oberdorfer, “ New Dangers, Opportunities to the South,” Washington Post, M ay 9, 1982. 16 . Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 58. 17 . Margot Hornblower, “ Rumbles of War Give Hill the Jitters,” Washing­ ton Post, March 8, 1982; Dan Balz, “Another War, Another Wave of Refugees,” Washington Post, March 15 , 1982; Barry Sussman, “ Major­ ity in Poll Oppose Reagan on El Salvador,” Washington Post, March 24, 1982. 18 . Hedrick Smith, “ How Reagan Rode Out 19 8 1 ,” N ew York Times Maga­ zine, January 10 , 1982. 19 . Alma Guillermoprieto, email interview with author, M ay 2008. 20. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “What’s Wrong with Reagan’s Foreign Policy?” N ew York Times Magazine, December 6, 19 8 1. 2 1 . Quoted in Edward Walsh, “ Salvador Killings Bring Out Critics, Backers of Policy,” Washington Post, April 10, 19 8 1; also see LeoGrande, “A Splen­ did Little War” ; Suji Dutta, “ El Salvador: Towards Another Vietnam,” Social Scientist 10 :2 (February 1982): 4 -17 . 22. Quoted in Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 19 7 6 - 19 9 3 .2nd ed. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, 59; also see “ The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America,” Confidential, Report, October 25, 19 77, DNSA ES00041; “ UN Human Rights Commission: El Salvador” [Text of Prepared Statement by Representative N owak to be Given before Human Rights Commission Submitted for Approval], Limited Official Use Cable,

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566

23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 3 1. 32. 33. 34.

Notes to Pages 237-238 March 3, 19 8 1, DNSA E S01423; “Justification for Presidential Deter­ mination to Authorize Continued Security Assistance for El Salvador,” Non-Classified, Report, January 28, 1982, DNSA ES02499; “Arguments against Human-Rights Certification of El Salvador,” Letter, July 26, 1982, DNSA ES03290; “ Cable Regarding the Withholding of Human-Rights Certification to El Salvador,” Cable, July 26, 1982, DNSA ES03287; “ Reply to Representative Sabo’s Letter (Originally Sent to President Rea­ gan) Requesting Comments on Op-Ed in N ew York Times regarding the President’s Pocket Veto of the Certification Requirement for El Sal­ vador,” Non-Classified Letter, March 8, 1984, DNSA ES04681; “ Com­ munist Interference in El Salvador Documents Demonstrating Communist Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency” (White Paper), U.S. Department of State, 19 8 1. Proceso, Vol. 2 -3 , 1982. Author translation; also see U.S. Department of State, “ Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the West­ ern Hemisphere,” statement by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders, before Subcommittee on Security and Terror­ ism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Current Policy No. 376 (Washington: March 12 , 1982); U.S. Department of State, “American Power and American Purpose,” address by Secretary Haig before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Current Policy No. 388 (Washington: April 27, 1982). Proceso, Vol. 2 -3 , 1982. Author translation. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 370. David Pezzullo, “Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s View,” Washington Post, April 24, 1983. Representative Jim Leach et al., “ From U.S. Aid to El Salvador: An Evalu­ ation of the Past, a Proposal for the Future: A Report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus,” Congressional Record 1 3 1 : 18 , February 22, 1985; Kenneth M . Coleman and George C. Herring, eds., The Central American Crisis: Sources o f Conflict and the Failure o f U.S. Policy. Wilm­ ington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1985. “ Transcript of Democrat’s Response to Reagan Speech on Central Amer­ ica,” N ew York Times, April 28, 1983. Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 372 Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 372. Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 372. Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 372. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 19 8 3 . RRPL, 1084. Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 10 2.

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Notes to Pages 238-242

567

35. Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador at War, 371. 36. Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador at War, 371.

Chapter 23. Solidarity 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14.

John Carson, “Missing the Marx,” Policy Review (Fall 1984): 91. Peter Kemp, “ Cuban Subversion,” Spectator, July 24, 1982. Eric Arnesen, “The Killings in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, July 9,19 85. Quoted in Kalev Sepp, “The Evolution of United States Military Strat­ egy in Central America, 19 7 9 -19 9 1.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2002. A long interview with Cienfuegos from early 19 8 1 was published in English a year later. The introduction to the book states: “These docu­ ments clarify the internal and external situation of El Salvador and give insight into the character of our revolution. They unmask the maneuvers of the oligarchy, the fascist military, and imperialism. They illustrate how our heroic people are taking up the strategy and tactics of Popular Revo­ lutionary War necessary for legitimate defense.” See Fermdn Cienfuegos, Commander Ferman Cienfuego Speaks . Los Angeles, CA: Solidarity Com­ mittee, 1982. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 81, 381. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 381. J. Michael Waller, The Third Current o f Revolution: Inside the ‘North American Front’ o f E l Salvador’s Guerrilla War. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991, 23-47. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador , 379-93. Waller, The Third Current o f Revolution , 23; for a more pro-activist inter­ pretation, see Hector Perla, “ Monseüor’s Resurrection: Transnational Sal­ vadoran Organizing,” N A CLA Report on the Americas , 43:6 (NovemberDecember 2010): 2 5 -3 1; Ross Gelbspan, Break-ins, Death Threats and the FBI: The Covert War against the Central America Movement. Boston: South End Press, 1991. In 1989, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report largely critical of the FBI’s investigation of suspected CISPES terrorist activity in the form of active support for the FMLN. See “The FBI and CISPES,” Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Govern­ ment Printing Office, July 1989. Waller, The Third Current o f Revolution , 23-47. Waller, The Third Current o f Revolution , 23-47. Barton Meyers and Jean Weisman, “The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador , 379 -9 1.

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568

Notes to Pages 242-247

15 . “ History of CISPES,” accessed December 16 , 20 14 . http://www.cispes .org/about-cispes/history/history-of-cispes/. 16 . Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 17 . Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 18 . Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 384. 19 . Peter Perl, “ Latin Unionists’ Visit Divides AFL-CIO Politically,” Washing­ ton Post, November 17 , 1985. 20. Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 2 1 . Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 22. Ari L. Goldman, “ Churches Becoming Home to Central American Exiles,” N ew York Times, April 1, 1984. 23. Quoted in Goldman, “ Churches Becoming Home to Central American Exiles.” 24. Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 25. Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 7 9 -9 1. The language of the 1967 pamphlet can be found in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., eds., Vietnam and America: A Documented History. New York: Grove Press, 1985; the indictment of the “ Boston Five” in U.S. District Court, January 6, 1968, is related in Jessica Mitford, The Trial o f Dr. Spock, the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Michael Ferber, Mitchell Goodman, and Marcus Raskin. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, Appendix 1. 26. Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 27. Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 28. Quoted in Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 29. Quoted in Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 30. Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 3 1. Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1. 32. Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 79 -9 1.

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Notes to Pages 247-252

569

33. Meyers and Weisman, “The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 379 -9 1. 34. Robert Surburg, Beyond Vietnam: The Politics o f Protest in Mas­ sachusetts, 19 7 4 -19 9 0 . Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009, 178. 35. Surburg, Beyond Vietnam, 178 ; Meyers and Weisman, “ The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” 3 7 9 -9 1. In October 1985, Diaz and 25 other guerrilla prisoners were released in the exchange for Ines Guadalupe Duarte. Diaz returned immediately to her FM LN unit. 36. Guillermo M. Ungo, “ The People’s Struggle,” Foreign Policy (Autumn 1983): 5 1-6 3 . 37. M ax G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, “A Strategic View of Insurgen­ cies: Insights from El Salvador,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Papers No. 8, M ay 1990, 7; U.S. Embassy San Salvador cable, September 1982, NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, “ Records Relating to the UN Truth Commission,” Box 1; Joanne Omang, “ Magana Says Rebels Can Be Defeated,” Washington Post, June 19 , 1983. 38. Ana Guadalupe Martinez, interview with author, San Salvador, June 2008. 39. “William Jeffras Dieterich, Deputy Chief of Mission in El Salvador, 1989­ 92,” ADST. 40. Mario Rosenthal, “ Guerrillas Lose Hearts and Minds in Salvadoran Offensive,” Wall Street Journal, December 15 , 1989. 4 1. Peter Kemp, “ Cuban Subversion,” Spectator, July 24, 1982. 42. Quoted in Waller, The Third Current o f Revolution, 222. 43. “The Harkin Doctrine,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 1989. 44. “The Harkin Doctrine.” 45. Edwin G. Corr in Foreword to Waller, The Third Current o f Revolution, xiv-xviii; also see Sepp, “ The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1.” Chapter 24. Troop Cap and Certifying Human Rights 1. Gerald M. Boyd, “Jackson Describes the Reagan Administration as ‘War­ mongering,’ ” N ew York Times, April 26, 1984. 2. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role o f a Lifetime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 19 9 1, 3 0 1. 3. Lydia Chavez, “ The Odds in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, July 2 4 ,19 8 3 . 4. Cannon, President Reagan, 298. 5. “ Interview with Ronald Reagan,” Washington Post, March 27, 19 8 1. 6. Excerpts from an interview with Reagan by Walter Cronkite of CBS News, March 3, 19 8 1. 7. Cannon, President Reagan, 3 13 .

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57o

Notes to Pages 252-254

8. On March 8, 1982, Byrd introduced the War Powers Resolution Amend­ ment of 1982 (S. 2179) specifically providing that U.S. armed forces shall not be introduced into El Salvador for combat unless (1) “ the Congress has declared war or specifically authorized such use; or (2) such introduc­ tion was necessary to meet a clear and present danger of attack on the United States or to provide immediate evacuation of U.S. citizens.” Sim­ ilar bills were also introduced in the House of Representatives. See “The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years,” CRS Report for Congress, R L32267, March 1 1 , 2004, http://fas.org/man/crs/RL32267.html. 9. Quoted in Philip J. Hilts, “White House Changes Tone on Troops in El Salvador,” Washington Post, March 7, 1982. 10 . Chris L. Lukasevich, “ U.S. Training and Advisory Assistance to the Armed Forces of El Salvador from 1 9 8 1 - 19 9 1 and the Resulting Decline in Human Rights Abuses: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces,” Master’s Thesis, University of Arizona, 2002. 1 1 . USGAO, “ El Salvador: Extent of U.S. Military Personnel in Country,” U.S. GAO, GAO/NSIAD-90-227FS, July 1990; also see Kalev Sepp, “ Combat­ ant Commands and Central America,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2002. 12 . The U.S. trainers could travel throughout their zone of responsibility if escorting a senior FAES officer. They were barred from accompanying FAES troops into combat, with or without a senior military escort. See Sepp, “ Combatant Commands and Central America.” 13 . Major Paul P. Cale, “ The United States Military Advisory Group in El Salvador, 19 7 9 -19 9 2 ,” Small Wars Journal 13 (1996). 14 . Cale, “ The United States Military Advisory Group in El Salvador, 19 79 ­ 19 9 2.” 15 . Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 60. 16 . George Miller, “ El Salvador: Policy of Deceit,” N ew York Times, October 2 1, 1988. 17 . Lukasevich, “ U.S. Training and Advisory Assistance to the Armed Forces of El Salvador,” 10. 18 . Lukasevich, “ U.S. Training and Advisory Assistance to the Armed Forces of El Salvador,” 10; USGAO, “ El Salvador: Extent of U.S. Military Per­ sonnel in Country,” U.S. GAO, GAO/NSIAD-90-227FS, July 1990. 19 . As the war unfolded, certification would turn to the issue of what con­ stituted an advisor. For example, the 55-person cap had earlier included the security assistance staff at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. The State Department contended that trainers were the U.S. military personnel with responsibilities for training their Salvadoran counterparts. After consulta­ tions, the embassy agreed that the cap would apply to military group staff

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Notes to Pages 254-256

20.

2 1. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26.

571

at the Embassy, medical trainers, and U.S. military personnel on tempo­ rary duty. Members of the mobile training teams (MTTs) were not counted against the cap unless they were in El Salvador for more than 14 consec­ utive days. Before the agreement on the MTTs, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces sent 55 soldiers into El Salvador from Panama to train the first of six “ rapid reaction” battalions, the Atlacatl that later this same year perpetrated the gristly massacres of El Mozote. See Sepp, “ Combatant Commands and Central America.” In 2007 at the height of the George W Bush administration’s “ troop surge” in the late years of the Iraq War, Arizona Senator John McCain stated during a congressional hearing that “ the record shows that cap­ ping the troops in El Salvador was an impediment to the progress that we made, in retrospect, rather than any kind of assistance to it.” See “ Cur­ rent Situation on Iraq,” Hearings before the Committee on Armed Ser­ vices, United States Senate, n o th Congress, 1st Session, January 12 and 25, 2007. Larry Cline, telephone interview with author, June 2008. James Steele, telephone interview with author, June 2008; also see “ El Sal­ vador: Extent of U.S. Military Personnel in Country,” U.S. GAO, GAONSIAD-90-227FS, July 1990; “ El Salvador: Accountability for U.S. M il­ itary and Economic Aid,” U.S. GAO, G AO -N SIAD -90-132, September 1990. Sepp, “ Combatant Commands and Central America.” “ El Salvador, Public Witnesses,” Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, February 25, 19 8 1; also see Juan de Onis, “ Baker Supports Added Advisers for El Salvador,” N ew York Times, February 26, 19 8 1. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 58. The official name of the certification legislation was the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 19 8 1. It provided that every 180 days the president must certify to Congress his determination that the Salvadoran government was (1) making a concerted and signif­ icant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights; (2) achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed forces, so as to bring to an end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvado­ ran citizens by these forces; (3) making continued progress in implement­ ing essential economic and political reforms, including the land reform program; (4) committed to holding free elections at an early date and to that end has demonstrated efforts to begin discussions with all major political factions in El Salvador, which have declared their willingness to find and implement an equitable political solution to the conflict, with such solution to involve a commitment to a renouncement of further

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27.

28. 29. 30. 3 1. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37.

38.

Notes to Pages 256-258 military or paramilitary activity and having internationally recognized observers present during the electoral process. The act was later amended to included language to certify that the Salvadoran government was mak­ ing a good faith effort to investigate the murders of the six Americans in El Salvador in December 1980 and January 19 8 1. See Christopher Dickey, “ Expected Certification for El Salvador Based on Mixed Record,” Wash­ ington Post, January 2 1 ,1 9 8 3 ; Bernard Weintraub, “ Reagan Plans to Cer­ tify Rights Progress in Salvador,” N ew York Times, January 1 1 , 1983; Thomas Enders, “ Certification of Progress in Salvador,” Current Policy 4 10 , Department of State July 29, 1982. Quoted in Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 19 9 1, 22 -23; Ellen Collier, “ El Salvador and the War Powers Resolution,” Congressional Research Service Review (June 19 8 1); U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub­ committee on Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Policy toward E l Salvador, Hearings, March 5 and 1 1 , 19 8 1,9 7 th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 19 8 1. “Aid to El Salvador,” CQ Almanac 19 8 1. 37th ed. Washington, DC: Con­ gressional Quarterly, 1982, 18 5. Quoted in Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Admin­ istration, and Central America. New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, 69. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 67. “A Communist Victory” (editorial), Wall Street Journal, M ay 1, 19 8 1; Arnson, Crossroads, 68. Arnson, Crossroads, 82. Quoted in Joan Didion, Salvador. New York: Washington Square Press, 19 83, 63. William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 156 . For an example of human rights reporting, see U.S. Department of State. The Situation in E l Salvador. Report No. 144. Washington, DC, April 1986; Charles Mohr, “ President Kills a Salvador Bill Tied to Rights,” N ew York Times, December 1, 19 83; Francis X . Clines, “ Reagan Says Rights Report Might Invite Salvador Strife,” N ew York Times, December 3 ,19 8 3 . Quoted in M ark Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote. New York: Vintage, 19 9 4 ,9 1-9 3 . Quoted in Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote, 90-92; Richard J. Meislin, “ El Salvador: The State of Siege Continues,” N ew York Times Magazine, February 20, 1983. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “ This Time We Know What’s Happening,” Washington Post, April 7, 1983.

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Notes to Pages 258-259

573

39. U.S. State Department official, confidential interview with author, Wash­ ington, DC, March 2 0 11. 40. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 156. 4 1. Quoted in “The Coming Showdown on Central America,” N ew York Times, April 10 , 1983. 42. Mark Danner, “The Truth of El Mozote,” N ew Yorker, December 6 ,19 9 3 . 43. Quoted in Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote, 12 3 . 44. Quoted in Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote, 140; also see “Arguments against Human-Rights Certification of El Salvador,” Letter, July 2 6 ,19 8 2 , DNSA ES03290; “ Cable Regarding the Withholding of Human-Rights Certification to El Salvador,” Cable, July 26, 1982, DNSA ES03287; “ Linkage of Human-Rights Certification to Progress in United States Churchwomen and Sullivan Cases,” Letter, October 29, 1982, DNSA E S0 3551; “ Reply to Representative Sabo’s Letter (Originally Sent to Pres­ ident Reagan) Requesting Comments on Op-Ed in N ew York Times regarding the President’s Pocket Veto of the Certification Requirement for El Salvador,” Non-Classified Letter, March 8, 1984, DNSA ES04681. 45. Loren B. Thompson, ed., Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern o f Warfare in the Modern Warfare. Washington, DC: Lexington Books, 1989. 46. Harry G. Summers, “ A War Is a War Is a War Is a War,” in Loren B. Thompson, ed., Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern o f Warfare in the Modern World. Washington, DC: Lexington Books, 1989, 27-49. 47. Quoted in Michael T. Klare, “The Interventionist Impulse: U.S. Military Doctrine for Low-Intensity Warfare,” in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., L o w Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties. New York: Pantheon, 1988; also see John A. Bushnell, “ Central American Review,” Statement before the Subcom­ mittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Commit­ tee on March 5, 19 8 1, U.S. Department o f State Bulletin 8 1: 2046-57 (Washington, DC, 19 8 1); James L. Buckley, “ Reprogramming Proposal for El Salvador,” Statement before Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of House Appropriations Committee on April 2 9 ,19 8 1. U.S. Department o f State Bulletin 81: 2046-57 (Washington, DC, 19 8 1); Alexander M. Haig Jr., “ El Salvador: The Search for Peace,” U.S. Department o f State Bulletin 81: 2046-57 (Washington, DC, September 19 8 1); U.S. Depart­ ment of State, “ Communist Interference in El Salvador,” Special Report 80 (Washington, February 23, 19 8 1); U.S. Department of State, “ Strate­ gic Situation in Central America and the Caribbean,” Current Policy 352, Washington, DC, December 14, 19 8 1. 48. Daniel Siegel and Joy Hackel, “ El Salvador: Counterinsurgency Revis­ ited,” in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., L o w Intensity

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574

Notes to Pages 259-264

Warfare: Counterinsurgency: Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties. New York: Pantheon, 1988, 1 1 2 - 3 5 . 49. Warren Hoge, “ Salvadoran Rebels Says War Is in ‘Definitive Phase,’ ” N ew York Times Magazine, February 2, 1982. Hoge, “ Salvadoran Rebels Says War Is in ‘Definitive Phase.’” 5 °Hoge, “ Salvadoran Rebels Says War Is in ‘Definitive Phase.’” 51. Chapter 25. Reagan Gambles on Elections, 1982 1. Christopher Dickey, “ Uprising Planned before Election,” Washington Post, March 8, 1982. 2. George Russell, “ To Save El Salvador,” Time, February 15 , 1982. 3 . Robert S. Leiken, ed., Central America: Anatomy o f Conflict. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. 4 . Juan de Onis, “ U.S. Bars Talks with Salvadoran Left,” N ew York Times, February 27, 19 8 1. 5 . Quoted in Edward Walsh, “ Salvador Killings Bring Out Critics, Backers of Policy,” Washington Post, April 10 , 19 8 1. 6. Margot Hornblower, “ Rumors of War Give Hill the Jitters,” Washington Post, March 8, 1982. 7. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role o fa Lifetime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 19 9 1, 308. 8. Thomas Enders, “ El Salvador: The Search for Peace,” Speech before the World Affairs Council, Current Policy 296, Washington, DC, July 16, 19 8 1. 9 . Enders, “ El Salvador: The Search for Peace.” 10. Enders, “ El Salvador: The Search for Peace.” 1 1 . Quoted in Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy. Berkeley: Uni­ versity of California Press, 19 9 1, 288. 12 . Fermdn Cienfuegos, Commander Ferman Cienfuegos Speaks. Los Ange­ les, CA: Solidarity Committee, 1982, 20. Cienfuegos, Commander Ferman Cienfuegos Speaks, 20. !3. 14. Cienfuegos, Commander Ferman Cienfuegos Speaks, 55. ! 5 . Cienfuegos, Commander Ferman Cienfuegos Speaks, 60. A few weeks before the letter to Reagan, San Salvador Bishop Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas sent a letter to the American ambassador in El Salvador asking that the U.S. government enter into a dialogue with the insurgency. 16. William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2 0 14 , 234. Director of Intelligence, “ Prospects for Stability in the Caribbean Basin 17 . through 1984, Central Intelligence Agency, April 22, 19 8 2 ,” DNSA GU00802. That same year the CIA prepared another intelligence report

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Notes to Pages 264-268

18 . 19 . 20. 2 1.

22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 3 1.

32. 33. 34. 35.

575

that concluded, “ We believe that Cuba’s repeated offers to negotiate on Central America are an effort to buy time and gain a propaganda advan­ tage. They have not been accompanied by any signs of a willingness to make concessions on the key issue of Havana supplying arms to insur­ gents.” See LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba, 234. Proceso, 1982, Vols. 2 -3 , author translation. Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit. New York: Times Books, 1984, 302. Cienfuegos, Commander Ferman Cienfuegos Speaks, 46. Christopher Dickey, “ Uprising Planned before Election,” Washington Post, March 8, 1982; Jim Hoagland, “ War Hits Home in the Country­ side,” Washington Post, March 14, 1982. “ U.S. Embassy San Salvador, FM LN Threatens Voters,” March 5, 1982, NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, “ Records Relating to the UN Truth Commis­ sion” Box 1; “ Report on the Situation in El Salvador,” Report, January 16, 1984, DNSA ES04479; U.S. Department of State. “ Caribbean Basin Initiative in Perspective,” address by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter­ American Affairs Stephen W. Bosworth before Dallas World Affairs Coun­ cil, Current Policy 370, Washington, DC, March 1 1 , 1982. John D. Waghelstein, “ El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterinsurgency,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Jan ­ uary 1, 1985. “ U.S. Embassy San Salvador, FM LN Threatens Voters.” “ U.S. Embassy San Salvador, FM LN Threatens Voters.” Colman McCarthy, “ Mountains of Sorrow,” Washington Post, February 14, 1982. Ruben Zamora, “ Elections Won’t Conceal the Truth,” Washington Post, March 2 1 , 1982. Quoted in Zamora, “ Elections Won’t Conceal the Truth.” Quoted in Zamora, “ Elections Won’t Conceal the Truth.” Ernesto Rivas-Gallont, “ Birth of a New Democracy,” Washington Post, March 2 1 , 1982. “The Most Pacific Means,” Washington Post, March 2 1, 1982; also see Reagan’s speech to the OAS: Ronald Reagan, “ Caribbean Basin Initia­ tive,” address by President Reagan before the OAS, Current Policy 370, Washington, DC, February 24, 1982. Quoted in Rivas-Gallont, “ Birth of a New Democracy.” Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 , 94. “Name-calling Punctuates Salvador Election Campaigns,” Associated Press, March 23, 1982. “Name-calling Punctuates Salvador Election Campaigns.”

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576

Notes to Pages 268-270

3 6. D. S. Picard, “ Connecticut’s Sen. Christopher Dodd: Odyssey from Liber­ alism to Far Left,” Human Events, June 25, 1983. 37. Waghelstein, “ El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterin­ surgency.” 38. Waghelstein, “ El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterin­ surgency.” 39. Quoted in Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, 295; Roland Ebel, “ Politi­ cal Instability in Central America,” Current History, February 1, 1982; Report of the U.S. official observer mission to the El Salvador Constituent Assembly elections of March 28, 1982, Committee Print, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, November 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982). 40. Quoted in Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, 295. Also see Post-Elections Update - 13 April,” Confidential, Cable San Salvador, April 14, 1982, DNSA ES02930; “ Coalition Building: Conversations with D’Aubuisson and Barrera,” Confidential Cable San Salvador, April 28, 1982, DNSA ES02968; “ El Salvador since March 28, 1982: The Development of Democracy,” Confidential Cable San Salvador, June 1, 19 83, DNSA ES04035: Thomas Enders, “ Commitment to Democracy in Central Amer­ ica,” Current Policy 386, U.S. Department of State, April 2 1 , 1982. 4 1. Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy, 26. 42. Walter Knut and Philip J. Williams, “The Military and Democratization in El Salvador,” Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 3 5 :1 (1993): 39-88. 43. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5,” DNSA E L00132. 44. “ Embassy San Salvador: Other Reactions to the FDR/FMLN Dialogue Proposal, 0 1 November I9 82,” N A II,SG 59, Entry 5238, “ Records Relat­ ing to the UN Truth Commission,” Box 1; “ Elections Update,” Unclassi­ fied, Cable San Salvador, March 17 , 1982, DNSA ES02761; “ Report of the U.S. Official Observer Mission to the El Salvador Constituent Assem­ bly Elections of March 28, 19 8 2 ,” Non-Classified Report, March 28, 1982, DNSA ES02829; “ Post-Elections Update - 13 April,” Confidential, Cable San Salvador, April 14 , 1982, DNSA ES02930; “ Coalition Build­ ing: Conversations with D’Aubuisson and Barrera,” Confidential, Cable San Salvador, April 28, 1982, DNSA ES02968; “ El Salvador since March 28, 1982: The Development of Democracy,” Confidential, Cable San Sal­ vador, June 1, 19 83, DNSA ES04035. 45. LeoGrande, Our O w n Backyard, I64. 46. Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 164. 47. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 165. 48. Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 16 5.

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Notes to Pages 270-273

577

49. Quoted in Joan Didion, Salvador. New York: Washington Square Press, i 9 83 , 9 3 . 50. U.S. State Department official, confidential interview with author, Wash­ ington, DC, March 2 0 11. 5 1. Quoted in Cynthia Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Adminis­ tration, and Central America. University Park: Pennsylvania State Univer­ sity, 19 9 3,9 8 . 52. Quoted in Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 19 7 7 -19 9 0 . New York: Free Press, 1996, 2 10 ; “Arguments against Human-Rights Certification of El Salvador,” Letter, July 2 6 ,19 8 2 , DNSA ES03290; “ Cable Regarding the Withholding of Human-Rights Certification to El Salvador,” Cable, July 26, 1982, DNSA ES03287; “ Linkage of Human-Rights Certification to Progress in United States Churchwomen and Sullivan Cases,” Letter, October 29, i9 82, DNSA E S0 3551; U.S. Congress, “ El Salvador: Reprogramming,” Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Congress, 1st Session, March 2 2 ,2 3 , and 2 4 ,19 8 3 . Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983. Republican Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, for one, described his reactions to observing the election in person: “ From many news reports and some of the more vocal critics of our policies towards Central America in general, and El Salvador in particular, one could get the idea that we were in the business of supporting dictators. Nothing could be farther than the truth, and the record should be set quite straight on this central point. The Sen­ ator from Kansas would like to recall that under circumstances of great difficulty, the people of El Salvador participated in a national election just a year ago, in March 1982. Nearly one and one-half million Salvadoran voters cast their ballots__ It was a significant turnout of brave people often under fire. For the guerrillas did try to disrupt the elections in many polling stations. They attacked the transportation that the people were to use to go to the polls. They harassed and threatened the voters.” 53. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 2 10 ; Frank Broadhead, “ Demonstration Elec­ tions in El Salvador,” Resist Newsletter (March 1984). 54. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “ Communism in Central America: This Time We Know What’s Happening,” Washington Post, April 17 , 19 83; Joanne Omang, “ Confusion Erupts within Salvadoran Guerrillas’ Political Arm,” Washington Post, August 13 , 1983. 55. Amelie Crosson, “ Our Next Step in El Salvador,” Washington Post, July i8 , i982. 56. Broadhead, “ Demonstration Elections in El Salvador.” 57. Enders, “ Commitment to Democracy in Central America.” 58. Thomas Enders, “ Building Peace in Central America,” State Department Bulletin, October 1982.

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578

Notes to Pages 274-277

59. Ronald Reagan, “ Central America: Defending Our Vital Interests,” Cur­ rent Policy 482, U.S. Department of State, April 27, 1983. 60. Director of Intelligence, “ Prospects for Stability in the Caribbean Basin through 1984,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 22, 1982,” DNSA GU00802. 61. “ Special National Intelligence Estimate, Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean,” DNSA ES00561.

Chapter 26. The Shultz Doctrine 1. “The Secretary’s Central America Speech ‘The Struggle for Democracy in Central America,’” Confidential Memorandum, April 14, 1983, DNSA ES03927; see Committee on Appropriations, Salvador Military and Eco­ nomic Reprogramming , 1984. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print­ ing Office, 1983. 2. “ Remarks of President Reagan and Provisional President Alvaro Alfredo Magana Borja of El Salvador Following Their Meetings,” June 17, 1983, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/61783b .htm; Ronald Reagan, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress: Cen­ tral America,” Washington, DC, April 27, 1983. 3. John M. Goshko, “ Haig Resigns at State; Shultz Is Named,” Washington Post, June 26, 1982. 4. Lou Cannon, “ Inner Circle Was Ready to Let Haig Go,” Washington Post, June 27, 1982. 5. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary o f State. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, 287. 6. George P. Shultz, “ Strengthening Democracy in Central America,” Cur­ rent Policy 468, U.S. Department of State, March 1983; “ Briefing Book on El Salvador,” Packet of Materials Distributed to Congress and Other Groups on the Eve of Regan’s Joint Session Speech on Central AmericaCover Memo from McFarlane to Hill Attached, Non-Classified Report, April 23, 1983, DNSA ES03948. 7. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph , 291. 8. Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America . New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, 1 1 5 . 9. “ From George Shultz to the President, Your Meeting with President Magaha, November 19, 1982,” DNSA EL00767. 10. “ From George Shultz to the President, Your Meeting with President Magaria, November 19, 19 8 2” ; also see U.S. Congress, “ U.S. Policy in El Salvador: Third Presidential Certification on El Salvador,” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and on Western Hemisphere

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Notes to Pages 277-280

579

Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Febru­ ary 4, 28, March 7, 17 , 19 83. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 19 83; U.S. Congress, Senate, “ Central America Policy,” Hear­ ings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Congress, 1st Ses­ sion, August 4, 19 8 3; U.S. Congress, “ El Salvador Military and Eco­ nomic Reprogramming,” Special Hearing before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, 98th Congress, 1st Ses­ sion, March 22, 19 83. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, i 9 83 . 1 1 . “ From George Shultz to the President, Your Meeting with President Magafia, November 19 , 19 8 2 ,” DNSA EL00767; on the Peace Commis­ sion, see Alan Riding, “ Salvador Chief to Set Up Peace Commission,” New York Times, September 13 , 1982. 12 . Joanne Omang, “ Salvadoran Guerrilla Aide Urges U.S. Role in Talks,” Washington Post, June 1 7 ,19 8 3 ; Carla Hall, “ The Radical Voice of M od­ eration,” Washington Post, March 14, 1983. 13 . Christopher Dickey, “ From Quagmire to Cauldron?” Foreign Affairs 62:3 (1983). 14 . Lou Cannon and John M. Goshko, “ U.S. Weighs Plan for ‘Two-Track’ Policy on Salvador,” Washington Post, February i0 , i9 8 3; Ronald Rea­ gan, “ Central America: Defending Our Vital Interests,” Current Policy 482, U.S. Department of State, April 27, 1983. 15 . Cannon and Goshko, “ U.S. Weighs Plan for ‘Two-Track’ Policy on Sal­ vador” ; Ronald Reagan, “ Central America: Defending Our Vital Inter­ ests,” Current Policy 482, U.S. Department of State, April 27, 1983. 16 . Dickey, “ From Quagmire to Cauldron?” 17 . Dan Oberdorfer and Lou Cannon, “ Enders’ Ouster Signals Policy Turn on Salvador,” Washington Post, June 5, i9 8 3. 18 . Dickey, “ From Quagmire to Cauldron?” ; Oberdorfer and Cannon, “ Enders’ Ouster Signals Policy Turn on Salvador.” 19 . Cannon and Goshko, “ U.S. Weighs Plan for ‘Two-Track’ Policy on Sal­ vador” ; Ronald Reagan, “ Central America: Defending Our Vital Inter­ ests,” Current Policy No. 482, U.S. Department of State, April 27, 1 9 83 . 20. The author thanks historian Ralph Levering for this insight. 2 1 . Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 1 1 7 ; Jeane Kirkpatrick, “ Communism in Central America: This Time We Know What’s Happening,” Washington Post, April 3, i9 8 3. 22. “ El Salvador Aid Approved - With Strings,” in CQ Almanac 19 8 3, 39th ed., 154 -8 4 . Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1984. http:// library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal83-1198526.

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Notes to Pages 280-285

23. Ronald Reagan: “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Cen­ tral America,” April 27, 19 8 3. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/ speeches/1983/42783d.htm. 24. Reagan: “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central Amer­ ica.” 25. Cannon and Goshko, “ U.S. Weighs Plan for ‘Two-Track’ Policy on Sal­ vador” ; Ronald Reagan, “ Central America: Defending Our Vital Inter­ ests,” Current Policy 482, U.S. Department of State, April 27, 1983. 26. Ronald Reagan, “ Central America: Defending Our Vital Interests.” 27. Steven R. Weisman, “ Reagan Said to Feel Latin Policy Was Managed Poorly by Enders,” N ew York Times, M ay 29, 1983. 28. Weisman, “ Reagan Said to Feel Latin Policy Was Managed Poorly by Enders.” 29. Weisman, “ Reagan Said to Feel Latin Policy Was Managed Poorly by Enders.” 30. Gerald F. Seib, “ Pickering to Become Envoy to El Salvador,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1983. 3 1. Quoted in William M . LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 19 7. 32. Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years. Berkeley: University of California Press, 19 9 1, 2 8 -3 1. 33. Quoted in Robert Pastor, “ Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Journal o f Policy Analysis and Management 3:2 (Winter 1984): 175-9 0 . 34. Cannon, President Reagan: Role o f a Lifetime, 303. 35. Cannon, President Reagan: Role o f a Lifetime, 3 15 . 36. “ Remarks of President Reagan and Provisional President Alvaro Alfredo Magana Borja of El Salvador Following Their Meetings,” June 17 , 1983. 37. “ Remarks of President Reagan and Provisional President Alvaro Alfredo Magana Borja of El Salvador Following Their Meetings.” 38. “ Remarks of President Reagan and Provisional President Alvaro Alfredo Magana Borja of El Salvador Following Their Meetings.” 39. John M . Goshko and Joanne Omang, “ U.S. Laying Plans for Talking with Salvadoran Rebels,” Washington Post, June 2 3 ,19 8 3 ; Christopher Dickey, “ Unruly Salvadoran Left Appears to Coalesce,” Washington Post, July 8, 19 83; Michael Posner, “ Central American Dilemmas,” Maclean’s, M ay 2, i 9 83 . 40. Robert J. McCartney, “ Salvadoran Opposition Chief Willing to Talk to Stone,” Washington Post, M ay 3, 19 83; Piero Gleijeses, “ The Case for Power Sharing in El Salvador,” Foreign Affairs 61:5 (Summer 1983). 4 1. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 194.

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Notes to Pages 285-288

581

42. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 114 . 43. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 114 . 44. “ U.S. Ambassador Richard Stone is provided with talking points in prepa­ ration for his meeting with Salvadorean President Alvaro Magana. Memo. White House. CONFIDENTIAL,” DDRS C K 3100546758. 45. Quoted in David Hoffman and Don Oberdofer, “ Rep. Long Insists Rea­ gan Pursue Political Solution in El Salvador,” Washington Post, June 14, i 9 83 . 46. “ Salvadoran Rebels Ask to See Stone,” Washington Post, June 1 1 , 1983; Joanne Omang, “ U.S. Conciliatory on Rebuff by Salvadorans,” Washing­ ton Post, July 12 , 1983. 47. Edward Cody, “ Special Envoy Ends Mission on Salvador,” Washington Post, July 10, 1983. 48. Cody, “ Special Envoy Ends Mission on Salvador” ; Robert S. Leiken, “They’re Tired of War, They Want to Talk,” Washington Post, February 27, 19 83; Robert J. McCartney, “ U.S. Denies Visa to Salvadoran Rebels’ Negotiator,” Washington Post, September 17 , 1983. 49. “Talks About What?” Wall Street Journal, July 13 , 1983. 50. Joanne Omang, “ Salvadoran Rebels Will Talk to Stone, Peace Commis­ sion,” Washington Post, August 2 1 , 1983. 5 1. Omang, “ Salvadoran Rebels Will Talk to Stone, Peace Commission.” 52. Paul Ellman, “A Tentative Search for Peace,” Maclean’s, September 12 , 1 9 83 . 53. Ellman, “A Tentative Search for Peace.” 54. Sandra Borda, “ The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts: A Com­ parative Study of Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala,” Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 2009.

Chapter 27. Human Rights 1. Oakland Ross, “ Salvador Rebels Set for ‘Inevitable’ War against U.S. Forces,” Globe and Mail, April 20, 1984. 2. Chris Hedges, “ El Salvador Military Said to Bomb Red Cross Aid Sites,” Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 1984. 3. Joan Didion, Salvador. New York: Washington Square Press, 19 83, 67; “ Resurgence of Extreme Rightist Violence,” Confidential State Depart­ ment cable, September 28, 19 83, DNSA EL00798. 4. Proceso, Universidad Centromaericana, Special Archive. Vols. 4-5, 1984. 5. Quoted in Jefferson Morley, “ Prisoner of Success,” N ew York Review o f Books, December 4, 1986; in “ Key to Improving Human Rights: ‘Bring the Army under Civilian Control,’ ” Christian Science Monitor, August 3, 19 83, Elliot Abrams responded to the death squad issue in El Salvador:

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582

6. 7.

8.

9.

10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 .

Notes to Pages 288-289 “ I don’t really know who the death squads are. I think probably the role of the security forces, especially of high-ranking people in the security forces, is very small, if there is one__ If you want to hire someone in El Salvador to go out and kill someone for you, you don’t need to hire somebody who is currently a member of the police force. There are plenty of former soldiers who know how to use weapons.” Morley, “ Prisoner of Success.” For more on how some in the Reagan administration subsequently viewed these events, see Elliot Abrams, “ Peace in El Salvador: An American Vic­ tory,” National Review, February 3, 1992; Ernest Evans, “ El Salvador’s Lessons for Future U.S. Interventions,” World Affairs 16 0 :1 (Summer 1997). Quoted in Deane Hinton, “Address Prepared for the American Chamber of Commerce in San Salvador, October 29, 19 8 2 ,” Department o f State Bulletin, December 1982; also see Edward Cody, “ Envoy Threatens Aid Cutoff,” Washington Post, October 2 9 ,19 8 2 ; John D. Waghelstein, “ M ili­ tary to Military Contacts: Personal Observations - The El Salvador Case,” L o w Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 10 :2 (Summer 2003); Sam Dillon, “ Dateline El Salvador: Crisis Renewed,” Foreign Policy 73 (Winter 1988-1989): 15 3 -7 0 . Marlise Simons, “ Salvador Aid: U.S. Resolve Is Questioned,” N ew York Times, November 22, 1982; Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 19 7 6 - 19 9 3 . 2nd ed. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, 104; Dillon, “ Dateline El Sal­ vador: Crisis Renewed.” Simons, “ Salvador Aid: U.S. Resolve Is Questioned” ; Arnson, Crossroads, 104; Dillon, “ Dateline El Salvador: Crisis Renewed.” Simons, “ Salvador Aid: U.S. Resolve Is Questioned.” Simons, “ Salvador Aid: U.S. Resolve Is Questioned” ; Arnson, Crossroads, 104; Dillon, “ Dateline El Salvador: Crisis Renewed.” “ Progress, of Sorts, in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, November 18 ,19 8 2 . Quoted in William M . LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Car­ olina Press, 1998, 179 . Upon his departure from his post in San Salvador, Ambassador Hinton made a second speech to the Salvadoran business community and its lack of concern for human rights: “ When there are peo­ ple [found] here in the parking lot of the Camino Real [hotel] strangled, with plaques saying ‘we’ve killed them because we are the Secret Anti­ Communist Army,’ that is not acceptable and ought not to be acceptable for you,” quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 13 3 ; Christopher Dickey, “ Hin­ ton Attacks Salvadorans for ‘Silence’ about Murders,” Washington Post, July 14 ,19 8 3 .

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Notes to Pages 289-291

583

15 . For more on the reactions to Hinton’s speech, see “ No Policy Shift Said Intended on Salvador,” Washington Post, November 1 1 , 1982; “ Progress, of Sorts, in Salvador,” N ew York Times, November 18 , 1982; Simons, “ Salvador Aid: U.S. Resolve Is Questioned” ; Bernard Weintraub, “ Tied to Right for Reasons Gone Wrong,” N ew York Times, November 7, 1982; John B. Oakes, “ Central American Folly,” N ew York Times, November 26, 1982. 16 . Quoted in Didion, Salvador, 96. 17 . Quoted in Didion, Salvador, 97. 18 . Quoted in Arthur Allen, “ Hinton Leaves El Salvador, but Leaves M ark,” Associated Press, July 16 , 1983. 19 . Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 19 7. 20. “ Resurgence of Extreme Rightist Violence,” Confidential State Depart­ ment cable, September 28, 19 83, DNSA EL00798; “ El Salvador: Threat from the Right,” DNSA EL00106; “ Central America,” DNSA ES04374; “ Bishop Rosa Chavez Discusses Salvadoran Death Squads with Asst. Sec­ retary Abrams,” DNSA EL00807. 2 1 . “ Vice President’s Dinner Toast,” U.S. Department of State, December 1 1 , 19 83, DNSA ES04400; “ Reply to Representative Sabo’s Letter (Originally Sent to President Reagan) Requesting Comments on Op-Ed in ‘New York Times’ regarding the President’s Pocket Veto of the Certification Require­ ment for El Salvador,” Non-Classified, Letter, March 8, 1984, DNSA ES04681; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and Political Developments in E l Salvador, 100th Congress, 1st Session, September 23 and 29, 1987; Lydia Chavez, “ U.S. Envoy Casti­ gates Salvadorans on Terrorism,” N ew York Times, November 26, 19 83. 22. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 134 . 23. Weintraub, “ Tied to Right for Reasons Gone Wrong” ; U.S. Congress, “ Recent Political Violence in El Salvador,” Report of the Select Commit­ tee on Intelligence, S. Rept. 98-665, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, October 10, 1984 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984). 24. Thomas Pickering, “ The Essential Stumbling Block to Democracy in El Salvador Remains Extremist Terror,” address to the Ambassador to El Sal­ vador before the American Chamber of Commerce, San Salvador, Novem­ ber 25, 19 83; Lydia Chavez, “ U.S. Envoy Castigates Salvadorans on Ter­ rorism,” N ew York Times, November 26, 1983. 25. Thomas Pickering’s interview: “ The Challenge of Counterinsurgency,” America Abroad (transcript), October 14 , 2006. http://americaabroad media.org/radio/challenge-counterinsurgency. 26. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 19 83, PPRR, 1645; Juan Williams, “ Salvadoran Rebels Imitate Rightists, President Suggests,” Washington Post, December 3, 19 83; in at least one

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584

27.

28. 29. 30. 3 1.

Notes to Pages 291-293 important history of U.S. policy in El Salvador the only language from Reagan’s comments are “ the right wing will be blamed for it.” See Arnson, Crossroads, 14 2. “ Vice President’s Dinner Toast” ; “ Reply to Representative Sabo’s Letter (Originally Sent to President Reagan) Requesting Comments on Op-Ed in ‘New York Times’ regarding the President’s Pocket Veto of the Certifica­ tion Requirement for El Salvador” ; for a sample of the reaction to Rea­ gan’s November 30, 19 83, pocket veto of the human rights certification legislation, see “ Licensing the Killer Right,” Washington Post, December 4, 19 8 3; “ M ajor News,” N ew York Times, December 4, 19 8 3; “ Salvador Leader Endorses Report,” N ew York Times, January 12 , 1984; “ Salvador Spinach,” N ew York Times, January 1 1 , 1984; “The Kissinger Report,” Wall Street Journal, January 12 , 1984; “ What’s a Salvadoran to Think?” N ew York Times, December 2, 19 83; Bernard Gwertzman and Hedrick Smith, “As for El Salvador, It’s That Time of Year Again,” N ew York Times, January 5 ,19 8 4 ; “ Panel Said to Urge Salvador Talks and U.S. Con­ tacts in Nicaragua,” N ew York Times, January 7 ,19 8 4 ; “ Reagan Planning Arms Aid Increase for El Salvador,” N ew York Times, January 13 , 1984; “ Reagan Planning More Aid for Salvador,” N ew York Times, January 4, 1984; “ Reagan Resists Panel on Arms for El Salvador,” N ew York Times, January 10 ,19 8 4 ; “ Reagan Said Leaning against Panel Report,” Washing­ ton Post, January 10, 1984; “ Rights Still Problem, Salvador Study Finds,” Washington Post, January 17 , 1984. Quoted in Francis X. Clines, “ Reagan Says Reports Might Invite Salvador Strife,” N ew York Times, December 3, 1983. Quoted in Charles Mohr, “ Democrats Assail Reagan on Salvador,” N ew York Times, December 2, 1983. More than half a year later, the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned the pocket veto, ruling that the move was illegal. Quoted in Charles Mohr, “ President Kills a Salvador Bill Tied to Rights,” N ew York Times, December 1, 19 83; to read more on the pocket veto affair, see Joanne Omang, “ President Vetoes Bill Tying Aid to Salvadoran Rights,” Washington Post, December 1,19 8 3 ; “ Senate Joins Suit over Veto on Salvador,” N ew York Times, January 29, 1984; Taylor Stuart, “ Court Hears Challenge to Pocket Veto,” N ew York Times, February 23, 1984; Al Kamen, “ Reagan Pocket Veto of Salvador Bill Held Constitutional,” Washington Post, March 10, 1984; Taylor Stuart, “ Reagan’s Pocket Veto of Salvador Aid Bill Upheld,” N ew York Times, March 10 , 1984; Ronald Kessler, “ Pocket Veto by Reagan Overturned,” Washington Post, August

30, 1984. 32. Albuquerque Journal series, January 19 83. Reprinted in Spanish in Los Escuardrones de la muerte en E l Salvador. San Salvador: Editorial Jaragud, 1995 (author translation), 27, 140.

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Notes to Pages 293-296

585

33. Fred Hiatt, “ Undersecretary Urges More Salvadoran Aid,” Washington Post, November 13 , 1983. 34. Andy Pasztor, “ Reagan Picks Clark as Watt’s Successor; Signals Shake-Up in Foreign-Policy Team,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1983. 35. Hedrick Smith, “ Salvadoran Says U.S. Helps Reduce Killings,” N ew York Times, December 14 , 1983. 36. John Solomon, “A Wimp He Wasn’t,” Newsweek, March 20, 2 0 11. 37. “ Vice President’s Dinner Toast,” U.S. Department of State, December 1 1 , 19 83, DNSA ES04400. 38. Quoted in Smith, “ Salvadoran Says U.S. Helps Reduce Killings.” 39. “ Vice President’s Dinner Toast” ; “ Reply to Representative Sabo’s Letter (Originally Sent to President Reagan) Requesting Comments on Op-Ed in ‘New York Times’ regarding the President’s Pocket Veto of the Certifica­ tion Requirement for El Salvador.” 40. “The Challenge of Counterinsurgency.” 4 1. “ El Salvador: Dealing with Death Squads,” CIA Intelligence Directorate, January 20, 1984, DNSA E L 0 0 117 ; “ Briefing Paper on Rightwing Terror­ ism in El Salvador,” CIA, October 19 83, DNSA E L 0 0 110 . 42. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5,” DNSA E L00132. 43. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5 ” ; according to the UN Truth Commission report, in the year 1984, there were 39 murders attributed to death squads and 1,965 civilian deaths attributed to the army, security forces, and death squads between January and September. The report cites 13 6 murders at the hands of death squads during the year 1985 (murders spiked after Salvadoran elections in March), and 1,655 deaths at the hands of govern­ ment forces. There was an overall decline from 1984 to 1985 in killings by government forces. Statistics from UN Security Council, From Mad­ ness to Hope: the 12-year war in E l Salvador: Report o f the Commission on the Truth for E l Salvador, S/25500,1993, 24-29. http://www.usip.org/ sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf. 44. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5.” 45. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5.” 46. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5.” 47. “ El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, CIA, February 19 8 5.” 48. James LeMoyne, “A Year after Talks, Salvador Peace Recedes,” New York Times, October 13 , 1985; “ Salvador Prelate Asks Study of Grisly Reports,” Reuters, September 17 , 1984.

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586

Notes to Pages 297-301

49. “ Stephen Palmer to Amb. Enders,” DNSAES. Reprinted in Arthur Jones, “A Look at Declassified State Department Documents,” National Catholic Reporter , September 23, 1994. 50. “America Embassy to Secretary of State Shultz,” DNSA EL00958; Arthur Jones, “A Look at Declassified State Department Documents,” National Catholic Reporter 30:41 (September 1994). 51. “America Embassy to Secretary of State Shultz” ; “A Look at Declassified State Department Documents.” 52. Quoted in Jefferson Morley, “ Prisoner of Success,” N ew York Review o f Books , December 4, 1986. 53. Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Sal­ vador: The Frustration o f Reform and the Illusions o f Nation Building . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991, 62-63. 54. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Salvador, 64. 55. Quoted in Robert J. McCartney, “ Bush Issues Stern Warning to El Sal­ vador on Death Squads,” Washington Post, December 12, 1983. 56. Quoted in “ El Salvador Transfers Two Officers to Curb Right-Wing Death Squads,” Globe and Mail, January 5, 1984. 57. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Salvador , 61-63. 58. ORDEN was decommissioned in November 1979 but continued to oper­ ate thereafter. For more on ORDEN-led violence, see Rusty Davenport, “ Monitor Salvador’s Border,” N ew York Times , December 23, 1981; Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “ El Salvador: The Machete of Injustice,” N ew York Times , March 1,19 8 2 ; “ Rightist Is Slain in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, March 24, 1985.

Chapter 28. Henry Kissinger 1. “The Kissinger Report,” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1984. 2. Hedrick Smith, “The Kissinger Report Could Sharpen Latin Policy Dis­ pute,” N ew York Times, January 15, 1984. 3. Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and E l Sal­ vador: The Frustration o f Reform and the Illusions o f Nation Building. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991. 4. Henry Kissinger et al., Report o f the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America . Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1984. 5. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and E l Salvador . New York: Times Books, 1984, 362. 6. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine in E l Salvador , 19. 7. Kissinger et al., Report o f the National Bipartisan Commission on Cen­ tral America , 104. For a sampling of the varied reactions to the Kissinger

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Notes to Pages 301-303

8. 9.

10 . 11.

12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 .

587

Report, see “ Salvador Leader Endorses Report,” N ew York Times, Jan ­ uary 12 , 1984; “ Salvador Spinach,” N ew York Times, January 1 1 , 1984; “The Kissinger Report,” Wall Street Journal, January 12 , 1984; Bernard Gwertzman, “ Salvador Curbs Death Squads, U.S. Aides Say,” N ew York Times, January 1, 1984; Hedrick Smith, “As for El Salvador, It’s That Time of Year Again,” N ew York Times, January 5, 1984; “ Panel Said to Urge Salvador Talks and U.S. Contacts in Nicaragua,” N ew York Times, January 7, 1984; “ Reagan Planning Arms Increase for El Salvador,” New York Times, January 13 , 1984; “ Reagan Resists Panel on Arms for El Sal­ vador,” N ew York Times, January 10 ,19 8 4 ; Joanne Omang, “ Reagan Said Leaning against Panel Report,” Washington Post, January 10 , 1984; Sey­ mour Hersh, “ Kissinger Panel, in a Draft, Says Soviet Is a Threat in Latin Affairs,” N ew York Times, January 8, 1984; William Orme and Edward Cody, “ Salvadoran Leftists Assail Kissinger Commission Report,” Wash­ ington Post, January 18 , 1984. Kissinger et al., Report o f the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 10 3. Kissinger et al., Report o f the National Bipartisan Commission on Cen­ tral America, 10 9; Representative Jim Leach et al., “ From U.S. Aid to El Salvador: An Evaluation of the Past, a Proposal for the Future: A Report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus,” Congressional Record 1 3 1 : 1 8 , February 22, 1985. Kissinger et al., Report o f the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 1 1 0 - 1 1 . Kissinger et al., Report o f the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 1 1 0 ; also see Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “ Failings of the Kissinger Report,” N ew York Times, January 17 , 1984; George P. Shultz, “ Substan­ tial Progress One Year after the Kissinger Report,” Report to the Presi­ dent from the Secretary of State, U.S. Department o f State Special Report 12 4 (April 1985); “ Implementing the National Bipartisan Commission Report,” U.S. Department o f State Special Report 148 (July 1986); “The Situation in El Salvador,” U.S. Department o f State Special Report 144 (April 1986). Kissinger et al., Report o f the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 94. “ Salvadoran Leftists Assail Kissinger Commission Report,” Washington Post, January 18, 1984. “ Salvadoran Leftists Assail Kissinger Commission Report.” Quoted in “ President Reagan’s televised address to the nation, Washing­ ton, DC, M ay 9, 1984,” Current Policy 576, U.S. Department of State. Shultz, “ Substantial Progress One Year after the Kissinger Report” ; “ Implementing the National Bipartisan Commission Report,” U.S.

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588

17 . 18 . 19 . 20. 2 1.

Notes to Pages 303-308 Department o f State Special Report 148 (July 1986); “ The Situation in El Salvador,” U.S. Department o f State Special Report 14 4 (April 1986). “ Reagan Resists Panel on Arms for El Salvador,” N ew York Times, Jan ­ uary 10, 1984. “ Reagan Resists Panel on Arms for El Salvador.” Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “ Failings of the Kissinger Report,” N ew York Times, January 17 , 1984. Proceso, Universidad Centroamericana Special Archive, Vols. 2 -3 , 1982. Author translation. Quoted in Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, 362; also see George P. Shultz, “ The U.S. and Central America: Implementing the National Biparti­ san Commission Report,” U.S. Department o f State Special Report 148 (August 1986).

Chapter 29. Contras 1. Quoted in Lou Cannon, President Reagan: Role o f a Lifetime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 19 9 1, 289. 2. Robert A. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 19 7 7 -19 9 0 . New York: Free Press, 1996, 130 . 3. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 192. 4. Ronald W. Reagan, “ National Security Decision Directive on Cuba and Central America (NSDD 17 ),” January 4, 1982, Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ nsdd/index.html. 5. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 203. 6. Peter Kornbluh, “ The Covert War,” in Thomas W. Walker, ed., Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, 22. 7. National Security Council, “ Scope of CIA Activities under the Nicaragua Finding,” July 12 , 1982, DNSA IC00060. 8. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 204. 9. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 726. 10 . Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “ U.S. Intelligence Perfor­ mance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Con­ cern,” U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, 3. 1 1 . Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “ U.S. Intelligence Perfor­ mance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Con­ cern,” 3. 12 . Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 2 17 .

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Notes to Pages 308-314

589

13 . Quoted in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Inter­ ventions and the Making o f Our Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 343. 14 . Quoted in Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 2 17 . 15 . Quoted in Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 2 17 . 16 . Stephen J. Kinzer, Blood o f Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua, with N ew Afterword. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, 4 1. 17 . Quoted in Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 192. 18 . Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 194. 19 . Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 19 7. 20. The Miskito (or Atlantic Coast Indians) are a Native American mixed race who live along the Atlantic coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua. After Somoza’s overthrow in 1979, the ruling Sandinistas’ efforts to limit Moskito autonomy sparked the formation of Miskito guerrilla groups. In all, approximately 2,000 Miskitos (out of 150,000) took up arms against Sandinista rule. See Jack Anderson, “ Nicaragua’s Indians: Ragtag Army,” Washington Post, December 9, 1984. 2 1 . During the peace process in 1990, it was estimated that 30,000 Nicaraguans had fought against the Sandinistas at one point in the con­ flict. Lynn Horton, Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains o f Nicaragua, 19 7 9 -19 9 4 . Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1998, xi; Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 2 17 ; also see Ariel Armony, Argentina, the United States and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 8 4 . Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997. 22. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 250-60. 23. Kinzer, Blood o f Brothers, 179 . 24. Philip Taubman, “ U.S. Backing Raids against Nicaragua,” N ew York Times, November 2, 1982. 25. U.S. House of Representatives, Congressman Harkin speaking on the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 19 83, Congressional Record, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982, 128, no. 2 1 (December 8, 1982), 29458-9. 26. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 242. 27. Congressman Boland speaking on the Department of Defense Appropri­ ation Bill, 19 83, U.S. House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982, 128, no. 2 1 (December 8, 1982), 29468. 28. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 240-45. 29. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 283. 30. Quoted in Kinzer, Blood o f Brothers, 3 14 . 3 1. Anthony C. E. Quainton, “ Cable: G RN Allegations of Contra Massacre,” August 13 , 19 83, DNSA N I0 17 9 1.

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59o

Notes to Pages 314-318

32. Quainton, “ Cable: G RN Allegations of Contra Massacre.” 33. American citizen Eugene Hasenfus while in Sandinista captivity, quoted by Peter Kornbluh, “ Nicaragua: U.S. Proinsurgency Warfare against the Sandinistas,” in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., L o w Inten­ sity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties. New York: Pantheon, 1988, 140. 34. In 19 83, Robert McFarlane, who would later become President Reagan’s National Security Advisor, convinced Saudi Arabia to send a total of $32 million to the contras between 1984 and 1986; see Jonathan Marshall, “ Saudi Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine,” Middle East Report (Spring 20 15); Jeff Gerth and Stephen Engelberg, “ Millions Untraced in Aid to Contras over Last 3 Years,” N ew York Times, April 8, 1987. 35. Pope John Paul II was described as “ indignant” over Nicaraguan Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega’s expulsion in July 1986. Shortly before his expul­ sion, Bishop Vega had outspokenly criticized the Sandinista regime. In the pope’s words, the Sandinistas’ action against the bishop “ evokes the dark ages” and saddens the “ soul of anyone who is sensitive to the demands of freedom.” Bruce Buursma, “ Pope Assails Nicaragua,” Chicago Tribune, July 6, 1986. 36. Stephen Kinzer, “ La Prensa’s Journalistic War against Sandinistas More Fierce than Ever,” Ottawa Citizen, March 12 , 1988.

Chapter 30. "Elections Yes, Dialogue No,” 1984 Presidential Election 1. Quoted in Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 3 .2nd ed. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, 159. 2. Frank Broadhead, “ Demonstration Elections in El Salvador,” Resist Newsletter (Somerville, MA), March 1984. 3. Quoted in Chris Hedges, “ On Salvador’s Ballots, the Fragmented Left Is Felt butNot Seen,” Specialto the Christian Science Monitor, M ay 7 ,19 8 4 . 4. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 158. 5. Proceso. Universidad Centroamericana. Vols. 4-5, 1984. Author transla­ tion. 6. Proceso. Universidad Centroamericana. Vols. 4-5, 1984. Author transla­ tion. 7. “ El Salvador: Election Outlook,” March 6 ,19 8 4 , Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room; Philip J. Williams and Guillermina Seri, “ The Limits of Reformism: The Rise and Fall of Christian Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala,” in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully,

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Notes to Pages 318-320

8.

9. 10 .

11.

12 . 13 . 14 .

15 . 16 .

17 . 18 .

19 . 20. 2 1.

591

eds., Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, 3 1 1 . Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 19 9 1, 30; Richard A. Haggerty, E l Salvador: A Country Study. Washing­ ton, DC: Library of Congress, 1990, 162; Joanne Omang, “ CIA Chan­ neled $2 Million into Salvador Voting,” Washington Post, M ay 1 1 , 1984; Robert J. McCartney, “ U.S. Cools Support for Duarte,” Washington Post, March 20, 1985. Robert J. McCartney, “ U.S. Seen Assisting Duarte in Sunday’s Salvadoran Vote,” Washington Post, M ay 4, 1984. William M . LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 249; “ CIA Role in Salvador Election,” in “ Congress Gives Reagan Aid for El Salvador,” CQ Almanac 1984. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1985. “National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) National Security Deci­ sion Directive 124, Central America, 2/7/84,” NAII, RG 273, Entry 20, Box 2. “ Report on the Situation in El Salvador,” Report, January 16 ,19 8 4 , DNSA ES 0 4 4 7 9 . Guillermo Ungo, “ Salvador’s Electoral Farce,” N ew York Times, March 22, 1984. Richard J. Mieslin, “ Salvadorans Ending Quiet Campaign,” N ew York Times, March 22, 1984; Robert J. McCartney, “ Salvadoran President Says Successor Will Have to Pursue Moderate Policies,” Washington Post, March 22, 1984. “ FDR/FMLN Interference with Elections,” NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, “ Records Relating to the UN Truth Commission,” Box 1. “ Interference with Elections,” San Salvador Cable M ay 5, 1984, NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, “ Records Relating to the UN Truth Commission,” Box 1. Oakland Ross, “ Salvador Rebels Set for ‘Inevitable’ War against U.S. Forces,” Globe and Mail (Canada), April 20, 1984. Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That: A Memoir o f War, Politics and Journalism on the Front-Row o f the Last Bloody Conflict o f the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 . Quoted in Joseph B. Frazier, “ It’s Election ’ 84, Salvadoran Style,” Associ­ ated Press, March 18 , 1984. “The Resistible Rise of M ajor Bob,” N ew York Times, March 25, 1984. Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 248.

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592

Notes to Pages 320-322

22. Quoted in McCartney, “ Salvadoran President Says Successor Will Have to Pursue Moderate Policies.” 23. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 248. 24. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 93. 25. Quoted in Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 1 1 7 . 26. Rivera y Damas died in 1994 and his replacement as archbishop was a more traditional individual, Monsignor Fernando Saenz Lacalle, for­ merly a military chaplain as well as a member of the conservative Opus Dei movement. Saenz’s appointment ended two decades of “ politically active liberal leadership” in the Salvadoran church. See Frazier, E l Sal­ vador Could Be Like That, 118 . 27. “ Turnout High in El Salvador,” Globe and Mail (Canada), M ay 9, 1984; Robert J. McCartney, “ Parties Agree on Count in El Salvador,” Wash­ ington Post, March 28, 1984; Lydia Chavez, “ Election Changes Lose in Salvador,” N ew York Times, April 27, 1984. 28. Alfonso Chardy, “ Reagan Hails Vote as a Success and U.S. Policy Victory,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 27, 1984. 29. Lydia Chavez, “ Moderate Leading by Early Counts in Salvador Vote,” N ew York Times, March 2 7 ,19 8 4 ; Tom Wicker, “ In the Nation: Reagan’s Terrorists,” N ew York Times, March 2 7 ,19 8 4 . Washington provided $3.4 million in aid for the election directly and roughly an equal amount indi­ rectly, not counting covert assistance. Around 300 officials from 28 coun­ tries observed the election; the American delegation was led by House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D, TX) and Senator William Roth (R, DE). See Robert J. McCartney, “ Salvadoran Vote Today: Clashing Candidates, Views of U.S. Role,” Washington Post, March 24, 1984; Philip Geyelin, “ El Salvador: High Stakes,” Washington Post, March 23, 1984. 30. Quoted in “ Rebels Call Vote a U.S. Defeat,” N ew York Times, March 28, 1984. 3 1. Quoted in “ Cuba Accused by Salvadoran Washington,” Reuters, March 25, 1984. 32. Lydia Chavez, “ ‘Complete Disorder,’ Poll Watcher Says,” N ew York Times, March 26, 1984; Richard J. Meislin, “ Salvadorans Vote but Mixups Spoil Polling for Many,” N ew York Times, March 26, 1984; Richard J. Meislin, “ On Eve of Salvadoran Vote, New Rules Cause Confusion,” N ew York Times, March 25, 1984. 33. Oakland Ross, “ Chaos of Salvador Vote Submerges Democracy,” Globe and Mail (Canada), March 29, 1984. 34. Ross, “ Chaos of Salvador Vote Submerges Democracy.” 35. Ross, “ Chaos of Salvador Vote Submerges Democracy.” 36. Oakland Ross, “ Salvador Rebels Set for ‘Inevitable’ War against U.S. Forces,” Globe and Mail (Canada), April 20, 1984. Senators J. Bennett

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Notes to Pages 322-325

37.

38.

39.

40. 4 1. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

48.

593

Johnston (D, LA) and Lawton Chiles (D, FL) were traveling in a U.S. Army helicopter when it was hit by machine gun fire near the Honduran bor­ der. FM LN representatives claimed that the aircraft and a second UH -1H helicopter were on a reconnaissance mission. American diplomats in the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador denied the accusation. Quoted in Francis X. Clines, “ Salvador Runoff Called a Pivot Point for Aid,” N ew York Times, April 16 , 1984. The Reagan administration chose to use up to $32 million in emergency funds for El Salvador after the Republican-controlled Senate had approved $62 million in aid (and $ 2 1 million in aid to Nicaraguan contras) while the Democratic-controlled House did not act. “ Standoff in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, March 29, 1984; Oakland Ross, “ Loser M ay Call Shots in Salvador,” Globe and Mail (Canada), March 28, 1984. Malcolm H. Bell, “ Duarte’s Misguided Ally,” N ew York Times, April 9, 1984; Jonathan Steele, “ El Salvador’s Agony Goes On,” Guardian Weekly, April 8, 1984. Marion Murray, “ Death Squad Democracy,” Globe and Mail (Canada), April 4, 1984. Jonathan S. Miller, “ Salvadoran People’s Will Freely Expressed,” New York Times, April 5, 1984. Quoted in Hedrick Smith, “ Better Prospects Seen for Raising Aid to El Salvador,” N ew York Times, March 27, 1984. Quoted in Smith, “ Better Prospects Seen for Raising Aid to El Salvador” ; Lydia Chavez, “ Moderate Leading by Early Counts in Salvador Vote,” N ew York Times, March 27, 1984. Philip Taubman, “An Old Washington Tool Is Turned against the Death Squads,” N ew York Times, March 24, 1984. Taubman, “An Old Washington Tool Is Turned against the Death Squads.” Quoted in Taubman, “An Old Washington Tool Is Turned against the Death Squads.” Clines, “ Salvador Runoff Called a Pivot Point for Aid” ; Karen DeYoung, “A Salvadoran Who Finally Had Enough of the Killing,” Washington Post, April 8, 1984. Robert J. McCartney, “ Salvadoran Death Threats Reported,” Washing­ ton Post, April 18 , 1984; “ Salvador Leaders Is Undecided in Election Dispute,” United Press International, April 16, 1984; “ Salvadoran Leg­ islature Changes Voting System for Runoff,” N ew York Times, April 15 , 1984; Robert J. McCartney, “ El Salvador to Scrap Voters List; Warnings of Fraud Are Voiced after Assembly Decision,” Washington Post, April 15 , 1984; “ Voting Observers Land in Salvador,” N ew York Times, March 25, 1984.

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594

Notes to Pages 325-327

49. The Christian Democrats also won an absolute majority in the legisla­ tive assembly. See Henry Giniger and Milt Freudenheim, “ Duarte Gets a Neutral Boost for Presidency,” N ew York Times, April 22, 1984. 50. Giniger and Freudenheim, “ Duarte Gets a Neutral Boost for Presidency” ; Hedrick Smith, “Reagan Takes a Break from the Furor over Central Amer­ ica,” N ew York Times, April 22, 1984. 5 1. “ Campaign ’ 84, Salvadoran Style, Is Drawing to a Close,” Associated Press, March 18 , 1984. 52. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “ U.S. Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Promise and the Challenge,” Special Report 158 (Washington, DC, March 1987). 53. “ Guerrillas Respond to Elections with Fractured Logic,” San Salvador Cable, M ay 23, 1984, NAII, SG 59, Entry 5238, “ Records Relating to the UN Truth Commission,” Box 1. 54. “ Election Related Developments,” Confidential Cable San Salvador, May 16, 1984, DNSA ES05192; “ Report on the Situation in El Salvador,” Report, January 16 , 1984, DNSA ES04479. 55. Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,” October 7 ,19 8 7 . Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency .ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=335i4. 56. Arnson, Crossroads, 158. 57. “ Senator Helms on Covert Assistance to Duarte,” [Text of 8 M ay 1984 Speech by Helms Charging CIA Funding of 1984 Duarte Campaign], Unclassified, Cable State, M ay 10 , 1984, DNSA E S0 5157; “ Election Related Developments,” Confidential, Cable San Salvador, M ay i6 , i984, DNSA ES05192; Official U.S. responses to elections can be found at George P. Shultz, U.S. Department of State, “ Sustaining a Consistent Pol­ icy in Central America: One Year after the National Bipartisan Commis­ sion Report,” Report to the President from the Secretary of State, Spe­ cial Report 12 4 (Washington, DC, April 1985); U.S. Department of State, “ The Situation in El Salvador,” Special Report 144 (Washington, DC, April 1986); U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, “ The Challenge to Democracy in Central America” (Washington, DC, June 1986); George P. Shultz, “ The U.S. and Central America: Implement­ ing the National Bipartisan Commission Report,” Report to the President from the Secretary of State, Special Report 148 (Washington, DC, August 1986). 58. Proceso, Universidad Centromaericana. Vols. 4-5, 1984. Author transla­ tion. 59. For a survey of the reporting on the alleged assassination attempt on Pick­ ering, see “ Sequel to a Salvador Plot,” N ew York Times, July 2, 1984;

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Notes to Pages 327-329

60.

6 1. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 7 1. 72. 73. 74.

595

Cristine Russell, “ Salvadoran Rightist Leader Expected Here This Week,” Washington Post, June 24, 1984; Hedrick Smith, “ U.S. Confirms a Right­ ist Plot in Salvador to Murder Envoy,” N ew York Times, June 23, 1984; Hedrick Smith, “ Salvadoran Denies Role in Plot against Envoy,” New York Times, June 28, 1984; James LeMoyne, “ Salvador Right Reportedly Plotted to Assassinate U.S. Ambassador,” N ew York Times, June 2 3 ,19 8 4 ; Joanne Omang, “ Key Officials Avoid Meeting Salvadoran,” Washington Post, June 2 8 ,19 8 4 ; Joanne Omang, “ U.S. Feared Slaying of Envoy Here,” Washington Post, June 27, 1984; Joel Brinkley, “ Helms and Rightists: Long History of Friendship,” N ew York Times, August 1, 1984; John M. Goshko, “ D’Aubuisson’s Cooperation Seen as Vital to U.S. Salvador Pol­ icy,” Washington Post, June 2 6 ,19 8 4 ; Leslie Gelb, “ D’Aubuisson’s Role in Plot Uncertain,” N ew York Times, June 24, 1984; Hedrick Smith, “Wild Cards,” N ew York Times, July 1, 1984; Hedrick Smith, “ D’Aubuisson Arrives in U.S.,” N ew York Times, June 26, 1984; Hedrick Smith, “ Sal­ vador Says It Has Suspect in Plot to Kill Envoy,” N ew York Times, July 1, 1984; Hedrick Smith, “ Salvadoran Rightist Tied to Murder Plot Will Meet Senators,” N ew York Times, June 25, 1984. James LeMoyne, “ Salvadoran Right Reportedly Plotted to Assassinate U.S. Ambassador,” N ew York Times, June 2 3 ,19 8 4 ; Omang, “ U.S. Feared Slaying of Envoy Here.” Quoted in LeMoyne, “ Salvadoran Right Reportedly Plotted to Assassi­ nate U.S. Ambassador.” Hedrick Smith, “ Salvadoran Denies Role in Plot against Envoy,” New York Times, June 28, 1984. Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 2 5 1. Smith, “ Salvadoran Denies Role in Plot against Envoy.” LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 2 5 1-5 2 . Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 19 7 7 -19 9 0 . New York: Free Press, 1996, 307. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 15 3 . Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 256. Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 15 3 . Hedrick Smith, “ Duarte Wins a Crucial One for Reagan in Salvador,” N ew York Times, M ay 13 , 1984. “ Congress Gives Reagan Aid for El Salvador,” CQ Almanac 1984. Wash­ ington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1985. Economic aid to El Salvador during the 1984 fiscal year totaled $329.3 million. In “ Congress Gives Reagan Aid for El Salvador.” Quoted in Arnson, Crossroads, 1 5 1 . Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 60.

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59 6

Notes to Pages 329-333

75. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 60. 76. Frank Broadhead, “ Demonstration Elections in El Salvador,” Resist Newsletter (Somerville, MA), March 1985. 77. Sam Dillon, “ Duarte’s Fix,” N ew Republic, June 17 , 1985. 78. Dillon, “ Duarte’s Fix.” 79. “ D’Aubuisson Ouster Part of Cleaning Up the Salvador ‘Right Stuff,’ ” Seattle Times, October 6, 1985. 80. Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 , 132.-33. 8 1. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary o f State. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, 408-10. 82. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 408-10. 83. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 408-10.

Chapter 3 1. La Palma 1. Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 393-96; Robert Pastor, “An 8-Point Peace Plan for Central America,” Washington Post, July 5, 1983. 2. “ Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, September 12 , 19 8 3 ,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, September 1983. 3. Quoted in Clifford Krauss, “ Talks in El Salvador,” Wall Street Journal, October 15 , 1984. 4. Quoted in Thomas O. Enders, “ Revolution, Reform, and Reconciliation in Central America,” SAIS Review (Summer 1983). 5. For more on the FPL’s inner sanctum, see Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 , 144 -47; Todd Greentree, Crossroads o f Intervention: Insurgency and Counterin­ surgency Lessons from Central America. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 86; Andrea Oüate, “The Red Affair: FMLN-Cuban Relations during the Salvadoran Civil War, 19 8 1-9 2 ,” Cold War History 1 1 : 2 (May 2 0 11). 6. Robert S. Leiken, “ The Salvadoran Left,” in Robert S. Leiken, ed., Cen­ tral America: Anatomy o f Conflict. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984, 5- I 3 . 7. Leiken, “ The Salvadoran Left.” 8. Stephen Kinzer, “ Salvador Rebels Revile Late Chief,” N ew York Times, December 14 , 1983. 9. Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 3 . 2nd ed. University Park: Pennsylvania State Uni­ versity Press, 1993, 2 1.

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Notes to Pages 334-337

597

10 . Jose Napoleon Duarte, Address to the United Nations, 39th General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record, New York, October 8, 1984. 1 1 . James Chace, “ In Search of a Central America Policy,” N ew York Times, November 25, 1984. 12 . “ Encuentro en La Palma,” in Proceso. Universidad Centroamericana, Vols. 4-5, 1984. 13 . Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 14 9 -50 ; Bernard Aronson, “ Peace in El Salvador,” Washington Post, October 12 , 1990. 14 . Several other government ministers joined Duarte and Vides while the FDR’s Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora and the FM LN ’s Fermdn Cienfuegos and Facundo Guardado represented the guerrillas. 15 . “A Wary Quest for Peace,” Maclean’s, October 22, 1984. 16 . “A Wary Quest for Peace.” 17 . Terry Lynn Karl, “After La Palma: The Prospects for Democratization in El Salvador,” World Policy Journal (Spring 1985). 18 . “A Wary Quest for Peace.” 19 . “A Wary Quest for Peace.” 20. Ronald Reagan, “ Letter to President Duarte on the Situation in El Sal­ vador,” October 16 , 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Wool­ ley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=392 56& st=& sti=. 2 1 . John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus. New York: Twayne, i994, i7 4 . 22. George P. Shultz, U.S. Department of State, “ Sustaining a Consistent Pol­ icy in Central America: One Year after the National Bipartisan Commis­ sion Report,” Report to the President from the Secretary of State, Report No. 12 4 , Washington, DC, April 1985; also see Joanne Omang, “ Rea­ gan Praises Duarte’s Peace Effort,” Washington Post, October 1 1 , 1984; Joanne Omang, “Administration Hails Salvadoran Talks as Product of U.S. Policy,” Washington Post, October 16 , 1984; “ Reagan Hails Duarte and the Peace Parlay,” N ew York Times, October i7 , i984. 23. Dan Williams, “ Chances Fade for El Salvador Peace,” Christian Science Monitor, September 16 , 1986. 24. “ Propuesta del FDR-FM LN,” Proceso, Universidad Centroamericana. Vols. 4-5, 1984. 25. Williams, “ Chances Fade for El Salvador Peace.” 26. Williams, “ Chances Fade for El Salvador Peace.” 27. The FM LN claimed the FAES did not pull its forces from a 650-square kilometer area around the meeting site; Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 393­ 9 6 . 28. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 393-96. 29. James LeMoyne, “ Salvador Rebel Vows to Spread War,” N ew York Times, July 7 , 1 9 85.

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598

Notes to Pages 337-341

30. James LeMoyne, “A Year after Talks, Salvador Peace Recedes,” N ew York Times , October 13, 1985. 3 1. LeMoyne, “A Year after Talks, Salvador Peace Recedes.” 32. LeMoyne, “A Year after Talks, Salvador Peace Recedes.” 33. Quoted in Sam Dillon, “Duarte’s Fix,” N ew Republic , June 17, 1985; “ FDR/FMLN Proposal for a Provisional Government,” English language press release by the FDR/FMLN, January 31, 1984; “ Rebels Weigh Pos­ sible Role in Future Elections,” Washington Post, November 16, 1984; Joanne Omang, “Salvadoran Rebels Weight Truce,” Washington Post, November 17, 1984.

Chapter 32. Esquipulas 1. Quoted in Henry Kamm, “ San Salvador Archbishop Named,” N ew York Times , March 2, 1983; also see Alan Riding, “Politics and Religion Divided and Entwined on Pope’s Route,” N ew York Times, March 2, 1984; Richard J. Meislin, “ 3 Latin Countries Plan Peace Talks with No U.S. Role,” N ew York Times, March 6, 1983; Daniel Southerland, “More Aid for El Salvador Looks Likely - With Strings Attached,” Christian Sci­ ence Monitor , March 9, 1983; Lydia Chavez, “ Pope Makes Plea of Rec­ onciliation for Salvadorans,” N ew York Times, May 7, 1983. 2. Quoted in James LeMoyne, “ Salvador Foes Share Caution on Chance for Peace,” N ew York Times, November 19, 1984; also see James LeMoyne, “ In Host Town for Salvador Talks, Talk Is of Peace,” N ew York Times, October 12, 1984; William Branigin, “ Costa Rica’s Peace Plan Fails to Win Central American Accord,” Washington Post, February 16, 1987; “ Main Points of Costa Rican President’s Peace Initiative,” Associated Press, March 15 ,19 8 7 ; “Nicaraguan Leader in Offer on Arms,” N ew York Times , May 28, 1986. 3. John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus. New York: Twayne, 1994, 198-200. 4. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States, 198-200. 5. James LeMoyne, “Negotiators Try to End Impasse on a Central American Treaty,” N ew York Times, April 7,19 86; William Stockton, “ Latin Envoys Try to Revive Contadora Plan,” N ew York Times, April 27, 1986; James LeMoyne, “The Clock Is Ticking on the Contadora Treaty,” N ew York Times , May 25, 1986. 6. Esquipulas I was signed by presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua - at a summit meeting at Esquip­ ulas, Guatemala, on May 24 and 25, 1986. See Sebastian R. Arandia, “ Burden of the Cold War: The George H. W. Bush Administration and El Salvador.” Master’s thesis, Texas A & M University, 2012; also see Christ

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Notes to Pages 341-345

7.

8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 .

13 . 14 .

15 .

16 . 17 . 18 . 19 .

20. 2 1. 22.

599

Norton, “ Central American Peace Moves,” Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 1987; Jorge G. Castaneda, “ Out of the U.S.’ Shadow, but Not Yet in the Light: The United States Can’t Have Its Way in Central America, but It Can Still Stop Central American Nations from Forging Their Own Destinies,” Newsday, October 26, 1987. Diana Negroponte, Seeking Peace in E l Salvador: The Struggle to Recon­ struct a Nation at the End o f a Civil War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2 0 12 , 6. Quoted in George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary o f State. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, 960. Quoted in Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 960. Quoted in Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 960. Quoted in Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 960. Ronald Reagan, “ U.S. Policy Initiatives to Improve Prospects for Victory in El Salvador, NSDD 82, February 24, 19 8 3 ,” NAII, R G 273, SA 250, Row 7, Compartment 29, Shelf 6, Box 2. Reagan, “ U.S. Policy Initiatives to Improve Prospects for Victory in El Salvador, NSDD 82, February 24, 19 8 3 .” Ronald Reagan, “ Economic Development for Central America, NSDD 2­ 85, January 9, 19 8 5,” NAII, R G 273, SA 250, Row 7, Compartment 29, Shelf 6, Box 1. Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church,” Central American Bulletin; to read more on Pope John Paul II and Arch­ bishop Rivera y Damas on negotiations and peace, see Ross Oakland, “ Civil War Enmeshes Church,” Globe and Mail (Canada), February 28, 19 83; “ Salvador Archbishop Named,” Globe and Mail (Canada), March 2, 19 8 3; Daniel Southerland, “ El Salvador’s Elusive Peace,” Christian Sci­ ence Monitor, June 3, 19 83; Alan Riding, “ Politics and Religion Divided and Entwined on Pope’s Route,” N ew York Times, March 2, 19 83; Ken­ neth A. Briggs, “John Paul’s Journey Is His Hardest Yet,” N ew York Times, February 27, 1983. Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church.” Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church.” Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church.” This section is adapted from Central American Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church” ; “ Salvadoran Rightist Death Squad Kills Four,” Asso­ ciated Press, October 7, 1983. Arthur Jones, “A Look at Declassified State Department Documents,” National Catholic Reporter, September 23, 1994. Central America Research Institute, “ El Salvador’s Catholic Church.” Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado, Comisión Arquidiocesana de Justicia y Paz, Report 30 (San Salvador, October 1984); also see Ronald

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6oo

Notes to Pages 345-349 Reagan, “ Central America: Promoting Democracy, Economic Develop­ ment, and Peace, NSDD 124, February 7, 1984,” NAII, RG 273, Stack 250, Row 87, Compartment 29, Shelf 6, Box 2.

Chapter 33. Counterinsurgency I 1. Andrew J. Bacevich et al., eds., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case o f E l Salvador . Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Analysis, 1988, 6. 2. Quoted in Anthony Lewis, “A Bloody Joke,” N ew York Times, October 17 ,19 8 3 ; also see Tom Wicker, “A Policy of Hypocrisy,” N ew York Times, October 2 1, 1983. 3. “The Challenge of Counterinsurgency,” America Abroad , October 14, 2006. 4. Quoted in William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Car­ olina Press, 1998, 225. 5. Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer, Strategy and Tac­ tics o f the Salvadoran F M L N Guerrillas: Last Battle o f the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, 3-18 . 6. The account of the FMLN commando raid is taken from David Spencer, From Vietnam to E l Salvador: The Sage o f the F M L N Sappers and Other Guerrilla Special Forces in Latin America . Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996; to read more about the FMLN raid, see “ Salvadoran Insurgents Attack Major Garrison,” N ew York Times, January 16, 1984; Drew Middle­ ton, “War in El Salvador: A Critical Phase,” N ew York Times, January 22, 1984; Lydia Chavez, “ Salvador’s Losses High in Rebel Attack,” N ew York Times, January 1, 1984; Stephen Kinzer, “ Salvador Guerrillas Said to Free 162 Soldiers Captured Last Week,” N ew York Times, January 7, 1984; Robert J. McCartney, “ El Salvador Confirms Loss of 100: Deaths in Attack on Friday Called Highest of the War,” Washington Post, January 4 , 1984. 7. Kalev Sepp, “The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 19 7 9 -19 9 1.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2002. 8. Spencer, From Vietnam to E l Salvador , 56; from McCartney, “ El Salvador Confirms Loss of 100” : “The Salvadoran Army today confirmed that more than 100 of its soldiers were killed in last Friday’s guerrilla attack on a northern garrison, making it the government’s highest casualty toll in a single battle in four years of civil war.” 9. Lydia Chavez, “The Odds in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, July 24 ,19 8 3. 10. Sepp, “The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central Amer­ ica, 19 7 9 -19 9 1.”

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Notes to Pages 349-352

601

1 1 . Sepp, “ The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central Amer­ ica, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1.” 12 . Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars, 4. 13 . Skip Thornton, “ Thinking About the Tactics of Modern War: The Sal­ vadoran Example.” Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1988-89; also see Bacevich, et al., eds., American Military Pol­ icy in Small Wars; “ Comptroller General report entitled: ‘U.S. Military Aid to El Salvador and Honduras’ Report, Department of Defense. Aug 22, 19 8 5,” DDRS C K3100697989. 14 . UN Security Council, “ From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Sal­ vador,” S/25500, 1993, 26. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ ElSalvador-Report.pdf. 15 . Jim Leach, telephone interview with author, April 15 , 2 0 1 1 ; “ We had to reform or we were going to lose. And it wasn’t because the guerrillas were so good; it was because the [Salvadoran] Army was so bad,” quoted in Mark Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote. New York: Vintage, 1993, 32. 16 . John D. Waghelstein, “ Military to Military Contacts: Personal Observa­ tions - The El Salvador Case,” L ow Intensity Conflict and Law Enforce­ ment 10 :2 (Summer 2003); former Special Forces officer Ed Phillips, tele­ phone interview with author, August 2 0 11. 17 . Waghelstein, “ Military to Military Contacts: Personal Observations -T h e El Salvador Case.” 18 . Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: US Policy and E l Salvador. New York: Times Books, 1984, 49. 19 . Quoted in Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote, 38. 20. Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, 25; Danner, The Massacre at E l Mozote, 20-38. 2 1 . Russell Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 17 7 6 to the War on Terror. New York: Cambridge University Press, 20 14 , 327. 22. M ajor Paul P. Cale, “ The United States Military Advisory Group in El Salvador, 19 7 9 -19 9 2 ,” Small Wars Journal, 1996. http://smallwarsjournal .com/documents/cale.pdf. 23. Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars, 3 2 1. 24. Initially 15 0 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel trained the Salvadoran troops. The controversial base was closed in 1985. See “ Honduras: U.S. Military Assistance and Training,” http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/ query/r-573i.html; William R. Long, “ U.S. Will Shut Honduras Base,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1985. 25. Charles H. Briscoe, “ El Paraiso and the War in El Salvador Part I (19 8 1­ 1983),” Veritas 3 :1 (2007): 17 .

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602

Notes to Pages 352-356

26. Luis Orlando, former U.S. Army Special Forces soldier, telephone inter­ view with author, September 30, 2 0 11. 27. Sepp, ‘The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central Amer­ ica, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1,” 106. 28. Robert D. Ramsey III, “Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador,” Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006, 9 9 . 29. “ El Mozote: Lucha por la verdad y la justicia,” Tutela Legal del Arzobis­ pado de San Salvador, 2 0 13 , 13 . 30. See Simon A. Molina, “The Peace Process in El Salvador: 19 8 4 -19 9 2 ,” Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (April 1,19 9 6 ); Angel Rabasa et al., “ Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations,” RAND Counterin­ surgency Strategy Paper 4. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2007; Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador” ; Alfred R. Barr and Caesar Sereseres, “ U.S. Unconventional Warfare Operations and Lessons from Central America, 19 8 0 -9 1,” L o w Intensity Conflict and Law Enforce­ ment 8:2 (Summer 1999). 3 1. John D. Waghelstein and Charles A. Carlton Jr., E l Salvador. Carlisle Bar­ racks, PA: U.S. Army History Institute, Senior Officers Oral History Pro­ 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38.

39. 40.

gram 1 9 ^ 53. Sepp, “ Combatant Commands and Central America.” Sepp, “ Combatant Commands and Central America.” Sepp, “ Combatant Commands and Central America.” James Steele, telephone interview with author, June 2008. Christopher Dickey, “ U.S. Advisers Dubious of Effect in Salvador,” Wash­ ington Post, June 7, 19 8 1; John D. Waghelstein. “ What’s Wrong in Iraq? Or, Ruminations of a Pachyderm,” Military Review (January-February 2006). Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, 63. Brigadier General Fred E. Woerner, “ Report of the El Salvador M il­ itary Strategy Assistance Team,” Report, September 12 , 19 8 1, DNSA ES02030; Fred Woerner, telephone interview with author, June 2008; also see “ Training of the Salvadoran Military in the United States,” Non­ Classified, Letter from Powell A. Moore, March 5 ,19 8 2 , DNSA ES02704; “Applicability of Certain U.S. Laws that Pertain to U.S. Military Involve­ ment in El Salvador,” Report, July 27, 1982, DNSA ES03302. Sepp, “ The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central Amer­ ica, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1,” 47. Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Viet­ nam, and El Salvador.”

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Notes to Pages 357-363 4 1. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48.

49. 50. 5 1. 52. 53.

603

Retired FAES officers, interview with author, San Salvador, July 20 14. Retired FAES officers, interview with author, San Salvador, July 20 14. Retired FAES officers, interview with author, San Salvador, July 20 14. Waghelstein, “ Military to Military Contacts.” Sepp, “ The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central Amer­ ica, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1,” 49. Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 225. Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer, Strategy and Tac­ tics o f the Salvadoran F M L N Guerrillas: Last Battle o f the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, 3 -18 . Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine in E l Sal­ vador: The Frustrations o f Reform and the Illusions o f Nation Building. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 19 9 1. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine in E l Salvador. Lydia Chavez, “ El Salvador,” N ew York Times, December 1 1 , 1983. John J. Shea, “ Explaining Success and Failure in Counterinsurgency.” The­ sis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 19 9 1. Shea, “ Explaining Success and Failure in Counterinsurgency.” Chavez, “ El Salvador.” Chapter 34. Counterinsurgency II

1. Terry Lynn Karl, “ El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 17 :2 (Spring 1992). 2. Clifford Krauss, “Touch and Go: Under U.S. Tutelage, El Salvador’s Forces Seem Stronger Now,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1984. 3. Lydia Chavez, “ The Odds in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, July 2 4 ,19 8 3 . 4. Quoted in William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 43; also see Lydia Chavez, “ Vides’ First Target Is Military Brass,” N ew York Times, April 24, 1983. 5. Walter Knut and Philip J. Williams, “The Military and Democratization in El Salvador,” Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 3 5 :1 (1993): 39-88; Frank Smyth “ Consensus or Crisis? Without Duarte in El Salvador,” Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30:4 (Winter 1988-1989): 29-52. 6. Mark Moyar, A Question o f Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009, 180. 7. Quoted in Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: E l Salvador’s F M L N and Peru’s Shining Path. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998, 1 5 1 . 8. John D. Waghelstein, “ Military to Military Contacts: Personal Observa­ tions - The El Salvador Case,” L ow Intensity Conflict and Law Enforce­ ment 10 :2 (Summer 2003).

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604

Notes to Pages 363-368

9. Quoted in Waghelstein, “ Military to Military Contacts: Personal Obser­ vations - The El Salvador Case.” 10 . Robert D. Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and E l Salvador. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 89. 1 1 . James S. Corum, “ The Air War in El Salvador,” Airpower Journal (Summer 1998): 32. 12 . Corum, “ The Air War in El Salvador,” 3 1- 3 2 . 13 . Corum, “ The Air War in El Salvador,” 33; Norman J. Brozenick, “ Small Wars, Big Stakes: Coercion, Persuasion, and Airpower in Counterrevolu­ tionary War.” Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air Univer­ sity, June 1998; Martin Van Creveld, Age o f Airpower. New York: Public Affairs, 2 0 1 1 , 409. 14 . Barton Meyers, “ Defense against Aerial Attack in El Salvador,” Journal o f Political and Military Sociology 22 (Winter 1994): 334. 15 . M ax G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, E l Salvador at War: An Oral History from 1979 Insurrection to the Present. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988, 306. 16 . Richard A. Haggerty, ed., E l Salvador: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1988, 248. 17 . UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in E l Salvador: Report o f the Commission on the Truth for E l Salvador, S/25500, 1993, 26. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvadorReport.pdf. 18 . “ El Salvador: A Net Assessment of the War, 1986,” CIA FOIAERR. 19 . Lydia Chavez, “ The Odds in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, July 2 4 ,19 8 3 . 20. Lydia Chavez, “ U.S. Envoy Says Salvador Killing Looks Political,” N ew York Times, M ay 27, 19 83; “ Deputy Chief of U.S. Military Unit Is Shot and Killed in San Salvador,” N ew York Times, M ay 26, 19 83. 2 1 . “ El Salvador: A Net Assessment of the War, 19 8 6 ” ; “ El Salvador’s Insur­ gents: Resurrecting an Urban Political Strategy,” CIA document, Septem­ ber 1, 1986, CIA FOIAERR. 22. “ El Salvador: A Net Assessment of the War, 19 8 6 ” ; “ El Salvador’s Insur­ gents: Resurrecting an Urban Political Strategy.” 23. For a variety of CIA assessments, see “ Near-Term Military Prospects for El Salvador,” CIA document, 14 December 19 83, CIA FOIAERR; “ The Sal­ vadoran Military: A Mixed Performance,” CIA document, June 1, 1984, CIA FOIAERR; “ El Salvador: Capabilities and Prospects over the Next Two Years,” CIA document, October 1984, CIA FOIAERR. 24. Joaquin Villalobos, “ Popular Insurrection: Desire or Reality?” Latin American Perspectives 16:3 (1989): 3 1. 25. M ax Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., E l Salvador at War: An Oral His­ tory o f Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection. Washington, DC: National

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Notes to Pages 368-373

26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 3 1.

32. 33.

605

Defense University, 1995, 47; Representative Jim Leach et al., “ From U.S. Aid to El Salvador: An Evaluation of the Past, a Proposal for the Future: A Report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus,” Congressional Record 1 3 1 : 1 8 , February 22, 1985. Quoted in Christopher Dickey, “ U.S. Advisers Dubious of Effect in Sal­ vador,” Washington Post, June 7, 19 8 1. In early 1984, a few days after the El Paraíso raid, dozens of large bridges were destroyed, most notably the impressive quarter-mile long Cuscatldn suspension bridge. Lydia Chavez, “ Salvador Rebels Blow Up Bridge, Nation’s Biggest,” N ew York Times, January 2, 1984; “ Destruc­ tion of Vital Bridge by Rebels Blocks Traffic to Eastern El Salvador: Repairs Expected to Cost $3.7 Million,” Washington Post, January 3, 1984. Proceso. Universidad Centromaericana. Vols. 2 -3 , Nos. 9 5 - 13 5 , 1983. “ El Salvador,” Country Profile, U.S. Department of State, April 1, 2 0 15 . James LeMoyne, “ El Salvador Rebels Capture Dam before Being Driven Off,” N ew York Times, June 29, 1984. Proceso. Universidad Centromaericana. Vols. 4-5, 1984; also see Jorge Castaheda. Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. Quoted in James LeMoyne, “ Salvadoran Rebels Draw a Bead on the Econ­ omy,” N ew York Times, July 14 , 1985. “A Bit of Hope in El Salvador,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1986. Chapter 35. Zona Rosa

1. Marjorie Miller, “ Rebel Killings Rekindle Fear in San Salvador,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1985. 2. Shirley Christian, “ Salvador Rebels Acknowledge Raid,” N ew York Times, June 22, 1985; UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in E l Salvador: Report o f the Commission on the Truth for E l Salvador, S/25500, 1993, 14 5 . http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf. 3. Quoted in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 268; Jose Napoleon Duarte, “ Sincere Condolences,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports, June 25, 1985. 4. Gerry L. Dexter, “ The Guerrillas Take to the Airwaves,” Progressive, June 1 9 85 . 5. U.S. Department of Justice, “ Chronology of DOJ Actions in Significant Events in the Zona Rosa Investigation,” September 19 , 1996. 6. Gerald M. Boyd, “ Reagan Promises Marines’ Killers Will Not Escape,” N ew York Times, June 23, i985. 7. Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 268.

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6o6

Notes to Pages 373-376

8. Ronald Reagan, “ Remarks to the Families of the United States Marines Slain in El Salvador,” June 22, 1985. 9. Joel Brinkley, “ U.S. Said to Have Weighted Raid on Training Camp in Nicaragua,” N ew York Times, July 25, 19 85; Ed Offley, “ Former Ranger Tells of Raid to Destroy Terrorist Camp,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 15 , 1995; “ U.S. Reportedly Killed 83 Guerrillas in El Salvador in ’ 85 Retaliations,” Boston Globe, June 16, 1995; William M . LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 270; Kalev Sepp, “ The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2002. 10 . Ronald Reagan, “ Combatting Terrorism in Central America, NSDD 176 , July 9, 19 8 5,” NA, R G 273, SA 250, Row 7, Compartment, 29, Shelf 6, Box 2. 1 1 . Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 268. 12 . Marjorie Miller, “ U.S. Fights Release of 3 Salvadorans in Marine Deaths," Los Angeles Times, November 17 , 1987; Marjorie Miller, “ Salvador to Free 3 Held in Killing of U.S. Marines,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 1988. 13 . UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope, 14 5 -5 5 . 14 . UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope, 14 5 -5 5 . 15 . Pedro Antonio Andrade was deported back to El Salvador in 1997. Tim Golden, “ From Suspect in Murders to a New Life in America,” N ew York Times, November 22, 1996; Tim Golden, “ Salvadoran, Former Rebel, Is Deported,” N ew York Times, November 5, 1997; also see U.S. Depart­ ment of State, “ Gist: El Salvador: Certification Process,” U.S. Depart­ ment of State Bulletin (Washington, DC: February 1983); U.S. Depart­ ment of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “ U.S. Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Promise and the Challenge,” Special Report N o .15 8 (Washington, DC, March 1987). 16 . “Abuses by Salvadoran Guerrillas,” N ew York Times, July 26, 1985; FM LN, “ Why We Kidnap Mayors,” Radio Venceremos, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports-Central America, M ay 16, i 9 85 . 17 . James LeMoyne, “A Year after Talks, Salvador Peace Recedes,” N ew York Times, October 13 , 1985; James LeMoyne, “ Salvador Rebel Vows to Spread War,” N ew York Times, July 7, 1985; Clifford Krauss, “ Salvador Rebels Unite; Woes Remain,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1985. 18 . “Abuses by Salvadoran Guerrillas,” N ew York Times, July 26, 1985. 19 . James LeMoyne, “ The Guns of El Salvador,” N ew York Times Magazine, February 5, i989. 20. Joan Didion, Salvador. New York: Washington Square Press, 19 83, 5 1. 2 1 . Didion, Salvador, 49.

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Notes to Pages 377-380

607

Chapter 36. Air War 1. Quoted in Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: E l Salvador’s F M L N and Peru’s Shining Path. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998, 97. 2. Quoted in Christopher Dickey, “ Leftist Guerrillas in El Salvador Defend Cuba Ties,” Washington Post, March 14, 1983. 3. Quoted in Paul Greenberg, “ Salvadoran Guerrillas Change Tactics,” Observer-Reporter , October 22, 1984. 4. Estimates of casualties in the Salvadoran Air War vary substantially. Amer­ ican historian James S. Corum calculated 2,000 civilian casualties in El Salvador between 19 81 and 1986, as a result of air raids (Corum based his calculation on Tutela Legal’s estimate of 3 7 1 civilian deaths in 1985). America’s Watch estimated that in just 1984, “thousands of noncombat­ ants are being killed in indiscriminate attacks by bombardments in the air, shelling, and ground sweeps. Thousands more are being wounded.” In James S. Corum, “The Air War in El Salvador,” Airpower Journal (Sum­ mer 1998): 40; Eric Arnesen, “ El Salvador: Reminders of War,” Monthly Review 38:5 (October 1986); Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 229. 5. “The Killings in El Salvador,” N ew York Times, July 9, 1985. 6. Barton Myers and Jean Weisman, “The El Salvador Solidarity Movement in the United States,” in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador , 379 -9 1. 7. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador , 229. 8. James LeMoyne, “ Salvadoran Air Role in War Increases,” N ew York Times, July 18, 1985. 9. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador , 229. 10. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports - Central Amer­ ica. Washington, DC: FBIS, May 24, 1985; Gettleman et al., E l Salvador , 235; “Salvador Prelate Asks Study of Grisly Reports,” N ew York Times , September 17, 1984. 1 1 . “U.S. Aid to El Salvador: An Evaluation of the Past, a Proposal for the Future - A Report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus,” from Representative Jim Leach (R, IA), Representative George Miller (D, CA), and Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R, OR), February 1985. 12. Julia Preston, “Air Power Key in El Salvador,” Boston Globe , August 15, i 9 85 . 13. Mary Jo McConahay, “ Living under El Salvador’s Air War,” in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., eds., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. 2nd ed. New York: Grove Press, 1986, 235-39 . 14. McConahay, “ Living under El Salvador’s Air War” ; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Air War and Political Development in El Salvador, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: GPO, i986.

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Notes to Pages 380-383

15 . Edwin G. Corr, “ Foreword to Michael J. Waller,” in The Third Current o f Revolution: Inside the “North American Front” o f E l Salvador’s Guerrilla War. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 19 9 1, xiv-xviii; also see Kalev Sepp, “ The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2002. 16 . Corr, “ Foreword to Michael J. Waller” ; also see Sepp,” The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1.” 17 . Corr, “ Foreword to Michael J. Waller” ; also see Sepp, “The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1.” 18 . Corr, “ Foreword to Michael J. Waller” ; also see Sepp, “The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1.” 19 . Corr, “ Foreword to Michael J. Waller” ; also see Sepp, “The Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 19 7 9 - 19 9 1.” 20. William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19 7 7 -19 9 2 . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 274. 2 1 . John D. Waghelstein, “ Military to Military Contacts: Personal Observa­ tions - The El Salvador Case,” L o w Intensity Conflict and L aw Enforce­ ment 10 :2 (Summer 2003); for more U.S. intelligence reports on human rights: Central Intelligence Agency, “ El Salvador: Performance on Certifi­ cation Issues,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, January 14 , 1983; CIA FOIAERR, “ El Salvador: Human Rights Abuses” (Truth Commis­ sion I) March 17 , 19 83; CIA FOIAERR, “ El Salvador: Rightist Violence” (Truth Commission I) September 2 1 , 19 83; for CIA reports in later years, see Central Intelligence Agency, “ El Salvador: Progress and Problems on Human Rights,” Directorate of Intelligence, June 8, 1987; “ El Salvador: Increase in Political Killings,” Directorate of Intelligence, September 13 , 1988, CIA FOIAERR.

Chapter 37. Jos»; Napoleon Duarte 1. Joseph B. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That: A Memoir o f War, Politics and Journalism on the Front-Row o f the Last Bloody Conflict o f the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Ojai, CA: Karina Library Press, 2 0 13 , 13 2 . 2. Shirley Christian, “ Duarte Addresses Notre Dame Class,” N ew York Times, M ay 20, 1985. 3. Jefferson Morley, “ Prisoner of Success,” N ew York Review o f Books, December 4 ,19 8 6 ; Daniel Southerland, “ Salvador’s Morales Ehrlich: Can the Middle Hold?” Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 19 8 1. 4. Guy Gugliotta, “ Duarte’s Second Chance: Can El Salvador’s New Presi­ dent Stanch the Bleeding?” N ew Republic 19 1:7 (August 1984): 20.

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Notes to Pages 383-386

609

5. Jose Napoleon Duarte, Duarte: My Story. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1986, 85; Gugliotta, “ Duarte’s Second Chance,” 2 1; Rod Nordland, “Two Tough Men Go for Broke,” Ottawa Citizen, March 24, 1984. While authors like Gugliotta wrote that Duarte mangled his hand when his fingers got caught in a cement compacter, newspapers and publica­ tions in the early 1980s contended that the injury was in fact the work of torturers. For instance, in Stephen Kinzer, “ El Salvador,” Boston Globe, August 29, 1982, Kinzer writes “ his deformed cheekbones and the man­ gled fingers of his left hand bear witness to the torture he suffered” ; then in Robert Armstrong and Janet Shank, E l Salvador: The Face of Revolution. Boston: South End Press, 1982, 63, “ They broke his cheek bones with rifle butts and cut off the tips of three fingers as souvenirs” ; but at last, in Duarte’s very own words the myth is dispelled. Writing in his memoir, Duarte reflects on his exile in Venezuela, “ There, while building the silos, I suffered the accident that took three fingers from my left hand. Some people believe I lost these fingers when I was tortured after the 19 72 pres­ idential elections.” While the contention that Duarte lost his fingers at the hands of torturers may have been an innocent misunderstanding, it serves as an example of the challenges of unveiling the truth in this controversial story. 6. Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 12 6 -30 . 7. See the widely read interview with Duarte in Marc Cooper and Greg Goldin, “ Interview with Jose Napoleon Duarte,” Playboy, November 1984. 8. Kevin Whitaker, U.S. Department of State, interview with author, March 2 0 11. 9. Quoted in Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 19 7 6 - 19 9 3 .2nd ed. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, 162. 10 . Quoted in Raymond Bonner, “The Agony of El Salvador,” N ew York Times Magazine, February 22, 19 8 1; also quoted in Michael Kramer, “What the U.S. Should Do in El Salvador,” N ew York Magazine, March 23, 19 8 1. 1 1 . Frank Smyth, “ Consensus or Crisis? Without Duarte in El Salvador,” Jour­ nal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30:4 (Winter 1988-1989): 29-52; Raymond Bonner, “ El Salvador: Another Vietnam? Out of Misery, a Fight for Democracy,” Globe and Mail (Canada), February 27, 19 8 1. 12 . Christian, “ Duarte Addresses Notre Dame Class.” 13 . Quoted in Tom Buckley, Violent Neighbors: E l Salvador, Central America, and the United States. New York: Times Books, 1984, 1 1 3 - 1 4 . 14 . Quoted in Buckley, Violent Neighbors, 114 . 15 . Frazier, E l Salvador Could Be Like That, 128.

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Notes to Pages 387-389

16 . Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years. Berkeley: University of California Press, 19 9 1, 32. 17 . Arthur Allen, “ Duarte Finds Murder Investigation Rough Going,” Asso­ ciated Press, October 8, 1984. 18 . To read more about the conviction, see Lydia Chavez, “ 5 Salvadorans Are Found Guilty in Slaying of U.S. Churchwomen,” N ew York Times, May 25, 1984; Lydia Chavez, “ Path to Justice in El Salvador Is Strewn with Roadblocks,” N ew York Times, M ay 26, 1984. 19 . Benjamin C. Schwartz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine in E l Sal­ vador: The Frustrations o f Reform and the Illusions o f Nation Building. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 19 9 1. 20. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, The Chal­ lenge to Democracy in Central America. Washington, DC: Department of State, Department of Defense, June 1986; “ El Salvador: Duarte’s First 100 Days,” CIA document (Truth Commission I) September 14 , 1984, CIA FOIAERR; “ Report on the Delegations to Latin America,” U.S. Congress. House Committee on Armed Services, 99th Congress, 1st Session, April, 1985; “The Situation in El Salvador,” Hearings before the House Commit­ tee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and Western Hemisphere Affairs, 98th Congress, 2nd Ses­ sion, February 6, 1984. 2 1 . John D. Waghelstein, “ Military to Military Contacts: Personal Observa­ tions - The El Salvador Case,” L o w Intensity Conflict and L aw Enforce­ ment 10 :2 (Summer 2003). 22. James Chace, “ In Search of a Central America Policy,” N ew York Times, October 25, 1984. 23. Joel Millman, “ El Salvador’s Army: A Force unto Itself,” N ew York Times, December 10 , 1989. 24. Quoted in Paul Heath Hoeffel, “ The Eclipse of the Oligarchs,” N ew York Times Magazine, September 6, 19 8 1. 25. Buckley, Violent Neighbors, ch. 6; also see Jose Napoleon Duarte, “ Pro­ moting Democratization and Economic Vitalization,” Address to the National Assembly, June 1, 1985, ECA/Estudios Centroamericanos 34 (May-June 1985). 26. Foreign Broadcast Service, Daily Reports-Central America, SeptemberDecember 19 85; Marvin E. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador: Central America in the N ew Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 19 8 1, 277-86; “ Six Sal­ vadorans Seize Daughter of President,” Associated Press, September 1 1 , 1 9 85 . 27. “ Duarte Gets Taped Message: ‘Papa, I Am Fine,’ ” United Press Interna­ tional, September 19 , 1985.

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Notes to Pages 389-393

611

28. “ Duarte Gets Taped Message: ‘Papa, I Am Fine.’ ” 29. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “A Band of Violent Kidnappers,” Los Angeles Times Syndicate, October 6, 1985. 30. Foreign Broadcast Service, Daily Reports-Central America, SeptemberDecember 1985; also in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 277-86. 3 1. James LeMoyne, “A Year after Talks, Salvador Peace Recedes,” New York Times, October 13 , 1985; Foreign Broadcast Service, Daily ReportsCentral America, September-December 1985; Gettleman et al., E l Sal­ vador, 277-86. 32. LeMoyne, “A Year after Talks, Salvador Peace Recedes.” 33. Foreign Broadcast Service, Daily Reports-Central America, SeptemberDecember 1985; also in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 277-86. 34. Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, E l Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988, 1 1 1 . 35. Quoted in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 279. 36. Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 279. 37. Foreign Broadcast Service, Daily Reports-Central America, SeptemberDecember 1985; also in Gettleman et al., E l Salvador, 277-86. 38. Under the understanding between the government and the FM LN, the guerrillas promised to release In