The SAGE Encyclopedia Of Surveillance, Security, And Privacy [03 Vols., 1st Ed.] 1483359948, 9781483359946

Table of contents :
Cover
......Page 1
About the pagination of this eBook
......Page 2
VOL 1 - TITLE PAGE......Page 5
COPYRIGHT PAGE......Page 6
CONTENTS......Page 7
LIST OF ENTRIES......Page 9
READER'S GUIDE......Page 15
ABOUT THE EDITOR......Page 21
CONTRIBUTORS......Page 23
INTRODUCTION......Page 31
A......Page 37
B......Page 119
C......Page 167
D......Page 313
E......Page 373
VOL 2 - TITLE PAGE......Page 421
COPYRIGHT PAGE......Page 422
CONTENTS......Page 423
LIST OF ENTRIES......Page 425
F......Page 431
G......Page 469
H......Page 513
I......Page 539
J......Page 599
K......Page 603
L......Page 615
M......Page 643
N......Page 697
O......Page 759
P......Page 769
VOL 3 - TITLE PAGE......Page 845
COPYRIGHT PAGE......Page 846
CONTENTS......Page 847
LIST OF ENTIRIES......Page 849
P......Page 855
R......Page 913
S......Page 941
T......Page 1075
U......Page 1121
V......Page 1161
W......Page 1175
Y......Page 1203
INDEX......Page 1207

Citation preview

About the pagination of this eBook This eBook contains a multi-volume set. To navigate the front matter of this eBook by page number, you will need to use the volume number and the page number, separated by a hyphen. For example, to go to page v of volume 1, type “1-v” in the Go box at the bottom of the screen and click "Go." To go to page v of volume 2, type “2-v”… and so forth.

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY

For my father, Anthony C. Arrigo: friend and family man to those who love him, educator and mentor to those who admire him, and Inspector General to those who respect him.

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY 1 Edited by Bruce A. Arrigo University of North Carolina at Charlotte

FOR INFORMATION: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2018 by SAGE Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

SAGE Publications Ltd. 1 Oliver’s Yard 55 City Road London, EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd. B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044 India SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd. 3 Church Street #10-04 Samsung Hub Singapore 049483

Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Arrigo, Bruce A, editor. Title: The sage encyclopedia of surveillance, security, and privacy / editor Bruce A. Arrigo, University of North Carolina, Charlotte. Description: First edition. | Thousand Oaks : SAGE Publications, [2018] Identifiers: LCCN 2017058118 | ISBN 9781483359946 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Electronic surveillance—Social aspects. | Electronic surveillance—Encyclopedias. | Privacy, Right of—Encyclopedias. | National security—Encyclopedias. Classification: LCC HM846 .S26 2019 | DDC 323.44/82097303— dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017058118

Acquisitions Editor: Andrew Boney Developmental Editors: Matthew Brann, Carole Maurer

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Reference Systems Manager: Leticia Gutierrez Production Editor: David C. Felts Copy Editor: QuADS Prepress (P) Ltd. Typesetter: Hurix Digital Proofreaders: Ellen Brink, Caryne Brown, Barbara Coster Indexer: Will Ragsdale Cover Designer: Candice Harman Marketing Manager: Jennifer Bourque

18 19 20 21 22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Volume 1 List of Entries  vii Reader’s Guide  xiii About the Editor  xix Contributors  xxi Introduction  xxix Entries A 1 D 277 B 83 E 337 C 131

Volume 2

List of Entries  vii Entries F 379 L 563 G 417 M 591 H 461 N 645 I 487 O 707 J 547 P 717 K 551

Volume 3

List of Entries  vii Entries P (cont.) 789 U 1055 R 847 V 1095 S 875 W 1109 T 1009 Y 1137 Index  1141

Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE publishes more than 1000 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. Our growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company’s continued independence. Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

List of Entries Abortion Abu Ghraib Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 Adorno, Theodor W. Advertising and Marketing Research Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Affordable Healthcare Act. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Agency Airport Security Airport Terminal Security Screenings Al Qaeda Alcoholics Anonymous AMBER Alerts American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center American Protective League Amnesty International Anarchism Ancient Greek Surveillance Anonymous Anti-Defamation League Antiglobalization Antinuclear Movement Antipsychiatry Movement Antiwar Movement, History in United States Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s Apartheid Apple Arab Spring ATM Cards Australia Authoritarianism Autonomy

Berlin Wall Biblical Surveillance Big Data Bill of Rights Bioengineering Bioinformatics Biometrics Biopolitical Tattooing Biosurveillance Blockades Border Patrol Checkpoints Botnets Brazil Breathometer and Breathalyzer Machines Brown v. Board of Education (1954) Camp David Accords Canada Capital Punishment Carrier Pigeons Castration, Chemical Castration, Surgical Catholic Church and the Sexual Abuse of Minors Cell Phone Tracking Cell Phones. See Cell Phone Tracking; Smartphones Central Intelligence Agency Chain Gangs Chicago, Illinois, Surveillance in Child Pornography. See Internet Pornography China Choice: Security or Civil Liberties Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) Citizenship Citywide Sweeps of the Homeless Civil Commitment Civil Disobedience Civil Liberties Civil Rights Movement

Beck, Ulrech Beijing, China, Surveillance in Benjamin, Walter Bentham, Jeremy vii

viii

List of Entries

Civil War Closed-Circuit Television Cloud Computing COINTELPRO Cold War Colonialism Commodification of the Body Communication Studies Community Computer Surveillance Concentration Camps Constructivism Cookies Copenhagen School Copwatch Corporate Personhood Corporate Surveillance Cosmopolitanism Counterintelligence Creeping Crime Crime Control Crime Mapping Critical Security Studies Cuba Cuban Missile Crisis Cults Cultural Studies Curfews Cyberbullying Cybercities Cybermarketing Cybermurder Cyberprostitution Cybersecurity Legislation Cyberstalking Cybertheft Cyberwar Data Mining and Profiling in Big Data Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis Data-Doubles Dataveillance Death Penalty. See Capital Punishment Death Row Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari Deportation Détente Deviance

Dictators and Dictatorships Digital Divide Digital Passwords Digital Privacy. See Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of Diplomacy Diplomatic Envoys Disease Model in Psychiatry Disinformation Campaigns Djibouti DNA Technology Domestic Terrorist Groups Drone Strikes Drones, Commercial Applications of Drug Testing Drug Testing Kits Drug Therapy Drug Trade. See Smuggling Drug Trafficking Dumpster Diving E-Government Electronic Harassment Electronic Monitoring. See Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices Electronic Restraint Devices Electronic Surveillance Email Embargoes Emergency Alert Systems Eminent Domain Environmental Security Equality Espionage Espionage in Ancient Egypt Ethics Ethiopia Eugenics Industrial Complex European Convention on Human Rights Facebook Fascism Fast Capitalism Fear, Culture of Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act Fingerprints

List of Entries

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Foucault, Michel Frankfurt School Franklin, Benjamin Free Speech Freedom of Expression Freedom of Information Act Garland, David Gated Communities Germany Glasnost Global Justice Global Mobility Global Positioning Systems. See United States v. Jones (2012) Global Surveillance Global Village Globalization Goffman, Erving Google Google Earth Governing Through Crime Governmentality Gramsci, Antonio Greece Guantanamo Bay Guatemala

Information Warfare Infotainment Insanity Intellectual Property Rights Intelligence Community International Diplomacy International Monetary Fund International Relations Theory Internet Pornography Internment Camps INTERPOL Inverse Surveillance iPhones. See Smartphones Iran Iran-Contra Affair Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979) Iraq Israel Italy Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act Jennicam Kafka, Franz Katz v. United States (1967) KGB Knowledge Kyllo v. United States (2001)

Habeas Corpus Hamas Hate Crimes Health Management Organizations Hepting v. AT&T Highway and Interstate Surveillance Hobbes, Thomas Home Surveillance Hoover, J. Edgar Houston, Texas, Surveillance in Human Trafficking Hunger Games, The

Latour, Bruno Law Law and Digital Technology Legal Moralism Libertarian Party Libya Lie Detector Instrumentation Life Sciences Surveillance and Security Life Without Parole Locke, John London, England, Surveillance in

Iceland Identity Politics Identity Theft Immigration Immigration and Naturalization Service Incapacitation India Information Security

Machine Learning Martial Law Marx, Gary T. Marxism Mass Incarceration Mass Surveillance. See Global Surveillance Matrix, The McCarthyism

ix

x

List of Entries

Medieval Castles Megan’s Law Mental Disability Laws Mental Health Inpatient Facilities Methadone Maintenance Mexico Military Industrial Complex Military Intelligence Minority Report Mobile Phones. See Cell Phone Tracking; Smartphones Modernism Monitor Versus Merrimac Moral Panic Morality Mountain Surveillance Movie Theater Security Municipal Surveillance Myspace Narcissism National Security National Security Agency National Security Agency Leaks National Security Council Nazism Neighborhood Watch Programs and Citizen Patrol Network Security Neuroscience and Brain Biology New Penology New York, New York, Surveillance in News Media Nigeria 9/11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization North Korea Nuclear Treaties Nuclear War Offender Reentry Programs Online Shopping Open Source Computing Orwell, George Panopticon, The Paparazzi Paramilitarization Parental Surveillance Parks

Parole Passenger Data Passenger Profiling Paternalism and Parens Patriae Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 PATRIOT Act Peace Talks and Peace Agreements Perestroika Phishing and Scams. See Email; Identity Theft Play-Dates and Play-Spaces Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Plethysmograph Police State Policing and Society Political Action Committees Political Dissidents Political Psychology Politics Port Security Postcolonialism Poststructural Theory Power Prison and Jail Segregation Units Prisons and Jails Privacy Privacy, Internet Privacy, Medical Privacy, Right to Privacy, Types of Privacy Act of 1974 Private Law Enforcement Private Prisons Probation Profiling, Racial Propaganda Protection Orders Psychological Assessment Psychotherapy Public Health, Surveillance in Punishment Punishment and Society Radio-Frequency Identification Devices Religion Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 Republican Party Researching Cybercrime Responsibility Restraining Orders. See Protection Orders

List of Entries

Revolutions and Revolts Riot Control Risk Society Thesis Russia Scandals, Political Scanners School Surveillance: Colleges and Universities School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools Search and Seizure Secure Fence Act of 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission Securitization Security, Concepts of Security Screenings at Sporting Events Security Theater Segregation, Residential Self-Deportation Sex Offender Laws Sex Offender Registries Sexting Shopping Mall Security Situationists Slave Trade Smart Borders Smartphones Smuggling Social Contract Theory Social Control Social Justice Social Media Social Network Analysis Social Sorting Sociality Society of Captives Thesis Solitary Confinement Sousveillance South Africa Sovereignty Spain Spam. See Email Special Operation Forces Specialty Courts for Domestic Violence Specialty Courts for Mental Health Specialty Courts for Substance Abuse Spectacle, The Spies Spyware. See Cybertheft

xi

Stand Your Ground Laws Stigma Stop and Frisk Stuxnet Virus Subjectivity Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities Supermax Prisons Surveillance, Culture of Surveillance, Theories of Surveillance & Society Surveillance Art Surveillance Deterrence Surveillance During the Age of Reason Surveillance During the Cold War Surveillance During World War I and World War II Surveillance Investigator Surveillant Assemblage Swatting Hack Synology Surveillance Station Synopticon, The Syria Taliban Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) Tasers and Other Less-Than-Lethal Devices Tea Party Technology Telemetric Policing Terrorism Tet Offensive Texting Threat Assessment Torture Totalitarian Surveillance Societies Traffic Control Traitors Transparency Trinidad and Tobago Truman Doctrine Truth Twitter. See Social Media UFO Surveillance (History, Purpose, Examples) UN Peacekeeping and Security Forces U.S. Constitution U.S. Customs and Border Protection U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Secret Service

xii

List of Entries

U.S. Transportation Security Administration United Kingdom United Nations United States United States v. Jones (2012) United States v. Miller (1976) United States v. Spy Factory, Inc. (1997) Unregulated Cyber Currencies Vagrancy Laws Vehicle Tracking Systems Victim-Offender Mediation Violence Against Women Act Voting Voyeurism, Digital

War on Drugs War on Terror Warrants Watchdog Groups Watergate and White House Tapes Weapons of Mass Destruction Whistle-Blowers WikiLeaks Wire Taps. See Electronic Surveillance Women, Girls, and the Body Work Surveillance Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices Youth Detention Centers and Facilities YouTube

Reader’s Guide The Reader’s Guide is provided to assist readers in locating articles on related topics. It classifies articles into 12 general topical categories: Digital Cultures, Cybercommunities, and Simulated Selves; Ethical Issues and Research Directions in Surveillance, Security, and Privacy; History and Philosophy of Surveillance Studies; Industries and Institutions of Surveillance and/or Security; Place, Space, and the Body; Security, Civil Liberties, and the Law; Security, Governance, and Democracy; Surveillance and Everyday Life; Surveillance, Identity, and Controlling Populations; Surveillance, Security, and Privacy Around the World; Tools, Practices, and Decisions of Surveillance and Security Politics; Trade in Surveillance, the Business of Security, and Strategies of Dissent. Digital Cultures, Cybercommunities, and Simulated Selves

Google Google Earth Hunger Games, The Infotainment Internet Pornography Jennicam Machine Learning Matrix, The Minority Report Myspace Narcissism News Media Online Shopping Open Source Computing Paparazzi Play-Dates and Play-Spaces Scandals, Political Scanners Sexting Smartphones Social Media Spectacle, The Stuxnet Virus Swatting Hack Texting Totalitarian Surveillance Societies Unregulated Cyber Currencies Voyeurism, Digital YouTube

Advertising and Marketing Research Apple ATM Cards Big Data Botnets Cloud Computing Cookies Creeping Cyberbullying Cybercities Cybermarketing Cybermurder Cyberprostitution Cyberstalking Cybertheft Data-Doubles Dataveillance Digital Divide Digital Passwords Drug Trafficking Dumpster Diving Electronic Harassment Email Facebook Fast Capitalism Global Mobility Global Village xiii

xiv

Reader’s Guide

Ethical Issues and Research Directions in Surveillance, Security, and Privacy

Agency Autonomy Choice: Security or Civil Liberties Citizenship Commodification of the Body Community Cosmopolitanism Crime Deviance Equality Ethics Fear, Culture of Global Justice Governing Through Crime Knowledge Law Moral Panic Morality Politics Power Privacy Punishment Researching Cybercrime Responsibility Risk Society Thesis Social Justice Social Network Analysis Sociality Society of Captives Thesis Sovereignty Subjectivity Surveillance, Culture of Surveillance Art Surveillant Assemblage Transparency Truth History and Philosophy of Surveillance Studies

Adorno, Theodor W. Beck, Ulrech Benjamin, Walter Bentham, Jeremy Bioengineering Bioinformatics Communication Studies Constructivism Copenhagen School

Critical Security Studies Cultural Studies Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari Fascism Foucault, Michel Frankfurt School Franklin, Benjamin Garland, David Globalization Goffman, Erving Gramsci, Antonio Hobbes, Thomas Hoover, J. Edgar International Relations Theory Kafka, Franz Latour, Bruno Locke, John Marx, Gary T. Marxism Modernism Nazism Neuroscience and Brain Biology Orwell, George Political Psychology Poststructural Theory Situationists Social Control Surveillance, Theories of Industries and Institutions of Surveillance and/or Security

Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Alcoholics Anonymous Biopolitical Tattooing Biosurveillance Breathometer and Breathalyzer Machines Closed-Circuit Television Drones, Commercial Applications of Drug Testing Kits Emergency Alert Systems Eugenics Industrial Complex Intelligence Community Law and Digital Technology Lie Detector Instrumentation Life Sciences Surveillance and Security Methadone Maintenance New Penology Offender Reentry Programs Parole

Reader’s Guide

Policing and Society Private Law Enforcement Private Prisons Probation Psychological Assessment Punishment and Society Radio-Frequency Identification Devices Sex Offender Registries Specialty Courts for Domestic Violence Specialty Courts for Mental Health Specialty Courts for Substance Abuse Threat Assessment Victim-Offender Mediation Place, Space, and the Body

Abortion Berlin Wall Biometrics Capital Punishment Castration, Chemical Castration, Surgical Chain Gangs Citywide Sweeps of the Homeless Concentration Camps Death Row Disease Model in Psychiatry DNA Technology Drug Therapy Electronic Restraint Devices Fingerprints Governmentality Incapacitation Internment Camps Life Without Parole Mass Incarceration Mental Health Inpatient Facilities Panopticon, The Parental Surveillance Plethysmograph Prison and Jail Segregation Units Prisons and Jails Riot Control Solitary Confinement Stigma Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities Supermax Prisons Surveillance Deterrence Synopticon, The Tasers and Other Less-Than-Lethal Devices

xv

Women, Girls, and the Body Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices Youth Detention Centers and Facilities Security, Civil Liberties, and the Law

Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 AMBER Alerts American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center American Protective League Amnesty International Anarchism Anti-Defamation League Bill of Rights Brown v. Board of Education (1954) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) Civil Commitment Civil Liberties Civil Rights Movement Corporate Personhood European Convention on Human Rights Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act Free Speech Freedom of Expression Freedom of Information Act Habeas Corpus Hate Crimes Hepting v. AT&T Home Surveillance Insanity Intellectual Property Rights Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act Katz v. United States (1967) Kyllo v. U.S. (2001) Legal Moralism Megan’s Law Mental Disability Laws Paternalism and Parens Patriae Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Political Action Committees Privacy, Internet Privacy, Medical Privacy, Right to

xvi

Reader’s Guide

Privacy, Types of Privacy Act of 1974 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 Search and Seizure Sex Offender Laws Sex Offender Registries Social Contract Theory Stand Your Ground Laws Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) U.S. Constitution United States v. Jones (2012) United States v. Miller (1976) United States v. Spy Factory, Inc. (1997) Vagrancy Laws Violence against Women Act Voting Warrants Security, Governance, and Democracy

Central Intelligence Agency COINTELPRO Cybersecurity Legislation E-Government Eminent Domain Federal Bureau of Investigation Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Immigration and Naturalization Service INTERPOL Iran-Contra Affair KGB Libertarian Party National Security National Security Agency National Security Agency Leaks National Security Council PATRIOT Act Republican Party Secure Fence Act of 2006 Securitization Securities and Exchange Commission Spies Tea Party Traitors U.S. Customs and Border Protection U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Secret Service U.S. Transportation Security Administration United Nations

Warrants Watergate and White House Tapes WikiLeaks Surveillance and Everyday Life

Airport Security Airport Terminal Security Screenings Beijing, China, Surveillance in Cell Phone Tracking Chicago, Illinois, Surveillance in Corporate Surveillance Drug Testing Gated Communities Highway and Interstate Surveillance Houston, Texas, Surveillance in London, England, Surveillance in Mountain Surveillance Movie Theater Security Municipal Surveillance New York, New York, Surveillance in Parks Passenger Data Passenger Profiling Public Health, Surveillance in Security Screenings at Sporting Events Shopping Mall Security Social Sorting Surveillance & Society Surveillance Investigator Synology Surveillance Station Telemetric Policing Vehicle Tracking Systems Surveillance, Identity, and Controlling Populations

Abu Ghraib Al Qaeda Ancient Greek Surveillance Apartheid Berlin Wall Biblical Surveillance Blockades Border Patrol Checkpoints Catholic Church and the Sexual Abuse of Minors Crime Control Crime Mapping Cults Curfews

Reader’s Guide

Data Mining and Profiling in Big Data Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis Deportation Domestic Terrorist Groups Global Surveillance Guantanamo Bay Hamas Human Trafficking Identity Politics Immigration McCarthyism Neighborhood Watch Programs and Citizen Patrol Police State Profiling, Racial Protection Orders Religion School Surveillance: College and Universities School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools Segregation, Residential Self-Deportation Slave Trade Smart Borders Stop and Frisk Taliban Traffic Control UFO Surveillance (History, Purpose, Examples) Surveillance, Security, and Privacy Around the World

Australia Brazil Canada China Cuba Djibouti Ethiopia Germany Greece Guatemala Iceland India Iran Iraq Israel Italy Libya

xvii

Mexico Nigeria North Korea Russia South Africa Spain Syria Trinidad and Tobago United Kingdom United States Tools, Practices, and Decisions of Surveillance and Security Politics

Authoritarianism Berlin Wall Camp David Accords Carrier Pigeons Civil War Cold War Colonialism Counterintelligence Cuban Missile Crisis Cyberwar Détente Dictators and Dictatorships Diplomacy Diplomatic Envoys Disinformation Campaigns Drone Strikes Electronic Surveillance Embargoes Espionage Espionage in Ancient Egypt Glasnost Information Warfare International Diplomacy Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979) Martial Law Medieval Castles Military Industrial Complex Military Intelligence Monitor Versus Merrimac 9/11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Treaties Nuclear War Paramilitarization Peace Talks and Peace Agreements Perestroika

xviii

Reader’s Guide

Postcolonialism Propaganda Special Operation Forces Surveillance Art Surveillance During the Age of Reason Surveillance During the Cold War Surveillance During World War I and World War II Terrorism Tet Offensive Torture Truman Doctrine U.N. Peacekeeping and Security Forces War on Drugs War on Terror Weapons of Mass Destruction Trade in Surveillance, the Business of Security, and Strategies of Dissent

Anonymous Antiglobalization Antinuclear Movement Antipsychiatry Movement Antiwar Movement, History in the United States Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s

Arab Spring Civil Disobedience Computer Surveillance Copwatch Environmental Security Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Health Management Organizations Identity Theft Information Security International Monetary Fund Inverse Surveillance Network Security New Penology Political Dissidents Port Security Psychotherapy Revolutions and Revolts Security Theater Security, Concepts of Smuggling Sousveillance Technology Watchdog Groups Whistle-Blowers Work Surveillance

About the Editor Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, holds a joint appointment at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNCC). He is Professor of Criminology, Law, and Society within the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology and Professor of Public Policy within the College of Liberal Arts and Science’s interdisciplinary doctoral Program in Public Policy. Professor Arrigo holds an additional faculty appointment in the Department of Psychology, and in the College of Health and Human Services, he holds an appointment in the Department of Public Health Sciences. He is a faculty associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics—a teaching, research, and service unit of UNCC’s Philosophy Department, a senior member of the University’s Honors College, and a faculty affiliate of Wake Forest University’s Bioethics, Health, and Society Program. Professor Arrigo began his professional career as an outreach worker, community organizer, and social activist. His mobilization efforts extended to a number of economically disadvantaged and political disenfranchised constituency groups, including (1) the homeless and marginally housed; (2) users of (mental) health services; (3) adult and juvenile ex-offenders; (4) survivors of sexual assault; and (5) abusers of licit/illicit drugs. Professor Arrigo’s work with these constituencies culminated when he directed and implemented the social designing housing strategy for the city of Pittsburgh’s largest single room occupancy (SRO) facility, Wood St. Commons. His civic engagement in this area also included developing and managing the facility’s human welfare and social policy agenda. During his directorship (1987–1990), this agenda addressed the health, human service, and advocacy needs of the city’s underserved and nonserved citizens. Professor Arrigo was awarded the PhD from the Pennsylvania State University in the administration

of justice. He specialized in the study of law, politics and mental health policy. He has additional graduate training in law (Temple University), as well as advanced degrees in psychology (Duquesne University) and in sociology (Duquesne University). He served as founding director of the Institute of Psychology, Law, and Public Policy at the California School of Professional Psychology-Fresno ­(1996–2001), and as chair of the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (2001–2004). Professor Arrigo’s research and scholarship is interdisciplinary in its scope, and it is pertinent to a wide range of public interest controversies at the intersection of human justice and social welfare. More specifically, he relies upon normative, doctrinal, and/or qualitative methods of inquiry to investigate enduring problems or emerging issues in (1) law, health, and politics; (2) theory, culture, and society; and (3) disorder, crime, and punishment. His exploration of these problems and issues extends from the interpersonal to the global and from the transpersonal to the transnational, resulting in more than 200 peer-reviewed journal articles, law reviews, chapters in books, and academic essays. He is also the (co)author or (co)editor of 25 titles, published or in press. Recent monographs include Revolution in Penology: Rethinking The Society of Captives (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), and The Ethics of Total Confinement: A Critique of Madness, Citizenship, and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, 2011). Recent textbooks and/or reference works include Introduction to Forensic Psychology 3rd ed. (Elsevier, 2012), and The E ­ ncyclopedia of Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol., 1-2 (Sage, 2014). Recent Journal Special Issues include Critical Criminology as Academic Activism: On Praxis and Pedagogy, Resistance and Revolution, Critical Criminology: An International Journal (Springer, 2016), and (with L. Davidson), What’s “Good” xix

xx

About the Editor

About Public Sector Mental Health?: Social Justice Policy Responses and Reforms, Behavioral Sciences and The Law (John Wiley & sons, 2017). Professor Arrigo was the editor-in-chief of the peer-reviewed sociological quarterly Humanity & Society (1996–2000); is founding and current editor-in-chief of the peer-reviewed behavioral ­ ­science publication Journal of Forensic Psychology Research and Practice (2000–present); and serves on the editorial or advisory boards of several (inter) national periodicals relevant to the disciplines of sociology/criminology, law/legal studies, psychiatry/ psychology, and social/public policy. Professor Arrigo was the founding book series editor for Criminal Justice and Psychology (Carolina Academic Press) and for Critical Perspectives in Criminology (University of Illinois Press). He is also the lead coauthor of The New Penology: Outline for a Theory of Mind, Subjectivity, and Power (in preparation). Professor Arrigo is the recipient of numerous professional awards and/or recognitions, and these honors are indicative of his prominence as a cross-disciplinary and multidisciplinary educator. ­ Examples include (1) elected fellow, American Psychological Association (Div. 41, Law and Psychology) and elected fellow, Academy of

Criminal Justice Sciences; (2) Lifetime Achievement Award, Society for the Study of Social Problems (Div. on Crime and Juvenile Delinquency) and Lifetime Achievement Award, American Society of Criminology (Div. on Critical Criminology and Social Justice); and (3) the Joseph B. Gittler Award, Society for the Study of Social Problems (for significant scholarly achievements addressing the ethical resolution of social problems), and Outstanding Educator, Southern Criminal Justice Association. Dr. Arrigo has been a (co)principal investigator for a number of public, private, and corporate grants and contracts totaling approximately $3,000,000. Sources of funding support have included the Departments of HUD and FEMA, the Office of Criminal Justice Planning (CA), and the William Penn Foundation (PA). He has served as a consultant to various organizations and institutions including the Correctional Service of Canada, the National Institute of Justice, the Florida Psychological Association, the National Science Foundation, and Savant Learning Systems. These consultancies have emphasized progressive public affairs policy and practice, evidenced-based research and programming, and citizenship-­ oriented education and training.

Contributors Angel R. Ackerman Independent Scholar

James M. Binnall University of California at Irvine

Btihaj Ajana King’s College London

Chastity Blankenship Florida Southern College

Ifeoma Ajunwa Columbia University

Todd Blevins Ball State University

Gordon Alley-Young Kingsborough Community College

Tendayi Bloom United Nations University

Emmanuel Amadi Mississippi Valley State University

Nicholas Branic University of California at Irvine

R. Bruce Anderson Florida Southern College

Clairissa D. Breen Cazenovia College

Laura A. Andersson Independent Scholar

Antonios Broumas Independent Researcher

Shayne Aquino Chicago School of Professional Psychology

Morgan Burcher Deakin University

Liliana Arroyo Moliner University of Barcelona

Colin Burke Northern Arizona University

Max Bader Leiden University

George Burruss Southern Illinois University

Vian Bakir Bangor University

Orisanmi Burton University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Lídia Balogh Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Legal Studies

Andrea Calderaro Cardiff University Steven J. Campbell University of South Carolina at Lancaster

Marcia Baruch Comprehensive Psychological & Forensic Services

Robyn Caplan Data and Society

Marcel F. Beausoleil Fitchburg State University

Victoria Carmichael Douglas Mental Health University Institute

Elizabeth Berenguer Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University

Arlinda Carter Mississippi Valley State University

xxi

xxii

Contributors

Lisa M. Carter Florida Southern College

James I. Deutsch Smithsonian Institution

Mary L. Carver Longwood University

Carmen Dexl FAU Erlangen-Nuernberg

John R. Cencich California University of Pennsylvania

Charalampos A. Dimoulas Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Charlotte Chadderton University of East London

Megan Doldron University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Christine J. Champion University of California at Irvine

Elena Dragomir University ‘Valahia’ of Târgoviste, Romania

Nien-Tsu Nancy Chen California State University at Channel Islands

Jesse Drew UC Davis

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo University of Texas at San Antonio

Brandon Dulisse Indiana University of Pennsylvania

Brandon Chuman Chicago School of Professional Psychology

Sanderijn Duquet University of Leuven

Guido Cimadomo Universidad de Málaga

Lukas Edeler University of Passau

Ian C. Clift Indiana University South Bend Rochelle E. M. Cobbs Mississippi Valley State University Thomas N. Cooke York University James Ross Corcoran Sr. Hawaii Pacific University Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera George Mason University Mathieu Cunche INSA-Lyon Bart Custers Leiden University Patricia P. Dahl Washburn University Eugene Deisinger Sigma Threat Management Associates Carolyn Dennis Keisr University Markus Denzler Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences

M. George Eichenberg Tarleton State University O. Oko Elechi Mississippi Valley State University G. Scott Erickson Ithaca College Reginaldo Chase Espinoza Chicago School of Professional Psychology Alayna R. Fahrny Kansas State University Michael Falgoust University of Twente Nicole Falkenhayner Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg Frank V. Ferdik University of West Florida Amanda M. Fisher Independent Scholar James FitzGerald York University Regan Flaherty York University

Contributors

Thomas Fleming Wilfrid Laurier University

Carlos Daniel Gutierrez-Mannix University of Texas at Rio Grande Valley

Helen Forbes-Mewett Monash University

Neil Guzy University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg

Elizabeth Fraysier Eastern Michigan University

Katerina Hadjimatheou University of Warwick

Franco Freilone University of Turin

Loren Halfmann University of Washington

Philippe M. Frowd McMaster University

Richard A. S. Hall Fayetteville State University

Gemma Galdon Clavell University of Barcelona

Grey Harris Ball State University

Jai Galliott The University of New South Wales

Francis Frederick Hawley Western Carolina University

Sebastian Garcia Czech Technical University

Meagan Hebel Florida Southern College

Venessa Garcia New Jersey City University

Martin Hennig University of Passau

K. Garth-James Notre Dame de Namur University

Andrea Henry Mississippi Valley State

Tony Gaskew University of Pittsburgh at Bradford

Vincent E. Henry Long Island University

James Geistman Wayne State University

Wendy L. Hicks Ashford University

Matthew J. Geras Florida Southern College

Wolfgang Hochbruck Albert-Ludwigs University Freiburg

Daniel German Library and Archives Canada

Matthew Hoddie Towson University

Claire Gibby Westminster College

Peter Holland Monash University

Camille Gibson Prairie View A&M University

Claire M. Hubbard-Hall Bishop Grosseteste University

Tobias T. Gibson Westminster College

Chris Hubbles University of Washington

Richard Goode Lipscomb University

Brad Ictech Louisiana State University

Artiko Greer Mississippi Valley State University

André Jansson Karlstad University

Matthew J. Gritter Angelo State University

Joshua W. Jeffery Sr. University of Tennessee

xxiii

xxiv

Contributors

J. Jacob Jenkins California State University Channel Islands

Peter Kuznick American University

Jude Lenjo Jokwi Wiley College

Francesca Laguardia Montclair State University

Kimberly Jones Northeastern University

Brittany Lakes Mississippi Valley State University

Lynn Jones Northern Arizona University

Sarah Lamdan CUNY School of Law

Steve Jones Southwestern Adventist University

Karen Lancaster-Ellis University of the West Indies

William T. Jones SUNY Canton

Annika C. Lee Independent Scholar

Douglas Jordan U.S. Army

Matthias Leese University of Tuebingen–IZEW

Maria Julian Nova Southeastern University

Travis M. Leslie Orage County Sheriff Department

Dietmar Kammerer Philipps-Universität Marburg

Karen E. C. Levy Cornell University

Thomas P. Keenan University of Calgary Kraig Kiehl Kutztown University Max Kilger University of Texas at San Antonio A. T. Kingsmith York University Jonathan Klos Florida Southern College Cranston S. Knight St. Augustine College, Chicago

John Liederbach Bowling Green State University Randy K. Lippert University of Windsor Michael Loadenthal George Mason University Kim Lorber Ramapo College of New Jersey Christoph Lueder Kingston University London Brenda J. Lutz Independent Scholar

Corey Koch Florida Southern College

James M. Lutz Indiana University–Purdue University Fort Wayne

Anisha Koilpillai Florida Southern College

Kevin Macnish University of Leeds

Zachary Kopin American University

Giuseppe Maglione Edinburgh Napier University

Chris Kozary University of Newcastle

Shahriyar Mansouri Shahid Beheshti University

Elizabeth A. Kus Chicago School of Professional Psychology

Robert Lee Maril East Carolina University

Contributors

Caleb Marquis Westminster College

Victoria M. Nagy La Trobe University

Jason D. Martinek New Jersey City University

Bernardo Negron-Rodriguez Nova Southeastern University

Sanjay Marwah California State University at East Bay

Bryce Clayton Newell University of Kentucky

Richard McCleary University of California at Irvine

Jason Nicholson University of Louisville

Eric S. McCord University of Louisville

Nadeem Nooristani Ball State University

Kelly McHugh Florida Southern College

Sarah Ober Ball State University

Andrew McStay Bangor University

Evaristus Obinyan Southern University at New Orleans

Robert J. Meadows California Lutheran University

Stacy M. Okutani ANSER

Francesca Menichelli University of Oxford

Diego Coletti Oliva Universidade Federal do Paraná

Trudy Mercadal Florida Atlantic University Travis Milburn Tennessee Tech University Seumas Miller Charles Sturt University (Canberra) Marcos L. Misis Northern Kentucky University Adam Molnar Deakin University

xxv

Alaba Oludare Mississippi Valley State University R. James Orr National War College Noel Otu University of Texas at Rio Grande Valley Stephen S. Owen Radford University Jennifer M. Pacella Baruch College, City University of New York

Sherill Morris-Francis Mississippi Valley State University

András L. Pap Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Sciences

Vincent Mosco Queen’s University

Allan L. Patenaude University of the West Indies

Lorna Muir University of Aberdeen

Wendy Perkins Urbana University

Tony Murphy Sheffield Hallam University

Arie Perliger United States Military Academy

Stephen L. Muzzatti Ryerson University

Maria Petrescu Nova Southeastern University

Michael Nagenborg University of Twente

Sylvie Peyrou University of Pau and Adour (France)

xxvi

Contributors

Kaisha Phillips The University of the West Indies

Zeshaun Saleem SOAS, University of London

Miriam Piegsa University of Passau

Joseph B. Sanborn Jr. University of Central Florida

Matteo Pretelli Postdoctoral Research Fellow

Emília Sánchez Ruiz Blanquerna School of Health Science, Universitat Ramon Llull, Barcelona

Charles Price University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Tara Lai Quinlan University of Sheffield Kira Ramirez Florida Southern College Marisa R. Randazzo SIGMA Threat Management Associates Jessica Ratel-Khan Ball State University Melanie Reid Lincoln Memorial University Leslie Reynard Washburn University Brandon Rigato Ryerson University Gina Robertiello Felician College Jessie Robertson Courtauld Institute of Art Sergio Rodríguez Tejada Universitat de València

Eric C. Sands Berry College Jessica Schmidt Tiffin University Patrick Schmidt Macalester College Paul R. Schupp Niagara University Steven Seiler Tennessee Tech University Brian G. Sellers Eastern Michigan University Vaughn Shannon Wright State University Peter Shields Eastern Washington University Manuela Sixt University of Passau Ursula Smartt University of Surrey

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk University of Trento

CalvinJohn Smiley Montclair State University

Tonya Rooney Australian Catholic University

Emma Smith Ryerson University

Lee E. Ross University of Central Florida

Nicholas Rush Smith City College of New York

Vassilis Routsis University College London

Keith Spiller Birmingham City University

Gabriel Rubin Montclair State University

William G. Staples University of Kansas

Rick Ruddell University of Regina

Kevin F. Steinmetz Kansas State University

Ann Rudinow Saetnan Norwegian University of Science & Technology

Emese Szilágyi HAS Centre for Social Sciences

Contributors

Blessing Tangban Southern University at New Orleans

Nelseta Walters University of Maryland Eastern Shore

Caitlin J. Taylor La Salle University

Debra Warner Chicago School of Professional Psychology

Emmeline Taylor Australian National University

Ashanti Weathers Mississippi Valley State University

Julian Teicher Monash University

Patrick Webb Saint Augustine’s University

Elle Gray Teshima Southern Illinois University

Stan Weeber McNeese State University

Ruth Thompson-Miller University of Dayton

Adele Weiner Metropolitan College of New York

Ulrich Tiedau University College London

Naomi M. Weinstein Independent Scholar

Elahe Tirandaz Shahid Beheshti University

Mordechai Wellish Florida Southern College

Tracy F. Tolbert California State University at Long Beach

Darren A. Wheeler Ball State University

Megan Travers Indiana University of Pennsylvania/HR

Chad Whelan Deakin University

Daniel Trottier Erasmus University Rotterdam

Elvira White-Lewis Texas A&M University–Commerce

Dimitris Tsapogas University of Vienna

Stephanie N. Whitehead Indiana University East

Brianna Turberville Florida Southern College

Rob Whitley McGill University

Kristene Unsworth Drexel University

Brandi Williams Mississippi Valley State University

Mercedes Valadez California State University Sacramento

Dianne Williams The University of the West Indies

Annette L. Varcoe Independent Scholar

Fay V. Williams Lakehead University

Andreas Veglis Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Jeff Williams National University of Córdoba

P. J. Verrecchia York College of Pennsylvania

Mark Wintz Point Park University

Julian von Bargen York University

Robert M. Worley Lamar University

Kevin Walby University of Winnipeg

Delmar P. Wright Saint Leo University

Wendell Codrington Wallace University of the West Indies at St. Augustine

Kali Wright-Smith Westminster College

xxvii

xxviii

Contributors

Georgia Zara University of Turin

Michael T. Zimmer University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee

Nancy Zarse Chicago School of Professional Psychology

Monica Zuccarini University of Naples Federico II

Introduction Overview We live in uncertain yet exciting technological times. Scientists and philosophers, theologians and politicians, and pundits and other prophets have all made this seemingly contradictory claim. Admittedly, this claim is not new although it does remain ­provocative. The sweeping and effusive history of civilizations across continents reveals the human struggle to be unfettered amid the clamor for engineered progress. Typically, this progress has been propelled by the logic of efficiency, the economics of utility and the erudition of capital. Plato understood the paradoxical necessity of technology, especially when material objects that did not already exist in the natural world were created or made more perfect. For Plato, these imaginative endeavors were the inspiration behind mathematical knowledge and practical action. That said, what does Platonic invention and technique teach us about our shared humanity and the ongoing challenge to be free? Aristotle, a student of Plato, recognized how technology as industry could be the source of everyday wisdom. For example, the aqueducts of Ancient Greece and Sparta transformed the activity of personal bathing and gave birth to public health/ hygiene. But forms of hierarchy and privilege existed during the Age of Antiquity, limiting access to such progress to those with influence, and mostly relegated slaves and servants to the dehumanizing status of the have-nots. Moreover, Alexander the Great, a pupil of Aristotle, seized upon technology’s enterprising truths to develop sophisticated weaponry and to deploy cutting-edge tactics producing a military juggernaut of uncompromising power. This is how Alexander conquered the Persian Empire leaving in his wake an awesome spectacle of destruction, destitution, and subjugation. Up until then, the archeology of practical knowledge had never experienced such creative xxix

will nor had it witnessed such material force. This was will and force that forever changed the landscape of Macedonian might, including mercantile expansion and new forms of commerce. So, then, the question is begged: What can be said of technology’s place in forging untapped and awaiting acumen given the present era’s (late modernity’s) insistence on relations of humanness derived increasingly (incessantly) from digitally engineered progress? This query is central to the genesis and substance of the ensuing encyclopedia project. The SAGE Encyclopedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy is the culmination of four years of systematic and strategic scholarship focused on investigating the condition of shared humanity in the age of technologized information. As an emerging field of theoretical and practical inquiry, its landscape is both the source and product of boundless possibilities and of omnipresent perils. Such is the order of things in an era of “big” data and datadoubles, “fast” capitalism and the attention economy, “biometric” scanning and predictive policing, and a host of other computer-generated expressions of hyper-real human relatedness. Clearly, then, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy signifies a provocation; an effort to explore the legitimate, although blurring, boundaries of digital technology’s practical wisdom and purposeful action for individuals and collectives, for social networks and cybercities, for interdependent and cosmopolitan existence.

Organization and Thematic Categories The architecture of the encyclopedia is deliberately broad. Burgeoning fields of academic ­speculation, analysis, and/or commentary demand far-reaching examination whose intention is p ­ robing inquiry. Twelve topical categories or ­overarching themes provide the scaffolding for this project. These

xxx

Introduction

themes/categories consist of the f­ ollowing: (1) Digital Cultures, Cybercommunities, and Simulated Selves; (2) Ethical Issues and Research Directions in Surveillance, Security, and Privacy; (3) History and Philosophy of Surveillance Studies; (4) Industries and Institutions of Surveillance and/ or Security; (5) Place, Space, and the Body; (6) Security, Civil Liberties, and the Law; (7) Security, Governance, and Democracy; (8)  Surveillance and Everyday Life; (9) Surveillance, Identity, and Controlling Populations; (10) Surveillance, Security, and Privacy around the World; (11) Tools, Practices, and Decisions of Surveillance and Security Politics; (12) Trade in Surveillance, the Business of Security, and Strategies of Dissent. In what follows, I provide a brief overview for each overarching theme and summarize the content that organizes each topical category. Digital Cultures, Cybercommunities, and Simulated Selves

How has digital technology transformed our collective humanity, and what does this metamorphosis tell us about the experience of belonging and the meaning of identity? An understanding of both place and personhood is pivotal to addressing this question. Thus, entries within this category emphasize inchoate traditions and peculiar trends in popular culture. These traditions and trends are suggestive of how we interrelate in the age of surveillance where security and privacy are automated demands of transactional life. Films such as The Matrix and Minority Report; social media, including Facebook and Myspace; and communication through sexting, creeping, and digital voyeurism (i.e., the pleasure of being watched) remind us that we inhabit multiple cybercommunities, and through them we simulate or replicate our manifold selves. What remains of our essential shared humanness becomes unclear as both place and personhood are digitally altered. What is certain, though, is that both security and privacy take on new significance as they become cradles of contested and continuous programming. Ethical Issues and Research Directions in Surveillance, Security, and Privacy

To contest the significance of security and privacy in an era of digital surveillance is to raise

serious doubts about the grounding and meaning of social life. These doubts are both philosophical and  scientific in nature. Thus, entries within this category examine important ethical issues and propose timely research directions on a host of heretofore recognized norms and regularized principles. For example, what relevance does autonomy or choice or citizenship command in the informational age? How does digital surveillance commodify the human body; co-opt definitions of deviance or crime; and create new forms of knowledge and power, law and politics, transparency and truth? These concerns invite conjecture on the f­ undamental properties of shared existence, disrupting, undoing and even reconceiving taken-for-granted expressions of human relatedness in the process. History and Philosophy of Surveillance Studies

One access point for comprehending the increasingly fluid dimensions of security and the progressively unstable dynamics of privacy in the digital age comes from an appreciation of the past—­ especially as prologue to the future. Indeed, these dimensions and dynamics are the source of considerable speculation. In order to address this speculation, the Encyclopedia suggestively reviews the history and philosophy of surveillance. To that end, several entries are featured within this topical category in which readers can expect to learn about important academic subfields, cultural icons, and timely directions. In addition to various theoretical approaches to surveillance, the insights of guiding luminaries such as Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Gary T. Marx, and Ulrich Beck are featured. Notable movements (including cultural studies, constructivism, and poststructural theory) and novel approaches (including bioengineering, bioinformatics, and neuroscience) also are discussed. Industries and Institutions of Surveillance and/or Security

It is not enough to simply showcase the field of surveillance by examining its historical and philosophical development. The apparatuses of control, the techniques of power, and the mechanisms of compliance are all a part of how security is maintained and privacy is managed. These apparatuses,

Introduction

techniques, and mechanisms are both abundant and profuse. They make evident how digital relations of humanness are unreflectively normalized through diverse modes of biopolitical inspection. Sex offender registries, radio frequency identification devices, drug testing kits, closed-circuit television, emergency alert systems, and the commercial application of drones exemplify this normalization. They are all industries (and institutional manifestations) of human scrutiny. Place, Space, and the Body

The effects of such scrutiny are particularly illuminating by way of the public policies that such scrutiny promulgates and by way of the social practices it promotes. These policies and practices redesign the human body and they reengineer human space. It is not simply that humanness is medicalized, criminalized, and pathologized; rather, it is that our veritable existences are transformed (i.e., de-individualized, de-personalized, and de-coupled) as a consequence. Segregation units in jails, life without parole, mass incarceration, supermax prisons, solitary confinement, wrist and ankle electronic monitoring, and other non-lethal restraining devices (e.g., tasers) all foster a society of captives. This is the captivity of the kept and their collective keepers. What is problematic about this metamorphosis is that the shared project of struggle and the mutual experience of overcoming vanish. Under these conditions of technological relationality, neither security nor privacy can ever fully be assured nor can they ever fully be vitalized. Security, Civil Liberties, and the Law

What are the laws of security in the informational age and how do these laws protect and promote or undermine and undo the civil liberty interests of citizens? In order to examine this question, entries situated within this category emphasize relevant court cases, discuss important legal constructs, and review controversial social practices. This emphasis includes U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, Hepting v. AT&T, and Kyllo v. United States. This discussion consists of legal concepts such as corporate personhood, Internet privacy, and intellectual property rights. This review

xxxi

encompasses policy prescriptions that reflect law in action such as stand-your-ground, vagrancy, mental disability, and sex offender directives. Entries showcased within this theme indicate that new forms of legal moralism govern judicial decision making in the digital era, and correspondingly, that novel interpretations for search and seizure, for hate crimes, and for free speech follow. Again, the issue of relationality emerges, especially when we consider how our humanness is informationally expressed and transformed through the redefinition of civil liberties. Security, Governance, and Democracy

Institutions, organizations, and agencies of digital security defend or deflect the law. This is security (or in-security) resolutely at work. An assessment of both the logics and limits of freedom and the breaches and “breachers” of security are essential to this enterprise. More specifically, questions concerning the nature of governance and the quality of democracy such security (or in-security) guarantees warrant consideration as well. Consequently, entities that are examined include, among others, COINTELPROL, the KGB, eGovernment, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Initiatives that are reviewed include, among others, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the PATRIOT Act, cybersecurity legislation, and the Secure Fence Act. These entities and initiatives help to explain the presence of spies and traitors among us and they help to account for the existence (and rise) of alternative news-making and news-reporting outlets (e.g.,WikiLeaks). Surveillance and Everyday Life

How do we live as a surveillance society? How do we inhabit and populate its identity through our everyday rituals and routines? These questions draw attention to the vitality of surveillance. This vitality finds expression in our homes and at recreational sites; in places of work and at sporting events; in airports and other travel stations; and on roads, throughout cities, and across highways. Examples of the entries featured within this organizing theme include gated communities, corporate surveillance, passenger data and profiling, vehicle

xxxii

Introduction

tracking systems, municipal surveillance, and telemetric policing. Additional entries address the scope of everyday surveillance. Examples include surveillance in Beijing, London, and New York as well as surveillance at parks, shopping malls, and movie theaters. In all of these instances, emergent forms of shared, collective, or interdependent human relatedness appear and take on associational significance. Surveillance, Identity, and Controlling Populations

The control of populations is one facet of surveillance life that reflects the increasing tension between collective security and group privacy. This control consists of the strategic monitoring, mapping, and management of citizens, cells, and other social networks worldwide. Border patrol checkpoints and blockades, (self)deportation and racial profiling, smart borders and crime mapping are mechanisms and methods of population control. These mechanisms and methods reveal shifts in our shared identity (e.g., Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay), they find expression in religious organizations (the Catholic Church) or terrorist groups (Al Qaeda, Hamas), and they exist within our communities (e.g., school surveillance, neighborhood watch programs and citizen patrol). The concerns for security and privacy invite a rethinking of the police state and they suggest a reconceptualization for identity politics. This tension, then, is the crucible in which news forms of McCarthyism emerge and novel outlets for global surveillance endure. Surveillance, Security, and Privacy Around the World

How do countries around the world understand surveillance, practice security, and embrace privacy in the informational age of digital technology? This question globalizes the conversation (and the metamorphosis) concerning our collective humanity, the experience of belonging and the meaning of identity. Several countries from every continent are discussed within this theme. These countries illustrate how geography and infrastructure, institutions and organizations, population size and density, culture and history both inform and are influenced by the information age of digital technology.

Tools, Practices, and Decisions of Surveillance and Security Politics

The global production of surveillance runs the risk of politicizing national security, and with it, compromising personal privacy and collective peace/prosperity. Efforts to minimize, manage, or manipulate this politics is found throughout history. Historical instances of security politics are featured within the Encyclopedia. Examples include the Berlin Wall, the Camp David Accord, the American Civil War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, surveillance during the Age of Reason and the Cold War, and espionage in Ancient Egypt. These entries focus on the use of diplomacy and intelligence as stables of surveillance and as decisional science for the art of war. Several tools of such diplomacy and intelligence also are reviewed within this topical category. Counterintelligence, cyberwar, détente, drone strikes, embargoes, propaganda, special operating forces, disinformation campaigns, and the War on Terror are illustrative of this point. The global presence of surveillance and the security politics it spawns suggests just how delicate the meaning of shared humanity has become in the digital age. Trade in Surveillance, the Business of Security, and Strategies of Dissent

Notwithstanding just how delicate prospects for collective and interdependent humanity have become in the informational age, surveillance remains a trade, security remains a business, and dissent remains a workable strategy for responding to the excesses of both. The insistence on human regulation and the calculation of human risk gives rise to innovative forms of digital resistance. Groups such as Anonymous, events such as the Arab Spring, practices such as civil disobedience, activities such as sousveillance and whistle-­blowing, and movements such as anti-globalization and anti-psychiatry illustrate the persistent spirit of renewal and reform in the informational age of digital relatedness. This spirit signals the search (perhaps a collective yearning) for a new and different societal balance where security and privacy have visceral (rather than simply virtual) meaning and import. The SAGE Encyclopedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy presents the evolving debates and

Introduction

dissects the emerging practices that populate the field’s cultural and global landscape. Admittedly, no single reference work of this sort can address all key controversies, cases, or questions; however, if systematically and strategically undertaken, it can make a decided contribution. To this extent, then, any omissions—intended or otherwise—are the sole product of the editor’s prerogative and judgment. As such, the encyclopedia can only be interpreted as both a point of initiation as well as departure. Clearly, more conjecture and theorizing, more research and scholarship, and more analysis

xxxiii

and commentary must follow. For now, however, I  extend my thanks to the international cast of contributors and reviewers whose insights and erudition fill the pages of this project. I am also indebted to my editorial team at SAGE, especially Carole Maurer (development editor) for her steadfast support and uncompromising enthusiasm in helping to bring this reference work to its longawaited and final completion. Namaste! Bruce A. Arrigo

A hormone that is created when a fertilized egg implants in the uterus. The results become more accurate with time, with the average early detection being around 1 week after a missed period. However, because hormone levels vary from woman to woman, many home pregnancy tests instruct users to take more than one test several days apart to ensure accuracy. Nevertheless, a woman who is pregnant may receive a negative result on a home pregnancy test. In some cases, a woman’s eggs may not implant in the uterus until as late as 1 week after a missed period; in the case of an ectopic pregnancy, the results may never appear as positive on a home pregnancy test. Thus, the recommended follow-up to a home pregnancy test is a blood test and pelvic examination performed by a medical professional. Women who have limited resources may rely on home pregnancy tests being accurate rather than spend time and money on a doctor visit. However, the longer it takes for a pregnancy to be accurately detected, the shorter the time frame the woman has to make a decision regarding parenthood.

Abortion Privacy-related issues concerning abortion are complex, due in part to the amount of information about fetal development that prenatal monitoring devices make available to both patients and medical providers. Laws dictating the use of prenatal monitoring devices have led to concerns about privacy and fetal surveillance. Historically, patients, regardless of the nature of their visits to a medical provider, gained autonomy for medical decisions through informed consent laws, which give patients the right to information about the risks and benefits of medical interventions or procedures. However, in the case of abortion in the United States, such autonomy has been affected by states enacting laws restricting abortions to certain stages of pregnancy. This entry focuses on prenatal monitoring and abortion regulations, including their impact on patient autonomy and privacy.

Pregnancy Testing Taking a home pregnancy test is one of the first steps many women take before having an abortion. Home pregnancy tests are available for purchase at most pharmacies and are taken in the privacy of one’s own home. The ability to detect a pregnancy early has an impact on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion within the time frame allowed by her state, with the many of the earliest cutoffs being about 20 weeks. Home pregnancy tests work by detecting through a urine sample a

Prenatal Monitoring Regulations A woman might decide to consult with an ­abortion provider once she determines that she is pregnant. Depending on the state in which she resides, the woman may encounter prenatal monitoring ­regulations to comply with the mandatory requirements for an abortion. One such regulation concerns fetal heartbeat detection. In 2013, Arkansas and North Dakota passed regulations making 1

2

Abortion

it  a  felony to perform an abortion after a fetal heartbeat has been detected. These regulations have since been struck down by federal judges who found the laws unconstitutional; however, legal actions to permit heartbeat legislation ­continue. Fetal heartbeat can be detected by transvaginal ultrasound or Doppler fetal monitors as early as 6 weeks. Since home pregnancy tests are a common method for women to detect pregnancy and accurate results may not be ascertained until more than 1 week after the first missed period, the time frame imposed by fetal heartbeat legislation can make a legal abortion more difficult to obtain. Thus, fetal heartbeat legislation might decrease a woman’s ability to choose to have an abortion, even in cases where she uses conventional means to find out whether she is pregnant. Also under the umbrella of prenatal monitoring and abortion regulations are laws mandating that abortion providers perform an ultrasound. Many of the states that have enacted such legislation indicate that the ultrasound is required to better inform providers of fetal development and of the patient’s unique characteristics, which can affect provider’s decision making during the procedure. The data provided by the ultrasound can help providers estimate whether the fetus meets the gestational age restrictions of the states in which they are practicing. However, in some cases, this information may be used for reasons other than estimating gestational age. For example, in ­Florida, women seeking an abortion must consult with a doctor to determine whether the fetus is able to survive on its own; if a doctor determines that a  fetus would be viable outside the woman’s body,  the woman is unable to legally obtain an abortion. Opponents of prenatal monitoring regulations argue that legislators, not medical providers, are the ones requiring ultrasounds, even though ultrasounds typically are not medically necessary for a doctor and a patient to make an informed decision about abortion, especially when the procedure is performed before 12 weeks from conception and when a fetus would not be viable outside the womb. For example, first-trimester pregnancies can be aborted through the use of a pill such as RU-486 rather than through surgery. Requiring an ultrasound, which is not medically necessary for all abortions, removes medical provider discretion

when making decisions that affect the cost, discomfort, and length of procedure time for ­ patients. Thus, opponents have argued that fetal development is monitored not with patients’ best interest or privacy in mind but with the state’s interest in determining acceptable circumstances for abortions and having citizens comply with its laws regarding abortion. Despite these concerns, some advocates of prenatal monitoring regulations argue that mandatory ultrasounds help inform abortion seekers as well. Specifically, ultrasounds allow women to obtain an accurate estimate of the date of conception and can help inform them of the procedure likely to be the safest option based on the gestational age of the fetus. In support of informed consent laws surrounding abortion, three states mandate that the provider show and describe the ultrasound to the patient so that she can learn as much as possible about the fetus before making a final decision regarding an abortion. This ultrasound requirement is intended to allow patients to take the time to think about the procedure before determining whether they do in fact want to have an abortion. Women seeking abortions in these states are required to view these images even if they feel that ultrasound or fetal monitoring invades their privacy or that it provides more information about the developing fetus than they may wish to have (an additional 18 states require providers to permit patients to view the image on request). Opponents have argued that viewing an ultrasound is mandated surveillance of the developing fetus and potentially invades an individual’s right to privacy in two ways: (1) by requiring prenatal monitoring no matter the circumstances of the pregnancy and (2) by requiring women to view and listen to information that may not affect their decision to abort. As a result of these regulations, when seeking an abortion, women in some states do not have the option to refuse medical treatment, as they do in other medical situations. Pro-choice advocates argue that having providers describe and show ultrasound images of the fetus is a veiled attempt to persuade women seeking an abortion to change their minds. However, there is little research to  support the view that more women will change their minds about an abortion after seeing the ultrasound images of the fetus. In the available

Abortion

research on the effect of ultrasound images on the decision making of women seeking an abortion, only a slight difference in number was found between women who viewed the fetal ultrasounds and those who did not view the images. Moreover, women already know that they are pregnant when seeking an abortion and understand that a fetus is developing with the potential to be human. Furthermore, if a woman is seeking an abortion by contacting a clinic, she may have already thought extensively about her options. Both pro-life and pro-choice advocates are likely to agree that if showing an ultrasound image to a woman who is undecided about the abortion results in her deciding to proceed with the pregnancy, it would be a positive decision. Those on both sides of the issue advocate for women to engage in decision making that does not lead to later regret about the choice to abort or to become a parent. Knowledge of fetal characteristics is only one component of the information women may be required to view when making a decision regarding abortion. Beyond mandatory ultrasounds, state law varies in the type of information that must be presented to a woman who seeks an abortion. Seventeen states require pre-abortion counseling, with eight states requiring doctors to disclose the longterm mental health consequences of the procedure and 12 states mandating that women be informed about contested research on the possibility of a fetus to feel pain. In addition, some states require women to be informed about child support laws and government assistance available to them. Prochoice advocates in many states argue that imposing waiting periods, viewing detailed images, listening to heartbeats, assessing fetal distress, and providing financial assistance are all attempts to present a one-sided view of the abortion issue, with no pro-choice information to counter the pro-life information required to be made available. While increased surveillance of fetal development might increase patient knowledge and promote informed consent, pro-choice advocates assert that it can present a pronatal viewpoint without addressing the challenges of parenting.

Other Considerations In addition to information about fetal development, prenatal monitoring technology can gather

3

information about a woman’s lifestyle, which also raises surveillance and privacy concerns. For instance, if a woman is an illegal substance abuser, then, depending on the state in which she lives, the information collected could be used against her in criminal proceedings. Some states require a test for prenatal drug exposure if a medical provider suspects abuse, and some require medical providers to report suspected drug use. These reports can in turn be used as a basis for filing assault or child abuse charges against the woman. Prenatal monitoring, new technology, and abortion relate to other pregnancy issues as well. Technology has improved medical providers’ ability to detect fetal developmental abnormalities, such as Down syndrome. Such knowledge about the developing fetus can also have an impact on abortion laws. For example, North Dakota has banned abortions for abnormal fetal development or genetic anomaly. Mandatory fetal monitoring can also increase medical costs, which may affect a woman’s ability to pay for the procedure. For example, many states require a waiting period, usually 24 hours, from the time a woman seeks abortion services before the abortion can be performed. To meet this state requirement, some patients, such as those from rural areas or who live far from the clinic or hospital, might have to pay for a hotel or additional transportation. Beyond hotel and transportation costs, a mandatory ultrasound can increase the cost of the procedure. Many clinics require upfront payment of procedure costs, and many states limit public funding to only rape or incest victims. Other unanticipated costs include time off work, the length of time required for each visit (typically 4–6 hours each day), and child care for any children the woman may already have.

Future Implications As fetal surveillance continues to develop alongside other reproductive monitoring technology, mandatory descriptions of fetal development will likely continue to improve and provide more detailed images. It is possible that in the near future abortion providers might be required to upload videos of prenatal ultrasounds to a doctorpatient website, allowing instantaneous access to patients, with explanations of fetal development,

4

Abortion

thus providing additional opportunities to experience the fetus as a developing human. Previously, women seeking an abortion were able to make a decision while also deciding the level of information they were presented with, rather than being required to view fetal development. Currently, several states require fetal development monitoring, and as technology continues to improve, the level of graphic information presented to the patient will also increase. Some women who have had abortions as well as some providers are also using technology to educate the public on abortion experiences. For example, Emily Letts, a clinic worker, filmed her own abortion in an effort to reduce the stigma and fear surrounding the procedure. Although Letts drew criticism because a video of a woman having an abortion seems graphic and personal, her video showed only her face during a typical surgical abortion, which in early-term procedures lasts around 5 minutes. Letts’s video is not the only abortion video available online intended to educate rather than deter women from seeking an abortion, and as pro-choice advocates increase their presence online, the public can expect an increase in the number of blogs, videos, and images that aim to show a more complex picture of the feelings and mind-set surrounding abortion procedures. Advanced medical technology will continue to change the landscape of the highly complex issue of abortion. Abortion mandates are and will continue to be complex due to the rise in information regarding fetal development made available by prenatal monitoring devices. While historically, increased usage of technology has led to greater patient autonomy, abortion regulations are playing a role in determining the balance between medical surveillance and a patient’s privacy rights and decision making. Chastity Blankenship See also Privacy, Medical; WikiLeaks

Further Readings Boland, Reed. “Second Trimester Abortion Laws Globally: Actuality, Trends and Recommendations.” Reproductive Health Matters, v.18/36 (2010).

British Broadcasting Corporation. “Emily Letts Abortion.” World Have Your Say (May 8, 2014). http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01y9dx2 (Accessed June 2014). Greene Foster, Diana, et al. “Relationship Between Ultrasound Viewing and Proceeding to Abortion.” Obstetrics and Gynecology, v.123/1 (2014). Guttmacher Institute. “An Overview of Abortion Laws” (Updated June 1, 2014). http://www.guttmacher.org/ statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (Accessed June 2014). Guttmacher Institute. “Requirements for Ultrasound” (Updated June 1, 2014). http://www.guttmacher.org/ statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (Accessed June 2014). Guttmacher Institute. “State Facts About Abortion” (February 2014). https://www.guttmacher.org/factsheet/state-facts-about-abortion (Accessed June 2014). Harris, Lisa and Daniel Grossman. “Confronting the Challenge of Unsafe Second-Trimester Abortion.” International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics, v.115/1 (2011). Holpuch, Amanda. “Florida Enacts Abortion Law Requiring Doctors to Evaluate Foetus Survival.” The Guardian (June 14, 2014). http://www.theguardian .com/world/2014/jun/14/florida-abortion-law-rickscott-fetus-survival (Accessed June 2014). Laufer-Ukeles, Pamela. “Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy.” American Journal of Law and Medicine, v.37 (2011). Liss-Schultz, Nina. “Michigan Lawmakers Propose ‘Heartbeat’ Abortion Ban.” Rewire (June 23, 2014). https://rewire.news/article/2014/06/23/michiganlawmakers-propose-heartbeat-abortion-ban/ (Accessed June 2014). Mayo Clinic. “Diseases and Conditions: Down Syndrome” (April 19, 2014). http://www.mayoclinic .org/diseases-conditions/down-syndrome/basics/testsdiagnosis/con-20020948 (Accessed July 2014). National Partnership for Women and Families. “Appeal Filed Over N.D. ‘Heartbeat’ Abortion Ban” (May 15, 2014). http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2? page=NewsArticle&id=44494&security=3161& news_iv_ctrl=3235 (Accessed June 2014). Office on Women’s Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. “Pregnancy.” https://www .womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/before-you-getpregnant/knowing-if-pregnant.html (Accessed June 2014). Olson, Justin. “Defining Fetal Life: An Establishment Clause Analysis of Religiously Motivated Informed Consent Provisions.” Indiana Law Journal, v.88 (2013).

Abu Ghraib Suter, Sonia. “The Politics of Information: Informed Consent in Abortion and End-of-Life Decision Making.” American Journal of Law and Medicine, v.39 (2013). Woodcock, Scoot. “Abortion Counselling and the Informed Consent Dilemma.” Bioethics, v.25/9 (2011).

Website All Women’s Health Centers: http://www.floridaabortion .com/services_abortion /index.shtml (Accessed June 2014).

Abu Ghraib Abu Ghraib was a prison located west of Baghdad in Iraq. Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein’s ­(1937–2006) regime used Abu Ghraib to incarcerate, torture, and execute thousands of political dissidents. After Hussein’s regime fell during the Iraq War (2003–2011), U.S. forces used the prison to detain and interrogate many Iraqis who were believed to be insurgents or to have information about insurgent groups planning attacks on the United States or the U.S.-led forces. The United States slowly began turning control of the prison back over to Iraq, which claimed full control in 2006 and closed the prison in 2014. During much of the United States’ occupation of Iraq, Abu Ghraib was in the spotlight due to the detainment, security, and treatment that inmates received while imprisoned there, and many questions were raised regarding the inmates’ individual rights or lack thereof. This entry sheds light on the detainment and treatment of those imprisoned at Abu Ghraib and examines how many of the practices by the U.S.-led forces violated U.S. and international laws and rules of war. Independent and American-sanctioned investigations into the prisoner abuse are reviewed, and legal challenges and subsequent decisions by the U.S. court system, and the ramifications of those decisions, are then discussed. Early in the Iraq War, a series of media reports and investigations illuminated a pattern of cruel, inhuman, and degrading detainee treatment inside Abu Ghraib prison. Military personnel committed

5

various human rights violations, including the rape, torture, and killing of prisoners of war. Personnel had redeployed torture methods that had been used during the Spanish Inquisition (15th to 19th centuries) and the Stalin show trials (20th century) while also creating new ones to coercively interrogate Iraqis suspected of supporting the anti-American insurgency. The abuses raised important questions about the responsibility of senior civilian and military officials to provide authorization and oversight of subordinates’ use of torture techniques during a war. Investigations and documentary evidence show that senior civilian and military officials not only failed to properly supervise low-level personnel but also created a climate in which the personnel were authorized and encouraged to torture detainees. In November 2003, the Associated Press published a report documenting numerous abuses at Abu Ghraib. That month, the U.S. Army’s provost marshal also reported that prison conditions in Iraq constituted a violation of the Geneva Conventions and thus involved war crimes. The U.S. Department of Defense began investigating the allegations in January 2004. In April and May 2004, Seymour Hersh published articles accompanied by photographs in The New Yorker detailing the abuses, and a televised 60 Minutes II report the aired pictures. Various human rights watchdog groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, also documented the abuses and torture. The then president George W. Bush and other senior officials condemned the abuses and attributed them to a small number of rogue military personnel working in Abu Ghraib. However, there is documentary evidence that the abuses resulted from a series of high-level policy decisions and directives developed and implemented by senior Bush administration officials and high-ranking military commanders charged with waging the war against terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere. These policy decisions redefined detainees and detention sites as being off-limits to traditional judicial oversight, authorized “coercive interrogation” techniques to gather “actionable intelligence,” and ignored abuse reports instead of investigating them. In 2002 and 2003, the Bush administration lawyers Jay Bybee and John Yoo, who were assistant attorney generals in the Office of Legal

6

Abu Ghraib

Counsel, at the behest of General Counsel for the Department of Defense William Haynes, wrote what would become known as the “Torture Memos.” Yoo penned the opinion that federal laws prohibiting torture do not apply to foreign detainees held abroad and that anyone prosecuted for following orders would be legally protected. Bybee, later appointed to the federal judiciary, ­created a new definition of torture that was so narrow that abuse would have to be severe enough to cause organ failure and death for it to be considered “torture.” These opinions would guide Bush administration policy. The legal team authorized what it called “enhanced interrogation techniques,” many of which had previously been prohibited by law as torture, to be used against foreign detainees. The legal team created the term enemy combatant to designate foreign detainees. A February 2002 presidential order declared that the administration would consider itself no longer constrained by Geneva Convention provisions prohibiting cruel and inhumane treatment and would use its definition of torture as a guide. In 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signed an “action memo” authorizing 15 new coercive interrogation techniques for detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (known as “Gitmo”). Major General Anthony Taguba’s report, the socalled Taguba Report, documented that Rumsfeld had sent Major General Geoffrey Miller to “Gitmoize” Iraq operations, where Miller set a clear policy of coercive interrogation. A 2004 internal Army review also reaffirmed this high-level “migration” of coercive interrogation directives across international theaters of operation. In 2004, Rumsfeld testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee and conceded that he was fully accountable for the torture and abuses at Abu Ghraib, and in 2008, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee agreed. Both the Taguba Report and the 2004 Schlesinger Commission criticized military officials in Iraq for failing to maintain proper command and oversight to prevent abuses. The Schlesinger Commission found what it called “errors of omission” and implicated Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, then the top U.S. commander in Iraq, for a “confused command relationship” that facilitated

abuse. Both the Schlesinger Commission and the Taguba Report reproached Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, the prison’s commanding officer. Karpinski was reprimanded for dereliction of duty and demoted to colonel in May 2005. She denied knowledge of any abuses and claimed that her superiors had authorized the interrogations and denied her access to them. She said that private subcontractors hired by the U.S. government and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents outside her chain-of-command actually oversaw the interrogations and were thus culpable for the supervisory breakdowns. Investigations suggest that they orchestrated some of the more deadly abuses at Abu Ghraib, directing low-level military personnel to “soften up” detainees to “set up the conditions” for interrogation. In 2008, former Abu Ghraib detainees brought federal lawsuits against private military contractors CACI International, CACI Premier Technologies, Inc., and L-3 (formerly Titan Corporation) for alleged abuses suffered there. The contractors’ lawyers argued that they should be considered immune from judicial oversight and accountability since they were operating like a military agency in a foreign war zone. Courts at various levels during the initial ruling and the subsequent appeals process differed in their opinions of whether the contractors were immune from prosecution. In 2012, L-3 reached a settlement with the plaintiffs, although a U.S. district court later dismissed the suit against CACI International. In 2014, a U.S. appeals court ruled that non-U.S. citizens can sue CACI pursuant to the 18th-century Alien Tort Statute, which allows non-U.S. citizens to sue in American courts when defendants violate international laws or U.S. treaties. The contractors, however, still have millions of dollars in federal contracts, and the matter of proper managerial oversight to prevent future abuses remains unresolved. In 2013, bipartisan reports from the Constitution Project and the Senate Intelligence Committee found fault with senior U.S. officials and strongly criticized the CIA for its role in perpetrating the abuses and in concealing information from the investigators. The Schlesinger Commission had already implicated CIA operatives in undermining accountability at Abu Ghraib through their practice of interrogating “unregistered detainees.” The

Abu Ghraib

Constitution Project lacked access to classified documents, while the Senate Intelligence Committee, using CIA agency records, accused the CIA of selectively sharing information in a manner designed to “manipulate” public opinion rather than pursue the truth. The Schlesinger Commission and internal Army investigation reports attributed the Abu Ghraib abuses to managerial oversight breakdowns within the chain of command. But there is evidence to suggest that the Abu Ghraib abuses were part of a widespread, systematic pattern throughout Iraq and that senior officials willfully ignored the abuse reports, failing to monitor and investigate subordinates’ detention and interrogation practices. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) testified that when it reported on Abu Ghraib abuses to U.S. authorities throughout 2003, suggesting that as many as 70% to 90% of the detainees were wrongfully detained, the U.S. authorities attempted to restrict its access to the facility. Rumsfeld publicly praised Sergeant Joseph Darby for providing photographic evidence of Abu Ghraib abuses, but Darby was the target of retaliation by some as a whistle-blower. Darby, whose house was vandalized and who reported sleeping with a pistol under his pillow for protection, was placed in the military’s protective services. Afterward, human rights investigators in Iraq and the Detainee Abuse Task Force (DATF), established in 2005, reported that there was evidence of widespread abuses beyond Abu Ghraib at facilities such as Camp Bucca, Camp Whitehorse, and the Forward Operating Base Rifles near alAsad, as well as numerous so-called black sites throughout Iraq. Yet the six DATF investigators found that very few service personnel were willing to report the abuses or even help the investigators. When DATF agents closed cases and submitted them to the Army’s Criminal Investigations Command, it reopened several of them to conduct additional fact gathering. This meant that the open cases were exempt from being released to outside groups via Freedom of Information Act requests. Since the Abu Ghraib scandal, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued rulings that have increased civilian judicial oversight over the detention ­ and  treatment of foreign detainees. In 2004, the  Supreme Court ruled that a presidential

7

administration cannot legally decide to disregard the Geneva Convention protections, and in 2008 in B ­ oumediene v. Bush et al., it reaffirmed the habeas corpus rights of foreign detainees held at Gitmo. On June 29, 2006, the Court reaffirmed its 2004 ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld et al., in which it declared that foreign detainees are entitled to protections under the Geneva Convention and U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996. Yet in 2010, a D.C. district court judge agreed with the then president Barack Obama’s administration and overturned a federal judge’s ruling, which meant that detainees in the Bagram prison in ­Afghanistan did not have habeas corpus rights. The authorities regarded the Abu Ghraib abuses as unforeseeable and isolated cases. Over a decade later, debate continues about whether senior officials enabled abuse through faulty oversight or even actively encouraged abuse through directives to obtain actionable intelligence via coercive interrogation. Amnesty International reported that thousands of detainees appeared to have been tortured and abused, contradicting the official assertions that the abuses were random, individual acts. The full scope of the abuse at Abu Ghraib and in Iraq remains unknown. Most Abu Ghraib abuse photographs have not been publicly released, though the whistle-blower website WikiLeaks and the British newspaper The Guardian obtained and released hundreds of thousands of documents and described uninvestigated abuse and torture cases even after the scandal waned. Paul R. Schupp See also Guantanamo Bay; Iraq; War on Terror; WikiLeaks

Further Readings Hersh, Seymour M. Chain of Command: The Road From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2004. Rajiva, Lila. The Language of Empire: Abu Ghraib and the American Media. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2005. Strasser, Steven, ed. The Abu Ghraib Investigations: The Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon on the Shocking Prisoner Abuse in Iraq. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004.

8

Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006

Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 Convicted sex offenders who are either paroled from correctional facilities or successfully released from required treatment at a psychiatric facility are subject to several forms of community supervision as they attempt to reintegrate into society. State and federal legislation has created various forms of postrelease surveillance that formerly convicted sex offenders are subjected to, such as sex offender registries, community notification systems, residency restrictions, community exclusion zones, and even Global Positioning System monitoring. While local and state-level criminal registration laws date back to the 1930s, the role of federal legislation in sex offender registration can be traced to the 1994 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children Act, which commanded all 50 states to require anyone convicted of a sex offense to register his or her current residential and employment information with law enforcement agencies for monitoring. The Wetterling Act was later amended to include Megan’s Law in 1996, after the sexual molestation and murder of 7-yearold Megan Kanka at the hands of her neighbor, who was a twice-convicted sex offender. Megan’s law mandated that police agencies notify communities of the sex offenders living near them by publicly providing the offenders’ names and residential addresses. A crucial moment in federal involvement in sex offender registration and notification systems emerged with the passage of the 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (AWA), which repealed the registration and notification requirements of the Wetterling Act, and its amendments, to replace them with a new set of standards aimed at providing a more inclusive system of sex offender surveillance with the goal of enhancing public safety. However, many concerns have emerged with regard to the AWA’s effectiveness and its implementation. The remainder of this entry explains the three tiers, and their nuances, of the AWA classification system for sex offenders; describes the territories and categories in which AWA applies; and provides a brief review of potential unintended consequences of the AWA registration requirements.

Title I of the AWA is the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which requires states to standardize their registration and community notification practices via a federal ­ classification tier system for sex offenders. Under this uniform, three-tier classification system, sex offenders must provide more extensive registration information, make periodic in-person ­appearances to confirm and update their registration information, and are assigned a minimum period of time when they are required to remain on the public Internet ­registries based on their tier ­classification. Tier 1 registrants are those o ­ ffenders who committed misdemeanors or sexual-related crimes that resulted in the sanction of less than 1  year of imprisonment, and they must register for 15 years, with annual in-person updates where they confirm their address and provide a current photo. Tier 2 registrants are sex offenders who have attempted to commit or committed offenses against a minor, including sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, solicitation for the practice of prostitution, and the use of minors for the production or distribution of child pornography. Tier 2 offenders must be registered for 25 years and have their address and current photo verified through semiannual in-person updates. Tier 3 registrants are people who are found guilty of aggravated sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact with a youth under 13 years of age, or nonparental kidnapping of a minor. Tier 3 offenders must register for a lifetime and update their address and photo in person every 3 months. The AWA extends these federal mandates beyond the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories to also include federally recognized Indian tribal jurisdictions, as well as foreign convictions. The requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act have also made juvenile court adjudications for sex offenders aged 14 years and older synonymous with those for adult sex offenders, whereby these juvenile sex offenders would qualify to be placed on Tier 3 and treated as adults. It is assumed that juvenile sex offenders pose a heightened risk for future sexual violence when compared with other delinquents; however, Elizabeth Letourneau and Michael ­Miner’s research suggests that there is no empirical evidence to support such an assumption and that the policy neglects to consider the unique

Adorno, Theodor W.

developmental factors that characterize adolescence and create psychosocial deficits in youth. The AWA also expanded the range of sexual offenses subject to mandatory registration, increased mandatory sentences for federal sex offenders, permitted their civil commitment, and required that DNA samples be collected and stored. Additionally, the act established retroactive provisions in which previously convicted or adjudicated sex offenders must register on conviction of a new crime regardless of whether the new offense was sexual in nature or not. Any state that does not comply with the new federal guidelines is subject to a 10% reduction in its Byrne/Justice Assistance grant funding for law enforcement. The increasing federal role in sex offender surveillance has generated concerns about the weakening of jurisdictional autonomy, the inconsistency between the law and emerging evidence-based practices, and unfunded federal mandates. The existing research also reveals several unintended consequences of the new registration practices to sexual offenders, such as hindering employment and housing opportunities, severing supportive relationships, and subjecting them to harassment, vigilante justice, and social rejection due to public stigmatization. Finally, the extant research has failed to find that sex offender registration and notification are effective at reducing recidivism. Brian G. Sellers and Elizabeth Fraysier See also Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act; Megan’s Law; Sex Offender Laws; Sex Offender Registries

Further Readings Arrigo, Bruce, et al. Ethics of Total Confinement: A Critique of Madness, Citizenship, and Social Justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. Caldwell, Michael, et al. “An Examination of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act as Applied to Juveniles.” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, v.14/2 (2008). Freeman, Naomi and Jeffrey Sandler. “The Adam Walsh Act: A False Sense of Security or an Effective Policy Initiative?” Criminal Justice Policy Review, v.21/1 (2010). Harris, Andrew and Christopher Lobanov-Rostovsky. “Implementing the Adam Walsh Act’s Sex Offender

9

Registration and Notification Provisions: A Survey of the States.” Criminal Justice Policy Review, v.21/2 (2010). Harris, Andrew, et al. “Widening the Net: The Effects of Transitioning to the Adam Walsh Act’s Federally Mandated Sex Offender Classification System.” Criminal Justice and Behavior, v.37/5 (2010). Letourneau, Elizabeth and Michael Miner. “Juvenile Sex Offenders: A Case Against the Legal and Clinical Status Quo.” Sexual Abuse, v.17/2 (2005).

Adorno, Theodor W. Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969), born Theodor Ludwig Weisengrund, was one of the most important social philosophers and critics in post–World War II Germany. His influence on the philosophy currents of the second half of the 20th century was deep and widespread. For example, ­Germany’s most renowned contemporary philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, was his student. The hallmark of the Frankfurt School, the research institution to which Adorno belonged, was the vast scope of its interdisciplinary research. The extent of Adorno’s sphere of influence is rooted precisely in the interdisciplinary character of his work. It was also born from the meticulousness with which he ­studied Western philosophical approaches, particularly those of Immanuel Kant and the neo-­ Kantians, and from the radical nature of his approach. Adorno is also one of the founding fathers of the discipline of critical theory. This entry examines Adorno’s contributions to philosophy and literature, which were influenced by his education at the Frankfurt School and his experiences during the Nazi Holocaust, which, in turn, influenced his beliefs and thoughts regarding Western civilization, the Enlightenment, and culture industries.

Literary Output Adorno left Germany in 1934, during the rise of Nazism. While in exile, he lived in England and the United States. During that time, he wrote several books, including the seminal Dialectic of Enlightenment, coauthored with Max Horkheimer, and other works, including Philosophy of New Music

10

Adorno, Theodor W.

and Minima Moralia. This was the time when he produced his first well-known critiques of the culture industry. After the war, he returned to ­ Frankfurt and became a leading intellectual and emblematic figure in the Institute of Social Research, later known as the Frankfurt School, which had been previously headed by Horkheimer. Adorno became its director in 1958. During the 1950s, Adorno produced a series of  works on social and cultural studies, as well as cultural and ideological critiques, including In Search of ­Wagner, Prisms, and Against Epistemology. Adorno and Horkheimer wrote their seminal critique of the culture of Western civilization, Dialectic of Enlightenment, during World War II. After the war, the full reach of its horrors was revealed, such as the Holocaust and the vast destructiveness of the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan by the U.S. forces. Adorno and Horkheimer wrote in the wake of what they saw as the failure of the Enlightenment. It is important to note, however, that Adorno and Horkheimer did not reject the Enlightenment ideals. What they saw was a pattern of domination that devolves from the degradation of these ideals. According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the source of the human-made catastrophes of the 20th century follows a pattern of systemic thinking and domination: first, human domination of nature; second, the domination by humans of human nature within themselves; and finally, the domination of some human beings by other human beings. These dominations can take various forms, which they examined in depth throughout their work.

Negative Dialectics In his magisterial work Negative Dialectics, Adorno articulated even further the tragic excesses of humanity outside the parameters of rationality proposed by the Enlightenment. Negative Dialectics was published 20 years after his work with Horkheimer, in the wake of the Holocaust and assuming that a Jewish identity guarantees death. Negative Dialectics is a dense book, famously hard to understand by the general public. Indeed, critics argue that Adorno wrote mainly for his ­colleagues, fellow academics, and philosophers. Admirers, however,

find that Negative Dialects is a profound and beautiful work. It posits that even though its attempt to change the world had failed, philosophy lives and is now compelled to critique itself mercilessly. According to many scholars, the underpinnings of Negative Dialectics lie in Adorno’s experience as a German philosopher who, due to his politics and Jewish roots, found himself condemned to being “the other” by his mother culture, to which he had dedicated his life’s work. For Adorno, the problem of the Enlightenment was caused by engaging in grand narratives to explain the world, or what he called “identity thinking.” Adorno asserted that the danger of identity thinking could be avoided through negative dialectics, which is an analysis impermeable to identity thinking. The dialectic of the Enlightenment is based on the Hegelian distinction between the self and the Other, between the master and the slave. Individuals reach self-recognition through the recognition of what is not-me, or the Other. This type of ­subjectivity has a dark side because it is reached through domination of the other. Science and instrumental reason are the ultimate expression of the drive to subjugate nature through culture and technology, a drive that accomplished its pinnacle with the technology that allowed the Holocaust.

Adorno and the Frankfurt School The Frankfurt School posited that the problem of contemporary Western civilization was the Enlightenment. Its pursuit of rationality and civilization had ended in barbarism. The inception of some of this theoretical approach was the work of Sigmund Freud, who argued that civilization could flourish only by way of the repression of humanity’s primal instincts. Therefore, civilization is the result of the use of force and, as such, of barbarity. The Frankfurt School came into being during what it saw as a time of battle between civilization and barbarism, represented by the Allies against the Nazis, respectively. The extent of Nazi barbarism was fully evident in the postwar period, by way of documentary evidence of death on a scale never seen before. The world wondered how a nation that had produced philosophers such as Kant and Georg Hegel and artists such as Beethoven could systematically slaughter millions

Adorno, Theodor W.

of people. The Enlightenment, then, had failed, having degenerated into positivism. Positivism, a degraded branch of the Enlightenment, created a technical society that led to totalitarianism. Adorno viewed critical thinking as primordial to the Frankfurt School’s work. Critical thinking, to Adorno, was a moral imperative. Instead of responding to grand narratives and reification of objects, the critical mind should reject the system that produces the object and closely examine the object itself. To paraphrase Adorno, if negative dialectics call for self-reflective thinking, it follows that for thinking to be true, it must also be a thinking against itself. In other words, critical thinking is necessary because uncritical thinking runs the risk of becoming, as Adorno put it in Negative Dialectics, “the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the screams of its victims.”

Culture Industries and the Frankfurt School The Frankfurt School adopted Karl Marx’s concept of reification of commodities as fetish, their crystallization of desire. Commodities are, by nature, estranged or alienated from their origin. For human wants or desires to be projected onto commodities, these objects must become reified. However, that cannot occur if people have a clear understanding of the properties and context of the reified object. Adorno relies on the redefinition of reification offered by Georg Lukács, who refers to the ways in which commodities affect life in capitalist societies. In Lukács’s view, commodities make humans appear as mere objects obeying the inexorable laws of the market. American popular culture was the ideal place for the reification of desire, or of the objects of  desire, through its mass media. Culture industries—the constellation of media that dis­ seminates culture and information—promoted freedom of choice, markets, and expression yet worked to undermine those very freedoms. The system of the culture industry, as we know it, was created in the more democratic and industrialized nations. The culture industry creates and manipulates a distorted mass consciousness or a sense of false consciousness, in Marxian terms. Popular culture and mass entertainment are homogenized

11

for easier production and distribution while promoting individualization. Adorno and other Frankfurt School theorists saw the culture industries as an apparatus to disseminate an ideology of instrumental reason, a type of thinking used to dominate through scientific rationale and control. However, notions of progress and technological achievement, instead of leading to the empowerment and emancipation of the people, led them to enslavement. The technological apparatus works toward an efficient categorization and homogenization that buttress the collective order. Powerful elites dominate the means of rationalization and consciousness ­making—in particular the culture industry—and in this way, they dominate and control other social groups. In essence, the masses are bribed with entertainment and commodities. The people, then, are quieted by a culture industry that, under the guise of promoting freedom of expression and providing information, offers behavioral models and silences opposition. The result is totalitarianism, even without recourse to overt police forces. If everybody behaves and thinks the same, identities are homogenized, and the system effectively resists the Other, any type of difference, which must then be eliminated. In this manner, the system seeks to eliminate the Other. The fascist state embraced modern technologies to produce and propagate its ideology. This was conveyed by way of film and radio, which were controlled by the totalitarian governments. Fascist ideology utilized universal mythic narratives to disseminate its propaganda. Adorno, who had escaped the Holocaust, proposed that the concentration camps were the ultimate example of the efficiency of a technology of death. The administration of places such as Auschwitz exemplified the extremes of rational thinking. The ideology of power and extermination controlled the modern technology that allowed this. It is no surprise, then, that theorists of the Frankfurt School, such as Adorno, were deeply wary of notions of the universal and of the totalitarian possibilities of mass media technology. Trudy Mercadal See also Frankfurt School; Global Surveillance

12

Advertising and Marketing Research

Further Readings Adorno, Theodor W. Negative Dialectics. London, England: Bloomsbury Academic, 1981. Adorno, Theodor W. and Max Horkheimer. Towards a New Manifesto. New York, NY: Verso, 2011. Brommer, Stephen Eric. Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2011. Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2010. Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007. Peters, John D. and Peter Simonson, eds. Mass Communication and American Social Thought: Key Texts. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Rose, Gillian. The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno. New York, NY: Verso, 2014. Schweppenhauser, Gebhard. Theodor Adorno: An Introduction. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. Tarr, Zoltan. The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2011. Zizek, Slavoj, et al. Mapping Ideology. New York, NY: Verso, 2012.

Advertising Research

and

Marketing

Advertising and marketing are intended to affect people’s behavior and nudge them in a predefined direction. This may be to buy an object, to vote one way over another, to subscribe to a service, to donate to a charity, or to have positive feelings about an organization’s preferred image of itself. To do this, advertisers and marketers have an interest in understanding the composition of their target audiences and potential and actual customers. This involves knowing as much as possible about where potential recipients of their communications live, what they do, where they go, who they associate with, what they say to one another, what their income is, what their interests are, what their political dispositions are, how they are feeling, what motivates them to action, and what they buy. In other words, it is paramount for the

advertising and marketing industries to engage in profiling. Being so, the activities of advertising and marketing industries are of interest to social scientists concerned with surveillance and privacy. Profiling may be achieved directly by people, as is the case of focus groups, interviews, and personto-person profiling. It may also be carried out by machinic profiling (machine to person). The latter is suited to large numbers of people because machines are efficient at identifying trends, patterns, and correlations in large amounts of data. Increasingly important, these data sets are fluid, changing in real time; are extremely large; and have information coming in from a range of different sources and points of interaction with people. As detailed in this entry, when advertisers and marketers know what type of people they are communicating with, and who is buying their goods, this allows them to refine and personalize their advertising, to offer more relevant products, to reward loyalty (and therefore encourage more purchasing), and to offer pricing strategies based on what is known about a person. However, although the advertising and marketing industries have undergone acceleration in profiling in recent decades, the need for information by advertising and marketing firms is sewn into their very nature and practice. Despite recent intensification in commercial surveillance practice, this is an important consideration. As such, advertising and marketing are an ongoing interest for scholars interested in surveillance because of the reliance of these industries on detailed information about people, the ways in which this information is collected, and the ends to which it is put. This entry first details the historical practice of commercial profiling, then depicts contemporary examples, and finally accounts for the ways in which social scientists theorize and understand these practices.

Information Society 1.0: The Historical Context of Advertising and Marketing Research Despite the ongoing prevalence of the term mass media, the early 1900s saw the end of the idea that consumers might be thought of as a single collective homogeneous audience, but instead an ensemble of groups with different dispositions and interests. Consequently, advertisers and their

Advertising and Marketing Research

agencies grew to recognize that messages had to be tailored for specific segments of the population. This meant that effectiveness was connected to understanding of audiences in specific situations. Feedback to advertising and marketing firms with audiences was initially provided by responses to questionnaires posed by early market researchers. Originating in the United States and subsequently adopted by media owners internationally, this included the formation of the Audit Bureau of Circulation in 1914 along with use of a range of other methods such as house-to-house calls, attitudinal and opinion surveys, retail sales, audience monitoring (AC Nielsen), and statistical sample surveys, among a panoply of other approaches to identifying audiences and recording feedback. These remain some of the leading market research practices. Technologies and practices to collecting audience data and market feedback developed in the late 1910s and continued to mature through the 1930s. This is a period that James Beniger identifies as the Control Revolution. This entailed the following: advertisement testing (1906), systematic retail collecting, analysis of domestic waste (1910s), questionnaire surveys (1911), coded mailings (1912), audits of publishers’ circulations (1914), specialized market research, departments and house-to-house interviewing (1916), research textbooks (1919), saturation and assessment of demand (1920), dry waste surveys (1926), a census of distribution (1929), sampling theory for large-scale surveys (ca. 1930), field manuals (1931), retail sales indices (1933), national opinion surveys, and audimeter monitoring of broadcast audiences (1935). Each reflects the modern belief that advertising, marketing, and consumer research should be treated as a science through the use of feedback as a means of understanding what techniques work and what do not.

Control Information has always been important to these industries because of the need to understand and profile people, groups, and their behavior. Emblematic of the desire for businesses to have efficiency, transparency, and control over production, distribution, and sales is the Universal Product Code (UPC) bar code. This was developed in the 1960s, began to be adopted by the late 1970s by

13

supermarkets, and has continued to aid in stock management. Bar codes caused social and academic consternation because they are readable and traceable by machines. On recording and understanding consumer preferences, the bar code and associated scanning technology facilitated quicker feedback loops than paper records or observational feedback. It is these early developments in logistics, data processing, and sorting that represent the implementation of control. The UPC bar code also underpins loyalty cards such as Tesco’s Clubcard, which contributed significantly to it’s becoming the dominant retailer in the United Kingdom and one of the biggest in the world. Since 1995, Clubcard has provided Tesco with an unprecedented level of information on its shoppers both in-store and increasingly online too. Another recent marketing example is the online retailer Amazon.com and its uncanny ability to suggest books and other objects that customers might be interested in purchasing. This is a major contributor to its ­ success—the recording, tracking, collating, and ­ analyzing purchasing history to accurately predict future interests (e.g., “If you liked this, you’ll love this”). Innovation in data management allows companies to understand purchasing patterns in terms of commonalities, variances, repetition, patterns, associations, relationships, reactions to price and placement, classification, clustering, and the generation of patterns so as to anticipate behavior and optimize product offers. Despite association with web-based data mining, the use of algorithms and computer systems to analyze marketing and customer segments is decades old, with wide-ranging debates taking place with regard to the efficiency of computer algorithms in the 1970s. However, data mining and warehousing came to greater prominence in the 1980s and the 1990s as a digital way of extracting meaning from large data sets. As computing power continued to fall in fiscal cost, most major organizations by the 1980s had built infrastructural databases about their clients, competitors, products, and customers. The challenge was (and remains) to discover valuable knowledge in data. In marketing, this has found expression in the language of “customer relationship management” and the warehousing and processing of information at all points where a business has an

14

Advertising and Marketing Research

interaction with a customer (be this a Clubcard UPC bar code scanned at the checkout, or an online activity). Contemporary data mining is thus a type of intelligence that combs through the memory of a business, finding patterns suitable for given business objectives. Furthermore, as data mining techniques often use market basket analysis (the process of analyzing customer shopping habits to find different associations between different elements of a basket), these enable institutions to make inferences about an individual based on analyses of how others who are similar to them behave. For advertisers, profiling is used to target people with advertising for goods, services, not-forprofit groups, and political organizations. Detailed and reliable information allows those who own media outlets (be this a newspaper, a social network, a television company, or a business that manages outdoor poster sites) to charge advertisers more because they can clearly tell advertisers who will see and engage with their messages. Of particular concern to surveillance scholars is the rise of behavioral advertising that involves tracking users’ online browsing activity over a period of time. This is done to enable advertising firms to tailor to what they assume are users’ interests. This occurs by means of personal computers, by means of smartphones, and increasingly in the living room by means of online television and games platforms (e.g., Xbox Live). Irrespective of the platform, the premise of behavioral advertising is to display advertisements according to the mediated observations of users. Third-party behavioral advertising networks achieve this by tracking users’ movements across websites whose publishers have signed up to an advertising network. The success of advertising networks stems from the number of web publishers they have signed up to  their services. Advertising networks include Google/Doubleclick, Advertising.com (AOL), and Yahoo, with lesser-known networks including ContextWeb, TribalFusion, Specific Media, Casale, and Traffic Marketplace. Use of the free web browser add-on, Ghostery, reveals which advertising networks are tracking a user’s computer. Far less prevalent than web-based behavioral advertising is third-party Internet-based behavioral advertising that uses Internet traffic that passes through the gateway of an Internet Service Provider. This is

illustrated by furor concerning the company Phorm in the United Kingdom, and Nebu-Ad in the United States (between 2006 and 2011). This was controversial because the advertising process entails a technical process called deep packet inspection. This scans packets of data that pass through an Internet bottleneck where all of a user’s traffic flows to and from the Internet. This was deemed by many activists, politicians, and engaged citizens as deeply invasive.

Information Society 2.0: Data Profusion Since the early 2000s, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of surveilled information circulating through computer networks. In addition to data on where, what, with whom, and by what by means, this also entails insights on moods, opinions, and sentiments. Historically, this takes place by means of cookies placed on computers that allow remote computers to know which webpages people have visited. This is changing. The means by which marketers and advertisers gain insight into emotions and feelings is broadening, particularly as media items (e.g., smartphones, wearable technologies, and games platforms) gather more personal data on facial expressions, voice patterns, bodily movement, and reactions to physical stimuli. These techniques are less abstract and involve less inference and more observation of what people really feel. Technologies do not tell data miners what people think, but bodily reactions say a great deal about emotional states and dispositions toward a brand, product, or service. Microsoft Xbox One, for example, (with Kinect sensor) possesses motion capture and analysis technologies, gesture recognition technologies, facial recognition technologies, voice recognition technologies, and acoustic source localization technologies. These technologies combine to build an accurate picture of who people are and what they are doing, and they grant far more insight into people than web cookies do. In the Xbox example, pets, products, brands, decorative style, and objects such as pictures and photographs in the scanning range may also be profiled. The overall impetus of data mining in a “big data” era is toward total informational awareness of both our interior selves (what we feel and think) and our public selves (where we go, what we do, what we

Advertising and Marketing Research

say, who we associate with, and what we i­nteract with). This all-inclusive picture of people allows marketers and advertisers to identify ­ patterns, cross-selling opportunities, and ­associations. This has less to do with surveillance of p ­ ersonally identifiable information (names, addresses, and phone numbers), but that which can be tracked and measured will be used to ­ generate patterns and predictions.

Fears About Profiling in Advertising and Marketing Critical attention is reflected well in the work of Mark Andrejevic, Greg Elmer, Christian Fuchs, and Andrew McStay, who have each focused on the techniques and consequences of targeting, rationalization, customization, and personalized media experience, over textual representation. They have their own reasons for addressing the material and technical aspects of online advertising, but whereas traditional advertising tends to be rich in the use of meaning and signification, in relevance-based online advertising, this richness of content is currently much less pronounced. The critical focus on profiling, the attention time we pay to advertising, insight into our preferences, and the ways in which these are understood by media and market researchers find original expression in the work of Dallas Smythe and his idea of the “audience-as-commodity.” The originality of his Marxist-inspired work was to focus on economic dimensions of media industries in capitalism and to point toward audiences as the main commodity manufactured by these industries. This is expressed in today’s truism that “If you’re not paying, you’re the product.” The premise of this is that for the media industry (whether traditional or online), viewers and listeners themselves are their main product. Magazines, newspapers, television shows, YouTube clips, and other content simply act as bait to deliver audiences to advertisers and advertising networks (who then pay the media organization). Media owners have a vested interest in being able to offer advertisers the most sophisticated profiles possible so to maximize the possibility that people might be interested in their products, services, and messages. The audienceas-commodity idea involves a feedback process in which content entices consumers, advertising is

15

served, data about audiences are generated, and advertising is again served on the basis of data generated. In such an account of events online, the user’s virtual self is the profiled commodity. This self is formed by our online histories. For Smythe, this Marxist-oriented argument involves the conceptualization of viewing time as labor. He ­ suggests that as working classes power capitalism, viewers and listeners also keep media industries in  business and profit. Furthermore, as workers “sell” labor power, audiences “sell” watching power, with wages equating to programming. For media and social science scholars, this process is intensified by awareness that much online content is not professionally produced (as it is with television) but is produced by people who share their created content for free (as with YouTube). This serves to effectively reduce a company’s production costs and to generate further profit by means of selling attention time to advertisers. With behavioral advertising, the value of the audience as commodity is increased, not only through precision of targeting but also through perceptions of relevance and the fact that behavioral advertising receives higher click-through rates and brand engagement than other forms of targeting. This leads Vincent Mosco, a political economist of media, to argue that new media amplify Smythe’s arguments. This is because the recursive nature of digital systems expands the commodification process in that companies may package users in a variety of means depending on the audience needs of an advertiser.

Critical Conceptions of These Processes The impetus we see today to quantify, rationalize, predict, preempt, and tailor advertising and marketing content founds initial expression some years ago. It is the search for perfect efficiency, which itself is connected with the capacity for control. The notion of control is an important one as it reflects broader societal change associated with modernity, particularly in terms of speed, movement, communication, precision, logistics, management, feedback, and effective use of resources. Notably, although the word control is linked to dystopian narratives and is often depicted as innately negative, it is more accurately defined in terms of managerial, organizational, and

16

Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance

technical means of reaching predetermined goals. However, a concern for many social theorists is the extent to which implementation of such processes has ceased to serve society and come to oppress it. Apprehension is also increased by the involvement of controlling machines in everyday life, that is, those machines employed to deliver reliable information on people, their activities, habits, preferences, mobility, communication of content, who they are communicating with, and the makeup of groups. This involves the application of machines to understand the world and its people in terms of causation, quantification, correlation, and categorization, and to control social and economic processes. This technical rationality entails a reduction in the value of people, or the process of dehumanization. This view is deeply influenced by the philosopher Martin Heidegger, who sees in technology the tendency to treat people as objects or as reserves. Like other natural resources (coal, oil, gas, electricity, water, food stocks), human culture and activity itself become a stockpile to be “mined.” His criticisms are less about the technologies themselves but instead more about looking at all things in the world through the lens of utility, quantity, efficiency, amounts, reserves, and productivity. In the case of advertising and marketing, this refers to how actions, mobility, beliefs, aspirations, fears, and communication with one another are employed machine-like for profit. Informational businesses share with heavy industry a tendency to use reserves from the environment in order to sustain production and to continue to deepen the levels to which they will mine. In the industrial period, this centered on resources from the ground. In the informational period, much of what is mined comes from people. This bears a distinct similarity to the concept of biopower. This comes from the work of Michel Foucault and entails a conceptualization of the body as a machine to be disciplined, optimized, and integrated into systems of efficient control. For Foucault, the regulation of people and their bodies was an indispensable element in the development of capitalism and the machinery of its production. Likewise, we may say that our digital selves play an indispensable role for the digital economy as it is segmented, clustered, compared,

cross-checked, and redistributed for commercial advertising and marketing objectives. Andrew McStay See also Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Foucault, Michel

Further Readings Andrejevic, Mark. Infoglut: How Too Much Information Is Changing the Way We Think and Know. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. Beniger, James. R. The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. Elmer, Greg. Profiling Machines: Mapping the Personal Information Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: Vol.1. An Introduction. London, England: Penguin Books, 1990. (Original work published 1976) Fuchs, Christian. Digital Labour and Karl Marx. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology.” In D. F. Krell (ed.), Basic Writings. New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1993. (Original work published 1954) McStay, Andrew. The Mood of Information: A Critique of Online Behavioural Advertising. New York, NY: Continuum, 2011. Mosco, Vincent. The Political Economy of Communication. London, England: Sage, 2009. Smythe, Dallas W. Dependency Road: Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness and Canada. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1981.

Aerial Reconnaissance Surveillance

and

Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance have been in existence since the Wright Brothers began tinkering with flying machines in the early 1900s. While surveillance and reconnaissance seem like similar words, they, in fact, have different connotations. Reconnaissance is defined as the inspection, observation, or examination of a region to gain information for military, law enforcement,

Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance

engineering, geological, or other purposes. Typically, reconnaissance refers to a preliminary survey of an area and is the term most often used to describe a military operation during which soldiers explore beyond an area occupied by friendly forces to gain vital information on enemy positions or to survey an unknown area of land before taking military action. Surveillance, on the other hand, refers to the close observation of a particular person, such as a military target, a suspected criminal or spy, a place, or a group. The term surveillance is most commonly used in the law enforcement or private investigative field, where investigators closely watch someone who is suspected of committing a crime by placing him or her “under surveillance” and monitor their behavior and daily activities. Aerial reconnaissance is conducted by using reconnaissance aircraft. Reconnaissance aircraft has taken various forms over the years, particularly of use by the military forces that wish to collect imagery intelligence on unknown regions and potential enemy maneuvers. While manned aircraft and aerial photography have been used to assist military reconnaissance since the early 20th century, high-speed reconnaissance aircraft in World War II and the invention of drone planes, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles, took reconnaissance to another level. While manned reconnaissance aircraft are faster, more maneuverable, and more versatile in their assignments, drones have other strategic advantages. Drones can fulfill any “dull, dirty, or dangerous” job. Dull refers to long flights that would otherwise fatigue pilots having to circumnavigate the globe. Dirty refers to situations where an area that was hit by a nuclear or biological weapon must be surveyed, and dangerous refers to a mission where a particular government might want to fly over a hostile enemy territory to observe the area and does not want to risk a pilot’s life while flying over the area. While drones can collect more intelligence than humans could possibly analyze, they also have a higher crash rate than manned aircraft because drones require satellites and satellite links to relay information to and receive information from the pilots who operate the drones via remote control. Surveillance aircraft comes in all shapes and sizes. Drones are now competing with airplanes

17

and helicopters in the skies. While the military has utilized drones for decades, domestic drones for commercial and recreational use have caught on, with domestic drone production anticipated to have an $82.1 billion domestic economic impact between 2015 and 2025. Domestic use of drones is currently limited only to those who receive specific approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). With the passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, the FAA has been assigned the task of creating regulations for government and civilian drone use by September 2015. The FAA has designated six test ranges with specific airspace throughout the United States to be used to operate drone flights in order to develop better certification and air traffic standards and to learn more about the safe operation of drones. Cameras can be attached to almost any drone and can stream video back to a tablet or a smartphone that has Wi-Fi. Aerial surveillance has become much easier with the invention of drones. Local police departments that could not have afforded a helicopter or an aircraft, a pilot, and aircraft storage fees can now have access to a powerful surveillance tool at a fraction of the cost. Not only are drones used for law enforcement purposes, but drones are also being used to film movie scenes, assist first responders in search-andrescue missions, inspect pipelines and oil rigs, survey and monitor crops, monitor storm damage and flooding, monitor wildlife populations and track poachers, count sea lions in Alaska, monitor drug trafficking on the U.S. and Mexico border, monitor high-crime neighborhoods during drug investigations, monitor traffic, monitor farms for cruelty to animals, assist realtors in marketing real estate, and conduct weather and environmental research. While the unwarranted violation of privacy rights might be a major concern when conducting domestic aerial surveillance, aerial reconnaissance outside the United States for military purposes is conducted with its own set of risks. The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Intelligence Agency collects and provides military and mili­ tary-related intelligence for the secretary of Defense  and other intelligence agencies. The National Reconnaissance Office collects specialized ­intelligence through reconnaissance programs.

18

Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance

While soldiers were sent up in observation balloons during the Civil War, airplanes and now drones collect intelligence through cameras. The National Reconnaissance Office also uses imagery satellites. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is responsible for processing and exploiting such imagery. As with any image or photo, the intelligence gained depends on the quality of the image and the interpretation given to it by a skilled or unskilled analyst. The image developed is a snapshot of one place at a particular time and, therefore, does not provide dynamic intelligence that a human on the ground might provide. Drones and reconnaissance aircraft flying over enemy territory have the risk of being shot down. However, the photo taken by a drone may be of significant worth to policymakers attempting to make an informed decision before going forward on a particular military or political action. Domestic aerial surveillance is much more controversial. Many, including the American Civil Liberties Union, worry that with the advent of drone technology and possible routine aerial surveillance of public life in the United States, we are one step closer to a 24-hour s urveillance state in which every move is ­ ­monitored, tracked, recorded, and scrutinized by government ­authorities, commercial businesses, and even our neighbors. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement. The U.S. Supreme Court determines whether a government action constitutes a search if the action violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy or if the action constitutes a trespass. The Supreme Court has developed a body of Fourth Amendment case law, which spells out which investigatory tools law enforcement has at its disposal that would not trigger the protections a citizen is given under the Fourth Amendment. Prior to drone technology, aerial surveillance was not considered a “search.” In California v. Ciraolo (1986), the Court determined that law enforcement’s observation of marijuana grown in the defendant’s backyard from a fixed-wing aircraft flying at 1,000 feet was not a Fourth Amendment search. Since law enforcement agents were acting just as the public would by flying in FAA-regulated airspace

designated for fixed-wing aircraft, and were seeing the same things the public would at 1,000 feet, the observations made by law enforcement during the flight were not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. In the helicopter case of Florida v. Riley (1989), the Court also found that law enforcement’s observations at 400 feet were done within current FAA guidelines and should not be considered a Fourth Amendment search as any member of the public could have done the same. Last, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States (1986), the Environmental Protection Agency had an aerial photographer take pictures of Dow’s manufacturing facility while within navigable airspace. Because Dow’s industrial facility was in plain view, the Environmental Protection Agency was flying in public airspace, and members of the public could have used the same type of commercially available camera to take the pictures, the taking of the aerial photographs was not deemed a Fourth Amendment search. Under the plain view doctrine, what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not granted Fourth Amendment protection. However, curtilage, the area immediately surrounding a dwelling in which the intimate, daily activities of family life are conducted, is protected. Aerial surveillance is not considered a technique that has the ability to pierce into the privacy of one’s home or curtilage; rather, it is considered to be acceptable if the aircraft is flown in public airspace where the aircraft would be unable to see inside citizens’ homes. Certain circumstances surrounding the use of domestic aerial surveillance, situations, and questions that remain undecided by the Supreme Court possibly jeopardize the legality of this technique by law enforcement: if the aircraft is flown outside FAA-navigable airspace, if the aircraft collects information emanating from within the home, if the aircraft utilizes highly sophisticated technology that is not readily available for public use, or if the aircraft, and more specifically a drone, hovers around the home for a long period of time or creates an undue amount of wind, noise, or dust that could constitute a trespass. All of these concerns could trigger a “search” and subsequent Fourth Amendment protections. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on an aerial surveillance, postdrone technology case. However,

Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance

this has not stopped the state legislatures from either banning law enforcement from using drones to conduct aerial surveillance or, at the very least, limiting drone use to instances where law enforcement has obtained a warrant and the requisite probable cause obtained before using a drone to surveil a particular target of investigation. Most of the states with either pending or passed legislation on this topic have focused on law enforcement’s use of drones and not on the potential for privacy infringement ramifications when drones are used for private, commercial, or recreational purposes. Thus far, 45 states have introduced legislation to protect privacy interests by restricting law enforcement’s use of drones. Guidelines and restrictions will likely be imposed on private drone users when the FAA publishes its new regulations in September 2015. In the meantime, citizens concerned about privacy rights can rely on the common law torts of trespass, nuisance, invasion of privacy, stalking, and harassment to keep drone abuse in check. To succeed in  a nuisance claim, a landowner must argue that  the aircraft substantially and unreasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment of the land. With an invasion of privacy claim, the ­landowner would argue that the flight was an intrusion that  was highly offensive to any reasonable person. If unrestricted drone use goes too far, private drone users, such as journalists, hobbyists, and commercial operators, may soon fear that their First Amendment right to free speech and press may be infringed on as the state legislatures begin to focus on limiting private use. Government restrictions that prevent private citizens or journalists from recording events from the air may infringe on a citizen’s right to gather or record information under the First Amendment. On the flip side, an overabundance of drones in the sky might actually curb one’s First Amendment right to free speech and assembly for fear that they may be monitored. Aerial surveillance in the drone age touches on both Fourth and First Amendment issues. Whether the prospect of inexpensive, small, portable aerial surveillance machines that can capture still images, video, and audio will create pervasive surveillance, police fishing expeditions,

19

nosy neighbors, and an elimination of privacy as we know it are concerns open to debate. What is certain is that in the coming years, both the federal and state legislatures will continue to pass new legislation restricting the use of drones for aerial surveillance and other purposes. These guidelines and restrictions will affect all users, from law enforcement and the intelligence community to hobbyists and businesses. Melanie Reid See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Drones, Commercial Applications of; Google Earth; Katz v. United States (1967); Privacy, Right to; Technology

Further Readings American Civil Liberties Union. Report: Protecting Privacy From Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft. New York, NY: Author, 2011. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf (Accessed October 2014). Bohm, Allie. “Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation in the States.” American Civil Liberties Union (April 22, 2014). https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-andliberty/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states (Accessed October 2014). California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). Dillow, Clay. “What Is the Drone Industry Really Worth?” Fortune (March 12, 2013). http://tech .fortune.cnn.com/2013/03/12/what-is-the-droneindustry-really-worth (Accessed October 2014). Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). Dycus, Stephen, et al. National Security Law (5th ed., Aspen Casebook Series). Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2011. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). Jacobsen, Annie. Area 51: An Uncensored History of America’s Top Secret Military Base. New York, NY: Little, Brown, 2011.

Affordable Healthcare Act See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010

20

Agency

Agency The term agency may be simply defined as the capacity or ability of human beings to make choices. Agency is not the same as free will, which means that human beings are not only free to make choices but also free to act on their choices apart from outside influences. Agency acknowledges that although human beings are free to choose their actions, there are constraints on their actions. These constraints are the result of direct causeand-effect relationships limiting choice as well as social, moral, religious, or circumstantial factors. The doctrine of free will states that human beings are entirely free to choose any course of action. Agency states that although we are free to make our choices, we cannot choose our choices. This, in turn, differs from the doctrine of determinism, which states that our actions are more or less predetermined through cause-and-effect relationships, as in scientific determinism, or God’s will as in theological determinism. Thus, the scientist might suggest that each cause and effect determines the next cause and effect, and so forth; people merely think and act on the previous effect. The theologian might suggest that God predetermined each situation and each participant’s action in that situation. The scientist would see the restraints on action as the product of genetics, early experience, or social forces. Agency would regard these factors as mere influences rather than determinants. Free will would consider such factors as merely present, one being free to act according to one’s will regardless of the situational variables. As stated, although agency acknowledges free choice, the concept acknowledges the existence of constraints on choice. Among those constraints are the effects of knowing that one is being watched, or surveilled. Particularly in public settings, many people will restrain their free ­ will, avoiding actions that could cause embarrassment, harassment, or even arrest. Many people, again, are far more willing to exercise less restraint in private settings. Even in private settings, however, the introduction of the knowledge or even the suspicion of surveillance by outside persons will likely change the behavior of private actors to

protect themselves and their privacy. In short, knowing or suspecting that one is being watched may exert a powerful influence on one’s behavior and choices. To further understand agency with regard to  social factors, including surveillance and ­privacy, this entry discusses how the concept has been applied in theology, philosophy, and sociology, as well as its role in moral agency and accountability.

Theology and Philosophy Judaism and most Christian sects base their theology, particularly with regard to punishment, human or divine, on a foundation of agency rather than free will or determinism. Human beings are free to act, subject to certain constraints, and are thus accountable for their actions, with perhaps at least some consideration being given to circumstances as mitigating factors. For example, in Mosaic Law, a person who intentionally murders an innocent is to be executed; the killer made a choice and must be held accountable for that choice. If extenuating circumstances existed, such as self-defense or accident, the choice to kill was not freely made but was made in terms of agency: freedom to choose limited by circumstances. Thus, the one who killed in self-defense is not held accountable as a murderer. Although many philosophical systems spend little time in dwelling on the nature of agency, free  will, or determinism, both Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx regarded agency as important human activity limited, but not controlled, by the social forces of one’s time and place. Thus, Hegel built on an idea of the Ancient Greeks with his belief in a weltgeist, or “world spirit,” referring to the forces of history and the effect of those forces on societies and individuals. The idea of a zeitgeist, or “spirit of the times,” would seem to follow logically; the spirit of one’s times affects one’s reality, one’s perception of reality, and therefore one’s actions. Marx ­ believed one’s actions to be limited by one’s class but, building on Hegel, developed the idea of “­universal  class”—the class that at a particular time was poised to most influence human events for ­universal human progress.

Agency

Sociology The Marxist and Hegelian ideas of geist and universal class are very close to core ideas in sociology, where the concepts of agency and social structure have formed a foundational debate of the discipline. Specifically, understanding the effects of structure (e.g., social class, race, gender) on agency, the ability to choose one’s actions, is vital to the discipline. That is, sociology rests on discussion of the limiting effects of society on the individual’s ability to make and act on choices.

Moral Agency The discussion thus far leads to the concept of moral agency or accountability. As referenced in theology, philosophy, and sociology, in terms of justice it would seem important to determine to what degree human beings are responsible for their decisions and actions as well as the degree to which they be rewarded or punished for those actions. In strictly theological terms, although one has agency, one must always act in accord with the revealed law of God, however one may understand it. Violating God’s law is an act of agency, and one is accountable to God for such acts. In secular terms, it must be considered that humans possess not only agency but also reason. The question then shifts from the nature (or even existence) of agency and the effects of circumstances on agency to the ability of the individual to rationally choose from the available alternatives. David Hume suggested, in effect, that humans use reason to perform a cost-benefit analysis to choose the alternative most generous to themselves; in effect, humans will always choose from selfishness as selfishness is supremely rational. Hume believed that moral judgment is a myth and that both agency and reason were purely survival mechanisms. Immanuel Kant, conversely, believed that humans must reason based not only on circumstances but also on principles. According to Kant, reason must include careful attention to the interests of others as well as one’s  own self-interest. To be moral, one must place the interests of others at least on a par with self-interest, implying that true morality requires self-sacrifice.

21

Although the Humean and Kantian perspectives are largely irreconcilable, both perspectives acknowledge personal responsibility as well as accountability to other individuals and to society as a whole. Both perspectives, then, see individual reason and society as limits on agency. Not all human beings reason well. Experience, maturity, education, and intelligence are factors in the reasoning process. Following logically the ideas of Hume and Kant, inexperience and immaturity would be limiting factors in agency. Persons with limited mental and experiential resources would accrue less moral responsibility than those not so limited. Children, for example, are not credited with the same moral judgment as adults, and their agency is limited by the internal and external variables inherent in childhood.

Conclusion Agency is the concept that human beings are free to choose courses of action subject to the limitations of personal and social factors. Personal limitations would include things such as conscience (a sense of personal moral responsibility) and cognitive ability. Social factors would include socioeconomic status and the prevailing social ethos of one’s time and place. The existence of agency implies moral responsibility mitigated by personal and social factors and suggests the need for a formal system of justice to determine responsibility based on these factors. M. George Eichenberg See also Choice: Security or Civil Liberties; Morality; Responsibility

Further Readings Bandura, Albert. “Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective.” Annual Review of Psychology, v.52 (2001). Bok, Hilary. Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. Cohen, G. A., et al. “Historical Inevitability and Human Agency in Marxism” [and Discussion]. Proceedings of the Royal Society (1986). http://rspa .royalsocietypublishing.org/content/407/1832/65 (Accessed August 2017).

22

Airport Security

Fischer, John and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. http://www.davidhume.org/texts/epm.html (Accessed August 2017). Kant, Immanuel. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. http://staffweb.hkbu.edu.hk/ppp/rbbr/toc.html (Accessed August 2017). Moore, Michael. Placing Blame. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1998. Pippin, Robert. (2008). Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Airport Security Airport security takes as its priority the safety of aircrafts, passengers, crew, and cargo traveling from one destination to another. A number of different security measures exist in various airports within the United States and globally to maintain this safety. The increasing volume of travel and cargo moved as a result of globalization and the increased threat posed by transnational terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have prompted major upgrades to security tools utilized by airports and government agencies. Profiling and interviewing techniques, closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, biometric data, backscatter X-ray ­ machines, millimeter wavelength detectors, passport checks, and data interception have ­ become common practices for major international airports. These surveillance measures provide airport security officials with a number of critical tools for intercepting threats made to the safety and security of passengers, but these tools may create risks to the integrity of passengers’ privacy, data, and personal information. With the notable exceptions of pandemics such as severe acute respiratory syndrome, hoof and mouth disease, and the avian and swine flus that have caused significant economic and travel disruptions, there have been several notable examples of human-based terrorism. The 1972 Tel Aviv’s Lod International Airport (now Ben Gurion International Airport) massacre saw 26 people killed and 86 injured. The bombing of Air India

Flight 182 in 1985 saw 329 people killed. The hijacking and intentional crashes of American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, ­ American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93 on September 11, 2001 (9/11) resulted in the deaths of 246 passengers aboard the aircrafts and 2,731individuals on the ground (2,606 people in the World Trade Center, where the first two aircrafts crashed, and 125 personnel in the ­Pentagon, where American Flight 77 crashed). The December 22, 2001, failed shoe bombing attempted by Richard Reid on American Airlines Flight 63 revealed significant gaps in both French and American securities. Subsequent acts of terrorism and violence at airports have compounded security restrictions and surveillance directed toward passengers in the post-9/11 period. An August 10, 2006, transatlantic aircraft plot caused heightened security at airports for the three implicated nations: (1) the United States, (2) Canada, and (3) Great Britain. This plot featured the targeting of 10 American and Canadian airlines from Heathrow International Airport. Three years later, the 2009 ­Christmas Day underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253, failed to detonate the plastic explosive within his underwear en route to Detroit, ­Michigan, from Amsterdam. The former event led to the restriction of gels and other carry-on items, whereas the latter prompted the need for full-body scanners and other detection suits in airports. The shooting of a screening agent, Gerardo H ­ ernandez, in November 2013 at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in the passenger screening area sparked the tightening of security at airports. The Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act requires the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate improved emergency management plans with national airports. These breaches have fostered increased escalation in security measures. Each of these incidents reveals limitations surrounding detection, surveillance, evaluation of passenger behavior, and security presence.

Profiling and Interviewing Profiling and interviewing of passengers have been standard features of airport security. These

Airport Security

practices are usually conducted by customs officials, the local police, private security, or airport staff depending on the configuration of airport security in the given state. Profiling and interviewing security practices work in conjunction with other security and surveillance systems as part of a real-time passenger screening process. These processes work within a risk management framework to determine what potential threat each passenger could pose. Profiling and interviewing relate to two different views of screening: (1) uniform screening and (2) selective screening. Uniform screening involves treating all passengers as a potential threat and screening out those who pose no risk. Selective screening involves the use of specific characteristics to isolate threats. Interviewing as a uniform screening approach subjects all passengers to equal evaluation to determine the passenger’s intention, goals, purpose of travel, and possible risks to the state posed by the individual. Profiling as a selective screening method focuses security practices on individuals who meet a given set of criteria or set of patterns. Whereas interviews gather information, profiles evaluate the individual against a set of already collected information such as behavior and appearance. Both methods attempt to assess if an individual is conducting human trafficking, smuggling a controlled substance, or plotting a potential terrorist attack. The difference is scale. Uniform screening practices, such as mass interviews, can be costly, require a large workforce, and delay the speed of traffic through an airport. Selective screening, in the form of profiling, can be costeffective and efficient as it requires regulating and assigning risk. For example, the TSA Pre¸™ program, like other prescreening programs, conducts a risk assessment on individuals prior to their travel, thereby sorting out the low-risk and the high-risk passengers. The primary concern of both approaches is to avoid being easily circumvented by threats. Most airports utilize randomized spot-checks and/or multiple layers of security. Multiple layers of security or a multilayered approach to security combines selective and uniform screening with profiling, explosives detection, canine teams, and on-board flight security. For example, the Department of

23

Homeland Security’s prescreening system ­Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), which was terminated in 2004, sorted through passengers and evaluated their credit histories and criminal records to assess what threat level they represented. It then selected passengers with higher risk levels for screening. CAPPS was not able to predict future behavior; the system was only able to evaluate risk and select passengers for screenings. CAPPS was able to evaluate risk based on information that would not be available to or detectable by individual security staff by interview or application of a profile.

Closed-Circuit Television CCTV coverage allows for sensitive points and crowd and/or passenger behavior to be observed from a safe distance. The strength of CCTV monitoring is its ability to go undetected within terminals as cameras are designed to blend into the architecture of the terminal. The limits of this medium of surveillance include data storage for digital recordings and/or video recordings. The detail of recordings may be restricted due to the sophistication of the software used. The visibility of distant objects may also be restricted depending on the model of the camera being used. The transition to modernize CCTV capabilities and coverage at international and national airports in the United States is an ongoing project. For example, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the department responsible for airline security, allotted approximately $4.9 ­million, as of 2009, to install CCTV systems at Philadelphia International Airport in order to improve surveillance coverage. Likewise, as of 2012, LAX has undertaken a CCTV enhancement project totaling more than $50 million to improve the coordination of camera feeds through the NICE video management system. The LAX enhancement project brought the number of CCTV cameras from 1,000 to approximately 3,000 in an effort to address issues of coverage, evidence collection, and coordination between feeds. Overall, LAX has spent approximately $1.6 billion from September 11, 2001, to 2012 on security infrastructure.

24

Airport Security

Biometrics Biometric screening technologies such as facial recognition software have seen marked improvements of enhancing screening at airports as they screen out individuals who match images held within a digital data bank. Facial recognition ­software, as a subcategory of biometrics, utilizes specific facial characteristics of an individual to determine a person’s identity based on a passport photo or images held in terrorist, law-­enforcement, or no-fly databases. Biometrics is the use of ­specific biological characteristics of individuals to determine their identity. Facial recognition software utilizes e-gates, CCTV, face scanners, and/or security-operated cameras to take a photo of a passenger and compare that photo with those within a database. This measure is unable to evaluate the intentions of the individuals who are not prior offenders. The system may also yield false positives or fail to work at certain distances. In addition, the software cannot see through facial coverings. As of 2001, Logan Airport, M ­ assachusetts; Oakland International Airport, California; T. F. Green ­Airport, Rhode Island; and Fresno Yosemite International Airport, California, had adopted facial recognition software. Heathrow Airport, London, in 2008 and the Cardiff Airport, Wales, in 2009 adopted facial recognition software. In 2014, the Brussel International Airport made use of facial recognition software. The 2014 Russian Winter Olympic Games at Sochi saw use of facial recognition to screen athletes, spectators, and dignitaries attending the Olympics.

Backscatter X-Ray Machines Backscatter X-ray machines are whole-body scanners (WBS) that utilize low-intensity X rays to scan the body for hidden weapons, metals, and other possible concealed objects. The X rays scan only the body’s exterior to generate an image and to reveal any concealed objects. WBS have replaced metal detectors in many airports due to metal detectors’ failing to detect biological, chemical, and nonmetallic weapons. The average scan takes about 15 seconds. The inability of the backscatter X-ray scan to penetrate the body makes it unable to detect drugs that may have been ingested or other objects that may be held within the body for

the purposes of smuggling. The duration for which the images can be stored remains largely unregulated internationally. The graphic detail of the images, as well as the possibility of images leaking to the public, has prompted numerous privacy concerns. The American Civil Liberties Union fielded numerous complaints with the U.S. Congress over the use of full-body scanners as an invasion of privacy. In 2007, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, headquartered in San Francisco, ­California, ruled that airport searches of passengers are reasonable and do not require consent. As of 2014, the TSA had deployed 700 WBS across the United States. The scanners prove useful in detecting hidden objects, concealed weapons, improvised explosive device components, and narcotics. However, the scanners require a TSA viewer to be always present and focused in order to effectively carry out a thorough inspection of the image. In addition, scanners have presented a high rate of failure in detecting biological and explosive substances. The high failure rate of detection has led the U.S. policymakers to allow passengers to request a pat down instead of entering the WBS. Backscatter X rays were banned in the European Union Airports in 2012 due to privacy and health concerns.

Millimeter Wavelength Detectors Millimeter wavelength detectors are WBS that utilize electromagnetic radiation to detect objects concealed under a passenger’s clothing. The millimeter wavelength detector represents the other detection technology that TSA has been deploying in U.S. airports since 2007 to detect explosive, drug, and biological compounds. The FAA (­ Federal Aviation Administration) Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 required that all full-body scanners replace nude body images with a chalk outline. The failure of the backscatter X-ray machines supplier, Rapiscan, to make these alterations resulted in all these machines being removed from U.S. airports as of 2013. Millimeter wavelength detectors have replaced backscatter X-ray machines. The primary difference between millimeter wavelength detectors and backscatter X rays is the use of automatic target recognition software in millimeter wavelength detectors. The

Airport Security

automatic target recognition allows for automated scanning for threats and concealed objects. This presents a major cost savings in reducing the number of personnel who have to oversee the m ­ illimeter wavelength detectors. The number of false alarms and the time burden on TSA screeners in resolving false alarms are not publically reported. TSA is deploying millimeter wavelength detectors to large, high-risk airports. This produces the problem of terrorists not being fully screened at smaller airports but arriving at larger airports.

25

a potential point of attack for hackers. The ability to read the chips and ensure the integrity of the data also presents a substantial cost to the airport screening facilities. The chip-reading terminals must be protected from sabotage and tampering. Finally, the risk of encountering e-­passports that have undergone chip substitution or photo ­tampering on the chip reflects another layer of risk that airport security must be attentive to.

Data Interception

Data monitoring and interception of data that are being transmitted through wireless or digital Passports are used in a variety of ways to verify the mediums is nothing new. The U.S. Department of identity of passengers. The passport can be encoded Defense National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency with data that allows passengers to easily pass has been monitoring communications between through security checkpoints once they have gone planes and air traffic control towers since 2001. through prescreening. As with the TSA Pre¸™, However, data monitoring with regard to airport passengers who have already gone through this security by centralized state intelligence agencies process enter a reduced level of surveillance. Passrepresents a relatively new application of informaports pose a number of challenges to airport secution surveillance. In 2014, Edward Snowden (an rity. The possibility of forged credentials is high. American computer professional) leaked docuThe e-passport is the latest generation of informaments that revealed that the Canadian foreign tion cards offered by the International Civil Aviacyberintelligence department, Communications tion Organization as well as national governments Security Establishment Canada, developed a pilot such as the United States and member states of the program in conjunction with the U.S. National ­European Union. The e-passport, while allowing Security Agency to monitor, track, and collect for expedience, has produced a number of probmetadata information from passengers logged lems. In 2012, the International Civil Aviation onto the free Wi-Fi offered by Canadian interna­Organization estimated that in the United States tional airports. The collection of metadata allows alone, more than 72 million e-passports were for conversations to be tracked and profiles for in  circulation. The e-passports employ radio-­ device users to be developed and correlated with ­frequency identification (RFID) to store and transother state databases. In addition, this metadata mit ­biometrics stored on a microchip. RFID allows tracking allowed passengers to be tracked backfor personal information to be confirmed and ward in time due to the metadata already stored viewed by airport scanners. Biometric data stored in their mobile devices, receiver towers, and Wi-Fi by the e-passport can include the optional facial hotspots hosted by service providers. The tracking image, fingerprints, and iris data. E-passports of metadata provides state security firms with an ­minimize the likelihood of forgeries and work to enhanced ability to profile, monitor, and coordisuppress human smuggling and trafficking. Hownate passengers who may pose a threat to national ever, storing the data digitally presents a number of security. This surveillance strategy is limited, critical threats, from hackers to transnational terbecause it assumes that passengers will activate rorism. The RFID feature of e-passports allows their mobile devices within a monitored airport. them to be tracked, allows data to be both skimmed However, TSA’s 2014 screening precautions now and cloned, and creates a possibility of both pasrequire passengers at overseas airports to activate sive and digital eavesdropping when the card is not mobile devices in order to ensure that they are shielded. In addition, the security of the connection not  a tool for smuggling or concealing a hidden between the chip reader and the chip on the card is weapon. In addition, the volume of data collected

Passports

26

Airport Terminal Security Screenings

by the phone may prove to strain the already tight resources of the state security agencies. Last, the application of data tracking surveillance without probable cause poses a risk to privacy of any person using the airport Wi-Fi. James FitzGerald See also Airport Terminal Security Screenings; Border Patrol Checkpoints; Closed-Circuit Television; Passenger Data; Passenger Profiling

Further Readings “Airport Starts Facial Recognition.” BBC News (November 17, 2009). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_ news/wales/8363232.stm (Accessed July 2014). Amoore, Louise and Alexandra Hall. “Taking People Apart: Digitised Dissection and the Body at the Border.” Society and Space, v.27 (2009). Armstrong, James. “CSEC Tracked Travellers Using Wi-Fi at Major Canadian Airport: Report.” Global News (January 31, 2014). http://globalnews.ca/news/ 1120935/csec-used-wi-fi-at-major-canadian-airportto-track-travellers-reports (Accessed July 2014). Cendrowicz, Leo Can. “Airport Body Scanners Stop Terrorist Attacks?” Time (January 5, 2010). http://content.time.com/time/world/article/ 0,8599,1951529,00.html (Accessed July 2014). Elias, Bart. “Airport Body Scanners: The Role of Advanced Imaging Technology in Airline Passenger screening.” Congressional Research Service (2012). https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/ metadc122258/ (Accessed October 2017). Garrett, Ronnie L. “LAX Beefs Up Security With Upgraded CCTV, Access Control & Badging Systems.” Airport Improvement Magazine (September 2012). http://www.airportimprovement.com/article/ lax-beefs-security-upgraded-cctv-access-controlbadging-systems (Accessed October 2017). Hoepman, Jaap-Henk, et al. “Crossing Borders: Security and Privacy Issues of the European e-Passport.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, v.4266 (2006). Jeng, Aalbert B. and Lo-Yi Chen. “How to Enhance the Security of e-Passport.” Machine Learning and Cybernetics, v.5 (2009). Juels, Ari, et al. “Security and Privacy Issues in e-Passports.” Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, (2005). Lombard, Etienne. “Bombing Out: Using Full-Body Imaging to Conduct Airport Searches in the United States and Europe Amidst Privacy Concerns.” Tulane

Journal of International and Comparative Law, v.337 (2010–2011). McLay, Laura A., et al. “Risk-Based Policies for Airport Security Checkpoint Screening.” Transportation Science, v.44/3 (2010). http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/ trsc.1090.0308 (Accessed July 2014). Persico, Nicola and Petra E. Todd. “Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening, and Airport Security.” American Economic Review, v.95/2 (2005). “Pre ✓™ Begins at John F. Kennedy International Airport.” U.S. Transportation Security Administration. (February 29, 2012). http://www.tsa.gov/press/ releases/2012/02/29/tsa-pre-check-TM-begins-john-fkennedy-international-airport (Accessed October 2017). Salter, Mark B., ed. Politics at the Airport. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Sweet, Kathleen M. Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism and Safety Concerns. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2004. “TSA Announces $4.9 Million for Airport Surveillance at Philadelphia International Airport” (Press release). U.S. Transportation Security Administration (October 19, 2009). http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2009/10/19/ tsa-announces-49-million-airport-surveillancephiladelphia-international (Accessed July 2014). “TSA Tightens Security, Requires Some U.S.-Bound Travellers to Turn on Phones.” CBC News (July 6, 2014). http://www.cbc.ca/m/touch/news/story/1 .2698166 (Accessed July 2014). Weikel, Dan. “House Passes Bill to Improve Airport Security in Wake of LAX Shooting.” LA Times (July 22, 2014). http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ la-me-ln-airport-security-bill-20140722-story.html (Accessed October 2017). Weston, Greg, et al. “CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Canadian Travellers: Edward Snowden Documents.” CBC News (January 30, 2014). http://www.cbc.ca/ news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadiantravellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881 (Accessed October 2017). Zureik, Elia and Mark B. Salter, eds. Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity. Portland, OR: Willan, 2005.

Airport Terminal Security Screenings Security screenings at airport terminals are an important and visible part of aviation security.

Airport Terminal Security Screenings

This entry examines the screenings that passengers undergo—similar measures are taken for the screening of the aircraft personnel and other members of the airport workforce. This entry looks into the spatial setups, technologies, and social relations that define the screening checkpoint and that have more recently rendered airport security as one of the most controversial issues in global travel. First, the checkpoint itself and its role in the architectural design of the (prototypical) airport are described. Then some of the numerous policy regulations and technologies that are usually in place for the sake of security screenings are discussed. The last section deals with the “human dimension,” exploring economics and social power relations at the checkpoint.

Architectural Design of Airports An airport basically consists of two parts, which are usually referred to as the “land side” and the “air side.” The land side of the airport is connected to the public transport systems and roads, and it provides the point of entrance for passengers (unless they take a connecting flight). The air side of the airport consists of everything that can be accessed by plane (including the runways). Within this air-side area, secure or “sterile” zones are established. There may be multiple secure zones at one airport, which may be interconnected or separated, and within these zones, different security regulations or standards may apply. For example, there may be different zones for international and domestic flights at a single airport. However, this entry focuses on the simple case of one sterile zone created within the air side, which can be accessed from the land side. Security screening typically takes place at the interface of the land side and the sterile zone. Only those who have successfully undergone the local security screening are allowed to enter the sterile zone. Passengers who enter the airport from the air side are usually not expected to undergo additional security screening. If one takes a connecting flight, one is expected to either stay within the sterile zone or undergo the same kind of security screening again if one has to leave and reenter the sterile zone. This indicates that local security screenings not only aim to provide security for departing flights but also serve as security

27

measures for the whole civil aviation system as each airport serves as an entry point to the international aviation network. This is highlighted by the demands for international security standards (e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 17: Security—Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference). This line of thinking already has implications for the design of the architectural environment, which at least must support the distinction between the public part of the airport, the sterile zone, and the extensive backstage area, where, for example, luggage is transported. Since every traveler needs to be subjected to security screenings, the entry to the sterile zone must allow for effective control of the flow of passengers, and the entry presents itself as a spatial bottleneck within an otherwise usually large and open environment. This furthermore indicates that security screening is only one part of the overall security system, because additional security measures may need to be in place in order to prevent unauthorized persons from having access to the sterile zone in the first place. As with every other checkpoint, for instance at borders, the urge to render crossing persons harmless stems arguably from the lack of knowledge of the “other.” The French anthropologist Marc Augé has deemed airports as transitory “nonplaces” that are characterized by a lack of social relations, and which therefore have a special need when it comes to the establishment of trustworthiness. This has not always been so. In the 1960s, one could easily walk up to the apron and to an aircraft, but such openness was abandoned after several politically motivated and highly publicized hijackings occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Aviation, subsequently, could no longer be thought of as a luxury elite community of the global avant-garde. Trustworthiness, as it had turned out, was not a given at all. Thus, with the awareness that aviation was part of the highly vulnerable modern mobility infrastructure, a paradigm of suspicion emerged. Passengers had to be inspected and scrutinized thoroughly to make sure they would not inflict any harm on/through aviation. The introduction of security checkpoints within the airport, however, has not solved the problem

28

Airport Terminal Security Screenings

of terrorism and violence. Rather, it has relocated potential targets, as the introduction of the bottleneck creates a potential target area with (at times) a large number of potential victims. However, attackers have not exploited this vulnerability too often. Incidents such as the Frankfurt Airport shooting (2011) and the Domodedovo International Airport bombing (2011) demonstrate the limitation of airport security screenings, which focus on creating a secure zone within the airport, yet do not provide any security for those in the public part of the airport. This also indicates the need to differentiate between airport security and aviation security. Security screenings aim to provide the latter.

Screening Methods and Technologies With regard to the screening process, it is useful to distinguish between the different elements of that process, which relate to the desire to prevent specific kinds of attack. In reaction to the increased numbers of hijackings, metal detectors were installed and the X-ray screening of carry-on luggage became obligatory in many countries in the late 1970s. Both measures aimed to identify what are considered to be “dangerous goods.” Weapons (e.g., guns, knives) are obvious examples here. Pat downs and the luggage screening may also detect explosives or flammable substances. The definition of dangerous goods that are allowed in carry-on luggage has varied over time according to what was believed to be likely threats. For instance, the controversial ban of liquids was introduced after a plot to detonate several aircraft on their way from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada with liquid explosives was foiled by the British police forces in August 2006. Subsequently, hand luggage restrictions in the United States and the European Union (as well as in many other countries around the world) were adjusted such that all liquids and gels were completely banned for an extended period. This ban has since been lightened but not abandoned. As of summer 2015, in addition to the “classical” list of forbidden objects that includes the likes of sharp objects (e.g., knives, box cutters, scissors), guns and firearms, certain sporting equipment, tools, and explosive and flammable materials, passengers are only allowed to carry

liquids and gels not exceeding 100 milliliters (3.4 ounces) in separate containers, which must be placed in a transparent zip-top bag. The liquid ban regulation has been widely criticized due to a supposed lack of effectiveness, with critics deeming it a merely symbolic effort to regain the trust of travelers. According to numerous experts, even small amounts of liquid explosives that fall within the limits of the regulation could, if strategically placed, cause major damage on board an aircraft. Efforts to repeal the liquid ban regulations have not yet been successful. The adequacy of security screening measures and carry-on luggage regulations has been questioned not only in terms of effectiveness but also in terms of the reactionary nature of these measures. ­Airport security screening has often been t­ ightened only in reaction to thwarted or actual terrorist or criminal incidents. Other criticism concerns the apparent role of negotiations, rather than security considerations, with regard to bringing certain items into the ­sterile zone. For example, some security experts suggest that passengers should not be allowed to take laptops on board aircraft because they present a major challenge to traditional screening devices due to the materials used (e.g., in batteries). But because of the economic importance of ­business travelers, bans on laptops or similar devices have not been introduced. If one considers the technologies used in the security process as a means to enforce the existing regulations, then one can see that the desire to detect certain goods goes hand in hand with the rollout of new technologies. The introduction of explosives-trace-detection machines and advanced imaging technologies (body scanners), for instance, points to the limited functionality of metal detectors that are not suitable to detect anything but metal (as the name suggests). Another element in the screening process is the verification of the identity of each passenger. Before entering the sterile zone, travelers need to be authorized by means of a valid ticket. At times, passengers are also required to present a valid personal identification (ID) before undergoing security screening. When leaving the sterile zone by means of boarding aircraft, passengers once more have to prove the ownership of their ticket’s by presenting their ID documents. These processes

Airport Terminal Security Screenings

allow a certain amount of control over who is within the secure zone at a certain point in time. For example, if a person proceeds through the screening checkpoint but does not board a plane, one may suspect that the person has left the secure zone and has entered a restricted area. However, the process also aims to ensure that a plane does not transport any luggage that does not belong to a passenger on board that plane. If a passenger does not board his or her plane on time, then the passenger’s luggage is removed from the plane. By doing so, the likelihood of mid-air bombings (like the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which on December 21, 1988, over Lockerbie, Scotland, was destroyed by the explosion of a bomb in a suitcase) is decreased, as potential attackers who manage to bring explosives on board must be willing to be killed by the explosion. The attacks of September 11, 2001, led to a shift in aviation security, as it became apparent that civil aircraft might be turned into powerful weapons. In addition, the “suicide attacker” became a prominent figure in aviation, taking its place alongside the hijacker. The perceived need to increase the level of aviation security eventually produced more restrictive screening protocols and upgrades in technology. One notable development was a stronger emphasis on profiling programs, which aim to discriminate among the different types of travelers. Among other things, these programs allow screeners to submit different categories of travelers to different kinds of security screenings. Profiling also has to be understood in economic terms and in terms of time constraints. Screening technology is costly, and airports could reduce costs if fewer technology devices (e.g., body scanners) were used in screening only select travelers. In addition, security checkpoints function in the fashion of a valve: They slow down the flow of passengers for the sake of careful scrutiny. If profiling is implemented, it arguably would speed up the flow of travelers through the checkpoints. Airports, therefore, have to position themselves on a continuum between the number of passengers screened in a certain period of time and the time that people spend waiting to undergo security controls. A long waiting time may make flying less attractive and may also prevent passengers from using the shops, bars, and other commercial

29

offerings inside the airport. Therefore, being able to differentiate between more and less trustworthy travelers is a tempting option. Only the latter would then have to be subjected to additional screening measures, and subsequently, fewer expensive devices might suffice. The idea of being able to detect attackers before they undergo security screening also promises to reduce part of the pressure on the actual checkpoint, which acts as the “last line of defense” in aviation.

Human Effect of Screening Procedures One of the most controversial technological means that has been introduced to provide enhanced security is “advanced imaging technologies” or “security scanners,” which are commonly known as “body scanners” and are often referred to in public debates as “naked scanners.” The machines had only been introduced at a wider level in the European Union after December 25, 2009, when an attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit with explosives hidden in the attacker’s underpants was foiled. In the aftermath of this incident, authorities of several countries decided to opt for technology that had already stirred public debates in the United States, where body scanners had been deployed several years earlier. Body scanners basically provide the capability to look under a passenger’s clothes by analyzing the reflection of radiation from the skin surface. However, from this reflection, a visual image is computed that strikingly resembles a picture of the naked human body. Thus, protests arose, centered on complaints in terms of an intrusion of intimacy and privacy, as well as in terms of violations of religious beliefs. Subsequently, body scanners became a subject in the discussion on privacy by design quite early. The basic idea was to redesign the scanners in such a way that the privacy intrusion could be minimized. Currently, the original images on most machines have been replaced by abstract matchstick figures, and the “naked” image is either not shown at all or transferred to a security officer who is placed in a remote room without visual contact with the actual passenger. Although this may reduce the privacy intrusion for many travelers, the application of the privacy-by-design principle amplified the privacy issues for others. Body

30

Airport Terminal Security Screenings

scanners work on the premise that a normal passenger has nothing to hide underneath his or her clothes. Yet, for example, people with disabilities and/or in medical conditions may have good reasons to hide “something” in order to “pass as normal” (e.g., adult diapers, prosthesis, medical devices, artificial body openings). All these are marked as “suspicious objects” by a body scanner. The so-called privacy-sensitive machines may make the situation worse, because with these machines security personnel are no longer able to react to an identified object (e.g., a medical device), but they have to react to the algorithmic detection of “something” that may be a bomb just as well as an adult diaper. Hence, the “suspicious person” has to undergo additional security screenings, which in turn may become rather unpleasant and/or even more revealing than the initial screening. Apart from concerns with body scanners, airport security screening in general has a rather negative reputation. Besides the protocols and technologies described so far, one may e­ ncounter— depending on the country and the specific a­ irport— requests to remove one’s shoes and/or all electronic devices (e.g., laptops, tablets) from his or her carry-on luggage in order to have them screened separately, passage through a metal ­detector portal, manual pat downs, submission to explosives detection devices, or even submission to sniffer, or detection, dogs. Security screening at airports is by no means convenient, and considerable criticism has been uttered toward screening practices with regard to groping, sexual harassment, humiliation, discrimination, and other issues. Arguably, this is at least partly due to the power imbalance that one encounters at the screening checkpoint. The passenger, although formally the paying customer, has little leverage to challenge screening practices or choose the technologies by which he or she would like to be screened. Particularly in the United States, civil initiatives have been calling for more dignified screening practices. For instance, the Transportation Security Administration has established the possibility for an opt-out when it comes to body scanners, but passengers who opt out would then need to undergo an enhanced pat-down procedure, which some have argued does not necessarily enhance passenger convenience.

When it comes to the social relations of the airport security checkpoint, another rather problematic issue is the outsourcing and privatization of the actual screening activities in many countries. As many authors have argued, such outsourcing undermines the democratic legitimacy of civil servants (e.g., police officers) when it comes to rather invasive screening measures. Most notably, the U.S. government, as a response to 9/11, founded the federal Transportation Security Administration to recapture security screening within the public domain.

Final Thoughts Airport security serves multiple purposes: Screenings are set to make sure that passengers have been cleared in terms of identification (“Is the physical person identical with the person on the ticket and also identical with the presented ID documents?”), in terms of authorization (“Does the person present a valid flight ticket that entitles him or her access to the sterile zone or does he or she need access for work reasons?”), in terms of carry-on goods (“Does the person transport any dangerous objects?”), and, arguably most important, in terms of trustworthiness (“Can the person be considered harmless?”). However, those multiple purposes can create multiple tensions as well. The latter notion of establishing trustworthiness has often been especially criticized. Practices, regulations, and technology all converge at the screening checkpoint and combine to form a strict regime of scrutiny. Particularly in the wake of 9/11, public unease has peaked, as airport screening around the world has undergone major transformations that have attempted to tighten procedures in order to enhance and ensure security—often in stark contrast to the convenience and uninterrupted journeys that aviation advertisements suggest. Matthias Leese and Michael Nagenborg See also Airport Security; Border Patrol Checkpoints; Passenger Profiling; Security, Concepts of; Technology

Further Readings Jones, Richard. “Checkpoint Security. Gateways, Airports and the Architecture of Security.” In Katja F. Aas,

Al Qaeda et al., eds. Technologies of Insecurity: The Surveillance of Everyday Life. London, England: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009. Lippert, Randy and Daniel O’Connor. “Security Assemblages: Airport Security, Flexible Work, and Liberal Governance.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, v.28/3 (2003). Lyon, David. “Airport Screening, Surveillance, and Social Sorting: Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Context.” Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, v.48/3 (2006). Martin, Lauren L. “Bombs, Bodies, and Biopolitics: Securitizing the Subject at the Airport Security Checkpoint.” Social & Cultural Geography, v.11/1 (2010). Salter, Mark B., ed. Politics at the Airport. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.

Al Qaeda Al Qaeda is a militant Islamic terrorist group that was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988. The name in Arabic means “the base.” Alternate spellings include “al-Qaida” and “al-Qa’ida.” Al Qaeda’s goal is to establish a worldwide caliphate, that is, an Islamic state that is ruled by a caliph (caliph is an Arabic word meaning “successor of Mohammad and ruler of the state”). The presence of and deadly attacks orchestrated by al Qaeda have led to drastic changes in surveillance and security, not only in the United States but in other Western countries as well. This entry examines the creation and founders of al Qaeda, reviews many of the organization’s most prominent terrorist attacks, and describes some of the changes instituted by the United States in response to those attacks. Al Qaeda is responsible for some of the most well-known acts of terrorism, including the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassy buildings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998; the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole; the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center; as well as the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing. Al Qaeda has also been responsible for a stream of smaller, though still deadly, terror attacks. The group uses suicide bombings, small-arms attacks, and complex attacks. Complex attacks are attacks on a

31

building or compound that are initiated by an explosive, followed by small-arms fire. Complex attacks usually entail a minimum of five terrorists, though there is no upper limit on the number of parties involved. Al Qaeda conducts the majority of its attacks in the Middle East, though Europe, North America, and South America are occasional targets. Currently, al Qaeda has operatives throughout the world, though it does not have the capabilities that it did during the 1990s and early 2000s, as a result of the global War on Terror. Al Qaeda was founded to establish a worldwide caliphate. The founders of the group, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, sought to eliminate Western influence from the Muslim world. Their views are largely based on the teachings of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a right-wing political group established in the 1920s. Qutb taught that the failure to follow Islamic law and its moral codes caused failings in Islam. Furthermore, Qutb believed that people were no longer true Muslims if they embraced the influences of the Western world. According to Qutb, the only way to restore Islam is to remove Western influence from the Middle East. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri took this to mean that ­Westerners must be killed and all Western influence removed from Muslim territory. Only then could a ­worldwide caliphate be established. Al Qaeda has many connections with other terrorist groups, as well as ideologically aligned nations. Offshoots of al Qaeda have been created, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent. Ideological allies include the Haqqani Network, Tamil Tigers, Taliban, Abu Sayyaf Group, and Lashkar e-Taiba. The status of al Qaeda is deeply divided among the countries of the world. Some nations view al Qaeda as a terrorist group, whereas other nations offer shelter and support for its members. Al Qaeda has received support from several countries, including Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and Iran. A common trait of nations that oppose al Qaeda is that they are mostly Western countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and New Zealand. The zeal that al Qaeda thrives on is found in the spirit generated by the Afghani and Middle

32

Al Qaeda

Eastern people during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The basis from which al Qaeda leaders and commanders drew experience and fighters was the mujahideen, a multi-ethnic group of fighters within Afghanistan that was fighting against the Soviet invasion of ­Afghanistan. bin Laden was a mujahideen financier, while alZawahiri was a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an Islamic ­terrorist group, founded in the 1970s, that is currently an affiliate of al Qaeda. These two, along with unnamed other members, formed the basis of al Qaeda in 1988. Al Qaeda has a loose hierarchical structure. It has a top-down-driven management style, where direction comes from the group’s shura. A shura is a governing group consisting of the highest-level leaders of an organization. The al Qaeda shura comprised bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Saif al-Adel, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and several others (an exhaustive list has never been released). Different elements are represented within the shura, such as operations, training, religion, Islamic study, finance, and law and military. Decisions from the shura are distributed through the Internet; however, operational information is kept a closely guarded secret. There are many separate cells of al Qaeda spread throughout the world. The cellbased structure allows al Qaeda to continue toward its goal even if one cell disbands. Should a cell be broken up by the authorities, the lack of information members have about one another limits the ability of law enforcement, the military, and the intelligence community to act. Al Qaeda made its presence known to the world in 1992. The group set two bombs at Yemeni hotels. The goal of the bombings was to drive U.S. soldiers out of Somalia. The next major attack was on February 23, 1993, when the World Trade Center in New York City was bombed. A truck bomb was parked in the basement of the World Trade Center, and it was detonated shortly after noon, killing 6 and injuring more than 1,000. The attack was coordinated by Ramzi Yousef and financed by Khaled Sheikh Mohammad. The planning for this attack began in 1991, while Yousef was in an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. The purpose of the attack was to force the United States to end aid to Israel, to have the United States cease relations

with Israel, and for the United States to pull out military support from the Middle East. In 1998, U.S. Embassy buildings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, were bombed. Two delivery trucks were parked outside the embassies and simultaneously detonated. As a result of these bombings, more than 200  ­people were killed, and more than 4,000 were injured. Responsibility for the attack lay with al Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The two groups claimed that the bombings were revenge for U.S. involvement in the arrest, extradition, and torture of four Egyptian Islamic Jihad members. These bombings resulted in bin Laden earning a spot on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s most wanted list. In addition, the then president Bill Clinton authorized the use of cruise missile strikes against al Qaeda training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda suicide bombers blew a large hole in the hull of the USS Cole on October 12, 2000. The attack occurred in the Yemeni port of Aden. Al Qaeda immediately claimed responsibility for the bombing. As a result of the attack, 17 sailors died, and 39 were injured. The vessel was still seaworthy, so after being repaired, it was placed back in service. Videos of the bombing and the aftermath taken by the insurgents have been used in al Qaeda recruitment videos. Two al Qaeda members, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Jamal Ahmad Mohammad Ali al-Badawai, were responsible for the planning of the attack, while bin Laden provided the funding. The most well-known attack was on September 11, 2001. Nineteen al Qaeda hijackers took control of four airplanes, flying two of them into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon, with the fourth crashing into a Pennsylvania field, en route to the White House. As a result of this attack, the United States declared a “War on Terror” and ramped up efforts and presence in the Middle East. It was also speculated that al Qaeda was involved in mailing letters filled with anthrax in 2001; however, it was discovered that al Qaeda was not responsible, and the source was traced to domestic terrorism. The attack on 9/11, as it has come to be known, as well as the anthrax letters triggered a reaction from Congress. On October 26, 2011, Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed the

Alcoholics Anonymous

PATRIOT Act into law. This law gave law enforcement and the intelligence community greater latitude in investigating domestic and international terrorism. In addition, the law greatly enhanced the penalties and sentences for terrorism-related crime. On October 12, 2002, al Qaeda and the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah attacked a nightclub in Bali. As a result of this attack, 202 people were killed and 209 injured. An audiotape released after the attack was connected to bin Laden, who claimed responsibility for the bombing. He claimed that the bombing was due to the United States’ War on Terror. A suicide bomber detonated an explosive device hidden in his backpack inside the nightclub. When people ran outside, a second bomb, hidden inside a van, was set off. It was later found that the attack was financed by al Qaeda and planned by Jemaah Islamiyah. The Muslim cleric Abu Baker Bashir, the religious head of Jemaah Islamiyah, planned the attack and recruited local insurgents to carry out the bombing. Since 2002, al Qaeda has planned and carried out smaller attacks, though not on the scale of those previously described. Douglas Jordan See also Terrorism; Torture

Further Readings Gerges, Fawaz A. The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2014. Ibrahim, Raymond. The Al-Qaeda Reader: The Essential Texts of Osama bin Laden’s Terrorist Organization. New York, NY: Broadway Books, 2007. Ryan, Michael W. S. Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013.

Alcoholics Anonymous Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) offers emotional support and advocates abstinence to recovering alcoholics. The international organization, developed in 1935 by Bill Wilson and Bob Smith, depends on self-help groups and a 12-step model.

33

AA regards alcoholism as both a medical and spiritual disease. AA purports to carry its message to alcoholics in an anonymous setting while not promoting itself or endorsing outside enterprises. AA relies on nonprofessionals who are recovering alcoholics. As such, privacy concerns may be an issue. This entry describes the AA 12-step program, discusses privacy concerns associated with the program, and presents criticisms of AA.

12-Step Program The 12-step program espoused by AA emphasizes spiritual, character, and social development and growth. To get to an individual’s goal of sobriety, AA members work their steps with the help of a sponsor who is an alcoholic in recovery. The steps must be worked sequentially, thus building on the previous step, and are completed only when the step is accepted and internalized. Half of the steps involve the necessity of the participant to appeal to a higher power to eliminate character defects. Prayer, meditation, or continued spiritual growth are essential throughout the recovery process of AA to progress through the steps. It is important to note that higher power can mean different things to different people, so it can refer to God, nature, the group, or any power that is greater than the individual. AA advises that once an alcoholic, always an alcoholic. As such, the program requires lifelong abstinence and attendance at AA meetings to strengthen moral character. Regardless of the treatment modality, such as insight-oriented therapy, detoxification, or medication, the rate of treatment success for alcoholism is not encouraging. Relapse is a significant problem for alcoholics because the addiction itself resides deep within the brain, and the necessity to prevent relapse rests ultimately with the individual. Thus, effective relapse prevention is purported to require some kind of supervision beyond the individual, an enduring behavior that competes with alcohol, strong interpersonal relationships, and a heightened sense of spirituality, thereby achieving a sustained pattern of relapse prevention.

Privacy Concerns Inherent in the very name, AA promotes privacy by virtue of the anonymous nature of meetings.

34

Alcoholics Anonymous

Records of meetings, including names and c­ ontent, are not maintained, and members are specifically advised not to reveal identities of or information about participants. The proponents of AA hold that anonymity encourages participation while safeguarding against the stigma of alcoholism. However, since AA has no professional staff, confidentiality does not typically attach, so it ­ relies on the consensus and compliance of members to ­protect anonymity. Some contend that AA warrants protection as privileged communication by virtue of the spiritual aspects of AA, arguing clergy privilege. The state of privacy for AA seems to be evolving. Washington state enacted legislation in 2016 to protect the confidentiality of sponsors in AA in order to prevent sponsors from testifying in civil matters against the individual in recovery. ­Criminal courts have ruled that statements made during the  course of an AA recovery program are not ­admissible in court, given that the spiritual nature of AA places it under a constitutionally protected activity.

Criticisms Critics maintain that the 12-step AA programs do not necessarily benefit the individual. On the one hand, there seems to be a lack of substantive research supporting the effectiveness of AA, especially as a stand-alone treatment approach. On the other hand, there is also a lack of scientific data disproving the value of AA. There appear to be several reasons for the lack of data on AA. The organization does not seem to value research. Because AA does not incorporate professionals, researchers may have to overcome their own biases when evaluating the program. Alcoholism tends to extend over many years and across numerous interventions, so methodical challenges exist in isolating and studying the effect of AA as a stand-alone treatment strategy. Critics note the challenges inherent in conducting research on an organization that is anonymous and self-selected. Questions can be raised about success rates due to selection bias, since the data come from those participating in AA who are already motivated to stop drinking. Furthermore, program participants may have improved on their own since the natural recovery rate for alcoholism

is 24%, according to Deborah A. Dawson and colleagues. In 2009, the Cochrane Collaboration conducted a meta-analysis of studies conducted between 1966 and 2005 and found a dearth of experimental studies that decisively demonstrated the efficacy of AA in the treatment of alcoholism as well as methodological issues with many studies of AA. However, other studies have shown the effectiveness of AA in treating alcoholism. In addition, detractors note the requirement of a lifetime commitment to AA meetings. Individuals are advised that they will relapse if they fail to attend meetings and work the program. Critics report that AA is a spiritual program with a reliance on a higher power that may be difficult to achieve for nonbelievers. Furthermore, there is concern that placing oneself in the hands of a higher power may disempower the individual, resulting in a lack of confidence in one’s own power and ability to abstain from alcohol. Current evidence-based therapies, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, attribute success in treating alcoholism to empowering individuals to  manage their lives and improve their self-­ confidence. These therapies promote self-efficacy, which demonstrates that the individual has what it takes to manage his or her own life. These ­particular therapies are short term in nature and typically result in improvement in approximately 6 months. Professionals tend to hold that AA can  be a component of treatment, but AA is not ­sufficient as the total treatment approach. AA has been criticized for its reliance on a higher power, which has obstructed the use of medication to treat alcoholism, since AA places more emphasis on a defect in character rather than a mental health disorder. In contrast, some practitioners point to the effectiveness of a variety of medications in decreasing alcohol consumption. Furthermore, many individuals who suffer from alcoholism have a co-occurring mental disorder, such as anxiety or depression, and need to obtain professional treatment. According to Mark McGovern and Scott Edelstein, more than half (50% to 65%) of those treated in substance abuse treatment facilities also have a mental health disorder. Further complicating the clinical picture is the use of alcohol and illicit drugs to self-medicate and thereby manage symptoms. If symptoms reoccur as a result of not drinking due to attendance

AMBER Alerts

at AA, there is a risk of suicidal behavior or a psychotic episode. People with co-occurring disorders may be quicker to relapse due to their efforts to self-medicate and manage symptoms. Despite the criticisms, AA groups continue to flourish, 12-step programs are part of treatment protocols, and professionals refer patients to these programs. Individuals attest to the importance of the acceptance and support that AA provides throughout their recovery process. Marcia Baruch and Nancy Zarse See also Privacy; Privacy, Medical; Psychological Assessment; Religion; Stigma

Further Readings Alcoholics Anonymous. Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions. New York, NY: AA Grapevine and Alcoholics Anonymous, 2004. Dawson, D. A., et al. “Recovery From Alcohol Dependence: Response to Commentaries.” Addiction, v.100/3 (2005). Diaconis, A. “The religion of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA): Applying the Clergy Privilege to Certain AA Communications.” Cornell Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student Papers (2014). http://scholarship .law.cornell.edu/cllsrp/7 (Accessed October 2017). Ferri, M., et al. “Alcoholics Anonymous and Other 12-Step Programmes for Alcohol Dependence” (Review). Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, v.3:CD005032 (2006). doi:10.1002/14651858. Jonas, D. E., et al. “Pharmacotherapy for Adults With Alcohol Use Disorders in Outpatient Settings.” JAMA, v.311/18 (2014). doi:10.1001/jama.2014.3628 Kessler, R. C. “The Epidemiology of Dual Diagnosis.” Biological Psychiatry, v.56 (2004). McGovern, Mark (with Scott Edelstein). Living With Co-Occurring Addiction and Mental Health Disorders: A Handbook for Recovery. Center City, MN: Hazelden, 2009. Orey, B. “Alcoholics Anonymous as a Vital Tool in the Treatment of Addicts.” UC Merced Undergraduate Research Journal, v.8/1 (2015). http://escholarship .org/uc/item/88b2w26x (Accessed October 2017). Powers, T. “Washington State Senate Bill Provides 12-Step Sponsors Freedom From Civil Court Testimony.” Sober Nation (2016). https://sobernation .com/washington-state-senate-bill-provides-12-stepsponsors-freedom-from-civil-court-testimony/ (Accessed October 2017).

35

Ruppe, D. “AA Confession Can’t Be Used in Court.” ABC News (2017). http://abcnews.go.com/US/ story?id=92654 (Accessed October 2017). Vaillant, G. “Alcoholics Anonymous: Cult or Cure?” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, v.39 (2005).

AMBER Alerts The AMBER Alert program is a partnership between law enforcement and mass media outlets to inform the general public about a child abduction incident. Its goal is to use technological advances and community-wide surveillance to assist in locating abducted children as quickly as possible. AMBER is an acronym for America’s Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response and was created as a legacy to Amber Hagerman, a 9-yearold girl from Arlington, Texas, who was abducted in broad daylight and later found murdered. The system was created in 1996 when Dallas–Fort Worth broadcasters united with local law enforcement to develop an early warning system to help find abducted children. It has since spread across all the 50 U.S. states and is used in several countries. This entry reveals the criteria needed for a situation to warrant an AMBER Alert notification, methods in which AMBER Alerts are issued, how the program has gradually expanded to the U.S. territories as well as other countries, and some controversies surrounding the program.

The Criteria and Methods AMBER Alerts are used in situations deemed as a true emergency and where time is critical. Research has shown that the first 3 hours after abduction are deemed especially crucial to the safe return of the child. A 2006 study showed that 76.2% of abductees who are murdered are dead within the first 3 hours of being abducted. Therefore, it is critical that law enforcement and the public share information and search for the child as quickly as possible. AMBER Alerts were originally issued via radio and television stations, but now, they also utilize digital billboards, mobile phones through the Wireless Emergency Alert system, text messaging,

36

AMBER Alerts

email, and the Internet. Alerts provide the general public with a description of the child, the abductor, and vehicle and request that the local police be contacted immediately with any information. In 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs assumed responsibility for nationwide coordination of the program, but control of the system is left to the individual states. Due to fear of overuse and public desensitization, specific criteria must be met for an AMBER Alert to be issued. First, law enforcement must confirm that a child abduction has taken place. Second, the child must be at risk of serious injury or death. Third, there must be sufficient descriptive information of the child, the abductor, or the abductor’s vehicle to issue an alert. Fourth, the child must be younger than 18 years of age. It is also recommended that information describing the abduction be quickly added to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center. The Department of Justice holds training events across the country to aid in local law enforcement’s use of the AMBER Alert program. There are many different types of missing children, including runaways, family member kidnappings, lost or abandoned children, and stranger abductions. The most recent, comprehensive national study for the number of missing children estimated in 1999 that approximately 800,000 children were reported missing in the United States, of which more than 200,000 were abducted by family members, and more than 58,000 were abducted by nonrelatives or acquaintances. An estimated 115 children were taken in “stereotypical” kidnappings that involved someone the child didn’t know or who was only a slight acquaintance and resulted in the child being held overnight, transported more than 50 miles, murdered, used for ransom, or held with the intent to keep permanently. According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, children are most likely to be abducted going to and coming from school. The organization’s statistics also reveal that 37% of attempted abductions occur between the hours of 2 and 7 p.m., 43% of attempted abduction victims are between the ages of 10 and 14 years, nearly 75% of victims are female, and 68% of attempted abductions involve the suspect driving a vehicle.

Expansion AMBER Alerts operate in all the U.S. states, the District of Columbia, Native American tribal regions, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Canada and Mexico also have cooperative AMBER Alert programs. Queensland, Australia, began AMBER Alerts in 2005. Policies based on AMBER Alerts were launched in France in F ­ ebruary 2006. Malaysia implemented its own version of AMBER Alerts in September 2007. In 2008, the AMBER Alert system was launched in the Netherlands, and within its first year, it helped successfully return a 4-year-old boy after his ­picture appeared on an electronic billboard. In April 2009, AMBER Alerts were implemented in Ireland and spread to Britain by May 2010. The expansion of AMBER Alerts has made a significant impact in recovering abducted ­children. According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 711 children have been recovered in the United States as of November 2014 thanks to AMBER Alerts. In some cases, eliciting information from the public is not needed due to abductors releasing a child simply because an AMBER Alert was issued.

Controversies The highly reported success of AMBER Alerts has not come without controversies and disagreement. For example, one recent study analyzed 333 publicized AMBER Alert “success” stories between 1998 and 2010 and found that 20% of the cases had no clear obvious threats of harm to the child and that more than 80% of the cases involved a family member or other person known to the victim. The author argued that the alert system was likely to be more effective against family and acquaintance abductors than the stereotypical dangerous stranger the public associates with AMBER Alerts. The Federal Highway Administration has warned that placing AMBER Alerts on electronic highway signs contributes to distracted driving and may result in more traffic accidents. The California Highway Patrol has decided not to use electronic highway AMBER Alerts during rush hour because of these safety concerns. Some also argue that the quick and certain publicity of AMBER Alerts might attract abductors who desire

American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center

the fame and notoriety of such a crime, although no evidence has been found to support this concern. Others are concerned that AMBER Alerts might place the child’s life in additional jeopardy because of the resulting publicity, but there also is no evidence to support this concern. False alarms are also troublesome in that people may become desensitized to AMBER Alerts. Studies have shown that it is common for AMBER Alerts to not adhere to recommend guidelines and, thus, be overused. Eric S. McCord and Jason Nicholson See also Community; Computer Surveillance; Global Surveillance; News Media

Further Readings Miller, Monica, et al. “The Psychology of AMBER Alert: Unresolved Issues and Implications.” Social Science Journal, v.46/1 (2009). National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. “AMBER Alerts.” http://www.missingkids.com/Amber (Accessed November 2014). U.S. Department of Justice. “AMBER Alert.” http://www .amberalert.gov (Accessed November 2014).

American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is a not-for-profit organization that defends and works to preserve the constitutional rights of individuals within the United States. It uses lawyers and the court system to ensure the guarantee of rights and to overturn infringing practices and laws. In recent years, the ACLU has partnered with the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a public interest research center in Washington, D.C., in its attempt to defend civil liberties and to protect privacy. This entry reviews the formation and history of the ACLU and EPIC, examines the groups’ role in defending challenges to civil liberties in the Digital Age, looks at Americans’ evolving view of digital privacy, and concludes with a glimpse of technology advances that have the potential to threaten civil liberties even further.

37

History Following the Russian Revolution in 1917, many Americans feared a similar uprising in the United States. The U.S. attorney general A. ­Mitchell Palmer arrested and deported individuals believed to be communists. Roger Baldwin, ­Crystal ­Eastman, Albert DeSilver, and others formed the ACLU in 1920 to ensure that these individuals would receive due process as provided in the U.S. Constitution. Since that time, the ACLU has focused on preventing government abuse and defending freedom of speech and religion; a woman’s right to choose; the right to due process; immigrant rights; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights; and citizens’ rights to privacy. It has been involved in some of the major legal cases of the 20th century, including partnering with Clarence Darrow for State of Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes (1925), which challenged the right of Tennessee to ban the teaching of evolution in schools. When President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the internment of JapaneseAmericans after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the ACLU challenged this policy. In Brown v. the Board of Education (1954), the ACLU joined with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to contest the “separate but equal” doctrine that allowed segregation of schools. It was also a party in Roe v. Wade (1973), which established a woman’s right to privacy in making decisions about her pregnancy, and in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), it used the right to privacy established in Roe v. Wade to convince the Supreme Court to strike down a law in Texas that made same-sex sexual behavior illegal. In 2013, the ACLU represented Edie Windsor before the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, which resulted in the overthrowing of the Defense of Marriage Act. While often seen as being on the side of liberal causes, the ACLU, in 1978, defended a Nazi group’s right to march through a suburb of Chicago in which many Holocaust survivors lived. This unpopular stand demonstrated its commitment to the belief that constitutional rights must apply to the unpopular to guarantee that they are to be preserved for all. Since 9/11, the ACLU has been involved in ensuring that individual rights are not violated in the government’s attempts to combat terrorism.

38

American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center

The organization believes that individual rights should not be sacrificed for the sake of national security without adequate safeguards. This has involved opposition to the PATRIOT Act, warrantless spying, and indefinite detention of terrorism suspects without charge or trial. The ACLU is a partner in the Digital Due Process website, a coalition of privacy advocates, major companies, and think tanks that strive to improve the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, which established standards for law enforcement access to electronic data available at that time. The EPIC, established in 1994, focuses public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and seeks to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and other constitutional values. EPIC routinely participates as amicus curiae before the federal and state courts in cases concerning the protection of privacy; it has partnered with the ACLU in recent cases. EPIC focuses on electronic privacy issues of both government agencies and nonprofit and commercial organizations. The center’s concerns concentrate on the security of private data networks and the Internet in general with a specific focus on consumer data security, cybersecurity, online social media, student and medical records, big data, cloud computing, search engine privacy, drones, and others as new issues emerge. EPIC maintains its own website and others designed to help ensure electronic privacy. In 1996, EPIC established The Public Voice coalition to promote public participation in decisions concerning the future of the Internet. It works throughout the world with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, governments, and nongovernmental organizations.

Challenges to Civil Liberties in the Digital Age The rapid growth of the Internet has challenged the privacy, free speech, and freedom of association rights ensured by the Constitution. Earlier laws designed to protect privacy are inadequate to meet the challenges of new technology. The Internet allows the tracking of personal information collected and analyzed by governmental agencies. Examples include email that is not secure and exists on servers of employers and Internet service providers, websites that track visitors with or

without their knowledge, and cell phone tracking of users’ locations. The EPCA, enacted in 1986, is the legislation designed to regulate law enforcement access to electronic communications. Technology has progressed significantly since that time, tracking individuals through their use of email, web browsing, social media, and cell phones’ location abilities. Individuals can be traced through their use of credit cards and ATM bank cards. Criminal cases have been solved using electronic toll-paying systems to track individuals traveling by car. Those supporting updating of this legislation indicate the need for warrants to obtain any electronic information. The PATRIOT Act, enacted after 9/11, modified the federal government’s authority in collecting electronic data and eroded individual rights in the name of national security. Warrantless wiretaps were authorized against U.S. citizens, and stored emails could be requested under search and seizure laws rather than more stringent surveillance laws. Government requests for information from Internet companies have become so prevalent that Google has developed a transparency report on the requests for reports it receives and provides information clarifying the legal process. The ACLU has launched an initiative to identify challenges to civil liberties in the Digital Age. It focuses on First Amendment rights of speech and association, and increasing control that individuals have over their own privacy. Areas of concern include participation in online political protests, freedom of expression, privacy of electronic information, online rights of journalists, scientific freedom and exchange of information, and transparency in court proceedings. As part of its online initiative, the ACLU has launched the Demand Your dotRights campaign to inform individuals about challenges to their digital rights and how to use the laws to protect themselves. In addition to privacy of electronic information, the ACLU has been involved in ensuring freedom of speech on the Internet. In Reno v. the ACLU (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that free speech on the Internet is entitled to the same protections as that in books, newspapers, and magazines. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 established that websites are not responsible for user-generated content. In 2013, the ACLU filed a friend of the court brief in

American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center

support of TheDirty.com, a user-generated gossip site. In Antigone Books vs. Horne (2014), the ACLU represented a coalition of publishers, booksellers, librarians, newspapers, and photographers in challenging an Arizona law that criminalizes the display or publishing of nude photographs that are protected by the First Amendment. The release of National Security Agency (NSA) documents in June 2013 by Edward Snowden confirmed the fears that many had, including the ACLU, that the government was unlawfully collecting data on millions of Americans.

Americans’ Understanding of Digital Privacy Many Americans believe that online activities and other electronic footprints such as those on credit card systems and mobile phones are routinely monitored by the federal agencies. For some, it is just a fact of life in the modern Digital Age, and they make reasonable efforts to protect their personal information. For others, it creates a paranoid obsession that results in behavior to avoid electronic communication. Shortly after 9/11, and before the passage of the PATRIOT Act, a majority of Americans (55%) felt that individuals should give up some privacy rights to deal with terrorism, whereas 10 years later, fewer (40%) held this view, and 54% felt that it was not necessary to sacrifice individual rights to curb terrorism, according to a 2013 Pew Research Center report. The Pew Research Center also reported that most Americans did not view the monitoring of personal phone calls and emails as an effective counterterrorism tool. In fact, it was believed to be the least effective. Although many individuals (64%) felt that the government was collecting too much information about them, a greater number (74%) were concerned about the information being collected by businesses. In a 2015 Pew Research Center survey of Americans’ views of governmental agencies, only 51% of those surveyed had a favorable rating of the NSA. Of the eight federal agencies studied, only the Internal Revenue Service had a lower score. The scores for the NSA have changed little since Snowden’s disclosure of NSA surveillance activities. Following the Snowden leaks, Americans perceive that they have little control over their personal

39

information. About 70% are concerned about government collection of their information on social media sites, whereas 80% believe that Americans should be concerned about government monitoring of home telephone calls and emails, according to a 2014 Pew Research Center report. Many do not believe that most online and mobile communication channels are secure. Because of their unique role in investigating government corruption and terrorist activities, journalists may be targets of government surveillance. Journalists may also come in contact with sources whose identities they wish to protect and historically have gone to jail to protect rather than reveal their sources. Among investigative journalists, 64% believe that the government has ­collected information about their online activities, and approximately 80% believe that being a journalist makes them more likely to be monitored, according to yet another 2015 Pew Research Center report. In line with these concerns, journalists also reported changing the ways by which they store and share sensitive documents (49%) and communicate with editors, producers, and other reporters (29%).

The Challenge of New Technologies Freedom of speech and association as well as the right to privacy remain two fundamental rights in U.S. society that have been challenged by genuine concerns regarding national security and the easy access to digital information. Furthermore, digital footprints of Americans keep growing every day as new technologies are developed. New “stingray” technology mimics cell towers and forces cell phones within their geographic location to broadcast information that can be captured by law enforcement. Under the Freedom of Information Act, the ACLU has requested records from police departments using stingray technology. These documents show that even when the police have a warrant for a specific phone, information is captured from nearby phones, thus collecting and storing data from individuals not included in the warrant. The ACLU has identified 48 agencies in 20 states and the District of Columbia that have purchased these devices. In a recently filed and ongoing lawsuit (Wikimedia Foundation v. National Security Agency),

40

American Protective League

the ACLU is challenging the NSA’s “upstream” surveillance of almost all international and some domestic text-based communications. The complainants in this case include the Wikimedia Foundation, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International USA, and others who claim that sensitive information is being trapped and collected by the government through devices installed by telecommunications providers directly onto the Internet’s “backbone.” Using this technology, the NSA captures and copies Internet communications in bulk while they are in transit and then later scans them using software to find keywords associated with suspected targets. In addition to governmental surveillance, citizens are concerned about how other sensitive data, including financial and health care information, are being collected and analyzed by private businesses. The ACLU and its affiliated organizations continue to assess the potential of emerging technology for surveillance and data collection to challenge constitutional rights to privacy and freedom of speech. When threats to these fundamental rights are identified, the ACLU plays a major role in challenging these practices using the court system. Adele Weiner and Kim Lorber See also Big Data; Civil Liberties; National Security Agency; PATRIOT Act; Privacy, Right to; U.S. Constitution

American Civil Liberties Union. “Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?” (February 24, 2015). https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-deviceswhos-got-them (Accessed April 2015). Doherty, C. “Balancing Act: National Security and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 Era.” Pew Research Center Report (June 7, 2013). http://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/2013/06/07/balancing-act-national-securityand-civil-liberties-in-post-911-era (Accessed April 2015). Holcomb, J., et al. “Investigative Journalists and Digital Security: Perceptions of Vulnerability and Changes in Behavior.” Pew Research Center Report (February 5, 2015). http://www.journalism.org/2015/02/05/ investigative-journalists-and-digital-security/ (Accessed April 2015). Madden, M. “Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era.” Pew Research Center Report (November 12, 2014). http://www .pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacyperceptions (Accessed April 2015). Pew Research Center. “Most View the CDC Favorably; VA’s Image Slips.” (January 22, 2015). http://www .people-press.org:2015:01:22:most-view-the-cdcfavorably-vas-image-slips (Accessed January 2015).

Websites Demand Your dotRights: https://www.dotrights.org Digital Due Process: http://digitaldueprocess.org Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC): http://epic.org Public Voice coalition: http://thepublicvoice.org

Further Readings American Civil Liberties Union. “About the ACLU’s Project on Speech, Privacy, and Technology” (September 25, 2012). https://www.aclu.org/aboutaclus-project-speech-privacy-and-technology (Accessed April 2015). American Civil Liberties Union. “ACLU Wikimedia v. NSA: Challenge to Mass Surveillance Under the FISA Amendments Act” (March 10, 2015). https://www .aclu.org/cases/wikimedia-v-nsa-challenge-masssurveillance-under-fisa-amendments-act?redirect= national-security/wikimedia-v-nsaAmerican (Accessed April 2015). American Civil Liberties Union. “Archive of NSA Documents Released by Edward Snowden” (March 23, 2015). https://www.aclu.org/nsadocuments-search (Accessed October 2017).

American Protective League The American Protective League (APL) was the largest vigilante organization that operated in the United States during World War I. Staffed by an all-volunteer force, the league was eventually organized as an official auxiliary of the Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice. It was disbanded in 1919, as concerns about the restriction of civil liberties, due in part to the APL’s surveillance activities and perceived invasion of privacy, mounted after the war. This entry reviews the founding of the APL and then examines its original intent, its evolution and expansion, and its ultimate demise.

American Protective League

Founded in 1917 by Albert Briggs, a wealthy Chicago advertising executive, the original mission of the APL was to provide free automobile transportation for Special Agents of the Bureau of Investigation who otherwise had to rely on railroads to get from place to place. Briggs’s original plan was to provide wealthy business executives who could dedicate all of their free time to drive agents around. As the United States began to enter the war in Europe, however, Bureau of Investigation Chief A. Bruce Bielaski, along with U.S. Attorney General Thomas Gregory, moved to take full advantage of having access to a force of volunteers. The APL soon morphed into a more comprehensive organization that donated motor vehicles to the Bureau and provided volunteer operatives and officers to conduct industrial and commercial surveillance. In time, its activities expanded into conducting background investigations and then into the extralegal enforcement of federal laws related to sedition, conscription, and espionage. Operatives and officers were issued badges and commission cards labeled “Secret Service—American Protective League,” much to ­ the chagrin of the U.S. Secret Service, which until mid-1917 was the primary investigative agency ­ conducting counterespionage operations and enforcement. The Bureau of Investigation usurped this role, largely with the assistance of the APL. At its founding, the headquarters of the APL was located in Chicago, Illinois, where Briggs coordinated activities with Bureau Special Agent in Charge H. G. Clabaugh. As offices proliferated across the country, however, Briggs, who was appointed ­general superintendent, and T. B. Crockett, assistant superintendent, moved the headquarters to ­Washington, D.C. From there, Briggs and Crockett directed field office operations in most major cities on both coasts and in the Midwest. Each field office consisted of a chief, one or more captains, lieutenants, and operatives. Operatives were used to conduct surveillance within the corporations they were employed and to provide information and intelligence regarding threats to their industries. Some operatives were also used to ferret out possible enemy aliens, largely employees of German ancestry, who could be a threat to companies engaged in war work. Officers were ­ engaged to supervise operatives, as well as to ­perform ­investigative and surveillance duties.

41

Agents eventually performed all background investigations of applicants for federal military officer commissions, as well as of applicants for YMCA overseas positions. They were also engaged in investigating violations of the Espionage and Sedition Acts, which included conducting surveillance on a number of targets. Agents infiltrated radical labor organizations, such as the International Workers of the World (Wobblies), as well as socialist organizations. Agents attended meetings and rallies, documenting the names of members and statements made against the war and the government, and assisted federal and local law enforcement in raids of organizational offices. Officers also investigated conscription resisters and delinquents, tracking down citizens who refused to sign up for the draft or who failed to appear before draft boards. Agents were also heavily involved in the New York “slacker raids” in which thousands of innocent men who failed to carry their draft cards were rounded up and detained, with assistance from Bureau of Investigation agents, Army Provost Marshal staff, and city police officers. APL officers regularly made arrests and detained individuals under the cover of governmental authority; however, they lacked statutory authority to make arrests or carry firearms, and they were prohibited by the Department of Justice from doing so. The APL, while intended to be simply a volunteer organization to assist the government with transportation during the war, was increasingly used as an agent for instituting social control. Operatives and officers used normative, remunerative, and coercive power to bring pacifists, labor radicals, draft resisters, and scofflaws into line. Agents would often detain offenders and lecture them on their duty as citizens, imploring them to obey the law, and then threatening them with consequences for noncompliance. Those who refused to comply might be arrested, with some suspects being imprisoned in the federal penitentiary. If probable cause for an arrest was insufficient, offenders often found themselves the victims of extralegal enforcement efforts. These might include being tarred and feathered, being forced to kiss the American flag, being ridden out of town on a rail, or having property seized and sold with the proceeds being used to purchase war bonds.

42

Amnesty International

Occasionally, operatives participated in more violent methods of dealing with dissent, including lynching and the burning down of residences. As World War I came to an end, Americans became increasingly concerned about abuses of civil liberties, violations of privacy, and the large number of imprisoned objectors to the war. As public sentiment changed against government intrusion into the lives of individuals and toward increased privacy rights, Attorney General Gregory decided to shut down the league due to its tendency to violate individual rights. The APL was disbanded in February 1919. Joshua W. Jeffery Sr. and Richard Goode See also Civil Liberties; Espionage; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Surveillance During World War I and World War II; U.S. Secret Service

Further Readings Abrams, Ray Hamilton. Preachers Present Arms: A Study of the War-Time Attitudes and Activities of the Churches and the Clergy in the United States, 1914–1918. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1933. Etzioni, Amitai. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates. New York, NY: Free Press, 1975. Hough, Emerson. The Web: The Authorized History of the American Protective League. Chicago, IL: Reilly & Lee, 1919. Jensen, Joan M. The Price of Vigilance. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1968. Mills, Bill. The League: The True Story of Average Americans on the Hunt for WWI Spies. New York, NY: Skyhorse, 2013.

Amnesty International Amnesty International was founded in 1961 with the goal of defending individual freedom of expression. As the debate over liberty versus security has unfurled, particularly in the shadow of the  global War on Terror, Amnesty International has become an outspoken critic of expanded governmental surveillance and the dearth of regulation of the technology that facilitates it. Amnesty

International continues to work to protect individuals by publicizing specific cases of state surveillance, harassment, and severe punishment of individuals for their online activity, but today, it also focuses on systemic issues stemming from electronic monitoring and electronic data collection. This has manifested in three significant ways. First, following Edward Snowden’s revelations about governments’ mass surveillance and data collection, Amnesty International has brought legal challenges against the surveillance programs of the United States and the United Kingdom. Second, Amnesty International cofounded a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that aims to publicize government surveillance strategies and pressure states to place restrictions on the transfer of surveillance technologies. Finally, it has attempted to directly enhance privacy and limit surveillance by disseminating technology that blocks government electronic monitoring capacity. This entry focuses on Amnesty International’s role in protecting civil liberties, regulating the trade in surveillance technology, and mounting legal challenges against government surveillance systems.

Protecting Civil Liberties In the absence of a legal framework that prevents excessive surveillance of web users, Amnesty International frequently expresses alarm that states are monitoring the web to control dissent and target critics. While it has always been a priority of Amnesty International to protect activists by investigating their cases and engaging in “urgent action” appeals, today many appeals focus on citizens targeted by government surveillance. ­ Amnesty International has publicized cases of bloggers and web creators who experienced intimidation, c­ensorship, and imprisonment based on state ­allegations that they were inciting violence or threatening national security. In reports on Saudi Arabia, Iran, ­ Kyrgyzstan, and China, among others, Amnesty International has detailed the ­ various strategies through which governments use technology to monitor and stifle criticism online, including web filtering, remotely controlling computers and web  cameras, restricting access to social media, ­ transmitting ­ malware for data extraction, and ­monitoring mobile phone appli­ cations. Its country  investigations analyze how

Amnesty International

states are institutionalizing these methods by creating legal frameworks that give power to i­ ntelligence agencies while minimizing judicial oversight. The case of Snowden and the revelations of extensive use of mass surveillance technologies by government intelligence agencies galvanized the efforts of Amnesty International. While the United States has asserted that Snowden’s exposure of classified information about U.S. security policy is an act of treason, Amnesty International is a consistent advocate of whistle-blower protection and increased governmental transparency regarding the boundaries of data collection and monitoring of citizens. Amnesty International has directed particular criticism at two governments and their intelligence agencies: the United States’ National Security Agency and the United Kingdom’s ­General Communication Headquarters. Amnesty International has argued for greater oversight of the mass data collection systems revealed by Snowden: the United Kingdom’s Tempora and the United States’ PRISM programs. Amnesty International’s condemnation is based on its contention that these governments are violating their citizens’ rights while also using this technology to spy on NGOs such as Amnesty International.

Regulating the Trade in Surveillance Technology The Coalition Against Unlawful Surveillance Exports (CAUSE) was formed in 2014. Amnesty International, working with a group of NGOs and other human rights actors, founded CAUSE to advocate for the creation of controls on the trade in technology tools used to monitor private communication. Citing the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 and 1976, respectively, Amnesty International argues that there is a recognized right to privacy, and communication surveillance technology sold by private companies enables infringement of this right. It further claims that when this technology is sold to governments that engage in widespread human rights abuse, such as Libya, Syria, and Iran, it facilitates further abuses of human rights, such as unlawful detention or restrictions on assembly.

43

Amnesty International and other members of CAUSE drafted an open letter to the members of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. In its 2014 letter, it urges the 41 members of the agreement to limit the export of surveillance technology to ensure that it is not used by recipient states to advance repressive practices. While recognizing steps taken in 2013 to regulate dual-use technologies, it condemns the absence of export controls on evolving surveillance tools, such as enhanced voice recognition technologies. Amnesty International and other members of CAUSE advocate for greater participation of nonstate actors in discussions of technology regulation, more consideration of international standards to regulate the trade of surveillance technologies, and greater state-level transparency surrounding export practices.

Direct Challenges to Government Surveillance Amnesty International has also mounted legal challenges to government surveillance systems. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013), Amnesty contested the legality of the United States’ practice of warrantless surveillance as protected by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2008. The case was dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court on the basis that Amnesty International did not have standing in the case because it could not prove direct injury resulting from the surveillance program. In 2013, Amnesty International, as a part of a coalition of NGOs, also brought a complaint to the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal, in which it argued that the procedures used by the United Kingdom’s intelligence agencies authorizing mass surveillance lack strict boundaries, transparency, and oversight. The U.K. court accepted the government’s claims that its practices conform to domestic human rights law but cannot be made public due to national security implications. Amnesty International subsequently submitted its case to the European Court of Human Rights. Amnesty International is moving beyond advocacy and criticism to directly counter the practice of mass surveillance and offer protection to those who might experience human rights abuse as a

44

Anarchism

result of monitoring. In 2014, it announced the creation of “Detekt,” a free, open source countersurveillance tool. Through a partnership with security researchers and other pro-privacy NGOs, Amnesty International has offered Detekt to activists who wish to be alerted to external attempts to interfere with their electronic communication. While advocating for greater long-term regulation of the estimated US$5 billion trade in surveillance technologies, Amnesty International asserts that tools such as Detekt allow activists and journalists to ensure that their electronic files and ­communication are not monitored or recorded by intelligence agencies. Amnesty International has explicitly recognized the need for states to possess tools that enable them to investigate threats and protect national security. It contends that the challenge for states today is to use technology to enhance security without engaging in mass surveillance and metadata collection or eliminating transparency, oversight, or respect for individual human rights. Kali Wright-Smith See also Civil Liberties; Freedom of Expression; Global Surveillance; National Security Agency Leaks; Privacy, Right to; Surveillance Deterrence

Further Readings Amnesty International. “Big Brother Knows Best” (September 2, 2014). http://www.amnesty.org/en/ news/big-brother-knows-best-2014-09-02 (Accessed December 2014). Amnesty International. “UK Court Decision on Government Mass Surveillance: ‘Trust Us’ Isn’t Enough” (December 5, 2014). http://www.amnesty .org/en/news/uk-court-decision-government-masssurveillance-trust-us-isnt-enough-2014-12-05 (Accessed January 2015). Bennett, Colin J. The Privacy Advocates: Resisting the Spread of Surveillance. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S.___ (2013). Dizard, Wilson. “Rights Groups Release Software to Detect Government Spyware.” Al Jazeera (November 20, 2014). http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/ 11/20/amnesty-nsa.html (Accessed December 2014). Reporters Without Borders. “New Global Coalition Urges Governments to Keep Surveillance Technologies

in Check” (April 4, 2014). http://en.rsf.org/newglobal-coalition-urges-04-04-2014,46086.html (Accessed December 2014). Reporters Without Borders. “An Open Letter to the Members of the Wassenaar Agreement” (December 2, 2014). http://en.rsf.org/an-open-letter-to-themembers-of-02-12-2014,47316.html (Accessed January 2015).

Anarchism The etymological roots of anarchism in the Greek α´ναρχι´α (combining the negative prefix αν- and α´ρχη´, “authority,” “rule”) indicates that anarchism should not be equated with chaos but signals an absence of governmentality. Anarchy is best defined as a political system relying on nonhierarchical forms of voluntary association of free individuals in self-organizing, cooperative societal formations. Anarchism opposes authoritarian power systems, social hierarchy, and institutionalized religion, while espousing beliefs in individual privacy. The logic of anarchism as an ideal is based on the philosophy of the individual of the Enlightenment: Independence of thought, outer and inner freedom, and self-determination are preconditions to anarchism. This entry reviews the origins and evolution of the term anarchy and how it is framed in religious and political philosophies, and describes the three branches of modern anarchism. The first uses of the term in the modern period were during the English Civil War (1642–1641) and then in The Anarchiad (1786), an epic poem by the Connecticut Wits, Joel Barlow, David Humphreys, John Trumbull, and Lemuel ­Hopkins. These references equated anarchy to chaos, which  the royalists viewed as a driving force behind the ideals of the “roundheads,” who supported the Parliament of England and fought against the ­royalists during the English Civil War. The early American poets issued a warning about social unrest and anarchy, which was the point of origin of the rebellions that shook the young republic. During the Reign of Terror, which followed the French Revolution, Maximilien de Robespierre also used the term anarchist against political enemies.

Anarchism

Structurally related to anarchism were a variety of communitarian projects in the late Middle Ages, like the English Diggers, and some peasant uprisings. To claim anarchism as a religious philosophy, however, is difficult since religious beliefs are based on an eschatological system beyond this earth and often also center on charismatic forms of religious leadership, which would be antithetical to the anarchist ideal of absent hierarchies. As a political philosophy, anarchism developed in the wake of the French Revolution. PierreJoseph Proudhon and Anselme Bellegarrigue used the term anarchy in the title of publications in the mid-19th century, while the first political rejection of the state and of institutionalized government has been attributed to William Godwin (in Political Justice, 1793). Modern anarchism can be differentiated into three main branches: (1) individualist libertarianism, (2) the political ideology of insurrectionist antiauthoritarianism, (3) and the cooperative and communitarian forms of anarcho-syndicalism and anarcho-communism or collectivism.

Libertarian Anarchism The libertarian movement is based on the idea of an absolutely free individual, liberated from the withholding strings of government, religion, tradition, education, ethics, and morals. The most influential of these “tabula rasa” anarchist thinkers was Max Stirner (i.e., Johann Caspar Schmidt), though few of his original works have survived besides The Ego and Its Own (literally Unique Man and His Property, 1844; English edition, 1907). Stirner influenced Karl Marx, John Henry Mackay, and Rudolf Steiner, as well as the radical egotism of economic libertarians, especially in the United States and Great Britain, even though Stirner expressly rejected egotism for the sake of material gain.

Antiauthoritarian Anarchism The antiauthoritarian wing of anarchism has been the most visible expression of anarchist ideas, as well as the form most frequently represented in caricatures, in satirical articles and dramatic sketches, and in literary fiction by, for instance, H. G. Wells and Joseph Conrad. It has also been the

45

branch that generated the most police activity and secret service counterinsurgency measures. Insurrectionist anarchists believe in direct action against governmental institutions and officeholders, the (para-)military and police forces of the state apparatus, and shareholder capitalism. The assassination of former U.S. president William McKinley by Leon Czolgosz in 1901 and Alexander Berkman’s attack on industrialist and financier Henry Clay Frick in 1892 contributed to the caricatures of dark-clad and wild-haired bohemians turned bomb-throwing and knife-wielding terrorists. It also resulted in statements like that of McKinley’s successor, Theodore Roosevelt, who declared anarchism to be the “enemy of humanity.” The background to antiauthoritarian anarchism is usually traced to Michail Bakunin, who had extended Stirner’s tabula rasa philosophy to the idea of a necessary obliteration of all power structures before anarchism could assure social and ethno-racial equality, liberty, and access to education for all. Followers of Bakunin, such as Emma Goldman, translated this idea into the “propaganda of the deed,” which proved influential, most notably in the 1880s and 1890s. In 1885 in New York, the German-born Johann Most published his booklet Revolutionaere Kriegswissenschaft (not to be confused with the 1970s hippie publication The Anarchist Cookbook) on how to use arms and explosives. It was also in the United States that the most flagrant use of illegal means against the antiauthoritarian anarchists occurred: A bomb thrown at Haymarket Square in Chicago during an altercation between the police and demonstrators following a workers’ rally, which killed several police officers and civilians, was used as a pretext to arrest eight leading anarchists. Although none of them had been at the event, they were found guilty. Four were hanged, and one committed suicide. The Haymarket judicial murders showed how far the state apparatus was ready to go to counteract the perceived threat of anarchism.

Anarcho-Syndicalism and Anarcho-Communism This wing of anarchism includes the more pragmatic approaches of anarcho-syndicalism and anarcho-communism. The latter should not be

46

Anarchism

confused with the authoritarian system of partybased communism. The distance between the communists and anarchists led to the anarchists being banished from the International Workingmen’s Association (i.e., First International) at their congress in The Hague in 1872. Anarcho-syndicalism is closest to the traditional models of cooperative labor and is the impulse behind trade unions. It is the most organized form of anarchism. Anselme Bellegarrigue’s journal L’Anarchie: Journal de l’Ordre (1850) set the pace for a number of utopian anarchist communities and cooperatives that attempted to carry on the most libertarian ideas of the failed E ­ uropean revolutions of 1848 to 1849. The concepts of syndicalism found their expression in the mutualist economic theory of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, reformulated by Pyotr Kropotkin in The Conquest of Bread (1892) and in Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902). Most individualist libertarian anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists agree that the ultimate freedom from oppression by governments and their state apparatuses as well as religious orders can be achieved only if this freedom is accompanied by self-discipline, and by responsibility toward fellow human beings. In recent decades, this attitude has been widened by many anarchist thinkers to include all life forms. Anarchism is not the absence of any structures of government; rather, it is selfgovernment. However, all sorts of antisocial individualism, bourgeois escapism, and romantic glorifications of violence and bohemian irresponsibility have been labeled as anarchism by those groups and the media. Few attempts have been made to create anarchist communities on a larger scale, and none have existed for long periods of time. The Munich Republic of 1919 lasted for only about 3 weeks before right-wing troops terminated it. Whether the so-called Red Army of the Ruhr, which fought back a proto-fascist coup d’etat in 1920, can be called anarchist is debatable; 2 weeks later, the very troops that had supported the attempted coup were used to quench this grassroots movement. Those parts of Ukraine liberated by anarchists headed by Nestor Makhno were subdued by the Bolsheviki by 1921. During the Spanish Civil War, anarchist units initially fought on all fronts, and in Catalonia, the popular anarcho-syndicalist

unions organized collectivist cooperatives both in the agrarian sector and in factories. Their success led to high hopes, before the communists, with strong backing by the Stalinist Soviet Union, imprisoned, killed, or drove out of the country most of the leaders of the anarchist movement and brought the republic under their control for the rest of its existence. The ideas of anarcho-syndicalism have, in more recent years, received renewed attention because they provide a viable alternative to the system of a capitalist economy that is based on exploitation of resources, labor, and time. The deterioration of the  financial system into anarcho-capitalist irresponsibility and the failure of a number of states— notably in Africa—have also led to renewed interest in cooperative forms of production and in collectivist societal lifestyles. Social scientists have also pointed out that the will to harmony and the spirit of cooperation are more pronounced in human interactions than had been believed under the influence of ideologies of competition and progress. Consequently, numerous cooperative projects have started worldwide, giving renewed hope that a new society might form itself within the shell of the old (from the preamble of the Industrial Workers of the World, a syndicalist union founded in 1905 by Maria Harris “Mother” Jones, “Big Bill” Haywood, etc.). In Mexico, the rebellious province of Chiapas has provided space for experiments for years, garnering support for a nondogmatic, grassroots socialism. One aspect lacking in anarchist philosophy is a theory of culture. Even influential thinkers such as Rudolf Rocker adopted rather traditional views of cultural production and a qualitative approach based on evaluations of art and literature on the basis of a rather bourgeois aestheticism. Anarchist cultural products include posters; shows like the Patterson Strike pageant of 1913 and the Pins and Needles musical, developed by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union in 1937; and many songs, often based on traditional hymns or ballads. Syndicalist ideas also influenced educators such as A. S. Neill and Maria Montessori. Wolfgang Hochbruck See also Security, Civil Liberties, and Law organizational theme

Ancient Greek Surveillance

Further Readings Dolgoff, Sam. The Relevance of Anarchism to Modern Society. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr, 1989. Goyens, Tom. Beer and Revolution. The German Anarchist Movement in New York City, 1880–1914. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007. Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture. New York, NY: Covici Friede, 1937. Schmidt, Michael and Lucien van der Walt, eds. Black Flame. The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism. Edinburgh, Scotland: AK Press, 2009. Woodcock, George, ed. The Anarchist Reader. Glasgow, Scotland: Fontana, 1986.

Ancient Greek Surveillance Unlike more modern societies, the political leaders in the city-states of the ancient Greek world lacked sophisticated methods of surveillance or security mechanisms to maintain themselves in power. The lack of effective surveillance systems helps explain why there were frequent changes in government in many city-states as one faction of the aristocracy replaced another with great regularity or as power shifted between more aristocratic types of government and the limited democratic forms of government that involved a somewhat wider group of citizens. Any understanding of these limited means of surveillance and other security measures that were available is complicated by the often fragmentary information in the historical records. It is generally known when changes occurred, but little is known about failed mechanisms for preventing change or even when such methods were successful. Greek city-states lacked effective police and security forces. Ordinary crime in many cities appears to have been relatively low, but when crimes were committed, it was the victims themselves or voluntary assistance from neighbors or from others that was used to catch the criminals. The relatively small size of the populations in many cities no doubt limited the potential for ordinary crime since culprits were likely to be recognized. The small population size also limited the possibility of clandestine political violence. In addition, active political participation was limited

47

to the citizens of the cities, which excluded foreign residents, slaves, and many lower class residents. Citizenship was often restricted to individuals who could afford the armor and weapons of the cavalry forces or heavy infantry. While small size may have made clandestine efforts more difficult, the absence of security forces combined with the fact that citizen-soldiers typically kept their armor and arms with them at home meant that competing political and economic factions could engage each other in violent confrontations. There were street battles and skirmishes, and the victorious side would often take control of the government. Conflicts in the cities involved battles between the rich and the poor, battles between the aristocracy and those in favor of more democratic styles of government, struggles within the aristocratic ranks of the elite, and alliances with foreign powers. This last group of struggles for control of cities was especially pronounced during the Peloponnesian Wars. Athens and Sparta and their respective allies would frequently establish government forms similar to their own when they captured an enemy city or when they convinced an enemy city to defect from their alliance on the other side. Political elites did have more rudimentary means of maintaining surveillance that were used, including reliance on armed dependents and followers and paid bodyguards. Such groups could also be used to intimidate potential opponents as well as to collect information. At least in some circumstances, there were individuals who provided information on plots against the existing political structure. Informants were often honored for their activities, and in some cases, a conspirator who informed on fellow plotters could escape punishment and even be rewarded. Such a practice actually provided an effective form of intelligence gathering and encouragement for conspirators to provide information on their colleagues when they were caught or if they changed their minds. In the Greek cities, the conflicts for political control between aristocratic factions or between the aristocracy and more democratic forces frequently led to mass banishments of the losers. Those sent into exile would then plot to return in order to regain political power. Athens developed a system known as ostracism, which could also be  regarded as preventative banishment. In this

48

Anonymous

system, an individual who was deemed to be politically dangerous could be exiled for 10 years by a majority vote of citizens in a general assembly. This sentence could not be appealed to any other body. After the 10 years had passed, the individual could return with no further penalty. Ostracism gave the Athenian citizens an opportunity to preemptively remove potential tyrants from political life. In most years, no one was exiled, but the practice did serve as a potential deterrent on ambitious individuals and was thus a form of public surveillance. It also served as a reminder to aristocrats that at least one ultimate power rested in the hands of the citizens of the state. This practice of ostracism was adopted by at least a few other Greek city-states. There were other methods for security and surveillance that were used in some cities. There were annual audits for the officials who were leaving office, which served as a financial check on them and undoubtedly at times as a political one as well. Public charges could be leveled in public assemblies with citizens serving as a mass jury. Such charges may often have lacked any basis in fact, but they were used to launch political attacks against opponents. In Athens, outraged assemblies could assess the death penalty for inappropriate actions, including military defeats. Sparta practiced a different form of preventive security in territories under its control. The Spartan military elite, few in number, used fear and intimidation to dominate the slave population (helots) and the free noncitizens. Violence against the helots by the warrior citizens was accepted and served to demonstrate the superiority of the elite. In the early days of the city, it is possible that the military caste actually purged those slaves and poorer members of society seen as dangerous to the existing political order. Instilling basic terror in a community so that it could not organize to protest or rebel is a security alternative that is possible, especially when there are insufficient methods of intelligence gathering and detection. Surveillance and security techniques in ancient Greece were not well developed; moreover, the struggles between different aristocratic factions that led to mass banishments and later victorious returns suggest that those in power lacked the ability to detect many plots. Athens and Sparta during their long conflict could impose aristocratic or

democratic forms on captured cities or those that changed sides, but they were usually unable to keep the new forms of government in place. They lacked the military forces to maintain garrisons and the security measures to prevent new uprisings by those unhappy with the changes. James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz See also Greece; Politics

Further Readings Berger, Shlomo. Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southern Italy, Historia Einsel-schriften 71. Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992. Canfora, Lucianao, “The Citizens.” In Jean-Pierre Vernant (ed.) & Charles Lambert and Teresa Lavender Fagan (trans.), The Greeks. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Forsdyke, Sara. “Exile, Ostracism and the Athenian Democracy.” Classical Antiquity, v.19/2 (2000). Hammond, N. G. L. A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (3rd ed.). Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1986.

Anonymous Anonymous refers to an Internet-based collaborative activist organization. It launched its first major web campaign in 2008 against Scientology, with attacks against its websites, YouTube videos, and calls for protests. Anonymous lacks formal membership, is loosely organized, and is motivated by different social causes, including freedom of speech and individual privacy, rather than money. Anonymous became internationally known during 2010 for its actions against MasterCard, Visa, and PayPal in support of WikiLeaks and in 2011 with attacks against Tunisian government websites for freedom of speech and freedom from oppression during the Arab Spring. The group also declared war on terrorist organizations after the two major terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. Anonymous counts on the help provided by mass media in promoting its message and especially on the publicity created by social media, which are its channels of communication. The organization is an exponent of the digital culture

Anonymous

and its characteristics, including informal membership, memes, digital symbols as forms of communication, anonymity, and the symbol of the mask. The Guy Fawkes mask, depicting Guy Fawkes, who in 1605 was part of a Roman ­Catholic group that plotted to blow up the House of Lords to kill King James I, has reemerged as a symbol of antigovernment and anticapitalist ­resistance since it appeared in the 2005 film V for Vendetta. This entry discusses the actions of Anonymous against surveillance and whether this group itself poses a security threat.

Anonymous Against Surveillance As noted earlier, Anonymous became internationally known during 2010 for its distributed denial of service (DDoS) actions against MasterCard, Visa, and PayPal in support of the website WikiLeaks, contributing to making public secret documents related to the activities of the U.S. National Security Agency and government ­surveillance. The attacks on the financial websites took place because MasterCard, Visa, and PayPal did not want to process donations in support of WikiLeaks, which led to company losses of ­millions of dollars. While the group is decentralized, members connect in Internet forums to plan various online attacks. The most common method of attack is denial of service, by overloading a website with traffic until it crashes. A DDoS attack is a way of drowning a computer system with far more requests for information than it can handle, causing it to shut down. Another method involves accessing organizational databases and releasing sensitive data on the web. A common goal of its members is to make sure that no government or corporation can control or censure the Internet and every citizen can keep his or her personal information safe, including online communications. In the course of time, the group has attacked different organizations, from government agencies to terrorist groups and banks. The UK Home Office website was the target of a cyberattack by Anonymous in 2012, in protest against government surveillance plans to monitor the email exchanges and website visits of every person in the United Kingdom. A similar cyberattack happened to government bureaus in several Chinese cities,

49

including Chengdu, a provincial capital in southwest China, in protest against the country’s Internet restrictions and the blocking of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and sensitive political information. Anonymous also posted information on how Chinese users can get around the restrictions imposed by the government. The organization also targeted several ­Canadian government websites in 2015 to protest Canada’s antiterrorism bill, which the organization claims infringes on individual privacy and empowers surveillance and security forces to monitor people’s private communications. Anonymous posted a video on YouTube asking C ­ anadian citizens to defend their rights and start protesting against the governmental measures. Also in the fall of 2015, the group targeted the official website of the Belgian prime minister Charles Michel, the Brussels Parliament, and the website of ­Belgium’s Federal Public Services Home Affairs for what the organization alleges are censorship and corruption. Members of the online Anonymous have also allegedly attacked a number of Vietnamese government websites to protest against online censorship and human rights violations in the country, as well as official Saudi government websites to protest the arrest, torture, and condemnation to death of a teenager for his participation in the Arab Spring protests. Nevertheless, legal actions have also been taken against alleged members of the network. Members of Anonymous in the United Kingdom were prosecuted and convicted in 2013 of conspiring to impair the operation of computers, for their role in the 2010 attacks against MasterCard, Visa, and PayPal. In 2011, the Spanish police arrested three men they claimed are core members of Anonymous, which led to the crash of a police website. At the same time, the Italian police claimed to have caught 25 members of the organization. During the same year, the police in Turkey arrested 32 alleged hackers who had recently attacked governmental websites in an attempt to protest regulation plans to increase policing of online traffic. Legal actions against Anonymous members have not remained without consequences, as many law enforcement organizations and parties involved have been targeted for DDoS attacks. For example, Anonymous members allegedly attacked the websites of the U.S. Department of Justice and the

50

Anti-Defamation League

Massachusetts Institute of Technology because of anger over the prosecution and suicide of a prominent computer programmer and free speech activist.

Robin Hood or Security Threat When Anonymous leaked top-secret National Security Agency documents in 2013, a debate started not only about the U.S. government’s surveillance but also about possible threats that organizations like Anonymous might represent, with access to just about any network and all information. The risks are high in circumstances where official classified information and documents are hacked, are released publicly, and fall into the wrong hands. This can jeopardize the operations of the intelligence community and law enforcement organizations and put individuals’ lives at risk. In the same context, the discussion about the actions of Anonymous actions is also centered on the degrees and purposes of government surveillance and considering measures that are legal, including according to the PATRIOT Act, and necessary in the fight against terrorism, a fight in which even Anonymous is involved. This issue is much more complex than a simple Robin Hood– type decision of fighting for citizens against government. This situation underlines the characteristics of the organization that make it a successful digital group but that also pose problems in its strategy and actions. Unlike in a formal organization, the decisions in Anonymous tend to have a subjective, one-sided nature, many times nonrepresentative of the majority of the membership. This could be seen in different actions where a few members do something in the name of the organization, only for the action to be denied later by a different Anonymous account. An example is the release of Ku Klux Klan member names and addresses in 2015, only for the release to be denied later after many errors were noticed and then to actually have the list corrected. Despite its stated concern for the people, this type of situation can be much riskier if the action deals with business information that can affect the stock market or with government documents that put lives at risk. Maria Petrescu, Bernardo Negron-Rodriguez, and Maria Julian

See also Arab Spring; National Security Agency; National Security Agency Leaks; PATRIOT Act; WikiLeaks

Further Readings C.C. “How Guy Fawkes Became the Face of PostModern Protest.” The Economist (November 4, 2014). http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2014/11/economist-explains-3. (Accessed November 2015). Coleman, Gabriella. Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous. London, England: Verso, 2014. Dobusch, Leonhard and Dennis Schoeneborn. “Fluidity, Identity, and Organizationality: The Communicative Constitution of Anonymous.” Journal of Management Studies, v.52/8 (2015). McDonald, Kevin. “From Indymedia to Anonymous: Rethinking Action and Identity in Digital Cultures.” Information, Communication & Society, v.18/8 (2015). The Economist. “An Anonymous Foe: Hackers Hit Big Companies, the IMF and the Headlines” (June 16, 2011). http://www.economist.com/node/18836210 (Accessed November 2015).

Anti-Defamation League The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) was established to fight the hate and defamation aimed at Jewish people. To accomplish its goals, the ADL has engaged in surveillance and documentation of hate crimes against Jewish people and their communities worldwide and has worked to inform and aid government initiatives to fight anti-­ Semitism and hate crime in general. Recently, the ADL has expanded its focus from anti-Semitism to identifying and reporting all crimes of hate and civil ­injustice. The ADL has been an influential organization affecting legislation, law enforcement, media, and communities. This entry ­investigates the history of the ADL’s attempts to monitor, report, and ultimately eradicate anti-Semitism. These efforts ­ included surveillance of media, c­ ultural trends, and government activities and ­ providing input that helped shape current hate crime laws. Those efforts have since expanded to include fights against extremism and other hate crimes.

Anti-Defamation League

Surveillance of Media and Cultural Trends Anti-Semitism, hate toward Jewish people, has been a social problem for about 2,000 years. It has included the oppression of Jewish people religiously, politically, socially, psychologically, sexually, economically, and racially. This oppression has resulted in discrimination, expulsion, and even genocide. The ADL was founded by Chicago lawyer Sigmond Livingston in 1913 to fight antiSemitism. Following the wrongful conviction of Leo Frank, a Jewish man from Chicago, ­Livingston established the ADL in his Chicago office with $200, two desks, and the sponsorship of the Independent Order of B’nai B’rith. Anti-Semitism of the day was increasing and eventually resulted in the mob lynching of Frank in 1915. In his efforts, Livingston, according to ADL’s website, aimed “to secure justice and fair treatment to all people alike.” The ADL initially focused much of its efforts on the negative images and stereotypes of Jewish people in the news media, in movies, and on stage. In the 1920s, the ADL fought ads that were discriminatory in employment, housing, and higher education. In the 1940s, the ADL worked toward fighting the Ku Klux Klan’s Black terror campaign via the media. In 1961, to examine anti-Semitism in the United States through a social science perspective, the ADL funded a 5-year study conducted at the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley. This project resulted in the development of the Research Program on Patterns of American Prejudice. Research conducted by the faculty resulted in several published works including The New Religious Conscious (1976) by Charles Y. Glock and Robert N. Bellah and Anti-Semitism in America (1983) by Harold E. Quinley and Charles Y. Glock. Among the findings of the ADL-funded research was that the most religious people tended to be the most intolerant of Judaism. They also found that one third of all Americans were anti-Semitic; however, very few supported discrimination against Jewish people.

Surveillance of Government Activities As a result of government efforts in the 1920s to limit Jewish immigration, the ADL began to fight

51

discrimination against all groups in order to accomplish equality for Jewish people. In the wake of the “final solution,” otherwise known as the Holocaust, the ADL moved toward lobbying for civil rights laws. In 1947, the ADL submitted its first amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) brief in Shelley v. Kraemer. This amicus curiae questioned the constitutionality of restrictive housing covenants, which worked to exclude certain groups of people (e.g., race, religion, nationality) from buying houses in particular neighborhoods. The Supreme Court determined that such covenants are unenforceable. In the 1950s, the ADL resumed its fight to stop the government’s immigration quota system with a campaign known as “Crack the Quota.” The ADL also submitted an amicus curiae brief in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 that helped end racial segregation in schools. Continuing the fight against oppression, the ADL helped defuse conflict resulting from desegregation. The ADL engaged in a large-scale campaign to educate the public about tolerance by publishing books, posters, and other educational tools. In the 1960s, the ADL aided the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In the 1980s, the ADL ran a campaign that focused on Jews trapped in the then U.S.S.R., urging the nation to recognize civil rights for Jews and to allow them to emigrate. In 1981, the ADL made a dramatic impact in the United States when it drafted a model ethnic intimidation statute. The model defined bias intimidation, institutional vandalism, and penalty enhancers for crimes motivated by hate. The ADL ushered the United States into an era in which hate crime became a recognized phenomenon. The ADL also stressed the need for law enforcement personnel training and government data collection. As of 2015, 45 states and the District of Columbia have some form of hate crime law. Many of these laws are similar to the ADL’s model law. The ADL’s model law also encouraged the federal government to pass the Hate Crime Statistics Act in 1990. In the 1990s, the ADL monitored militant antigovernment extremist groups within the United States. A report released by the ADL warned of this growing problem 6 months before the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in 1995.

52

Anti-Defamation League

Monitoring Anti-Semitism, Extremism, and Hate Crimes In the 1920s, the ADL began to focus on fighting the Ku Klux Klan’s attacks on Jewish people. Livingston also focused the ADL’s efforts on fighting Henry Ford’s anti-Semitic propaganda. In the 1930s, the ADL fought a rise in anti-Semitism resulting from the rise of Nazism in Germany. During this decade, the ADL increased its staff and began to monitor the behaviors of extremist individuals and organizations in the United States. In the 1960s, when anti-Catholic sentiments rose with the election of President John F. Kennedy, the ADL also rose to fight this hate. Following the Six Day War, also known as the Third Arab-Israeli War, in June 1967, the ADL launched a series of radio broadcasts, known as “Dateline Israel,” that helped Americans better understand Israel and its people. In the 1970s, the ADL focused on international acts of anti-Semitism, in part by opening offices in Israel and Europe and publishing The New Anti-Semitism. Expanding its efforts to educate the public, the ADL established the Center for Holocaust Studies in 1977, later known as the Braun Holocaust Institute-Glick Center for Holocaust Studies. Since 1979, the ADL has published the annual ADL Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents. This annual report documents acts of anti-Semitism in the United States. However, this documentation includes incidents that are reported to the ADL regardless of their criminal or noncriminal nature. Furthermore, the report does not include those incidents that have occurred but have not been reported. Research shows that crime reporting can be problematic for police as well as for advocacy groups. One must also take into account that these data are not scientific. The ADL continues to educate the public on anti-Semitism and intolerance. In 1985, the ADL launched a program called A World of Difference in which it provided tolerance training to educational institutions, corporations, and law enforcement. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ADL’s World of Difference Institute produced a widely distributed guide titled Empowering Children in the Aftermath of Hate. Worldwide, the World of Difference Institute has affected 56 million people. In

recent years, the ADL has educated schools on fighting bullying, especially cyberbullying. The ADL has also joined the fight to recognize the civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons. As of 2015, the ADL has 28 regional offices and continues its aggressive surveillance of hate crimes in the United States and internationally. Venessa Garcia See also Brown v. Board of Education (1954); Civil Rights Movement; Cyberbullying; Domestic Terrorist Groups; Hate Crimes; Israel; Nazism; 9/11; Religion

Further Readings Anti-Defamation League. (2013). “History of the AntiDefamation League.” http://archive.adl.org/ adlhistory/1913_1920.html#.V”Kq0Mrd0xdh (Accessed January 2015). Brief of American Jewish Committee and AntiDefamation League of B’nai B’rith Amici Curiae, Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421 (1962)). http://archive .adl.org/civil_rights/ab/website%20amicus%20 brief%20-%20engel%20v.%20vitale.pdf (Accessed December 2015). Brief on Behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union American Ethical Union, American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League of the B’nai B’rith, Japanese American Citizens League and Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice as Amici Curiae, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/ racialjustice/brownvboard_amicus_1952.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Gerstenfeld, Phyllis B. Hate Crime: Cause, Controls, and Controversies (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013. Glock, Charles Y. and Robert N. Bellah, eds. The New Religious Conscious. Oakland: University of California Press, 1976. Quinley, Harold E. and Charles Y. Glock. Anti-Semitism in America. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

Website Anti-Defamation League: http://www.adl.org/

Antiglobalization

Antiglobalization The antiglobalization movement is a nonhierarchical global social network that stands opposed to economic neoliberalism policies or corporate globalization, which has guided international development and trade since the late 20th century. The movement consists of a variety of communities organizing against the consequences of neoliberal policies, and although very diverse, all such communities connect their actions to the broader goal of limiting corporate globalization. These groups charge that corporate globalization policies have exacerbated global poverty and increased inequality. Their protests target organizations that enable corporations to pursue a largely unregulated, free market, privatized form of globalization, such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, the World ­Economic Forum, and the Group of Eight (G8) heavily industrialized nations. Because of the movement’s anticapitalist bent and unconventional tactics, police agencies have used hardline policing strategies as security measures to subdue antiglobalist protests and to ensure public safety. This entry briefly reviews the rise and decline of the antiglobalization movement and discusses the various security strategies employed by the police in response to antiglobalization protestors.

Origins The movement had peaceful origins in the 1980s but adopted more confrontational tactics in the 1990s, beginning with the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas followed by the 1999 Battle of Seattle, when an initially nonviolent protest at the World Trade Organization headquarters turned violent. About 40,000 protestors marched, chanted, and occasionally rioted against the World Trade Organization, smashing windows at Starbucks and McDonald’s and looting Niketown. The authorities pushed back by declaring a state of emergency, calling in the National Guard, and arming the police with tear gas, pepper spray, stun grenades, and rubber bullets. Hundreds of protesters were arrested. This response was the beginning of a larger, more orchestrated and militarized strategy

53

to contain the movement’s use of direct action and social disruption. In April 2000, 5 months after Seattle, many of the same demonstrators took to the streets of Washington, D.C., to protest a meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with 1,300 arrests being made. The first death of an antiglobalization protester occurred in July 2001, during protests against a meeting of the G8 in Genoa, Italy. As several thousand people marched in the streets of Genoa, 16,000 police officers were deployed.

Strategies for Security In 2003, a meeting of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was held in Miami, Florida, to negotiate the elimination of trade barriers on nearly all goods and services provided anywhere in North, Central, and South America. Thousands of protesters traveled to Miami to express opposition to the proposed accord, arguing that such an agreement would result in the privatization of vital public services and would undermine environmental and labor laws. In response, the MiamiDade Police Department debuted the “Miami Model,” whereby the police department collaborated with local, state, and national law enforcement agencies to meet the protesters with decisive force. Before the protest, the police patrolled the streets with armored, military-style personnel carriers while helicopters hovered above downtown. As the demonstrations began, the city was packed with thousands of cops dressed in full body armor and gas masks. The police occupied the streets while shouting at the demonstrators and randomly firing rubber bullets into crowds of unarmed protesters, spraying tear gas at thousands of others, and using Tasers to subdue a selected few. Movement ethnographer Luis Fernandez, who studied the 2003 FTAA protests, argued that the brute force shown in the Miami Model was one of the tactics used by the police to subdue the protesters in Miami and beyond. Behind the scenes, the police engaged in softer legal strategies designed to change the demonstration’s nature and limit its scope. For example, the lengthy permit process that protest groups must submit to before events serves as a means of police surveillance, which the authorities use to plan for the

54

Antiglobalization

protests as well as to channel protest activity toward nonviolent strategies. The information collected in the permit application allows the police to predict the number of officers necessary to patrol the events as well as gives the police an estimate of the number and type of organizations that might be attending. This, in turn, enables specific planning about how to prepare for the groups coming in, with the realization that some may be more confrontational than others. In addition, specific parts of a permit application may be denied, which works to the advantage of the police. The permit may specify, for example, that marches end at particular locations that are strategically beneficial to the police but may be detrimental to the activists. Fernandez relates how during the 2002 World Economic Forum protest in New York, the police issued a permit for a march that ended four city blocks away from the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, where World Economic Forum members were gathering. The police prepared for the large crowds that they knew would end up in that location and successfully cordoned them off. This action placed the protesters far from the forum delegates, out of view of the media, and isolated in a location that the police could easily control. These types of specifications outlined or negotiated in the permit are ones protestors may follow, as was the case at the World Economic Forum protest, or may not, which could create divisions within the movement and also allow organizations that do not follow the rules to be labeled by the authorities as “deviant,” operating outside the limits agreed to for the protest activity. Another legal strategy that the authorities may use for security is the enacting of laws on short notice. In the run-up to the 2003 FTAA protests, a hastily enacted Streets and Sidewalks Ordinance temporarily expanded the authority of the police, allowing them to conduct searches and seizures of antiglobalization activists with the excuse of looking for outlawed materials. Because any hard object was outlawed, the police had broad latitude. By criminalizing everyday objects such as bottles and batteries, the net of possible violations was expanded. Of the 200 individuals arrested in Miami, no one was charged with violating the Streets and Sidewalks Ordinance. When arresting the activists, the police fell back on traditional

charges, such as blocking a thoroughfare or disobeying officers. A few days after the protests, the ordinance expired, thus preempting legal challenges to its constitutionality. Scouting activists—advance personnel sent to preplan protest events in various cities—faced legal zoning laws that were selectively applied, arguably as a form of harassment. Interviews conducted by Fernandez revealed that advance teams are tasked with trying to secure the needed resources before protests, which often have insufficient cash resources. Consequently, spaces secured for meetings and sleeping are often in the poorer parts of the city, which are vulnerable to being inspected for fire code and building violations, insurance issues, or food-handling problems. For example, zoning laws played a role in the 2000 International Monetary Fund/World Bank protests in Washington, D.C. The Metropolitan Police Department raided the convergence center, which served as the protest headquarters in the days before the event. Supposedly investigating a fire code violation, the police entered the building and confiscated all puppets, banners, and medical supplies stored there.

Decline of the Movement Some circumstances converged leading to the decline of the antiglobalization movement after 2003. The hard policing of the Miami Model had chilling effects on protesters. Then free trade organizations scheduled meetings outside the United States, and some host cities closed off public lands to activists, making it more expensive and challenging to send advance teams or to house confederates before or during the planned disruptions. More recently, the movement faced a dilution of  its ranks as participants bailed to engage ­progressive movements opposed to the policies of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. As a result, there were fewer antiglobalization dissidents to police, and softer policing methods were sufficient, for the most part, to contain the demonstrators. Stan Weeber See also Anarchism; Global Justice; Globalization; Political Dissidents; Riot Control

Antinuclear Movement

Further Readings Cunningham, Steve. “Trump: The Anti-Globalization Movement Protesters Forgot.” American Thinker (February 5, 2017). http://www.americanthinker .com/blog/2017/02/trump_the_antiglobalization_ movement_protesters_forgot_about.html (Accessed August 2017). Dwyer, Mimi. “Where Did the Anti-Globalization Movement Go?” The New Republic (October 25, 2013). https://newrepublic.com/article/115360/wtoprotests-why-have-they-gotten-smaller (Accessed August 2017). Engler, Mark. “Defining the Anti-Globalization Movement.” Democracy Uprising (Apri, 2007). http://democracyuprising.com/2007/04/01/antiglobalization-movement/ (Accessed August 2017). Fernandez, Luis. Policing Dissent. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008. Juris, Jeffrey. Networking Futures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008. Korten, David. When Corporations Rule the World. Oxford, England: Greenleaf, 2015. Warner, Adam. “A Brief History of the Anti-Globalization Movement.” University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, v.12/2 (2006).

Antinuclear Movement The worldwide antinuclear movement is a social movement based on taking political action against and raising awareness of nuclear usage and further proliferation. It revolves around two axes: (1) nuclear weapons and (2) nuclear power. While the roots of the movement lay in the initial reactions of the world to the United States’ dropping of the world’s first wartime nuclear weapon on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945, it has since grown to include those who oppose the maintenance of nuclear arsenals for national security and nuclear power as a source of energy. While the antinuclear movement has enjoyed some minor successes, such as Sweden’s abandonment of its nuclear program during the Cold War, the movement has largely oscillated in and out of relevancy on the world’s stage the risk of nuclear war, and the problems that arise from nuclear energy become apparent and then recede in the face of other issues. Overall, the antinuclear power

55

movement has been far more successful than the antinuclear weapon movement. Although the antinuclear movement reached its highpoint during the Cold War, and it has enjoyed a modicum of popular resurgence in the wake of the disaster at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant in March 2011, it has since receded from the forefront of the political conversation, being replaced by terrorism and other national security issues. This entry discusses both axes of the movement— nuclear weapons and nuclear power—and the future outlook for this movement worldwide.

Nuclear Weapons The antinuclear weapon subsection of the movement, although participation in one is not necessarily mutually exclusive to the other, is the oldest part of the antinuclear movement. Although the theoretical use of atomic energy as an offensive weapon existed before the Second World War, both Germany and Japan had nuclear weapons programs, and prewar and wartime scientists discussed the ethics of such a weapon, but the bombing of Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945, brought the issue forward to the wider world. The official announcement of the dropping of the bomb instigated many opinions over the ethics of the bombing, a conversation furthered by the dropping of a second bomb on Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945. In addition, the publication of John Hersey’s field reports from Hiroshima in the August 31, 1946 edition of The New Yorker gave the movement traction. For the first time, people outside of Japan could read about what life was like under and in the wake of the mushroom cloud. The topic of this subsection, like its relative relating to power, has a way of oscillating with geopolitical events. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the movement had a brief moment of monopoly over the nuclear conversation, only to lose it to increasingly anti-Soviet hard-line government policies. So too, in the wake of U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech in early 1983 did movies such as The Day After (1983, United States), Testament (1983, United States), and Threads (1984, United Kingdom) have the West discussing the potential danger of nuclear war that nuclear stockpiles engendered; but neither these films nor the 1-million-person protest against

56

Antinuclear Movement

nuclear weapons in New York City on June 12, 1983, or the Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament of 1986 had a major effect on arms reduction in the United States. By the 21st century, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel all have nuclear weapons. With the exception of North Korea, all of these countries have strong antinuclear movements that are unable to gain much political headway. Excepting South Africa, because the apartheid government destroyed the country’s nuclear weapons for fear of postapartheid reprisal, and the former Soviet Bloc, which simply could not afford to maintain the soviet warheads in the 1990s, no country has willingly abandoned its nuclear weapons program once completed, and Iran and South Korea are attempting to join the nuclear weapons club.

Nuclear Power The antinuclear power movement has had more success worldwide than its cousin. Unlike nuclear weaponry, nuclear power has had far more blatant disasters across the globe that have engendered a more practical conversation about the threats entailed in nuclear energy than in nuclear weaponry. Whether it be the 2011 Fukushima disaster (Japan), the meltdown at Three Mile Island (United States) in 1979, or Chernobyl disaster (Ukraine) in 1986, nuclear power disasters are followed by decreased construction or replacement of online reactors. This effect is furthered by the increasingly high cost of plant construction, the high-risk nature of its contents, and the ever-present problem of fuel storage, and compounded by popular films such as The China Syndrome (1979), these bring new fighters to the antinuclear power cause. While the movement sees its greatest successes from disaster, it arose out of a rejection of the legacy plan of U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower wet out in his “Atoms for Peace” speech. Throughout the 1970s, Europe saw increasingly large protests around already online nuclear power plants. West Germany was a hotbed of antinuclear power outrage. While the West Germany protests may not have been the largest, they were the most frequent and the most violent, with the injured frequently numbering the high double or even triple digits. The antinuclear power movement has been

so much more successful than its cousin not because its cause was better but because the threat of a nuclear meltdown was something people actually experienced.

Future Outlook Ultimately, the antinuclear movement, worldwide, has had some successes in getting governments to abandon their plans for nuclear expansion, whether peaceful or otherwise (e.g., Sweden); some contingent gains in the area of arms reduction (e.g., South Africa); and some spectacular failures (e.g., Japan). Japan, the only country to ever experience the destruction of a nuclear weapon not once, but twice, is also the most nuclear-latent of any country in the world. The future success or failure of the antinuclear movement lies firmly in the geopolitics of East Asia. While North Korea’s nuclear activities may dominate headlines and South Korea’s attempts to revise its 123 agreement with the United States in order to allow for domestic reprocessing of spent fuel may attract the attention of policy wonks, Japan’s fate with regard to Article 9 of its constitution rests on whether or not the country’s antinuclear movement, based on a circle of increasingly small number of hibakusha (atom bomb survivors), can resist the repeated attempts of the Japanese right to extract the country from the U.S. nuclear umbrella and rearm as an offensive power, with domestic nuclear armament capabilities, in East Asia. As history shows, with one outlying exception based on racial fear more than nuclear ethics, once a country obtains nuclear weapons, it becomes exponentially harder for the antinuclear movement to get rid of those weapons. The success of the antinuclear movement rests in prevention rather than removal when it comes to nuclear weapons. Zachary Kopin See also Antiwar Movement, History in United States; Cold War; Nuclear Treaties; Nuclear War

Further Readings Bird, Kai, et al. Hiroshima’s Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy. Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer’s Press, 1998.

Antipsychiatry Movement Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen. International Security. London, England: Sage, 2007. Goldblat, Jozef. Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002. Hersey, John. “Hiroshima.” The New Yorker (August 31, 1946). http://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/1946/08/31/hiroshima (Accessed October 2017).

Antipsychiatry Movement This entry briefly describes and outlines the antipsychiatry movement, an amorphous movement that is highly critical of some of the currents and trends in psychiatry mentioned earlier. The entry starts by giving a brief overview of psychiatry as a medical specialty, examining trends and current issues therein. It then describes and analyzes the antipsychiatry movement, detailing the specific critiques of psychiatry by those involved in the movement. Many of these critiques relate to issues of security and surveillance. These include arguments that psychiatry overuses interventions such as medication, forced treatments, and compulsory hospitalization as a form of control and containment of those whom society marks out as deviant or nonconformist.

Trends and Current Issues in Psychiatry Psychiatry developed as a specific branch of medicine in the 19th century, and it has consolidated its position as a medical and academic discipline since. The discipline of psychiatry has expanded much scientific effort into fine-tuning the categorization, diagnosis, and treatment of mental disorders. In terms of the treatment of mental ­ disorders, psychiatry has traditionally been propelled by the biopsychosocial model that attempts to address various deficits associated with mental illness with a mixture of biological, psychological, and social interventions. Psychiatric diagnoses and broader categorizations have changed considerably over time and remain the subject of controversial debate. Presently, the American Psychiatric ­Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5),

57

published in 2013, is the gold standard of diagnosis and categorization. This book amounts to 947 pages of descriptive text, listing more than 200 mental disorders. Psychiatric services have been configured to address various levels of severity. Outpatient services are delivered in the community to patients with less severe mental illness by psychiatrists and allied professionals (e.g., social workers, psychologists, occupational therapists, and general practitioners) and generally involve a mixture of medications, psychotherapies, and psychosocial interventions. Inpatient services are reserved for patients with more severe mental illness and are delivered in specific mental hospitals, forensic hospitals, and psychiatric wards of general hospitals. Inpatient services place a heavy reliance on medications and commonly use seclusion (solitary confinement) and restraint (both chemical and physical) as interventions. While many patients self-present to psychiatric hospitals, a large portion of inpatients are brought to the hospital involuntarily by police, ambulance, family, or friends. Most Western countries have legislation allowing psychiatrists to compulsorily admit and treat people against their will, and hospital staff can use seclusion, restraint, and coercion inside the hospital where deemed necessary. Such coercion is mainly used in inpatient settings, but it is increasingly being used for communitydwelling patients with mental illness, in the form of community treatment orders. These community treatment orders can force a community-dwelling patient to take medication or face compulsory prehospitalization.

Antipsychiatry Movement and Its Critiques of Psychiatry In its more extreme form, antipsychiatry is critical of the whole psychiatric enterprise itself, seeing it as a pseudoscientific tool of social control. While there have always been criticisms of psychiatry, antipsychiatry reached its zenith in the 1960s revolving around psychiatrists such as R. D. Laing and Thomas Szasz and social scientists such as Michel Foucault and Irving Goffman. More recently, a new generation of academic psychiatrists and social scientists, many of them from the “critical psychiatry” movement, have continued

58

Antipsychiatry Movement

the critique of mainstream psychiatry. They have been joined by disgruntled ex-patients who label themselves “consumer/survivors” of the mental health system, as well as by other well-organized groups such as the Church of Scientology, which calls psychiatry “an industry of death.” The antipsychiatry critique of mainstream psychiatry has many nuances, and there are differences of opinion within. That said, there are some broad commonalities in the critique, centering on three key points, which are dealt with in turn in the following paragraphs. First, the antipsychiatry movement has questioned the validity and reality of psychiatric diagnoses. There have been five editions of the DSM since 1952, and each version lists many new diagnoses, deletes many old diagnoses, and changes the criteria for core categories, implying that even the psychiatric establishment cannot agree on core concepts. Famously, homosexuality was considered a psychiatric disorder until 1973. Others have argued that many of the listed psychiatric disorders are within the normal range of human experience but have been unnecessarily labelled as “mental disorders.” In this argument, social ­phobia is considered a label for shyness, depression a label for sadness, and attention-deficit/­ hyperactivity disorder a label for boisterousness. Even disorders such as schizophrenia have been considered societal labels rather than concrete illnesses. Common across this argument is the belief that people considered deviant or nonconformist by mainstream society are given a psychiatric label to b ­ etter control and monitor them. Second, and related to the previous point, the antipsychiatry movement has heavily criticized the nature and extent of common psychiatric treatments and interventions. It has been cogently argued that psychiatry has transformed its approach in the 21st century from a biopsychosocial model to a “biobiobio” model that overly emphasizes psychotropic medication to the detriment of equally effective psychosocial approaches. Some have argued that this has been driven by the agenda of profit-driven pharmaceutical companies, rather than by the therapeutic needs of patients. These companies have received sustained critique from academic scholars in the antipsychiatry and critical psychiatry movement, who have accused them of deliberately misleading the

public (by underemphasizing side effects and overemphasizing efficacy) and unduly influencing the psychiatric profession to prescribe these medications. Others, especially among the consumer/ survivor movement, continue to criticize the use of seclusion (solitary confinement) and restraints in mental hospitals as signs of barbarism and social control. Third, newer versions of antipsychiatry and critical psychiatry have emphasized the inequalities experienced by marginalized populations within psychiatry. For example, much research has shown that interventions such as seclusion, heavy dosages of medication, and involuntary commitment are disproportionately high among racial and ethnic minorities such as blacks in the United Kingdom and the United States. Other research shows how political dissidents have been labeled with mental illness and coerced into “treatment” in places such as the Soviet Union and apartheid South Africa. Such data are used to bolster the argument that psychiatric interventions are routinely deployed as measures of security in order to control and contain “threatening” populations. Such activity is frequently supported by specific legislation (often known as mental health acts) that gives psychiatrists the power to hospitalize and forcibly medicate patients, a power not enjoyed by other physicians. This leads many supporters of antipsychiatry to conclude that mainstream psychiatry is an agent of social control and an integral part of state security. To conclude, many critics of psychiatry note that the nature and power of psychiatry as described herein makes it unique among medical disciplines, specifically criticizing (a) its ability to  involuntarily commit and treat patients, a ­capability absent in other branches of medicine; (b) its allegedly flawed system of diagnosis and categorization that is considered to medicalize ­ everyday problems in living; and (c) treatments of ­questionable therapeutic efficacy but which allegedly ­control and contain deviant individuals and “threatening” populations. All this led famed antipsychiatrist Thomas Szasz to repeatedly argue that psychiatry is in reality a branch of law rather than a branch of medicine. While antipsychiatry is considered marginal in mainstream psychiatry, it continues to find many adherents among scientologists, the consumer/survivor movement, and a

Antiwar Movement, History in United States

small number of critical social scientists and academic psychiatrists. It is a distinct line of critical thought that will likely persist, if not grow, as time moves on. Rob Whitley See also Deviance; Health Management Organizations; Mental Health Inpatient Facilities; Psychological Assessment; Psychotherapy; Social Control; Stigma

threat to national security, state response to antiwar movements often creates threats to privacy, civil liberties, and freedom of movement in wartime. This entry investigates the early formation of the antiwar movement in the United States and examines the movement’s efforts in the 19th and early 20th centuries, during the Vietnam War, and during the 21st-century U.S. conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

The 19th-Century Antiwar Movements

Further Readings Carlat, D. Unhinged: The Trouble With Psychiatry: A Doctor’s Revelations About a Profession in Crisis. New York, NY: Free Press, 2010. Laing, R. D. The Divided Self. London, England: Random House, 1969. Szasz, T. “The Myth of Mental Illness.” American Psychologist, v.15 (1960). Whitley, R. “The Anti-Psychiatry Movement: Dead, Diminishing or Developing?” Psychiatric Services, v.63 (2012).

Antiwar Movement, History United States

59

in

Although most famously active during the Vietnam War, the United States has harbored, if not effective, then loud, antiwar sentiment since its early national period. Both inside and outside the government proper, these voices have expressed disdain for both the target war and its methods. There has never been a war in the United States that did not have its internal enemies, although the support against the war often fluctuated based on battlefield successes, casualty counts, and longevity. The movements against the MexicanAmerican War, Civil War, First World War, and Vietnam War are perhaps the most famous, but there were many more, including the current War on Terror. Even World War II, which has since been remembered as a moment of national unity in support of the “good war,” had its opponents both in 1941 and in 1944. The antiwar movement has generally been a tenuous alliance among strict pacifists, nonintervenionalists, popular crusaders, and lifetime supporters. Because of the perceived

As long as the United States has fought, or not fought, wars, popular opinion has come out both for and against governmental positions. While the  long-term basis for the strict pacifist sect of the  antiwar movement draws mostly from the mid-19th-century philosophical writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, and to a lesser degree from religious teachings, the antiwar movement existed long before those writings. Even in the pre-national period and extending well into the 19th century, every time the state clashed with native populations, there were voices of discontent. America’s first great national war, the War of 1812, initially was very controversial, with many being opposed to the conflict. By 1814, things had gotten so bad that New England Federalists, angered over the loss of trade revenue because of Republican policies, gathered in Hartford, Connecticut, to debate secession. In the West, the war was just as controversial. Years later, Illinois Whig politician Justin Butterfield famously sarcastically quipped, in reference to another controversial war, the Mexican-American War, “I opposed one war [The War of 1812]. That was enough for me. I am now perpetually in favor of war, pestilence and famine.” Butterfield Whig compatriot Abraham Lincoln, during his short period in the House of Representatives, famously called the legality of President James Polk’s war into question, a position that would cause Lincoln to lose his congressional seat. As in other areas, such as the development of the rules of war, throughout the 19th century, the antiwar movement sought international adjudication as a way to replace violence as a means for the settlement of international disputes. The American Civil War brought out many against

60

Antiwar Movement, History in United States

the war, first those who thought the South was better off left alone, then famously the 1863 New York draft rioters, and the Peace Democrats, known as  copperheads. Famously, Lincoln’s government exiled Clement Vallandingham, a ­ Democratic Congressman, for encouraging desertion. And at the end of the 19th century, many of the nation’s citizens saw the deposition of the Hawaiian government and John Hay’s “splendid little war” as the piece of naked American ­imperial aggression that they believed they were.

Antiwar Sentiment in the Beginning of the 20th Century The 20th century began with the United States engaged in a new type of conflict. Although in the previous century the nation had almost constantly been at war—whether against a foreign foe, itself, or natives—in the new century, the constabulary U.S. military would attempt to pacify nationalist forces in the areas it previously brought into its territorial empire, as well as in places in which its citizens had business interests. In a broader sense, this period, characterized by radical activity on many fronts, saw an adoption of broad antiwar planks by those on the outskirts of the political conversations as well as narrower ones by the establishment. Although it may have been the Socialist Party of America, with members such as Eugene V. Debs and Helen Keller, that opposed war outright, President Woodrow Wilson, while using violence to deal with a problem involving Mexico and the U.S.-Mexico border, ran on an antiwar platform in 1916. Famously, Wilson ran under the Democratic slogan “He kept us out of war,” with a promise to stay the course, a course he reversed in 1917. Wilson expected 1 million men to volunteer immediately following the declaration of war on April 6, 1917. However, in the first 6 months, only 75,000 men volunteered. Clearly, the American people opposed direct involvement in World War I on a massive scale, and the government could not afford such discontent. The government used a massive propaganda machine to try to convince the American people to reverse course by utilizing posters; “dollar-a-year” speakers; music, including John Philips Sousa; and erecting monuments to the Franco-American

alliance in the Revolution in the hope that it would convince the American people to support the conflict. The government passed the Espionage Act of 1917 as a way to deal with the war’s detractors and established a draft to deal with the manpower shortage. Under this act, the government jailed Debs for speaking out against the draft. A perceived threat to national security led to Debs’s continuing to serve out his sentence long after the war ended. If Warren Harding’s successful presidential platform based on a “return to normalcy” indicates anything, it is that even after the First World War the American people at large preferred, rather than a Wilsonian policy of interventionalism on a massive scale, an antiwar policy of limited engagement. In the United States between the wars, the policy of anti-interventionalism held sway, despite calls to the contrary and those who decried any U.S. interventionalism at all. In response to the pro-business Banana Wars that the United States fought between the World Wars, the outright pacifist movement once again held power over the American antiwar discussion. Backed by former Marine Corps Major General Smedley Butler’s description of the U.S. government’s use of force in his 1935 book War Is a Racket, the voice of the pacifist left enjoyed resurgence in a generally reactionist country. By 1940, despite President Franklin D. ­Roosevelt’s attempts to the contrary, the American public still held a largely noninterventionist idea of foreign policy. Through movements like “­American First,” people such as Charles Lindbergh argued for the United States to continue to pursue a noninterventionist policy. Even after Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 thrust the United States into the Second World War, certain hard-core antiwar activists such as Pete Seeger kept the movement going; however, they quickly abandoned this pursuit in the wake of extremely popular support for the war.

The Antiwar Movement and Vietnam The high watermark of the antiwar movement in the United States was the popular crusade against  the Vietnam War, as young people began to reject the big government policies of their parents. The movement arose in the context of the

Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s

Civil Rights Movement, where student activism and large-scale, peaceful protests were able to, at least superficially, create change. Like its contemporary movements, government fear led to unwarranted FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) surveillance. Although limited antiwar protests had existed since the beginning of fighting, as troop deployments increased, so did opposition to the war. These protests reached a high point between 1967 and 1971, when antiwar rhetoric permeated the political conversation and popular culture. In 1968, a protest against the war at the 1968 Democratic National Convention turned violent as Chicago Mayor Richard Daley deployed the police department against the protestors. Similarly, after four people were killed and nine others were injured at a series of protests at Kent State University in 1970, the antiwar movement captured the national imagination, eventually forcing a Vietnamization of the war in 1972–1973 and a final exit of U.S. forces following the fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese in 1975. After the war, the antiwar movement largely ran out of steam; however, small efforts were mounted to protest President Ronald Reagan’s administration’s use of force, as well as the First Gulf War.

Antiwar Activism in the 21st Century The War on Terror created a new frontier of statesponsored surveillance alongside an antiwar response to it. The antiwar movement has had a checkered experience in the 21st century. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the American public overwhelmingly supported the ­ 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, with the exception of a few pacifists on the extreme left. This led to a massive expansion of government surveillance powers under the USA PATRIOT Act and similar legislation. The George W. Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003, backed by later unproven evidence of weapons of mass destruction and limited international support, however, lit a fire under the antiwar community. In largescale protests not seen since Vietnam, a grassroots movement against the war arose and grew as the war dragged on and casualties mounted. The antiwar movement was largely responsible for the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and continues to pressure the federal government to minimize

61

U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In addition, the antiwar movement has rallied, although less successfully, against potential U.S. intervention in Syria, Libya, and Iran and against non-U.S. wars like the Arab-Israeli conflict. The antiwar movement has been less successful, however, in minimizing the government’s surveillance. Large, existential fears of a terrorist attack have led to massive electronic surveillance of average citizens by the government. Even small-scale opponents of unlimited war can find themselves on the government’s “no-fly” list. State surveillance may not be a child of war, but it can certainly grow under it. Zachary Kopin See also Antinuclear Movement; Cold War; Nuclear Treaties; Nuclear War; World War I and II

Further Readings Kuznick, Peter, et al. Untold History of the United States. New York, NY: Gallery Books, 2012. Butler, Smedley D. War Is a Racket. New York, NY: Round Table, 1935.

Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s The U.S. government spied on an estimated 2 ­million individuals and 3,000 groups that voiced opposition to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973. These peaceful protestors were taking advantage of their constitutional right to dissent to the government’s Vietnam policy. Governmental surveillance was designed to neutralize or eliminate the protestors’ voice, even though the right to disagree is widely recognized as a fundamental liberty in a democratic society. The scope of the spying graduated quickly from student protestors to black militants and then to “radicals,” very broadly defined. This entry examines the birth of the antiwar protest movement and then highlights the surveillance tactics carried out toward the movement by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Richard Nixon administration, the U.S. Army, and the Federal Bureau of

62

Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s

Investigation (FBI). The entry concludes with a summary of congressional responses to the surveillance.

Antiwar Protest Movement Former protest leader Tom Hayden framed the surveillance as part of a conflict between Machiavellians, technicians doing the power elite’s work, and Movements, the organized mass gatherings that assemble outside institutional structures to right a moral injury that those institutions fail to address. The antiwar movement contended that the Vietnamese had a moral right to determine their own government, while the American elite saw winning the war as a measure of U.S. dominance in the world and a necessary tactic to prevent another “domino” from falling to Soviet influence. The government’s surveillance of the 1960s-era Vietnam War Protest Movement was driven by an overarching Machiavellian cold war competition between U.S. and Soviet establishments. Given the tensions of the era, U.S. leaders were vitally interested in the question of whether the movement was being influenced or funded by international communists or terrorists. Reports out of the Soviet Union suggested that black militants aligned with U.S. protesters were trained by North ­Koreans and that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Soviet police force KGB had been involved in varying degrees in aiding the antiwar movement. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover strongly believed such reports, being completely assured that a strong link existed between the antiwar movement and foreign extremists. President ­Lyndon B. Johnson was far less convinced, and he sought a second opinion by instructing CIA Director John McCone in 1965 to provide an independent, objective analysis of the student antiwar protests.

Central Intelligence Agency Almost from the beginning, the legality of CIA spy operations within the United States was vigorously debated. The staunchest defenders of such actions believed that when internal security was compromised, domestic spying was completely legal; the offending antiwar insurgents forfeited

what would have been, in more peaceful times, a constitutional right to privacy. According to this admittedly extreme view, a president’s decision to initiate such domestic intelligence gathering is not prosecutable. Critics countered that spying on U.S. soil violated the CIA’s charter as well as a 1947 U.S. statute forbidding such operations. Meanwhile, government officials tasked with carrying out these missions perceived the situation as a gray area not specifically prohibited by law, as in the case of a U.S. citizen who has been approached by foreign intelligence agents. In such instances, given heightened fears of foreign involvement in the protests, CIA spying was justified as a crucial tool to gather the information to assess the level of foreign complicity. By 1967, the CIA’s questionable or illegal collection of domestic intelligence had become so widespread that one of McCone’s successors as director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, was forced to create a Special Operations Group to handle the volume of incoming information. Embedded in the Deputy Director of Plan’s counterintelligence division, Special Operations Group provided data on the U.S. peace movement to the Office of Current Intelligence on a regular basis. Based on intelligence received, the CIA implemented two new domestic operations. The first, Project RESISTANCE, was designed to provide security to CIA installations and contractors as well as agency recruiters on college campuses. The CIA reached out to campus security, college administrators, and local police in an effort to identify antiwar activists and dissenters. Information on thousands of students and dozens of groups was eventually passed on to campus recruiters as a warning of potential dangers. The CIA’s Office of Security created a second project, MERRIMAC, to provide warnings about demonstrations being carried out against agency facilities or personnel in the nation’s capital. In this project, agents infiltrated Washington-based peace groups and black activist groups. Under both programs, the agency was given free rein to do whatever was necessary to prevent radical groups from protesting or to disrupt or subvert ongoing operations. It used its contacts with local police departments and their intelligence units to pull off burglaries, wiretaps, shared interrogations, and disinformation campaigns.

Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s

Police departments received sophisticated equipment purchased by the CIA, and in return, the agency was able to peruse suspect lists, intelligence reports, and arrest records. CIA agents together with officers in large metropolitan police units carried out illegal, warrantless searches of  private properties to provide intelligence for Restless Youth, a report submitted to President Johnson. In July 1968, Helms decided to consolidate all  CIA domestic intelligence operations under one  program, Operation CHAOS. Domestic ­spying capabilities were expanded, with President ­Johnson’s support, to include all intelligence about foreign ties to racial, antiwar, and student protest activity. Key presidential advisors Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow concurred with Hoover that foreign intelligence assets were aiding and abetting ­American antiwar protests.

The Nixon Administration Hayden observed that Machiavellians tend to be divided on how to respond to social movements, splitting into one faction that favors an extreme overreaching response and another that is more accommodating to movement demands. This observation applied to the internal social dynamics of President Richard Nixon’s administration as he took office in 1969. At the time, there were two opposing pressures on the CIA regarding its domestic intelligence capabilities. One was the allegation that the agency was not doing all it could do, that it was overpaid for domestic intelligence but was not producing acceptable results. A young, enthusiastic White House aide, Tom Charles Huston, agreed with President Nixon that current domestic intelligence was inadequate and pressed for ever-increasing domestic operations. Fearing an organized armed insurrection and stunned by the speed at which student strikes mobilized after the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in April 1970, Huston was eager to expand Operation CHAOS to include overseas agents and to share information with the FBI’s intelligence division. This is the overreaching response that Hayden wrote about. In June 1970, President Nixon met with Hoover, Helms, and the directors of the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, informing the group that he wanted a coordinated,

63

concentrated effort against domestic dissenters. To do this, he was creating the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ICI) to be chaired by Hoover. The first ICI report, in late June, ­recommended new proposals for “black bag” operations, wiretapping, and a mail opening program. In mid-July 1970, Huston told ICI that its recommendations had been accepted by the White House. A few days later, the president rescinded his approval, citing resistance from Attorney General John Mitchell as well as from Hoover. The refusal of the attorney general to accept the ICI directives illustrated the second pressure  point on the CIA during the Nixon ­ administration—the pressure to disband the ­ domestic spying on the antiwar movement that had been assembled in President Johnson’s s­ econd term. For instance, the Management Advisory Group, consisting of young CIA executives, ­formally opposed Operation CHAOS in a March 1971 report. Furthermore, internal agency s­ tudies suggested that the program had overstepped its bounds by performing i­ntelligence activities within the United States, raising questions about the legality and the l­egitimacy of the operation and its predecessor programs. Bowing to this pressure, and reflecting a more moderate response, the CIA ended the operation in 1973. During the life of Operation CHAOS, the CIA compiled personality profiles on more than 13,000 individuals, prepared dossiers during the years 1967–1973 on the political activities of 7,200 individuals and 100 radical groups, and stored data on 300,000 citizens in a computer database shared with law enforcement agencies including the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI. The agency also opened and photographed the contents of about 216,000 letters sent to and from the Soviet Union. A computerized index of 1.5 million names was created from these mail openings.

U.S. Army Fearing an expanding antiwar movement and caught off guard by urban riots in Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; and other U.S. ­ ­cities, the U.S. Army launched a campaign from 1967 to 1970 to gather intelligence on political dissidents. This spying was part of a coordinated effort by the CIA, the FBI, the National Security

64

Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s

Agency, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Department of Defense to share information and to improve intelligence-gathering capabilities. The Army systematically studied civil disturbances and potential hotspots within the continental United States, claiming that it needed these data to determine when and where to dispense troops and supplies in the event of a riot. In particular, Army agents were interested in knowing about any increases in police brutality charges and resentment of law enforcement officers. They were searching for known radical leaders both overt and covert— especially the presence of outside agitators—as well as organizational plans and activities. The definition of “radical” was broad and fluid and came to be defined as anyone who disagreed with the administration policy on Vietnam. While gathering such data, the Army spied on groups covering a broad ideological spectrum, including some that would probably not be suspect in creating civil disturbances (e.g., the Students for a Democratic Society, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the League of Women Voters). Portions of the materials collected on groups and individuals were obtained from private institutions through covert operations. For instance, Army undercover agents posed as press photographers, newspaper reporters, and television newsmen during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Illinois, to better spy on protesters assembled in Civic Center Plaza and Lincoln Park. Universities were another target of Army intelligence. Agents enrolled as students in the Black Studies program at New York University and kept dossiers on students and faculty at the University of Minnesota. By 1970, Army intelligence had files on the political activities of 100,000 individuals unaffiliated with the armed services. The Army maintained more than 350 separate records storage centers containing files on civilian political activities; one such center at Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, reported the equivalent of more than 120,000 file cards on personalities of interest.

Federal Bureau of Investigation From 1956 to 1971, the FBI implemented a covert counterintelligence program called COINTELPRO, whose purpose was to spy on, infiltrate,

discredit, and disrupt domestic groups that it believed to be subversive and to be carrying out programs that would overthrow the existing social and political order. A wide range of domestic groups were investigated during the life of this program, including multiple New Left organizations, and almost all anti-Vietnam War protest organizations. In an effort to prevent and disrupt protests, the bureau created divisions within antiwar groups by spreading misinformation, pushing violent confrontations as an alternative to peaceful demonstrations, and encouraging protesters to commit crimes. Targeted groups were subjected to “black bag” jobs or warrantless surreptitious entries and had 130,000 of their first-class letters opened and photographed. The FBI also maintained an army of 1,300 “free-floating” informers who traveled widely throughout the United States with little supervision, spying on radical groups. Ultimately, from multiple intelligence streams, the bureau compiled a list of 26,000 subversives to be detained in the event of a national emergency. The IRS sent confidential tax data on 8,000 suspected dissidents and 3,000 antiwar groups to the FBI. The IRS had a Special Services Staff whose job was to target such individuals and groups for investigation. Organizations on the list included peaceful and law-abiding groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the National Urban League.

Congressional Response to Surveillance Domestic spying by governmental agencies was costly and produced poor results. It appeared to seriously overreach the minimal threats presented by peaceful dissenting individuals and groups. It undermined the constitutional rights of Americans to free speech, association, and privacy. This erosion of rights occurred because the constitutional system for checking abuse of power had not been properly applied. To this end, the Foreign ­Intelligence Surveillance Act was passed in 1978, prohibiting physical and electronic surveillance ­ against U.S. citizens except in certain c­ ircumstances affecting national security. Ronald R ­eagan’s administration weakened important ­ sections of  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, while ­others were circumvented after the September 11,

Apartheid

2001, terrorist attacks. Thus, government surveillance of legitimate dissenters continues to the present day. Stan Weeber See also Antiwar Movement, History in United States; Central Intelligence Agency; COINTELPRO

Further Readings Hayden, Tom. The Long Sixties. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2009. Lyon, Verne. “Domestic Surveillance: The History of Operation CHAOS.” Covert Action Information Bulletin, Summer, 1990. Roebuck, Julian and Stanley C. Weeber. Political Crime in the United States. New York, NY: Praeger, 1978. U.S. Senate. Intelligence Activities and Rights of Americans, Book II. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Report 94-755, 1976.

Apartheid The term apartheid generally refers to a system of state-enforced racial or ethnic segregation. As a political system, apartheid was first developed by the South African state in 1948 to enforce physical and political separation among the country’s racial groups. In response to the South African government’s brutality in enforcing this system, apartheid was declared a crime against humanity in 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly. Although apartheid officially ended in South Africa in 1990, prior to the country’s first fully democratic elections in 1994, the term is still used to describe state policy elsewhere in the world, most notably and controversially in contemporary Israel. As a result of its application outside the South African context, human rights proponents have increasingly used the term apartheid to refer to forms of social segregation beyond race or ­ethnicity, such as global apartheid, which is used when citizens of different countries have unequal access to goods and resources based on  the c­ountry in which they live. This entry

65

highlights apartheid in South Africa, the United Nation’s official declaration against it, and how global apartheid can be tied to security and countersurveillance.

Apartheid, Security, and South Africa Originally deriving from the Afrikaans words for “separate” and “hood,” apartheid is often translated into English as “apartness” or “separateness.” It was made South African state policy in 1948 following the election of the Afrikaner nationalist National Party and codified into law through several acts over the ensuing decade. Two of the most important early acts were the 1950 Population Registration Act, which formalized racial distinctions and categorized the South ­African population into four distinct racial groups (Europeans, Africans, Indians, and Coloureds [mixed race]), and the 1950 Group Areas Act, which forced each group to live in racially defined areas to prevent mixing. These acts were further supplemented by the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, which created separate governing authorities for blacks and whites, and the 1970 Black Homeland Citizen Act, which declared that Africans were citizens of designated homeland territories, not South Africa. Collectively, these laws were premised on the idea that Africans living in urban areas was “unnatural” and that their presence therefore presented a threat to urban order. The  effect was to enable the state to police the movement of nonwhites and enforce political subservience. Surveillance to enforce these acts was carried out in numerous ways; however, the primary mechanism was the distribution of passbooks to all people of African descent certifying whether or not they could reside legally (even if temporarily) in urban areas. The passbooks quickly gave rise to expanded police powers, as the police targeted Africans living in cities for arrest en masse for pass violations. The practice of stopping African people on the suspicion of a pass violation was so common that by the 1960s the South African Police were recording 700,000 arrests for pass offenses every year. The effect of apartheid and the massive institutional effort to enforce it was that South Africa developed one of the largest and most efficient security apparatuses in Africa, including a

66

Apartheid

well-trained military, a large and brutal police force, and even a nuclear program as part of its “Total Onslaught” strategy to defeat the internal opposition forces. Such massive securitization engendered increasingly forceful resistance to apartheid. Originally peaceful, mobilization against apartheid took a violent turn following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, in which the police shot 69 people ­ peacefully protesting the pass laws. In the wake of the massacre, the primary opponents of apartheid, the African National Congress and the Pan-­ Africanist Congress, formed armed wings that began carrying out sabotage operations. Particularly following the 1976 Soweto Massacre, in which the police shot more than 300 protesting high school students, resistance to apartheid became increasingly difficult for the state to control. By the mid-1980s, the rebellion had spread across the country, which ultimately resulted in the lifting of the pass laws in 1986, followed by a negotiated transition to democracy in 1994.

Apartheid and the United Nations The brutality of the South African state led to increasing international condemnation of apartheid over time. Particularly in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre, the international community was forced to respond. It did this primarily through the United Nations, whose General Assembly, in 1966, declared apartheid a crime against humanity (a declaration that was ratified by the Security Council in 1984). This resolution was strengthened in 1976 when The Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid came into force. The Apartheid Convention (as it is commonly known) was targeted at South Africa, but its reach also extended beyond that country, defining apartheid as “inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them.” The specific acts associated with the crime of apartheid as defined by the Apartheid Convention are broad, including everything from murder and torture to the imposition of deleterious living conditions on a particular group through the

creation of segregated residential areas for racial groups. However, no international court was established to prosecute crimes of apartheid at the time the convention came into effect. Instead, legislatures and courts in individual states were left to determine how to punish perpetrators of apartheid, albeit now with the strength that comes with a universal jurisdiction such as that afforded by the convention.

Apartheid, Security, and Countersurveillance Beyond South Africa One effect, perhaps unintended, of the adoption of the Apartheid Convention by the international community has been that the language of apartheid is now available for political movements and human rights proponents to sanction certain regime practices. In this sense, the language of apartheid acts as a kind of countersurveillance available to citizens to hold state leaders and human rights abusers in check. That is, apartheid has become a term to be used to police forms of perceived injustice. The fact that the Apartheid Convention defined the crime in a broad sense has allowed human rights activists and proponents to claim that states other than South Africa also engage in apartheid crimes. In recent years, this argument has been applied most notably and controversially to Israel and its ongoing occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Pro-Palestinian campaigners, such as ­ those associated with the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement, justify calling Israel an apartheid state in part because of the security and surveillance tactics Israel uses to prevent attacks by Palestinian liberation movements. In keeping with such countersurveillance practices, human rights proponents have gone even further and expanded the meaning of apartheid beyond just racial or ethnic segregation. Notably, representatives from pro-poor civil society groups have referred to the emergence of “global apartheid” as a system of differential access to economic, social, and political goods depending on whether one lives in a wealthy or a poor country. In this way, the term apartheid is becoming increasingly divorced from its original South African context and now serves as a language for rights

Apple

campaigners engaging in countersurveillance of states, international financial institutions, or social and political policy. Nicholas Rush Smith See also Counterintelligence; Israel; South Africa

Further Readings Bond, Patrick. Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance. London, England: Zed Books, 2003. Dugard, John. “Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid” (November 30, 1973). http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cspca/cspca.html (Accessed June 2014). Ochs, Juliana. Security and Suspicion: And Ethnography of Everyday Life in Israel. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. Welsh, David. The Rise and Fall of Apartheid. Johannesburg, South Africa: Jonathan Ball, 2009.

Apple Apple Inc. is a U.S.-based international corporation that produces and sells consumer electronics, such as personal computers, smartphones, and digital media players. As of 2015, the total value of Apple’s stock was more than $700 billion, making it the largest publicly traded corporation in the world. The increasing popularity of Apple’s products, in particular its mobile devices, has made it a growing target of cybercriminals and has increased concerns over the security of users’ personal data. This entry first highlights the history of Apple Inc. and follows this with a discussion about device users’ security and privacy concerns and some criticisms leveled against Apple regarding the protection of its consumers’ data.

History Apple was founded in 1976 by Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, and Ronald Wayne to build and sell personal computer kits to hobbyists. Wozniak designed and built the company’s first product, the Apple I

67

computer, which was hand assembled in homemade wooden cases and sold in a local computer store for $666.66 when it debuted. When Apple incorporated in the following year, Wayne sold back his share of the company to his partners for $800. The Apple II computer, which Jobs and Wozniak showcased at the 1977 West Coast Computer Faire, went on to become one of the most successful mass-produced home computers. More than 5 million Apple II computers were built during its 17-year production run. The first spreadsheet computer program, VisiCalc, was originally released for the Apple II and made the computer popular in the business sector. The Apple II was also aggressively marketed to the education market, causing it to become the first computer in widespread use in U.S. schools. Apple has consistently marketed itself as a uniquely creative alternative to contemporary competitors like IBM. The first Macintosh (“Mac”) personal computer was introduced by Apple to the U.S. public with the now iconic “1984” television commercial. The advertisement was directed by filmmaker Ridley Scott (Blade Runner) and featured an athletic woman running through an Orwellian dystopia, ending with her smashing an image of Big Brother with a sledgehammer. The “1984” advertisement was run before a national audience during Super Bowl XVIII and was subsequently pulled from broadcast due to legal action on behalf of George Orwell’s estate. Although “1984” was run only twice, it is considered to be a turning point in the marketing industry and recognized as one of the greatest advertisements of all time. During the 1980s and 1990s, Apple controlled a progressively smaller market share in the personal computer industry, in part due to the relative expense of its products. The corporation purchased multiple software companies during this time to build recognition as the platform of choice in digital media production. In the 2000s, Apple continued to experiment with additional consumer electronics lines such as portable audio devices, mobile phones, and tablet computers. Apple also opened its online digital media purchasing service, the iTunes Store, in 2003, and by 2010 the service had become the largest music vendor in the world.

68

Apple

Security and Privacy Consumers began to gain access to the Internet during a time when Apple controlled a comparatively small portion of the personal computer market. As Microsoft dominated the operating system market at the time, malware written by cybercriminals was frequently designed to exploit Windows-based computers and had little to no effect on Apple’s Mac OS. This was due in part to Apple using a proprietary, UNIX-based operating system on its consumer electronics. Apple continues to enjoy a reputation for customer security and privacy to this day as a consequence of representing a small, exploit-resistant portion of the personal computer market. Malware that targets Apple software does exist, such as the iWorm botnet, discovered in October 2014. Apple has taken a low-key approach to combating known security exploits with the inclusion of XProtect antimalware software as part of its operating system. This software quietly runs in the background on Apple products and is continuously automatically updated with protective measures against newly identified security vulnerabilities. Although Apple still controls a relatively small portion of the global personal computer market, the corporation’s products dominate the smartphone and tablet computer industry. This has made Apple’s operating system for mobile products, iOS, an attractive target for security exploits. In 2011, Apple introduced iCloud, a remote backup service for consumer data such as contact details and photos, which has proven to be an additional desirable target for cybercriminals. Customers manage their accounts with a single user ID (“Apple ID”) and password for all Applebased services. When an Apple ID has been compromised, information such as the customer’s private data and payment details such as credit card numbers may be accessed. As a result, Apple has endured several high-profile security breaches related to these popular mobile services.

Controversies Apple has occasionally drawn criticism from the security technologies industry for an allegedly lax attitude toward patching known software vulnerabilities. The fix for a security flaw identified in

2009 for Sun Microsystem’s Java platform was not distributed to Apple’s customers for more than 5 months. In 2010, a grey hat hacker organization calling itself Goatse Security discovered a vulnerability for Apple iPads running on the AT&T 3G network. Goatse Security, headed by Andrew “weev” ­Auernheimer and Daniel “JacksonBrown” Spitler, attempted to leak information about the exploit to mass media organizations and gain attention for the handling of security flaws. Subsequently, Auernheimer and Spitler were investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and subjected to criminal prosecution in 2012 for identity fraud and conspiracy to access a computer without authorization. The case against Auernheimer and Spitler sparked debates in the hacking community over ethical considerations when revealing similar “zeroday exploits.” Spitler pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation in exchange for his testimony against his partner. Auernheimer was found guilty and sentenced to 3 years and 5 months in prison. His conviction was overturned on appeal in 2014. In June 2013, National Security Agency documents leaked by Edward Snowden included Apple on a list of companies cooperating with its PRISM program. PRISM is a clandestine data mining program that uses mass surveillance of electronic data for the stated purpose of combating terrorism. Although the U.S. government acknowledges the existence of PRISM, Apple has publicly denied participation in the program and maintains that it does not provide customer data to government agencies without a court order. Apple was the target of criticism in August 2014 when a large collection of private celebrity photos was made available on public Internet image boards. The event, referred to by the media as “the Fappening,” included hundreds of intimate and nude photos believed to have originated from celebrity accounts with Apple’s iCloud service. Apple confirmed that the leaked images originated from specifically targeted iCloud accounts rather than from a security flaw in the service itself. The incident has increased discussion by security analysts with respect to the nature of cloud computing and inherent vulnerability to breaches of privacy. Christine J. Champion and Richard McCleary

Arab Spring See also Cloud Computing; Cybertheft; Dataveillance; Global Surveillance; Information Security; National Security Agency Leaks; Smartphones; Technology

Further Readings Behl, A. and K. Behl. “An Analysis of Cloud Computing Security Issues.” In Proceedings of the 2012 World Conference on Information and Communication Technologies, Trivandrum, India, October– November 2012. Grimes, G. A. “Are Apple’s Security Measures Sufficient to Protect Its Mobile Devices?” In Proceedings of the 2012 Wireless Telecommunications Symposium (WTS 2012), London, England, April 18–20, 2012. Hoog, A. and K. Strzempka. iPhone and iOS Forensics: Investigation, Analysis and Mobile Security for Apple iPhone, iPad and iOS Devices. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 2011. Kaspersky Lab. “Unveiling ‘Careto’: The Masked APT” (February 2014). http://kasperskycontenthub.com/ wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_ v1.0.pdf (Accessed November 2014). Olson, Parmy. We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of Lulzsec, Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency. London, England: William Heinemann, 2012. Seriot, Nicholas. iPhone Privacy. Arlington, VA: Black Hat DC, 2010. Sipior, Janice C., et al. “Privacy Concerns Associated With Smartphone Use.” Journal of Internet Commerce, v.13/3–4 (2014). United States v. Auernheimer. http://www.dmlp.org/ threats/united-states-v-auernheimer (Accessed October 2014).

Arab Spring The Arab Spring was a series of antigovernment protests that took hold throughout the Middle East and North Africa beginning in December 2010 and that greatly affected the security of citizens, as well as government regimes, in the affected nations. The protests began in Tunisia, then moved across North Africa and to the larger Middle East. They affected a number of countries spanning from Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia in North Africa to Yemen and Bahrain in the Gulf, to Syria and beyond in the Middle East. The outcomes of

69

the demonstrations varied significantly based most clearly on how the national government and the military responded. In some cases, the government fell in response to the protests without the eruption of civil war; in others, the government fell due to civil war; and in some countries, the government stood its ground by using violence or by paying off the citizenry. This entry first examines three misconceptions about the Arab Spring, provides details on the initial spark in Tunisia that ignited the wave of protests and violence both there and in other countries, and highlights the results of the Arab Spring in various countries. The entry also discusses the factors that led to differing outcomes in the various countries, and it finally examines the future of the Middle East and North Africa in their peoples’ quest for breaking free from the current regimes of power.

Misconceptions There are three main misconceptions regarding the Arab Spring. The first misconception is that these protests constituted a sudden paroxysm of antigovernment feeling. In reality, antigovernment protests had been going on and building up throughout the Middle East well before 2010. The second misconception is that these protests were somehow coordinated or connected between groups in different countries. While social media such as Twitter and Facebook helped spread word of the protests, the protests took different tonalities and modalities in different settings and were not coordinated. The final misconception is that the Arab Spring signified a transition to a more democratic Middle East and North Africa. In reality, only Tunisia has seen a smooth democratic transition, whereas other countries have seen their dictators dig in their heels or the status quo remain largely in place. Due to this fact, many have posited that the Arab Spring has become an Arab Winter.

Protests On December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a street fruit vendor in the tiny town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, started the chain of events that came to be known as the Arab Spring. That day, Bouazizi’s fruit scale was confiscated by a policewoman

70

Arab Spring

because he did not have a license to sell fruit; he was also fined approximately $280 (equivalent to 2 months’ salary). In addition, the scale itself cost about $100, and Bouazizi knew that he would have to pay a bribe to retrieve it. When Bouazizi protested the confiscation of his scale—which he needed to make sales—the policewoman slapped him in the face. This humiliation set Bouazizi into an apoplectic fit. He went to the local government office, but they would not let him in. Enraged, the 25-year-old then went to a local gas station, filled a canister with petrol, stood in front of the government building, and screamed, “How do you expect me to make a living?” before setting himself on fire. A key moment came when President Zine Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia for 23 years, visited Bouazizi in the hospital. This moment helped glorify Bouazizi and elevate his cause. The incident involving Bouazizi immediately sparked protests in his hometown, which soon spread to other parts of Tunisia. Caught off guard, Ben Ali did not know how to quell the unrest. A cabinet reshuffling and promises of new jobs had no effect, shooting at the protestors only made the protests grow, and a last-ditch attempt to stop the civil disobedience by closing all schools and universities indefinitely also did not impede the revolutionaries. On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali, Tunisia’s decades-long autocrat, fled the country. The protestors had won, and Tunisia now would hopefully transition to a democratic country. Ben Ali’s ouster inspired Egyptian protestors, who filled Tahrir Square in Cairo, denouncing the 30-year dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. As in Tunisia, these protests were met with flailing solutions by the Egyptian president, who attempted to reshuffle the government and installed a vice president before eventually ceding power to the military in February 2011. Protests in other Arab countries proved less fruitful. In Libya, the protestors were met with brutal violence by dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Libyans started demonstrating in February 2011 but were met with heavy resistance from the dictator who had ruled them for 42 years. By March 2011, a civil war had erupted in Libya, largely pitting the east of the country, which housed the opposition’s Benghazi base, against the west. On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council declared a no-fly zone over Libya to

prevent Gaddafi from bombing his own people. The United States and the United Kingdom initiated an aerial bombing campaign, which soon included a coalition of 27 other Middle Eastern and European nations, against Gaddafi’s forces 2 days later. By October, Gaddafi was dead, but new stable leadership has not emerged in Libya as of early 2015. Instead, the country continues to be wrought with infighting, instability, and civil war. In Syria, a similar dynamic played out with the Syrian civil war. Syrian protestors were met with brutal violence by dictator Bashar al-Assad. This violence led to an enormously violent and brutal civil war pitting the north of the country against the south. In this case, the revolutionaries were, for the most part, not aided by outside forces until 2014. As of January 2015, the civil war in Syria continues to rage on, leading to huge refugee flows into the neighboring countries, hundreds of thousands of deaths, and the wholesale destruction of northern Syria. The rise of the Islamic State in Syria forced outside nations to finally get involved in this conflict, though the military involvement has been limited in capacity and scope. In Yemen and Bahrain, attempts at upheaval failed as well. In Bahrain, the protestors were met with violence, which eventually stopped the demonstrations. In Yemen, the protests led to smallerscale violence that included an assassination attempt on Ali Abdullah Saleh. Illegitimate elections have since led to the rise of Saleh’s chosen successor, while violence and unrest continue in Yemen. In other countries, citizens were paid off to nip in the bud the potential for revolution. In Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, large salary increases for government ­ workers and new subsidies were introduced in response to the Arab Spring protests. These ­payouts were mostly successful in stopping ­large-scale protests from occurring in these countries.

Critical Factors Affecting Arab Spring Outcomes Four critical factors help explain why different countries saw different outcomes to their Arab Spring “revolutions.” The first and foremost is government reaction. Governments that reacted to

Arab Spring

the protests with more violence were, for the most part, able to stay in power. The lone exception is Libya, which was also the only country in which external powers became involved in a big way in the early stages of the conflict. In Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, the violent government response to the demonstrations helped keep the government in power. Furthermore, governments that responded to the violence by essentially bribing their populace remained unscathed. Governments that used neither large-scale violence nor large-scale payouts, namely Egypt and Tunisia, were overturned. The second major factor determining the outcomes of the Arab Spring protests was the use of social media. In Tunisia and Egypt, social media provided a vector for gathering popular support and organizing demonstrations. In Syria, where the government turned off the Internet in late 2012, social movements had more difficulty organizing. In the Gulf, heavy censorship of the Internet impeded demonstrations. The third factor that helps explain the differing outcomes of the Arab Spring in different countries is the role of the military. In Tunisia and especially in Egypt, a military ambivalent about the task of quelling protests, and even siding with the revolutionaries, made regime change possible. While Libya and Syria saw their fair share of military defections, the loyalty of the military to the ruling regime made civil war necessary to create the potential for regime change. In Bahrain and other Gulf states, strong military support of the monarchy made regime change nearly impossible. Finally, the order of events helped explain the differing outcomes of the Arab Spring in different countries. In Tunisia, where the movement began, the government was caught completely off guard. Egypt’s leadership change was possible because Egyptian citizens were inspired by the Tunisian revolution. Syria, Libya, and Bahrain’s rulers’ brutal reaction to the demonstrations was the result of those regimes taking these protests very seriously due to the ouster of Ben Ali and Mubarak in Tunisia and Egypt, respectively.

Long-Standing Grievances and the Future While the mythology of a wave of revolutions sparked by the dramatic actions of a fruit vendor is certainly inspirational, the reality is that

71

long-standing structural, political, and economic problems led to the revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa. Surely Bouazizi felled the first domino, but the governments that the Middle East and North African dictators and monarchs had created were built on sand. High unemployment, endemic corruption and nepotism, lack of political freedoms, a democratic vacuum, and the sclerotic nature of their still quasi-socialist economies had already led to protests and violence in the Middle East and North Africa well before 2010. For instance, large-scale protests over labor policies occurred in both Egypt and Tunisia in 2008. Furthermore, Iran saw huge protests and government violence in response to its 2009 presidential election, which many believed was rigged. As of 2015, the future of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa looks mostly bleak with the lone “victory” of a newly established democracy in Tunisia. Egypt is once again run by the military after democratic elections putting the Muslim Brotherhood in power led very quickly to a coup. Yemen and Libya are both looking increasingly like failed states. The Syrian civil war continues to rage. The Arab Spring was a moment in the history of the Middle East and North Africa that laid bare the grievances of the Arab people against their governments. While it may be true that the Arab Spring has turned to an Arab Winter, the grievances that sparked these revolutions still remain in many countries. Gabriel Rubin See also Libya; Revolutions and Revolts; Social Media; War on Terror

Further Readings Ahram, Ariel. “The Crisis of Authoritarianism and the Prospects of State Breaking in the Arab World.” Moscow State University Bulletin, Series 25, International Relations and World Politics, No. 1 (2012). http://www.internationalstudies .socsci.uci.edu/files/docs/ahram2011.pdf (Accessed January 2015). Danahar, Paul. The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring. New York, NY: Bloombury Press, 2013. Friedman, Thomas. “The New Hama Rules.” The New York Times (August 2, 2011). http://www.nytimes

72

ATM Cards

.com/2011/08/03/opinion/the-new-hama-rules.html (Accessed December 2014). “Libya: The Next Failed State.” The Economist (January 8, 2015). https://www.economist.com/news/ leaders/21638122-another-font-global-mayhememergingnot-helped-regional-meddling-and-western (Accessed August 2017). Robinson, Glenn. “Syria’s Long Civil War.” Current History (December 2012). http://www .joshualandis.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/ Robinson-Current-History.pdf (Accessed November 2014). Ryan, Yasmine. “The Tragic Life of a Street Vendor.” Al-Jazeera English (January 20, 2011). http:// english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/ 201111684242518839.html# (Accessed January 2015). Simon, Bob. “How a Slap Sparked Tunisia’s Revolution.” 60 Minutes (February 22, 2011). http://www.cbsnews .com/news/how-a-slap-sparked-tunisias-revolution22-02-2011/ (Accessed January 2015). Yousef, Tarik. “Development, Growth, and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa Since 1950.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, v.19/3 (2004).

ATM Cards Automated teller machines, also known as ATMs, were created in 1984 to allow an alternative for those who wanted to be able to purchase things without carrying cash. Fred J. Gentile and Jack Wu Chang, the inventors of the ATM, envisioned that a person could make a transaction or a purchase through the use of a single, personalized ATM card, thus avoiding the need to exchange cash or write a check. For the cards to be personalized, they needed to be connected to the person’s accounts. This means that all of a person’s accounts, whether checking or savings, as well as credit cards and debit cards, could be accessed with an ATM card individualized for that person. ATM cards can be processed in three ways: (1) by electronic funds transfer at point of sale (EFTPOS), also known as a personal identification number (PIN); (2) by off-line debit, also known as

signature debit; and (3) by the electronic purse card system. Each of these functions so that the ATM card can be used in a variety of ways to make payments and fulfill other banking functions. Most of the cards issued today are owned by the brands Visa and MasterCard. Through ATM cards, these companies guarantee payment without the consumer having to write a check or use cash, while charging licensing fees to the issuing banks. Overall, the purpose of ATMs is to streamline a person’s use of his or her funds without having to keep physical money on them at all times.

Consumer Security The creation of ATM cards has made transactions easier for consumers and banks. However, with this luxury comes a pitfall—security risks. A person’s account information, and any other personal information linked with that account, are at risk of being breached every time the person uses the ATM card. For example, there are several potential issues with the electronic system supporting ATM cards, chiefly the ability of criminals with a modicum of computer savvy to “hack” them and steal from the cardholder. However, there are a variety of security policies to protect consumers’ accounts and money. Such policies include maximum and minimum size purchases. For example, if a cardholder’s maximum purchase per item is $1,000 and the cardholder’s spending limit for a day is $3,000, then any amount exceeding these limits alerts the bank to possible fraudulent spending. An associated problem is that if a person’s ATM card is stolen or breached, remedying the situation can take time: Once you notify your bank or credit union, it generally has 10 business days to investigate the issue (20 days if the account has been open less than 30 days) . . . Your bank or credit union then has three business days to report its findings to you. If the bank or credit union can’t complete its investigation within 10 (or 20) business days as applicable, it must credit your account for the full ­ disputed amount less a maximum of

Australia

$50 while the investigation continues. (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau)

Sometimes, due to the company’s policies, it could take up to 3 to 4 weeks to get a new card in the mail to replace the old one; unless the cardholder pays an expediting fee to receive the card sooner However, often, if purchases were made with a stolen card or breached account, the amount of the purchases will be reimbursed to the cardholder.

Security Breaches Large-scale security breaches of consumers’ private accounts and personal information has brought the issue of ATM card security to the forefront. One such security breach is that at U.S. retailer Target in 2013. In December 2013, there was a data breach in Target’s system that held ATM card information of approximately 110 million customers. The Target attackers gained access not only to card numbers, but also card expiration dates, CVV codes, and cardholders’ names. As a result, they could use the stolen information to make fraudulent purchases via phone or online as well as to create working counterfeit credit cards. (Yang & Jayakumar, 2015)

Not only did the hackers receive consumers’ card information, but they received personal information tied to those card numbers, such as consumers’ addresses and phone numbers. Since ATM cards were created, this has been a problem, as every time a card is swiped for a purchase or other transaction, its associated information is transferred and stored in the receiving company’s system. This can be problematic if these issuing and receiving companies, as well as consumers themselves, do not take measures to protect consumers’ information. Some of these measures are ATM card companies’ issuing cards with  updated security chips that require a more secure card reader, cardholders’ monitoring their spending and their bills closely and imposing any limits that they deem fit, and business-to-consumer

73

companies’ spending more resources on security and protection for their customers. R. Bruce Anderson and Meagan Hebel See also Information Security; Online Shopping

Further Readings Lambert, M. “History of Debit Cards: How Debit Cards Changed the Way We Bank.” Bright Hub. N.p., 6 July 2011. Web. 03 Jan. 2015. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. “Someone Took Money from My Account without My Permission. What Can I Do?” N.p., 23 Dec. 2013. Web. 03 Jan. 2015. Publications. “Cards, Cards and More Cards: The Evolution to Prepaid Cards.” N.p., n.d. Web. 03 Jan. 2015. Yang, Jia, and Amrita Jayakumar. “Target Says up to 70 Million More Customers Were Hit by December Data Breach.” Washington Post. The Washington Post, 10 Jan. 2014. Web. 03 Jan. 2015.

Australia Australian society generally has been defensive about the protection of privacy, particularly in relation to communications. Apart from some limited common law and statutory protections, there is no right to privacy but rather an amorphous interest in privacy. In recent years, however, technological changes have led to increasing incursions into citizens’ privacy. This entry looks at Australia’s evolving stance on surveillance, examines the failed attempts at creating national identification cards, and reviews legislation relating to privacy and surveillance in the workplace.

Stance on Surveillance Australia is unusual in having its modern origins as a penal colony. This is not without irony, as those familiar with the field of monitoring, surveillance, and privacy will be aware of Jeremy

74

Australia

Bentham’s concept of a panopticon prison, in which all cells could be viewed from a central tower, with the prisoners unable to be sure if or when they are being watched. It could be argued that Australia’s origins lie very much in the institutional monitoring and surveillance of its ­ people. Australia’s history and geography have been significant in relation to this institutional monitoring and surveillance. During World War II, ­Australia’s alliances shifted from reliance on the United Kingdom to the United States. In the subsequent Cold War period, Australia became a major surveillance and intelligence-gathering post for the United States, with the remote Pine Gap facility in central Australia playing a key role. This role is continuing, with recent revelations that the facility may also play a role in the surveillance of civilian Internet communications.

Identification Cards Despite its penal origins, state intrusions into the lives of citizens have always been contested. Toward the end of the 20th century, successive governments attempted with limited success to centralize information on the Australian population through the introduction of national identification cards. In the 1980s, the “Australia Card” identification was proposed, although not implemented. Shortly after, the national government required that all Australians have a tax file number and a Medicare card, which together provide for greater surveillance of the population. In 2006, the government, led by John Howard (who in the 1980s opposed the Australia Card), attempted unsuccessfully to introduce the “Access Card.” A key feature of the debate surrounding the implementation of this card was privacy and the concern that technology provided the opportunity to integrate databases. Otherwise known as functional creep, governments could create a virtual network database that would compromise individual privacy regarding personal information flows. Paradoxically, there was comparatively little controversy when Australian governments initiated campaigns of proactive monitoring and surveillance that saw Australia lead the world in implementing mandatory drunk-driving tests and then drug-driving tests to improve road safety.

Privacy and Surveillance at Work At the workplace, the unique nature of the ­Australian protectionist industry policies for most of the 20th century meant that labor unions were provided a legitimate role in the workplace, and this was allied with the high levels of trade union membership until the 1980s. The position of unions was a key factor in mitigating the worst excesses of scientific management or time-andmotion surveillance studies through the postwar period. Metal trades workers, for example, refused to work at the appearance of a stopwatch and downed tools until the time-and-motion expert had left. In the contemporary context of work, social networking and drug testing have also been at the forefront of workplace disputes. Mandatory alcohol and drug testing at work has been the subject of ongoing debates and industrial disputes between trade unions and management, and social media has also been the subject of court cases over people’s right to voice their opinion’s about work in their own time on social media. While there is great interest in workplace privacy, the regulatory framework remains fragmented and lacking a coherent strategy. There are very few statutory or common law constraints on employers with respect to employee privacy. An examination of privacy protection in Australia ­suggests that successive Australian governments have favored the United States’ laissez-faire ­ market-oriented tradition rather than the protective European human rights approach. In the ­ workplace context, the market-based approach places a greater emphasis on the proprietary rights of capital than on labor’s right to privacy. Governments at the state and national levels have avoided confronting the larger philosophical and legal issues by adopting a reactive approach to privacy protection, responding only to specific concerns when public or external pressure has forced the issue. At the national level, despite various law reform investigations, legislation regulating privacy was not introduced until the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). This legislation had a minimalist approach to privacy protection, largely confined to regulating government agencies’ use of information. In 2000, the government enacted legislation extending privacy protection to the private sector. The act established National Privacy

Authoritarianism

Principles covering collection, use, and disclosure, and the transfer of personal information overseas. Organizations were required to ensure that personal information is accurate, up-to-date, complete, and secure; organizations must also be transparent about the management of personal information and provide access and correction rights to individuals. Privacy requirements can also be found in state legislation covering legal issues as diverse as the adoption of children, health records, spent convictions, and criminal records. State legislation that specifically deals with privacy can generally be classified into three areas: (1) industry or sector specific, such as the protection of medical records; (2) listening or surveillance devices; and (3) the protection of personal/informational privacy. While some of this legislation may affect the workplace, it is more broadly directed at the use of information across a range of areas, particularly in the criminal law jurisdiction. Only two states (Victoria and New South Wales) and the Australian Capital Territory have enacted legislation specifically governing workplace surveillance. However, only New South Wales’ legislation refers to email and Internet monitoring. Essentially, the legislation addresses the privacy concerns of employees using email and the Internet in a limited set of circumstances. It starts from the premise that employers are entitled to engage in email and Internet monitoring but requires notice to be given to the employees if monitoring or surveillance is to be undertaken. The legislation acknowledges that there may be some personal space for the employee, particularly in relation to the receipt of information from industrial organizations. Covert surveillance is strictly regulated, requiring an employer to demonstrate to the Magistrates Court that there is reasonable suspicion that an employee is engaging in unlawful activity, what actions the employer has taken to detect the unlawful activity, a description of the proposed surveillance device, and when the covert surveillance may be conducted. Peter Holland and Julian Teicher See also Big Data; Identity Theft; Privacy, Right to; Work Surveillance

75

Further Readings Wright, C. The Management of Labour: A History of Australian Employers. Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Authoritarianism The term authoritarianism refers to a type of social structure characterized by unquestioning obedience to authority. Used in the social sciences, this concept is particular to disciplines and fields such as international relations, history, political science, psychology, media and communication studies, sociology, and pedagogy. It may refer to a state, government, or social system; to a type of personality; to a theory of mass communication; or to a type of leadership of a group or organization. As it relates to surveillance, security, and privacy, authoritarian governments and regimes often utilize various surveillance tactics to maintain authoritarian control of their citizens. This entry first takes a brief look at how authoritarianism relates to various disciplines, followed by an in-depth examination of authoritarianism as a type of government. Actions that authoritarian states and regimes take with regard to surveillance, security, and privacy are further investigated, with examples from some current authoritarian governments.

Relation to Various Disciplines Authoritarian pedagogy refers to a teaching style or to a type of student-teacher relationship in which teachers exercise autocratic and dominating control over students, who are expected to obey and follow the instructions and decisions of their educators. In communication and media studies, authoritarian theory refers to a type of relationship between the government and the press and places all forms of (mass) communication under the complete control of the state authorities, which allows little if any press freedom. Truth and information are the monopoly of  those in authority, and the press is subject to  ­censorship or auto-censorship. The theory of authoritarianism essentially describes a type of

76

Authoritarianism

press system that is placed under the control of an authoritarian regime. In psychology, authoritarianism defines an individual’s tendency toward being antidemocratic, autocratic, and prejudiced. The “authoritarian personality” concept was developed in the 1950s by Theodor Adorno to explain the interwar rise of fascism in Europe. Such a personality type has several characteristic patterns of thought: It adheres to conventional values; obeys unquestionably an idealized authority; tends to condemn, reject, or punish those who (may) question ­authority and (may) disregard normative values; and is stereotypical. In the 1980s and 1990s, Bob Altemeyer developed the concept of right-wing ­ authoritarianism, which is defined as a set of ­attitudes rather than a personality type.

The Authoritarian State and Its Classification Most commonly, however, authoritarianism is a term that refers to a type of government. Next to autocracy, totalitarianism, despotism, dictatorship, absolutism, or theocracy, authoritarianism is a type of nondemocratic political regime characterized by obedience to authority. There is no universally accepted taxonomy of authoritarian regimes, and over the years many typologies have been proposed and many criteria used for such classifications. For instance, according to the level of control over different aspects of society, ideal and less ideal—or hard and soft, respectively— authoritarian regimes were identified. The degree of competitiveness differentiates between competitive and electoral authoritarian regimes. The methods used by authority to come to power point to inherited and acquired authoritarian governments, while the characteristics of the economy identify closed authoritarianism (in the case of a centrally planned economy) and open or capitalist authoritarianism (when market economy is in place). Authoritarian monarchy or authoritarian democracy may be recognized when the type of political regime is considered. Some scholars distinguish between authoritarianism and totalitarianism or between authoritarianism and dictatorship, but others argue that totalitarianism and dictatorship are forms of authoritarian rule. Some argue that terms such as

fascism, Nazism, communism, and totalitarianism are subsumed to authoritarianism, but others consider that there is a considerable distinction ­ between Italian fascism and German Nazism, between fascism and communism, and between military authoritarian regimes and fascism. According to Juan Linz, for instance, there are ­ ­several types of authoritarian regimes: bureaucratic-­ military, corporatist, mobilizing, postcolonial, racial (or ethnic), pretotalitarian, posttotalitarian, and sultanism. Stephen Levitsky, Luca A. Way, Andreas Schedler, and Larry ­ Diamond operate with the ­so-called hybrid political regime, which is placed between democracy and “ideal” authoritarian states, using in their analyses the concepts of competitive authoritarianism and ­electoral authoritarianism. Barbara Geddes advances yet another typology, differentiating the nondemocratic regimes in personalist, military, single-party, and hybrid regimes, the latter incorporating characteristics of the first three. Although there are no universally accepted characteristics, generally the hard authoritarian regime is associated with several features that differentiate it from a democratic one. Power is retained by one leader or by a group of leaders who took over through vote rigging, a military coup, or other nondemocratic methods. The leadership makes decisions with little if any consideration for the needs and opinions of the citizens, and appeals to censorship, propaganda, and the cult of personality. Political pluralism is limited, with one or no political party admitted. Even when political parties do exist, their influence is not decisive, and the role of ideology is weak. Authoritarian regimes are usually characterized by a high level of corruption, are arbitrary in conduct, lack the separation of powers, are highly bureaucratized, and are sometimes highly militarized. They are based on a strongly centralized power and often have a centrally planned economy. Citizens do not have autonomy from the state. There is a severe control over civil society, and the fundamental freedoms are limited. The authoritarian state uses punishment, coercion, and even terror against (potential) opponents and contesters. It uses its power to implement surveillance and control over the population, and in some cases the authoritarian state may evolve into a police state. While not all authoritarian regimes

Authoritarianism

are police states, all police states are fundamentally authoritarian. However, these are characteristics of an “ideal” type of authoritarianism, while in practice much variation and overlap may be found. Less ideal authoritarian states may admit a certain degree of individual and civil society freedom, may organize and conduct free elections, and may admit the existence of democratic institutions that the contenders for authority may use to take over political power. Eastern Europe during the Cold War, Burma (1962–2011), Turkey (1923–1946), South Africa (1948–1994), Libya under Muammar ­Gaddafi, and Spain under Francisco Franco are examples of historically authoritarian states. Cuba under Fidel and Raúl Castro, Syria under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, China under the Chinese Communist Party, Belarus under Alexander Lucashenko, and Russia under Vladimir Putin are examples of contemporary authoritarian regimes.

Surveillance, Security, and Privacy in the Authoritarian State The differences that exist among authoritarian regimes make impossible any generalization with regard to the problem of surveillance, security, and privacy in such states. However, an authoritarian state often engages in regular surveillance of the civil population, at times identifying specific target groups for more attention. These groups are considered subversive—a threat to the power position of the ruling elite, to the social order in general, or to the regime’s conservative normative values. They may be identified according to criteria related to age, profession, (presumed) political or religious beliefs, level of education, sexual orientation, ethnicity, race, or gender. Video, audio, or digital surveillance technologies may be employed together with the use of clandestine stakeouts, spies, or informants. Surveillance techniques are employed not only in the public sphere (work, offices, restaurants) but also in the private lives of people, invading their homes. Today, digital surveillance technologies are used on a large scale by the world’s authoritarian regimes. Sometimes bought from Western (U.S., Canadian, or European) companies, such technologies are used to read emails and text messages, to filter and block online content, to listen

77

in on mobile phone calls, to change email content en route to its recipient, to secretly turn on webcams and microphones built into personal laptops and mobile phones, to obtain banking information, or to track a citizen’s movements using the Global Positioning System. Authoritarian governments around the world—such as those ­ in  ­Afghanistan, Bahrain, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Egypt, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela—rely on such technologies to limit their citizens’ civil rights. Crowded and poor living and working ­conditions (when associated with the authoritarian state) make privacy more elusive and facilitate surveillance among neighbors, friends, colleagues, and family members who are encouraged or pressured by the security forces to spy on their relatives, colleagues, friends, and neighbors and to denunciate them to the authorities. Police permanently monitor the (potentially) threatening citizens, keeping files on their public and private lives and using them to enforce social and political control. In the case of authoritarian states, surveillance of individuals may be arbitrary and abusive, not implemented in accordance with the rule of law. Security forces may employ surveillance tactics against the population with no legal reason, but sometimes they can simulate the legality of their surveillance, using different legal pretexts. Often politically driven, police surveillance of individuals may be legally mandated under formal suspicion or accusations of violation of criminal law. National legislation may also be modified to allow for a severe control over the population and to legitimize the limitation of its civil rights. Public security is often a priority of the authoritarian government, with public security policies placed in the hands of the police, the secret police, or even the military, and authoritarian regimes may use surveillance under the pretext of monitoring (possible) criminal activity that violates public security. A hard authoritarian state may strictly regulate all aspects of life, whether social, political, economic, religious, or personal. The interference of the authorities in private life may go as far as regulating sexual practices. Nicolae Ceausescu’s

78

Autonomy

Romania, for instance, is famous for its ­1967–1989 antiabortion law and for its strict surveillance practices to identify and punish any person (woman, doctor, or friend) who violated or concealed the violation of that law. Today, abortion is outlawed in many authoritarian countries, such as Nicaragua, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Angola, Iran, Egypt, and Libya. Homosexuality is also criminalized in many authoritarian or postauthoritarian regimes and is subject to surveillance by the authorities. For instance, same-sex consensual acts were incriminated by postwar Romanian law (1948–1989), and the police were monitoring such “criminals,” who were often punished with many years of imprisonment. The police were monitoring the gay person’s life and activities, and sometimes the secret police would arrest a (perceived or real) political opponent under a false accusation of being gay. As a legacy of its authoritarian past, postcommunist Romania maintained the antigay legislation until 1996, when consensual sexual acts between same-sex adults in private were legalized. The penal code, however, continued to criminalize public manifestations of homosexuality until its abolition in 2000. In the late 1990s, the Romanian police were still monitoring (and arresting) people who identified themselves in public as gay. Today, homosexuality is criminalized in countries with authoritarian rule, such as Libya, India, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and Russia. An authoritarian regime uses surveillance to maximize its power and control over a society, but authoritarianism is not associated with a single type of surveillance. In practice, much variation and overlap may be found, depending on the many possible combinations of features that characteristize an authoritarian state. Elena Dragomir See also Adorno, Theodor W.; Fascism; Global Surveillance; Police State; Privacy; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies

Further Readings Adorno, Theodore, et al. The Authoritarian Personality. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1950.

Altemeyer, Bob. The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. Baran, Stanley J. and Dennis K. Davis. Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2012. Diamond, Larry. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy, v.13/2 (2002). Geddes, Barbara. Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. Hier, Sean P. and Joshuah Greenberg. The Surveillance Studies Reader. Maidenhead, England: Open University Press, 2007. Jagodzinski, Jan. Pedagogical Desires: Authority, Seduction, Transference, and the Question of Ethics. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Linz, Juan. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000. Schedler, Andreas. “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections.” International Political Science Review, v.23/1 (2002). Siebert, Fred S., et al. Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956. Whitley, Bernard and Mary Kite. The Psychology of Prejudice and Discrimination (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2010.

Autonomy The word autonomy derives from the two Greek words auto (“self”) and nomos (“law”). The term was originally applied to political entities in ancient Greece: An autonomous city-state, such as Athens, was one that laid down its own laws rather than having them imposed on it by some outside authority (e.g., by the Persians). Similarly, and as elaborated by the famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant, an autonomous person is someone who determines his or her own maxims or rules for action and acts in accordance with them. So an autonomous person, like an autonomous city-state or nation-state, is self-legislating.

Autonomy

There are two sets of distinctions to be kept in mind. The first distinction is between rationality and morality. An autonomous agent is a rational agent. However, arguably, being rational is not a sufficient condition for autonomy. For perhaps an autonomous agent is also a moral agent. The second distinction pertains to sources of potential domination. An autonomous agent is one whose decisions are not externally imposed; he or she is not dominated by external forces or other persons. Autonomy thus stands in some tension with security, at least insofar as security concerns justify granting the police and other security agencies powers, for instance, to ban speakers who incite violence and to detain suspected terrorists who might, nevertheless, turn out to be innocent. However, an autonomous person is also possessed of self-mastery; he or she is not dominated by internal forces (e.g., addictions).

Rational Agency Some have suggested that an autonomous person is both rational and moral. So what is it to be a rational person? Evidently a rational person is possessed of a continuing, rationally integrated structure of mental attitudes, such as intentions, beliefs, and desires. Moreover, the attitudes in question, notably beliefs, are evidence based. In short, the mental attitudes of a rational person are both rationally coherent and based on evidence. Second, a rational person’s actions and dispositions to action are based on such coherent and evidence-based attitudes. So the actions are rational in light of the person’s mental attitudes (which are themselves rational). Third, for a person’s attitudes and actions to be rational in this sense, the person must surely engage in both practical (action oriented) and theoretical (knowledge oriented) reasoning that makes use of objectively valid procedures, such as deriving valid conclusions from evidence and selecting means on the basis of their efficacy with respect to relevant ends. Fourth, the concept of a rational person or being needs to be relativized to empirical circumstances, including inherent properties of the particular kind of rational beings in question. And it is possible that there are rational persons who are not human beings (e.g., Martians or creatures

79

from some far-flung and as yet undiscovered planet). If so, then such nonhuman rational beings might not have all the inherent properties that human beings have. For example, human beings, but not necessarily other rational beings, have emotions, are highly social, and live for a finite number of years. Naturally, a rational being will act rationally in light of such additional inherent properties (as well as contingent external features of his or her environment). Fifth, a rational beings are able to engage in rational scrutiny of their extant higher-order attitudes, such as beliefs about their own beliefs. If, for example, a rational person is engaged in selfdeception (and, as a consequence, has false beliefs about his or her own motives), then, at least in principle, such a person can come to recognize and eliminate this self-deception. Sixth, evidently, rationality in the sense in question admits of degrees; some people, for example, are better than others at drawing true conclusions from the evidence presented to them.

Moral Agency Someone can be rational, up to a point, without necessarily being moral. Consider, for example, a highly intelligent psychopath. Such a person may well pursue his or her goals efficiently and effectively and make sophisticated, evidence-based judgments in doing so. So evidently psychopaths can be highly rational. However, psychopaths do not care about other people and are happy to do them great harm if it suits their own purposes. Moreover, psychopaths, even if they recognize the constraints of morality and pay lip service to them, do not feel the moral force of moral values and principles. In short, psychopaths can be rational and yet are not moral agents. So rationality and morality seem to be different, albeit related, concepts. On the other hand, to return to an earlier point, perhaps rationality is relativized to inherent properties. If so, since psychopaths lack some of the inherent properties of other human beings (e.g., concern for the welfare of others, a moral sense), their rationality is more restrictive and, to this extent, they are less rational than their fellow human moral agents. If this is correct, then arguably psychopaths are not simply nonmoral or less

80

Autonomy

than fully moral, they are also less than fully ­rational. At any rate, roughly speaking, a human moral agent is a rational agent who is disposed to make true judgments and valid inferences in relation to the moral worth of human actions, attitudes, motivations, emotions, and agents and to act on those judgments and inferences where appropriate. It is worth noting the distinction between nonrational and irrational agents, and between nonmoral and immoral agents. A nonrational agent cannot make judgments or inferences. An irrational agent has the capacity to make such judgments and inferences but has some significant deficit in his or her rationality, and thus makes a significant number of false judgments and/or invalid inferences, or often fails to act on the results of his or her practical reasoning. Similarly, a nonmoral agent lacks the capacity to make moral judgments and act on them; an immoral agent, by contrast, is merely (significantly) deficient in his or her moral judgment making or often fails to act on his or her correct moral judgments. That said, sometimes it is not clear whether we should think of a person as nonmoral (or nonrational) or as immoral (or irrational).

Autonomous Agency Given that a fully human life involves responsiveness to moral reasons, an autonomous human being will thus be both rational and moral. Understood in the way outlined herein, rationality and morality imply independence and self-mastery. Someone who is dominated by the overriding desire to please an authority figure, and who acts only in accordance with that aim, will not count as autonomous. Similarly, the autonomous human being not only must be able to make good judgments about what to believe and how to act but must also be capable of acting in conformity with those judgments. Drug addicts, for example, may know perfectly well that it is unwise to keep feeding their addiction, but they may find themselves unable to act on that knowledge; the drug addict’s lack of self-mastery in respect of his or her desire for the drug means that the person lacks autonomy, at least in this area of his or her life. To say that an autonomous human being is independent and possesses self-mastery does not,

of course, imply that autonomy is incompatible with all forms of constraint. The autonomous person cannot infringe the laws of physics or the laws of logic. The fact that a human agent cannot hope to fly when jumping off a tall building or cannot both walk and not walk at the same time does not undermine his or her autonomy. Moreover, an autonomous person can choose to comply with the law without compromising his or her autonomy. Specifically, when human beings choose to comply with laws because these laws enshrine their moral beliefs and principles, they may well be acting autonomously, the laws in question being in effect self-imposed. Morally justified laws needed to protect individual and collective security are a case in point. Autonomous human beings are ones who decide for themselves what is important and valuable to them, and they possess the capacity to make reason-based choices on the basis of recognizing, assessing, and responding to relevant considerations, including nonmoral facts and moral principles. When we call an act autonomous, we mean that it is something done by such a person on the basis of such a response. Moreover, autonomy is in part constituted by various moral features, including freedom of thought and individual privacy. None of us, presumably, is completely autonomous, since we all fall short of full rationality, perfect morality, and absolute self-mastery, for example. Since these qualities vary from person to person, some people are more autonomous than others. Moreover, someone might be autonomous in one area of his or her life but not another. Nevertheless, we achieve the status of an autonomous human being—someone who is entitled to decide for oneself how one wishes to live—when we are sufficiently autonomous. Furthermore, autonomy can be undermined if one or more of its constitutive moral features are compromised. For instance, violations of privacy, such as ongoing intrusive surveillance, can undermine autonomy. Autonomous agents have a right and a need to control external access to their private lives. There is a presumption that all human adults, at least, have achieved that status. This presumption is defeasible. We may be able to show that a person is so deficient in various conditions of autonomy, such as rationality or self-mastery, that

Autonomy

he or she should not be counted as autonomous and others might be justified in making decisions on the person’s behalf. But in the absence of such deficiency, we all possess the status of autonomous human beings. Seumas Miller See also Morality

Further Readings Alexandra, Andrew and Seumas Miller. Ethics in Practice: Moral Theory and the Professions. Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press, 2009. Benn, Stanley. A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

81

Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Journal of Philosophy, v.68/1 (1971). Kant, Immanuel (trans. Mary J. Gregor). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Kleinig, John, et al. Security and Privacy: Global Standards for Ethical Identity Management in Contemporary Liberal Democratic States. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2011. Mele, Alfred. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. Miller, Seumas. “Individual Autonomy and Sociality.” In F. Schmitt (ed.), Socialising Metaphysics: Nature of Social Reality. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1986.

B processes, fundamentally altering the social, political, cultural, and economic conditions of people across the globe. Following World War II and coupled with the severe preoccupation with the events that precipitated it, further technological advancements contributed to yet another movement that affected citizens throughout the world. Widespread concern over a potential third World War and the proliferation of new technologies such as nuclear power plants, aircraft, cellular telephones, and the Internet facilitated worldwide communication and transportation, transcending national borders and creating a more globalized citizenry. These latest features of the world society have been subsumed under the broader label of “globalization,” which Nayef Al-Rodhan has characterized as a process involving global economic integration, the transfer of policies and knowledge across national borders, cultural stability, and the reproduction of social relationships and discourses of power. Globalization further involves attenuation of national boundaries, increased interdependence between nations and the individuals residing within them, shared problems and problem-solving approaches among nation-state representatives, and the creation of more hybrid, rather than individualized and national, identities. While many have welcomed these transformations, for several decades now, a number of ­scholars have contributed to a growing awareness of the potential consequences associated with this most recent era of civilization. One of the more noteworthy of these scholars is Beck, who published an array of manuscripts on the broader

Beck, Ulrech Ulrech Beck (1944–2015) was a German sociologist who was internationally known for his writings on technology, globalization, modernity, and climate change. He gained notoriety for his belief that advances in technology would create additional global security risks, and he came up with terms, now widely used, such as risk society and second modernity. This entry focuses primarily on Beck’s work regarding globalization. The entry first explains globalization and then reviews Beck’s stances on globalization and the intertwined issues of modernity and cosmopolitanism. The entry concludes with a look at some of the criticisms of Beck and, in particular, his thesis on the global risk society.

Globalization Many global societies have undergone considerable transformation over the course of their histories and adopted a number of different characteristics. As an example, between the 14th and 17th centuries throughout much of Europe, a period referred to as the Enlightenment—social movements that included a revival of Ancient Greek and Roman ideas as well as the adoption of a humanistic framework for understanding human behavior—replaced many of the traditions practiced during the Middle Ages. A short time later during the Industrial Revolution, global societies again underwent significant change with the introduction of the newly developed manufacturing 83

84

Beck, Ulrech

topic of globalization and its related outcomes. Beck, in borrowing from some of the historic ideas originally postulated by Immanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt, hypothesized that as a result of the rapidly changing nature of humanity, which has been transpiring for some time now, globalization ultimately contributes to worldwide “unicity” or world citizenship. Devastation from modernday technological, environmental, social, and economic dangers that undermine the welfare of human beings and that present themselves in the form of natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, nuclear power plant explosions, pollution, global warming, mass migration, worldwide transmission of diseases, and economic meltdowns is no longer strictly contained within specified national territories. Instead, and as a result of the increasingly interdependent nature of humanity brought about by globalization, these dangers and their concomitant threats have produced a “second modernity,” or global “risk society” as termed by Beck, marked by cosmopolitanization, or cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism denotes a process whereby human consciousness is transformed to reflect acknowledgment of the interwoven and interconnected nature of contemporary humanity and how these newfound connections produce a state in which all human beings are equally exposed to some of the aforementioned modern-day dangers. Gerard Delanty distinguished between four approaches to the study of cosmopolitanism: (1) a political philosophy concerned with normative principles of issues related to world citizenship, global governance, and concepts such as global rights, global democracy, and global justice; (2) liberal multiculturalism, where the emphasis is on plurality, diversity, and the embracing of difference; (3) transnational cosmopolitanism, where the emphasis is on changes to global culture and how lifestyles, identities, and modes of communication are ever mutable; and (4) a methodological approach to the social sciences that attempts to  resolve problems inherently resultant from globalization. Although each frame of reference approaches any investigation of cosmopolitanism from different vantage points, according to Beck, they all share the common denominator that every human being, regardless of race, class, socioeconomic status, gender, or other distinguishing

attribute, is equally exposed to and threatened by modern-day dangers and that this realization is creating a more unified global society. For Beck, advances in technology observed under globalization have presented vast benefits to humanity, but they have also, albeit unintentionally in some respects, presented the potential for worldwide destruction. Through cosmopolitanism, human beings have become increasingly cognizant of this, and for this reason Beck describes the second modernity era in which we are currently living as a period of reflexivity and perceived risk. Ultimately, his risk society thesis describes a current state of human affairs in which the threats from globalized dangers have forced human beings to work together to devise global resolutions to global problems. Once again, the consequences of pollution, terrorism, transnational crime, and the production of weapons of mass destruction are not localized issues that affect only a small subset of humanity but, instead, large-scale problems afflicting the entire globe. This realization, achieved through a reassessment of the human condition and perceptions of the risk associated with these dangers, requires all people to develop a more cosmopolitan frame of mind. By recognizing that we can all become potential victims of the numerous dangers that surround us, we can appreciate and accept our differences and work cohesively for the mass benefit of humanity. Under this mode of thinking, furthermore, identity is reshaped so that we no longer identify ourselves merely as citizens of a nation but, rather, as citizens of the globe. Beck even went so far as to say that nation-states such as Italy, Germany, and Spain have disintegrated and that individuals from these geographical locations, as of recently, view themselves more as global residents than as residents of these countries. Beck further argued that to effectively combat worldwide dangers and their related risks, political decision making must move beyond state boundaries and become universally applicable to all humankind. Globalized political decision making involves having representatives from different nation-states communicate with one another, share ideas, and depart from a nationalistic-only framework. Global initiatives undertaken to indemnify human beings from wide-reaching

Beijing, China, Surveillance in

threats include, among others, the establishment of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, INTERPOL, Amnesty International, and the Red Cross. Most of the research directed at examining the effectiveness of these policies in protecting humankind has produced generally positive results. However, it still remains to be seen whether these global strategies will prove efficacious in the battle against global risks.

Criticism of Beck and His Global Risk Society Thesis While on the one hand much of Beck’s work on the topics of globalization, cosmopolitanism, and the global risk society has received mostly positive reviews, several of his assumptions have also come under considerable scrutiny. Geraldine Donoghue, for instance, argues that aggregate assessments of human cognition and behavior fail to consider the contextual factors responsible for influencing each of these outcomes. Not every individual across the globe perceives risk from natural disasters, terrorism, and the production of weapons of mass destruction in a similar fashion. Depending on particular sociodemographic variables such as income, race, gender, or even residential location, among other considerations, human behaviors and judgments may take on completely different characteristics. Furthermore, since not every human is equally affected by the dangers and their associated risks, perceptions of risks and other related outcomes will not be consistent across different categories of people. Donoghue further claimed that a global risk society and macrolevel perceptions of risk will not necessarily transition into globalized, democratic decision making. Even if much of the world population were to adopt a frame of mind consistent with Beck’s descriptions, it is still unknown whether national-oriented politics will be replaced by more globalized political decision making and, furthermore, whether human beings will put aside their differences for the betterment of humanity. These limitations notwithstanding, the ideas and work of Beck have illuminated certain characteristics of contemporary human beings that may have otherwise gone unnoticed were it not for his efforts. Humanity has undergone numerous changes over the course of history, and we are

85

presently experiencing another fundamental alteration to the nature and structure of human relations. Whether Beck was correct or not in his assertions that world affairs are becoming more globalized, dangers and risks are ever increasing, and identities are transcending national barriers, he opened an avenue toward the possibility of a wealth of research that can be undertaken to test his central hypotheses. Frank V. Ferdik See also Cosmopolitanism; Globalization; Risk Society Thesis

Further Readings Al-Rodhan, R. Nayef. Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2006. Beck, Ulrech. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London, England: Sage, 1992. Delanty, Gerard. Citizenship in a Global Age. Buckingham, England: Open University Press, 2000. Donoghue, Geraldine. “Global Risks and Ulrech Beck’s Cosmopolitan Politics.” Social Alternatives, v.30 (2011).

Beijing, China, Surveillance

in

The city of Beijing, China, with a population of nearly 20 million people, has approximately 800,000 surveillance cameras, half of which are for government use. Private businesses, Internet cafes, shops, and other public venues are ordered by the government to install surveillance cameras at their own cost and are fined if they fail to comply. In addition to surveillance cameras, China’s capital city also has an extensive web-monitoring and web-blocking system, physical surveillance, and listening (wiretapping) surveillance. Face recognition technology is being adopted for camera surveillance. Camera systems allow for real-time observation as well as video recording. Beijing is the largest part of a nationwide program labeled “Safe Cities,” which is designed to monitor activities citywide. While police and

86

Beijing, China, Surveillance in

national security organizations say that the program is needed to help protect the public and to allow for increased responsiveness to crime, both domestic and foreign observers point to the use of camera surveillance to deal with dissidence and public unrest brought about by opposition to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its government programs and activities. Beijing is part of a nationwide Internet monitoring system. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) system of Internet monitoring is the largest in the world, employing some 2,000,000 people at all levels of government. Chinese Internet security includes user monitoring as well as blocking of Internet traffic. China has imprisoned more journalists and cyberdissidents than any other country in the world. This entry explains why Beijing is so heavily surveilled and examines the various monitoring and surveillance methods used.

The Chinese Communist Party and Government’s Concern for Public Security Before continuing with a fuller description of the various surveillance systems in Beijing, it is necessary to explain why the capital is one of the most completely surveilled city in the world. The explanation begins with a recounting of the heightened security in Tiananmen Square, the large public gathering place fronting the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen), on June 4 each year. June 4 is the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, wherein hundreds of university students and citizens from all walks of life were killed or injured by the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police forces for not vacating Tiananmen Square and the nearby streets on June 4, 1989. The attack took place after the CCP and its government declared martial law to put an end to the months-long protests, demonstrations, and hunger strikes carried out in Tiananmen Square to call for government reform, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and other social reforms. Fearing a revival of trouble on the yearly anniversary, city officials fill the square with plainclothes agents, increase video surveillance, and also block foreign journalists from entering the square. The main impetus for government precaution is that accounts for the killings on June 4, 1989, have yet

to be settled. Many Chinese citizens at home and abroad demand a full disclosure of the government’s actions and role. The CCP and its government (run by the Party) fear the emergence of wider agitation about the massacre. The Tiananmen massacre is just one of the many threats to the continued legitimacy and rule of the CCP and its government. The CCP’s legitimacy is brought into ever extensive question by the growth and diversity of China’s society and economy. As the standard of living rises for a growing middle class, there is increased questioning of the CCP’s power and control over the world’s most populous nation of 1.3 billion and the world’s second largest economy. More and more people are asking why the CCP should have dictatorial power over their nation. These views are fueled by widespread graft, corruption, nepotism, and favoritism throughout the country, all perpetrated, aided, and abetted by the CCP and its government. There is increasing dissatisfaction with misgoverning by the CCP and its government, and that dissatisfaction is manifested in the growing numbers of incidents of civil unrest, disorder, and strife. Large numbers of people (officially designated at 19 or more) gather to protest or demonstrate against national, provincial, or local government actions such as corruption, seizures of land, hazardous environmental incidents, police brutality, or other causes of discontent. Groups and crowds turn violent, throw objects and Molotov cocktails, burn vehicles, and beat and stab police and security forces, who in turn use tear gas, rubber bullets, police nightsticks, and even live fire against the violent crowds. Hundreds of thousands of civil unrest and civil strife events take place throughout China each year. The CCP and its government stopped publicly announcing the number of cases of civil disturbance in 2010, when the count reached nearly 100,000 across the country for that year. In 2011, the PRC’s budget allocation for domestic security ($111 billion) was for the first time higher than the national defense budget ($105 billion). The CCP leaders have determined that their top priority is to remain in power, to have the party and its government continue to rule China. They have also determined that to remain in power, China’s economy must continue to expand. If the

Beijing, China, Surveillance in

economy flattens out or declines, so the reasoning at the top levels goes, the people will lose hope for a chance to improve their livelihoods, and massive discontent would erupt into national movements to remove the CCP from power. Thus, the leaders of China must avoid social upheaval that would threaten the CCP’s grip on power. China’s ruling authorities have further decided that for the economy to continue to grow there must be order and stability in China and the region around China; any domestic or regional disturbances would threaten China’s economic growth, and foreign investment would be imperiled, causing additional economic damage. The leadership believes that damage to China’s economy would create massive dissatisfaction across the country and lead to attempts to overturn the CCP and its government. To preserve its hold on power and retain its position of rulership over China, the CCP uses surveillance, censorship, intimidation, and physical violence to quell dissidence and suppress information. The CCP claims the need for increased public scrutiny to guard against crime and terrorism, which in fact allows for dealing with any sort of criticism of the Party, its members, or its government. CCP members hold all top government and security apparatus positions. The government ministries responsible for state security (14 have varying degrees of responsibility and authority to ensure local, regional, and national public security) use their resources to crack down on dissent and public advocacy in Beijing and other cities throughout China.

Parameters of Surveillance in Beijing The authorities in Beijing and other cities monitor telephone conversations, fax transmissions, email, text messaging, and Internet communications. They also open and censor domestic and international mail. Beijing security services routinely monitor and enter residences and offices to gain access to computers, telephones, and fax machines. According to foreign media reports, the Ministry of Public Security uses tens of millions of surveillance cameras in the country, with about 400,000 in Beijing alone. The authorities justify the presence of security cameras as a way to improve public safety, fight crime, manage traffic, and

87

maintain “social stability.” Human rights groups state that the authorities increasingly rely on security cameras to monitor and intimidate political dissidents. The government frequently monitors gatherings of intellectuals, scholars, and dissidents where political or sensitive issues are discussed. After Bloomberg.com and The New York Times published articles detailing the outsized family wealth garnered through kinship connections with the two top national leaders Xi Jinping and Wen Jiabao, the websites of both media outlets were, and remain, blocked. The CCP and its government are continually increasing their capability to monitor Internet use, control content, restrict information, block access to foreign and domestic websites, promote selfcensorship, and identify and seize users who are seen to be in violation. As mentioned previously, altogether 14 government ministries participate in monitoring the Internet, in Beijing and other cities, resulting in the censorship of thousands of domestic and foreign websites, blogs, cell phone text messages, social networking services, online chat rooms, online games, and email. Also, the government imposes responsibilities on Internet companies to put into place online censorship and surveillance regimes, as well as to prohibit anonymous expression online. One particularly surprising case of Internet surveillance in Beijing and other parts of China is Microsoft’s Skype server identifying and passing “key word” traffic to the Chinese network TOMSkype (a joint venture with majority owner TOM Online, a Chinese wireless Internet company), which has a list of 2,000 key terms—such as the Chinese characters for Beijing falali chehuo (“Beijing Ferrari crash”), referring to the scandal of the death of a high-level official’s son while recklessly driving a Ferrari car in Beijing, or the number 89, which will key any message referencing the Tiananmen massacre on June 4, 1989. These 2,000 encrypted words prompt SkypeChina to intercept the typed messages and send copies to its computer servers in China. Messages can also be blocked. Messages both inside and outside China are intercepted. Microsoft’s response to inquiry about Skype-China was that the software is made available to the Chinese through a joint venture with TOM Online. The mechanism in TOM-Skype, which has nearly 100 million

88

Beijing, China, Surveillance in

users in China, scans Internet traffic for these key words and phrases. If a message contains content related to any of these 2,000 key, encrypted words, then the sender’s name and details of the transmission as well as the recipient’s identity are sent to the TOM-Skype server site, which is accessible by Beijing and other security agencies. The Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau (PSB) is the agency directly responsible for monitoring the Internet for the capital city and for blocking web traffic deemed to endanger state security, subvert state power, damage state honor and interests, jeopardize state religious policy, propagate heretical or superstitious ideas, spread rumors, contain content forbidden by laws and administrative regulations, and so on. The Information Office of the State Council’s 2010 official white paper puts forth the details of all of these categories. The Beijing Municipal PSB also handles municipal police requirements, public security, social order, and internal and external matters such as the registration of temporary residents (including both foreign and domestic visitors). The Beijing Municipal PSB is controlled by the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC, which is headed by the Minister of Public Security and is the nation’s principal police and security authority as well as the agency that exercises oversight over, and is ultimately responsible for, day-to-day law enforcement. The other main government agency responsible for China’s public security is the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which handles counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, and political security. While those missions are more related to overseas security operations rather than activities within Beijing and other cities, the MSS has the same authority as the city police to arrest and detain people. The PBS and the MSS are located next to each other in Beijing and work together in ways designed to provide complete coverage of perceived threats to public security in Beijing and across China. Their presence in the capital, which is the center of China’s social, political, economic, diplomatic, and military governing authority and activities, has brought about tighter control in Beijing than is normally seen in other cities—with the exception of cities with temporary domestic crises for whatever reasons—and Beijing is ruled directly by the national government through the municipal government.

The PRC’s constitution provides the basic authority to the government to carry out surveillance activities, in Beijing and beyond, for the purpose of protecting the security of China. The National Criminal Procedure law allows for physical surveillance of a suspect for up to 6 months if approved by the next higher authority, which is a frequently ignored formality. The legal system of China is controlled and directed by the CCP, and any effective oversight of violations wrought by surveillance activities is only selectively dealt with, by the CCP’s choice. Judges rule on cases as directed by the CCP and its government whenever a legal case is deemed politically sensitive. Over the past decades, with the blossoming of advances in surveillance technologies, greater monitoring of public and private activities in Beijing has taken place, and the future seems to portend ever greater surveillance to come. James Ross Corcoran Sr. See also China; Computer Surveillance; Electronic Harassment; Email; Global Surveillance; Gramsci, Antonio; Municipal Surveillance; Network Security; Policing and Society; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of; Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Further Readings “The Chinese Government Employs More Than Two Million People to Monitor Internet Activity, According to the State-Controlled Beijing News.” Spectator, v.322/9659 (2013). Foreign Affairs. Tiananmen and After. Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014. McLeod, Callum. “China Surveillance Targets Crime and Dissent.” USA Today (January 3, 2013). http://www .usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/03/chinasecurity/1802177/ (Accessed July 2014). Public Intelligence.net China. “China Installed More Than 10,000,000 Surveillance Cameras in 2010.” http://publicintelligence.net/china-installed-more-than10000000-surveillance cameras-in2010/ (Accessed June 2014) Silver, Vernon. “Cracking China’s Skype Surveillance Software” (March 8, 2013). https://www.bloomberg .com/news/articles/2013-03-08/cracking-chinas-skypesurveillance-software (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Department of State, Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights. “2013

Benjamin, Walter Human Rights Report: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)” (February 27, 2014). http://www .state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/eap/220186.htm (Accessed June 2014).

Website The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China: http://www.gov.cn/english/

Benjamin, Walter Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) was a German theorist and philosopher, as well as a literary critic and cultural historian, who was born into an affluent Jewish family. Benjamin suffered from severe depression and—perhaps fearful of capture and deportation back to Germany after leaving the country around the time of Adolph Hitler’s reign of Nazi Germany—committed suicide by way of a morphine overdose in a Spanish hotel. While Benjamin’s departure from Germany and some of his writings were influenced by his political beliefs formulated during a time of lack of individual privacy and security as a German Jew, the majority of his most recognized writings focused on aspects of culture and the media. This entry begins with a brief glimpse of Benjamin’s formative years, followed by examinations of his writings and theories that undertook a critical analysis of modernity, mass media, and cultural studies.

Formative Years Early in his life, Benjamin advocated for education reform in Germany and unsuccessfully pursued a teaching position as a professor of philosophy in academia. Benjamin, who experienced an intense drive to travel, turned to a peripatetic existence while he wrote books, essays, and reviews by the hundreds. Some scholars have argued that Benjamin, little known in his time, had a strong influence in shaping the avant-garde realism and even in creating the concept of pop culture. In 1933, he left Germany, never to return. Benjamin spent his last years in exile, where he wrote most of The Arcades Project, his incomplete masterpiece on the rise of

89

commodity capitalism in 19th-century France. While not all scholars accept Benjamin’s standpoint in The Arcades Project, many highlight the importance of the work, in which he collected excerpts from 19th-century sources on the phenomena of novelty, specifically the development of commercial arcades and department stores, and other consumerist elements of modern life. Among the emblematic concepts developed in this work is the flâneur as representative of modernity. The flâneur, a concept he builds on from the French poet and writer Charles Baudelaire, is a constantly walking Parisian spectator who leisurely strolls through the city and, basking in its novelties and pleasures, records his impressions in writing. During his lifetime, Benjamin was acknowledged and admired by only a small circle of intellectuals. Today, however, Benjamin is a major intellectual figure whose work is often considered crucial to understanding modernity. His writings cover the humanities spectrum of philosophy, politics, literature, history, the media, art, photography, film, technology, and religion, among many other topics.

On the Possibilities of Mass Media Benjamin, writing in the 1930s, found progressive aspects in the new culture industry technologies, such as radio, film, and photography. His seminal essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” has proven strongly influential in all fields related to cultural studies and media studies. In his essay, Benjamin pointed out that mass media were taking over from traditional forms of culture and the ways in which people used them. For example, the massive reproduction of photography and film, among other cultural artifacts, replaced the focus on the originality of the work of art and what he called its “aura”—a kind of magical aspect or mystification ascribed to it due to its belonging to an earlier time. Such art works were part of the treasure trove that buttressed the notion of high culture. However, once separated from such mystification because of the reproductive possibilities of mass production, in Benjamin’s view, more critical individuals might arise from the new media culture. These critical individuals would be better able to judge and analyze culture and its artifacts. Moreover, the new

90

Benjamin, Walter

mass reproduction of works of art, in his view, had a democratizing function, by way of placing in the hands of many people reproductions of pieces that remained enshrined in museums. Benjamin also analyzed popular culture in the growing industries of music, film, and radio. These also had a democratizing effect. The rapid movement and rush of images typical of cinema could allow people to better understand the flow and instability of living in industrial urban societies. Benjamin saw possibilities for social progress in new technology. He also worked with the renowned German artist and theorist Bertolt Brecht on radio scripts and films, and both sought ways to use the media as channels for social progress. This hope is reflected in Benjamin’s essay “The Artist as Producer” (1934), in which he posits that progressive artists should give new purpose to the whole apparatus of cultural production. Culture producers could, for example, turn theater and film into spaces for engaging in political consciousness and debate, rather than allow them to become solely a medium for entertainment and pleasure. The collaboration between Benjamin and Brecht produced radio plays meant to be used as instruments of social change. Some scholars have found that in an essay on radio theory, Brecht anticipated the Internet by foreseeing a medium that would allow an interactive forum of multiple, simultaneous forms of communication.

Benjamin and the Frankfurt School Benjamin was loosely affiliated with the ­Frankfurt School. However, it was not an uncritical alliance. His work contested some of the theoretical standpoints of Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Leo Lowenthal, and other members of the Institute for Social Research, as the Frankfurt School was initially called. Although Benjamin had hopes for the progressive possibilities of mass communication technology, he also acknowledged that media such as film could be used for conservative, even oppressive purposes. He saw some positive effects in the loss of aura in massproduced art reproductions, but posited that film could also create a kind of aura, of ideological mystification, through film techniques that fetishized actors and created a celebrity cult. In

this manner, Benjamin joins radical cultural critics such as Adorno and Horkheimer, who encouraged the public to give a close, critical reading of media texts and cultural artifacts and consider carefully their social effects. Benjamin was one of the first theorists to develop a methodological approach to media analysis and critical studies. This has been one of his most enduring contributions to academic disciplines and art criticism. He examined cultural history, including in his historical analysis of 19thcentury Paris, The Arcades Project, which he left uncompleted on his death. However, all of his incomplete work contains a trove of material that is still being analyzed for study and debate. The Frankfurt School focused on massproduced culture in what it called the culture industry or industries. The culture industry theories described the production of mass-produced cultural artifacts and their homogenization and standardization. Mass culture in this view ­indoctrinates people into a capitalist ideology of consumption by producing always unsatisfied ­ dreams, hopes, and desires and socializes people into specific cultural mores and values. Among the behaviors that the culture industry strives to replicate is an endless desire for consumer products. The culture industry turns audiences into consumers who would use and consume its products—in the form of both culture and commercial goods. The consuming audiences are persuaded to accept the ideological imperatives they receive and conform to the values and mores of a capitalist society. Nevertheless, Benjamin argues that while this downside to the culture industry exists, it also may produce critical consumers who are rationally capable of discerning among different types of cultural texts and artifacts. The body of work developed by Benjamin and other theorists, including the Frankfurt School intellectuals, took place in an era that marked the beginning of economic control by the state and large corporations—an era also known by many as Fordism. While the Frankfurt School respected the Enlightenment values that honored the individual, in the interwar and postwar period during which members lived, progress was equated with ­systems that allowed increasingly efficient mass production, standardization, and homogenizing.

Bentham, Jeremy

Rather than progress being ascribed to the genius of the individual, as during the Enlightenment, the state and corporations co-opted and controlled individuals. These were the decades that would give birth to the conservative and conformist world of corporate capitalism of the 1950s and beyond. Despite illuminating the liberating possibilities of culture industry technologies, Benjamin was also able to foresee a period in which mass culture and its technologies were capable of shaping and disseminating the ideology that led to a massively consuming society. His work, and the theories developed by the Frankfurt School and other Marxist intellectuals of the time, marked an important paradigm shift in critical and analytical thinking among intellectuals and academics. It forecasted the late capitalist era in which arose the controlled mass communication apparatus. By way of network radio and television, newsprint and popular magazines, Hollywood films, and other mass-produced cultural artifacts, the great corporate media apparatus furthered the consumerist ethos of contemporary society while obscuring the ways in which the political will and liberties of the citizenry were curtailed. Trudy Mercadal See also Adorno, Theodor W.; Fascism; Frankfurt School; Gramsci, Antonio; Nazism; Social Control

Further Readings Benjamin, Walter. The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings. Cambridge, England: Belknap Press, 2008. Bronner, Stephen Eric. Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2011. Eiland, Howard. Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014. Kellner, Douglas. Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity, and Politics Between the Modern and the Postmodern. London, England: Routledge, 1995. Miller, Tyrus. Modernism and the Frankfurt School. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. Scheuerman, William E. Frankfurt School Perspectives on Globalization, Democracy and the Law. London, England: Routledge, 2012.

91

Steiner, Uwe. Walter Benjamin: An Introduction to His Work and Thought. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Weitz, Eric D. Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013.

Bentham, Jeremy Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) was born into an upper-middle-class English family in a suburb of London. Bentham, a philosopher and political and social reformer, must be viewed within the context of his times for any measure of understanding of his works. He grew up during a time of rapid social change brought about by the Industrial Revolution and the attendant changes in the distribution of population as young people, in particular, migrated from rural areas to urban industrial centers seeking economic opportunity not available under the British system of landownership. Bentham and his family benefited from the attendant redistribution of wealth as industry and commerce replaced land as the major source of socioeconomic status. Many persons, however, were driven from the land and forced into cities not because of industrialization but because of changes in agricultural techniques sparked by advances in technology and ideas of profitability. As a result, crime increased, as did other social problems related to poverty and the attendant social dysfunction, including widespread substance abuse and the decline of the family as an instrument of social control. In many respects, Bentham lived during a period best described as anomic. Persons living in such times tend to possess a heightened sense of concern for public order. For Bentham, this concern was displayed in a near obsession for social reform and increased governmental power to improve social conditions and restore social order. His social and political theories focused on security being one of the most important aspects of governments and societies. This entry first discusses the influences and beliefs that shaped Bentham’s worldview, then describes his opinion of natural law, and concludes with an examination of his position on personal and political liberties.

92

Bentham, Jeremy

Bentham’s Early Influences and Beliefs Displaying an early genius, Bentham received his bachelor’s degree at age 15 years and was admitted to the bar in 1769. He never practiced law but was a legal scholar and a student of what would be viewed today as the sociology of law and political science. Early in his legal studies, he condemned the British legal system as too complex and thus subject to manipulations leading to injustice and inefficiency. Having witnessed the treatment of the London poor and the criminal classes through the eyes of the educated English middle class, Bentham came to view the true purpose of law as a tool for social stability and reform. In developing his theory of government, he was strongly influenced by many of the thinkers of the European Enlightenment, including David Hume (1711–1776) and John Locke (1632–1704), and was a correspondent of Adam Smith (1723–1790), an early advocate of free market economics. The Enlightenment emphasized empiricism and reason over faith, discounting ideas that could not be corroborated through experimentation or logic. As a follower of the Enlightenment, Bentham rejected the ancient notion of natural law as unscientific. He likewise denied the existence of natural law rights—rights granted by “nature or nature’s god,” to use the familiar Jeffersonian phrase. Bentham believed that such rights were merely a creation of the human imagination and without divine sanction. Bentham also did not endorse the idea of a social contract, as propounded by Hume and others at the time. Bentham held that Hume’s idea of humans originating in a “state of nature” with “perfect freedom” never existed; rather, he believed that humans have always lived in social groups and under the limitations to freedom imposed by social life in an ordered society.

Personal Liberty and Political Liberty Bentham recognized a difference between political society and natural society, which is the difference between one’s public and private life, but he still held that even in private, one was constrained by the demands and expectations of one’s public life. Bentham rejected the notion of liberty as an inherent or natural law right, stating that liberty exists only where established through law and protected

through a governmentally sponsored justice system. Bentham thus defined liberty in terms that can be classified as negative liberty, which is freedom from external constraint, whereas positive liberty is a matter of personal autonomy or the exercise of free will. As interpreted by Bentham, there is no perfect freedom in a state of nature, but rather, individuals are free only to the degree that they are not restrained in their actions by others. As such, he viewed liberty not as an inherent right but rather as a social tool developed by communities and later used by governments to secure an orderly society. Bentham regarded the true goals of government (and society) to be “the happiness and security of the community.” More specifically, Bentham believed the goals of society to be “security, subsistence, abundance, and equality” for its members; liberty was merely a means to attain security at both a personal and a societal level. Bentham identified two types of liberty: personal liberty and political liberty. Personal liberty was merely “security against a certain class of wrongs which affects the person.” This would include the idea of a right to privacy in terms of one’s relationships with other people and would thus be associated, for example, with torts against paparazzi. Political liberty was also included under security, with political liberty being “security against injustice at the hands of the persons entrusted with government”; we would refer to that as civil rights (e.g., those protections secured by the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution). His concern toward personal liberty extended only to the possible effect that it might have on the good of the community as a whole. Likewise, his concern for the preservation of rights in terms of political liberty applied only to its positive effect on the community as a whole and not its individual members. Bentham believed that humans naturally sought pleasure and avoided pain. This simple standard was the basis for Bentham’s standard of value for ranking all actions, laws, and ideals. To Bentham, liberty was good because it was pleasant; it produced pleasure. Political liberty produced pleasure for society. Restraints on personal liberty were evil in that they produced pain for the individual. In this sense, society and law could be seen as evil in that they placed restraints on the liberty of the

Berlin Wall

individual. But in Bentham’s worldview, the needs of the community always trumped the needs of its individual members. As such, Bentham’s concern for personal liberty extended only to the positive (pleasurable) effect that it might have on the community as a whole, the good of the community being tantamount to that of the person. So that which was evil to the individual (a communityimposed restraint) could be good for the community. Since law, by definition, places constraints on the liberty of the individual, law could be seen as evil, at least at the individual level. However, since the constraint by society on the liberty of the individual is necessary for social order, the evil imposed on the individual is beneficial for society and is, if not an outright good, certainly a “minor” evil under Bentham’s calculus. Thus, executing an innocent person for a murder he or she did not commit would be seen as a social good if it had a deterrent effect on would-be murderers. In modern vernacular, Bentham believed that people should all be willing to “take one for the team.” In a just social system under Bentham’s theory, law should be least restrictive, in terms of constraints on personal liberty, to accomplish the goal of the greater good of society. However, Bentham regarded personal liberty as less of a concern than the security of a society. In addition, Bentham concluded that individual rights could exist only when established through a set of laws and a formal justice system to ensure their equitable enforcement. Therein lies a paradox: Individual liberty can exist only when limited by the greater needs of society. Conflicts between the liberty needs of the individual (personal liberty) and the liberty needs of society (political liberty) were to be resolved through the principle of utility administered through just laws tailored to the needs of the particular community. As stated by Bentham in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, “The science of legislation consists in determining what makes for the good of the particular community whose interests are at stake.” He acknowledged that such legislation would be difficult to craft and might be more difficult to implement and enforce. M. George Eichenberg See also Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Locke, John

93

Further Readings Bentham, Jeremy. “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” (n.d.). http://www.econlib .org/library/Bentham/bnthPML1.html (Accessed August 2017). Bentham, Jeremy. “Principles of the Civil Code” (n.d.). http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/pcc/ (Accessed August 2017). (Digitized from Vol. 1 of the 1843 Bowring edition of Bentham’s works.) Emsley, Clive. Crime and Society in England, 1750–1900 (3rd ed.). Harlow, England: Longman Pearson, 2005. Kirk, Russell. The Roots of American Order. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1991. Mill, John S. On Liberty: Morality and the Law (ed., Richard A. Wasserstrom). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971. Quinn, Michael and Xiaobo Zhai. Bentham’s Theory of Law and Public Opinion. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Rosenblum, Nancy. Bentham’s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978. Stephen, Leslie. The English Utilitarians. New York, NY: P. Smith, 1950.

Berlin Wall Erected in 1961, the Berlin Wall symbolized not only the division of postwar Germany but also the division of the Cold War world between East and West, between the democratic and the communist states. Built to stop East Germans from fleeing the country, the wall encircled West Berlin, separating it from the surrounding East Germany. It was 155 kilometers long and was a barrier and a surveillance system like none other in the world, as it was erected against the state’s own population. The East German authorities officially referred to the wall as “the border,” “the border security,” or “the Anti-Fascist Protection Rampant.” The latter suggested that the wall was built to protect the state against West Germany, which had not been de-Nazified. In the 1980s, Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and chairman of the Council of State of East Germany, referred to it as “the so-called wall.” Use of the word wall in relation to this security structure was strictly forbidden in East Germany. This

94

Berlin Wall

entry reviews the events that led to the construction of the Berlin Wall, examines the security and surveillance capabilities and evolution of the wall, and concludes with an account of the fall of the wall.

Origin of the Berlin Wall Following the Potsdam Conference (July 17 to August 2, 1945), postwar Germany and its capital city, Berlin, were divided into four occupation zones—British, French, American, and Soviet. Although Berlin fell into the Soviet zone of occupation, technically it was jointly administered by the four victorious nations. As the Cold War emerged, the tensions between the former allies increased, culminating in the ending of the governing partnership in 1948 and the Berlin Blockade (June 24, 1948, to May 12, 1949), which was the Soviets’ attempt to gain control over the entire city of Berlin by cutting off any access to the western sectors, which were controlled by the Allies. Using the air corridors that, according to a November 1945 agreement, provided them free access to Berlin, the Western Allies—­supported by Canada, New Zealand, and Australia—organized an “airlift” to provide ­supplies to people in West Berlin. By the time Joseph Stalin lifted the blockade, two different governments—one under Soviet control and the other under British, French, and American ­control—had been established for the ruling of East Berlin and West Berlin, respectively. By late 1949, a German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was declared, with its capital in East Berlin, while Bonn became the capital of the correspondent Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Throughout the Cold War, West Berlin remained a free city, a political enclave that was 110 miles from the border of West Germany. It was surrounded by East Germany, without being a part of it. Legally, the status of West Berlin was controversial; the city remained a military occupation zone until the 1990 reunification of Germany, but de facto, it functioned as one of the states of the Federal Republic of Germany, with a successful market economy and a democratic political system. Given, on the one hand, West Germany’s democratic political system and its successful economic growth and, on the other, the nondemocratic rule and the poor living standards in East

Germany, many East Germans wanted to move to West Germany, and they began to use West Berlin as a gateway to freedom and economic prosperity. According to the agreement reached at the Potsdam Conference, Berliners were free to travel between East and West Berlin. Taking advantage of this opportunity, East Germans would come to East Berlin, cross over to West Berlin, and then go to West Germany. It is estimated that between 1949 and 1961 more than 3.5 million East Germans left their country to head for the free world via West Berlin. For the leaders of the Soviet Union and East Germany, this not only negatively affected their prestige—since East Germany’s citizens were fleeing to the capitalist world—but it also presented an economic problem since the fugitives were primarily young and educated people. During the overnight hours of August 12, 1961, the East Germans closed the Berlin border, erecting barriers of barbed wire and fences that surrounded West Berlin along 155 kilometers. Later, a concrete wall was built. Western nations criticized in strong terms the building of the Berlin Wall, but as it was placed on East Germany’s territory, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took no measure against it. However, on June 26, 1963, in a famous speech delivered in front of 450,000 West Berliners, U.S. president John Kennedy declared that the United States was ready to defend the free city of West Berlin if necessary. Between 1961 and 1991, West Berlin was a symbol of the free world.

The Berlin Wall and Its Victims Despite its name, the security system that separated East Berlin from West Berlin was in fact less a wall and more a strictly monitored and controlled series of open, visible spaces. During the 1960s, the Berlin Wall was repeatedly renovated and expanded, but it was in the 1970s that it took its more elaborated form. Technically, the construction went through four different architectural stages over the years: (1) a barbed-wire fence (in 1961), (2) two parallel wire fences (1961–1965), (3) two walls of concrete (1965–1975), and (4) the improved two concrete walls—“The Border Wall” (1975–1989). Displaying barrier, detection, and surveillance measures, the Berlin Wall was in fact two parallel walls, about 100 meters apart. The

Berlin Wall

section between the walls—“the death strip”— was covered in sand or gravel, so that the guards could easily locate the footprints of East German defectors, and was equipped with steal tank traps, barbed wire, patrol jeeps, attack dogs, scatter guns, and surveillance cameras. The wall was reinforced with antivehicle trenches, electrified signal fences, a “bed of nails,” floodlights, border patrol roads, 302 watchtowers, and 20 bunkers. Self-firing devices and mines—used elsewhere on the border—were not employed in Berlin. Thus, whoever wanted to flee East Germany through Berlin had to climb the inner wall, sprint across the death strip, and then climb over the second wall, which was 3.6 meters high and 120 centimeters thick. In 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, East Germany was making plans for the high-tech modernization of the wall, with installation of electronic sensors, motion detectors, acoustic sensors, and remote, low-light-level television cameras. Even after the wall was built, East Germans continued to try to escape to West Berlin. Between 1961 and 1989, more than 100,000 people tried to cross the Berlin Wall. There are no definitive numbers, but it is believed that more than 600 of them died—shot by the border patrols, suffering fatal accidents during their escape attempts, or killing themselves when caught. More than 130 people were killed by border patrols, the first of them as early as August 1961. One of the first victims was 18-year-old Peter Fechter, who, on August 17, 1962, attempted to escape to West Berlin but was shot and left to bleed to death under the eyes of hundreds of witnesses. People caught trying to flee the country (if not killed during the attempt) were sentenced to months or years of prison sentences or hard labor. Relatives, colleagues, and friends of those who were caught attempting to cross the wall or of those who succeeded were under the constant surveillance of the militia and the Stasi (the secret police). The Stasi’s far-reaching surveillance was an important factor that helped erode East Germans’ sense of security and privacy. Stasi, whose headquarters was in East Berlin in Normannenstrasse, was reported to be one of the most effective and repressive secret police in Cold War Eastern Europe. One of its main tasks was to spy on East Germany’s population through a complex network of secret

95

agents and informants to identify and stop any opposition to the political regime. In this context, preventing border breaches (including in Berlin) was a major concern. By 1989, Stasi had 97,000 employees, of which 15,000 worked at Normannenstrasse, from where, through the 14 regional offices in East Germany, they administered the Stasi’s operations overseas and surveillance of the population at home. It is estimated that in East Germany (including East Berlin) there was a secret agent or informant for every 63 persons. The level of suspicion was very high, and even the most innocent activity could raise the Stasi’s concern that the person intended to leave the country illegally, violating Article 213 of the criminal code— “Illegal Border Crossing.” People who had relatives in the West (including in West Berlin), who got mail and phone calls from the West, who filed applications to leave East Germany legally and permanently, or who filed applications to temporarily visit the West were suspected of intending to leave the country illegally and of opposing the regime. They were therefore placed under surveillance—their letters were opened and photocopied, and the envelopes were ironed shut; observation posts were established around their houses; informants were employed; telephones were tapped. However, it is believed that in East Berlin (as well as in East Germany) it was not mail or telephone surveillance that had the most important role in ­monitoring individuals suspected of intending to illegally leave the country or to oppose the regime but the informants. In 1963, Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the Soviet Union (first secretary of the Communist Party and prime minister), declared that the Berlin Wall was a success. Many people from both East Germany and West Germany, however, hated what it represented. Often they wrote and painted on the wall their feelings, making the wall famous for its graffiti. On the eastern side, approaching the inner wall was not allowed, with the area near it being declared a restricted zone. On the western side, however, by 1989, the outer wall became a giant canvas covered with comments, figures, and slogans. Although the East German authorities periodically covered the graffiti (much of which was political and anticommunist), the multicolored graffiti was rapidly redone.

96

Biblical Surveillance

The Fall of the Wall In August 1989, Hungary opened its border with Austria, and more than 13,000 East German ­tourists used this opportunity to flee to Austria via Hungary. In September 1989, the “peaceful revolution”—a series of peaceful demonstrations against the political regime in East Germany— began. In October, the East German prime minister Erich Honecker resigned, and the new prime minister, EgonKrenz, decided to offer East German citizens visas for West Germany. On November 9, 1989, the authorities issued a decree allowing citizens to freely travel to West Germany if they had a visa. Announcing this in a press conference, Gunter Schabowski, Minister of Propaganda, declared that the measure would take effect immediately. The news was broadcasted in both German states. A huge crowd of East Berliners gathered at the wall’s six checkpoints and demanded that the guards open the gates. As nobody in East Germany was willing to order the guards to use deadly force against the crowd, at 10:45 p.m. the gates were opened, and the people crossed over, with little if any identity checking. They were greeted in West Berlin with flowers and champagne. In June 1990, the East German military began to tear down the wall. On October 3, 1990, the two German countries reunified. Today, only several sections, fragments, and observation towers still stand along the former path of the Berlin Wall, and some fragments are in museums in Germany or abroad. Elena Dragomir See also Cold War; Police State; Surveillance During the Cold War; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies

Further Readings Bruce, Gary, The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2010. Hertle, Hans-Hermann and Maria Nooke. The Victims at the Berlin Wall. A Biographical Handbook. Berlin, Germany: Ch. Links Verlag, 2011. Ladd, Brian. The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Rottman, Gordon L. The Berlin Wall and the IntraGerman Border, 1961–89. Oxford, England: Osprey, 2008.

Smyser, W. R. Kennedy and the Berlin Wall: A Hell of a Lot Better Than a War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.

Biblical Surveillance Practices of monitoring in the Old and New Testaments of the Judeo-Christian Bible have formed the foundations of Western conceptions of surveillance, security, and privacy. Although contemporary surveillance theorists may allude to instances of biblical surveillance, the concentrated study of this in a sociological context is an emerging phenomenon, often associated with the desire for a more robust ethical engagement with considerations of monitoring. This entry looks at the various forms of surveillance documented in biblical texts, with the most common form being spying. Types of monitoring, including self-examination and confession, are also discussed. Dates vary for the historical accounts of surveillance cited in the biblical canon, with practices ranging across extensive temporalities and geographies, documented by a multiplicity of authors. These can be further subdivided into human and divine forms of surveillance. While this can be a helpful organizing tool, it should be noted that the boundaries between these two modes of monitoring are not singular but plural and the borders between the two are not fixed but porous. For example, various human figures and institutions often invoke divine surveillance as a method of control and power for their own ends, rather than to further a biblical understanding of surveillance. There are various forms of surveillance found in biblical texts, the majority of which relate to embodied human observation of one person or group of people by another. Frequently, this is directly related to the act of spying. Just as in a contemporary context, a number of reasons can be given for this activity, ranging from, but not limited to, economic security and growth, military strategy and advantage, securitizing the nation-state (usually the people of Israel), ­intelligence gathering, political gain, as well as social control and cohesion. One of the bestknown examples of this is found in the book of

Biblical Surveillance

Numbers, Chapter 13, in which 12 men are chosen for a reconnaissance mission in Canaan. The spies pass through various regions over a 40-day period, in which they observe the inhabitants, agricultural production, and military strength of the land. The report from the mission is documented as having two different interpretations, with 10 of the 12 advocating caution due to Canaan’s superior fighting capacity and two men encouraging occupation of the area. Civil unrest and rebellion follow the spies’ account, ultimately resulting in a wilderness pilgrimage for 40 years before the people of Israel reach the “promised land.” It is telling that Joshua, one of the 12 spies, went on to use spies to scout out the surrounding foreign terrain when he became the leader, suggesting a perpetual cycle of observation (see Joshua 2). In the New Testament, the Bible indicates that Jesus and his followers were subjected to sustained surveillance as they represented a source of interest to the people and a threat to the ruling authorities, both religious and secular (e.g., see Luke 20 and Galations 2). Monitoring is not confined to external, surreptitious observation, however. Followers of God in both the Old and the New Testaments are commanded to take part in forms of self-examination, with frequent exhortations to “watch over” themselves or to “watch out” for dangers and temptations from both within and without. When a believer does stray from the path, he or she is encouraged to confess the sin first to God and then to others (James 5), so that a form of loving community watchfulness might follow and restoration be made. Some religious denominations urge a more formalized ritual of confession. Such situations highlight the complexities of surveillance in this context, as a dual purpose of care and control of the individual and the group, made vulnerable in the act of confession, can be identified. While the motivation behind confession may be to form a transparent, honest community, it is open to misuse of power. The self-surveillance brought about by confession recalls the Panopticon structure, designed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, in which prisoners govern their behavior after internalizing the invisible gaze of the inspector, who is positioned in the center of the structure. A number of parallels have been drawn between this gaze and

97

the “eye of God,” as one that destabilizes the “see/ being seen dyad.” In this view of divine surveillance, God is a distant being whose eyes “run to and fro throughout the whole earth” (Zechariah and 2 Chronicles), seeking only to judge and control humans. An imbalance of power is negatively framed in favor of the watcher, God, who not only sees but also knows His creatures, to seek out their sins. The modernist project, which produced Bentham’s Panopticon, sought to emulate this controlling impulse by offering a secular gaze in the place of God’s vision. Recent scholarship has sought to destabilize this entrenched Enlightenment paradigm of divine surveillance by drawing attention to the believer’s desire for God’s regard in his or her life (see, e.g., Job and Psalms), in a relationship of mutual love and trust. For theorists David Lyon and Eric Stoddart, this leads to a new interpretive framework for surveillance studies that focuses on an ethics of care. That is, contemporary monitoring practices should be critically engaged from a hermeneutics not only of control but also of concern for the other. Within this model, the place of vision in surveillance is subtly undermined and reinterpreted. The work of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas is also noted by scholars as providing an alternative model of divine surveillance by drawing on his concept of the faceto-face encounter in our relationships with God and one another. The significance of embodiment, both in our everyday lives and in the incarnation of the Son of God in Jesus, cannot be overlooked in this emerging understanding of biblical surveillance. Lorna Muir See also Morality; Panopticon, The; Religion; Social Justice; Spies; Surveillance, Theories of

Further Readings The English Standard Version Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments. London, England: Collins, 2002. Hand, Seán, ed. The Levinas Reader. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Jay, Martin. Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

98

Big Data

Lyon, David. “Surveillance and the Eye of God.” Studies in Christian Ethics, v.27/1 (2014). doi:10.1177/09 53946813509334 Norris, Clive and Gary Armstrong. “Introduction: Power and Vision.” In Clive Norris, et al. (eds.), Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television and Social Control. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1998. Schmidt-Burkhardt, Astrit. “The All-Seer: God’s Eye as Proto-Surveillance.” In Thomas Y. Levin, et al. (eds.), CTRL [SPACE]: Rhetorics of Surveillance From Bentham to Big Brother. Karlsruhe, Germany: ZKM Centre for Art and Media, 2002. Stoddart, Eric. Theological Perspectives on a Surveillance Society. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2011.

Big Data Big data refers to the phenomenon of processing large quantities of complex information in an acceptable period of time. Given the increasing amount of information and personal data available, the management of such large data sets requires improvements at different stages of the process. Leveraging big data includes the complex synchronization of capture devices (e.g., sensors), connection networks (e.g., Wi-Fi), storage capacities (e.g., cloud services), and analysis systems (e.g., software) that enable the extraction of useful information through the establishment of relationships, the detection of patterns, and the comparison of individuals, among other tasks. There is no definition of what constitutes big data, but it is generally understood that data are “big” when their level of complexity goes beyond traditional data-analyzing tools. While the uses of big data proliferate, the possibility of function creep (i.e., widening the use of a system beyond its original purpose) and the use of metadata by national intelligence agencies without control or consent raise questions about the acquisition and use of big data and big data analysis. Questions concerning the surveillance techniques used to acquire big data, as well as a perception of invasion of privacy when data are unknowingly acquired, have increasingly surfaced. This entry first reviews the history and definition of the term big data and then looks at some of the uses of big data. Surveillance techniques related to big data

are then discussed, and the entry concludes with an examination of privacy concerns and mismanagement of big data.

History and Definition Big data may be understood as a generalized trend, not just as a problem that arises when an organization has to deal with large and complex amounts of information. In this sense, big data refers to the imaginary vast network of databases, potentially interconnected, that contribute to deepening and optimizing the knowledge of specific contexts and situations (through the monitoring of variables) or to depicting the profiles or data doubles of individuals or human groups (through the monitoring of their personal data). In the 1940s, there were attempts to describe the problem posed by the availability of large amounts of data sets. At the time, the term chosen by those discussing the phenomenon was information explosion, a term first used in the newspaper Lawton Constitution. This expression was further developed in an article published in the New Statesman in March 1964, pointing out the difficulty of managing the large volumes of information available. Information explosion refers to the rapid increase in the amount of published information, as this renders the processing problematic and can lead to overload. The term big data, however, was not used until 1997, in an article titled “Application-Controlled Demand Paging for Out-of-Core Visualization,” in which the authors, NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) researchers Michael Cox and David Ellsworth, mentioned the “problem of big data” regarding visualization issues and that “when data sets do not fit in main memory (in core), or when they do not fit even on local disk, the most common solution is to acquire more resources.” It has not been established when data sets create a “big data problem,” as the size of a database in terms of entries, individuals, fields, or bytes is not indicative of the complexity involved in managing the database. “Large” data sets may refer to databases that contain vast amounts of information from a considerable variety of sources (e.g., devices, places, moments), thus generating a large number of variables or harvesting information

Big Data

from many different individuals. “Big” is therefore a reference more to the complexity, not the size or volume, of the data. A two-variable data set for millions of individuals does not necessarily imply the technical complications that big data entails. Nevertheless, such a huge database rarely comprises a small number of variables. In addition, the notion of “too much” or “too large” has varied over time. Innovations in software and artificial intelligence (e.g., algorithms) and the increase of storage capacity have advanced in a way that makes the difficulty of managing a data set always relative. According to Parkinson’s law of data, “data expands to fill the space available for storage.” Over the past 10 years, the memory usage of evolving systems has doubled roughly once every 18 months. At the same time, the memory density available for constant dollars has also tended to double about once every 12 months. Therefore, the “big” in big data is commonly assessed using the concept of the “3 Vs”: volume, velocity, and variety. A fourth V has been proposed, veracity, and there are references to value and variability, even though the existing consensus does not expand beyond the three original terms. Simply put, big data processes comprise the following set of moments or elements: (a) collection, (b) storage, and (c) analysis. The collection of data is becoming increasingly sophisticated, since the development and deployment of a wide range of sensor solutions allow for the measurement of a growing variety of facts and actions. The collected information may refer to human activities or not, and it can be exerted by instrumented or uninstrumented devices. The storage of data is one of the most obvious and immediate challenges of big data, as the growing size of data sets, together with the optimization and maximization of storage units, requires the constant creation of storage space. In this respect, the development of remote storage capacities connected through the Internet to clients, known as cloud services, has momentarily eased the storage question. Once collected and stored, the analysis of big data continues to be the main challenge—how to extract useful information from the collected data and find solutions to facilitate and manage the visualization and interpretation processes, identifying meaningful connections and establishing comparisons that reveal clear patterns.

99

Uses The kind of information collected under the logic of big data processes may refer not only to impersonal facts but also to personal traits and actions. Whereas the former generates information related to phenomena that in normal conditions should not reveal or allow for the inference of personal data (e.g., environmental indicators, traffic density, weather conditions, market trends), the latter enables the possibility of profiling and targeting human groups and individuals. There are many areas and applications that take advantage of complex data sets, such as home automation, health care records, and industry manufacturing optimization. The cross-area exchange of data creates compound applications that may be perceived as additional benefits or as undesired externalities. Big data is also an integral part of new technology-enabled trends, such as the drive to develop solutions to measure an increasing number of public and private variables in the context of smart cities, wearables and the quantified self, and the Internet of Things. This drive to digitize everything is what makes it possible for large data sets to be generated, collected, and analyzed. The collected personal ­ data can be classified under two main categories: (1) processes related to the optimization of informational usage by public bodies (political/ ­ government dimension) and (2) processes related to the optimization of information analysis by private companies (corporate dimension). The lines between these two spheres, however, are increasingly blurred. Another field in which big data is used is national security. A key source of information for intelligence agencies to infer useful facts about individuals is to gather metadata variables that describe the structural properties of the contextual information units under surveillance. For instance, during a telephone or cell phone call, available metadata includes date and time, location of sender and receiver, duration of the call, service provider, and sender and receiver phone numbers; the content of the call itself (i.e., the conversation) is not the main informational unit. Processing information on the calling activities of large networks or groups of people requires complex systems that can organize the collected data and extract meaningful information from it. The use of

100

Big Data

metadata by security agencies came to light after Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, leaked NSA documents revealing details on the mass harvesting of personal metadata, conveniently stored and analyzed, under secret espionage programs. These revelations not only exposed the extent of the surveillance activities of national security agencies but also shed light on the relationship between public and private bodies, as the wiretapping of fiber optic cables and other means of surveillance were facilitated by private developers and operators. The NSA leaks thus showed a blurring of the lines between two traditionally separate spheres: public bodies and private companies.

Surveillance and Big Data The improvement of solutions developed to deal with large and complex data sets may also help foster the sophistication of surveillance practices, as shown by the NSA leaks. However, not all data sets that can be processed as big data can be used for surveillance purposes. There are certain features of the information gathered that will determine whether it can enable such practices. When assessing potential surveillance practices based on big data contexts, the subset of information to be taken into account is the one that refers to data that can be linked to identifiable individuals (i.e., personal data). This may contain intrinsic or extrinsic traits, which reveal static or dynamic properties that are used to investigate or monitor the actions or communications of groups of people. Big data surveillance implies the collection, storage, and processing of massive amounts of personal data to find useful patterns that allow control tasks to be optimized. It is different from conventional surveillance, even if also performed with the support of information and communication technologies, as big data surveillance characteristically deploys tools that keep track of large numbers of people, originally unsorted, and aims to collect the largest possible range of information, ideally on a global scale. It also takes advantage of the increasing voluntary self-disclosure of information and the data resulting from automation of processes. Although capturing information from specific targets was the norm in conventional surveillance

routines, big data introduces a comprehensive logic based on the premise of collecting as much data as possible: the largest number of measurable variables and indicators, for the largest number of individuals, during the longest time possible. The self-volition of individuals in the generation of data, the shift toward an exante prediction-focused perspective (tracking and storing rather than monitoring), and the increasing automation of data collection and analysis by data mining agents and data brokers suggest deep changes in traditional surveillance practices, in which the surveillant and the surveilled had clear roles and positions in the hierarchy.

Mismanagement and Privacy Concerns One of the most controversial issues regarding the management of big data is the potential for function creep. Given the wide range of available uses and the flexibility of the information, personal data, data processing, and the analysis derived from them can be used for functions different from those stated when the data were collected, thus creating a situation of function creep. In addition, the line that separates what is personal data and what is nonpersonal data (in the sense of being nonidentifiable or non-reidentifiable) may change over time, and reidentification techniques that did not exist previously may be developed in the future and turn nonpersonal data into personal data without knowledge or control by the data subject. Even though the active volition on the contribution of personal data is widely recognized, some questions arise around this issue. The awareness by the data subjects of the uses and potential consequences of data sharing is often not promoted or stated beyond obscure or hidden privacy policies. Moreover, providing data is usually the only way to access some products and services, where the possibility to opt out and still enjoy the said product or service is not considered. This raises questions about the legitimacy of data collection. In addition, individuals are not always those who make their personal data accessible or visible. Acquisition of big data can be accessible to common users through relatively simple devices such as search engines, which allow users to find precise pieces of information located in remote places

Bill of Rights

of a vast network. Control over personal information may be nearly impossible since it is distributed among numerous virtual resources. Nevertheless, in Europe, judiciary authorities’ support for the “right to be forgotten” forced the bigger Internet search engine companies to improve their efforts in attending to demands to erase personal information. A key reference concerning the mismanagement of personal data is the aforementioned NSA leaks. They revealed the existence of global massive surveillance programs, such as PRISM and XKeyscore, that rely on metadata gathered without control or a legal framework. The revelations were a turning point for global awareness of the privacy risks of mass personal data or metadata gathering by unaccountable bodies. In June 2013, U.S. president Barack Obama justified the activities conducted under espionage programs, highlighting that content was not gathered and analyzed but, rather, “just metadata” were collected. He argued that the security versus privacy trade-off was necessary and justified. As mentioned, metadata are not anonymous data. Possibilities for reidentification exist and are on the increase. Although complete anonymity is impossible to achieve, there are alternatives available that protect the privacy of the data subjects, such as “pseudonimity.” These include avoiding the disclosure of actual data whenever possible through the use of anonymization tools (e.g., software, proxies) or opting out of data-intensive services and processes. These actions undermine the accuracy of the data subject’s data double, but they improve the privacy and control levels of individuals.

Final Thoughts Big data refers to the efficient management of large and complex amounts of data, whether or not they are personal, through a process of collection, storage, and analysis. Such management of data can be performed for governmental or public purposes or to seek corporate or private ends. As the optimization of information sources and analysis creates management and decision-making advantages, big data offers meaningful benefits for a wide range of bodies. However, there are negative externalities resulting from the analysis

101

of information that is collected without consent or taking into account legal, ethical, and societal concerns. Gemma Galdon Clavell See also Creeping; Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Data-Doubles; Dataveillance

Further Readings Bettencourt, Luís M. A. “The Uses of Big Data in Cities.” Big Data, v.2/1 (2014). Boyd, Danah and Kate Crawford. “Critical Questions for Big Data.” Information, Communication & Society, v.15/5 (2012). Bryant, Randal E., et al. “Big-Data Computing: Creating Revolutionary Breakthroughs in Commerce, Science, and Society.” Computing Community Consoritum, Version 8 (December 22, 2008). http://www.cra.org/ ccc/files/docs/init/Big_Data.pdf (Accessed August 2017). Clarke, Roger. “Information Technology and Dataveillance.” Communications of the ACM, v.31/5 (1988). Cox, M. and D. Ellsworth. “Application-Controlled Demand Paging for Out-of-Core Visualization” (1997). https://www.nas.nasa.gov/assets/pdf/ techreports/1997/nas-97-010.pdf (Accessed August 2017). DegliEsposti, Sara. “When Big Data Meets Dataveillance: The Hidden Side of Analytics.” Surveillance & Society, v.12/2 (2014). Matzner, Tobias. “Why Privacy Is Not Enough Privacy in the Context of ‘Ubiquitous Computing’ and ‘Big Data’.” Journal of Information Communication and Ethics in Society, v.12/2 (2014). Parks, Malcolm R. “Big Data in Communication Research: Its Contents and Discontents.” Journal of Communication, v.64/2 (2014). Van Dijck, Jose. “Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big Data Between Scientific Paradigm and Ideology.” Surveillance & Society, v.12/2 (2014).

Bill

of

Rights

The Bill of Rights was written alongside the U.S. Constitution and encompasses the first 10 amendments. Included within the Bill of Rights is the freedom of speech, right to bear arms, protection

102

Bill of Rights

from warrantless searches, right to an attorney, and protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The main author of the Bill of Rights was James Madison. The founders of the country wrote the Bill of Rights to secure additional protection for American citizens. In this entry, each of the 10 amendments that makes up the Bill of Rights is listed, and the rights provided by them are reviewed.

First Amendment Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

The First Amendment guarantees five rights: (1) freedom of speech, (2) freedom of assembly, (3) freedom of petition, (4) freedom to worship, and (5) freedom of the press. The First Amendment is the amendment that has been the subject of the most legal battles.

Second Amendment A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

The Second Amendment provides for the freedom to keep and use firearms. The amendment was originally written to protect the ability of the local population to form a militia in order to protect itself from an oppressive government. In the current age, there is less of a focus on forming a well-armed militia and, instead, more of a focus on maintaining the right to keep firearms.

Third Amendment No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

The Third Amendment guarantees that citizens do not have to provide room and board for soldiers of the state or federal government. During the

time leading up to the American Revolution, the British government forced colonists to house and feed their soldiers. This is one of the least litigated amendments, with only a few court cases being heard about this amendment. There are no U.S. Supreme Court cases centered on the Third Amendment, primarily because there have been few occasions when the United States has been attacked on its own soil. Thus, there are few opportunities for legal challenges to this amendment. Its most visible impact is seen in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), in which the Third Amendment was used in support of the construction of a right to privacy.

Fourth Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless searches and seizures of a person’s property by the federal government or its agents. This amendment was the basis for the exclusionary rule as well as the right of privacy. Privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but the Supreme Court has found intent on behalf of the authors and, as such, created one. The exclusionary rule entails that illegally seized evidence will be dismissed in a criminal court proceeding. The Fourth Amendment is best represented by the cases of Weeks v. United States (1914) and Katz v. United States (1967). The Supreme Court in Weeks established the federal exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a legal protection for defendants that prohibits the use of illegally seized evidence in court. Katz held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. As a result of this case, as well as Griswold, a new era of privacy rights was born.

Fifth Amendment No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in

Bill of Rights

cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

The Fifth Amendment contains three rights: (1)  the guarantee of a grand jury, (2) protection against self-incrimination, and (3) protection against eminent domain. A grand jury is a group of 16 to 23 jurors who decide if there is enough evidence against a defendant for the state to proceed to a trial. If there is not enough evidence, then the case will be dismissed. The protection against self-incrimination ensures that a person does not have to provide testimony against himself or herself. The last part of the amendment protects a person’s property from being taken by the state. If the state or government wants to use a person’s property, then the government has to pay for the property.

Sixth Amendment In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

The Sixth Amendment provides for the bulk of fundamental criminal rights a citizen has. This amendment guarantees a speedy trial, that a defendant gets a chance to confront his or her accuser in court, and that a defendant has a right to be represented by an attorney, to be able to subpoena witnesses to aid in his or her case, and to have an impartial jury. The guarantee of a speedy trial means that a defendant will not have to wait an extraordinary amount of time in order to have a trial. This protection arose as a result

103

of colonists waiting a long time in a debtors’ prison prior to the American Revolution for a trial. The Confrontation Clause ensures that a person will get a chance to confront his or her accuser in court. This means that the person can question the accuser’s story and prove his or her innocence. The right to an attorney is embodied in this amendment. As a result, every person accused of a crime has the right to an attorney, even if he or she cannot afford one. The ability to subpoena witnesses to testify on one’s behalf is also provided through this amendment. This means that a person can have the court order another person to appear at the trial in order to testify, providing information that may affect the outcome of the trial.

Seventh Amendment In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

The Seventh Amendment guarantees that every defendant has the right to a trial by jury. This is for both civil and criminal cases. This is the only amendment within the Bill of Rights that has not been incorporated, though every state has a similar provision within its state constitution.

Eighth Amendment Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

The Eighth Amendment provides protection against cruel and unusual punishment, as well as ensures that bail set for release from prison is not excessively high. This amendment has been used to justify the disuse of capital punishment.

Ninth Amendment The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

104

Bioengineering

The Ninth Amendment guarantees that because a right is not mentioned in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, it does not mean that it does not exist. The authors of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights wanted to have an expanded view of civil rights and liberties, not a narrow scope.

Tenth Amendment The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The Tenth Amendment supports states’ rights and the rights of the people. When the amendment was drafted, the authors understood that they would be unable to explicitly list all of the rights that the states would have. Therefore, this amendment was left open so that the states would have more power than the federal government. Douglas Jordan See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Civil Liberties; Corporate Personhood; Habeas Corpus; U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Kennedy, Caroline and Ellen Alderman. The Right to Privacy. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1997. Solove, Daniel J. and Paul M. Schwartz. Privacy Law Fundamentals. Portsmouth, NH: International Association of Privacy Professionals, 2013. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

Bioengineering The word bioengineering comprises two ideas: (1) engineering, “application of techniques and principles of engineering,” and (2) bio, “relating to living systems.” However, because of the immense breadth of the prefix bio, bioengineering necessarily becomes a topic of considerable diversity. Because of this diversity of bioengineering, there is

potential reach into issues regarding surveillance, security, and privacy, especially pertaining to corporations’ involvement in bioengineering advances. This entry delves further into the concept and genesis of bioengineering, looks at some recent advances produced via bioengineering, and concludes with an examination of how the field more specifically relates to surveillance, security, and privacy. In attempting a more concrete grasp of the topic of bioengineering, a simple search turns up the following highly disparate bioengineering book topics: neurological control systems, artificial organs and prostheses, titanium materials (e.g., artificial hips), creating sustainable stream banks and slopes, biomedical engineering, embryonic stem cells, pollution prevention, visual prosthetics (e.g., artificial eyes and/or enhanced vision), tissue engineering and mechanobiology, the human machine, polymers for biomedical applications, computerized cancer diagnostics, brain imaging, sports medicine, using plants and/ or bacteria to create new medicines, and immobilized enzymes. There are also books on careers in bioengineering and the sociological aspects of bioengineering—what it may mean for the “human condition.” One commonality among these disparate areas is a drive toward precision, an increased use of mathematical reasoning, and a goal of reproducibility, so that “this device” is not merely specialized to help “that” person but can be usefully extrapolated to a broader societal application and utility. To some extent, the concept of bioengineering is reminiscent of science fiction movies and books, where humans are redesigned to live on highgravity planets, to have gills like fish, or to see in the ultraviolet light like bees. However, in practical terms, bioengineering is being used today to help those who are blind to see, to help those who are maimed to walk again, and even to link individuals who are disabled with computers that they can control with thought alone. These are real-life scenarios, not science fiction. Also, there are goats making milk containing spider silk, which can be separated, spun, and used for stronger ropes, and bacteria producing human insulin for patients with diabetes. The key in putting bio and engineering together is that element of intentional design, of human ingenuity—whether working with plants, bacteria,

Bioengineering

metals, or computers—to innovatively create something that solves a problem. At the same time, however, these processes open new doors to both practical and ethical considerations. For example, consider engineering bacteria that would successfully clean up oil spills. Such bacteria exist at present; however, they are not as effective as would be desired. Obviously, it is rather simple to consider the scenario where it is good to have oileating bacteria clean up a spill but bad if ecoterrorists were to dump such bacteria in an oilfield or if an unscrupulous business used such bacteria at a competitor’s site. Strictly speaking, genetically modified organism (GMO) foods are also examples of bioengineering. GMO foods have the vast potential to help many individuals if, for example, a full-­ protein rice could be made freely available so that no one would starve. However, many individuals are opposed to GMO foods, whether their fears are unwarranted or not. Yet the same individuals might gladly purchase the new GloFish, which is a genetically modified zebrafish in fluorescent colors. As recently as 1976, bioengineering was considered a new scientific area. A text of that era described the newly coined term bioengineering as an interaction between engineers and biological scientists. Examples were given of collaborations between microbiologists and chemical engineers in the fermentation industry (e.g., beer and wine). Another example was the exemplary work of physiologists and mechanical engineers on prosthetic devices. Since that time, considerable progress has been made, and bioengineering is now an immensely diverse field of scientific endeavor. In the broadest sense, bioengineering and biotechnology are causing considerable disparity of opinion with respect to appropriateness of patents, the role of patent laws, and even whether biological “inventions” should be patented or should be freely available. This has led to growing global action and discussion in the arena of bioethics. Who is, or who should be, “in charge” of bioengineering advances? Should this arena be treated somewhat as is the case for nuclear weapons, with global oversight committees and discussions as to what person or state should be permitted to make bioengineering advances?

105

As alluded to in the introduction of this entry, bioengineering can directly or indirectly be related to surveillance, security, and privacy. How is this so? Three words come to mind: corporate, proprietary, and patent rights. Each of these involves elements of surveillance and security, as well as privacy. Let’s start with security. First, the research and development laboratories for a given project would want security for their innovation until it is ready to be released. Second, security would, or might, be necessary in terms of certain inventions that might not be appropriately released to the general public. Third, there would also be corporate interests, due to investments, and a need for security during development. Privacy rights come in for individuals, who might want to “design” their child to be healthier and not carry a dangerous genetic defect. In 2004, the Biomedical Engineering Society published a list of professional obligations. These include the following: (a) abilities, skills, and knowledge to be used to enhance public welfare, health, and safety; (b) patients’ privacy and confidentiality rights as primary concerns; and (c) full compliance with scientific and research guidelines in terms of ethical considerations and duties, respecting the rights of the public, colleagues, and both human and animal subjects. Bioengineering has an immense potential for good and a concomitantly immense potential for creating havoc in the absence of serious reflection as to how these potentials can be protected, safeguarded, and directed toward the benefit of humanity as a whole. Laura A. Andersson See also Bioinformatics; Biometrics; Biosurveillance; DNA Technology

Further Readings Baille, H. and T. K. Casey. Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics, Bioengineering and the Future of the Human Condition (Basic Bioethics, eds. G. McGee and A. Caplan). Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. Biomedical Engineering Society. “Biomedical Engineering Society Code of Ethics.” http://www.bmes.org/files/ CodeEthics04.pdf (Accessed August 2017). Naurato, N. and T. J. Smith. “Ethical Considerations in Bioengineering Research.” Biomedical Sciences

106

Bioinformatics

Instrumentation, v.39 (2003). http://www.ncbi.nlm .nih.gov/pubmed/12724954 (Accessed March 2015). Valentuzzi, Max. Understanding the Human Machine: A Primer for Bioengineering (Series on Bioengineering and Biomedical Engineering, Vol. 4). Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2004.

Bioinformatics Bioinformatics is the utilization of computer software to study biological information and methods. Some examples of the diverse data produced by the field include analysis of genomic, proteomic, and metabolomics sequencing; computational biology models; biodiversity measurements; and records and models of protein expression, regulation, and structure. The potential application of such computational analysis is limitless, but work is focused primarily on creating ways to effectively store, process, and manipulate large data sets, on deriving statistical or mathematical analysis from such data, and on creating and analyzing models of important molecular, physiological, and ecological systems. Bioinformatics has potential medical, agricultural, and biological applications, both commercially and academically, as the patterns derived from samples and modeling can be used to better understand, develop, and optimize treatments, products, and crops. Bioinformatics, commonly used by the health care system to manage large amounts of patient data, is now being used in international collaborations focused on understanding disease states and normal physiology for commercial purposes as well. This entry looks at the security and privacy issues specific to bioinformatics.

Data Privacy and Security Challenges The cost savings to companies from the gathering of data via a computerized modeling system, rather than traditional wet-bench biology, led to a dramatic increase in the formation of bioinformatics companies beginning in the 1990s. However, this rapid increase in the types and sources of bioinformatics data meant that the data collected by these companies were a new source of security

and privacy concerns for individuals and corporate entities trying to protect their interests. One challenge intrinsic to data privacy and security in the field of bioinformatics is that a large proportion of bioinformatics solutions have been developed in open source software, such as Perl and Unix. This was welcomed by groups concerned with the cost of obtaining software code from proprietary corporate databases and by developers (often academics, e.g., students and researchers) who shared a philosophical belief in the widespread sharing of data. During the dot.com decline of 2000, many companies preferred and encouraged the open source movement in bioinformatics, due to cheaper utilization costs. Other supporters argue that open source software is more reliable and better developed as broad usage and diffuse expertise allow optimization. They hope that, in exchange for the tools needed to conduct research, researchers will freely contribute to ongoing projects. However, the ready availability of open source code allows easier hacking of the information developed from these bioinformatics systems. It also became difficult to define and protect intellectual property and commercial interests with universally available data.

Secure Methods for Storing and Transferring Data Besides hoping to maintain the integrity of the data itself, companies and researchers need to protect their commercial or academic interests in an increasingly competitive field. As such, it has become important to develop more secure methods to store and transfer data. Depending on the privacy needs of both the data and the data user, as well as the method of data sharing, multiple schemes have been proposed, some of which will be outlined briefly. Secret sharing is a direct method of sharing between two trusted parties in which components of data are “garbled” before sharing, so that the data transferred are themselves indecipherable but the receiving party can reconstruct the original value from them. Often called encryption, variations of this data sharing between multiple parties go by many names, including homomorphic encryption, Bloom Filters, yao’s garbled circuit,

Bioinformatics

and zero-knowledge proof protocols. All protect sensitive data by allowing one party to obtain a conclusion without obtaining the original data but, instead, by analyzing encrypted, garbled, or unknown data. Another proposed solution is to create a “trusted third party,” which is then used either as a method to transfer encrypted data while maintaining input and query secrecy or as a way to store data in a secure but accessible form. Interestingly, although these proposed solutions increase the level of data protection as desired, the field’s intrinsic wish to maintain data accessibility and sharing is still evident. It is understood that larger and more complete data sets provide higherquality analyses, and as such the data are still available, albeit in a secure form.

Privacy Concern Example One especially pertinent example of potential concerns facing privacy, especially in the health informatics subdiscipline of the bioinformatics field, is the increasing utilization of large-scale genomic databases. These data sets are used to study the association between genomic composition and molecular, organ, and tissue-level systems, a study that has proven essential to understanding the genetic predisposition to complicated medical disorders. This information, which allows researchers to make advances in the knowledge and treatment of disease, brings fear of identification and discrimination for those individuals carrying medically stereotyped genetic information. Questions of patient privacy are complicated by the nature of the data: Genomic information by definition is the ultimate identification tool, which carries the further risk of implicating family members. To protect personal privacy, steps are taken to anonymize or pseudonymize the data, if identity is not required (as in a health care setting). This is often done automatically on collection by assigning each genome a randomized ID, but ­further precautions must be taken with the genetic information itself to prevent potential reidentification of samples. Potential solutions include deleting or altering incriminating sequences, ­ ­adding extra “noise” sequences, or providing only short, nonincriminating sequences relevant to the researchers’ query.

107

Sharing genomic data must be done in a secure way, and this is one example of the potential application of the trusted third party, which can function as an encryption system and a further layer of de-identification for the genomes collected. There are still limitations to protecting data in this way, as the nature of the genetic material that allows identification is continually changing as science progresses. This material must accordingly be continually monitored for incriminating sequences. This rather extreme example highlights potential difficulties as well as the warranted necessity to protect data and the inevitable compromises made to open-access data to maintain the level of privacy warranted. Annika C. Lee and Ian C. Clift See also Cloud Computing; Privacy, Medical

Further Readings Akgün, Mete, et al. “Privacy Preserving Processing of Genomic Data: A Survey.” Journal of Biomedical Informatics, v.56 (2015). doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2015 .05.022 Claerhout, B. and G. J. E. DeMoor. “Privacy Protection for Clinical and Genomic Data: The Use of PrivacyEnhancing Techniques in Medicine.” International Journal of Medical Informatics, v.74/2–4 (2005). Greco, Joseph F. “The Commercialization of Bioinformatics and the Threat of Open-Source Software.” Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, v.14 (2007). doi:10.1057/palgrave.jcb.3050051 Kamm, Liina, et al. “A New Way to Protect Privacy in Large-Scale Genome-Wide Association Studies.” Bioinformatics, v.29/7 (2013). doi:10.1093/ bioinformatics/btt066 Kesh, Someswar and Wullianallur Raghupathi. “Critical Issues in Bioinformatics and Computing.” Perspectives in Health Information Management, v.1/9 (2004). Martin-Sanchez, F., et al. “Synergy Between Medical Informatics and Bioinformatics: Facilitating Genomic Medicine for Future Health Care.” Journal of Biomedical Informatics, v.37 (2004). Perl, H., et al. “Privacy/Performance Trade-Off in Private Search on Bio-Medical Data.” Future Generation Computer Systems, v.36 (2014). doi:10.1016/j.future .2013.12.006

108

Biometrics

Biometrics Biometrics is the science and technology of measuring and analyzing biological data. In information technology, this typically refers to technologies used to measure and analyze human body characteristics such as facial patterns, fingerprints, retinas, irises, voice patterns, and hand measurement. Biometrics has become a useful tool for criminal justice practitioners and for businesses that increasingly use it to market their products and to surveil consumers. Biometric technology is also increasingly being used by individuals to provide personal security as well as to protect their private information online. This entry begins with an overview of the history of biometrics and then discusses the use of biometrics specifically for security. The entry concludes with an examination of the challenges and privacy concerns associated with the use of biometrics.

History Evidence of biometrics can be traced back as far as handprints used as signatures for paintings created by cavemen. Babylonians used fingerprints on clay tablets during business transactions around 500 BCE. In 1879, the French police officer Alphonse Bertillon created the first significant advance in biometrics as a way of establishing identification among criminals. The Bertillon system established a method of measuring and recording different parts and components of the human body, especially components of the head and face, to store a detailed description of an individual that could be used in criminal investigations. In the late 1800s, a method known as the Henry System was developed for indexing fingerprints based on the individualistic patterns and ridges of a fingerprint. This system, developed in India by police officer Azizul Haque for Inspector General of Police Edward Henry, is still widely used for classifying fingerprints. However, it has been modified so that searching can be done using computers and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, commonly known as AFIS. In 1936, ophthalmologist Frank Burch p ­ roposed a concept of identification using an individual’s

unique iris pattern, but the first patent for the concept of an iris identification system was granted in 1987 to Drs. Leonard Flom and Aran Safir. It was not until 1995, however, that the first iris recognition product became widely available. In the 1960s, computer scientist Woodrow W. Bledsoe developed the first semiautomatic facial recognition system. Under this system, the administrator was required to locate prominent features in photographs, such as eyes, ears, nose, and mouth, to extract useable feature points. The system was further automated in the 1970s when 21 subjective markers, such as hair color and lip thickness, were used to automate facial recognition. However, the first actual semiautomated facial recognition system was not deployed until 1988, when the Lakewood Division of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department began using composite drawings of suspects to conduct database searches of digitized mugshots. In 1986, the National Bureau of Standards— now known as the National Institutes of Standards and Technology—published a standard for the exchange of fingerprint minutiae data that was the first version of the current fingerprint interchange standards used by law enforcement agencies around the world. True biometric systems experienced an explosion of activity in the late 1990s and early 2000s, coinciding with the emergence of computers. In 1987, mathematicians M. Kirby and L. Sirovich developed a system of eigenvectors, also known as characteristic vectors, that is associated with a system of linear equations in computer science. This helped computer scientists Matthew Turk and Alex Pentland develop a system called eigenfaces. The eigenfaces system can be used to detect faces in images, making reliable, real-time automated facial recognition possible. Besides facial recognition, the technique has also been used for handwriting analysis, lip reading, voice recognition, interpretation of sign language and hand gestures, and medical imaging analysis. In 1996, the first major use of hand geometry was implemented at the Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia, after the development of hand geometry–reading devices. These hand geometry scanners were used to measure the shape, thickness, and even the vein pattern of a person’s hand. Hand geometry scanners were used to control and

Biometrics

protect physical access to the Olympic Village, processing more than 1 million transactions in a period of 28 days. Two years later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation launched the Combined DNA Index System to digitally store, search, and retrieve DNA markers for forensic law enforcement purposes, a system that continues to be widely used. As computer technology advanced in the late 1990s and early 2000s, biometric development became more prominent, and the technology itself became faster and more accurate. Cellular telephones (and eventually smartphones) became more widely used and were equipped with biometric security features such as fingerprint scanners, which could be used to lock a person’s phone, granting exclusive access to the owner of the fingerprint. Increasingly fast and highly accurate applications, which are essentially facial recognition software, can also be purchased and downloaded onto a phone or computer tablet. Social media platforms also use biometrics— mainly facial recognition—increasingly to promote their services. Biometrics is even being used in advertising. Companies use biometrics to measure a consumer’s emotional response at the point of engagement with an advertisement. Companies can track eye movements and facial characteristics to generate advertisements based on how people react to the advertisements they are viewing. In addition, the concept of “pay-per-gaze” has been launched, whereby viewers wear a head-mounted gaze tracker that measures the amount of time the viewer looks at an advertisement, and the advertisement is then charged accordingly.

Biometrics for Security Biometrics can be used to enhance an individual’s personal security. Biometrics offers the potential to make all passwords obsolete, and it can be used to enhance home security systems. With biometrics, a person would no longer have to remember multiple passwords because access could be granted through a simple scan of the iris, face, fingerprint, handprint, or even voice. A home could be placed on lockdown as soon as a  home security system picks up some physical measurement that does not match that of a resident of the home.

109

Biometrics is also an advanced way to provide security for individuals and their information, and it even helps companies expand and provide more personalized products for their consumers. However, for biometrics to work there must be a database of information to run the new sample against. For a biometrics system to properly identify a person, an accurate registration sample must be taken and stored safely to guarantee that any live sample can be compared to identify that person. If the original sample is not reliable, possibly due to environmental factors or out-of-date technology, the live sample is at risk of returning a false match or false nonmatch. A false nonmatch could keep a person from accessing what is rightfully his or hers, and a false match could give a person access to an area or information that he or she should not be given.

Challenges and Concerns All biometrics systems face certain obstacles that keep them from reaching perfection. Environmental factors—such as temperature, humidity, and pressure, as well as illumination and noise—can affect the ability of systems to accurately identify a person. Regardless, biometrics becomes more advanced as technology itself advances. Public and private entities have also used biometrics for surveillance. This has raised many privacy concerns, particularly among people who are required or asked to participate in some form of biometric surveillance for work, school, or even their government. There are also concerns about the security and transparency of biometric databases. It is often difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to know exactly what data have been collected on them, how they are being used, and even how long the information is being stored. An additional concern revolves around the security of these databases. They contain valuable information and so are prime targets for hackers. Biometric surveillance faces many policyrelated privacy concerns as well, mainly because these processes are so advanced and can change so quickly. There are few laws that specifically deal with biometric surveillance and even less regulation about the collection and use of biometric data. Without regulation, the public and private sectors have considerable freedom to collect and

110

Biopolitical Tattooing

use biometric data for a host of purposes. Developing public policies that maximize the advantages of biometric surveillance while minimizing the associated risks will continue to be a challenge for public officials in the future as the use of biometrics continues to grow. Darren A. Wheeler and Sarah Ober See also Bioinformatics; Biosurveillance; Fingerprints

Further Readings Abernathy, W. and L. Tien. “Biometrics: Who’s Watching You?” Electronic Frontier Foundation (September 14, 2003). https://www.eff.org/wp/biometrics-whoswatching-you (Accessed October 2014). Banerjee, S. “Evolution of Biometrics as an Identity Authentication Technology.” Authentic ID (September 30, 2014). http://authenticid.co/ blog/2014/09/30/evolution-of-biometrics-as-an-identityauthentication-technology/ (Accessed October 2014). Bolle, R., et al. Guide to Biometrics. New York, NY: Springer, 2004. Gulair, R. and K. Sheth. “Overview of Biometrics.” Techno-Innova (2004). http://www.oocities.org/ slazetech/Biometrics.pdf (Accessed October 2014). Jain, A., et al. Handbook of Biometrics. New York, NY: Springer, 2008. Kisku, D. R., et al. Advances in Biometrics for Secure Human Authentication and Recognition. New York, NY: CRC Press, 2014.

Biopolitical Tattooing In January 2004, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben caused a controversy when he canceled a course he was scheduled to teach at New York University, refusing to travel to the United States as a result of the introduction of new security measures that required foreign nationals to submit their fingerprints for entry into the United States. Following this, Agamben published a short article titled “No to Bio-Political Tattooing,” in which he explained his reasons and motivation for taking such a stance against these security measures. His refusal to subject his body and its biometric characteristics to security and surveillance practices was an attempt to resist what he saw, building on

the concept borrowed from Michel Foucault, as “the progressive animalisation of man which is established through the most sophisticated techniques”(Agamben, 2004). Agamben took issue with the ways in which biological life itself is becoming the object and target of mechanisms of control and political interventions. This entry defines biopolitical tattooing, reviews Agamben’s opposition to it, and concludes with an examination of the interest biopolitical tattooing has received from scholars and commentators, many of whom have expressed concerns and criticisms about the practice.

Definition “Biopolitical tattooing” is Agamben’s metaphor for surveillance and security techniques that are reliant on the “body” for managing life (biopolitics), determining identity (through biometrics), and designating levels of risk and dangerousness to individuals and populations (in the name of preemption). The wholesale developments in passports, identity certifications (e.g., identity cards), face recognition, fingerprinting, and so on, can be regarded as an instantiation of this biopolitical tattooing. The term itself is reminiscent of the process by which inmates of the Auschwitz concentration camp were identified and coordinated through tattooed serial numbers. Through the metaphor of biopolitical tattooing, Agamben (2004) draws a parallel between the paradigm of concentration camps and contemporary security measures to the extent that these are marked by a similar interest in the abstraction, organization, and filing away of what he sees as “the most private and incommunicable aspect of subjectivity: the body’s biological life.”

Agamben’s Concerns Importantly and somewhat alarmingly, Agamben is concerned by how surveillance and security measures, such as biometric identification and profiling, are no longer consigned only to spaces of “exception,” such as prisons or detention centers. Instead, they are now part of the “normal” and routine functioning of contemporary societies. Exception has become the norm, according to Agamben, and what was once at the margin of

Biopolitical Tattooing

politics is now at its very center. In this spillover, he sees numerous threats to so-called modern liberal democracies, not least in terms of the universalization of what he refers to elsewhere as “bare life” (Agamben, 1998), the naked form of life that is stripped from its political qualities and legal protection. The rising use of biometrics in the governance of societies and territories signals the intensification of various illiberal practices in which every identity becomes a suspect identity by default. As Agamben (2004) writes, applying these techniques and these devices invented for the dangerous classes to a citizen, or rather to a human being as such, states, which should constitute the precise space of political life, have made the person the ideal suspect, to the point that it’s humanity itself that has become the dangerous class.

What makes this all the more sinister is the “normalization” process by which surveillance techniques and exceptionalist measures of security become gradually, and at times abruptly, accepted as part of the routine practices of everyday life, often in the name of safety and public interest. According to Agamben, “There has been an attempt the last few years to convince us to accept as the humane and normal dimensions of our existence, practices of control that had always been properly considered inhumane and exceptional.” As such, Agamben warns that the biopolitical tattooing that the United States, for instance, imposes at its borders could well be the precursor to what people will accept, if they wish to be identified as good citizens, as the normal practice of identity registration and the state’s mechanisms.

Tattooing” does well in condensing some of his major thoughts on sovereignty, exception, security, and the force of law, themes that run throughout the corpus of his writing. Crucially, this compound conceptual formulation of biopolitics and tattooing indicates the centrality of the body in the current and emerging mechanisms of surveillance. Within the growing circuits of control and monitoring, the body is increasingly being looked to as what Katja Aas (2006) describes as “a source of instant truth” (p. 154), encapsulated in the expression “the body does not lie,” a catchphrase that has been opportunely and profitably marketed by the biometrics industry. This instant truth is not so much about the biographical dimension of the body but, rather, concerns the “body as data” that can be extracted, stored, analyzed, manipulated, and ultimately used for surveillance purposes—“body without words,” as Agamben (2004) puts it. Despite the usefulness of the concept of biopolitical tattooing in highlighting some of the political and ethical issues pertaining to the rise of electronic and biometric control, it has received some criticism. This is partly due to the generalizing aspect of the text and the problematic comparison of contemporary visa regimes and ­ surveillance practices to Auschwitz. Furthermore, Arne De Boever, for instance, takes issue with Agamben’s use of the term animalization to describe the effects of biopolitics on human life. De Boever asks, “Does biopolitics really reduce human life to animal life? Or does it reduce human life to a life that is different from both human and animal life?” Exploring what form of life is emerging from the current practices and rhetoric of security and surveillance is no doubt a necessary task for comprehending and resisting the everpervasive horizon of control under which societies are increasingly living.

Others’ Concerns and Criticisms The concept of biopolitical tattooing has since received some interest from scholars and commentators who are concerned with the actual and potential ramifications of contemporary forms of surveillance and biometric control and, more generally, with the interplay between identity, biological life, and politics. Despite the brevity of Agamben’s 2004 text, “No to Bio-Political

111

Btihaj Ajana See also Bioinformatics; Biometrics; Biosurveillance

Further Readings Aas, K. F. “‘The Body Does Not Lie’: Identity, Risk and Trust in Technoculture.” Crime Media Culture, v.2/2 (2006).

112

Biosurveillance

Agamben, G. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. Agamben, G. “No to Bio-Political Tattooing” (trans. Stuart J. Murray). Le Monde (January 10, 2004). https://ratical.org/ratville/CAH/totalControl.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Ajana, B. Governing Through Biometrics: The Biopolitics of Identity. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Dahlberg, L., ed. Visualizing Law and Authority: Essays on Legal Aesthetics. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter, 2012. De Boever, D. “William Watkin, The Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis” [Book review]. Bryn Mawr Review of Comparative Literature, v.10/1 (2012). http://www.brynmawr.edu/bmrcl/ BMRCLFall2012/TheLiteraryAgamben.htm (Accessed October 2017). Lacy, M. Security, Technology and Global Politics: Thinking With Virilio. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Pugliese. J. (2010). Biometrics: Bodies, Technologies, Biopolitics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010.

Biosurveillance Biosurveillance refers to the integration of a wide variety of data to predict and quickly detect health events and forecast their impacts in a way that improves response decisions. As a practice, biosurveillance emerged out of public health surveillance with the goal of integrating significantly more data (and more types of data) for earlier and more accurate detection of health events. Practitioners believe that biosurveillance could lead to a more nuanced understanding of the early signs of the emergence and spread of diseases. Analysts look for a clearer disease signal in all the noisy data that can be gathered from human and animal activity. The conduct of biosurveillance, whether for public health or national security purposes, raises questions of individual privacy when so much of an individual’s detailed personal information is stored, shared, and accessible to public and private entities—foreign and domestic—for the stated ­ purpose of the individual’s own health, well-being, and safety.

The variety of data that can be gathered is significant and expanding all the time. How those data are being collected, shared, and used is also changing as more applications of the data become apparent and more networks are created to exploit the data. All of this activity does, on reflection, beg consideration of the balance of risk and benefit to the individual, to society, and to global populations.

Types of Data Captured There is a significant amount of very specific personal data that are captured today in electronic formats that simplify data sharing and analysis. This includes medical, laboratory, genetic, and health information as well as online and social media activities. Every medical encounter, from an ambulance run to a hospital visit, can be collected as an electronic record. In such medical records are many traditional statistics such as the history of an individual’s vaccinations, diagnoses, lab results, and prescriptions; indicators of health status; and occurrences of infections and broken bones. To these are being added genetic tests that provide an even more unique description of who an individual is. Taken together, a significant amount of information exists about an individual’s past and present health at the molecular and clinical levels. Access to mobile technologies creates numerous other sets of potentially useful data. Individuals reveal a lot about their personal habits, their social networks, their health status and that of their friends and family through chats, tweets, and other online posts. These data sets can be mined for a fairly complete picture of who individuals are; what they do, think, and feel; and with whom and where they spend their time. Individual human health information can then be combined with other kinds of data, such as weather patterns, vector prevalence, travel patterns, and animal and plant health indicators, to begin to understand the correlates of health and disease. Certain diseases are seasonal, such as influenza. Other diseases, such as malaria, yellow fever, plague, dengue, and Zika, are carried by insects. Yet other diseases are associated with animal

Biosurveillance

interactions, making it important to track the flow of potentially exposed animals and people. MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) and highly pathogenic avian influenzas are rare but often fatal diseases that are associated with animals, animal movement, and the activities of people. Many infectious diseases of public health concern are prevalent outside the United States. Polio, measles, and viral hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola all pose risks in other countries if not quickly detected and contained. Detecting outbreaks outside the United States requires both a voluntary network of reporting through state ministries of health and the monitoring of news and social media. The World Health Organization requires that all countries report certain diseases or health events known as “public health events of international concern.” In addition, private entities such as HealthMap and ProMED gather information from the news media and from individuals who report on local outbreaks in their cities or town and quickly post that information in ways useful to both specialists and a general audience.

Using Data for Biosurveillance Biosurveillance can be used as a way to enhance public health surveillance and enable precision medicine, including improvements to pharmaceutical research. Currently, the benefits of biosurveillance are more speculative rather than scientifically established. This is due to a combination of technical and knowledge gaps. Knowing what data are relevant—beyond medical encounters, lab results, and prescription information—and being able to gather such data on a regular basis is an ongoing challenge. Even if useful data can be accessed, it is still often a challenge to develop systems that can exploit the data in ways useful to any of these purposes. How data have been or could be used for two different purposes is discussed in the following subsections. Public Health

Public health refers to measures used by the state to prevent disease, promote health, and prolong life. Public health offices focus on the health of the population as a whole and not on any one

113

specific individual. A standard use of biosurveillance methods is for the enhancement of public health surveillance. Medical encounters form the core of biosurveillance for public health purposes. Epidemiologists at the state and local levels regularly look to such data for early signs of disease clusters in their populations. They often combine these data with other data sources such as poison control center calls, prescriptions, laboratory data, and morgue data—where available—to look for any other signs indicating an abnormal level of disease of some type. State and local public health officials want to be able to intervene early in an outbreak to protect the health of their communities. Because biosurveillance provides access to much more data than can be traditionally accessed, earlier detection is becoming more possible. However, there are still challenges in understanding what kinds of nontraditional data can provide earlier signs of a disease outbreak. Another challenge is in generalizing the results. Different communities may react differently to outbreaks within their populations. Therefore, the data and analysis that serve one community well may not apply equally to others. There is always the need for well-informed public health officers who know the habits of their specific populations. Overall, biosurveillance data and practices can enhance situational awareness of the health of a community through an analysis of its longitudinal data. This can support research studies and lead to better intervention strategies for at-risk populations and support any investigation and response to a health event. Precision Medicine

Precision medicine is an emerging area of research that seeks to provide treatments that are tailored to an individual’s specific genetic makeup, environmental influences, and lifestyle. Under this model, diagnostic testing is done to select therapies based on such individual characteristics. Precision medicine further expands the data used for biosurveillance purposes. In contrast to public health, however, precision medicine is designed to optimally serve the individual and not the public.

114

Biosurveillance

This does not mean that these two practices are divergent. Instead, there are closer connections emerging between clinical medicine and public health. To serve the individual, precision medicine requires the context of a much larger set of data. This would help determine what is unique in the individual’s biology and upbringing that would have an impact on the individual’s treatment. Like politics, though, public health is local. The habits and environment that shape the health of one community can be quite distinct from those of another community in the same state and region. Context for an individual is further complicated by travel and mixing with multiple communities. Understanding what factors are causative and which ones correlate with health outcomes is not easy. Advancements in the ability to tailor treatments will be built both on the continuing development of expertise in public health and the practice of clinical medicine and, critically, on the sharing of information between these very different professional communities. Data will need to be shared—and appropriate sharing will need to be defined. There are groups who believe that sufficient computing power and appropriately calibrated models can provide the necessary answers given the right data. Others insist on the need for human experts, whose training and experience cannot be replaced by algorithms. The practice of biosurveillance appears to require both to continually improve the understanding of the other. Experts train systems. In turn, systems provide meaningful analyses and visualizations that prompt further expert inquiry, leading to further system improvements.

Privacy and Public Benefit Each individual generates a significant amount of data about himself or herself that are captured for personal, public, commercial, or other uses every day. Individuals have very little control over their private information once it is collected in an information system—whether they voluntarily contributed the information or not. All this information, if shared, collected, and analyzed, could benefit biosurveillance practices—which in turn could benefit the individual. However, a number of

privacy questions are associated with this activity. Fundamentally, how much authority do individuals possess over the sharing and use of their personal information? And how much should individuals have going forward? Who has rights to the health and medical information that individuals provide to a hospital, clinician, or laboratory for their own medical care? To provide safe and efficacious medical care, it is important for a medical provider to know an individual’s medical history and the medical history of the individual’s close relatives. Currently, much of this information is automatically shared with local and state public health staff to monitor the community’s health—that is, for biosurveillance. Such “line-level” data (e.g., name, age, address, symptoms) are readily visible to the government’s public health staff to aid in their determination of whether there is an unusual disease cluster worth further investigation, and the individual has no right to prohibit this data sharing. Essentially, the right of the larger community to protect itself from infectious diseases outweighs an individual’s right to withhold his or her health information. This is a long-established practice in public health. The case of Mary Mallon, often referred to as “Typhoid Mary,” is an example of how much authority the state has to take action to protect the health of the public. In 1915, Mallon was forcibly isolated by the New York City Health Department because she was an asymptomatic carrier of typhoid fever. In her work as a cook, she unknowingly infected 51 people, causing three deaths. In addition, private laboratories and state ministries of health have asserted ownership of samples and data related to samples. An individual may have a sample taken to diagnose disease— such as a throat or nasal swab. That sample, after being evaluated at a laboratory, appears to subsequently become the property of the laboratory or the state. In the course of an outbreak, other countries that wish to have the clinical sample or any microbe isolated shared must obtain permission from the lab or country, not the individual. The basis for this right of the state is not known; however, it has been repeatedly asserted in many recent outbreaks, including the MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) coronavirus outbreak

Biosurveillance

in the Middle East and the West Africa Ebola epidemic in 2014–2015. This assertion of state ownership has inhibited information sharing, which could delay the identification and provision of useful diagnostics and therapeutics. Should individuals continue to have rights to the sharing of their own clinical samples, or should this be a state-owned right? There are questions both as to whether individuals have a right to control the uses of their private information and as to how that can be enforced. For example, there is a public benefit from public health biosurveillance activities. However, could this information be used for national security or commercial purposes without an individual’s consent as well? Can individuals’ personal information be sold or exploited for other purposes without their knowledge or consent once it is acquired? For example, when individuals submit samples for genetic sequencing, can the sequencing company keep the samples and exploit the database of sequences for commercial or other purposes? Informed consent for the use of biological samples is evolving as various countries adopt different rules surrounding the subsequent use of such samples, particularly in biobanks. Can the government compel release of this information to respond to a public health emergency or to assist in a criminal investigation? If the information could be used to identify subpopulations that are particularly susceptible or unusually resistant to certain diseases, should that be done to prioritize treatments in an emergency? And if evidence from a crime points to an individual with certain genetic traits, should the law enforcement authorities be allowed to use biosurveillance information to narrow the list of suspects based on their genetic profiles? These kinds of considerations lead to a question of whether the state should establish protections for the individual in cases of misapplication of the data. If an individual is harmed from the misuse of data that are generally used for biosurveillance purposes, should the state provide a means of redress? Similarly, a widely discussed topic is genetic discrimination—the concern that employers or insurance companies could use the results of genetic testing to deny employment or coverage, respectively, for individuals based on

115

those results. Should genetic discrimination be prohibited, or should insurance companies ensure coverage for specific tests for individuals with certain predispositions to yield earlier diagnoses?

Opting Out It is worth considering whether protective measures should be adopted in the area of biosurveillance. Such a debate would likely be as contentious as the ongoing debate regarding the right to be forgotten on the Internet. There are valid and compelling arguments on both sides. However, if too many people opt out of sharing their information, whole communities can be put at risk. Over time, the ability of public health officials to quickly detect and control a disease outbreak would be weakened by the lack of such information, and more people would have to suffer than would otherwise have been the case. If individuals should not have total control over the use of their information, however, there is a question of whether there should be some opportunity for their intent to be reflected. That is, should there be a set of choices for the further storing and sharing of their information for biosurveillance purposes, as there is for medical research? Individuals are creating billions of records that can tell a lot about how they are shaped by numerous daily choices in their travel, diet, emotional state, work, and play in combination with their genetic makeup. Technology is indifferent to the intent of the user, but it increasingly enables greater mass benefit and mass harm. The practice of biosurveillance, by definition, involves the acquisition and use of private health and medical information at its core, and it is expanding to include a variety of other related data about individuals’ personal habits, environment, and genetics. It is timely to consider these questions of ownership, intent, potential benefit and harm, and appropriate protections as technology allows for the creation, storage, exploitation, and sharing of ever more data about individuals. Stacy M. Okutani See also Bioinformatics; Biometrics; DNA Technology; Global Surveillance; Public Health, Surveillance in

116

Blockades

Further Readings Bravata, D. M., et al. “Evaluating Detection and Diagnostic Decision Support Systems for Bioterrorism Response.” Emerging Infectious Diseases, v.10/1 (2004). Dato, Virginia, et al. “How Outbreaks of Infectious Disease Are Detected: A Review of Surveillance Systems and Outbreaks.” Public Health Reports, v.119 (2004). Friedman, Laine, et al. “Technical Report: Ethical and Policy Issues in Genetic Testing and Screening of Children.” Genetics in Medicine, v.15 (2013). doi:10.1038/gim.2012.176 Fulda, K. G. and K. Lykens. “Ethical Issues in Predictive Genetic Testing: A Public Health Perspective.” Journal of Medical Ethics, v.32/3 (2006). McNabb, Scott, et al., eds. Transforming Public Health Surveillance (1st ed.). London, England: Elsevier, 2016. National Research Council. Toward Precision Medicine: Building a Knowledge Network for Biomedical Research and a New Taxonomy of Disease. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011. Ng, Jane, et al. “The Role of Longitudinal Cohort Studies in Epigenetic Epidemiology: Challenges and Opportunities.” Genome Biology, v.13 (2012). doi:10.1186/gb-2012-13-6-246 Public Health Informatics Institute. Redesigning Public Health Surveillance in an eHealth World (June 2012). https://www.phii.org/sites/www.phii.org/files/ resource/pdfs/Requirements%20Lab_Final%20 Deliverables_RWJ%20Sureveillance.pdf (Accessed August 2017). Scheuner, Maren T., et al. “Are Electronic Health Records Ready for Genomic Medicine?” Genetics in Medicine, v.11 (2009). doi:10.1097/GIM.0b013e 3181a53331 Sintchenko, Vitali, et al. “Towards Bioinformatics Assisted Infectious Disease Control.” BioMed Central Bioinformatics, v.10/Suppl. 2 (2009). doi:10.1186/ 1471-2105-10-S2-S10 White House. National Strategy for Biosurveillance (July 31, 2012). https://obamawhitehouse.archives .gov/the-press-office/2012/07/31/national-strategybiosurveillance (Accessed August 2017). Wild, C. P. “The Exposome: From Concept to Utility.” International Journal of Epidemiology, v.41 (2012). doi:10.1093/ije/dyr236 Zeng, D., et al., eds. Infectious Disease Informatics and Biosurveillance (Integrated Series in Information Systems). New York, NY: Springer, 2011.

Blockades A blockade is an act in which a state or an international actor prevents goods, communications, and people from accessing or exiting an enemy’s territory, whether by land, sea, or air. Blockades are usually enforced to restrict the actions of a state, rather than just the city or port that the blockade might take place in. The history of blockades can be traced back to the Peloponnesian Wars, with the Spartans blockading the city of Athens. Modern examples of blockades are more sophisticated and include the Berlin Blockade in the late 1940s and the Blockade of the Gaza Strip, which is still being enforced. A traditional blockade, with regard to legality, has to be formally declared and effective. Effective in this sense means that the blockade must be properly imposed by a sufficient force to prevent the enemy from replenishing itself through outside resources. In Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations, which was ratified in 1945, the United Nations Security Council declared blockades a legal action that may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Security refers to being free from risk or danger and taking the appropriate measures to provide for a secure or safe environment, and blockades serve as a mechanism for ensuring national or global security against a threatening enemy.

History Historically, blockades have been used as a strategic tool during war, consisting mainly of naval ships blocking and obstructing entrance to or exit from a state. Most historians have come to a consensus that the first significant blockade occurred in the second Peloponnesian War from 431 to 404 BCE, fought between Athens and Sparta, with Sparta ultimately emerging as the victor. An important aspect of the war that helped Sparta to victory was the blockade of the Athenian port of Piraeus. The Athenians built vast walls from the city of Athens to the port so that cargo and resources could be safely brought to the city. The Spartans put a blockade on the port, which cut off supplies to Athens, resulting in starvation in the city. Athens surrendered a year later to save its people from further suffering.

Blockades

Blockades were conducted in this manner throughout history to force an enemy to surrender, and another prominent example of this occurred during the Revolutionary War between the American colonies and England. The Battle of Yorktown was won by the colonies, with a large amount of help from the French, which led to the British surrendering in the war. Lord Cornwallis arrived in Yorktown to await fresh supplies from Britain. Meanwhile, George Washington led his troops south from New York to Yorktown, and the French fought the British in the Chesapeake Bay. The French took control of the bay, which led to a French blockade that did not allow Lord Cornwallis to receive any supplies or any route of escape. Cornwallis had no choice but to surrender, leading to the end of the war.

Legal Status Blockades, for the most part, have changed due to the dynamic climate in which actors now engage with one another. The Security Council defines blockades in a traditional sense; in recent years, blockades have become harder to apply, and there are questions regarding the legality of modern blockades. As noted earlier, a blockade must be declared and effective to be legal and binding. This aspect still applies through the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, adopted in 1994 as part of round table discussions by legal and naval experts. Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations gives the Security Council the power to use blockades as necessary to provide adequate peace and security for members of the United Nations. The emergence of humanitarian law has strained the use of blockades because starving civilians of another state would violate this kind of law. While the military advantage that blockades can offer is substantial, the backlash in abusing humanitarian law can negate this advantage. Blockades have shifted from being enforced strictly by sea to also include land and air blockades and blocking or jamming electronic communications. This is part of the dynamic climate that now exists in the world, consistent with recent examples of blockades. The significance of legal definitions of blockade can be made apparent by noting that the John

117

F.  Kennedy administration announced that its efforts to isolate Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 should be officially referred to as a “quarantine” rather than a “blockade.” President Kennedy noted that a blockade indicated a state of war and thus utilized the term quarantine in an attempt to de-escalate the tensions and to reach out to Cuba diplomatically.

Recent Examples The Berlin Blockade is a good example of a blockade that was ineffective due to a constantly changing security environment in which technological improvements are always being made. The blockade was started in the summer of 1948 by Soviet forces in fear of Berlin falling into the hands of the Allies of World War II. The Soviet Union blockaded rail, road, and water access to the western portion of Berlin. In response to this blockade and the crisis in Berlin, the United States and the United Kingdom airlifted food, fuel, and other supplies to Berlin from West Germany. The crisis ended the next year due to the efficiency of the airlift in aiding Berlin. The lesson learned from this blockade is that states now have the resources and technology to bypass land and sea blockades; blockades must also be enforced through the air. The blockade of the Gaza Strip is in reaction to Hamas taking over political control of the strip in 2007. Israel, with the support of Egypt, has enforced this blockade by sea, land, and air since 2007. The blockade has prevented the movement of goods and people between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel has strategically placed this blockade to ensure that the people of Gaza do not starve, in order to prevent action from the international community on behalf of humanitarian law. Balancing the effectiveness of the blockade and the security of Israel has been vital to the blockade maintaining its legitimacy, as Israel regularly makes claims of the need for border protection from Hamas. As blockades continually evolve from being coordinated naval efforts into complex land, sea, and air endeavors, it is up to states and the international community to oversee blockades in accordance with conflict and humanitarian law, while also gaining the strategic advantages that blockades have to offer.

118

Border Patrol Checkpoints

Conclusion Blockades have a long, rich history in the quest for national security. Modern international law has had an impact on the method and limits of a blockade, but the continued use of blockades indicates that they remain as policy choices for governments seeking security options. Tobias T. Gibson and Caleb Marquis See also Port Security

Further Readings Spelman, Elizabeth. “The Legality of the Israeli Naval Blockade of the Gaza Strip.” Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, v.19/1 (2013). http://webjcli.org/article/ view/207/277 (Accessed December 2014). United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations.” http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (Accessed December 2014). U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. “The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949” (October 31, 2013). https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/berlinairlift (Accessed December 2014). U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. “The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962” (October 31, 2013). https://history.state.gov/milestones/19611968/cuban-missile-crisis (Accessed January 5, 2015).

Border Patrol Checkpoints According to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “checkpoints are a critical enforcement tool for securing the Nation’s border against all threats to our homeland.” The Border Patrol, a division of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, views border checkpoints as one of the three security layers designed to protect the homeland from undocumented workers, illegal drugs, and international terrorists. Along with sophisticated surveillance technology, canines, and ground sensors, Border Patrol agents strategically rely on checkpoints, both permanent and tactical, to provide a final layer of defense against security threats emanating from Canada, Mexico, or Central America. Public debate surrounding Border Patrol checkpoints

includes issues of surveillance and privacy as well as issues of efficiency and utility. While patrolling the borderline and roving patrols constitute two crucial layers of defense, checkpoints are considered a third vital security component. As mandated by changes in the statutes of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and subsequently as acted on by the U.S. Department of Justice, border checkpoints can be established as much as 100 miles into the interior. About 200 million Americans live within the defined areas in which checkpoints can be established, and some have argued that these areas are negatively affected by such checkpoints.

Permanent Checkpoints The United States’ borders with Mexico and Canada and its coastal borders are divided into 20 sectors by the Border Patrol. In 2014, there were 35 permanent checkpoints along the primary highways, staffed by Border Patrol agents. Each of these permanent checkpoints is designed to facilitate a brief visual screening by agents, after which vehicular traffic is permitted to pass through to its destination. Based on the initial screening, vehicles judged to be suspicious in nature are directed to a secondary lane for further inspection. Each checkpoint is directly tied to national databases providing Border Patrol agents specific information about vehicles and/or drivers, including terrorist watch lists. Permanent checkpoint buildings provide facilities for agents and technology facilitating the screening process. Checkpoints also may have sniffer dogs to detect illegal drugs, and agents who operate mobile handheld devices, including the Enforcement Link Mobile Operations technology. Fixed license plate readers are also in use at many border checkpoints. Permanent checkpoints may also have communication towers, permanent lighting, canine kennels, and, frequently, concrete lane barriers to protect the screening agents. Other assets ­associated with these checkpoints are agents who patrol the area, surveillance cameras, and ground sensors. In 2014, agents at the border checkpoints seized $15.2 million in currency, 72 firearms, and 35,756 rounds of ammunition, and they arrested 602 fugitives or violators of export laws.

Border Patrol Checkpoints

Tactical Checkpoints Another kind of Border Patrol checkpoint is a tactical checkpoint, which differs in size, infrastructure, and location from a permanent checkpoint. These checkpoints are most often positioned along secondary highways used by drug smugglers and human traffickers. The purpose of tactical checkpoints is to inspect vehicles whose drivers seek to avoid the permanent checkpoints. Tactical checkpoints are set up for short periods of time and consist of a few Border Patrol vehicles, canine cages, and warning signs and traffic cones alerting drivers to slow down for an upcoming inspection.

Legal Issues Several issues have plagued the Border Patrol checkpoints and fueled extensive public debate. The most contentious public issue regarding Border Patrol checkpoints is whether or not the agents who inspect vehicles are superseding the legal rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. One interpretation of the laws in place suggests that the Fourth Amendment protects all Americans from random and arbitrary stops and searches, including vehicle inspections at Border Patrol checkpoints. In addition, the increased use of national databases along with sophisticated surveillance technologies at the Border Patrol checkpoints has created legal concerns focused on privacy issues. In response, the Department of Justice has successfully argued that some basic constitutional rights afforded by the Constitution do not apply at checkpoints, including the requirement of suspicion of wrongdoing to justify a search of a vehicle and/or driver. The Department of Justice further argues that the knowledge gained from national databases and from specific surveillance technologies must be weighed against the real threats posed by international terrorists. Regardless of the legal aspects that have arisen, it appears that a minority of agents assigned to Border Patrol checkpoints have on occasion superseded the rights of some Americans as a result of lack of professional training or other reasons. Training at the Border Patrol Academy in New Mexico has been reduced from 6 months to approximately 54 days. One result of this

119

reduction in academy training is that agents who graduated after 2006 are less likely to be familiar with the complexities of their legal powers at checkpoints, especially regarding whether or not American citizens are obligated to answer certain kinds of questions when stopped. Infringement of both Fourth Amendment and personal privacy rights have been vigorously pursued through the court system and in the media. The debate between these two opposing positions shows no signs of subsiding.

Efficiency and Utility Two U.S. Government Accountability Office reports, the first in 2005, the second in 2009, have questioned the efficiency and utility of both permanent and tactical checkpoints as presently constituted. Both reports document, based on data provided by the Border Patrol, the relatively low seizure rates of contraband and low number of arrests of illegal aliens and criminals in proportion to the number of Border Patrol agents assigned to the checkpoints. These reports seriously question whether or not checkpoints are necessary and/or cost-effective. A common complaint by border residents, for example, is that checkpoints do little other than cause perpetrators to find long-­standing ways to circumvent checkpoints. These methods include dropping off illegal aliens before the checkpoint is reached, then picking them up on the other side of the checkpoint. Another report by outside consultants suggests that a serious problem frequently overlooked is the collection of inaccurate data at the checkpoints. The consultants documented the insertion of inaccurate or misleading data by Border Patrol agents as a common occurrence at these checkpoints, and they questioned the reliability of the data produced.

Impact on Nearby Communities School officials, business owners, community leaders, retirees, and local law enforcement leaders have voiced concerns that Border Patrol checkpoints have adversely affected their regions. Claims of the negative impacts of these checkpoints on the nearby communities include, among other concerns, increased illegal activity in

120

Botnets

neighborhoods and schools, jeopardizing public safety; negative interactions with the agents; fear of being profiled; and economic harm, especially involving declines in tourism rates and real estate prices. Research on these topics remains sparse, and attempts to quantify the negative impacts remain difficult to document. A 2014 study of the impact of a checkpoint on I-19 in Arizona by Jeffrey Jenkins and colleagues suggests that real estate price data “appear[s] to provide marginally statically significant evidence of one type of economic harm associated with the checkpoint” (p. 32). With regard to declining tourism, the report states that “business representatives to the south of the checkpoint . . . were unequivocal in their views that there has been, in fact, a decline in tourism in the region as a result of this checkpoint” (p. 32). The authors conclude that “the nature of these impacts seems fairly clear and the quantitative analysis [they] were able to perform provides support for some of the concerns expressed by members of the community” (p. 32). Extensive research on Border Patrol checkpoints is required to learn more about their efficiency and utility in support of national security, challenges to legal rights, and negative impacts on the safety, economics, and social well-being of nearby residents and businesses. Robert Lee Maril See also Smart Borders; U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Further Readings American Civil Liberties Union. Border Patrol Authority Within 100 Miles of the U.S Border (n.d.). http:// legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/Border%20 Patrol%20KYR%20Packet%20%2801.18.13% 29.pdf American Civil Liberties Union. The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone (n.d.). https://www.aclu.org/ other/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (Accessed October 2017). Jenkins, Jeffrey, et al. Checking on Checkpoints: An Assessment of U.S. Border Patrol Checkpoint Operations, Performance, and Impacts. Tucson, AZ: National Center for Border Security and Immigration, September 2014. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3c5f/

17704d1137c3c946a767de50497205866fbb.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Maril, Robert Lee. The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration ALong the U.S.Mexico Border. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2011. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Border Patrol Checkpoints (CBP Publication No. 0000-0710). https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=29216 (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2014. http:// www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP_ DHS_2014%20PAR_508C.PDF (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Government Accountability Office. Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance (GAO-05-435) (July 22, 2005). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO05-435 (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Government Accountability Office. Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness (GAO-09-824) (August 31, 2009). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-824 (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Government Accountability Office. Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan not yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs (GAO-13-25) (December 10, 2012). https://www.gao .gov/products/GAO-13-25 (Accessed October 2017).

Botnets A botnet (from “robot network”) is a group of computers that are remotely and simultaneously controlled to achieve the same goal. The purpose of a botnet is to automate repetitive tasks and coordinate actions, taking advantage of the power of multiple computers. The term was originally applied to describe nonmalicious programs that are used to manage Internet relay chat (IRC) channels. The usefulness and power of controlling a large group of computers progressively led to an abuse of their capabilities for malicious actions. These malicious botnets became one of the most important security problems of the Internet around the year 2000 with the proliferation of automated

Botnets

attacks and infections. Since then, botnets have grown into the main support infrastructure of profit-oriented malicious online activities. The legality of botnets is very difficult to establish since each country has its own laws and botnets perform a large number of actions. Moreover, there are still a large number of benign botnets that do have the authorization to control remote computers but do not perform attacks. Some examples of these benign botnets are the network of IRC bots, the SETI@HOME initiative, and the Folding@ Home initiative. In contrast, a malicious botnet obtains new computers (bots) without authorization and performs attacks for the gain of its owner (the botmaster). Since 1999, the term botnet has been mainly applied to malicious botnets. This entry focuses on malicious botnets that pose security issues. It describes the structure and operation of botnets, discusses protecting against botnets, and presents information on several of the most well-known botnets.

Structure and Operation It is very difficult to classify malicious botnets into categories because their infrastructures are a complex, layered, and interwoven mixture of components. Botnets are usually composed of bots (victim computers that were attacked to be part of the botnet), command-and-control (C&C) servers (computers that control the bots), intermediate servers (computers that hide the owners), C&C channels (communication channels using different protocols), encryption algorithms, and the people controlling the botnet. These components are highly interrelated and interdependent. There are three common classification criteria. The first one is based on their main protocol for communication: hyphertext transfer protocol (http), https (secured http), peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol, IRC protocol, or custom protocol. The second is based on their topology: hierarchical, centralized, or P2P. The third is based on the attacks performed: sending spam emails, doing click fraud, or stealing users and passwords, among others. Most of the work done by a botnet relies on malicious actions to operate. This is why the software used by botnets is called malware (from “malicious software”). Botnets typically use different malware to perform each of their actions.

121

Botnets are highly dynamic, resilient, and adapting structures. Depending on the importance and size of the botnet, botmasters continually add new bots and C&C servers, change how bots are obtained, and change the protocols, the attacks, and the encryption algorithms. All these changes have mainly two goals, to avoid disruption and increase profit. Disruption is avoided because it is more difficult to detect something that is changing. The profit is increased because the botnet is adapted to have more bots. The operation life cycle of a botnet depends on many factors, and it can be summarized in the following five phases: (1) set up a support infrastructure, (2) obtain new bots, (3) control the bots using a C&C channel, (4) use the bots to attack, and (5) profit from the information and resources stolen. Each phase is highly complex and can have several variants. Depending on the type of botnet, the first phase (setting up the infrastructure) starts with the design of the botnet to decide the topology and protocols to be used. Then a group of servers is obtained for the C&C channel (perhaps buying them from another botmaster), and some domain names are registered for the C&C servers (although it is possible not to use domain names). This first phase can involve more complex tasks such as designing a DGA (domain generation algorithm) for creating domain names or implementing a DNS (domain name system) fast-flux infrastructure. However, the most important part of the first phase is obtaining the new malware to be used by the botnet. Depending on the complexity of the botnet, this may involve buying a malware variant from other attackers, modifying the source code of a known malware, or developing a new type of malware. Once the infrastructure is working and the malware is ready, the second phase involves obtaining new victim computers to convert into bots. The bots can be obtained by directly attacking them from another computer, by infecting them from webpages (however access to the webpage should be obtained in advance), by sending phishing emails (emails pretending to be legitimate but actually installing malware), or, more simply, by buying them from another attacker. In 2006, a new method for obtaining bots appeared; it consisted in infecting them by using a type of program called Exploit Kits. Exploit Kits are web server

122

Botnets

pages that can recognize victims and exploit specific vulnerabilities in web browsers to gain access and execute code. If successfully infected, a victim that accessed an Exploit Kit webpage would not see any difference or problem in the website and therefore not realize that it may be now part of a botnet. Once the bots are infected with the malware, the third phase involves the control of the bots using C&C channels and servers. A C&C channel is any way to remotely control and coordinate the actions of a group of bots. It is usually implemented as a network connection. The most common C&C channels use http protocols (even social networks such as Twitter and Facebook), unknown custom protocols, P2P protocols, or IRC protocols. The goal of any C&C channel is to keep the bots connected and to transmit orders and data. A C&C channel shared by all the bots makes it easier to send orders to all of them at the same time. To keep the bots connected for a longer time, it is better if the C&C channel is not easily detected. Therefore, C&C protocols have been changing and adapting to mimic the network traffic of normal users. Since the normal traffic of users is mostly http traffic due to the restrictions imposed by most organizations, in 2003 botnets started to migrate their C&C channels to the http protocol. The C&C channel connects the bot with the C&C server. C&C servers are usually computers that had been attacked and forcefully converted into part of the botnet infrastructure. Usually, C&C servers are not the computers of normal users but unattended computers. They are the computers used by botmasters to control the botnet and therefore are an important part of the botnet. To maximize the chances of survival, C&C servers are usually arranged in a layered structure that hides the botmaster from the defenders. In this way, every communication is routed through several intermediate C&C servers before reaching the botmaster. The fourth phase is to use the bots to perform different attacks. Botnets have different attack goals and attack methods. Some of the goals are to attack computers and convert them into C&C servers, to attack computers to convert them into bots, to send spam emails to victims, to steal information from the victim computers (e.g.,

credit card information, cookies, credentials, emails, contacts), or to mimic actions from the victim user to forge access to advertising websites. These attacks can be done in different ways depending on the circumstances and are not exclusive to botnets. Typical attacks from bots are to brute force access credentials in other computers, exploit vulnerabilities in other computers, inject HTML (hypertext markup language) code into websites by attacking them using SQL (structured query language) injection attacks, find information on the victim computer, and abuse the resources of the victim computer to mine crypto currencies. The fifth phase is to profit from the information and resources stolen. Among the ways of profiting, botnets are known for selling the stolen credentials in the black market, selling the bots to other botmasters, selling the access to different C&C servers, selling credit card information, selling victims’ identities, obtaining money from encrypting the hard disk of the victim, selling email addresses so others can send spam, and selling the process capacity of the bots. However, the most profitable use of botnets seems to be the renting of a subset of bots to a client for a limited amount of time. The rent of bots usually works by giving the client access to a webpage where the bots can be ordered and controlled. In this way, the botmaster does not lose control of the bots, and the client has a very simple access interface to perform the attacks.

Protection Strategies Protection from botnet actions is done by a distributed effort of many companies, organizations, individuals, researchers, and universities. The defending strategies include detecting the malware files on computers (e.g., by using antivirus tools); detecting the indicators of compromise used by the botnet, such as IP (Internet protocol) addresses and domains names; shutting down the domain names; and detecting the malicious behaviors of the botnet by using machine learning techniques. The vast amount of information to analyze, the amount of botnets and malware to detect, the continuous updates of the malware, and the behavioral changes make the detection of botnets a very difficult task.

Brazil

Known Botnets Since their appearance around the year 2000, there have emerged a large number of botnets. The following is a nonexhaustive list of known botnets, with a short description of each: •• Gbot, which appeared in the year 2000, is considered the first botnet. It was based on the mIRC client program and used the IRC protocol. •• Also in the year 2000 appeared Agobot, which introduced the concept of modularized attacks. At that point, it became common to leak the source code of the malware in order to increase profit, making it very easy to modify old malware and produce variants. •• In 2002, SdBot, which was still mainly a backdoor, although controlled by a C&C channel, appeared. •• In 2003, there appeared several botnets such as Spybot, with key-logging capabilities; RBot, which has been used and modified for several years; and Sality, which sends spam and is one of the older botnets still active today. •• In 2004, Bagle appeared. One of its versions used P2P as a protocol and sent large amounts of spam. •• In 2006 appeared Rustock, which had more than 1 million bots sending spam. •• In 2007 appeared Storm, which attacked the researchers investigating it, and Cutwail, which sent 74 billion spams per day and performed DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks. •• In 2008, several famous botnets appeared, including Mega-D, Mariposa (which had more than 12 million bots), Confiker (which managed to have more than 6 million bots by attacking social web users such as Facebook), Asprox, Torpig, Waladec (well-known for sending spam), TDSS (which sold the user traffic using pay-per-click advertising networks), and Grum (which delivered 39.9 billon spam messages). •• In 2009, Festi and Bredolab appeared, but more important, Zeus appeared. Zeus, one of the largest and most famous botnets, become widespread when its source code was leaked. •• In 2010, Kelihos, which sent a large amount of spam, appeared.

123

•• In 2011, there appeared a variant of TDSS called TDL-4, which used P2P protocols and its own encryption algorithm to hide its traffic. •• In 2012, Citadel, an offspring of Zeus, which could take screenshots and videos from the victim, appeared. In that year also appeared Flashback, which was the first to infect Mac users to steal their credentials. •• In 2011 appeared ZeroAccess, which performs bitcoin mining and click fraud. •• In 2014, Semalt, which uses the Soundfrost malware to perform web search engine requests, appeared. •• In 2015 appeared Bebep, which uses malvertising to infect new bots and opens a backdoor in them.

Sebastian Garcia See also Cookies; Cybertheft; Information Security; Machine Learning; Network Security

Further Readings Abu Rajab, M., et al. “A Multifaceted Approach to Understanding the Botnet Phenomenon.” In Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, October 25–27, 2006. Cooke, Evan, et al. “The Zombie Roundup: Understanding, Detecting, and Disrupting Botnets.” SRUTI, v.5 (2005). Honeynet Project. (2004). Know Your Enemy: Learning About Security Threats (2nd ed.). Ann Arbor, MI: Author, 2004. Schiller, Craig and James R. Binkley. Botnets: The Killer Web Applications. Rockland, MA: Syngress, 2011.

Brazil As a growing global power, Brazil has a paradoxical relationship to security. While Brazil has a history of military dictatorships, more recently there has been resistance to the inclusion of Brazil in U.S. surveillance programs. As a nation, Brazil has created policies that are unique and are reflected in its constitution and in laws that provide for injunctions, liability, and consumer

124

Brazil

protection. Relatively powerful privacy protections are combined with a somewhat contradictory attitude toward security. Brazil gained international attention when it objected to U.S. surveillance, but Brazil also maintains its own security agency and created surveillance operations for the 2014 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup. Like virtually every nation, Brazil works to create policy that accounts for both the need for civil liberties and the need to preserve security in a world climate that reflects the increasing power of decentralized nonstate actors. This entry begins by looking at Brazil’s privacy laws and its use of surveillance. Key security concerns are then highlighted, followed by concluding thoughts on the future of surveillance in Brazil.

Privacy Laws Brazil enshrines the concept of privacy in the nation’s federal constitution. As a result, rights in the area of protection and communication are fundamental rights, and individuals in Brazil have the right to seek recourse for them. Brazil has a concept known as habeas data, which enables individuals to access information regarding them in public databases. Brazil does not stop its privacy and data protection laws at constitutional protection. Under the Brazilian Civil Code, there are procedures for injunctions for privacy violations. There are also situations where liability for damages can be obtained. Brazil also interprets privacy as a consumer protection issue, and there are protections under the Brazilian Consumer Protection and Defence Code. In addition, there are protections implemented by legislation that became effective in June 2014 that provide for transparency in the use and storage of easily accessible data. Overall, privacy laws provide a variety of protections that continue to be enhanced at various levels of the legal system. Constitutional protections, claims for liability and damages, and consumer protections are all evident in the system created in Brazil. While these laws provide protections, there is also evidence that governmental authorities participate in some of the same types of surveillance

activities that are evident in the policies of other nations. In addition, there has been some effort to facilitate cooperation in surveillance activities with other countries.

Status of Surveillance Brazil has gained attention for questioning the surveillance activities of other nations. However, despite challenging the surveillance tactics of the United States and other countries, Brazil maintains its own security agency. The Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN) is one of the main agencies that provides security and surveillance in Brazil, and like other countries’ agencies, this agency has a history of controversy, including allegations that it wiretapped members of the Brazilian Senate and the Brazilian Supreme Court. Other parts of the government that play a role in Brazil’s surveillance activities include the Justice Department and the federal police. There is evidence that Brazil is undertaking some of the same tactics for surveillance that are being undertaken in nations such as the United States. Bruno Magrani, a law professor who was part of an effort to study many countries in terms of their surveillance, identified several ways in which the Brazilian government may be accessing data.

Key Security Concerns One key area of concern for Brazil is objecting to the tactics of the United States and its National Security Agency, particularly its monitoring of foreign leaders. Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff was strongly critical of the United States when she learned that the National Security Agency was monitoring her emails. Rousseff responded in part by canceling a state visit, including a state dinner, to the United States. Rousseff was not the only world leader to challenge the United States, but she has continued to give public comments against the United States’ surveillance activities, including at the United Nations. In 2014, Brazil began attempting to create its own Internet cable infrastructure, in part to avoid U.S. surveillance. However, despite the public rhetoric, there were also attempts toward

Breathometer and Breathalyzer Machines

greater global cooperation. There continues to be a tension between the needs of cybersecurity and broader national security, and Brazilian sovereignty. Another key area of concern for Brazil occurred in 2014 when it hosted the global FIFA World Cup competition. Steps were taken to avoid incidents during that global event. As a country that is characterized as rising in prestige, avoiding a terrorist incident or other security breach during such an international public event was crucial. In 2011, within the Justice Department, the Secretaria Extraordinária de Seguarança para Grandes Events (Special Secretariat for the Security of Large Events) was created, and command centers were built in the cities that were to host the World Cup events. There was also surveillance of social media such as Facebook. Some civil liberties activists criticized the surveillance infrastructure. This shows the difficult balancing act involved in creating security policies while also safeguarding civil liberties.

Future of Surveillance As Brazil develops as a global power, several key security and privacy concerns remain. It has adopted some strong data protection protocols and continues to pass protective legislation. However, this individual protection and attempt at transparency are balanced with security and surveillance efforts. In a way, Brazil continues to struggle between a desire for individual data protection, an international diplomacy profile characterized in part by a willingness to criticize the surveillance tactics of the United States, and policies and practices that challenge the rhetoric and values of civil liberties and data protection. Dealing with intertwined issues such as cybersecurity, social media, and threats by all types of nonstate actors will likely continue to create challenges in the years ahead. One particular area of interest will be how much global cooperation Brazil participates in since President Rousseff and other political leaders have taken such a public stand in a variety of venues. Matthew J. Gritter See also Civil Liberties; Security, Concepts of

125

Further Readings Nancy Scola. “Brazil Begins Laying Its Own Internet Cables to Avoid U.S. Surveillance.” The Washington Post (November 3, 2014). https://www.washingtonpost .com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/11/03/brazil-beginslaying-its-own-internet-cables-to-avoid-u-s-surveillance/? utm_term=.c00897dcc4fd (Accessed August 2017).

Breathometer Machines

and

Breathalyzer

Breathometers and breathalyzers are devices designed to estimate the blood alcohol content (BAC) in the human body. The term breathalyzer actually refers to several different types of devices, all of which analyze alcohol concentration by having a subject blow into the machine. Breathalyzer machines use a chemical reaction involving alcohol that produces a color change in proportion to the amount of alcohol in the body. Intoxilyzers detect alcohol content by the use of infrared spectroscopy, whereby BAC is measured based on a calculation of the absorption of infrared light. Alcosensors utilize fuel cell technology to capture BAC through the creation of an electrical current. These devices have typically been used by law enforcement for investigating suspected cases of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol. Recently, however, smaller and less expensive devices called breathometers have entered the market. These units are aimed at consumers who want to monitor their own BAC before driving or the BAC of those for whom they are responsible. While breathometers and breathalizers are generally used to enforce laws and ensure safety, there are privacy concerns related to the administration of these devices. This entry examines the use of breathalyzers by law enforcement, in schools, and in the workplace, before concluding with a glimpse at the future of breathometers and breathalyzers.

Breathalyzers in Law Enforcement Breathalyzers are primarily utilized by law enforcement officers in efforts to detect and

126

Breathometer and Breathalyzer Machines

combat DUI offenses. Drunk driving is a major public policy problem in the United States, contributing to as much as 30% of car crash deaths. In addition, more than 1 million drivers are arrested each year for DUI. Breathalyzers are an important tool in helping law enforcement officers identify impaired drivers and in ensuring that drivers are prosecuted for DUI crimes. As of 2015, all 50 states defined a DUI offense as operating a motor vehicle with a BAC of more than 0.8, a standard that demonstrates the law’s reliance on breathalyzers to define prohibited conduct. Nevertheless, the use of breathalyzers by law enforcement raises a number of difficulties. Many states attempt to prevent citizens from evading a breathalyzer by refusing to give consent to be tested. Such states have passed what are known as “implied consent laws,” which stipulate that a person operating a motor vehicle on a public road is considered to have given consent to blood, breath, urine, or saliva tests for the presence of alcohol if that person is involved in a traffic offense and a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is intoxicated. A person’s refusal to be tested is treated as either an admission of guilt or a separate offense that can result in driving license forfeiture. These laws have been upheld in courts against challenges that they violate due process, infringe on the right of selfincrimination, and impose unreasonable search and seizure. States imposing implied consent laws for breathalyzer tests justify them on the ground that driving a vehicle is a privilege rather than a right. The implied consent is thus a condition for the enjoyment of the privilege, and such consent can be withdrawn by choosing not to drive. Critics argue, however, that driving is much more than a privilege; it is a necessity for many people. A person relying on a vehicle for transportation to work, child care, shopping, and many other essential life activities has no choice but to comply with whatever conditions the state requires. Consent, in this view, is not so much implied as coerced, and a person’s need to have transportation should not require the sacrifice of constitutional rights.

Breathalyzers in Schools Public schools have often faced difficult choices in trying to balance the personal rights of students with the need to maintain safe school environments free of drugs and alcohol. In general, courts have been unwilling to sanction school policies that subject the student body to mandatory drug testing because such a requirement infringes on the protection against unreasonable searches granted by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This judicial prohibition, however, has not been extended to students participating in competitive extracurricular activities. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that mandatory drug testing for such students does not violate the Fourth Amendment because a student’s privacy interest is limited to the public school environment. Moreover, students participating in extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to intrusions on their privacy, which include being tested for illegal substances. Given that courts have allowed urine screenings for students taking part in extracurricular activities, it seems reasonable that breathalyzer tests for alcohol use would be permissible as well. For students not engaging in extracurricular activities, courts have determined that the use of breathalyzers by schools is more restricted. In Anable v. Ford, a teacher approached a student after smelling alcohol on his breath and observing the student acting in a disruptive fashion. The teacher asked the student to submit to a breathalyzer test. The student initially refused but later consented to the test with his mother’s approval, and the test produced a positive result for alcohol. A lawsuit based on the test was decided in the school’s favor. The court held that the school did not need a search warrant to perform the breathalyzer test because there was a reasonable suspicion that the student was violating school policy. The court also ruled that the administration of the test did not pose a Fourth Amendment violation because the student and his mother had voluntarily given their consent to having it performed. While the court noted that a breathalyzer is not a particularly invasive test, it remains unclear whether a student alone can consent to it and whether the presence of school officials could interfere with the consent being voluntary.

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Breathalyzers in the Workplace Courts have recognized that employers have a legitimate interest in maintaining drug- and alcohol-free workplaces to ensure employee safety and improve work productivity. At the same time, courts have held that such interests must be balanced against the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the privacy rights of employees. As such, courts have generally looked at the type of work performed in deciding how breathalyzers can be used. Random or mass screenings of bus attendants, firefighters, police officers, and teachers, for example, have been deemed unconstitutional. Such employees can be subjected to breathalyzer tests only if there is a reasonable suspicion that an employee is under the influence of alcohol. Conversely, random or mass screening of jockeys, nuclear power plant employees, and prison guards has survived constitutional scrutiny. In these cases, courts have found the public and employer interests in a drug- and alcohol-free workplace more compelling. At the same time, courts have required such screenings to be supported by notification procedures, less intrusive testing protocols, and safeguards against discrimination in selecting employees for testing.

Future of Breathalyzers Breathalyzer technology continues to evolve, with new models being developed that can screen for drug use. Law enforcement may soon have units that can test for DUI of marijuana, a growing issue as states begin legalizing its use. At the same time, the privacy concerns raised by breathalyzers persist as society tries to balance the need for safe roads, schools, and workplaces with the protection of individual rights. Eric C. Sands See also Bill of Rights; Crime Control; Drug Testing; Drug Testing Kits; Privacy; Search and Seizure

Further Readings Anable v. Ford, 663 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1985). Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2008).

127

Borkenstein, R. F. and H. W. Smith. “The Breathalyzer and Its Applications.” Medicine, Science, and the Law, v.2/1 (1961). Clark, Paul A. “Do Warrantless Breathalyzer Tests Violate the Fourth Amendment?” New Mexico Law Review, v.44/1 (2014). Koebler, Jason. “New Breathalyzer Can Detect Marijuana, Cocaine, Heroin.” USNews (April 25, 2013). http://www.usnews.com/news/ articles/2013/04/25/new-breathalyzer-can-detectmarijuana-cocaine-heroin (Accessed December 2014).

Brown v. Board (1954)

of

Education

Although the U.S. Supreme Court issued its Brown v. Board of Education decision in two separate opinions, the 1954 decision is the landmark decision that determined that having separate but equal accommodations for the white and black races is unconstitutional. The 1955 decision served only to clarify how quickly schools should desegregate and placed the local federal district courts in charge of any legal hearing arising from the desegregation process. Ultimately, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) established the modern ideas of privacy and security in the constitutional rights. This entry reviews the groundbreaking decision of the Supreme Court by thoroughly examining Chief Justice Earl Warren’s majority opinion and how the arguments that he presented in his decision helped serve as the foundation for other important Court decisions. In Brown v. Board of Education the Court unanimously overturned Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), finding that the “separate but equal” aspects of segregation denied equal protection under the law for those who were segregated out of general society, that is, the black citizenry of the United States. While the Court’s opinion in Brown focuses on the equal protection of black children in education, what can be seen is a forceful argument by Chief Justice Warren that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution goes beyond just the legal status of citizens to include the equal protections of security in civil rights and of personal privacy.

128

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion relied heavily on Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy. Justice Harlan outlined that the Louisiana law that required separate but equal train coaches not only was inherently unequal but also did not allow citizens privacy of travel or the security of rights, as any train conductor was a de facto government agent to enforce the law. A conductor invaded not only privacy by determining the race of passengers but also the privacy of travel choice. According to Harlan, the arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.

For the first time in Court history, Chief Justice Warren went outside legal arguments and brought in aspects of psychology and sociology to expand on Justice Harlan’s dissent. Arguing that public education has taken on a more important function of state and local governments since Plessy, Warren contended that education is more important than ever in the lives and the futures of children. In school, children learn cultural values, develop language and math skills, and acquire the foundation of good citizenship. By separating white and black children, both races are denied cultural skills and lessons, and for black children, cultural and citizenship lessons as well. Forcing black children into segregated schools denies them, through their parents, the right to choose the best school that will impart those lessons. These decisions are a private matter for parental determination, and the government should not be involved or interfere in these decisions. In this sentiment, Chief Justice Warren wrote out the foundation of constitutional protection and equal protection of private decisions or, in current parlance, the right to privacy. Chief Justice Warren does not go into further detail on this right to privacy and does not claim where in the Constitution it is located, but he does make it clear that private decisions, whether educational choices or travel choices, are protected from government interference by the Constitution. The Court’s opinion spent more time on the area of security, and while Chief Justice Warren

gave a compelling argument of precedence in overturning Plessy, the area of security is where psychology and sociology are used the most. Chief Justice Warren’s main legal argument against Plessy is spelled out in Footnote 5, where he cited Strauder v. West Virginia (1880): Exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.

He argued that before Plessy the Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment was a limitation on state-imposed discrimination, finding that Plessy was the anomaly in Supreme Court jurisprudence, not the current Brown decision. Chief Justice Warren’s other attack on Plessy is based on the psychological and sociological outcomes of segregation. He devoted considerable space to the idea that separation of the races, regardless of how equal the facilities are, leads to insecurity of rights and legal standing in society. He went beyond Justice Henry Billings Brown’s argument that the Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments guarantee only legal freedoms, not personal freedoms, by claiming that if a race is denied personal freedoms, legal freedoms will automatically be called into question as well. How society treats a citizen on a day-today basis determines the amount of legal security that citizen has. He also pointed out that children who are separated by law from their peers and society will not feel secure in their legal rights and in their equal standing in society. He argued that this insecurity will continue into adulthood for many of these children, jeopardizing their ability to exercise their full rights as adults, including voting, jury selection, and their rights under the First through Eighth Amendments. Brown v. Board of Education established the modern ideas of privacy and security in the constitutional rights. This case is the first layer of the foundation of privacy rights that led to decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and Roe v. Wade (1973). Although it was radical for the time, the use of psychology, sociology, and nonlegal arguments has become commonplace in

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Court decisions. Most important, the Brown decision declared that it is not enough to just have a law or even a constitutional amendment stating that a right exists or is protected but having citizens who are secure in those protections is paramount. Mary L. Carver See also Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Plessy v. Ferguson (1896); Privacy, Right to; U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Eisenberg, David A. “In the Names of Justices: The Enduring Irony of Brown v. Board.” Journal of Jurisprudence, v.22 (2014). Patterson, James T. Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537(1896). Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).

129

C Nasser’s desire to avenge Egypt’s loss in 1948 led to the Six-Day War in June 1967. During the war, Israel fended off an attack by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; at the conclusion of the conflict, Israel had wrested control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, as well as claimed the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. In 1973, Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, rallied Arab forces for another attack on Israel in the hope of regaining the lost territory and boosting his domestic support. Although the Arab forces made a stronger showing than in 1967, Egypt failed to regain the Sinai, and it eventually accepted a cease-fire brokered by the United Nations.

Camp David Accords The Camp David Accords are a 1978 agreement signed by the Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. The accords, which were negotiated with the assistance of the then U.S. president Jimmy Carter, provided for the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and also outlined a framework for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. Subsequently, in March 1979, the two sides formalized this agreement into a peace treaty: the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. This treaty made Egypt the first Arab state to recognize Israel, and it garnered Begin and Sadat the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. The agreement presaged a major shift in the national security polices of both Egypt and Israel, and the accords remain a cornerstone of both countries’ foreign policies. For Israel, the treaty ended more than two decades of armed conflict with Egypt, at that time its chief antagonist in the Arab world. For Egypt, the argument cemented the country’s strategic shift away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States.

The Negotiations By the late 1970s, Sadat was prepared to make a strategic shift in his country’s foreign relations. Specifically, Sadat no longer believed that Egypt’s security was best preserved through a close alliance with other Arab nations and the Soviet Union. Instead, he sought to cultivate a relationship with the United States, viewing the country as a more reliable alliance partner that would provide Egypt with ­ ­significant military aid. In accordance with this, in November 1977, he offered to travel to Israel to speak before the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. Several weeks later, Israel extended an invitation to Sadat, making him the first Arab leader to visit Israel. Subsequent one-on-one meetings between Sadat ­ and Begin failed to produce an agreement, and on September 5, 1978, Carter hosted the two men at the secluded Camp David retreat in Maryland.

Conflict Between Egypt and Israel The conflict between Egypt and Israel dates to Israel’s founding in 1948, when Egypt joined a coalition of Arab states in attacking the new country. From 1956 until 1970, under the government of President Gamal Abul Nasser, the dual pillars of Pan-Arab unity and antagonism toward Israel guided Egyptian foreign relations. 131

132

Camp David Accords

Although Begin agreed in principle to the return of the Sinai in exchange for Egypt’s diplomatic recognition of Israel, the issue of Palestinian self-determination proved to be a far more contentious subject. Specifically, Begin resisted plans to disband Israel’s settlements in the Sinai and rejected Carter’s call to return East Jerusalem to the Palestinians. The negations nearly broke off on two separate occasions, with Sadat and Begin each threatening to leave Camp David; both were eventually mollified by Carter’s personal appeals. The talks concluded on September 17, and Carter, along with Begin and Sadat, flew to Washington, D.C., to sign the accords at the White House.

The Accords The Camp David Accords comprised two separate documents and called for the parties to formalize these principles into a peace treaty within 3 months. The first document, the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” outlined a broad agenda aimed at achieving Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza within 5 years. To accomplish this, the framework called for Israel’s withdrawal from these territories, followed by elections to select representatives for the Palestinian people. The second component of the accords, the framework for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, set conditions for the return of the Sinai to Egypt in exchange for the normalization of relations between the two countries. The document outlined a three-stage process for the return of the Sinai, which would occur between 1979 and 1982. Following approval by both the Egyptian cabinet and the Israeli parliament, the official signing ceremony for the peace treaty took place at the White House on March 26, 1979. Although the peace treaty represented a significant milestone in the United States’ quest for a comprehensive settlement between Israel and the Arab countries, the document left several major issues unresolved. Notably, the contentious issue of Jerusalem was eventually excluded from the accords. Moreover, Begin refused to commit to a freeze on Israeli settlements in the West Bank over the next 5 years and would only agree to a 3-month freeze. Finally, the accords made no mention of the Golan Heights and Israel’s ongoing conflict with Syria.

The Aftermath The signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel represented a high point for the Carter administration. In addition, as noted earlier, Begin and Sadat were jointly awarded the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. The response to the accords, however, was not uniformly positive. The United Nations rejected the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” since the United States had excluded both the United Nations and representatives of the ­Palestinian people from the negotiating process. In addition, leaders in the Arab world almost universally condemned the accords; the Arab League suspended Egypt from 1979 to 1989 and moved its headquarters from Egypt to Tunisia. The accords also angered Egyptian hardliners, who rejected any rapprochement with Israel. On October 6, 1981, a member of Al Gamaa alIslamiyya, a radical group favoring an Islamic revolution in Egypt, assassinated Sadat. Although the accords were initially controversial, the peace between Egypt and Israel has proved durable. Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, maintained peaceful relations with Israel during his nearly 3 decades in power. Following the 2011 Egyptian revolution and the subsequent election of a government led by the Muslim Brotherhood, many analysts feared that Egypt would abrogate the treaty. Despite the upheaval of the Arab Spring, however, Egypt continues to honor the treaty and maintains a close alliance with the United States. Kelly McHugh See also Peace Talks and Peace Agreements

Further Readings Feron, James. “Menachem Begin, Guerrilla Leader Who Became Peacemaker.” The New York Times (March 9, 1992). http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/09/world/ menachem-begin-guerrilla-leader-who-becamepeacemaker.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1 (Accessed May 2014). “Peace Talks at Camp David, September, 1978.” PBS.com. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/ general-article/carter-peace/ (Accessed May 2014). Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.

Canada Wright, Lawrence. Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin and Sadat at Camp David. London, England: One World, 2014.

Canada In Canada, security, surveillance, and privacy have developed lockstep with those in other AngloWestern countries, positioning Canada as a case study of new developments. Canada, however, differs from some Anglo-Western jurisdictions, ­ notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, in having superior, albeit still weak, legal privacy protections.

Surveillance If video monitoring is an exemplar of surveillance patterns, then surveillance has been expanding in Canada for decades. Commencing with private establishment video surveillance in banks and retail shops, open-street or public surveillance cameras were then rolled out at the local level, in some cases inspired by the United Kingdom’s embrace of these technologies but not in a manner that mirrored that country’s centralized funding arrangements. Video surveillance has since gone mobile via various forms, including in taxicabs, police-operated automatic license recognition cameras on cruisers, temporary redeployables, mobile body cameras for the police, and cameras affixed to police drones. Yet not all the proposed surveillance initiatives have been widely accepted. National identity cards, for instance, were proposed several times but have failed as a policy option. Until recently, mass surveillance practices of the kind uncovered by Edward Snowden in 2013 had not advanced as far in Canada as in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. ­Canada has two national intelligence agencies, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the ­ Communications Security Establishment, both of which are actively involved in surveillance of the citizenry. In Canada, there is less oversight of these two agencies by commissioners compared with their counterparts in other Anglo-Western countries. Recent federal legislation has legalized more

133

intensive surveillance for both agencies in Canada and abroad. However, it is also true that a recent Canada Supreme Court decision has prevented the public police across Canada from acquiring data from Internet service providers without a warrant, as they can in Australia through its new mandatory data retention legislation. Also, corporate surveillance is rapidly expanding in Canada, consistent with other Anglo-Western jurisdictions, since many corporations (e.g., Amazon, Google) operate transnationally. Biometric surveillance continues to proliferate in everyday life, as seen in its use to access new “smart” cell phones and in hospitals that require staff to use fingerprint scanners to access files and drugs.

Security In Canada, the security provision is typically divided between public and private. In the public realm, national security organizations have followed the patterns of other Anglo-Western nations in that Canada is, along with the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, one of the “Five Eyes.” In the private realm, Canada has a host of private contract security agencies and has branch plants of the transitional contract security agencies headquartered abroad, such as G4s. As important, but often neglected, are major private corporations operating in C ­ anada that have corporate or in-house security units. These units can be sophisticated, and the ones in Canada are equal to those found in other Anglo-Western countries and also in Europe. While the overlap of public and privacy security provision (and surveillance) is evident, what may be distinctive about Canada is one form of blurring that distinguishes it from European countries as well as the United Kingdom and ­ ­Australia. This involves municipal public governments that are not only contracting private security agency guards but, during the past 15 years, also employing their own corporate security units, which draw resources and expertise from international players such as the American Society for Industrial Security. Another example of distinctive institutionalized arrangements (the United States also features these arrangements) that serve as a mix of private and public in Canada is public “paid duty” policing, which increasingly sees the

134

Canada

public police providing policing to private users, including corporations, for a fee.

Privacy In Canada, privacy entails governing through an amalgam of legislation and forms of law. Canada has privacy commissions at the provincial level and a federal commissioner’s office as well. The Privacy Act refers to the federal public sector (government and crown corporations), and the ­ Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act governs the private sector. Each Canadian province has distinctive privacy legislation. For example, in Canada’s most populous province, Ontario, there is the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (regarding provincial government–funded agencies) and the Municipal Freedom of Information and P ­ rotection of Privacy Act (governing municipal g­ overnment– funded bodies). There is variation in administration among provinces and the federal government privacy commissioners and over time. For example, le Commission d’acces a l’information was very interventionist in the 1990s in Quebec. The Ontario commissioner proffered the privacy-bydesign model in that province in the 2000s. The federal commissioner was interventionist in, for example, trying to stop the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from installing video surveillance in British Columbia in the early 2000s, but since his departure his successors have not been so. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms is also a factor nationally, though (as with the U.S. Constitution) it does not describe a right to privacy. Rather, its Section 8 describes a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Provincial privacy legislation is weak and poorly enforced, taking the form of guidelines rather than regulations. For example, video surveillance signage to ensure fair information practices is often ignored by the public and private organizations to whom it applies because it is not binding. Overall, the concern over privacy is marginally more enhanced in Canada than in the other Anglo-Western jurisdictions. Randy K. Lippert and Kevin Walby See also Australia; Corporate Surveillance; Municipal Surveillance; United Kingdom; United States

Further Readings Doyle, A. and K. Walby. “Cab Cameras: The Case of Surveillance in Ottawa Taxi Cabs.” In A. Doyle, et al. (eds.), Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of Camera Surveillance. London, England: Routledge, 2011. Forcese, Craig. “One Warrant to Rule Them All: Reconsidering the Judicialization of Extraterritorial Intelligence Collection.” In Randy K. Lippert, et al. (eds.), National Security, Surveillance and Terror: Canada and Australia in Comparative Perspective. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Hier, Sean P. and Kevin Walby. “Policy Mutations, Compliance Myths, and Re-Deployable Special Event Public Camera Surveillance in Canada.” Sociology, v.48/1 (2014). doi:10.1177/003803851 3477755 Lippert, Randy K. “Open-Street CCTV, Canadian Style.” Criminal Justice Matters, v.68 (2007). doi:10.1080/09627250708553283 Lippert, Randy K. “Signs of the Surveillant Assemblage: Privacy Regulation, Urban CCTV, and Governmentality.” Social and Legal Studies, v.18 (2009). doi:10.1177/0964663909345096 Lippert, Randy K. and Bryce Newell. “Police Body Cams and Beyond: Debate Introduction.” Surveillance & Society, v.14/1 (2016). Lippert, Randy K. and Kevin Walby. “Municipal Corporate Security and the Intensification of Urban Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society, v.9/2 (2012). Lippert, Randy K. and Kevin Walby. “Police Moonlighting Revisited: ‘Pay Duty’ in Three Canadian Police Services.” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, v.7/4 (2013). doi:10.1093/police/ pat026 Lippert, Randy K. and Kevin Walby. “Marketization, Knowledge Work and Visibility in ‘Users Pay’ Policing in Canada.” British Journal of Criminology, v.54/2 (2014). doi:10.1093/bjc/azt074 Lippert, Randy K. and Kevin Walby. “Governing Through Privacy: Authoritarian Liberalism, Law, and Privacy Knowledge.” Law, Culture and the Humanities, v.12/2 (2016). doi:10.1177/1743872113478530 Walby, Kevin. “Little England? The Rise of Open-Street, Closed Circuit Television Surveillance in Canada.” Surveillance & Society, v.4/1–2 (2005). Walby, Kevin and Randy K. Lippert. “The New Keys to the City: Uploading Corporate Security and Threat Discourse Into Canadian Municipal Governments.” Crime, Law and Social Change, v.58/4 (2012). doi:10.1007/s10611-012-9395-9

Capital Punishment Walby, Kevin, et al. “Interrogating National Security, Surveillance, and Terror in Canada and Australia.” In Randy K. Lippert, et al. (eds.), National Security, Surveillance and Terror: Canada and Australia in Comparative Perspective. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Walby, Kevin and Randy K. Lippert. Municipal Corporate Security in International Context. London, England: Routledge, 2015. Walby, Kevin and Sean Hier. “Securitizing Citizenship: ID Cards, Passports and Border Surveillance in Canada.” In Sandra Rollings-Magnusson (ed.), Anti-Terrorism: Security and Insecurity After 9/11. Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada: Fernwood, 2009. Warren, Ian, et al. “When the Profile Becomes the Population: Comparing Privacy and Law Enforcement in Road Traffic Surveillance in Canada and Australia.” Current Issues in Criminal Justice, v.25/2 (2013).

Capital Punishment Despite the fact that fewer than 120 people in the United States are sentenced to death every year, capital punishment (death penalty) still remains one of the most deeply debated and contested issues in criminal justice. To some scholars, especially those who are leery of an omnipotent government, state-sanctioned execution represents a fundamental infringement on constitutional rights where criminal justice officials are the principle actors in a theater of cruelty. Other academics, however, do not perceive that capital punishment, as it is currently practiced, poses a significant threat to either the civil liberties or the privacy interests of the majority of Americans. In fact, some scholars have even suggested that executing society’s worst offenders may actually preserve fundamental freedoms by reducing the population of habitual violent offenders. Perhaps this is why the majority of Americans support the practice of capital punishment, in spite of strong evidence suggesting that it is more costly to execute than to incarcerate an offender. This ­ entry examines how states vary in their laws regarding capital punishment, the frequency with which the death penalty is carried out, the ­historical context of capital punishment in the United States and globally, and how the American public views capital punishment.

135

Prevalence of Capital Punishment in the United States While there is considerable disagreement as to whether or not capital punishment erodes or ­protects civil liberties, both liberals and conservatives agree that the imposition of the death ­penalty is an extraordinarily rare phenomenon in the United States. In fact, less than 1% of individuals who commit homicide actually receive the death penalty. For example, in 2010, 14,748 persons were murdered nationwide, yet only 114 offenders were sentenced to death that year. Even  in the rare cases in which criminal defendants are ­sentenced to death, the odds are actually quite high that they will die of natural causes in prison, as correctional officials tend to refrain from scheduling execution dates. For example, ­California, the state that has the largest death row population in the United States, rarely executes offenders. In 2015, there were nearly 750 people on death row in California, yet only 13 individuals had been executed since capital punishment was reinstated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976. This is not altogether unusual. In fact, many states, such as New Hampshire, Kansas, ­Wyoming, New Mexico, and Connecticut, do not administer the death penalty despite the fact that it is allowable by law. Perhaps this gives a sense of comfort to voters, who feel secure in knowing that they can impose the ultimate punishment without ­having to risk the guilt of possibly executing an innocent person. Even though a criminal defendant can theoretically receive the death penalty if he or she commits a capital offense in one of the 32 states that permit capital punishment, as previously mentioned, such individuals are much more likely to receive life sentences. Of the executions that do occur in the United States, more than 80% take place in the southern states, with fewer than 1% of all executions taking place in the northeast. On the rare occasions when executions do occur in the northeast, it is often because the individual on death row waives all appeals and either volunteers or requests to be executed. When this happens, criminal justice officials may be able to give citizens the illusion that they are being protected from dangerous criminals. But, in reality, justice officials seem to be much more concerned with sentencing individuals to death than with actually imposing the

136

Capital Punishment

death penalty. However, unbeknown to many, Ohio, which is the farthest east of the midwestern states, has become quite aggressive in executing offenders who are sentenced to death. For example, in 2010, eight of the 46 executions in the United States occurred in Ohio. While the vast majority of states within the United States, including Texas, are beginning to execute fewer people, statistics indicate that Ohio is an exception to this rule. This is something that researchers have not addressed and is likely to be the subject of future academic inquiry if this trend continues. There is, indeed, enormous variation across all 50 states and the federal government regarding the use of the death penalty. This is likely a ­reflection of the fundamental differences that citizens from state to state have regarding the role government should play in attempting to balance security with individual freedom. Michigan, in 1846, became the first state to abolish capital punishment. Interestingly, there is evidence that ­ legislators in the state of Michigan may have been inspired to abolish the death penalty following a well-publicized incident in Canada where an innocent man was put to death. To some observers, it may be ironic that states such as Michigan (1846), Wisconsin (1853), and Maine (1887) actually led the abolitionist movement against the use of the  death penalty in the 19th century. Even as recently as 1972, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in F ­ urman v. Georgia, overturned the sentences of more than 600 death row inmates, officials in France guillotined two inmates who had murdered a nurse and a prison guard during their escape from Clairvaux Prison.

Historical and Global Perspective By 1973, the entire United Kingdom had officially abolished the death penalty. Several years prior to this, legislators in Northern Ireland were reluctant to follow the lead of England, Wales, and Scotland by halting executions. However, it is possible that legislators in Northern Ireland were encouraged not to allow the death penalty after the world watched the U.S. Supreme Court put a halt to capital punishment in the landmark 7–2 decision of Furman v. Georgia (1972). This was a case in which all nine Supreme Court justices took the time to write a separate opinion, something that is

extraordinarily rare according to legal experts. Even though in this case the death penalty itself was never declared unconstitutional per se, the Court ruled that it had been applied arbitrarily, with racial minorities often being the recipients of capital punishment. During this period in U.S. history, it is likely that capital punishment was, indeed, administered in a capricious fashion. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, 54% of all offenders executed from 1930 to 1976 were African Americans, despite African Americans constituting no more than 11% of the population during this time frame. Immediately prior to Furman v. Georgia (1972), and in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” the U.S. prison population began to decline by approximately 1% per year. In the early 1970s, there were only 96 convicts per 100,000 U.S. residents, a figure that prompted prominent prison scholars, such as Michel Foucault, Norval Morris, and David Rothman, to suggest that correctional institutions were in an inevitable state of decline. This, coupled with Furman v. Georgia, initially led many scholars to believe that the United States’ obsession with punishment was fading and that more diversified and humane instruments of social control would soon replace the death penalty. However, beginning in 1973, and around the demise of Keynesian economics, the U.S. imprisonment rate began to rapidly escalate. It was also during the same time that legislators began to craft laws in an attempt to reintroduce Americans to the death penalty. Only a few years later, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia (1976). Since then, opinion polls have reflected that Americans tend to support the death penalty. ­ Many believe that capital punishment makes society a safer place, despite the fact that very little, if any, evidence exists that demonstrates that it deters would-be criminals. While the death penalty is also utilized in democratic and developed nations, such as India and Japan, critics tend to point only to the United States as the country that is presently violating the international norm against capital punishment. In fact, some scholars who are vehemently against the death penalty have argued that as long as this method of punishment is used, the United States

Capital Punishment

will find itself in the company of other “less enlightened” countries such as China, Iran, ­Pakistan, Syria, Palestine, and North Korea, which frequently execute offenders. Many abolitionists throughout the world have criticized Americans for ignoring international opinion regarding the proper role of punishment. Officials in some ­Western democracies have even commented that the United States is a “vigilante nation,” obsessed with punishment and retribution.

The American Public’s View of Punishment In 2015, more than 2.4 million persons were incarcerated within correctional facilities across the United States. The United States’ criminal justice juggernaut consumes more than $200 billion a year, with the carceral function constituting more than one third of the price tag. The United States incarcerates more than 25% of the world’s prisoners, despite constituting only 5% of the world population. Most states in the United States have retained the death penalty, as Americans seem to place a high premium on punishment. Indeed, U.S. criminal justice officials are often able to shield themselves from criticism by arguing that by enacting and administering the death penalty they are merely carrying out the will of the people. They see themselves as public servants who are doing the voters’ bidding while still taking care to respect the due process rights of criminal defendants. While some critics argue that it is ironic that a democratic nation such as the United States still executes some of its own citizens, defenders of the death penalty nevertheless contend that this form of punishment is actually possible only because it reflects the will of the people and criminal justice officials are carrying out a democratic legal mandate. As long as capital punishment is approved of by most Americans and is not deemed to be either cruel or unusual by the U.S. Supreme Court, it is likely to remain in parts of the country. While the death penalty certainly has its critics, some legal scholars argue that defendants are afforded many more procedural rights in a capital case than they would normally receive in an ordinary felony case. For this reason, the procedures employed during the adjudication of capital cases

137

have been referred to as a form of “super due process.” As a result of Gregg v. Georgia (1976), states now use what is referred to as a bifurcated trial. In bifurcated trials, there are two phases: The first phase determines a defendant’s guilt or innocence, and the second phase determines whether the defendant will receive death or imprisonment. During the penalty phase, jurors must carefully balance both aggravating and mitigating factors to ascertain whether or not to impose the ultimate penalty on someone who is found to be guilty of a capital offense. Sentencing guidelines require jurors to weigh all variables prior to imposing a sentence of death. For example, if a defendant is believed to be immature or has no prior criminal record, this could be sufficient to encourage a jury to temper justice with mercy and not impose the death penalty. In addition, even if an individual is sentenced to death, his or her case is automatically reviewed by a state supreme court. Also, some jurisdictions have proportionality review, a process in which appellate courts seek to identify any disparities that may occur in sentencing individuals to death. Finally, in the unlikely event that an individual is sentenced to death, he or she has multiple opportunities to appeal this sentence. This is because capital punishment is regulated by federal law, which requires that criminal justice officials go to great lengths to ensure due process and follow well-established procedures. Although capital punishment is rarely imposed in the United States, it is nevertheless the subject of much discussion and debate. The evidence suggests that the majority of Americans perceive that the death penalty makes society a safer place, and they are therefore tolerant of state-sanctioned executions. Robert M. Worley See also Amnesty International; Bill of Rights; Death Row; Life Without Parole; Punishment; Supermax Prisons

Further Readings Acker, James and Robert M. Bohm. America’s Experiment With Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the Ultimate Penal Sanction (3rd ed.). Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

138

Carrier Pigeons

Alarid, Leanne F. and Philip L. Reichel. Corrections. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2012. Bohm, Robert M. Capital Punishment’s Collateral Damage. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013. Death Penalty Information Center. “Executions in the U.S. 1608–2002: The Espy File.” www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ executions-us-1608-2002-espy-file (Accessed November 2014). Del Carmen, Rolando, et al. The Death Penalty: Constitutional Issues, Controversies, and Case Briefs (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Fox, J., et al. The Will to Kill: Making Sense of Senseless Murder (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2012. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Garland, David. Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

Carrier Pigeons Carrier pigeons are common domestic pigeons, or rock doves (Columba livia), that have been trained to fly back to human-tended lofts on being released with messages attached to their tail feathers or legs. For hundreds of years, carrier pigeons have been used extensively to send long-distance messages, and in the 19th and 20th centuries, they became an essential backup communication tool in situations where more modern technologies failed or were impractical, particularly in wartime. Pigeons were also one of the first unmanned aerial surveillance technologies; they were successfully used for airborne photography more than 100 years ago. Even in recent times, information transfer has been carried out covertly through this secure, low-technology means. This entry first reviews the capabilities and early uses of carrier pigeons, then discusses their usage during wartime, followed by an examination of how carrier pigeons have been utilized for intelligence gathering and military usage, among other purposes.

Capabilities Pigeons were domesticated thousands of years ago; they show little fear of people and have

become accustomed to living in close quarters with human society. The attribute that has made pigeons most useful to humans is their ability to home, or navigate accurately back to their living quarters over long distances. Pigeons become attached to the home lofts in which they were raised, and when they are removed from these surroundings to a location foreign to them, they will faithfully and quickly return to the home loft, even without having line-of-sight or visual information from the outbound voyage. With training, they can be habituated to new home lofts and to recognize mobile lofts moved relatively short distances, though they work only in one direction (two-way homing pigeons were trained in the 20th century with limited success and did not see general use). Their speed exceeds 60 miles per hour in good wind, and they can home over hundreds, or even thousands, of miles; one pigeon, released in France in 1931, returned 24 days later to its home loft in French Indochina, 7,200 miles away. There does not appear to be a single explanatory mechanism for how pigeons accomplish this feat. They do not rely heavily on sight to navigate, though they do use some visual clues, even following human roadways at times. Experiments by pigeon biologists indicate that sun orientation, olfaction, and compassing using the earth’s magnetic field all have some impact on their ­ ­ability to home.

Early Uses The homing capabilities of pigeons were known in ancient times, and their use probably extends back at least to the time of King Solomon. During the Islamic Golden Age, a sultan of Baghdad established carrier pigeon coops across Persia, Syria, and Egypt. The Turks constructed pigeon relay stations across Anatolia in the 1300s; Chinese merchants in Peking and Shanghai used them for business, as did African caravaneers. Pigeons carried news westward from the Crusades, though their recorded use in Europe is scant prior to the Renaissance. Until the advent of semaphore and telegraph lines in the 18th and 19th centuries, pigeons were the fastest and most reliable means of communicating messages over long distances or across difficult terrain. They had a longer range than messenger dogs and were quicker and cheaper

Carrier Pigeons

than humans on horseback, though they also faced threats from inclement weather, birds of prey, and gunfire. The Reuters news agency began as a “pigeon post” in 1851, moving information across the telegraph gap between Brussels and Aix-la-Chappelle faster than the railroad could. Pigeon posts were used by newspapers in England for rapid receipt of reports from continental Europe, and they were essential in restoring communication in Japan after earthquakes and typhoons. Near the end of the 19th century, pigeon airmail services, complete with stamps, were offered on islands such as Great Barrier Island in New Zealand and Santa Catalina Island in California. The birds were used during the Prohibition era to facilitate the movement of bootleg alcohol from ship to shore.

Wartime Use Accounts of the wartime utility of pigeon messenger services date back as far as Julius Caesar. Pigeons could be used to keep officials informed of developments on front lines and to move troops more efficiently. The siege of Paris by the ­Prussians in 1870–1871, however, saw the French employ military carrier pigeons to previously unknown effect. Prior to the surrounding of the city, pigeons from the countryside had been brought into Paris; pigeons homed in Paris were sent up with refugees in balloons, allowing for two-way communication. Much refinement of message attachment technique occurred during the siege. Originally, messages were wrapped, waxed, and attached to the feathers, but many of the messages fell off from the birds. Instead, now papers were curled inside the hollow quills, which were tied together at the ends and then attached to the birds’ tails. (Later, canisters were developed that were attached to the pigeons’ feet or strapped to their backs.) The Parisians used microphotography to copy the communication onto collodion films, allowing a single bird to carry more than 30,000 words. In the 4 months when Paris lay besieged, some 150,000 official communiques and 1 million private messages were sent via carrier pigeon, despite the Prussians’ use of hawks as a counterstrategy. The success of the Paris pigeon post led many European nations to establish military pigeon

139

stations. In World War I, the birds were used extensively; they allowed for communication at a distance when telephone or telegraph wires were cut, and they were issued to airplanes, tanks, minesweepers, and warships to send progress dispatches or distress signals. Carrier pigeon success rates were greater than 90%, according to many military reports, though they were generally considered reliable only over distances of about 100 to 200 miles. Their importance was such that the German forces ordered the destruction of all pigeons found in the overtaken territories. One of the most famous carrier pigeons of the war, Cher Ami, was sent up by the “Lost Battalion,” an American unit that had inadvertently become surrounded by German forces in the Argonne Forest and was subjected to friendly fire. Cher Ami was shot through the breast almost immediately after release but still managed to home back to headquarters in less than half an hour, the message containing the unit’s coordinates hanging from the shredded remains of its leg. Pigeon use for military ends continued to expand in World War II. In 1938, the British established a National Pigeon Service in anticipation of war and put more than 200,000 pigeons into use for military and civilian communication. They were often standard issue for aircraft, naval vessels (including submarines), and paratroopers and enabled multiple rescues of the crews of downed planes and sinking ships. The first information relayed back to Britain during the D-Day invasion, under conditions of radio silence, arrived via Gustav, a pigeon who returned 5 hours after being released from the Normandy beachhead. The Dickin Medal, established in England to honor the efforts of wartime animals, was awarded to 54 creatures for service in World War II—32 of the recipients were carrier pigeons.

Intelligence Gathering and Military Uses Pigeons could also be used for intelligence ­purposes. Night patrols and embedded units used them to communicate quietly and clandestinely. During World War I, the Germans landed spies with pigeon baskets onshore to relay information across the English Channel. British intelligence, in both World Wars, parachuted baskets of pigeons

140

Carrier Pigeons

into German-occupied areas in the hope of contacting the resistance efforts. These were sometimes co-opted by the German forces, who sent back false messages and counterintelligence or substituted their own homing pigeons in the ­baskets to identify and punish dissenters. At the outbreak of World War II, the British War Office ordered all commercial pigeon lofts to release their birds, in the hope that “Nazi pigeons,” planted by sympathizers, would fly back to Germany. In 1945, the U.S. Office of Strategic ­ Services (predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]) routinely lifted photographs of Japanese military installations in Burma from behind enemy lines via carrier pigeon. In the first decade of the 20th century, it was found that homing pigeons could facilitate photographic surveillance as well. Julius Neubronner, a German pharmacist who used pigeons to transfer prescriptions and medications, strapped small cameras with pneumatic shutter systems to the pigeons’ chests. Once the birds were airborne, the  slowly releasing air from a rubber ball closed the  shutter at regular intervals. If timed properly, the pigeon photographer could return with a continuous visual record of its flight path. ­ ­Neubronner patented the device in 1908, and soon afterward, the German military adopted it for topographic reconnaissance. Camera-bearing pigeons were occasionally shot down by the Allied forces in World War I, though their use seems to have been minimal afterward. While the typical method of deployment was via aircraft, the birds would also be trucked to areas where they could fly over enemy land, and on at least one occasion in World War II, the Germans attempted pigeon surveillance of Russian territory using dogs trained to release them from pack-baskets. The CIA explored pigeon reconnaissance possibilities in hope that it would provide better-resolution images than high-flying aircraft, though the extent of this usage is not known. Even more exotic uses of birds as biosurveillance and biowarfare tools were imagined. Classical conditioning using food was the most popular training technique, as many birds respond to this well; for instance, the British threw bread from surfaced submarines so that seagulls would learn to associate the vessels with food, the better to detect submerged U-boats. The CIA considered

attaching explosives or biological weapons to pigeons during the Cold War. Behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner trained pigeons to home on pictures of targets, with the intent of using them to guide missiles. While this never saw actual use, it was taken seriously enough by the U.S. military so that several years were spent in the 1940s and 1950s investigating its efficacy. Inspired by S­ kinner, other researchers taught birds to identify the human form, with an eye toward ambush detection and search-and-rescue. While pigeons were found in Coast Guard experiments to be even better than humans at spotting orange life vests over open water, they never came into use in this ­capacity. In the 1970s, it was found that pigeons could be trained to differentiate between natural and man-made objects, and the feasibility of using this to have the birds detect and gather visual (via photography) or locational (via remote sensing) information about structures was explored. More recently, pigeons with tracking devices and air pollution sensors have been used for smog ­ ­monitoring in California. Despite the increasing speed and ubiquity of wired and wireless communication systems, carrier pigeons have not died out as a service. Many military pigeon programs were dismantled in the decades after World War II, but some countries, including France and China, still maintain small carrier programs. The aerospace company Lockheed used pigeons to transfer microfilm between campuses in the 1980s, finding it faster and cheaper than delivery service over slow, winding mountain roads. Homing pigeons were found in Iraqi bunkers by U.S. soldiers during military operations against Saddam Hussein. Reports of “spy pigeons” continue to surface in Asia; Iranian and Indian press outlets have reported on pigeons captured in politically sensitive areas with clamping rings on their feet and branded or stamped identifiers on their bodies. With a carrying capacity of approximately 3 ounces, pigeons have been used to smuggle cigars from Cuba to Florida, drugs and mobile phones into and out of Brazilian prisons, and diamonds out of South African mines. Data storage devices with significant capacities can easily be attached to homing pigeons, with speeds of transfer sometimes exceeding that of modern broadband Internet; pigeons, moreover, are not subject to electronic eavesdropping

Castration, Chemical

or to radar jamming and other communications interference tactics. Chris Hubbles See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; Surveillance During World War I and World War II

Further Readings Levi, Wendell Mitchell. The Pigeon (2nd Rev. ed.). Sumter, SC: Levi, 1974. Lubow, Robert E. The War Animals. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977. Osman, A. H. and W. H. Osman. Pigeons in Two World Wars. London, England: Racing Pigeon, 1976. Parussini, Gabriele. “In France, a Mission to Return the Military’s Carrier Pigeons to Active Duty.” The Wall Street Journal (Updated November 11, 2012). http:// online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732443980 4578104933926157320 (Accessed September 2017).

Castration, Chemical Chemical castration employs the drug medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), a female hormone that reduces the production and effect of testosterone, to control deviant sexual impulses and desires in convicted sex offenders. Chemical castration is typically performed after conviction for a sexrelated crime and without the consent of the offender. The deterrent effect of chemical castration arguably makes society safer and more secure, at least with regard to the castrated individual; however, chemical castration also involves individual privacy rights because it constitutes a bodily invasion of the offender. Until recently, castration was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as a cruel and unusual punishment. Since 1996, however, eight states have adopted (though two have since repealed) statutes permitting chemical castration of convicted sex offenders. Because chemical castration does not have the same physically maiming effect as orchiectomy (surgical castration), some argue that it is not a cruel and unusual punishment. Those who oppose chemical castration argue that the long-term negative health and

141

mind-controlling effects of the hormones constitute a cruel and unusual punishment. This entry briefly reviews the state statutes and discusses the debates surrounding chemical castration.

Statutes Six states permit chemical castration for persons convicted of sex-related offenses: (1) California, (2) Florida, (3) Louisiana, (4) Montana, (5) Iowa, and (6) Wisconsin. At one time, both Georgia and Oregon enacted chemical castration laws, but those laws were repealed in 2006 and 2011, respectively. California was the first state to implement a chemical castration statute. In California, a judge has the discretion to order chemical castration on a first-time conviction for committing forcible or statutory rape on a victim 12 years old or younger. On a second conviction, chemical castration is mandatory. Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and M ­ ontana modeled their statutes after that of California. Each state considers the underlying offense, the victim’s age, and recidivism. Wisconsin’s chemical castration statute is the broadest in the nation. For offenders in prison, the decision to castrate is made by the department of corrections and the parole commission, and castration may be imposed as a condition of probation or parole. For offenders who are civilly committed, the process varies slightly. The department of corrections prepares a treatment plan addressing the offender’s need for chemical castration after release. On review, the court may order chemical castration as a condition of release. Only those who have been convicted of a sex offense against a child 13 years of age or younger may be considered for chemical castration.

Debates In terms of privacy, the aforementioned statutory schemes are problematic because they eliminate the offender’s right to bodily privacy. Notably absent from the statutes is any requirement for review by a physician, diagnosis of a sexual disorder, and informed consent. Some states do not even inform the offender as to the effects of chemical castration. Although privacy rights are implicated by chemical castration statutes, nearly all the debate surrounding their constitutionality focuses on

142

Castration, Chemical

whether they violate the Eighth Amendment’s ­prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. At the heart of the Eighth Amendment is the belief that all persons merit respect regardless of their actions. Respect for basic human dignity prevents the imposition of overly harsh, humiliating, and degrading punishments, regardless of the atrocity of the underlying crime. Those opposed to chemical castration argue that it is even more invasive and offensive than surgical castration. The female hormone MPA, commonly known as Depo-Provera, has been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration only to prevent pregnancy in women. Side effects of the drug include testicular atrophy, reduction in sperm production, pulmonary embolisms, diabetes mellitus, depression, nightmares, weight gain, headaches, muscle cramps, dyspepsia, loss of bone mineral density, and gallstones. Women are advised not to use this method of c­ ontraception for more than 2 years, but a male who is ­sentenced to chemical castration will likely be administered the drug for many more years. In addition, the dosage for the purpose of chemical castration far exceeds the recommended dosage for use as a contraceptive. A man sentenced to chemical castration will receive anywhere from 4 times to 12 times the dosage approved by the Food and Drug Administration. Because the u ­ ltimate purpose of chemical castration is to control the thought process and bodily functions of a person in order to prevent possible sex offenses in the future, opponents argue that chemical castration necessarily violates the integrity of the person as well as his human dignity. On the other hand, proponents of chemical castration view this punishment as a legitimate way to protect society from dangerous sexual offenders. They argue that the government has a compelling interest in protecting society from dangerous sexual offenders and that the administration of a drug is a minimally invasive and narrowly tailored way to accomplish this goal. This, in turn, reduces the need for law enforcement surveillance to achieve public security. Because the effects are not permanent (the effects of chemical castration reverse when the individual stops receiving MPA), the punishment does not maim in the same way as surgical castration, yet it yields the same protection against recidivism and

reoffense by reducing testosterone levels and the desire to commit sex-related offenses. In addition, releasing offenders from prison under the condition that they submit to chemical castration drastically reduces the significant costs associated with criminal punishment, and consent to chemical castration obviates the invasion of privacy inherent in castration ordered over the offender’s wishes. From a cost-benefit analysis, chemical castration significantly reduces the costs to society of punishing, monitoring, and protecting against sex offenders. The greatest challenges with chemical castration lie in the statutory schemes adopted by the various states. It has been argued that to ensure appropriate sentencing, the statutes should account for some form of medical review and diagnosis. Not all sex offenders are created equal— and some offenders do not have a sex-related mental health disorder. Those offenders are not likely to need such invasive control as that offered by chemical castration. Since California’s enactment, chemical castration has been challenged as a cruel and unusual punishment; but as of 2017, chemical castration has not been declared unconstitutional. Elizabeth Berenguer See also Castration, Surgical; Sex Offender Laws

Further Readings Cal. Pen. Code 645 Fla. Stat. Ann. 794.0235 Ga. Code Ann. 42–9-44.2 (repealed 2006) Iowa Code Ann. 903B.10 La. Rev. Stat. Ann 15:538 Mont. Code Ann. 45–5-512 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. 144.625 (repealed 2011) Saleh, Fabian M. and Laurie Guidry. “Psychosocial and Biological Treatment Considerations for the Paraphilic and Nonparaphilic Sex Offender.” Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, v.31 (2003). Stinneford, John F. “Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity.” University of St. Thomas Law Journal, v.3 (2005–2006). Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. 501.061 Wis. Stat. Ann. 302.11

Castration, Surgical

Castration, Surgical Orchiectomy, or surgical castration, has long been regarded as cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits castration as a form of punishment because it involves mutilation of the body that deprives the offender of his manhood. Such mutilation also represents a deprivation of the offender’s privacy rights to bodily integrity, procreation, and freedom of thought. Although constitutional privacy rights are affected by surgical castration, most of the arguments against its use have been couched in terms of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. There are two methods by which to accomplish castration: surgical and chemical. Orchiectomy is the surgical removal of one or both testicles. By removing the male sex organ, surgical castration reduces testosterone in the body, which in turn reduces the capacity of the individual to think about and engage in sexual acts. Chemical castration accomplishes the same effect through the administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate, a female hormone that reduces the production and effect of testosterone. The effects of chemical ­castration are reversed when the subject stops receiving medroxyprogesterone acetate. Surgical castration, unlike chemical castration, is not reversible. Although controversial, surgical castration is effective as a security measure because it reduces the rates of recidivism in convicted sex offenders and reduces the need for ongoing surveillance of offenders by law enforcement. During the mid-20th century, some European countries imposed mandatory surgical castration on convicted sex offenders. Statistical data reflect the recidivism rates for castrated sex offenders at around 3%, compared with as high as 46% for noncastrated offenders. Current research, however, suggests that surgical castration may not be effective at reducing recidivism for all types of sex offenders. When compared with other types of crimes, the recidivism rate for sex-related crimes is low overall, and convicted sex offenders are generally more likely to re-offend by committing a non-sex-related crime than by committing a sex offense. For a small group of sex offenders, however, the recidivism rate is higher. Sex offenders with

143

paraphilia (deviant sexual interests) or antisocial orientation present a greatly increased risk of recidivism and, thus, present a greater security danger to society as a whole. The risk of recidivism for paraphiliacs is high because their desire to engage in illegal sexual activity cannot be controlled. Sex offenders with an antisocial orientation generally desire to violate the rights of others. If an opportunity presents itself in the form of a deviant sex act, the antisocial person will take advantage of the opportunity, regardless of whether the sex act itself is the primary motivator. Of course, some sex offenders are both paraphilic and antisocial. Offenders who possess both characteristics present the greatest security risks. Even though studies support the conclusion that surgical castration can make society safer by reducing the risk of re-offense posed by convicted sex offenders, this method of castration cannot be imposed as punishment in the United States. The American Medical Association considers it an ethical violation to perform an orchiectomy pursuant to a court order. U.S. courts adopt a ­ similar perspective and have generally forbidden ­orchiectomy as criminal punishment. Under U.S. jurisprudence, not only is it unlawful to impose orchiectomy as punishment, but it is also unconstitutional to incentivize orchiectomy in exchange for a reduction in sentence, early release, or any other consideration or leniency in punishment. As of 2017, only one U.S. jurisdiction, Texas, has developed a statutory scheme that permits ­surgical castration. This system allows certain convicted sex offenders to opt for an orchiectomy on a purely voluntary basis. Texas law requires that the offender meet seven criteria before the procedure can be performed: the offender must (1) have two or more convictions for indecency with a child, sexual assault of a child, or aggravated s­exual assault; (2) be 21 years of age or older; (3) submit a request in writing; (4) admit in writing to having committed the offenses; (5) submit to evaluation by both a psychiatrist and a psychologist with experience counseling sex offenders; (6) provide written informed consent; and (7) not have previously withdrawn a request for orchiectomy. In addition to these seven requirements, Texas adds another layer of privacy protection against undue coercion. Any inmate requesting orchiectomy is required to consult an independent m ­ onitor

144

Catholic Church and the Sexual Abuse of Minors

who has expertise in mental health, law, and ethics to determine whether the inmate has been coerced into requesting the procedure. The monitor is also required to determine whether the inmate has received adequate information about the procedure and to provide additional information as needed. If the monitor believes that the inmate has been coerced, the monitor is required to advise the inmate to withdraw the request for castration. Once a request has been withdrawn, the inmate cannot again elect orchiectomy. The Texas statutes specifically prohibit the state from providing any benefit to the inmate for undergoing orchiectomy, and judges and parole panels are prohibited from imposing orchiectomy as a requirement for ­conditional supervised release. These requirements are all designed to protect an offender’s right to privacy. Because the Texas statutes provide for a completely voluntary orchiectomy free from motivations of leniency in sentencing, it seems to pass constitutional muster. In any event, it has not been challenged as unconstitutional. As of 2017, no other jurisdiction within the United States, either state or federal, permits surgical castration for convicted sex offenders. Elizabeth Berenguer

Catholic Church Abuse of Minors

and the

Sexual

The revelations of the sexual abuse of minors by some Roman Catholic priests have brought to light the issues of surveillance, security, and privacy in U.S. society. While the Catholic Church in 1984 implemented policies to curb abuse, the abuse was kept out of the public eye until the media exposed the sexual abuse in 2002. After the abuse came to public attention, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops commissioned the John Jay College of Criminal Justice to study the nature and scope of the problem. The study showed that most of the abuse occurred between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s, peaking in the 1970s. In 1984, the Church addressed the issue by implementing reforms. In 2011, the John Jay College issued a second study as to the causes and context of the abuse. In both studies, it was confirmed that most of the victims were postpubescent but under the age of 18 years. Some have claimed that in the search to understand what happened, how it happened, and how it can be prevented in the future, the security and privacy of those involved have been violated and continue to be at risk, and some have demanded surveillance of seminarians.

See also Castration, Chemical

Security Further Readings American Civil Liberties Union of Arkansas, Inc. v. State, 5 S.W.3d 418 (1999). Hanson, R. Karl and Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon. “The Characteristics of Persistent Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies.” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, v.73 (2005). Hanson, R. Karl and Monique T. Bussière. “Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies.” Journal Consulting and Clinical Psychology, v.66/2 (1998). State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985). Stinneford, John F. “Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity.” University of St. Thomas Law Journal, v.3 (2005–2006). Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 42.12 Sec. 11(f). Texas Government Code Annotated § 501.061. Texas Government Code Annotated § 508.226.

The security of minors is of foremost concern in this issue. As a response to the media exposure of the sexual abuse of minors by Catholic priests, lawmakers have introduced new policy protections through state legislatures. Many of these laws concern mandatory reporting of suspected abuse to the local police or extending the statutes of limitation for criminal prosecution from 90  days to up to five decades. The Catholic Church has also implemented safeguards of its own to ensure the safety of minors. The Church has implemented improved background and personality checks on seminarians and now removes from active duty any priest who has been accused of abuse until the investigation has been completed. In addition, the Church has implemented a program called VIRTUS. This program is required of everyone who wishes to work or interact with minors during Church activities, outside of Mass,

Cell Phone Tracking

including teachers, ministers, priests, religious personnel, and those who wish to be an adult ­ supervisor on field trips, even if the adult is supervising or accompanying his or her own child. Although laws that change the statutes of limitation are understandable, some contend that such laws are unfair. Opponents to these laws point out that most of these laws are directed specifically at the Catholic Church or at religion itself; rarely do these laws include changing the statutes of limitations for all who work with children, including public school employees. This creates a situation in which some accused abusers will be free from prosecution after 90 days, whereas others will have to face allegations dating back decades. Furthermore, opponents argue that because these laws target a specific religion, they have already been determined to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (1993), the Court, in a 9–0 decision, struck down a city ordinance that banned the killing of animals. The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye is Santeria, and religious ­worship includes the sacrificing of chickens and other small animals. What the Court found at issue with the ordinance was that while it did not specifically name the church or mention religion, it was ­specifically targeting the church and how it ­worships—and the Court stated that any law that targets a religion or religion in general is unconstitutional.

Surveillance Surveillance is also an issue as some advocacy groups, such as the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests (SNAP), have requested that the Church release the personnel files of each seminarian to them for review and that the Church receive SNAP’s recommendation before the seminarian is ordained as a priest. Because SNAP has requested that the federal courts require this of the Church, some have questioned the constitutionality of this type of surveillance. These opponents view such activity as a form of government coercion and argue that it has already been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (2012). They argue further that SNAP, a private organization, will use government entities, such as

145

the police, to enforce compliance with its determinations, a type of enforcement that was found unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948). Mary L. Carver See also Bill of Rights; Civil Liberties; Privacy, Right to; U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The Nature and Scope of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the United States: 1950–2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2004. http://www.usccb.org/issues-andaction/child-and-youth-protection/upload/The-Natureand-Scope-of-Sexual-Abuse-of-Minors-by-CatholicPriests-and-Deacons-in-the-United-States-1950-2002 .pdf (Accessed September 2017). Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

Cell Phone Tracking As cell phones have become more common, privacy concerns about the ease of tracking users have arisen. To work properly, cell phones must continuously make contact with a signal service provider (typically by connecting to a network of signal towers). Consequently, users are unable to use the phone effectively without being tracked. The data gathered through this tracking—such as location data, contact lists, call history, text message logs, and network cache—allow for a fairly complete profile of a user to be constructed. Law enforcement officers can employ tracking technology and the resulting data to track and apprehend suspects, but because this technology is relatively new, the enactment and enforcement of laws associated with it are inconsistent. This entry reviews the technology that allows for cell phone tracking, reveals the capabilities of law enforcement to access telecommunication records, and points out the privacy vulnerabilities of cell phone users.

146

Cell Phone Tracking

A working cell phone inevitably tracks the user’s location while maintaining connectivity to signal towers. As the cell phone moves from the range of one tower to another, the user’s m ­ ovements are tracked. If the mobile service provider maintains connectivity logs, as most do, detailed ­location histories can be generated. With deliberate effort, more specific location data can be derived through triangulation, comparing connection strength at the tower with connection to a second location, either a second tower or, more typically, a mobile signal repeater. Law enforcement’s use of cell phone technology— such as signal repeaters, which help strengthen or “boost” a cell signal—to track individuals came to media attention through the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and a report by USA Today. According to both organizations, law enforcement officers have used these devices without seeking warrants or other judicial oversight. Because these devices can locate an individual within his or her private space, they raise substantial privacy concerns. However, there is little jurisprudence on law enforcement’s use of mobile signal repeaters, so, like much new technology, they operate within a legal gray area. In June 2014, the U.S. Marshals seized records connected to the use of such devices by the police in Sarasota, Florida. The seizure effectively blocked a public records request by the ACLU to obtain more information about how law enforcement officers use the “Stingray” model of mobile signal repeater. Public debate over the use of these devices continues. In addition to the cell telephony signals, smartphones transmit more rich data about the user through email, social media applications, and web browsing. Smartphones and other data-equipped devices are assigned an International Mobile State Equipment Identity (IMEI), a number that uniquely identifies the device to connected networks. As many cell phone providers associate the IMEI with subscribers, the IMEI can be considered personally identifiable information. Because smartphones are also Wi-Fi-enabled, users can be tracked according to the Wi-Fi networks scanned by the smartphone, even if they do not connect to those networks. Finally, the Global Positioning System (GPS) installed on most smartphones provide a direct path to location tracking as long as

the GPS is active. All of these functions provide rich location information about the user. Smartphone applications, both user-installed and bundled with the factory-installed operating systems, use location data to present targeted advertisements, weather forecasts, or traffic information. While these services may be convenient for the user, they also report location data to the application provider (e.g., Google, Facebook, Apple). Location-based services establish all smartphone users as data subjects, monitored by various service providers to generate market data and to improve services. Although users are typically asked to consent to such location tracking when installing or configuring these applications, there is little information offered about how these data will be used. In addition, these “click-through” consent forms do not offer users an opportunity to opt out of some tracking or use only services that do not involve tracking. Once consent is given, smartphone operating systems do not provide the user with rich information about when location is reported, so users may be unaware of how much fine-grained location data they have exposed. Smartphone operating systems are typically locked from user modification, preventing users from effective administration of their devices. The status of cell phone location data with regard to privacy rights remains uncertain. In the United States, the third-party doctrine negates any expectation of privacy around information held by a third party. Because cell phone location data are held by cell phone providers, users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding that data. Law enforcement officers can then request location data directly from cell phone providers. The same vulnerability applies to the mobile Internet data collected from smartphones. Because these data are held by third parties, there is simply no robust privacy protection. In the case of an arrest or a temporary detention, a suspect’s personal possessions are subject to a casual search. When these possessions include a cell phone, even a casual search can reveal the user’s social connections, recent contacts, and other information about recent activity. The passive nature of such data gathering is a major concern for many users. A mobile phone can be traced without making the user aware that his or her location is exposed. In addition, logs of network activity and access can

Cell Phone Tracking

be obtained from the service provider without any contact with the user. In addition to all of these concerns, cell phones allow for backward-looking surveillance. When an individual becomes the subject of surveillance, the individual’s history can be reconstructed to the limit of the service provider’s records. The serverside storage of short message service (SMS), or text, messages provides an especially telling example. If law enforcement requests records from an individual’s cell service provider, these records could include SMS messages stored by the service provider. Depending on the provider’s storage policy, all of an individual’s SMS messages from the past week (or the past year) could be exposed. Because cell service providers do not often publicize their storage policies, users are typically unaware of this vulnerability. Records received by the ACLU reveal that some service providers maintain various records, including location-­ sensitive information, for years. All of these issues are made more problematic by “bring-your-own-device” policies now common in many professions. Employers save money through policies that allow employees to use their own smartphones or other mobile devices in conjunction with work. In such situations, employers have an interest in ensuring that trade secrets or other confidential information remains secure, so that employees may be obligated to allow their employers to regularly inspect their devices or agree to allow employers to manage device software. Employees may be required to install software that gives the employer access to their cell phone or smartphone’s location data or remote management of information stored on the device. The use of cell phones has changed the way in which individuals communicate and relate to information technology. While the location sensitivity of these devices can be an advantage, it can also be a vulnerability to users concerned about privacy. Although cell signals are transmitted in the open air, tracing these signals can reveal locations within traditionally private spaces. At the time of this writing, many legal questions remain unsettled. Against the background of many questions about pervasive surveillance of the Internet, cell phone tracking forms a point of contact between online and off-line tracking. Advocacy groups,

147

including the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, argue for stronger privacy protection and judicial oversight for all electronic surveillance. As more users become aware of the privacy consequences, they are also faced with the inability to prevent tracking and still use their devices. Law enforcement agents and first responders can use location tracking to improve response time or to apprehend suspects, but citizen expectations of privacy are at odds with current capabilities of cell phone tracking technologies. Michael Falgoust See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Civil Liberties; Smartphones; United States v. Jones (2012); Warrants

Further Readings Freiwald, Susan. “Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact.” Maryland Law Review, v.70 (2010). Heath, Brad. “Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes.” USA Today (August 24, 2015). http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/ baltimore-police-stingray-cell-surveillance/31994181/ (Accessed October 2017). Junglas, Iris A. and Richard T. Watson. “Location-Based Services.” Communications of the ACM, v.51/3 (2008). Kerr, Orin S. “The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine.” Michigan Law Review, v.107 (2008). McLaughlin, Kevin. “Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are We.” Hastings Communication and Entertainment Law Journal, v.29 (2006). Roux, Brian and Michael Falgoust. “Information Ethics in the Context of Smart Devices.” Ethics and Information Technology, v.15/3 (2013). Soghoian, Christopher and Stephanie K. Pell. “Your Secret Stingray’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy.” Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, v.28/1 (2014).

Cell Phones See Cell Phone Tracking; Smartphones

148

Central Intelligence Agency

Central Intelligence Agency The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as its purpose, collects a broad range of information to analyze its meaning and report its significance to the president of the United States and other government policymakers. To obtain this information, the CIA has within its organizational structure several collection disciplines such as technical collection, human collection, and open collection, along with cyber and audio technology to assist in gathering information. CIA surveillance methods are some of the most complicated, intrusive, and wide-ranging regarding the ability available to policymakers. Historically, the United States has relied on the information provided through CIA surveillance methods to make significant foreign policy decisions. This analysis explains how the CIA participates in surveillance and the intelligence process, and it supplies an overview of ­surveillance methods such as technical intelligence and its subcategories, which include communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and photoreconnaissance. Furthermore, this entry includes an overview of human intelligence, open source intelligence, bugs, and other devices, along with the challenges CIA surveillance methods pose when dealing with the threats of terrorism.

CIA Surveillance The CIA is directed to collect and analyze information as requested by the president of the United States and other policymakers. The goal of the CIA in answering such requests is to assess what is happening and why it is happening and predict what will likely follow and its meaning for the interests of the United States. To organize their collection of information, the CIA has five primary directorates: (1) the Directorate of Operations, (2) the Directorate of Analysis, (3) the Directorate of Science and Technology, (4) the Directorate of Support, and (5) the Directorate of Digital Innovation. Each directorate has responsibilities that add to the surveillance ability of the CIA. The Directorate of Operations is mostly responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, with human intelligence methods as its

primary source of surveillance. The Directorate of Analysis takes the information surveyed and produces reports, such as briefings, that explain foreign policy issues. It is through analysis that the collected information can be interpreted for policymakers to use in their decision making. The Directorate of Science and Technology collects information through technical surveillance methods and continues to develop new scientific and technical methods that will innovate the surveillance abilities of the CIA. The Directorate of Digital Innovation works on producing digital and cyber surveillance methodologies, along with exploring the information technology infrastructure. It is through these directorates that the CIA uses counterterrorism surveillance, cyber surveillance, and economic, leadership, military, and political surveillance, among others. From its origin, the CIA has been committed to surveying a host of governments and groups, gathering information in hopes of gaining intelligence from the material. The history of the CIA surveillance is one of progress and failure, beginning with the mission to only keep track and inform policymakers of international news. From here, the CIA has partaken in a broad range of covert actions and surveillance methods that have received both praise and condemnation. With the Cold War, the CIA began to emerge as an intelligence powerhouse and structured itself to better collect intelligence regarding the Soviet Union. Multiple surveillance strategies were used, and many were invented through the purpose of spying on the Soviet Union. With the rise of new technologies such as satellites, the CIA could widen its surveillance abilities, which has a wide range of implications on the United States and international affairs.

Intelligence Process For the CIA to begin surveillance, a policymaker, such as the president, requests information that he or she believes will assist in decision making. The CIA then determines which surveillance methods will prove most successful in answering the ­policymaker’s request, and begins to collect the necessary information. However, surveillance only produces information. This information must go through processing and exploitation for that

Central Intelligence Agency

information to become useful intelligence. For example, information collected through technical methods is primary data and must be analyzed for the information to be interpreted. The CIA is often challenged by whether more resources should be given to surveillance methods or to processing and exploitation, often ending with surveillance being given more of a priority. This results in the CIA having much more information than intelligence. Another challenge is that the CIA is often not given clear priorities of what to look for while being requested to produce intelligence on an individual issue. Once the information is analyzed, the CIA disseminates the intelligence to policymakers through reports and briefings such as through the ­President’s Daily Brief and the World-Wide ­Intelligence Review.

Overview and Challenges of CIA Surveillance The CIA determines the methods used to collect information primarily through two factors: (1) the nature of the intelligence requested and (2)  the various ways in which the information can be collected. Therefore, the CIA has different collection disciplines that focus on many modes of surveillance. It is a goal of the CIA to have collection synergy, whereby several different types of surveillance are combined, providing a more thorough gathering of information, which can, in turn, be analyzed. Also, a strategy of “all-source intelligence” allows for the lack of information collected by one surveillance method to be alleviated by the information gathered by other means. For example, it was through all-source intelligence that information was gathered from Human Intelligence and Signals and ­Geospatial-Intelligence that led to the information necessary to locate and eliminate Osama bin Laden in 2011. Another challenge that affects CIA surveillance is the wheat versus chaff dilemma. Here, the CIA collects a lot of information, but because that information is primarily useless until analyzed, the CIA is slowed in its mission of disseminating its intelligence to policymakers. A significant imbalance of information and intelligence affects the CIA, and although it is working on means to expedite process and exploitation of its collected

149

information (e.g., through technology that automatically examines data such as images, and cross-checks them through a library of images already collected), this imbalance still occurs.

Technical Surveillance Technical surveillance includes communication intelligence, electronic intelligence, and photoreconnaissance. Here, information, in the form of data or images, is collected by highly sophisticated equipment on planes, ships, submarines, radio and electronic intercept stations, radars, and satellites. The sensors or devices used for technical surveillance consist of always-improving high-resolution and wide-angle cameras, infrared cameras, data receivers, radars, and the like. Historically, the development of technical surveillance has resulted in the invention of highly specialized data processors, along with new surveillance fields, such as cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, photographic interpreters, telemetry, radar, and signal analysis. Because the information received through technical surveillance comes in as real data, these new fields were needed to interpret the data and turn them into easily discernable information to supply to policymakers. Communications and Electronic Intelligence

Communications intelligence is a field within technical surveillance. The goal of communications intelligence is the interception of communication between two parties. In the beginning of radio communication, there was an increase in information that was simple to listen to through surveillance methods. However, because of an increase in surveillance, communication began to be encrypted. Therefore, cryptographers must decode the collected information for messages to be intelligible. With the growth in different modes of communication, such as through cell phones, email, and online communication, the CIA continues to adapt and create new communication ­technology to interpret these new sources of information. For instance, the CIA uses surveillance technologies, such as software, that can l­isten in to cell phone conversations. By tracking, intercepting, recording, and analyzing phone calls, the CIA can discern possible plots against the United

150

Central Intelligence Agency

States, along with using any information collected via the phone to track the location of targets. Electronic intelligence is the interception of radio waves of a noncommunicative type—such as those from radars. Electronic intelligence is mostly used to detect and track hostile aircraft and missiles. However, another form of electronic intelligence, called radar intelligence, also falls under the classification of electronic intelligence. For example, radar intelligence can observe a missile in flight. These electronic surveillance methods allow the CIA to survey the military capabilities of a nation, such as when a target country tests a new weapon. Through tracking the signals released by, for example, a missile test, the CIA can analyze the capabilities and effects new weapons may pose against the United States. Photoreconnaissance

Surveillance through the means of images, in which photos are taken of facilities, equipment, or  forces, emerged while using airplanes flying over targeted complexes. With the progress in  ­aeronautics, photoreconnaissance as a means of  ­surveillance also progressed. For example, in 1955, the CIA began a project constructing a long-range, h ­igh-altitude, photoreconnaissance aircraft. This aircraft became known as U-2 and revolutionized the CIA’s surveillance capabilities. The U-2 plane was the surveillance method used to detect Soviet missiles in the 1960s and was continually used to survey Cuba, alerting the CIA, and therefore the president, in the incident that became known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Similar to how airplanes revolutionized photoreconnaissance, satellites have proven even more  explosive in surveillance capabilities. The CIA currently uses several different types of satellites, including those with low earth orbits, medium earth orbits, geosynchronous orbits, sun-­ synchronous orbits, and highly elliptical orbits. Low earth orbits ranges from 200 to 1,000 miles above Earth’s surface and allows for a detailed view of the CIA’s targets. Medium earth orbits are around 22,000 miles above the earth’s surface, and geosynchronous orbits allow a satellite to stay over the same spot above Earth in a fixed orbit. At this same height, sun-synchronous orbits move along with earth rotations so that the satellite

always remains where there is sunlight hitting Earth. Finally, highly elliptical orbits allow for the satellite to come closer to Earth while over the Southern Hemisphere at a distance of about ­ 300 miles, and then travel further away while over the Northern Hemisphere at a distance of about 25,000 miles. This pattern, coming in close around the Southern Hemisphere and moving farther away over the Northern Hemisphere, allows for the satellite to revolve around the earth two times a day. This is useful because as the satellite approaches the Southern Hemisphere, it speeds up rapidly, and slows down significantly around the Northern Hemisphere, allowing the satellite to be over the Northern Hemisphere 16 out of 24 hours a day. The decision on which satellite to use depends on the nature of the intelligence being collected. A  challenge for satellites is that they can take images only of facilities, equipment, or forces that are not covered. However, most nation-states are susceptible to photoreconnaissance surveillance as they are unable to hide all of their military capabilities under cover, and they routinely partake in training exercises under a rigid timetable. However, within the 21st century, private satellite photo capabilities have emerged, giving the private sector power to take similar images. With the emergence of satellites came the desire to eliminate foreign nations’ satellites. During the Cold War, the idea of antisatellite weapons was conceived, and some were built and tested. However, they were never implemented within the time frame of the Cold War. In 2011, though, China successfully destroyed one of its old weather satellites, proving the potential of antisatellite weapons to be a cause for concern again.

Human Intelligence Human intelligence consists of espionage or the traditional concept of spying. It is the responsibility of the CIA, through the National Clandestine Service, to operationalize this method of surveillance for the U.S. government. Human intelligence primarily involves sending clandestine service operators to foreign countries, where it is their goal to persuade foreign government officials to supply information about their governments to the CIA. The process in which clandestine service

Central Intelligence Agency

operators act to accomplish that purpose is commonly referred to as the agent acquisition cycle. The agent acquisition cycle begins with the clandestine service operator identifying an individual who has access to information that the CIA desires. These individuals usually work within a branch of a targeted nation’s government. The clandestine service operator then assesses the individual, gaining his or her trust and evaluating the potential weaknesses that moving ahead with the selected individual may pose. This part of the process is known as the validation process, in which the clandestine service operator guarantees the likelihood that this individual will prove successful and, therefore, moves ahead with the cycle. After being validated, the clandestine service operator begins recruiting the individual—­pitching the individual the idea of working alongside the clandestine service operator to survey information desired by the CIA. The reasons that the individual may accept the offer are often different, whether it be for money, dissatisfaction with his or her government or job, or the excitement following the idea of spying. If the individual accepts, the clandestine service operator continues to handle the individual, gaining information from him or her and being the individual’s liaison to the CIA. Once the necessary information is collected, or for various other reasons, such as the individual not supplying adequate information, the clandestine service operator terminates the relationship with the individual, ending the cycle. It should be mentioned, however, that the individual may rely on other people that he or she is connected to in order to gain information and then supply such information to the clandestine service operator. This method is simply called “subsources.” The CIA uses several methods concerning human intelligence. An example of such is the use of what is termed “sleepers.” Sleepers are inserted into a target region by the CIA and spend time, sometimes years, integrating themselves into the community. At a time that the CIA determines necessary, the sleeper is then activated and begins his or her mission of collecting information and communicating the findings to the CIA. There are numerous reasons for the implantation of ­sleepers, such as if time is needed for the spy to gain the trust of peers. Like clandestine service operators, sleepers will be given either an official or unofficial

151

cover. An official cover is usually that of the operator holding another type of government job, such as working with an Embassy. This kind of cover is useful as it allows for diplomatic immunity if the operator is revealed. An unofficial cover allows for the operator to have no clear connection to his or her government. However, an unofficial cover makes communicating with the CIA more difficult as the operator needs to separate himself or herself from the CIA and the government. In this instance, the operator also needs a cover, a reason for being in the nation. Historically, these covers have been wide-ranging; however, many have posed as journalists. Human intelligence, through clandestine service operators, has proved the least successful regarding gathering information compared with other forms of intelligence, such as technical intelligence. While spying on the Soviet Union and Communist China during the 20th century, clandestine service operators supplied little useful intelligence. A main reason behind this failure is the difficulty for a clandestine service operator to penetrate the inner workings of a government, where valuable information is communicated. However, the CIA has had some success with different subcategories of human intelligence, such as defectors. Another method for human intelligence is that of walk-in sources, commonly referred to as defectors. These are individuals who voluntarily supply information to the CIA. Defectors usually provide the CIA with names, places, dates, and other information that may be used to identify foreign agents or any other information that would be deemed useful to the United States. Therefore, defectors are most likely to be of value to the CIA immediately after they arrive and offer aid, as they may be able to identify their former colleagues and their operations. However, a challenge with the use of defectors is the possibility that they are dangels, individuals who volunteer with the idea of entrapment. The dangles may supply false information that leads the CIA astray or volunteer to gain information about the CIA’s intelligence process. A famous historical example of a defector is Yevgeny Runge, who in 1967 voluntarily supplied intelligence regarding techniques of the Soviet clandestine intelligence while in Germany. Runge

152

Central Intelligence Agency

was a Soviet clandestine operator who worked under an assumed identity in West Germany and reportedly became a defector after he lost interest in his work with the KGB. This information was useful to the CIA, as no other clandestine service operators were able to gain entry into the KGB. Defectors such as Runge proved to be the most valuable surveillance gatherers within Human Clandestine Service because of that very reason. Throughout the history of the Cold War, it was mostly defectors who supplied the CIA with useful intelligence. Concerning human intelligence, the CIA also partakes in physical surveillance. Here, a clandestine service operator investigates and surveys ­foreign intelligence operators and their contacts. For physical surveillance to occur, the CIA must identify foreign intelligence officers and then watch their activities, communicating their findings to analyze the significance of the interactions. This process is often time-consuming and requires various operators to complete the surveillance process. For example, as a rule of thumb, it takes at least six people and three cars to follow one person 24 hours a day without being identified. The CIA may also use Access Agents who are recruited by the CIA and are close to the target. These Access Agents then supply information regarding the identity and location, sometimes keeping track, of the target individual. Using Access Agents allows for the CIA to allocate its resources from physical surveillance to other means of surveillance. Another human intelligence strategy is to use double agents to learn the techniques and priorities of a foreign government. These double agents may be defectors from their governments coming to the CIA voluntarily or may be recruited by a clandestine service operator to gather information. The use of double agents is oftentimes ­dangerous and may result in the effect of dangle, as previously explained. Finally, the CIA may also use liaisons with foreign governments and intelligence agencies to gather information. This process, commonly practiced between nations with military or economic alliances, allows for the sharing of information that would have been previously unavailable to the CIA. This process is often opened through the CIA supplying the liaison with money, equipment,

information, or privileges on U.S. soil. Overall, the use of liaisons to gain information proves useful as some governments are more capable of intruding into a target nation if they have better national relations with the target nation than the United States does. A challenge for human intelligence is the prospect of clandestine service operators and analysists to turn on the CIA, as how the CIA works to turn foreign government officials against their own nations. In this case, a CIA operative or analyst becomes a double agent—known as a ­ mole—against the agency, supplying a foreign government’s intelligence agency with classified information regarding the inner workings of the CIA, intelligence gathered by the CIA, the aims of the CIA, or the names of covert agents working abroad. The process of how this occurs is similar to how the CIA attempts to gain an informant in a foreign nation, and this has historically been in return for money. A famous example of a double agent within the CIA is that of Aldrich Ames. Ames was a CIA operative and analyst who was convicted for espionage in 1994. Ames’s responsibility within the agency was to infiltrate the Soviet Embassy to identify potential intelligence assets. While at the Soviet Embassy, Ames began to make contact with Soviet KGB officials and began to trade information regarding the names of CIA foreign operators for large amounts of money from the KGB. One instance of this was in 1985, when Ames provided information that the Soviets requested in return for a sum of $50,000. This process continued, with Ames supplying more and more information regarding CIA clandestine operators for money. While the CIA was eventually aware that there was a mole within the agency, it was not until investigators at the CIA suspected Ames after noticing his expensive lifestyle—a lifestyle far out of reach than the salary he was earning at the CIA would allow. Once suspected, the CIA began surveying Ames, using processes of electronic and physical surveillance, along with monitoring his finances. For example, the CIA planted a tracker in Ames’s car so that it could monitor his location and used clandestine service operators to continually follow Ames when he left the CIA offices. Furthermore, the CIA could collect information through physical surveillance regarding his

Central Intelligence Agency

finances and was eventually able to map his increased income to the Soviets who were paying him to spy on their behalf. These surveillance tactics eventually led to the intelligence that Ames was the mole within the CIA and, thus, allowed for his arrest. Surveillance tactics used in this manner to identify a foreign spy or a mole within one’s own agency is called counterintelligence. The methods regarding counterintelligence are like those of the surveillance methods used by the CIA in their operations to collect intelligence of foreign governments. The main difference, however, is ­ who the surveillance is aimed at, and in the aforementioned example, the CIA’s wide range of ­surveillance methodology was used against one of its own.

Open Sources The CIA also uses open sources to gain useful information that may prove significant to U.S. priorities. For example, the CIA may collect and analyze foreign media, public data, and professional and academic publications. Surveillance through open sources is valuable for the CIA as it allows for a large amount of easily collected information. To analyze open sources, the CIA has two main departments for this process: (1) the Open Source Center and (2) the Open Source Works. The Open Source Center focuses on the content of the media, especially how the media are reporting the news. By analyzing how the media of a target nation are reporting news, an analysis may be configured on what the national view is on an individual subject. For example, if a nation reports on the U.S. drone strike on Syria as an act of war against Syria, the CIA may be able to understand that nation’s policy on the Syrian–U.S. conflict better. The other department within the CIA that surveys open sources is the Open Source Works. It is the mission of the Open Source Works to translate foreign open source information and use such information to answer pertinent questions relating to the incidents in that nation. Overall, open source collection is useful for the CIA to anticipate the direction of a foreign covert action or confirm already collected intelligence. Furthermore, open sources allow for the CIA to better understand the mind-set of potential recruits

153

or potential enemies to the United States. Understanding what situations are motivating an individual to act allows the CIA to predict the outcomes and, possibly, allows for intervention to take place.

Bugs and Other Intelligence Devices Within the CIA, the Technical Services Division is responsible for developing new equipment that can be used to assist in the Human Intelligence branch. Often, these devices prove useless outside of the use by individual clandestine service operators. Reports of such devices outline an array of odd and unusual devices, commonly thought of as spy tools. For instance, the Technical Services Division has reportedly created pens that dispense ink not visible to the plain eye; rear-view mirrors that show not the area behind the vehicle, but rather the back seat passengers; and recording devices inserted in personal objects, such as watches, pens, and glasses. The CIA also famously “bugs” rooms in which target individuals are suspected of communicating. Surveillance devices, such as audio- and video-recording technologies, may be placed in a room before the target individuals arrive. So doing requires detailed planning, mapping the room, and searching for optimal locations to hide the surveillance devices. This methodology requires human personnel to position the audio or video recorders within the room, leading clandestine service operators to either place the devices themselves or recruit individuals to do so for them. The emergence of this type of surveillance technology has caused the CIA to attempt to recruit not only government officials but also individuals such as janitors, or other low-level personnel, who work with the CIA.

Terrorism and CIA Surveillance With the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 20th century and the rise of terrorism in the early 21st century, the CIA has shifted its surveillance a­ bilities to combat this new threat to the United States. However, many challenges arise for CIA s­ urveillance on this new front. For instance, unlike the Soviet Union and traditional state actors, terrorist organizations do not operate using large, identifiable

154

Central Intelligence Agency

infrastructures that can be photographed via satellites. Furthermore, terrorist organizations do not use a broad range of communication networks that are detectable to CIA surveillance technologies. Current CIA surveillance of terrorist networks often focuses on what is termed chatter. Chatter refers to the patterns of communication between terrorists, keeping track of who is talking to whom, and at what rate they are communicating. Whenever there is a change in the rate of this chatter, the CIA perceives this as an indication of development toward the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Chatter also allows for link analysis, whereby the CIA establishes connections between various individuals and then continues to survey those people. The goal is that by surveying individual terrorists, the CIA can learn about the aims and methods of the wider terrorist network. Human intelligence concerning terrorism has also proved difficult. Terrorist networks are organized within a close group of individuals who have likely known one another for years, restricting the ability of Clandestine Agents to penetrate the inner circle. Even if a Clandestine Agent could infiltrate a terrorist network, the agent would be required to partake in terrorist attacks, which raises many ethical dilemmas concerning how far a Clandestine Agent should go in his or her mission of collecting information. Furthermore, inserting a Clandestine Agent into a terrorist network is also extremely dangerous, in the sense that if the identity of the agent were to be discovered, the agent would likely be immediately eliminated. This is different from traditional state actors uncovering the identity of a Clandestine Service Agent, as in most cases historically, they have only been imprisoned or expelled from the region. To better enact surveillance methods to collect information on terrorists, the CIA made changes to its photoreconnaissance strategies. For example, the CIA began to purchase commercial satellite images from private companies to subsidize some satellite images collected. Doing so also prevented other sources, such as foreign governments and journalists, from purchasing such intelligence. Furthermore, the CIA began implementing the use of drones, unmanned aircraft supplied with imagery capabilities, to better survey terrorist networks. There are three advantages of using drones for surveillance collection. First, they can

fly closer to target areas and remain close, unlike satellites that must make an orbital pass, and continue. Second, drones do not put human life in danger as they can be flown from sometimes thousands of miles away. Finally, drones supply realtime imagery and video to the CIA. A downfall of drones is the large amount of information that is collected, which must be processed. For example, in 2009, drones reportedly collected 200,000 hours of video, proving the review of such information extremely difficult.

CIA and U.S. Affairs CIA surveillance, and its many methods, has resulted in influencing how U.S. policymakers make decisions, and therefore has guided U.S. foreign policy since its origin. Rising during the Cold War, the CIA, through collecting and analyzing intelligence, alerted policymakers to incidents that were a threat to the security of the United States. For example, in the early 1960s, the Cuban ­Missile Crisis along with the events leading to the Bay of Pigs invasion were both surveyed by the CIA. With regard to the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was through the CIA’s photoreconnaissance that images depicting the growth of missiles and military personnel on Cuba were collected. With regard to the Bay of Pigs invasion, it was the information gathered about troop formation (or the lack thereof) that led to President John F. Kennedy pushing forward on the ultimately dire mission. In both cases, it was because of the surveillance measures taken by the CIA that policymakers acted. This relationship between the U.S. policymakers and the CIA continues into the 21st century with the War on Terror. The CIA is continually adapting its surveillance methodologies to better collect information on terrorists and their cells. For example, it was through the CIA that a terrorist personnel was located, arrested, and interrogated. The information gathered from that interrogation led to the identification of a courier who was then followed to Osama bin Laden’s home. Surveillance of the home, through both clandestine service operators and photoreconnaissance, collected the necessary information about the design of the house and the surrounding area for a special operations team to attack the complex and eliminate bin Laden. From the initial

Chain Gangs

capture to the interrogation to the identity of the courier and the location of the complex bin Laden was staying in, the CIA disseminated the intelligence to senior policymakers and the president. By receiving this intelligence, the president was therefore able to make a decision authorizing the mission to eliminate bin Laden. Overall, the surveillance methods enacted by the CIA are meaningful regarding the ability of policymakers to make informed decisions about foreign relations. Since the intelligence reform of the CIA in the 1990s, the agency has grown more capable in its abilities and continues to research new ways to gather intelligence in the 21st century such as through the Internet. Although the days of covert human intelligence gathering are most likely over, technical means of surveillance is expected to grow. Furthermore, one should expect that the CIA will continue far into the 21st century as the nation’s powerhouse for surveillance, covering all forms of surveillance and reaching into the corners of targets’ homes via computers, smartphones, or, possibly, a clandestine service operator watching from across the street. R. Bruce Anderson and Patrick Webb See also Counterintelligence; Espionage; Intelligence Community; Military Intelligence; Spies; Threat Assessment; United States

Further Readings Borosage, Robert L., & John Marks. The CIA File. New York, NY: Grossman, 1976. Godson, Roy. Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2008. Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017. Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. London, England: Sceptre, 1988.

Chain Gangs A chain gang refers to a group of prisoners shackled at the waist and chained to one another that performs hard labor in full view of the public. Chain

155

gangs were used during the 19th century as a form of punishment in parts of the world including England, France, Australia, and the United States. Chain gangs were first introduced in the United States during the Reconstruction period, which followed the end of the Civil War in 1864. Chain gangs were primarily used in southern states including Alabama, Florida, Georgia, L ­ ouisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, where many prisons were overcrowded or had been destroyed during the Civil War. Chain gangs both cost less than standard imprisonment and provided cheap labor for a region decimated by the Civil War and whose free-labor pool evaporated when slaves were freed by the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This entry reviews the early ­history and purpose of chain gangs, details opposition to this form of punishment, describes a modern version of chain gangs, and highlights pertinent legal rulings. Chain gang labor conditions were notoriously brutal. Chain gangs performed hard labor for 10 to 12 hours per day on projects including building and repairing roads, installing railroad ties, and breaking rocks into gravel. The prisoners remained shackled to one another while laboring, eating, sleeping, and even defecating. Prisoners labored under constant threats from guards and were punished with beatings from a rifle butt, club, or leather strap; with solitary confinement in a “sweat box” (an outdoor wooden box that was not high enough to stand in but not deep enough to sit); by stretching limbs on a Georgia rack; by being chained to two stakes while covered in molasses to attract insects and other creatures; or by the denial of meals. The brutal nature of chain gang conditions often amounted to a death sentence for the prisoners. Chain gangs had higher rates of prisoner deaths than standard imprisonment, with inmates frequently dying from exposure to the elements, exhaustion, dehydration, malnutrition, or being killed by guards or fellow prisoners. Prisoners were sentenced to perform hard labor on chain gangs for a variety of offenses, including violent crimes like murder, and lesser crimes and nonviolent crimes including loitering, public intoxication, or vagrancy, which in the 19th

156

Chain Gangs

century referred to the crime of lacking or breaking a formal labor contract. Other prisoners were sentenced to chain gangs for violating the terms of their parole or probation to commit other offenses. Because the majority of chain gang prisoners during the Reconstruction were African American, critics argue that chain gangs amounted to de facto slavery and were a mechanism designed to socially control and criminalize emancipated slaves who lacked employment. Chain gangs served a number of social functions related to crime and punishment. Chain gangs served to publicly humiliate and degrade lawbreakers, which supporters argued deterred future lawbreaking. Chain gangs also satisfied the public’s desire to see just punishment meted out to criminals. In his seminal work Discipline and ­Punish, critical scholar Michel Foucault observed that chain gangs were a popular public spectacle of punishment in the tradition of public executions, designed to combine punishment and ceremonial torture for the viewing pleasure of the spectators. As the United States entered the 20th century, chain gangs were increasingly criticized for economic reasons. By the time of the Great Depression, organized labor and the unemployed decried the use of unpaid chain gangs to labor in public works projects, demanding that they be given these jobs. By the 1950s, shifts in penal reform and several notorious prison riots prompted new  public scrutiny about whether chain gangs amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and involuntary servitude, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. By the 1960s, chain gangs had fallen out of favor in most U.S. states. But chain gangs were not gone for good in the United States. In the mid-1990s, chain gangs were reintroduced in a number of states, including ­Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Modern chain gangs were swept in on a tide of other tough-on-crime criminal justice policies that became popular with politicians and the public in the 1990s, including mandatory minimum sentences and “three strikes” laws. This trend of popular support for harsh criminal justice measures, known as punitive populism, saw the use of chain gangs spread to a

number of states by the late 1990s. As with the Reconstruction-era version, modern chain gangs served the same social function of humiliating and shaming prisoners in public and satisfying a popular desire for vengeance against criminals. Modern chain gangs varied somewhat from those of the Reconstruction era. Although modern chain gang prisoners were shackled and chained together, they returned to the prison at day’s end to eat, sleep, and shower unshackled. Many states also limited the sentencing of criminals to modern chain gangs to violent felony convictions rather than misdemeanor and nonviolent crimes like vagrancy. Alabama, however, was one state in which prisoners were sentenced to modern chain gangs for probation or parole violations or for violating prison rules while incarcerated. Modern chain gangs also performed a broader range of hard labor, including repairing highways, clearing trash, pulling weeds, painting buildings, and breaking rocks into gravel. Modern chain gangs  were more racially diverse than their ­Reconstruction-era predecessors, and some even included women. Modern chain gangs were challenged by a number of lawsuits alleging that the harsh conditions violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, as well as international law. While the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed aspects of chain gangs, including that punishing a chain gang inmate by attaching him or her to a hitching post violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment (Hope v. Pelzer, 2002), the Court has not directly ruled on whether chain gangs amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. In the present day, chain gangs remain active in several states, albeit with greater constraints than their predecessors. Tara Lai Quinlan See also Crime; Prisons and Jails; Punishment; Slave Trade

Further Readings Austin v. James, 95-CV-637 (M.D. Ala.1995). Burns, Robert Elliot. I Am a Fugitive From a Georgia Chain Gang! Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997.

Chicago, Illinois, Surveillance in Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (trans. Alan Sheridan). New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).

Chicago, Illinois, Surveillance

in

Surveillance serves as a cornerstone of the evidence-gathering portion of criminal investigation necessary to prevent or prosecute criminal activity. Surveillance involves discreet, covert observation of people, places, organizations, or objects. Surveillance assists law enforcement in a number of ways, such as collecting information on suspected criminals, verifying the accuracy of criminal and/ or witness statements, observing crimes in progress, protecting witnesses to criminal activity, and preventing terrorism. This entry reviews the legal cases associated with surveillance capabilities, describes the purpose of cities participating in surveillance activities, and details the widespread and controversial use of video surveillance by the city of Chicago, Illinois, including examples of how the tactic has stopped potential catastrophic attacks in the city. Ultimately, surveillance encompasses a balancing act between the individual right to privacy and the societal right to protection. It is important to realize the distinction between privacy itself and a reasonable expectation of such. For instance, in United States v. McKinnon (1993), the Court denied a right to privacy in a police car, even if unaware of the use of recording devices. The right to privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure without probable cause and judicial affirmation. Certain types of surveillance require probable cause and a court order. Katz v. United States (1967) stipulates the legal foundation necessary for electronic surveillance and wiretapping of phones. In this case, Charles Katz was convicted of gambling on the basis of evidence obtained via recording devices at the phone booth where he placed bets. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction because the police, although acting on probable cause, had not secured judicial approval for use of the recording devices.

157

The ultimate purpose of surveillance is to keep society safe from harm. The U.S. Congress passed legislation, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, authorizing law enforcement, on behalf of society, to intercept communication in order to prevent and/or to prosecute criminal behavior. There are many ways to conduct surveillance, including visual, audio, and aerial. Law enforcement officers choose the type of surveillance based on the purpose for the surveillance and the subject. Stationary surveillance (a stakeout) occurs when the location of the criminal activity is known, while moving surveillance (a tail) allows a greater amount of information to be gleaned about the subjects, their associates, and a host of activities. Since 9/11, many police departments, especially those in large cities, have developed counterterrorism programs to protect their jurisdictions as well as support national counterterrorism efforts. Such activities are encouraged by federal agencies, many of whom cooperate with local law enforcement. Fusion centers and joint task forces have been developed to allow for a coordinated approach to the identification and prevention of terrorist activity, as well as the integration and sharing of information. There are concerns that local jurisdictions lack the oversight that characterizes national law enforcement, that intelligence gathering in general needs greater scrutiny to uphold individual rights to privacy, and that information is collected on law-abiding citizens without proper judicial review. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, known as the USA PATRIOT Act and signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001, granted tremendous latitude to law enforcement agencies to search, detain, and conduct surveillance on individuals suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. An increased emphasis on intelligence gathering about and prevention of terrorist activity in the face of 9/11 has led to greater surveillance activities by law enforcement. As a result, concerned citizens and civil rights groups raise the issues of unauthorized surveillance and entrapment with increasing frequency. Experts agree that the development of human intelligence is pivotal. The information

158

Chicago, Illinois, Surveillance in

gathered by human intelligence sources often leads to surveillance of suspected criminals, which fuels the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of criminal and terrorist activities. In Chicago, the use of surveillance cameras has gained widespread usage. Monitored by the city’s Office of Emergency Management and Communications, they have been integrated into a system called Operation Virtual Shield. The Office of Emergency Management and Communications and the Chicago Police Department possess the capability to monitor the cameras, which yield information on traffic infractions, violence, and areas deemed vulnerable to terrorism such as the Chicago Board of Trade and the Federal Reserve. An estimated 24,000 surveillance cameras in ­Chicago have the capacity to increase the size of the image, provide facial recognition, and track targets from one camera to the next. The theory behind surveillance cameras lies at the heart of crime prevention: that observation reduces criminal activity; that identification of criminal behavior increases prosecution, which serves as both punishment and deterrence; and that society feels safer as a result of police ­presence. However, considerable opposition to the use of surveillance cameras also exists, as do concerns regarding civil rights violations. The ­American Civil Liberties Union objects strongly to the widespread use of surveillance cameras and contends that they infringe on the rights, including privacy rights, of law-abiding citizens. The surveillance cameras in Chicago seem to have mixed results. Traffic accidents have not decreased but speeding has diminished, so there are less severe injuries. Certain areas of the city have seen a reduction in crime rates, and police departments claim reduced costs for crime enforcement. Vocal opponents of surveillance point to the limited data on the efficacy of surveillance techniques to reduce violence and criminal activity, while stressing the need to protect privacy. Examples of the use of surveillance in criminal cases in the Chicago area include the NATO 3 and Adel Daoud. In the case of the NATO 3, surveillance and undercover work by the Chicago Police Department during the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago led to the arrest of several people on charges of plotting terrorist attacks. Although not convicted of terrorism charges, three suspects

were convicted of criminal activity and sentenced to prison. In the case of Adel Daoud, an 18-yearold U.S. citizen living in a Chicago suburb, he was arrested for attempting to detonate a bomb in downtown Chicago. The arrest followed an undercover investigation, which included surveillance, led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Chicago’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. Daoud was convicted of criminal charges, though appeals are pending. On the one hand, there is little doubt that law enforcement will continue to utilize surveillance for investigative and preventive purposes. On the other hand, the battle will continue to rage over individual privacy versus societal protection. Nancy Zarse and Marcia Baruch See also Global Surveillance; New York, New York, Surveillance in; Surveillance, Theories of

Further Readings Carrera, I. and S. Yaccino. “3 in Chicago Face Charges of Terrorism in Protests.” The New York Times (May 19, 2012). http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/us/3-inchicago-face-terrorism-charges-tied-to-nato-protests .html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar% 2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A12%22%7D&_ r=0 (Accessed October 2017). Corum, J. Fighting the War on Terror. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007. Cox, Ted. “Number of Chicago Security Cameras ‘Frightening,’ ACLU Says” (May 9, 2013). https:// www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20130509/chicago/ rahm-boosts-number-of-security-cameras-frighteningnumber-aclu (Accessed October 2017). Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Hillside Man Arrested After FBI Undercover Investigation on Federal Charges for Attempting to Bomb Downtown Chicago Bar” (September 15, 2012). http://www.fbi.gov/ chicago/press-releases/2012/hillside-man-arrestedafter-fbi-undercover-investigation-on-federal-chargesfor-attempting-to-bomb-downtown-chicago-bar (Accessed October 2017). Hess, K. and C. Orthmann. Criminal Investigation (9th ed.). Clifton Park, NY: Delmar, Cengage Learning, 2010. Hess, K. and C. Orthmann. Police Operations: Theory and Practice (5th ed.). Clifton Park, NY: Delmar, Cengage Learning, 2011. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

China La Vigne, N., et al. Evaluating the Use of Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center, 2011. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/ files/publication/27546/412401-Evaluating-the-Use-ofPublic-Surveillance-Cameras-for-Crime-Control-andPrevention-A-Summary.PDF (Accessed October 2017). Price, M. National Security and Local Police. New York: New York University of Law, Brennan Center for Justice, 2013. Schwartz, A. “Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive and Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy.” Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, v.11/2 (2013). United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 1993).

Child Pornography See Internet Pornography

China This entry examines security and privacy-invasive surveillance operations in China. Following Edward Snowden’s leak of classified information about invasive U.S. intelligence agency practices in 2013, Snowden’s request to the Chinese government for asylum remained unanswered. It seems as though Chinese government officials did not want to attract attention to their own privacyinvasive surveillance programs. Prior to the leaks, top Chinese leaders avoided discussion of surveillance and denied claims of utilizing intrusive techniques; however, global and domestic activist groups have claimed that the Chinese government has breached legal rights guaranteed to citizens by the Chinese constitution and by international agreements signed by the Chinese government. China’s surveillance penetration of the public is regarded as comprehensive, with the authorities maintaining jurisdiction over numerous channels of surveillance, including social media, cell phone data, and emails. In late 2014, the agency accountable for Internet affairs in China, the China Internet Network Information Center, a nonprofit organization employed by China to provide

159

Internet statistics, reported 649 million Internet and 557 million mobile Internet users nationally. The Chinese government exploits this extensive medium for various surveillance operations, including to arrest corrupt officials, Tibetan and Uyghur dissidents, and “leftist” bloggers. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds that invasive surveillance programs are imperative to maintaining social stability and to extending the party’s authority. The CCP understands the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in a unique way, notably on the issue of surveillance. The monitoring practices in China frequently lead to arbitrary arrests and interference with privacy. While the use of these techniques assists the government in maintaining control over the country’s massive population, there are numerous negative effects, including restriction of creativity and social instability. Since Chairman Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2013, the government has made an effort toward creating a society under the rule of law. However, China still faces one major ­contradiction— the CCP and its members are shielded from the legal system’s adjudication. Former chairman Hu Jintao created the “Three Supremes” slogan in 2007, declaring that the CCP’s interests take ­priority over the interests of the people, the government, and the constitution. Therefore, the CCP can freely conduct intrusive surveillance despite drafting legislation designed to prevent privacyinvasive intelligence gathering. For example, laws drafted in late 2015 concerning online security and surveillance to protect the public are markedly vague in their definition. These laws are largely dual purpose, providing heightened security for citizens against cybercrime while also increasing the government’s right to interfere with private space. Furthermore, activist groups have expressed concern that the CCP is overly protected from the legal system, permitting officials to define legality on a case-by-case basis. Such political maneuvering is considered to be emblematic of the CCP, to avoid subjecting itself to a judicial system that holds the party accountable.

Public Security Budget As China emerged as an economic superpower at the beginning of the 21st century, the nation increased its security budget exponentially. In

160

China

2015, the estimate of China’s total military budget stood at US$141 billion (886.9 billion renminbi). This 10.1% increase from the previous year’s budget was partly due to Chairman Xi Jinping’s plan for “informatization” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The term informatization became a popular word in China during the 1990s to refer to integrating high-technology weaponry and equipment into military units. Among other goals, officials aimed to increase surveillance and countersurveillance capabilities with the improved technological efficiencies that resulted from the enlarged budgetary allocation. China’s economic transformation has created deep ramifications for freedom of speech and rule of law in China, as well as for key global economic and security concerns of the international community. Transparency Issues

When determining China’s public security budget apparatus, there is difficulty analyzing the full depth of the financial plan due to lack of transparency. Every year, the Chinese government releases official defense white papers that detail the budget and the military strategy. Examination of the various uniformed police, paramilitary, and ­ military units listed in the report revealed that ­ many of the personnel included in the “national defense” section of the white papers were spotted participating in domestic security operations, such as riot control and clearing protesters. By 2013, China reported a domestic security budget of US$120.8 billion (769.1 billion renminbi), which surpassed the US$119 billion (740.6 billion renminbi) allocated for the PLA for the same year. Although there are no exact figures to identify how much is spent on surveillance, there is ­evidence showing that China is using this large budget to actively employ personnel and equipment to monitor its citizens. In 2014 and 2015, China did not transparently report the details of its domestic security spending. Labeling the budget for these personnel as “national defense” makes it difficult to determine whether the public security budget surpassed the national defense allocation, as the trend shows. This indication that the main bulk of the government’s security measures, including surveillance, is focused on the citizens may explain why the government has

reshuffled its defense apparatus starting in 2013, defining national defense differently and marking a requirement for a budgetary reshuffling focused on social stability. Informatization

One of the linchpins of China’s surveillance objectives is domination in information technology warfare strategy. In 2004, Chinese officials gave the public a glimpse of their goal to informatize the armed forces. Encompassed in this arrangement is the ability to use surveillance measures on both domestic and overseas targets. These procedures include hacking into electronic devices, video surveillance, and cell phone intrusion. Since the implementation of the informatization policy, Chinese officials have found new ways to make use of information technology to monitor their citizens. Popular bloggers, rights activists, and protest leaders are examples of individuals who have been alienated by the informatization program. Foreign workers and students residing within China are also subjected to intrusion of their personal virtual space due to the implementation of this policy. The government continues to fund this program and considers it one of its top priorities in its rise to power and influence.

The Surveillance Authorities and Organizations China is controlled by the CCP within a singleparty system. In this form of political organization, the party and the government are two separate entities, with the latter in a subordinate role. While the bureaucracy is subject to the law, the party itself frequently averts legal repercussions for compromising on international agreements and the Chinese constitution. This exclusion includes surveillance and privacy issues. Prior to the Snowden incident, the CCP seldom spoke of legal guidance for monitoring operations and had acted in the interest of the party ideology, social stability, and economic development. The Chinese Internet is one of the authorities’ largest fields of operations for conducting surveillance; individuals spreading sensitive content are promptly incarcerated. In total, hundreds of thousands to millions are employed for stability maintenance, and

China

millions alone are engaged with Internet security, marking this organization as one of the most powerful in China. Stability Maintenance Apparatus

China’s internal security structure includes four main internal security forces: (1) the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), (2) the Ministry of State Security (MSS), (3) the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and (4) the PLA. The remainder of the ­network is made up of the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal systems. These institutions collaborate to maintain the 200,000 or more ­ annual social disturbances. Various surveillance techniques are used by these organizations to extract information on targets. For certain stability operations, blog or chat accounts are accessed. Cell phone data may also be extracted through backdoor access points. Information such as text messages, call histories, and current locations are among the data of interest to the authorities. This private information can be used as evidence to incarcerate suspects. The MPS oversees all domestic police activity in China, including the PAP. The responsibilities of the ministry include police operations, prisons, internal political and economic protection, and communications security. Its lowest organizational units are public security stations, which maintain day-to-day contact with the public. The MSS is one of China’s leading civilian intelligence entities, responsible for both foreign and domestic intelligence work. It is subordinate to the State Council, the chief administrative authority, comprising the premier and the heads of each of the governmental agencies and departments. Among other responsibilities, the MSS compiles intelligence on dissenters in China and reportedly targets dissidents and prodemocracy groups at home and abroad. The MSS was authorized in 1983 to guarantee the security of the nation through preventive actions against enemy spies, operatives, and counterrevolutionary activities designed to disrupt or overthrow the Chinese socialist system. At an estimated strength of 1.5 million ­personnel in 2015, the PAP is organized into 45 divisions, designated with the responsibilities of internal security policing, border defense, government

161

buildings and embassies protection, and safeguarding communications. The PAP is the organization most responsible for maintaining social balance and conducting stabilizing surveillance operations. Some of the most documented PAP surveillance missions were those conducted in Xinjiang and Tibet, when the police force managed procedures for tracking down proliberation activist cells that were responsible for protests and spreading violence. At 2.3 million members, the PLA serves in a supporting role in domestic surveillance operations. In a few recorded instances, the PLA has played a direct role in domestic observation operations. The PLA may deploy soldiers in the thousands only in direct support of domestic surveillance annually, but these soldiers are some of the best trained in all of China for the function of monitoring. While the role of PLA soldiers in domestic affairs is mostly in support of the Armed Police Force missions, a U.S. cybersecurity firm called Mandiant discovered a PLA cyberwarfare group, Unit 61398, conducting malicious surveillance operations on Westinghouse Electric Co. and other U.S. companies. Mandiant brought forth evidence in early 2013 exposing the operation. The unit, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 1 (APT 1), was charged by the U.S. Supreme Court on May 19, 2014, for stealing confidential business data and intellectual property from U.S. companies and planting malware on electronic devices. Despite the indictment against the Chinese military hackers, China’s military chiefs announced in late 2015 their plans to unify all cyberunits under one command and to train specialized cyber spy forces to strengthen operation capabilities. Internet Security Apparatus

China’s Internet security apparatus and its functions are a secret program of the government, rendering the verification of information a challenging task. Exact details of the organizations associated with the Internet security apparatus are also scarce. However, some features of this apparatus have been released to the public. In 2014, Jinping oversaw the first meeting of the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization. This authority is in charge of Internet security

162

China

concerns and provides directives to subordinate bodies that engage in censorship and surveillance. The implementation of this comprehensive apparatus has made Jinping one of the most pro– domestic surveillance leaders in China. There are multiple departments in charge of managing Internet surveillance and security under the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization. The Internet Affairs Bureau and the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion of the State Council Information Office, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s Internet Illegal Information Reporting Centre, the Internet Bureau and the Information and Public Opinion Bureau of the Publicity Department, the Internet Information Security Supervision of the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology are all involved in the process of monitoring Internet activity. There are reportedly 2 million Internet police employed by these organizations to carry out the various technical surveillance measures. On August 4, 2015, Chinese authorities publicly released the Internet law draft that outlined the government’s cyberspace plans for the near future. The document received widespread criticism from many organizations, including Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch. Rather than merely requiring website firms to report illegal activity, the law requires companies to actively participate in censorship and surveillance. Various activist groups are concerned that the law will limit healthy debate and exchange of information, which are paramount for scientific, technological, and social advancement. Furthermore, foreign and domestic companies will be required to censor and restrict online anonymity, store user data in China, and report to the government ambiguous network security incidents. Internet firms in China have already been required to censor messages, assist the police in finding Internet users who post content critical of the government, and ask users to register their real names, citizen identification numbers, or phone numbers on all websites, including chat forums, blogs, and video games.

The Golden Shield Project As revealed by Snowden’s intelligence leak, intrusive surveillance techniques can be implemented

by an organized and well-funded intelligence agency. Perhaps the most capable and unrestrained agency in history, the U.S. National Security Agency was capable of accessing all call history, tracking phone and Internet traffic, utilizing the Global Positioning System to pinpoint a person’s location, reading personal emails, conducting sweeping online searches of individuals, and viewing a person’s webcam, among other invasive surveillance techniques. Not all of the same capabilities of the National Security Agency may be utilized by the Chinese government; however, the Chinese intelligence community is capable of using similar techniques to monitor Chinese citizens. The first effort of the authorities to construct a sophisticated mass surveillance and security system was in 1993 with the establishment of the Golden Shield Project, or Great Firewall. The National People’s Congress (NPC) first passed the law CL97 in 1997, which defined cybercrime. The project was completed in 2006 and has been improved on in the subsequent years. The main purpose of the project has been to utilize mass surveillance and censoring techniques to prevent acts of cybercrime as defined by CL97 and to arrest those who transgress against the party’s administration. As a result of the Golden Shield Project, the majority of all global netizen arrests have taken place in China. From 2012 to 2015, thousands have been detained and fined, including online Internet firms that failed to prevent users from committing these ambiguous crimes. A number of these individuals were civil activists, freedom fighters of Xinjiang and Tibet, or prodemocracy organization leaders. These persons have been charged with crimes such as insulting officials, subversion, inciting a disturbance, and spreading rumors. Many of these offenses were committed via blog or microblog platforms. Furthermore, one of the more powerful Great Firewall features is the ability to perform web blocks and local manual Internet shutdowns. This technique was used in the western province of Xinjiang in 2009 during a Uyghur (an ethnic minority) riot. In response to the violent rioting, the authorities turned off the Internet altogether for several months as part of a security procedure to prevent news of the incident from spreading. Another feature of the Great Firewall is the ability

China

to search for any sensitive Internet content using a highly precise filter. The authorities are proactive at using this capability to delete posts and to find the accounts of offenders. Chat Services Monitoring

The monitoring structures established in China permit the authorities to block outgoing and incoming communications through observation technology built into social networks, chat services, and Voice Over Internet Protocol, among others. In China, private companies are directly accountable to the government for the surveillance of their networks to ensure that banned messages or contents are not circulated. The QQ application, a popular chat service owned by Tencent, permits the government to conduct surveillance in detail on exchanges between users by searching for certain keywords and phrases. The identity of the writer can be established by his or her user number. By law, all users must register with their real name, identity number, or phone number, linking their personal information to their account. The lack of anonymity on China’s web space, such as when using the QQ application, makes the process easy for the authorities to locate the individuals responsible for writing sensitive messages. Because of the QQ software’s intrusiveness, it has been defined by some U.S. technology firms as a virus. Social Media Monitoring

By 2015, online community monitoring had become so ubiquitous that the policing actions had brought about the degeneration of what was once a vivacious and influential community centered on a Chinese version of Twitter, the microblog service called Weibo. According to figures given by the China Internet Network Information Center, between 2013 and 2014, the utilization rate of microblogging declined by 11.4% and the utilization rate of mobile microblogging declined by 13%. During these 2 years, the authorities conducted a dramatic crackdown operation on thousands of bloggers, leading to the arrest of many high-profile online stars. One such well-known example is Charles Xue, who once had 12 million Weibo followers and often shared content that

163

was considered disdainful by government officials. On August 23, 2013, Xue was arrested on prostitution charges, and he later appeared on national television to apologize for spreading rumors on the Internet. The common user is also a frequent target of the government’s crackdowns. Netizens face automatic deletion of posts, warnings from the authorities, and fining for posts that become popular. Publications that say anything negative about certain political figures or policies are immediately the subject of expunction. The suppression on these platforms has been so pervasive that netizens have since gone to alternative communication platforms.

Surveillance Revolution The Chinese state surveillance model reflects a modernist view of surveillance: high technology utilized under the doctrine of rationality and efficiency to maintain social order and harmony in ideology and culture. The process by which China chooses to use surveillance has been described as authoritarian informationalism, an Internet growth and regulatory model combining elements of Confucianism, authoritarianism, and capitalism; private space for creativity and freedom of expression are limited; however, productivity and capital are more easily directed. Surveillance plays a major role in this system to create and maintain a harmonious social system. At the end of 2012, the NPC issued a law, SC-NPC Decision on Internet Information Protection, regulating the collection and use of private data. In the following year, a draft amendment to the nation’s 2-decade-old consumer protection law was announced, and China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued regulations guiding the release of preinstalled applications on smart devices, as well as nonobligatory data privacy guidelines. While the dominance of surveillance practices has been checked by the Snowden leaks in the United States and other nations, the pervasiveness of surveillance in China will likely be projected into the future. Because of the party’s control over the national legal system and media outlets, the leaders of China are widely protected from the impact that the Snowden incident has had on surveillance agencies around the globe. In 2015, China had an estimated 30 million surveillance cameras, with

164

Choice: Security or Civil Liberties

plans to cover all key public areas across the nation by 2020. Beijing officials have declared that the capital is already 100% covered under a network of cameras. The central government is expecting other cities to follow Beijing’s lead by implementing an absolute-coverage policy. The technique is regarded as an invasion of privacy by some civil activists, stating that the cameras are for controlling people’s behavior in public locations. The Chinese government maintains that the purpose of the camera coverage is to avoid crime and maintain social stability. While the government rapidly pursues its physical monitoring campaign with cameras, the authorities are also expanding their Internet surveillance efforts. Chinese officials from the MPS declared in August 2015 their plans to set up network security offices in dominant Internet firms and offices of websites so that the officiating bodies can act quickly to stop illegal online behavior. This new plan will allow government officials to be even more efficient at regulating the Internet from within the companies. As a result, the authorities can prevent content from ever reaching the web. The authorities hope to prevent criticism, violence, and pornographic material from entering the Chinese virtual space. According to Human Rights Watch and Tibetan exile associations, at least 132 self-immolations have occurred between 2009 and 2015. Selfimmolation became an extreme measure for protesting against CCP rule after the 2008 ethnic riots in Tibet. In response, the Chinese authorities strengthened surveillance measures through the development of 600 police checkpoints and stations and the expansion of volunteer security groups. In 2013, the government additionally bolstered operations by stationing 60,000 new officials and party officials in Tibet to conduct political reeducation programs, organize security groups for monitoring, and foster economic development. The campaign expense was more than one quarter of the regional budget. In February 2014, the Xinjiang provincial government announced that over the next 2 years the authorities would increase control at the local level by stationing 200,000 high-level party officials to administer outreach, strengthen surveillance, and promote economic growth, as in the campaign in  Tibet the previous year. Three months later, ­Jinping put in motion a yearlong counterterrorism operation that has led to a number of arrests,

public mass sentencing, and an increase in surveillance. In September, the authorities in the capital of Xinjiang, Urumqi, sought to improve surveillance effectiveness by offering rewards of up to US$163,000 (1 million renminbi) for information on terrorists or religious extremists. Other techniques, such as cell phone tracking, Internet blackouts, website blocking, and chat service monitoring, were also utilized in both regions. In future national or regional crises, the Chinese government can replicate the success of the Xinjiang and Tibet surveillance operations to promote social stability and security at the expense of privacy. Loren Halfmann See also Cybersecurity Legislation; Law; National Security Agency; Orwell, George; Surveillance, Culture of

Further Readings “2014 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2014. http:// www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/ Complete%20Report.PDF (Accessed September 2017). Bartow, Ann. “SYMPOSIUM: The Second Wave of Global Privacy Protection: Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China.” Ohio State Law Journal, v.74 (2013). Jia, Lu and Zeng Fanxu. “Microblogging and Grassroots Surveillance in China.” China: An International Journal, v.12/3 (December 2014). Jiang, Min. “Authoritarian Informationalism: China’s Approach to Internet Sovereignty.” SAIS Review of International Affairs, v.30/2 (November 2010). Mandiant. “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Espionage Units” (February 19, 2013). https://www.fireeye.com/ content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiantapt1-report.pdf (Accessed September 2017).

Choice: Security Liberties

or

Civil

Civil liberties as a concept emphasizes the importance of due process rights, including legal restrictions against unreasonable searches and seizures,

Choice: Security or Civil Liberties

the right to legal counsel, and prohibition of illegal detention, torture, and punishment. National security relates to protecting a nation from attack. While most Americans see national security as a priority, some are willing to set aside due process rights if they would harm a nation’s ability to protect its citizens; that is, they are willing to trade some of their civil liberties for security. This entry focuses on this trade-off.

Terrorism and National Security Some researchers have compared the impact of terrorist attacks, such as that of September 11, 2001 (9/11), with an earthquake because they occur without warning and have the possibility of subsequent aftershocks. The 9/11 attacks changed the U.S. government’s handling of terrorism into a “War on Terror.” In an effort to prevent any aftershocks, on October 26, 2011, the then president George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act (or the United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) into law. This act was designed to increase the surveillance and investigative powers of law enforcement agencies in the United States in an effort to combat terrorism. The act, which received near-unanimous support in both houses of Congress, extends to 342 pages and references other surveillance laws, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Right to Financial Privacy Act. Public concern about terrorism follows a pattern whereby support for efforts to counter terrorist attacks increases following such an attack and decreases as time passes without another attack. Research conducted after the passage of the PATRIOT Act indicated that the U.S. public had strong positions toward it, with 90% of respondents either in opposition or in support. The split in support seemed to come down to a debate about safety versus civil liberties or, more p ­ recisely, a trade-off between civil liberties and personal security, which has continued to the present time.

Concerns Regarding Civil Liberties Shortly after 9/11, members of Congress endorsed the idea of some form of national identification system as a way to fight terrorism. A number of national polls conducted after 9/11 showed that

165

more than two thirds of Americans expressed support for a national identification card. This raises the issue of a trade-off between security, privacy, and convenience. Civil liberties groups raised concerns about national identity cards on the grounds that they could facilitate information sharing among government agencies and increase police power; other critics argued that any security benefits that would come from a national identification system are outweighed by threats to civil liberties, such as overzealous surveillance. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, and in light of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) data mining program that seeks to identify terrorist networks through telephone and email records, many citizens have been questioning what is meant by “unreasonable.” The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in United States v. Choate (1980) that the U.S. Postal Service may record what is written on the outside of an envelope as there is no expectation of privacy with regard to this information. An envelope is placed in a public mailbox, picked up and read by a worker, read by workers sorting the mail, and read and delivered by another worker. However, what is in the letter is private information. In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court made virtually the same point with regard to telephone records in Smith v. Maryland. The record of a telephone call (to whom a call is placed, from whom, and the length of the call) is not private information (think, the outside of an envelope) since it is shared with a third party (the telephone company), but the content of the conversation (think, the inside of the envelope) is private. On the one hand, this is what the NSA’s data mining program does, and supporters have argued that there is nothing constitutionally disturbing about seeking to identify terrorists through telephone pattern recognition. On the other hand, another NSA surveillance program, PRISM, is designed to read the emails of non-U.S. citizens outside the United States. Supporters of this program argue that reading other people’s email (or mail) to protect their citizens is what governments do—it is called espionage—and should a terrorist network in another country send an email to a potential recruit, our government would be derelict in its duty not to intercept it.

166

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010)

Ethical Choice It is a truism that a society can neither have freedom without security nor have security without freedom. The ethics of making the choice between security and civil liberties comes down to balance. It is commonly understood that a society has to be safe, but questions remain as to how far a government should go, and how much will people tolerate, in the name of freedom. What concerns many people is not the constitutionality of programs designed to curtail civil liberties in the name of national security but the possibility of unethical behavior, and considering the power of government entities such as the NSA, any unethical behavior could have drastic effects on citizen’s civil liberties. The ethical choice, then, involves balancing proper safeguards with the existence of such security programs. Rather than abolishing programs aimed at national security entirely, advocates have proposed tightening these programs with the following safeguards: (a) stricter congressional ­ oversight, (b) periodic legislative reauthorization, (c) judicial review, and (d) independent outside review. In addition, they call for programs that measure and examine the effectiveness of these safeguards vis à vis the external threat. Yet there are those for whom no compromise can be made. Rather than trying to balance safeguards with these programs, they call for the complete elimination of safeguards. Their argument is that civil liberties need to be protected at all costs: If the government is allowed to justify the curtailing of some liberties in order to keep its citizens safe, then it will only be a short time before they justify curtailing all liberties for the same purpose. P. J. Verrecchia See also Bill of Rights; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; 9/11; Terrorism

Further Readings Hawdon, James and Robert Wood. “Crime, Fear and Legitimating Ideologies: State of the Union as Hegemonic Strategy.” Criminal Justice Review, v.39/4 (2014). doi:10.1177/0734016814538649 Huddie, Leonie, et al. “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies.” American Journal of Political Science, v.49/3 (2005). doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907 .2005.00144.x

Levin, Brian. “Precarious Balance Between Civil Liberties and National Security: A Historical Perspective.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, v.27/2 (2002). Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d. 21 (1980). Verrecchia, P. J. and Nicole Hendrix. “The Effects of Individual Characteristics on Perceptions of Security Levels and Civil Liberties: An Examination Over a Decade After 9/11.” Virginia Social Science Journal, v.50 (2015).

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission is a 2010 Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of portions of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), also known as the McCain-Feingold Act. Initially, the case raised the relatively narrow issue of whether or not the BCRA permitted a nonprofit group to air a film critical of Hillary Clinton during the Democratic presidential primary; however, a divided court overturned the previous precedent, ruling that portions of the BCRA were unconstitutional infringements on free speech. The decision had farreaching implications, with many analysts arguing that the ruling resulted in the creation of so-called super political action committees (PACS) and the record-breaking sums spent in the 2012 election cycle. Critics of the ruling note that although super PACS are required by law to report the sources of their funding, they may accept donations from 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, which are not legally required to disclose the names of their donors. This arrangement has resulted in large amounts of so-called dark money being funneled to super PACs, with high-dollar donors effectively shielding their i­dentities from both the Federal Elections C ­ ommission and the public.

The BCRA and Issue Ads The BCRA represented an attempt by Congress to regulate election expenditures. One key portion of the act placed limits on the ability of unions, corporations, interest groups, and individuals ­ to use their funds to sponsor “electioneering communications”; these were advertisements that

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010)

mentioned a candidate by name, but they did not specifically encourage viewers to vote for or against the candidate. Under the BCRA, these ads were banned from television and radio within 30 days of a primary election and within 60 days of a general election.

Legal Challenges to BCRA After President George W. Bush signed the BCRA in March 2002, it was subject to immediate legal  challenge by more than 80 individuals and ­interest groups, including Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell and the National Rifle Association. ­ These plaintiffs argued that the restrictions on electioneering communications constituted an infringement on their freedom of speech. Subsequently, in December 2003, the Supreme Court decided McConnell v. Federal Election Commission; in a 5–4 decision, the Court upheld the BCRA, holding that the government had a legitimate interest in instituting regulations that prevented the corruption of the election process.

Background of the Citizens United Case In 2008, the BCRA was again subject to a legal challenge. During the 2008 Democratic primary contest between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, Citizens United, a conservative advocacy group, produced a film critical of Clinton. The group planned to air the film, titled Hillary: The Movie, on DIRECTV and sought to purchase a series of 30-second television spots to advertise the documentary. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), however, found that the ads for the film constituted electioneering communications as defined by the BCRA; as a result, the FEC prohibited Citizens United from advertising the film while the Democratic presidential primary process was ongoing. Citizens United challenged the decision in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the documentary was incorrectly classified as an electioneering communication; the court sided with the FEC, and Citizens United then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court Decision Oral arguments for the case took place in March 2009. Theodore Olson, the attorney for Citizens

167

United, requested that the Court make a narrow ruling. More precisely, he did not challenge the constitutionality of the BCRA but rather asked that the Court find that the advertisements in question were exempt from the BCRA’s regulations. The U.S. government argued that advertisements were correctly classified as electioneering communications. After the oral arguments, five of the nine justices favored the statutory arguments made by Citizens United and agreed that the BCRA did not apply to the film. Justice Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice John Roberts, however, favored a more expansive ruling, which would declare sections of the BCRA unconstitutional. Such a ruling would not only overrule the precedent set in McConnell v. FEC but also address an issue not raised by the plaintiffs in the oral arguments. Facing resistance from the four dissenting justices, Roberts elected to schedule a reargument of the case; this time, the Court asked both sides to present arguments regarding the constitutionality of the BCRA. The reargument took place in September 2009; during the second set of oral arguments, the lawyers for Citizens United made two claims. ­ First, they argued that corporations have the same free speech rights as individuals; in this view, the BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering communications by corporations violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the BCRA’s requirement that the group disclose its donors was also a violation of free speech. The Justices issued their decision in January 2010. In a 5–4 ruling, the majority applied the standard of strict scrutiny to the BCRA’s provisions and found that its restrictions on political speech were unconstitutional. The opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Justices Roberts, Anontin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, endorsed the idea that corporations and unions, as associations of individuals, had the same First Amendment rights as did individual citizens. The majority, however, rejected that argument that the BCRA’s disclosure requirements were unconstitutional. Justice John Paul Stevens composed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayer joined the opinion, which totaled

168

Citizenship

more that 90 pages in length. To demonstrate his dissatisfaction with the majority opinion, Stevens read part of his dissent from the bench; he argued that the decision in Citizens United was likely to increase the influence of money in polices, resulting in greater corruption.

Impact of the Case The ruling in the case made it legal for associations, such as unions and corporations, to directly fund political advertisements that advocated for a particular candidate. The Citizens United ruling, as well as a series of subsequent lower court ­decisions, facilitated the creation of super PACs; these fundraising groups allowed individuals and corporations to contribute unlimited sums of money for direct candidate advocacy, so long as the group did not directly coordinate with a candidate. After the ruling, the super PACs proliferated, and the subsequent 2012 presidential election became the most expensive in history at that time, with outside groups spending three times the amount in 2012 than they did in 2008. The 2016 election cycle also broke records, with the super PACS spending more than $1 billion on issue advocacy, nearly doubling the record set in 2012. Kelly McHugh and Meagan Hebel See also Bill of Rights; Corporate Personhood; Republican Party

Further Readings Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Garrett, R. Sam. “Campaign Finance Policy After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Issues and Options for Congress.” Congressional Research Service Report (February 18, 2010). https:// nabpac.memberclicks.net/assets/docs/LegalHotline/ Legislation/crs%20campaign%20finance%20 after%20citizens.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Hasen, Richard, L. “Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence.” Michigan Law Review, v.109 (2011). La Raja, Raymond J. and Brian F. Schaffner. “The Effects of Campaign Finance Spending Bans on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence From the States About the Potential Impact of Citizens United v. FEC.” Electoral Studies, v.33 (2014).

Levitt, Justin. “Confronting the Impact of Citizens United.” Yale Law and Policy Review, v.29 (2010). McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). Toobin, Jeffrey. “Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated the Citizens United decision.” The New Yorker (May 21, 2012). http:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/moneyunlimited?currentPage=all (Accessed July 2014).

Citizenship Citizenship can be broadly defined as the participatory relationship of individuals with their political community. The legal status, political agency, and identity of citizenship in each sociohistorical context are not fixed but, rather, fluctuate in space and time, determined by correlations of power between dominant and dominated social actors. In this state of flux, citizenship is dialectically connected with privacy and surveillance. In any society, the dominant notion of privacy and the degree of its restriction by social surveillance influence the relation between individuals and political communities, and vice versa. Hence today, privacy is prevalently considered as crucial for the political agency and identity of citizens and is, therefore, embedded in the legal status of citizenship as a fundamental right, whereas excessive surveillance is regarded as having the capacity to corrode personal autonomy and political participation. In this context, the rising phenomenon of pervasive and intensive surveillance intervenes in the contemporary social relation of citizenship to enhance the power of dominant actors and structures and the capacities of social control. This entry discusses the ways in which the concepts and practices of surveillance, personal autonomy, and security shape the structure of citizenship. The rapid development of surveillance technologies and their diminishing cost have increased the capacities of state and corporate powers to massively frame individual behaviors and diffuse regulation and control in the social fabric. In this context, citizenship is remolded to afford more extensive encroachments of privacy by states and enterprises. The manipulation of social risks overwhelmingly in favor of security, the War on Terror,

Citizenship

states of emergency and exception, big data, the construct of privacy as commodity, and an alarming social visibility are manifestations of the same deep transformation of citizenship, in which surveillance plays a key role. Various stories around contemporary surveillance are being covered by different kinds of mainstream and alternative media and play a significant role in modifying citizens’ level of awareness, understanding, and perceptions around privacy, data protection, security, and surveillance. Such media narratives—often characterized by exaggeration, distortion, questionable analysis, and symbolization—contribute to the creation of a culture of fear and insecurity, with further implications for democratic citizenship. Surveillance can negatively influence important societal values, such as individual freedom, autonomy, privacy, solidarity, equality, nondiscrimination, trust, and the rule of law. Such values are of paramount importance for the structure of a democratic system and the support of key democratic processes, such as the creation of associations, political interests, and constructive and alternative ideas, and the raising of criticism. The human right to privacy, according to which no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home, or correspondence, and anyone shall be protected by law against such interference, is considered one of the foundations of a democratic society. Specifically, in relation to personal autonomy, the right to privacy establishes a zone in which citizens have the opportunity to withdraw, contemplate, make choices, and relate to one another without being subjected to the control of ruling powers. By protecting and facilitating personal autonomy, this private zone acts as a prerequisite for the existence of a democratic public sphere because it empowers citizens to effectively engage in activities of collective self-determination. Yet the ways in which privacy is instituted today not only protect but also shape citizenship, and in certain ways they may even promote the surveillance of citizens. By recognizing the right of individuals to freely market elements of their private lives in exchange for goods or services, privacy as commodity has become the dominant manifestation of instituted privacy. The often vague, unclear, and outdated legal framework around privacy, data protection, and

169

security, as well as the increase in covert—and often illegal—antiterror legislations frustrate citizens even more due to the unpredictable consequences of their actions. The democratic prerequisite of the rule of law has often been disregarded, as various revelations and publications around surveillance have shown. This decreases even more the already low level of trust of citizens toward private and public authorities. In this environment of uncertainty, citizens tend to be more careful regarding their social interactions. This, in turn, limits the possibilities of solidarity, which, together with trust, is the basis for meaningful political organization. Social sorting and informational structures of citizenship, such as electronic identification cards and databases, can be employed by states to implement certain types of citizenship categorization and discrimination in terms of entitlements, responsibilities, or access to space and public services. If surveillance acts as a techno-social substrate to relations of domination and subordination, then it undercuts freedom and democracy. It can therefore be reasonably assumed that the intensification of surveillance leads us not to freer and more equal societies but to societies in which relations of exploitation and domination are deepened and multiplied. Citizens are shaped by infrastructures of surveillance in the direction of self-constraint from modes of behavior considered as deviating from the norm. Yet citizens also engage in social struggles against state or corporate surveillance as a means to guard their personal and collective autonomy and reshape instituted concepts of privacy toward wider protection of their private and interpersonal spheres of activity. Thus, the Digital Age reveals a dialectical relationship between citizenship and privacy/surveillance, both complex and mutually shaped. In contrast to various techno-deterministic approaches, the decisive factor in this dialectical process is not technological but genuinely social, that is, the outcome of the correlations of power between citizens’ organizations and prosurveillance state/market forces. Dimitris Tsapogas and Antonios Broumas See also Civil Rights Movement; Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Politics; Social Control; Social Sorting

170

Citywide Sweeps of the Homeless

Further Readings Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (trans. Thomas Burger and Frederik Lawrence). Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1989. Hagerty, Kevin D. and Samatas Minas, eds. Surveillance and Democracy. London, England: Routledge, 2010. Solove, Daniel J. Understanding Privacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Citywide Sweeps

of the

Homeless

A growing number of U.S. cities regularly conduct sweeps of the homeless, ostensibly to protect public health and to create more secure and orderly environments. During these sweeps, law enforcement officials and sanitation workers may descend—sometimes without warning—on areas where homeless people are congregating, thereby either forcing the homeless to move elsewhere or arresting them for outstanding warrants or for minor offenses, such as vagrancy and loitering. In the process, officials routinely destroy the personal property (including food, medicine, clothing, tents, and personal documents) of those they displace. Although these sweeps certainly reduce the number of people seen living outdoors on city streets or in public parks, there is little evidence indicating that they have any long-term benefits in decreasing homelessness, poverty, or crime. Although cities conducting sweeps use public security as a reasoning, it has been argued that the privacy rights of those being swept off the streets are being violated. This entry reviews some of the historical and current city sweeps of the homeless before examining the legality and long-term effectiveness of such sweeps. To cite several instances from news reports in just 1 month (August 2014), officials conducted homeless sweeps in Fort Collins, Colorado, issuing 32 citations for illegal camping; in New Orleans, Louisiana, clearing a large encampment of 140 people living underneath the Pontchartrain Expressway; and in Salinas, California, using three bulldozers and four dump trucks to topple the temporary shelters built by homeless people and to remove couches, mattresses, clothes, bicycles, and other personal belongings to the city

dump. In reporting on such sweeps, news reports often demonize the homeless and their encampments as dangerous to public health, according to an academic analysis of media coverage. Although homeless sweeps have increased in frequency and number during the 21st century, the phenomenon is hardly new. A New York Times report from 1860 describes how police officers throughout the city were alerted by telegraph to strike at precisely the same time and capture every beggar or vagrant—regardless of age or gender— they could find. The result was 486 arrests in a matter of hours, which the newspaper declared a great success in restoring urban order and protecting the public. Other reports indicate that periodic sweeps continued in cities throughout the country, often during periods of economic downturn, when the homeless population swells. For instance, police officers raided and swept homeless settlements along the Potomac River in Washington, D.C., in February 1894; they arrested 95 homeless persons in Macon, Georgia, over the course of one weekend in August 1903; they arrested 23 “vagrants” in Anaconda, Montana, during one 24-hour period in February 1917; they arrested 59 unemployed men in 1 week and another 44 men 6 weeks later in Baltimore in February–March 1930; and in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, they used “broom squads” to arrest 85 persons in October 1951, mostly on charges of vagrancy and loitering. The homeless population increased significantly in the United States during the 1980s, due in part to the gentrification of certain urban neighborhoods and a decrease in affordable housing, in part to greater economic disparity, and in part to the deinstitutionalization of socially and/or economically marginal persons, such as mental patients. As a result, more people found themselves sleeping outdoors or in abandoned buildings, becoming much more visible to law enforcement officials and to concerned and often fearful permanent residents. In response to this social problem, many cities chose to increase the criminal penalties for homelessness, effectively incarcerating offenders rather than providing more social services. According to a survey of 187 cities by the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty in 2014, 34% of cities prohibit camping in public places and 18% prohibit

Civil Commitment

sleeping anywhere in public; 33% of cities have made loitering anywhere in public illegal; 24% of cities prohibit begging or panhandling anywhere; and 9% of cities even prohibit sharing food with homeless people. One of the best-known sweeps of the homeless is the Safer Cities Initiative (SCI), which began as a pilot program in Los Angeles in September 2005, was fully launched in September 2006, and concluded in late 2007. Seeking to remove a very visible homeless population from Los Angeles’s “skid row,” the SCI assigned 50 police officers to destroy homeless encampments, issue citations, and arrest violators of the law. As a result, thousands were displaced from tent cities, thousands more were sent to jails and prisons, and thousands of citations were issued. The SCI succeeded in removing large numbers of homeless and poor people from skid row, but as critics of criminalization have noted, the SCI did not decrease the incidence of homelessness, but rather, it made ­ escaping from homelessness more difficult for those who were displaced or arrested, due to the consequences of moving, losing belongings, or being held in custody. Civil libertarians argue that homeless sweeps may violate the Fourth Amendment as constituting “unreasonable searches or seizures,” especially if cities do not provide sufficiently reasonable notice before the sweeps begin. Homeless a­ dvocates assert that government officials could more effectively reduce homelessness through alternatives to criminalization, such as increasing the availability of subsidized and affordable housing, improving the delivery and efficiency of social services, and ceasing to criminalize homelessness. James I. Deutsch See also Civil Liberties; Crime Control; Vagrancy Laws

Further Readings Amster, Randall. “Patterns of Exclusion: Sanitizing Space, Criminalizing Homelessness.” Social Justice, v.30/1 (2003). “Continued Crusade Against Vagrants.” Macon [Georgia] Telegraph (August 24, 1903). Homeless Media Coverage Study Group. Media Analysis of Homeless Encampment “Sweeps.” Seattle: University

171

of Washington, 2008. https://faculty.washington.edu/ stygall/homelessmediacoveragegroup (Accessed January 2015). “Maloney’s Broom Sweeps Up Streets.” Pittsburgh Courier (October 6, 1951). National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty. Mean Sweeps: A Report on Anti-Homeless Laws, Litigation and Alternatives in 50 United States Cities. Washington, DC: Author, 1996. National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty. No Safe Place: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities. Washington, DC: Author, 2014. “A Raid Upon the Ragged: Extensive Arrest of Mendicants and Vagrants.” The New York Times (September 5, 1860). http://www.nytimes.com/ 1860/09/05/news/raid-upon-ragged-extensive-arrestmendicants-vagrants-scenes-incidents-police.html (Accessed October 2017). Vitale, Alex S. “The Safer Cities Initiative and the Removal of the Homeless: Reducing Crime or Promoting Gentrification on Los Angeles’ Skid Row?” Criminology & Public Policy, v.9/4 (2010). White, Michael D. “Jim Longstreet, Mike Marshall, and the Lost Art of Policing Skid Row.” Criminology & Public Policy, v.9/4 (2010).

Civil Commitment Through their inherent police power, states in the United States are permitted to civilly commit certain individuals, usually those who are deemed dangerous, in order to promote public security. Although the commitment process is purely civil, it often functions synchronously with the criminal justice system and effectively absolves local law enforcement of the burden of ongoing surveillance or monitoring of the individual. Arguably, society as a whole is safer when dangerous offenders are civilly committed because they are physically removed from society. Society may also be more secure when law enforcement resources are not taxed by having to monitor individual offenders. Four types of civil commitment are the most common: (1) postsentence for sex offenders, (2) post–trial/plea for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, (3) pretrial to restore competency, and (4) precrime for mentally ill persons who present a danger. For most types of civil commitment, the state must establish proof of future

172

Civil Commitment

dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. Often, this evidence comes in the form of expert psychiatric testimony coupled with evidence of past behavior.

Convicted Sex Offenders Civil commitment for convicted sex offenders occurs postsentence after the resolution of a criminal matter. In the United States, the federal government and at least 20 states have enacted legislation permitting the involuntary civil commitment of sex offenders who have served their prison sentences. Most statutory schemes provide for the indefinite confinement of any person deemed to have a mental abnormality that will cause the individual to commit sex offenses in the future. In most jurisdictions, the state can establish a threat to safety and security by proving mental abnormality and future dangerousness with clear and convincing evidence. This burden is lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal conviction, even though the hearing may result in indefinite confinement similar, if not identical, to prison. Courts generally balance the state’s need to protect and secure society against the offender’s privacy and right to be free after serving a prison term. In addition, the law is vague regarding the definitions of mental abnormality and future dangerousness. Finally, because it is a civil process, not a criminal process, the opportunity for meaningful review is significantly limited and the risk of unconstitutional confinement high. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of involuntary civil commitment in the context of sex offenders in Kansas v. ­Hendricks. It held that civil commitment of convicted sex offenders after they have served their prison sentences is constitutional when those offenders present a threat of future dangerousness to the community.

Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity For individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity, civil commitment occurs on termination of a criminal case. A person who is found not guilty by reason of insanity, based on either a negotiated plea or a jury verdict, may be civilly

committed (instead of sentenced to prison) in most jurisdictions. The decision to civilly commit must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has a mental illness or abnormality and presents a risk of future dangerousness to society. The purpose of civil confinement is to protect and secure society from the offender. After commitment, periodic evaluations are mandated to determine whether the threat of dangerousness persists. This procedure protects ­ the offender’s right to privacy and freedom from confinement if the threat of danger is eliminated. Once there is no longer a threat of danger, constitutional privacy protections demand that the ­individual be released. One advantage of civil commitment of those found not guilty by reason of insanity is that individuals who have mental illnesses and disorders can receive treatment. Sometimes treatment can restore an individual, thereby facilitating societal reentry.

Competency An individual who is not competent to stand trial may be civilly committed prior to trial in an attempt to restore competency. This type of involuntary civil commitment is not predicated on future dangerousness, and it occurs prior to resolving any pending criminal cases. In other words, the accused has not yet been afforded due process, and the risk of violating privacy rights is high. Confinement in this type of case is intended to facilitate due process and is premised on the likelihood that the individual can be restored and made competent to stand trial. Generally, courts rely on the evaluations of expert psychiatric witnesses when determining whether a person is competent and whether civil commitment is likely to restore the individual’s competency. A person is not competent to stand trial if the individual cannot meaningfully assist in the preparation of the case for trial or if the individual does not understand the nature of the charges or the criminal process. The civil commitment lasts only until the individual is restored to competency or a determination is made that competency cannot be restored. Although a more secure society may result by

Civil Disobedience

confining the individual, this is not the purpose or  goal of pretrial confinement to restore competency.

Mental Illness The only type of civil commitment wholly divorced from the criminal justice system involves the commitment of individuals who are experiencing acute mental illness. The criteria for commitment are that the individual experiences an acute mental break and presents a danger to self or others. In these cases, the state’s interest in protecting and securing society outweighs the individual’s rights to privacy and freedom. Generally, this type of commitment is limited to no more than 3 days. If an ongoing danger persists, the individual is ­entitled to a hearing, at which time the state is required to prove by clear and convincing ­evidence that the individual presents a danger to self or the community. This process preserves the individual’s constitutional privacy rights while balancing the state’s interest in protecting and securing society. Continuing commitment may occur only if the court finds that the individual has a mental illness that poses a security threat to the individual or the community.

Future Dangerousness Perhaps the most controversial aspect of civil commitment is the determination of future dangerousness. Generally, courts rely on testimony by psychiatric expert witnesses, but the measuring tools and criteria are imperfect. In addition, the recommendation is based in large part on one person’s opinion about what the measuring tools reveal. Currently, no truly objective way to determine future dangerousness exists, which makes it challenging for courts to accurately balance the state’s interest in protecting and securing society against the individual’s right to privacy and freedom. Commitment standards vary from state to state, and recent studies indicate that psychiatrists in states with strict dangerousness standards are more likely to find clear and convincing evidence of danger than those in states with broader standards. The modern therapeutic jurisprudence movement tends to support early intervention for

173

individuals with mental health issues. Proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence argue that the criminal justice system interferes with the indi­ vidual’s ability to receive the necessary treatment in a timely manner, while failing to provide any long-term or tangible security protection to society. Although they are not necessarily advocates of involuntary civil commitment in all circumstances, proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence favor increased community resources for those with mental illness. Elizabeth Berenguer See also Mental Disability Laws; Mental Health Inpatient Facilities; Sex Offender Laws; Specialty Courts for Mental Health

Further Readings Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). McAllister, Stephen R. “Sex Offenders and Mental Illness: A Lesson in Federalism and the Separation of Powers.” Psychology, Public Policy, & Law, v.270 (1998). Schopp, Robert F. “Mental Illness, Police Power Intervention, and the Expressive Functions of Punishment.” New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement, v.39 (2013). Stone, Donald H. “Confine Is Fine: Have the NonDangerous Mentally Ill Lost Their Right to Liberty? An Empirical Study to Unravel the Psychiatrist’s Crystal Ball.” Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law, v.20/2 (2012). Yung, Corey Rayburn. “The Ticking Sex-Offender Bomb.” Journal of Gender, Race & Justice, v.15 (2012).

Civil Disobedience In 1848, Henry David Thoreau used the term civil disobedience, and since that time the term and practice have been widely used. Citizens frequently use civil disobedience as a form of social protest against laws and governing forces that are viewed by the collective as unjust to society, a threat to a person or group’s security, or potentially intruding on individual privacy. This entry defines civil disobedience and its purpose, reviews historically significant acts of civil protest, describes how civil disobedience contributed to

174

Civil Disobedience

the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, and concludes with a review of two influential marches that helped facilitate progress toward equality. For an action to be considered an act of civil disobedience, certain criteria must be met. The protest must be public and witnessed by other ­citizens, the protest must be nonviolent and collective, and citizens must be protesting against laws, policies, or practices that they consider immoral or unjust to society and individuals. The practice of nonviolent protests, however, does not shield the protesters from the potential of violence from everyday citizens, police officers, and other highranking officials who do not want them protesting the status quo in society. Violence against protestors has ranged from yelling and spitting to psychological and physical injury—including death in some instances. The practice of civil disobedience has been utilized to protest against laws and government policies that support racial inequality, gender inequality, animal cruelty, discrimination, and environmental degradation. In American history, the Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, is considered one of the first examples of civil disobedience, when American colonists protested against taxation and destroyed huge cargos of tea shipped from Britain. Since that time, civil disobedience has become a common form of protest in the United States and has ranged from environmentalists protesting oil drilling to citizens protesting the use of surveillance by the U.S. government after the attacks on September 11, 2001. In 2013, environmentalists used civil disobedience in front of the White House to protest and bring attention to the Barack Obama administration’s lack of policies concerning the drilling of oil and climate change. Mahatma Gandhi’s fight for India’s independence from British rule during the 1920s to 1940s and his large-scale protest against racism, discrimination, and the mistreatment of people from India living in South Africa brought attention to the practice of nonviolent civil disobedience as a means to rally for civil rights. Inspired by ­Gandhi’s civil disobedience protests, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. used civil disobedience to protest the U.S. laws of legal segregation in the South in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Civil Rights Movement In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. citizens (both black and white) used civil disobedience to protest the laws of legal segregation in the South. The Civil Rights Movement is an example of the use of civil disobedience to protest laws, policies, and practices that citizens consider unjust to individuals. The public protest against these laws and government policies took place in the form of sit-ins, bus boycotts, and marches. On college campuses across the United States, students used sit-ins as a form of civil disobedience to protest issues such as separate lunch counters for whites and blacks and the government’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Sit-ins at a Woolworth’s store in North Carolina were the catalyst that compelled the Woolworth chain of stores to change its policy on separate lunch counters for whites and blacks across the South. On February 1, 1960, four black college students (Joseph McNeil, Franklin McCain, Ezell Blair Jr., and David Richmond) from North C ­ arolina Agricultural and Technical State University in Greensboro walked into the Woolworth’s store in Greensboro, North Carolina, sat at the white lunch counter, and didn’t leave until the store closed. The next day, they were joined by other students, and by the 4th day, hundreds of students were involved in the sit-in at the Woolworth’s store in Greensboro. In addition, in fewer than 10 days after the sit-in began, college students in several counties in North Carolina held sit-ins in  their towns. In addition, college students in Richmond, Virginia, and Nashville, Tennessee, ­ joined the growing number of protesters. As a result, Woolworth’s caved under the pressure and changed its policy on separate lunch counters for whites and blacks. Ideally, the desegregation of other aspects of social life in the South would have followed the results of the sit-ins at Woolworth’s. However, on December 1, 1955, the courageous act of Rosa Parks, an African American who refused to give up her seat to a white man on a public bus in Montgomery, Alabama, sparked the Montgomery Bus Boycott days later. Parks’s determination to change the unjust laws and practices of legal segregation catapulted her into the public eye. Parks was arrested for her actions on the bus, but her act of individual civil disobedience transformed the

Civil Disobedience

175

fight for racial equality in the United States and around the world. Parks’s involvement in the National Association for the Advancement of ­Colored People (NAACP) and her activism, moral standards, and standing in the community as an upstanding and righteous woman made her a prime candidate to refuse to give up her seat and to get arrested as a result, garnering national and international coverage in the process. King spoke with Parks after her arrest, seeking her help with organizing the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which began on December 5, 1955. During the Civil Rights Movement, King, because he was such an influential leader in the movement, was under constant surveillance by the police, a tactic that had been used to dismantle collective acts of civil disobedience throughout history. As a result of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Civil Rights Movement gained the momentum it needed for the three Selma-to-Montgomery (Alabama) marches in 1965.

in the spirit of civil disobedience, marched in Washington, D.C., to protest the lack of economic growth for African Americans. The march was mostly peaceful, devoid of the violence that citizens would witness 2 years later during the march to Montgomery. The Selma-to-Montgomery marches were a 54-mile walk with a focus on the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment (the right to vote). On August 6, 1965, just a few months after the Selma-to-Montgomery marches and a series of other marches, the then president Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, ensuring that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments would be enforced.

Civil Rights Marches

Allen, Barbara. “Martin Luther King’s Civil Disobedience and the American Covenant Tradition.” Publius, v.71 (2000). Armaline, William T., et al. Human Rights in Our Own Backyard: Injustice and Resistance in the United States. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. Brinkley, Douglas. Rosa Parks: A Life. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005. Carson, Clayborne, ed. The Autobiography of Martin L. King, Jr. New York, NY: Warner Books, 2001. Combs, Barbara. From Selma to Montgomery: The Long March to Freedom (Critical Moments in American History). New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. Garrow, David. “The Origins of the Montgomery Bus Boycott.” Journal of the Southern Regional Council, v.7/5 (1985). Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd. “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past.” Journal of American History, v.91/3 (2005). Jones, William P. The March on Washington: Jobs, Freedom, and the Forgotten History of Civil Rights. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2014. Klinkner, Philip A. and Rogers M. Smith. The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994. McGuire, Danielle L. and John Ditter. Freedom Rights: New Perspectives on the Civil Rights Movement. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011.

The use of marches as a form of civil disobedience garnered the Civil Rights Movement an enormous amount of public attention and media coverage, which helped propel the movement forward. The media coverage allowed Americans to witness the treatment of the nonviolent protestors (including women and children) from their living rooms. The protestors were beaten with police clubs, sprayed with fire hoses, bitten by dogs, and bombarded with tear gas. As with the sit-ins, the participants faced the possibility of arrest, injury, or, in some instances, even death. Some of the notable marches include the 1963 March on Washington, D.C., and the 1965 Selma-to-Montgomery marches, with the first of the three Selma-to-Montgomery marches often referred to as “Bloody Sunday” because so many people were beaten, maimed, and killed by the police as they marched to Alabama’s capital. In these marches, thousands ­ showed their public outrage regarding the unequal treatment of African Americans, the need for jobs, the plight of the poor, and unequal rights, including voting rights. The protestors understood the law that allowed them to voice their grievances about policies and the government in a collective group. On August 28, 1963, thousands of citizens,

Ruth Thompson-Miller See also Civil Rights Movement; Plessy v. Ferguson (1896); Civil Liberties.

Further Readings

176

Civil Liberties

O’Brien, M. J. and Julian Bond. We Shall Not Be Moved: The Jackson Woolworth’s Sit-In and the Movement It Inspired. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2013. Thoreau, Henry David. Civil Disobedience and Other Essays. Mineola, NY: Dover, 1993.

Civil Liberties Civil liberties are designed to prevent the government from intruding on the various manifestations of individuals’ freedom. Often, civil liberties and national security come into conflict. During times of national crisis, for example, nations—and in an increasingly globalized world, international institutions—must balance individuals’ civil liberties and national security. This entry devotes particular attention to the United States and the rationale for civil liberties in that country; it also includes discussions of global issues and the policies of other nations. An understanding of what civil liberties are is enhanced by specific discussions of the way in which civil liberties have been reflected in the legal systems of various countries and in the emerging field of international law. The entry then discusses some of the main areas in which civil liberties have become contentious and the difficulty in reconciling these tensions.

What Are Civil Liberties? Whereas civil rights involve the state protecting historically marginalized groups, civil liberties are protections for individuals from the restriction of their rights and expression by the state. Examples of key civil liberties include freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and due process of law. Freedom from torture, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to legal counsel are additional examples of civil liberties. In terms of national security, freedom of speech is often the most prominent civil liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court has designed a test for speech known as the clear and present danger test. If there is a clear and present danger, then speech can be restricted. Other civil liberties that can be

subject to questions of security include freedom of the press and freedom of expression. A particularly contentious area is what, if any, limits should be placed on freedom of religion. When security issues are associated, with or without merit, to particular faiths, some people may raise concerns and advocate for restrictions. Civil liberties provide a means for individuals to be treated fairly in society and to shape the way in which their community is governed. Diminishing civil liberties has the potential to create a society in which governments abuse power and citizens lose even the most basic liberties. Past examples of nations where civil liberties were abolished often serve as cautionary tales; one such example is Nazi Germany, which began under the democratic Weimar Constitution. By the same token, many democracies have restricted civil ­liberties during times of war, in part due to the danger that any release of information could ­jeopardize national security. Laws involving civil liberties, or the restriction thereof, are sometimes passed by democratic institutions or implemented by executive action. Thus, the judicial system is often the place where the limits to civil liberties are discussed.

Civil Liberties Protections and the Law There are many ways in which civil liberties are protected throughout the world. As concern for human rights has grown, civil liberties have been included among other rights, such as education and health care, that often represent the state’s provision of protection and services. A body of law and practice has been built throughout the centuries and has often been tested and breached in the name of security. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, written shortly after the founding of the United Nations in 1945, outlines several rights that have helped form the basis of international law. The protection of civil liberties dates back at least to the Magna Carta of 1215, which assured protections in terms of the writ of habeas corpus. Various nations have bills of rights and/or constitutional protections governing civil liberties. For example, in the United States, individuals are protected from incursions on the freedom of speech, religion, the press, and assembly by the

Civil Liberties

Constitution of the United States. In 1982, C ­ anada adopted the Canadian Charter of Rights, which provides for civil liberties and also protects language rights while including strict prohibitions against hate speech. In addition, many nations enact laws and policies addressing civil liberties. These laws and policies often come under stress during periods of war or threats of national security. For instance, in the current Digital Age, nonstate actors ranging from hackers to terrorists groups seek to access electronic systems, so nations are challenged to create new laws and policies that do not violate civil liberties but that deal with these potential indefinite threats.

Challenges to Civil Liberties and National Security When there are threats to national security, balancing civil liberties with the needs to protect and preserve security is always an issue. Focusing on the United States, which provides an interesting microcosm, this section explains how war has affected civil liberties and how nonstate actors and the global War on Terror are creating new challenges. These challenges are exacerbated by the global availability of information. During World War I, legislation such as the Espionage Act of 1917 was used to suppress the speech of individuals seeking to protest the activities of the government. In the name of national security, individuals such as the Socialist Party of America’s presidential candidate, Eugene V. Debs, were imprisoned. In the immediate postwar era, government immigration policies were used to deport antigovernment figures such as Emma Goldman. Such tactics during this era represent a repression of dissent. Some scholars have argued that the U.S. government went too far in restricting civil liberties. During the 1920s, in part as a response to the cases brought to the U.S. Supreme Court by those who dissented during this turbulent period, the Supreme Court began to take a more prominent role in civil liberties cases. The concept of clear and present danger as a limit to free speech was articulated during this period. World War II saw more emerging issues of violations of civil liberties. Beyond suppression of speech, there was also the internment in camps throughout the United States of Japanese Americans

177

and others whom the U.S. government considered to  be threats to national security. The end of World War II did not represent an end to conflict. Rather, the Red Scare of the early 1950s saw the U.S. ­ government investigating people based on their suspected communist ties. The Pentagon Papers and the work of Daniel Ellsberg is another example of conflict between civil liberties and security. Ellsberg released to press outlets, including The New York Times and The Washington Post, classified documents regarding the U.S. government and its policies during the Vietnam War. The documents showed how many of the plans for the war were poorly thought out, and they also provided a window into the disconnect between the public presentation of the ­Vietnam War and private thinking. The Supreme Court protected the freedom of the press in this particular matter, and although Ellsberg was charged under the Espionage Act, all charges against him were dismissed. While it can be argued that the release of the classified documents had a negative impact on national security, it can also be said that the release of the information gave the public insight into a dysfunctional and ultimately harmful process. During the Cold War, national security activity also expanded into new areas. The Central Intelligence Agency conducted clandestine activities including facilitating coups in nations such as Iran and Guatemala. As national security expanded beyond traditional warfare and civil liberties began to enter the information age, new conflicts began to emerge.

The War on Terror and Civil Liberties The aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, represented a new era in terms of civil liberties. The first attack on the continental United States since the War of 1812 was a serious event. Rather than seeking to fight specific countries, a global War on Terror was called for, although not formally declared. Coming after a decade that saw the rise of the Internet as a form of communication and other decentralized and difficult to trace forms of communication such as cell phones and text messaging, new conflicts began to emerge. The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act with minimal opposition in 2001 represented an early

178

Civil Liberties

challenge to civil liberties. The act gave the U.S. government unprecedented powers in the name of national security. Little debate was conducted among elected officials as areas such as library records became subject to possible scrutiny. Global responses to civil liberties emerged in other nations as well. Great Britain, for example, considered policies that were seen by many as a violation of due process in the aftermath of the attacks that occurred in 2005. In addition, there were also increasing efforts to coordinate national security efforts, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity. In the United States, cybersecurity became an area that was primarily dealt with through the inner workings of the National Security Council and the National Security Agency (NSA). During the administration of George W. Bush, presidential directives were issued regarding the protection of government databases. Moreover, protecting the records of major corporations also became a growing concern of the U.S. government and was an area in which the former president Barack Obama issued presidential directives designed to create a policy infrastructure. The United States received a lot of criticism for certain national defense practices. The detaining of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques (e.g., waterboarding, or simulated drowning), and the increased use of technology to monitor communications of all kinds all received criticism. The U.S. government attempted to construct a rationale for these activities, particularly through the so-called Torture Memos that were authored by John Yoo when he was serving with the Office of Legal Counsel. Despite tactics that were objected to by many civil libertarians, the U.S. government attempted to prepare legal reasoning for its actions, and many policymakers noted that they felt that difficult steps needed to be taken in the interest of national security. The U.S. government also used secret detention facilities in nations such as Poland, known as “black sites.” Objections to such actions were raised by the United Nations in the European Court of Human Rights.

Recent Controversies Over National Security In 2014, a global controversy emerged over surveillance activities undertaken by the NSA, as a

result of confidential information released by an NSA subcontractor, Edward Snowden. While civil libertarians had objected to policies in the past, the actions of the NSA began a mass discontent over the collection of metadata. In addition, many world leaders, such as the German chancellor Angela Merkel and Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, were angered by the idea that the United States was spying on their emails and other electronic communications. Although the U.S. government charged Snowden under the Espionage Act, he fled the United States and sought asylum in Russia, even spending a period of time in the ­Moscow airport awaiting the requested asylum. Before the Snowden case gained international attention, another prominent case brought attention to the issue of emphasizing national security over freedom of speech, the press, or conscience. In January 2010, U.S. Army intelligence analyst Bradley Manning (now Chelsea Manning) downloaded hundreds of thousands of national security documents and turned them over to WikiLeaks in February 2010. The WikiLeaks release brought many documents to the press and was seen by many members of the national defense infrastructure as endangering the lives of informants. Manning was charged under the Espionage Act and in 2013 was convicted of 17 charges and sentenced to 35 years in prison; however, in January 2017, Obama commuted the remainder of Manning’s sentence.

Contemporary Challenges While in the first years after the attacks of ­September 11, 2001, there was strong support for increased security even if it involved giving up civil liberties, there continues to be conflict in terms of law and public opinion shaped by current events. For example, in January 2015, a satirical French newspaper, Charlie Hebdo, was the subject of an attack that killed 12 people. While many used the opportunity to defend civil liberties, some people in France were arrested for various social media posts and other behavior that was seen as suspect. These attacks show the contemporary nature of security threats. Unlike during previous eras, such as World War II or the Cold War, specific national powers are not always the subject of conflicts. Rather, decentralized conflicts and social media create new challenges for which it is

Civil Rights Movement

difficult to craft policies that balance civil liberties and national security. Matthew J. Gritter See also Free Speech; Freedom of Expression; National Security; National Security Agency; National Security Agency Leaks

Further Readings Doherty, Carroll. “Balancing Act: National Security and Civil Liberties in Post 9/11 Era” (June 7, 2013). http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/ balancing-act-national-security-and-civil-liberties-inpost-911-era/ (Accessed September 2017). Farber, Daniel and Suzanna Sherry. A History of the American Constitution. St. Paul, MN: West, 1990. Fisher, Louis. Defending Congress and the Constitution. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Shipler, David. The Rights of the People. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2011.

Civil Rights Movement From the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 to his assassnation in 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was a transformative figure in the Civil Rights Movement. His journey, along with civil rights activists throughout the United States, is a testament to the power of radical social change and the determination of individuals dedicated to the cause of equality. His philosophy of nonviolent protest provided the blueprint that shaped the movement for almost 2 decades. Despite the eventual success of the movement, King and hundreds of protestors drew the attention of local and federal law enforcement officials. J. Edgar Hoover, the first appointed director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), spied on King regularly using a variety of surveillance technologies and programs with the sole purpose of delegitimizing and imprisoning the leaders of the movement. This activity raises several concerns pertaining to the legitimacy of the U.S. government’s actions in spying on American citizens. The U.S. Constitution guarantees citizens the right to privacy and freedom from government tyranny, yet the government appeared to usurp

179

the rights of King and other civil rights leaders on a regular basis. This entry offers a brief overview of the history of the Civil Rights Movement and an examination of the U.S. government and the FBI’s response to King’s leadership of the movement. In relationship to the surveillance programs and technology used to spy on King, two questions are often raised: Was the Civil Rights Movement threatening to the safety and security of the country at large? Or did Hoover and the FBI have a vendetta against King?

History of the Civil Rights Movement The Civil Rights Movement was a period in U.S. history when black people marched to gain legal and federal recognition of several constitutional rights gained in the aftermath of the Civil War era (1865). For example, The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment gave former slaves the right to citizenship, and the ­Fifteenth Amendment gave black males the right to vote. Many whites resisted these changes, and groups such as the Ku Klux Klan swept the southern countryside spreading fear and terror within the black population and among white sympathizers. Blacks fled the South and migrated to the northern states hoping for freedom and the ability to live free of violence. Not much changed, however, as they soon discovered a world of racism and discrimination. The North was divided along color lines, with institutions of racism imposing strict social divisions between blacks and whites. Laws validating an ideology of “separate but equal” restricted access to education and the labor market. Social memberships and interpersonal relationships between blacks and whites were forbidden. Blacks and whites were also forbidden from eating side by side in restaurants or sharing bathrooms and water fountains. Movie theaters were segregated, with blacks relegated to one ­section of the theater and whites to another. In short, racial discrimination throughout the North and South negated the guarantees of the Constitution and set the stage for a confrontation over the nature of freedom and equality in the United States. Therefore, the modern Civil Rights Movement started in the “Jim Crow” South, where racial discrimination and oppression against black people, in general, rose out of the post-Reconstruction era

180

Civil Rights Movement

of the South (1865–1877). The U.S. Supreme Court codified this system in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) by upholding the constitutionality of the laws related to racial segregation of public facilities, making segregation the law of the land. Black people in general rejected this regime of racism and separation between the races, and black leaders prepared to fight back. They began by filing a series of lawsuits against the federal government and then conducted community organizing and actively pursued changes in labor laws. These leaders were soon joined by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), founded in 1909. The NAACP advanced the fight to end discrimination through litigation, education, and lobbying efforts in the U.S. Congress. These efforts, which inevitably led to the reversal of Plessy v. Ferguson, paved the way for the Supreme Court to overturn sections of the separate but equal doctrine. The fight over school integration, for example, started in the spring of 1951 after several student groups at Moton High School in Virginia held protests against the overcrowded classrooms and the lack of educational facilities. The NAACP joined the protest and filed several cases challenging the Board of Education, codified under Brown v. Board of Education (1954). The plaintiffs charged that the education of black children in separate (i.e., segregated) schools was unconstitutional. NAACP attorneys argued to the Court that black children were the victims of a form of school segregation that negatively affected their future. The Court handed down its decision in May 1954. The decision ordered the phasing out of school segregation; however, it did not fully overturn the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, which was still effective due to an additional ruling in favor of segregation in transportation. Brown v. Board of Education did, however, advance a framework for weakening this section of the separate but equal doctrine. In 1955, Rosa Parks was arrested for refusing to give up her seat on a public bus to a white passenger. The separate but equal doctrine relegated black people to ride in the back of the bus despite the fact that fares were the same for both blacks and whites. Several men of color offered their own seats; however, Parks refused on principle. She was arrested, tried, and convicted of disorderly

conduct and violating a local ordinance. As news of the event became widespread, black leaders developed a strategy to force the city to change course and to allow equal treatment of blacks on Montgomery, Alabama, buses. As expected, politicians and business leaders in Montgomery refused to negotiate or recognize the validity of the requested changes in racial policy. As a result, the Montgomery Bus Boycott was born. King and 50 black leaders joined the boycott and devised a plan to force the city leaders to respond to the demands of the black community. King was an up-and-coming Baptist minister at the time and the president of the Montgomery Improvement Association. His involvement with the boycott is significant because of his philosophy of nonviolent protest, which stood in direct contrast to the campaign of hate, violence, and terror organized by the Ku Klux Klan. The boycott attracted approximately 50,000 protesters, who marched in opposition to the separate but equal doctrine. Men, women, and children refused to ride the buses and walked for miles to get to their jobs and schools. Those with automobiles formed rideshare programs and provided transportation for those who found it difficult to walk long distances. The boycott went on for 381 days and was largely effective because it struck at the heart of the Montgomery business community. The lack of regular bus riders caused a rapid decline in revenue, which gave the city leaders pause to rethink their actions. As a result, a federal court ordered the end of segregation on Montgomery buses in November 1956. The decision in Brown v. Board of Education also forced the integration of public schools across the South. The first to integrate, albeit under duress, was Little Rock Central High School in Arkansas. Nine black students, who later became known as the Little Rock Nine, were selected to enroll in Little Rock Central High during the fall of 1957. There was no question of each student’s qualification to enroll since all were selected because of their high grade point averages and academic potential. On the first day of the fall semester, the Arkansas governor Orval Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to block entry to the school. The fact that the students had sued for the right to integrate reportedly provided a political rationale for the governor to stand

Civil Rights Movement

against the court order. The then president Dwight D. Eisenhower was monitoring the situation closely and moved to overturn the governor. The  Arkansas National Guard was placed under federal jurisdiction and ordered back to the barracks, and Eisenhower deployed the 327th Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division, U.S. ­ Army, to the state of Arkansas. Outflanked politically, ­Faubus  had little choice but to allow the Little Rock Nine to make their entrance into the school on September 4, 1957, under the protection of the U.S. Army. The situation on that day escalated significantly as crowds of angry white southerners formed a gauntlet on the path to the school entryway. Some in the crowd spat at the nine black students, making it physically difficult for them to make their way through the crowd to the door. In spite of the daily presence of federal troops, the Little Rock Nine were physically attacked and harassed by white students. One of the nine, Minnijean Brown, was suspended for retaliating against a white female who harassed her constantly. Brown was eventually expelled for verbally abusing another white student. Of the nine, Ernest Green was the only student to graduate from Little Rock High. After a year of constant turmoil (1957–1958), the city of Little Rock closed down its entire school system, which established a pattern of resistance adopted by school districts across the South. As the decade of the 1950s drew to a close, and with several successes of the Civil Rights Movement, King, along with Ralph Abernathy and other leaders, formed the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The conference was designed to access the moral authority and organizing power of black churches throughout the North and South. What was significant about this strategy was that it gave King an opportunity to establish a strong national base of operation, which drew widespread notice from the federal government. This organization became the base from which the fight for voting rights gained strength. The SCLC, for example, organized more than 20 voting drives in key southern cities, all of which had the effect of increasing voter registration by blacks. Around the same period (1958–1960), the NAACP Youth Council held a series of student sit-ins around the South, which served the purpose

181

of integrating lunch counters, restaurants, parks, beaches, libraries, theaters, museums, and other public facilities. The sit-ins drew great attention nationally as the students employed King’s model of nonviolent protest. They were encouraged to dress professionally, present themselves with quiet dignity, and occupy as much space as possible. Nonetheless, the participants were often subjected to violence by the local police and state troopers, who used brutal force to “escort” (i.e., remove) demonstrators from the lunch counters. Despite the acts of overt violence by law enforcement officials, the nonviolent strategy was successful in ending the segregation of lunch counters and restaurants in 27 southern cities. The model of nonviolent protest was also adopted in 1960 by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee at Shaw University, Raleigh, North Carolina. The then president John F. Kennedy’s administration furthered the cause of civil rights in their support of the march on Washington organized by A. Phillip Randolph and Bayard Rustin. Concerned that the march would negatively affect pending civil rights legislation, Kennedy enlisted church leaders and the United Auto Workers to assist with the planning and mobilization of activists and laypersons around the country. The march was held on August 28, 1963, and represented a collaborative effort between several civil rights organizations, the labor movement, liberal ­activists, and citizens. The goals of the march were diverse, including the institutionalization of civil rights law, a federal works program, fair employment and housing, voting rights and equal education, and, importantly, the passage of the ­ civil rights law proposed by the Kennedy administration. The media was in full attendance covering the march, with a contingency of 500 cameramen, technicians, and correspondents from the major radio and television networks. American and international audiences witnessed 300,000 people marching on the U.S. capital, finally gathering in front of the Lincoln Memorial, where King gave the stirring “I Have a Dream” speech. In his words, “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.” Through the televising of the march and of the speech by King, local

182

Civil Rights Movement

audiences and the world at large for the first time witnessed the strength, power, and legitimacy of the Civil Rights Movement and its leaders. Following the march, King and a group of civil rights leaders met with Kennedy in Washington to discuss the civil rights bill, which had little chance of becoming law. While there was some support from northern congressmen and senators of both parties (Democratic and Republican), the bill was continuously blocked by threats of filibusters by southern senators. Hopes for its passage grew even dimmer in the aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963. The bill was revived, however, after vice president Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as ­ president following Kennedy’s death. After 54 days of ­filibuster from the floor of the Senate, the bill was passed. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law on July 2, 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was seen as the crowning achievement of the Civil Rights Movement because it gave rise to a sweeping ban on discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex and national origin” as well as in employment practices and public accommodations. The bill also gave the U.S. attorney general the authority to file lawsuits against entities and parties that denied these rights; all discriminatory laws at the local and state levels were nullified as well. Following the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, King continued to increase his visibility as a champion for civil rights for blacks in America. Many people across America began to question the legitimacy of the Jim Crow laws and the longheld ideology of discrimination against black citizens. King became internationally renowned, particularly when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10, 1964, becoming the youngest man, at 35 years, to be honored with the prize.

Government Response to King and the Civil Rights Movement As a leader of the Civil Rights Movement, King also drew the attention of local and federal law enforcement agencies soon after he joined the movement. Although the government, and the FBI in particular, claimed at the time that the surveillance was conducted as a normal function of the

agency, these policies and practices raised concerns pertaining to the legitimacy of the U.S. government’s actions in spying on American citizens. The FBI was originally established in 1909 to investigate federal crimes; however, its role expanded in the 1930s to researching and investigating “subversives,” people and groups who threatened the safety and security of the United States. Congress also passed a series of laws increasing the number and types of crimes falling under federal jurisdiction, giving the FBI the power to expand its operation into the area of spying and advanced surveillance capabilities. The FBI increased its spying capabilities using advanced technology as the United States was drawn into World War II following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. During this period the FBI and other government agencies were deeply concerned with matters of national security, particularly as spying increased around the globe. The United States was under threat of attack by subversive agents of the Axis powers, which declared themselves enemies of the U.S. government. Therefore, the overall mission of the FBI, although defined as an agency dedicated to the safety and defense of the United States, was irrevocably transformed. Under the direction of Hoover, the mission of the FBI was advanced to include a long-term investigation into the Civil Rights Movement. Documents obtained from the FBI’s files on King indicate that Hoover was personally hostile to King. Records indicate that the FBI was heavily engaged in covert operations against King and the Civil Rights Movement throughout the 1960s. It was purported that King was a communist, a communist sympathizer, or ideologically influenced by communism. Therefore, the FBI monitored King under the Racial Matters Program, which focused on individuals and organizations involved in racial politics. Whether or not King and the leaders of the movement were subversives has been questioned; however, Hoover appeared to be certain that King was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. Hoover charged agents with the task of gathering information that linked King to subversive activity against the United States. In 1963, Robert Kennedy, the then U.S. attorney general, authorized wiretaps on King’s home and the offices of

Civil Rights Movement

the SCLC. The FBI, through anonymous sources, sent King a compromising tape recording of a trip to Washington, D.C., where he, the subject of the investigation, was recorded having illicit relations with prostitutes or women other than his wife, Coretta Scott King. The most controversial aspect of the tape was a message encouraging King to “commit suicide to avoid public embarrassment.” This obvious breach of privacy called into question King’s right to constitutional protections under the law and demonstrated the abject willingness of the FBI, and Hoover in particular, to circumvent these rights. While the intrusion on King’s rights as a private, albeit public, figure can be explained in the best interest of national security, it appears more as an attempt to delegitimize King as the leader of a significant social movement. Hoover’s vendetta against King did not stop there, as he also approved investigations into the private activities of other prominent civil rights leaders. In August 1967, for example, the FBI created the Counter Intelligence Program to spy on King and a cadre of black nationalist groups. The firebrand activist Malcolm X, the Black Panther Party and its leader Huey Newton, as well as leaders of the well-established SCLC were also targeted under this program. Senior agents of the FBI believed that King, in particular, would become a “messiah” with the power to unify black nationalists around the country. This perceived messianic power supposedly possessed by King points to the fear experienced by members of the FBI and the U.S. government of a man who could challenge the status quo and bring about social change in American society. The fact is that King had a seismic impact on race relations in America. The promises of the U.S. Constitution and the rights guaranteed under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were to be finally realized for black Americans. Perhaps government officials thought it was necessary to halt the progress of the Civil Rights Movement and therefore developed programs and methods as a means to accomplish their desired goals. While the FBI continued the surveillance program against the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement, King was assassinated on April 4, 1968. In the days leading up to the assassination, he was engaged in planning another march on Washington in an effort to revive the movement, which

183

had begun to lag, and to bring attention to several issues, including the overrepresentation of young black men serving in the Vietnam War. In fact, he and President Johnson, who championed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, were in great disagreement over the efficacy of the war. On April 3, in what some historians call a ­prophetic statement, it appears that he told supporters that he had seen his fate: “I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight that we, as a people, will get to the Promised Land.” The next day, as he was standing on a balcony outside his room at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, ­Tennessee, he was struck by a sniper’s bullet. The killer, James Earl Ray, was apprehended after a 2-month investigation that spanned the nation and the world at large. Ironically, the same g­overnment agency (FBI) that for two decades had wiretapped King’s phones, bugged his house, and kept him under constant surveillance was ­ instrumental in launching the investigation that captured his killer. Tracy F. Tolbert See also Brown v. Board of Education (1954); Civil Disobedience; Civil Liberties; Electronic Surveillance; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Plessy v. Ferguson (1896); Privacy; Segregation, Residential; Surveillance During the Cold War; U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Arsenault, Raymond. Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006. Barnes, Catherine A. Journey From Jim Crow: The Desegregation of Southern Transit. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983. Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963–1965. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Garrow, David J. The FBI and Martin Luther King. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1981. (Reprint ed., Viking Press, 1983. Rev. and expanded ed., Yale University Press, 2006) Kirk, John A. Martin Luther King, Jr. London, England: Longman, 2005. Patterson, James T. Brown v. Board of Education, a Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.

184

Civil War

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Sitkoff, Howard. The Struggle for Black Equality (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 2008. Williams, Juan. Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years, 1954–1965. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1987.

Civil War According to historian Shelby Foote, the ­American Civil War was actually a rebellion rather than a civil war, with a group of states attempting to secede from the United States and form an independent nation, the Confederate States of ­America. As such, the war began in late December 1860 with the secession of South Carolina from the United States. South Carolina was followed by 10 other southern states over the course of the next 4 months. Open hostilities between the newly formed Confederate States of America and the United States are generally regarded to have begun on April 12, 1861, with the bombardment of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor—a federal property the United States had refused to surrender to the South Carolina authorities. The war is generally considered to have ended with the surrender of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia some 4 years later on April 9, 1865. In actuality, according to historian Jay Monaghan, the war may be said to have begun with the so-called border war along the Kansas and Missouri state lines during the mid-1850s. The war did not end with Lee’s surrender as the other southern armies did not surrender until mid-1865; if one considers the depredations of the Ku Klux Klan and other groups of discharged Confederate soldiers as a guerilla war against the United States, the war did not end until about 1870, in which case the war could be considered to have occurred in three phases, all of which involved spying and surveillance in one form or another. The Civil War was fought in three major theaters and four minor theaters, with a great deal of spying and intrigue occurring in Europe, Cuba, and the British Caribbean colonies. Northeastern Virginia, including the Shenandoah Valley, has been the focus of generations of historians, and thus the focus of more casual consumers of

history, with numerous major battles having been fought along a roughly north-south line between Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia. Other major battles were fought along a line from central and eastern Tennessee into Georgia (leading to  the Union Army general William Tecumseh ­Sherman’s March to the Sea) and along the line east of the Mississippi River from Memphis toward the south. Battles were also fought in Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana (referred to ­ simply as the trans-Mississippi) and even from Texas into the New Mexico Territory.

Prelude to the War In 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act became law, allowing for a territory to become free or slave at the will of the majority of voters in the territory. This immediately touched off vicious battles in northeastern Kansas and northwestern Missouri. The battles in this border war could be best described as rival guerrilla bands or perhaps even gangs raiding and counterraiding, attacking individuals, homesteads, newspaper offices, and even churches. Selection and location of targets was largely based on a widespread informant system cultivated by rival forces, with neighbors on opposing sides of the slavery issue secretly providing information to their allies in the armed bands. Missteps by informants brought summary death sentences, perhaps best exemplified by a not yet famous abolitionist named John Brown in the ­Pottawatomie Massacre of May 24, 1856, when a band led by Brown murdered five men believed to have provided information and other support to a proslavery group that had ransacked Lawrence, Kansas, a few days earlier. Such retaliatory acts on a smaller scale were not uncommon along the border during the war years and beyond.

The War Begins The secession of South Carolina immediately touched off a more formal game of spy versus spy throughout the border regions dividing the United States from the Confederate States as Confederate agents sought to purchase arms and other military equipment from the more industrialized North and Europe. During this early phase of the war, Confederate agents purchased supplies covertly as

Civil War

well as overtly through northern dealers and manufacturers as both sides sought to purchase materials and support in Europe. Confederate agents also worked diligently to keep federal forts and arsenals in the southern states under surveillance and worked with southern or southernsympathizing U.S. Army officers to secure the surrender of these facilities to state authorities. This program proved successful in the surrender of the San Antonio, Texas, army arsenal a few days after the secession of Texas in February 1861. Such intrigue was far less successful in St.  Louis, where an effective counterintelligence operation blocked southern plans to seize the arsenal as well as to blow up a powder magazine at the nearby Jefferson Barracks. Legend claims that the Union Army general Nathanial Lyon donned women’s clothing along with a veil to hide his red beard to spy on the training camp of prosouthern militiamen near St. Louis, leading to the Camp Jackson Affair and serious riots when regular army troops and pro-northern volunteer units arrested the southern-leaning militia and seized their weapons on April 10, 1861. In March 1861, as the newly elected president Abraham Lincoln prepared to travel from his Springfield, Illinois, home to Washington, D.C., for his inauguration, he was contacted through an intermediary by Allen Pinkerton, who was perhaps the first famous private detective in America. Pinkerton advised Lincoln that his agents had infiltrated a group of southern radicals in Baltimore, Maryland, who had sworn to assassinate Lincoln as he was en route to Washington. During the final stage of his journey, Lincoln switched trains and was disguised and personally guarded by Pinkerton as well as several agents. Whether the plot existed in fact or not has never been entirely determined; Lincoln later complained that he had been duped and made to look foolish entering Washington, D.C., under Pinkerton’s tutelage. Despite Lincoln’s later dissatisfaction with Pinkerton, Pinkerton and many of his agents found themselves on the federal payroll as the forerunners of future police intelligence divisions (called, during the Civil War, the Secret Service, which was a term loosely applied to all northern spies; such spies were said to be “on secret service”) and Army intelligence and counterintelligence units.

185

By April 1861, both sides had developed spy networks with Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia, which became centers of spying, as well as St. Louis, Missouri, the key to much of the freight and passenger traffic on the Mississippi River and the site of a major federal arsenal and Jefferson Barracks, the largest fort west of the Mississippi at the time. Washington and Richmond, as capital cities, were hubs of information for military strength, troop movements, and purely civil government operations. St. Louis was a hub of communications for the middle border states and the west, as well as the chief source of supply of firearms and munitions for western operations of both sides. In all three cities, “outed” spies, and often mere sympathizers, were placed in what would now be referred to as preventive detention. To assist the federal government in ending ­Confederate espionage, as well as more generally to put down the rebellion, Lincoln invoked the constitutional provision for suspension of habeas corpus in the event of invasion or insurrection. Suspected spies were arrested and jailed, often on uncorroborated informant testimony, and held without being formally charged. Other than the Pinkertons, whose information provided to northern generals operating in northeastern Virginia soon came to strain credulity, neither side had an organized intelligence service recognizable today. Commanders in each theater were responsible for their own intelligence gathering, and often this duty fell to low-level, local commanders, with no real attempt to centralize or coordinate information collection or correlation for strategic operations. Thus, a general in ­Virginia hearing of troop movements to Tennessee had little ability or incentive to communicate the information to his counterpart in Tennessee, quickly or at all. Because of the nature of military science at the time of the Civil War, spying and surveillance were often done by unpaid persons with no official status or training. Due to the nature of the war itself, sometimes quite literally brother against brother, spies and other informants were sometimes motivated by patriotism (a motive often romantically attributed to southern women), by vengeance, or by some form of payment; such informants gave inaccurate or outdated information as often as intelligence of value.

186

Civil War

Allan Pinkerton and His Agents Pinkerton was a noted Chicago detective who in 1850 formed a private investigations firm eventually named the Pinkerton National Detective Agency. Early clients included railroads experiencing theft and labor unrest. Pinkerton and his “operatives” relied on surveillance and undercover work to solve crimes as well as to head off labor troubles. It was his work with the Illinois Central Railroad that brought him into contact with George B. McClellan, then chief engineer for the line. McClellan was instrumental in introducing Pinkerton to Lincoln, and when McClellan, a West Point graduate, was given command of the U.S. troops in Virginia in the fall of 1861, ­Pinkerton was brought in as Chief of the Intelligence Service, a position he held until McClellan’s removal from command in late 1862. Pinkerton’s wildly exaggerated reports of the size as well as the armament and equipage of Confederate troops has been widely blamed for the failure of ­McClellan and other Union generals to prosecute the war with sufficient rigor to accomplish early victories. Although no major defeats can directly be blamed on Pinkerton or his agents, they cannot be credited with producing any victories.

Lafayette Baker Lafayette Baker functioned as an undercover agent for the Union during early 1861 and was given an army commission as a reward. He was made provost marshall of Washington, D.C., in September 1862 and, replacing Pinkerton, ran an effective counterintelligence operation, catching numerous Confederate spies. Following P ­ inkerton’s methods of surveillance and planting undercover agents, he also began tapping military and civilian telegraph lines. His efficiency may have led to his undoing as intercepted telegraph ­ messages suggested the corruption of a cabinet member. This led to his reassignment to New York City, a city of ethnic unrest and southern sympathy, in late 1863. In April 1865, he was assigned to catch the conspirators in the Lincoln assassination, a mission that proved successful. Other than the discussed formal operations in the eastern theater of the war, Union generals were responsible for developing their own intelligence. They relied on local, paid informants as well as their

own men working undercover. In the Confederacy, the Army Signal Corps developed its own Secret Service Bureau, which operated a network of spies in Washington, D.C., which included an 1840 graduate of West Point named Thomas Jordan and the infamous Rose O’Neal Greenhow, a wealthy widow whose social ­connections included cabinet members and congressmen.

Women Spies Greenhow began operating under the direction of Jordan, perhaps as early as the fall of 1860. Using a system of couriers, she sent critical information regarding Union troop movements to Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard, which may have been instrumental in that general’s victory at First Manassas (called First Bull Run by the Union) in July 1861. She was placed under house arrest in August 1861 but continued to ply the trade of spymaster until her imprisonment in 1862. She was eventually released and sent to Richmond, Virginia. After her arrival in Richmond, Confederate President Jefferson Davis made her a diplomatic courier to Europe, where she continued both an active social life and running an espionage operation. In October 1864, she drowned while trying to run the Union Naval Blockade of Wilmington, North Carolina. Another well-known female spy for the Confederacy was Belle Boyd of Front Royal, Virginia, in the Shenandoah Valley. Boyd assisted her family in running a hotel in that city and, perhaps by accident, overheard a council of war between Union General James Shields and his lieutenants, information she passed on to Confederate General Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” Jackson, which greatly assisted him in his Valley Campaign. The Union too had female spies, although they have never held the seemingly more romantic and thus more celebrated place of female Confederate spies. Among these was Harriet Tubman, well-known for her role as a conductor on the Underground Railroad, who organized a spy network in South ­Carolina. Also among these were Pauline Cushman, an actress caught with incriminating papers and saved from being hanged as a spy by the timely arrival of Union troops, and Sarah Edmonds, who worked as a woman or successfully disguised herself as a white man or a black man as the need arose.

Closed-Circuit Television

Scouts Armies of the 19th century relied heavily on scouts, a job that fell most often to cavalry units due to their greater mobility compared with men on foot. Cavalry often worked deep behind enemy lines, raiding and gathering information as they destroyed targets of military value. As the war progressed, scouting duties fell increasingly to regularly enlisted cavalrymen working in enemy territory while wearing captured enemy uniforms or civilian clothing. Union Army Officer George Armstrong Custer, in particular, used such men during the final retreat of Lee’s army during March to April 1865. If captured, these men faced immediate hanging because such operations were considered contrary to the rules of war. In the Border States, warfare most often took the form of guerilla operations, with apparently peaceful civilians spying and supplying guerilla bands with information on military targets and who among their neighbors were on the other side.

187

Axelrod, Alan. The War Between the Spies: A History of Espionage During the American Civil War. New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1992. Fishel, Edwin. The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1996. Foote, Shelbey. The Civil War: A Narrative (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Random House, 1958. Larson, Rebecca. Blue and Gray Roses of Intrigue. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas, 1993. Longacre, Edward. Lincoln’s Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of the Potomac, 1861–1865. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. Markle, Donald. Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War. New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, 2004. Monaghan, Jay. Civil War on the Western Border, 1854–1865. Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1984. Nichols, Bruce. Guerilla Warfare in Civil War Missouri, 1862. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004. Wittenberg, Eric. The Union Cavalry Comes of Age: Hartwood Church to Brandy Station, 1863. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2003.

Conclusion Civil War spying was a haphazard affair, enjoying mostly local successes and not many of these. Spying operations were not organized according to any strategic plan, nor did they operate under any system of centralized control. Part of this was simply due to the state of the art. The United States had little experience with operating spy networks and no plan for integrating intelligence for any type of strategic planning. As a result, commanders in the field most often relied on scouts and local systems for their immediate areas of operations. What was stated earlier about the Pinkerton agents would apply to Civil War espionage in general; it achieved very little that affected the outcome of individual battles, much less the war. M. George Eichenberg See also Espionage; Spies

Further Readings Adamson, Hans. Rebellion in Missouri, 1861: Nathanial Lyon and His Army of the West. Philadelphia, PA: Chilton, Book Division, 1961.

Closed-Circuit Television There are few crime control technologies that have caused more controversy than closed-circuit television (CCTV) in recent years. Since the ­Metropolitan Police first installed CCTV cameras in Trafalgar Square, London, in the 1960s, the status and understanding of CCTV as a crime control technology has only become more c­ omplex and nuanced. There are numerous reasons why the use of CCTV has been resisted by some, including the claim that it affects privacy and civil liberties, cost implications, the indiscriminate gaze of the camera that captures the movements of lawabiding citizens as well as of those with c­ riminal intent, and strong doubts that CCTV is indeed an effective mechanism for controlling crime as the public has been encouraged to believe. CCTV has become strongly politicized, and this has often clouded understanding regarding its strengths and limitations. This entry first defines CCTV and its capabilities and then examines the prevalence and cost of communities utilizing CCTV. The effectiveness of CCTV with regard to deterrence, d ­ etection, and displacement is also analyzed.

188

Closed-Circuit Television

What Is CCTV? Much of the literature on CCTV spends little time describing the attributes of the CCTV systems that are the subject of analysis. This is particularly the case for the more theoretical discussion about the societal impact of CCTV. It is important to note that systems vary considerably in design and scope, as well as over time. CCTV can vary from unmonitored systems that include a small number of analogue cameras with basic technological capability to complex integrated digital networks that incorporate sophisticated features such as night vision, face recognition, tracking devices, “talking” cameras, and so on that are monitored 24 hours a day. CCTV has evolved considerably since its first introduction, which has important implications for how it operates and whether it can be considered effective. A new generation of “smart” cameras, combining visual surveillance with biometrics, is demanding a reconsideration of what CCTV is, how it operates, and how ­effectively it works. In addition to changes in technological capabilities, a body of evidence has emerged over recent decades that has informed understanding about how, when, and under what circumstances CCTV can be used as an effective crime control technology.

Prevalence and Cost There has also been controversy around the prevalence of CCTV and the number of cameras in operation, particularly in Britain, which is widely considered to have been one of the earlier adopters of large-scale CCTV. For a long time, British citizens were considered to be the most cameramonitored population in the world. It is difficult to know the precise number of CCTV cameras in use, because estimations are few and often the figures rely on extrapolations from small surveys producing guesstimates that have large margins for error. The density of CCTV coverage is hugely varied by location, which renders extrapolations imprecise across disparate geographical areas. For example, rural areas are likely to have far fewer cameras than metropolitan areas. The different methodological approaches and the difficulties involved in accurately determining the number of cameras have produced hugely

varied estimates, which have ranged in recent years from 1.85 million to 5.9 million cameras being operative in Britain alone. It is important to recognize that the vast number of CCTV cameras are privately owned and operated, with some studies suggesting that as many as 98% are privately owned and operated. This, in turn, raises issues of regulation and accountability regarding the processing of personal data, but it also challenges those who regard CCTV surveillance as largely the purview of the state. While Britain has been a key consumer of CCTV, the technology is also increasingly being embraced by other countries around the world. An exponential upward trend is often experienced in locations following the implementation of public CCTV, but it should be recognized that in recent years some areas have actually decreased their investment in some systems or have changed the way in which they are used and operated. The ongoing costs of maintenance and monitoring are likely part of the reasons underpinning a shift toward disinvestment. State funding is often provided for the initial purchase of equipment and infrastructure but not for ongoing expenditure to operate, monitor, maintain, and upgrade systems. In light of this, an interesting development is that some locales have switched to recording, not actively monitoring, camera footage, which is then accessed only if an incident is found to have occurred. Clearly, this could affect the effectiveness of CCTV, particularly the potential for CCTV operators to alert the relevant authorities, who can then dispatch police or security personnel to an incident as it develops. However, with the advent of smart CCTV, some systems are being developed to raise an alarm if a suspicious event is detected. Another development in response to the expense associated with monitoring CCTV is the emergence of companies that utilize crowdsourcing to enlist the help of the public to watch live footage. The development of crowdsourced CCTV monitoring opens up new concerns about data ­ protection and a lack of professional training for individuals who are able to access visual personal data. Discrimination based on stereotypes and prejudicial profiling has been identified in some studies among some professionally trained staff, and there is concern in some camps that this

Closed-Circuit Television

practice will become more prevalent among amateur operators. To date, there has been no evaluation of crowdsourced CCTV monitoring, and it is not known how effective it is in the detection of crime.

Understanding the Effectiveness of CCTV The rationale for deploying CCTV is largely based on its supposed effectiveness as a crime control technology, as well as its presumed ability to reassure the public and reduce fear of crime. However, there have been challenges to this view, and the inconsistent findings from evaluations have fueled growing doubts about the capability of CCTV to deliver on early promises of effectiveness. Research studies that have explored the ability of CCTV to deter and detect crime have often produced contradictory findings. In light of this, systematic reviews and meta-analyses have been conducted that pool all of the available data to establish if there are any patterns to the impact that CCTV can have on crime. Overall, and somewhat simplifying the complexity of the nuanced findings, it has been shown that CCTV can have a modest effect on preventing crime, with the most marked impact on vehicle crime in parking lots and garages. The findings show that when CCTV is used alongside other crime control interventions, crime prevention is increased, and the environmental context can make a big difference in this prevention. Environmental factors have long been recognized as having a significant impact on the levels of crime in a given area. Similarly, the conditions under which a CCTV system is operated will affect its effectiveness. For example, the number and positioning of cameras, the extent to which they cover relevant space, and the technical competence of the camera’s system will affect effecti­ veness. Furthermore, how the system is viewed by the police and the extent to which they are prepared to act on any intelligence received is important. External environmental features that are sometimes independent of the system might radically change the ability of CCTV to deter or detect crime. Factors such as lighting, signage, security personnel, and target-hardening measures are recurring influences in the literature exploring the operation of CCTV. In addition, the presence or

189

absence of monitoring staff and the culture within the monitoring room have also been suggested as key determinants in how effective CCTV is. The role of individual agency is very important when accounting for the operation of CCTV. Therefore, regardless of whether CCTV can be effective, human operation may dictate whether it works in practice. Research has highlighted the difficulties that operators face in trying to monitor a large amount of footage simultaneously—poor communication channels with other agencies such as the police, the monotony of the work, as well as long hours and low pay. Measuring the effectiveness of CCTV is complex and involves the consideration of many different factors, just some of which have been mentioned. However, most empirical assessments and discussions will gravitate around understanding the impact of CCTV on the “3Ds”: deterrence, detection, and displacement. Deterrence

The crux of the deterrence capability lies in the claim that offenders are rational beings that weigh the benefits and risks of committing crime. If CCTV is interpreted as posing a significant risk, and one that cannot be easily overcome, it might prevent a crime from taking place in that location. For CCTV to deter offenders, they must first be aware that CCTV is present in the location and then perceive it to present a risk that cannot be overcome. Some research points to the fact that many crimes go undetected and unpunished and, therefore, offenders might recalculate the extent to which they believe CCTV presents a substantial enough risk to deter them from committing a crime. The deterrence capability is also vulnerable to changes over time. Initial deterrence can wane, particularly as offenders familiarize themselves with the location of the cameras and operation of the system, and especially as transgressions go undetected. Research has also shown that CCTV is least effective in deterring expressive or violent crimes, which although comparatively rare, cause the most fear to the public. Expressive crimes, particularly those involving drugs or alcohol, are unlikely to be prevented by cameras because offenders are not likely to be in a rational mind-set. CCTV can

190

Closed-Circuit Television

affect premeditated crimes that involve a certain level of cognition and thought process—usually property crimes—but many studies report that offenders are not overly concerned about the threat presented by CCTV. Rational offenders can wear a disguise or hide their identity, or find ways to avoid the cameras’ field of vision. Overall, the effectiveness of CCTV in deterring crimes is questionable, but it should be recognized that the concept of deterrence can only ever generate “nonevents,” which by their nature are unobservable and so empirically difficult to measure.

The flip side of displacement is a diffusion of benefits whereby the beneficial influence of an intervention stems beyond the location directly targeted. The more optimistic proponents of CCTV suggest that the positive impact of introducing cameras can be extended beyond the actual field of vision as offenders might have a general sense of feeling inhibited or being aware of a generalized shift toward target hardening and growing securitization.

Detection

Research has begun to untangle the strengths and limitations of CCTV. The evidence is clear that CCTV is by no means a panacea and that any proposed use of CCTV needs to be part of a broader crime reduction strategy that carefully considers the benefits and limitations of the technology. It’s important to note that CCTV technology is continuing to develop, and this will improve its effectiveness over time. Furthermore, it is increasingly being integrated into and used alongside a range of other technology systems such as facial recognition, radio-frequency identification, and automatic number plate recognition. New types of CCTV use are emerging, and these offer both positives and negatives. Point of view cameras or body-worn video cameras are now being used (e.g., worn on the head or chest) as part of routine activities to monitor every interaction by the police and private security. Most citizens have mobile phones with cameras, and new methods are emerging to facilitate the use of images generated in this way for crime prevention benefits. CCTV is now being used to provide aerial surveillance from unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as drones, which generates new concerns about the ethical operation of CCTV. CCTV certainly continues to be controversial, but it is clear that it will continue to be used in some guise. Sufficient, credible, and enforced regulation will be the key to ensuring that the right balance between liberty and security is struck.

It has been argued that in light of a growing body of evidence on how CCTV can be best used, the role of CCTV has shifted from being primarily deterrence to data and intelligence gathering. Under some circumstances, footage can be used to assist investigations, identify offenders, eliminate suspects, and seek witnesses, but its capabilities as a crime detection tool should not be overstated since the proportion of crimes that are solved as a direct result of CCTV footage remains relatively low. Returning to the idea of rational criminals, offenders can simply evade detection by wearing some form of disguise or utilizing everyday clothing items such as hats, scarves, and glasses; interfering with the cameras; or even damaging them so that they are no longer operable. However, using CCTV as a reactive forensic tool is cheaper since it avoids the expensive monitoring costs as previously outlined. Displacement

The displacement of crime is a pervasive concern in relation to situational crime prevention measures. In its simplest form, displacement refers to the movement of a crime or problem elsewhere due to an intervention, rather than eradicating the problem entirely. Displacement can take a variety of forms, including spatial (crime is moved from one location to another), tactical (offenders use a new means to commit the same offense), and functional (offenders change the type of crime, e.g., from street robbery to domestic burglary). Determining whether displacement has occurred is not straightforward, and studies remain inconclusive.

Conclusion

Emmeline Taylor See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; Crime Control; Home Surveillance; Public Health, Surveillance in; Technology

Cloud Computing

Further Readings Gill, M. CCTV. Leicester, England: Perpetuity Press, 2003. Gill, M. and A. Spriggs. Assessing the Impact of CCTV (Home Office Research Study 292). London, England: Home Office, 2005. Norris, C. and G. Armstrong. The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV. Oxford, England: Berg, 1999. Taylor, E. “Evaluating CCTV: Why the Findings Are Inconsistent, Inconclusive and Ultimately Irrelevant.” Crime and Community Safety Journal, v.12 (2010). Taylor, E. and M. Gill. “CCTV: Reflections on Its Use, Abuse and Effectiveness.” In M. Gill (ed.), The Handbook of Security. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Welsh, B. C. and D. P. Farrington. Crime Prevention Effects of Closed Circuit Television: A Systematic Review (Home Office Research Study 252). London, England: Home Office, 2002. Welsh, B. C. and D. P. Farrington. “Closed-Circuit Television Surveillance.” In B. C. Welsh and D. P. Farrington (eds.), Preventing Crime: What Works for Children, Offenders, Victims and Places. London, England: Springer, 2007.

Cloud Computing Cloud computing allows users to utilize off-site computing infrastructure, often in an overseas jurisdiction, as a platform for running networked applications and storing data, among other tasks. There are several competing definitions of cloud computing, but the definition introduced by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, is widely regarded as the de facto definition. The definition has also been adopted by a number of governments worldwide, such as Australia. Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.

191

Because data stored in cloud services are accessed via the Internet, there is a growing concern about data protection and privacy due to surveillance of data. This entry highlights some criminal activity associated with cloud computing, discusses the expanding practice of government surveillance of online data, examines individual privacy concerns related to cloud computing, and concludes with suggestions about how cybersecurity and individual privacy can coexist.

Criminal Activity While cloud computing can potentially result in significant cost reduction and convenience for both individual and organizational users (e.g., the capability to share and access data in real time in the always connected “cloud” from devices such as smartphones), users need to be aware of the privacy risks associated with the use of cloud computing services. In May 2014, for example, a significant number of Australian Apple iOS devices were reportedly hijacked and locked for ransom. Subsequent investigations determined that the affected users’ iCloud accounts had been compromised, and affected users who did not set a ­passcode prior to the hack had to reset their devices to factory settings. The latter resulted in the erasure of all user data stored on the affected devices. In another highprofile incident, a number of iCloud accounts belonging to several celebrities were reportedly compromised in September 2014, which resulted in the theft of photos (many of which were intimate) from these accounts. The incident was subsequently confirmed by Apple. In most criminal cases involving the use of cloud computing services, evidence is located in one or more overseas jurisdictions, and government agencies may find it difficult or challenging to obtain access to the evidential data without the timely assistance of the authorities and cloud ­service providers in these overseas jurisdictions. Existing digital forensic techniques are designed to collect evidential data from computing devices, where advanced security features and antiforensic techniques are rarely exploited to their full extent. In contrast, serious and organized criminals often make use of information and communications

192

Cloud Computing

technologies (ICT) specifically designed to evade legal interception and forensic collection attempts. Therefore, the digital forensics “space” can be seen as a race to keep up not only with hardware (i.e., device) and software releases by providers but also with software and hardware modifications made by end users, particularly serious and organized criminals, to complicate or prevent the collection and analysis of digital evidence. Therefore, to keep pace with the growth and changing face of criminal activity, particularly to ensure that evidential data can be forensically recovered, a number of governments have ­undertaken measures to enhance their technical capability (in some instances, seeking to circumvent or weaken existing security measures) and introduce legislation that allows national security and law enforcement agencies to conduct online surveillance. For example, in September 2014, Australian government agencies successfully lobbied for new legal powers to put Internet users under surveillance.

Surveillance and the Cloud Legitimate surveillance by government agencies (e.g., law enforcement, criminal intelligence, and national security agencies) can be an effective crime deterrence measure and can allow these agencies to gather evidence, monitor the behavior of known offenders, and reduce the public’s fear of crime. For example, analysis of intelligence gathered from different or disparate data sets (e.g., data from the cloud and big data applications) may facilitate the prediction of major impending events and identify connections between individuals of interest. Due to the advancement of ICT and the interconnectedness of our society, however, the scope and reach of online surveillance by governments are being expanded, sometimes to the detriment of individual privacy. For example, when we upload or store our data (e.g., photos, videos, documents) in one of the cloud computing services, do we know the path of the transmitted data (i.e., through which countries or Internet service providers our data will be routed) or whether anyone is collecting and analyzing our transmitted or stored data? While there is a legitimate need for cooperation between cloud service providers and governments, there are also concerns about cloud service

providers being compelled to scan or search data of interest to national security and to report on, or monitor, particular types of transactional data. The concern is generally not about the privacy rights of criminals or terrorist suspects but the unintended collateral damage where the privacy of innocent individuals and ordinary citizens may be compromised in such surveillance programs (e.g., when finer-granulated aspects of an individual’s life are derived or inferred from the intelligence collection and analysis). It is unsurprising that cloud user data privacy has emerged as a salient area of inquiry for researchers and a growing concern for public policy and the public, particularly in societies where individuals place a significant value on privacy (including against government intrusion). Concerns about wide-scale government surveillance targeting the cloud computing ecosystem and about the invasion of individual cloud user data privacy are not restricted to authoritarian societies but also pertain to liberal democracies, particularly after September 11, 2001. In 2013, for example, Edward Snowden, a former U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, leaked NSA documents that indicated that the agency allegedly undertook broad online surveillance activities. The activities included intercepting and collecting information from non-U.S. citizens (as well as U.S. citizens if they were conversing with a foreign target) and targeting organizations such as major U.S. cloud computing service providers. In response to the NSA surveillance revelations, the European Parliament conducted an inquiry on the impact of the surveillance program on European Union (EU) citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. In a February 2014 report by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, it was determined that these programs allowed for the mass surveillance of Internet users through direct access to the central servers of leading US internet companies (PRISM programme), the analysis of content and metadata (Xkeyscore programme), the circumvention of online encryption (BULLRUN), access to computer and telephone networks, and access to location data, as well as to systems of the UK intelligence agency GCHQ such as the upstream surveillance activity (Tempora programme), the

Cloud Computing

decryption programme (Edgehill), the targeted “man-in-the-middle attacks” on information systems (Quantumtheory and Foxacid programmes) and the collection and retention of 200 million text messages per day (Dishfire programme). (p. 20)

While intelligence derived from online surveillance programs is typically used in preemption responses (also known as anticipatory selfdefense), in combating terrorism and other criminal activities, and in the shaping of government responses to national and cybersecurity threats, the inquiry by the European Parliament in 2014 determined that the broad-based NSA surveillance programs are not justifiable and are “incompatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality in a democratic society” (p. 20/62). The negative impacts due to the NSA revelations include an estimated lost revenue of up to US$35 billion for the U.S. cloud computing industry by 2016. Some scholars and commentators have also expressed concerns about the negative impact of NSA surveillance programs on the security of the Internet and the cloud computing ecosystem.

Threats to Individual Privacy Attempts to define privacy in a legal context in the United States date back to 1890. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in their 1890 article “The Right to Privacy,” contended that the scope of privacy rights over the years has gradually

193

broadened from the “right to life” to the “right to enjoy life, the right to be let alone, and the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges” (p. 193). Although the right to individual privacy is guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (designed to protect individuals from intrusions into their privacy or private life and, more broadly, against the improper collecting, storing, sharing, and use of their data), recent debates and incidents such as the NSA surveillance programs suggest that overseas (e.g., non-EU) cloud service providers may not be legally obliged to notify EU cloud users (the owners of the data) about such requests. Only 3 years before the NSA surveillance revelations, KimKwang Raymond Choo had posited that foreign intelligence services and industrial spies may not disrupt the normal functioning of an information system as they are mainly interested in obtaining information relevant to vital national or corporate interests. They do so through clandestine entry into the cloud computing infrastructure/ecosystem as part of their information-gathering activities. Some threat actors (see Table 1) are better resourced than others to carry out more sophisticated malicious activities, although most threat actors are unlikely to have unlimited repertoires. To carry out sophisticated targeted attacks (also known as advanced persistent threats), it is likely that the attackers would require considerably more resources and possibly be state sponsored/ affiliated.

Table 1  Potential Threat Actors and Attack Vectors Exploiting Vulnerabilities in One or More of the Following Potential Attack Vectors Threat Actors (Individuals and/or Organized Crime Groups) Criminally motivated

Technologies (e.g., Using Malware and Embedding Vulnerabilities or Malicious Code in the Underlying Cloud Computing Software or Infrastructure)

People (e.g., Social Engineering)

Processes (e.g., Policies and Procedures)

The aim is to disrupt one or more combinations of the following security (Central Intelligence Agency) notions: Issue/ideologically Data confidentiality (data are available only to authorized parties) motivated Data integrity (data have not been tampered with or modified) Financially motivated Data availability (data continue to be available at the minimal operational level in State sponsored/affiliated situations ranging from normal to disastrous) Others (e.g., curiosity and fame seeking)

194

Cloud Computing

Reconciling Tensions Between Cybersecurity and Individual Privacy The contention between the need for cybersecurity and ensuring individual privacy is not new. In our attempts to address the many, and potentially thorny, issues in this contention, we need to understand and recognize the tensions between the need for cybersecurity and for ensuring ­individual privacy. As these two objectives may also be mutually incompatible or inconsistent with each other, potential solutions are likely required to have trade-offs. A key research question, therefore, is “How do we balance the need for a secure cloud computing ecosystem and the rights of individuals to privacy against the need to protect society from serious and organized crimes and terrorism and safeguard cybersecurity and national security interests?” Given the relatively new and changing aspects of cloud computing technologies and their use, it is important to bring highly technical expertise and social research capacity together. In addition, online surveillance activities cannot be self-symbiotic as they are affected by many factors. While it is important to focus on an individual country or government, we also need to look at the macrolevel (e.g., market and intergovernmental levels). The institutional isomorphism theory, for example, explains that “external actors may induce an organization to conform to its peers by requiring it to perform a particular task and specifying the profession responsible for its performance.” In other words, institutions (e.g., governments) are “morally governed”—known as the normative pillar or normative isomorphism—without the need for a coercive framework, and misdeeds and noncompliance are “punished” by way of social, economic, and/or political sanctions. Therefore, only by interdisciplinary collaboration can we begin to tackle cyberspatial threats, as it would allow us to better address the knowledge and research gaps in the existing evidence base and would contribute to fill the strategic, operational, and policy vacuum. Bringing together interdisciplinary and international ­perspectives will also ensure that developments in ICT, political, geographical, socioeconomic, legal, and regulatory issues are well understood and can be used to refine policy strategies

without infringing on civil liberties such as individual privacy. Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo See also Computer Surveillance; Inverse Surveillance; Privacy, Internet

Further Readings Apple. “Update to Celebrity Photo Investigation.” Apple Media Advisory (September 2, 2014). http://www .apple.com/pr/library/2014/09/02Apple-MediaAdvisory.html (Accessed September 2017). Apple Insider Staff. “Hackers Use ‘Find My iPhone’ to Lockout, Ransom Mac and iOS Device Owners in Australia.” Apple Insider (May 26, 2014). http:// appleinsider.com/articles/14/05/27/hackers-break-intolock-macs-and-ios-devices-for-ransom-in-australia (Accessed October 2014). Castro, Daniel. How Much Will PRISM Cost the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry? Washington, DC: Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 2013. http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computingcosts.pdf (Accessed October 2014). Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond. “Cloud Computing: Challenges and Future Directions.” Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, v.400 (2010). http:// www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/ tandi400.pdf (Accessed October 2014). Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond. “A Conceptual Interdisciplinary Plug-and-Play Cyber Security Framework.” In H. Kaur and X. Tao (eds.), ICTs and the Millennium Development Goals: A United Nations Perspective. New York, NY: Springer, 2014. DiMaggio, Paul and Walter Powell. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review, v.48/2 (1983). European Parliament. “Report on the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs” (February 21, 2014). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/con t/201403/20140306ATT80632/20140306ATT8063 2EN.pdf (Accessed October 2014). Gellman, Barton and Todd Lindeman. “Inner Workings of a Top-Secret Spy Program.” The Washington Post (June 29, 2013). http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/ page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spyprogram/282/ (Accessed October 2014).

COINTELPRO Greenwald, Glenn. “XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet’.” Guardian (July 31, 2013). http://www.theguardian .com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-programonline-data (Accessed October 2014). Hooper, Christopher, et al. “Cloud Computing and Its Implications for Cybercrime Investigations in Australia.” Computer Law and Security Review, v.29/2 (2013). Kelion, Leo. “Apple Toughens iCloud Security After Celebrity Breach.” BBC News (September 17, 2014). http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29237469 (Accessed October 2014). Martini, Ben and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. “An Integrated Conceptual Digital Forensic Framework for Cloud Computing.” Digital Investigation, v.9/2 (2012). Martini, Ben and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. “Cloud Storage Forensics: ownCloud as a Case Study.” Digital Investigation, v.10/4 (2013). Martini, Ben and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. “Distributed File System Forensics: XtreemFS as a Case Study.” Digital Investigation, v.11/4 (2014). doi:10.1016/j.diin.2014.08.002. Mell, Peter and Timothy Grance. The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011. http:// csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800145.pdf (Accessed October 2014). National Institute of Standards and Technology. “NIST Cloud Computing Program” (2015). http://www.nist .gov/itl/cloud/index.cfm (Accessed September 2017. Quick, Darren and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. “Digital Droplets: Microsoft SkyDrive Forensic Data Remnants.” Future Generation Computer Systems, v.29/6 (2013). Quick, Darren and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. “Dropbox Analysis: Data Remnants on User Machines.” Digital Investigation, v.10/1 (2013). Quick, Darren and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. “Forensic Collection of Cloud Storage Data: Does the Act of Collection Result in Changes to the Data or Its Metadata?” Digital Investigation, v.10/3 (2013). Quick, Darren and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. “Google Drive: Forensic Analysis of Cloud Storage Data Remnants.” Journal of Network and Computer Applications, v.40 (2014). Quick, Darren, et al. Cloud Storage Forensics. Waltham, MA: Syngress, 2014. Ratcliffe, Jerry. Video Surveillance of Public Places (Police Response Guides Series No. 4). Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2006.

195

Staten, James. “The Cost of PRISM Will Be Larger Than ITIF Projects.” Forrester Research Blog (August 15, 2013). https://www.forbes.com/sites/forrester/2013/ 08/15/the-cost-of-prism-will-be-larger-than-itifprojects/#6f4be0cd795f (Accessed September 2017). Warren, Samuel D. and Louis D. Brandeis. “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review, v.4/5 (1890).

COINTELPRO COINTELPRO refers to the U.S. Counter Intelligence Program, consisting of more than 2,300 covert operations sponsored and organized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under the directorship of J. Edgar Hoover. COINTELPRO was designed to disrupt, infiltrate, misdirect, and neutralize left-wing organizations such as the Communist Party, the “New Left,” the Puerto Rican independence movement, the Socialist Worker Party, white hate groups, the underground press popular in the 1960s, and virtually all of the important movements and social change organizations associated with the counterculture of the 1960s, especially antiwar, antiestablishment, and student groups. Specific targets of COINTELPRO included the American Indian Movement (AIM), the Black Panther Party (BPP), the Chicano Movement, Students for a Democratic Society, the ­Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Revolutionary Action Movement, and the Women’s Liberation Movement. The official existence of COINTELPRO dates from 1956 to 1971. At its conclusion, more than 100 political prisoners had been placed in the U.S. prison system. It was also responsible for several assassinations, untold murders, riots and gang wars, disruptions and factions in many social liberation movements, splits among social ­ ­liberation leaders, and the bankruptcy of several popular underground publications. Revelations of ­COINTELPRO’s existence began appearing in the mainstream media between 1968 and 1978. These reports gave rise to Senate investigations, with the final outcome being the historic Church Committee Report in 1976. It has been argued that at least two actual programs under a different name ­continued after COINTELPRO’s closure and that

196

COINTELPRO

many of the tactics and underlying strategies used in its operations are still possibly current in the government’s continued practice of mass ­surveillance in the name of national security and antiterrorism defense. COINTELPRO’s tactics included extralegal and illegal activities. Of the seemingly mundane activities, these tactics included publishing derogatory cartoons, sending anonymous poison-pen letters designed to break up marriages, writing insinuating articles, and creating jealousies and suspicions among the staff and leadership of targeted groups. On a more antagonistic level, ­ insinuations and accusations were made, labeling rival members of other groups or pointing to members within a group as police or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) informants. These accusations and playing off of other suspicions and hostilities often created suspicions within a group, and sometimes gang wars erupted between the groups, and occasionally murders were committed. Groups advocating nonviolent tactics would be infiltrated, and the agent would attempt to steer it toward violent and illegal activities. COINTELPRO also engaged in well-orchestrated disinformation campaigns. These were designed to portray nonviolent groups as radical or violent in the eyes of the media. The more audacious tactics included framing selected members on drug or murder charges, the bombing of selected editorial offices, and even orchestrating assassinations. There were also broad-based surveillance programs. Some of these covert operations were conducted on private citizens (e.g., Operation CHAOS, Project MERRIMAC, and Project RESISTENCE). In conducting its operations through COINTELPRO, the FBI often ­ coordinated its efforts with and shared or collected information from the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the military police, local law enforcement, and, at times, even right-wing ­radical groups.

The Underground Press The reason for the demise of the underground press in the early 1970s remains debatable. The underground press became a force to be reckoned with, and some papers had national distribution (e.g., East Village Other, Nola Express, and Ramparts). Underground news services (Underground

Press Syndicate and Liberation News Service) provided stories and bulletins to the underground papers. Readership was in the tens of millions by the late 1960s, but by the early 1970s only a handful were barely surviving. From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, Allen Ginsberg began collecting documents through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) because of stories of harassment. His research indicated that COINTELPRO contributed to the decline of the underground press. Tactics such as sending poison-pen letters to cause jealousies and marital breakups, falsely accusing editorial staff members of being informants, and playing on the hostility between groups were employed. In addition, one tactic used often to disrupt the underground press was to continually arrest street vendors. Even though the defendants always won their cases due to the protections afforded by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the accumulated court costs could drive an underground paper into bankruptcy. COINTELPRO would apply pressure on printers to refuse printing assignments from the papers and order local police to conduct drug raids on the editorial offices, where subscription, accounting, and other information would be gathered in addition to damaging archives and other files. There were also cases in which COINTELPRO employed radical right-wing groups to bomb the editorial offices of some papers. As a consequence of the disinformation and propaganda generated by COINTELPRO, the history of the failed underground newspapers and counterculture movements in general has been distorted. In some cases, even those directly affected were not, and even today are not, aware that some of the infighting and internal tensions were a result of COINTELPRO.

Black Nationalist Movements One group receiving considerable attention was African Americans. Close to 295 COINTELPRO operations were directed against individuals and organizations associated with black liberation movements; of them, 233 were directed against the BPP. The number of deaths, the number of people put in prison on false charges, and the number of lives ruined by COINTELPRO’s tactics against members of black nationalist movements

COINTELPRO

is not known. The high-profile successes of COINTELPRO operations against black nationalist movements include orchestrating the assassinations of the BPP leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark and indirect involvement in the assassination of Malcolm X as a result of deliberately planning and instigating infighting within the Nation of Islam. Other individuals targeted for surveillance, misinformation campaigns, and other forms of neutralization included Stokely Carmichael, Dr.  Martin Luther King Jr., Elijah Muhammad, Huey Newton, and Geronimo Pratt. The BPP became one of the most important focal groups because the FBI determined that it was most likely to succeed as a unifying force with the potential to build coalitions with other groups. In late 1967, the BPP was known among the ­African American community for its humanitarian service projects, citizen’s arrests, and training to guard against police brutality. The BPP initiated a free breakfast program for children and free health care for ghetto residents, and in 1968, it started an antiheroin campaign. The growth within the party went from 5 members in 1966 to close to 5,000 at the end of a 2-year period, and it spread from its home base in Oakland, California, to a dozen other cities. False arrests and police raids, often accompanied by violent shoot-outs, were frequently used tactics in the FBI’s war against the BPP. In addition, a massive misinformation campaign was launched whereby FBI agents or infiltrators posed as violent demonstrators and arranged to be interviewed in spontaneous media coverage of demonstrations and other protest events, giving the image of the BPP as a radical, violent, antiwhite hate group. The community service work of the BPP never reached the general consciousness of the mainstream media. The BPP leadership was kept from interviews and other high-profile media coverage. The general tactics of poison-pen letters, forged articles, and other forms of misinformation were used to create hostility between various groups and to prevent coalitions. The overall strategy was successful, and by 1974, the BPP was no longer a viable political force.

American Indian Movement In targeting the AIM, COINTELPRO began an operation on the eve of its closure and extended it

197

years after its official close. The FBI’s tactics proved as successful in dismantling AIM as it did with the BPP, and by late 1970, like the BPP, AIM, which was once a hope for self-determination, pride, and a vehicle for regaining lost rights among the American Indian people, had, in the words of AIM cofounder Dennis Banks, “kind of disappeared.” Banks and George Mitchell founded AIM in 1968, and it was modeled after the BPP in its focus on urban issues. After Russell Means and John Trudell, among others, joined AIM, the focus changed to emphasizing treaty rights and preserving traditional culture. A series of activism followed during the next 2 years that culminated in massive protests in 1972 over the murder and torture of Raymond Yellow Thunder. The success of AIM and its leadership, namely Means and Banks, in bringing about justice regarding Yellow Thunder’s murder, garnered support for the group among tribal leaders, the public, and reservation residents. It also brought the FBI’s attention and COINTELPRO operations. Local police began arresting AIM leaders under fabricated causes and utilizing other tried-and-true techniques. In addition, there were violent repressions, including those occurring at Rapid City, Pine Ridge, and Wounded Knee during the 1970s. One prime target, Leonard Peltier was eventually convicted for the murder of an FBI agent and as of early 2017 was still imprisoned. After the Wounded Knee incident, for a 36-month period until May 1976, more than 60 AIM members and supporters were killed and at least 342 suffered violent assaults.

Post–Church Committee Report Even though the FBI claimed it abandoned COINTELPRO in 1971 and the Church Committee released its report in 1976 condemning the FBI’s actions and placing restrictions and new guidelines on future operations, COINTELPRO-type operations continued. Throughout the 1980s, trademark techniques surfaced in operations against the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) and other groups, giving credence to the idea that COINTELPRO had ceased to exist in name only. In addition to no longer using the label COINTELPRO, the FBI’s counterintelligence operations changed the wording for its targets and no longer used words that

198

COINTELPRO

would imply political orientations. Instead of using the words extremists or subversives, in the post–Church Committee era, the word terrorist was used. CISPES and 215 other groups became part of the first of these “terrorist investigations” conducted by the FBI. The tactics used were the same as those used by COINTELPRO, including ­conspicuous surveillance to instill paranoia, disinformation, framed charges (whereby guns or other incriminating evidence might be planted), home burglaries (whereby computer disks, papers, and files were stolen but valuables were left untouched), mail tampering, the use of infiltrators/provocateurs, random arrests, and warrantless ­wiretapping and other forms of surveillance. During the period from 1984 to 1988, CISPES and other groups opposed to U.S. Central American policy experienced more than 100 break-ins and 300 incidents of government harassment. In addition to CISPES, some of the other organizations and groups targeted included Amnesty International, the ­ ­Chicago Interreligious Task Force, Clergy and Laity Concerned, grassroots groups associated with Jesse Jackson’s presidential bid, the Maryknoll Sisters, the New Jewish Agenda, the Silo Plowshares ­organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the United Auto Workers, and the ­ U.S. Catholic Conference. Surveillance, infiltration, and other ­COINTELPROstyle tactics were used throughout the 1990s against antinuclear groups, environmentalists, and groups protesting globalization, but the next major period of COINTELPRO-type activities occurred after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Within hours of the attacks, several known political prisoners were rounded up and placed in isolation and denied access to their lawyers. These prisoners included Sundiata Acoli, Carlos Alberto Torres, Phil Berrigan, Marilyn Buck, Antonio Camacho Negron, Yu Kikumura, Ray Levasseur, Tommy Manning, and Richard Williams. Some were denied any communication with their lawyers until October. In addition to political prisoners, lawyers of unpopular defendants also came under government harassment. Within 8 months of the attack, Attorney General John Ashcroft had revised the guidelines put in place by the Church Committee.

Ashcroft’s new guidelines allowed the FBI, through Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), to freely infiltrate houses of worship, including churches, mosques, and synagogues; listen in on online chat rooms; and read message boards without warrants or suspicions of criminal wrongdoing. JTTFs monitored online correspondence (a type of correspondence that did not exist in the early days of COINTELPRO), and utilized the newly implemented no-fly list, which prevented certain people from flying on airlines and thereby leaving or entering the country. The monitoring of online exchanges has given rise to data mining and massive surveillance of the broader population in the United States and across the globe. The National Security Agency has sent requests for patron’s personal data to libraries and, related to new technologies, used cell phones as tracking devices and monitored Internet traffic. Another tactic used since the 2000s is the increased number of classified government documents and the delayed release of documents through the FOIA. In several cases, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has sued the FBI and or the Central Intelligence Agency for release of documents through the FOIA. In some cases, a portion of the documents requested was released, but not having all of the documents and the time delay were sufficient to hinder the ACLU’s work in defending the public’s constitutional rights of privacy and freedom of speech. Yet another new development is profiling, and when pointing to specific targets, JTTFs tend to focus on men with Middle Eastern or North African backgrounds. In specifically targeting ­ ­Middle Eastern, North African, and Muslim males, the New York Police Department expanded its surveillance activities to include students and campuses along the Northeast, 300 miles away from city limits. The FBI and the Justice Department began a number of community outreach programs (e.g., for Arab Muslims), but these turned out to be used largely for data mining purposes. Informants and infiltrators are often faced with threat of deportation, a common form of pressure to assure cooperation. Increased negative stories were published, and the Internet became a valuable tool in this regard. The legal system, through arbitrary arrests, can close businesses, shut down organizations, cause suspicions in the community,

Cold War

199

create media hype, distract the efforts of the individuals and groups involved that now have to seek legal defense, cause internal infighting, require less experienced individuals to take responsibility, disrupt national networks, deplete funding for legal expenses, direct a community’s focus to more local concerns, and create an environment of fear. The latest tool in the surveillance arsenal is the Department of Homeland Security fusion centers. These centers engage in analysis of datamined information and intelligence sharing. The type of surveillance is referred to as dataveillance. Many of these centers are located in local police departments and/or connected with JTTFs. Fusion centers are often used in profiling efforts and thereby become a useful tool for COINTELPRO-type operations. The cultural impact of COINTELPRO was and continues to be significant. Government agencies that conduct broad-based, unfounded surveillance on its citizenry potentially pose a threat to the very democracy they purport to protect. The full story of COINTELPRO is still not known, as many files are still withheld despite the FOIA, and its operations appear to have continued through the years of the war on terrorism, if not in name, at least in practice.

Journal, v.18 (2002). http://heinonlinebackup.com/ hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/ hblj18§ion=6 (Accessed July 2014). Glick, Brian. War at Home: Covert Action Against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do About It. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1999. Guzik, Keith. “Discrimination by Design: Predictive Data Mining as Security Practice in the United States’ ‘War on Terrorism.’” Surveillance & Society, v.7/1 (2009). http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillanceand-society/article/view/3304 (Accessed July 2014). Monahan, Torin. “The Future of Security? Surveillance Operations at Homeland Security Fusion Centers.” Social Justice, v.37/2–3 (2010–2011). http://www .antoniocasella.eu/nume/TorinMONAHAN_2011.pdf (Accessed July 2014). Naqvi, Zehra. “The Return of J. Edgar Hoover: The FBI’s Reversion to Political Intelligence Gathering.” Modern American, v.1/2 (2005). http://heinonlinebackup.com/ hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/ moderam1§ion=17 (Accessed July 2014). Rips, Geoffrey. UnAmerican Activities: The Campaign Against the Underground Press. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1981.

Jeff Williams

The term Cold War is generally associated with the 1945 to 1991 period and defines the political, ideological, strategic, or military conflict, hostility, tension, or competition between the democratic and capitalist West and the communist East. The United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies formed the Western Bloc, and the Soviet Union (USSR) and its Warsaw Pact allies created the Eastern/Communist Bloc. The Eastern Bloc (or Eastern Europe) generally included the USSR and the communist-run Central and Eastern European states, while the Communist Bloc included non-European states aligned with the USSR. Other concepts used to mark the Cold War division were the First World—denoting the countries aligned with the United States, France, and the United Kingdom; the Second World—European communist-run states; and the Third World—non-European communist-run states from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Another Cold War bloc was represented by the self-proclaimed nonaligned movement formed of

See also Counterintelligence; Federal Bureau of Investigation

Further Readings Bazian, Hatem. “Muslims—Enemies of the State: The New Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO).” Islamophobia Studies Journal, v.1/1 (2012). http://crg .berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Bazian.pdf (Accessed July 2014). Bovard, James. “Federal Surveillance: The Threat to America’s Security.” The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty (January–February 2004). http://www.fee.org/files/ doclib/bovard0104.pdf (Accessed July 2014). Churchill, Ward and Jim Vander Wall. The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents From the FBI’s Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002. Elijah, J. Soffiyah. “The Reality of Political Prisoners in the United States: What September 11 Taught Us About Defending Them.” Harvard BlackLetter Law

Cold War

200

Cold War

states that refused to align either with the West or with the East (Egypt, India, Yugoslavia, Ghana, and Indonesia). Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and— since the 1955 Austrian State Treaty—Austria adopted a policy of neutrality between the East and the West. The tensions between the Eastern and the Western blocs were, at times, considerable and ­ affected the fields of ideology and propaganda, economic measures and competition, espionage and surveillance, the arms race, technological competition, and psychological warfare. Still, it was a “cold” war because there was no “hot,” armed large-scale conflict between the two sides. In this entry, the debate about the origin and causes of the start of the Cold War is reviewed, followed by a thorough historical account of the three primary periods of the Cold War—the beginning of the First Cold War (1945–1953), a period of crises and détente (1953–1979), and the Second Cold War (1979–1991).

Origin and Causes of Debate The Cold War started in the late 1940s as a nonviolent confrontation over Europe, but gradually the East-West tensions were moved over the Third (Developing) World, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where the Cold War often turned hot, with the USSR and the United States supporting their proxies with arms. Only occasionally, however, were American and Soviet soldiers involved in proxy wars, the former in the Korean War (1950–1953) and the Vietnam War (1955–1975), and the latter in the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–1989). There is no scholarly consensus with regard to the debut of the Cold War, but generally it is considered that it began between 1945 to 1947, in the aftermath of World War II, and ended in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR and of the socialist system in Eastern Europe. Some authors, however, argue that if the Cold War represented the opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union, between capitalism and communism, between the free market and the state-planned economy, or between the Western pluralist society and the Eastern collectivist, single-party society, then the Cold War began in 1917 with the Bolshevik ­ Revolution. Other authors claim that the

debut of the Cold War must be placed in 1939, when World War II started. There is no universally accepted periodization of the Cold War. According to one interpretation, it is divided into three main periods: (1) the first Cold War (1945/1947 to 1962), (2) détente (1962– 1979), and (3) the second Cold War (1979–1991). According to another interpretation, the Cold War had four major eras: (1) 1945–1953—its beginning as a consequence of World War II; (2) 1954– 1964—international crises and high tensions; (3) 1965–1979—détente and decreasing tensions; and (4) 1980–1991—reemergence of tensions. There are different interpretations and theories with regard to the origins and causes of the Cold War. Simplifying, the Cold War orthodox historians (e.g., Thomas A. Bailey, Herbert Feis) emphasized the USSR’s responsibility in the emergence of the Cold War. They argued that Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin’s policy was aggressive and threatened the interests of the free world, the United States having, therefore, the moral duty to respond through the containment policy. Some orthodox theorists argued that Stalin’s postwar goal was a worldwide communist revolution and that any attempt to reason with Stalin was futile. Others contended that Moscow’s actions were determined by its security needs and that the United States needed to accommodate those needs, especially in Eastern Europe. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the revisionist historiography (of William Appleman, Walter LaFeber, Gar Alperovitz) followed. It stressed the United States’ responsibility for the beginning of the Cold War and argued that the United States’ expansion had begun long before the beginning of the Cold War and was not driven by moral principles and ideals but by economic pragmatism. According to other revisions theses, the United States had misinterpreted the postwar Soviet goals, intentions, capabilities, and power. The postwar Soviet Union was a weak state, legitimately concerned with its security, but the United States, through its policy to contain the expansion of communism, provoked Stalin to establish satellite states in Eastern Europe. The postrevisionist approach, established by John Lewis Gaddis in the 1970s, argued that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union ­ bore alone the responsibility for the Cold War.

Cold War

Multiple factors needed to be considered in the attempt to understand and explain this phenomenon, and the Cold War emerged from mutual misperceptions and conflicting interests between the two superpowers. Starting in the 1990s, a socalled new history of the Cold War began to develop. It proposes new theoretical and methodological approaches; emphasizes the role and responsibility of the two conflicting sides; sees the Cold War less as a bipolar confrontation; is less interested in the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, paying more attention to the role and influence of the minor powers; and explains the conflict through a combination of economic, strategic, military, and ideological factors.

The Beginning of the Cold War (1945–1953) In an attempt to jointly decide the postwar fate of the world, on October 9, 1944, in Moscow, the then British prime minister Winston Churchill and Stalin concluded the so-called percentages agreement, which secured the USSR’s influence in Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom’s influence in Greece. By 1945, the World War II alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union had begun to break up under the pressure of the Allies’ different views with regard to the postwar order in Europe and Asia. The future of Germany, Eastern Europe, and Japan was the main concern. At the Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945), Stalin, Churchill, and the then U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to split Berlin and Germany into four occupation zones (British, American, French, and Soviet). At the Potsdam Conference (July 17 to August 2, 1945), Stalin, Churchill, and the new U.S. president Harry Truman (Roosevelt had died on April 12, 1945) decided to partition Indochina; to divide Germany, Austria, and their capitals ­Berlin and Vienna, respectively, into four occupations zones; and to secure the denazification, decentralization, and democratization of Germany. Stalin wanted to severely punish Germany and Japan for their participation in the war and to create a strip of puppet regimes at the USSR’s western border to function as a buffer zone in case of another German attack against the USSR. His war

201

allies, however, had different aims. The Americans wanted to secure the United States’ economic interests and to create a system of collective security aimed at securing peace through negotiations; the British wanted to control the Mediterranean Sea; and both intended to ensure the independence of Central and Eastern Europe. However, between 1944 and 1949, the USSR gradually imposed communist-led regimes in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany). Following the Berlin crisis and the B ­ erlin Blockade (June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949), by late 1949, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), with East Berlin as the capital, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), with Bonn as the capital, were established. Between 1945 and 1949, the mutual suspicion and distrust continued to increase. On February 22, 1946, the “long telegram” of George F. Kennan, Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States in Moscow, arrived at Washington, D.C. Keenan argued that the USSR was an expansionist, aggressive power, at continuous war with capitalism, unable or unwilling to be in peaceful coexistence with the Western world, and whose aim was to export the Marxist-Leninist ideology. As a solution, Kennan proposed a strategy of containment designed to block the Soviet expansion. Several weeks later, on March 5, 1946, in Fulton, ­Missouri, Churchill delivered his famous Iron Curtain speech, contending that Soviet Russia’s postwar goal was to achieve the “indefinite expansion of its power and doctrines” and asking the Western democracies to ally against Russia. Kennan’s ideas of containment were reflected in the 1947 Truman Doctrine, announcing the United States’ decision to aid Greece and Turkey so that they would not be taken over by communists. By late 1947, the Soviets reacted with the socalled Zhdanov Doctrine. In late 1947, Andrei Zhdanov (the chair of one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) announced that the world was divided into two antagonistic camps—the imperialist and antidemocratic camp, led by the United States, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, led by the Soviet Union. Although this idea was subsumed to the cultural doctrine of Zhdanovism, its

202

Cold War

political implications were immense, as it led to the conclusion that there could be no coexistence between the two systems. The Marshall Plan was also consistent with the U.S. policy of containment. Implemented in ­Western Europe between 1948 and 1952, it was a $13 billion program designed to secure postwar Europe’s economic reconstruction, with the goal to prevent the spread of communism. The USSR refused to participate in the Marshall Plan and forced the same reaction from its Eastern ­European satellites. On January 8, 1949, the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA), an economic organization imagined— according to mainstream historiography—as a countermeasure to the influence of the Marshall Plan. In February 1949, Albania joined the CMEA (in 1961, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Albania stopped participating in the CMEA), followed by East Germany in 1950, Mongolia in 1961, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam in 1978. Adding military containment to economic containment, on April 4, 1949, NATO was created, becoming a military alliance whose members committed to consider an armed attack against one member state to be an armed attack against them all. Presented officially as a mutual military and defense alliance, NATO was designed to ­guarantee the security of Western European democracies, perceived to be threatened by Soviet expansionism. The founding members of NATO were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Iceland, Canada, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Luxembourg. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. The joining of West Germany on May 9, 1955, was followed by the creation of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact Organization 5 days later. In 1958, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command because Charles de Gaulle, Minister of Defense, felt that the United States and the United Kingdom did not treat France as an equal within the alliance. Although France remained a member of the ­alliance, in early 1959, the French Mediterranean fleet was withdrawn from NATO’s command, and the non-French NATO troops left France by 1967. The first main confrontation between the East and the West occurred in Korea. Between 1950

and 1953, under the United Nations’ flag, 21 states contributed to the defense of South Korea, with the United States providing the majority of the soldiers. It is estimated that the United States participated in this war with more than 320,000 soldiers, of whom more than 36,000 died, more than 100,000 were wounded, and about 8,000 were missing in action. The Korean War offered the only occasion during the Cold War when the American, Soviet, and Chinese forces met directly in combat. At times, the three belligerents thought that this conflict was the preamble of a third world war. The Korean War marked China’s rise as a military power and the strengthening of NATO, and also the rise of the modern limitedwar theories, which were caused by the development of nuclear weapons. Although the then U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) was not ready to use nuclear systems as weapons of war, he did use them as a means of threat, warning that the United States might consider a nuclear attack to end the Korean War if the armistice negotiations were not resumed. Eventually, on July 27, 1953, an armistice agreement was signed; it divided Korea along the 38th parallel, a situation in place to this day.

Crises and Détente (1953–1979) In matters of foreign policy, the Eisenhower administration’s main goal was to secure the containment of the Soviet-led communist expansion in the Middle East. Fearing that any new communist success would have a domino effect in a given region or in the world, in January 1957, Eisenhower formulated what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, authorizing U.S. forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of those nations threatened by armed aggression from a communist-controlled country and encouraging Middle East states to request U.S. aid if threatened by the armed aggression of other states. This doctrine produced effects in 1958, when the Lebanese president Camille Chamoun requested U.S. assistance to resist the perceived threat posed by Gamal Abder Nasser, the president of Egypt, which supported the Lebanese Muslim opposition. Although Nikita ­ Khrushchev, the leader of the USSR, threatened to  use nuclear weapons if the United States

Cold War

intervened in Lebanon, the U.S. military did intervene and, between July and October 1958, secured the replacement of Chamoun, the defeat of the Lebanese opposition, and the restoration of ­Lebanon’s policy of neutrality. First Secretary of the Soviet Union since March 14, 1953, Khrushchev was the promoter of a new foreign policy built around two main concepts— de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence. The first years of de-Stalinization (1953–1956) witnessed several major uprisings in Eastern Europe, such as the East German uprising (June 16–17, 1953), which was economically driven, and the Hungarian revolution (October 23 to November 10, 1956), which was mainly political and a direct result of the de-Stalinization process. Both uprisings were violently repressed by the Soviet forces. De-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence greatly affected the relations between the communist states, determining, for instance, the improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Romania’s detachment from Moscow, and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the latter culminating in the so-called Sino-Soviet split (1960–1989). Regarding East-West relations, Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence doctrine aimed to lessen the tensions, to facilitate trade, and to diminish the nuclear danger. Formulated in 1953 to 1956, the doctrine argued that the Soviet Union and United States, with their blocs and ideologies, could coexist in peace and could settle any disagreements peacefully. The end of the Korean War in July 1953, the settlements regarding the borders of Turkey and Iran, and the recognition of Israel were, to a great extent, consequences of ­Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence proposals. The signing of the Austrian Peace Treaty in May 1955 and the Geneva Summit of June 1955 were also possible in the special context of peaceful coexistence. Still, Eisenhower was skeptical of this thesis, and in 1957, he formulated the doctrine that took his name. The issue of Germany was still the main area of disagreement between the East and the West. While Khrushchev was asking for the reunification of the two Germanys and for the recognition of East Germany, the Western world was reacting by admitting West Germany—reconstructed with the aid of the Marshall Plan—in NATO. In

203

September 1955, West Germany announced its Hallstein Doctrine, according to which Bonn would not establish diplomatic relations with any state that recognized and maintained relations with East Germany, with the exception of the Soviet Union. In practice, however, it was rather difficult to apply such a doctrine, and West Germany did have diplomatic relations with ­ states  that recognized East Germany (Romania, ­Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Egypt). In 1969, in the beneficial context of détente, the Hellstein Doctrine was abandoned and replaced by Ostpolitik. Formulated by Willy Brandt, West Germany’s chancellor, this Eastern policy aimed for the normalization of relations between West Germany and the Eastern European states, including East Germany. In 1971, Brandt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his successful Ostpolitik. In the beneficial context of détente, in the early 1970s, relations between West Germany and East ­Germany normalized, a four-power agreement on Berlin was concluded, and bilateral treaties were signed between West Germany and the Soviet Union, Poland, and other Eastern European countries.

The Second Cold War (1979–1991) The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 may be regarded as an application of the ­so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. Formulated in late 1968 to justify the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, this Soviet doctrine argued that a threat to the cause of socialism in any given country was a common problem and the concern of all socialist countries. In 1979, the Soviet leadership feared that the overthrow of the communist regime in Afghanistan might influence the neighboring Soviet republics. Therefore, in December, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev decided on a fullscale—he believed short-term—invasion to preserve the communist regime. The war, however, lasted 9 years, until February 1989, when it was ended by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and it greatly affected the economic and military establishments of the USSR. The U.S. administration responded to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan with the Carter Doctrine, announcing that the United States was ready to use military force to defend its interests in the

204

Colonialism

Persian Gulf. For President Jimmy Carter, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a serious threat to world peace because it put Moscow in a position to dominate the Persian Gulf and thus to control trade with Middle East oil. Under the Carter Doctrine, the United States supported the Afghan mujahideen financially and militarily. The next U.S. president, Ronald Reagan, continued to grant economic, military, and political support to the Afghan mujahideen. Aware of the lessons of the Vietnam War, Reagan did not involve the United States in a full-scale conflict in Afghanistan or anywhere else, preferring instead the strategy of low-intensity conflicts. Under the Reagan ­Doctrine, the United States intervened with overt and covert operations in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Angola. The Reagan Doctrine was also a ­rollback program under which the United States provided economic, military, and political aid to guerillas and anti-Soviet resistance movements in Third World countries with the goal to block communist expansionism. To ensure national security, under the Reagan administration, the United States oversaw the largest military buildup in its history, developing new weapons systems, of which the Strategic Defense Initiative (better known as “Star Wars”) was the most ambitious. Despite the military buildup, between 1985 and 1988, Reagan and Gorbachev met successfully in Geneva, Switzerland; Reykjavik, Iceland; Washington, D.C.; and Moscow to discuss the reduction in nuclear weapons. In 1988, in Moscow, the two signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the first nuclear arms agreement since SALT II in 1979. The withdrawal in 1989 to 1990 of the Soviet military forces from the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa was seen by Reagan’s admirers as a victory of his doctrine. Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost were also regarded as major contributors to the end of the Cold War. In 1989, socialism in Eastern Europe collapsed without any Soviet intervention. In 1990, Germany reunified, and by the end of 1991, the USSR disintegrated. The Cold War was over, which took by surprise international relations practitioners and theorists alike. Elena Dragomir See also Berlin Wall; Cuban Missile Crisis; Détente; Glasnost; Perestroika; Surveillance During the Cold War; Truman Doctrine

Further Readings Bischof, Günter, et al., eds. The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010. Calvocoressi, Peter. World Politics Since 1945 (9th ed.). New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2004. Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Soviet-Afghan War, 1979–1989. Oxford, England: Osprey, 2012. Graebner, Norman A., et al. Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. Hastings, Max. The Korean War. London, England: Pan Books, 2010. Kühn, Melanie. Iron Curtains on Paper. The Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1947. Norderstedt, Germany: GRIN Verlag, 2009. Larres, Klaus and Ann Lane, eds. The Cold War. The Essential Readings. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2001. Lewis, Adrian L. The American Culture of War: The History of US Military Force From the World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007. Lühti, Lorenz, M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. McCauley, Martin. The Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1949. London, England: Pearson, 2006. Nuenlist, Christian, et al., eds. Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on Global Foreign Policies, 1958–1969. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010. Van Dijk, Ruud, ed. Encyclopedia of the Cold War. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. Westad, Odd Arne, ed. Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations and Theory. New York, NY: Routledge, 1998.

Colonialism Colonialism refers to a bigger or more powerful country taking control of a smaller or weaker country or territory for economic and political gains, thereby allowing the colonizing country to expand its geographic and political territory. Typically, the colonial power imposes its political, cultural, and educational systems on the colonized country. Colonialism is inherently exploitative and

Colonialism

205

oppressive and is antithetical to the Anglo-American tradition of individualism, natural rights, and autonomous domains. For the survival of the colonial administration, colonial authorities often conducted surveillance of citizens by whatever means were at their disposal (e.g., hiring indigenous people as paid informants to spy on their own people). Such tactics helped undermine the resistance of the colonized people. Accordingly, the colonized people often had no say in the relationship with their colonial masters. The security apparatus of the state occupying another country is set up to intimidate and control the colonized people, and dissenting voices are typically repressed. European colonial powers based their legal authority for colonizing other peoples on the international legal principle known as the “doctrine of discovery.” This principle gave the colonial power superior rights over the indigenous people in the control of the indigenous peoples’ land. Another international legal principle used to justify the occupation of other lands was the “contiguity principle.” Under this principle, the colonial power has legal authority to claim a land that is close to the one that it is occupying. Furthermore, the contiguity principle empowers the colonial authority to claim an indigenous land irrigated by a river whose source is in the land it is occupying. Between the 16th and mid-20th centuries, almost all African countries were colonized by European countries. The Europeans also established colonies in Asia and the Americas during this era, which is often described as modern colonialism. Some of the European colonial powers were Britain, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Germany, and Belgium. Before embarking on full colonization of territories, European colonizing authorities’ foray into Africa, Asia, and the Americas began with mercantile, trade, and religious missionary expeditions. This entry explains the various types of colonialism, reviews the history of colonialism, and then discusses the consequences of colonialism, including its reliance on surveillance to monitor and control people.

and oppressive. However, settler colonialism describes colonialism where a significant number of citizens from the colonizing country migrate en masse to the colonized country or territory. This occurs when people from the colonizing country seek to escape economic hardship and/or religious or political oppression. In settler colonialism, the colonists are determined to settle in the colonized country or territory despite the indigenous peoples’ resistance, with the aim of exploiting the economic products of the colonized country for use in their home country. The settler colonial subjects, conscious of the fact that they are not welcomed by the colonized people, typically employ repressive tactics to subjugate and control the indigenous people. Two examples of settler colonialism are the (1) Dutch mass migration to and settlement in South Africa and (2) the British peoples’ migration to America. The Dutch East India Company, commanded by Jan Van Riebeeck, established its base in South Africa in 1652, originally for shelter for its ships and for its hungry sailors to replenish their supplies of meat, fruit, and vegetables. The European settlement in what is now the United States could be said to have started in 1492, following the Spanish expedition led by Christopher Columbus. Attempts were often made to either exterminate the aboriginals or subjugate them for exploitative purposes. Exploitation colonialism describes the colonial system where the purpose of the colonization is the exploitation of the natural and human resources of the colony. In plantation colonialism, the colonial authorities established a permanent or semipermanent base in the colonies to plant tobacco or cotton, for example. Surrogate colonialism describes a colonial system in which the colonial authorities sponsor and/or provide support for another nonnative people to occupy the indigenous peoples’ land. Internal colonialism occurs when there is uneven development within a nation-state and the inherent exploitation resulting from the structural political and economic inequalities between the different areas of the nation-state.

Types of Colonialism

History of Colonialism

There are different types of colonialism, namely settler, exploitation, plantation, surrogate, and internal colonialism—all of which are exploitative

Colonialism was not started by Europeans, although they were the major beneficiaries. Colonialism is as old as the history of humankind.

206

Colonialism

Ancient Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans at some time in their histories established and maintained colonies for several hundred years. Arabs used Islam as an instrument of conquest to acquire and expand their colonies. Other notable colonial empires included the Russian Empire (1721–1917), Ottoman Empire (1299– 1922), Austrian Empire (1804–1867), and ­Japanese Empire (1868–1947). Germany lost its colonies after its defeat in World War I, as the Allied forces confiscated Germany’s colonies as booties of war and divided them up among themselves. Between 1500 and 1914, the European colonial powers dispatched their excess population to their colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Colonialism positioned the European colonial powers to exploit the labor, and human and natural resources of their colonies. Colonialism also gave the European colonial powers undue military and economic advantage over their colonies.

Consequences of Colonialism Marxist theorists argue that colonialism, just like capitalism, is exploitative of workers, especially workers from the colonies. According to this perspective, colonialism created forced social change and uneven development. Colonialism destroyed the culture, economy, and educational systems of the colonies. It created a dependency relationship between the colonial powers and the colonies. Colonialism changed, for example, Africa’s economic and social priorities to meet the needs of Europeans. Colonialism also reinforced the racist and race superiority ideologies that served the economic and social interests of Europeans and their descendants. Colonial people also brought to the colonies diseases that were not indigenous to the colonized people, resulting in many deaths. For example, Europeans introduced smallpox to Australia, and it is estimated that more than 50% of the indigenous Australian population died as a result. In addition, colonialism undermined the colonized peoples’ traditions, languages, religion, and educational and political systems and constrained their development. Some scholars blame colonialism for Africa’s and Asia’s economic, social, and technological underdevelopment.

However, there are some scholars who see positive developments with colonialism. Adherents of this school of thought argue that colonialism created universal standards by bringing diverse populations to speak one language, practice one religion, and share scientific and philosophical ideas that spurred scientific and technological  development in the world. ­ Colonialism, some  scholars have argued, has also acted as a bridge between the “imperial capitals” and the “metropoles”—that is, between the colonial ­powers and their colonies—narrowing the geographical, ideological, commercial, and religious divides between them. According to this argument, ­colonialism is  the forerunner of globalization and its attendant economic and social benefits, including technological advancements. Thus, today’s expanded economic activities have their roots in the colonial era. Some scholars also credit colonial powers with the introduction of Western education and health care, which they believe have had a positive impact on the lives of the colonized people. Furthermore, they assert that colonialism contributed to centralizing power and bringing an end to political conflicts and instability in some of the colonized countries or territories. The operational strategy of colonialism is often shrouded in secrecy, but its survival depends on the extent to which the colonial country is able to marshal its security and surveillance apparatus to repress dissent and to control resistance to it. That is, the maintenance of colonialism depends on the effectiveness of the surveillance strategies and practices of the colonial country for monitoring and controlling the people of the colonized country or territory. O. Oko Elechi, Rochelle E. M. Cobbs, and Emmanuel Amadi See also Postcolonialism; Social Control

Further Readings Ekeh, Peter. “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, v.17/1 (1975). Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York, NY: Grove Press, 2005.

Commodification of the Body Korman, Sharon. The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1996. Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982. Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1979.

Commodification

of the

Body

The unremitting surveillance and concealed tracking of the human body have intensified over the 21st century. The emergence of smartphone technologies, online rewards programs, fitness apps, and facial recognition software has led to the daily collection of personal data by both corporations and the government. Security measures designed and implemented into portable gadgets, such as location settings and fingerprint detection, also eliminate all notions of wandering and concealment in everyday routines. Even one’s private information, including medical details, can be e­asily extracted through an individual’s operation of devices. The standards of confidentiality are challenged and replaced with modern technological initiatives powered by computers. Surveillance routines are further ingrained into modern socialization practices, as the lives of strangers are readily observable through the consumption of reality television programming. Often produced and edited in multiple entertainment formats, the television industry has nurtured dedicated viewers who are immensely intrigued with the lived realities of others. This format of surveillance works to further objectify the human body as a site of digital absorption. Drawing on themes of privacy, exposure, and corporatization, the following entry outlines the various perspectives toward understanding the commodification of the body within the highly politicized and capitalizing developed world.

Institutional Surveillance Institutional surveillance of the human body is a long-standing practice that has spanned centuries. The extraction of people from everyday society,

207

for committing transgressive and violent acts, and the further isolation of these offenders reinforce power dynamics within any era. Utilized to enforce social order and deter future criminality, a prison facility is now a site of corporeal tracking and consumption both from inside and outside the structure. The panopticon design, subject of Michel ­Foucault’s discussion on punishment and discipline within society, is a circular model with a central single-man watchtower. This strategic institutional layout forces prisoners to moderate their behavior toward the unceasing potential of being continuously surveyed. Heightened levels of paranoia and alarm are displayed in this setting, as the power differences between the inmates and administration are reinforced. Further identified as a governing concept, the panopticon offers an introduction to discussions on surveillance practices, the employment of solitary confinement, and inmate socialization within contemporary institutions. The prison space has emerged as a popular subject in the realm of reality television. Documentary and entertainment series are continuously being developed and released to the public displaying the different perspectives operating within a prison facility. Narratives following the experiences of correctional officers and families are included into a larger exploration of inmate culture. The camera functions as the “panoptic” eyes for the audience into an isolated world of transgression. It is through this medium that the surveillance of bodies is multiplied, where both the correctional officers and at-home viewers are tracking the behaviors of prisoners. The additional layer of corporate profit making is also entangled in this discussion, through the repeated success of these televised representations. The sequestered body is commodified. As measures of security exponentially increase within society, so too does the public’s fascination with the disciplinary practices of the state.

Body Trackers Portable technological devices function as a multidimensional life tool for users. Daily banking, communications, and shopping can all be accomplished through the accessibility of assorted apps and features. Many operators also store valuable

208

Communication Studies

photos and information on these machines, serving as a hard drive for recent activity. All of these data are often stowed behind passwords requiring programming that is marketed as being secure from any infiltration. Fingerprint detection software, a recent inclusion on smartphones, is a further measure utilized toward the protection of consumer identity. This modern technology scans for a distinct impression to grant access to the phone’s contents. It is through this surveillance method that the human body loses all concealment, where the device can recognize a person’s most distinguishable marks within seconds. The health of consumers is also tracked through movable devices, with the inclusion of pedometers, heart rate monitors, and sleep recording technologies. The popularity of these features continues to increase with the expansion of fitness and nutritional initiatives within our communities. These programs utilize the bodily data inputted by consumers and sensor mechanics to outline the daily performance of individuals. This ongoing collection of medically related information is central to the success of fitness app corporations, where new technologies are developed and sold to the public. Additionally, most of these health features do not allow the user to omit confidential information through the setup process. It must be acknowledged that any data inputted into these devices are theoretically retrievable by employees of these technology companies. The potential for full bodily surveillance is unleashed. The integration of Global Positioning Systems into multiple portable technologies also functions as a noninvasive form of microchipping for humans. Automobiles, watches, tablets, and keys are just a few objects that contain locative software. Electronic supervision programs, supported and administered through government-based ­initiatives, are further incorporating Global Positioning Systems technology toward the tracking of individuals released from prison on parole. Replacing radio-frequency programming, these ankle devices now offer detailed coordinates on the movements of citizens. Any violation of a set perimeter will result in signals triggering an alarm system. Though not a new concept, it is this rapid development of surveillance machineries that reinforces grander narratives of power, supervision, and confinement in our modern world. Emma Smith

See also Crime; Crime Control; Cybertheft; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of; Surveillance, Culture of

Further Readings Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Random House, 2005. Mosco, V. The Political Economy of Communication. London, England: Sage, 1986. Presdee, M. Cultural Criminology and the Carnival of Crime. London, England: Routledge, 2000.

Communication Studies Communication studies is a broad and interdisciplinary field that explores the processes by which people create, exchange, and interpret communicative messages. The academic field of communication comprises interrelated subfields, ranging from critical communication to mass communication to organizational communication to technical communication, to name but a few. Many of these subfields examine surveillance—particularly surveillance’s relationship to issues of power, control, and discipline within organizational and societal contexts. The significance of these issues has grown in recent decades due to the creation of new laws and the development of new technologies that allow for increased levels of surveillance. This entry traces the beginning of communication studies, lists the interdisciplinary subfields of ­communication that are widely recognized, and highlights how many of those subfields contribute to the study and understanding of surveillance in today’s society. The study of human communication is often traced to ancient Greece and Aristotle’s study of rhetorical discourse during the 4th century BCE. Aristotle characterized rhetoric as an experiencebased technique for developing and delivering arguments of logic. Aristotle also outlined the three persuasive appeals of persuasion, (1) logos, (2) ethos, and (3) pathos, which led to the five canons of rhetoric: (1) invention, (2) arrangement, (3) style, (4) delivery, and (5) memory. By the 1st century CE, oratory and persuasion became a cornerstone of Western education. Rhetoric was viewed as a civic art and responsibility—a means by which to persuade the public in political

Communication Studies

matters. By the early 20th century, Columbia ­University and the University of Chicago institutionalized communication studies within higher education by formalizing several committees on communication, as well as the first degree-­granting program. The National Communication Association (NCA) was later founded at the University of Missouri in 1914, and the first college of communication was founded at Michigan State ­University in 1958. Due to the field’s interdisciplinary concerns, communication studies incorporates characteristics from the humanities (e.g., rhetoric, persuasion) as well as social sciences (e.g., psychology, sociology). Communication studies also goes by  a  variety of labels, depending on the academic institution it comprises: “communication,” “speech communication,” “communication arts/ sciences,” “media studies,” or “media ecology,” for example. For these reasons, the NCA has specified 10 interrelated subfields within the larger discipline of communication: (1) critical/ cultural communication, (2) environmental communication, (3) health communication, ­ (4)  intercultural communication, (5) interpersonal communication, (6) organizational communication, (7) mass communication, (8) political communication, (9) rhetorical communication, and (10) technical communication. Although not formally recognized by the NCA, additional areas of interest for communication scholars include ­journalism, film criticism, public relations, and computer-mediated communication. Many subfields of communication studies ­examine the issue of surveillance—particularly, the subfields of critical communication, mass communication, organizational communication, and technical communication. Scholars within each of these contexts examine surveillance’s relationship to power, control, and discipline. From a functional approach, surveillance of the environment is considered a main function of mass communication. That is, individuals rely on newspapers, radio, television, and other communication channels for both warnings about potential dangers in their environment (e.g., natural disasters, terrorist attacks) and information that is useful in everyday life (e.g., fashion trends, stock prices). Organizations, such as government agencies and corporations, also use these communication channels to monitor responses and to identify potential challenges to their policies.

209

From a critical perspective, however, such surveillance can also be used as a form of power to control and discipline those being surveilled. Michel Foucault’s work with the penal system revealed how prisoners become defined through communicative discourses, which simultaneously serve to establish the prisoner’s r­elationship to society. Epitomized by the p ­ anopticon—a prison system designed around a guard tower located at its ­ central core—Foucault argued that invisible and unverifiable supervision resulted in self-­ disciplining, as inmates internalized the possibility of being surveilled at all times by censoring their own behavior. The potential for surveillance to result in abuses of power is especially evident within organizational communication processes. Con­ temporary organizational members are increasingly subjugated to the ever-present possibility of surveillance. From security cameras to monitored phone calls to “secret shoppers,” many employees must constantly behave as though they are being surveilled during customer interactions, even when they are not. The significance of such surveillance has grown in recent decades due to the creation of new laws and technologies. For instance, The USA PATRIOT Act, which the then U.S. president George W. Bush signed into law shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, allows government surveillance of anyone suspected of terrorist-related activities, even U.S. citizens who have not been linked to any type of terrorist group. Similarly, the development of unmanned aerial vehicles and remotely piloted aircraft now allow nonprofessionals to surveil private property from high above—a legal issue that remains indeterminate in many areas of the United States. In summation, communication studies is a broad field dating back to the 4th century BCE. Formalized in the 1st century CE and institutionalized in the early 20th century, the academic field of communication draws from both the humanities and social sciences. The particular subfields of critical communication, mass communication, organizational communication, and technical communication focus on the subject of surveillance and its relationship to issues of power, control, and discipline. Although surveillance can be used to provide information to the public, critical scholars argue that such surveillance can also be  used to control and discipline those being

210

Community

surveilled. The role of surveillance is especially significant within organizational contexts, as employees are subjected to constant supervision. This significance has also grown in recent decades due to the creation of new laws and technologies, which allow for unprecedented levels of personal surveillance. J. Jacob Jenkins and Nien-Tsu Nancy Chen See also Agency; Computer Surveillance; Foucault, Michel; Free Speech; Freedom of Expression; Global Surveillance; Panopticon, The; PATRIOT Act

Further Readings Foucault, Michel. The Birth of the Prison. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1979. Iedema, Rick, et al. “Surveillance, Resistance, Observation: Exploring the Tele-affective Volatility of Workplace Interaction.” Organizational Studies, v.27 (2006). Sewell, Graham, et al. “Working Under Intensive Surveillance: When Does ‘Measure Everything That Moves’ Become Intolerable?” Human Relations, v.65 (2012). Snyder, Jason. “E-mail Privacy in the Workplace: A Boundary Regulation Perspective.” Journal of Business Communication, v.47 (2010).

Community The word community is a broad term used for fellowship or organized society. In general, the term community has been used with respect to either a geographical community (e.g., a neighborhood, town, or city) or the sharing of common beliefs or social practices (e.g., the Muslim community; the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community). Within a community, security and s­ urveillance technologies serve to protect individuals, their property, and the community itself. Through such technology, individuals may be able to achieve their desire to live in a crime-free community. According to data released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, violent crime and property crime in the United States declined by more than 4% from 2012 to 2013. Many scholars ­attribute this decline to various factors, including

more community crime prevention measures and improved policing, especially the extended use of surveillance technology by communities and law enforcement agencies to improve neighborhood safety. The extensive application of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras worldwide has also been reported to improve arrest and conviction rates, due to the increased availability of the physical evidence required in the prosecution of offenders. However, the constitutionality of using surveillance technologies in communities, often without individuals’ consent, remains a contentious issue. In this entry, the types of communities and societies and what makes each of them different are discussed, and the role of a community as an agent of social control and its cooperation with local law enforcement are described.

Types of Communities Ferdinand Tönnies, a German sociologist, described two types of human association: (1) Gemeinschaft (meaning “community”) and (2)  Gesellschaft (meaning “society” or “association”). As Tönnies argued, Gemeinschaft, due to the presence of a “unity of will,” is perceived to be a tighter and more cohesive social entity, such as the family and groups with shared characteristics (e.g., place, beliefs). Gesellschaft is defined as a group in which individual members are motivated to participate purely on the basis of self-interest. It is proposed that in the real world most groups are a mixture of these two. Similarly, the French sociologist Émile Durkheim identified two types of societies: (1) ­ mechanical solidarity and (2) organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity societies describe premodern, agrarian, homogeneous societies. Such societies had a common heritage and beliefs, and limited division of labor. Because of the close-knit nature of such societies, the need for surveillance was limited. Organic solidarity societies describe urban, industrialized societies, characterized by diversity and extensive division of labor. In organic solidarity societies, the need for a formal social control mechanism is higher than in mechanical solidarity societies. Mechanical solidarity societies tend to emphasize communitarian values, as opposed to organic solidarity societies, which promote individualistic values. Durkheim holds that

Computer Surveillance

a community in modern society is developed more around interest and skills than around locality. He sees “community” as a set of human interactions that can be found not only in the traditional ­villages but also in the most sophisticated modern cities. For most individuals, community is an important aspect of life. To belong to a particular community, members must have a sense of belonging, a feeling that they matter to one another and to the group and a shared faith that their needs will be met through their commitment to be together. Therefore, for a community to exist and thrive, both freedom and security must be present: The community can flourish because individuals feel free enough to share and secure enough to get along. This sense of connectedness—the formation of social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness—is known as social capital. Once social capital exists, the community will be productive, making possible the achievement of goals that would not be attainable in its absence.

Agent of Social Control The community is an important agent of social control and socialization. Communities with weak bonds and cohesion tend to have higher crime rates. In the same vein, communities with strong bonds and efficacy tend to have lower crime rates. Communities that play an active role in crime prevention and community safety are able to reduce offenses in their communities. The ­community is also a veritable agent for the rehabilitation of offenders, through community services, electronic monitoring, parole, and probation sentences. There seems to be an emerging recognition of community corrections programs in both t­reatmentand control-oriented models of offender change and transformation. It is widely believed in society that the police and the community share responsibility in maintaining order, fighting crime, and solving other social problems. Thus, the community often partners with law enforcement agencies in the maintenance of law and order, in identifying crime and social problems, and in crafting resolutions for those problems. Law enforcement agencies cannot be everywhere at the same time, so the active

211

involvement of communities in the maintenance of law and order is considered essential. Modern societies, as both Tönnies and ­Durkheim observed, are diverse and require more formal approaches to the maintenance of law and order. Many have suggested that the employment of surveillance and CCTV cameras is necessary to ensure the security of the community. However, others wonder if the security of community members can be obtained without sacrificing their ­liberty. Such issues need to be addressed as the value of surveillance in the maintenance of law and order in the community is pondered. Rochelle E. M. Cobbs, O. Oko Elechi, and Sherill Morris-Francis See also Closed-Circuit Television; Crime; Crime Control; Policing and Society; Social Control

Further Readings Brint, Steven. “Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept.” Sociological Theory, v.19/1 (2001). Cohen, Anthony P. The Symbolic Construction of Community. New York, NY: Routledge, 1985. Durkheim, Émile. The Division of Labor in Society. New York, NY: Free Press, 1964. Gusfield, Joseph R. The Community: A Critical Response. New York, NY: Harper Colophon, 1975. McMillan, David W. and David M. Chavis. “Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory.” Journal of Community Psychology, v.14/1 (1986). Tönnies, Ferdinand. Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 1988.

Computer Surveillance Computer surveillance is an act of gathering, storing, processing, assessing, and using data stored on or transmitted via a computer device, without the knowledge or consent of the person or groups who own the data. The information being ­surveilled may be stored on a storage device or transmitted via a computer network, such as the Internet. Thus, computer surveillance has a

212

Computer Surveillance

broader meaning than Internet surveillance or network surveillance. While some treat computer surveillance as something neutral, necessary, and indispensable in contemporary societies for organizational and security matters, others suggest that it should be considered as a purely negative concept, as it is a tool of disciplinary power, which is related to potential or actual harm, coercion, violence, asymmetric power relations, control, manipulation, and domination. After a brief review of the early history of computer surveillance, this entry describes the main agents of ­computer surveillance, such as state, workplace, marketing, and industrial and economic computer   surveillance. Next, strategies of computer surveillance are discussed. Social and political ­ ramifications of computer surveillance are then highlighted, and the entry concludes with a section on protection against computer surveillance.

History In the earlier days of computing and before computers entered the household sphere, computer surveillance was mainly limited to state espionage. Even when computers started to become more mainstream in the 1980s and early 1990s, their isolation from wider networks made computer surveillance difficult. Most malicious software from that period was limited to viruses and worms that would cause harm to the local machine, usually by deleting data or making the operating system inoperable; it was uncommon for a personal computer virus to collect personal information from the user. However, in recent decades, with the expansion of the Internet, computer surveillance has been accomplished using the Internet as the medium to intercept and collect data. Two factors are considered to have played a determinative role in the rapid expansion of computerized surveillance practices. First, the radical development of information and communication technologies and networked computing devices, which was made possible due to the increasing availability of inexpensive and efficient data storage. The second factor that has contributed to what is often characterized as a “surveillance society” was the creation of a culture of fear for terrorism, especially after the attacks in New York,

Madrid, and London in 2001, 2004, and 2005, respectively.

Main Agents of Computer Surveillance State Computer Surveillance

States have the financial and technical resources to establish powerful surveillance systems that can gather information from computer devices and their online activities across the world. They gain their legitimacy usually for national security reasons; however, most of the details on how those surveillance scheme projects actually work remain under secrecy. This has changed to a great extent since Edward Snowden’s revelations in June 2013 on global surveillance practices. Snowden, an American and former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, with the collaboration of the Guardian, The Washington Post, Der Spiegel, and a number of other media outlets, revealed—and importantly attested—the extent of the American, British, and other intelligence agencies’ surveillance activities. The published material that Snowden leaked to the media demonstrated a vast range of state surveillance programs, such as PRISM, Tempora, and Xkeyscore, which allowed the systematic interception, storage, and analysis of various types of stored and real-time electronic communications of both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens, including mass online, mobile, and landline telephone surveillance, covering nearly all possible communicative transactions. Workplace Computer Surveillance

In the United States, it is estimated that more than 0.5% of employers use some kind of computer surveillance software for their employees. There are numerous ways by which employers can surveil their employees’ computer activities. They might log and review all computer activities and the transmitted network packets (e.g., applications accessed, Internet usage, websites visited), sniff exchanged emails, log keystrokes, review computer files, or monitor social media sites. Workplace computer surveillance might also take place using monitoring software such as virtual network computing applications in which administrators can have virtual visual access to the users’

Computer Surveillance

computer screens. Depending on the country, there are some regulations or codes of practice that attempt to govern the permissible computer surveillance in workplace environments; however, they usually rely on employers’ goodwill and thus are unable to sufficiently protect employees. Marketing Computer Surveillance

The gathering of information derived from user-generated content for marketing, economic, and targeted advertising purposes is probably the most common type of computer surveillance today. This is very apparent in the cases of very large corporations that dominate the Internet. For example, since 2012, Google maintains a unified privacy policy for all its offered services. This means that data deriving from users’ search queries and analysis of their activities in all of Google’s services (e.g., email, Google+, YouTube) construct invaluable personal marketing profiles for each one of their users. These data are then used to offer personalized search results and ads. Similarly, Facebook uses the information its users voluntarily upload to offer personalized ads and sells these data to third-party entities such as application developers. With the widespread use of smartphones and tablets, economic surveillance on corporate Internet services and social media has seen an enormous growth. Smartphone users often install mobile applications with controversial and obscure privacy policies without first reviewing them. These applications may take advantage of the huge pool of personal information contained in a smartphone device, such as geolocation, contacts, personal and device ID, text messages, Internet history, or even emails and stored passwords.

213

for personal advertisement or aggregated marketing reports, they are being specifically ­ ­targeted at activists, advocacy groups, or competing ­ companies. The 2013 Snowden disclosures revealed that corporate surveillance has strong ties with state surveillance, as there seems to be a great amount of information exchange between those two agents.

Main Computer Surveillance Strategies Data Retention

Following the terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe, many countries developed data retention laws that demand all telecommunication providers to retain all of their customers’ and users’ traffic and location metadata for a specific period of time. These metadata concern all Internet, mobile, and landline communications and may include information such as Internet Protocol (IP) address, time of activity, type of activities performed including websites visited or persons called, location, and details about hardware, software, and operating system. Law enforcement authorities (police or national intelligence services) can then have access to these data, on request, for the purposes of investigating, detecting, and prosecuting criminal activities. Data retention laws have sparked an international debate not only for their legality and proportionality but also for their necessity and efficiency, in the pursuit of illegal acts and terrorism. As a result of this debate and in a phenomenal decision in April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the European Data Retention Directive of 2006 invalid and emphasized its serious violations of various fundamental human rights, such as the right to privacy.

Industrial and Economic Espionage

Deep Packet Inspection

The systematic computer surveillance of information by a corporation about an entity ranging from a person to a country constitutes what is called industrial and economic espionage. This type of surveillance primarily aims to protect or to promote corporations’ interests. The information collected for such purposes may or may not come from the same data pools as the marketing computer surveillance. However, instead of being used

Deep packet inspection (DPI) is a computer network filtering technique that enables companies, intelligence services, and states to read the content of electronic communications shared online. Although DPI was initially developed to detect viruses and spam, to manage networks and bandwidth, and to provide statistical information, it is now also being used to surveil every aspect of  electronic communications for a variety of

214

Computer Surveillance

additional purposes. This includes by default surveillance of users’ activities, such as web browsing; emails; social networking sites; instant messaging; search queries; username; and unique ID. DPI surveillance is conducted at the level of routers that belong to telecommunication providers, who manage the network locally, regionally, nationally, or internationally. Its efficiency lies in the usage of sophisticated computer algorithms that are constantly scanning through the data for particular keywords. By their nature, DPI practices are hard or impossible to account for and control. Although many of its commercial or public applications entail neutral aspects of computer surveillance (e.g., network management and crime investigations), many negative ones have been extensively documented. In the recent uprisings of various parts of the Arab world, for example, DPI technologies were used for sociopolitical control of the revolts, by either censoring their electronic communications or even altering them, in an effort to cause disinformation. Social Media Analysis

With the fast proliferation of the various social media, Internet users started disclosing more information online than ever. Facebook rapidly attracted hundreds of millions of members, while Twitter has become a global online public opinion and debate tool. Policing agencies and corporate interests found an unprecedented amount of personal information deriving voluntarily from individuals themselves. The collected information can be analyzed to map almost every aspect of a person’s (online) life, such as interests, habits, whereabouts, friendships, beliefs, and so on. Complex algorithms are being developed and tested using predictive analytics, the science behind efforts to predict human behavior. Both the NSA in the United States and Government Communications Headquarters in the United Kingdom are investing a lot of resources on social media analysis and surveillance. Social media analysis is an area that attracts much interest from commercial bodies as well, given the fact that it is a rich source of information that can be used for marketing and advertising purposes. The way of obtaining information varies: Companies can buy data directly from

social media services, collect them through social media third party applications, or run custom data mining software. Malicious Software and Software Vulnerability

Another common surveillance strategy concerns the installation of malicious software, developed by individuals or marketed to law enforcement agencies by corporations. As an example, Finfisher, also known as Finspy, developed by the corporation Gamma International UK Ltd., is a sophisticated surveillance tool that is compatible with most common computer and mobile operating systems, such as Windows, Mac OSX, Linux, Android, iOS, and BlackBerry OS. The software can be installed on site or even remotely by the law enforcement agencies, without the user’s consent, and can bypass (certain) antivirus systems; establish covert communication with headquarters; monitor Skype communications; record most common communication like email, chats, and voice-over-IP; enable live surveillance through webcam and microphone; trace the location of the targeted individual; silently extract files from the hard disk; log keystrokes; conduct live remote forensics on target systems; and use advanced filters to record only important information. Published evidence suggests that such software has been sold even to governments with a questionable democratic state and a long history of political repression and criminalization of speech. Against corporations’ claims that this kind of software is being used by law intelligence services solely for the surveillance of illegal activities, evidence suggests that in certain countries, it has been used against political activists, with no criminal records or record of wrongdoings. Physical Access Computer Surveillance

Computer surveillance is conducted not only via communication networks and software; it can also be achieved by managing direct access to the physical device (computer or router) of the targeted person. If such physical access can been made possible, the attacker can directly collect the target’s personal data or install a so-called malicious hardware, also known as a hardware

Computer Surveillance

Trojan, which is the covert insert of circuitry into a computer device’s integrated circuits. Such malicious hardware can establish covert communication with the surveillance agent and secretly deliver electronically the intercepted data. Such security threat is considered more intrusive and difficult to prevent and to detect, as it cannot be detected by software, such as antivirus systems. In addition, scientific research has shown that under certain conditions, it is possible to surveil a computer’s communications by intercepting the electromagnetic signals that its display transmits. These signals can then be translated to meaningful, readable information. Other researchers were able to recover text typed on a computer device, by simply analyzing the sound generated by the keystrokes.

Social and Political Implications of Computer Surveillance Stories around contemporary computer surveillance practices are being covered by different kinds of mainstream and alternative media and play a significant role in modifying citizens’ level of awareness, understanding, and perceptions around privacy, data protection, security, and surveillance. This results in the instillation of fear and insecurity within a society, which may negatively influence important societal values, such as individual freedom, autonomy, solidarity, equality, nondiscrimination, trust, and the rule of law. Importantly, there is the concern that citizens may feel that their privacy is being violated, which can lead to a kind of self-censorship, known as a “chilling effect.” Such values are of paramount importance for the structure of a democratic system and the support of key democratic processes, such as the creation of associations, political interests, constructive and alternative ideas, and the raising of criticism. The June 2013 revelations on state surveillance programs by Snowden have undoubtedly caused a major shift in how people perceive computer surveillance. Until then, little was known about how these clandestine operations worked, and any information about them was usually treated as speculative and without evidence or even ­dismissed as conspiracy theory or mere rumor. Snowden’s exposure of NSA, Government Communications

215

Headquarter, and other intelligence agencies’ operations revealed their deep-rooted level as well as their ties with corporate information giants such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. These revelations reintensified the debate about the consequences of digital technology and the value of privacy, with their long-term implications yet to be determined.

Protection Against Computer Surveillance Technical Strategies

There are numerous ways to protect privacy in an increasing surveillance society. Although achieving a completely secure computer environment or communication is very difficult to guarantee, today there are tools and practices offering a significant level of protection for storing or transmitting private data. One of the fundamental aspects of computer security is the protection against malicious software and external networked intrusions. Antivirus, antispyware, and firewall software is, thus, one way by which an individual can be protected from such exploits. Furthermore, data encryption is a method that the military has been using for many decades to ensure that delivered messages will be read only by the authorized recipient. Today, sophisticated implementations of encryption technology are openly available to the wider public. Some are being used to encrypt local files, or to secure connections between servers and clients like the Secure Sockets Layer and the more recent Transport Layer Security cryptographic protocols, or to protect the confidentiality of communications in emails, such as the Pretty Good Privacy software. While encryption can protect the privacy of information, it cannot per se protect the anonymity of communications, which is, for example, the identification of the IP used for the sending of an email. For that reason, a user can connect to the Internet by using proxy servers to hide the real identity (IP address) from the websites visited. Proxy servers act as an intermediary between clients and webservers, causing the latter to log the IP address of the proxy instead of the real user. There are several free or paid anonymous proxy lists on the Internet, but it is often difficult to measure their reliability. Proxy servers also usually

216

Computer Surveillance

have a negative impact on Internet connection speed. A free, open source, and well-reviewed alternative to the standard proxy lists is the Tor network and software, an encrypted worldwide and volunteer network of relays that enables online anonymity and helps surpass online censorship. For an even more advanced layer of protection against surveillance, some also pay anonymous virtual private networks to encrypt and hide their online activity even from their own Internet service providers. Bitcoins are being increasingly used as a virtual currency that can prevent the tracking of the identities of those involved in financial transactions. Because proprietary operating systems and software have been found to entail security vulnerabilities or even backdoors to law enforcement agencies, open source software is yet another strategy for the protection of privacy. The important, distinct characteristic of open source software is that its code can be reviewed by developer communities—or by any citizen—for the tracking of vulnerabilities and potential malicious scripts. Political and Legal Strategies

Computer surveillance practices, to a large extent, come about with a crisis of accountability and lack of transparency. In this sense, restoring these two essential democratic elements is another strategy. This could be done, for instance, by the establishment of parliamentary or congressional oversight committees, which would be led by members of the opposition and that would include a vast range of social actors. The 2013 Snowden revelations have shown that legal safeguards per se do not constitute a real protection against preemptive mass surveillance, as many of the surveillance practices were actually enabled by secret laws while others were being conducted outside the law. Therefore, the legislative process should open up to truly democratic processes that will take into consideration not only the interests of states and corporations but also those of the broader public. Educational and Advocacy Strategies

Although there are several countersurveillance and privacy protection strategies available, their partial or full adoption by citizens and companies

is still limited. The latter can mainly be attributed to lack of awareness and/or the significant technical knowledge and time investment that is demanded to efficiently employ some of these strategies (e.g., email encryption). New educational strategies can be implemented that will increase the level of awareness of citizens about not only the dangers that are entailed in surveillance but also the political, social, and legal implications that can arise. Also, developers can be encouraged to employ a privacy-by-design approach, which could facilitate the shifting of these challenges. Organizations and groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and WikiLeaks have aided, so far, in countersurveillance efforts by engaging in legal battles or exposing related classified documents. Nonetheless, critical citi­ zens, advocacy groups, privacy and data protection experts, and policymakers could contribute even more in the increasing of transparency and accountability by closely observing and documenting private and public surveillance ­ developments. Dimitris Tsapogas and Vassilis Routsis See also Corporate Surveillance; Global Surveillance; Surveillance, Theories of; Work Surveillance

Further Readings Acquisti, Alessandro, et al., eds. Digital Privacy: Theory, Technologies and Practices. Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach, 2008. Fuchs, Christian. “Societal and Ideological Impacts of Deep Packet Inspection Internet Surveillance.” Information, Communication and Society, v.16/8 (2013). Greenwald, Glenn. “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily.” The Guardian (June 6, 2013). http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-courtorder (Accessed November 2014). Macaskill, Ewen and Gabriel Dance. “NSA Files: Decoded. What the Revelations Mean for You.” The Guardian (November 1, 2013). http://www .theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/ snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelationsdecoded#section/1 (Accessed November 2014). Marquis-Boire, Morgan. “For Their Eyes Only: The Commercialization of Digital Spying.” The Citizen Lab (May 1, 2013). Research Brief, Munk School of

Concentration Camps Global Affairs, University of Toronto. https:// citizenlab.ca/storage/finfisher/final/fortheireyesonly. pdf (Accessed November 2014).

Concentration Camps Concentration camps or methods for concentrating populations for purposes of security and surveillance come in many different forms, although the first type brings to mind the camps in Nazi Germany prior to and during World War II. Concentration camps often bring up visions of the death camps of the Nazi era that resulted in the Holocaust. However, there were other types of concentration camps, although none reached the level of evil that was present in Nazi Germany when Adolf Hitler was in power. This entry examines the concentration camps used in Nazi G ­ ermany, early uses of concentrating a population, and concentration camps used by various countries with varying success after World War II.

Nazi Germany Concentration Camps In Nazi Germany, concentration camps were initially penal facilities used to house individuals deemed dangerous to the state. These camps were different from normal prisons in that individuals were detained indefinitely without trial for both personal actions that were deemed unacceptable and for possessing group identities such as belonging to the Communist Party or other suspect organizations. The detention of these individuals was designed to provide greater security for the regime and to avoid internal dissent. In other cases, the camps were used as a mechanism for concentrating groups whom the regime considered to be in some way dangerous or to be an existentialist threat to German society. Jews were the most obvious group to fall into this category, but ­Gypsies and other undesirables such as homosexuals and those with physical defects who also were considered to be threats to the purity of German society were also imprisoned. They were placed in camps entirely on the basis of group membership without regard to any personal actions they might have (or not have) undertaken to threaten the Nazi government. Their placement in the camps in increasing numbers isolated them from the rest of

217

the German population. The removal of Jews to ghettoes in the cities was also another form of  concentrating the Jewish population. The concentration camps and the ghettoes became ­ the gateway for the death camps that resulted in the deaths of 6 million Jews as a matter of state policy as well as another 6 million individuals deemed to be undesirable or threatening. Some of these v­ ictims died as a consequence of overwork, malnutrition, inadequate medical care, and the ­ notorious medical experiments, but the majority of these victims were murdered as a matter of state policy.

Early Concentration Camps One of the first uses of camps to concentrate a suspect population occurred during the Boer War (1899–1902). After initial battlefield defeats, the British army was able to defeat the field forces of the Orange River State and the South African Republic (Transvaal). The British occupied the major cities and towns, but they were unable to control the countryside. Boer guerrillas (commandos) refused to give up the fight and attacked isolated British units, outposts, and supply columns. These commandos had the support of the local Boer population and of at least some of the indigenous African groups. To reduce the flow of supplies and the support that the guerrillas were receiving, the British concentrated both the white and indigenous African populations into camps— thus providing the name for concentration camps in the future. These camps proved to be extremely unhealthy, resulting in significantly increased mortality rates among all the populations. The ­ strategy, however brutal in fact if not in intent, was ultimately effective in limiting assistance for the guerrillas. Eventually, the remaining Boer ­commandos surrendered to the British as a consequence of their isolation and as a consequence of the deaths of family members, including wives and children, in the concentration camps. Other types of concentration facilities appeared. Although the term was not used, Indian reservations in the United States served the same purpose once the Amerindian tribes were not simply forced to move to the West. The reservations forced the surviving tribes into small areas where the ­authorities could watch over them and where they were less likely to present a threat to settler

218

Concentration Camps

populations. Aborigines in Australia suffered the same fate even though they were less threatening  to the settler populations. The relocation of ­Japanese-American citizens to camps in the interior west of the United States served much the same purpose during World War II. An entire group of citizens were under suspicion of favoring an enemy state and thus were concentrated in areas where they could provide no assistance to that enemy. These relocation centers proved to be unnecessary because there was never any real ­evidence that these citizens as a group represented a danger.

Post–World War II Concentration Camps Concentration camps were used after World War II as part of government counterinsurgency strategies in colonial territories. The British in Malaya faced a rebellion when they tried to reestablish control after the Japanese occupation from local communists whose support was largely drawn from the ethnic Chinese community in the colony. To deprive the rebel guerrillas of food and other support, the rural Chinese population was concentrated in villages, not only where they could more easily be protected from coercion from the guerrillas but also where they could be prevented from voluntarily providing assistance to these groups. This technique proved to be effective in reducing the threat from the rebels rather quickly. They became an irritant rather than a direct threat, although it took almost two decades to completely eliminate the challenge that they represented. This British technique of concentrating vulnerable or supportive populations that worked in Malaya was tried in a number of other locations. It was used with some success in the Philippines in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The newly independent government of the Philippines faced a rebellion by local leftist/communist groups that appeared during World War II to fight the J­ apanese. The Huks (short for Hukbalahap, or People’s Anti-Japanese Army) challenged the government. The Huks mobilized peasant opposition in central Luzon in the North. The government opted for the  British approach and concentrated farmers into more secure villages in the areas where the Huk rebels were operating. This approach helped

undermine the ability of the rebels to gain food and other support (although a lack of attention to rural needs in the following years has resulted in a resurgence of violent challenges). The British used a similar strategy when they faced the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the 1950s. Tribal groups suspected of supporting the rebels were relocated to special villages to deprive the rebels of supplies and information and to protect those loyal to the colonial government. The Mau Mau rebels were defeated as a consequence of the overwhelming disparity in military forces, but their isolation from support did hinder them. The French, when facing a rebellion in Algeria, adopted a similar tactic with some success. Loyal villagers were placed in locations where greater security could be provided, but the concentration also made it more difficult for the rebels to receive any effective support. The French were able to win a military victory but lost the political battle when Algerian independence was negotiated. The idea of concentrating a population for purposes of security and surveillance in wartime was also tried in South Vietnam with the support of the United States on the assumption that the ­policy that worked in Malaya and the Philippines would also work in Indochina. The policy in this case was called the Strategic Hamlet Program. The goal was again to separate the population from the Viet Cong guerrillas. The hamlets were designed to be easier to defend and protect the ­villagers, but they also provided a means of gaining intelligence on the Viet Cong. The hamlets also made it more difficult for any pro-Viet Cong ­villagers to join the guerrillas for specific attacks (farmers by day and guerrillas by night). However, this strategy did not save the South Vietnamese government and the United States from eventual defeat. The war in South Vietnam was lost for many reasons, including significant involvement by North Vietnamese military units, but it is clear that the strategic hamlets policy did not save the situation for the government. The idea of the strategic hamlets may even have made matters worse because the forced relocation of the rural peasants disrupted the social and economic relationships at the local level and alienated some individuals from the government. Concentration camps by whatever name have a deserved negative connotation. In Germany before

Constructivism

World War II, they were used as mass detention centers for those the regime distrusted on either an individual or a group level. They eventually became part of the system of the death camps. In  the United States, Japanese Americans were forcibly sent to relocation centers. Indians in the United States and aborigines in Australia were placed in reserved areas. Faced with guerrilla groups fighting the government or invading forces  in the cases of the Boer War, Malaya, the ­Philippines, Kenya, South Vietnam, and Algeria, individuals were forced to relocate and concentrate in order to serve government objectives of security and surveillance regardless of personal desires. In some cases, these relocations were effective in defeating the guerrilla forces, and in other cases, the battles were still lost. James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz See also Germany; Mass Incarceration; Nazism

Further Readings Fein, Helen. Accounting for Genocide: Victims and Survivors of the Holocaust. New York, NY: Free Press, 1979. Jahoda, Gloria. The Trail of Tears: The Story of American Indian Removals, 1813–1855. New York, NY: Wing Books, 1975. Kenrick, Donald and Grattan Puxton. The Destiny of Europe’s Gypsies. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973. van Heyningen, Elizabeth. The Concentration Camps of the Anglo-Boer War: A Social History. Johannesburg, South Africa: Jacana Books, 2013.

Constructivism Constructivism is best understood as an approach or philosophical position with regard to international relations. If there is a unifying theme to all constructivisms, it is (a) the ontological primacy of intersubjective ideas as the basis of political action and (b) the changeability of such ideas (as social constructions, not material facts) and thus the changeability of our collective realities. P ­ olitics for constructivism cannot be reduced to biology or material power, or to individuals’ choices or

219

perceptions. Individuals both create and replicate the social facts that define their identity and their appropriate political actions. This entry first reviews several constructivist perspectives and then discusses constructivism with regard to surveillance, security, and privacy. The entry ends with a brief discussion of constructivism’s role in social science.

Perspectives Beyond these basic points of agreement, there are a variety of constructivist perspectives differing on epistemology (how we know what we know), ­levels of analysis (systems vs. states vs. groups), and theoretical orientation. Epistemologically, the debate between critical and conventional (or modernist) constructivism involves different degrees of skepticism in p ­ ursuing objective knowledge and the ethical position of seeking knowledge rather than the more emancipatory goals of wakening oppressed groups to their plight amid unjust hegemonic discourses. The notion of causation is common to mainstream political science, but constructivists also highlight the “constitution” of action, not just the cause. Methodologically, the latter involves understanding why political actors do what they do by reconstructing their perceptions and language in a given social context, rather than worrying about the “scientific” mission of generalizable laws and patterns of politics. In terms of levels of analysis, that is, where the analysis is located (or the causal variables are located), this varies greatly in constructivism over time and across the literature. Constructivism’s “first wave” in the United States tended to be modernist and systemic, sociologically showing how shared ideas promoted changes and isomorphism in state identity and behavior. Critics pointed out great variation in norm violations or norm adoption across states and regions and focused on “domestic” constructions as barriers to global norms or as areas of study in their own right. Others focused on the social constructions of elites and decision makers within countries and the contingent definition of interests and options within domestic socio-cognitive constraints from Russia to the U.S. John F. Kennedy administration in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

220

Constructivism

Theoretically, there are liberal, realist, and psychological variants, among others. Critics of early forms of constructivism noted its similarity to neoliberal institutionalism: that norms and institutions shape and constrain choices in the international arena. Charges of liberalism included the optimism with which some constructivists viewed the ability to change the world’s social norms and, thus, change the world. Others, intrigued by the notion of social forces and ideas applied to politics, represented realist constructivism or constructivist realism. More recently, Jacques Hymans heralded the arrival of psychological constructivism in Richard Ned Lebow’s Cultural Theory of International Politics, which combined internal psychological drives toward honor with global cultural dynamics to explain the outbreak of wars not clearly defined by self-interest. The potential of psychology’s focus on identity and beliefs to enrich constructivism has been explored in studies of threat perception and decision making. Other forms of constructivism highlight the power of words, narratives, and linguistic turns; others focus on practices; and still others foreground the role of power in the process of social constructions that perpetuate or alter political relationships, behaviors, and structures. In any case, the constructivist tendency is to “denaturalize” and deconstruct: emphasizing that what we take for granted is a social construction that can, in theory, be changed.

Constructivism and Surveillance, Security, and Privacy If constructivism questions the “naturalized” assumptions of politics, this implies that definitions and understandings of surveillance, security, privacy, and terrorism are bound to be contested. At the broadest level, the notion of security tends to be problematized from the constructivist perspective. Jutta Weldes questions the objective nature of national interest, pointing instead to the culturally contingent politics behind defining threats and interests. Others have advanced a literature on securitization that suggests ulterior motives and politics behind things presented to the public as “threats.” More broadly, national security and interests gave way in the 1990s to a notion of human security. Yu-Tai Tsai’s constructivist analysis of the

emergence of human security credits the perspective for opening spaces for thinking and theorizing beyond the narrow practices of Cold War national interests. Edward Newman (2001) joins Yu-Tai Tsai in crediting constructivism with reframing the priorities of security and to whom security applies, “in contradistinction with the structural realist mainstream of international relations” (p. 240). As terrorism is an important subject in the security and surveillance field, constructivism’s views on terrorism become relevant here as well. Ben Yehuda argues, as many others do, that “terrorism is not a ‘given’ in the real world; it is instead an interpretation of events and their presumed causes” (cited in Krishnaswamy, 2012, n.p.). Metaphors and constructions for terrorism have been analyzed for their political value and social meaning in places like Germany, fundamentally questioning the assumption that terrorism is objective and not constructed. In the realm of counterterrorism and national security, there is the matter of surveillance and privacy concerns. Monahan (2008) states that even technologies are not “inevitable developments” but “socially constructed . . . creations . . . thoroughly embedded in social practices” (p. 218) and institutions. Coming from a critical perspective, Monahan’s constructivism blames neoliberal ideology and associated political contexts for perpetuating notions of a privatized public space combined with increased social control mechanisms excluding and managing vulnerable populations in the name of confronting “terrorism.” These concerns about security/privacy trade-offs are not limited to radical theories of the left, and constructivism allows for various critics, conventional and critical, to challenge dominant ideas, practices, and institutions.

Role in Social Science For all its promise and performance as a critic of mainstream theory, method, and practice, constructivism still disappoints in the realm of falsifiable, empirically testing social science. Some don’t mind, proudly denying the value or possibility of positivist-style knowledge acquisition and hypothesis testing. But to have an impact on mainstream social science and practitioners, it would be beneficial to have increased efforts to produce convincing and

Cookies

cumulative results showing how different norms and narratives diffuse and how they influence what sorts of audiences and when. Whatever side of the security/privacy debate one is on, the construction of the threat to privacy or the need for surveillance is of great importance. Vaughn Shannon See also National Security; Politics; Securitization; Terrorism

Further Readings Adler, E. “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.” European Journal of International Relations, v.3/3 (1997). Balzacq, Theirry, et al. “Security Practices.” In Robert A. Denemark (ed.), International Studies Encyclopedia Online. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Barkin, J. Samuel. Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Checkel, Jeff. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.” World Politics, v.50 (1998). Checkel, Jeff. “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe.” International Studies Quarterly, v.43 (1999). Eriksson, Johyan and Giampiero Giacomello. International Relations and Security in the Digital Age. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007. Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” International Security, v.23 (1998). Hulsse, Rainer and Alexander Spencer. “The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist Turn.” Security Dialogue v.39 (2008). Hymans, Jacques. “The Arrival of Psychological Constructivism.” International Theory, v.2 (2010). Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Daniel Nexon. “Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism?” International Studies Review, v.6 (2004). Krishnaswamy, Janani. “How Does Terrorism Lend Itself to Constructivist Understanding?” E-IR (2012). http:// www.e-ir.info/2012/09/18/how-does-terrorism-lenditself-to-constructivist-understanding/ (Accessed September 2017). Lebow, Richard Ned. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Monahan, Torin. “Surveillance and Inequality.” Surveillance and Society, v.5 (2008). Newman, Edward. “Human Security and Constructivism.” International Studies Perspectives, v.2 (2001).

221

Ringmar, Erik. “How the World Stage Makes Its Subjects: An Embodied Critique of Constructivist IR Theory.” Journal of International Relations and Development, v.19 (2016). Rousseau, David. Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Shannon, Vaughn and Paul Kowert, eds. Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared.” International Studies Quarterly, v.44 (2000). Tsai, Yu-Tai. “The Emergence of Human Security: A Constructivist View.” International Journal of Peace Studies, v.14/2 (2009). Weldes, Jutta. Constructing National Interests: The US and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Wendt, Alexander. “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations.” Review of International Studies, v.24/5 (1998). Yehuda, Ben N. Political Assassinations by Jews. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.

Cookies Cookies are small, byte-sized data files found in the browser cache of most information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as smartphones, tablets, computers, and wearable technologies. Although cookies were initially designed in the 1990s to minimize the loading time of websites, they have since become increasingly repurposed as tools for Internet marketing and advertising. There are numerous kinds of cookies, utilized to serve a variety of different purposes for social media–based data mining and web analytics efforts. Cookies essentially record a variety of information about how an individual browses the Internet. With the average ICT device carrying upward of thousands of different cookies at any time, coupled with the number of ICT devices exceeding 1.5 billion worldwide, cookies raise numerous privacy concerns—concerns driven by not only private sector operations but government Internet surveillance techniques as well. This entry describes the process of how cookies work,

222

Cookies

lists several types of cookies and their purposes, and concludes with a discussion on the privacy concerns regarding access by private corporations and government agencies to users’ cookies. Each time an individual visits a website on his or her device, the website installs numerous cookies into the device’s memory. With as many as a dozen cookies installed at one time, each cookie is instructed to record different information about the individual’s interaction with the website. Once the individual leaves the website—or sometimes when the individual returns to that website later— the cookie sends all of the information it records back to the website. In most cases, websites redirect this information directly to third-party service providers, such as Google Analytics. Cookie-based analytics initiatives compile and analyze this information to assist clients in understanding their web traffic’s behavior on their own sites better, enabling them to conduct more detailed, accurate, and ­efficient advertising and marketing. Cookies, thus, play a primary role in placing targeted advertisements toward specific individuals and their devices, as well as enabling corporate analytics divisions to build consumer behavioral profiles. Cookies enable this specific advertising, marketing, and behavioral research due to their collective ability to record highly specific, nuanced details about an individual’s browsing sessions. Although websites and the companies they outsource utilize customized cookies tailored to meet specific needs, there are numerous categories of cookies that are widely used across the Internet, including preferences, security, processes, advertising, session, and customized analytics cookies. Preferences cookies allow websites to remember information that alters how a website looks or behaves, such as an individual’s adjustments to preferred language, region, font, color, and other customizable information, for example, about weather and traffic conditions. Security cookies are used to authenticate users to, on the one hand, prevent fraudulent use of login credentials but, on the other, to remember the identity of an individual and his or her specific device. Processes cookies are essential to website functionality, making navigation and secure-area access possible. Advertising cookies is a complex category of specialized cookies. These cookies are the most important for advertising, marketing, and research. They

essentially record a wide variety of information, for example, about all of the websites an individual visits across the Internet, search engine queries and results, and which advertisements and videos are watched. Session cookies similarly record information about what an individual clicks or taps on a website, including any other information about how the user specifically interacts with the website. Analytics cookies serve different functions depending on the website or analytics company that deploys them. In general, these highly customizable cookies can be instructed to govern other cookies. For example, they can command the expiry or renewal dates or times for all other cookies, or instruct which details should be prioritized. Because of the detailed nature of cookie recording, information exchange, and ubiquitous behavioral analysis practices, companies aim to ensure that the information they are collecting directly reflects specific individuals and devices. Accordingly, many cookies contain specific identification information to allow analytics companies to cross-identify the information they receive. For example, most preferences cookies are instructed to assign a random but unique device identification number to the device. Cookies do not store information pertaining to an individual’s identity, in an attempt to protect Internet users’ privacy. For example, unique identification numbers are indeed deployed for identifying specific devices but are utilized as a means of supplanting personal identity information; analytics companies and websites cannot determine specifically who their visitors are—visitors are identifiable only by number. Some websites utilize JavaScript code snippets to execute the initial installation of cookies onto a device. In some cases, such as with Google Analytics, this snippet records Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and other regional data. However, many of the numbers in these IP addresses are scrambled to protect the individual’s privacy. Despite websites’ and analytics companies’ attempts to keep web users’ identities anonymous, many privacy issues arise around the ethics of indefinitely documenting Internet movement and behavior. As more companies become invested in behavioral analyses for marketing and advertising purposes, the Internet precludes many private

Copenhagen School

experiences for users across the globe. Furthermore, cookies are also aggressively targeted by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). In particular, the NSA captures cookies from targeted devices to geographically locate the user anywhere across the globe. The NSA’s PRISM program deploys QUANTUM software, which accesses cookies, particularly preferences cookies, to extract unique identification numbers as well as any other regional information available. In doing so, the NSA cross-references this information with any other information in its databases in an attempt to geo-tag people and their devices. Because of many Western governments’ post-9/11 security commitment to risk management and threat prediction, prevention, and preemption via data surveillance, the very information that is used to generate behavioral profiles in the private sector is similarly scrutinized to assess an individual’s risk level with regard to national interests and safety. These privacy issues are compounded by the intergovernmental sharing that occurs within the Five Eyes security consortium as a means of by passing domestic surveillance restrictions. Thomas N. Cooke See also Big Data; Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; National Security Agency; Surveillance Culture.

Further Readings Dwyer, C. Behavioral Targeting: A Case Study of Consumer Tracking on Levis.com. Paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Americas Conference, San Francisco, CA, April 6–9, 2009. Hand D. J., et al. “Data Mining for Fun and Profit.” Statistical Science, v.15/2 (2000). Peng, Weihong and Jennifer Cisna. “HTTP Cookies: A Promising Technology.” Online Information Review, v.24/2 (2000).

Copenhagen School The Copenhagen School of security studies is an academic school that employs a critical approach to security studies. It is part of the postpositivist

223

movement in the field of international relations (IR), which became a salient part of post–Cold War scholarship. IR theorist Barry Buzan’s 1983 book People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations forms the bedrock of the school’s academic thought. Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde are two well-known scholars connected with the school. At the core of the school is the way in which many different types of security issues interact with domestic politics. Drawing on the ideas of the ontology of constructivism within the field of IR, the Copenhagen School looks at threats to states (i.e., national security) as matters that are socially constructed. The term Copenhagen School was first used by Professor Bill McSweeeny, an expert in peace studies at the University of Dublin and one of the Copenhagen School’s ­principal critics. Securitization is a seminal feature of the Copenhagen School, whereby actors turn regular issues of domestic level politics into issues of high politics that affect states on a national level (i.e., when something becomes an issue of national security). Security as a socially constructed phenomenon is highly subjective. This view held by the Copenhagen School is a guiding aspect of its view on security and security-related issues. The securitization process comprises three distinct phases: 1. The creation of an existential threat (i.e., an issue or event such as climate change) before a referent object (i.e., a state or group of states) (this phase is called the “speech act”). 2. The commencement of special/emergency/ extraordinary actions in an attempt to secure and protect the referent object against the existential threat. 3. The receiving of the speech act by one or more audiences.

One of the major problems associated with this process, particularly the third phase, is the lack of control that a securitizing actor ultimately has over the way in which the audience receives and subsequently processes or interprets the speech. During the course of this process, the referent object can be categorized in one of three ways.

224

Copenhagen School

First, it can be nonpolitical. Second, it can be politicized and therefore require action by government in “normal” ways or by using nonexceptional means. Third, the referent object can be extrapoliticized (or securitized). While the first stage involves nondebated (private) responses or action, the second is debated (public), and the third can lead to the use of extraordinary measures. Examples of extraordinary measures include long-term military occupation; extreme forms of interrogation and torture; reduction in civil liberties, such as phone tapping or the Central Intelligence Agency’s policy of rendition, detention, and interrogation; and the use of militarized drones in drone strikes and targeted killings. Proponents of the Copenhagen School speak of the issues of security in terms of different facets of contemporary international politics and societies. These facets can be taken as different areas or fields, such as the state and society, the state and the military, levels of politics and, the field of economics and its impact on other areas, as well as the environment and the many changes within it and how it affects people and states. As such, the Copenhagen School (through security studies theory) addresses a truly wide spectrum of issues and events that affect the world today and people living within it. The depth of analysis within each field can be significant and is therefore able to engage with and “widen” the materialist security studies practiced more traditionally. This capacity to examine and analyze objects and events within the international system by means of various sectors represents one of the main pillars of the Copenhagen School. One of the major problems of security concerns is that what is considered a threat in one country may not necessarily be considered a threat in another country. Different states are faced, in many cases, with their own unique set of issues that cannot easily be translated from one state to another or from one region to another. Thus, regional security complex theory, a theory of regional security attached to the Copenhagen School (put forward by the school’s primary scholars), is used to approach the “clustering” of security in different geographical locales. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the South East Asia Treaty Organization constitute two examples of regional

security arrangements formed as a result of patterns of cooperation and discord or hostility securitization and de-­securitization processes. The Copenhagen School has attracted much criticism from scholars of other IR theoretical areas. For example, some claim that it has taken far too strong a European perspective on issues related to security. Furthermore, the claim is often made that the school fails to conceptualize and problematize critical terms within the field. It might be beneficial if it, as Filip Ejdus (2009)— editor of the journal Western Balkans Security Observer—points out, “would devote itself more to the theorization of the term ‘political’ and take a clearer and better articulated normative stand in relation to the dichotomy political-security” (p. 1). Finally, a leading IR scholar, Lene Hansen, in her article “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” published in 2000 in Millennium, has argued that the Copenhagen School fails to adequately include gender in its security scholarship. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk See also Constructivism; Critical Security Studies; National Security; Politics; Securitization

Further Readings Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. London, England: Routledge, 1997. Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. Hemel Hempstead, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983. Ejdus, Filip. “Editor’s Word.” Western Balkans Security Observer, v.4/13 (2009). Huysmans, Jef. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. London, England: Routledge, 2006. Knudsen, Olav F. “Post Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization.” Security Dialogue, v.32/3 (2001). Wæver, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995. Williams, Paul. “Critical Security Studies.” In Alex J. Bellamy (ed.), International Society and Its Critics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Copwatch

Copwatch Copwatch is a loosely affiliated international network of community-based organizations comprising volunteers who patrol neighborhoods and video record public interactions between law enforcement and citizens. While various Copwatch groups are motivated by distinct political views, Copwatching is broadly understood to be method of deterring police misconduct and increasing police accountability via surveillance of police activity, as the practice of Copwatching was developed to enable community-based organizations to exercise power over the police and hold them accountable for abuse of authority. Copwatch videos are typically posted on YouTube or other social media and/or submitted as evidence of police misconduct in a court of law, but some have objected that the practice of Copwatching violates privacy. Since 1990, more than 50 Copwatch organizations have formed in North America, Europe, and Australia. Today, with the proliferation of camera phones, Copwatching is so ubiquitous that it has emerged as a social practice that is commonly carried out by individuals who have no affiliation with a Copwatch organization. While it is generally accepted that Copwatching has had positive effects on police accountability worldwide, critics argue that Copwatching can have the unintended consequence of inducing intensified police action. Two important legal cases concerning Copwatching activities are Bandele v. City of New York (2007) and Glik v. Cunniffe et al. (2011). In 1990, a group of activists in Berkeley, ­California, began patrolling Telegraph Avenue to document police activity in response to growing concerns about police harassment of homeless people of color. While this group would become the first Copwatch organization, in 1966 the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP) had already organized citizen patrols to monitor police activity in Oakland and Berkeley, California. During these patrols, BPP members exercised their legal right to carry loaded firearms until that right was revoked by the passage of the 1967 Milford Act. In contrast to the BPP, Berkeley Copwatch, from its inception, has been committed to the philosophy of nonviolence, as well as to policies of noninterference with police activity and de-escalation. In addition to

225

fostering police accountability, the organization uses Copwatching as a method of community building and political education. While Berkeley Copwatch has produced the Copwatch Handbook and regularly provides technical assistance for aspiring Copwatchers, it emphasizes that knowledge of local conditions should inform and determine the specific tactics employed by emergent Copwatch initiatives. Commonly used tactics for Copwatchers across the globe include, but are not limited to, recording instances of police misconduct from an approximate distance of 20 feet, patrolling in pairs, patrolling at unpredictable times, avoiding recording civilians in the act of committing crimes, working with police review boards (when available), posting videos on social media sites such as YouTube, and using police scanners to monitor police communications. In addition to direct monitoring, many C ­ opwatch organizations perform activities such as maintaining local databases of reports of police misconduct, conducting independent investigations into claims of police misconduct, producing research about important community issues, c­onducting “know your rights” trainings with members of the community, and hosting fund-raisers to support victims of police brutality. In 2007, Berkeley Copwatch hosted the first International Copwatching Conference. Winnipeg C ­ opwatch in Manitoba, Canada, hosted the second conference in 2011. While many police officers have publicly supported the practice, others say that Copwatching violates their privacy. Critics also argue that Copwatch footage can potentially be subpoenaed and used as evidence against the person the Copwatchers were trying to protect. They also argue that recording police interactions makes the officers less likely to use discretion and let someone who has committed a minor offence off with a warning. For their part, Copwatchers say that police officers have developed countertactics to prevent Copwatching. These police countertactics include lying to persons in police custody by telling them that Copwatchers intend to publicly humiliate them with the video footage, thereby encouraging the person in custody to tell the Copwatchers to leave, shining flashlights into the camera lens so as to make recording difficult, confiscating and/or destroying recording devices, physically removing

226

Corporate Personhood

Copwatchers from the area, and arresting and/or brutalizing Copwatchers. Bandele v. City of New York is a federal civil rights lawsuit filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) on behalf of Lumumba Bandele, Djibril Toure, and David Floyd, three ­ members of the Brooklyn, New York–based Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, who were ­ arrested in 2005 for Copwatching. Toure was charged with assaulting a police officer, while all three men were charged with obstruction and resisting arrest. The recovered video footage absolved the ­Copwatchers of any wrongdoing, and in 2006 all charges against the men were dropped. This case is significant in that it reveals how the act of C ­ opwatching itself has become criminalized. In 2011, several Copwatch organizations and CCR filed Glik v. Cunniffe et al., a brief that appeared in the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals in response to Simon Glik’s arrest in 2007 for recording an instance of police brutality with his cell phone. The charges against Glik were eventually dropped, and the court determined that private citizens have the right to record public ­ officials performing their jobs in public places and that the arrest of citizens for this activity constitutes a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In 2012, Glik v. Cunniffe et al. was cited by the U.S. Department of Justice when it upheld the right of citizens to record public police conduct. Orisanmi Burton and Charles Price See also Cell Phone Tracking; Policing and Society; Smartphones; Sousveillance; Synopticon, The

Further Readings Bandele v. City of New York, No. 1:07-cv-03339 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) Berkeley Copwatch. Copwatch Handbook: An Introduction to Citizen Monitoring of the Police (n.d.). https://decarcerating.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/ copwatch-handbook-an-introduction-ot-citizenmonitoring-of-the-police.pdf (Accessed September 2017). Glik v. Cunniffe, No. 10-.1764, 2011 WL 3769092 (1st Cir. Aug. 26, 2011). Huey, Laura, et al. “Cop Watching in the Downtown Eastside: Exploring the Use of (Counter) Surveillance

as a Tool of Resistance.” In Torin Monahan (ed.), Surveillance and Security: Technological Politics and Power in Everyday Life. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 2006. Prichett, Andrea and Annie Paradise. “The Criminalization of Copwatching: Berkeley Copwatch Report on State Violence, Police Repression and Attacks on Direct Monitoring.” http://berkeleycopwatch.org/resources/ Criminalization_of_Copwatching_2011.pdf (Accessed October 2014). Wilson, Dean Jonathon and Tanya Serisier. “Video Activism and the Ambiguities of CounterSurveillance.” Surveillance & Society, v.8/2 (2010).

Corporate Personhood In the first decade of the 21st century, a five-justice majority of the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that corporations are “persons” vested with the same constitutionally protected rights as actual persons, a legal recognition for which corporate lawyers had long campaigned. The ruling was stunning to many, as it disregarded the clearly stated warnings of prominent U.S. Constitutional framers, such as Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, and lacked jurisprudential precedent in the previous U.S. Supreme Court rulings. It also lacked any legislative basis at either the state or the federal levels and contravened public opinion, which clearly opposes the notion of corporate personhood. The ruling has significant implications for surveillance, security, and privacy issues related to corporate owners and operators because as corporate persons they may invoke potent due process rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution to protect themselves from scrutiny and accountability when accused of engaging in deviant and illegal behaviors that may threaten the individual rights and security of actual U.S. citizens. Because corporations usually have far greater resources than individual citizens and do not suffer the same mortal frailties that flesh-and-blood human beings do, corporations can actualize their due process rights more aggressively to preserve corporate privacy and resist regulatory surveillance than ­ typical human citizens can. This entry reviews the

Corporate Personhood

history of corporations and discusses the campaign to achieve personhood for corporations.

History Corporations have existed since the Roman Empire. Modern corporations date back to the Dutch trading companies of the 1500s and Queen Elizabeth I’s charter of the East India Company in 1600. Governments incorporated such companies as legal fictions and granted them conditional, revocable privileges to engage in commercial enterprises capable of signing contracts and participating in the legal system. They were allowed to own property; but as “limited liability” corporations, their greatest benefit was to protect their shareholders from personal liability arising from any debt the companies might incur should those companies go bankrupt. The Anglo-Saxon common law tradition operating throughout the British Empire distinguished between human beings as “natural persons” and corporations, such as companies, churches, and families, as “artificial persons.” Although the former inherently possessed natural rights, the latter were granted only conditional and revocable privileges for specific purposes under strict conditions. When the American colonists declared their independence from Great Britain in 1776, they were clear about this distinction and established a constitutional republic to protect human beings from governmental intrusions into their privacy and infringements of their property. In 1773, the Boston Tea Party propelled the colonists toward revolution. This was a dramatic protest against the British government’s decision to give the East India Company tax exemptions and subsidies. The company, at that time the world’s largest corporation, dominated lucrative tea imports into the American colonies. British policies favored the global giant to the detriment of colonial small businesses and consumers. With the establishment of a new democratic republic and the framing of a new constitution, the American leaders were both hostile toward and fearful of the power and influence of commercial monopolies such as the East India Company and aimed to protect the new republic from them. Thomas Jefferson in particular warned the other Founding Fathers against the danger of

227

artificial enterprises becoming too influential, lest they become what he called a “pseudoaristocracy” that could usurp power from a democratically elected “natural aristocracy” of citizens. In 1784, even before the U.S. Constitution was ratified, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a precedential law to legally reaffirm the prevailing understanding that in the new American republic, states would reserve the right to grant or revoke corporate charters as they see fit. Between 1790 and 1860, more than 2,000 corporations were chartered. There were many privileges granted conditionally with numerous constraints placed on chartered corporations. U.S. laws required that corporations open all their records and facilities to government oversight as a condition of being chartered. During Thomas Jefferson’s and James ­Madison’s presidencies (1801–1809 and 1809–1817, respectively), the threat of corporate power emerged. The Second Bank of the United States became the United States’ first large corporation and began putting forth its own political candidates, becoming so powerful that in 1832 President Andrew Jackson threatened the bank with the corporate death penalty. In 1811, New York enacted the first state-level “corporate veil” shielding stockholders from liability for corporate wrongdoing, even though the U.S. Constitution does not provide for any corporate shareholder liability limitations. In the 1855 Dodge v. Woolsey case, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed that the states are able to place limitations on corporations and have the authority to revoke their charters. Later, when corporate officials made campaign contributions to Republican Party candidates to combat antitrust campaigns, President Theodore Roosevelt signed the Tillman Act of 1907, the first federal law aimed at prohibiting corporate campaign financing.

Campaign for Corporate Personhood The campaign to consider corporations as constitutionally protected persons gained strength after the Civil War when the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution were ratified (in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively), specifically to protect the citizenship

228

Corporate Personhood

rights of newly freed black slaves. The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly granted the blacks full citizenship rights and aimed to protect them from discrimination. But it was the corporate lawyers who would invoke the presumed Fourteenth Amendment protections against “discrimination” from local ­ communities, doing so more often and with more success than the black (or female) persons would. Through the 1870s and 1880s, corporate lawyers relentlessly argued that their clients were people entitled to protection. In the first half-century following the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifica­ tion, of the 307 Fourteenth Amendment cases that made it to the Supreme Court, 288 involved corporations, whereas just 19 were brought by the black persons. Some assert that in 1886, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, the Supreme Court ruled that corporations were legally persons entitled to constitutional protections. However, rather than dealing with corporate personhood, this case involved taxes that the railroad company believed it should not have to pay. Although company lawyers argued that the railroad company was legally a person entitled to “equal protection under the law” pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court rejected this argument and did not rule that corporations are persons with constitutional rights. Because there were no court stenographs at that time, the legal community relied on court reporters to accurately record what had transpired in Supreme Court cases. In a headnote to the case, court reporter J. C. Bancroft wrote that corporations were legal persons. Although headnotes have no legal standing and do not set precedents, generations of lawyers have assumed that this gave corporations legal status as persons vested with constitutionally protected rights. To protect corporate privacy, lawyers have argued that corporations should be recognized as people with Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights as well. The former guarantees citizens the right to privacy, protecting them from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures, whereas the latter guarantees protection from self-incrimination. Corporate lawyers have successfully won favorable rulings, for instance, protecting corporations from random regulatory inspections. Between 1967 and 1978, the Supreme Court ruled that

corporations did not have to open their books and  facilities to government regulators because ­American citizens do not have to submit to unreasonable searches. In 2003, footwear manufacturer Nike claimed that pursuant to the First Amendment right to free speech, it had the right in its advertising to deny claims regarding working conditions while workers in its Vietnamese factory were being exposed to toluene, a known carcinogen. Several multinational corporations, trade associations, and the American Civil Liberties Union wrote amicus briefs to support Nike, based on their belief that the Santa Clara case had granted corporate personhood and, thus, First Amendment rights. But the Supreme Court decided not to hear the case, so the matter was left undecided. Then, in 2007, in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Election Commission could not prohibit the latter from running campaign ads just because the latter was a corporation. The Court did not decide on whether or not corporate persons could actually vote in elections, but a five-justice majority ruled that corporations could now run campaign ads. The dissenting justices argued that the majority’s ruling set a dangerous precedent that would threaten citizens’ First Amendment rights and democracy itself. In 2008, a conservative activist group, Citizens United, wished to run a film attacking the aspiring Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton during paid television programming. The Federal Election Commission recognized that it was a campaign ad restricted by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act), and because the Tillman Act prohibited corporate campaign contributions, it ordered Citizens United to stop. In 2010, the Supreme Court decided to hear the case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Instead of focusing on the relatively narrow issue at hand, the Supreme Court widened the case to the matter of corporate political free speech generally. The same majority that in 2007 declared that corporations are persons entitled to First Amendment free speech rights (i.e., fund political ads) decided that corporate persons could now fund political campaigns directly. As a result, corporations have made unprecedented financial campaign contributions.

Corporate Surveillance

These Supreme Court decisions have given corporations power and protections that ordinary citizens do not have. For instance, corporations can monitor employee communications and subject employees to physical examinations. When corporations are criminally implicated in violating citizens’ privacy rights, they have successfully sought immunity from accountability. For example, in 2008, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act granted telecommunications giants such as AT&T immunity from legal liability for allegedly helping President George W. Bush’s administration spy on U.S. citizens’ private communications. The Supreme Court has also issued rulings that apply different standards of “proportional” punishments to corporate persons than to natural persons. In 2003, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Supreme Court limited the punitive damages that courts could award natural persons in civil awards when corporate persons illegally harm them. Also in 2003, while ruling on two cases, Lockyer v. Andrade and Ewing v. California, the Supreme Court upheld California’s notoriously punitive “three strikes law,” ruling that even lifelong prison sentences for nonviolent felonies were constitutionally proportionate when committed by natural persons. Public opinion opposes the notion that corporations are “people” with the same constitutional rights as actual people, and no American legislature has ever recognized them as such. However, returning corporations to their traditional place as artificial persons granted only conditional privileges, and privacy rights will likely require ­ amendments to both state-level constitutions and the U.S. Constitution. Until then, potentially ­dangerous and illegal corporate behavior remains ­difficult to surveil. Paul R. Schupp See also Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010); U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Bakan, Joel. The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power. London, England: Constable & Robinson, 2013. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. ___ (2010).

229

Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1885). Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). Hartmann, Thom. Unequal Protection: How Corporations Became “People”: and How You Can Fight Back (2nd ed., Rev. and expanded). San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2010. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).

Corporate Surveillance Corporate, or organizational, surveillance can take a lot of forms, including watching customers, competitors, or the basic operating environment (environmental scanning). Given this volume’s emphasis on privacy, this entry focuses generally on surveillance of customers, including privacy and other concerns raised by the expansion of such surveillance.

Customer Surveillance Organizations watching customers is a phenomenon with a long history. Previously, surveillance often took the form of observation studies. Observation studies, taking place in public where individuals know or should know that they could potentially be objects of scrutiny, were usually not controversial. Techniques were as simple as noting automobiles or pedestrians passing by for a traffic count or tracking a shopper’s path through a store. Ethical problems arose only in situations where customers would have a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., changing rooms). More recent history has raised the stakes. Observation studies today on individual observers or simple mechanical devices (traffic counters) aren’t as dependent as before. Advances in computing systems, from obtaining information to storing it and processing it, have automated and expanded surveillance activities exponentially. Initial growth came from transactional data, including loyalty programs, and has expanded to include online search and purchase histories and other computer-assisted record keeping. The general purpose is to better serve customers, obtaining a

230

Corporate Surveillance

deeper understanding of their needs and wants. From the better understanding come rewards for regular purchases, targeted promotional offers, customized product suggestions, and personalized communications. As the overall point of marketing is constructing an exchange that is better tailored to the individual customer, this increase in information raises the profession to a new level. Even more recent advances in data gathering, including web tracking (e.g., Google Analytics, cookies) and monitoring social media activity, serve to reinforce the general trend. One of the first applications of loyalty programs to detailed customer observation was the UK grocer Tesco’s clubcard program, created with assistance from dunnhumby. The clubcard tracks customer purchases as well as responses to targeted offers delivered to individual members. With a membership in the millions and even more potential individual promotional offers, the program demonstrated the power of individualized knowledge of each customer. A similar program was instituted by Harrah’s (now Caesar’s) casinos. The True Rewards card collects information on hotel stays, restaurant purchases, show attendance, and gaming activity. By the turn of the 21st century, the firm had the capability to make targeted offers to customers (whatever drew them to the casinos more frequently: e.g., free/discounted shows, free/discounted rooms, cash for gambling) and had even moved into yield management in pricing, with different offers for different customers and situations, much like the airlines do. Even more recently, the firm has started tracking gambling activity. Money is loaded on the reward cards and monitored (players insert cards at specific tables) so the casinos know what games are played, for how long, how much is bet, who won or lost, and other such precise data. Activity is tracked down to the level of casino managers meeting the best customers at the door after a bad night with a check that will make them feel better (and return sooner). Thus, modern technology has enabled a much more detailed customer surveillance capability on the part of organizations. By obtaining customer willingness to essentially log in at the cash register with each purchase, or when responding to offers or even just visiting, organizations can compile

quite large databases on a person-by-person basis. In return, customers get more individualized attention and, presumably, satisfaction. Customers give up their privacy by choice. Terms of use, including an implicit or explicit agreement from the individual, are part of the package, though one could ask whether the vast majority of customers actually know the depth of the information gathering.

Expansion of Surveillance These trends have been expanded with even more detailed database construction in online environments. Online retailer amazon.com has an ability to not only track online purchases and response to offers but also record search histories, from where the customer comes as well as other sites visited, and even equipment used. Orbitz, for example, received substantial publicity when it was found that the firm was reordering hotel listings depending on the type of computer used to visit the site. Apple Mac users were shown more expensive properties at the top of their listings than were PC users. Use of Internet sites also comes with customer agreements—sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit. So customers are well aware that surveillance may be occurring, but they may not be fully informed of its breadth and depth. Even more recently, with big data capabilities, firms have been able to further expand their surveillance activity and subsequent analytical processes. Big data usually refers to the ability of organizations to obtain massive amounts of data when conducting day-to-day activities, including operations, transactions, and communication (e.g., social media). Big drops in the cost of data storage and computer processing power have made it cost-effective to take in, hold, and analyze all of these data. Firms are using this capability to divide customers into increasingly specific subsegments, discover buying patterns (e.g., what products are bought together), and find other, even more precise, analytical insights. An individual fitting a specific demographic profile, for example, might be determined to be 3% more likely to buy a product than another, fitting a different profile. Since the finding is based on analyzing the full population of customers, there is no statistical doubt—targeting all such customers should result in a bump in sales.

Corporate Surveillance

In a related example, a Target store manager received a complaint from a customer whose teenage daughter had received a targeted mail concerning pregnancy products. Some days later, the store manager called back to apologize more fully and found that the daughter was, indeed, pregnant. In explaining the episode, Target noted that it had built a model, based on purchase of around 25 products, that could predict pregnancy with a high degree of probability. The store had known that the girl was pregnant before her father did, perhaps even before she did.

Concerns This incursion into customers’ personal lives begins to raise some important questions about how far these surveillance capabilities should go. The collected records are fairly mundane, but through analysis, personal insights can be drawn as well. These trends have been taken even further as some online firms have started conducting experiments on customers. Once again, the intentions aren’t necessarily objectionable: to better determine customer needs and wants so as to better satisfy them. But also once again, the capability can be taken a stretch too far. In summer 2014, Facebook owned up to conducting experiments on customers. It turned out that the practice was quite prevalent, and to a great extent, most experiments were aimed at improving service (companies change packaging or prices all the time, experimenting with response). But the experiment that was drawing publicity was changing the nature of members’ newsfeeds from positive to negative, something that had the potential to influence their mental states. O ­ KCupid weighed in on the controversy by noting that it also conducted experiments, sometimes even recommending matches that weren’t accurate ­ according to its established algorithm, essentially changing the product offering. Once again, the question was raised as to whether activities based on the surveillance databases had been taken to an inappropriate level. The danger with these modern capabilities are that marketing or other initiatives take the information considerably beyond the level customers expected when they agreed to yield the data—if they explicitly agreed at all. Furthermore, firms

231

are now capable of combining databases. So proprietary databases with identified customers who willingly give up their information can be combined with other databases that customers may have expected to be kept anonymous. In such cases, matching up details in the databases allows data miners to attach the anonymous data to an identifiable customer, by name. The power of contemporary data analysis lets organizations ­ take surveillance in directions far beyond what customers agreed to or what could have ­reasonably been expected to anticipate when they gave permission for collection. If the customer never explicitly gives permission, of course, the concerns are magnified. Although much current customer surveillance is justified by better serving customer needs and recognition that individuals willingly turn over the information, the use of such data has moved far beyond just serving needs and into areas ­customers never anticipated when yielding the information. Usually, this is harmless, but there is growing ­evidence of the potential for considerable abuse of privacy as these new tools are more aggressively employed. G. Scott Erickson See also Ethics; Information Security; Privacy; Privacy, Right to

Further Readings Grandoni, Dino. “OkCupid Proudly Admits It Experiments on People All the Time.” The Huffington Post (July 28, 2014). http://www.huffingtonpost .com/2014/07/28/okcupid-experiment_n_5628054 .html (Accessed October 2014). Hill, Kashmir. “How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did.” Fortnue (February 26, 2012). http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/ 02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnantbefore-her-father-did/ (Accessed October 2014). Loveman, Gary. “Diamonds in the Data Mine.” Harvard Business Review (May 2003). http://hbr.org/2003/ 05/diamonds-in-the-data-mine/ar/1 (Accessed October 2014). Manyika, James, et al. Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity. New York, NY: Mckinsey Global Institute, 2011. http:// www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/

232

Cosmopolitanism

big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation (Accessed October 2014). Mattioli, Dana. “On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels.” The Wall Street Journal (August 23, 2012). https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304 458604577488822667325882 (Accessed October 2014). Spethmann, Betsy. “Loyalty’s Royalty.” Promo, v.17/4 (2004).

Cosmopolitanism Cosmopolitanism is the ideology of a shared human community built around an ethos of mutual openness and hospitality among all people. The term has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy and is etymologically related to the Greek words kosmos (“world”) and polites (“citizen”). A person who follows the cosmopolitan idea can be called a cosmopolitan, or a citizen of the world. In modern philosophy, cosmopolitanism was advanced by Immanuel Kant as a universal principle that would sustain perpetual peace among the peoples and nations of the world. The relationship between cosmopolitanism and ­ ­surveillance is ambivalent. On the one hand, the cosmopolitan ideology may motivate the ­implementation of surveillance. Inasmuch as surveillance has been integral to the building of modern nation-states, it has also been central for enabling safe and secure exchanges between citizens of different countries. On the other hand, surveillance of various kinds may circumscribe the possibilities for citizens to encounter the Other and gain broader cosmopolitan understandings of the world. This entry explains this interplay. First, it gives a principal view of how surveillance relates to the inbuilt tensions of cosmopolitanism. Second, it presents how new media and communication technologies accentuate these tensions in contemporary society.

Tensions The point of departure for cosmopolitanism is that all human beings are unique while also inhabiting a shared world. The Greek Stoics stated that individuals dwell on different levels, ranging

from the family and local community to the unrestricted community of mankind. Even today this means that cosmopolitanism oscillates between respect for cultural (ultimately individual) differences and concern with the conditions of human life in general. Cosmopolitanism can be expressed through an invitational stance toward the Other, a willingness to take the other person’s perspective, as well as engagement with questions related to, for example, human rights and the global environment. This dualistic orientation implies that each human being must also be willing to put into question his or her own worldview in order to build a tolerant society where communication can occur between all individuals and groups on equal terms. In social life, there are weaker and stronger forms of cosmopolitanism. Weaker forms are associated with a general curiosity about the Other and an inclination to explore cultural differences. In modern societies, marked by global mobility (e.g., migration, tourism, other forms of travel), international trade, and intensified mediatization, weaker or “banal” forms of cosmopolitanism are easily adopted by citizens. The willingness to learn about the Other can even be advanced as a required stance for handling the cultural complexity of a globalized society. Stronger forms of cosmopolitanism refer to active engagement with people in need and support for sustainable solutions to global challenges (e.g., diseases, climate change). Cosmopolitanism is then turned into political action played out at the level of everyday life or in the wider political arena. If surveillance is taken as the systematic gathering and ordering of information about people to exercise control over their actions and/or a certain territory, a term like surveillance society might be posited as the opposite of cosmopolitan society. Whereas surveillance speaks about enclosed and controlled spaces, cosmopolitanism points to open and hospitable spaces. However, modern forms of surveillance have played a crucial role in granting citizens and consumers their rights and the ­security to move and communicate with others. Keeping track of people’s belongings and movements through state surveillance, for example, has been a way of establishing democratic welfare societies where hospitality can also be extended to visitors. Similarly, commercial

Counterintelligence

monitoring has been motivated by the need to promote fair and efficient modes of transaction regardless of which social actors are involved and where the exchanges take place. From a cosmopolitan perspective, an important critique of surveillance is that surveillance systems tend to reinforce administrative and cultural boundaries that inhibit different groups from encountering and learning about one another. One example is the social sorting that occurs in relation to international travel, where surveillance systems enhance the mobility of certain citizens and privileged groups while making border crossing a more complicated matter for those without the appropriate resources. This includes not only primarily legal control systems such as passports and visa documents but also credit cards, club memberships, communication infrastructures, and other means of smooth transit. Social sorting thus underscores that cosmopolitan lifestyles, in the weaker sense of the term, are more available to certain groups than to others.

Digital Media and Communication Technologies The expansion of digital media and communication technologies has accentuated this tendency. Within the realm of online media, most activities (e.g., social interaction, information seeking, geotagging, transactions) are automatically registered, aggregated, and processed through algorithms to generate profitable consumer segments and advertising environments. This is called datafication (or dataveillance), which according to its critics fosters social enclosure. Media users are led to reinforce already existing values, interests, social bonds, and mobility patterns rather than seek out new and foreign domains or problematize their own standpoints. An associated line of critique is that new forms of interactive media, especially social media ­platforms, stimulate peer-to-peer monitoring and social control. Ordinary users become able and encouraged to regularly keep an eye on the ­activities of their peers and present themselves in socially sanctioned ways. This development, it is argued, goes against the ideology of cosmopolitanism and rather resonates with traditional forms of bounded sociality and solidarity. At the same time, research

233

has shown that groups that hold cosmopolitan values tend to problematize the encapsulating and segregating forces of surveillance media to a greater extent than others. Whereas weaker forms of cosmopolitanism typically enter a symbiotic relationship with surveillance, stronger forms are thus marked by ethical and political resistance to the potentially anticosmopolitan consequences of surveillance. André Jansson See also Citizenship; Communication Studies; Corporate Surveillance; Dataveillance; Global Mobility; Social Media; Social Sorting

Further Readings Appiah, Kwame Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2006. Beck, Ulrich. The Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2006. Christensen, Miyase and André Jansson. Cosmopolitanism and the Media: Cartographies of Change. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Delanty, Gerard. The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Derrida, Jaques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London, England: Routledge, 2001. Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1985. Hannerz, Ulf. “Cosmopolitans and Locals in a World Culture.” Theory, Culture and Society, v.7/2 (1990). Held, David. Cosmopolitanism: Ideals, Realities and Deficits. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2010. Kant, Immanuel. To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003. (Original work published 1795) Silverstone, Roger. Media and Morality: On the Rise of Mediapolis. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2007.

Counterintelligence Counterintelligence consists of activities designed to prevent intelligence gathering from foreign intelligence entities. The purpose of counterintelligence

234

Counterintelligence

is to detect and counter growing security threats. In the United States, there are several organizations that conduct counterintelligence measures daily; however, the two most prominent organizations are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for international counterintelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for domestic counterintelligence. While U.S. counterintelligence has existed since the American Revolution, counterintelligence measures reached a new level of prominence and sophistication with the Cold War.

The Cold War U.S. counterintelligence during the Cold War was largely characterized by attempts to monitor the Soviet Union, the United States’ major state adversary during this time period. U.S. counterintelligence during the Cold War was characterized by both failures and successes. From 1951 onward, British intelligence and American intelligence worked on creating a plan to create a system of tunnels in order to wiretap into telecommunications flowing between the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The idea came from British ­intelligence, which had been tapping into Soviet telecommunication cables in occupied Vienna since the end of World War II. Meanwhile, there were a few failed attempts by the CIA with sending a spy into Moscow in 1953 and 1954. In 1953, the KGB, the Soviet Union’s security agency, had an agent pose as a housemaid to seduce the CIA operative, exposing his cover. In 1954, the CIA agent was caught in the act of espionage shortly after his arrival. Arguably, one of the biggest successes of counterintelligence during this period came when, in 1954, it was discovered that there were underground routes of telecommunication cables used by East German and Soviet officials in Berlin, where the United States had a strong presence in the western sectors of the city. CIA agent Walter O’Brien managed to photograph the blueprints of these plans, which the British and American intelligence used to create a 1,467-foot tunnel into East Berlin. This tunnel operation was codenamed GOLD, but it is now better known as the Berlin Tunnel Project. Construction began in early 1954 and was completed by February 1955. Information began flowing in May of that year. Tens of

thousands of hours of teletypes and conversations were tapped into. However, in April 1956, Soviet officials uncovered the tunnel, effectively ending GOLD. It is now known that a double agent within British intelligence, George Blake, uncovered the plot. Blake informed Soviet intelligence about the plan to create a tunnel for espionage in late 1953, but Soviet forces broke into the eastern end of the tunnel in 1956. Despite its quick collapse, the Berlin Tunnel is widely regarded as a success in penetrating the Soviet Union’s military intelligence operations. There were other successes with counterintelligence during the Cold War too. For example, in 1956, CIA counterintelligence led to the publication of Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech to the 20th Party Congress. Another success came with Operation SOLO, in which FBI assets Morris Childs and Eva Childs, who had ties to the highest levels in the Kremlin, provided the FBI with intelligence from the late 1950s onward. Of course, there were also other failures with U.S. counterintelligence during the Cold War. One such instance was William Weisband, a Soviet agent inside the U.S. Army’s code-breaking operation in Arlington Hall. He tipped off the Soviet officials that their codes were being read. The Soviets then changed their codes, which led to U.S. blindness in China’s preparations to enter the Korean War. Aldrich Ames, a CIA counterintelligence officer, gave Soviet intelligence the names of CIA agents in the Soviet Union, leading to their arrest. Despite anomalies in Ames’s reports, indicating early on that he could have and should have been monitored, the CIA did not monitor him, leading to one of the worst disasters in U.S. counterintelligence. John Walker, a Navy petty officer, recruited a group of family and friends that helped give up critical naval codes to the Soviet Union over a 20-year period; these codes had war-winning potential. Cuban intelligence managed to infiltrate the CIA during the Cold War. Jonathan Pollard, a naval intelligence analyst, was also a double agent with Israel, providing them thousands of U.S. secrets. Robert Hanssen, an FBI counterintelligence officer with higher standing in the FBI, p ­ rovided the Soviets with virtually every U.S. secret and counterintelligence operation ­ underway. This occurred shortly after the

Counterintelligence

Ames disaster. Also, in the 1970s, more than 200 KGB officers around the world targeted and stole U.S. and Western technologies to support Soviet development. These successes and failures show the true nature of counterintelligence during the Cold War. The year 1975 became known as the Year of Intelligence in the United States. This was characterized by electronic eavesdropping and computer data banks built to keep files on U.S. citizens. There were also illegal openings of U.S. citizens’ mail to see what was being sent to the Soviet Union. There were international cable interceptions, and there were plans to surveil Vietnam War dissenters in the United States. U.S. intelligence operators infiltrated a wide range of groups, including universities and religious organizations, to spy on their events and to ensure their loyalty to the United States. Assassination plans were also created during this time to silence foreign leaders who supported the Soviet Union and spoke against the United States. There was also the purposeful incitement of violence against African American groups to distract against other counterintelligence measures by the United States. Moreover, in the 1980s at the height of the Cold War, a tunnel was built underground in Washington, D.C., to spy on the Russian Embassy. Although it is believed that the tunnel is still used today, no public information indicates under which house the tunnel starts on Wisconsin Avenue.

Post–Cold War Counterintelligence The collapse of the Soviet Union did not declare the end of counterintelligence operations against the United States. A 1997 Defense Security Service publication lists more than 120 cases of espionage or espionage-related activities against the United States from 1975 to 1997 that were caught by U.S. counterintelligence officials. In 1999, it became known that China obtained classified information on U.S. nuclear weapons. In the 21st century, the element of threat became inundated with the emerging power of technology. Particularly, it was the development of the modern computer and the Internet that provided ways to create programs to cause ­ ­information warfare and to increase intelligence

235

collection capabilities. On December 28, 2000, U.S. president Bill Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive titled “U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness—Counterintelligence for the 21st Century,” or CI-21 for short. Essentially, CI-21 stated that the United States needed to adapt to these new technological changes in order to emerge as a frontrunner in counterintelligence capabilities. CI-21 also called for a proactive, analytically driven approach to gathering and ­ ­prioritizing information collected. The policy also states cooperation among counterintelligence entities in the United States as well as a more ­ centralized guidance for counterintelligence ­ ­policies and resources.

9/11 and the Shift Toward Terrorism After the events of September 11, 2001, detecting and countering individual and group-based terrorism have largely driven U.S. counterintelligence measures. The PATRIOT Act, which President George W. Bush signed into law in October 2001, allows for the collection of private data on U.S. citizens for the purpose of detecting and countering threats and potential acts of terrorism. However, there have been two well-known backlashes against the PATRIOT Act, coming in 2005 and 2013. In 2005, it became known that President Bush had the National Security Agency (NSA) conduct warrantless surveillance on U.S. citizens who were believed to be linked to the ­terror organization al Qaeda. Although there was outrage, Bush was legally allowed to authorize the NSA to do so under the 2001 Authorization of Use of Military Force Act. Bush signed the Protect America Act of 2007 to explicitly state that ­warrants were unnecessary for surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be linked to ­terrorism. In 2013, it became known that there were far-reaching domestic surveillance activities ­conducted under the NSA. Also, there was an issue with Verizon releasing its phone records of ­millions of customers to the NSA. Moreover, it was revealed that a secret program, code-named PRISM, accessed troves of communication data, such as audio calls, emails, and photos, from ­several U.S. technology companies. All of these actions were justified under the umbrella of the PATRIOT Act but received

236

Creeping

backlash because of the seemingly large effect the act holds. President Barack Obama acknowledged these rebukes from the public. In August 2013, he created a task force of intelligence and legal experts to review the NSA operations and to formulate potential reforms for counterintelligence measures under the PATRIOT Act. In the second decade of the 21st century, U.S. counterintelligence has shifted toward countering ISIS and threats in the Middle East, largely ­ignoring Russia. This has posed an issue for U.S. spy agencies, reducing the number of agents monitoring Russia. However, Russia has not stopped monitoring the United States. Russian spies in the Embassy, as well as sleeper agents deemed ­“illegals” by Russia, are still focused on the United States. More recently, U.S. agencies have begun to refocus on Russia, recruiting more agents who can read intelligence in Russian or other languages. R. Bruce Anderson and Anisha Koilpillai See also Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War; Espionage; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Intelligence Community; International Diplomacy; KGB; Russia; Surveillance During the Cold War

Further Readings Council on Foreign Relations. “U.S. Domestic Surveillance” (December 18, 2013). https://www.cfr .org/backgrounder/us-domestic-surveillance (Accessed October 2017). Johnson, L. “‘The Contemporary Presidency’’: Presidents, Lawmakers, and Spies: Intelligence Accountability in the United States.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, v.34/4 (2004). http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552639 (Accessed April 2017). Kelly, M. L. Decades After Cold War’s End, U.S.-Russia Espionage Rivalry Evolves (June 15, 2016). http:// www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/06/15/ 481440402/decades-after-cold-wars-end-u-s-russiaespionage-rivalry-evolves (Accessed April 2017). Poteat, G. Counterintelligence, Homeland Security and Domestic Intelligence (April 3, 2014). https://www .afio.com/publications/Counterintelligence_ (Poteat)_2014Apr03_DRAFT.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Scoville, H., Jr. “Is Espionage Necessary for Our Security?” Foreign Affairs, v.54/3 (1976). doi:10.2307/20039589

Shelby, R. Intelligence and Espionage in the 21st Century (May 18, 2001). http://www.heritage.org/defense/ report/intelligence-and-espionage-the-21st-century (Accessed April 2017). Weiner, T. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. London, England: Penguin Books, 2011.

Creeping Creeping, or creepiness, refers to surveillance or tracking practices that obtain personal, sometimes private, information and then use that information in ways that the public or individual persons do not anticipate or understand. In today’s Digital Age, almost everyone confronts unexpected and sometimes unwanted technology-based surveillance in places as diverse as the shopping mall, the airport, and, especially, the online world. For example, a web-based ad may suggest the exact item a person would like to buy. After pushing the “I’m Feeling Lucky” button on Google Flights, a person’s dream destination may pop up. Such seemingly unexpected outcomes are the result of a set of sophisticated online tracking and surveillance systems through which information is ­collected, stored, bought, and sold, and sometimes even hacked and stolen. Because of the intrusive nature of creeping, some have raised privacy concerns with this practice. This entry examines the various types of creeping, including government, corporate, and personal.

Government Creeping Governments, at all levels, have unique legal ­powers to compel citizens and companies to disclose information. In return, the public expects a certain level of protection for that information. Indeed, most government documents completed by citizens, at least in the developed world, carry some indication that they are “protected when completed.” However, the burgeoning open-government movement tips the balance in the opposite direction. In releasing the data they have collected, even with the best of intentions, governments can expose citizens to privacy invasion. New York City accidentally disclosed private email addresses

Creeping

and security questions in one of its published databases. Researchers and reporters have datamined public files to find the addresses of gun owners who live near schools and to pinpoint political donors who have unusual donation patterns, such as supporting faraway local candidates. A newspaper in Calgary used property tax records to locate the city’s most expensive properties and published photos of them, against the wishes of the owners. Releasing government data can lead to thorny ethical issues. In Slovakia, a businesswoman successfully sued the Fair Play Alliance, a nongovernmental organization that won the 2011 EU Open Data Challenge, to force removal of information about her and her companies, even though it was simply taken from public records. A Canadian municipality is legally obliged to disclose the fees it collects from development permits. However, since those fees are a fixed percentage of the project value, developers argue that the city is effectively sharing confidential business information. Ill-considered social media posts can also have serious consequences when they attract government attention. A man in Colorado hit a vehicle while drunk, failed to stop, and posted about this on Facebook. Within minutes, the police were at his door. Other technologies can also provide incriminating evidence. In 2004, a man in Montreal, Quebec, was convicted of speeding, in a fatal accident where there were no witnesses, in part from data taken from his car’s Event Data Recorder, the so-called black box. Data obtained by law enforcement from Facebook, Google, Stockhouse, and many other sites have been used successfully in trials, for purposes such as showing that a terrorist suspect was researching bomb construction or an accused murderer searched “how to dispose of a body.”

Corporate Creeping Companies are also voracious collectors and users of data about people. Most users see some value in the auto suggestion features of online systems. Amazon displays what “customers who bought this item also bought” and highlights choices “inspired by your browsing history.” The latter list reveals that the company has indeed been tracking every entry and every click that the user has made

237

over a long period of time. In a similar fashion, Facebook dutifully logs every search a user makes. The company says that these are visible only to the searcher. However, Facebook itself can view them, just as Google has access to every search term a person enters. With the proper paperwork, law enforcement can have access to these data too. Just as some people argue that privacy concerns are overblown because they obey the law and have nothing to hide, some feel that this corporate collection of data about them is benign and even helpful. Others have expressed great concern, however, especially around the area of health information. Posting photographs of smoking or divulging this in an online survey could lead to problems if the person has purchased nonsmoker life insurance. Reports abound of insurance companies mining social media, looking for clues to a reckless lifestyle, such as skydiving photos. On the other hand, a Swiss company refused to buy the rights to the insurance policy of an elderly woman who supposedly had dementia and was likely to die soon. Her social media postings showed her living a vibrant lifestyle. A British consumer loan company has taken social media creeping to a new level. Lenddo allows applicants to prove their identity and creditworthiness by giving the company access to their social media accounts. The better the friend network, the lower the interest rate. Of course, if the borrower happens to default on that loan, the company reserves the right to shame that person in his or her online community. Some people believe that they will avoid technocreeping by not using the Internet. However, technologies are moving into the workplace and the retail sphere that will make this impossible. In Japan, there is an app that tracks an employee’s activity at work through the accelerometer on a smartphone. It makes it easy for the boss to see who is sleeping on the job. While that might be unacceptable in some cultures, some U.S. companies have given fitness monitors to their staff, asking them to wear the fitness monitors round the clock. In some cases, the staff are promised perks such as extra vacation days or health club memberships for doing so. These fitness monitors could give the companies access to some very intimate data about a person’s whereabouts and activities. It has been

238

Crime

suggested that the monitor could easily determine when an employee is, for example, sleeping, or having sex. In theory, an airline pilot might arrive for work and be told that he or she has not had sufficient sleep to fly. Even staff who do not sport a fitness monitor probably carry a company smartphone, which silently logs every Wi-Fi site they use and, quite possibly, their geographical location. The growth of predictive analytics and other algorithms, coupled with inexpensive storage and computing power, means that those who hold these data can analyze and reanalyze the data, not only looking for competitive advantage but also displaying a disturbing knowledge of our online and physical world activities.

Personal Creeping A neighbor, coworker, and the merely curious now have unprecedented and often free access to information about people through online sources. Does the person have a firearm? Rent a post office box? Own a valuable property? The answer is probably available online. Unlike the days when people had to rummage through dusty files in courthouses, digitization means that the data can be accessed from anywhere. People search engine sites such as Spokeo and Zoominfo collect every mention of a person in the media, every speech he or she makes, every publicly shared presentation. Data brokers collect information on people and sell it, often organized by demographic profile. Sometimes these data are incomplete or inaccurate. There have been horror stories of consumers who were unable to correct or explain their entries in privately run database systems. Increasingly, personal data are being indexed by identifiers such as the customary email address, which has become an alternative to government-issued identification numbers, whose use may be restricted. Not content with stalking people in the virtual world, individuals are now flying inexpensive quadcopter drones to snoop on their neighbors. These unmanned aerial vehicles recently came under regulation in the United States, though the rules are fairly loose and difficult to enforce. Other people are wearing bodycams, much like police officers, and recording every interaction

they have. Even people who eschew such technology usually carry smartphones, which increasingly are pulled out the minute something interesting happens, creating a full audio and video record that can be shared online.

Future Creeping One of the biggest concerns of privacy experts is how data collected now might be used in the future. Just as DNA forensics have solved old murder cases, future data analysis technology, combined with changing social norms, may imperil personal privacy. Predicted advances in health technologies, such as personalized medicine, suggest the advent of a world in which privacy will be the exception rather than the rule. The population will need to decide whether the good things offered by technology outweigh the increasing creeping into personal privacy that comes with it. Thomas P. Keenan See also Cybermarketing; Drones, Commercial Applications of; E-Government; Law and Digital Technology; Privacy, Internet

Further Readings Angwin, Julia. Dragnet Nation: A Quest for Privacy, Security, and Freedom in a World of Relentless Surveillance. New York, NY: Times Books, 2014. Keenan, Thomas P. Technocreep: The Surrender of Privacy and the Capitalization of Intimacy. Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: Greystone Books, 2014. Nissenbaum, Helen. Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010. Schneier, Bruce. Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. New York, NY: Copernicus, 2003.

Crime As law enforcement authorities strive to combat crime in the Digital Age, the need for surveillance has become an important aspect of criminal

Crime

investigations. In an era of increasingly sophisticated investigative tools, surveillance has become synonymous with the darker aspects of law enforcement. Rapid advances in technology have enabled the authorities to engage in large-scale observation of individuals without the need for direct physical observation. As discussed in this entry, there are many misconceptions about how surveillance fits into contemporary criminal investigations.

Definition of Surveillance Surveillance has been defined as focused, systematic, and routine attempts to gain access to personal data with the intent of influencing, management, protection, or direction. This definition strives to take into account the historical underpinnings of surveillance and how the technique was utilized historically as a way of maintaining societal cohesion. Researchers have identified digital surveillance as significant for two primary reasons. First, the use of digital technology for surveillance purposes allows for monitoring, prioritization, and ­judgment to occur across vast geographic distances with ­little time delay. Second, digital technologies p ­rovide for the automated observation of various individuals or groups on a continuous real-time basis without the need for human engagement. This changes the role of the human investigators from primary agents to designers, programmers, and custodians of these automated digital technologies. Surveillance can encompass a variety of law enforcement activities. From police officers sitting in patrol cars outside a suspect’s home to modern computer specialists monitoring computer traffic, surveillance is a time-honored method of intelligence gathering, crime prevention, and criminal investigation. Some within the world of academia have argued that computer technology has become a major player in social policy and the policymaking processes. Michel Foucault devised the concept of panopticism, which is the tendency toward a system based on direct surveillance in which individual behavior would be ascertained and judged based on the outcomes of digital information obtained through authoritative ­ surveillance. Contemporary academicians have ­ broadened Foucault’s panopticism to a more

239

encompassing conceptualization referred to as a superpanopticon, which essentially constitutes a system of surveillance without the need for human guards or borders. Governmental surveillance ends up creating a generalized sense of being watched, resulting in people policing themselves through informal means of social control. This serves the government well because additional funds do not have to be spent on increased surveillance efforts as the public slowly becomes a selfpolicing entity.

Surveillance Operations in the United States After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), surveillance operations in the United States became much broader in scope than had been typical in previous years. With the passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the PATRIOT Act, surveillance procedures for federal and local law enforcement authorities were broadened considerably. While the existing Computer Fraud and Abuse Act laws were expanded following the attacks of 9/11, the PATRIOT Act strengthened the existing laws to include any computer anywhere in the world so long as it is being used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communications of the United States. Provisions within the PATRIOT Act enable law enforcement agencies within the United States to conduct surveillance operations and investigations in foreign nations as long as such activity is recognized as legitimate by that respective nation. The PATRIOT Act also served to modify existing law to include unauthorized access to a computer or digital network that modifies or eliminates access to medical data, causes physical injury to a person, poses a threat to public safety, or damages a computer used by a government entity. In addition, interpersonal communications via email, ­cellular telephone, and other assorted electronic means became open to surveillance in unprecedented ways. The PATRIOT Act provided allowances to law enforcement to engage in ­ surveillance of electronic communications and ­ revised sections of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act pertaining to Internet service

240

Crime

providers and cable companies. The revisions stipulated in the PATRIOT Act provided law enforcement agencies with the power and authority to obtain the names and addresses of subscribers in addition to their billing records, the phone numbers called, the duration of online activity, the services used, communication device information, and any related data needed during an investigation. The modification of existing surveillance laws enabled U.S. law enforcement authorities to engage in the pursuit of and more effective prosecution of criminals wherever they might be located. Large-scale surveillance situations, typically referred to as dragnet operations, capture intelligence from the digital communications of a large group of individuals with no front-end acknowledgment of whether the information obtained will be worthwhile. However, such surveillance projects are not always simple undertakings. Despite the popular notion of a highly decentralized Internet, the online environment can be described as polycentric. The backbone core of the Internet that carries the vast majority of digital traffic is owned by a relatively small number of carriers. As a result, large-scale surveillance efforts are made considerably more efficient and effective as most of the Internet activity of interest can be obtained by listening at the points of exchange between these carriers. It is possible for law enforcement surveillance efforts to capture most of the world’s digital communications from a few key locations. However, for the larger Internet sites, such as Google, Facebook, and Netflix, surveillance efforts at these points of exchange are less fruitful due to the fact that these sites have installed content delivery networks inside the already existing networks of the large Internet service providers. As a result of the subnetworks residing within the larger nodes of the Internet, surveillance of these subnetworks becomes more difficult to monitor.

Methods of Surveillance As law enforcement authorities undertake various surveillance efforts, there are several different routes investigators might take. The identity or association of the perpetrator matters little due to the fact that computer breaches share numerous common features.

Probably, the easiest method of surveillance, and the one with which most people are familiar, is the use of closed-circuit television, or CCTV. Numerous cities worldwide make use of CCTV in efforts to maintain order, keep the peace, establish safer public areas, and monitor for known fugitives or terror suspects. There are various forms of CCTV, with some requiring monitoring by a human operator while others simply record and upload their contents to Internet storage servers. Some camera systems are operated and maintained by governmental authorities, while others remain under the control of private corporations or organizations. As technology continues to improve, biometric screening and surveillance have left the realm of science fiction and become the stuff of contemporary law enforcement and governmental surveillance. Biometric surveillance consists of having technology turn biological characteristics into quantifiable data. Examples of biometric surveillance include having one’s fingerprints, DNA, facial characteristics, or voice pattern recorded and measured by biometric technology and quantified for use as recognition efforts at a later date. Facial recognition scanning technology is now being used by the U.S. military in Afghanistan to check images of detainees against those of known terrorists. The Seattle Police Department is also using facial recognition technology to identify suspects on video footage. Other forms of digital surveillance that have the potential to affect everyday citizens are automatic license plate readers, stingrays, and automated electronic toll readers. Although automatic license plate readers are still controversial, numerous cities across the country utilize such devices to apprehend traffic offenders, check license plates for wanted fugitives, and maintain safety. A ­stingray, also commonly referred to as a cell-set simulator or an international mobile subscriber identity catcher, is used to mimic a cell phone communications tower, causing the cell phone to communicate with it. This enables the stingray to track the location of the user and intercept communications. One style of network interposition surveillance is referred to as a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack. In an MiTM operation, the authorities can interpose agents in the data stream between two

Crime

parties. In such an operation, breach data can be stolen, modified, or monitored, or viruses can be injected into the target system. An MiTM attack can be launched from any location worldwide, regardless of the target’s location. Operations such as these are often associated with large-scale surveillance efforts typical of national governments. However, weaknesses in mobile devices have been exploited by law enforcement agencies during surveillance operations due to their vulnerability to inexpensive international mobile subscriber identity catchers. Computer systems can also be surveilled by the authorities via physical compromise. To physically compromise a computer or network device, all that is needed is the installation of a piece of hightech equipment that will allow interested parties to eavesdrop. Physical compromise of a computer is quite inexpensive and difficult to detect. It is possible for law enforcement to install a USB device into a computer that records the key strokes made by the user. This technique is effective, efficient, and inexpensive. Another technique that can be utilized in surveillance efforts are remote exploit tactics. Due to the fact that software tends to contain many unknown security vulnerabilities, attackers are able to take advantage of such weaknesses. In the vast majority of instances, software designers are notified of a vulnerability, and a fix is created as a patch. Attackers are able to exploit the time gap between the occurrence of a vulnerability and the time required for software engineers to develop a patch. This lag time is referred to as a 0-day, because zero days have elapsed since the vulnerability has been communicated to the software designers. Law enforcement investigators have been known to use social engineering as a tool in surveillance operations. Often the police can misdirect human targets, rather than the computer system, yet still be able to acquire the information needed in an investigation. There have been research projects in which random USB drives were scattered in various locations. People who discovered these devices invariably plugged them into their home computers or their organizations’ corporate systems. Such recklessness can provide an easy opening for viruses or surveillance efforts. Governmental or law enforcement agencies can also exploit software updates in efforts to track or

241

surveil people. The authorities simply make use of the software update system intended to install security patches into a device as a means of delivery for surveillance codes. A related method of surveillance is the third-party compromise. As an increasing number of individuals and organizations, including government agencies, are making use of cloud computing, the reliance on thirdparty systems has multiplied considerably. In recent years, third-party vendors have begun to consolidate their caches of information, thereby lowering the total number of third-party data holders. The result of a smaller number of thirdparty vendors holding larger amounts of data is a more centralized source for surveillance efforts. The security of information is only as good as the security protocols of the third-party systems. Despite the popular belief that Trojans are viruses used only by those with nefarious intentions, such devices can also be a means of surveillance by governmental and law enforcement authorities. A Trojan is a virus disguised as a normal computer program. It can be hidden inside a modified application or exist as a stand-alone, independent virus. In uses by law enforcement or governmental agencies, a Trojan is typically installed surreptitiously in a device when it is out of possession of the owner or during an MiTM attack. A final style of attack used by legal authorities in surveillance operations is usability error. This technique is most often utilized with software that allows users to communicate with external parties. Such software applications tend to be ­ highly sensitive to misconfiguration and provide a host of opportunities for attack. A skilled attacker can readily exploit the connections between the user and the server. Few individuals outside of formal computer circles have an adequate grasp of ­ security protocol for chat-style applications. As a result, attackers can easily ­infiltrate a conversation.

Controversies of Digital Surveillance As digital surveillance continues to be an integral aspect of law enforcement, there has been some measure of concern regarding how data obtained through such efforts are stored and utilized. Some researchers have expressed concern over the use of digital surveillance techniques, arguing that the

242

Crime

use of such technology necessitates the use of databases and system networking as the vast amounts of information obtained must have some mechanism of storage. System networking becomes an essential facet of digital surveillance due to the fact that the captured information obtained during investigations must be compared. However, despite such concerns over the storage of surveillance intelligence and networking systems to effect the comparison of data, there are those who maintain that the world of digital surveillance might enhance the role of the police in contemporary society. As some forms of surveillance, such as facial recognition software, become automated, the risks associated with wrongful arrests and discriminatory policing are virtually eliminated as the system software is capable of categorically determining if a certain individual is wanted for criminal behavior. In addition, such automation also enables the authorities to determine if certain persons are connected to terrorist or other criminal organizations. As a result of digital surveillance efforts, definitions of acceptable behavior within various social contexts have become increasingly automated. In many ways, the role of the police in contemporary society is rapidly evolving, with many aspects of behavior policed by an assemblage of networked computers and digital programming, which are less beholden to the mores of human discretion. This raises some salient concerns and questions pertaining to privacy and the rights of the individual within the greater society. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government justified increased surveillance on private citizens in the name of national security. Numerous agencies operating under the umbrella of the federal government, including the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and state and local law enforcement departments began to amass vast data storehouses of information on cellular telephone conversations, Internet search histories, and any other intelligence related to suspicious activity. Initially, such surveillance efforts were deemed necessary for maintaining the security and sanctity of the United States. However, as time elapsed and fear waned, concerns regarding personal privacy, liberty, and freedom began to be raised.

While digital surveillance proponents have applauded the use of newly developed technology to help the authorities maintain public safety and weed out terrorist or other criminal elements, concerns over individual privacy have been raised. People are ready to acknowledge the fact that a trade-off between security and privacy must occur for the authorities to enhance safety. However, there is little consensus on precisely how such a balance should occur. The American Civil Liberties Union decried the collection of sensitive information by government and law enforcement agencies. Apart from worries over the collection of sensitive information, concerns were also expressed about the use and potential abuse of the collected information. Instances of innocuous information being included in watch lists have at times proved to be inconvenient and detrimental to individual citizens who had committed no crime nor engaged in any nefarious activity. Cases of people not being able to board airplanes or gain access to personal banking accounts, being detained for questioning, or discovering that they are barred from engaging in certain types of employment began to raise the proverbial red flag for civil libertarians, liberals, and other citizen watch groups nationwide. According to the ­American Civil Liberties Union the U.S. democratic system of government necessitates governmental transparency and accountability to citizens. In the wake of the 2013 leaks by Edward Snowden pertaining to surveillance programs by the National Security Agency, many Americans began a concerted effort to discuss and debate issues pertaining to concerns over privacy versus safety. While most people asserted that it is acceptable for governmental and law enforcement authorities to monitor the communications and behavior of foreign citizens and leaders, few entertained the belief that it was acceptable for the government to monitor the actions of U.S. citizens. In a 2013 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, the vast majority of Internet users said that they had taken steps to mask or remove their digital footprints in order to avoid detection by the authorities. One of the more salient features of privacy arguments centers on the fact that most members of the general public do not have an adequate understanding of the nature or the scope of the information that is

Crime Control

obtained about them, nor do they have a good understanding of the technology used by the authorities to monitor public activity. Measures used to prevent surveillance efforts are known as countersurveillance. Attempts to disguise an Internet search by erasing digital footprints left behind, sweeping a room or location for electronic surveillance devices, or removing the inner workings of a cell phone to prevent it from being tracked are techniques often used by those engaging in countersurveillance. Wendy L. Hicks See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; Biometrics; Biosurveillance; Cell Phone Tracking; Computer Surveillance; Electronic Surveillance; Law and Digital Technology; PATRIOT Act

Further Readings Brenner, Susan. Defining Cybercrime: The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. Dinev, Tamara, et al. “Internet Privacy Concerns and Beliefs About Government Surveillance: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Strategic Information Systems, v.17 (2008). Hampton, Brittany. “From Smartphones to Stingrays: Can the Fourth Amendment Keep Up With the Twenty-First Century.” University of Louisville Law Review, v.51/1 (2012). Henman, Paul. “Computer Technology: A Political Player in Social Policy Processes.” Journal of Social Policy, v.26/3 (1997). Holt, Thomas. Cybercrime and Digital Forensics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2015. Lyon, David. Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2007. Poster, Mark. The Mode of Information. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1990. Simon, Bart. “The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection and the New Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society, v.3/1 (2005).

Crime Control Crime control, a form of social control, refers to the broad range of methods used in society that

243

aim to reduce or prevent the occurrence of criminal behavior. Methods of controlling crime include those used by the state, such as policing strategies, courts, the use of punishment, bureaucracies that make up the criminal justice system, and the public policies that dictate them, as well as methods like private policing and private security. Nonstate entities, such as individuals and corporations, also practice various forms of crime control in the pursuit of safeguarding homes and businesses. A variety of technologies have increasingly become integral to attempts at controlling or preventing crime and monitoring offenders in the name of security for society. Crime control often appears in the fields of criminology and criminal justice in a few important theoretical ways: as a model of the administration of justice, the crime control model; to explain how private entities have played crucial roles alongside governmental crime control agencies while producing enormous profits, or crime control industry; and as a defining feature of latemodern (late 20th century and beyond) culture. Western countries have experienced a trend of intensified security measures as harmful behaviors are being evermore criminalized and dealt with in terms of risk. This spiraling of security is seen through a variety of surveillance technologies that facilitate the pivot in crime control strategies and legislation. Examples of such technologies are data mining, offender registries, environmental design, closed-circuit television, data matching, and fingerprint systems, among others. There also now exists the ability to pool various technologies of surveillance into an assemblage of surveillance.

Conceptualizing Crime Control Beyond a set of policies, agencies, and specific technologies designed to curb criminal behavior, crime control may be thought of as a model of criminal process, or an orientation of the criminal justice system. This idea was set forth by Stanford University legal scholar Herbert Packer in 1964. The crime control model functions simultaneously with, but counter to, the due process model depending on social climate. Each model represents a separate set of core values that direct the criminal justice process. The crime control model, thought of as an ideology, assumes that criminality is a significant threat to society.

244

Crime Control

The maintenance of order requires high rates of arrest and conviction in an efficient manner through the processing of cases in a uniform, efficient manner with confidence in the judicial process. By contrast, the due process model represents a different set of values that may guide the criminal process that emphasizes the protection of individual rights from o ­fficial overreach and the possibility of m ­ istakes in the drive for efficiency. In this sense, the state and its criminal justice agencies dictate crime control given their a­ uthority over the administration of the criminal process. Packer specifically refers to the police and courts, thus omitting corrections and the juvenile system, which play important functions in crime control. Crime control also involves many nonstate entities and, when coupled with governmental pursuits to prevent crime, has been labeled the crime control industry.

Crime Control Industry and the Culture of Control The crime control industry is a term used for the methods, reasonings, technologies, and processes of the social response of crime in industrial society. The idea of crime control as an industry has existed since the 1970s, but U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which advocated the use of science and technology as a mechanism for combating the existence of crime, has been a catalyst in the immense growth of the crime control industry. Used as a critique of dispensing justice, it highlights the massive swelling of criminal justice expenditures. For instance, in the United States, expenditures rose from about $36 billion in 1980 to well over $200 billion by the 2010s. This industry secures both profit and work alongside the social control of individuals who may potentially cause social disorder. This crime control industry is unique in that crime is seemingly always in supply and growth of the industry is foundational to it, as evident through the swelling in expenditure alongside public calls for additional crime control. An integral part to this idea is the effect from private entities on the operation of crime control and the criminal justice system. Corporate influences are evident in the merging of business and criminal

justice (e.g., private police and prisons) and in using for-profit ideals to administer justice and manage bureaucracies in an impersonal way. These crime control entities operate within social contexts that have changed in important ways since the 1950s. David Garland, a prominent sociologist of crime and punishment, describes crime control in relationship to its situation within the broader sociocultural and economic conditions of late modernity to which crime control adapts and influences. Late modernity is a term used to describe features of industrial society since the mid- to late 19th century (e.g., free market mentality, new penology, social exclusion, and decline of state sovereignty—including over crime control) that have gradually supplanted modernity (e.g., advanced technology, industrialization, and reliance on government for security). Crime control is thus changing in significant ways because though the state may provide punishment, it cannot guarantee security. Garland calls this new dynamic of political, social, cultural, and economic changes the crime control complex, which marks a momentous shift from the focus on rehabilitation and reform that preceded it. Entities external to the state, such as private security companies, have exploited the criminal justice market and have been increasingly utilized in spaces where the state is perceived to insufficiently maintain security. Crime control in Western industrialized nations has been critiqued for its various social and fiscal costs. Among these criticisms are that it causes racial division, causes social exclusion of large groups, fosters intolerance for policy, and bolsters the very processes that often underpin criminality. The reality that penal exclusion as crime control overwhelmingly targets racial minorities is a primary criticism of current crime control in the United States. The criminal justice system has used a “get-tough” approach to controlling crime where offenders receive longer sentences and harsher treatment. This has facilitated a phenomenal growth in the prison population, which is referred to as mass incarceration. Despite this emphasis on punishment to control crime, the ability and potential for this approach to controlling crime is severely limited and, arguably, entirely ineffective. Further critiques of crime control, particularly the

Crime Mapping

American variety, are that it undermines principles of democracy and intensifies public fear of crime. Taken in sum, these critiques hold that the true danger to society is not crime, but rather crime control. Travis Milburn See also Closed-Circuit Television; Garland, David; Governing Through Crime; Incapacitation; New Penology; Social Control

Further Readings Christie, Nils. Crime Control as Industry: Towards Gulags, Western Style. New York, NY: Routledge, 2017. Currie, Elliot. Crime and Punishment in America. New York, NY: Macmillan, 2013. Ericson, Richard. Crime in an Insecure World. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2007. Garland, David. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in a Contemporary Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Packer, Herbert L. “Two models of the criminal process.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v.113/1 (1964).

Crime Mapping Crime mapping is a technology-based analytic method widely used by crime analysts, strategists and planners, and operational officers and policymakers in police and other law enforcement agencies to identify, detect, map, and display the spatial and, often, the temporal distribution of crime incidents and crime patterns. By identifying the locations and the times at which crimes have already occurred, the capacity of crime mapping analysis to recognize ongoing crime patterns and trends has great predictive value in terms of focusing police activity and police resources at the locations where they will have the greatest impact in reducing crime and hence increasing security. This entry reviews crime mapping techniques and discusses the benefits as well as concerns associated with its use, including civil rights and privacy concerns.

245

Pin Mapping Police and law enforcement entities have long used rudimentary crime mapping processes involving paper-based “pin maps” or acetate cover sheets with color-coded “dots” to depict the spatial and temporal distribution of crimes on a local level. Despite their low-tech nature, Dale Peet argues that these “pushpins on maps” are nevertheless a form of geospatial analytics and have been practiced for decades. These manual processes have inherent limitations, however, including the challenge of plotting the distribution of specific criminal events over extended periods of time. Paper-based mapping processes are also problematic in terms of identifying the particular crime characteristics (e.g., specific modus operandi or descriptions of perpetrators) that are critical elements in defining crime patterns and in differentiating between a mere cluster of crimes and an actual pattern of crimes attributable to a single offender. In conjunction with expansive linked data sets containing these and other critical crime characteristics and elements as well as temporal and location data, sophisticated mapping software can overcome these limitations to permit highly accurate and highly refined spatial and temporal analysis of crime.

Computer-Based Geographic Information Systems The advent and availability of computer-based Geographic Information Systems analytic software and the initial propagation of affordable microcomputers in law enforcement agencies in the late 1980s and early 1990s—an era of increasing rates of crime and public disorder across the United States as well as increasing public demands for more effective policing—advanced the practice and value of crime mapping analysis. Crime ­mapping has since emerged as a primary method in the development and implementation of crime-­ fighting strategies and is now widely used in contemporary law enforcement to identify and address “hot spots,” trends, and patterns of crime and public disorder. Crime mapping is an essential feature of the Compstat crime reduction and police management system, which was created in the New York City Police Department in 1994

246

Crime Mapping

and had a dramatic and immediate impact in reducing crime, to the extent that the Compstat model was quickly adopted and implemented by scores of large, medium, and small police agencies across the nation and internationally. The Compstat management system paradigm, including its crime mapping technology component and related capacity for identifying and responding to emerging crime conditions and patterns in near real time, has also been successfully applied to address disparate law enforcement issues such as traffic conditions, domestic violence, and the police internal investigative function. The Compstat crime control paradigm is based on four basic principles of crime control: (1) timely and accurate crime intelligence; (2) effective strategies and tactics; (3) rapid deployment of resources; and (4) relentless follow-up and assessment. Crime mapping is an essential element in operationalizing each principle. Most notably, crime mapping is used in conjunction with other data sources to develop timely and accurate crime intelligence. After identifying a robbery pattern involving a specific modus operandi, for example, a crime mapping capability linked to an offender database can identify probationers, parolees, and others who have operated with a similar modus operandi and live or work in proximity to the robbery pattern. While this example of crime mapping does not provide probative evidence of guilt, it is a useful investigative tool to limit the pool of potential suspects. For the same reason, overreliance on crime mapping for investigative purposes could raise questions of civil liberties violations related to profiling. Given its potential to provide crime analysts, strategists, and operational personnel with a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the spatial and temporal relationships between crime incidents, crime mapping has become a prominent feature of advancements on the basic Compstat model, including intelligence-led policing and the evolving field of predictive policing, which uses crime mapping and advanced algorithms to predict, with a reasonable degree of certainty, where crimes are likely to occur in the future. Law enforcement activities, in response to predictive policing’s capacity to forecast when and where future crimes are likely to occur, have raised a variety of legal and ethical issues, including questions of entrapment.

Geographic Profiling Geographic profiling, an innovative analytic technique pioneered by former Vancouver Police detective Kim Rossmo, also uses advanced crime mapping techniques to examine the spatial relationships between the locations of serial crimes or crime patterns (including serial murders and serial rapes) and the characteristics of the surrounding area, particularly transportation routes. This analysis is based in part on complex statistically based presumptions that offenders tend to operate in areas that are familiar to them and in relative proximity to their residences or to places they frequent, and it can assist investigators in focusing their investigation on potential suspects living or working within a specific area or neighborhood. Crime mapping often incorporates data sets that include data on geospatial features other than crime incidents as a means to explore the relationships between crime, place, and other variables. These data sets might include sociodemographic data to plot population density or the economic features of an area, the locations of specific types of businesses in an area (e.g., banks, convenience stores, ATMs, and other businesses that might attract criminal activity), public transportation routes and facilities, critical infrastructure, schools, parks, and the locations of previous arrests for various crimes. To aid in the investigation of a rape or sex crime pattern, for example, analysts might overlay the addresses of known sex o ­ ffenders. In line with broken windows theory, advanced by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling in 1982, data concerning public order offenses, locations where graffiti proliferates, abandoned buildings, and other “broken windows” features that contribute to criminogenic conditions can also be imported and displayed. Crime mapping software can overlay these and other relevant data on p ­ lotted crime locations to discover previously undiscovered relationships between crime and place. Analysts might, for example, discover a relationship between abandoned buildings and street robberies and adopt a strategy that addresses abandoned buildings as a means to reduce robberies. Similarly, crime mapping can be an important investigative tool. For example, analysts might discern the typical or most likely routes car thieves use by plotting the locations where vehicles were

Crime Mapping

stolen as well as where those vehicles were stripped and abandoned, and focus operational enforcement efforts along those routes.

Crime Mapping and Criminology Theories Although several criminological theories that have emerged from academic research serve to explain the reasons why relationships may exist between crime, time, and space, it should be noted that the growth, development, and expansion of Geographic Information Systems–based crime analysis were primarily driven by the practical demands of operational law enforcement rather than by academic theory. Innovative crime analysis and ­ practical crime mapping matured as a function of the increasing demands placed on police and law enforcement agencies for effective crime reduction. The criminological theories that serve to explain the social causes for the relationships between crimes and places include routine activities theory, which was developed in the late 1970s by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson. Routine activities theory observes that a criminal transaction requires the victim and the perpetrator to both be present in the same activity space at the same time, and that in the course of their routine daily activities individuals tend to operate within a specific activity space. Another important theoretical position is environmental criminology, a set of principles first articulated in the early 1980s by the Canadian criminologists Paul and Patricia Brantingham, which asserts that crime occurs from the confluence of particular geographic, temporal, and legal factors as well as the characteristics of the offender and the victim. Rational choice theory, developed by Ronald Clark and Derek Cornish in the late 1980s, takes an essentially economic approach to explain crime, asserting that offenders decide to commit crimes as a result of an idiosyncratic costbenefit analysis made within a framework of availability and opportunity. The environmental variables entering into the decisions include risk of detection, the perceived value of potential costs and benefits, and the availability of a suitable victim. These theories and perspectives, along with broken windows theory’s focus on the criminogenic nature of an environment in which public disorder prevails, share a common recognition of the importance of place in the crime equation.

247

Crime mapping permits a sophisticated and nuanced practical application of this observation, a more robust exploration of the relationships between criminal incidents, and the identification of effective strategies to detect, deter, prevent, and investigate crime.

Criticisms and Concerns Despite crime mapping technology’s proven ­efficacy in reducing crime and enhancing public safety, the technology’s capacity to quickly and precisely identify the geographic locations where crimes (and other events) take place and to link those events to a host of other data sources raise concerns that it might be misused to infringe on or violate civil liberties and/or undermine civil rights. Crime mapping technology potentially provides law enforcement and other government entities with a robust capacity to surveil the public and, by collecting and correlating various data sources with geographic information, to infringe on the privacy interests of individuals and groups. As noted, overreliance on crime mapping as an investigative tool can also put innocent people under suspicion simply by virtue of their residence ­location. Crime mapping technology is a powerful and effective law enforcement tool that can, like any law enforcement tool, be used properly to enhance public safety or improperly to restrict, infringe on, or violate civil liberties. Vincent E. Henry See also Crime; Crime Control; Policing and Society

Further Readings Boba, Rachel. Crime Analysis and Crime Mapping. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005. Brantingham, Paul J. and Patricia L Brantingham, eds. Environmental Criminology. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1981. Bratton, William J. and Sean Malinowski. “Police Performance Management in Practice: Taking COMPSTAT to the Next Level.” Policing, v.2/3 (2008). Cohen, Lawrence E. and Marcus Felson. “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach.” American Sociological Review, v.44/4 (1979). Cornish, Derek and Ronald V. Clarke. The Reasoning Criminal. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 1986.

248

Critical Security Studies

The CSSWS was developed at Aberystwyth University in Wales, and the foundations of this school are an outgrowth of the work of professors Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones. The CSSWS views security studies through the lens of emancipatory theory. The CSSWS has several characteristics; most notable is that it places the emphasis on individual security rather than on that of the state. The roots of its critical perspective are said to derive from theorist Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School (notably Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Jürgen Habermas), and its emphasis is on fostering the emancipation of individuals as a path to peace. The CSSWS is also said to be distinguished from other schools of security studies in its aim to foster a political awareness of critical security rather than just political event analysis. The CSSPS believes that security is not the only concern of international relations scholars, as this school is grounded in sociology and the writings of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Didier Bigo of Kings College, London, is a leading figure of this school. Meanwhile, the CSSCS has its roots in the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and emphasizes the social aspects of security and the idea of securitization, whereby the issue of national secuCritical Security Studies rity is used to justify individuals in society claiming more power over others. Barry Buzan of the Critical security studies is an academic discipline London School of Economics and Political Science that advocates a social constructionist approach is a leading figure of this school. Security studies rather than a realist approach to security studies. scholars regularly debate the extent to which the In security studies, realism is a central school of thought that argues that individuals are self-­ aims of constructionism, realism, and liberalism centered beings whose behaviors must be kept in (another school of security studies) overlap. check by a security-focused state. Realism also The CSSWS, the CSSPS, and the CSSCS place a holds that states are competitive and self-interested strong emphasis on social constructionism and an and must keep one another in check (e.g., the ever-changing social discourse. As previously menNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization). Alternationed, the CSSWS, in particular, places the emphatively, constructionists believe that reality is sis on individual security rather than on that of socially constructed; thus, security is formed the state. The CSSWS notes how the state can through persuasion, culture, shared values, and threaten the security of individuals, especially social identities. There are three main schools of those who are disenfranchised by the current critical security studies: (1) the Critical Security world order. Rather than emphasize the power Studies of the Welsh School (CSSWS), (2) the Paris and authority of states, this perspective looks to School (CSSPS), and (3) the Copenhagen School social justice (e.g., eliminating gender, class, and (CSSCS). This entry compares and contrasts these other barriers) to emancipate the individual in schools in general and discusses the philosophy order to achieve peace. and criticism of CSSWS in particular. Guidetti, Raymond and James W. Morentz. “Geospatial Statistical Modeling for Intelligence-Led Policing.” The Police Chief, v.77 (2010). Henry, Vincent E. The Compstat Paradigm: Management Accountability in Policing, Business, and the Private Sector. Fresh Meadows, NY: Looseleaf Law (2002). Henry, Vincent E. and Albert R. Roberts. “Police Response to Domestic Violence Complaints: Future Directions.” In Roslyn Muraskin and Albert R. Roberts (eds.), Visions for Change: Crime and Justice in the 21st Century (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2008. Henry, Vincent E. and Charles V. Campisi. “Current and Future Strategies for Managing Police Corruption and Integrity.” In Roslyn Muraskin and Albert R. Roberts (eds.), Visions for Change: Crime and Justice in the 21st Century (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2008. Peet, Dale. “Fighting Crime Using Geospatial Analytics.” The Police Chief, v.79 (2012). Rossmo, D. Kim. Geographic Profiling. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2000. Wilson, James Q. and George Kelling. “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” Atlantic Monthly, v.249/3 (1982).

Cuba

Leading theorists of the CSSWS include founders Booth and Wyn Jones. Booth is cited for equating security to emancipation and asserting that states are primarily a means (not an ends) for ensuring the individuals’ security because states often create insecurity and are only meant to be instruments. He also argues that the construct of a state is too uncertain a concept to form a sole basis for theorizing security. Wyn Jones has articulated the nature of the emancipation of the CSSWS by noting that complete emancipation will never be fully realized because there will always be a goal for improvement and greater emancipation. Critics of the CSSWS approach have argued that the CSSWS and its theorists are more focused on making social progress through dialogue than with articulating what is ethically good. Others have questioned whether the CSSWS’s goal of emancipation might be better versed in the ­language of justice, human rights, or economics. Finally, critics have asked for more clarification of the emancipationist response to global acts of human genocide and mass killing. Scholars continue to engage with CSSWS thought as a ­ means for understanding events such as Scotland’s independence referendum in 2014; the 2014 ­ race  rights protests in Ferguson, Missouri; and the  ­ terrorist attack on the French magazine ­Charlie Hebdo in 2015. These and other similar events continue to shape the social discourse on security. Gordon Alley-Young See also Cold War; Constructivism; Copenhagen School; Frankfurt School

Further Readings Booth, Ken. “Security and Emancipation.” Review of International Studies, v.17 (1991). Browning, Christopher S. and Matt McDonald. “The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics and the Politics of Security.” European Journal of International Relations, v.19 (2011). Gaan, Narottam. “Critical Security Studies: Emancipatory Challenges.” Journal of International Affairs, v.14 (2010). Mustapha, Jennifer. “An Analytical Survey of Critical Security Studies: Making the Case for a (Modified) Post-Structuralist Approach” (n.d.). http://yciss.info

249

.yorku.ca/files/2012/06/WP53-Mustapha.pdf (Accessed December 2014). Newman, Edward. “Human Security” (n.d.). http://www .isacompss.com/info/samples/humansecurity_sample .pdf (Accessed December 2014). Pupinis, Mantas. “Critique of the Chapter National Insecurity: Threats and Vulnerabilities from Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear” (n.d.). https://www .academia.edu/2766413/Critique_of _the_chapter_ National_Insecurity_Threats_and_Vulnerabilities_from_ Barry_Buzans_People_States_and_Fear_ (Accessed December 2014). Stateless Diplomat. “Emancipation vs. Power and Order: Dichotomies of Critical Security Studies” (n.d.). http:// statelessdiplomat.blogspot.com/2014/05/emancipationvs-power-and-order.html (Accessed December 2014).

Cuba The Republic of Cuba is an island located in the northern Caribbean where the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea intersect. Haiti, its closest neighbor, is situated about 48 miles to the east. Jamaica is located about 87 miles to the south of Cuba. The Bahamas archipelago is located on the northern part of Cuba. Cuba is also situated about 90 miles south of Florida, the southernmost state in the United States. The Republic of Cuba remains one of the few surviving socialist countries in the world. Unlike in capitalist countries, Cuba’s government plays dominant roles in the economic, social, media, and political life of the people, as is characteristic of socialist countries. Dissent or open criticism of the operations of government are not tolerated. To maintain full control of power, and restrict the operations of internal and external agencies opposed to the socialist government, the Cuban government engages in extensive surveillance, p ­rimarily for intelligence gathering and to prevent activities that might undermine its power, authority, and influence. After reviewing the history of Cuba, this entry focuses on modern-day Cuba and the role of surveillance in Cuban society.

History of Cuba The original inhabitants of present-day Cuba are  Amerindian tribes, notably the Taino, the

250

Cuba

Guanajatabey, and the Ciboney. The name Cuba is derived from the Taino language, one of the aborigines, meaning “great place” or “fertile land is abundant.” The Taino were said to have migrated from the Hispanola during the 3rd century CE. The Ciboney came from South America. Farming was the main occupation of the Taino people. The Ciboney people were seminomadic and depended on fishing and hunting-gathering for their livelihood. The Taino were the dominant ethnic group in Cuba with about 150,000 people when Christopher Columbus arrived on the island in 1492, thus heralding the colonization of the island by Spain. Diego Velazquez de Cuellar was the first Spanish person to found a settlement in Cuba, called Baracoa, in 1511. San Cristobal de la Habana, which later became the capital city, was founded in 1515. The Spanish colonizing authorities created a feudal like economic system, with the Taino natives as the peasants. A measles outbreak in Cuba in 1529 decimated most of the native population, although even before the measles outbreak, the indigenous peoples’ population was already in decline from several factors, including their inability to withstand Euro-Asian infectious diseases, and from hardship resulting from their oppression by the Spanish colonial authorities. On appointment as governor of Cuba in 1548, Gonzalo Perez de Angulo released all the natives from their bondage. Angulo also relocated the headquarters of Cuba from Santiago to Havana. Cuba’s development, relative to the other Caribbean islands was slow, although its agricultural economy was diversified and it was more urbanized than the other islands. In the 18th century, a major historical event transformed Cuba’s economy and altered its political alliance: The Seven Years’ War. This war began in 1754 and was fought on three continents. Spain, Cuba’s colonial authority, aligned with France during the war to fight the British. By 1762, the British expedition prevailed and took over control of Havana. It subsequently started importing and exporting goods to North America and the Caribbean colonies instead of Spain, and it imported slaves from West Africa to work in the sugar plantations. British control and occupation of Havana ceased in 1763, following the signing of the Treaty of Paris. The treaty transferred the ownership of Florida to Britain, with Spain regaining control of Cuba.

The economic transformation of Cuba was also accelerated by the Haitian Revolution (1791– 1804). Cuba intensified its importation of slaves, bringing in about 325,000 slaves from Africa between 1790 and 1820. By 1817, Cuba’s population was reported to be 630,980, comprising 291,021 Caucasians, 224,268 African slaves, and 115,691 persons of mixed ethnic heritage who had regained their freedom. At the time, Cuba had a slave policy, called coartacion, whereby slaves could buy their freedom. As a result, many former slaves worked in industries in urban areas. By 1860, the number of free people of color in Cuba was 213,167, which was about 39% of the nonwhite population. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, a plantation owner, led the 1868 Cuban Ten Years’ War against Spain. The rebellion was bolstered by 2,000 ­ Chinese, who had previously been imported as indentured laborers, and African slaves freed by Cespedes to assist him in the war. Following the Pact of Zanjón, the rebellion was called off in 1878, with Spain agreeing to grant Cuba greater autonomy. Cuba formally abolished slavery in 1875. Despite these conflicts, Spain retained its control of Cuba until 1898, when Cuba joined forces with the United States to defeat Spain and declared its independence from Spain. The 1898 Treaty of Paris was signed at the end of Spanish-American War, which forced Spain to relinquish Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam to the United States for US$20 million. The Republic of Cuba however, was born in May 20, 1902, when Cuba declared its independence from the United States.

Modern-Day Cuba In 1959, Fidel Castro and his revolutionary forces overthrew the government of Fulgencio Batista. Castro declared the new regime a socialist government and aligned itself with the former Soviet Union. The Communist Party’s First Secretary is the president of Cuba, who serves a 5-year term, with no time limits. The National Assembly consists of 609 members who serve a 5-year term. Cuban citizens of age 16 years or older without a criminal record are eligible to vote in the national elections. In 2008, Raul Castro replaced his brother as the new president of Cuba. Cuba’s economy has stagnated following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and

Cuban Missile Crisis

the economic embargo imposed against it by the United States. However, in 2017, the mainstays of Cuba’s economy are sugar, tobacco, fish, fruits, coffee, beans, rice, livestock, and potatoes, and tourism is a major source of foreign exchange for the island. In line with the socialist political system, the government is the dominant actor in the economy, employing more than 78% of the workforce. The media is controlled by the government. Eighty-five percent of the estimated population of 11 million are said to own their houses, and Cubans are not required to pay property taxes and mortgage payments cannot exceed 10% of the total household income. In the 21st century, Cuba’s literacy rate of 99.8% is one of the highest in the world. Its life expectancy at birth of 78.3 years is also one of the highest in the world. Cuba’s medical system is considered among the best, and Cuba was recognized globally as the first country to eradicate the transmission of HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and syphilis from a mother to child. It is also the only country to achieve the standard of sustainable development as defined by the World Wide Fund for Nature. Nonetheless, the denial of civil and human rights remains a big issue on the island. To maintain its power over the social and economic life of Cuban society, the government has deployed sophisticated surveillance technology. Government agencies use this technology to gather intelligence, monitor the citizens’ actions and utterances, and limit nonconformist activities. Furthermore, citizens are often encouraged to spy on one another. Opponents of such an e­ xtensive use of surveillance argue that it undermines the privacy and human rights of the people; p ­ roponents, however, assert that the security interests of the government and the population as a whole override the rights of the individual. Because the socialist government in Cuba is not accountable to the people and does not appear to  consider the privacy and human rights of its people, many individuals and groups concerned about human rights consider the government control of the surveillance apparatus to be problematic. O. Oko Elechi See also Cuban Missile Crisis

251

Further Readings Dominguez, Jorge I. Cuba: Order and Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1978. Horowitz, Irving L. Cuban Communism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988. Gott, Richard. Cuba: A New History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. Wright, Irene A. The Early History of Cuba, 1492–1586. New York, NY: Macmillan, 1916.

Cuban Missile Crisis The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day confrontation between the Soviet Union (the then USSR) and the United States. It is generally regarded as  the most serious incident of the Cold War, when  the communist East and the democratic West came closer than ever to a mutual nuclear destruction. The crisis emerged on October 14, 1962, when a U.S. Air Force–operated U-2 aircraft produced detailed aerial photographs of Soviet ballistic nuclear missiles installations being constructed in Cuba, and ended on October 28, when the United States and the USSR reached an agreement consisting of concessions on both parts. The U-2 aircraft surveillance missions provided critical information to the U.S. administration in assessing the escalating situation. This entry reviews the actions leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, recounts the intelligence gathered from the surveillance missions and the subsequent deliberation by the U.S. administration about how to respond, and concludes with a glance at how the crisis ended and how it affected future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The origin of the crisis can be traced to at least one year prior, in 1961, when the United States attempted a military invasion in Cuba (the Bay of Pigs incident) and deployed nuclear mediumrange ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey as part of its Cold War deterrent policy against the USSR. In June 1962, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and Cuban leader Fidel Castro reached an agreement concerning the deployment in Cuba of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads to deter the U.S. government from attempting another invasion of Cuba. The Cuban revolution (1953–1959) had

252

Cuban Missile Crisis

ended with the victory of Fidel Castro and of the Communist Party of Cuba. Uneasy with the vicinity of a communist-ruled Cuba that devel­ oped friendly relations with the USSR, the U.S. administration repeatedly and unsuccessfully tried to remove Castro from power. It tried assassination, counterrevolution, economic blockade, and military invasion, but all of these attempts failed, and Cuba became the subject of intensive air reconnaissance. Between October 1960 and September 1962, the U.S. government regularly sent U-2 surveillance flights over the island. In August 1962, the U.S. government was already suspecting the deployment of Soviet weapons in Cuba, but ­several air reconnaissance missions in August and September failed to confirm such suspicions. In September, U.S. officials thought to redirect the satellites programmed to fly over the Soviet Union in order to cover Cuba’s territory, but the idea was rapidly abandoned as reprogramming the ­satellites would have caused important delays in gathering intelligence. Thus, the U.S. government continued to rely on the intelligence gathered by its Lockheed U-2 aircrafts—single-engine planes capable of flying at very high altitudes. The Soviet missiles arrived in Cuba in ­September 1962 in the utmost secrecy. Having a range of 2,000 to 4,500 kilometers, they could destroy the United States within minutes from launching. The U.S. administration, however, was not aware of this deployment until mid-October, because, for reasons still unclear, between September 5 and October 14, the U-2 surveillance over Cuba decreased in intensity—a period known as the “photo gap.” On October 14, Steve Heyser flew his U-2 aircraft over the San Cristobal area and took 928 photographs of what the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) identified as Soviet offensive missiles. President John F. Kennedy and the Department of State were notified, and on ­October 16, an Executive Committee (ExComm) of the National Security Council was created to assess the situation. Among the members of the ExComm were Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor, CIA Director John McCone, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy.

Aiming to remove the nuclear missiles from Cuba, the ExComm contemplated several directions of action: military attack against Cuba, including an invasion and the overthrow of Castro; diplomatic negotiations with Castro and Khrushchev; or a naval blockade to prevent further transports of Soviet military equipment and weapons to Cuba. The U.S. administration feared that a full-scale attack against Cuba could enable Khrushchev to respond with a nuclear strike or with a blockade against West Berlin. It opted, therefore, for what it called a naval quarantine. This term suggested that the U.S. government wanted to “quarantine” offensive weapons only, without intending to block all materials from entering Cuba, which might have been seen as an act of war. On October 22, President Kennedy appeared on television, declared that the construction of Soviet military bases in Cuba was an act of aggression that could not be tolerated, and announced the quarantine. The next day, he signed the proclamation regarding the interdiction of the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba. The commanders of the U.S. warships in the Caribbean were instructed to halt and search all cargo vessels heading for Cuba. The blockade included about 200 ships and nearly 1,000 planes. ­Khrushchev designated the U.S. blockade as “an act of aggression” and instructed the Soviet ships to ignore it. During the entire crisis, the United States continued to gather intelligence via air surveillance. Receiving CIA reports that the installment of the Soviet missiles in Cuba continued unabated, on October 26, President Kennedy argued in an ExComm meeting that only an invasion could remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba. The crisis continued to build up, aggravated by an incident that occurred on October 27, when a U.S. spy flight was shot down in Cuba and its pilot killed. Following this incident, the U.S. Department of Defense proposed a military attack against Cuba, but this time, Kennedy rejected the proposal, hoping for a diplomatic solution. However, had the negotiations failed, the United States was ready to employ its plans of invading Cuba. By October 26, more than 100,000 troops stood ready in Florida, two aircraft carriers were heading toward Cuba, the Air Force was prepared for more than 1,000 aircraft attack missions, and 3,000 nuclear

Cults

weapons were put on alert with a total of 7,000 megatons—enough to kill all life on Earth. In the meantime, the Soviets transmitted through various official and nonofficial channels their willingness to negotiate an agreement. On October 26, Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union was disposed to remove its weapons from Cuba under the supervision of the United Nations, provided that the United States would remove its missiles from Turkey and Italy and would declare that it would not invade Cuba. Kennedy had ordered that the missiles from Turkey be removed prior to the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but when the Soviet demand was formulated in these terms, he considered it unacceptable as it would have undermined the authority of the United States and the North American Trade Organization. Thus, the U.S. administration responded that it was ready to lift the blockade and to give assurances that it would not invade Cuba, but it said nothing about the removal of its missiles from Europe. Although there is no historiographical consensus, it is considered that after much negotiation and deliberation, Kennedy agreed to remove the missiles from Europe in exchange for the USSR removing its weapons from Cuba. On October 28, in a radio-broadcast speech, Khrushchev announced that he had given the order for the returning of the Soviet weapons from Cuba to the USSR. The U.S. aerial surveillance missions confirmed that the Soviets were removing the missiles systems from Cuba. On November 20, the U.S. administration announced the end of the blockade. In early 1963, the U.S. missiles were removed from Europe. The general perception, both in the West and in the East, was that Khrushchev had been defeated and embarrassed in this confrontation that he himself had initiated. Castro believed that the USSR had betrayed Cuba’s interests. China severely criticized Khrushchev for his Cuban “adventure” and for giving in to U.S. demands. The crisis also weakened the personal power of the Soviet leader, who, by the end of 1964, was removed from office. However, the crisis consolidated the regime of Castro, which now had guaranties against a U.S. invasion. The crisis proved that rapid, direct, and reliable communication between Moscow and Washington was necessary and of the utmost importance, and in 1963, a

253

Moscow-Washington hotline using teletype equipment was established to ease tensions during international crises. The Cuban Missile Crisis increased the world’s awareness of the nuclear danger and made Kennedy a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament. In 1963, the two nuclear superpowers signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear test explosions in the environment. Elena Dragomir See also Berlin Wall; Cold War; Cuba; Détente; Nuclear War; Surveillance During the Cold War

Further Readings Hilsman, Roger. The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. Max, Holland and David M. Barrett. Blind Over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2012. Meagher, Michael and Larry D. Gragg. John F. Kennedy: A Biography. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2011. Norris, Pat. Spies in the Sky: Surveillance Satellites in War and Peace. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2008.

Cults Two fundamental uses of the word cult exist. In the first, a cult refers to devotion organized as a specific part of a recognized religious institution. A cult can exist in any religion and in any culture. In the second definition, the term cult refers to those systems of worship that emphasize an unconventional doctrine and a vague organizational structure and is often applied to groups whose beliefs and practices deviate from the established norm. In the earliest uses, there was not necessarily a negative context through which a group became identified as a cult. In contemporary society, however, the term has been transformed to suggest an organized group headed by a charismatic leader with secretive, potentially nefarious intentions, which can result in jeopardizing the security and well-being of its members. It wasn’t until after the murders committed by the Manson Family in 1969 that the more sinister

254

Cults

definition became commonplace. This entry focuses on cults as defined by contemporary society, listing the common characteristics of a cult and detailing the history (and subsequent demise) of several of the more well-known cults in modern American culture.

Contemporary Definition Today, a cult is considered to be a group that deviates considerably in doctrine and practice from a host religion. As a result, cults can be considered to exist as derivatives of an already established religious institution. The reasons underlying a personal decision to join a cult are varied, but ­ common elements can be discerned. The desire to belong, the search for a deeper meaning in life, or the quest for physical or spiritual health have all been rationales for why cults continue to attract members.

Characteristics Cults, often referred to as charismatic groups, have several basic characteristics in common. First among these is authoritarian leadership. The leader of a cult typically exercises complete control over members’ behavior. Considered a living prophet, the leader’s word is deemed the ultimate truth. Cults also share the common characteristics of exclusivism, isolationism, opposition to independent thinking, fear of exclusion from the group, and threats of Satanic attack. Members are expected to exist as a shared community, reflecting the ideals of the cult in their behavior, mode of dress, thought, and expression, with little tolerance for individualism. The cult leader may use fear, threats, or intimidation as tactics for maintaining control over the group. Additional characteristics include excessive zealotry and mind-altering practices such as meditation, chanting, use of drugs, or speaking in tongues. Teachings tend to focus on an exalted end or apocalyptic future. Cults are generally preoccupied with attracting new members and making money, and members are expected to devote extraordinary amounts of time to achieving the exalted end predicted by the leader. Psychologists have categorized many zealous religious sects— some highly cohesive self-improvement groups,

certain political action movements, and select terrorist groups—as having cult characteristics.

Well-Known Cults In recent history, several well-known cults and charismatic leaders have been highlighted by the news media. Among the more infamous are the Manson Family, Branch Davidians, Peoples Temple, and Heaven’s Gate. These groups operated under the guidance of a charismatic leader who combined an apocalyptic end-of-times rhetoric with claims of divinity and premonition. While there are countless other cults that have existed throughout time or are currently in operation, very few have become as notorious as those listed here. Regarded by many as the first modern cult, the Manson Family was founded by Charles Manson in 1967 in San Francisco, California. Manson and his followers did not rely on religious tenets as motives for their actions. Rather, Manson prophesied a race war in which blacks would emerge victorious but would eventually turn to whites for leadership. It was his intention to remain in hiding and then surface after the war to lead the victors. On August 9, 1969, the Family brutally slayed coffee heiress Abigail Folger, actress Sharon Tate, hairstylist Jay Sebring, and writer Wojciech Frykowski and killed supermarket executive Leno LaBianca and his wife, Rosemary the following evening in an effort to instigate the race war by attempting to frame blacks as the suspects. The Family wrote the words “Helter Skelter,” “Rise,” and “Death to Pigs” in blood on the walls and refrigerator of the LaBianca home as cryptic ­messages to the authorities. David Koresh, leader of the Branch Davidian cult, earned infamy for his alleged sexual relationships with underage girls, his espousal of a radical apocalyptic end to humankind, and the Branch Davidians’ amassed armory of illegal weapons. A botched raid on the Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms resulted in a subsequent 51-day siege by federal authorities. The compound erupted in flames on April 19, 1993, after the federal authorities used tanks to penetrate and insert tear gas into the compound. At the culmination of events, more than 70 Branch Davidian adults and children and four agents of the bureau were dead.

Cultural Studies

The Peoples Temple of the Disciples of Christ, or Peoples Temple, was founded in San Francisco in 1955 by Jim Jones. Abuse allegations levied by former members drew media attention, prompting Jones to move his group to Guyana in an effort to create a socialist paradise and sanctuary called the Peoples Temple Agricultural Project. After Congressman Leo Ryan, who had traveled to the project’s farm to investigate the claims of abuse, was shot dead on November 17, 1978, Jones feared further intrusion by legal authorities. The following day, Jones instructed his followers to commit mass suicide by ingesting a cyanidelaced grape drink. In the end, more than 900 people, including 303 children and adolescents, were dead. Heaven’s Gate drew the attention of news media and police authorities after its leader, Marshall Applewhite, directed his followers to commit suicide to enable them to travel up to an alien spacecraft hidden in the tail of Comet Hale-Bopp. On March 26, 1997, Applewhite and 38 of his followers were found dead in Rancho Santa Fe, California. Heaven’s Gate members believed in a fusion of Christian apocalyptic thought and concepts popularized in science fiction. They believed in the presence of unidentified flying objects, which were to appear and whisk away selected individuals for existence on a higher plane. Wendy L. Hicks See also Anarchism; Authoritarianism; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Deviance; Domestic Terrorist Groups; Ethics; Free Speech; Freedom of Expression; Internet Pornography; Narcissism

Further Readings Bowden, Hugh. Mystery Cults of the Ancient World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Dawson, Lorne L. Cults and New Religious Movements: A Reader. Hoboken, NJ: WileyBlackwell, 2003. Galanter, Marc. Cults, Faith, Healing and Coercion. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1999. Goldwag, Arthur. Cults, Conspiracies, and Secret Societies: The Straight Scoop on Free Masons, The Illuminati, Skull and Bones, Black Helicopters, The New World Order, and Many, Many, More. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2009.

255

Jenkins, Philip. Mystics and Messiahs: Cults and New Religions in American History. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001. Martin, Walter. The Kingdom of the Cults. Ada, MI: Bethany House, 2003. Nichols, Larry A. Encyclopedic Dictionary of Cults, Sects, and World Religions: Revised and Updated Edition. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2006. Singer, Margaret T. Cults in Our Midst: The Continuing Fight Against Their Hidden Menace. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2003.

Cultural Studies Surveillance practices of various kinds have always been an important aspect of cultural power valences. However, since we entered the realm of the “new” surveillance within late capitalist societies, scientific analyses of this phenomenon in the social sciences and the humanities are confronted with the peril of fast datedness due to the rapid development of surveillance technologies and their networks. This also rapidly changes our use of these technologies, as well as our cultural ­attitudes to them, and the way people perceive themselves in relation to surveillance. With this problem, the urgency of cultural analysis of surveillance is expressed simultaneously: We need cultural analysis of surveillance to understand our contemporary life worlds. Examining surveillance from a cultural studies perspective has, therefore, become a growing field in recent years. Several special issues of the journal Surveillance & Society have been dedicated to art and social media practices, and there has also been an increase in the discussion of surveillance aspects within literary, film, and media studies. This entry reviews the history of cultural studies with regard to surveillance and how it has evolved in recent years, and it concludes with an examination of how popular culture and media theorists see cultural studies and the study of surveillance interacting. When the surveillance studies network started to consolidate in the late 1990s, approaches that investigated both the cultural valences of surveillance and surveillance as a cultural practice were not the focus of the scientific program of this network but, rather, an undercurrent. Research ­

256

Cultural Studies

questions and investigations included a focus on aspects generally of concern to cultural analysts, such as contexts of race, class, and gender. The social sorting that surveillance practices in public space perform, by rendering underprivileged and raced parts of the population especially visible, were most broadly discussed. Until the early 2000s, there was discussion of cultural issues in surveillance studies as well as discussion of ­surveillance in cultural studies, but the interaction between the areas was not pronounced. The most dominant interest in the cultural aspects of ­surveillance so far has been aimed at investigating what cultural expressions tell us about how surveillance is imagined, or of how surveillance enhances existing paradigms of exclusion in society. Since the mid2000s, a stronger focus on questions concerning what cultural and artistic strategies are employed to express an awareness of, the creative use of, or dissent against increasingly ubiquitous surveillance technologies and their ethical, as well as ideological, implications has developed. Gary T. Marx has already presented a concise genealogy of how American post–World War II popular culture imagined surveillance. The most useful volume concerning this research question— cultural imagining of surveillance—is still the edited volume CTRL [SPACE] (which accompanied an exhibition at the Center for Media and Communication in Karlsruhe, Germany, in 2001), due to its theoretical and historical focus. The closed-circuit television camera and its many cultural implications have been an especially fruitful entry point for cultural analysis of surveillance. A more practice-oriented approach to issues of cultural expression and surveillance is represented by the work of John McGrath, who discusses film and theater of and with surveillance from a point of view gleaned from the study of performativity, and examines the cultural implications of expressing ourselves with surveillance technology on a reflected cultural-theoretical level. Early issues of the journal Surveillance & Society focused on the role of new media and surveillance art in a similar context. David Barnard-Wills has discussed the ways of subjectivation that techniques of ­identification established by the state impose on individuals. From the middle of the 2000s onward, the interest of cultural studies in surveillance increased

for various reasons. First, the route on which surveillance studies had been set—a social scientist lens, empiricist studies often focusing on examples from Great Britain, on the one hand, and a strong foundation of theoretical assumptions in Panopticism, on the other—started to expand both methodologically as well as epistemologically. Second, after the events of 9/11, surveillance and security became the dominant tropes of global politics and increasingly shaped global popular culture. The intertwined development of personal digital communication and consumption, and a global culture of surveillance and security after 9/11 not only increased the ubiquity of surveillance but also brought to the forefront the ambiguities and multiple contexts of everyday life, of which surveillance is a part. In short, the images of Big Brother and the Panopticon started to be diversified. In the field of popular culture, the new culture of surveillance as simultaneously a technique of control, voyeurism, and exhibitionism—or simply an aesthetic convention—became increasingly evoked. Artworks by female artists, as well as the reception of Andrea Arnold’s movie Red Road, changed the conventions of a Western imaginary of the surveillant gaze as male and voyeuristic, including ambiguous aspects of aestheticism, media specificity, melancholia, and care into their representation or performance of surveillance. Film scholars, especially, took this as a cue to discuss the significance of gender, race, class, and sexuality in representations of the surveillant gaze. Film scholar Patricia Pisters shows how female surveillance art is able to express a host of affects that diversify the cultural expressions— evocations of total control or the attempt to evade total control—we have classically connected with film and narratives concerned with surveillance themes. Film and media theorists such as Pisters, Matthew Fuller, and Wendy Chun see surveillance as increasingly becoming a mode of cultural production that might entail new kinds of freedom under control. Epistemologically, Torin Monahan has proposed an investigative stance influenced by actor network theory and situational analysis to analyze the social practices of surveillance. There is still ample room for investigation in the fields in which cultural studies, cultural theory, and the study of surveillance interact. The pronounced

Curfews

Euro-American focus of cultural studies of surveillance is starting to be counteracted by ­ investigations focusing on surveillance contexts and their cultural valences in Brazil and China, for example. Nicole Falkenhayner See also Closed-Circuit Television; Identity Politics; Marx, Gary T.; Panopticon, The; Social Sorting; Surveillance & Society

Further Readings Barnard-Wills, David. Surveillance and Identity: Discourse, Subjectivity and the State. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011. Chun, Wendy H. K. Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006. Fuller, Matthew. Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. Lake, Jessica. “Red Road (2006) and Emerging Narratives of ‘Sub-Veillance’.” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, v.24/2 (2010). Levin, Thomas Y., et al., eds. CTRL [SPACE]: Rhetorics of Surveillance From Bentham to Big Brother. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002. McGrath, John E. Loving Big Brother: Performance, Privacy and Surveillance Space. London, England: Routledge, 2004. McGrath, John E. and Robert J. Sweeny, eds. “Surveillance, Performance and New Media Art” [Special issue]. Surveillance & Society, v.7/2 (2010). Monahan, Torin, ed. “Surveillance as Cultural Practice” [Special issue]. Sociological Quarterly, v.52 (2011). Pisters, Patricia. “Art as Circuit Breaker: Surveillance Screen and the Powers of Affect.” In Bettina Pepenburg and Marta Zarzycka (eds.), Carnal Aesthetics: Transgressive Imagery and Feminist Politics. London, England: I. B. Tauris, 2013.

Curfews A curfew is an order prohibiting or limiting one’s right to be out in public at certain times or in certain places, and it is implemented by federal, state, or local authorities, depending on the particular reason for the order. Curfew laws represent a

257

method of surveillance of movement for certain individuals, which the government argues is needed for the protection of people and property and is not outweighed by privacy concerns. This entry reviews the various populations to whom these laws may apply and then discusses legal challenges to juvenile curfew laws.

Application Many curfew laws in the United States apply only to juveniles under the age of 18 years, having been implemented in an effort to curtail juvenile delinquency; however, curfew laws have been enacted during times of natural disasters, civil unrest, and other types of disturbances, perceived or real. For example, in the summer of 2014, the governor of Missouri declared a state of emergency and imposed a curfew for the city of Ferguson following demonstrations protesting the police killing of an unarmed black teenager. When curfew laws have been implemented during times of natural disasters (e.g., tornados, hurricanes, floods), the stated purpose is to protect people, real and personal property, and communities from would-be looters and for public safety. Curfew laws have also been used to target certain groups. For example, curfew laws were used during slavery and during the Jim Crow era whereby African Americans were required to be out of the public domain or away from certain locales at a particular time or before sunset; hence, the laws were sometimes referred to as sundown laws or Black Codes. Other minorities have also been subjected to this type of social control: ­Curfew laws were imposed on people of Japanese descent during World War II, Chinese people in the mid-1800s, and Native Americans and people of Mexican origin during the first half of the 20th century. In addition, curfews have been imposed on persons on parole or probation and those with bail or bond restrictions to control their m ­ ovement while under government monitoring.

Challenges During the 1980s and 1990s, juvenile curfews were seen as a strategy to prevent juvenile delinquency and youth victimization, yet they were not without court challenges. Between 1990 and

258

Cyberbullying

1995, 60% of the 200 largest U.S. cities enacted curfew statutes or revised existing ones. Many of these laws were challenged on the absence of reliable research that demonstrated a decrease in juvenile delinquency. In fact, some studies have shown that in some jurisdictions, youth delinquency had merely been displaced to times when the curfews were not in effect. In addition, the laws were challenged as operating a method of racial profiling since the laws were applicable in cities with large percentages of youth of color. Juvenile curfew laws have also been challenged on constitutional grounds. Most often these challenges are based on the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Those opposed to curfews have argued that these laws place limitations on a youth’s right to free association and speech. Others suggest that these laws give law enforcement excessive power to detain youth without probable cause and subject them to questioning by the police in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Still others argue that under the Ninth Amendment, these laws violate parents’ rights to privacy in their ability to rear their children. Furthermore, it has been suggested that youth curfews violate the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a suspect class based solely on the age and, in some cases, the race and ethnicity of individuals. Groups such as the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and the American Civil Liberties Union, in arguing against these laws in court, suggested that these laws result in disparate treatment of minority youth. In reviewing curfew cases, courts have tried to strike a balance between the government’s interest in protecting public safety and ensuring the mobility rights of individuals. However, it seems that the courts have not addressed another issue that critics have raised: the issue of more youth having contact with and being processed through the juvenile justice system. Critics claim that although violations of these laws are status offenses (i.e., offenses that would not be a crime if committed by an adult) and may not result in a youth having a delinquent record, such violations may affect the youth’s future. While some courts have struck down curfew laws that they found to be vague, overreaching, and in violation of basic fundamental rights, others have upheld such laws.

As a result of the diverse court rulings, some states and localities are strengthening their laws or enacting new laws. In 2014, two Maryland jurisdictions, one urban and one suburban, enacted more stringent juvenile curfew laws. In June 2014, Baltimore City’s City Council, despite protests, passed a bill that requires juveniles under 14 years to be home by 9 p.m. and those aged 14 to 16 years to be indoors by 10 p.m. on weeknights and 11 p.m. on weekends. Similarly, Hagerstown, a western Maryland suburb, passed stricter legislation that raised the curfew age from 15 to 16 years and moved up the time that unaccompanied ­children must be indoors by 1 hour, with violations being subject to fines ranging from $100 to $500 for repeat offenses. Elvira White-Lewis See also Municipal Surveillance; Policing and Society

Further Readings McDowell, D., et al. “The Impact of Youth Curfew Laws on Juvenile Crime Rates.” Crime and Delinquency, v.46/1 (2000). Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives for the States 1994–1996. http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_ c.html (Accessed September 2017). Reynolds, K. M., et al. (2000). Do Juvenile Curfew Laws Work? A Time-Series Analysis of the New Orleans Law.” Justice Quarterly, v.17/1 (2000).

Cyberbullying Cyberbullying is a technologically based form of torment, coercion, and intimidation manifested through the use of computers, cell phones, and various other computer-based technology. It may be an individual activity, but in adolescent manifestations of the activity, groups of bullies are often collectively engaged. The activity has a repetitive element, and the intent of the perpetrator is to do harm. Cyberbullying has the ability to invade an individual’s privacy and can lead to security concerns when physical and psychological threats are made. In this entry, various forms

Cyberbullying

of cyberbullying are described, as well as the reasons for and manifestation of the practice. The responsibility and reactions of schools and parents of bullied students are discussed, and workplace cyberbullying and adult cyberbullying are also highlighted. As many as one in five middle school students have been victimized by this practice. At one time a child’s home was considered a refuge from school, peers, and bullies, but technology has rendered that nugatory; most cyberbullying occurs at home, perhaps even in the victim’s bedroom, previously thought to be a safe haven. However, although primarily thought of as a form of cruelty limited to teenagers and adolescents, cyberbullying is also found outside the juvenile milieu, such as in the workplace and in social networks frequented by adults. In addition, so-called cyber vigilantism—using social networks to focus community disapprobation on various forms of supposed transgression—certainly can cross the line from engaged activism when it becomes excessive, and it can seem like bullying to the target of the subsequent Internet-based and public humiliation. Although a noted and pervasive problem in North America, cyberbullying appears anywhere technology has become computer oriented and where cell phones that employ texting and computer technology are in use.

Reasons for and Manifestations of Cyberbullying Among younger people, cyberbullying, like normal bullying, may seemingly begin as goodnatured jocular teasing among peers, but the victim might not perceive it as such. Some cyberbullies, like more mundane bullies, claim that raillery helps make the victims “stronger,” insinuating that the behavior is for the healthy development of the victim. The most obvious reason for bullying of any degree is to degrade the victim and/or in some way to raise the status or improve the state of mind of the bully. Contrary to popular belief, bullies are often popular and self-satisfied; they are seldom victims of an inadequate sense of self or overtly pathologically damaged victims of an inferiority complex. They may in fact gain status among their peers for inflicting physical and/ or psychological harm on their victim. Not

259

surprisingly, research reveals that cyberbullies show little or no empathy toward their targets. In addition, research suggests that cyberbullies are likely to receive nonnurturing parenting and are themselves somewhat more likely to be the recipients of severe and physical discipline. Manifestations of cyberbullying take many forms: Some use Facebook and other social networking sites to deliver withering assaults on an adolescent’s emerging sense of self and fragile selfesteem. Taunts may focus on sexuality and are frequently homophobic or fixed on beauty and physical development. Sometimes victims are alleged to be promiscuous or afflicted with a sexually transmitted disease. A child’s family’s income level may be mocked, as well as the clothes the child wears if they are not viewed as fashionable among the child’s peers. Female cyberbullies may play sadistic games with other girls, making them the target of horrendous abuse and elaborately exclusionary scenarios. Thus, a girl may find herself ostracized in the lunchroom for no apparent reason. Frequently, these incidents are the result of disputes over the affections of a boy. Boys may “sext” (i.e., send revealing photos of a trusting female who has unwisely shown more of her body than was seemly) to their buddies. After a couple ends a relationship, acrimoniously revealing photos of the female party may begin to circulate. This sort of “revenge porn” may be especially damaging. These photos may be passed around the school and make their way into general circulation. That this practice may run afoul of child pornography laws is a definite possibility as well. Locker room photos of an obese boy similarly being circulated in his school occasion humiliation and self-destructive behavior. In some cases, victims have been so disheartened and demoralized by the continued harassment and concomitant loss of self-esteem and status among their peers that they have dropped out of school, suffered psychological illness, or even committed suicide. More generally, victims’ characteristics are similar to those of victims of traditional bullying: emotional distress, low selfesteem, poor grades, school phobia, social anxiety, and depression. In one case, an adult female, pretending to be a male peer, so humiliated a depressed and vulnerable adolescent girl, saying that “the world would be a better place without

260

Cyberbullying

you,” that the child committed suicide. Since most of the harassment takes place outside the aegis of the school, school administrators are not involved and sometimes do not wish to be. Yet the activity profoundly affects students’ morale, behavior, and performance. Victims of cyberbullying in the workplace similarly have increased absenteeism and personnel issues. Yet because their tormentor is often a colleague or a superior, they may feel that they have little recourse.

Dealing With Adolescent Cyberbullying School officials have been confounded by the issues raised by cyberbullying. For example, is it constitutionally protected free speech or merely crude intimidation? Perhaps more appositely, is conduct that occurs entirely off school grounds and in the discretionary time of the students involved actionable by school officials at all? In general, when student behavior interferes with the school’s educational mission, it may be actionable, according to some court decisions. But state laws and court decisions mandating school action for off-campus behavior are inconsistent and of dubious constitutionality and fairness. School officials have to contend with the fallout from “cyber reality” daily. Dealing with the very real consequences of nonstop, over-the-weekend texting and social network cyberbullying on Mondays has become a part of guidance counselors’ and principals’ workload. Working through the web of messages and figuring out just what has occurred and who is involved may take many hours away from more directly educational tasks. However, contending with dropouts and students with falling attendance and grades, and breaking up fights in classrooms, lunchrooms, and on buses that stem from cyberbullying are a consequence of  neglecting these issues. Thus, dealing with devastated children whose identities have been ­ disvalued and with angry and bewildered parents in this connection has become the new normal for educators. Whereas some parents want principals to act decisively, others want school officials to stay out of their family affairs altogether and are uncooperative. Many students feel that school authorities cannot or will not help them, and they are afraid to inform their parents. This is because parents may act to precipitously limit access to

technology and cut the student off from all cybercontact with peers. School officials generally want parents to know that it is the parents’ responsibility to monitor and regulate their children’s Internet and social networking access and behavior. Because many parents seem unwilling and unable to do so, the problem seems addressable only through school-based educational sensitivity-raising activities. How much impact such programs might have is still up for debate. There are numerous websites on the Internet that address these issues, and they can be easily found by any search engine. They generally suggest that any and all cyberbullying should be reported to the police when threats of violence or stalking are involved. Any depiction of minors involved in sexual behavior should be reported, as should sexually explicit writings concerning minors. Other situations such as photos taken in circumstances where one should reasonably expect privacy (e.g., “upskirt” photos or pictures from dressing rooms, locker rooms, toilet facilities, and showers) should be documented and reported. Workplace cyberbullying and adult cyberbullying should be dealt with similarly. All examples should be saved and carefully documented. In large organizations, instances of cyberbullying should be reported to the human resources (personnel) department or to an uninvolved superior. Private citizens who are bullied outside the workplace should block the source with software, if possible, and report threats to the authorities. The abuse should also be reported to the cell phone company, and/or social networks sites should be contacted. A private attorney should be engaged if law enforcement seems unable or unwilling to deal with the problem. It should be noted, however, that it is difficult for civil juries to assess damages in such cases even when clear culpability has been established. Francis Frederick Hawley See also Facebook; Free Speech

Further Readings Agatston, P., et al. “Students’ Perspectives on Cyber Bullying.” Journal of Adolescent Health, v.41/6 (2007).

Cybercities Bhat, Christine Suniti. “Cyber Bullying: Overview and Strategies for School Counsellors, Guidance Officers, and All School Personnel.” Australian Journal of Guidance and Counseling, v.18/1 (2008). Dilmac, Bulent. “Psychological Needs as a Predictor of Cyber Bullying: A Preliminary Report on College Students.” Educational Sciences: Theory and Practice, v.9/3 (2009). Mason, Kimberly. “Cyberbullying: A Preliminary Assessment for School Personnel.” Psychology in the Schools, v.45/4 (2008). Patchin, Justin. “Advice for Adult Victims of Cyberbullying” (November 9, 2015). http://cyberbullying.us/advicefor-adult-victims-of-cyberbullying (Accessed September 2014).

Cybercities Cybercities are cities that leverage modern information technology to better deliver services to their residents. The concept of a cybercity can be traced to the late 1990s. The proliferation of the Internet from the early 1990s opened the way for the integration of this modern form of information and communication technology to other areas of socioeconomic life. The progressive penetration of the Internet into the general society resulted in the adoption of new approaches of doing things by incorporating modern information and communication technology, including within-city management. The term cybercity is loaded with debatable interpretations. However, any city that systematically integrates innovative modern information technology in its overall functionality to more efficiently and optimally manage its critical infrastructure would be a cybercity. Infrastructure such as energy generation and delivery; transportation system, including railways, roads, waterways, airports, water supply, low carbon emission technologies, waste removal and management, and government services; and the digital security afforded this infrastructure. The ensuing environment is a well-organized clean city with smart and industrious people, a vibrant economy, an ­accountable e-government, and an overall conducive ­ environment favoring mobility and good living for its residents. This entry discusses the ­

261

characteristics and benefits of cybercities as well as the challenges, including challenges for securities and privacy, associated with cybercities.

Characteristics and Benefits In the true sense of the term, one would envisage that a cybercity is built with all its integrated ­features from scratch. In reality, this is a contemplation for future cities, although existing cities are adapting their existing infrastructures by integrating them with modern information and ­ technology capabilities. Despite the enormous challenges involved in adapting existing cities to becoming cybercities, many cities beginning in the early 2000s have made significant strides in this regard and have earned the name cybercities. These cities manifest a combined adequacy in intellectual capabilities and well-resourced institutions and infrastructures that are properly coordinated in an Internet-sustained grid developed specifically to make the supply and demand for utilities, products, and services more efficient for residents and tourists visiting the cities. The overall expectation is to create a symbiotic environment wherein the city’s infrastructure and inhabitants coexist in an overall efficient way with mitigated sense of expectation of the unknown. Generally, the elements of a cybercity would include the technology infrastructure, the different public and private institutions within the city, and the general population harnessing to their benefit the potentials offered by the city. To this end, the quality and efficiency of the information communication technology network and delivery are cardinal. This serves as the foundation for the proper organization of knowledge and the generation of intellectual capital needed for the effective management of both private and government affairs in the city. It also feeds into the capacity for constant innovation in the different aspects of city activities especially with regard to security challenges emanating from exposure of critical infrastructure grids to bad actors. Given the benefits that come with integrating modern information technology to run city affairs, it has become commonplace for most cities to incorporate these technologies to their overall management. Many cities around the world to some extent have earned the name cybercity, given

262

Cybercities

the giant strides toward becoming more technology driven in the delivery of both public and private services. Cities like Singapore, Dubai, Toronto, Vienna, New York, and many more across the globe are now considered to be cybercities, though at different stages of this technology infusion in city management. They are characterized by many automated services connected to the Internet that have greatly made the delivery of services more efficient and in a timely manner. Some of these services include streamlining waste in public transportation through ride-sharing providers, thereby reducing traffic congestion and environmental pollution from carbon monoxide. Other innovative strategies are employed with regard to the removal and recycling of solid waste to maintain an ecologically friendly city. There is also the provision of ample green spaces such as parks in different parts of the cities for recreational purposes and at the same time requirement of environmentally friendly construction materials for new building projects. Also, many services like water delivery, power supply, and solid waste removal are remotely monitored through sensors installed at various points around the city that would signal for immediate response in the event of an anomaly. Furthermore, citizens are able to remotely participate in the governance of their city by electronically submitting their concerns via government apps and portals. This citizen participation is equally supplemented by closed-circuit television cameras installed in busy areas of the city and around ­critical infrastructure and are remotely monitored, being part of the security component of the cybercities.

Challenges Associated With Cybercities The concept of cybercities has also come with a significant downside. With most of the cities’ infrastructure and activities linked to the Internet, any interruption in either power supply or physical accident affecting the network can significantly lead to the disruption of many city activities. This could engender substantial and debilitating losses at various levels in terms of data, money, and resources for the government, organizations, and individual citizens. Also, cybercities are exposed to enormous vulnerabilities, including hacking of

systems, resulting in the theft of vital information from individuals and organizations or data for nefarious use or for ransom. To this end, it becomes very concerning when individual privacy is compromised in several routine activities of urban life, including the use of city cameras and scanners for vehicle license plates for municipal surveillance and/or crime control. The insecurities in the cyberworld remain common sources of concern as the phenomenon of cybercities continues to capture the imagination of modern city planners. Inasmuch as any security breach poses potential devastating losses to the city, its infrastructure, and inhabitants, there is no reneging on the development of cybercities. This is because investing in innovative technologies over time substantially reduces the overall cost of running the city, while delivering efficient and timely services to all residents at the same time, providing a conducive environment for city activities. Alaba Oludare and Jude Lenjo Jokwi See also Closed-Circuit Television; Cybersecurity Legislation; E-Government; Municipal Surveillance

Further Readings Arribas-Bel, D., et al. “Cyber Cities: Social Media as a Tool for Understanding Cities.” Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy, v.8/3 (2015). Calvillo, C. F., et al. “Energy Management and Planning in Smart Cities.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, v.55 (2016). Cerrudo, Cesar. “An Emerging US (and World) Threat: Cities Wide Open to Cyber-Attacks.” Securing Smart Cities (2015). Cerrudo, Cesar and Drew Spaniel. “Keeping Smart Cities Smart: Preempting Emerging Cyber Attacks in US Cities.” Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology (2015). Helfert, M., et al., eds. “Smart Cities, Green Technologies, and Intelligent Transport Systems.” In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference, SMARTGREENS 2015, and 1st International Conference VEHITS 2015, Lisbon, Portugal, May 20–22, 2015. Kalay, Y. E. “How Smart Is the Smart City? Assessing the Impact of ICT on Cities.” In Agent Based Modelling of Urban Systems: First International Workshop, ABMUS 2016, Held in Conjunction with AAMAS, Singapore, Singapore, May 10, 2016.

Cybermarketing Kitchin, Rob. “Making Sense of Smart Cities: Addressing Present Shortcomings.” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, v.8/1 (2015). Komninos, Nicos. The Age of Intelligent Cities. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Singh, Amita. “Enhancing Capacity to Govern Through Big Data.” Sri Lanka Journal of Business Economics, v.4/1 (2015).

Cybermarketing Cybermarketing, or digital marketing, is emerging as one of the most prolific and effective advertising and marketing strategies in recent history. The evolution and use of digital devices and platforms has transformed individuals into complex, multidimensional digital surfaces that generate vast quantities of data related to their everyday lives. Digital devices such as smartphones, digital tablets, personal computers, digital televisions, smart appliances, and personal fitness monitors significantly enhance people’s lives; however, these and other digital platforms also radiate immense quantities of invaluable information that provide marketers and advertisers with an intimate p ­ ortrait of these consumers’ lives. The value of digitally sourced consumer data to businesses can be measured in the hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars annually. The conundrum is what are the corresponding benefits to the consumer and what are the non-trivial risks to individual privacy? Do these personal and economic benefits outweigh the risks to individual privacy? Adding to the concern of the incursion of personal privacy by corporate entities through the collection of large data sets is the considerable risk to personal privacy posed by the fusion of multiple data sources to provide a more complete picture of the consumer’s characteristics, behaviors, and attitudes. Promoted under labels such as a “360 degree picture of the consumer,” marketers and advertisers are aggressively aggregating and fusing these multidimensional data sources into more or less complete pictures of individual ­consumers’ lives with the objective of precision targeting on the household or individual level. The efficiencies that result from precision marketing also provide some tangible benefits to consumers

263

in the form of reduced exposure to nonrelevant advertising and reductions in product cost due to more efficient marketing. The risks to the privacy of the individual consumer are, however, considerable. Because personally identifiable information is often attached to fused data, there are non-trivial risks, including, for example, data concerning the taking of specific prescription drugs, which suggests that the individual has a particular ailment or in one already widely publicized case where an adolescent was precision targeted by a major retailer for baby products for a pregnancy that had not yet been disclosed to her parents. Another controversial area in cybermarketing is the collection of app use and geolocation data, particularly prevalent in the use of mobile devices such as smartphones and digital tablets. These technologies are being utilized in new, real-time marketing strategies such as geofencing. Geofencing as utilized by the marketing industry involves the use of geolocation data typically from mobile devices to identify when an individual has entered or exited some predefined geographical area, which typically coincides with the physical location of a brick-and-mortar store. Often these geolocation data are combined with other consumer information held about the individual to offer the individual some sort of promotion for a store or business that is geographically nearby. Technology companies producing these types of products and the communications carriers they use are responsible for making important decisions regarding the constraints and notifications to consumers under which this type of data is collected and used, but at the same time these technology companies are generating very significant revenues off the collection and sale of these consumer data. The potential conflict of interest is great and the paucity of federal regulations regarding the collection and use of this type of data makes the situation for personal privacy precarious at best. It turns out that the very same data synergies that enhance a marketer’s ability to efficiently advertise its products or services may in fact turn out to pose some of the most significant risks to personal privacy. For example, mobile geolocation data could identify individuals who are present at the location of a cancer treatment facility, suggesting that they or a family member is

264

Cybermarketing

being treated at that facility. In another example, it could reveal a person’s religious affiliation when the geolocation data reveal time spent at a specific church, temple, or mosque. Geolocation data could also imply or identify a person’s sexual orientation by analyzing the areas of a city that the individual visits. The situation is further complicated by the deployment of sophisticated statistical models and machine learning strategies to mine the massive data sets that are generated by emerging digital technologies. Data mining the content and social network structure of Facebook users or parsing the content of Gmail email messages is currently powering very precise targeting for digital advertising campaigns within those services. The acceptance of the terms of use of these platforms provides these companies with the legal right to perform this data mining. In addition, often there are predictive models built upon these statistical and machine learning– derived strategies that may predict key characteristics or behaviors for personally identifiable individuals. These predictions will always contain some level of error but often are treated by many in the cybermarketing world as having the same verisimilitude as non-modeled data. The consequences of these errors for individual consumers are often not grave—they might miss out on a particular offer or may not hear about a specific sale—however, modeled errors that persist in this database when applied to purposes other than marketing might have much more serious costs to an individual. For example, the application of these statistical models by federal law enforcement could be utilized to attempt to produce a pool of suspects that are suspected of committing a crime, or the intelligence community might apply these models to identify or locate potential terrorists. The serious consequences of being falsely swept up into a database of individuals who may be a threat to the community or national security has already been demonstrated by efforts such as the U.S. no-fly list. Statistical models always have error incorporated into them and the use of additional data on consumer attitudes and behaviors in statistical models for purposes other than marketing holds significant potential for misuse. The emergence of cybermarketing has brought a renewed sense of saliency of the concept of

personal privacy. While personal privacy is perhaps more salient, this state of affairs has not seemingly altered what Patricia Norberg and her colleagues (2007) call the paradox of privacy. The paradox of privacy refers to the phenomenon whereby individuals understate the amount of information they are willing to provide and then proceed to actually disclose significantly more information that they previously said they would disclose. Norberg and her colleagues suggest that this occurs because risk is the primary social factor affecting attitudes and statements about information disclosure while trust is the primary factor governing the actual amount of information that is disclosed. Finally, it is useful in the examination of cybermarketing and privacy to highlight the fact that there are different, competing theoretical perspectives on privacy. These perspectives include but are not limited to privacy as the ability to control information, privacy as a legal right, and privacy as a commodity. Perhaps privacy as a commodity is the most relevant perspective here. Privacy as a commodity refers to the perspective that individuals realize that privacy has value and they are willing to trade personal information to businesses in return for something of value. Data from a large U.S. national probability sample (Simmons, 2012) suggest that over 50% of U.S. adults state they are proactive about protecting their privacy but in fact are willing to trade personal information to a business in exchange for something of value. It is clear both from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective that the relationship between personal privacy and cybermarketing is a complex one that continues to evolve. Max Kilger See also Advertising and Marketing Research; Corporate Surveillance; Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Information Security; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings Acquisti, A., et al. “The Economics of Privacy.” Journal of Economic Literature, v.54/2 (2016). Eastin, M., et al. “Living in a Big Data World: Predicting Mobile Commerce Activity Through Privacy Concerns.” Computers in Human Behavior, v.58 (2016).

Cybermurder Lyon, D. “Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique.” Big Data & Society, v.1/2 (2014). Norberg, Patricia A., et al. “The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors.” Journal of Consumer Affairs, v.41/1 (2007). Simmons National Consumer Study data set. Experian Simmons, 2012. https://www.experian.com/assets/ simmons-research/brochures/simmons-nationalconsumer-study.pdf (Accessed August 2017).

Cybermurder The transformation of communication globally through the medium of the Internet has also fostered a new form of homicidal interaction, referred to as cybermurder or Internet murder. Historically, murderers have used various approaches to identify strangers as potential victims, including the use of newspaper advertisements. Henri Landru, the French serial killer, placed ads in the lonely hearts columns of newspapers during World War I. Landru first seduced his victims, and having gained their trust, he embezzled their assets and finally murdered them. The term cybermurder is applied to murders that occur as a result of Internet advertisement or connection through chat rooms, dating sites, sex-for-sale sites, online role-playing games, Internet forums or groups, ­ listservs, or bulletin boards. It also has been used to refer to the use of the Internet by persons to solicit their own murder or to induce others to take their own lives. Cyberhomicide presents a significant challenge for law enforcement since the identification of perpetrators may prove difficult or impossible given the anonymity provided by the World Wide Web. Consensual homicide is one form of this phenomenon. This involves Internet advertisement by one individual to cannibalize or to be cannibalized by another. The most oft-cited legal case involves the murder of Bernd Brandes, a German engineer, in 2001 by Armin Meiwes. Meiwes murdered, dissected, and then ate 20 kilograms of Brandes’s body, with Brandes’s consent captured on videotape, before being apprehended by the police. Meiwes was initially sentenced to 8 years in prison but received a life sentence on appeal.

265

The active solicitation of an individual to murder another with the person’s consent was reflected in the 1996 case of a Maryland businesswoman, ­Sharon Lopatka, who met Bobby Glass through an Internet chat room. After a lengthy correspondence centering on sadomasochistic sex and her desire to be tortured and murdered, she met with him in person in a trailer he owned. Her husband alerted the police, who located her body buried near Glass’s trailer. Glass was convicted of manslaughter but claimed that her death was the result of an accident that occurred during their consensual sexual activities. The term Craigslist killer is often associated with cybermurders in the media; however, given the overwhelming number of sites on the Internet that can just as readily provide a forum for communication, the term ascribes too much blame to one service. The case most commonly associated with this term is that of Phillip Haynes Markoff, a medical student who answered advertisements for sexual services in two cases in which he was alleged to have committed armed robberies. ­Markoff was indicted for the murder of Julissa Brisman on April 14, 2009, but subsequently hanged himself while awaiting trial. Brisman had posted an Internet ad offering massage services (often understood to be synonymous with paid sexual services). Another well-known case illustrative of this form of cybermurder is that of Miranda Barbour. Barbour, aged 19 at the time of the crime, posted  an ad on Craigslist offering to provide “companionship” to men for the sum of $100. Troy ­LaFerrara, age 42, answered the ad, and they met in her car at a mall parking lot. Unbeknown to Ferrara, Barbour’s husband of 3 weeks, Elyette Barbour, was hiding in the back seat of the car hidden under a blanket. Her husband did not attack LaFerrara as planned, so Miranda stabbed Ferrara multiple times with a knife, ending his life. In a 2013 Canadian case, Tim Bosma of Ancaster, Ontario, advertised for the sale of his truck. Two individuals arrived to inspect the vehicle, and Bosma was last seen going with them for a test drive. His body was eventually found burned beyond recognition on farmland located some distance from his home. Dellen Millard was arrested and charged with forcible confinement, theft of more than $5,000, and first-degree murder. Millard is awaiting trial on the charges.

266

Cyberprostitution

In 2014, The Huffington Post reported that since 2009 there have been 29 such homicides, which typically stem from attempted robberies that are unsuccessful and lead to the murder of the victim. However, murderous situations can emerge from other forms of advertisement too, including those for items for sale, room rentals, sexual partners, and romance. The relative anonymity of the Internet for those seeking to harm others provides ample opportunity for violent interactions to occur. Serial killers, according to Elliot Leyton, kill three or more persons over a period of days, weeks, months, years, or even decades, with resting periods between the murders. Some serial killers have used the Internet to identify victims and commit homicide. From 1993 onward, John Edward Robinson utilized Internet chat rooms and social networking sites to select his victims. Robinson advertised as a dominant male looking for submissive women for sex. His motive in the first of two of these murders was economic gain. His victims, Sheila Faith and her teenage daughter, moved to Kansas City to join him and were never seen again; but, Sheila Faith’s pension checks continued to be cashed by Robinson for almost 7 years. Two other women eventually disappeared after becoming involved with him; their bodies were found in chemical drums on his farm. Robinson was eventually charged and convicted for the deaths of these women. He received the death sentence as well as life sentences without the possibility of parole in five of his cases. Inducing others to take their own lives has been considered by some commentators to constitute a specific form of cybermurder. However, from a legal perspective, it is likely more accurate to describe this practice as assisting suicide via the Internet. Such cases provide a significant legal challenge for prosecutors because freedom of speech is protected in the United States. The case of William Francis Melchert-Dinkel illustrates this dilemma: Although he was originally convicted of assisting a suicide, his conviction was overturned by the Minnesota Supreme Court and remanded back to a lower court. As the Internet evolves and as technology increasingly connects the globe, new forms of cybermurder may emerge. Thomas Fleming See also Crime

Further Readings Brenner, Susan W. Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues and Outcomes. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2012. Harding, Luke. “Victim of Cannibal Agreed to Be Eaten.” Guardian (December 4, 2003). https://www .theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/04/germany .lukeharding (Accessed August 2017). Leyton, Elliot. Hunting Humans: The Rise of the Modern Multiple Murderer. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: McClelland Stewart, 1986. McCormack, Simon. “There Have Been at Least 45 ‘Craigslist Killings’ Since 2009: Report.” Huffington Post (October, 29, 2014). http://www.huffingtonpost .in/entry/craigslist-killings_n_6064756 (Accessed August 2017).

Cyberprostitution Cyberprostitution is the process of engaging in sexual behaviors for money or other favors using the Internet and other technological devices. Cyberprostitution is of great concern because it appears to be increasing and because it poses privacy and security risks—especially for children and other vulnerable groups.

Method Cyberprostitution occurs in the virtual space, with the physical interaction involving masturbation and active communication within an individual’s private space. It is conducted using sex-related communications or activities, such as sexually explicit pictures and stories, sexually suggestive emails, or sexually arousing videos, which may be live or prerecorded. Although the communication or activities may be perceived as occurring anonymously from a private location, images could be live streamed and transferred to various websites throughout the World Wide Web. However, cyberprostitution can facilitate freedom and flexibility, as individuals can  take on different personas, engage in sexual ­experimentation, or explore sexual fantasies.

Growing Phenomenon Cyberprostitution is a rapidly growing phenomenon resulting from the increased availability of

Cyberprostitution

affordable electronic devices such as smartphones, laptop computers, and computer tablets that are capable of accessing Internet services. Cyberprostitution is also facilitated by cheaper Internet services, the use of remote locations and domains, and the opportunity for anonymity through the use of pseudonames and fake email addresses. There is also increasing usage due to improved types of webcams; the increased availability of chat rooms, forums, social media, websites, and blogs; and the ability for live streaming—all of which can facilitate cyberprostitution.

Extent Although it is believed that cyberprostitution is increasing, there are no official statistics or a standardized method for determining the extent. ­Estimates have been made by extrapolating from the general Internet usage, counting the number of sexually explicit websites and webpages, assessing the amount of time spent on sexually explicit sites, and determining the number of visits to these sites. However, none of these methods specifically identifies the number of individuals who are actually involved in payment for sexual favors. It has been estimated that 15% of the approximately 75 million Internet users in the United States will visit sexually explicit sites. Another report has suggested that between 15% and 30% of persons who use the Internet daily and visit sexually explicit sites are likely to become involved in sexually related activity. However, there is a real challenge in obtaining an accurate level of cyberprostitution because the content of personal communication through email and text messages, as well as interactions on social media sites, is not readily accessible for evaluation. With the dynamism involved in domains and locations, there is a great challenge in obtaining accurate records.

Implications Cyberprostitution increases the risk of an ­individual’s security and privacy. An individual’s personal and private information could be disseminated extensively across the world in a ­ very short period of time—although many Internet service providers and social media platforms attempt to monitor and regulate the transmission of sexually explicit materials. Because it is difficult

267

to police individuals’ private behaviors, opponents point out that children and other vulnerable groups could be exposed to sexually explicit materials or be susceptible to exploitation. Cyberprostitution is also of concern to ­psychologists and therapists because some individuals who are involved with cyberprostitution may eventually develop an addiction. The ­American Medical Association, for example, has expressed concern that increased involvement in cyberprostitution can contribute to cyber and sex addiction. However, others argue that cyberprostitution facilitates the elimination of a middleman in the sex trade business, thus facilitating individual marketing and promotion. In some areas, such as Germany, prostitution is legal, and with cyberprostitution, those engaging in the sex trade can manage their affairs easily. Some websites, for instance, allow prostitutes to create their own profiles so that they can upload detailed information about themselves, the range of services they ­provide, and the attending charges. In addition, certain apps enable those who are seeking ­ ­commercial sex to specify the characteristics and criteria of the sexual encounter they desire. It is also argued that cyberprostitution can increase the safety and security of those engaging in it, because they can better secure payments. It also may reduce client violence, which is associated with other forms of prostitution. Moreover, with cyberprostitution, the likelihood of being targeted by police officers may also decline.

Addressing Cyberprostitution Because cyberprostitution is relatively new, strategies for addressing it include providing opportunities for open discussion on the subject and disseminating general information through online educational programs, workshops, and seminars. Those who may be experiencing challenges with cyberprostitution can be encouraged to seek professional help. It is difficult to control the cyber environment, so maintaining the safety and security of children and vulnerable groups can be a challenge. Thus, vigilance on the part of parents, social and community leaders, library personnel and computer supervisors, and others involved in the care and supervision of children and vulnerable groups is

268

Cybersecurity Legislation

encouraged to maintain the privacy and security of the individuals in these groups. Fay V. Williams See also Internet Pornography; Sexting

Further Readings Ashford, C. “Sex Work in Cyberspace: Who Pays the Price?” Information & Communications Technology Law, v.17/1 (2008). Bonnie, R. “What Counts as Cybersex?” Village Voice (2007). (Accessed April 2010). Han, C., et al. “The Analysis of Relationship Between Online Contact of Obscene Contents and Real Experience.” International Journal of Computer and Communication Engineering, v.3/4 (2014). Ko, T. “Adolescent Deviant Leisure Activities on the Internet.” International Journal of Tourism Sciences, v.14/3 (2014). Le, O. “Understanding Cyberspace Addictive Behavior With the Critical Social Theory.” Communications of the IIMA, v.5/4 (2015). http://scholarworks.lib.csusb .edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1281&context=ciima (Accessed August 2017). Molencamp, R. J. and L. M. Saffiotti. “The Cyber Sexual Addiction.” Human Development, v.22/1 (2001).

Cybersecurity Legislation* Cybersecurity, a broad and arguably somewhat fuzzy concept for which there is no consensus definition, might best be described as measures intended to protect information systems—including technology (e.g., devices, networks, and software), information, and associated personnel—from ­various forms of attack. The protection of information sent through cyberspace has implications for personal privacy, business, and national security. In addition, law enforcement and national security agencies need to be able to effectively utilize cyber capabilities in order to gather evidence, identify and surveil potential threats, and

*The views expressed in this entry are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

take appropriate enforcement action. Ever since the earliest days of the telegraph and telephone communication, the U.S. Congress and state legislatures have sought to balance the competing interests of security and privacy. The issue of legislating cybersecurity has proven to be a difficult area for actual improvement. This is in part due to the rapid change in technology, in part due to increasing polarization within the U.S. Congress, and in part due to competing fears of wrongful use of cyberspace by criminal and terrorist elements on the one hand and the scope of government surveillance efforts made public as a result of disclosures made by Edward Snowden, WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, and others on the other. As of December 2016, the cybersecurity legislation that exists in the United States is generally considered outdated, while efforts to reform these laws or enact new ones remain unsuccessful. Several enacted statutes address various aspects of cybersecurity. Some notable provisions are in the following acts: •• The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, as amended, prohibits intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and thereby obtaining information from any protected computer (generally considered to include federal computer systems and those used by banks and in interstate and foreign commerce). •• The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, which amended the Wiretap Statute (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968), prohibits unauthorized electronic eavesdropping and establishes the statutory procedures for authorized electronic surveillance warrants. •• Under the Computer Security Act of 1987, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for developing security standards for federal computer systems except those that are part of the national security systems used for defense and intelligence missions. •• The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, formerly the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, made agency heads responsible for ensuring the adequacy of agency informationsecurity policies and procedures, established the chief information officer position in agencies,

Cybersecurity Legislation

••

••

••

••

and gave the Secretary of Commerce authority to make promulgated security standards mandatory. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the Department of Homeland Security some cybersecurity responsibilities in addition to those implied by its general responsibilities for homeland security and critical infrastructure. The Cyber Security Research and Development Act, also enacted in 2002, established research responsibilities in cybersecurity for the National Science Foundation and NIST. The E-Government Act of 2002 serves to guide federal IT management and initiatives to make information and services available online, including a number of various cybersecurity requirements. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 clarified and strengthened cybersecurity responsibilities of NIST and of federal agencies. It also transferred responsibility for promulgating federal cybersecurity standards from the Department of Commerce to the Office of Management and Budget and established a central federal incident center.

A number of cybersecurity-related bills were introduced in the 111th, 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses, but few passed. Those that did tended to focus on education, workforce development, and other related aspects of the discipline, as opposed to laws regarding cybersecurity measures and authorities specifically. The early months of the 115th Congress did not include any cybersecurity proposals. One of the most significant pieces of proposed legislation debated was the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), a bill introduced and debated in 2012 and 2013 but never passed, which was intended to amend the National Security Act of 1947 in order to add provisions concerning cyber threat intelligence and information sharing. CISPA was introduced and passed in the House of Representatives in 2012, but it was not passed by the Senate, in large part because the Obama administration believed that the bill lacked adequate confidentiality and civil liberties safeguards and that the president would veto the bill. In  ­February 2013, the bill was reintroduced and again passed in the House but stalled and was not voted on by the Senate.

269

On July 10, 2014, a similar bill, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 (CISA), was introduced in the Senate. Although CISA was generally regarded by many to have addressed the flaws perceived in CISPA, it was opposed by civil liberty advocacy groups and was not voted on by either the House or Senate in 2014. During 2013 and 2014, cybersecurity-related legislation was prompted by the disclosures by government contractor Edward Snowden of widespread National Security Agency and other intelligence community surveillance. The USA FREEDOM Act would have amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) in a number of ways intended to promote protection of privacy and greater transparency of the intelligence surveillance programs of the federal government. As with both CISPA and CISA, however, these efforts generated significant public discussion but failed to pass the Congress. In the waning days of the 113th Congress, ­Congress approved a package of four cybersecurity bills after a series of votes in the House and ­Senate, which was thought to increase the likelihood that some cybersecurity-related legislation could be enacted by the end of the year. None of the bills addressed any of the larger, more contentious cybersecurity issues, such as immunity for private companies that share cybersecurity threat information with the federal government. Instead, the bills focused on narrower cybersecurity issues and the structures and procedures of the federal agencies that oversee cybersecurity. However, none of these pieces of legislation was ultimately enacted into law. It remains uncertain whether the future political climate will allow Congress and the president to enact any meaningful cybersecurity legislation, despite almost ­universal agreement that reforms are needed both to improve security and protect civil liberties. The USA FREEDOM Act (Pub. L. 114-23), enacted on June 2, 2015, is one successful piece of cybersecurity legislation, with significant implications for surveillance, security, and privacy. It amended provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the practices of the intelligence and law enforcement communities covered under the FISA. The USA FREEDOM Act requires the use of more specific selection terms and that new processes be ­followed when the Federal Bureau of Investigation submits an application to a FISA court for an

270

Cyberstalking

order requiring the production of tangible things, for orders approving pen registers (i.e., surveillance devices that capture the phone numbers dialed on outgoing telephone calls) or trap and trace devices (i.e., devices that capture the numbers that identify incoming calls), and for requests for National Security Letters. The act also requires the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to audit the effectiveness and use of FISA authority, requires enhanced minimization procedures for the targeting of persons outside the United States (other than U.S. persons), and introduces a measure of adversarial procedure by requiring the FISA Court and the FISA Court of Review to appoint an amicus curiae to assist in the consideration of applications for an order or review by raising issues of civil liberties and privacy on behalf of the general public. The bill requires the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the FISA courts and to make such decisions, orders, or opinions publicly available to the greatest extent practicable, subject to permissible redactions. Finally, it expands the requirement for an annual report to Congress regarding tangible things applications to include a much higher level of detail than had previously been the case. Another piece of cybersecurity legislation that was successfully enacted was the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, which was signed into law by President Barack Obama on December 18, 2015. This legislation aims to help government and businesses better defend against cyberattacks by creating a framework for the voluntary sharing of cyber threat information between private entities and the federal government, as well as improving the sharing of cyber threat information within agencies of the federal government. It also provides for immunity from lawsuits for businesses that share cybersecurity information with the government. While this legislation was hailed by many in the national security and law enforcement community as an important measure to improve cybersecurity and enhance effective and legitimate surveillance efforts, the measure was criticized by many in the civil liberties community as further encroachment on the privacy rights of individuals. R. James Orr

See also Information Security; Law and Digital Technology; National Security

Further Readings Committee on National Security Systems. National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary. Ft Meade, MD: Author, 2010. https://www.ecs.csus.edu/csc/iac/ cnssi_4009.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Donohue, Laura K. The Future of Foreign Surveillance: Privacy and Surveillance in a Digital Age. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Hayes, Carol M. “Chilling Effects: Code Speech and the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.” SSRN (March 31, 2017). https://ssrn.com/abstract= 2944411 (Accessed October 2017). Margulies, Peter. “Global Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Privacy: The Obama Administration’s Conflicted Legacy.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (in press). Tehan, Rita. “Cybersecurity: Legislation, Hearings, and Executive Branch Documents.” Congressional Research Service Report, R43317 (June 23, 2017). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43317.pdf (Accessed October 2017).

Cyberstalking Stalking is defined as an obsessional search for intimacy in which a person engages in a long-term pattern of threat and harassment directed toward the targeted individual. Pursuit patterns by s­ talkers are multiple and vary, with new methods that evolve as technological innovation in communication develops. Cyberstalking involves the repetition of unwanted contact that could be of a sexual, violent, or threatening nature by using electronic telecommunication devices (e.g., emails, cameras, text messages), the Internet, computer programs, and the Global Positioning System (GPS). As with other criminal conduct that requires persistent involvement, cyberstalking is the evolution of antisocial behavior into a pattern of acts that escalates from less serious to ever more serious actions. It is this escalation that represents the basis for concern, aggravated by the influence of the obsessional search and the psychological invasion of one’s privacy. Cyberstalking puts at stake

Cyberstalking

the sense of security of an individual or of an entire group or organization.

Criminal Conduct To be considered a crime, the invasive cyberbehavior should occur on at least two occasions, and the harassment should spread over a temporal period of at least 1 month. An isolated event of threatening someone, independently of how malicious that could be, does not meet the criteria for stalking. Stalking was first outlawed in 1990, and since then many legislations have been passed. In E ­ ngland and Wales, the Protection From Harassment Act of 1997 does not define stalking but rules that a person must not pursue a course of conduct that amounts to the harassment of another person. In the United States, most legislations depict stalking as an intentional pattern of repeated or unwanted pursuit that a “reasonable” person would consider threatening or fear inducing. Antistalking laws vary not only in what behaviors are encompassed by stalking and cyberstalking but also regarding the minimum number of occurrences required (e.g., not specified; two, three, or more than three occasions) for the conduct to be assessed as criminal. Another controversial aspect is the issue of intent: Should the stalker’s intention constitute a key element for judging his or her conduct as stalking and cyberstalking, hence as criminal? The ambivalence over “no intent required” versus “the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear for their safety or the safety of their family” is still a debated issue in many legislations. When considering cyberstalking, it becomes even more complicated to establish the intentional nature of the actions and the temporal scheme (i.e., when did it start?), which both constitute the ground for a criminal prosecution. In many states in the United States, it is still not clear whether persecuting and pursuing a victim through electronic devices constitutes or does not constitute a crime. According to specialized literature, cyberstalking is currently defined as a group of behaviors through which an individual, group of individuals, or organization gathers information and uses communications technology to harass one or more individuals. Such behaviors may include, but are not limited to,  the transmission of threats and false  accusations, computer monitoring, psychological terror

271

and control, cyberbullying, the solicitation of minors for sexual purposes, and even other organized criminal schemes that involve identity theft, data theft, or data or equipment damage.

Impact on Victims In the definition at the beginning of this entry, obsessional refers to the persistent, pervasive, imposing, and unrequested presence of a self in the virtual space of another person or organization. Search implies an unwanted and unreciprocated shadowing of a victim, in which the matter of following the targeted victim is not only the end but also the means to satisfy one’s own abnormal pursuit. The consequences of this invasive a­ ttitude, combined with this pattern of virtual and emotional intrusions, are numerous and differentiated but have a common feature among victims: the sense of a naked threat and an overwhelming fear. Cyberstalking can arouse extreme emotional responses in victims. State statutes vary as to whether such victim responses are necessary to determine that cyberstalking has legally taken place. However, if stalking is considered not just in legal terms but in terms of the intrusion into the life of a person, the virtual obsessional following becomes especially powerful in that it is left to the imagination of the person to ruminate about who the intruder is, how he or she looks, what he or she is capable of doing next, and where he or she actually is. If stalking is seen only in terms of recurrently maintaining a visual and/or physical vicinity to a person, the cyber pursuit would not have any ­psychodynamic and energizing appeal for the perpetrator. But adding the power of unending time to the pursuit would be sufficient for galvanizing the cyberstalker, as the idea of being present in somebody’s virtual and mental space exceeds the sense of achievement of any visual and physical vicinity. It is this last aspect of cyberstalking that renders it more problematic for victims to protect themselves and for the law to control it. Cyberstalking exerts a stronger and more menacing impact because of the imaginary intimacy on which the intrusion is based. Accordingly, what makes cyberstalking effective is its ominousness. It is this silent manner that leaves room for other ways of exerting control on another person. The

272

Cybertheft

Internet induces the “partners” to play their own roles in an obsessional plot, in their own time, and using their own respective attacks and defenses. It follows that certain emotions and desires—such as possessiveness, anger, jealousy, envy, revenge, and resentfulness—become more pervasive and intense in cyberstalking because it is fantasy that arouses further actions aimed at devaluing and scarring the victim. The cyberspace is an unrestrained and unconfined social reality, which provides opportunities for the cyberstalker to act out his or her obsession, to the extent that, in Shakespearian terms, the stalker “waxes desperate with imagination.” In fact, while off-line stalking usually requires the perpetrator and the victim to be in geographic proximity, cyberstalkers may be across the street, across the country, or even across the world. Electronic communications technologies reduce to a minimum the barriers to harassment and threats.

Threats to Privacy and Security The cyberstalker does not directly see, hear, touch, smell, or emotionally sense the other person but knows that the person can be reached at any time. This belief is also reinforced by the possibility of a suspension of real time. It is this divergence in space between victims and cyberstalkers that can foster opportunities for threats and the invasion of someone’s privacy. That is to say, although victims and cyberstalkers do not come together in the physical world, they do converge in cyberspace. Messages sent electronically at one time can be acknowledged at another time, and the communication game is determined by the reaction of the receiver. Even a nonreaction can trigger the fantasy of the cyberstalker. It may be useful to recognize that the force of fantasy, as a central component of intense emotions and inexplicable behaviors, is the first element in the understanding of the psychology of cyberstalking. However, cyberstalking has become a major threat in the social and political arena; further research is necessary to understand how to intervene efficiently and effectively to guarantee the protection and security of individuals and groups. Georgia Zara

See also Computer Surveillance; Cyberbullying; Cybersecurity Legislation; Cybertheft; Electronic Harassment; Identity Theft; Researching Cybercrime

Further Readings Bocij, Paul and Leroy McFarlane. “Online Harassment: Towards a Definition of Cyber-Stalking.” Prison Service Journal, v.139 (2002). Lloyd-Goldstein, Robert. “De Clérambault On-Line: A Survey of Erotomania and Stalking From the Old World to the World Wide Web.” In Reid J. Meloy (ed.), The Psychology of Stalking: Clinical and Forensic Perspectives. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1998. Meloy, Reid J. “Stalking (Obsessional Following): A Review of Some Preliminary Studies.” Aggression and Violent Behavior, v.1 (1996). Meloy, Reid J. “The Psychology of Stalking.” In Reid J. Meloy (ed.), The Psychology of Stalking: Clinical and Forensic Perspectives. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1998. Miller, Neal. “Stalking Investigation, Law, Public Policy and Criminal Prosecution as Problem Solver.” In Joseph A. Davis and Marcella A. Chipman (eds.), Stalking Crimes and Victim Protection. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2001. Reyns, Bradford W., et al. “Stalking in the Twilight Zone: Extent of Cyber-Stalking Victimization and Offending Among College Students.” Deviant Behavior, v.33 (2012). Sheridan, Lorraine P., et al. “Stalking: Knowns and Unknowns.” Trauma Violence Abuse, v.4 (2003).

Cybertheft Cybertheft is an aspect of cybercrime commonly defined by typology. Cybercrime is generally characterized into three groups: (1) cyberattacks, (2) cybertheft, and (3) other computer security incidents. Cybertheft occurs when a computer device or the Internet is used to steal money or other valuables, including a person’s identity. Some offenses listed as cybertheft include embezzlement, fraud, theft of intellectual property, and theft of personal or financial data. Cybertheft may be distinguished from cyberattack, which occurs when the computer system is basically the target of the crime, such as with computer viruses, denial-of-service attacks,

Cybertheft

and electronic sabotage against a person’s hardware or software. Cybertheft also includes spyware, adware, hacking, phishing, spoofing, pinging, port scanning, and stealing of other information. Some terms used in relation to cybertheft are as follows: Carding—a type of identity theft that involves the stealing of bank or credit card information to fraudulently withdraw money from ATMs or stores Phishing—a method of hijacking other people’s login information and passwords Fiscal fraud—the theft of official online payment information to make false claims for benefits or to avoid payments (including tax obligations) Viruses and worms—computer programs that affect the storage capacity of a computer or network, which is then used to unlawfully replicate information without the owner’s knowledge and for digital espionage

Cybertheft often occurs as identity theft and identity fraud, which are terms used to describe criminal activities involving unlawful access to or acquisition of another person’s personal information for fraud or deception and economic gain. Identity theft may occur through unlawful interception of a person’s email or by unlawfully obtaining another person’s digital password or passwords. The theft must involve the use of computer technology to unlawfully acquire data, which may subsequently be used fraudulently for applying for loan or credit cards, making bank account withdrawals and money transfers, acquiring and using telephone calling cards, or obtaining goods or other privileges in the other person’s name. Beginning in 2010, strategies for committing cybertheft were categorized as business email compromise (BEC), email account compromise (EAC), and ransomware. BEC refers to a sophisticated scam that targets businesses engaged in monetary transactions with foreign suppliers and/ or businesses that regularly do wire transfer payments. EAC refers to a sophisticated scam targeting the public and professionals associated with, but not limited to, financial and lending institutions, real estate companies, and law firms. EAC

273

perpetrators use compromised emails to request payments to fraudulent locations. Ransomware is a type of malicious software used to block access to a computer system until money is paid. The remainder of this entry focuses on the crime cybertheft, including its prosecution, its victims, and the losses due to cybertheft.

Reporting and Prosecuting Cybertheft Complaints about cybertheft may be directed to local state, federal, or international law enforcement agencies depending on the level of the theft. In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the major law enforcement agency responsible for cybercrime investigation. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), comprising the FBI, the National White Collar Crime Center, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance, is empowered to serve as a vehicle to receive, develop, and refer criminal complaints of cybercrimes. The IC3 provides a central reporting forum for victims and law enforcement officers on all incidents of cybercrime. There are several laws in the United States under which cybertheft can be prosecuted, including identity theft, larceny, and fraud, among others. Specifically, identity theft is prosecuted under several statutes, including the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, which prohibits the knowing transfer or unlawful use of other people’s means of identification with the intent to commit, aid, or abet an unlawful activity against a federal law or a felony under state and local law. The punishment for the offence is 15 years maximum term of imprisonment, a fine, and forfeiture of any property involved in the commission of the crime. Identity theft is also punishable as identification fraud, credit card fraud, computer fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, or financial institution fraud—all of which are felonies punishable with imprisonment for a maximum term of 30 years, fines, and forfeiture of assets. Other laws existing for mitigating the impact of cybertheft provide avenues for victims to dispute claims and receive fraud alerts and free credit reports, and restitution in an amount equal to the value of the victim’s time spent remediating the actual or intended harm of the theft.

274

Cyberwar

Victims Any person—whether an individual or a group of people—or a corporate entity, small business, nonprofit corporation, or government entity may become a victim of cybertheft, as long as the person or entity possesses an identity or anything of value that may be accessed through the use of a computer or via the Internet. In 2013, Target and its customers were victimized when the financial information of 40 million customers was compromised. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics data reveal that in 2014, about 7% of persons aged 16 years or older were victims of identity theft (similar to the 2012 findings) and 86% of identity theft victims experienced the fraudulent use of existing account information, such as credit card or bank account information. There also was an increase in the number of elderly victims of identity theft from 2.1 million in 2012 to 2.6 million in 2014. In 2015, victims of cybertheft included 37 million users of Ashley Madison’s website; more than 100 banks across 30 countries, which were digitally robbed; and 22 million federal employees in the United States. In addition, the personal email of the former CIA director John Brennan, was hacked by a person posing as a Verizon worker to obtain information from AOL customer service for the unlawful publication of several people’s social security numbers, names, addresses and other personal information.

The State and Cost of Cybertheft A 2005 survey of the National Computer Security Survey (NCSS) shows that among 7,818 businesses, 86% of those victimized detected multiple incidents, with about half of them detecting 10 or more incidents during the year. About 68% of the victims of cybertheft sustained monetary losses of $10,000 or more. By comparison, 34% of the businesses detecting cyberattacks and 31% of the businesses detecting other computer security incidents lost more than $10,000. Of those detecting incidents, 11% detected cybertheft and 24% detected other computer security incidents. Most businesses did not report cyberattacks to the law enforcement authorities. In 2016, losses in cyber incidents reported to the IC3 amounted to more than $1.4 million. The

IC3 received more than 12,005 BEC/EAC complaints, with losses of more than $360 million, and 2,673 ransomware complaints, with losses of more than $2.4 million. Alaba Oludare See also ATM Cards; Digital Passwords; Email; Identity Theft; Online Shopping

Further Readings Brenner, S. W. Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes for Law Enforcement. Holliston, MA: Northeastern, 2012. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Cybercrime. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2013. Doyle, C. Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. Federal Bureau of Investigation and National White Collar Crime Center. IC32015 Internet Fraud Report. Washington, DC: National White Collar Crime Center, 2016. Grabosky, P. Computer Crime: A Criminological Overview. Paper presented at the Workshop on Crimes Related to the Computer Network, Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Vienna, Austria, April 15, 2000. Harrell, E. and L. Langton. Victims of Identity Theft, 2014. Washington DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015. Herhalt, J. “Cybercrime: A Growing Challenge for Governments.” Issues Monitor: KPMG International, v.8 (2011). Internet Crime Complaint Center. 2016 Internet Crime Report. Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016. https://pdf.ic3.gov/2016_ IC3Report.pdf (Accessed August 2017).

Cyberwar Wars are armed conflicts between the armed forces of political entities, which are typically nation-states, although this is not always the case. An armed force can be defined as a collective entity comprising combatants with task-defined roles and with a command-and-control structure.

Cyberwar

It is necessary to distinguish between legal or other institutional determinants of war and the substance of war. On the one hand, a nation-state might declare war on another nation-state, but if no actual armed conflict takes place, then the “war” is apparently war in name only. On the other hand, a sustained period of intense armed conflict between nation-states might technically be defined as a war even if neither side has actually declared war. This is not to say that declarations of war cannot make a difference to whether or not an armed conflict is in fact a war. Perhaps a low-level armed conflict can become a war once the protagonists declare it to be such. For example, this might be so if Ukraine decided to declare war on Russia in the context of the 2014 Russiabacked separatist armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. Cyberattacks, a new form of conflict that can lead to cyberwar, provide additional complications in defining war. Contemporary nation-states now suffer and inflict ongoing cyberattacks on a large scale. However, whether all or any of these attacks constitute war rather than conflict or mere breaches of security (criminal or otherwise) is not always entirely clear. This entry reviews some recent examples of cyberattacks that may constitute cyberwar, considers the thresholds that may be met for cyberattacks to be construed as acts of war, and details four types of cyberattacks that may lead to cyberwar.

Examples Recent high-profile cyberattacks include the following: •• Denial-of-service cyberattack on Estonian banks, media, and government websites in 2007, allegedly perpetrated by Russia •• Stuxnet malware attack, in which the software worm Stuxnet was used to disrupt Iran’s nuclear enrichment information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure in the context of a joint U.S. and Israeli operation established to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program •• Operation Orchard, the Israeli bombing of a Syrian nuclear facility after it had penetrated Syrian computer networks and “turned off” Syrian air defense systems

275

•• Mandiant, the U.S. computer security firm that has documented ongoing Chinese cybertheft and disruption of websites and other ICT infrastructure of U.S. corporations and government agencies

Because Estonia is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia was assumed to be the aggressor, one might presume that the cyberattack on Estonia was an act of cyberwar. However, there were no deaths or destruction of property. Moreover, computer technicians rectified the problem quickly, and the disruption was minimal. In addition, NATO did not declare war, and Russia denied responsibility. Arguably, therefore, this cyberattack did not constitute an act of cyberwar. Perhaps such attacks should be regarded as a form of covert political action. Operation Orchard involved the Israeli bombing of a Syrian nuclear facility immediately after an Israeli cyberattack on Syrian air defense systems. Importantly, this cyberattack was the precursor to the bombing, and the latter was an act of war. Therefore, Operation Orchard is considered an act of war. So a cyberattack can be an act of war.

Thresholds and Types It has been argued that cyberattacks that cause significant loss of life and destruction of physical infrastructure constitute war (cyberwar). However, what is less clear is whether cyberattacks that do not cause significant loss of life and destruction could constitute war. What should we make of, for example, a denial-of-service cyberattack that does not cause damage to physical infrastructure or loss of life but that does bring about a prolonged period in which welfare and other services cannot be provided, leading to severe hardship for large sections of the population? This raises the question of the nature, extent, and duration of the harm culpably caused. Presumably, thresholds of harm can be delineated, or at least described, to serve as benchmarks in determining what is, and what is not, an act of war. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between an act of war and war. Arguably, an act of war is not sufficient to constitute a war. If, for example,

276

Cyberwar

the nation-states against which the act of war has been perpetrated choose not to make an armed response and the matter ends, then war has been averted. Perhaps this is what best describes the situation of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia. Some have argued that whether or not a cyberattack constitutes an act of war—or, by parity of reasoning, whether an ongoing series of cyberattacks and counter-cyberattacks constitutes a war—depends on whether certain thresholds have been met. These thresholds have to be specified, at least legally, and presumably also morally, in terms of the nature and/or extent of the injury, loss of human life, and/or physical destruction caused. According to that view, cyberattacks cannot in and of themselves constitute war. Rather, cyberattacks can constitute war only if they cause significant loss of life or, at the very least, substantial damage to physical objects (e.g., buildings). However, there are four kinds of harm or damage in question. First, there is harm (physical or psychological) done to human beings. Second, there is damage done to buildings, ICT hardware, and other human artifacts (as well as to the natural environment insofar as it supports individual and collective human life). Third, there is cyberharm, which is damage to software and data (as opposed to the physical ICT hardware itself). Fourth, there is institutional harm, which is the undermining of institutional processes and purposes (e.g., major breaches of confidentiality in a security agency, loss of institutional control of a territory). The last two types of harm (cyberharm and institutional harm) might have thresholds at which war might be justified, independent of the level of

the first two kinds of harm (i.e., the level of physical or psychological harm caused to humans and the level of destruction of physical property). Alternatively, the third and fourth types of harm might have thresholds at which a seriously harmful response short of war is morally, and perhaps legally, justified. Such harmful responses might include economic sanctions, but they might also include various forms of covert political action, notably covert political cyberattacks. Seumas Miller See also Cybertheft; Stuxnet Virus

Further readings Dipert, Randall. “Ethics of Cyberwarfare.” Journal of Military Ethics, v.9 (2010). Eberle, Christopher. “Just War and Cyberwar.” Journal of Military Ethics, v.12 (2013). Ford, S. B. “Jus Ad Vim and the Just Use of Lethal ForceShort-of-War.” In F. Allhoff, et al. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War in the 21st Century. Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2013. Miller, Seumas. “Cyber-Attacks and ‘Dirty Hands’: Cyberwar, Cyber-Crimes or Covert Political Action?” In F. Allfhoff, et al. (eds.), Binary Bullets: The Ethics of Cyberwarfare. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2015. Sanger, David. Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. New York, NY: Broadway Books, 2013. Singer, Peter and Allan Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2014.

D Data Mining in Big Data

and

product groups, and assess credit scores. Particularly, banks and insurance companies are interested in risk profiles to determine to whom to provide loans, mortgages, and insurances and under which conditions. For government agencies, profiles may be useful to identify target groups for their policies, to evaluate their policies, and to optimize public services. Particularly, criminal investigation organizations, including police agencies, and intelligence organizations are interested in risk profiles to identify criminals and terrorists, to assess and predict where crime will take place (so-called hotspots), and to disclose criminal networks. General disadvantages of group profiles may involve, for instance, unjustified discrimination (e.g., when profiles contain sensitive characteristics like ethnicity or gender, which are used for decision making), stigmatization (when profiles become public knowledge), dehumanization (regarding people as data sets rather than human beings), de-individualization (regarding people as parts of groups rather than unique individuals), loss of privacy (when predicting characteristics that people do not want to disclose), loss of autonomy (as data mining and profiling practices may not be very transparent), and being confronted with unwanted information (e.g., with life expectancies). Many of the effects of group profiles may be considered advantageous as well as disadvantageous, depending on the context and the way in which, and by whom, the group profile is used.

Profiling

Data mining and profiling are technologies used for analyzing and interpreting large amounts of data (a set of facts) to obtain knowledge (patterns in the data that are interesting and certain enough for a user). In the information society, vast amounts of data are collected, stored, and processed by both public and private organizations. When dealing with large data sets, particularly in the context of big data, human intuition may be insufficient to obtain insight into or an overview of the data available. Data mining and group profiling are considered separate technologies, even though they are often used together. Whereas the focus of data mining is on finding novel patterns and relations in data sets, the focus of profiling is on ascribing characteristics to individuals or groups of people. Profiling may be carried out without the use of data mining, and vice versa. In some cases, profiling may not involve (much) technology—for instance, when psychologically profiling a serial killer.

Advantages and Disadvantages Profiles may offer general advantages, such as enabling the selection of target groups, customization, and cost efficiency. For corporations, profiles may be useful to identify new customers, personalize special offers, evaluate the profitability of

277

278

Data Mining and Profiling in Big Data

Data Mining Data mining is an automated analysis of data, using mathematical algorithms, to find new patterns and relations in (large amounts of) data. Data mining is a step in a process called knowledge discovery in databases. Knowledge discovery in databases is the nontrivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and ultimately understandable patterns in data. This process consists of five successive steps: (1) data c­ ollection, (2) data preparation, (3) data mining, (4) interpretation, and (5) determining actions. Hence, the third step is the actual data mining stage, in which the data are analyzed to find certain patterns or relations. This is done using mathematical algorithms. Data mining is different from traditional database techniques or statistical methods because what is being looked for does not necessarily have to be known. Thus, data mining may be used to discover new patterns or to confirm suspected relationships. The former is called a bottom-up or data-driven approach, because it starts with the data and then theories based on the discovered patterns are built. The latter is called a top-down or theory-driven approach, because it starts with a hypothesis and then the data are checked to determine whether they are consistent with the hypothesis. There are many different data mining techniques. The most common types of discovery algorithms with regard to group profiling are clustering, classification, and, to some extent, regression. Clustering is used to describe data by forming groups with similar properties; classification is used to map data into several predefined classes; and regression is used to describe data with a mathematical function. In data mining, a pattern is a statement that describes relationships in a (sub)set of data such that the statement is simpler than the enumeration of all the facts in the (sub)set of data. When a pattern in data is interesting and certain enough for a user, according to the user’s criteria, it is called knowledge. Patterns are interesting when they are novel (which depends on the user’s knowledge), useful (which depends on the user’s goal), and nontrivial to compute (which depends on the user’s means of discovering patterns, e.g., the available data and the available people and/or technologies to process the data). For a pattern to

be considered knowledge, a particular certainty is also required. A pattern is not likely to be true across all the data. This makes it necessary to express the certainty of the pattern. Certainty may involve several factors, such as the integrity of the data and the size of the sample. The knowledge discovered may concern people, in which case it may result in profiles. These profiles may concern individuals, resulting in individual profiles, or they may concern groups, resulting in group profiles. When the knowledge reveals the probabilities of particular characteristics of individuals or groups, the profiles are generally referred to as risk profiles.

Profiling Profiling is the process of creating profiles—that is, a property or a collection of properties of an individual or a group of people. Although profiles can be made of many things, such as countries, companies, or processes, in the context of surveillance, security, and privacy the profiles of people or groups of people are most relevant. Personal profiles are also referred to as individual profiles or customer profiles, while group profiles are also referred to as aggregated profiles. A personal profile is a property or a collection of properties of a particular individual. A property or characteristic is the same as an attribute, a term more often used in the computer sciences. An example of a personal profile is the profile of Mr. John Smith (age 47 years), who is married, has three children, earns $75,000 a year, has two credit cards, and has no criminal record. He was fined for speeding twice last year and was hospitalized once in his lifetime, last year, because of appendicitis. A group profile is a property or a collection of properties of a particular group of people. Group profiles may contain information that is already known—for instance, people who smoke live, on average, fewer years than people who do not. But group profiles may also reveal new facts—for instance, people living in zip code area 90003 may have a (significantly) larger than average chance of having asthma. Group profiles do not have to describe a causal relation. For instance, people driving red cars may have (significantly) more chances of getting lung cancer than people driving

Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis

blue cars. Note that group profiles differ from individual profiles with regard to the fact that the properties in the profile may be valid for the group and for individuals as members of that group but not for those individuals as such. This is referred to as non-distributivity or a nondistributive profile. When the properties in a profile are valid for each individual member of a group as an individual, it is referred to as distributivity or a distributive profile. Several data mining methods are particularly suitable for profiling. For instance, classification and clustering may be used to identify groups. Regression techniques may be useful for making predictions about a known individual or group. Bart Custers See also Big Data; Passenger Profiling; Privacy; Social Network Analysis; Technology

Further Readings Bygrave, L. A. Data Protection Law. New York, NY: Kluwer Law International, 2002. Custers, B. H. M. The Power of Knowledge: Ethical, Legal, and Technological Aspects of Data Mining and Group Profiling in Epidemiology. Tilburg, Netherlands: Wolf Legal, 2004. Custers, B. H. M., et al., eds. Discrimination and Privacy in the Information Society: Data Mining and Profiling in Large Databases. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2013. Fayyad, U. M., et al. “The KDD Process for Extracting Useful Knowledge From Volumes of Data.” Communications of the ACM, v.39/11 (1996). Harcourt, B. E. Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing and Punishing in an Actuarial Age. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Hildebrandt, M. and S. Gutwirth. Profiling the European Citizen. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2008. Mayer-Schönberger, V. and K. Cukier. Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work and Think. New York, NY: Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt, 2013. Schauer, F. Profiles, Probabilities and Stereotypes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. Solove, D. The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age. New York: New York University Press, 2004. Zarsky, T. Mine Your Own Business! Yale Journal of Law and Technology, v.5 (2003).

Data Mining and Profiling Social Network Analysis

279

in

Data mining refers to the practice of analyzing a vast amount of information to discern the patterns and relationships contained within those data. Once detected, these patterns can then be used to draw conclusions about past behavior and make predictions about future behavior. A related practice, data profiling, is the creation and utilization of a user profile from a specific database. Data mining and profiling have many applications and are used by retailers and intelligence agencies alike. Recently, analysts have begun to apply data mining and profiling to social network analysis, examining how the linkages between individuals or “nodes” in a social network affect behavior. As discussed in this entry, the practices of data mining and data profiling, and their use in social network analysis for marketing and intelligence, have raised concerns about privacy and security.

The Practice of Data Mining Data mining programs rely on complex computer algorithms that can identify patterns in individual behavior. More specifically, data mining involves creating user profiles, which serve as data points. Profiles are made up of two components: (1) a demographic component and (2) a behavioral component. Specifically, the demographic component contains basic information about an individual, such as his or her age, household income, profession, and location. The behavioral component identifies what an individual does; for a retailer, the behavioral component of a customer profile would include information about the items this individual purchases, how often he or she shops, and how likely he or she is to use coupons. By aggregating the patterns found in individual profiles, data mining can create behavior rules that can predict the behavior of other individuals with similar demographic profiles. In retail applications, for example, a store can discover which consumers buy specific items, and target its marketing accordingly.

280

Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis

Social Network Analysis and Data Mining Increasingly an individual’s membership within overlapping social networks is used as a predictor of behavior. Social network analysis, a field of study first developed by sociologists in the 19th century, looks at the manner in which individuals are embedded in various social networks; for instance, a person can simultaneously be a member of a family, an employee of a company, a member of a professional association, and a member of an activist group. Social network analysis suggests that individuals are likely to behave in similar ways to other people in their network; moreover, members of the same social network possess a great ability to influence the beliefs and perceptions of one another. Social networks, as manifested on social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Google+, provide a rich database for data mining; a study by IBM estimated that humanity creates approximately 2.5 quintillion bytes of data every day. In Social Network Data Analytics, edited by Charu C. Aggarwal, the contributors identify two ways in which public and private actors can analyze the vast amounts of data generated by these social networks. First, and most commonly, analysts can mine the text or visual content of the networks, such as the names of videos on YouTube or the tags on photos on Instagram. Alternately, analysts can undertake a structural analysis of the network; this includes identifying key nodes and hubs in the networks, as well as changes in the size and scope of a particular network over time. The goal of this type of analysis is to identify individuals within a network who exercise a strong influence on other members. The vast amounts of data generated by social networks have proved attractive to retailers, political campaigns, and intelligence agencies. The use of commercial data mining has occasioned legal challenges, as technological developments outpace existing law. In 2011, in the Supreme Court case Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont v. IMS Health, Inc., by a vote of 6–3 the Court struck down a Vermont law that banned the unauthorized sale of doctors’ prescribing information to pharmaceutical companies for the purposes of data mining. Although the case did not directly touch on social network data mining, it did

suggest that the Court would allow private actors broad latitude to use data mining for commercial purposes. Subsequently, in 2016, students and alumni from the University of California, Berkeley, who used emailed accounts provided by the Google Apps for Education program sued the company; the plaintiffs argued that Google’s practice of scanning student emails for data to provide targeted advertising violates federal privacy and wiretap laws. As of January 2017, the case is pending before a U.S. District Court.

Data Mining in Retail In recent years, retailers have relied on customer segmentation when designing marketing campaigns. More precisely, retailers no longer send the same catalogs and coupons to all potential customers; instead, stores seek to personalize the shopping experience, using data mining to predict what types of appeals motivate different customer segments to make purchases. For example, the online retailer Amazon uses data mining to discover which products customers typically buy together. Based on an analysis of past customer behavior, when a new customer views an item, Amazon activates the “Frequently Bought Together” feature, showing items that past customers have often purchased together. In addition, when a customer purchases an item from Amazon, he or she is offered the opportunity to “share” this information on Facebook; this allows members of the customer’s social network to view the purchase, and based on the user’s recommendation, other members of that social network may buy the same item. Increasingly, companies have turned to social media sites to seek data about their customers and offer targeted advertising. For example, the Facebook advertising mechanism is extremely efficient in producing advertisements that are applicable to each user. These advertisements are selected based on all the data that users enter; this includes information from the user’s friends list, wall posts, and “liked” pages. For example, using such data, firms buying ads on Facebook can ensure that their ads are shown only to women, people who are a DIYers (“do it yourself”), or individuals who renew their auto insurance in the month of May. Currently, Facebook

Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis

is also experimenting with algorithms that make inferences about a user’s emotions and offer advertisements based on that information. Google is another company that collects and analyzes vast amounts of user data to provide retailers with advertising opportunities. Currently, Google compiles user data from each of its services, including its search engine, Gmail, and its social network, Google+. It uses these data to create a profile of the user; subsequently, Google displays targeted marketing whenever a user accesses any of its services. For example, a user who searches Google for “hotels in France” is assumed to be a potential traveler; this user will later see advertisements for flights to France when the user opens his or her Gmail account.

Data Mining and National Security Increasingly, U.S. intelligence agencies are using data mining to predict and prevent terrorist attacks; these agencies employ models that use demographic and behavioral data to predict whether or not a person is likely to commit an act of terrorism. One of the earliest attempts at this was the “Able Danger” program, used by the Army Land Warfare Agency in 1999. This program combed through various data sources in an attempt to identify individuals who shared traits with known terrorists. Moreover, the program relied on social network analysis to root out possible terrorist sleeper cells. Specially, the program could detect whether an individual flagged as a potential terrorist had any connection to another flagged individual. Another similar program, MATRIX (an acronym for the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Exchange) was unveiled in 2001, soon after the 9/11 attacks. The program analyzed information from both federal and state databases in an effort to identify potential terrorists. The information in this database included basic demographic data, as well as banking records, criminal records, and flight information. In addition, the MATRIX program examined whether or not an individual was linked to any known terrorists, by examining the person’s social network, including membership in various organizations. After analyzing the data, the algorithm assigned each individual a Terrorism Factor Score; those with a High Terrorism

281

Factor were deemed likely to join a terror cell. During a pilot of the program in 2001, the analysts identified 120,000 individuals in the United States with a High Terrorism Factor rating. Ultimately, only four states ended up participating in the data mining program, citing both high costs and privacy concerns.

Data Mining and Political Campaigns Beginning with the 2004 election, national political campaigns began to use predictive analytics to pinpoint possible supporters and encourage them to turn out on Election Day. By 2012, the presidential campaigns of both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney maintained a separate department for voter analytics. George W. Bush’s campaign first used data mining in 2004. The campaign began by creating a database of individuals who had voted for Bush in 2000; analysts then gathered a vast array of information on these individuals, including their income levels, their tastes in food and beverages, and their religious practices. Based on inferences from this data set, the campaign was able to identify a group of people who had not voted for Bush but who shared many characteristics with existing Bush supporters. The campaign then worked to contact these potential supporters directly, sending volunteers to their homes and encouraging them to vote for Bush on Election Day. By 2008, the Obama campaign had developed even more sophisticated data mining algorithms; specifically, the campaign had models that could predict how likely a person was to vote, as well as how likely that person was to vote for Obama. This information allowed the campaign to allocate its resources to those voters who were considered the most persuadable. Four years later, during the 2012 campaign, Obama’s campaign managers increased the size of his analytics team fivefold. During the 2012 election, the Obama campaign also mined the social networks of existing Obama supporters to identify other potential supporters. More precisely, when a person signed up for a Facebook app provided by the Obama campaign, this individual also gave the campaign permission to access information about his or her Facebook friends. Next, the campaign encouraged these Obama supporters to contact their Facebook

282

Data-Doubles

friends and inform them about the ways in which Obama’s policies could benefit them. Notably, the campaign used data mining to identify the types of appeals that would resonate with various subgroups on the user’s friend list. In the view of the Obama campaign, younger voters were far more likely to be persuaded by their Facebook friends than by direct contact from a political campaign. As a result of this initiative, a total of 600,000 Obama supporters contacted 5 million of their Facebook friends and directed them to information provided by the Obama campaign. Kelly McHugh and Corey Koch See also Big Data; Cookies; Corporate Surveillance; Data Mining and Profiling in Big Data; Privacy, Internet

Further Readings Aggarwal, Charu C., ed. Social Network Data Analytics. New York, NY: Springer, 2014. “Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth Amendment: A Framework for evaluating suspicionless mass surveillance programs.” Harvard Law Review, v.128/2 (2014). Duhigg, Charles. “How Companies Learn Your Secrets.” The New York Times Magazine (February 16, 2012). http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/ shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (Accessed July 2014). Issenberg, Sasha. “How President Obama’s Campaign Used Big Data to Rally Individual Voters.” MIT Technology Review (December 19, 2012). http://www .technologyreview.com/featuredstory/509026/howobamas-team-used-big-data-to-rally-voters/ (Accessed July 2014). Seifert, Jeffrey W. “Data Mining and Homeland Security: An Overview” Congressional Research Service Report (Updated January 18, 2007). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ intel/RL31798.pdf (Accessed July 2014). Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont v. IMS Health Inc. 564 U.S. ___ (2011).

Data-Doubles Data-doubles are purely virtual objects designed to supplant and/or supplement an individual’s biological identity. Developed as an end point for

data collection, through new surveillance techniques and technologies, data-doubles consist of any digital information derived from or created by observing the activity, movements, and interactions of human subjects. The data are transmitted as information flows to different databases around the world, which are subsequently reassembled into readable, scrutinized profiles. These profiles are generated continuously through progressive surveillance conducted by governments, security regimes, corporations, international organizations, and other entities across the globe. Datadoubles are thus recursively constructed and mobilized between actors and entities as more and more information is created or made available to a given surveillance regime. Due to the ubiquity of networks, surveillance, and information flows therein, data-doubles reflect virtually any individual across the world who has, at some point, interacted with the Internet, mass communication technologies, social media, police departments, borders, airports, and so on. Accordingly, the data-double raises numerous political and privacy concerns, particularly concerning the extent to which the nuances of daily life are recorded, analyzed, and traded for profit, entertainment, ­ research, and national security purposes. This entry describes the process of constructing ­data-doubles, looks at the history and usage of data-doubles in the public and private sectors, and concludes with a look at the political and privacy issues that may arise from their construction and use.

Data-Double Construction The process of data-double construction is not congruous; data-doubles are not created via a singular, unified effort. Rather, the process emerges discretely as part of a global assemblage. The increasing proliferation of surveillance methods— whether through governments, corporations, or international organizations—facilitates the intersection of numerous information flows, which, in turn, gives the process of data-double construction its encompassing character. Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson note that this is made possible by the ways in which contemporary surveillance is becoming increasingly more rhizomatic in nature; contemporary surveillance is a structure

Data-Doubles

that grows horizontally beneath a surface, laterally projecting its roots into new social spaces to facilitate enlargement.

History and Usage The rationale behind the data-double coalesces through numerous sources, forms, and intents. In Western liberal democracies, for example, the events transpiring on September 11, 2001, accelerated national security investments in ubiquitous global surveillance, and so the data-double as a concept was deemed a valuable utility in predicting, preventing, and preempting national security threats. Even prior to the 2000s, the data-double was on the political agenda of the European Union, as it provided security regimes a way of documenting and analyzing the increasing mobility of workers and migrants across the borderless Schengen Area. Moreover, and as part of the continued effort in security risk management, the United States and the United Kingdom are becoming increasingly more invested in dataveillance— utilizing any communications or information network to identify, monitor, and scrutinize individuals worldwide deemed risky to national integrity. Accordingly, Western governments build data-doubles not solely on their own accord but through aggressively piggybacking on corporate surveillance techniques. This is particularly because social media companies are innovators in data-double construction themselves. As a second example of the eclectic bases of rationale driving data-doubling around the globe, social media data mining and web analytics efforts deploy mathematical, software-driven algorithms that analyze Internet browsing behavior; doing so allows them to generate marketable ideas about consumer shopping behavior. The continued effort of acquiring and accumulating data mining and web analytics means that data-doubles are recursively constructed in the private sector—another motivator for security regimes interested in scrutinizing human behavior. It is important to note that data-doubles are constructed through much more discrete and subliminal processes as well. For example, the digitization of paper records into a database can be accessed by numerous software systems, sources, and networks irrespective of where they are. The

283

information can be shared between social media data mining and data analytics firms, financial institutions, police departments, and research labs across the globe. Information used to construct data-doubles assumes significant and meaningful value to different, yet inescapably overlapping, data-double construction projects. Charitable donation databases, gym membership lists, and electronics purchase histories are invariably important sources of information for law enforcement and intelligence gathering, as the information may provide details about a person’s political orientation, religious preferences, or income, among other things.

Political and Privacy Issues Numerous political and privacy problems surrounding data-doubles are thus inescapable. Privacy advocacy organizations are becoming increasingly concerned that the data-double is constructed through essentially any data or information available about an individual’s lifestyle; the ability to retain any sense of privacy about one’s daily life appears increasingly more difficult. Of similar concern is the subsequent way in which dataveillance is increasingly monitoring people who were previously ignored by surveillance. Because security regimes chase corporate sector surveillance and databases to construct their own data-doubles, targets and innocents alike are scrutinized due to the volume of available data-­ doubles. Moreover, two tremendous political issues arise. The first concerns the inability of the subject of the data-double to play any role in discussing, changing, or negotiating the content of his or her data-double. Because data-double construction is largely automated, the necessity for human input or alteration is removed. Second, the speed and rate at which the data-double is constructed reveal that the data-double mobilizes geographically at exceptional speeds—much faster than the biological body. The consequence of this is that the data-double of a traveler, migrant, or refugee arrives at the border or airport inspection area well before the person’s actual, physical visit. Both examples demonstrate that the data-double depoliticizes interactions between the subject and a government when they are most needed, specifically by  precluding conversation. The positivistic

284

Dataveillance

philosophical principle driving the data-double itself—the belief that true and meaningful knowledge is ascertained only through math and ­science—indicates that there is little need for conversation between a traveler and a security guard; human interaction can be perceived as inefficient, inaccurate, and susceptible to manipulation, ­misunderstanding, and error. Thomas N. Cooke See also Cookies; Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Dataveillance; Privacy; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings Bauman, Zygmunt and David Lyon. Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2013. Haggerty, Kevin D. and Richard. V. Ericson. “The Surveillant Assemblage.” British Journal of Sociology, v.51/4 (2000).

Dataveillance Dataveillance is the observation, collection, and processing of data, whether on a personal or group scale. The term dataveillance comes from the work of surveillance theorist Roger Clarke, who proposed this term as a way of capturing the impact of data processing and information technology systems on personal or mass surveillance. What distinguishes dataveillance from analog surveillance is its reliance on the technical means of processing. The potential of dataveillance, as detailed in this entry, is visible in the corporate world, in national security applications, as well as in citizens’ demands for transparency. Therefore, dataveillance’s massive potential, dependent on computing power, is at once a tool for profit, an instrument of mass surveillance, and a technique for ensuring better governance. This entry first describes dataveillance, then examines its usage in the corporate world and by governments, and concludes by examining the possibility of discrimination and the ethically ambiguous nature of dataveillance.

Although data may be raw, their aggregation and processing through digital means can be very informative. This view of data and their processing has led authors to increasingly speak of data-doubles—the collection of data that we leave behind or have been stored about us. When aggregated or processed, data-doubles produce a noncorporeal image of our lives that the data controller can use to tailor goods and services to a person or to assign the person to one category (e.g., citizens, consumers) or another. The monitoring of personal credit histories, the sharing of passenger travel data between states, and the tracking of power usage through smart home technologies are all examples of how data automation and digital processing can be put to work for surveillance. Dataveillance is now extensively used in the corporate world, not only for efficiency gains but also for better profiling of customers. For instance, businesses are keen to use radio-frequency identification tags on products, in place of product codes, to track individual items through a supply chain. Businesses also track people as well as goods, and dataveillance has emerged as an important way for free online and off-line services to derive sustainable revenue from the use of personal data. In fact, this monetization of personal data has become a central business model on the Internet. Social networking sites, leveraging the personal information and usage habits of their users, analyze these data with the express goal of providing relevant targeted advertising to their users. While online social networking is one of the more recent models of dataveillance, card-based consumer loyalty programs have consistently made use of mass collection of data to categorize consumer tastes for client businesses, rewarding their users with redeemable points. Companies also increasingly derive revenue from selling a range of devices that cater to surveillance of one’s own data (e.g., fitness trackers, heart monitors, step counters, mobile applications that track sleep patterns). Governments are also heavy users of dataveillance techniques for security purposes. One of the most large-scale uses of dataveillance, in terms of both processing power and number of users targeted, is the increasing tapping of signals ­ ­intelligence—communications data—by security agencies. This includes techniques such as the

Death Row

tapping of undersea fiber-optic cables for Internet surveillance and the emphasis on gathering metadata—data about other data—to track users’ activities without obtaining their consent. Age-old technologies of the state, such as the passport, have, due to digital and database technologies, been transformed into documents that are interconnected to citizens’ bodies (through biometric information stored on their chips) as well as to other states’ databases (due to global information sharing and electronic visas). Governments, however, do not have a monopoly on dataveillance, with citizens pushing for “open data,” which is access to data stored not only about them but also about the public services on which they rely. As the types of data that can be collected continue to increase in line with the sophistication of sensory technologies—including factors such as gait recognition and online click patterns—so does the potential for discrimination. This has raised concerns about what David Lyon calls “social sorting,” the tendency of surveillance to facilitate or create new forms of categorization. The use of databases is central to the operation of data harvesting and use, and as computer processing power, storage capacity, and software complexity have increased, so have the positive and negative impacts of digitally mediated surveillance. One of the distinguishing elements of dataveillance is the sheer capacity to process raw data into information or actionable knowledge that digital computing capacity has enabled. As the sources of data, and their processing, have become more mobile, so has the potential space in which to exert dataveillance. The growing use of mobile phones produces not only a more connected population but also a large potential base of personal location data. The ability to automate the recording, uploading, and processing of images has enabled the creation of vast virtual worlds in mapping software, as well as facilitating the mass collection of information that was previously too tedious to massively collect, such as automobile license plate numbers. The ethically ambivalent nature of surveillance applies in the case of dataveillance, as this method enables large-scale tracking and profiling as much as it does the facilitation of mobility and better decision-making information.

285

In sum, dataveillance is a contested terrain. Some practices, such as the use of biometrics for tracking employee attendance patterns, reinforce corporate control. Others, such as government tax analysis databases, reinforce the state’s sovereign ability to see and control its territory. The use of data by citizens and consumers can create not only new forms of discrimination but also a demand for transparency. Dataveillance, though its potential grows in line with computing capacity, remains an ethically ambiguous practice. Gemma Galdon Clavell See also Big Data; Passenger Data; Social Sorting; Transparency

Further Readings Clarke, Roger. “Information Security and Dataveillance.” Communications of the ACM, v.31/5 (1988). Degli Esposti, Sara. “When Big Data Meets Dataveillance: The Hidden Side of Analytics.” Surveillance & Society, v.12/2 (2014). Trottier, Daniel. Social Media as Surveillance: Rethinking Visibility in a Converging World. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012.

Death Penalty See Capital Punishment

Death Row Death row is a general term used to refer to a prison housing unit designated for inmates who have been sentenced to death for their crimes. In the United States, which is the focus of this entry, these include inmates who have been convicted of the highest level of homicide (i.e., murder) in a jurisdiction—usually referred to as first-degree or capital murder—and for which a jury has determined that capital punishment (i.e., the death penalty) should be the sanction. As of 2016, capital punishment is authorized by 31 states, the federal government, and the military in the

286

Death Row

United States. Each of these jurisdictions must then provide housing for inmates under the sentence of death, sometimes known as condemned inmates, until an execution occurs (inmates may also leave death row if their conviction or sentence is overturned by an appellate court, which occurs more frequently than executions). Death row housing is usually among the most secure in a prison, or for that matter within a jurisdiction’s entire prison system. Inmates on death row are subject to many rules and restrictions and much surveillance.

Death Row Background Capital punishment has been less favored in the 21st century than in previous decades. Twentyfirst century trends have included fewer death sentences, fewer executions, and longer times between sentencing and execution. In 2013, for instance, the average time between sentence and execution was approximately 15.5 years. While the reasons for these trends go beyond the scope of this entry, it is important to note that death row is not a short-term housing unit but, rather, one in which inmates under the sentence of death spend a substantial amount of time. The size of death rows can vary greatly. For many years, California has had the largest death row population, with more than 700 inmates in 2013. At the other extreme, some states have only a few inmates under the sentence of death, in some cases fewer than 5. The size of the death row has significant implications for how it is structured, physically and in terms of the resources required and policies specified for its operation. In addition, jurisdictions must actually be prepared to maintain two separate death rows—one for male inmates and one for female inmates. While the majority of death row inmates (more than 95%) are male, and some states have no female inmates under the sentence of death, facilities must be available for both. Male and female death rows are located at different institutions, as prisons are segregated by gender. A series of Supreme Court cases have established limits on who may be sentenced to death and, accordingly, assigned to death row. Specifically, capital punishment is prohibited for offenders who were under 18 years of age at the time of

their offense (Roper v. Simmons, 2005); persons with mental retardation, which is defined differently by different states (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002); inmates who are deemed legally insane (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986); and those whose crime was adult rape (Coker v. Georgia, 1977), child rape (Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2008), or kidnapping (Eberhart v. Georgia, 1977) in which there was no murder. Death row for male federal inmates (as of 2016, no females were under a federal sentence of death) is located at the U.S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana. Death row for male military inmates (as of 2016, no females were under a military sentence of death) is located at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Leavenworth, Kansas. And each of the 32 states with the death penalty has its own death row in one of its existing prisons. Death row is not its own separate prison but, rather, is one housing unit within an existing high-security prison. The latter point is particularly significant, as death row is one of the highest-security—if not the highest—housing units within a prison system.

Death Row Housing and Security Broadly speaking, there are two models of death row structure. One is focused on segregating death row inmates, also known as an unreformed death row; the other is focused on mainstreaming death row inmates, also known as a reformed death row. The unreformed model is far more common, as only a few states have attempted the reformed model. Segregated, or unreformed, death rows have much in common with other administrative segregation units. These are what the public has traditionally understood as “solitary confinement” units, in which inmates spend much of their day inside an individual cell, with few opportunities for out-of-cell activities, such as work, recreation, or other types of programming. In some cases, inmates may be in their cells for almost the entire day, permitted to be outside the cell for only an hour or two per day. Time that is spent out of the cell is highly controlled. Movement may be limited to only a few inmates at a time, recreation yards may be small and limited

Death Row

to one person each, and the only other inmates encountered may be others on death row. The emphasis in this type of death row is on control and monitoring of inmates in highly secure settings, where the death row inmate has very little contact with other persons. Mainstreamed, or reformed, death rows are also highly secure, situated within maximumsecurity prisons, which also emphasize control and monitoring of the entire inmate population. However, they differ from the unreformed model in that death row inmates are permitted out of their cells for much longer periods of time, to engage in work, recreation, and programming opportunities—and in doing so, they intermingle with other inmates, sometimes including those who are not on death row. While death row inmates still may be housed together in the same unit within the prison, they are not restricted to that unit in their daily activities. Research on one state’s mainstreaming of death row inmates found it to be a safe alternative, not associated with increased institutional violence, and with the potential to be beneficial for the mental health of death row inmates. Death row housing units place a high emphasis on security, which is the most significant factor that drives their daily operations and procedures. Security systems on death row may include, but are not limited to, monitoring of inmate behavior via CCTV (closed-circuit television) systems; remote control of door openings and closings, facilitated from a central command center removed from the housing unit, itself; regular patrol and visual inspection of inmates and the facility structure by correctional officers; restrictions on the amount of inmate movement, particularly movement outside the housing unit (e.g., for recreation, programming, and visitation); restrictions on the amount and types of personal property that may be held or received by inmates; restrictions on the number and type of visitations, including prohibition of “contact” visits (as opposed to noncontact visits, conducted through video visitation or visiting booths separating inmates from visitors); and more. Correspondence between inmates and others, whether written or verbal, may be closely monitored; only legal communication is exempt from scrutiny. The types of security systems implemented on death

287

row are not unique to that environment but, rather, are consistent with those utilized in any high-security correctional setting. However, they may take on more significance on death row, given concerns about escape or other risks that may be posed by the inmates themselves to other inmates, facility staff, or the public. In Prieto v. Clarke (2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a challenge to the use of solitary confinement with limited privileges for death row inmates, which is particularly characteristic of the segregated or unreformed death row model. Negative psychological impacts have been documented for solitary confinement housing generally, and research specifically focused on death row housing has found that inmates may perceive a lack of privacy and experience feelings of isolation, depression, and withdrawal. Correctional staff working on death row note the importance of maintaining professionalism and ensuring that all security protocols are meticulously followed, which sometimes leads to stress; at the same time, they also report death row to be a less disruptive and generally less stressful working environment than other areas of the prison. Death row is intended for the housing of inmates under the sentence of death prior to their execution. However, inmates do not generally move directly from death row to the execution chamber. Instead, there is an intermediate housing unit to which inmates are transferred several days prior to their execution date. This is sometimes even located at a different prison. Usually adjacent to the execution chamber, “death watch” cells have nearly constant surveillance over the inmate, often with direct visual observation that must be documented on a near-hourly basis. Virtually every aspect of the inmate’s behavior, along physical and psychological domains, is recorded. For instance, one state’s protocols require written documentation of an inmate’s activities to be prepared every 15 minutes, day and night. It is in the death watch cell that inmates are generally read the death warrant; receive visits from administrative personnel, medical staff, or clergy; have their last meal; and are prepared for execution. Some policies may be less stringent, such as the right to receive contact visits from family prior to execution and more readily available access to a telephone.

288

Death Row

Death Row Surveillance and Privacy Death rows are simultaneously hidden from and visible to the public. They are hidden in the aspect that the public tends not to know where they are located (unless the person lives nearby), consistent with the “out of sight, out of mind” mentality with which the public tends to view prisons and their issues. Except for fictional portrayals in films such as The Green Mile, the public arguably has little awareness of death row. On the other hand, and in a form of virtual surveillance, many departments of corrections have websites devoted to capital punishment in their jurisdictions, often including lists of death row inmates, with a variety of information about them and details of death penalty facts and protocols. Indirect surveillance of the execution process is provided through media reporting, illustrating Lorne Conquergood’s concept of “lethal theatre,” in which executions are underlain with ritual and some degree of public spectacle. Although the death watch cell area is generally hidden from public view, correctional agencies report and media outlets disseminate information about the inmate’s choice of last meal (for those states that allow inmates to choose something other than the daily menu) and final statement (when one is given), certainly a news-reporting ritual. In fact, at least one state audio records inmates’ final statements and places them online for public listening. This has prompted studies on meal choices (e.g., that last meal choices are generally high in calories, protein, and fat) and on final statements (e.g., that they more frequently express remorse, admitting guilt rather than containing declarations of innocence or unfairness). The execution itself is witnessed only by those parties permitted by the state systems—typically, the victim’s family, a selected number of public witnesses, media representatives, and in some jurisdictions members of the inmate’s family. In rare cases, executions have been broadcast on CCTV systems when the number of victim family members in attendance exceeds the capacity of the witness area (e.g., when Timothy McVeigh was executed for his role in the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City) or have been recorded pursuant to a court order for the purpose of reviewing the execution process. In

no case has an execution in the modern era (post1976, after the temporary moratorium on capital punishment imposed by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 1972, was lifted in the subsequent case of Gregg v. Georgia, 1976) been publicly televised. The issue has never been addressed by the Supreme Court, but lower courts have consistently denied requests to do so, including requests from reporters (Garrett v. Estelle, 1977), pay-per-view providers (Entertainment Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 2001), and the inmates themselves (Lawson v. Dixon, 1994). Again, however, indirect surveillance is provided through the media when reporters or other witnesses share their observations of the execution. Recent debates about privacy and surveillance have addressed the sources of drugs used for lethal injection (as of 2016, the method used in almost all executions). As some drugs have become in short supply, states have changed their protocols, for which the Supreme Court provided fairly wide latitude in Glossip v. Gross (2015), and sought alternate supply sources. Some states have enacted legislation that shields from public discovery the source from which execution drugs are obtained. An argument in favor is that it protects the privacy of drug suppliers who, if publicly known, might not be willing to provide execution drugs; an argument in opposition is that confidentiality makes more difficult an assessment of whether the drugs being used would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This issue remains under debate as states differ in their policies.

Conclusion Although the popularity of capital punishment has declined, it is still issued as a sentence in some cases. In those cases, death row serves as the area of confinement for offenders under a sentence of death. As illustrated herein, death row is subject to many security protocols and, while generally hidden from public view, becomes the subject of public attention and media focus as executions draw near and are conducted. Stephen S. Owen See also Capital Punishment; Prisons and Jails; Punishment; Solitary Confinement

Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari

Further Readings Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Arrigo, Bruce and Jennifer Bullock. “The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units.” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, v.52 (2008). Brown, Kelly and Melissa Benningfield. “Death Row Correctional Officers: Experiences, Perspectives, and Attitudes.” Criminal Justice Review, v.33 (2008). Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Conquergood, Lorne. “Lethal Theatre: Performance, Punishment, and the Death Penalty.” Theatre Journal, v.54 (2002). Cunningham, Mark, et al. “Is Death Row Obsolete? A Decade of Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates in Missouri.” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, v.23 (2005). Eberhart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977). Entertainment Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (2001). Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). Fretland, Katie. “Records Show Oklahoma Officials Wanted Perks for Helping Texas in Search for Scarce Lethal Injections.” Colorado Independent (March 18, 2014). http://www.coloradoindependent.com/146553/ oklahoma-scrambles-to-find-lethal-injections-for-twoimminent-executions (Accessed June 2016). Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (1977). Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Johnson, Robert. Deathwork: A Study of the Modern Execution Process (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). Lawson v. Dixon, 510 U.S. 1171 (1994). Peppers, Todd and Laura Trevvett Anderson. Anatomy of an Execution: The Life and Death of Douglas Christopher Thomas. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2009. Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (2015). Rice, Stephen, et al. “Of Guilt, Defiance, and Repentance: Evidence From the Texas Death Chamber.” Justice Quarterly, v.26 (2009). Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Snell, Tracy. “Capital Punishment, 2013: Statistical Tables.” http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp13st .pdf (Accessed June 2016). Wansink, Brian, et al. “Death Row Nutrition: Curious Conclusions of Last Meals.” Apetite, v.59 (2012).

Deleuze, Gilles, Guattari

and

289

Félix

Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992) were French thinkers whose work, together and independently, has influenced theoretical and philosophical concepts of modernity. For example, their work on the control society, schizoanalysis, and body-without-organs explains the surveillance and control of individuals by corporations and discusses how humans can free themselves. Deleuze was a French philosopher who studied at the Sorbonne and acquired an interest in modern philosophy from the specialists teaching there: Georges Canguilhem, Jean Hyppolite, Ferdinand Alquié, and Maurice de Gandillac. After teaching at several French universities and working at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (National Center for Scientific Research), Deleuze was appointed in 1969 to the experimental school at the University of Paris VIII at Vincennes/St. Denis, where he taught until his retirement. Among the influences on Deleuze’s thinking, Friedrich Nietzsche, Benedict de Spinoza, and Henri Bergson had a relevant role. Guattari was a French psychoanalyst trained under the guidance of Jacques Lacan. After being involved with leftist and revolutionary groups in his youth, Guattari worked most of his life at the experimental psychiatric clinic of La Borde, where he was able to engage in broad philosophical explorations. Here, group therapy was developed, making possible open discussion on several subjects, such as ethnology and architecture. Apart from his work with Deleuze, Guattari worked extensively on the question of subjectivity in the last decades of his life. At the university at Vincennes, Deleuze met Guattari, starting a collaboration that resulted in several publication, including Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980). The main theme developed in these works is human desire, a concept present in all of their work, and how humans can be freed through the use of schizoanalysis. As a result of studying human desire, and the limitations imposed by capitalism, Deleuze described the transformation of society into a control society.

290

Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari

The Control Society In 1992, Deleuze wrote an article, “Postscript to the Societies of Control,” that analyzed the change of society from a disciplinary society, identified by Michel Foucault as the governing system from the 18th to the 20th century, to a society of sovereignty, which is governing in current times. Whereas the former had strict schemes to follow and obliged humans to start again at each stage of life (e.g., at school, at work), the latter can be seen as a much more liberal environment, especially with the diffusion of information technologies (which were not yet devised at the time Deleuze was writing). Having the freedom to do whatever one wants and to access work from any location (delocalization) seems to offer individuals the ability to move freely and to organize themselves at their own pace. But in a control society, one is never finished with anything, and as Camaeron Crae recognizes, the demands of work are not constrained to official work hours but can pervade all of one’s time, effectively expanding control over all of one’s activities. Thus, the society of sovereignty actually limits citizens’ freedom much more than the previous model; such permanent control over citizens’ movements is justified by the argument that it brings more security to their lives. Such normalization of surveillance opens up many ethical questions, which have yet to be fully addressed. For example, multinational corporations may track individuals’ activities to convince consumers of a need for their products, making such products the objects of desire. To Deleuze and Guattari, however, desire should be productive, creating its own objects.

Schizoanalysis In the first section of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the concept of desiring-production, whereby desiring-machines appear to connect the criticized Freudian concept of libido with the Marxian concept of labor-power. Schizoanalysis is used to study schizophrenia—not the clinical disorder but the result of a generalized psychosis pervading a capitalist society. It is a positive concept, emphasizing the potential of freedom, in contrast to paranoia, where everything would be

fixed and without any possibility of change. This duality is not new and can be seen as the eternal dilemma between free will and determinism. Born in the aftermath of the 1968 revolution in France, Anti-Oedipus is a critique not only of capitalism but also of the established power structures. Many philosophical theories, including Sigmund Freud’s Oedipus complex, are criticized, with the aim of freeing humans from any oppression resulting from the capitalistic model, which controls individuals by convincing them that desires can be directed only toward products. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the control realized by the companies that market these products can be reversed only by a revolution overturning the existing power structures. The metaphor that Deleuze and Guattari used was of individuals becoming “schizophrenics” to free their feelings without any limitations. However, their use of the term schizophrenic for their conceptual model created misunderstandings, as some equated the term as used by Deleuze and Guattari with the clinical disorder of schizophrenia. Such misunderstanding is not  ­ surprising as in their works the authors often  introduced terms without any introduction or explication, such as schizoanalysis and bodywithout-organs.

Body-Without-Organs Since Deleuze and Guattari’s first work together in 1972, the body has been considered more privatized because modern humans articulate their desires through speaking. Body-withoutorgans is a term borrowed from the 1947 radio play To Have Done With the Judgment of God by Antonin Artaud, and it first appeared in Deleuze’s book The Logic of Sense. Its use in Anti-Oedipus refers to a body that, apart from a limited set of behaviors, has a virtual dimension filled by unstable flows of different intensities. According to Deleuze and Guattari, humans should actively experiment with these hidden potentials, which is seen as “becoming a body-without-organs.” Also, whereas desire can be produced, the body-without-organs is nonproductive and de-organized. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari further developed this concept, differentiating between the previous body-without-organs,

Deportation

which was defined as empty, and the full, healthy body-without-organs. The body-without-organs can be imagined as a productive machine, and depending on what machines are connected to it, it can produce events, although it has no purpose in itself. The body-without-organs points out all the events that an organic body could do but that it does not do due to the outer control and regulations existing in society. Deleuze and Guattari also use the term body-without-organs in a broader sense when relating to the virtual dimension of the plane of immanence, or reality in general, making it more difficult to fully understand its significance.

Relation of Deleuze and Guattari With Surveillance, Security, and Privacy The influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s work on contemporary society is broad and covers many fields. They foresaw the control that companies would have over citizens. At a time when faith in the development of modern technologies was great, they envisioned the effects that increased control would bring to society. Today, despite the increased freedom provided by new technologies and social networks, some of those effects, as Deleuze and Guattari predicted, have been negative. For example, today individual privacy has decreased, and the technological advances that are commonly used in many of our daily activities also track our movements, decisions, and desires—in effect, putting our entire lives in the control of multinational companies. Deleuze and Guattari developed schizoanalysis in the context of a control society. It is basically a political attempt to plan a strategy of survival under capitalism, fighting against the established power structures and against oppression. It aims to create new values and desires to oppose the psychosis and fear fostered by the capitalist society. In addition, Deleuze and Guattari introduced the concept of the body-withoutorgans as a solution to the relations between machines and organisms. Through these concepts, Deleuze and Guattari examined how humans could survive in a capitalist society and free themselves. Moreover, they predicted the

291

ongoing struggle between the security policies implemented by postcapitalist societies and the control society. Guido Cimadomo See also Foucault, Michel; Marxism; Modernism; Social Control

Further Readings Buchanan, Ian. “The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, or, What Can a Body Do?” Body & Society, v.3/3, (1997). Crain, Cameron. Living in a Society of Control (July 30, 2013). http://mantlethought.org/content/living-societycontrol (Accessed November 2014). Holland, Eugene. Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis. New York, NY: Routledge, 1999. Lambert, Gregg. Who’s Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari? An Introduction to Politica. London, England: Continuum, 2006. Parr, Adrian. The Deleuze Dictionary. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.

Deportation In their 2003 discourse on deportation, Matthew J. Gibney and Randall Hansen refer to deportation as “the return of foreign nationals to their country of origin against their will” (p. 2). Deportation is therefore involuntary return, distinct from voluntary return, in which individuals are encouraged—often through a combination of carrot-and-stick measures—to return to their countries of origin. Matthew Walzer and Gary Freeman explain that deportation can be viewed both as a concept and as a policy that allows democratic states the right to exercise control over their borders, a key component of the sovereignty of nation-states. Indeed, deportation is conducted by a public authority on behalf of the state. The practice of deportation is relevant to surveillance, security, and privacy due to a great number of deported individuals being removed after the commission of a criminal offense. These individuals are typically viewed as threats to the public security of the deporting country.

292

Deportation

Furthermore, deportation policies tend to create “deportation agencies” geared to the surveillance of particular communities and people whom the state pre-identifies for removal, which poses privacy issues for those persons and communities. Deportation in its current manifestation is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it has existed since the 16th century. The term deportation can be traced back to the 1590s; it is derived from the Middle French term deportation and the Latin term deporationem. In its earliest form, “deportation” referred to the expulsion by a state agency of an alien whose presence in the country was deemed as unlawful or detrimental. Deportation, however, has often had broader meanings, such as exile, banishment, and the transportation of criminals to penal settlements. As part of his discourse on deportation, William C. Burton noted that deportation refers to banishment, casting out, dislocation, dismissal, displacement, driving out, ejection, ejectment, elimination, eviction, exilement, expatriation, expulsion, extradition, extrusion, forced departure, forced leave taking, ouster, purge, removal, riddance, sending away, thrusting out, exclusion, expulsion, extradition, ostracism, rejection, or removal of an individual. Deirdre M. Moloney, in her discourse on deportation, noted that deportation is the state-mandated process by which noncitizen immigrants are expelled from a nation and returned to their countries of origin after residing in the state, on the basis of the administrative determination that they have violated immigration policy or committed a crime. Deportation also refers to the act of expelling foreigners from a country, usually because they have committed a criminal or civil offense and their presence is deemed by the relevant authority (usually state immigration officials) to be against the best interests of the nation. Globally, deportation is generally viewed as a civil proceeding wherein the national government of a country orders a noncitizen to be removed from the jurisdiction for violating civil (immigration) or ­ criminal laws. Deportation is usually to the country of origin. In other words, deportation is the act of expelling a nonresident from a country to his or her country of origin. In many instances, the deported individuals are culturally, economically, and socially disconnected from the societies in which they were born.

As part of their work on deportation, Bridget Anderson, Matthew J. Gibney, and Emanuela Paoletti submitted that in recent years states across the world have boosted their legal and institutional capacity to deport noncitizens residing in their territory, including failed asylum seekers, “illegal” migrants, and convicted criminals. The authors note that scholars have analyzed this development primarily through the lens of immigration control and point out that deportation has been viewed as one among a range of measures designed to control entrance, distinguished primarily by the fact that it is exercised inside the territory of the state. The authors note that deportation also has broader social and political effects, as it provides a powerful way through which the state reminds noncitizens that their presence in the polity is contingent on acceptable behavior. This entry describes the process of deportation, including grounds for removal, and then discusses the consequences of deportation.

Process Deportation of persons is usually done from large, developed countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada) to small, less powerful, underdeveloped or developing countries (e.g., Cambodia, Guatemala, Mexico, Jamaica). However, it is increasingly becoming the norm for small, underdeveloped or developing countries in the contemporary world to use deportation as a means of protecting their scarce financial resources from perceived abuse by nonnationals. The process of moving a nonresident from a host country to the nonresident’s country of origin can be complex and varies from country to country. The rationale for removal may also vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; however, there are many steps common among the removal processes in various countries. Deportation is not always final, as there are opportunities for relief from deportation that are available to the prospective deportee. The process of deportation is usually started by the issuance of a deportation order by a magistrate or immigration judge. This requires the nonresident to appear before the magistrate or immigration judge in order to determine whether he or she has any legal grounds for remaining in

Deportation

the jurisdiction. If the magistrate or immigration judge is satisfied that there are no legal grounds for the nonresident to remain in the country, he or she will issue an order of deportation, which is then enforced. If there are legal grounds for the nonresident to remain in the country, the magistrate or immigration judge may stay the order or discontinue the matter. Typically, the deportation order is devoid of any form of punishment being imposed. Persons awaiting deportation are usually housed at detention centers, unless they are imprisoned for the commission of a criminal offense and are awaiting deportation. Generally, deportation is triggered in a variety of ways; these methods may differ in nature and scope. The most common ways are discussed in the following section.

Grounds for Removal There are many grounds for the deportation of a nonresident from the deporting country to the country of origin. The literature on deportation has provided numerous grounds on which persons may be deported, which vary from country to country. The following is a compilation of these grounds; however, this list is not exhaustive: •• Persons present in a country in violation of immigration laws •• Persons who have violated nonimmigrant status or condition of entry •• Visa overstayers (e.g., persons remaining in a jurisdiction beyond a visa expiry date) •• Persons staying in a jurisdiction on a visa granted in error •• Persons staying in a jurisdiction on a visa obtained under a false identity •• Persons who have breached their visa conditions •• Individuals whose character has been called into question (e.g., terrorists, persons suspected of terrorism) •• Persons whose circumstances no longer meet the rules or criteria under which their visa was granted •• Persons breaching the conditions of a resident visa •• Nonresidents for whom new information prejudicial to their character has become

•• •• •• ••

•• •• •• •• •• •• ••

•• ••

293

available that if known at the time a residence class visa was granted would have resulted in the visa being refused Individuals whose refugee and/or protection status has been canceled Persons who are perceived as being a risk or threat to national security Persons for whom a conditional permanent residence has been terminated Nonresidents who obtained admission into a country but then married to evade any provisions of immigration laws (marriage fraud) Persons convicted of a crime or persons with multiple criminal convictions Non-asylum-seeking clandestine migrants Persons who have been convicted for aggravated offenses Persons convicted of firearm offenses Persons who have committed acts of domestic violence Individuals who have failed to register their status with the relevant authorities Individuals who have engaged in activities prejudicial to the state or that jeopardize the national security of the country (e.g., terrorist activities) Persons acting in a manner not beneficial to the interests of the state Individuals whose presence in a country may have adverse foreign policy consequences and/or implications

Despite a nonresident being deportable, there are several types of relief from deportation that may allow the individual to stay in the deporting country. For example, in many countries, a nonresident subject to deportation proceedings may request discretionary relief at any time before an immigration judge or magistrate enters the final order. Importantly, nonresidents may have the burden of proving eligibility for relief under the law or that they deserve such relief as an exercise of discretion. Some of the most common methods of relief are cancellation of deportation, adjustment of status, and asylum. A deportation order may be executed once it has been served by taking the person into custody, and if there is no relief from deportation, judicial review, or stay, it may be enforced by escorting or arranging for the person to be escorted to an

294

Deportation

airport and ensuring that the person is placed on board an aircraft and detained there until the person leaves the deporting country for the country of origin.

Consequences For men and women who are deported, there are several consequences of deportation, including social, economic, and political consequences. According to Randy Capps in his discourse on deportation, the consequences of deportation are felt by the deported individual as well as the individual’s partner and children and include the indignity of separation from family and home, economic and social instability, psychological trauma, material hardship, residential instability, family dissolution, increased use of public benefits, and aggression (primarily among boys). Researchers such as Ajay Chaudry and ­colleagues, Drika Weller Makariev and Phillip R. Shaver, and Heather Koball and colleagues point out that the consequences of deportation include family economic hardship, social isolation and depression, mental health issues, strained parentchildren relationships, anxiety, and self-destructive activities such as cutting and substance abuse. However, the major consequence of deportation falls on the deported individual, who becomes permanently separated from or loses contact with family, including children. In addition, deported individuals must resettle in their country of origin, which may now be alien to them in terms of culture, lifestyle, infrastructure, governance systems, familial connection, education, way of life, and economic opportunities, after having spent their formative years residing in the host country. Researchers Kalina M. Brabeck, M. Brinton Lykes, and Cristina Hunter posit that some deported individuals face high levels of stigma on returning to their countries of origin, are treated with scorn and derision by family and friends in their country of origin, or are viewed by their communities of origin and/or their own families as failures or as criminals, while others are isolated or live on the streets, which may result in their death. David Brotherton and Luis Barrios point out that deported individuals may also experience employment difficulties, feelings of demoralization, and readjustment and discrimination issues.

Joanna Dreby points out that for women, deportation is an act that forces them (especially single mothers) into difficult situations due to their primary roles as caretakers and providers. Brabeck, Lykes, and Hunter, as well as Angela M. Robertson and colleagues, point out that deportation increases women’s criminogenic risks for prostitution as well as a range of assaults (physical and sexual) in the context of financial insecurity and weak policing in their countries of origin. In most developing and underdeveloped countries, there is a chronic lack of tailored support for deported individuals on their return to their countries of origin. Moreover, a system of bans aimed at preventing them from returning to the deporting country may be in place. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, these bans are final, whereas other countries (e.g., New Zealand, the United Kingdom) operate on a system of graduated bans. Instructively, the workability of deportation is becoming increasingly questioned by scholars who view it in the context of “one country’s deportee becoming another country’s problem.” Wendell Codrington Wallace See also Immigration

Further Readings Anderson, Bridget, et al., eds. The Social, Political and Historical Contours of Deportation. New York, NY: Springer, 2013. Bleichmar, Javier. “Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law.” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, v.14 (1999). Brabeck, Kalina M., et al. “The Psychosocial Impact of Detention and Deportation on U.S. Migrant Children and Families.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, v.84./5 (2014). Brotherton, David and Luis Barrios. Banished to the Homeland: Dominican Deportees and Their Stories of Exile. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011. Chaudry, Ajay, et al. Facing Our Future: Children in the Aftermath of Immigration Enforcement. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2010. Dreby, Joanna. How Today’s Immigration Enforcement Policies Impact Children, Families, and Communities:

Détente A View From the Ground. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2012. Freeman, Gary. “The Decline of Sovereignty?” In Christian Joppke (ed.), Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998. Gibney, Matthew J. and Randall Hansen. Deportation and the Liberal State: The Forcible Return of Asylum Seekers and Unlawful Migrants in Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom (New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 77). Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, 2003. Kelle, Brad E., et al. Interpreting Exile: Displacement and Deportation in Biblical and Modern Contexts: 2012. Atlanta, GA: Brill Academic, 2012. Koball, Heather, et al. Health and Social Service Needs of U.S.-Citizen Children With Detained or Deported Immigrant Parents. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2015. Makariev, Drika Weller and Phillip R. Shaver. “Attachment, Parental Incarceration, and Possibilities for Intervention.” Attachment and Human Development, v.12 (2010). Moloney, Deirdre M. “Muslims, Mormons and U.S. Deportation and Exclusion Policies: The 1910 Polygamy Controversy and the Shaping of Contemporary Attitudes.” In Bridget Anderson, et al. (eds.), The Social, Political and Historical Contours of Deportation. New York, NY: Springer, 2013. Robertson, Angela M., et al. “Deportation Experiences of Women Who Inject Drugs in Tijuana, Mexico.” Qualitative Health Research, v.22 (2012). Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983.

Détente In diplomacy, politics, or international relations studies, détente is a concept used in relation to the Cold War easing of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, with their subsequent blocs. The Cold War (1945–1991) was marked by several periods of high tension, separated by several periods of relaxation (détente) and a greater sense of national security, but there is no universally accepted periodization or definition of Cold War détente. This entry examines the

295

periods of détente and the leaders, events, and agreements that played a role in orchestrating the times of peace between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unsuccessful attempts of U.S.-Soviet détente were made as early as 1955, 1959, and 1961, during the Geneva summit, a meeting between the U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, and the Vienna summit, respectively. Conventionally, however, détente is associated with the 1970s foreign policy employed by the administrations of U.S. presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and it refers to the United States’ attempts to refine its relations with the Soviet Union in order to increase predictability and reduce the potential for direct military confrontation. According to different interpretations, détente was achieved from 1965 to 1979, 1962 to 1979, 1965 to 1985, or 1969 to 1979. In terms of nuclear weapons and technology, in the early 1960s, the United States was in a position of advantage, but by the late 1960s, the Soviets had reached strategic and nuclear parity, with each country capable of completely destroying the other. In the late 1960s, the United States’ resources were drained not only by the arms race but by the Vietnam War as well, and the government’s ­legitimacy was shaking. On becoming the ­president in January 1969, Nixon, together with Henry ­Kissinger—national security advisor (1969–1973) and secretary of State (1973–1977)—assembled the basis of a new foreign policy centered on détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China, aiming to prevent nuclear war and to build a less dangerous world. After the 1961 Berlin Wall Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union and the United States decided to be more open to bilateral negotiations, aimed at decreasing international tensions. After years of difficult negotiations, on August 5, 1963, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, signaling the beginning of a new era in Cold War disarmament and arms limitation talks. Although the treaty prohibited test detonations of nuclear weapons on the ground, underwater, and in the atmosphere, nuclear testing continued underground at a high rate. In 1967, the same three nations signed the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibited the placement of nuclear

296

Deviance

and mass destruction weapons on the orbit of the earth, on the moon, and in outer space. The SeaBed Treaty followed in 1972, banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons and mass destruction weapons on the seabed, on the ocean floor, and in the subsoil. The entire period of détente was characterized by negotiations and the signing of treaties designed to increase international security. The most notable are the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), the SALT Agreements, and the Anti-­ Ballistic Missiles Treaty. The SALT were rounds of bilateral Soviet-U.S. negotiations on the issue of armament control. Held between 1969 and 1972, and between 1972 and 1979, these talks resulted in two agreements, respectively: (1) SALT I, signed in 1972 in Moscow by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and Nixon, and (2) SALT II, signed in 1979 in Vienna by Brezhnev and U.S. president Jimmy Carter. These agreements limited and reduced the number of nuclear weapons and strategic forces. After more than 4 years of bilateral negotiations, the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty was signed in Moscow in 1972 by Brezhnev and Nixon, which limited the systems of antiballistic missiles used to intercept incoming nuclear missiles. Besides the arms control agreements, several minor agreements contributed in the 1970s to the normalization of cultural and economic relations between Moscow and Washington. The era of détente was not spared of moments of tense international relations, though. The Yom Kippur War (October 6–25, 1973), the 1975 Soviet military support for the procommunist insurgents in Angola, and the 1975 Soviet aid for the Portuguese Communist Party proved that the Soviet-U.S. détente was a rather fragile concept. In the mid-1970s, U.S. domestic criticism against détente increased so much that President Ford banned the use of the word by his administration. As the next president, Carter centered U.S. relations with the Soviets on the reduction of nuclear weapons and the promotion of human rights, but the latter was interpreted in Moscow as an attempt at interfering in the Soviet Union’s domestic affairs and did not favor an improvement of bilateral relations. Détente was defined, understood, and implemented differently by the Cold War practitioners of international politics. Although it took form

within the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, it gradually affected the general East-West relations, favoring negotiations, collaboration, and relaxation of tensions not only between Moscow and Washington but also between the West and the East in general. In the beneficial context of détente, the relations between West Germany and East Germany normalized (1971–1972); a fourpower agreement on Berlin was concluded (June 3, 1972); and bilateral treaties were signed between West Germany and the Soviet Union (1970), Poland (1970), and other Eastern European countries. Another major result of détente was the opening in 1973 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which gathered 35 participating states from both sides of the Cold War. While superpower détente focused on the reduction of nuclear weapons, the conference—an outcome of European détente—focused on human rights as well. Elena Dragomir See also Berlin Wall; Cold War; Cuban Missile Crisis; Nuclear War; Surveillance During the Cold War

Further Readings Bischof, Günter, et al., eds. The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. Dahlman, Ola, et al. Nuclear Test Ban: Converting Political Vision to Reality. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2009. Hanhimäki, Jussi M. The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013. Nuti, Leopoldo, ed. The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. White, Brian. Britain, Détente and Changing East-West relations. New York, NY: Routledge, 1992.

Deviance Deviance is a form of resistance to mainstream values, goals, norms, and morals. However, space, place, and time can predict whether certain events

Deviance

or actions can be construed as deviant or conventional. Therefore, deviance is constantly changing and reinventing its definition of what is acceptable in society. As part of his theory of deviance, sociologist Howard Becker proposed that social groups create deviance by making the rules to follow and then applying those rules to a particular group, in turn creating an inclusive and exclusive dichotomy. Those who are included are perceived as normal and mainstream, and those who are excluded are viewed as outsiders or deviant. A label is applied to those seen as deviant, shaping perceptions and observations of, and overall sentiments toward, that group. Furthermore, the role that deviance plays in the 21st century is profoundly rooted in its perception in social media and surveillance. In the past decade, social media forums have provided platforms for individuals and groups to expose, find, and comment on deviant forms. The same virtual spaces have thus been used by law enforcement to survey and watch these behaviors. Moreover, deviance is a performed action that is constantly monitored because of innovations in technology, social media, and surveillance. In this entry, deviance is compared and contrasted with criminality, examples are provided to show how behavior initially perceived as deviant may evolve into socially acceptable actions, and social media and technology’s role in capturing, sharing, and investigating deviant behavior is examined. Societal views of deviance tend to be in association with criminality. Although they are not the same, they are not mutually exclusive either. The best summation of the two is thinking of them as a Venn diagram, where they are both unique and separate but share many commonalities. For instance, on the one hand, rape, murder, assault, and robbery are all considered criminal acts but are simultaneously seen as deviant behaviors. Jaywalking, on the other hand, might be against the law but is not deviant, and having a large facial tattoo might be seen as deviant but not a crime. Therefore, to define deviance, space, place, and time must be taken into consideration. These variables can indicate whether certain acts are considered taboo or not, and criminal or decriminalized. Two examples are interracial marriage and recreational drug use. First, the concept of marriage has changed over the past 100 years. Historically, in

297

the United States, this union was reserved for a man and a woman of the same age, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic background, and religion. Any deviation from this was seen as deviant, as well as prohibited by law under some of the first Black Codes dating back to the 17th century. However, in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia that antimiscegenation laws were unconstitutional. This ruling began the process of breaking down the deviant label associated with interracial marriage. Thus, law affects the way in which deviance is perceived over time. A second example is the use of recreational drugs (e.g., marijuana). Research indicates that marijuana is the third most frequently used recreational drug in the United States, next to alcohol and tobacco. The ample and abundant use of marijuana has taken away many of the deviant qualities that were once associated with it. In particular, during the early to mid-20th century, films such as Reefer Madness (1936) exploited the supposed negative propaganda of using marijuana. Today, many films have been made that celebrate recreational marijuana use, such as Pineapple Express (2008), which highlights the positive and comedic uses of the drug. In addition, factoring in space and place, specific states such as Colorado, Alaska, Oregon, and Washington have made some forms of marijuana use legal, therefore taking away both the criminalized and, to some extent, the deviant elements. These two examples are used to show how deviance is socially constructed and enforced or dismantled by popular opinion and legislative policies. In the Digital Age, smartphones and other visual recording devices are constantly capturing deviant behaviors such as public sexual acts, selfinflicted body mutilation, “challenges,” and pranks. Consequently, many deviant acts are collected, organized, categorized, and archived. Social media outlets provide a platform to perform actions that will then be viewed by a wider audience. Many times, videos go viral—spreading quickly over the Internet—and are shared by millions of people. Videos on popular social networking sites such as Facebook or Instagram as well as other social media sites such as YouTube and WorldStarHipHop have opened a space for deviant behaviors to be distributed and viewed. A prime example of this is Bobby Shmurda’s music

298

Deviance

video for his song “Hot Nigga.” Throughout the song, Shmurda raps about a variety of deviant acts, such as selling drugs and using guns. On December 17, 2014, Shmurda and 14 other associates were arrested on a 69-count indictment, including conspiracy to commit murder, weapons possession, and reckless endangerment. Hot New Hip Hop, a hip-hop news source, reports that Shmurda’s song has 14 potential confessions of criminal activity, which would be a form of selfincrimination via social media. In 2014, “challenges”—performing an act on camera and calling out others to perform the same act—became a viral way of sharing videos. The “fire” challenge, which consisted of individuals having a flammable liquid poured on their bodies and immediately setting themselves on fire, was exhibited on websites such as WorldStarHipHop and YouTube. While many of the viewers of this deviant act might laugh or see the lunacy in setting oneself on fire, this challenge in some cases left the person with burn wounds. A second challenge, known as the “loud” challenge for its slang reference to marijuana, refers to people recording themselves smoking marijuana in public spaces, such as a mall or a restaurant. Both of these challenges pose the risk of criminal sanctions, depending on the geographic location, the public place, and the individual engaging in the act. Both have implications for surveillance, particularly by law enforcement, which can use these videos as incriminating evidence against the individuals or groups. Social media has also changed and shifted language. One of the most prominent ways is through the use of hashtags (i.e., “#”). A hashtag used before a word, phrase, or sentence allows users of virtual space to easily find videos, links, or statements. This becomes a useful tool for surveillance and law enforcement. Surveillance of key terms alerted the attention of the authorities to the Instagram page of Ismaaiyl Brinsley, a lone gunman who executed two New York City police officers on December 20, 2014. Brinsley had shot his exgirlfriend earlier in the day and soon thereafter began posting several threats and pictures on social media of the harm he intended to inflict on law enforcement. The Baltimore County Police intercepted these posts and informed the New York Police Department of these threats, which they believed Brinsley intended to execute.

Unfortunately, the message was received just around the time when Brinsley opened fire, killing two police officers before taking his own life. This example shows how law enforcement uses surveillance of social media to track suggestive language, deviant behavior, and criminal acts. Many law enforcement agencies have cybercrime divisions that monitor social media and online space. The fundamental question remains: Why would someone self-incriminate by posting deviant or criminal behaviors to online space or social media? Briefly, here are three potential reasons. First, the ability to post, view, share, and comment on videos gives individuals agency. Agency produces forms of power that create a narrative of “I matter.” Second, the ability to perform in and post videos of deviant actions conveys a sense of authenticity, of being viewed as genuine. It is imperative to be viewed as real and authentic, particularly in forms of masculinity or femininity. Finally, the ability to move from the margin to the center is deeply important to the human condition. Specifically, to leave a legacy of any capacity, whether deviant or not, becomes significant, particularly for individuals and communities that have been systematically labeled as the other or deviant. CalvinJohn Smiley See also Crime; Facebook; Policing and Society; Privacy, Internet; Surveillance, Theories of; YouTube

Further Readings Becker, Howard S. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York, NY: Free Press, 1963. Fenton, Justin. “Police Say Killer of 2 NYPD Officers First Shot Ex-Girlfriend in Ownings Mills” (December 20, 2014). http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ maryland/bs-md-co-owings-mills-shooting-20141220story.html#page=1 (Accessed December 2014). Hogan, Bernie. “The Presentation of Self in the Age of Social Media: Distinguishing Performances and Exhibitions Online.” Bulletin of Science Technology & Society, v.30/6 (2010). Lilah, Rose. “Bobby Shmurda and GS9 Arrest by the Numbers” (December 19, 2014). http://www .hotnewhiphop.com/bobby-shmurda-and-gs9-arrestby-the-numbers-news.13317.html (Accessed December 2014).

Dictators and Dictatorships Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Smiley, Calvin John. “From Silence to Propagation: Understanding the Relationship Between ‘Stop Snitchin’ and ‘YOLO.’” Deviant Behavior, v.36/1 (2015). Yar, Majid. “Crime, Media and the Will-toRepresentation: Reconsidering Relationships in the New Media Age.” Crime Media Culture, v.8/3 (2012). Young, Jock. The Exclusive Society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999.

Dictators

and

Dictatorships

A dictator is a kind of autocratic—or despotic— ruler, that is, someone who wields power with little or no accountability and therefore is not much limited by formal or informal restrictions. Unlike absolute monarchs, whose authority is based on heritage and religion, dictators and tyrants— typically males—are usually upstarts; their position is typically unsteady and dubious, driving them to rely on menace and violence as their last resort. All of these traits together contribute to surveillance being an essential component of dictatorships. If monitoring people is necessary, to some extent, for any kind of government, it is even more so when power is extremely centralized, censorship hinders conventional feedback, and the position of the de facto sovereign is relatively insecure. Paradoxically, notwithstanding their claims to be the best guarantors of peace and order, dictators are usually apprehensive and distrustful of everyone, including their subjects, underlings, and even deputies. Therefore, they seek ways to control them all in order to both reduce their own uncertainty and burden them with hesitation and fear.

Surveillance Under Dictatorships Although there are always gray areas in any political system, and the broad scope of surveillance under dictatorships makes the existence of clearcut boundaries still more arguable, a basic differentiation between external and internal surveillance can be introduced for the sake of clarity. On the one hand, external surveillance focuses on those who are targeted as enemies by the powers that

299

be—either for an attributed stigma or because they actively try to undermine the government— or simply are thought to be disaffected, too passive, or just indifferent. On the other hand, internal surveillance deals with the behavior of those who are supposedly loyal to the regime, including members of the political and economic establishment, the security forces, and stalwarts and followers of the official—usually s­ingle— party and/or its affiliates. External surveillance has received more scholarly attention than internal surveillance, partly because the former is thought to be more important for the preservation of the state of affairs, and often less information about the latter is available, but also because it is easy to buy the self-presentation of dictatorship as a coherent, monolithic apparatus. A long tradition that goes back to Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) depicts this kind of government as a controlling, peacemaking machine devoted to asserting its authority over private, partisan interests. However, even autocratic governments are necessarily based on some kind of political and social coalition; therefore, they have to deal with many domestic disputes to stay in power, with the supreme leader acting as quite an unstable arbitrator. The extent of those quarrels and the extent to which dictatorships can actually be driven by startling levels of inner chaos was pointed out in Franz Neumann’s Behemoth (1944). The title, borrowed from other work of Hobbes describing the English Civil War of the 1600s, was used by Neumann to portray the convulsed ­operation of the Nazi regime in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s as a hardly veiled state of war among organizations, groups, and individuals, which fiercely fought one another to prevail, while closing ranks to achieve collective aims, including holding their common enemies at bay. Thus, Leviathan (order by force) and Behemoth (the force of chaos) represent two sides of the same coin, and they need to be studied together as surveillance is a perennial feature in both mechanisms. From the beginning of the territorial state, and the consequent consolidation of political bonds beyond face-to-face interactions, gathering and processing large amounts of information have been keystones of governance. Ancient empires had to cope with potential forces of dissent and

300

Dictators and Dictatorships

rebellion—among the subjected population, the tributary local elites, and even their own provincial governors—as soon as possible. Diverse systems of inspection and surveillance—often under some version of the widespread metaphor “eyes and ears”—were implemented over the centuries in regions such as China, India, Persia, the Mediterranean, and the Andes. Basic procedures such as the infiltration of paid agents and blackmail or bribery naturally evolved as efficient ways of control, with religion being a common justification for both checking everyone out and criminalizing dissent (as happened with the Inquisition in some European territories during the Middle and Modern Ages). However, except for intermittent episodes of—generally violent—unrest, most of the populace remained submissive, at least in their public stance, and the sovereign was seldom the only target of blame. On the contrary, exhibitions of homage to the supreme power could be used to legitimize resistance against both lower authorities and members of the privileged groups. Since conventional, continual politicization was mostly restricted to certain educated, well-to-do minorities, these were the priority for government surveillance, which was able to perform on a relatively small scale. Ever since the dawn of the contemporary period, the changes associated with the liberal and industrial revolutions—such as the establishment of the nation-state, the expansion of communications, rural flight, the improvement of literacy, increased social mobility, and the faltering but unstoppable politicization of the masses— exerted a strong pressure on governments to update and expand surveillance resources and procedures. Some autocracies were able to survive for a few more decades——due to, among other reasons, their ability to modernize their political police, as happened with the Okhrana in Tsarist Russia. Often in spite of the Enlightenment-inspired principles of freedom and equality before the law, the postrevolutionary political systems, in Europe and elsewhere, also improved on the strong-arm and intelligence apparatuses inherited from the absolute monarchies, especially in those cases in which the military gained influence due to their increasing role in both curbing social protest and making governments, if not as strongmen, warlords, or even genuine

dictators. On these matters, the self-proclaimed French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1804– 1814) was a well-known trailblazer. In the first half of the 20th century, new kinds of dictatorships guided by innovative, revolutionary political doctrines, such as Marxism-Leninism and fascism, took advantage of the technical advances derived from the second industrial ­revolution—especially in the field of mass media— to both mobilize the population of their countries and control every aspect of their daily life. Together with the most cited examples of the Soviet Union under Stalinism (1929–1953) and Nazi Germany (1933–1945), other dictatorships inspired by communism and fascism were established before and after World War II in Eastern Europe and Asia. Under these so-called totalitarian regimes, surveillance reached its peak, since it became, together with repression, censorship, and propaganda, the backbone of governance, as depicted in wellknown literary accounts such as the omniscient Big Brother from George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). Systematic wiring of private communications, police infiltration into any suspicious group, and a widespread network of collaborators and informers were essential resources to both dominate the country and prevent dissenters from organizing in a productive way. Wellstudied cases such as the vast web weaved by the Stasi, the political police of the so-called German Democratic Republic (1949–1990), reveal the extent to which state surveillance was able to penetrate everyday experience. Inducing ordinary people to cooperate—­usually by administering diverse combinations of indoctrination, reward, and fear of punishment—tended to be a good solution to lower the costs of subjugating huge numbers of individuals. Terrified of being reported to the police, citizens living under such political regimes restrained themselves from talking freely both outdoors and at home. Children and teenagers were often put under opposite, strong pressures, since they were warned by their families not to meddle in politics and to avoid being questioned by strangers, while they were also asked by their political instructors at school and in official youth organizations to be loyal to the state and denounce any subversive activity conducted by their relatives, friends, or acquaintances. Infiltration and collaboration were also

Dictators and Dictatorships

employed to distort dissent and make use of opposition organizations to reinforce the status quo, for instance, by allowing, or even promoting from inside by means of agent provocateurs, extremist statements or criminal actions—such as indiscriminate terrorist attacks—that could detract from the political aims originally declared by the dissidence.

Limitations and Long-Term Costs However, those ambitious projects of social control had their own limitations. Even when counting on both the technology available at that time and broad grassroots collaboration, the very aim of covering every member of an entire society proved to be unrealistic because each group and individual had their own priorities, including the government officials themselves. The bottom-up information stream was not always reliable since it often aimed to satisfy the expectations of good news rather than to provide an accurate picture of the situation. And despite the tight controls, people managed to whisper their discontent—as happened even in the worst years of Nazism and Stalinism, at home, at the workplace, and in concentration camps. On the other hand, the differentiation between “authoritarian” and “totalitarian” regimes, partially based on the extent to which a new kind of monolithic, strongly ideologized state was able to invade and shape private interests and everyday life, has been questioned for diverse reasons. It was used during the Cold War to make some far-right authoritarian dictatorships more presentable as allies of the United States, concealing the fact that some of them—for instance, General Francisco Franco’s New State in Spain—had actually lessened their previous aspirations to absolute power to better match the new circumstances of the postwar era. In addition, even though maintaining the pertinence of distinguishing diverse types of dictatorships, totalitarianism has lately been deemed to be more a tentative project rather than a fulfilled reality, even in the most extreme attempts. Moreover, the most totalitarian regimes need to manage internal competition, with surveillance being not only an instrument for the dictator to deal with confrontation and conspiracy but also a means for each faction to fight rivals by foreseeing

301

their movements and exploiting their weaknesses. On that matter, the supreme leader is routinely the recipient of many of these surveillance reports, which aim to gain his favor and discredit other groups. This allows the supreme leader to take advantage of a system of crisscrossing surveillance, usually by means of the coexistence of, and competition among, several intelligence services, each affiliated to different sections of the state and to the single party. However, the dictator himself is normally monitored to anticipate his decisions and size up his strength. Such a rule-changing game makes even tough dictatorships more shifting and frail than they normally seem to be. However, if they endure, it is because surveillance also helps ease centrifugal forces, at least in the same way it deters active opposition. The complex, global cycle of protest that arose in the third quarter of the 20th century, defying the established order of the Cold War, mostly as myriad of youth-based movements fighting authoritarianism, bureaucracy, militarism, imperialism, racism, and conservatism alike, induced further political adaptations, including a new updating of surveillance organizations and methods. In the West, for instance, national intelligence services improved their internal and external coordination by tightening the bonds among agencies that were affiliated to different institutions and governments. The vigorous student mobilizations of the time were watched with apprehension, since they represented disaffection among those who were expected to play a strategic role in the future of the country. Special programs of monitoring, infiltration, and persuasion were implemented in the United States (e.g., COINTELPRO, CHAOS) and other countries to disrupt youth movements, while old intelligence networks inherited from the postwar period, such as the European Gladio, were revived. At the same time, intelligence and police cooperation with existing dictatorships were improved, while a new generation of authoritarian regimes—based on some version of the national security doctrine—were encouraged in the United States, Europe, Africa, and Asia. Most of them resorted to surveillance to identify and neutralize—mostly through an extensive use of violence—any attempt at political change. The leading role of political surveillance in contemporary societies, especially those ruled by

302

Digital Divide

despotic governments, has long-term costs that persist beyond the very conclusion of the particular situation in which such surveillance thrived. Victims can hardly be sure that their files have been destroyed for good or that such procedures have been completely abandoned in the present. Postdictatorial security forces are seldom purged from the kind of professionals who, having a bloody record, could still be used for other purposes in the future. Moreover, former bureaucrats who had access to sensitive information have been able to advance in their later political careers. In addition, people have become used to being controlled by the authorities to an extent that does not necessarily match the rights formally recognized in a democratic constitution. Therefore, political surveillance helps blur the limits between different kinds of government, a situation that benefits only a few but is harmful for many. Sergio Rodríguez Tejada See also Authoritarianism; Fascism; KGB; Nazism; Police State; School Surveillance: Colleges and Universities; Surveillance During the Cold War; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies

Further Readings Baratieri, Daniela, et al. Totalitarian Dictatorship: New Histories. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Boersema, Keers, et al. Histories of State Surveillance in Europe and Beyond. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Ezrow, Natasha M. and Erica Frantz. Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders. New York, NY: Continuum, 2011. Figes, Orlando. The Whisperers. Private Life in Stalin’s Russia. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2007. Johnson, Eric. Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999. Suri, Jeremi. Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. Weiner, Amir and Ahigi Rahi-Tamm. “Getting to Know You: The Soviet Surveillance System, 1939–57.” Kritika: Exploration in Russian and Eurasian History, v.13/1 (2012). Wintrobe, Ronald. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Digital Divide At the beginning of the 21st century, the digital divide referred to the gap between individuals in the population who had regular access to computers and those who did not. In the mid-1990s, there was a call for greater access to computers and online services in public schools and libraries, with the goal of bridging the digital divide. After the call went out to address the disparity in access among schools, institutions across wealthier areas increased the number of computers available to students; over time, schools in poorer areas also increased the numbers of computers available to students, and now access to the Internet has reached an all-time high within the larger population. As the gap between those with access to the Internet and those without has narrowed, the definition of the digital divide has changed to reflect the ongoing gaps in knowledge and skills due to the increasing complexity of technology. This newly defined knowledge- and skills-based divide has lasting effects on one’s ability to secure and protect one’s privacy online. Individuals who have more computer and Internet experience are more likely to engage in positive security behaviors. Positive security behaviors include effectively using firewalls, encryption, spam filters, and pop-up window blockers. Other positive security behaviors include the use of strong passwords, not reusing passwords on various websites, backing up files, and careful use of file-sharing software. Overall, engaging in positive security behaviors can help reduce an individual’s risk of having his or her personal information accessed by an unwanted third party. The sharing of personal information on social media websites such as Facebook poses concerns with regard to the knowledge-based digital divide. Some social media users may not understand that the information they share online may be public, or they may not know how to adjust the privacy settings of their accounts. Users need to be properly informed in order to able to weigh the benefits of sharing information against the potential intrusion of their privacy. Online privacy and computer surveillance related to data tracking can also be an issue for

Digital Passwords

those without adequate computer knowledge and skills. Internet service providers track users’ movements on the web, and although some users may clear their browser histories in an attempt to protect their privacy, this action may not necessarily delete all data. For example, one’s recent searches may still be viewable by a subsequent user. In addition, a browser’s autocomplete feature may show information that indicates recently used search terms. Less savvy Internet users may not be fully aware of just how much data are tracked and may believe that their behaviors are unable to be traced to them; however, achieving anonymity requires a high degree of sophisticated Internet knowledge. Possessing the knowledge and skills to protect personal information is becoming increasingly important as more users are now using computers more often than ever before. Schools and libraries have made great strides in attempting to close the digital divide by providing greater access to computer technology; however, accessibility alone does not create a well-informed public who are able to secure their private information. Teaching computer literacy and information security skills may help close the knowledge- and skills-based gaps of the newly defined digital divide. Chastity Blankenship See also Computer Surveillance; Cybersecurity Legislation; Privacy, Internet

Further Readings Debatin, Bernhard, et al. “Facebook and Online Privacy: Attitudes, Behaviors, and Unintended Consequences.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, v.15/1 (2009). Goodman, Jessica. “The Digital Divide Is Still Leaving Americans Behind.” Mashable (August 18, 2013). http://mashable.com/2013/08/18/digital-divide/?utm_ medium=feed&utm_source=rss (Accessed July 2014). Hargittai, Eszter. “Digital Na(t)ives? Variation in Internet Skills and Uses Among Members of the ‘Net Generation’.” Sociological Inquiry, v.80/1 (2010). Hargittai, Eszter and Amanda Hinnant. “Digital Inequality: Differences in Young Adults’ Use of the Internet.” Communication Research, v.35/5 (2008). Rhee, Hyeun-Suk, et al. “Self-Efficacy in Information Security: Its Influence on End Users’ Information

303

Security Practice Behavior.” Computers & Security, v.28/8 (2009). Smith, Rick. “Cedar Rapids Library to Lend Computer Tablets to ‘Bridge the Digital Divide’.” The Gazette (Updated March 29, 2014). http://thegazette .com/2014/02/27/cedar-rapids-library-to-lendcomputer-tablets-to-bridge-the-digital-divide (Accessed July 2014). Wadhwa, Vivek. “The $40 Indian Tablet That Could Help Bridge America’s Digital Divide.” The Washington Post (October 23, 2013). http://www .washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/ wp/2013/10/23/the-40-indian-tablet-that-could-helpbridge-americas-digital-divide (Accessed July 2014). Warschauer, Mark, et al. “Technology and Equity in Schooling: Deconstructing the Digital Divide.” Educational Policy, v.18/4 (2004). Zillien, Nicole and Eszter Hargittai. “Digital Distinction: Status-Specific Types of Internet Usage.” Social Science Quarterly, v.90/2 (2009).

Digital Passwords A digital password is a sequence of random characters used to limit access to a digital device and/ or software by requiring a user to show authorization via the secret password. Oral passwords predate electronic technology and were used by the ancient Romans. The first digital passwords of the modern era came from researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the mid-1960s with the creation of their compatible time-sharing system computer. The proliferation of digital devices and systems using passwords has led to increases in fraud and theft through password phishing and hacking. In response, government and private industry have worked to create digital password solutions to circumvent hackers and prevent them from invading users’ privacy or conducting data surveillance, while easing the pressure on users to create, conceal, and recall numerous unique passwords. This entry describes the various forms and systems of authentication, including digital password; reveals the vulnerabilities in digital password systems; reflects on some prominent corporate theft of digital passwords; and concludes with suggestions for how users and administrators can combat password hacking.

304

Digital Passwords

A digital password is an unspaced sequence of random computer characters (i.e., numbers, letters, and symbols) that is created to limit access to a digital device and/or software application by requiring a user to show authentication via the secret password. Digital passwords are a form of what is called authentication. Different authentication types include something a digital user knows (e.g., a password or one’s unique signature), something a digital user has (e.g., a physical token or a one-time password), or something a digital user is (e.g., fingerprints, voiceprints, and other biometrics). Digital security experts have criticized digital systems that rely on single-factor authentication, such as requiring only one digital password before providing a user with access to a resource. Digital passwords are considered to be effective digital security measures when they are required in conjunction with other levels of authentication. In 2012, it was estimated that an average person has more than eight digital passwords, and this has posed a challenge for users to create passwords that are secure and easy to remember. Different organizations have posed solutions that offer a single sign-on for different online services. For example, the nonprofit InCommon, founded in 2005, provides services to 8 million end users as of 2014 and is used in many universities and colleges. Critics noted the cost of InCommon software, the challenges of working on incompatible platforms, and how a single sign-on server going down can also take down supported applications. In 2011, the U.S. government unveiled a $56.3 million plan to create an identity ecosystem in which a smart card or a token would create a single one-time digital password to eliminate password reuse and increase online anonymity. The theft of mobile devices has left many digital users vulnerable, as their device contains unsecured passwords that security experts say should be kept in secured, encrypted, and cloud-based password managers or digital wallets. Recent estimates place the number of smartphones that are not password protected at more than 30%. Digital passwords are often stolen using several common techniques. A front-door attack is a hacker repeatedly trying to guess the password, whereas a ­backdoor attack is when a hacker can access a device’s password manager’s database. In addition, a transmission attack happens when data are

intercepted when broadcast (e.g., syncing data, Wi-Fi). Password hackers have attacked major companies such as ADP, Anthem Inc., Ebay, Google, Facebook, Sony Pictures, Twitter, Last.fm, LinkedIn (6.5 million passwords stolen in June 2012), and Yahoo. Hackers in some high-profile cases such as these are suspected to have used backdoor attacks via malware keylogging software, which captures administrator-typed passwords to gain access to consumer information databases. When the hackers of Sony Pictures released the studio’s films and executives’ private emails in late 2014, the press reported that the hackers had found a file directory on company computers named “Passwords” during a backdoor attack, which contained thousands of passwords. Smaller password hacks can be attributed to user actions. For example, some digital users whose passwords were hacked had used passwords that were easily guessed by a front-door attack hacker, including “password,” “123456,” and “admin,” and/or had used these passwords for multiple websites. Experts estimate that one in 10 four-digit personal identification numbers are “1234.” Security experts suggest a multifaceted defense against password hacking. Experts advise using multiple antivirus programs that are continually updated to prevent backdoor attacks, as well as password manager software that encrypts and stores your password in the cloud and not on the device. Front-door attacks can also be prevented with password manager software that selfdestructs after several wrong password attempts and automatically locks the device when it is set down. The digital password user can make behavioral changes by never writing, reusing, or sharing passwords and by fabricating answers to password questions (e.g., your mother’s maiden name). Twelve-character and long-sentence passwords are harder to hack. For example, you could use the first line of your favorite song, book, or poem. For example, for Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities, one might use the line “It was the best of times; it was the worst of times” or make it into a 12-character acronym, “IWTBOTIWTWOT.” (Note: Do not choose this as a password as it has been published.) Information technology administrators can also use techniques such as hashing and salting to protect their systems’ passwords.

Diplomacy

Hashing uses an algorithm to combine passwords into a fixed-length string of random characters. Salting passwords combines a password with extra information before hashing it. Gordon Alley-Young See also Anonymous; Bioinformatics; Cloud Computing; Identity Theft

Further Readings Crosman, Penny. “Westpac Aims to Be First to Unlock Mobile Apps With Fingerprints.” American Banker, v.178 (2014). Francis, Julianne. “U.S. Unveils Plan to Shield Online Marketplace; More Security; US$56M Will Be Spent to Combat Fraud and Theft.” National Post (April 16, 2011). Harris, John. “Achieving a Comprehensive Information Security Strategy Using Certificate-Based Network Authentication.” Database & Network Journal, v.43 (2013). McMillan, Robert. “The World’s First Computer Password? It Was Useless Too” (January 27, 2012). http://www.wired.com/2012/01/computer-password (Accessed February 2015). Nimocks, Amber. “Commentary: If ‘Password’ Is Your Password, You’re Toast.” North Carolina Lawyers Weekly (December 13, 2013). http://nclawyersweekly .com/2013/12/13/if-password-is-your-password-youretoast/ (Accessed September 2017). Pfeiffer, David. “Shutting Access to Passwords.” SC Magazine: For IT Security Professionals, v.23 (2012). Savage, Marcia. “Linkedln and Leaked Out.” Information Security, v.14 (2012).

Digital Privacy See Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of

Diplomacy Traditionally, diplomacy referred to the art of negotiations, but by the 20th century, it was defined not only as the management of international affairs through negotiations but also as the

305

communication and methods used by the states’ representatives to achieve their countries’ objectives in various fields—trade, environment, economy, peace and war, human rights, cultural relations, or public health. By the beginning of the 21st century, not only nation-states but also civil society organizations, multilateral institutions (World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), and transnational companies (Gazprom, Toyota) engaged in diplomacy. Through diplomacy, international actors pursue their interests and communicate their policies, negotiate compromise resolutions, manage or resolve conflicts, conclude treaties and create international organizations, limit the use of force in international affairs, prevent war, or sometimes employ threats. This entry examines the aims, strategies, and types of diplomacy; investigates its relationship to surveillance and espionage; and reviews some recent examples of the erosion of diplomacy between nations due to the use of surveillance tactics. Diplomacy may achieve its aims either through formal negotiations and agreements or through informal talks and tacit “gentlemen’s agreements.” A “secret” diplomacy refers either to secret— unknown to its citizens or to other governments— agreements or arrangements concluded by a state’s government or to the secrecy—as opposed to publicity—surrounding certain aspects of negotiations. Considering its strategies, functions, or aims, scholars and practitioners have identified economic, commercial, business, environmental, cultural, military, security, power, preventive, monetary, public, coercive, nuclear, maritime, bilateral, multilateral, personal, informal, medical, secret, open, old, and new diplomacy. Diplomatic relations function under the provisions of international law, which does not allow espionage and interference in the affairs of the receiving state. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations defines the immunity rights of accredited diplomats and provides for the diplomatic function of observation, which is restricted to “lawful means,” a rather controversial concept, leaving room for interpretation as to when diplomatic observation involves acts of espionage or interference in the receiving state’s internal affairs. The residence of the head of the diplomatic

306

Diplomacy

mission or of a diplomatic agent, and the diplomats’ official and private papers, correspondence, and property enjoy inviolability. The freedom and secrecy of the communications of diplomatic missions are also protected by international law, but the right to use secure methods such as codes or ciphers is allowed only in relation to the sending state and not to third parties. Despite these provisions of international law, diplomatic communication is threatened by electronic espionage or surveillance conducted by other state or nonstate actors. Moreover, diplomacy itself encompasses activities such as gathering information or intelligence about others, and sometimes embassies are bases for spies, some of whom are deep undercover agents and accredited as diplomats, which is illegal. Although the boundary between diplomacy and espionage in international law remains disputed, in practice, states (as well as firms) do engage in espionage, including diplomatic espionage. In this respect, old electronic surveillance methods, such as listening devices placed in the homes, cars, and offices of diplomats, are now accompanied by new, digital ones. Founded in 2006 by Julian Assange, the controversial WikiLeaks, an international organization that publishes leaked documents, provides many examples in this respect. In 2009, for instance, U.S. diplomats received several directives demanding technical details about the communications systems used by top UN officials, including UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and the Security Council representatives from China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. In 2008 to 2009, directives to gather biographic and biometric information of leading figures in business, politics, intelligence, military, religion, and ethnic groups were sent to U.S. diplomats from more than 30 embassies, including the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Mali, and Bulgaria. The technical details requested included passwords, personal encryption keys used in private and commercial networks for official communications, DNA samples, and iris scans. In 2013, another scandal pointing at the blurring line between diplomacy and espionage emerged when the U.S. intelligence agencies the

National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency were accused of using the American Embassy in Berlin as a listening station to spy on the United States’ ally. Spiegel reported that the NSA had a “Special Collection Service” operational in 80 locations, 19 of which were in Europe—in cities such as Paris, Madrid, Berlin, Frankfurt, Geneva, Rome, and Prague, whose personnel were accredited as diplomats in the U.S. embassies and consulates and whose secret mission was to gather intelligence. Although wiretapping from an Embassy is illegal, the American personnel are alleged to have done precisely that, using sophisticated equipment and technologies placed on the roofs and upper floors of the Embassy and consulate buildings. Being under the protection of their diplomatic immunity and privileges, they could intercept cellular signals, wireless networks, and satellite communication, and they have been accused of even tapping German chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone. The German authorities were convinced that these allegations were true, and German-American diplomatic relations entered a phase of crisis of confidence. Thomas Oppermann, chairman of the Parliamentary Control Panel and responsible for monitoring Germany’s federal intelligence services, declared that “the NSA’s monitoring activities have gotten completely out of hand and evidently take place beyond all democratic controls.” Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff also complained that the NSA had tapped her cell phone, and in November 2013, Germany and Brazil asked the General Assembly of the United Nations to adopt a resolution on the rights to privacy in the digital era. One month later, the resolution was adopted. Elena Dragomir See also Electronic Surveillance; Germany; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of; WikiLeaks

Further Readings Booth, Robert and Julian Borger. “US Diplomats Spied on UN leadership.” The Guardian (November 28, 2010). http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/ nov/28/us-embassy-cables-spying-un (Accessed August 2014).

Diplomatic Envoys Kish, John and David Turns. International Law and Espionage. The Hague, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1995. McClanahan, Grant V. Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1989. Mwenda, Kenneth Kaoma. Public International Law and the Regulation of Diplomatic Immunity in the Fight Against Corruption. Pretoria, South Africa: Pretoria University Law Press, 2011. Pigman, Geoffrey. Contemporary Diplomacy. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2010. Spiegel Online International. Embassy Espionage: The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin (October 27, 2013). http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phonefrom-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html (Accessed August 2014). Spiegel Online International. “Out of Hand”: Europe Furious Over US Spying Allegations (October 24, 2013). http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ angry-european-and-german-reactions-to-merkel-usphone-spying-scandal-a-929725.html (Accessed August 2014).

Diplomatic Envoys Formal diplomatic actions enable states to maintain relations with other subjects of international law and to communicate with foreign audiences and nationals living, traveling, or doing business abroad. An important part of such relations is executed by diplomatic envoys, sent on an ad hoc or permanent basis to a receiving state to serve as the sending state’s direct representatives. The specific nature of the functions performed by diplomats necessitates a climate in which secrecy and confidentiality are respected, which is reflected in international law. Largely developed during the Cold War period and thus reflecting sentiments of distrust, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and many agreements of international organizations contain provisions protecting diplomatic documents and correspondence from unwanted disclosure. At the same time, an impressive body of customary international law on the topic has emerged. This entry explores the international legal framework that deals with the culture of secretiveness in bilateral diplomacy. First, it discusses the rights and

307

obligations of diplomatic envoys regarding secrecy, surveillance, and privacy. Second, the applicable law on the diplomatic mission, its archives, and its means of communications is examined.

Rights and Obligations of Diplomatic Envoys Immunities and Inviolabilities

Although the Vienna Convention is comprehensive, its text does not address secrecy, surveillance, or privacy in direct terms. Rather, the VCDR is conceived as an instrument that enables diplomatic agents to shield information from the receiving state, other states, and the public and to protect these agents from pressures that may exist to disclose intelligence. Diplomatic envoys enjoy freedom of movement and personal inviolability. The latter entails a duty of the receiving state to abstain from exercising enforcement rights and a special duty to protect the diplomat from unwanted interference in the exercise of his or her functions or privacy. The diplomatic agent also enjoys personal immunity. He or she cannot be judged in the courts of the receiving state, be the object of any act of investigation or prosecution, or be required to give evidence as a witness. The sending state can waive the aforementioned immunities if it deems that diplomatic confidentiality is not at risk. Obligations of Diplomatic Agents

The VCDR does not expressly deal with the reverse situation, namely secret intelligence gathering by diplomats. In its general provisions, however, the VCDR spells out that diplomats are under the obligation to respect the laws and regulations, including national espionage and privacy legislation, of the receiving state. Moreover, the International Court of Justice held in its 1980 Tehran Hostages judgment that acts of espionage are an abuse of diplomatic functions, and most states condemn the involvement of diplomats in espionage activities. In practice, however, it has proven difficult to draw a line between permitted intelligence gathering and acts prohibited under diplomatic law. The VCDR considers the ascertaining of conditions in the receiving state, and the reporting thereon, to be a function of a diplomatic

308

Diplomatic Envoys

mission. It is also not uncommon for embassies to employ intelligence officials. Consequently, even in modern practice, accusations that diplomats have violated the rules on confidentiality are relatively common. Edward Snowden’s 2013 leak of classified National Security Agency documents, for example, revealed that acts of espionage had been conducted from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, Germany, by a special unit of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, which allegedly monitored telephone communications in Germany’s government quarter.

Immunities and Inviolabilities of Diplomatic Missions Inviolability of the Premises

The premises of a diplomatic mission, including the private residence of the head of the mission, are inviolable. This means that the receiving state must take all appropriate steps to protect the premises, while it is forbidden for its agents to enter these premises without due consent. The host state must protect the mission against intrusion or damage and prevent the disturbance of the peace of the premises or impairment of their dignity. According to the International Court of Justice in its 2005 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo judgment, this constitutes an obligation to take measures to repel any armed attack on the premises by private actors. The protection, which calls for preventive measures, has to be proportionate in light of the security risk at hand. No permanent surveillance can be expected, but when the authorities are aware of specific threats against the security or privacy of the mission, they are obliged to provide an appropriate level of protection. If the receiving state fails to do so, it has to make reparation for the injury caused. Inviolability of Communication and Documents

Inviolability of Archives and Documents The documents and archives of a diplomatic mission are inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. They cannot be opened, searched, or requisitioned without consent, or used as evidence in a court of law. The 2014 UN General Assembly Resolution 69/121 on the consideration of effective

measures to enhance the protection, security, and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives confirmed that the term archives includes modern forms of storage such as computer files and USB keys. Freedom of Communication The Vienna Convention permits diplomatic missions to communicate freely with their government by all appropriate means, ranging from modern means of communication to more traditional means such as the diplomatic bag and messages in code or cipher. The consent of the receiving state is imperative for the installation and use of wireless transmitters. The VCDR stipulates that the interception of, or any attempt to become acquainted with, the content of diplomatic communication is not allowed. In practice, however, observers of international relations provide ample examples of state-led surveillance operations through the installation of listening devices and the bugging of telephones of diplomatic missions. The Diplomatic Bag

The diplomatic bag is protected under diplomatic law if it bears visible external marks of its character and if it contains documents or articles intended for official use. The rule that a diplomatic bag cannot be opened or detained is (and has been) subject to controversy. In particular, keeping a balance between the protection of diplomatic communication and the prevention of abuse has proven to be a challenge. It has been discussed whether modern screening methods that allow for the contents of the bag to be detected without opening it are permitted under international law. Increasingly, states use such techniques to discover the presence of explosives, metal, drugs, or nuclear substances, for instance, at airports. It is generally accepted that airline authorities can scan diplomatic bags and even refuse their transport when a threat to aircraft safety is presumed. Sanderijn Duquet See also Counterintelligence; Diplomacy; Espionage; International Diplomacy; Law; National Security Agency Leaks; WikiLeaks

Disease Model in Psychiatry

Further Readings Berridge, Geoff. Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (4th ed.). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Denza, Eileen. Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (4th ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2016. Duquet, Sanderijn and Jan Wouters. “Diplomacy, Secrecy, and the Law.” In Corneliu Bjola and Stuart Murray (eds.), Secret Diplomacy: Concepts, Contexts and Cases. London, England: Routledge, 2016. Roberts, Ivor, ed. Satow’s Diplomatic Practice (6th ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Disease Model

in

Psychiatry

The disease model in psychiatry utilizes a biopsychosocial (BPS) conceptualization in understanding human functioning. Previously, the accepted ideology in treating psychiatric illness pertained to a biomedical view of human functioning. A psychiatric illness was conceptualized, and focus was placed solely on the biological factors that may be causing the individual’s suffering, omitting other factors such as psychological, social, and environmental issues. The BPS model is used to better understand humans and their behaviors by incorporating the biological, psychological, and social factors that are present in a person’s life that may affect his or her current functioning. The biological aspect incorporates the physical aspects of human functioning (physical health and genetics). The psychological aspect incorporates the psychological factors that affect functioning (coping skills and self-esteem). The social aspect incorporates the environmental factors affecting functioning (family, socioeconomic status, and work). The interplay among these three aspects of human functioning makes up the BPS model. While expanding the information included in the BPS model, the practice of storing and accessing medical information digitally can lead to privacy concerns. In this entry, the BPS and the disease model in psychiatry are examined, along with concerns regarding potential oversight of and access to medical records by government agencies, particularly with regard to electronic record keeping.

309

Medicalization is the process by which nonmedical human conditions and problems come to be defined and treated as medical conditions or in a disease model. Medicalization of psychiatry at present relates to the medicalization of potentially common experiences—for example, feeling sad is considered depression, being shy is called social anxiety. A disease model in psychiatry relates to the difference between disease and illness. An illness represents a complete person and incorporates the biological, physical, psychological, and cultural aspects of the individual. It has been argued that the BPS model favors the medicalization of the psychiatric field. The focus is shifted from a patient-oriented approach to a more scientific, hard-science model. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5), published in 2013, is used by many clinicians to determine and classify mental health disorders. Utilizing tools such as the DSM-5 allows for classification of disorders, diseases, and illnesses, but it also allows for conditions that were previously not considered disorders to now be described as pathologies. Critics of the BPS and the disease model in psychiatry note that the more formalized and systematic the approach utilized within the BPS model, the higher the potential for governing agencies to survey and deny coverage, access to treatment, or medical and social care. The gatekeeping by governing agencies could be due to the larger amount of information recorded in patients’ health files, and the greater chance for problems to be found and coverage to be denied. Supporters of the medicalization of psychiatry note that this model allows for physicians, psychologists, and other health care professionals to provide a higher level of care than in non-medical-based settings and for those who cannot afford health care coverage. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) allows for medical health coverage for people who may not have had insurance previously. The act mandates that every citizen hold a minimum of coverage or pay a tax. With the advent of this legislation in 2010, citizens of the United States who previously did not have health care insurance, possibly due to a preexisting condition, became eligible for coverage without the possibility of a claim being denied. Opponents of the ACA note that although it

310

Disinformation Campaigns

makes health care more accessible and prevents insurers from denying preexisting conditions (e.g., cancer, diabetes, or back pain) by utilizing the PreExisting Condition Insurance Plan, the additional health care coverage does not necessarily mean better quality of care. With the increase of coverage comes the increase of monitoring for privacy and security due to the possibility of abuse of the system and the potential confidentiality issues contained within. Supporters of the ACA note that with the re-envisioning of the health care field, patients will have better access to their information, be monitored more thoroughly, and be able to get treatment more easily. The product of electronic record keeping relating to the medical field is commonly known as an electronic medical record (EMR). An EMR is a digital version of a paper chart and can be accessed through a desktop computer, laptop, or tablet. It allows for tracking of progress, medications, and medical history. A frequently used method of identifying a patient is to use the patient’s Social Security number. This provides a quick and accurate model for identifying a patient; however, it can be an additional avenue to gain access to potentially sensitive information contained within a health file stored electronically. EMRs are required to comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, which protects the privacy of an individual’s identifiable health information. With the EMR, there are potential security and privacy concerns that arise. Records that are stored electronically have the potential to be stolen. By bypassing company security measures, a hacker may be able to access sensitive information of anyone contained within that database. Improved security measures such as encryption or renewing passwords regularly provide an increased level of security. Furthermore, governing bodies utilizing a technique known as data mining (analyzing data to detect patterns or relationships) may have access to these records and can potentially identify patterns to be utilized. Debra Warner and Brandon Chuman See also Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Dataveillance; Digital Passwords; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010; Privacy, Medical

Further Readings Barrows, Randolph C. and Paul D. Clayton. “Privacy, Confidentiality, and Electronic Medical Records.” Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, v.3/2 (1996). Borrell-Carrió, Francesc, et al. “The Biopsychosocial Model 25 Years Later: Principles, Practice, and Scientific Inquiry.” Annals of Family Medicine, v.2/6 (2004). Chaum, David. “Achieving Electronic Privacy.” Scientific American, v.262/2 (1992). Ghaemi, S. Nassir. “The Rise and Fall of the Biopsychosocial Model.” British Journal of Psychiatry, v.195 (2009). Green, Alexander, et al. “Why the Disease-Based Model of Medicine Fails Our Patients.” Western Journal of Medicine, v.176/2 (2002). Manchikanti, L. and J. A. Hirsch. “Obamacare 2012: Prognosis Unclear for Interventional Pain Management.” Pain Physician, v.15/5 (2012). Meingast, M., et al. “Security and Privacy Issues with Health Care Information Technology.” In Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society, New York, NY, August 30 to September 3, 2006.

Disinformation Campaigns Rhetorician and theorist Kenneth Burke stated that language “selects, reflects, and deflects reality.” It may be argued that humans’ ability to rhetorically construct “reality” reached its apex in the development of a type of information manipulation called disinformation. Disinformation is the deliberate framing of data in such a way that a false view of reality is produced in the minds of receivers. In Burke’s terms, this can be done by selecting or framing particular data elements and evading others, precluding more valid or relevant information from being brought into the frame. It can be done by reflecting elements of receivers’ viewpoints, biases, or core values, such as stereotyping, scapegoating processes, and negative interpretations, to exploit them. Finally, it can be done by deflecting reality through forms of deliberate lying such as perjury, calumny, hyperbole, and forgery. In contrast to misinformation, which is accidentally providing false information, disinformation is the

Disinformation Campaigns

deliberate construction of a message that the sender knows to be false to achieve the sender’s own objectives, which are often to undermine the position or security of the receiver and/or the subject of the false message. In this entry, the early employment of disinformation in military history is reviewed, as are concerns about its use by nations. The process of how disinformation works is then explained. Finally, government disinformation campaigns and health and environment disinformation campaigns are discussed.

History and Concerns Disinformation, as the postmodern art and science of weaponized communication, has its roots in the Soviet Union’s Cold War strategy of dezinformatsia, although attempts to deceive enemies by way of perception manipulation have been documented throughout military history (recall the Trojan Horse). In the United States, information warfare, a form of unconventional warfare, includes black propaganda (information designed to appear to be coming from one source when it is actually the production of a source antagonistic to the pretended source). Subsets of black propaganda are psychological operations (psy ops), which aim to influence receivers at the emotional or psychological levels, and disinformation campaigns, which aim to influence receivers through intentionally deceptive messages processed mentally. Deployment of information warfare techniques, including disinformation campaigns, is problematic both legally and morally, although these practices are widespread globally because they are often quite effective. Under U.S. law, black propaganda and related covert actions are prohibited within the United States but may be conducted abroad. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under the direction of the president and the oversight of Congress, has been authorized to carry out these “special activities.” Concerns about the morality of such activities are often discussed within the framework of just war theory and tradition.

How Disinformation Works Human beings are quite susceptible to manipulation through the misuse of information, especially so in the wake of globally networked

311

communication networks, postmodern notions of “authority” and “truth,” and, some would say, the dearth of training in critical thinking. Because certain conditions are prerequisites for humans to communicate meaningfully at all, this causes us to be infused with a certain level of gullibility that allows information manipulators to successfully influence our beliefs and actions. The concept that defines this human tendency is known as truth bias. This phenomenon is well illustrated by Chico Marx’s question in the 1933 film Duck Soup, “Who you gonna believe, me or your own eyes?” Oddly enough, the answer is that we tend to disbelieve our own experiences and sensory evidence and accept claims that others make, even when those claims are contrary to our experiences. Another related theory is language philosopher Paul Grice’s cooperative principle, which assumes that individuals are working toward a common goal of developing understanding and creating shared meanings when they communicate. Four conversational maxims extend from that— quality, quantity, relation, and manner—and they instruct communicators to ensure that their contributions move the interaction toward the (assumed) shared goal of truth building. In disinformation enterprises, the maxim of quality is deliberately violated; yet receivers are oriented to accepting these messages as true because, first, they are psychologically inclined toward belief and, second, fact checking the daily barrage of data people encounter is impossible. Since the 1980s, these notions have been examined and further developed by philosophers, linguists, sociologists, communication studies scholars, and information scientists. A consequence of postmodern skepticism, competing truth claims, and mistrust of and challenges to traditional authority is the dilemma of what and whom to believe. In terms of government-initiated campaigns, the disinformation/ conspiracy theory dialectic is often two sides of the same coin. For example, the collapse of the World Trade Center towers in New York City on September 11, 2001, has been at the center of competing, evidence-based truth claims by experts and authorities on both sides since it occurred. Conspiracy theorists will often label information ­presented by power elites as nothing more than disinformation.

312

Disinformation Campaigns

In instances where strong empirical evidence can be produced by both sides, each may claim that the other is promulgating disinformation. Claiming that evidence of wrongdoing is a disinformation strategy of the accuser has become a popular form of self-defense. Some skeptics claim that warning of disinformation is itself a form of disinformation. It is becoming increasingly difficult for information consumers to determine what is credible and what is not.

Disinformation Campaigns Disinformation practices are not limited to governments; they are the coin of the realm in many corporate and nongovernmental organizational campaigns as well. Examples of disinformation campaigns, such as those that follow, can be helpful to recognize disinformation. Government Campaigns

Present-day disinformation techniques have their origin in World War II operations by the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain. Among the more successful of these were Britain’s Operation Fortitude, where the German army was diverted to the wrong landing point and directed away from Normandy, and Operation Mincemeat, where Axis troops were misled about the British invasion of Italy when a corpse dressed in a military uniform with false invasion plans in the pocket was deliberately left to wash up on a Spanish beach. Soviet disinformation campaigns designed to discredit and undermine the United States, Israel, and the Catholic Church were described in detail by a former three-star general in the Romanian secret police who defected to the United States in 1978. Ion Mihai Pacepa detailed Soviet campaigns, which he helped plan and implement, to discredit Pope Pius XII; to employ 4,000 “agents of influence” in Arab countries as tools for creating anti-Semitic, anti-Christian, and anti-U.S. sentiments; and to institute numerous other activities that extend to the present time. By the same token, the United States spread disinformation in foreign media about internal strife and instability in communist regimes throughout the Cold War. The Watergate debacle made it known that some of President Richard Nixon’s reelection

operatives engaged in “dirty tricks” (disinformation strategies). In 1986, a disinformation campaign, planned or actual, during Ronald Reagan’s presidency was made public by The Washington Post, and a similar report relative to Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein was published during the George H. W. Bush presidency. In late 2014, at about the same time when searchable Project Blue Book (the U.S. Air Force UFO [unidentified flying object] compendium) files were made public on the Internet, the CIA took responsibility for the majority of UFO sightings from 1954 to 1974. “It was us,” they said, claiming that they encouraged UFO stories to camouflage tests of the U2 spy planes. In terms of the conspiracy theory/ disinformation dialect, believers in “ancient alien” theories, Men in Black (alien enforcers), and alien abductees believe that this recent CIA claim is, itself, the disinformation and that the UFO reports were the actual information. Other conspiracy/ disinformation debates in the United States center on a variety of issues related to the War on Terror, including the events of September 11, 2001. Health and Environment Campaigns

When the AIDS crisis began in the 1980s, a disinformation campaign by the Soviet spy organization KGB, named Operation INFEKTION, planted news reports that the United States had developed the virus as part of a biological weapons program. Similar stories have emerged related to Lyme disease. The tobacco industry’s “spin” (disinformation) campaign to conceal the health dangers of smoking was revealed in lawsuits and satirized in the 1994 novel and subsequent film Thank You for Smoking. Practitioners of alternative medicine, including alternative cancer treatments, naturopathy, and homeopathy, claim that disinformation campaigns have been translated into public and corporate policy and have unfairly and wrongly denied their veracity, preventing people from accessing and benefiting from alternative health providers. Just as vociferous are claims that environmental issues are being subjected to disinformation strategies. The issue of climate change is the most highly publicized and the most hotly contested, with scientific expertise being brought to bear from all sides. Debates about the negative effects,

Djibouti

and probably nefarious origin, of contrails and chemtrails—vapor trails that frequently appear in the sky and then turn into artificial clouds—are related to the climate change dispute. Finally, concerns for the environment linked to economic interests have generated the practice of greenwashing, which occurs when a firm markets its products with false claims as to the ways its products or practices are environmentally friendly. An example is the placard found on the pillows in many hotel rooms that claims that asking guests to reuse towels throughout their stay is a way to lessen the negative impact on the environment, when it is actually a strategy to reduce the costs of labor, utilities, and supplies needed to wash them each day.

313

June 2000. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/down load?doi=10.1.1.116.4728&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Accessed October 2017). Pacepa, Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai and Ronald Rychlak. Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism [Audiobook]. WND Books, 2013.

Websites DeSmogBlog Project—Clearing the PR Pollution That Clouds Climate Science: http://www.desmogblog .com Greenwashing Index: http://www.greenwashingindex .com/about-greenwashing

Leslie Reynard See also Cold War; Intelligence Community; Iran-Contra Affair; 9/11; Propaganda; Russia; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies

Further Readings Block, Marylaine. “Gullible’s Travels: Marylaine Block Shows How to Teach Students to Guard Against Misinformation, Disinformation, and Spin on the Net.” School Library Journal, v.48/5 (2002). British Library Board. “Learning Disinformation” [Interactive website linked to video]. http://www .bl.uk/learning/cult/disinfo/disinformation.html (Accessed October 2017). Fallis, Don. “Floridi on Misinformation.” Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics, v.13/2 (2011). http:// www2.units.it/etica/2011_2/FALLIS.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Jackson, Brooks and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. un-Spun: Finding Facts in a World of Disinformation. New York, NY: Random House, 2007. Keshavarz, H. “How Credible Is Information on the Web: Reflections on Misinformation and Disinformation.” Infopreneurship Journal, v.1/2 (2014). http://eprints.rclis.org/23451/1/How%20 Credible%20is%20Information%20on%20the%20 Web.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Moran, Richard. “Getting Told and Being Believed.” Philosopher’s Imprint, v.5/5 (2005). O’Neill, Barry. A Formal System for Understanding Lies and Deceit. Paper presented at the Jerusalem Conference on Biblical Economics, Jerusalem, Israel,

Djibouti Security concerns attracted international interest in Africa during the Cold War, when the struggle between Western and Eastern powers, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, resulted in “proxy wars,” or the use of unstable African nations to represent the conflicts of larger nations. Today, many African regions receive the label of “comprador regimes,” whereby African nationstate rulers ignore the needs of their citizens in favor of the economic and political interests of foreign nations. The location of the Republic of Djibouti—on the Horn of Africa bordering Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea—has given it a unique position in global negotiations over security, especially in counterterrorism efforts in a post-9/11 world. Djibouti, which oversees access to the Red Sea, has become an international military training ground, where multiple nations converge with military operations focused on piracy and global terrorism. The opportunity to host the military presence of Western powers has resulted in contested spaces of surveillance between nations with different agendas. Djibouti makes financial gains from these operations, in part by encouraging competition between the different nations that rely on its geographic location. This entry briefly describes some of Djibouti’s recent struggles with its bordering countries and then reviews the

314

Djibouti

arrangements the country has with the United States, the European Union, France, and Japan to serve as an important host for foreign military bases and surveillance facilities. Djibouti struggled with its internal security in the 1990s, when tensions between the ethnically Somalian Issa, the authoritarian political party that controlled the country, and the ethnically Ethiopian Afar erupted into a civil war. The resulting 4-year conflict created multiple parties and splinter groups that continued to resist the ruling government until a final peace agreement was made in 2000. Today, the tension between the different ethnic groups requires a continual balance by the government of Djibouti. The 2011 election of Ismail Omar Guelleh to an unprecedented third term as president was the result of a constitutional change in 2010 and a troubling electoral process marred by the boycott of the Afar opposition. The need for political legitimacy resulted in a system of limited proportional representation, first tested in the legislative elections of 2013. Since that election, political power has reverted to previous forms of patronage politics between various affiliations of Issa and Afar, with internal security continuing to be a challenge to harmony. The Port of Djibouti is the basis of the dependent relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia, and it is where the majority of Ethiopian imports and exports are sent. As Ethiopia recovered from the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea, ­Djibouti found itself in the middle of the unresolved tension between its neighbors. Djibouti has limited the ability of Ethiopia to make controlling investments in the port, ensuring some independence. The Republic of Djibouti struggles with poverty and lacks natural resources such as water. Despite foreign governments providing more than 12% of the Djiboutian national budget and offering employment opportunities for locals, the unemployment rate is more than 60%, with 19% of the population living on less than US$1.25 a day. The capital, Djibouti City, is a garrison town with prices and services geared toward foreigners and not the indigenous population. Djibouti hosts the United States’ only permanent base in Africa, with approximately 3,200 service members. Founded in 2007, AFRICOM

(U.S. Africa Command) monitors regional terrorist activity and serves as a launch point for surveillance drones. The official website describes the command as focused on security: “A full-spectrum combatant command, U.S. AFRICOM is responsible for all U.S. Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, its island nations, and surrounding waters.” The United States coordinated its invasion of Somalia from Camp Lemonier/Lemonnier, the former French base now leased yearly to the American forces for US$38 million. No other African nation has allowed the United States to establish bases in Africa. In 2008, the European Union created permanent naval operations, the European Union Naval Force Atalanta, to address piracy in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean from the Port of Djibouti. This operation works with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States, sharing facilities with the latter and France. France pays €30 million to keep about 2,000 troops in Djibouti, including at Camp Monclar. France also has a medical complex in the capital, Bouffard Military Hospital. France initially founded the Djiboutian armed forces, including giving the Djiboutians planes for their air force, and has historically trained Djiboutian military officers in accordance with agreements made in 1977, when France gave Djibouti its independence. Eastern powers have also increased their presence on the Horn of Africa. In its search for natural resources such as oil, China has stepped up economic operations, conducting more than a dozen naval escorts in the region and facilitating an antipiracy partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States, and the European Union Naval Force. Long-term strategy suggests that China will eventually consider creating a permanent naval base in the region. Japan completed a naval base in Djibouti in July 2011, the first such base outside Japan. The Japanese base for the Counter-Piracy Facility hosts 200 personnel. The Japanese pay US$30 million to lease this base. Annette L. Varcoe and Angel R. Ackerman See also China; Ethiopia; United States

DNA Technology

Further Readings Blanch, Ed. “AFRICOM’s Agenda Still Baffles Africa.” New African (February 2009). Feuilherade, Peter. “China and Japan Take Military Rivalry to Djibouti.” New African (July 2010). Gberie, Lansana. “Liberia Going Against the Grain.” New African (December 2007). Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. and Victor Ojakorotu. “Surveillance Over a Zone of Conflict: Africom and the Politics of Securitisation of Africa.” Journal of Pan African Studies, v.3/6 (2010). Styan, David. “Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub” (Africa Programme, Chatham House Briefing Paper) (April 1, 2013). https://www .chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/190835 (Accessed September 2014). Wasara, Samson. “Conflict and State Security in the Horn of Africa: Militarization of Civilian Groups.” African Journal of Political Science, v.7/2 (2002). Whitlock, Craig. “Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations.” The Washington Post (October 25, 2012). http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secretoperations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd105ff056538b7c_story.html (Accessed September 2014).

DNA Technology Since the turn of the 21st century, the use of DNA technology has gained a firm foothold in society. DNA technology is now increasingly called on to serve both state and private functions. In state practices, DNA technology is employed in surveillance by law enforcement, and in the private sphere, the use of DNA technology (e.g., by employers, genetic testing companies) calls forth issues of privacy invasion and employment discrimination. The ubiquity of DNA technology in both public and private domains is spurred by sociological phenomena such as genetic essentialism and genetic determinism. Genetic essentialism is the notion that the genetic material is the “essence” of the individual, and genetic determinism is the concept that genetic information is determinative of an individual’s predisposition for disease as well as other social behaviors. Genetic essentialism as related to defining and constructing legal identity is represented by the

315

surveillance uses of DNA technology by the state. In 2000, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started developing a biometrics database, the Next Generation Identification System (NGI). The creation of this system is a $1 billion program, designed by defense contractor Lockheed Martin, that will combine data such as fingerprints, iris scans, photographs, and voice data into a searchable platform for use by federal and state agencies. The NGI has been designed to be flexible to incorporate other biometric markers, such as DNA, in the future. Advances in computing have led to a wider variety of mobile DNA collection devices, as well as more cost-efficient solutions for storing and for sharing data between agencies and organizations. The benefits of DNA technology for law enforcement cannot be discounted, even as it is weighed against its harms. DNA information may help identify those present at the scene of a crime and also plays an important role in proving the innocence of the wrongly accused. The Innocence Protection Act, as well as nonprofit organizations (e.g., The Innocence Project, based out of Cardozo Law School) that support the act’s aims, allows for postconviction appeals through the use of DNA testing. The development of sophisticated DNA-testing technologies allows for the introduction of new DNA evidence that was previously undetectable by past technologies, resulting in several successful appeals. At the same time, the use of DNA in contemporary policing raises numerous legal, civil rights, and ethical concerns, particularly regarding the overpolicing and surveillance of minorities and activists. This entry discusses several of the issues associated with the increased use of DNA technology by both state and private entities, including civil rights, privacy, and employment discrimination.

DNA Technology Advancements and Issues DNA evidence was first used in 1980s England and became more commonly used within forensics in the United States in the 1990s. The use of DNA as evidence within the adjudication process has had a complex legal history, which may become more complicated as the size of the federal and state databases increases and those databases

316

DNA Technology

acquire DNA information from a wider array of individuals. Issues arising from the overreliance on DNA evidence by courts, including false positives, the effects of transferred or degraded DNA, and fabrication of DNA evidence, could increase as DNA databases expand. This is due to the way DNA evidence is used to solve crimes—either by comparing DNA taken directly from suspects with DNA found at the crime scene or through taking biological data from a crime scene to match with offender profiles in existing DNA databases. A wider array of potential matches within a database widens the pool of potential suspects and the possibility of false positives, providing a gap through which bias—now bolstered through scientific techniques—may enter into court systems. Evidence shows that biometric data, such as DNA, are subject to collection and laboratory errors and pro-prosecution bias and are often presented in ways that may overstate scientific certainty. Fabrication of DNA evidence could increasingly become a problem as researchers have shown that they can manufacture evidence to match a given DNA profile, even without a sample from the individual who holds that DNA profile. A number of cases illustrate the consequences false positives can have on individuals within the criminal justice system. For instance, in some cases where DNA has traveled through environments— through cells and fluids—its presence has resulted in innocent people being implicated in crimes despite not being present at the scene of the crime. In one case, a homeless man spent 5 months in prison because his DNA was found at the scene of a crime that had been committed while he was lying unconscious in a hospital. Investigators eventually discovered that his DNA had been transferred to the scene of the homicide through emergency medical technicians and medical equipment. In the case of DNA and fingerprints, the length of time and the condition under which biometric data are collected can also affect the strength of the match, and these degraded samples are more likely to produce false positives than if full profiles can be retrieved from the scene of a crime. The presence of data from multiple individuals can also affect the degree to which evidence can be perceived as conclusive. When samples are degraded, experts analyzing DNA evidence can often disagree over the results.

A survey conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in 2013 asked analysts from 108 labs to look at a three-person mixture and determine whether a suspect’s DNA was present. The study found that analysts disagreed as to whether the suspect’s DNA was included in the sample, with 70% of the analysts saying the suspect might be present, 24% saying the data were inconclusive, and just 6% saying the suspect’s DNA was not in the sample (which was the right answer). These types of disagreements can often be used in court to cast doubt about the theories being presented by either the prosecution or the defense. Regardless of these deficiencies, DNA evidence has become entrenched as a tool for law enforcement. At the same time, DNA can implicate individuals in crimes they may not have committed or expose family members to a judicial system that could see them as a suspect by virtue of their DNA’s relation to that found at the scene of a crime.

Expanded DNA Data Collection and Data Sharing by Law Enforcement In 2013, the Supreme Court held in Maryland v. King that when officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The justices concluded that DNA collection while a suspect is in custody meets the “reasonableness” standard of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because law enforcement has a legitimate government interest in processing and identifying arrestees and using that information to set (or deny) bail. Ultimately, the Court ruled that an arrestee’s interest in keeping his or her DNA information private does not outweigh the legitimate government interest in obtaining that information. What this means in practice is that the police can and do collect DNA samples from anyone arrested for any reason. Some legal scholars have expressed concern that the ruling in Maryland v. King does not

DNA Technology

provide specific and adequate constraints on how the collected DNA information may be used in the future. Those critics argue that allowing such large-scale collection of DNA information could lead to governmental abuses. Some scholars have argued that none of the state or federal statutory regimes allowing DNA collection would prevent the government from testing DNA samples for other purposes, including testing with the objective of discovering the genetic causes of a crime. Other legal scholars, however, maintain that the Maryland v. King decision allows DNA information to be used for identification purposes only in the narrow sense. At this stage, there is too little legal precedent to be certain where the boundaries might be drawn. Data sharing between government agencies and between government and private entities is in many cases also justified through U.S. legal theory. The Third Party Doctrine has been upheld by several Supreme Court rulings, and it stands for the idea that anything that an individual has shared with another party no longer holds an expectation of privacy such that it is not a “search” (under the Fourth Amendment definition) for the government to collect that information. In the 1979 decision of Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy for information that has been voluntarily turned over to third parties. The Smith ruling had as its precedent another Fourth Amendment case decided 3 years earlier, United States v. Miller, which involved warrantless government access to a suspect’s bank records, in which the Supreme Court ruled that bank customers possessed no standing to contest government subpoenas to access customer records. What the Third Party Doctrine means in an age of inexpensive DNA collection technology is that as more people opt or are mandated to share their DNA information (e.g., with corporations for genetic testing or with the government for immigration purposes), their information becomes vulnerable to capture by law enforcement without the need for a search warrant. The length of time biometrics is stored in the state and federal databases creates other privacy concerns. Currently, depending on the state or federal law, DNA information can be stored for as many as 75 years or until the statute of limitations

317

for all criminal violations has expired. Since the full capacity of technology in the future is unknown, it is unclear how these data might be employed in the future. Furthermore, there are few barriers for government agencies to share DNA data with each other. Since 9/11, the government has enacted several measures to allow information sharing within and among federal intelligence and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. All 50 states currently share DNA records through CODIS (the Combined DNA Index System), the FBI-managed central database that links DNA profiles from across federal, state, and territorial collection programs. Although DNA databases are currently kept separate from fingerprint and other biometrics databases, such as the NGI, that could change. According to government documents, in November 2014, the FBI hosted a briefing at the Criminal Justice Information Services Division to show businesses how the FBI was streamlining and automating DNA collection by law enforcement, for potential integration of the Rapid DNA Analysis into the FBI’s CODIS and NGI systems. In addition to data collected by governments, there are also DNA databases being produced by private enterprises. Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com collect and store DNA data, and these data can be sold to or accessed by third parties. For example, the terms of service for Ancestry.com permits targeted DNA-based advertising. The federal government does not appear to have formal data-sharing arrangements with private companies. However, there have been attempts by law enforcement to gain access to DNA data held privately in the past. Law enforcement can gain access to biometric data held by private companies through other means. For instance, in a case in Idaho, the police were able to run DNA found at a crime scene in 1996 against a database owned by Ancestry.com. After finding 41 potential familial matches, they were able to obtain a warrant to gain access to all information, including full names and dates of birth.

Civil Rights Concerns The collection of biometric information from social activists, particularly those who lead the

318

DNA Technology

Black Lives Matter movement, has raised some alarm about the impact of biometric information collection on minorities. Some scholars have noted that if databases contain a majority of biometric information from minority arrestees, since minorities are arrested at higher rates than whites, then minorities will be disproportionately affected by practices such as “familial matching.” A typical database search for DNA collected from a crime scene or suspect aims to find an exact match between a known person and the DNA sample, whereas familial searching merely looks for partial matches to discover potential relatives of the source. Some legal scholars have argued against familial matching for a variety of reasons, including those related to equality, accuracy, privacy, and racial discrimination. One proposal to counter this problem is the creation of a universal database, whereby everyone’s biometric information is collected and archived. A major disadvantage of this suggested solution is that, given the prevalence of data breaches, a universal database of DNA information that includes genetic information could open the door for the database to be coopted for genetic discrimination, or it could become a target for hackers looking to sell the sensitive information to the highest bidder. Much is still unknown about how genetic information will be used in policing in the future, but the systems that are being built now have few checks and balances built into them, and neither the public nor the regulators fully understand the technical mechanisms of these systems or the bureaucratic processes that surround them.

Privacy and Employment Discrimination Concerns Besides the ways in which DNA technology is employed in surveillance, the rise of DNA technology in the private sphere raises concerns about privacy and employment discrimination. With advancements in DNA technology, DTC genetic testing has become socially acceptable as a means to discover both ancestry and propensity for disease. However, the databases amassed by DTC genetic testing companies represent attractive targets for hackers and thus pose risks to the consumer related to data breaches that could

lead to privacy invasions and the sharing of such information in ways that aid employment discrimination. Also, in March 2017, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce moved forward a bill (H.R. 1313), sponsored by Representative Virginia Foxx (R-NC), that enables employers to grant higher insurance premium discounts to employees who join employer-sponsored wellness programs wherein genetic information is collected from the participating employees. Several advocacy organizations have criticized the bill, particularly noting that it undermines privacy and employment discrimination protections for workers established by antidiscrimination laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act. The bill is now awaiting approval by the House Ways and Means Committee. Ifeoma Ajunwa and Robyn Caplan See also Biometrics; Biosurveillance; Crime Control; Policing and Society; Privacy, Right to; United States v. Miller (1976)

Further Readings Ajunwa, Ifeoma. “Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Torts and Contract Law Issues.” Ohio State Law Journal, v.74 (2014). Ajunwa, Ifeoma. “Genetic Data and Civil Rights.” Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review, v.51 (2016). Cole, S. “Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System: Historical Lessons for the DNA Debate.” In D. Lazer (ed.), DNA and the Criminal Justice System. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. Lynch, J. From Fingerprints to DNA: Biometric Data Collection in U.S. Immigrant Communities and Beyond (May 2012). https://www.eff.org/document/ fingerprints-dna-biometric-data-collection-usimmigrant-communities-and-beyond Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. ___ (2013). Murphy, E. Inside the Cell: The Dark Side of Forensic DNA. New York, NY: Nation Books, 2015. Nelson, Alondra. Body and Soul: The Black Panther Party and the Fight Against Medical Discrimination. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. Roberts, D. E. Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-Create Race in the Twenty-First Century. New York, NY: New Press, 2012.

Domestic Terrorist Groups Roth, A. “Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in Law Enforcement.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, v.11 (2013). Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

Domestic Terrorist Groups According to the Code of Laws of the United States, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2331, domestic terrorism is defined as any activity that (a) involves acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; (b) is intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (c) occurs primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Throughout the history of the United States, multiple domestic terrorist groups and individual terrorists have used violence against the government and civilians to further their political, religious, or economic agendas and ideology. This entry briefly reviews the history of domestic terrorism in the United States, describes several notorious domestic terrorist groups, and discusses the use of surveillance in curbing their activities, including implications for privacy.

A Brief History of Domestic Terrorism in the United States One of the first events to be considered an act of domestic terrorism occurred in 1622. The Powhatan Native Americans attacked the Jamestown colony and killed 30% of the inhabitants. After gaining independence from Britain in 1776, the newly formed republic experienced a few random uprisings and rebellions. During the Civil War (1861–1865), both the Confederacy and the Union engaged in guerrilla warfare against citizens to gain control over their communities. Burning the homes of individuals loyal to the enemy or derailing railroad trains to prevent supplies and food from reaching their intended destinations was a common occurrence during the Civil War. One of the most notorious events during this time was the

319

“March to the Sea,” led by Union general William T. Sherman. General Sherman and his 62,000 troops marched from Atlanta to Savanah, Georgia, burning and destroying homes, farms, businesses, and railroads. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) is commonly considered the first terrorist organization in the history of the United States. This white supremacist group emerged during the reconstruction efforts following the Civil War. Between 1868 and 1870, the KKK lynched, bombed, and burnt the homes of freed slaves and their white supporters and intimidated black voters, with the goal of restoring white rule in the southern states. In 1871, a series of anti-KKK laws and crackdowns on their activities by the federal government considerably reduced the influence and membership of the Klan until the first part of the 20th century. The last three decades of the 19th century brought anarchist terrorism to the United States. Anarchist terrorists used violence to eliminate any form of organized government and social hierarchy. One notorious terrorist attack in the United States was the Haymarket affair on May 4, 1886, which began when someone threw a bomb at the police during a labor protest rally at Haymarket Square in Chicago. Seven police officers and a civilian died as a result of the ensuing violence that day; hundreds were injured. In August 1886, eight alleged radical anarchists were convicted for their role in the events of that day; one was sentenced to 15 years in prison, and the other seven were sentenced to death. On September 6, 1901, President William McKinley was shot to death in Buffalo, NY, by Leon Czolgosz, a radical anarchist. Czolgosz was tried and convicted in September 1901, and on October 29, 1901, he was executed. On June 2, 1919, a group of Italian anarchists launched simultaneous bombing attacks in New York City; Boston, Massachusetts; Cleveland, Ohio; Patterson, New Jersey; Washington, D.C.; and Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Government officials, such as Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, were the primary targets of these bombs. As a result of these bombings, Palmer attempted to crash radical labor organizations, organizing the so-called Palmer Raids, which resulted in the detention of thousands of suspected anarchists and the deportation of many of them.

320

Domestic Terrorist Groups

From 1920 to 1960, the United States experienced limited domestic terrorism actions. During these 4 decades, terrorism in the world was characterized by anticolonial sentiment, which gave rise to terrorist groups using guerrilla-type actions against colonial powers. In the 1950s, the Puerto Rico Nationalist Party was gaining momentum in its fight for independence from U.S. rule. The party conducted violent protests and uprisings throughout Puerto Rico, but it did not limit its activities solely to the island. On November 1, 1950, two Puerto Rican Nationalists attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman in the Blair House, across the street from the White House. During their attempt to gain access to the president, the two assailants exchanged fire with members of the White House Police and U.S. Secret Service. Both assailants were wounded and arrested. On March 1, 1954, four Puerto Rican Nationalists shot 30 rounds from semiautomatic pistols from the U.S. Capitol’s visitors’ balcony, injuring five U.S. representatives. All were arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. During the 1960s and 1970s, domestic terrorism in the United States had a revolutionary, leftist political connotation mixed with a strong anti– Vietnam War sentiment. Groups such as the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Weather Underground Organization, and the Black Liberation Army targeted federal, state, and local buildings and officials in their struggle to gain notoriety for their cause. On August 24, 1970, four radical, antiwar activists planted a bomb in Sterling Hall, a University of Wisconsin–Madison building that hosted the Army Mathematics Research Center. The blast resulted in the death of a physics researcher and wounded others. On March 1, 1971, members of the Weather Underground bombed the Senate wing of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., and in 1975, the same group bombed the U.S. State Department building in the nation’s capital. No one was killed in either of the attacks. During this period, radical groups fighting for Puerto Rican independence continued to be active. On January 24, 1975, members of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacíon Nacional) bombed Fraunces Tavern, in the heart of New York City, killing four and injuring 63 people.

The 1990s brought terroristic violence from white nationalist and other extreme far-right groups and from lone wolves. In addition, radical Muslims also started operating in the United States. On February 26, 1993, a 1,200-pound bomb in a truck parked in a parking garage beneath the World Trade Center exploded, causing 6 deaths and injuring more than 1,000 people. Seven Islamic terrorists linked with the radical Muslim terrorist organization al Qaeda were convicted for the attack. On April 19, 1995, a bomb was detonated outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The blast killed 168 people and injured more than 500. Two rightwing, antigovernment extremists, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were arrested and convicted for the bombing. McVeigh was executed in 2001, and Nichols was sentenced to life in prison. On July 27, 1996, a bomb exploded at the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, killing one person and injuring 111 others. Eric Robert Rudolph, an anti-abortion, antigay radical, was convicted for this blast and for another attack on an abortion clinic. On September 11, 2001, four commercial airplanes were hijacked by 19 members of al Qaeda. The planes were crashed into the Twin Towers of New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The fourth plane, which was thought to be en route to the White House, crashed in an open field in Pennsylvania. The attacks took nearly 3,000 lives and injured many others. The September 11 terrorist attacks marked the start of an era of global terrorism and the so-called War on Terror. Since September 11, 2001, radical Islamic groups and individuals, along with white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups, have been very active. The year 2009 saw two notorious failed terrorist attacks on U.S. soil by individuals linked to al Qaeda. At the beginning of 2009, Najibullah Zazi actively plotted to bomb the New York City subway with other radical Muslims. On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian national, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, traveling from Paris to Detroit, Michigan, tried to detonate a bomb he was carrying in his underwear. He was subdued by the passengers and crew members while the plane was approaching Detroit International Airport.

Domestic Terrorist Groups

On November 5, 2009, a U.S. Army psychiatrist, Nidal Malik Hasan, fatally shot 13 people and injured more than 30 others in Fort Hood, Texas. Although the act has been labeled as “work-related violence,” many believe that the connections of Malik with al Qaeda extremists indicate an act of domestic terrorism, as he confessed that he had opened fire to protect Taliban fighters from U.S. soldiers. On May 1, 2010, a Pakistani immigrant with strong links to al Qaeda, Faisal Shahzad, parked an SUV full of explosives in New York’s Time Square. The bomb failed to detonate. On April 15, 2013, two bombs exploded near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring at least 264 others. The Boston police identified the bombing suspects as two brothers, 26-year-old Tamerlan Tsarnaev and 19-year-old Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Muslim extremists linked to terrorist groups in Chechenia. Tamerlan died in a shoot-out with the police, while his brother was arrested. In 2015, Dzhokhar was convicted of all the indicted charges and sentenced to death (as of 2016, he was still in prison).

Notorious Domestic Terrorist Groups Left-Wing Terrorist Groups

The Weatherman/Weather Underground Organization The Weatherman was formed in 1969 out of the Students for a Democratic Society national convention in Chicago, Illinois. It advocated for bombings, armed resistance, and assassinations to defeat U.S. imperialism and create a communist world without social classes. By the mid-1970s, most of the leaders of the organization were on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list. The unofficial end of the Weather Underground occurred in 1981, after many of its leaders turned themselves in to face charges. The Symbionese Liberation Army The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was an urban guerrilla group founded in late 1973. The group was led by Donald DeFreeze, an ex-convict, and comprised primarily middle-class, white,

321

college-educated individuals. The SLA was responsible for multiple bank robberies; the murder of the Oakland, California, school superintendent in November 1973; and the kidnapping of the 19-year-old newspaper heiress Patricia Hearst on February 4, 1974. Hearst resurfaced in April 1974, participating in an SLA bank robbery in San Francisco. She was captured in 1975 and convicted of bank robbery; she served 21 months in prison and was pardoned by President Bill Clinton in 2001. Animal Liberation Front The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is a singleissue extremist organization that started its operations in the mid-1970s. The main goal of the organization is to use vandalism, arson, animal releases, harassing telephone calls, and threats and attempts to disrupt the business activities of people and organizations that support animal research and testing. According to the FBI, the ALF is upgrading its tactics to the use of direct violence against food producers, biomedical researchers, and law enforcement and to planning assassinations of researchers, corporate officers, and employees of such organizations. Earth Liberation Front The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is a singleissue extremist organization that came about in 1992. Its activities have been directly linked with those of the ALF. Following ALF’s tactics, the ELF engages in economic sabotage to halt the exploitation and destruction of the environment. The FBI has estimated that from 1996 to 2002 the ALF and the ELF have together committed more than 600 criminal acts in the United States, resulting in damages in excess of $43 million. Right-Wing Terrorist Groups

Ku Klux Klan The KKK is thought to be the oldest violent hate group in the United States. The primary targets of the group’s violence have been African Americans, Jews, immigrants, gays, lesbians, and Catholics. Although the KKK has been considerably weakened since the mid-1980s, it has been

322

Domestic Terrorist Groups

estimated that the group has today between 5,000 and 8,000 members, divided into different groups. The KKK has strong links with neo-Nazi groups and actively participates in rallies all over the country. The Order The Order was founded in 1983 by Robert Jay Mathews, a racial supremacist activist. The Order’s members believed that there was a strong component of Zionism within the U.S. government. Their main methods to fight Zionism were bank and armored car robberies, counterfeiting, and murder. Very active in the Pacific Northwest in 1984, members of the group bombed a synagogue in Boise, Idaho; seized $500,000 from an armored car in Seattle, Washington, and $3.6 million from another one in California; and murdered Jewish Radio personality Alan Berg. The Order disappeared after the prosecution and imprisonment of most of its members in December 1985. Racist Skinheads The skinhead movement has its origins in working-class youths in England during the 1960s. In the United States, the first groups appeared in the Midwest and in Texas in the 1980s. In the 1990s, most of the skinhead groups unified to form the Hammerskin Nation, but since then, other groups have emerged to challenge the power of the Hammerskin Nation. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, in 2011, 133 skinhead groups were active in the United States. Violence and hate crime actions are ingrained in the skinhead movement. Their violence seems to be spontaneous and opportunistic. They usually target nonwhites and social and religious minorities. Militia Extremists The militia movement is a fairly new right-wing extremist movement. These groups are armed paramilitary groups with a defined antigovernment, conspiracy-oriented ideology. Militia groups were formed after the 1993 Waco standoff between Branch Davidians and federal law enforcement; 2 years later, almost every state had representation in one or more of these groups. After the

Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the militia movement declined from 441 groups in 1995 to 72 in 2001. Since 2008, however, the militia movement has experienced a revival. In 2011, according to some accounts, there were 330 active militia groups. The majority of their violence is targeted at law enforcement, judicial, and government officials; those who are arrested are often charged with weapons, explosives, and conspiracy violations.

Domestic Terrorist Groups and Surveillance, Security, and Privacy Surveillance is an important tool to prevent and disrupt domestic terrorism incidents in the United States. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies depend on surveillance to obtain valuable intelligence. In the post-9/11 era, government surveillance programs have expanded. These programs are sensitive and secretive in nature, which in turn has contributed to public suspicion and the growing debate over privacy laws. A good example of such programs is Project Prism. Conducted by the National Security Agency, this program reportedly collects Internet communications and information from nine major Internet providers in the United States, targeting specific individuals and organizations that are suspected to have terrorist links. Controversy about privacy issues for American citizens was aroused when a former agency contractor, Edward Snowden, publicized the extent of the program and a series of alleged privacy violations, in the name of national security, affecting millions of American citizens with no ties to terrorism. Marcos L. Misis See also National Security; Threat Assessment; War on Terror

Further Readings Borgeson, K. & R. Valeri. Terrorism in America. Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2008. Fagin, J. A. When Terrorism Strikes Home. Boston, MA: Pearson, 2006. Martin, G. Essentials of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014.

Drone Strikes McCann, J. Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators From the Famous to the Forgotten. Boulder, CO: Sentient, 2006. Rapport, D. C. “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism.” Current History, v.100/ 650 (2001). Simon, J. Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat. New York, NY: Prometheus Books, 2013.

Drone Strikes Drones or unmanned aerial vehicles are used not only for surveillance but also, when armed, for lethal strikes in armed conflict. Examples of combat drones include General Atomics’s MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper. Perhaps the most well-known drone strikes are the ones conducted by the United States in its counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan (Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA—especially North Waziristan). In this entry, the use of drone strikes as a means of conducting targeted killings and the settings and circumstances in which they are employed are examined from both practical and moral perspectives. The differences between targeted killings, surgical strikes, and signature strikes are then revealed, with a discussion on the morality of the latter two in theaters of war. Drone strikes are sometimes referred to as targeted killings. Roughly speaking, targeted killing is the premeditated, freely performed, intentional killing of a uniquely identified individual who does not pose an imminent threat. The targets do not pose an imminent threat since they are typically killed in circumstances in which they are, for example, asleep in their domiciles (e.g., Osama bin Laden). It is not necessary to use drones to perform targeted killings; indeed, compared with handguns, rifles, and other weapons, drones are a blunt instrument. Nevertheless, drones can be used for targeted killings. For example, the firing of a rocket from a U.S. drone in Yemen in 2002 that killed six al Qaeda operatives was an instance of targeted killing since it took place in a relatively sparsely populated geographical location (so that

323

there was little or no chance of the loss of innocent life). However, drones can also be used for nontargeted indiscriminate killing. For example, a drone operator could deliberately activate a drone to destroy school buildings known to be occupied by children. Moreover, even when carried out with the best of intentions, drone strikes have killed innocent bystanders. Accordingly, the moral controversy in relation to targeted killing, although it overlaps with the moral controversy over the use of drones, is different in important respects; one might support the targeted killing of terrorists under certain circumstances but argue that the use of drones in counterterrorism operations should be banned. There is a need to make a threefold distinction between theaters of war (e.g., battlefields), wellordered civilian jurisdictions existing under the rule of law (e.g., London), and disorderly jurisdictions that—although not well-ordered—are, nevertheless, not theaters of war (e.g., the FATA). Presumably, the lethal use of drones in wellordered jurisdictions during peacetime (e.g., the streets of London, New York, or New Delhi) is morally impermissible. In general, the use of lethal force in these circumstances is governed by very restrictive moral principles. The police, for example, can use lethal force only in personal selfdefense (or the defense of some third party) against an imminent threat, as a last resort, and in accordance with a very restrictive principle of necessity. On the other hand, as Bradley Jay Strawser has argued, there does not appear to be any good and decisive in principle moral objection against the lethal use of drones in a theater of war in the context of a just war. Strawser argues for the stronger claim that the use of drones is morally obligatory in a just war. The antidrone arguments, on the other hand, include the claim that asymmetrical warfare is unfair and the so-called threshold effect argument. According to the former argument, the fact that drone operators are safe but the terrorist-combatants are at risk is unfair. No doubt this is unfair, but surely a just war does not need to be fair in this sense. According to the latter argument, since the enemy does not have drones and does not have the means to target drone operators, one is more likely to resort to drones. The total quantum of innocent lives lost

324

Drone Strikes

is likely to increase, notwithstanding that in any given drone strike considered on its own the likelihood of loss of innocent lives is reduced. This is, of course, a disputable empirical claim. The controversial cases of drone use, and indeed of targeted killings, are in disorderly jurisdictions—areas that are neither theaters of war nor well-ordered civilian areas. The term targeted killing should not be confused with the notion of a surgical strike or that of a signature strike. Surgical strikes include ones conducted against individual high-value targets and also to inflict relatively heavy casualties. The latter is clearly not targeted killing, because the targets may well be anonymous combatants. However, neither is the former necessarily targeted killing, because such surgical strikes against uniquely identified high-value targets may well involve the unintended but foreseen killing of innocent civilians (so-called collateral damage). Signature strikes are strikes on individuals who have not been uniquely identified in our sense but who exhibit a pattern of suspicious behavior. As such, they are not targeted killings. As is the case with targeted killings, surgical strikes and signature strikes are, at least in principle, morally permissible in a theater of war (in the overall context of a just war). Likewise, they are morally impermissible in well-ordered civilian jurisdictions. However, the morally problematic cases are disorderly jurisdictions and, in particular, counterterrorist activity in areas such as the FATA. Signature strikes are morally problematic in counterterrorist operations in civilian areas of disorderly jurisdictions in which terrorists are active because, in effect, the definitions on which they rely are regarded as too permissive. They are too permissive by virtue of not being sufficiently reliable indicators as to whether or not a given terrorist suspect is in fact a terrorist. Accordingly, they inevitably lead to the intentional killing of suspects who turn out to be innocent civilians. In short, the notion of suspicious behavior is arguably too epistemically weak to underpin a moral justification to take the life of a person otherwise known to be only a civilian, albeit in an area in which there is terrorist activity. In counterterrorist operations in disorderly jurisdictions, such as those engaged in by the

United States against al Qaeda in the FATA, surgical strikes are frequently lethal drone strikes against terrorists living among innocent civilians and not readily distinguishable from those civilians. Notwithstanding that they are intended to minimize innocent civilian deaths, surgical strikes bring with them the distinct possibility of collateral damage and, therefore, given multiple surgical strikes, the likelihood of significant loss of innocent human life. By contrast, targeted killings do not imply any loss of innocent human life on any occasion or, indeed, on multiple occasions taken in aggregate. Arguably, therefore, surgical strikes cannot be morally justified in counterterrorist operations in disorderly jurisdictions but, rather, only in theaters of war in which the principles of military necessity and proportionality—rather than more restrictive principles, such as those governing the use of lethal force by the police—are applicable. This view is consistent with maintaining that targeted killing is morally permissible, at least in principle, in counterterrorist operations in disorderly jurisdictions. This is because targeted killings do not, at least in principle, necessarily or typically involve collateral damage. By contrast, surgical strikes involve significant collateral damage, hence the significant loss of innocent human life arising from drone strikes in the FATA. Although the numbers here are in dispute, according to a recent Council on Foreign Relations report, the loss of innocent human life in FATA alone from 2002 to 2012 was in the hundreds. Seumas Miller See also Drones, Commercial Applications of; Morality; Terrorism

Further Readings Amnesty International. Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan. London, England: Author, 2013. Finkelstein, C., et al., eds. Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2012. Medea, Benjamin. Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control. London, England: Verso Books, 2013. Miller, Seumas. Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Ethics and Liberal Democracy. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2009.

Drones, Commercial Applications of Miller, Seumas. “The Ethics of Targeted Killing: Osama bin Laden, Drones and Counter-Terrorism.” Public Affairs Quarterly, v.28/3 (2014). Strawser, Bradley Jay. “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.” Journal of Military Ethics, v.9/4 (2010). Strawser, Bradley Jay. Killing bin Laden: A Moral Analysis. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Zenko, Micah. Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013.

Drones, Commercial Applications of Also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), drones are aircraft that are either controlled wirelessly by pilots from the ground or pre-programmed to fly autonomously. They can carry cameras, sensors, and other devices, integrating radio control, wireless communications, and internal navigation technologies, which enable them to be used for surveillance of various kinds in the public and private sectors. Developed and conceived originally for the military and law enforcement, drones are currently expanding into the commercial industry as well as civilian and public safety sectors. This entry focuses on the commercial application and possible uses of drones—with discussions on UAVs’ capabilities; regulations concerning their federal, commercial, and private use; and potential violations of privacy through the use of drones for surveillance.

Application and Uses Drones vary in terms of size, and technological and aerial capabilities. In terms of size, drones are currently classified into four main categories: strategic, tactical, micro, and mini. Strategic drones are currently used only by the military, both in foreign operations and to secure internal border areas, as they can reach altitudes of 20,000 meters. Tactical drones are mainly deployed in security contexts and by public bodies, primarily by the police in law enforcement operations. Micro and mini drones are the types currently being used by the private sector, as they are more suitable for low-altitude flights in populated areas.

325

Drones can collect a broad range of data from multiple aerial vantage points, introducing new data visualization capabilities with multiple uses in the private sector. The commercial applications of drones seem endless, and they will likely increase with the development of new technologies. Currently, the surveillance technologies most often mounted on UAV devices are high-power zoom lenses, thermal imaging, light detection and ranging, radar technologies, video analytics technology, distributed networked surveillance, and facial recognition or other biometric recognition to identify height, age, gender, or skin color. The Teal Group Corporation, a group of aerospace and defense industry analysts, considers the global market for drones to be “the most dynamic growth sector of the world aerospace industry” and estimates that worldwide UAV spending will almost double to US$11.5 billion by 2024. Specifically, drones are also currently in use in ­search-and-rescue operations, tracking and monitoring of animal populations, real estate, crime scene and highway accident imagery, aerial archeology, monitoring of environmental change and abuse, advertising, celebrity spotting, film and television production, assessing of otherwise inaccessible areas, observing of crowd behavior in major events, and monitoring of power lines, forest fires, and crop health. Individuals are ­ increasingly using drones for recreational purposes, such as photography and activism. The private sector has shown an interest in drones for some time. Both Google and Facebook own UAVs and have invested in developing solarpowered strategic devices that would enable the UAVs to remain in the air for months at a time. Both companies stated their willingness to explore the possibilities of using drones to bring wireless signals to parts of the world currently not serviced by terrestrial communication networks, and Google is looking at specific ways to integrate drones into its mapping applications. As for micro and mini UAVs, in December 2013, Amazon’s CEO, Jeff Bezos, announced the company’s intention to start developing drones for aerial deliveries of its products. In July 2014, Amazon asked the U.S. government for permission for broader testing of the unmanned, compact aircraft in outdoor areas, and in 2016, federal regulations for commercial drones went into effect. The more ­

326

Drones, Commercial Applications of

widespread use of these smaller devices, however, is contingent on the energy sector and its monitoring of power lines. In such a diverse and evolving market, the ­commercial applications of drones are difficult to categorize. Some of the broad categories that emerge are commercial aerial surveillance (which can be used in filmmaking, advertising, aerial archeology, sports photography, geophysical and geomagnetic surveys), disaster relief and conservation (search-and-rescue, transporting and receiving samples and medicines, diagnosis of a crisis ­situation, accessing difficult areas, fire detection), training (of human pilots and operators, or in any other field), and scientific research.

Regulations The legality of UAVs, however, is still an open debate. Amazon’s announcement of its plan to deliver products using micro and mini drones was met with different arguments pointing to the many obstacles such development would face, the first and foremost being federal and state regulatory approval. As noted earlier, in the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration, acting on a mandate from the U.S. Congress, issued regulations in 2016 regarding commercial drones in U.S. airspace. News that the U.S. military has seen more than 400 of its drones crash in accidents around the world since 2001 and the National Park Service’s 2014 policy to prohibit UAVs on the grounds of noise and nuisance are matters to take into account. In most countries, governments have issued only general guidelines for the use of UAVs, and while comprehensive regulations are being discussed, countries such as Spain have banned the use of commercial drones altogether until such regulations come into effect. In other countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, drones are used by the public and private sectors with no regulations or plans for regulations whatsoever.

Privacy Concerns and Other Challenges Aviation regulations are likely to address only some of the problems arising from the proliferation of drones. Matters related to public safety,

reliability, individual privacy, operator training and certification, security, traffic control, theft, societal acceptability, and other logistical challenges need to be addressed by legislation spanning beyond the competences of civil aviation agencies. In Australia alone, privately owned drones have made headlines after crashing into infrastructure or people on at least two occasions, in 2013 and 2014. On a different note, the U.S.based paparazzi agency AKM-GSI admitted to capturing drone videos of celebrity homes and selling them as an established practice. While this practice is not that much different from traditional celebrity-spotting techniques, the use of drones to capture images of private areas or persons brings to light the lack of privacy and protection for the subject, who is often unaware of such practices or, if made aware of them, unable to exercise his or her privacy rights. The promise of a broad market for UAVs is prompting investment in commercial drones in many different sectors and countries. However, the drive for drone development seems to be obscuring current challenges linked to data management, the security and privacy of the devices, their compliance with existing regulations, and respect for fundamental rights, such as privacy rights. Gemma Galdon Clavell See also Airport Security; Border Patrol Checkpoints; Dataveillance; Identity Politics.

Further Readings Adey, Peter. Aerial Life: Spaces, Mobilites, Affects. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Bracken-Roche, Chiara, et al. Surveillance Drones: Privacy Implications of the Spread of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Canada. Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Surveillance Studies Center, 2014. Cavoukian, Anne. Privacy and Drones: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Information and Privacy Commissioner). Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Privacy by Design, 2012. http://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/ pbd-drones.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Finn, Rachel L. and David Wright. “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Surveillance, Ethics and Privacy in Civil Application.” Computer Law and Security Review, v.28 (2012). Parsons, Chris and Adam Molnar. Watching Below: Dimensions of Surveillance-by-UAVs in Canada.

Drug Testing Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Block G Privacy and Security Consulting, 2013. Teal Group Corporation. “Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $91 Billion in Its 2014 UAV Market Profile and Forecast” (July 17, 2014). http://www.tealgroup.com/index.php/aboutteal-group-corporation/press-releases/118-2014-uavpress-release (Accessed October 2017).

Drug Testing In an effort to prevent substance abuse and its consequences, drug testing has become increasingly frequent in workplaces, schools, and athletics. More recently, drug testing has been extended to being a condition of access to social benefits such as welfare and unemployment benefits, but it is complicated by results showing that few test positive. For athletes, drug testing targets performance-enhancing drugs as well as illegal drugs, whereas in the workplace and the social benefits realm, drug testing targets illicit drugs, with marijuana being the most common drug for which people test positive. Opponents of drug testing have argued that it violates the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Thus, balancing a desire to prevent the abuse of illicit drugs and performance-enhancing drugs with privacy concerns remains part of the ongoing debate regarding drug testing policies and procedures.

Drug Testing in the Workplace Many employers require new employees to complete drug testing prior to beginning employment. Among the employers requiring drug testing are retailers, oil companies, and various levels of government. In addition, federal government officials with security clearances, potential employees who operate expensive equipment, and staff who deal with sensitive environments also may be drug tested. Federal and state courts have allowed drug testing, although certain limits have been put in place. California, for instance, requires there to be a compelling interest to drug test a current employee. At the state and local levels, each jurisdiction has different requirements. Some allow drug testing

327

only in very specific and limited circumstances, whereas others allow drug testing to be done more frequently and with less scrutiny. Although in the United States marijuana remains classified as a Schedule I controlled substance (i.e., it has no currently accepted medical use) and Attorney General Jeff Sessions indicated in 2017 the possibility of greater enforcement, during the 2010s many states moved to decriminalize marijuana offenses, and some states, such as Colorado, legalized its recreational use. It remains to be seen what impact this will have on drug testing, especially in the workplace. Many have noted that marijuana is detectable in a drug test for 4 to 8 weeks following usage, whereas other drugs deemed more serious (e.g., cocaine) are hard to track.

Drug Testing in Middle and High Schools In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court in Pottawatomie County v. Earls voted 5–4 to allow drug testing of middle and high school students engaged in extracurricular activities. The decision did not break out solely on conventional ideological difference. Justice Stephen Breyer, who advocates a “living Constitution,” supported the decision, while Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a moderate conservative, dissented. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote, Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug  testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no ­ opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh’s Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District’s important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren.

As a result, drug testing has expanded for middle and high school students.

Drug Testing in Colleges and Universities National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) athletes are subjected to drug testing, with distinctions made for performance-enhancing and street drugs. The NCAA conducts drug tests at championships and at Division I and II programs. NCAA

328

Drug Testing Kits

athletes who fail drug tests because of performance-enhancing drugs can lose 1 year of eligibility after failing one drug test; if they fail a subsequent drug test because of performanceenhancing drugs, they may lose eligibility permanently. Lesser penalties are in place for illicit street drugs. NCAA athletes who fail to present themselves for drug testing are considered to have had a positive test. Schools themselves also may establish drug test programs.

Drug Testing in Professional Athletics and International Competitions Several scandals in athletics have helped make drug testing more common. The World AntiDoping Agency was established in 1999, and it designs procedures and accredits laboratories and other facilities. It also administers the World AntiDoping Code. Athletic organizations such as the International Olympic Committee and the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency determine penalties and enforcement. The past 20 years have seen a move toward more uniform standards.

Drug Testing and Social Benefits The most recent expansion of drug testing has occurred in access to social benefits. As of March 2017, at least 15 states have passed legislation requiring drug testing to access social benefits. For example, in 2013, the state of Texas passed legislation requiring people receiving unemployment insurance to undergo drug testing; however, as of 2017, the legislation has not been implemented. In 2015, the state of Wisconsin passed a law attempting to require recipients of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program to undergo drug testing, but the federal government stated that states are not allowed to create additional regulations. Laws in states such as Florida have been blocked in the federal courts because of Fourth Amendment violations. Drug testing laws present two additional problems: (1) difficulty of implementation and (2) results that do not always support the need for the legislation. For instance, it is difficult for states to determine how many recipients to test and who is to be tested. States such as Florida, Tennessee, and

Utah have shown that of the people tested, very few have tested positive. Matthew J. Gritter See also Drug Trafficking; Smuggling; U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, et al., 536 U.S. 822 (2002). https://www.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-332 (Accessed October 2017). Budd, Jordan C. “Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment.” Williams & Mary Bills of Rights Journal, v.19/3 (2011). National Conference of State Legislatures. “Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance” (March 24, 2017). http://www.ncsl.org/research/ human-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance .aspx (Accessed October 2017).

Drug Testing Kits Drug testing involves the two-part analysis of a biological specimen, typically urine, to determine whether traces of illicit drugs are present in the body. The first part, a screening test, involves a relatively simple analysis using thin-layer chromatography. If the sample tests positive for drugs, a more sophisticated confirmation test employing gas chromatography/mass spectrometry may be performed. In addition to urine analysis, blood and saliva may be tested, and the use of hair sample analysis has become more common. The basic drug testing “panel” includes checks for the presence of amphetamines, tetrahydrocannabinol (cannabinoids, marijuana, hash), cocaine, opiates (heroin, opium, codeine, morphine), and phencyclidine. Additional panels include legal drugs that individuals may be taking with a physician’s prescription, such as opiate pain killers and benzodiazepines tranquilizers. After three decades of the “war on drugs,” testing has become a ubiquitous form of surveillance in both the criminal justice system and the everyday lives of millions of people in workplaces, schools, homes, and other community

Drug Testing Kits

settings. Professional and amateur athletes have also been the target of comprehensive drug testing regimes to determine if they are “doping,” or using performance-enhancing drugs. Current estimates put the number of Americans tested in 2013 to be 20 million to 25 million, up from around 7 million in 1996, and the drug testing industry has more than $2 billion in sales. This entry reveals the process of utilizing various types of drug testing kits; describes the prevalence of drug testing in the criminal justice system, workplaces, and schools; looks at the methods employed to “beat” drug tests; and concludes with an examination of the individual privacy concerns associated with drug testing programs. Currently, urine analysis screening kits cost as little as $5 each and require minimal knowledge on the part of the tester. Fully automated test cups can test whether a specimen sample is at the correct temperature and that it has not been altered or diluted. The tester simply peels back the result label, and a negative result is shown with two lines or a positive is shown with one line in the urine drug test panel. In addition to urine analysis, saliva and hair samples can be tested as well. Saliva-testing kits provide on-site, instant results; the testers do not have to handle urine, and the tests are considered, by some, as less personally invasive. While testing urine specimens can only detect a single instance of drug use in the prior 1 to 3 days, hair testing can detect a pattern of repetitive use over a period of up to 90 days because the ingested drugs circulate in the bloodstream and traces of it remain in the hair follicles. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, drug testing may take place at all stages of the criminal justice system: arrest, pretrial, incarceration, probation, parole, and community corrections. However, drug testing is most commonly deployed in the workplace, where the vast majority of the tests are used for purposes of preemployment screening rather than on current employees. Quest Diagnostics processed nearly 9 million workplace drug tests in 2013. In certain occupational categories, drug and alcohol tests can take place under conditions of “reasonable cause” or suspicion, after an accident, or randomly during the preemployment stage. Employers assert that alcohol or drug abuse by employees creates

329

significant safety and health hazards in the workplace and results in decreased productivity, poor employee morale, and additional costs in the form of disability and health care claims. By one estimate, in 2008, 16.5% of U.S. public school districts had student random drug testing programs, with at least 1% of districts adding programs every year. Delaware Valley High School in Pennsylvania made national headlines when it began testing every student who wanted to join any school-sponsored activities, including the yearbook and the chess club. Miami-Dade Public Schools launched a “voluntary” drug testing program for all high school students, requiring consent from both parents and students. And in 2011, the Belvidere Board of Education in Belvidere, New Jersey, approved a plan that let parents have their 12-year-old sixth graders subjected to random drug testing. In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration approved the first drug testing kit for home use without a prescription. Today, parents can pick up testing kits at chain drug stores or order them over the Internet. Since failing a drug test is likely to carry significant personal consequences, many attempt to “beat” the test by purchasing products designed to produce a “false negative,” or nondetection of a drug despite its presence in the sample. Purveyors in this unregulated sector tout herbal teas, pills, and liquids that they claim can detox the body in a matter of hours, daily-cleansing capsules for continual detoxing, and even shampoos that remove evidence from hair. Drug testing has generated a considerable amount of litigation over the issue of privacy, but many rulings seem to follow the reasoning that, on balance, there is a “greater good” for society established at the cost of minimal individual invasion of privacy. Courts have generally concluded that the applicants have a simple choice to either consent to the limited invasion of their privacy caused by the test or decline to submit and lose the job. Few states have enacted protective legislation against random drug testing, leaving private employers free to test anyone for any reason. Drug testing, as a form of bodily surveillance, raises a host of ethical and legal issues regarding the power of private and governmental organizations to collect personal information about individuals and use that information to control their

330

Drug Therapy

behavior. Testing programs, if used, are likely to be most successful if they are designed to balance the needs and demands of organizations with the protection of privacy rights, confidentiality, and human dignity. William G. Staples See also Drug Testing; Privacy; Privacy, Medical; War on Drugs; Work Surveillance

Further Readings Hanson, F. Allan. Testing Testing: Social Consequences of the Examined Life. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Sznitman, Sharon R., et.al. “Student Drug Testing in the Context of Positive and Negative School Climates: Results From a National Survey.” Journal of Youth and Adolescence, v.41/2 (2012). Tunnell, Ken D. Pissing on Demand: Workplace Drug Testing and the Rise of the Detox Industry. New York: New York University Press, 2004.

Drug Therapy Drug therapy refers to treatment options using pharmacological substances. There is a wide range of pharmacological substances used to treat diseases and other health conditions. Because the prevalence of diseases and other health conditions tends to be higher among incarcerated offenders when compared with the general population, it is understandable that the need for drug therapy may be relatively high among inmates. However, the use of drug therapy among prison populations, although primarily to treat health conditions, can also facilitate surveillance and monitoring, as well as be a means of self- and social control. Drug therapy contributes to change in behavior based on social control, enhances effective inmate management, and facilitates improvement in the health status of offenders. The extent of drug therapy in the criminal justice system is not clear. As of 2015, there were more than 2.2 million individuals incarcerated in the United States, and it is estimated that approximately 85% of offenders tend to have some level

of drug or substance abuse problems or addiction. It has also been identified that the health status of offenders tends to be lower when compared with the general population. There are high levels of infectious diseases such as sexually transmitted infections, including HIV, hepatitis B, and tuberculosis. A large proportion of offenders are also being diagnosed with mental and psychological problems. In 2005, estimates suggest, 56% of state prisoners, 45% of federal prisoners, and 64% of jail inmates had a mental illness. With more offenders having to serve long sentences because of mandatory sentencing requirements, the proportion of aging prisoners, who tend to have chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, and hypertension, has increased tremendously. Although the exact extent of drug therapy cannot be accurately computed, the usage of drug therapy appears to be quite extensive. Drug therapy is generally requested by medical personnel affiliated with the prison or jail facilities. However, inmates may be incarcerated who have already been on therapy or who may develop symptoms that warrant treatment. The multimodality approach, which has been shown to be quite effective in addressing inmates’ needs, includes drug therapy as well as provision of other services. The method of administration of drug therapy varies depending on the patient, the health condition, and the substance being prescribed. Drug therapy can be administered through a range of modalities, including intravenously, intramuscularly, orally, or topically.

Types of Drug Therapy Drug therapy is used to fulfill a number of goals in the criminal justice system. Principally, it is used to treat offenders who are clinically ill with a range of chronic and/or infectious diseases. However, it can also be used to address behavior modification so that offenders may be able to stand trial or as a means of self- or social control to address negative or aggressive behaviors. For example, testosterone drug therapy has been used to lower hormone levels among some male sex offenders in order to reduce the likelihood of reoffending. In situations where offenders may be aggressive and impulsive, drug therapy provides a means of self- and social control. Because offenders may be assigned to drug

Drug Trafficking

courts, drug therapy can also be used as a means of monitoring and surveillance of these inmates.

331

Wilper, Andrew P., et al. “The Health and Health Care of US Prisoners: Results of a Nationwide Survey.” American Journal of Public Health, v.99/4 (2009).

Implications Drug therapy is an important strategy in inmate management based on the diverse health and other needs of offenders. Some inmates are physically ill, whereas others may have mental and psychological problems or substance addiction. Drug therapy is beneficial to treat existing or developing conditions experienced by inmates, as well as fulfill the human rights mandate of access to health services. The therapy can also be used to facilitate better relationships among inmates and improve inmate management. Drug therapy is also used to render offenders fit for trial as well as treat certain types of drug addiction. In these ways, drug therapy provides tremendous benefits to the criminal justice system. It contributes to improving the health status of offenders, maintaining behavior and social control, and effective inmate management. Its use in multimodal programs facilitates surveillance and monitoring of inmates. Fay V. Williams See also Prisons and Jails; Social Control; Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities

Drug Trade See Smuggling

Drug Trafficking Drug trafficking is the illegal or unlawful production, selling, distribution, or transportation of illegal controlled substances. These include, but are not limited to, crack, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, MDMA (ecstasy), and LSD. In 2017, Global Financial Integrity estimated the global drug trade to be valued at US$426 billion to US$652 billion. Due to the criminalization of controlled substances, drug trafficking has become a global issue and affects regions and countries differently. For example, some countries are source countries, whereas others are destination/market countries. This entry discusses the international drug trade before turning its attention to security and surveillance strategies for monitoring and controlling drug trafficking and associated privacy concerns.

Further Readings Balbuena, Lloyd, et al. “Does Clozapine Promote Employability and Reduce Offending Among Mentally Disordered Offenders?” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, v.55/1 (2010). Belenko, S. and J. Peugh. “Estimating Drug Treatment Needs Among State Prison Inmates.” Drug and Alcohol Dependence, v.77/3 (2005). Butler, Tony, et al. “Reducing Impulsivity in Repeat Violent Offenders: An Open Label Trial of a Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor.” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, v.44 (2010). Marvel, Francoise, et al. “Multidimensional Family Therapy HIV/STD Risk-Reduction Intervention: An Integrative Family-Based Model for Drug-Involved Juvenile Offenders.” Family Process, v.48/1 (2009). Wild, T. C. “Social Control and Coercion in Addiction Treatment: Towards Evidence-Based Policy and Practice.” Addiction, v.101/1 (2006).

Multinational Drug Trade Worldwide, most suppliers and cultivators of controlled substances are from less developed countries in Southeast and Southwest Asia and Latin America. Some enter the international drug trade as a lucrative endeavor, whereas for others, it is a means of survival. For example, some politicians have been prosecuted for profiting from the illegal drug trade, whereas some peasant farmers in South America rely on the drug trade as a means of making a living after being driven out of traditional harvests like coffee in lieu of coca, which is used to manufacture cocaine. The dominant suppliers of drugs have changed over time. The United States is one of the largest consumers of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Marijuana remains the most

332

Drug Trafficking

commonly used type of drug in the United States and is primarily supplied from Mexico. Prior to the 1990s, Colombia was the dominant supplier of cocaine to the United States. The subsequent dismantling of the Colombian cartels opened the market to Mexican suppliers. However, since 2013, Colombia has experienced a boom in coca production. This has led to a more concentrated effort between both countries to address the growth and cultivation of coca. While most of the cocaine found in the United States is originally from Colombia, it is transported through Mexico. Some less developed countries provide the raw materials for controlled substances based on their geographical areas. Many of the underdeveloped countries that supply raw materials or illegal controlled substances to more developed countries do so as a form of keeping their economies afloat. Some countries have been left behind by the global economy and resort to competing in the drug market. Bolivia, Malaysia, and Guyana are examples of countries whose economies are supported by drug trafficking, which keeps their economies afloat.

Drug Type, Production, and Distribution Illegal drugs are typically found in three forms. First, they can be found as raw plants (e.g., cannabis). Second, they can be produced as refined plants (e.g., cocaine). Third, drugs can also be found in the form of synthetic controlled substances (e.g., ecstasy). The three most competitive countries in the drug trade are Colombia for coca, Mexico for cannabis, and Afghanistan for opium. One of the drugs that has been growing in popularity, especially among white American consumers, is methamphetamine. Methamphetamine is a synthetic chemical drug made in laboratories from amphetamines and other chemicals. Unlike other drugs, methamphetamine provides producers independence from crops. It also allows manufacturers to make the drug in almost any location, but remote locations are typically used to avoid detection or suspicion by neighbors, as a chemical smell, fires, and explosions are common during the production of methamphetamine. Cocaine continues to be primarily supplied by South American countries. It is trafficked through

the Caribbean and Central American countries into the United States. It is also shipped to Europe. Different means are used to traffic cocaine, including boats, ships, and people. While marijuana is primarily supplied from Mexico to the United States, Asian traffickers (e.g., Vietnamese and Chinese) are the dominant suppliers in Canada. Heroin use is among the lowest relative to other types of drugs worldwide. Opium is primarily grown in Mexico, Southeast and Southwest Asia, and South America, with most opium being cultivated in Afghanistan.

Drug Trafficking, Crime, and the War on Drugs The production, sale, and distribution of illegal substances are linked to criminal organizations and drug cartels. Such organizations have had disputes over ports and territories used to traffic drugs, with violence being used to claim and maintain their trafficking routes. In response to the violence associated with drug trafficking, some European countries have chosen to decriminalize some types of drugs. Other countries, such as the United States, continue to address the issue of drugs with crime control strategies. The United States’ War on Drugs is a controversial drug control strategy widely regarded as a failed policy. It has served not to eradicate illegal drug use but to exponentially increase the prison population. The focus of the War on Drugs has been to punish both users and sellers. Drug trafficking laws and punishments vary by drug type, quantity, whom it is sold to, and the location of distribution. In some countries, such as Canada and the Netherlands, possession of small amounts of drugs is not punishable by prison. In the United States, though, drug possession is a criminal offense. Although some states have decriminalized marijuana, it is still a punishable offense at the federal level. In other countries, such as Indonesia, the possession of drugs can be punishable by death.

Security and Surveillance Technological advances have fostered a new era of security and surveillance. Law enforcement authorities are currently using surveillance drones

Dumpster Diving

in the Caribbean and Latin American countries to monitor drug trafficking activities, including known drug trafficking routes. However, drug cartels have also started using drones to traffic drugs across different countries. Current trends indicate that the use of both armed and unarmed drones across Latin American countries will become widespread. Some countries are moving toward building their own drones, with Colombia being the first Latin American country to do so. However, most Latin American countries rely on Israel and the United States to supply drones. New and innovative methods of surveillance have also created privacy concerns. For example, in the United States, an increase in domestic surveillance techniques have been called into question. It has been argued that such law enforcement surveillance activities violate the right to privacy as well as the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Federal law enforcement agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have been criticized for their use of phone metadata collection, wiretaps, drones, and infrared scans without a search warrant in an effort to combat drug trafficking and other crimes. As the federal courts and the Supreme Court tackle cases dealing with surveillance methods and techniques, the expectation of privacy may become redefined. Mercedes Valadez See also Electronic Surveillance; War on Drugs

Further Readings Babor, T. F., et al. Drug Policy and the Public Good. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010. Chambliss, W. J. Power, Politics, and Crime. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001. Kleiman, M. A. R., et al. Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Websites National Drug Intelligence Center: https://www.justice .gov/archive/ndic/index.htm

333

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: https://www .unodc.org U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration: https://www.dea .gov/index.shtml

Dumpster Diving Dumpster diving is the practice of sorting through another’s garbage or recycling to retrieve something of value. While the object of the activity may be food for a hungry person, it can also be used as a surveillance tool—sorting through the trash to uncover information. Potentially directed at both individuals and organizations, the latter has had more discussion because of its prevalence as a means of gathering competitor information (though individuals related to an organization may be targeted as well). This entry focuses chiefly on dumpster diving for surveillance of organizations, providing a review of reasons for doing it and the techniques employed, opinions about the ethics and legality of dumpster diving, examples of well-known organizations that utilized the technique, and governmental usage of the tactic. The practice of dumpster diving is sometimes referred to as garbology or trash archaeology, perhaps to provide a touch of respectability. One of the primary arenas where dumpster diving is applied is in competitive intelligence (CI) or economic espionage work. Mainstream CI practitioners will avoid the technique, questioning its effectiveness, its ethics, and its potential for negative publicity. But the murkier field of economic espionage does employ dumpster diving more regularly. Both in the more ethical and law-abiding CI discipline and in economic espionage, an individual or team is charged with compiling data and information. A variety of tools are employed to glean these data assets, from publicly available sources to human intelligence. But active gathering techniques, including dumpster diving, are focused on aggressively seeking out and procuring hard-to-get insights. Given the analytical techniques used on the collected data assets, little pieces might be the key to understanding the full picture of competitor strategies, tactical and operational plans, or other actions. As a result, even

334

Dumpster Diving

snippets of information found in a dumpster might have considerable value. But, as noted, there are legal and ethical issues with the practice that keep the more legitimate CI operations from using dumpster diving. From a legal perspective, laws vary by country and even by region (e.g., by state in the United States). But, by and large, trash is considered abandoned property, so the action of taking it is often not a crime. One complication in the law is whether the dumpster is owned by the targeted organization or by a separate disposal company. Another is its location. If on private property, trespassing laws would come into play, even if the act of taking the material was legal. Similarly, if any misrepresentation occurs, there will likely be a problem, even if the action itself violates nothing. Opinions also vary regarding the ethics associated with dumpster diving. The Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) industry group doesn’t include any specific dumpster diving techniques or activities; it only urges operatives to follow all pertinent laws. In explanatory materials, SCIP doesn’t endorse dumpster diving but notes that any taking of confidential documents may be illegal and may violate the organization’s own code of conduct. What SCIP does recommend is weighing the public relations implications if the activity were to come to light. In one of the best-known cases of commercial dumpster diving, Procter & Gamble was accused of contracting another firm to obtain information concerning Unilever’s hair care product line. Dumpster diving was involved, resulting in dozens of documents concerning strategies and pricing. Procter & Gamble essentially blew the whistle on itself when top management learned the details, but it claimed that no laws were broken and it was only a breach of the corporation’s ethical standards. There were reports, however, that some of the operatives, when confronted, misrepresented themselves, claiming to be students or reporters. One extension of the topic includes taking or sorting through the trash of third parties or even individuals. Typically, a CI or economic espionage operation will target the entire network of a competitor. Again, small tidbits of information may unlock bigger data troves, so no insight or source of data is considered too small. In another widely

reported case, Oracle was accused of employing an investigative firm that, among other things, apparently attempted to buy the trash of a nonprofit firm supporting Microsoft’s antitrust defense. A cleaning crew at the Association for Competitive Technology was offered cash to funnel office trash to the operative, looking for evidence of funding sources for the nonprofit organization. The offer was declined, and the activity came to light. Oracle owned up to its role, though denied any knowledge of the investigative firm hired or that dumpster diving would take place. The core organization may not even be the one targeted in an episode. A BusinessWeek report featured a video of an investigative firm posing as a garbage disposal service and collecting curbside trash at a private residence. The entire network of firms, organizations, and individuals involved with a target may be subject to dumpster diving. Recently, government use of dumpster diving has also had some attention. While it is fairly well understood that anything, including trash, may be subject to seizure and analysis in the investigation of a crime, the Federal Bureau of Invesigation’s latest Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide establishes a lower bar for the activity. Agents conducting an assessment with no clear evidence of criminal activity are now given more leeway for investigations including rummaging through trash. Overall, dumpster diving remains an activity on the edge of legality and ethics. Although often legal in and of itself, execution can require other illegal acts. The ethics are often referred to as an organizational decision. And while adjectives such as distasteful are repeatedly thrown around by organizations or professional groups discussing the activity, many fall back on legality when actual operations come to light. G. Scott Erickson See also Ethics; Information Security; Knowledge; Privacy; Privacy, Right to

Further Readings Bridis, Ted. “Oracle-MS Flap: How It Happened.” ZDNet (June 29, 2000). http://www.zdnet.com/news/

Dumpster Diving oracle-ms-flap-how-it-happened/96149 (Accessed October 2014). Ehrens, Amelia. “Competitive Intelligence Guru Fuld: Media Confuses Dumpster Diving With Competitive Intelligence” (September 6, 2001). http://www .oocities.org/maitef2001/arttrab2oyc.html (Accessed October 2017). Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide” (December 16, 2008). http:// documents.nytimes.com/the-new-operations-manualfrom-the-f-b-i. (Accessed October 2014). Savage, Charlie. “FBI Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds.” The New York Times (June 12, 2011).

335

SCIP Code of Ethics for CI Professionals. http:// www.scip.org/?page=CodeofEthics (Accessed October 2017). Serwer, Andy. “P&G’s Covert Operation.” Fortune, v.144/5 (2001). http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/ fortune/fortune_archive/2001/09/17/310274/index .htm (Accessed October 2014). Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. “The Ethics of Competitive Intelligence.” http://tefkos.comminfo .rutgers.edu/Courses/e530/Readings/Ethics%20of%20 competitive%20intelligence%202005.pdf (Accessed October 2017).

E technologies, the long process of reinventing was strengthened. There was an awareness that information technologies could create four main benefits for the reform process: (1) economic benefits (producing the same results at a lower cost), (2) increasing production (more outcome at the same cost), (3) fast productivity (more outcome at equal cost and less time), and (4) improved results. In this framework, new technologies and the Internet make government reform cheaper, faster, and better but bring about issues such as redesigning government structures and processes, all of which encompass e-government. Initially, e-government was used like a modern expression or a buzz word, and different definitions of the concept emerged. People started to apply the attribute “electronic” to different fields of new technologies and politics, causing confusion and a lack of any real rigor, as well as adding very little to the sense of what was added by this new electronic factor. In this way, e-government has frequently been seen as an administrative experiment rather than as a lasting part of the complex governmental process. This is not the only way, but it is a restrictive way to define e-government. E-government is a dynamic process that calls into question the very form of government and affects the institutional innovation as a whole. Any attempt to reduce this phenomenon to the online public administration is an understatement. In a broader definition, e-government is a strategy of governments’ intervention; a new organizational model of the relationship among a state, institutions, and citizens; and a formula for

E-Government E-government has become one of those words that is used frequently and has a wide range of ­references—just like e-democracy, e-voting, or e-commerce. It is the “electronic” aspect of the term that is the key variable in improving both the  democratic systems of government and  the lives of citizens. Yet caution should also be taken because an expansion of e-government has the potential to cause a reduction in individual privacy due to expanded opportunities and tools to conduct surveillance. In this entry, background information, including the definition, concept, and early history of e-government, is presented, followed by a review of how various scholars view the increase of technology within a government. The entry concludes with a look at the potential ramifications of e-government.

Background An analysis of what e-government is should be considered in the broader context of governments’ changes and the “reinventing-government” processes that began in the United States in the 1970s—and then affected Europe as well—to reform the public sector in response to the rising crisis that involved many nations. This phenomenon was written about in Reinventing Government by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler in 1992. The goal was the decentralization of the key functions of internal decision making for government decisions. With the introduction of information 337

338

E-Government

reinventing governments in which the Internet becomes an important variable of the numerous factors that lead to governments’ changes. With the emergence of a new virtual space, the arenas of government power extend from the international and supranational levels to the virtual world. The new frontier of the Internet changes not only the structures but also the processes of government. The innovations, in fact, slowly slip into the bureaucratic logics that underlie the modern state. These promote the effectiveness and efficiency of government action, reducing the discretion of the government bureaucracy.

Increased Use of Technology Scholars such as Andrew L. Shapiro, Peter Drucker, and Don Tapscott identified the increased use of digital technologies with the emergence of a technological revolution that can overthrow the old paradigm of the vertical distribution of power in favor of a greater democratization of society. In the 1970s, Kenneth Laudon, in his “vision of citizen technology,” imagined a citizen that, thanks to modern technologies, is aware that he has the power and tools to relate to the institutions that surround him. On the other side, however, are those like Joseph S. Nye, who looks at the “soft power” of information technology as a tool of great seduction or coercion, or someone like David Lyon, who is concerned about the “electronic eye” and the greater power of control that the states—as well as the private sector—can obtain through the use of technology.

E-Government as “E-Eye” One of the most worrisome dimensions of e-government is one that envisages that behind the e-government’s tale is hiding an enormous power of control and surveillance by governments that could be called “e-eye” for their ability to monitor endless items. In the name of e-government—and, from the beginning of this millennium, also in the name of national security—is increasing the government’s demand for sophisticated technological solutions for encryption, security, information sharing, and interactive communication. But this progress would bring with it the specter of the “Big Brother.” The sophisticated technology would

allow governments (as well as potentially other organizations) total control over their citizens’ behavior, resulting in a growing exasperation of the logic of surveillance. Decisions that affect citizens will be less and less dependent on direct contact and increasingly based on digital information stored in huge databases. Thus, a new type of society is gradually evolving—the surveillance society. Gradually, over the centuries, we have moved toward a “policed society,” as stated by Gary T. Marx, in which the state and the market seek to exercise control over increasingly large geographical areas. Today, with the growth of national and international economies, and the welfare state, and with the extension of the Internet, surveillance expansion enables collection of personal information. This information can be used to boost trade or create uniformity to the point that it is worth asking whether we are heading toward an open society with an open government—which offers free access to all—or to ward a secret society, more and more closed, which uses information technology to monitor and control. Monica Zuccarini See also Governmentality; Gramsci, Antonio; Kafka, Franz; Marx, Gary T.

Further Readings Drucker, Peter. “The Next Information Revolution.” Forbes ASAP, v.8 (1998). Laudon, Kenneth C. Dossier Society. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986. Lyon, David. The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1994. Marx, Gary T. “The Surveillance Society: The Threat of the 1984-Style Techniques.” The Futurist, v.6 (1985). Nye, Joseph, Jr., et al. Why People Don’t Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Osborne, David and Ted Gaebler. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Books, 1992. Shapiro, Andrew L. The Control Revolution: How the Internet Is Putting Individual in Charge and Changing the World We Know. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 1999.

Electronic Harassment Tapscott, Don. Growing Up Digital: The Rise of the Net Generation. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Zuccarini, Monica. “E-Government Development Trends: New Dynamics of Power.” In A.-V. Anttiroiko and M. Malia (eds.), Encyclopedia of Digital Government. Hershey, PA: Idea Group, 2006.

Electronic Harassment Electronic harassment involves the use of electronic devices by an individual or companies to invade a person’s privacy or property. This is often done to gather information illegally or for the purpose of causing emotional, psychological, or physical harm. Electronic harassment comes in many forms and types, ranging from electronic surveillance to electronic sabotage or jamming, to the use of directed harmful high-energy devices, radiation and laser devices, and implants to harm or control a person’s behavior. Electronic surveillance involves the imposed observation of a person, or his or her belongings or property, through the use of electronic listening, video or transmitting devices, spectral imaging using heat or infrared light, sound, or other radiation sources. Electronic sabotage or jamming is done to intentionally cause a person’s personal property (e.g., a computer) to malfunction or be destroyed. Directed harmful high-energy devices such as high-energy microwave devices and other weapons can kill or disable an individual. The use of radiation and laser devices is also a very common form of harassment and is known to induce physical harm that manifests in symptoms such as dizziness, breathing difficulty, headaches, and being momentarily blinded by light in the case of lasers. The most common forms of electronic harassment occur through electronic communication, including cyberharassment or cyberstalking. Cyberharassment can be directly or indirectly aimed at a victim. For example, a direct form of cyberharassment may involve sending intimidating or ambiguous emails or sabotage in the form of spamming whereby the victim is bombarded with junk messages or computer viruses. Indirectly, online harassment may take the form of a cyberstalker impersonating the victim online and sending fraudulent spams or abusive emails in the victim’s name. In other instances of cyberharassment, victims may be

339

subscribed without their permission or consent to a number of mailing lists, resulting in their receiving hundreds of unwanted emails daily. Being a victim of online harassment can be not only annoying, but it can also undoubtedly cause considerable anxiety and fear. It is considered an invasion of privacy and thus a violation of the individual’s rights. Electronic surveillance has been used by governmental agencies and committees as well as by private detectives and employers in the workplace to monitor individuals and gather information. The use of these devices has advantages for law enforcement and national security—for example, devices can be used to gather information on dangerous and or suspicious individuals or organizations. Likewise, electronic surveillance can be used in the gathering and assessment of information relating to espionage and hostile actions directed against the United States. However, the increased use of these devices triggers a debate focusing on states’ interests versus the need for safeguards to ensure the rights provided by the constitution. An important aspect of this debate happened in the post-Watergate era and triggered the enactment of new legislation and adherence to laws governing the use of electronic devices. A basic question that needs to be answered is whether or not the intelligence community can employ nonconventional methods to check crime while preserving constitutional rights. Some would argue that electronic surveillance violates the very rights it purports to protect. For example, a number of amendments (e.g., the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Fourteenth), to some extent, prohibit illegal invasion of privacy. In addition, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these amendments in matters relating to personal privacy have allowed for the expansion of civil rights and liberties. However, balancing individual rights and national security can be challenging. History has shown that wiretapping and bugging were used by law enforcement to gather data during Prohibition, under Harding’s administration, and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for partisan purposes. In 1950, President Truman used a directive to broaden the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s intelligence-gathering function to conduct electronic surveillance. These activities and others have resulted in the increased need for legislation and judicial restraint to protect lawabiding citizens.

340

Electronic Restraint Devices

State and Supreme Court decisions and federal legislation have addressed the use of electronic surveillance. In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court held that wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Similarly in 1942, in the case of Goldman v. United States, the Court applied the doctrine of physical trespass to conclude that a nontelephonic device placed against a wall was not intrusion on a constitutionally protected area. These two decisions guided the Court’s reasoning in subsequent decisions relating to the use of electronic surveillance until the decisions of Silverman v. United States in 1961 and Katz v. United States in 1967. In Silverman, the Court ruled that a “spiked” microphone placed into a heating duct to overhear incriminating evidence was an illegal search and seizure; and in Katz, the Court stated that placing a microphone outside a public telephone to overhear incriminating evidence constituted a violation of privacy. The Federal Communication Act of 1934 and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 were major legislations that regulated the use of electronic surveillance devices. Another issue related to electronic surveillance is whether the president has authority to authorize electronic surveillance. The Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 alludes that in sensitive matters of national security, the presidency has the discretionary power to authorize intelligence gathering from foreign countries, embassies, and individuals, but it discourages the use of electronic surveillance against private U.S. citizens. While not all surveillance is considered illegal, it can be deemed as harassment when federal agencies, congressional committees, the Central Intelligence Agency, private detectives, and individuals use microrecorders, covert hidden cameras, or tiny microphones to bug and spy on other individuals. Indeed, electronic surveillance, when used as a tool for national security can limit and ultimately repudiate the individual’s right to privacy. A review of the use of technology at the domestic level has shown that indiscriminate use can leave innocent citizens vulnerable to attacks on rights to their personal privacy. Nelseta Walters See also Cell Phone Tracking; Creeping; Cyberstalking; Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Further Readings Advanced Electronic Security Co. Electronic Harassment (n.d.). http://www.bugsweeps.com/info/electronic_ harassment.html (Accessed December 2014). David-Ferdon, Corrine and Marci Feldman Hertz. Electronic Media and Youth Violence: A CDC Issue Brief for Researchers. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009. http://eric.ed.gov/?q=Electronic+Harassment+&ft=on &id=ED511647 (Accessed January 2015). Education Partnership Inc. Research Into Practice: Cyberbullying (n.d.). http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ ED538543.pdf (Accessed January 2015). Ellison, L. and Y. Akdeniz. “Cyber-Stalking: The Regulation of Harassment on the Internet.” Criminal Law Review (December Special Edition: Crime, Criminal Justice and the Internet), (1998). Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Hall, Jeffrey R. Cyberstalking and Electronic Harassment: How Far Should Facebook “Creeping” Go? (February 8, 2012). http://hallrustom.blogspot .com/2012/02/cyberstalking-and-electronicharassment.html (Accessed January 2015). Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).

Electronic Monitoring See Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Electronic Restraint Devices Electronic restraint devices (ERDs), also referred to as electromuscular disruption technology, electronic control devices, and electronic control weapons, are a form of electronic restraint used for containing, securing, and restraining the activities of dangerous prisoners as well as aggressive, uncooperative suspects, generally by incapacitating neuromuscular functions and inhibiting motor control. An ERD is one form of available electronic policing tool used to assist law enforcement personnel in the capture of alleged suspects in a less-than-lethal manner. ERDs are frequently used when transporting dangerous prisoners from one

Electronic Restraint Devices

location to the other as well as to prevent assaults on law enforcement. ERDs are also used in prisons and jails as restraint solutions to prevent and/ or minimize suicide attempts by prisoners and assaults on prison personnel. ERDs also have a variety of other uses; however, they may be prone to abuses by their handlers. ERDs are usually handheld, conducted energy devices designed to administer a disruptive electrical shock to suspects and/or prisoners and are aimed at incapacitating, restricting, immobilizing, and controlling behaviors by an individual who may refuse to respond favorably to instructions from law enforcement personnel or who may make attempts to evade custody or become a serious threat to themselves, to law enforcement personnel, or to society. Typically included in this continuum of electronic restraints devices are stun cuffs, riot shields, stun guns, tasers, and stun belts. These electrical restraint devices are usually functional and highly efficient as they utilize high electrical voltages and high frequencies to deliver electrical shocks via electrodes placed on the individual’s body and that stimulate and immobilize the musculoskeletal system of the individuals who are actively resisting arrest or are acting in an aggressive manner toward law enforcement personnel. Globally, police officers possess a monopoly on the use of state-sanctioned use of force; however, this force must be reasonable. Added to this, as policing and policing technology are continuously evolving, so too are methods used to capture suspects and restrain prisoners. With this in mind, ERDs are additional tools to the ever-evolving technological ecosystem of contemporary law enforcement. Apart from the increasing availability of ERDs; the Police Executive Research Forum and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) pointed out in 2001 that there is a concomitant increase in their usage across the globe, especially by the police departments in the United States. ERDs are relevant to surveillance, security, and privacy for differing reasons. For example, when an ERD is utilized as a policing tool, it may negatively impinge on citizens’ rights to freedom of movement. Furthermore, the history of policing in the United Kingdom, the United States, Europe, and other metropolitan countries points to its indiscriminate usage against people of African descent, minority people, mentally challenged persons, and

341

persons whose ethnicity may be different from the established status quo. This suggests that for those persons who are unfairly targeted by the use of ERDs, there is an air of extreme vulnerability to attacks on their right to personal privacy.

History of Electronic Restraint Devices The history of what is now known as ERDs is somewhat checkered. This is premised on the notion that such devices were originally known as conducted energy devices. However, in 2005, the COPS Office and Police Executive Research Forum came together to produce a set of policy guidelines regarding the use of what was then called conducted energy devices, and a decision was made to change the name of the device from conducted energy devices to electronic control weapons. Further modifications to the device were made possible through the exponential advances in technology, and the device was subsequently referred to as electronic control devices and, more frequently, ERDs.

Uses and Challenges A report from the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the COPS Office Use of Force Symposium (2012) submits, “Law enforcement faces innumerable challenges created by the current environment, particularly with regards to use of force” (p. 11). Instructively, concepts surrounding the use of force have been significantly altered over the years, moving away from physicality to now include use of force based on the increased usage of technology- and science-based devices. It is against this background that ERDs have come to the forefront of policing. This is predicated on the notion that the use of an ERD may be seen on the continuum of use of force (reasonable or unreasonable); however, these devices are lessthan-lethal (nondeadly) force, and when used appropriately, they can offer a nonlethal alternative to the use of firearms. There are many effects of the ERDs on individuals, and these may vary from individual to individual. Some aftereffects following an encounter with ERDs include, but are not limited to, the following: falling to the ground, freezing in place (involuntary muscle contractions) during the discharge of current, screaming or remaining silent, and dazed feelings.

342

Electronic Restraint Devices

In spite of ERDs being viewed in a glowing light by some individuals, they have been subject to much scrutiny by practitioners such as electrical and biomechanical engineers as well as by academics and stakeholder groups. These entities have analyzed ERDs and have expressed concerns about the inappropriate use of tasers as well as leg restraints. Conversely, health, electrical, human rights, and even law enforcement personnel have recognized the benefits to be derived from the use of ERDs. They have cited that ERDs can save lives when used properly instead of using a firearm or physical acts such as chokeholds and handcuffing to subdue a suspect. In addition, as the electrodes for the ERD are concealed from public view (underneath the clothing of an accused), it is argued that from a human rights perspective, it reduces the prejudice against individuals on trial as jurors might be prejudiced if accused individuals appear at trial wearing visible wrist or leg restraints. In spite of these arguments, the topic is often controversial, as opponents, some in the aforementioned disciplines, have criticized the reliance on ERDs on several grounds. For instance, it has been argued that ERDs are fast becoming a replacement for good police work but that these devices should not become a substitute for effective police work. Furthermore, it has been argued that the proliferation of ERDs has facilitated the diminishing of effective communication skills by police and prison officials who now lack the means to effectively communicate with suspects and prisoners and thus de-escalate terse encounters. ERDs also have the potential to cause secondary injury (i.e., sustained when a subject falls to the ground as the result of the deployment of ERDs); they have the potential for harm, misuse, and abuse; and the voltage applied to individuals can cause cardiac arrest and death in some people. The possibility of death after an ERD encounter was made visible in the case of Robert Dziekanski, a Canadian national who died in the secure arrivals area of Vancouver International Airport, Canada, on October 14, 2007, moments after he was shot with Royal Canadian Mounted Police stun guns.

Final Thoughts ERDs are used in prisons and jails to restrain and control aggressive inmates, to minimize self-harm to inmates, and to prevent assaults on prison

personnel. ERDs are also utilized in the wider society to apprehend and subdue violent, aggressive, and noncooperative suspects and to prevent assaults on law enforcement personnel. While ERDs are a less-than-lethal alternative to the use of firearms, for example, they are the source of a number of benefits and controversies, and the aforementioned dicta facilitate a greater understanding of their usage as well as their challenges. Wendell Codrington Wallace See also Electronic Surveillance; Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Further Readings Amnesty International. Excessive and Lethal Force? Amnesty International Report on Taser Abuse. London, England: Author, 2005. Bozeman, W. P., et al. “Safety and Injury Profile of Conducted Electrical Weapons Used by Law Enforcement Officer Against Criminal Suspects.” Annals of Emerging Medicine, v.53/4 (2009). doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2008.11.021 International Association of Chiefs of Police/Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. Emerging Use of Force Issues: Balancing Public and Officer Safety: Report From the International Association of Chiefs of Police/COPS Office Use of Force Symposium (May 4, 2011). http://www.theiacp .org/portals/0/pdfs/emerginguseofforceissues041612 .pdf (Accessed October 2017). Jauchem, James R. “Deaths in Custody: Are Some Due to Electronic Control Devices (Including TASER Devices) or Excited Delirium?” Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine, v.17/1 (2010). doi:10.1016/j .jflm.2008.05.011 Kroll, Mark W., et al. “Electronic Control Devices and the Clinical Milieu.” Journal of the American College of Cardiology, v.49/6 (2007). Kroll, Mark W., et al. “Ventricular Fibrillation Risk Estimation for Conducted Electrical Weapons: Critical Convolutions.” Proceedings of the 33rd Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society, Boston, MA, August 30–September 3, 2011. Smith, Michael R., et al. “The Impact of Conducted Energy Devices and Other Types of Force and Resistance on Officer and Suspect Injuries.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, v.30/3 (2007).

Electronic Surveillance U.S. Department of Justice, Police Executive Research Forum and Community Oriented Policing Services. Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines. Washington, DC: Author, 2011. White, M. D. and Justin Ready. “The Taser as a Less Lethal Force Alternative: Findings on Use and Effectiveness in a Large Metropolitan Police Agency.” Police Quarterly, v.10 (2007). Williams, Howard E. Taser Electronic Control Devices and Sudden In-Custody Death: Separating Evidence From Conjecture. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 2008. Yu-Sheng Lin and Tonisha R. Jones. “Electronic Control Devices and Use of Force Outcomes: Incidence and Severity of Use of Force, and Frequency of Injuries to Arrestees and Police Officers.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, v.33/1 (2010). Zigmund, Edmund. “Electronic Control Devices: Liability and Training Aspects.” AELE Monthly Law Journal, v.5 (2007).

Electronic Surveillance Broadly construed, surveillance is concerned with gathering and processing information. Usually, the goal of such practices is to intervene in some way to manage the objects of surveillance. Surveillance may be directed at humans or nonhumans (e.g., animals, viruses, commodities). While some forms of surveillance rely on the human senses only, others are enabled by technical means that extend these senses in various ways. Technically, enhanced surveillance can take nonelectronic and electronic forms. The former is made possible by devices such as binoculars or a telescope, for example, while the latter depends on electronic technologies and infrastructures such as computers, satellites, and digital networks. Although surveillance has always been a feature of social systems, it is the ubiquity of electronic-based information gathering and processing practices that has positioned surveillance as a central constitutive feature of modern contemporary societies. Indeed, many commentators claim that we live in a “surveillance society” precisely because myriad forms of electronic surveillance are now deeply embedded in virtually every sphere of human activity. This entry focuses

343

on the proliferation of electronic surveillance and its implications.

Proliferation of Electronic Surveillance One way to grasp the ubiquity of electronic surveillance in contemporary society is to consider all the instances of this kind of surveillance one would encounter in a typical 1-week period. The log will likely burgeon with entries: the digital traces left when using ATMs and your debit card, your smartphone’s continuous tracking of your location and messages, the applications on your smartphone generating detailed data each time you use them (and sometimes when you are not using them), the web browser’s storage of your Internet search queries and sending the data to websites concerning your software usage, and the numerous occasions you were observed by video cameras whether at work, in stores, on the sidewalk, or at other public spaces. Additional log entries may include your employer’s remote scan of your work computer, the update made to your digitized medical record after visiting the doctor, social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter creating records of your interactions with others, and your wearable fitness device collecting data on your weight, steps taken per day, sleep quality, calories burned, and perhaps GPS location. Moreover, your car’s online computer routinely records your location, performance, and driving practices, and when reading an e-book on an e-reading device, the e-book and e-reader companies may be monitoring how quickly you read, whether you finished the book, and whether you highlighted certain passages. Technological change is a pivotal precondition for the ubiquity of electronic surveillance. The introduction of mainframe computers in the 1960s enabled a quantum leap in the information collection and processing practices by large organizations. These computers provided credit agencies, banks, and government agencies with a vastly increased ability to collect, search, and analyze records. Still, at that point in the 20th century, electronic surveillance did not pervade everyday life as it does in the 21st century. A number of related technological developments played a key role in changing this state of affairs. Since the 1970s, the cost of processing and storing data has declined rapidly. At the same time, computer-processing

344

Electronic Surveillance

power has doubled roughly every 2 years, enabling computers that were once the size of entire rooms to now be carried by individuals in the form of laptops, tablets, and smartphones. These developments have decreased the price and increased the attractiveness of conducting electronic surveillance on a bewildering array of everyday activities. Moreover, the exponential increase in bandwidth that has also occurred over this time period has enabled the high-speed sharing of more personal data across organizations and across national borders. In short, these technological developments and others (e.g., satellite imagery, biometric identification) have created the possibility for the enormous enhancement of the scope and range of surveillance systems. While technological developments have helped fuel the proliferation of electronic surveillance, it is important to understand that various imperatives, logics, agendas, and choices have shaped these developments and their effects. Consider, for example, the domain of consumption. Private enterprises not only took advantage of the advent of modern computing to enhance their information collection and processing practices, but their desire to collect and analyze more personal information in order to facilitate greater management of consumption was an important factor driving the trend toward increasingly sophisticated and affordable computing. This, in turn, made possible the emergence of “database marketing” in the 1980s. This new form of targeted marketing involved companies using computing power to collect, meld, and analyze vast amounts of demographic, psychographic, and lifestyle information with the goal of profiling and sorting groups of consumers into various marketable categories as well as into “high-quality” and “low-quality” targets of opportunity. More recently, a plethora of online enterprises have emerged to serve the corporate sector’s appetite for even more personal information. Taking advantage of the emergence of the Internet and the decision to privatize and commercialize it, these enterprises have invested in the development and deployment of tracking technologies. This business model has resulted in a surveillance-intensive Internet architecture that yields a cornucopia of fine-grained information on users’ interactions with and migration across websites. Similarly, the proliferation of electronic surveillance in other institutional spheres such as the

workplace, education, health, policing and crime control, and national security have been driven by the interplay between technology developments and the social contexts within which these developments arise and are deployed. At the same time, as electronic surveillance has suffused through these various domains, information flows across the domains have increased greatly. Certain private sector enterprises routinely use government-collected data to build consumer profiles that can be used for marketing. Police agencies regularly acquire personal information collected and stockpiled by banks, airlines, libraries, telecommunication companies, and Internet service providers. This is often made possible by the recalibration of laws and regulations. For example, all European Union member states require telephone companies and Internet service providers to store data about their customers’ communications and location for police access. The revelations by Edward Snowden made clear how much the U.S. National Security Agency relies on corporations to monitor electronic communications on a massive scale. In one program, telecommunication companies provided all customers’ call information, including the time, location, and duration of calls, on a daily basis for years. Through another program, the National Security Agency sought to compel the provision of large volumes of personal data by Internet companies like Google and Facebook. In the post-9/11 era, U.S. intelligence agencies have also become prized customers of database companies such as Axciom, Choicepoint, and LexisNexis, which maintain billions of records on hundreds of millions of Americans. This access to private sector information troves is arguably an end run around the Privacy Act of 1974, which prevents government agencies from collecting such information.

Implications It is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a general conclusion concerning the social implications of the proliferation of electronic surveillance in contemporary society. This is because, as Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson (2005) point out, “While surveillance is ubiquitous, it is also diverse, multifaceted, and employed in such a panoply of

Email

projects that is it almost impossible to speak coherently about ‘surveillance’ more generally” (p. 22). Electronic surveillance can be involved in projects that produce dubious or estimable outcomes, for instance. The deployment of electronic surveillance in some marketing and national security contexts may result in the erosion of privacy and the production of new forms of inequality and discrimination. At the same time, robust cross-border electronic surveillance systems are at the heart of efforts to prevent or arrest the transmission of communicable diseases. Other modes of electronic surveillance may be used to locate lost persons or more efficiently distribute resources to society’s most needy. This suggests that assessments of the impact of electronic surveillance should be based on an examination of the dynamics and factors involved in specific surveillance projects: What is the power relationship between the surveiller and the surveilled? What kind of information is being collected and toward what ends? What rules, if any, apply to information collection, storage, and sharing? If there are rules, how transparent are they? Yet to fully grasp the role of electronic surveillance in social life, a bird’s-eye perspective must complement project-specific evaluations. This perspective recognizes that in the coming decades, the presence of electronic surveillance, in familiar and new forms, will likely become evermore present in all spheres of everyday life. To what extent will this change the nature of society? What will your daily log of electronic surveillance encounters contain in 30 years? Peter Shields See also Advertising and Marketing Research; ATM Cards; Cell Phone Tracking; Facebook; Google; National Security Agency Leaks; Privacy, Internet

Further Readings Ball, Kirstie, et al., eds. Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. Haggerty, Kevin and Richard Ericson, eds. The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2005. Marx, Gary. “What’s New About the ‘New Surveillance’? Classifying for Change and Continuity.” Surveillance & Society, v.1/1 (2002).

345

Email Electronic mail (email) is one of the oldest and most widely used Internet services. It involves the exchange of digital messages among two or more Internet users. Every day billions of email messages are exchanged between users. Email service is supported by special servers that are called email servers. These servers accept, deliver, and store email messages in a store-and-forward operation. Email operation is quite simple. A user writes an email message, enters a recipient’s address, and relays it to the delivery service, which sends the message to the recipient user. The user can also attach files (of a certain size, depending on the email service) and send it to other users. Because email servers and individual accounts have been accessed by hackers, privacy concerns exist. In addition, some government agencies access email servers to conduct surveillance on individuals and groups. This entry provides readers with an understanding of various facets of email, beginning with a review of its history. The entry then discusses how email works, email subsystems and protocols, and methods for using email services. The entry concludes with sections on email encryption for preserving the privacy of emails or files being sent, email misuses, and methods for ensuring secure use of email.

History The term electronic mail was widely used to refer to any transmission of electronic documents. Email is considered to predate the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), which after it was created in the late 1960s became one of the foundations of the Internet. Thus, it is almost impossible to locate the first mention of the term email with the specific meaning that it has today. Initial email systems were much simpler in characteristics from today’s email services. The first email system appeared in mainframe computer systems. In 1962, the Automatic Digital Network system was introduced and provided messaging service to 1,350 terminals. Every month, the system handled 30 million messages, with an average message length of 3,000 characters.

346

Email

During the same time period, many host-based email systems were developed. These systems allowed multiple users to log into a central system. The system supported not only file storage and file exchange on the central disk but also the exchange of messages. The problem was that these systems utilized different characteristics and were incompatible with one another. Thus, communication was possible only to those users who were logged on to the same host. In the 1980s, server-based systems for personal computers (PCs) connected to local area networks started to appear. Initially, these systems offered mail exchange between users who were connected to the same server, but gradually users were able to connect to one another as long as they ran the same email system and proprietary protocol. At that point, the service became more complex since the email messages needed to be inserted into an “envelope”—an electronic format that includes the email addresses, subject, and message—and addressed to a certain destination. ARPANET is considered to have contributed significantly to the development of the email service. Experimental intersystem email transfers began shortly after its introduction in 1969. Ray Tomlinson, who worked as an ARPANET contractor, is credited with inventing email in the early 1970s. He proposed the use of the @ sign to separate the names of the user and the user’s machine when sending emails from one computer to another. The first email was sent from one DEC-10 (Digital Equipment Corporation) computer to another nearby DEC-10 computer. The system was quickly adopted across the ARPANET. Outside the ARPANET, many other networks had developed their own email protocols and address formats. Thus, “gateways” were introduced to pass emails between the Internet and these other networks. By the mid-1970s email use was rapidly expanding. Commercial packages began to appear, and at that point, 75% of the ARPANET traffic was emails. As email service matured, email protocol standards began to emerge. The first was called Simple Message Transfer Protocol (SMTP), and it was introduced in 1982. In 1985, the Post Office Protocol (POP), a protocol for retrieving the contents of a mailbox, was proposed. The Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) emerged in 1986 as a remote mailbox protocol.

Email technologies and standards have been under development for more than 30 years. The protocols to relay email messages between systems and the rules for formatting email messages have evolved through time.

How Email Works To employ an email service, the user must have an account on an email server and a computer, or other mobile device, connected to the Internet. Thus, the user is able to receive emails sent to him by other users. The user connects to his email server using an email application (email client) to download his email messages to his computer or mobile device, or he employs a web browser to read his emails online. The received emails reside in the email server until the user downloads them on his computer (via his email client) or deletes them by accessing them online via a web browser. In a similar manner, when a user wants to send an email, he writes the message using an email c­ lient on his computer or his mobile device, or online with the help of a web browser. Then his email server relays the email message to its destination. During the process of sending and receiving email messages, a number of protocols are employed. The protocol that is employed for sending email messages is the SMTP. When receiving email messages, the POP or the IMAP is being utilized. Initially, the email service supported the transmission of messages that included only text. But with the introduction of the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension, the ability to send other types of encoding schemes was added. Thus, email messages are able to include various types of files (e.g., documents, photos, audio and video files). If multiple files are being sent in one email, usually users will compress the files they want to attach to a single file. It is worth noting that the size of the attached files cannot be above a certain limit, depending on the email server the user employs (usually 10–20 megabytes). But because users often exchange multimedia files (i.e., photos and videos), the maximum allowable file size is often inadequate since it cannot accommodate large files. Because of that limitation, users often use file-sharing services (e.g., Google Drive, Onedrive, Dropbox, Sugarsync), which can accommodate an almost unlimited file size.

Email

Email Subsystems and Protocols An email system consists of two subsystems. The first one is the Message Handling System, and it is responsible for delivering emails from the sender to the recipient. This system is serviced by a set of servers called Message Transfer Agents. The second subsystem is the User Agent system, and it enables the email user to perform various functions that are related to the email service (e.g., receive, delete, archive, print, and create email messages); the User Agent also interacts with the Message Handling System for the email messages to be delivered to the destination user. All the communication transactions between the user’s computer or mobile device and the email server are conducted with the help of the three previously mentioned protocols: SMTP, POP, and IMAP. The SMTP is the standard protocol for sending email transmission, although it can also be used for receiving messages. The POP is an Internet protocol used by local email clients to retrieve emails from a remote server over a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol connection. The POP downloads the messages from the email server and then deletes the messages from the remote mailboxes that are located in the email servers. The problem is that the POP allows only one email client to connect to the email server at each instant, and it deletes the messages once they are downloaded from the email server. Thus, it is not possible for a user to access the email server from multiple devices (e.g., a computer, smartphone). This problem was solved with the introduction of the IMAP, which allows users to store their emails on their remote email servers. This two-way protocol also permits the user to synchronize emails among multiple devices, an extremely important characteristic today, when most people have at least two devices connected to the Internet. The majority of email servers support the SMTP and both POP and IMAP.

Methods for Using Email Services When email services were initially introduced, users employed client applications to send and receive email messages. These applications have to be installed in the user’s computer. All received emails reside in the user’s computer, and they are accessible regardless of whether or not the computer is

347

connected to the Internet. Popular email clients include Mozilla’s Thunderbird, Microsoft Outlook, Eudora, IBM Lotus Notes, and Pegasus Mail. These programs offer various features that allow organizing messages in folders and subfolders. Email ­clients are very useful, especially in the early days of the Internet, when dial-up connections were utilized. Thus, users were able to organize, write, and delete messages while being off-line. A user connected to the Internet for small time periods, only to send emails and download new emails. The problem with this method is that the user must always use her own computer to access her email service. The solution to this problem was the introduction of webmail (or web-based email). In this case, an email client is implemented as a web application running on a web server. Gmail and Hotmail are examples of typical webmail services. The majority of email servers today offer their services via both webmail and email clients. Although the webmail concept is quite attractive, there is one significant drawback. Users must be connected to the Internet to access their emails.

Email Encryption In recent years, there has been growing public concern regarding the privacy of electronic communications. In the case of the Internet, email service appears to be vulnerable to unauthorized display of email messages. To ensure users’ privacy, various encryption techniques may be utilized. Encryption can be defined as the process of encoding information in such a way that only legitimate parties can read them. In the case of email encryption, the process usually involves the encryption and often authentication of email messages. Encryption technology for emails has been available, but it has not been widely adopted. The reason for this low adoption is the fact that most people believe that their email messages are not important and thus encrypting them is not necessary. Email encryption comprises three stages: (1) the connection to the email service, (2) emails that are being sent or received, and (3) emails that are being stored in the user’s computer or mobile devices. The first stage has to do with the communication between the user’s computer or ­ mobile device and the email server. This is very significant in case the user is connected to the Internet through public Wi-Fi (wireless Internet connection)

348

Email

“hotspots.” If the user employs a webmail service (through a web browser), she must be assured that her browser utilizes the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure when accessing her email server. Also, if the user utilizes an email client, she must confirm that her email client employs Secure Sockets Layer/ Transport Layer Security encryption for sending and receiving emails. Email encryption usually utilizes public-key cryptography. This involves users publishing a public key that other users can use to encrypt the messages they are sending to them. They also keep secret a private key that they can use to decrypt such messages or to digitally encrypt and sign the messages they send. Many email clients provide native support for various encryption protocols (e.g., Open Pretty Good Privacy, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension, Transport Layer Security, identitybased encryption, mail sessions encryption). One of the most widely used encryption methods is Pretty Good Privacy, which is a data encryption and decryption computer program that provides cryptographic privacy and authentication for data communication (including emails). Stored emails may also be encrypted, especially if they reside on mobile devices (smartphones and tablets) and laptop computers. The majority of mobile devices offer some kind of full-device encryption protection through their operating systems (e.g., Android, iOS, BlackBerry). For laptops and even PCs, the best solution is to encrypt only the stored emails through encryption offered by email clients.

Email Misuses Email services have also created many problems for Internet users. Spam, spoofing, phishing, and hoaxes are some of the issues that are related to email services. Spam is an unsolicited email message, usually related to advertising. Email spoofing is defined as the creation of email messages with a forged sender address. It is mainly used in cases where the sender of an email wants to remain anonymous or wants to present a false identity. The problem is that SMTP, the protocol that is mainly used for sending email, does not incorporate authentication. Thus, it is possible to send an email message that appears to originate from anyone. Although the majority of the received spoofed emails are easy to detect, there are some

cases of spoofed emails that can cause serious problems and security risks. That is why email users must always examine the received emails with caution, even though they may appear to be sent by a known user. Phishing can be defined as the attempt to acquire sensitive information (e.g., usernames, passwords, credit card details, account numbers) by impersonating a trustworthy entity. Such emails include, in many cases, links to websites that are infected with malware. In other cases, the emails may include attachments that appear to do nothing when the user attempts to open them. The problem is that they install a “backdoor” to the user’s computer that allows hackers to take control of the machine. Usually, spoofing techniques are employed in the case of phishing in an attempt to make users believe that the message was sent by a legitimate authority. Phishing can be considered an example of social engineering techniques employed to deceive users, which is possible due to the poor usability of current web security technologies. A hoax is a deliberately fabricated falsehood made to masquerade as the truth. In the case of an email hoax, it involves an email message warning recipients of a nonexistent threat, usually referring to legitimate well-known authorities such as Microsoft or Apple. The email attempts to persuade the recipients to forward the email to their email contacts. In some cases, the hoax is more harmful, and it tries to convince users to delete useful files from their computer by telling them that these files are infected.

Methods for Secure Email Use Although there are various problems that may appear through the use of email services, Internet users can easily minimize the risk by following some simple practices. Email passwords must be strong to make difficult for scammers and hackers to discover them. Attention must also be given to the secret questions and answers that many services use to reset users’ passwords. Users must be cautious in entering their email addresses and password to subscribe to some Web 2.0 service, as their email addresses may be included in spam lists. They must also avoid inviting other users (by entering their email addresses) to subscribe to the same service, since they will become spamming targets.

Embargoes

Users must always remember that banks and financial institutions will never send their clients emails asking them to follow links in order to verify their information (e.g., username, password). Thus, users should never follow links from emails to log in to their web banking service. Such links may lead them to fake websites. Instead, they should type the URL of the banking institution or create a bookmark. There are certain actions that users should avoid if they receive spam emails. They should not reply to spam emails and should not buy products that are advertised through spam email. They should also activate the spam filter in their email service to minimize the number of incoming spam emails. Another instance of when email needs to be secured is when users start receiving a large number of bounced spam emails that appear to have been sent from their own email address. The first action users should take is to reset their email account’s password, just in case spammers have hacked into their email account. If the bounced spam emails continue to flow in, users should determine if their PC has been compromised (infected by virus or malware) by scanning it with antivirus and anti-malware software. If the problem is not resolved, the safest thing users can do is to cancel their email accounts. Although email is one of the oldest Internet services, it is still one of the most widely used. Since the introduction of email service, there have been many unsuccessful attempts to substitute email with other new services that employ additional and modern characteristics. Many other Internet services, especially social networking services, have incorporated similar messaging features. For example, Facebook offers an internal messaging system for its users. Nevertheless, email continues to be among the top services that Internet users employ daily. Andreas Veglis See also Email; Identity Theft; Spam

Further Readings Bradley, Tony. “Minimizing Your Exposure to Email Spoofing.” PCWorld (April 5, 2012). http://www .pcworld.com/article/253305/minimize_

349

your_exposure_to_email_spoofing.html (Accessed September 2017). Crocker, Dave. “A History of E-Mail: Collaboration, Innovation and the Birth of a System.” Washington Post (March 20, 2012). http://www.washingtonpost .com/national/on-innovations/a-history-of-e-mailcollaboration-innovation-and-the-birth-of-asystem/2012/03/19/gIQAOeFEPS_story.html (Accessed September 2017). Geier, Eric. “How to Encrypt Your Email.” PCWorld (April 25, 2012). http://www.pcworld.com/ article/254338/how_to_encrypt_your_email.html (Accessed September 2017) Hatton, Les. E-Mail Forensics: Eliminating Spam, Scams and Phishing. London, England: BlueSpear, 2011. Kamal, Raj. Internet and Web Technologies. New Delhi, India: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2002. Krebs, Brian. Spam Nation: The Inside Story of Organized Cybercrime—From Global Epidemic to Your Front Door. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2014. McAfee. “Email Encryption Made Simple.” White Paper (2012). http://bluekarmasecurity.net/wp-content/ uploads/2014/01/McAfee-WhitePaper-EmailEncryption-Made-Simple.pdf (Accessed September 2017). Norton, Peter. Peter Norton’s Introduction to Computers. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2005. Partridge, Craig. “The Technical Development of Internet Email.” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing (April–June, 2008). http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ document/4544553/ (Accessed September 2017). Van Vleck, Tom. The History of Electronic Mail (2001). http://www.multicians.org/thvv/mail-history.html (Accessed September 2017).

Embargoes An embargo is an official ban or prohibition on trade or other commercial actions between two or more countries. The intent of embargoes is typically for a country or group of countries to coerce another state to change its policies in a desired direction through economic sanctions in times of peace. Embargoes, however, have often proven unsuccessful, especially when adequate surveillance is not in place to prevent smuggling, which is covertly or illegally transporting goods into or out of a country. This entry begins with a brief glance at embargoes enacted in early times, and it follows with examinations of well-known embargoes

350

Embargoes

against countries such as Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Rhodesia, Iraq, and Iran. The entry concludes with a look at the variables that affect the success of embargoes, as well as some often unintended effects of embargoes.

Early History and Well-Known Embargoes Embargoes have a fairly lengthy history. Even in the ancient world, kingdoms sought to prevent technologies, such as the know-how to make iron weapons in the era of bronze weapons, from spreading to other states. During the age of exploration, maps of the New World or the African coast were jealously guarded. Efforts to use such economic weapons have carried over into the modern world. One early attempt at an embargo as a weapon of foreign diplomacy occurred when Thomas Jefferson was president of the United States early in the 19th century. He declared an embargo on trade with Great Britain since the Royal Navy was interfering with trade by neutral countries with France and its allies that were at war with Great Britain. While the United States accepted that war materials could not be carried on neutral shipping, the British used an extremely liberal definition of “war materials.” Jefferson hoped that the embargo would keep Britain from benefiting from being the only remaining major trade partner of the United States. This embargo was not especially effective. Smuggling became widespread in both directions, depriving the national government of tariff revenues, and the economy suffered major losses from reductions in foreign trade. Ultimately, the United States needed the industrial goods of Britain much more than the British needed American raw materials. Napoleon Bonaparte undertook a similar policy once he consolidated power in France. In his struggles with Great Britain, he attempted to use economic sanctions. He established his Continental System, which was intended to deny the British access to European markets and raw materials. The Continental System failed in part because smuggling was rampant and in part because in many cases British goods were seen as better and cheaper than their French or ­European equivalents. Embargoes were used by the United States during the Cold War. The United States limited the

shipment of strategic goods (broadly defined) to the Soviet Union and its allies. American allies supported this action, although they eventually disputed the lengthy list and did not observe all the prohibitions. The Soviet Union managed to acquire technology through theft of industrial secrets and often was able to purchase some materials through countries that legally had access to the technology. Although the United States and its allies had significant difficulty in preventing important technology from getting to the Soviet Union, the embargo on strategic goods did slow down Soviet efforts to develop technology in some areas or to quickly modernize its economic system. There were higher costs to gaining technology or creating Soviet versions, and Soviet efforts at effective central economic planning would no doubt have been greatly enhanced by open access to Western computer and software technologies that were on the prohibited list of strategic goods. The United Nations placed embargoes on many economic goods for Rhodesia after the minority white government declared its independence from Britain unilaterally in 1965. This embargo was not very effective since goods reached Rhodesia through the neighboring Portuguese colonies or South Africa. Portugal and South Africa paid lip service to the embargo but chose not to enforce it, and there was no effective surveillance. There was a series of economic sanctions directed against South Africa that occurred later, especially when the government implemented its harsh apartheid system of race separation. These sanctions were only partial and were honored to differing degrees by different countries, but they did have an economic impact. A variety of factors played a role in the transition to majority rule in that country, and economic considerations were one of them. Iraq faced a lengthy period of sanctions related to its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The initial invasion led to the imposition of sanctions under a United Nation resolution that have had a great deal of support around the world. Even so, there were surveillance issues. Jordan, which faced significant economic losses given its close trade links with Iraq, was considered a weak link, and there may have been some leakage from Iran as well. Although the Islamic Republic was very wary of Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein, it was also concerned about external economic sanctions since it had already

Emergency Alert Systems

faced some. Hussein apparently hoped that support for the sanctions would fade over time and that enforcement would weaken, permitting the absorption of Kuwait into Iraq. He was no doubt heartened by the argument of some that it was necessary to give sanctions time to work. Another issue for the imposition of sanctions was the fact that Kuwaitis in the occupied country were likely to suffer the most under the sanctions. The United States and other countries shared the same fear, leading to the use of military force to liberate Kuwait. After the liberation of Kuwait, sanctions remained in place as part of an effort to force Iraq to destroy its chemical and biological weapons and to permit international inspections to guarantee compliance. These sanctions included an embargo on the purchase of Iraqi oil, later changed to permit limited sales of Iraqi oil on the international market so that Iraq could provide food and medicine for its citizens. The sanctions did not work as anticipated. Hussein used the revenues available to the state to strengthen his security apparatus rather than for purchases of food and medicine or for rebuilding sanitation facilities. The hardships and increased fatalities from inadequate health care actually led to calls for an end to the sanctions. The failure of sanctions to lead to any improvement in the Iraqi regime contributed to the United States’ decision in 2003 to invade Iraq to remove Hussein from power. Iran also faced a variety of economic embargoes in the aftermath of the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and then due to Iranian efforts to develop its nuclear capacity. These sanctions have clearly harmed the Iranian economy in numerous ways. In conjunction with domestic political events inside Iran, the economic sanctions contributed to the increased willingness of the government in 2014 to consider negotiations on the discontinuation of the program or its continuation under strict international surveillance, which would provide an element of security for those concerned about Iran becoming a nuclear power.

Effects Embargoes and sanctions have obviously not always succeeded, and effective surveillance can be an important element in their success. They have also been a prelude to military action in many cases. Their imposition can also have

351

additional negative effects. The costs can be passed on to a minority group, to the population in general, or perhaps to the most vulnerable members of society, while the government relies on security forces to deal with any discontent. This creates a moral dilemma for countries imposing embargoes, especially if they are designed to achieve humanitarian goals. Embargoes can also encourage smuggling and other evasions. In earlier times, smugglers were considered heroes, and they could again gain increased status in modern times as nationalists fighting against foreign interference. In today’s world, however, the successful smugglers are often part of well-established criminal networks, and the increased status may provide them with opportunities for increased influence or chances to use the wealth from smuggling to corrupt government officials. James M. Lutz See also Cold War; Iran; Iraq; South Africa

Further Readings Andreas, Peter. “Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy.” International Studies Quarterly, v.49/2 (2005). Baldwin, David A. “The Sanctions Debate and Other Political Uses: The Logic of Choice.” International Organization, v.24/3 (1999–2000). Drezner Daniel W. “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice.” International Studies Review, v.13/1 (2011). Hufbauer, Gary and Jeffrey Schott (with Kimberly Elliot). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983. Pape, Robert. “Why Sanctions Do Not Work.” International Security, v.22/2 (1997).

Emergency Alert Systems Emergency alert systems (EASs) are designed to provide the public with timely information in the event of a local, regional, or national emergency situation. The goal of an effective EAS is to reach as many persons as possible within the geographic area facing a risk, to alert them to the risk, and to

352

Emergency Alert Systems

indicate specific actions they should take in order to protect themselves from, or otherwise respond to, the risk. There are numerous technologies that can be used to convey emergency alerts, which are often coupled together to provide the same message through a variety of channels. To accomplish this task, EASs may utilize cellular telephone networks, listings of persons who reside in a particular area, or listings of persons who have opted in (or have not opted out) for a specific EAS service, which raises concerns regarding privacy and surveillance. Because there are different types of EASs, their purposes, technology, and operations may vary.

Types of EASs While EASs need not rely on advanced technology— the story of Paul Revere’s ride could be construed as a historic emergency alert, and into the 20th century, phone trees and tornado sirens were lower-tech examples—the growth of such systems did benefit from technological development. In the wake of the Cold War and with the advancement of radio and television technologies, the audio tones of the Emergency Broadcast System (since renamed the Emergency Alert System) became familiar warnings. The next major wave of attention to warning systems came in the aftermath of incidents such as the attacks on September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which through tragedy brought increased attention to emergency management, generally, including public notification. Since that time, EAS structures have grown substantially, with virtually all jurisdictions having some type of system in place to provide notifications regarding issues from weather alerts to AMBER Alerts providing notifications about missing or abducted children, to notifications such as Silver Alerts pertaining to persons with Alzheimer’s or dementia who are reported missing, to shelter in place or evacuation messages, to emergency or disaster situations, and more. There are a variety of mechanisms through which EASs can be structured. National, state, and local governments can utilize the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, which is a partnership with cellular telephone service providers to deliver emergency notifications to mobile devices. WEA notifications are geographically targeted, meaning that an alert can be sent to all devices within a certain geographic area, delivered through cellular

telephone towers in that area. This helps ensure that only devices in areas for which the alert is necessary receive the notification. Wireless carriers may choose whether or not to participate in the system; for those who do, customers can choose to opt out of receiving alerts, except for those issued by the president of the United States. Another popular alternative for local governments is the use of reverse 9-1-1 systems. As the name suggests, these systems are capable of delivering a phone message—and in some cases a text message—to numbers archived within a jurisdiction’s 9-1-1 system. Reverse 9-1-1 systems generally begin with the presumption that all persons (with phones) in the jurisdiction will participate, but they may allow an opt-out option for those who do not wish to do so. Some localities also utilize third-party emergency notification providers; there are a number of private companies that provide mass notification services through phone, text messaging, email, and smartphone applications. Local governments contract these services for their residents, and participation is often on an opt-in model, in which residents who wish to participate submit their preferred contact information. In some cases, participants can even select the types of notifications they wish to receive. In many of the aforementioned systems, messages may also be targeted to phones associated with addresses in specific geographic areas within a jurisdiction, to allow customized notifications based on location. EASs are not limited to national and local governments. Large-scale organizations, such as school districts, universities, and hospitals, may also have their own EASs. Incidents of mass violence, such as the 2007 shootings at Virginia Tech, have led many institutions to develop and adopt notification systems. In particular, the Jeanne Clery Act (named after a university student who was raped and murdered by another student) requires institutions of higher education to make notifications to the campus community pertaining to certain reported criminal offenses and to emergency situations. When housed within an institution, EASs can include telephone, text messaging, and email communication, but they may also include a variety of other strategies. These can include scrolls across the screens of networked computers, internal intercom or announcement systems, emergency alert lighting systems, the use

Emergency Alert Systems

of electronic signage devices to transmit messages, and more. Software packages can help coordinate the transmission of the same message to multiple outlets. The personalized elements of an institutional system (e.g., phone, text, email) are often opt-in systems for members of the institution. Governments and institutions may also incorporate social media into their EASs. Postings to social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter allow messages to be distributed quickly and to a wide audience. Local or institutional webpages can also be structured to have an emergency mode, in which only basic content is included with most of the page dedicated to providing information and updates about an emergency or crisis situation. From this discussion, it quickly becomes clear that there is not one single EAS but rather a multitude of systems specific to various jurisdictions and institutions. In some cases, these systems may overlap (e.g., a resident living, working at a hospital, and attending college in the same town could potentially subscribe to emergency alerts for the hospital, college, and town, in addition to receiving WEA messages). In an effort to bring together what would individually be a fragmented approach to emergency notification, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has developed the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, also known as IPAWS. The purpose of this system is to allow coordination between and among systems, so otherwise disparate systems can be tied together to provide the most effectively targeted communications for incidents that extend beyond institutional or jurisdictional boundaries. In considering EASs, it is important to recognize that they are only as effective as the messages they deliver. Messages must be written clearly, be easily understandable, and provide the necessary and specific information to help the audience know what to do. Messages must also be accessible to persons who speak languages other than English and to persons whose vision or hearing is impaired. Additional technologies may be required of some systems to accomplish these goals.

Security, Surveillance, Privacy, and EASs The primary purpose of EASs is to notify the public of an emergency situation. EAS usage has expanded as new notification technologies have

353

emerged, and EASs will likely continue to develop in an effort to reach as many members of the public as possible. The primary goal of EAS usage is to promote public safety and security, both by notifying the public of actual or potential threats and by providing instructions regarding protective actions for the public to take. EAS usage also has implications for surveillance, consistent with the growth in what some have called a surveillance culture, in which the public is increasingly vigilant against security threats. Members of the public who have received an EAS notification can report information to appropriate authorities. For instance, law enforcement social media accounts, AMBER Alerts, Clery Act notifications of reported crimes on college and university campuses, Silver Alerts of missing senior adults, and other forms of notification can informally deputize the public as eyes and ears of public safety first responders, to share information about offenses under investigation or sightings of missing persons. Likewise, EAS messages can be used to solicit from the public information about changing circumstances in natural disasters or other unfolding incidents, which can be used to promote the situational awareness of responders—such as what streets are unpassable due to flood waters, the depth of snowfall, locations of persons in need of evacuation, and other information. At the same time, EASs have been criticized for privacy considerations. On one level, the public sometimes may feel that their personal privacy is violated by receiving messages that they do not deem to be worthy of EAS notification. This has demonstrated the importance of having accepted protocols regarding the types of messages for which EASs should (and should not) be used. Care must be taken so that the public perceives that an EAS notification, when made, truly is for a significant issue. For instance, using a school-based EAS to distribute a sports schedule would not be appropriate, but using it to announce a weatherbased shelter-in-place alert would be. On another level, some members of the public have expressed concern about the privacy of information used to generate alerts, including the ability of systems such as WEA to send signals based on their current geographic locations. While the WEA system does not actually monitor the location of a particular mobile device (the alert is

354

Eminent Domain

simply received by all devices within range of a designated cellular communications tower), public perceptions regarding information privacy can shape the trust placed in an EAS. Therefore, it is important for EAS administrators to respond to public inquiries and to be transparent about information utilized by the system. In addition, some EAS databases record potentially sensitive information. For instance, some EASs may ask persons with disabilities to self-identify during an opt-in process, so appropriate accommodations may be made available in an emergency situation. There may be hesitation among members of the public to share this type of information, even for inclusion in a secured database. As with so many applications of information technology, EASs sometimes raise questions about what information is utilized or preserved and what safeguards are taken to protect it.

Conclusion Development and use of EASs is currently a standard procedure in emergency planning and public safety policy. Doing so yields benefits in the area of security. EAS planners and operators must be cognizant of addressing issues or concerns related to the areas of surveillance and privacy to ensure a system that most effectively reaches, and is perceived as legitimate and valuable by, the public. Stephen S. Owen See also AMBER Alerts; Cell Phone Tracking; Email; Smartphones; Texting; U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Further Readings Federal Communications Commission. “Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA).” https://www.fcc.gov/ consumers/guides/wireless-emergency-alerts-wea (Accessed June 2016). Federal Emergency Management Agency. “Integrated Public Alert & Warning System.” https://www.fema .gov/integrated-public-alert-warning-system (Accessed October 2014). Gray, Robin Hattersley. “Campuses Continue to Invest in Emergency Notification Systems and Upgrades.” Campus Safety, v.22/2 (2014). Hsu, Spencer. “Bush Orders Update of Emergency Alert System.” The Washington Post (June 27, 2006). http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2006/06/26/AR2006062601304.html (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Department of Education. The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting. Washington, DC: Author, 2011. https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/ safety/handbook.pdf (Accessed June 2016).

Eminent Domain Eminent domain refers to the power of the government to take private property for public use by the state. The power of eminent domain is recognized in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which declares that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” In requiring “just compensation” for a taking under the Fifth Amendment, the Constitution acknowledges that eminent domain is a power that can be exercised legitimately by government provided that the taking is for public use. Determining what constitutes “taking” and “public use” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, however, is extremely controversial. Frequently, takings under the Fifth Amendment run afoul of private property rights and place the security of property rights in jeopardy. Balancing the private property rights of individuals with the public needs of the government is one of the most difficult challenges in eminent domain law.

Expansion of Eminent Domain Initially, the Fifth Amendment’s limitation on eminent domain applied only to takings by the federal government. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the U.S. Supreme Court held that seizure of private property by the states was not subject to the “just compensation” requirement because the Fifth Amendment did not apply to state action. States were thus free to take private property without offering any sort of compensation to the owners unless state law required it. The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution altered the free rein states enjoyed under eminent domain. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago (1897), the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the same level of protection of

Eminent Domain

private property for state action as the Fifth Amendment required of the federal government. In a subsequent decision, the Court also held that “public use” meant that the property could not be conveyed to private individuals. Public use applied to takings for the creation of things like parks, roads, bridges, schools, and other such enterprises that are physically used by the public. In Clark v. Nash (1905), however, the Court began to expand the meaning of public use. In that case, the Court held that a taking could be justified so long as the government could show that it was related to the public interest or public welfare. In Clark, this reasoning validated a taking for public use despite there being a single individual who would benefit from that use. The taking was upheld because the individual could show a public interest that would be served from the exercise of eminent domain. The effect of Clark was a significant relaxing of the Fifth Amendment’s restrictions on eminent domain, and, in response, states soon became more aggressive in their takings. States began to apply eminent domain to various public policy problems, such as urban renewal, affordable housing, residential blight, and economic development. Courts generally supported state efforts in these endeavors. In Berman v. Parker (1954), for example, the Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia statute directed toward urban renewal. The statute allowed a redevelopment agency to exercise the power of eminent domain to eliminate slums and substandard housing by reselling that land to other private parties for redevelopment purposes. In siding with the city, the Court stated that its role in overseeing eminent domain was extremely narrow and that, as a general rule, courts should defer to the decisions of state legislatures. Recent decisions have affirmed Berman’s permissive attitude toward eminent domain. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984), the Court upheld the state’s seizure of land from wealthy landowners to transfer it to lessees living on single-family residential lots on the land. The Court again declared that weighing in on the wisdom of public policy was not a proper role for the judiciary. In Kelo v. City of New London (2005), the seizure of a home for economic development was ruled constitutional, though the majority opinion was written in such broad language that critics argued the Court had effectively deleted the

355

word “public” from the Fifth Amendment. Public reaction to Kelo was largely negative, and in response, many states revised their eminent domain laws to afford greater protection for private property.

Regulations as Takings The Fifth Amendment requires that just compensation be given when the power of eminent domain is exercised, but it is less clear what is owed, if anything, when property is “taken” as a result of a government regulation. A regulation that has substantial impact on the land’s value or its free use by the owner would, in application, have all the essential characteristics of a taking. Thus, the Court has confronted whether and under what circumstances regulations require just compensation. In its early history, the Court found no relationship between regulations and takings and did not require compensation for owners adversely affected by regulations. The Court began a shift, however, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922). While failing to provide any clear guidance in its decision, the Court acknowledged for the first time that a regulation must be recognized as a taking when it goes “too far.” Later decisions have attempted to define the boundaries of “too far.” One limitation was articulated in Armstrong v. United States (1960). There, the Court ruled that a regulation that affects a single person or a small group of people is not permissible. Individuals or small groups cannot be asked to bear the costs of public interests that affect everyone. The costs of pursuing public policy objectives must be borne by everyone in the community. Thus, if a regulation has a disproportionate impact on a small number of people, a state must use eminent domain and compensate those individuals for their injuries. Another limitation recognized by the Court applies to regulations that result in physical invasion of a person’s property. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982), New York passed a regulation requiring landlords to allow cable companies to install cable facilities in apartment buildings. The facilities required less than 1.5 cubic feet of space. Nevertheless, the Court held the facilities requirement to be a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because of the

356

Eminent Domain

physical invasion of the property, which required compensation to be paid to the landlords. The Court has defined regulations that deprive an owner of all economically viable use of the land as takings. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992), the appellant had purchased coastal property with the intention of developing it into homes. After buying the property, a statute was passed barring new construction to prevent erosion. The Court, while acknowledging the problem of coastal erosion, sided with the plaintiff and ruled that a person must be compensated when a regulation renders his or her land devoid of all economically beneficial use. The Court has qualified the preceding rule in one important respect. In Tahoe-Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002), the Court determined that temporary regulations that deprive an owner of economically beneficial use of a property are permissible. As such, no compensation is due to the owner when a prohibition on economic use is temporary and the owner will be able to resume full use of the property. In making its ruling, though, the Court did not specify how long a temporary regulation could be imposed and did not address a potential issue of states passing successive temporary regulations to create a permanent regulation in fact. Regulations must also substantially advance a legitimate government interest to not be considered takings. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987), the appellants sought a coastal development permit to build a home on their beachfront property. The appellee issued the permit, but on the condition that the appellants grant an easement to the public across their property to allow easier access to the beach. The Court held that the condition attached to the permit was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the condition did not substantially advance the state’s interest in simplifying public access to the beach. The state could still accomplish its desire for an easement, but it would need to use the power of eminent domain and compensate the owners.

Compensation Courts have held that compensation requires that an owner be given the fair market value of his or her property. In practice, calculating just compensation as fair market value involves numerous difficulties.

Disputes frequently arise, for example, regarding how fair market value should be determined. In the case of land seizures, courts must often take into account issues related to contract rights and other legal issues that can apply to land use. Courts may also have to contend with claims about the future economic value of the land that is taken. In short, even when compensation is due, the property owner may be challenged in ensuring that it is just. Homeowners take fewer things for granted than being secure in their private property rights. The notion that the state can come in and take away a person’s home is unimaginable to many, yet it happens with some frequency all across the United States. In the wake of Kelo, some additional protections have been put in place to protect privacy and to help homeowners stay secure in their properties. But critics argue that more should be done to keep states from overreaching and intruding into homeowner private property rights. For now, the fight between public interest and private rights will continue to be waged in courtrooms across the United States. Eric C. Sands See also Bill of Rights; United States

Further Readings Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). Fischel, William. Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Siegan, Bernard. Property and Freedom: The Constitution, the Courts, and Land-Use Regulation. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1998. Tahoe-Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).

Environmental Security

Environmental Security Environmental security refers to the impact that people and states have on the environment as well as threats posed by the environment, including patterns, events, and shocks, to people, communities, and states. The term also considers how threats posed by the environment can transcend states and affect entire regions and subregions. The term encompasses a wide range of events, activities, and outcomes of human conflict (e.g., destruction to forests and water supplies/sources), communities, and states. This entry discusses the issues and concerns associated with environmental security, the various definitions of the concept, and the coordinated programs to ensure environmental security.

Issues and Concerns In general, the term environmental security refers to a wide spectrum of issues and concerns that can be placed into the following three categories: 1. Security and the negative impact that humans and human activity have on the environment 2. Security and concerns about the direct and indirect effects of changes taking place in the environment (i.e., water scarcity, degradation, and desertification) now and in the future 3. Security and insecurity that individuals, groups, communities, and humankind experience and will experience as a result of environmental changes (i.e., water scarcity, land degradation, pollution, urbanization, global warming and stratosphere ozone depletion, and multifaceted changes in ecosystems as a result of biodiversity decline)

According to the World Health Organization, the results of escalating human pressure on the global environment affect health in the following ways: Direct health impacts: floods, heat waves, water shortage, landslides, increased exposure to ultraviolet radiation, and exposure to pollutants Ecosystem-mediated health impacts: altered infectious diseases risk, reduced food yields (malnutrition and stunting), depletion of natural medicines, mental health (personal and community), impacts of aesthetic/cultural impoverishment

357

Indirect, deferred, and displaced health impacts: diverse health consequences of livelihood loss, population displacement (including slum dwelling), conflict, inappropriate adaptation, and mitigation

Definitions Although international cooperation and attempts to deal with environmental security issues are plagued by a lack of universal acceptance of what actually constitutes environmental danger, threat, and security, there exist a number of very useful working definitions employed by governments, regional organizations or associations, and scholars. However, all definitions that can be found are problematic. The U.S. Department of Defense Directive Number 4751.1, issued on February 24, 1996, states as follows: The environmental security program enhances readiness by institutionalizing the Department of Defense’s environmental, safety, and occupational health awareness, making it an integral part of the Department’s daily activities. Environmental Security is comprised of restoration, compliance, conservation, pollution prevention, environmental security technology, and international activities.

The Russian Federation adopted the following definition at a meeting of the interagency commission on environmental security on October 13, 1994. Environmental security is defined as protectedness of natural environment and vital interests of citizens, society, the state from internal and external impacts, adverse processes and trends in development that threaten human health, biodiversity and sustainable functioning of ecosystems, and survival of humankind. Environmental security is an integral part of Russia’s national security. (Security Council of the Russian Federation, 1996, p. 55)

The Commonwealth of Independent States adopted an advisory legislative act “On Environmental Security” in 1996, with the following definition: Environmental security is the state of protection of vital interests of the individual, society, and natural

358

Environmental Security

environment from threats resulting from anthropogenic and natural impacts on the environment. Environmental danger is the state posing a threat to vitally important interests of the individual, to society and the natural environment as a result of anthropogenic and natural impacts on it (natural environment).

James McQuaid (2013), in Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean, referred to environment security as an integrated approach for assessing and responding to the risks as well as opportunities generated by environmental state-change. Broader governance discussions are premature without an holistic vetting of the risks. (p. 120)

W. Chris King, Brigadier General U.S. Army (ret.) and Dean of Academics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, defines the concept as a process that effectively responds to changing environmental conditions that have the potential to reduce peace and stability in the world. Accomplishing our environmental security goals mandates planning and execution of defense programs to prevent and mitigate anthropogenically induced adverse changes in the environment, which impact sustainable living conditions for people in a region.

And Jon Barnett (2001), author of The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era, briefly describes environmental security as the process of peacefully reducing human vulnerability to human-induced environmental degradation by addressing the root causes of environmental degradation and human insecurity. [It is] the process of minimizing environmental insecurity [italics added]. (p. 129)

Coordinated Programs While natural resources found within the environment have been linked to conflict between states and nonstate actors, not all conflict is the result of

this. Moreover, the resources and aspects of the environment are not the sole cause of conflict in the world. Despite the competition that exists between states over resources and environmental security, the common problems have the potential to bring people, communities, and states together to work toward common goals. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe states that “environmental co-operation can act as a tool for conflict prevention and confidence-building” (United Nations, 2015). The Environment Security Initiative is an interagency initiative comprising the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environment Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Economic Commission for Europe, and the Regional Environment Center. The initiative focuses on four themes: 1. Natural resources and security risk management 2. Hazardous substances 3. Climate change 4. Information and participation

Because Environment Security Initiative projects operate in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, South East Europe, and the South Caucasus, it is a good example of coordinated program implementation that brings multiple governments together to focus on the issue of environmental security. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk See also Politics

Further Readings Barnett, Jon. The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Betsill, Michele, et al. Advances in International Environmental Politics. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Dalby, Simon. Environmental Security. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. DeSombre, Elizabeth R. The Global Environment and World Politics. New York, NY: Continuum. Detraz, Nicole. Environmental Security and Gender. London, England: Routledge, 2014.

Equality Floyd, Rita and Richard Matthew. Environmental Security: Approaches and Issues. London, England: Routledge, 2013. King, Chris. A Strategic Analytic Approach to the Environmental Security Program of NATO (2008). http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0803-science/ pdf/chris_king.pdf (Accessed October 2017). McQuaid, James. “Observations on the Evolution of NATO’s Science Programme.” In Paul Berkman and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin (eds.), Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean. London, England: Taylor & Francis, 2013. Security Council of the Russian Federation. Environmental Security of Russia (Issue 2). Moscow, Russia: Author, 1996. United Nations. “Fostering Peace and Sustainable Development.” UN Chronicle, v.52/4 (2015). https:// unchronicle.un.org/article/fostering-peace-andsustainable-development (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Department of Defense. Directive Number 4715.1 (February 24, 1996). http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/ dodd/corres/html2/d47151x.htm (Accessed October 2017).

Equality In discussions concerning the relationship between surveillance and equality, the latter is understood as lack of discrimination among individuals or social groups. In the context of surveillance, social groups are mainly conceptualized through categorization, based on socially constructed categories and situation-dependent criteria. Some surveillance practices that are relevant from the point of view of equality are explicitly aimed at surveilling individuals; in other cases, surveillance is an unintended consequence. In terms of its effect, surveillance can either reinforce or reduce social equality. The relationship between social equality and ­surveillance often comes up in the context of law enforcement practices and social policies, and it often relates to the phenomenon of i­ ntersectionality (i.e., people whose social position is determined by the interplay of multiple social disadvantages). This entry explains the relationship between antidiscrimination and social sorting, and how categories are socially constructed. It then discusses surveillance as harassment and the relationship between intersectionality and surveillance.

359

Antidiscrimination and Social Sorting In the context of surveillance, the equality concept of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights norms that center on freedom from discrimination among social groups are the most relevant. Crucial elements within this concept of equality are the “basis” or “grounds” for discrimination (i.e., personality traits or characteristics that may cause disparate treatment of certain individuals). Antidiscrimination norms are not generally applicable, only in relation to predefined, qualified, and enumerated characteristics. These “protected grounds” mostly include the following: race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, political or other opinion, social status, origin, age, and disability; and they usually refer to being characteristics that are essential to the personality, or immutable (or only subject to change with costs that are high enough not to be reasonably expected from an individual). Surveillance-related inquiries on social equality usually apply a broader concept than the legal definition of discrimination and include social sorting, the categorization of individuals in specific situations by value and risk factor; the basis or ground for discrimination may include dressing, hairstyle, or consumer preferences—which may also be related to more substantive grounds, such as religion, political opinion, or class. Categorization, the mental or computerized process that puts the individual in a social group or a risk group, is a central concept in both antidiscrimination law and social sorting. Antidiscrimination law builds on perception, when outlawing discrimination based on real or presumed characteristics, while social sorting sees the roots of discrimination in abstracting information on the individual.

Categories as Social Constructions Scholarship on social equality emphasizes that social categories defining social roles and relations are social constructs and not necessarily essential or “naturally” determined. Gender, as an analytic category, is a classic example, building on the assumption that gender roles are less determined biologically than by historically and culturally varying social expectations. This theoretical trend

360

Equality

on social equality is also expressed in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities, which is based on the presumption that even disability is not a purely biological status but, to a certain degree, a social construct. The aim of deconstructing the concept of d ­ isability is to identify the morphology of disability and thereby the obstacles and barriers to accessibility that societies create—both literally and in the abstract sense. The Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disability sets forth the requirement of “universal design,” which means that to reduce unnecessary barriers, when designing products, environments, programs, and services, the needs and requirements of all social groups should be taken into consideration. Surveillance scholarship uses the term body discrimination for practices that discriminate against people whose physical characteristics do not fit into environments designed for the privileged: for example, the ablebodied, white males. This approach sees power relations reflected in the design of surveillance instruments and systems, pointing to indirect discrimination—such as when medical diagnostic tools are unfit for persons who have physical deformations or use a wheelchair, as this prevents them from taking part in preventive screenings or accessing adequate therapies.

Surveillance as Harassment Antidiscrimination norms usually codify harassment as a special, sui generis form of discrimination if it happens in connection with an individual’s protected characteristic. Certain surveillance practices that have a disproportionate impact on a protected group may in effect also amount to discrimination. Ethno-racial profiling, when members of ethno-racial groups are identified and subsequently targeted as high risk by law enforcement authorities or private security personnel, can also be conceptualized as harassment within the framework of antidiscrimination law. Racial profiling, a form of prejudice-led institutional discrimination, is problematic from the point of view of social equality, even if individual stop-andsearch measures are not unlawful. Feminist scholarship on the implications and consequences of surveillance practices also identifies surveillance as a form of sexual harassment when male employees in closed-circuit television

monitoring rooms pay disproportionate and voyeuristic attention to women who pose no security risk.

Surveillance and Intersectionality Intersectionality is highly relevant in the relationship between surveillance and social equality, especially in relation to the concept of social sorting. Intersectionality refers to when individuals have several characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, and class, that subject them to marginalization and discrimination and the interplay of these multiple disadvantages determines their social position. A notable form of social sorting concerns law enforcement authorities identifying youths or lower-middle-class nonwhite males as a high– security risk social group. This approach and practice not only cause further marginalization of the affected individuals but also create security risks for them, as being retrieved from police control and from areas under surveillance makes them vulnerable to victimization. In the field of social policies and social services, low-status, mostly welfare-recipient women—especially single mothers from a minority background—face heightened scrutiny by the child protection services responsible for social services, and they are often threatened with removal of their children to state custody.

Surveillance for Combating Social Inequality Some surveillance initiatives have been specifically designed to combat certain forms of discrimination. A form of sousveillance concerns wearable cameras used by police officers, which are deployed to record their interactions and provide transparency in order to answer allegations of ethnic/racial profiling or disrespectful or illegal treatment of members of certain social groups. Certain crime prevention surveillance technologies can also be conceptualized as falling within the terrain of antidiscrimination when they target crimes that are intrinsically connected to social inequalities, such as the power asymmetries between men and women. For example, there are specially designed personal alarm devices that are aimed at protecting individuals exposed to the risk of intimate partnership violence. Here, activating

Espionage

the panic function directly signals the designated police department and not only provides the GPS (Global Positioning System) coordinates of the incident but also contextualizes it, for example, as an expartner violating restraining orders. In some nations, such as those in Scandinavia, where to end prostitution criminal sanctions have been introduced targeting customers purchasing sexual services, certain public order surveillance technologies can also be perceived as tools combating the social inequality between men and women. This abolitionist approach identifies prostitution as a form of sexual exploitation and as an indirect factor in preserving social inequalities and, hence, aims at restricting the demand for such services. This, in practice, means that surveillance technologies are used to target both public spaces and Internet sites (including dating sites) to identify and sanction clients purchasing sexual services. A further point of connection between equality and surveillance concerns the requirement dictated by efficiency for policy measures adopted to enforce antidiscrimination regulations to establish monitoring mechanisms with data desegregated by protected grounds (e.g., gender or ethnicity), which also creates an inherent surveillance potential. András L. Pap and Lidia Balogh See also Policing and Society; Profiling, Racial; Protection Orders; Social Sorting; Sousveillance

Further Readings Gilliom, John. Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Lyon, David. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life. Buckingham, England: Open University Press, 2003. Martin, Denise, et al. “Risky or at Risk? Young People, Surveillance and Security.” Criminal Justice Matters, v.68/1 (2007). Monahan, Torin. “Dreams of Control at a Distance: Gender, Surveillance, and Social Control.” Cultural Studies: Critical Methodologies, v.9/2 (2009). Webster, William, ed. The Social Perspective: A Report Presenting a Review of the Key Features Raised by the Social Perspectives of Surveillance and Democracy. Stirling, Scotland: University of Stirling, 2013.

361

Espionage Espionage, or spying, refers to the covert surveillance of another government aimed at gathering information about the behavior and intentions of the opposing state. Espionage encompasses the following activities: undertaking covert operations in foreign countries, recruiting foreign nationals to work as double agents, monitoring the mail and telecommunications of foreign nationals, and using reconnaissance flights for aerial surveillance of enemy territory. Although espionage has existed for more than 2,000 years, it was not until the 20th century that most countries developed permanent espionage programs, creating government agencies and training professional agents. Espionage is common in international politics, but it remains a controversial practice. This entry provides an overview of espionage, detailing the legal and political debates over covert surveillance programs. It then considers the multitude of surveillance tools that countries have employed to gather intelligence about enemies and allies alike, in an effort to gain a strategic advantage in international affairs.

Espionage and National Security Although there is no single definition of espionage, scholars agree that all espionage is covert; in this view, espionage is different from other categories of intelligence gathering, such as the analysis of open source materials. Commonly, espionage involves the recruitment of double agents. An effective double agent is a high-ranking official in another country. This person can be a source of valuable information on the internal politics of his or her country, by providing copies of classified documents. Double agents are also valuable for counterespionage; for example, if Country A recruits a double agent in Country B, the double agent can then inform Country A if any of its own top officials are secretly working on behalf of Country B. Individuals who spy for another government may be motivated by any number of factors. Most commonly, double agents are paid for their services. In some cases, a double agent may be motivated by ideology. Jonathan Pollard, an American citizen who spied on behalf of Israel, is an example of this. Alternately, a double agent may be blackmailed

362

Espionage

into cooperating with an enemy government. For example, prior to World War I, the Russian government discovered that Alfred Reid, an Austrian politician, was a homosexual. Russian officials forced him to spy on his own government by threatening to expose secrets from his personal life. Another type of espionage relies on the use of electronic surveillance. Here, a government can gather information on another regime using reconnaissance flights, satellite photographs, or the monitoring of electronic data, such as phone calls and Internet traffic. Advances in technology, such as the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have made this form of intelligence gathering much more common. Most countries see espionage as a policy tool, allowing them to gather information about the actions and intentions of enemies and allies alike. Specifically, governments can use the information gathered from spying to predict and prevent military attacks, discern the motives of a negotiating partner, or gain knowledge on new military technologies. Nearly every country in the world has an agency dedicated to foreign intelligence gathering. Notable agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States, MI6 in Britain, the Ministry of State Security in China, the Mossad in Israel, and the Foreign Intelligence Service (formerly the KGB) in Russia. Traditionally, espionage has been defined as spying on a foreign government. For many countries, however, especially those in the developing world, the greatest security threats come not from foreign powers but, rather, from internal forces, such as separatist movements or terrorist groups. To combat these asymmetric threats, governments can also employ the tools of espionage, for example, monitoring the communications and financial transactions of a targeted group.

The Legality of Espionage Espionage occupies a legal “gray area” as it is neither expressly forbidden nor permitted by international law. Several major international treaties and conventions do provide insight into the permissibility of the activity. For example, although the founding Charter of the United Nations does not speak directly of the issue of espionage, Article 51

of the Charter codifies the idea that states are sovereign entities with the right to self-defense. In this view, espionage is permitted as one tool states can use to protect their national security. Two other legal documents contain clearer statements on the legality of espionage. The 1949 Geneva Convention, which outlines standards for humane conduct in wartime, defines espionage in Article 29; the treaty notes that a spy is an individual who enters a foreign nation under false pretenses for the purpose of gathering information. Although the convention holds that a captured spy may be punished, under the laws of war, this individual retains the right to a fair trial. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which outlines modern standards of diplomatic practice, also addresses the issue of espionage committed by diplomats. More precisely, the convention specifies that diplomats, as credentialed personnel of foreign nations, are granted diplomatic immunity; as such, a diplomat who is caught spying may not be arrested or prosecuted by the host country. The host country, however, retains the right to declare the diplomat a persona non grata and expel him or her. Finally, customary international law, namely the traditions and practices of states that are not codified into treaties, suggests that espionage is viewed as a legitimate though much disparaged tool of international politics. Specifically, while most regimes denounce espionage when it is committed against them, the same governments are willing to provide asylum to foreign nationals who commit espionage on their behalf. Overall, there is a moral relativism inherent in espionage: A citizen who spies for another country is reviled in his or her home country but is treated as a hero in the country to which he or she provides the intelligence. In addition to debating the legality of espionage, scholars are also divided over the utility and wisdom of using espionage as a policy tool. Critics of espionage, such as Herbert Scoville, point to a litany of problems associated with the practice. Most basically, he questions whether or not espionage actually produces useful information. He notes that many double agents are motived by monetary gain, and they are unlikely to provide high-quality, actionable intelligence that will aid a country in making policy decisions.

Espionage

Moreover, Scoville notes that espionage deepens distrust between countries and, when it is discovered, can precipitate an international ­crisis. For example, he points to the fallout that occurred in 1960 when the Soviets shot down a U2 spy plane piloted by the American Gary Baker. Following the incident, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev became less willing to work with the United States; he walked out of an international summit attended by representatives from the United States and refused to engage in arms control negotiations. Supporters of espionage, however, argue that the practice actually decreases the probability of international conflict by providing countries with a more complete picture of the intentions of their enemies. For example, Glenn Sulmasy and John Yoo argue that the information gathered through espionage allows a country to adjust its strategy accordingly so as to prevent conflict. For example, if a country gains information about an imminent attack on its territory, it can take deterrent action to prevent military conflict. Alternately, espionage may reveal that a perceived enemy actually has benign intentions; in this case, a government may decide to open up peace talks. Overall, Sulmasy and Yoo argue that espionage provides intelligence that helps mitigate the uncertainty inherent in the international political arena.

Domestic Prohibitions Against Espionage Although espionage is not clearly banned by international law, many countries have passed domestic laws criminalizing the behavior and outlining harsh punishments for captured spies. The United Kingdom was one of the first nations to formalize this prohibition into law, with the 1889 Official Secrets Act. The law has been amended multiple times, most recently in 1989. Specifically, the Official Secrets Act made it a crime for a U.K. citizen living anywhere in the world to obtain state secrets, transmit state secrets, or harbor an individual who is acting as an agent of a foreign power. The United States modeled its own anti-espionage law, the 1917 Espionage Act, on the U.K. law. President Woodrow Wilson signed the Espionage Act into law during World War I; the act updated existing law, making it a crime to provide intelligence to the enemy. The act was later

363

broadened, making it a crime to disrupt the war effort by urging draft resistance or disseminating false information. Like the United States and the United Kingdom, Russia also maintains laws criminalizing espionage; during the Cold War, the Soviet Union meted out harsh punishments to officials who acted as double agents. Typically, captured double agents were executed and buried in unmarked graves. Domestic espionage laws have been the subject of much criticism, as governments often use these laws to punish political dissidents or silence whistle-blowers. Famously, during World War I, the United States used the Espionage Act to jail Eugene Debs, an outspoken socialist who opposed U.S. involvement in the conflict. The law was also used to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg, a defense analyst for the RAND Corporation. In 1969, Ellsberg gave members of the press classified information about U.S. strategy during the Vietnam War; Ellsberg hoped that the release of the information would promote a robust public debate about continued U.S. involvement in the conflict. More recently, some members of the U.S. Congress have argued that the act should be used to prosecute Edward Snowden; Snowden, an intelligence analyst, leaked information to the press about the National Security Administration’s surveillance of domestic phone calls.

The Tools and Techniques of Espionage Espionage, as commonly defined, is a form of intelligence gathering. There are four categories of intelligence that can be gathered: (1) human intelligence, (2) imagery intelligence, (3) communications intelligence, and (4) measurement and signals intelligence. Human intelligence is defined as the collection of data by individuals; this is the form of intelligence gathering most commonly associated with espionage. To obtain this form of information, a country must first recruit a double agent who has access to valuable intelligence. Next, the double agent is assigned to a handler, namely an employee within an intelligence agency who manages the transfer of this information and, if applicable, provides the double agent with payment for his or her services.

364

Espionage

Under the guidance of a handler, a double agent may employ a variety of techniques to gather and transfer information to a foreign government while remaining undetected. Since smuggling physical documents is risky, governments have often provided their double agents with document cameras. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union provided double agents with a version of the Minox camera for photographing documents. Moreover, the Soviets developed document cameras that resembled books and notebooks, allowing agents to easily smuggle them into secure U.S. facilities. In addition to document cameras, miniature hidden cameras were also common in 20thcentury espionage operations. During the Cold War, the Soviets proved adept at engineering small cameras that could snap photos without detection. For example, by 1948, the KGB had developed a miniature robotic camera; this device, the F21, could be hidden on an agent’s clothing, disguised as a button or pin. The Soviets also developed the Tokya 58-Ml; this camera was the size of a cigarette case, and it was often hidden behind an agent’s necktie. Once a double agent had gathered intelligence, he or she then faced the task of passing it to the handler. Typically, both sides would agree to exchange information at a “drop site”; this was a predetermined location, often in a public place. Most commonly, intelligence agencies used “dead drops.” To avoid direct contact between the double agent and the handler, the agent would leave the information in a public place. Later, the handler would retrieve the drop and often leave a payment. Famously, John Anthony Walker Jr., a U.S. Navy chief warrant officer who spied for the Soviets from 1968 to 1985, would hide classified documents inside a bag of ordinary household trash. Later, his Soviet handler would pick up the information and leave a payment for Walker in a trash bag at the same location. In addition to human intelligence, a second type of intelligence, communications intelligence, can be obtained through espionage operations. Communications intelligence includes information gathered by monitoring foreign mail, phone conversations, and online activity. Although it may be relatively easy for a country to tap into the communication streams of an enemy government, most regimes

guard against this type of spying by encrypting sensitive information. Prior to the Digital Age, governments used ciphers to encode communication concerning national security; many ciphers, such as those used in the 17th and 18th centuries, were based on simple substitution codes, where one letter or number in the encrypted message corresponded to another letter in the alphabet. Recruiting a double agent who possessed a cipher key was a boon for a country, allowing the government to decrypt virtually all of the enemy’s messages. By the time of the Cold War, most countries relied on cipher machines to create complex codes that could not be cracked through trial and error. Today, ciphers have become obsolete, as most data are sent digitally and are heavily encrypted. To decode this information, intelligence agencies now rely on supercomputers. Another type of intelligence is imagery intelligence, or photographic data. Here, states can use spy planes or spy satellites to gather data about enemy troop movements and military installations. Governments have been gathering imagery intelligence for more than a century; for example, in the early 1900s, countries used hot air balloons and rudimentary cameras to gain information about enemy activities. By the time of World War I, states had developed spy planes, such as the U.S. B-17 Flying Fortress, that could photograph enemy territory. Subsequently, during the Cold War, spy satellites became common. For instance, the United States used the CORONA satellite, originally designed for geological surveys, to photograph large surface areas of the Soviet Union. Increasingly, surveillance by unmanned aerial vehicles has replaced piloted planes as a tool of espionage. Drones provide several advantages over traditional surveillance flights; most obviously, since drones are unmanned, they can be sent into areas of ongoing conflict where the airspace has not been secured. In addition, some strategic drones, such as the Global Hawk, can fly at 60,000 feet, evading detection while gaining highresolution photographic information. During the 21st-centry War on Terror, the United States has used Predator drones extensively; these drones have been used to gather intelligence in conflict zones such as Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition, the United States is also turning these surveillance

Espionage

drones into weapons; the Predator drone can be equipped with missiles that are fired remotely. The United States first used armed drones in 2004, to execute an airstrike against al Qaeda members residing in Yemen.

The History of Covert Surveillance Since the beginning of recorded history, statesmen and military strategists alike have considered espionage to be a legitimate tool of statecraft. In 544 BCE, when Sun Tzu wrote his famous treatise The Art of War, he discussed the necessity of espionage-style activities. Specifically, he wrote that a good general is one who is able to gain intelligence on the other side, by intercepting communications, eavesdropping, or recruiting informants. In his view, espionage allowed a general to gain the upper hand when making both strategic and tactical decisions. Niccolo Machiavelli offered similar advice in The Prince, his guidebook for effective statesmanship. Writing in the 16th century, he counseled European leaders to embrace espionage as a means to detect and disrupt plots against their regimes. Historians have recorded instances of espionage in many ancient regimes, including Mesopotamia, Greece, and Egypt. Of these ancient societies, Rome had the most sophisticated espionage program. In fact, many historians believe that Roman spies discovered the plot to assassinate Julius Caesar; the Roman leader, however, elected to ignore the warnings from his intelligence community. By the 16th century, with the emergence of the modern state system, rulers used espionage to root out domestic treason plots and also monitor the behavior of neighboring powers. For example, in Britain in the mid-1500s, Queen Elizabeth I, a Protestant, developed a spy network to infiltrate Catholic groups who were plotting to overthrow her. Francis Walsingham, the head of her spy network, intercepted messages sent by the Spanish ambassador to England and discovered that the Catholic country planned to invade Britain and install Mary, Queen of Scots, as the new leader. Mary was eventually arrested for her role in the plot and beheaded for treason. Espionage became increasingly common in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, in the era

365

of wars between the continent’s great powers. For example, in France during the reign of King Louis XIII, the regime created the Cabinet Noir (“the black room”); this was a group of officials led by Cardinal Richelieu who monitored the mail of aristocrats suspected of plotting against the king. Subsequently, during the French Revolution, France used espionage to improve its fortunes on the battlefield. For instance, as an officer during the Italian campaign of 1796 to 1797, Napoleon relied on a network of French sympathizers to inform him about Italian troop movements. Notably, many of these informants were average Italian citizens, including doctors, lawyers, and merchants. Once in power, Napoleon tasked one of his trusted advisors, Joseph Fouché, with gathering information about plots to overthrow his government; some historians credit Fouché with the development of the first police state. Fouché, however, was eventually exiled after Napoleon discovered that he was acting as a double agent, conspiring to restore the monarchy to France. On the other side of the Atlantic, espionage played an important role in several American conflicts. During the American Revolution, the Continental Army found itself at a significant military disadvantage. To gain the upper hand on the battlefield, General George Washington relied on information provided by civilian spies. One spy ring, the Culper Ring, was based in New York and headed by Benjamin Tallmadge, a soldier in the Continental Army. The members of the spy ring were trusted friends of Tallmadge; most were merchants who interacted with British officers on a daily basis. Washington eventually appointed Tallmadge to head the Continental Army’s intelligence-gathering unit. Another similar spying operation, the Clark Ring, was based in Philadelphia. The intelligence gained from these civilian spy rings had a significant impact on American military planning; for example, members of the Clark Ring informed Washington that the British were planning a major surprise attack at White Marsh in Pennsylvania. In response, Washington massed his troops there and was able to repel the British offensive. Similarly, during the Civil War, both the Union and the Confederacy engaged in espionage. During this conflict, many spies were average citizens; for example, the Union Army would use escaped

366

Espionage

slaves to gather intelligence about Confederate war plans. Notably, female spies were frequently used by the Confederacy since they were unlikely to arouse suspicion. One of the most famous, Belle Boyd, began working for the Confederacy at 17 years of age, passing on her observations about Union troop movements. By the time of World War I, most major powers, with the notable exception of the United States, had developed permanent intelligence agencies dedicated to the surveillance of foreign governments. This changed during World War II, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan to head the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); the OSS was tasked with providing intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. In the fall of 1945, at the conclusion of the war, the then president Harry S. Truman dissolved the OSS, delegating its responsibilities to various executive branch agencies. Subsequently, in 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act; this law created the CIA, a civilian agency dedicated to gathering foreign intelligence. The CIA quickly became the dominant organization in the U.S. intelligence community; the agency saw its size and budget grow steadily during the Cold War, when it became deeply involved in traditional intelligence gathering as well as engaging in covert actions against communist regimes in the Third World. Although Congress sought to curtail the powers of the CIA in the 1970s and 1980s, the agency gained renewed prominence during the War on Terror.

Espionage During the Cold War In many ways, the Cold War can be considered the golden age of espionage. During this protracted conflict, the two superpowers went to great lengths to recruit double agents; the Soviets proved to be more adept than their American counterparts in this pursuit. One of the most notorious double agents, Aldrich Ames, spied for the Soviets while working for the CIA. Ames first became a double agent in 1985; he provided documents to a Soviet agent and was paid $50,000 for the information. During the next two decades, he continued to work with the Soviets, providing the KGB with information on more than 100 covert U.S. operations. Moreover, Ames also disclosed

the names of 30 Russians working on behalf of U.S. intelligence agencies; the Soviets later arrested and executed many of these individuals. By 1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was actively investigating Ames’s activities; in 1994, he was arrested and eventually sentenced to life without parole. His wife was also charged with abetting his activities. At the same time when Ames was spying for the Russians, another American, Robert Hanssen of the FBI, was also providing intelligence to that country. Hanssen, who joined the FBI in 1976, worked for the Russians from 1979 to 2001; he appeared to be motivated solely by financial gain and received more than $2 million in total from the Russian government in exchange for classified information. In 2001, Hanssen was arrested, and he received a life sentence after being convicted of 13 counts of espionage. In 2002, a Justice Department report classified the failure to detect Hanssen’s spying as the “worst intelligence disaster in U.S. history.” During the Cold War, the British were also victims of Soviet espionage. One of the most notorious cases involved the so-called Cambridge Five. More precisely, in the 1930s, the Soviet Union successfully groomed five Cambridge undergraduates to become double agents; the KGB anticipated that these men would eventually go on to hold high-level positions in the British government, allowing them to access top-secret information. The five men, Harold “Kim” Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt, and John Carincross, all eventually secured government positions, including placements at MI5, MI6, and the Foreign Office. Philby, the leader of the group, directed anti-Soviet counterintelligence at MI6; by 1949, he was stationed in Washington, D.C., where he had access to highly classified U.S. intelligence. During this time, Philby worked on the Venona Project, a U.S. counterintelligence operation that intercepted messages from Soviet intelligence agencies; he informed the Soviets about the existence of this monitoring, ultimately compromising the American project. Guy Burgess, another member of the ring, secured a position at MI5 and informed the Soviets about American plans to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to prevent Soviet expansion into Western Europe.

Espionage

All of the Cambridge Five were eventually discovered by British intelligence. Maclean and Burgess escaped punishment by defecting to the Soviet Union in 1949. After a Soviet informant later exposed Philby, he too defected. Blunt and Carincross elected to cooperate with British intelligence and were not prosecuted. The United States also successfully recruited well-placed Soviet officials into its service, although these Soviet double agents were fewer in number than the Americans who collaborated with the KGB. One, Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel with Soviet military intelligence, provided information to both the CIA and MI6. While working for Western intelligence agencies, he provided them with thousands of pages of classified documents, including information about the degree to which the Soviets were exaggerating the country’s missile stockpile. Moreover, he provided U.S. officials with information about the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, eventually triggering the Cuban Missile Crisis. Jack Dunlap, a National Security Administration agent who was working for the KGB, alerted the Soviets to Penkovsky’s activities, and the Soviet colonel was eventually arrested and executed in 1963. Another double agent, Dmitri Polyakov, was considered by U.S. intelligence to be the “crown jewel” of Soviet informants. Polyakov began working for the United States in 1961, when he was assigned to the Soviet Mission at the United Nations. Polyakov, who was referred to by the code names “Top Hat,” “Bourbon,” “Donald,” and “Roam,” rose quickly through the Soviet ranks, eventually becoming a general. In this capacity, he was able to provide the United States with highly classified information on Soviet foreign relations; for example, he provided the United States with information about the growing conflict between China and the Soviet Union. This intelligence helped convince President Richard Nixon to actively exploit the growing Sino-Soviet split and open up diplomatic relations with China in 1972. Polyakov claimed to be motivated by disillusionment with Soviet communism; as such, he refused any payment from the United States, accepting only small items such as power tools and fishing gear. Aldrich Ames eventually alerted the KGB to Polyakov’s espionage; subsequently, in

367

1986, Polyakov was arrested. He was convicted of treason and executed in 1988.

Spying for an Ally: The Case of Jonathan Pollard Most espionage occurs when countries seek to gain information about their enemies. In some cases, however, countries will attempt to spy on their allies. One example of this is the espionage of Jonathan Pollard; Pollard, a U.S. citizen and an analyst at Navel Intelligence, received a life sentence after pleading guilty to spying on behalf of Israel. Notably, he became the only person to receive a life sentence for spying on behalf of an American ally. Pollard was raised in a Jewish household and was a strong supporter of Israel; he believed that the United States was failing to adequately aid its ally in its struggle against Palestinian terrorism. As a result, in 1984, Pollard began providing classified documents to Colonel Aviem Sella, a veteran of the Israeli Defense Forces. Although Pollard initially refused any payment for his services, the Israeli government eventually provided him with a stipend of $2,500 a month. Some of the intelligence provided by Pollard had an impact on Israeli policy; for instance, information from Pollard led to Israel’s 1985 decision to bomb the Tunisian headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the hope of killing Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. In 1985, fearing that he was about to be arrested by U.S. officials, Pollard and his wife traveled to the Israel Embassy, seeking asylum in Israel. The Israeli government, however, denied ever working with Pollard and refused to aid in his legal defense. In exchange for clemency for his wife, Pollard pleaded guilty to espionage and was sentenced to life in prison. In 1995, Israel did eventually grant him citizenship, and Israeli activists have continued to lobby for a presidential pardon for Pollard. Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, however, have all refused to commute Pollard’s sentence.

Conclusion Throughout recorded history, governments have used espionage to gain information about the inner workings of other governments, in an

368

Espionage in Ancient Egypt

attempt to anticipate their future actions in the international arena. Until World War II, espionage operations were mostly limited to wartime, with the military assuming primary responsibility for intelligence gathering. By the time of the Cold War, however, both superpowers had developed sophisticated intelligence-gathering operations, training professional spies and exploiting technological advances to gain more detailed and accurate information about each other’s military capabilities and covert operations. Although espionage remains a controversial tool of statecraft, new technologies such as data mining and surveillance drones are likely to make the practice more, rather than less, common. Kelly McHugh and Kira Ramirez See also Counterintelligence; Diplomacy; Intelligence Community; Spies; Surveillance During the Cold War

Further Readings Baker, Christopher D. “Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach.” American University International Law Review, v.19/5 (2003). Bennett, Richard. Espionage: Spies and Secrets. New York, NY: Random House, 2012. Crowdy, Terry. The Enemy Within: A History of Spies, Spymasters and Espionage. New York, NY: Osprey, 2006. Scoville, Herbert, Jr. “Is Espionage Necessary for Our Security?” Foreign Affairs, v.54/3 (1976). Sulmasy, Glenn and John Yoo. “Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law.” Michigan Journal of International Law, v.28 (2006–2007).

Espionage

in

Ancient Egypt

Espionage is a complicated aspect of security. It both assists in providing security and is an active threat to security at the same time. Those engaging in espionage do so to increase the security and safety of their government and its interests by acquiring secrets and information regarding the actions of enemies, allies, and citizens; but at the same time, their acts of espionage are a threat to the security of anyone from whom the secrets and information have been acquired. In ancient Egypt,

espionage was rampant at all levels, both by official government decree against domestic and international targets and by those targets in attempts to protect themselves and their interests. Much of what developed into modern espionage has its roots in the protocols developed in Egypt for the security of the pharaoh. The ancient empire of Egypt was a place and time of great intrigue and developed many of the espionage protocols still in place around the world today. The pharaohs of ancient Egypt employed a wide range of spies for domestic and international purposes. The spies of ancient Egypt were among the first to develop codes and encryption for passing clandestine messages, and they laid the framework for many current espionage techniques and tactics. This ensured security and privacy of communication. In terms of security, the actions of the ancient Egyptian espionage network give a historical basis for the understanding of modern spy networks, their practices, their exploitation, the dangers they face, and their ultimate purpose of maintaining the safety and security of their homeland. As the powers of the ancient world struggled for territory and domination, it became more and more important to acquire knowledge of the enemy, so as to disrupt the enemy’s plans and to protect one’s own territory. In ancient Egypt, threats to the stability of the pharaoh’s reign came from both internal and external sources. Domestic unrest was as dangerous to the continued rule, and sometimes to the life of a pharaoh, as threats from the outside. Therefore, it was necessary to have the spies keeping tabs on the population to ensure the security of the pharaoh. Spies were employed to determine the validity of political intrigue and threats against the pharaoh. They sought out information from the general population of Egyptians as well as from any servants, slaves, or nomadic tribes living or traveling in the region. As the pharaoh’s rule was absolute, privacy was not a concern; if the information could be acquired, his spies would find it. They kept a close eye on the citizens within the country as well as on any diplomatic or military inquest by outsiders. They were especially mindful of the succession of pharaohs and kept tabs on individuals within a pharaoh’s family to make certain that assassination attempts were discovered and prevented, maintaining the security of the state by

Espionage in Ancient Egypt

preventing the upheaval that such assassinations would cause. With the variety of intrigues occurring within the country, talented espionage agents were a desperately needed resource, and the ones who could apply ingenuity as well as secrecy were highly sought after. The spies of ancient Egypt developed a variety of encrypted styles of writing. They were among the first to develop invisible and disappearing forms of ink. They created codes, as well as other forms of obfuscation in written messages. To further protect such messages, they developed ways of hiding the messages within clothing and other objects through hidden pockets and compartments, thus maintaining the security of such information. The role of a spy in ancient Egypt was also the role of an assassin. The espionage networks of ancient Egypt invented a wide variety of poisons and toxins that were employed for a range of purposes. In some cases, these toxins, derived from both plants and animals, were used to assassinate enemies; in other cases, they were used to sabotage the actions of individuals whose immediate death would be detrimental to the political needs of the pharaoh but whose illness could be equally expedient. Egypt’s creation of an espionage network began to seek out domestic threats, prevent assassinations, and maintain the pharaoh’s power; however, not all spies were employed by the pharaoh; other political and religious figures used spies to protect themselves and their privacy from the pharaoh’s spies or to carry out their own political intrigues. Domestic espionage agents were deployed to seek out information on individuals traveling through the Egyptian territory, to determine their purpose, as well as to determine their potential use as slaves. If a tribe traveling through the Egyptian territory was considered to be weak and easily dominated, based on the information from the spies, it would be attacked and its members enslaved; if it appeared to be well protected, it would likely be unmolested, as long as it did not attempt to settle within the Egyptian territory. In some cases, espionage networks working for some of these tribes, such as the Hittites in the 1200s BCE, were able to send spies to attempt to trick the Egyptians. While some of these intrigues are known to have worked, it is also known that Egypt was quite skilled in capturing and interrogating spies of its rivals and used any acquired information to its advantage.

369

As the Egyptian empire expanded and those of ancient Rome and Greece took notice and desired conquest, Egypt’s espionage network turned from internal and domestic security to external threats, seeking information on the political and military strength and intentions of these two potential enemies. In these situations, it was necessary for Egyptian spies to attempt to gather information outside their home territory, where capture might mean immediate death. For such reasons, spies may have employed disguise to blend in with diplomatic envoys as servants or among groups of merchants, so as to avoid detection and still gather information. As animosity grew between the ancient nations, more advances were needed. The Egyptians were surpassed by the Greeks in advances in the methods of espionage, as the Greeks relied heavily on surprise attacks and expanded their military espionage to include one of the ancient world’s foremost communication networks between its city-states, including symbolic communication from watchtowers and outposts, the predecessor of the modern semaphore. As the Roman Empire surpassed both the Greeks and the Egyptians, its espionage network dwarfed both these nations as well. While espionage was useful to the Romans throughout most of its campaigns for territorial domination, especially when spies were used for infiltration and creation of alliances in desired territories, such tactics did not succeed in the Roman conquest of Egypt, mostly due to Egypt’s extensive knowledge of how espionage operated. Rome did surpass Egypt in its domestic use of espionage agents as a secret police who worked to prevent dissension, predominately through censorship in Roman territory. Clairissa D. Breen See also Espionage; Spies

Further Readings Crowdy, T. The Enemy Within: A History of Espionage. Oxford, England: Osprey, 2006. Owen, D. Hidden Secrets: The Complete History of Espionage and the Technology Used to Support It. Richmond Hill, Ontario, Canada: Firefly Books, 2002.

370

Ethics

Rank, M. Spies, Espionage, and Covert Operations: From Ancient Greece to the Cold War. North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace, 2014. Singh, S. The Code Book: The Science of Secrecy From Ancient Egypt to Quantum Cryptography (Reprint ed.). New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2000. Volkman, E. The History of Espionage: The Clandestine World of Surveillance, Spying and Intelligence, From Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 World. London, England: Carlton, 2008.

Ethics The question of ethics and surveillance involves looking at when surveillance should or should not be employed. When is it right to monitor someone, and when is it wrong to do so? Are there any rules or principles that can guide the decision to use surveillance in particular situations? Yet it also goes beyond these questions; the impact that surveillance has on society must also be considered. Two famous literary examples of negative types of surveillance societies are George Orwell’s 1984 and Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We. To what degree is our society approaching these dystopias, and to what degree is that acceptable in attempting to reduce crime and terrorism? This entry provides an overview of responses to these questions. It starts with the normative issues of principles and guidance for acts of surveillance before looking at more discursive approaches to the impact that surveillance has on society.

Principles and Guidance Surveillance is a broad and complex activity, and it is questionable whether it is even possible to develop a set of principles to determine which acts of surveillance would be justifiable and which not. Furthermore, some surveillance is clearly consensual (e.g., contestants in the television program Big Brother or a person with limited capacity aided in independent living by surveillance mechanisms allowing a doctor to monitor his or her health from a distance), while other surveillance is not. In the latter category, one may think of investigative surveillance by private investigators, the police, or state intelligence and security organizations, or of surveillance intended to coerce and

intimidate, such as Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, a prison that allowed the guards in a central location to view and communicate with every prisoner at any time. It is the ethics of the latter, nonconsensual surveillance that will be the focus of this section. There is some controversy as to which principles should be included in justifying surveillance. Gary T. Marx has described an ordered set of principles as the “Rosetta Stone” of ethical surveillance, offering in its place a list of 29 questions that should be asked of surveillance, ranging from issues of transparency and public debate to the possibility of physical or psychological harm resulting from the surveillance. David Lyon, on the other hand, has suggested that there are three key areas that should be considered: (1) personhood (the impact surveillance will have on the individual or group surveilled), (2) proportionality, and (3) purpose. Graham Sewell and James Barker draw from Michel Foucault in considering surveillance from the perspective of power and question the cause of the surveillance, the authority for carrying it out, and whether or not it is necessary. John Kleinig, writing with the ethics of police-led surveillance in mind, has argued for a fuller list of principles that incorporates proportionality, necessity, and cause, along with chance of success and a ban on any means of surveillance that might be evil in and of itself. Finally, Kevin Macnish has attempted to draw all of these principles together, arguing that the principles that inform the ethics of war (the “just war” tradition, incorporating principles of just cause, right intention, authority, necessity, chance of success, formal declaration, proportionality, and discrimination) are the same as those that should inform the ethics of surveillance. There are a number of principles that are held in common among most commentators. These include cause, proportionality, necessity, and authority. Cause considers the reasons for the surveillance being carried out in the first place. If there is no good reason for surveillance (i.e., if it is purely random or arbitrary), then it is unethical. This is reflected in principles of human rights, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12 and the European Union Convention on Human Rights, Article 8. In both cases, there is acceptance that privacy can be violated in

Ethics

exceptional circumstances when there is a good reason to do so. Proportionality is a principle widely acknowledged but rarely discussed in detail. It essentially aims to strike a balance between the harms that arise from surveillance and the end to which that surveillance is aimed (i.e., meeting the cause). However, there is a paucity of evidence as to precisely what are the harms of surveillance. The violation of privacy is an obvious harm, but this may not be a harm when the surveillance is of activity in a public space. Chilling effects—the deterrence from engaging in democratically legitimate activities (e.g., demonstrations) for fear of reprisals from the state—are another harm, but they very difficult to prove. Diminished social trust not only may be a harm but is also one that is difficult to establish. The principle of necessity is seen as the meeting of two conditions: (1) that there is no alternative means of achieving a particular goal or (2) that if there are alternative means, then these are more harmful than the particular means in question. The inclusion of harm as a measure in necessity explains why there is sometimes seen to be an intersection of this principle with that of proportionality. Hence, a wiretap on the home phone of a suspected shoplifter in the hope of hearing that shoplifter confess to her crimes would seem to be unnecessary (closed-circuit television would be less harmful and just as, if not more, effective) and disproportionate (the harms outweigh the benefits of identifying a shoplifter). The question as to who is carrying out the surveillance is ethically relevant, but it is not always clear as to who the authority should be. Consider the example of a citizen witnessing a bank robbery who watches the thieves closely for identification and then follows them out of the bank. In what manner does this citizen have authority? At the same time, it is generally expected that the state needs to gain authority to interfere with the private lives of its citizens, requiring a warrant to enter their homes or read their correspondence. Hence, there are a number of principles that have been suggested as morally relevant to assessing surveillance. While there is no agreement as to precisely which principles are relevant, this entry has described four that are widely held by those writing in the field.

371

Surveillance and Society Ethical questions about surveillance do not stop with the question of when particular acts of surveillance are justifiable. Many writing in the field ask questions about the impact that surveillance is having on a society and the shape that society will take in a situation of near-ubiquitous surveillance. While ethical questions are often not addressed explicitly in these writings, there is usually an ethical subtext that is rarely far from the surface. In this tradition, David Lyon has written on the impact of surveillance as a means of social sorting, separating groups in society from one another and often reinforcing existing social stereotypes and divides. Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong have written about the relationship between closedcircuit television operators and the police, noting that the interaction is not always predictable or obviously justifiable, as operators choose to report events that are not relevant to criminal activity while ignoring others that clearly are. Kirstie Ball has written on the relationship between workers and employers when the former are subjected to surveillance, including considerations as to how workers choose to resist such surveillance. Finally, Eric Stoddart has contributed by drawing on a feminist ethics of care, noting that surveillance can and should be used for the benefit of society in particular cases and that when it cannot be used in such a way, it should be treated with caution. Kevin Macnish See also Bentham, Jeremy; Foucault, Michel; Marx, Gary T.; Orwell, George; Panopticon, The; Privacy; Social Sorting

Further Readings Ball, Kirstie S. “Situating Workplace Surveillance: Ethics and Computer Based Performance Monitoring.” Ethics and Information Technology, v.3 (2001). Bentham, J. The Panopticon Writings. New York, NY: Verso Books, 1995. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New ed.). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1991. Kleinig, John. “The Ethical Perils of Knowledge Acquisition.” Criminal Justice Ethics, v.28 (2009).

372

Ethiopia

Lyon, David. “Facing the Future: Seeking Ethics for Everyday Surveillance.” Ethics and Information Technology, v.3 (2001). Lyon, David. Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Automated Discrimination. New York, NY: Routledge, 2002. Macnish, Kevin. “Just Surveillance? Towards a Normative Theory of Surveillance.” Surveillance & Socitey, v.12 (2014). Marx, Gary T. “Ethics for the New Surveillance.” The Information Society, v.14 (1998). Norris, Clive and Gary Armstrong. The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV (1st ed.). Oxford, England: Berg, 1999. Ryberg, Jesper. “Privacy Rights, Crime Prevention, CCTV, and the Life of Mrs Aremac.” Res Publica, v.13 (2007). Sewell, Graham and James R. Barker. “Neither Good, nor Bad, but Dangerous: Surveillance as an Ethical Paradox.” Ethics and Information Technology, v.3 (2001). Stoddart, Eric. Theological Perspectives on a Surveillance Society. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2011.

Ethiopia Even with great economic progress in recent years, the Federal Republic of Ethiopia is widely regarded as one of the poorest countries in the world. Because of its economic plight, it should come as no surprise that the possession and use of mobile devices and other forms of electronic communication are not prevalent among Ethiopia’s population. Compared with other African nations, Ethiopia has few Internet users. As of 2016, Internet penetration (i.e., the percentage of the population using the Internet) was approximately 4%, far less than that of its southern neighbor, Kenya, where Internet penetration was nearly 45%. Ethiopia also ranks behind Kenya in cell phone use. Only about 25% of Ethiopians have cell phones, compared with more than 70% of Kenyans. Still, Ethiopia’s government has employed various surveillance practices with regard to individuals’ use of electronic devices. This entry highlights Ethiopia’s privacy laws, surveillance practices, and concerns as they relate to security and human rights.

Current Privacy Laws Ethiopia appears to be a modern democratic state. It has a constitution that clearly lays out the rights of citizens, and it holds regular and orderly elections. It also appears to have a free press and a strong judiciary. In reality, the government limits individual freedoms. The state-owned Ethio Telecom closely monitors telephone and Internet communications and limits Internet content. In recent years, the government has taken further steps to restrict what Ethiopians receive and send online. Article 26 of the Ethiopian constitution of 1995 addresses privacy rights: 1. Everyone has the right to privacy. This right shall include the right not to be subjected to searches of his home, person or property, or the seizure of any property under his personal possession. 2. Everyone has the right to the inviolability of his notes and correspondence including postal letters, and communications made by means of telephone, telecommunications and electronic devices. 3. Public officials shall respect and protect these rights. No restrictions may be placed on the enjoyment of such rights except in compelling circumstances and in accordance with specific laws whose purposes shall be the safeguarding of national security or public peace, the prevention of crimes or the protection of health, public morality or the rights and freedoms of others.

Section 1 of Article 26 explains the right to privacy in general terms. Section 2 goes into specific areas of privacy and seems broad enough to encompass the right to communicate by telephone and Internet privacy. Section 3 presents reasons why the government might find it necessary to limit these freedoms. However, it fails to adequately define what is meant by terms such as “national security,” “public peace,” and “public morality.” These remain open to government interpretation. Ethiopia has also passed specific laws and proclamations limiting privacy and allowing the government to act if it has “reasonable grounds,” a

Ethiopia

standard far less rigorous than “probable cause.” Among these laws are the Anti-Corruption Proclamation (2005), Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (2009), and Proclamations on Telecom Fraud Offences (2012). The Anti-Corruption Proclamation gives the government discretionary power to intercept correspondence (including email) in order to investigate corruption. The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation allows the government the same powers to head off a terrorist attack or to gain control of one. The Proclamation on Telecom Fraud Offences bans the Voice Over Internet Protocol, a prime example of which is Skype. When Skype users expressed opposition, the government promised that Skype would be allowed; however, the proclamation has not been altered, so Skype’s future remains uncertain.

Status of Surveillance Like Ethio Telecom, the Ethiopian Internet Service Provider is state run. In 2013, the Ethiopian government contracted with the Chinese firm ZTE, which was banned in the United States because it was believed to be responsible for hacking into Internet systems and stealing intellectual property. Internet Service Provider has also installed Deep Packet Inspection software, which allows the government-run Information Network Security Agency to inspect Internet traffic in Ethiopia. The government has also contracted with the spyware firm Gamma International for FinFisher, a toolkit that can monitor a computer, activate webcams, eavesdrop on Skype communication, and keep track of what the user types. FinFisher essentially turns a personal computer into a government spy device.

Key Security Concerns The major security concern in Ethiopia appears to be political dissent, especially as manifested in the press. Ethiopia has used the Telecom Fraud Offences law to block Internet sites that engage in antigovernment rhetoric. Internet users fear that the government will begin blocking social media sites such as Facebook. The government has also shut down numerous newspapers and either imprisoned or banished journalists. Ethiopians living outside the country have found their computers hacked and their phones wiretapped. The

373

goal seems to be to limit Ethiopians to information provided on government-run websites. The Ethiopian government has used the AntiTerrorism Proclamation to charge journalists and bloggers with terrorism. For example, in April 2014, a group of bloggers known as the Zone 9 collective were arrested and charged with terrorism for posting stories that the government found offensive, although there was no evidence indicating that the group belonged to a terrorist organization or that it had any plans to undermine the government.

Future of Surveillance Governmental surveillance will likely continue. The heads of various state agencies unilaterally decide who and what to surveil; the so-called independent judiciary tends to rubber stamp any requests that are presented. The Ethiopian governmental process lacks meaningful checks and balances. As of this writing, the government continues to incarcerate dissidents and journalists, and it appears to be strengthening its ties with the Chinese communist government. Great Britain and the United States, with whom Ethiopia has counterterrorism ties, continue to donate funds and have not been very outspoken regarding the human rights abuses. However, in a visit to Ethiopia in April 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry expressed concern regarding the treatment of bloggers and journalists. James Geistman See also Cell Phone Tracking; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Right to; Smartphones

Further Readings Ademo, Mohammed. “Media Restrictions Tighten in Ethiopia.” Columbia Journalism Review (August 13, 2012). http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/ethiopia_ news_crackdown.php?page=all (Accessed December 2014). Clayton, Mark. “With New Chinese Cyber-Tools, Ethiopia More Easily Spies on Its People.” Cyber Conflict Monitor (March 25, 2014). https://www .csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/0325/With-newChinese-cyber-tools-Ethiopia-more-easily-spies-on-itspeople (Accessed September 2017).

374

Eugenics Industrial Complex

Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2014: Ethiopia” (2014). http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/ country-chapters/ethiopia (Accessed December 2014). Reporters Without Borders. “Enemies of the Internet” (n.d.). http://12mars.rsf.org/2014-en/2014/03/06/ ethiopia-full-online-powers/ (Accessed December 2014). World Intellectual Property Organization. “Ethiopia: Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.” http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text .jsp?file_id=234349 (Accessed December 2014). Yilma, Kinfe Micheal and Alebachew Birhanu. “Safeguards of Right to Privacy in Ethiopia: A Critique of Laws and Practices.” Journal of Ethiopian Law, v.26/1 (2013).

Eugenics Industrial Complex The general concept of eugenics was first introduced in Greek philosophy as early as 368 BCE. Plato and Aristotle both refer to the city and state’s need for healthy citizens to create an elite ruling class and army. In this concept of eugenics, men and women were encouraged to reproduce when they were at their highest physical and mental powers in order to conceive the healthiest and the most intelligent children. This underlying principle of striving for an ideal society through selective breeding is one that has motivated eugenicists throughout history and has facilitated the emergence of the eugenics industrial complex, a flawed and crude interpretation of Gregor Mendel’s laws on heredity to argue that criminality, intelligence, and pauperism were as inherent in families as were simple dominant or recessive hereditary traits. For example, California women’s prisons, which have a history of forcibly sterilizing inmates (more than 20,000 between 1909 and 1964), continued to sterilize inmates without their consent, nearly 40 years after the practice had been criminalized. The concept is therefore related to surveillance, security, and privacy, given its direct violation of the privacy of the victims. The term eugenics was derived from the Greek word eugenes meaning “good (or beautiful) birth.” It was first coined in 1885 by the English mathematician Sir Francis Galton, Charles Darwin’s

cousin. He defined eugenics as the science of improving stock, not only by judicious mating but also by all the influences that give the more suitable strain a better chance. Galton believed that intelligence and other appreciated traits were inborn quite apart from environmental influence. With a resolve to maximize brilliance and prevent “feeblemindedness,” Galton encouraged “good” marriages that would produce highly intelligent males and ultimately assure the stock of the next generation. He believed in the superiority of one race over another and therefore advocated a form of selection that restricted undesirable people from reproducing. What Galton saw as a new branch of scientific inquiry became a rigid prescription in the ranking and ordering of human worth. At the turn of the 20th century, his ideas found a receptive audience in the United States. At that time, the United States was experiencing rapid social and economic changes. The industrialization and urbanization that were occurring in the United States brought millions of poor immigrants from southern and Eastern Europe seeking a higher standard of living. At the same time, thousands of African Americans were migrating to Northern cities from the Southern states. The increased competition for jobs intensified existing frictions along class and racial lines. Intermittent economic recessions over this period created further social unrest. Labor unions, civil rights groups, and the women’s suffrage movement pressed for greater equity in the country. Simultaneously, nativist and racist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan wanted to maintain the status quo. Mainline eugenicists, who were preoccupied with issues of race, believed that some individuals and entire groups of people (e.g., southern Europeans, Jews, Africans, and Latinos) were more predisposed to the “defective genes.” As such, Charles Davenport, a leader in American eugenics, argued for laws to control the spread of “inferior blood” into the general population. Today, this approach speaks directly to the issues of invasion of privacy and violation of human rights. The theory of eugenics found favor with and had the support of intellectuals and academics such as H. G. Wells, Winston Churchill, George Bernard Shaw, Alexander Graham Bell, John

Eugenics Industrial Complex

Maynard Keynes, Theodore Roosevelt, and Calvin Coolidge. Their support advanced the agenda of the eugenics industrial complex. In 1921, President Calvin Coolidge embraced the assumptions of eugenics and declared that there are racial considerations too grave to be brushed aside for any sentimental reasons. Biological laws tell us that certain divergent people will not mix or blend. The Nordics propagate themselves successfully. With other races, the outcome suggests that observance of ethnic law is as great a necessity to a nation as immigration law. In 1924, supporters of eugenics played a decisive role in the passage of the Immigration and Restriction Act, which established blatantly racist quotas for individuals wishing to enter the United States. This law was based on a quota of 2% of a defined ethnic group’s population according to the 1890 census. The law was not substantially revised until 1965. Support for eugenics and racial hygiene increased with the reinforcement of Margaret Sanger in the United States. She led the movement for global birth control and supported the concept of more children from the “fit” and less from the “unfit,” which was purported as the chief issue of birth control. This approach was readily accepted by the American society during that period. Eugenicists began to influence public concern that society was afflicted by the “unfit,” and they demanded government action. Throughout the 20th century, advocates of the eugenics industrial complex convinced 30 state legislatures to pass involuntary sterilization laws that targeted “defective strains” within the general population, such as the blind, deaf, epileptic, feebleminded, sexually deviant, alcoholics, and paupers. Sterilization laws were most popular in the Atlantic region, the Midwest, and California, with California carrying out more eugenic sterilizations by 1933 than the rest of the United States combined. California records show that based on their representation in the state’s population, African Americans and foreign immigrants were subjected to sterilization at double the rate of other Californians. By 1929, approximately 8,500 sterilizations were conducted; by 1940, the number increased to 35,000; and by 1968, the number of sterilizations had risen to 65,000. However, most states did not

375

enforce sterilization laws, and more than one third of American states never passed such laws. Subsequent to World War I, Adolf Hitler began to take notice of the eugenics movement in the United States. After assuming leadership of Germany, he changed Germany’s sterilization law from voluntary to compulsory. From 1934 to 1937, 400,000 sterilizations took place in Germany, compared with 30,000 sterilizations in the United States by 1939. Leading biologists and physicians in Germany supported Hitler’s idea of placing race at the center of building a new state, which resulted in the concentration camps and genetic research on humans that defined the Holocaust. The ideology of eugenics also influenced the educational reform movements of the 1910s and 1920s, affecting teacher training, curriculum development, and school organization. It was also instrumental in the development of the first IQ tests, which were promoted as a tool to assess the intelligence of children in the education system. Those tests were used to track and segregate students into separate and unequal education courses; by 1921, more than 2 million American children were tracked based on IQ tests. It was also used to “establish the first gifted and talented programs, and promote the idea that educational standards could be measured through single-numbered scores.” Prominent educational researchers such as Lewis Terman, Edward Thorndike, and Carl Brigham subscribed to the notion of intelligence propagated by the eugenics industrial complex. They successively convinced many U.S. school districts to use high-stakes and culturally biased tests in order to place “slow” students into special classes, rigid academic tracks, or entirely separate schools. The assumptions of race and class that underscored these recommendations were justified as scientifically sound because the “tests told the truth.” IQ tests soon became a popular eugenics tool for identifying “superior” and “inferior students and then charting their educational destiny. In most cases, it was the African Americans and the descendants of recent immigrants who were being identified as “inferior” students. The ideology of the eugenics industrial complex became so embedded into the American education

376

European Convention on Human Rights

system that it was found that university courses in eugenics had increased from 44 in 1914 to 376 in 1928. An analysis of 41 high school biology textbooks used throughout the 1940s revealed that nearly 90% of them had sections on eugenics. A cadre of university experts trained in the latest testing methods and embracing eugenic principles believed that they could make schooling a more efficient enterprise. Schools would be the place where students both learned the basic principles of eugenics and were also tracked into their future roles as prescribed by their biological worth. Although the eugenics industrial complex enjoyed popularity during the early 20th century, at its highest point, there was an active minority of educators, journalists, labor groups, and parents who resisted the ideas advocated by the concept. In particular, there were informed critiques by African American scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Horace Mann Bond, and Howard Long who criticized the use of these tests to rank racial groups and warned that its use further disadvantaged the minority groups in the society and limited the potential of the next generation. Dianne Williams and Megan Doldron See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Paternalism and Parens Patriae; Privacy, Right to; Violence Against Women Act; Women, Girls, and the Body

Further Readings Cogdell, Christina. Eugenic Design: Streamlining America in the 1930s. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Coolidge, Calvin. “Whose Country Is This?” Good Housekeeping, v.72/2 (1921). Hartmann, Betsy. “Old Roots, New Shoots: Eugenics of the Everyday.” Different Takes, v.47 (2007). https:// dspace.hampshire.edu/bitstream/10009/901/1/popdev_ differentakes_047.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Pearson, Karl. The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis Galton. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Stern, Alexandra Minna. Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

Stoda, Kevin Anthony. Eugenics in America, in Testing Practices, School Tracking, and American Memory (October 10, 2009). http://www.opednews.com/ articles/EUGENICS-IN-AMERICA-IN-TE-byALONE-091010-966.html (Accessed October 2017). Stoskepf, Alan. “The Forgotten History of Eugenics.” Rethinking Schools Magazine, v.13/3 (1999). Zimmermann, Susan. “Industrial Capitalism’s Hostility to Childbirth, Responsible Childbearing, and Eugenic Reproductive Policies in the First Third of the 20th Century.” Reproductive and Genetic Engineering, v.3/3 (1990).

European Convention Human Rights

on

The European Convention on Human Rights (originally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) is a regional, supranational human rights treaty, drafted and administered by the Council of Europe, an independent international organization based in Strasbourg, France. The convention has played an important role in outlining the limits of governmental authority to conduct domestic (and international) surveillance as well as privacy protections. This entry reviews the provisions of the convention and discusses its application with regard to surveillance, security, and privacy.

Provisions The convention was drafted in November 1950 under the auspices of the newly formed Council of Europe, and it entered into force on September 3, 1953. The text of the convention is produced both in English and in French, both versions being equally authentic. Informed by the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, the convention seeks to protect a variety of fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life (Article 2); the prohibition of torture (Article 3); the prohibition of slavery and forced labor (Article 4); the right to liberty and security (Article 5); the right to a fair trial (Article 6); the prohibition of criminal

European Convention on Human Rights

punishment for actions not illegal at the time the offense was committed (Article 7); the right to respect for private and family life (often discussed in terms of privacy; Article 8); the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9); freedom of expression (Article 10); freedom of assembly and association (Article 11); and the right to marry (Article 12). The convention also guarantees individuals an effective remedy against violations of these rights (Article 13), through the mechanism of the European Court of Human Rights, and prohibits any discrimination in the enjoyment of the convention rights (Article 14). The convention also established the European Court of Human Rights, also based at Strasbourg, as a supranational human rights court with the authority to rule on cases involving convention rights. Importantly, the convention and the Council of Europe should not be confused with the European Union (EU) and its various legal and political bodies or legal instruments. As of 2017, all 47 Council of Europe member states had signed the convention, including all 28 member states of the EU. After adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is obligated to ratify the convention as well, as a distinct legal entity. The convention was modified in 2010 with Protocol 14 to provide the legal basis for EU succession, which would put the EU itself under the external oversight of the European Court of Human Rights.

Surveillance, Security, and Privacy Uniquely, the convention allows individual persons, groups of individuals, and nongovernmental organizations (rather than merely signatory governments) to claim violations of their rights by their individual governments’ signatory to the convention. These claims may be brought before the European Court of Human Rights after all domestic legal remedies have been exhausted. Because the convention lays out a number of broad rights with minimal explanatory text, the European Court of Human Rights has played a vital role in interpreting the convention rights and has developed a robust case law, including on issues of privacy, surveillance, and security. The convention has a long history of being used as the legal basis for claims by individuals

377

challenging state surveillance on privacy grounds (particularly under Article 8, which guarantees a right to privacy expressed as the right to respect for private and family life). As such, the European Court on Human Rights has played an important role in outlining the limits of governmental authority to conduct domestic (and international) surveillance. A number of cases challenging state surveillance activities have come before the court in the past few decades, including Klass and Others v. Germany (1978), Malone v. the United Kingdom (1984), Weber and Saravia v. Germany (2006), Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria (2007), Liberty v. the United Kingdom (2008), and Iordachi and Others v. Moldova (2009). In Klass, which set the groundwork for future cases, the court held that a person may claim a violation of his or her convention right to privacy “by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him.” Despite liberal rulings on standing (or the right of a person to bring a claim), the court has also held that, due to the increasingly sophisticated nature of international terrorism, states may be justified, in extraordinary circumstances, in enacting legislation that provides for secret surveillance of physical or electronic communications. Generally, the court has interpreted the convention to require the states to show that surveillance measures have been carried out in accordance with existing law (such a law must also be adequately accessible and sufficiently precise to allow a person to regulate his or her conduct accordingly), that the measures are limited to those necessary in a democratic society, and that they are compatible with the general rule of law. This broad interpretation of convention rights by the court has also applied in cases challenging the publication of photographs of individuals by other individuals, corporations and news media, and public bodies, under Article 8 (privacy) and Article 10 (freedom of expression). In a line of cases, including Peck v. United Kingdom (2003), von Hannover v. Germany (2004), Sciacca v. Italy (2006), and von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) (2012), the court has found that the convention protects individuals against the unauthorized publication of private information about them

378

European Convention on Human Rights

(photographs) that do not involve matters of public interest. Bryce Clayton Newell See also Civil Liberties; Global Surveillance; London, England, Surveillance in; Privacy; Privacy, Right to

Further Readings Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, 2007 ECHR 533 (2007). Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the text of the Convention). http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/ en/treaties/html/005.htm (Accessed October 2017). Council of Europe. European Convention on Human Rights: A Convention to Protect Your Rights and Liberties. https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rightsconvention (Accessed October 2017). Council of Europe. Statistics: Violations by Article and by States (1959–2013). http://www.echr.coe.int/

Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2013_ENG.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Gomien, Donna. Short Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd ed.). Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, 2005. von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), ECHR 228 (2012). von Hannover v. Germany, ECHR 294 (2004). Iordachi v. Moldova, ECHR 256 (2009). Klass and Others v. Germany, ECHR 4 (1978). Liberty v. United Kingdom, ECHR 568 (2008). Malone v. United Kingdom, ECHR 10 (1984). Newell, Bryce Clayton. “The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe.” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, v.10 (2014). Peck v. United Kingdom, ECHR 44 (2003). Rainey, Bernadette, et al. Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2014. Sciacca v. Italy, ECHR 8 (2006). Weber and Saravia v. Germany, ECHR 1173 (2006).

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY

For my father, Anthony C. Arrigo: friend and family man to those who love him, educator and mentor to those who admire him, and Inspector General to those who respect him.

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY 2 Edited by Bruce A. Arrigo University of North Carolina at Charlotte

FOR INFORMATION: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2018 by SAGE Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

SAGE Publications Ltd. 1 Oliver’s Yard 55 City Road London, EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd. B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044 India SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd. 3 Church Street #10-04 Samsung Hub Singapore 049483

Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Arrigo, Bruce A, editor. Title: The sage encyclopedia of surveillance, security, and privacy / editor Bruce A. Arrigo, University of North Carolina, Charlotte. Description: First edition. | Thousand Oaks : SAGE Publications, [2018] Identifiers: LCCN 2017058118 | ISBN 9781483359946 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Electronic surveillance—Social aspects. | Electronic surveillance—Encyclopedias. | Privacy, Right of—Encyclopedias. | National security—Encyclopedias. Classification: LCC HM846 .S26 2019 | DDC 323.44/82097303— dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017058118

Acquisitions Editor: Andrew Boney Developmental Editors: Matthew Brann, Carole Maurer

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Reference Systems Manager: Leticia Gutierrez Production Editor: David C. Felts Copy Editor: QuADS Prepress (P) Ltd. Typesetter: Hurix Digital Proofreaders: Ellen Brink, Caryne Brown, Barbara Coster Indexer: Will Ragsdale Cover Designer: Candice Harman Marketing Manager: Jennifer Bourque

18 19 20 21 22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Volume 2 List of Entries  vii Entries F 379 L 563 G 417 M 591 H 461 N 645 I 487 O 707 J 547 P 717 K 551

Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE publishes more than 1000 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. Our growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company’s continued independence. Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

List of Entries Abortion Abu Ghraib Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 Adorno, Theodor W. Advertising and Marketing Research Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Affordable Healthcare Act. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Agency Airport Security Airport Terminal Security Screenings Al Qaeda Alcoholics Anonymous AMBER Alerts American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center American Protective League Amnesty International Anarchism Ancient Greek Surveillance Anonymous Anti-Defamation League Antiglobalization Antinuclear Movement Antipsychiatry Movement Antiwar Movement, History in United States Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s Apartheid Apple Arab Spring ATM Cards Australia Authoritarianism Autonomy

Berlin Wall Biblical Surveillance Big Data Bill of Rights Bioengineering Bioinformatics Biometrics Biopolitical Tattooing Biosurveillance Blockades Border Patrol Checkpoints Botnets Brazil Breathometer and Breathalyzer Machines Brown v. Board of Education (1954) Camp David Accords Canada Capital Punishment Carrier Pigeons Castration, Chemical Castration, Surgical Catholic Church and the Sexual Abuse of Minors Cell Phone Tracking Cell Phones. See Cell Phone Tracking; Smartphones Central Intelligence Agency Chain Gangs Chicago, Illinois, Surveillance in Child Pornography. See Internet Pornography China Choice: Security or Civil Liberties Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) Citizenship Citywide Sweeps of the Homeless Civil Commitment Civil Disobedience Civil Liberties Civil Rights Movement

Beck, Ulrech Beijing, China, Surveillance in Benjamin, Walter Bentham, Jeremy vii

viii

List of Entries

Civil War Closed-Circuit Television Cloud Computing COINTELPRO Cold War Colonialism Commodification of the Body Communication Studies Community Computer Surveillance Concentration Camps Constructivism Cookies Copenhagen School Copwatch Corporate Personhood Corporate Surveillance Cosmopolitanism Counterintelligence Creeping Crime Crime Control Crime Mapping Critical Security Studies Cuba Cuban Missile Crisis Cults Cultural Studies Curfews Cyberbullying Cybercities Cybermarketing Cybermurder Cyberprostitution Cybersecurity Legislation Cyberstalking Cybertheft Cyberwar Data Mining and Profiling in Big Data Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis Data-Doubles Dataveillance Death Penalty. See Capital Punishment Death Row Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari Deportation Détente Deviance

Dictators and Dictatorships Digital Divide Digital Passwords Digital Privacy. See Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of Diplomacy Diplomatic Envoys Disease Model in Psychiatry Disinformation Campaigns Djibouti DNA Technology Domestic Terrorist Groups Drone Strikes Drones, Commercial Applications of Drug Testing Drug Testing Kits Drug Therapy Drug Trade. See Smuggling Drug Trafficking Dumpster Diving E-Government Electronic Harassment Electronic Monitoring. See Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices Electronic Restraint Devices Electronic Surveillance Email Embargoes Emergency Alert Systems Eminent Domain Environmental Security Equality Espionage Espionage in Ancient Egypt Ethics Ethiopia Eugenics Industrial Complex European Convention on Human Rights Facebook Fascism Fast Capitalism Fear, Culture of Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act Fingerprints

List of Entries

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Foucault, Michel Frankfurt School Franklin, Benjamin Free Speech Freedom of Expression Freedom of Information Act Garland, David Gated Communities Germany Glasnost Global Justice Global Mobility Global Positioning Systems. See United States v. Jones (2012) Global Surveillance Global Village Globalization Goffman, Erving Google Google Earth Governing Through Crime Governmentality Gramsci, Antonio Greece Guantanamo Bay Guatemala

Information Warfare Infotainment Insanity Intellectual Property Rights Intelligence Community International Diplomacy International Monetary Fund International Relations Theory Internet Pornography Internment Camps INTERPOL Inverse Surveillance iPhones. See Smartphones Iran Iran-Contra Affair Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979) Iraq Israel Italy Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act Jennicam Kafka, Franz Katz v. United States (1967) KGB Knowledge Kyllo v. United States (2001)

Habeas Corpus Hamas Hate Crimes Health Management Organizations Hepting v. AT&T Highway and Interstate Surveillance Hobbes, Thomas Home Surveillance Hoover, J. Edgar Houston, Texas, Surveillance in Human Trafficking Hunger Games, The

Latour, Bruno Law Law and Digital Technology Legal Moralism Libertarian Party Libya Lie Detector Instrumentation Life Sciences Surveillance and Security Life Without Parole Locke, John London, England, Surveillance in

Iceland Identity Politics Identity Theft Immigration Immigration and Naturalization Service Incapacitation India Information Security

Machine Learning Martial Law Marx, Gary T. Marxism Mass Incarceration Mass Surveillance. See Global Surveillance Matrix, The McCarthyism

ix

x

List of Entries

Medieval Castles Megan’s Law Mental Disability Laws Mental Health Inpatient Facilities Methadone Maintenance Mexico Military Industrial Complex Military Intelligence Minority Report Mobile Phones. See Cell Phone Tracking; Smartphones Modernism Monitor Versus Merrimac Moral Panic Morality Mountain Surveillance Movie Theater Security Municipal Surveillance Myspace Narcissism National Security National Security Agency National Security Agency Leaks National Security Council Nazism Neighborhood Watch Programs and Citizen Patrol Network Security Neuroscience and Brain Biology New Penology New York, New York, Surveillance in News Media Nigeria 9/11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization North Korea Nuclear Treaties Nuclear War Offender Reentry Programs Online Shopping Open Source Computing Orwell, George Panopticon, The Paparazzi Paramilitarization Parental Surveillance Parks

Parole Passenger Data Passenger Profiling Paternalism and Parens Patriae Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 PATRIOT Act Peace Talks and Peace Agreements Perestroika Phishing and Scams. See Email; Identity Theft Play-Dates and Play-Spaces Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Plethysmograph Police State Policing and Society Political Action Committees Political Dissidents Political Psychology Politics Port Security Postcolonialism Poststructural Theory Power Prison and Jail Segregation Units Prisons and Jails Privacy Privacy, Internet Privacy, Medical Privacy, Right to Privacy, Types of Privacy Act of 1974 Private Law Enforcement Private Prisons Probation Profiling, Racial Propaganda Protection Orders Psychological Assessment Psychotherapy Public Health, Surveillance in Punishment Punishment and Society Radio-Frequency Identification Devices Religion Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 Republican Party Researching Cybercrime Responsibility Restraining Orders. See Protection Orders

List of Entries

Revolutions and Revolts Riot Control Risk Society Thesis Russia Scandals, Political Scanners School Surveillance: Colleges and Universities School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools Search and Seizure Secure Fence Act of 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission Securitization Security, Concepts of Security Screenings at Sporting Events Security Theater Segregation, Residential Self-Deportation Sex Offender Laws Sex Offender Registries Sexting Shopping Mall Security Situationists Slave Trade Smart Borders Smartphones Smuggling Social Contract Theory Social Control Social Justice Social Media Social Network Analysis Social Sorting Sociality Society of Captives Thesis Solitary Confinement Sousveillance South Africa Sovereignty Spain Spam. See Email Special Operation Forces Specialty Courts for Domestic Violence Specialty Courts for Mental Health Specialty Courts for Substance Abuse Spectacle, The Spies Spyware. See Cybertheft

xi

Stand Your Ground Laws Stigma Stop and Frisk Stuxnet Virus Subjectivity Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities Supermax Prisons Surveillance, Culture of Surveillance, Theories of Surveillance & Society Surveillance Art Surveillance Deterrence Surveillance During the Age of Reason Surveillance During the Cold War Surveillance During World War I and World War II Surveillance Investigator Surveillant Assemblage Swatting Hack Synology Surveillance Station Synopticon, The Syria Taliban Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) Tasers and Other Less-Than-Lethal Devices Tea Party Technology Telemetric Policing Terrorism Tet Offensive Texting Threat Assessment Torture Totalitarian Surveillance Societies Traffic Control Traitors Transparency Trinidad and Tobago Truman Doctrine Truth Twitter. See Social Media UFO Surveillance (History, Purpose, Examples) UN Peacekeeping and Security Forces U.S. Constitution U.S. Customs and Border Protection U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Secret Service

xii

List of Entries

U.S. Transportation Security Administration United Kingdom United Nations United States United States v. Jones (2012) United States v. Miller (1976) United States v. Spy Factory, Inc. (1997) Unregulated Cyber Currencies Vagrancy Laws Vehicle Tracking Systems Victim-Offender Mediation Violence Against Women Act Voting Voyeurism, Digital

War on Drugs War on Terror Warrants Watchdog Groups Watergate and White House Tapes Weapons of Mass Destruction Whistle-Blowers WikiLeaks Wire Taps. See Electronic Surveillance Women, Girls, and the Body Work Surveillance Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices Youth Detention Centers and Facilities YouTube

F with a brief look at the history of Facebook and how it works to connect users and the information that they share and then provides a thorough examination of institutional ­ privacy and social privacy that is being compromised through individuals’ use of Facebook and the monitoring of that activity by corporations, government entities, and others.

Facebook Daniel Trottier defines surveillance as the sustained and targeted collection of personal information. Surveillance here is an ambiguous term, and it is often associated with closed-circuit cameras like traffic light cameras, department store cameras to prevent theft, or the observation of a person, a group of people, or an area by law enforcement as in the case of detectives following a suspected criminal. But these definitions and connotations of surveillance often overlook the fact that surveillance is so pervasive in everyday life and that the methods of surveillance have obviously adapted to the progression and advancement of technology. The creation of the online global village and the growth of online social networking websites have successfully transformed human communication and converged people around the world from various walks of life on one platform, consequentially, complicating and redefining surveillance. With the increasing use of online social networks such as Facebook, much research has focused on the privacy issue of the network in terms of its growing presence in the surveillance of everyday life, as well as the usage of personal data transmitted through it as a tool for surveillance by the government and consumer-based corporations. This entry considers the use of Facebook as a tool for surveillance at the interpersonal or institutional levels to provide a holistic, multidimensional understanding of social media surveillance in a socially converging world. The entry begins

Social Migration and Convergence In 2004, while they were enrolled at Harvard ­University, Mark Zuckerberg and a few of his colleagues created Facebook, a social networking website that connects people with common interests; it also enables its users to keep up to date on one another’s activities. Users can send messages to one another and share pictures, videos, and interesting websites or articles. They can also join networks set up by organizations such as schools, businesses, and charities. Originally designed for Ivy League college students, Facebook quickly became popular in many countries. In 2011, people in Tunisia and Egypt used Facebook to help organize massive protests, which eventually toppled the governments of both countries. In 2012, Facebook became a public company with an initial public offering of $104 billion—one of the largest ever. Facebook is available in more than 60 languages. By 2006, anyone over the age of 13 years with a valid email address could have a Facebook account, and as a result, it has grown to be the world’s largest social networking website with more than 1 billion users and counting worldwide. 379

380

Facebook

Soon after, other social networking websites such as Twitter and Instagram were created following the rapid adoption of Facebook by individuals and collectives. This trend suggested that socialization had begun an imminent migration to social networking websites. Today, for many, having a Facebook or other social network account is now an expected part of being online, much like having your own email address. Social networking is best understood as a series of practices surrounding the authoring of personal information like who you are, where you’re from, or where you went to school, and the creation of interpersonal networks through the use of that information. This process of networking is largely based on information sharing and perpetual visibility. For a social network website like Facebook to function, users are expected to routinely submit detailed personal information with the user being able to control with whom the user can share this information. While Facebook offers privacy tools to help users manage their privacy, it is important to understand that Facebook is designed to be more open and social than traditional communication tools like emails, phone calls, or text messages. Its growing popularity has made it a platform where individuals, institutions, businesses, and law enforcement agencies converge, turning it into more of a corporation than just a social networking website. This in turn complicates the term privacy, making it relative in its application in either a social or an institutional context. Looking at Facebook within the political economy of capitalism raises important questions as to what happens with users’ data and whether and how Facebook uses its users. The privacy in the age of the Internet can be described as either social or institutional. The social privacy focuses on the control of personal information by ­individual users on a small scale, while the institutional privacy focuses on the use of data by corporations.

Institutional Privacy Since Facebook is so popular, other companies have worked to integrate Facebook into their own websites. This means that you can use a single Facebook account to sign in to different services across the Internet, making it possible for

companies, marketers, and even governments to collect significant amounts of data about individual users through certain social media technologies. For example, the video-sharing website YouTube aggregates user information with data collected by its parent site Google, making social network platforms “information warehouses” by processing, storing, and analyzing a wide range of personal information and usage data. With Facebook having the largest number of social network users, it offers a series of business solutions to companies wanting to utilize the social network. This corresponds to a wealth of social engagements, ranging from creating fan pages to indepth advertising schemes whereby information is collated about users. By harvesting personal information, businesses acquire knowledge about users who themselves perhaps would not share if they were informed on how it would be used. Facebook wants to know where users are from, how old they are, who they are friends with, what industry they work in, their likes, their relationship status, and where they went to school. It also includes a feature that makes it possible for users to “check in” with their friends, revealing exactly where they are on the map, what they are doing, and who they are, in large part, because marketers want to know those things. Author E. J. Westlake suggests that users do not mind sharing private information with Facebook because their need for social cohesion outweighs their desire for privacy. However, privacy advocates have warned that the result of the symbiotic relationship between Facebook and institutions will be a tool for surveillance disguised as a free social network to its user base. Also noteworthy is the concept of a masked power such as the U.S. government watching, or potentially watching, the content of electronic communication through the monitoring of citizens’ interactions on social networks. This realization does not focus on the act of surveillance itself; instead, it brings awareness to the mechanism with which the surveillance is carried out.

Social Privacy Social relationships are being transformed and redefined by virtue of the variety of people being mediated on social network platforms like

Facebook

Facebook. One is quickly apprised on the mutual risk involved by those cohabiting on the social network and how it affects the way in which they share their lives. While some see Facebook as a tool for socialization that allows them to express themselves and interact with fellow members of society, others see it as a tool that enables surveillance between individuals and organizational entities. This leads to several questions that address the issue of exposure and visibility as well as the seemingly conflicting desires for privacy and publicity by users allowing for multiple types of surveillance simultaneously within the social network. These surveillance practices differ in their expression and effects. In 2005, Facebook and MySpace, another popular social networking website, made headlines in relation to issues that were raised about Internet predators as well as the availability of information for state surveillance through the social networks and the ease of access with which both individual and institutional entities can obtain personal information from users’ profile pages. While there are many features of the site that allow users to manage their personal information, the same features also allow them to monitor the activities of other users to the point of even taking advantage of the information that others put up. Personal romantic relationships, friendships, and family issues have been exposed and subject to scrutiny by the ­general public. Researchers say that Internet users leave enough clues and digital footprints through the use of social networks to provide identity thieves, stalkers, and sexual predators with a new tool to find victims, follow them, study them, and sometimes know them well enough to even become them in the case of identity thieves. Nowadays, some employers use Facebook to investigate potential employees, using the social network to see if applicants present themselves professionally, to determine if they will be a good fit for the company’s culture, to run a background check on the potential employees through the information provided on their profile, or sometimes to find reasons not to hire the potential employee. In some cases, businesses have gone so far as to ask or even demand that applicants provide the prospective employer with usernames and

381

passwords to their individual social networking accounts so that even information that is “hidden” to the general public on their accounts will be accessible to the employer. This practice has been met with outrage from society, which sees this practice as an invasion of privacy. Summarily, while the ability to globally socialize is a good thing, scholars and researchers of social networks have questioned whether it is a negative evolution due to the risks involved both in terms of socialization and security. Social networking is risky. The dependence of its existence on the continuous exchange of information and the exposure of personal data with the widest network possible make preventing the invasion of privacy nearly impossible. This is partly because a social networking website like Facebook makes money from the amount of data it exposes and largely because socialization in contemporary society is dependent on social networking. Gone are the days when people interacted with one another and the world around them over a phone call or over a cup of coffee in a coffee shop. Today, many people are more apt to learn or receive the latest news about one another through Facebook rather than through a personal phone call or faceto-face interaction. Also gone are the days when people could control with whom they shared personal information. The availability of social network applications on smartphones makes the sharing of information easy across a large network of people with whom one does not necessarily have to be friends on Facebook; they simply have to exist on social networks. This grants them instant access to any information others share. Even more invasive in terms of privacy is the technological capacity of smartphones to produce visual recordings (i.e., motion picture or still images) of any activity. This means that anyone with a smartphone can take a video recording or picture of another person without the person’s knowledge or permission and share it with everyone on his or her social network, meaning that, now, everything a person does can potentially be seen by more than a billion people worldwide. Blessing Tangban and Evaristus Obinyan See also Privacy; Privacy, Internet; Social Media

382

Fascism

Further Readings Facebook. Funk & Wagnalls New World Encyclopedia [serial online], 2014. Knickerbocker, Brad. “PRISM: What’s Behind This NSA Surveillance Tool Lurking About Your Facebook Page?” Christian Science Monitor (June 8, 2013). https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/DC-Decoder/ 2013/0608/PRISM-What-s-behind-this-NSAsurveillance-tool-lurking-about-your-Facebook-page (Accessed September 2017). Netchitailova, E. (2012). “Facebook as a Surveillance Tool: From the Perspective of the User.” TripleC (Cognition, Communication, Co-Operation), v.10/2 (2012). Peckham, Matt. “Facebook Killing ‘Unsearch’ Is No Big Thing, but the Lack of a Blanket Opt-Out Is.” Time (October 11, 2013). http://techland.time.com/2013/ 10/11/facebook-killing-unsearch-is-no-big-thingbut-the-lack-of-a-blanket-opt-out-is/ (Accessed September 2017). Penny, Laurie. “Facebook and Google Know That We Value Conformity More Than Our Privacy.” New Statesman, v.141/5133 (2012). Trottier, Daniel. Social Media as Surveillance, Rethinking Visibility in a Converging World. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012. Westlake, E. “Friend Me If You Facebook: Generation Y and Performative Surveillance” [serial online]. TDR: The Drama Review, v.52/4 (2008).

Fascism Scholars address fascism either as political ideology and mass movement or as political regime, but there is no universally accepted definition and no consensus with regard to its origins, attributes, or manifestations. In the post–World War II (WWII) world, fascism and fascist became two terms pejoratively used to describe any (real or perceived) authoritarian, conservative, or right-wing regime, policy, or person, which further complicated any attempt at a universal definition. The term fascism originates from the Italian fascio and the Latin fasces, meaning a bundle of rods tied around an ax, and it symbolizes discipline, authority, and strength through unity. Fascist states were notorious for surveillance of its citizens and suppression of many individual privacy rights. This entry provides a brief review of the history of fascism, describes the ideology of

fascism, and concludes with a section on surveillance and the private life in fascist states, with Germany and Italy receiving much of the focus. In 19th-century Italy, fascio came to mean league or group—often revolutionary league or group—and it was this revolutionary connotation that fascinated young Benito Mussolini, who, in 1919, founded the Italian League of Combatants, which transformed in 1921 into the National F ­ascist Party. Besides the National Fascist Party (1921–1943), some of the most ­ important fascist parties and movements from the interwar period and from the time of WWII were the National  Socialist German Workers Party (the Nazi  Party,  1920–1945), the Spanish Falange ­(1933–1975), the Croatian Revolutionary Movement (­1929–1945), the Iron Guard in Romania (­ 1927–1941), the Arrow Cross Party in Hungary (1935–1937, 1939–1945), the National Union in Portugal (1930–1974), the Lapua Movement in Finland (1929–1932), the Fatherland’s Front in Austria (1933–1938), the National Union in Norway (1933–1945), and the Imperial Aid Association in Japan (1940–1945). By the mid-1930s, there was a fascist party or movement in most European countries, including Western Europe. After WWII, most European fascist parties and movements were disbanded and outlawed, but neo-fascist organizations continued to appear periodically. Fascism also had important adherents in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The British Union of Fascists (1932–1940), the Cross of Fire (1927–1936) and the Young Patriots (1924– 1936) in France, the Rexist Party in ­ Belgium (1930–1944), the South African Fascists, the ­Syrian People’s Party, the Movement of Young Egypt, the Japanese Imperial Way Faction, the Blue Shirts in China, the Nacis in Chile, the Revolutionary Union in Peru, and the Gold Shirts in Mexico are just a few examples in this regard. Fascists argued that their movement was revolutionary and hostile to the corrupt parliamentarism that—it was said—had allowed the Jews, masons, and capitalists to control the state to their advantage. In 1926, Mussolini proclaimed that fascism was “a new principle in the world” and “a categorical antithesis of democracy, plutocracy, [and] freemasonry.” Fascism called, therefore, for a national revolution to unite those abused and neglected by the liberal system and to create a

Fascism

utopian fascist society and a strong state. Italy under Benito Mussolini (1922–1943), Germany under Adolf Hitler (1933–1945), and Japan under Hideki To¯jo¯ (1940–1944) were the most notorious fascist political regimes.

383

solidarity. The fascist was a “new man,” a “man of destiny” represented above all by a strong leader who controlled all levels of society and was at the center of a powerful personality cult. Fascism was antirational and placed special emphasis on emotion and myths, including the myth of the decadent society, the myth of Fascist Ideology the national rebirth, the myth of the Aryan race, Fascism was initially an antimovement—­ the myth of the new man, and the myth of the antiliberal, anticlerical, antimonarchist, antidemoJewish conspiracy. Fascist movements developed a cratic, anticapitalist, antisocialist, anticommunist, cult of youth and physical strength, and they purand antidictatorship. Although it rose as a political sued the rebirth of a “true,” vital, aggressive, and ideology in the 1920s, fascism originated from a militarist nation, believed to be biologically supelate-19th-­century European intellectual movement rior to others, historically rooted in a mythologirepresented by thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche cal past, and entitled to replace a (perceived) (1844–1900), Georg Ritten von Schönerer (1842– liberal, corrupt, weak, and passive political ­system. 1921), Georges Sorel (1847–1922), Auguste-­ Hitler’s racism and anti-Semitism were tightly Maurice Barrés (1862–1923), Enrico Corradini connected with the myth of the Aryan race, which, (1865–1931), and Filippo Tommaso Marinetti according to Nazi ideology, originated from the (1876–1944). Fascism, though, lacks consecrated proto-Aryans who had arrived on the North Gerideologists, and it is not a homogenous doctrine. man plains from the lost continent of Atlantis. Its Many key figures of fascism, for instance—­ superiority entitled the German Aryan race—Nazi including Mussolini, Hitler, and Sorel—were ideology c­ontended—to expand its territory in socialists in their youth. In fact, fascism absorbed order to gain “living space.” Implementing Nazi elements and influences from socialism, conservaideology into practice, Hitler expelled and extertism, social Darwinism, anarchism, syndicalism, minated races considered i­nferior—Jews, Poles, nationalism, and futurism. Combining right-wing, Russians, Ukrainians, and other Slavic people. center-wing, and left-wing political stands, fascism The myth of the Jewish conspiracy was at the is very difficult to define or to fit into the tradibasis of the Nazi-run Holocaust, in which more tional linear left-right political spectrum. Fascists than 11 million people were exterminated because believed that they proposed a third way—one they were deemed inferior. The Jews were probetween capitalism and communism. claimed the main enemy of the Aryan race, The many fascist or fascist-oriented parties and because it was said that they had conspired to movements presented many distinctions, but genercontrol the world and had been the main culprits ally, it is accepted that fascism was antiliberal, antifor the economic, social, and political problems of Marxist, ultranationalist, and militarist. F ­ascism the German state. Mentally and physically dislacked tolerance toward any nonfascist ideologies abled individuals, Gypsies, and homosexuals were and political regimes, including communism, paralso seen as inferior, Aryan-less, unmanly, and liamentary democracy, and liberalism. It venerated immoral people, and they were therefore subject the state, the authority, the hierarchy, and the to persecution or even extermination. The C ­ atholic strong leader; aimed to unite and rejuvenate the Church was also attacked under accusations of nation; adopted protectionist and interventionist immorality and corruption. economic policies; and promoted racism and impeWhile Hitler pursued a “living space” for the rialism. Fascism affirmed the soldiery duty and German (believed) superior race, Mussolini tried to sacrifice, and it glorified war, heroism, and viocreate a “vital space” for the Italian nation. The lence, including the scapegoating of different German living space targeted Eastern Europe and groups. It placed great emphasis on mass mobilizaregions from the USSR, while Italy’s vital space covtion and was anti-individualist, placing the nation ered Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, above the individuals, which were deemed imporand Northern Africa. Mussolini’s goal was to build tant only as long as they were bound together in a new Roman Empire, but he rejected the German

384

Fascism

racialism and anti-Semitism. The Italian vital space was to be divided into two areas—one inhabited by Italians and the other by non-Italians—that were to be placed under Italian domination. Italy’s role was to illuminate and educate these people and not to exterminate them. Under the influence of Hitler, in 1938, Italy also adopted anti-Semitic laws, introducing the Manifesto of Race. Observing that German racism reached the monstrous proportions of genocide, while Italy did not pursue the extermination of its ethnic minorities, some scholars argue that Nazism and fascism were two distinct phenomena. Still, they do present systematic common features. Both were anticommunist, antiliberal, and ultranationalist. Both pursued the nation’s regeneration and a vital/living space for their people. Both were expansionist and militarist, glorified war and violence, and admired modern war technology. Both used propaganda to acquire and maintain power, manipulating mass communication and mass politics. Both were revolutionary movements until they ceased the power. Both employed racist ­policies—Italy only after 1938. Both were to some extent conservative, exaggerating the values of rural life and seeing women primarily as mothers and homemakers. Although they initially criticized capitalism, in practice, fascists associated themselves with landowners and industrialists to preserve power. Other attributes employed by fascism were its embracement of totalitarianism and its corporatism. One main feature that makes fascism a form of totalitarianism is its ideological and political monopoly, ideology being regarded almost as a type of religion. Italy became a single party state in 1926, followed by Germany in 1933. The fascist state sought to control all aspects of political, economic, social, and cultural life, which made it totalitarian. In the early 1920s, totalitarian was a term employed to criticize the fascist movement, but Mussolini ceased it and used it to describe the movement positively. In economics, Italy embraced the theory of corporatism and established corporations (i.e., economic sectors) involving representatives of the state, the capital, and the workers. It was believed that such an economic organization was to create harmonious labor relations, increase production, and sustain the war efforts and the conquest of

new territories in the interest of the whole nation. In practice, however, the Italian corporatist state was never truly functional, with corporatism being in fact a top-down model of state control over the economy. Nazi Germany did not adopt the economic doctrine of corporatism, with its only corporatist-like enterprise being the Reich Nutrition Estate.

Surveillance and Private Life in Fascist States The fascist system was marked by surveillance and punishment, and Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are notorious examples of police states. Arguing that they acted on behalf of national security and fought against “the enemy of the state,” fascist states eliminated all political opposition and attempted to control all aspects of the public or the private life of ordinary people, with the goal to create the new fascist man and the utopian fascist—“harmonious”—society. The fascist state wanted to order and discipline life and society in order to not only secure the rejuvenation of the nation, including its moral rebirth, but also punish those considered guilty of the decadence of the state. Nazi Germany used surveillance and brutal methods to suppress and prevent any (real or perceived) opposition. The Gestapo, the Schutzstaffel, the Sturmabteilung, and large networks of informants were employed to ensure the control and surveillance of the society. The Nazis developed a culture of control. They wanted to know everything about everybody, and especially who was a Jew, Gypsy, homosexual, or communist. Fascist authorities expected all Germans to accept and live by the norms and precepts of the Nazi ideology, and they spied on everybody, including the members of the Nazi Party. In Nazi Germany, security forces could arrest, detain, torture, or even murder any suspect for no reason, without having a warrant or a court order, and without informing the family about what happened with the disappeared ones. The Gestapo and the Schutzstaffel, for instance, were exempted from responsibility in administrative courts and could detain and imprison people without any judicial proceedings. Therefore, thousands of political prisoners in their custody simply disappeared. The Gestapo’s ordinary investigative

Fascism

methods included harassment, blackmail, threats, sleep deprivation, planting evidence, and torture, while its targets were political and ideological opponents, the Roma people, the religious organizations, homosexuals, handicapped individuals, and above all the Jews. A first step in Germany’s extermination policy against Jews was to register all Jews, and such registration practices were introduced in Germany in 1938, in Poland in 1939, in Austria and France in 1940, and in Holland in 1941. The separation of powers was greatly undermined in Nazi Germany, and, for instance, the courts were simply executors of the orders of the secret police. Between 1934 and 1945, the Nazi people’s courts condemned to death, for political reasons, more than 12,000 civilians and sent thousands more to concentration camps. In Italy, after the opposition parties, unions, and newspapers were closed, the Public Security decrees adopted in 1926 allowed state authorities to arrest and punish individuals “singled out by public rumor as being dangerous to the national order of the state” or the women who were “wrong” for the new fascist Italy. The Italian equivalent of the Gestapo was the Organization for Vigilance and Repression of anti-Fascism, founded in 1927. The organization had a special archive where it kept the information it had gathered from police workers or informants about possible opponents, with data regarding everything from their education to their sexual orientation. Under the Public Security decrees, all prostitutes were removed from the streets in 1926. The fascist state was trying to control sexualities that did not match its moral values. One year later, the bars used by the working class as well as other meeting places were closed down by the police, while those that did remain open were occupied by the new fascist man and were placed under surveillance. In fascist states, the virile, aggressive, and heroic fascist man was the only master of the public sphere, including the political sphere that was closed to women, who were supposed to stay indoors and to give birth to as many children as possible. In fascist Italy, motherhood was seen as a sacrifice that women had to make, similar to the sacrifice that men had to make in war. Women were attributed maternal and domestic roles, and

385

they were supposed to raise the new fascist man, capable of soldiery sacrifices, ready to fight for the imperialist glory of the fascist state. Fascist Italy was a pronatalist regime that believed that unhygienic and immoral cities threatened the virility and fertility of the nation. Italy adopted laws that limited the rural–urban migration (restricting population to the rural areas where their natural fertility was believed to be assured), severely limited women’s access to contraception, adopted social policies for mothers and children, gave medals to the “heroine” mothers of large families, imposed a celibacy tax on unmarried men, and granted tax reductions to large families. In Italy, fascist propaganda ­portrayed two types of women, bearing on c­lass-based fertility differentials and social inequalities—one was urbane, skinny, sterile, h ­ ­ysterical, and decadent; the other was national, robust, fertile, calm, and a symbol of morality. Thus, Italy’s pronatalism was also a policy directed against the emancipation of women. Abortion, birth control, and homosexuality were seen as serious threats to the health and strength of the Italian nation; the same view was held in Germany. However, Nazi Germany employed pronatalist policies in the case of some women and antinatalist policies in the case of others. It encouraged marriage and motherhood only in the case of healthy, socially, politically, and racially acceptable women, while those considered inferior were not encouraged to have children, and they did not receive the benefits to which other families were entitled (marriage loans, tax reduction, child allowance). The child allowances, however, were paid to fathers and not to mothers even in the cases of racially acceptable families. Nazi Germany used sexuality as a political tool to control and to limit the autonomy of the family, and it put individuals’ private lives under state control. It encouraged the state’s control over maternity, illegitimate children, sexual relations between unmarried racially approved heterosexual partners, heterosexual marriage, and biological reproduction. Still, in Nazi Germany, a certain liberalization of heterosexuality took place, ­continuing preexistent trends. Fascist regimes in the 1930s developed very hostile attitudes against male homosexuality

386

Fast Capitalism

(presuming that female homosexuality did not exist), because they believed that homosexuals threatened the health and morality of the nation. Like the Jews, the Roma, the disabled, or the criminals, homosexuals were also considered socially and racially undesirable. In Germany, in 1936, a Reich Central Office for Combating Homosexuality and Abortion was established. Even without a court conviction, homosexuals were sent to concentration camps and forced to do hard labor, and suffered beatings, malnutrition, and inappropriate sanitary conditions. In 1942, the death penalty was introduced in the Reich for homosexual acts. Men suspected of being homosexuals were kept under strict surveillance by police or informants, both in Italy and in Germany. However, the repressive sexual policies of fascist Italy did not reach the grotesque proportions of Nazi Germany. It is estimated that in Nazi Germany, between 5,000 and 15,000 homosexuals died in concentration camps. However, when it came to homosexuals and other German “criminals,” the main aim of the regime was to reeducate them and not to exterminate them, as it was the case with the Jews. It was only in 1938 that Italy adopted anti-Jew legislation. The Italian Racial Laws were employed until 1943, and, although targeted especially at the Jews, they also addressed the situation of the non-Italian inhabitants in the colonies. The Italian racial legislation excluded Jews from higher education, public offices, military service, banks, and the National Fascist Party; banned their publications, limited their civil rights; confiscated their assets; expropriated most Jewish businesses; put a ban on the Jewish professionals (e.g., lawyers, doctors, dentists); limited their travels; expelled foreign Jews from Italy; and sent Jews to concentration camps. During this time, Jews in Italy were subjected to “sustainable,” “active,” “intense,” “strict,” and “attentive” surveillance by the police. After WWII, elements of the fascist ideology— ultranationalism, antiliberalism, antiparliamentarism, opposition to immigration, and xenophobia—survived within the neo-fascist or neo-Nazist movement. In the first decade of the 21st century, in the context of the economic crisis, the influence of far-right extremism increased in Germany, Greece, Spain, Hungary, and France,

which revived academic interest toward fascism as an ideology or political regime. Elena Dragomir See also Authoritarianism; Concentration Camps; Global Surveillance; Nazism; Police State; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies

Further Readings Atkinson, Davin. “Totalitarianism and the Street in Fascist Rome.” In N. R. Fyfe (ed.), Images of the Street: Planning, Identity and Control in Public Space. London, England: Routledge, 1998. Blamires, Cyprian, ed. World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006. Griffin, Roger. The Nature of Fascism. New York, NY: Routledge, 1993. Griffin, Roger and Matthew Feldman, eds. Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. Griffiths, Richard. Fascism. London, England: Continuum, 2005. Payne, Stanley G. A History of Fascism, 1914–1945. New York, NY: Routledge, 1995. Sarfatti, Michele. The Jews in Mussolini’s Italy: From Equality to Persecution. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007. Schmeidel, John C. Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. Woodley, Daniel. Fascism and Political Theory: Critical Perspectives on Fascist Ideology. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010.

Fast Capitalism The central features of capitalism today are both the same as and different from Karl Marx’s writings on the subject in the late 19th century. Capitalism still relies on the exploitation of labor power through alienation in the workplace and the household, but what Marx called ideology—the values, beliefs, and morals shared by the majority of the people in a given society—has changed dramatically. Ideological directives are no longer issued solely from the pages of books. They are now encoded into the numerous layers and levels of a public world in which money, science, and

Fast Capitalism

speed have, in effect, replaced the written word. Capitalism has become a language game, a disempowered everyday life in which reading has been turned into a mindless rehearsal of social life’s various subtexts—buy, work, privatize, count, and capitulate. Whereas for Marx ideology taught values from the outside, people now learn conformity from the inside, without having to read in the oldfashioned sense. Thus, in many regards, fast capitalism can be read as an infusion of Marxism with the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, a group of theorists who argue that due to the speed at which modernity has unfolded, instead of first learning a world and then reproducing it, people are indoctrinated with conformist values simply by engaging with everyday signs and structures. Nowadays, the ideology of (fast) capitalism is both self-sustaining and self-mediating and, as will be revealed in this entry, is tied to an increase in surveillance and an erosion of privacy. This entry first differentiates between “slow” and “fast” capitalism and then describes how fast capitalism is related to fast technology, fast surveillance, and slow privacy, with examples of both the benefits and the drawbacks provided. One of the fundamental differences between “slow” and “fast” capitalism is the pace at which significance diminishes from text has accelerated dramatically. It is much more difficult to oppose the hasty world of the 2010s than it was to challenge the sluggish world of Marx’s 1880s because fast capitalism robs words of meaning, quickly shielding ideological claims from critical counteranalysis and reproducing itself frenetically by consuming thought and denigrating reason. As a result, reading has become incidental because people have neither the time to read carefully nor the critical intellectual skills, which are not provided in this educational climate of rapid, standardized learning. Fast capitalism is able to speed up the rate at which people live out the historical possibilities presented to them, bringing about the demise of a world in which people could make sense of and then oppose the dominant ideology. Although slower capitalism ground everyone down, it left some space for dissent. Due to the realities of fast capitalism, however, it is almost impossible to imagine a modern project having a similarly radical and sweeping impact as that of, for example, Marx’s Capital or Herbert Marcuse’s

387

One Dimensional Man. The more capitalism accelerates, the less people pause to engage and explore text and the lives it recommends. Instead, facts are venerated, while knowledge is stripped of history and sped up to serve the accelerating ideologies of capitalism.

Fast Technologies and Faster Capitalism The adjective “fast” can be read as a modification of capitalism in two ways. The first, as introduced above, involves time and the way in which it is compressed as the pace of everyday life continues to speed up to meet certain economic imperatives and to achieve social control—subordination by way of efficiency. The second involves the erosion of boundaries, which are being destroyed by a social order bent on eradicating private space and time. What some call postmodern capitalism involves removing boundaries between people and social institutions, and thus, the self is at risk of losing freedom and mind in a fast society of information, communication, surveillance, and stimulation. However, it is important to note that whether technologies are good or bad depends entirely on the context in which they are employed. The Internet, for example, can help empower people with a wealth of previously inaccessible information, but it is also facilitating the relentless spread of globalized capitalism. In short, what underlies these two senses of the word “fast” in our current stage of capitalism—defined by acceleration and the erosion of boundaries—is the total spread of instantaneity. Instantaneity refers to the human experience of accelerated information flows and the impact these have on the sensibilities of people. From fast food, fast cars, and fast bodies to fast work, fast reading, and fast writing, we have come to expect things almost instantly. Faster production must be matched with faster consumption. We can connect with people anywhere, reading emails, webpages, and blogs, and communicate without waiting for a response. Instantaneity breaks down boundaries, accelerates information and communication, compresses time, and shrinks space. As the world speeds up and condenses, we lose the capacity for retreating into privacy, and we lose the distance from the world required to assess it critically and to reflect or to engage in reasoning.

388

Fast Capitalism

The self has thus seamlessly merged with the world. People experience their own dissolution and dispersal as they are bombarded with control and commodities. Communicative technologies dismantle barriers and boundaries between private and public, home and work, in ways that profoundly affect our identities and intimate lives. The Internet is invasive, as are cell phones, tablets, and, of course, televisions and radios. The critical self is at risk. Fast capitalism is a stage of civilization in which texts ooze out of their covers and into the world, commanding attention by having their literary signatures removed. We no longer read advertising as a text, nor television, nor webpages—they are inscribed within us, gripping us in ways beyond our register.

Fast Surveillance and Slow Privacy As fast capitalism is a process in which production, consumption, and communication are all greatly accelerated, it has much to tell us about the interrelationship between surveillance and privacy. Through fast technologies such as closed-circuit television cameras, infrared sensors, data miners, and biometric border crossings, surveillance has become encoded, ubiquitous, and part of the everyday experience under fast capitalism. As information collection processes have become automatic and hassle free—from the X-ray machine at airport security to running a quick background check through social media—we find ourselves offering our information freely, not wanting to be excluded from what we are told are the prerequisites of good citizenry. Hence, the processes of surveillance via fast capitalism go everywhere we go, both online and off-line, making it possible to monitor, collect, and analyze all of our movements, conversations, and behaviors. And as fast capitalism overwhelms reason and convinces people to value speed over critical thought, we surrender our personal information both unknowingly and, at times, willingly, so as not to slow down the processes of productivity and consumption. Many of the new controls seem more acceptable because they are hidden or built-in, less invasive relative to the traditional forms of personal intrusion. We are often complicit in their application—whether out of fear, for convenience, or for frequent-shopper points. Converting privacy to a commodity in which the seller receives

something in return to compensate for the invasion is a clever and more defensible means of overcoming resistance. Those who fail to volunteer their personal data to the fast capitalism surveillance machine can be viewed as having something to hide—difficult citizens who do not have society’s best interests in mind. Thus, there is a direct correlation between surveillance and privacy under fast capitalism. By not only watching what we say and do, but also by programing how we think, fast capitalism accelerates past former boundaries of reason, and as a result, privacy is seen as an archaic pastime, an inefficient indulgence, and a leftover from a previous century. Life under fast capitalism has no time for context or history, for solitude or reflexivity; fast capitalism has become a language game of mindless rehearsal, conformity, and indoctrination. Reading, writing, and thinking critically have become casualties of instantaneity, appropriating resistance and dissent into a capitalist project that has proselytized us with its ideologies of speed and performance. Time has been cluttered so that we cannot peruse the past and imagine a different future. The spaces between the personal and the performative have been torn down, replaced with an omnipresent surveillance structure that observes us from the outside and programs us from the inside. And while inherently neutral, technology has become the central mechanism for a fast capitalist project, serving to extend and entrench ideology’s eclipse of reason. This, however, does not mean that fast capitalism is an invulnerable force. Struggling toward a form of slow modernity that recaptures private moments of thought and reflection in the face of an overstimulating and instantaneous climate of rapidity requires us to reboundary and deboundary our worlds. For a critical theory of fast capitalism, the key to challenging the marriage of speed and productivity that defines our current lifeworld is the reappropriation of everyday life. This can be done by periodically shutting down the electronic prostheses dictating our lives, setting priorities that minimize work, spending time with family and friends outside structures of production and consumption, and, most important, viewing and enacting our everyday lives as political, not as irrelevant to, or beneath, politics. A. T. Kingsmith

Fear, Culture of See also Frankfurt School; Marxism; Privacy, Types of; Technology

Further Readings Agger, Ben. Fast Capitalism: A Critical Theory of Significance. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989. Agger, Ben. Speeding Up Fast Capitalism: Cultures, Jobs, Families, Schools, Bodies. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2004. Allmer, Thomas. “Critical Internet Privacy Studies.” Fast Capitalism, v.10/1 (2013). Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991. Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol. 1, New ed.). New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2004.

Fear, Culture

of

The culture of fear affects many aspects of life in society, including people’s behavior in social interactions (e.g., fear and insecurity can hinder one’s ability to share), people’s associations and political participation, and local and national security policies. In recent years, the culture of fear appears to have intensified, influencing how societies organize themselves and how they respond to perceived threats. Sometimes, such fear can be transformed into a powerful tool for social and political control. This entry provides historical and current examples of a culture of fear as well as types of perceived threats that contribute to creating a culture of fear; it then discusses who may be afraid of whom in various situations and concludes by relating this fear to the concepts of surveillance, security, and privacy. In contemporary times, fear has become part of the collective imagination, being constantly reproduced, disseminated, and, sometimes, even intentionally created to justify certain actions. During the Cold War, for example, the frightening figure of the communist, which carried a burden of fear, was used to justify abuses and authoritarian practices of dictatorial governments in Latin America. In the United States today, terrorism is used to legitimize imperialist practices and authoritarian

389

policies. Thus, fear often appears as a justification discourse for the pursuit of security and to implement urban securitization, segregationist public policies, and an expansion of the criminal and punitive state. According to sociologist Barry Glassner, media, markets, and politics have historically made use of fear as a tool for social control, spreading a wave of fear, generating distortions and misinterpretations of reality, and causing individuals to fear things that do not necessarily threaten them or to see nonfactual causal relations, thus ignoring the latent reasons of social issues. Among these everyday threats are the fears caused by the violence that inundates television news and the media in general, including programs dedicated exclusively to the coverage of violence and crime. The danger posed by this violence promotes a general feeling of insecurity, making it seem as though everyone is equally subject to the risk of being murdered, kidnapped, or robbed anytime and anywhere, when that is not the case. Other fears include property hazards and fears of new diseases that, from time to time, haunt the collective imagination with threats of pandemics able to bring death and suffering on a global scale, as with the panic caused by the avian flu in 2006 and the swine flu in 2009. Other fears that fit into this category are fears caused by the risk of accidents and natural disasters that threaten to destroy not only the lives and physical integrity of individuals but also their homes and their possessions. Examples of natural disasters that can incite a culture of fear, despite their being neither common events nor a general threat to all societies, are the landslides that occurred in Rio de Janeiro in early 2011 and the destructive earthquake in Haiti in 2010. The mutant viruses of avian and swine flu, characterized in the media as capable of causing the death of millions of people, were less lethal than the regular flu in the same time period. Despite the importance of the issue of violence, reports that imply that all individuals are subject to the same risk of being victims of violence inflate the already high rate of anxiety and insecurity among individuals. Apart from natural hazards, there are other potential threats that feed the culture of fear. These threats are present in more subtle and indirect ways but generate fears of another order: fears associated with social and moral order.

390

Federal Bureau of Investigation

These fears generally are deeply internalized by individuals and, therefore, easily escape initial perception; nonetheless, they sustain and legitimize internal issues such as prejudice and social segregation. These dangers against the social order represent a fear of chaos, which is the fear of what cannot be managed and the fear of all that—one way or another—goes against the established norms of society. Whether real or not, this fear to the existing order can be characterized as the fear of difference. It is important to pay attention to who is afraid of whom. The higher classes of society often fear the poor classes and minorities. To avoid contact with these groups, the higher classes utilize a number of techniques and strategies of segregation and engage the police and public security apparatus to ensure their interests. In contrast, minorities are often afraid of the police and other public security measures due to police violence and arbitrary acts committed by the justice system. It is necessary to emphasize the inaccurate nature of those fears of difference. For example, the discourse regarding the stigma of black people as perpetrators of violence tends to legitimize and reaffirm the prejudice; however, careful analysis of statistics reveals that the percentage of black men who are victims of crime is much higher than that of white men. As Glassner states, in the United States, a black man has a much greater risk of being murdered than a white woman; however, television news and other programming bring the figure of the black criminal to the living rooms of U.S. families daily, reinforcing a sense of fear that is unnecessary as well as prejudiced. This is just one case of the dangers against social order that proliferate in the culture of fear, but the same effects can be applied to homophobia, the marginalization of the poor classes, and even cases of prejudice that receive less emphasis (e.g., drug users, homeless people, and some religious groups). Thus, the concept of the culture of fear can be and often is used to legitimize security, surveillance, and privacy-related practices, leading to their acceptance by society without much discussion or debate. Such acceptance permits a discourse of combating violence and a constant search for security, with little attention given to the negative consequences and effective uses of

these practices, which may result in serious abuses and violations of basic human rights. Diego Coletti Oliva See also Cold War; Securitization; Social Control

Further Readings Bauman, Zygmunt. Medo líquido [Liquid fear]. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Jorge Zahar, 2008. Furedi, Frank. Culture of Fear Revisited: Risk Taking and the Morality of Low Expectation. London, England: Continuum, 2006. Glassner, Barry. The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000.

Federal Bureau

of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a federal law enforcement agency responsible for ­ upholding and enforcing all federal laws, countering domestic terrorist threats, and assisting federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their investigations. As of October 31, 2013, the FBI had a total of 35,344 employees, of whom 13,598 were special agents and 21,746 were support personnel. The FBI has its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and it has 56 field offices and 380 resident offices throughout the country. In addition, the FBI has 63 international offices— called Legal Attaché Offices—and 15 suboffices around the globe. For the 2014 fiscal year, the FBI had an approximate budget of $8.3 billion. Due to the nature of its role, the FBI assists in providing security for the United States and routinely conducts surveillance operations to accomplish that goal. In this entry, the history of the FBI is reviewed, the organization of the FBI is outlined, and the Bureau’s core values, priorities, and functions are described in detail.

History The FBI was created in 1908 with the name the  Bureau of Investigation due to the efforts of ­Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte. Bonaparte

Federal Bureau of Investigation

sought to remedy the lack of investigative officers that the Department of Justice had to investigate business corruption and other violations of federal law. As such, President Theodore Roosevelt transferred eight agents to the new bureau. After the passage of the White Slave Traffic Act in 1910 and the Espionage Act in 1917, the Bureau of Investigation grew rapidly both in manpower and in authority and jurisdiction. In fact, by 1915, Congress authorized an increase of special agents and support staff from 34 to 360. In 1924, J. Edgar Hoover was named the director of the Bureau of Investigation. Hoover joined the Bureau in 1917 and was part of the “Red Scare” in which the Bureau concentrated its efforts on identifying radical anarchists and communists. In 2 years, he created files for 450,000 people. Among them, 60,000 were identified as dangerous radicals. At the time of Hoover’s appointment, the Bureau employed around 650 people and was characterized by corruption and lack of organization. At 29 years of age, Hoover embarked on a crusade to create a culture of professionalism and an environment free of corruption within the Bureau. Hoover fired 400 agents for incompetency and instituted background checks and academy training for special agents. He also instituted the requirement that special agents must have college degrees, preferably in law and accounting. In 1932, Hoover established the Bureau’s crime laboratory, and within the first year, almost 1,000 cases were examined. In 1935, the Bureau of Investigation changed its name to the FBI. With Franklin Roosevelt as president, the FBI saw an expansion in its law enforcement a­ uthority. In 1934, Congress passed different laws that made it a federal crime to rob a bank, cross state lines to  avoid prosecution, participate in interstate racketeering, transport stolen property across ­ state lines, and resist arrest from a federal officer. Congress allotted the enforcement of all these ­ laws to the FBI. With the unconditional support of Roosevelt, Hoover amassed ample political and personal power. Roosevelt directed Hoover to gather information about diplomats from ­Germany, Italy, and Russia due to his concerns with fascism and communism. In addition, Roosevelt gave the Bureau the responsibilities in matters of domestic espionage, counterespionage,

391

and sabotage. Due to its increase of responsibilities, the FBI grew from 772 agents in 1934 to 4,370 in 1941. During the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI concentrated its efforts on defeating the Ku Klux Klan, although Hoover did not quite favor the Civil Rights Movement. In fact, some sources cite that Hoover believed that the movement was just a communist plot. Due to lack of jurisdiction and political interests, the FBI did not intervene in many cases of civil rights violations. During the 1960s and 1970s, the FBI was heavily criticized because of its use of surveillance and wiretaps on political and civic groups, such as civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Until Hoover’s death in 1972, the FBI acted as an independent institution with no control or supervision from external political or governmental sources. After the death of Hoover and the Watergate scandal under President Richard Nixon, the FBI received criticism after documents were revealed detailing a series of burglaries the FBI conducted to get documents about alleged radical groups and individuals and its questionable role in the investigation of the Watergate scandal. During the following years, the FBI sought to change its public image and overcome public suspicion of its activities. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the FBI was paired with the Drug Enforcement Administration to handle the increase of drug trafficking and consumption in the United States. In addition, the FBI was given more jurisdiction to investigate terrorism. As such, the FBI began setting up the Joint Terrorism Task Forces—a multiagency organization to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks in the United States. During the 1990s, the FBI had to respond to increasing criminal activity taking place via the Internet. The FBI sought to expand its capabilities to fight cybercrime and cyberterrorism. In addition, the FBI had to strengthen its intelligence and investigative capabilities to counter the globalization of the terrorist threat, domestic terrorist groups, and other transnational criminal activities. As such, the FBI began its worldwide expansion, opening international offices in strategic locations around the world. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the FBI entered a new era in its history. As it was heavily criticized for failing to “connect the dots” and

392

Federal Bureau of Investigation

ignoring some intelligence pointing out the possibility of such an attack, the FBI had to once again go through internal changes to adapt itself to the new threats to the American homeland. In this new era, the main focus of the Bureau is countering domestic terrorist threats within the United States. To do so, the FBI works closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

Organization The FBI is headed by a director who is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Organizationally speaking, the FBI is divided into five branches and the Office of the Director. The five branches are as follows: 1. National Security Branch: This branch coordinates the FBI’s counterterrorism, counterintelligence, weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence efforts. 2. Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch: This branch is in charge of the investigation of white-collar crimes, violent crimes, organized crimes, public corruption, civil rights violations, and drug-related crimes. In addition, it handles all computer-related crime concerning counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal threats against the United States. 3. Human Resources Branch: This branch manages and coordinates all of the human resources within the Bureau as well as training, leadership development, and the security of people, information, operations, and facilities. 4. Science and Technology Branch: This branch manages the FBI’s scientific and technological capabilities and functions. Its professionals provide the FBI with state-of-the-art technological tools to better collect, analyze, and share evidence from crimes. 5. Information and Technology Branch: This branch provides the FBI with all its information technology needs and creates and distributes the necessary applications to improve overall effectiveness of the agency.

The Office of the Director serves as the main unit for management, coordination, and administration of the FBI. The Office of the Director is divided into the following subdivisions: •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• ••

Facilities and Logistics Services Division Finance Division Inspection Division Office of Congressional Affairs Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Affairs Office of Integrity and Compliance Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the General Counsel Office of the Ombudsman Records Management Division Resource Planning Office

The FBI also provides the following services: Identification Division: The Identification Division was created in 1924, and it collects and maintains a massive fingerprint database. This database is used by the FBI and state and local law enforcement agencies. National Crime Information Center (NCIC): The NCIC is a vast computer-based database of criminal information and activities. The NCIC database includes 21 files: 7 property files and 14 person files. Examples include stolen property files, gang file, and violent person file. The FBI Crime Laboratory: This laboratory is the largest forensic laboratory in the world. It provides DNA, microscopic, and chemical analyses together with spectrography and cryptography. The FBI lab also examines evidence such as hairs, feathers, fibers, blood, and minerals. Uniform Crime Reports: The FBI compiles crime data from known crimes to law enforcement from police agencies throughout the country. Once a year, the FBI publishes Crime in the United States, which is a compilation of criminal statistics published to better understand the patterns and nature of crime in the United States. National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS): To deal with shortcomings of Uniform Crime Reports data and in response to the need of law

Federal Bureau of Investigation

enforcement’s more in-depth understanding of crime data, the FBI created the NIBRS. The NIBRS provides comprehensive, detailed information about crime incidents to the different stakeholders involved in the fight and study of crime.

Core Values, Priorities, and Functions Core Values

As noted on the FBI’s website, its core values are as follows: (a) rigorous obedience to the Constitution of the United States, (b) respect for the dignity of all those they protect, (c) compassion, (d) fairness, (e) uncompromising personal integrity and institutional integrity, (f) accountability by accepting responsibility for their actions and decisions and the consequences of their actions and decisions, and (g) leadership, both personal and professional. Priorities

The FBI has several priorities, which include protecting the United States from terrorist attacks, espionage, and cyber-based attacks and hightechnology crimes as well as protecting civil rights. Combating public corruption, transnational and national criminal enterprises, and major violent and white-collar crimes are also priorities for the FBI. Functions

The FBI has various functions to fulfill. The FBI collects intelligence and conducts investigations to offset threats posed by domestic and international terrorists and groups within the United States. In addition, the FBI designs and implements counterterrorism initiatives to deal with terrorist threats, coordinates counterterrorism efforts with other agencies, and collaborates with other agencies to protect America’s critical infrastructure from physical and cyber attacks. Likewise, the FBI investigates and collects evidence in cases where federal law has been violated and the United States may be a party of interest, unless the investigation of such violations falls under the purview of other agencies. To this extent, the FBI locates and apprehends federal law violators in coordination with state and local governments and agencies. In addition, the Bureau conducts

393

national and international investigations against organized crime enterprises (including individuals and groups involved in terrorism) that directly affect the safety and interests of the United States. Furthermore, the FBI organizes and implements community outreach programs to strengthen relations with the community and performs investigations on personnel for the Department of Justice and whenever required by statute or otherwise. The FBI also implements and conducts law enforcement training programs, conducts research to provide support to state and local law enforcement agencies, and participates in interagency law enforcement initiatives—all in an effort to combat crime and other issues affecting law enforcement agencies and their communities. Moreover, the FBI maintains and manages computer databases to provide data and identification services concerning individuals, stolen property, criminal organizations and activities, crime statistics, and other law enforcement data to all stakeholders in the study and control of crime, including academic, employment, licensing, and firearms sales organizations. In addition, the Bureau manages and operates a laboratory to serve its forensic needs as well as those of state and local law enforcement agencies—this includes technical and scientific assistance, including expert testimony in federal or local courts. Finally, the FBI, in compliance with all applicable laws, assesses and reviews work operations and performance to ensure technical and economic efficiency and communicates its activities and outcomes to Congress, the media, and the public. Marcos L. Misis See also Civil Rights Movement; Crime; Crime Control; Hoover, J. Edgar; National Security Agency; U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Further Readings Bumgarner, Jeff, et al. Federal Law Enforcement: A Primer. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013. Dempsey, John S. and Linda S. Forst. An Introduction to Policing (6th ed.). Clifton Park, NY: Delmar, Cengage Learning, 2011. Department of Justice. “Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Federal Bureau of Investigation”

394

Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection

(n.d.). http://www.justice.gov/jmd/organizationmission-and-functions-manual-federal-bureauinvestigation (Accessed October 2014). Federal Bureau of Investigation. “National IncidentBased Reporting System” (n.d.). http://www.fbi.gov/ about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs (Accessed October 2014). Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Today’s FBI: Facts and Figures 2013–2014” (n.d.). http://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/todays-fbi-facts-figures/facts-andfigures-031413.pdf (Accessed October 2014). Gaines, Larry K. and Victor E. Kappeler. Policing in America (7th ed.). Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 2011. Johnson, David R. American Law Enforcement: A History. Arlington Heights, IL: Forum Press, 1991.

Website Federal Bureau of Investigation: https://www.fbi.gov (Accessed October 2017)

Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection The United States’ main consumer protection agency is the Bureau of Consumer Protection, a bureau of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC’s goal is to prevent business practices that are deceptive or unfair to consumers and that suppress competition that can also be harmful to consumers. Through its Bureau of Consumer Protection, the FTC works to promote informed consumer choice and public understanding of the competitive process, and investigate consumer complaints regarding deceptive, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, including practices that involve consumer security (e.g., data security breaches, identity theft) and privacy (e.g., “do not call” violations). It attempts to meet these goals without overly burdening legitimate and legal business practices. The FTC operates numerous bureaus under its purview other than the Bureau of Consumer Protection, which works extensively to uphold and promote these aims and values. The other bureaus and departments within the FTC include the Bureau of Competition, the Bureau of Economics, and the Office of the General Counsel.

This entry reviews the history and aims of the FTC and its Bureau of Consumer Protection and discusses the consumer complaint process.

History The FTC was first established on September 26, 1914, with the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade Commission Act is often considered one of the most significant pieces of legislation passed during the Progressive era (in this instance by the Wilson administration), which is known as an era of political, economic, social, and moral reform. The act passed through Congress with bipartisan support. The U.S. Senate voted for implementation 43 to 5. In its initial form, the FTC was a bipartisan commission of five members that were appointed by the president of the United States for seven-year terms. The commission was authorized to issue cease-anddesist orders to corporations in order to combat unfair trade practices. Some of the actions targeted by the commission included deceptive advertising and deceptive pricing. The FTC replaced its predecessor, the Bureau of Corporations, which had been created in 1903 during the Roosevelt administration. Over 100 years later, the FTC is still headed by five commissioners who are still nominated for seven-year terms by the president of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

Aims and Goals The commission’s modern goals remain twofold: first, to protect consumers and, second, to promote competition. With regard to protecting American consumers, the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection investigates and files lawsuits against individuals and companies that may be in violation of the law and who inflict unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices in the United States. The Bureau of Consumer Protection also collects and maintains extensive records of complaints from the public on a variety of consumer-related issues. Some of these complaints deal with the issues of data security, deceptive advertising, identity theft, and “do not call” violations. The FTC records are made available to law enforcement agencies both nationally and internationally. For

Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection

example, on May 25, 2016, the Department of Justice ruled in favor of a lawsuit filed by the FTC. This verdict in United States v. Feature Films for Families, Inc., et al., found a Utah-based telemarketing company had engaged in deceptive and abusive practices in the course of selling and promoting films. In regard to promoting competition, the FTC focuses on three major aspects of competition: price, selection, and service. The FTC follows the belief that consumers benefit when prices are low without the tradeoff of fewer choices of goods and lower quality of products and services. The FTC is tasked with enforcing antitrust laws, which leads to free and open consumer markets. Another important task of the FTC is monitoring and challenging potential mergers. The commission will challenge and contest mergers that it believes will result in less competition in a particular market as seen by lower product quality, fewer product choices, or reduced innovation. It believes that mergers and business practices in general should ensure that a particular market works according to the preferences of consumers. Overall, the FTC has administrative and enforcement responsibilities on over 70 different laws intended to protect consumers, including the Federal Trade Commission Act, Telemarketing Sale Rule, Identify Theft Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Clayton Antitrust Act. Finally, the Federal Trade Commission also plays a role in policy making through advocacy and research. Specifically, the FTC sends advocacy letters, files amicus curiae briefs for court cases, gives Congressional testimony, collects public opinion on rules, cases, and policies, issues advisory opinions, leads workshops, and publishes reports examining antitrust and consumer protection concerns.

Consumer Complaints Outside of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, the federal government also maintains a directory of state and local consumer agencies operating in the United States. The directory is organized by state, providing consumers with easy access to the appropriate organization to address their concerns. In addition, the federal government outlines procedures and suggestions for

395

filing official consumer complaints. The commission recommends that consumers first contact the company in question directly, because the majority of cases can be settled without third-party involvement. If the dispute or complaint is not settled in this fashion, the federal government recommends that consumers contact a third party, whether it be a trade association, licensing agency, state or national consumer agency, or a similar organization. Official consumer complaints can also be filed with either a local or state level consumer agency or with the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. After receiving and investigating a complaint filed with the Bureau of Consumer Protection, the FTC may decide to sue a company that has made deceptive claims about its services or products or has engaged in unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent business practices. If, as a result of the lawsuit, the accused company is found to be at fault, consumers may be rewarded refunds. For example, in 2017, the FTC provided refunds to more than 2.7 million AT&T customers, after they were charged for premium text message services without their consent. Similarly, in December 2016, a settlement between the FTC and DeVry University regarding claims of deceptive advertising resulted in individuals receiving refunds and/or student loan debt forgiveness. The FTC has also shown a willingness to take action against companies who violate consumer privacy and security. After the FTC filed a suit against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, which is a global hotel corporation, for failing to fully secure its computer network and thus allowing hackers to access customer information, Wyndham Worldwide argued that the FTC did not have the necessary authority to regulate data security standards of commercial companies. In August 2015, the Third Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a lower court ruling that claimed the FTC did have the authority to protect consumer data. The area of privacy is likely to become an everincreasing area of concern, and therefore an arena of expanding enforcement for the agency. Much of the worry, on the part of consumers, will be in the area of data protection—and consumers are reminded that “data” can be anything from credit scores and records (as with the Yahoo and

396

Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act

Equifax data breaches of 2016 and 2017, respectively) to family pictures. R. Bruce Anderson and Matthew J. Geras See also Cybersecurity Legislation; Identify Theft; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings Cornell University Law School. (2014). 15 U.S. Code Chapter 2, Subchapter I—FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | LII / Legal Information Institute. Retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ text/15/chapter-2/subchapter-I Federal Trade Commission. (2004). Federal Trade Commission 90th Anniversary Symposium Event Program. Federal Trade Commission. Federal Trade Commission. (2014). About the FTC. Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc Federal Trade Commission. (2015, August 25). Third Circuit rules in FTC v. Wyndham case. Retrieved from https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/ business-blog/2015/08/third-circuit-rules-ftc-vwyndham-case Haefner, J. E., & Leckenby, J. D. (1975). Consumers’ Use and Awareness of Consumer Protection Agencies. The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 9(2), 205–211. Meier, K. J. (1987). The Political Economy of Consumer Protection: An Examination of State Legislation. Western Political Quarterly, 40(2), 343–359. United States Government. (2014). Index of State and Local Consumer Agencies | USA.gov. Retrieved from http://www.usa.gov/directory/stateconsumer/

Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) was passed in 1994 and, as of 2017, is the largest crime bill in U.S. history. The act was written by Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) with the intention of providing federal action to combat a perceived rise in violent crime. Portions of the act remain controversial, such as the act’s heavy emphasis on incarceration and its disproportionate impact on minorities. There is also vigorous debate about whether the act contributed to falling crime rates throughout the United States

after its passage. The act has added enormous funding to police forces and encouraged aggressive policing in communities, all in the interest of greater security for the population. At the same time, critics have raised the question about whether greater security is coming at the expense of increased threats to individual liberty and rights.

Federal Assault Weapons Ban One of the signature components of the VCCLEA was a prohibition on the manufacture and sale of certain semiautomatic firearms that the act classified as “assault weapons.” In the case of rifles, an assault weapon was one that combined at least two of the following features: a folding or telescoping stock, a pistol grip, a bayonet mount, a flash suppressor or threaded barrel to accommodate a flash suppressor, and a grenade launcher. The ban also restricted the sale and possession of magazines holding more than 10 rounds of ammunition. Enforcement of the ban took effect on September 13, 1994, and it was scheduled to expire on September 13, 2004. The ban was not renewed on the date of the sunset provision, so it is currently legal to purchase and possess these firearms in the United States. Critics assailed the ban as an unnecessary restriction on rights afforded in the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and complained that the authors of the legislation betrayed remarkable ignorance about firearms. Firearms, for instance, can generally be classified into two categories: (1) guns that expel a single bullet with each pull of the trigger and (2) guns that expel multiple bullets with each pull of the trigger. Thus, the key distinction is between those guns that are semiautomatic and those that are fully automatic or capable of firing multiround bursts. Since 1986, the possession of fully automatic firearms had been heavily regulated by the federal government, making semiautomatic firearms the overwhelming choice of consumers. It is not clear, therefore, what the term assault weapon applied to. Moreover, the classifications defined in the law, according to critics, made little sense. None of the “assault weapon” features enhanced a semiautomatic firearm’s lethality, and some of the features, such as the addition of a grenade launcher, had never been legal. Nor was there significant

Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act

evidence that these firearms contributed substantially to violent crime.

Criminal Reforms The VCCLEA provided stricter sentences and punishments for criminal offenders. Sixty new offenses were included in the act for which prosecutors could seek the death penalty. Such offenses included murder by terrorism, civil rights murders, murders as a result of drive-by shootings, murders as a result of carjacking, murders of federal law enforcement officers, and drug trafficking on a large scale. The act created a three strikes rule under federal law, which imposed life imprisonment for persons with three or more convictions for violent felonies. Juveniles, under the act, could be prosecuted for violent crimes at the age of 13 years. The act also made it a crime to be a member of a street gang. Finally, the act required states to create sex offender registries for violent sexual offenders whereby offenders must register with the state for 10 years after being released from prison. Critics of the reforms in the law argued that they focused heavily on punishment while ignoring the underlying socioeconomic causes of crime. Critics also complained of the lack of persuasive evidence that stiffer penalties have a deterrent effect on offenders. Instead, longer sentences would only put greater pressures on already overcrowded prisons, and more liberal use of the death penalty would increase the likelihood of killing an innocent person. Other critics argued that the criminalization of gang affiliation violated the First Amendment right of freedom of association.

Violence Against Women VCCLEA featured a number of provisions targeted at the protection of women. The act increased federal penalties for repeat sex offenders and required restitution for the medical and legal costs of sex crimes. The act also allocated funding for preventing and investigating violence against women and provided federal grants for battered women’s shelters and a National Domestic Violence Hotline. In addition, persons under restraining orders for domestic violence were prohibited from purchasing and possessing firearms.

397

Another part of the act allowed victims of crimes motivated by gender to recover compensatory and punitive damages from their attackers, thereby creating a federal cause of action for a victim seeking relief. This provision was challenged in 2000 in United States v. Morrison. The Supreme Court held the provision to be unconstitutional. In the majority opinion, the Court reasoned that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment supported Congress’s having the power to create a federal cause of action for gender-motivated crimes.

Funding VCCLEA allocated billions of dollars in funding for state law enforcement efforts. The act created grant programs to support the upgrade of criminal history records, the establishment of juvenile programs for at-risk youth, the construction of correctional facilities, drug courts, improvement of DNA testing, and bolstering of crime prevention efforts. The act also allocated significant funding to place 100,000 additional police officers on the streets to assist with community policing programs.

Assessment Advocates of VCCLEA credit the law with significant declines in violent crime rates and the development of a new policing philosophy among local law enforcement of trying to prevent crime rather than merely responding once crimes have occurred. Critics of the act argue that violent crime rates had begun to decline before the law was even passed and that lower crime levels were more the result of rapid economic growth during the same time period than the reforms of the law. Critics also argue that many of the community policing approaches may have worsened relationships between the police and the minority populations, and the tough sentencing provisions of the law have had a disproportionately negative impact on those same minority groups. Eric C. Sands See also Crime Control; Punishment; U.S. Constitution; Violence Against Women Act

398

Fingerprints

Further Readings Koper, Christopher S., et al. An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets and Gun Violence, 1994–2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2004. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/204431.pdf (Accessed December 2014). United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Wilson, James Q. Thinking About Crime. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2013.

Fingerprints A fingerprint is the impression made by the corrugated skin, or friction ridge, that appears on each finger of the palmar side of the human hand. The skin in this area produces certain patterns and subpatterns, the most common known as “arches, loops, and whorls.” Fingerprints are often left on the surface of materials such as metal and glass when touched or handled because of secretions of sweat from the eccrine glands that are present in the epidermal ridges. Since it is generally assumed that each finger has a unique pattern of friction ridge and that this pattern remains unaltered throughout a person’s life, the fingerprint is the most widely used and trusted biometric identifier. Fingerprints have been used as evidence of personal identification in the criminal justice system in the United States for more than 100 years. Today, computerized “livescan” fingerprint readers have helped generate enormous digital databases of fingerprint images, and these archives have raised concerns about personal privacy and governmental surveillance powers. This entry discusses the ways in which fingerprint storage and analysis can assist law enforcement and how fingerprints are collected and stored in a central database. Other uses of fingerprint analysis outside the criminal justice system are then described, followed by a review of potential privacy concerns regarding the increasing use of such technology.

Fingerprint Analysis in the Criminal Justice System Fingerprints may be used to verify the identity of a person when checked against a stored record. In

law enforcement, a known print is a print that has been collected intentionally by police. Such deliberately recorded fingerprints may be checked against a database of fingerprint records indexed according to print pattern type to determine whether an individual has a criminal record. Fingerprints inadvertently left at the scene of crime may be used for forensic purposes to identify someone who may have been at that location. A latent print is a partial or fragmentary fingerprint that typically requires the use of chemical methods or alternative light sources to be made visible. Beginning in the 1980s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began converting some 40 million older, ink-based fingerprint cards into digitized files. That database—with continuing contributions of digital prints from all but three U.S. states and territories—is now called the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). IAFIS is the largest biometric database in the world, containing digital fingerprints of more than 70 million people who have come into contact with the justice system. Also included are more than 31 million “civil prints” of citizens who have, for example, served in the military, been employed by the federal government, had employment background checks, and bought firearms. Each year, local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies submit more than 60 million ­ electronic “Tenprint Rapsheet Request” checks of the IAFIS database. Latent match search “hits” for unsolved crimes are more than 10,000 per year, and more than 200,000 fugitives are identified by the system. A new multimodal, biometric system called “Next Generation Identification” is expected to replace IAFIS and will include fingerprints, mug shots, iris scans, palm prints, and voice recordings. The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program has collected digital fingerprints from all non-U.S. citizens applying for visas or arriving in the United States. Prints are checked against a “look out” database of suspected terrorists, criminals, and/or illegal immigrants containing records of more than 100 million people. Once in the country, immigrants are more likely than others to encounter police engaging in “stop and scan” routines facilitated by the portable fingerprint scanning technologies increasingly used by urban police.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Despite its central role in the criminal justice system, the collection, storage, and examination of fingerprints are rife with potential problems. For example, the police charged with collecting fingerprints can do a poor job or manipulate the evidence; this has been the case in a number of high-profile instances. Furthermore, the task of matching the “points” of similarity between two prints—or fingerprint identification, known as dactyloscopy—is more art than science, especially with regard to latent print analysis, since there is a lack of standards to determine what is a match and what is not. Moreover, because of the assumed infallibility and accuracy of fingerprint identification, examiners who serve as expert witnesses in courtrooms have been able to testify with impunity. Finally, the claim of a fingerprint match is a powerful and rarely challenged piece of information that may more easily justify the issuing of search warrants, making arrests, provoking suspects into confessions, and swaying the decisions and actions of district attorneys, judges, and juries.

Other Uses of Fingerprint Technology The use of fingerprint technology as a form of surveillance has expanded beyond criminal justice. Welfare recipients have been targeted for fingerprinting surveillance, while some motor vehicle departments collect drivers’ digitized fingerprints. At most banks, if you try to cash a check where you do not have an account, you will need to offer your thumbprint to a scanner and place a copy on the check. A biometric measurement is taken from the finger of visitors to Disney World to ensure that a ticket is used by the same person from day to day. Many child care centers are turning to biometric technology to ensure that only parents or authorized caregivers can enter and leave with a child. Inexpensive fingerprint scanners to authenticate identity are now used to control access to homes, automobiles, secure areas, computers, and cell phones. The proliferation of digital fingerprint technologies and the indefinite retention of biometric data—especially of individuals with no criminal history—have implications for personal privacy invasion and abuse of civil liberties. While such systems have little citizen oversight, contractors

399

and other third parties may have access, thus raising concerns about possible identity theft or the compromising of biometric information. Moreover, given the lack of standards in latent print identification, potential “false positive” findings by examiners may mean criminal convictions of the innocent. Finally, the spread of biometric collection points and scanners means that an individual’s ability to move about anonymously, without being monitored and identified, may be compromised. William G. Staples See also Biometrics; Biosurveillance; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Law and Digital Technology

Further Readings Cole, Simon A. Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System: Fact Sheet (n.d.). http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_ biometrics/iafis/iafis_facts (Accessed December 2014).

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 USC § 1801 et seq., authorizes electronic surveillance of telephone, email, and Internet communications and physical searches of property for the purpose of gathering intelligence on foreign powers or their agents. Widely used to gather intelligence on terrorism and espionage, since the September 11, 2001, attacks, FISA has been the primary legal basis for widespread surveillance, collection, and analysis of the electronic communications of millions of Americans. This entry describes the formation of FISA, the process in which FISA applications are submitted and reviewed, how FISA relates to other U.S. surveillance programs, and opposition and legal challenges to FISA. Enacted in 1978 after the Watergate scandal, Congress debated for 2 years in formalizing legal

400

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

standards for government officials seeking warrants to conduct electronic surveillance or physical searches of foreign powers or their agents within the United States. Congress sought to ensure that there would be a wall between foreign intelligence gathering and domestic criminal law enforcement investigations to ensure that FISA would not serve as a substitute for criminal law investigations constrained by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures.” FISA mandated that government agencies seeking electronic surveillance or physical search warrants show that the “primary purpose” was foreign intelligence gathering (later reduced to a “significant purpose” by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001). Unlike standard warrants in criminal investigations, FISA does not require specificity that particular crimes have or will take place, only probable cause that the surveillance or search subject is a foreign power or agent thereof. “Foreign power” has been broadly interpreted to include foreign governments, factions, groups, entities, and organizations, while “agent of a foreign power” has been interpreted to include agents of any “foreign power,” plus any person affiliated with a foreign power including both U.S. citizens and permanent residents. FISA requires all warrant applications to undergo internal review and certification by high-level U.S. Department of Justice officials. The FISA applications are made in secret and ex parte, meaning that the intended surveillance or search subject has no knowledge of the application and no opportunity to object or appeal. Applications are made to the 11-member Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), comprising federal district judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. The FISC decisions are classified and rarely made public. Between 1979 and 2012, the FISC approved more than 33,900 government surveillance and search applications, and rejected only 11. Critics argue that the FISC process is too deferential to government, is too secretive, and lacks sufficient oversight to ensure that the FISC judges do not rubber stamp warrant applications simply because they invoke national security interests. The September 11, 2001, attacks resulted in significant expansion of government powers to

conduct terrorism investigations and prosecutions, including amendments to the FISA under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. With new terrorism threats and changing electronic communications technologies, the government sought to enhance intelligence collection and interagency cooperation. With limited debate, Congress amended the FISA to permit FISA-gathered intelligence to be used in domestic criminal investigations and relaxed the legal standard to allow surveillance and searches to be undertaken where foreign intelligence gathering was a “significant” rather than “primary” purpose. Critics argued that the FISA amendments eroded the important wall between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations, and they warned that the FISA could become a less stringent means for government surveillance and searches conducted without the Fourth Amendment protections. As it turns out, the National Security Agency (NSA) did launch a secret Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) in 2002 to monitor domestic telephone and email communications when there was reasonable grounds that one of the parties was affiliated with al Qaeda or a related organization. The TSP was initially authorized under a presidential executive order, not the FISA, as intelligence officials viewed the FISA’s requirements as too constraining (although the program was later moved to FISC oversight in 2007). The TSP remained secret until a 2005 New York Times story revealed that, in cooperation with telecommunications companies, the NSA was engaged in domestic surveillance, recording and analyzing telephone and email communications of a small number of individuals suspected of terrorism involvement. The TSP, however, was just one part of the NSA’s post-9/11 surveillance program known as PRISM, which was revealed by the 2011 Edward Snowden disclosures and subsequent Freedom of Information Act requests, and it showed that the NSA engaged in bulk surveillance, recording, collection, and analysis of the telephone, email, and Internet browsing records of millions of Americans. It is estimated that PRISM collected between 15 and 20 trillion electronic communications between 2001 and 2012. In 2008, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) amended the statute to provide retroactive immunity for

Foucault, Michel

government officials and telecommunications companies engaged in the NSA’s bulk surveillance program, and it formalized much of the legal authority for the program. Critics of the FAA and the NSA’s surveillance program, including the American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Frontier Foundation, filed more than 40 lawsuits with minimal success, as courts generally favored the government’s national security interests over individual privacy protections. One high-profile lawsuit, Amnesty International USA v. Clapper, saw civil liberties groups, journalists, and attorneys argue that NSA surveillance prevented adequate performance of their jobs, precluded important confidential conversations, and required costly measures to avoid detection. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that because the plaintiffs could not prove that they had been ­subjected to NSA surveillance, they lacked standing to sue. Despite numerous legal defeats, critics continue to argue for reform of the FAA and the NSA surveillance program and seek increased transparency, accountability, and opposition in the FISC warrant application process. To date, however, Congress reauthorized an unamended FAA in 2012, and the FISC continues to ­reauthorize the NSA’s surveillance program every 90 days. Tara Lai Quinlan See also Bill of Rights; National Security Agency; PATRIOT Act; Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Further Readings Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1978). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008. Jewel et al. v. National Security Agency, 08-cv-04373 (N.D.C.A. 2008). Risen, James and Eric Lichtblau. “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts.” New York Times (December 15, 2005). http://www.nytimes.com/ 2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all (Accessed July 2014). USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

401

Foucault, Michel Michel Foucault (1926–1984) is one of the most important philosophers of the second half of the 20th century and one of the foundational thinkers in surveillance studies. The common thread that runs throughout his work is that of power and of its productive capabilities, both in terms of conformity and social control and for the creation of modern subjectivity. This entry focuses in particular on the disciplinary society and biopower and on how each is constituted through a particular set of dispositifs.

Dispositifs The word “dispositif” refers to the set of techniques, systems of knowledge, administrative mechanisms, and procedures that support and make the exercise of power possible. The word does not have a precise English equivalent and has been variously translated, even within the same text, as device, apparatus, mechanism, or construction. Foucault’s own definition of the dispositif in The Confession of the Flesh revolves around three points. First, dispositifs are made of discursive and nondiscursive elements, such as architectural forms and spatial dispositions; second, because the elements constituting the dispositifs are under constant variation, the technologies of power that result from their interactions will change over time; third, dispositifs are a formation that responds to an urgent need at a given historical moment. Crucially, because they are what constitute a specific rationality of power, it follows that these rationalities cannot be separated from the practices and the sites that produce them, such as the prison and the factory for disciplinary power, and the city in the case of biopower.

Disciplinary Power In Surveiller et Punir (Discipline and Punish), Foucault casts the prison as the epitome of modern forms of control, and disciplines as the dispositif through which these forms can be enacted and put to use to create a new subject. From a historical point of view, the book portrays the

402

Foucault, Michel

progressive abandonment of violent and repressive forms of punishment, such as the torture described in the opening passage on the public dismemberment endured in 1757 by Robert-Francois Damiens for the attempted killing of Louis XV, and their replacement with milder forms of control aimed at the transformation of the guilty, such as the inspection and the prison. However, what Foucault intends to do with this work is not a simple reconstruction of the changes that occurred in how punishment was administered between the 18th and the 19th centuries; rather, he is more interested in exploring how these mark a change in how power is exercised on the subject and to what ends. Although historical contingencies played a part in the move away from stark and brutal punishment, with the increase in crimes against property and the fear of the ruling classes as to the effects on the masses of these public displays of power both cited by Foucault, the key claim advanced in the book is that this shift can also be linked to the concurrent establishment of capitalism and the related need for trained subjects that could be put to work in factories. It is under this light that the prison can be seen as part of a wider movement toward the development and generalization of disciplines as a new technology of power that targets individuals to transform them into profitable subjects. This is why institutions other than the prison are mentioned in the book—most notably the school, the hospital, and the military ­barrack— because the disciplinary techniques that are used in prisons to transform the inmates are deployed in these other contexts to produce the right kind of children, patients, and soldiers. Essentially, disciplines produce highly regulated and highly trained bodies that can be profitably put to use in modern institutions. Disciplines can work in different ways. On the one hand, they seek to train the body in the most minute of gestures, breaking down every movement to its most basic components, so as to increase its efficiency and make it docile; on the other, they normalize deviance and use a series of corrective instruments to induce conformity and self-control. It is through the repetitive series of exercises and training that a new, more controlled, subject is created, one that sees his or her economic utility maximized, but any possibility of resistance stripped away

from him or her. Under this light, the Panopticon is the fullest realization of a disciplinary institution; while its design made it possible for the guardian to observe inmates at all times, not knowing whether or not they were actually being watched at any given time caused the prisoners to assume that they always were and, consequently, to internalize the norms of behavior expected of them.

Biopower Biopower is a different technology of power, whose emergence Foucault traces back to the mid18th century. It is crucial to stress that the emergence of biopower cannot be framed in evolutionary terms, with a more efficient technology of power replacing older, less efficient ones. Technologies of power cannot be ranked hierarchically in terms of their greater or lower efficiency, nor is it plausible to believe that, when a new one emerges, it sweeps out everything that existed before. Such an approach also runs the risk of explaining away what does not fit in within the security paradigm as nothing more than residual to then dismiss it accordingly. Foucault himself was explicit in saying that the emergence of mechanisms of security did not imply the abandonment of disciplinary mechanisms and that, rather than the appearance of a new series of elements causing the disappearance of older ones, it is important to focus on the correlations that exist between disciplinary power and biopower. Under this light, it becomes clear that the emergence of security cannot result in the complete abandonment of disciplinary techniques, because the former exists on a different scale than discipline and uses different instruments. The key characteristic of biopower is the new target at which power now aims—no longer a single body but the mass of bodies taken together. Whereas disciplines wanted to train and transform the individual, this new rationality considers the single as part of a group and every individual in his or her belonging to the human species and focuses specifically on the natural processes of life. The aggregate dimension of this new form of rationality allowed for the birth of a new political subject, the population, and provided momentum for the systematization of statistics, as it was

Frankfurt School

through its instruments that this new collective could be made knowable and known. This was done to identify the elements that have an impact on the population and to understand how these could be manipulated according to two imperatives: (1) increased prosperity and (2) maintenance of peace and order. Order and prosperity were soon translated into a problem of circulation, specifically how to differentiate good circulation from bad for the benefit of both the people and the state as a whole. Foucault believes that this was achieved due to security apparatuses, devices that take into account the material characteristics of a given environment and proceed to try and maximize their utility while at the same time keep risks and inconveniences to a minimum, with the overall aim of ensuring free circulation both within the city and between that and its surroundings. Positioning the town at the heart of security mechanisms provided a way of dealing with the “inherent dangers of this circulation” so much so that these ended up being “canceled out” and the “fact of the town” could be successfully reconciled with legitimate sovereignty. The basic assumption at the heart of these mechanisms of security is that negative phenomena, such as crime, famine, and epidemics, cannot be eradicated from reality but can only be placed within probable series of events so that a threshold of acceptability can be set to contain them, and costs thus arising can be spread among the population. The government of things is steadily grounded in the reality, while forbidding and imposing give way to regulating and steering. While the natural processes concerning a population—birth, death, ageing—were the very first fields of application for this new technology, the gathering of data on wealth, ­ national resources, and population and their processing with statistical methods made it possible to ­produce technical knowledge on the reality of the state itself. In turn, this was functional to a rationalization in the exercise of power within the administrative apparatus of modern nation-states. Francesca Menichelli See also Governmentality; Panopticon, The; Poststructural Theory; Power

403

Further Readings Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977. Foucault, Michel. “The Confession of the Flesh.” In C. Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 1980. Foucault, Michel. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976. New York, NY: Picador, 2003. Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979. New York, NY: Picador, 2008. Foucault, Michel. Security, Population, Territory: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978. New York, NY: Picador, 2009.

Frankfurt School The Frankfurt School loosely refers to a group of German Marxist intellectuals who developed a model of deeply insightful analysis on capitalist society and culture, which proved vastly influential from the 20th century to today in many spheres, including surveillance and privacy. This entry examines some of the works of several founding theorists of the Frankfurt School, such as Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, especially regarding the culture industry, and then looks at the work of modern Frankfurt School theorist Jurgen Habermas. Beginning in the 1920s and early 1930s, theorists such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Otto Kirchheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, and, peripherally, Walter Benjamin produced some of the very first works of critical theory dealing with the importance of mass culture, the importance of mass media, and their role in political domination and culture. The Frankfurt School spearheaded the creation of theoretical models used to analyze the processes of political economy and cultural production, ideology and cultural texts, and the audience’s use of all mass-produced cultural artifacts. During the years of Nazi rule and World War II, its members left Germany for exile to the United States. After some years in exile, the Frankfurt School returned to Germany after World War II.

404

Frankfurt School

The Frankfurt School and the Culture Industry Due to the Marxist nature of their work and the Jewish roots of many of its originators, the Frankfurt School intellectuals moved from Nazi Germany to England and the United States. In the United States, members of the Frankfurt School witnessed the rise of a behemoth media industry that included radio, television, film, newspapers, magazines, and others. They found that while in Nazi Germany mass media production was controlled by the state for its own ideological purposes, in America, media production mostly took the shape of commercial entertainment manufactured and controlled by corporations. Horkheimer and Adorno wrote a seminal account of what they termed the culture industry, which illuminated the nature of the mass production and commercialization of culture under capitalist relations of production. These became main focuses of the field of cultural studies, which did not exist yet as such. This highly industrial mass culture became a particular factor of societies under capitalism. The Frankfurt School developed a critical and interdisciplinary approach in which practices of textual analysis, political economy, and the study of the effects of ideology on society became mainstays. The term culture industry, which arose out of their body of work, referred to the process of industrialization of mass culture and the ideology and economic imperatives that fueled the whole apparatus. All mass-produced cultural artifacts were fair game for analysis, within an approach in which cultural commodities produced by the culture industries exemplify any other mass-produced goods: standardization, homogenization, massproduction, and commodification. Moreover, a more specific function of the culture industries was to legitimize the market-oriented ideology of a capitalist society and to persuade the audiences in order to voluntarily accept capitalist values and lifestyle. Adorno, who after Horkheimer became head of the Frankfurt School, analyzed a wide range of cultural products, such as popular music, television, political speeches, and others. Horkheimer and Adorno also wrote a seminal study on cultural industries, and other members created a body of work on popular literature and magazines, radio,

the perspectives and critiques of mass culture, and the effects of advanced media technology. In their view, mass culture and mass communications produce mass entertainment and, as such, are powerful mediators of political reality and socialization, with pervasive economic, political, cultural, and social interests and repercussions. The endeavor of examining cultural production in capitalist societies, from the standpoints of ideology and political economy, led them to reconceptualize Marxist theory. Most of the Frankfurt School theorists were victims of the tyranny of fascist Germany, and they witnessed the ways in which the Nazi state produced mass culture to seduce society into submission, while the horrors of the Holocaust raged on. This colored their view of the world. Therefore, on examining mass culture in the United States, the Frankfurt School theorists believed that popular culture in the United States was deeply ideological and aimed at indoctrination to promote the ideology of capitalism. This was further cemented by the fact that the culture industries churned out mass-produced goods that promoted a highly commercialized culture, presented as “The American Dream” and “The American Way of Life.” In 1948, Horkheimer and Adorno wrote a deeply influential analysis of the culture industry titled Dialectic of Enlightenment. They explained that the cultural industries were controlled by advertising and commercial interests and were meant to buttress the consumer imperatives of the capitalist system. Critics have argued that this approach can be reductive and deterministic. However, its supporters explain that it provides important tools to understanding how powerful media culture and industries exert power over audiences and help shape mass conformism.

The Frankfurt School Today The Frankfurt School provides a historical account of the ways in which traditional culture transitioned to modernism and the shift to a mass-produced media and consumer society. Habermas, a former student of Adorno, is today one of the most important theorists representative of the Frankfurt School approach. In his first major work, the seminal The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), Habermas built on Adorno and Horkheimer’s take on the culture

Franklin, Benjamin

industry. In it, he gives an account of how the Enlightenment values of the 18th and 19th centuries produced a civil society and public sphere, which became the arena of rational debate and negotiation between civil society and the state. In other words, it became a space for the mediation of public and private interests in society. Common citizens could participate in public expression of their ideas, publicly oppose the state and dominant classes, and in general influence and shape public opinion. These democratic Enlightenment values were the elements that fueled the American and French Revolutions and the emergence of mass participation in creating a new society. Habermas, following Adorno and Horkheimer, argued that this shifted to an ideology in which powerful corporations dominated the public sphere and turned it from a space of rational debate and citizen participation to a site of passive consumption of information and entertainment. In this manner, public opinion becomes an opinion shaped by mass media and experts. For Habermas, then, the public sphere of rational debate and citizen participation was broken and transformed into a world of spectacle and political manipulation. Other scholars have criticized Habermas, arguing that by presenting it as a space of rational debate, Habermas idealized the Enlightenment era and its bourgeois public sphere. During the Enlightenment era, in which egalitarian documents such as the Rights of Man were produced, women and slaves were excluded from the forums of rational and political debate and decision making. Defenders of Habermas, however, point out that in the revolutionary years of the 18th and 19th centuries, a public sphere did emerge, which, for the first time, opened spaces for the common people to engage in political discussion and speak out against tyrannical rule. Finally, Habermas’s work reflects on the growing power and reach of mass media in politics, culture, and private life, and on the ways in which it has allowed corporate interests to colonize the public sphere. Today, however, experts argue that mass media culture and ideology were never as allencompassing and homogeneous as the Frankfurt School proposes. Other schools of thought have been influenced by the Frankfurt School of thought, even if not uncritically, such as the influential B ­ irmingham School. The original Frankfurt

405

School approach to the culture industry, however, shaped the theoretical model that examines the importance of media culture under capitalist imperatives, and it is still used today to study the ways in which commercial interests, political ideology, and technology serve to further the goals of dominant corporate interests. Trudy Mercadal See also Adorno, Theodor W.; Benjamin, Walter; Fascism; Gramsci, Antonio; Social Control

Further Readings Abromeit, John. Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Bronner, Stephen Eric. Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2011. Feenberg, Andrew. The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukacs, and the Frankfurt School. London, England: Verso Books, 2014. Kellner, Douglas. Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity. Baltimore, MD: Polity Press, 1989. Kellner, Douglas. Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity, and Politics Between the Modern and the Postmodern. London, England: Routledge, 1995. Miller, Tyrus. Modernism and the Frankfurt School. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. Scheuerman, William E. Frankfurt School Perspectives on Globalization, Democracy and the Law. London, England: Routledge, 2012. Tarr, Zoltan and Michael Landmann. The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2011. Wiggershause, Rolf. The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.

Franklin, Benjamin Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790) was one of the 18th century’s most remarkable polymaths. As printer, satirist, polemicist, scientist, inventor, and statesman (among other things), he was an international celebrity, a noted man of letters, and a key

406

Franklin, Benjamin

political figure before, during, and after the ­American war of independence. His list of accomplishments is dizzyingly varied—he cofounded the first organized volunteer fire company and founded the first subscription library; invented bifocals, the lightning rod, an improved home stove, the glass armonica (a musical instrument), and a bladder catheter for kidney stones; made significant theoretical contributions to the scientific understanding of electricity; proposed daylight saving time; won French aid for America in the Revolutionary War; and helped orchestrate the Treaty of Paris, which ended that war. Alongside this, he developed a considered, but simple, theory of personal virtue, popularized in Poor Richard’s Almanack and his Autobiography, and he wrote profusely on matters regarding liberty and governance, including one oft-repeated quote regarding trade-offs between liberty and security. This entry reviews Franklin’s contributions to numerous industries and sectors of the American society, with a focus primarily on his activities, beliefs, and writings with regard to politics, society, surveillance, and privacy. Franklin apprenticed at his brother’s printing press as a young man in Boston, but he left for Philadelphia in 1723, where, by 1730, he established himself as the Pennsylvania Colony’s official printer. He published extensively under his own name and pseudonymously, penning satires, moral instruction, and political tracts, including forceful articulations of the need for freedom of speech and of the press. By 1748, he had been successful enough as a printer that he retired from the business and, having already been thoroughly involved in local politics, joined the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1751. Initially a royalist, he sought to strengthen colonial unity through the Albany Plan of 1754, and he helped provide troops and equipment to British front lines in the French and Indian War. From 1757 to 1775, he spent most of his time in London as an emissary, first for Pennsylvania and then concomitantly for several other states. On the outbreak of war, he returned to Philadelphia, taking part in the Second Continental Congress and helping draft the Declaration of Independence. He sailed to France and secured France’s aid in the fight against Britain, and he was instrumental in brokering favorable terms for the United States in the Treaty of Paris in 1783. In 1787, he forged agreement on the Great

Compromise, which established a bicameral legislature in Congress. He became increasingly antislavery over the course of his life, setting his own slaves free in the 1770s and arguing for slavery’s abolition in his final years as the president of a Philadelphia-based abolitionist society. Franklin wrote no overarching work of political philosophy, though the corpus of his letters, satires, constitutional proposals, almanacs, and autobiography give shape to a broadly consistent set of principles. As a figure both influenced by and part of the Enlightenment, Franklin held reason and evidence superior to tradition and authority. He eschewed dogmatism, particularly in religious matters (where he came to profess deism after considerable internal deliberation) and also in politics and statecraft, where pragmatic solutions to the problems of democratic governance took precedence over large-scale political theorizations. His approach to moral and political problems can be characterized as utilitarian in outlook, although he predates the formal utilitarian theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Franklin sought to justify moral actions based on what human experience demonstrates is most compatible with what he called “The Felicity of Life.” He advocated the personal adoption of a set of qualities based on truth, sincerity, and integrity and saw industry and thrift as necessary public virtues for the success of a democratic society. Public service was fundamental to Franklin’s conception of democratic life, and he sought to inculcate habits of volunteerism and provision for the common good both in his writings and in practical politics. Among the civil associations he founded in Philadelphia were a volunteer firefighting company, a fire insurance association, the first hospital in the United States, the American Philosophical Society, and the Junto, a quasi-secret discussion group on matters moral, political, and economic, with an eye toward fostering personal and civic improvement. In 1731, Franklin, through the Junto, chartered the Library Company of Philadelphia, the nation’s first subscription-based library, which became a model for similar libraries throughout the American colonies. Franklin had a deep commitment to the civic ideal of libraries as engines of self-improvement for the common people, making him one of the United States’ first major defenders of free access to information. He

Franklin, Benjamin

saw libraries as crucial to the development of well-informed minds and essential to enabling considered discussion on social, political, and religious topics, and he was correspondingly suspicious of rhetoric and oratory, which could be used to dupe and control the public. Franklin wrote very little that directly impinged on surveillance or privacy, though Poor Richard once mused, “Love your Neighbor, yet don’t pull down your Hedge.” He was not categorically opposed to surveillance, as evidenced by the night watch for fire and crime he had instituted in Philadelphia, after years of political wrangling, in 1756. His most important practical contributions to privacy stemmed from the various postal capacities in which he served. He was appointed Postmaster of Philadelphia in 1737, became Deputy Postmaster General of the colonies in 1753, and was the inaugural U.S. Postmaster General, serving briefly from 1775 to 1776. In these roles, he worked to improve the security of mails in several ways: Postal carriers were obliged to swear an oath, post offices disallowed open sorting of mail by expectant recipients, employees were instructed to mind seals on individual letters, and mailbags were to remain sealed shut until they reached the town of their destination. However, Franklin himself was occasionally known to open and read mail likely to contain political or trade secrets; indeed, while in London in 1769, he somehow obtained private correspondence between New England politicians and British Treasury officials and publicized them, nearly garnering himself a charge of treason. In the surveillance literature, he is best known for an aphorism about trading liberty for security, one whose original context has been largely forgotten. An early statement of the sentiment can be found in the 1738 Almanack, which counsels, “Sell not virtue to purchase wealth, nor Liberty to purchase power.” The full phrase was first published in the Pennsylvania Assembly’s Reply to the Governor of November 11, 1755, and it reads, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” At the time, Franklin was head of the Assembly, which was in a protracted power struggle with the Pennsylvania proprietor Thomas Penn in the midst of the French and Indian War. Pennsylvania’s western edges were frontier territory, subject to skirmishes, and

407

Franklin had been successful in creating a volunteer militia, even in the face of opposition from pacifist religious groups such as the Quakers and the Mennonites. Penn, who regarded Franklin as dangerous, used the war as grounds to have his governor press for the Assembly to cede its longstanding powers of taxation and expenditure. One instance of this was a bill passed by the Assembly that sought to tax estates to fund defense of the frontier; it was rejected by deputy governor Robert H. Morris, since Penn would have nothing of taxation for the landed aristocracy. This prompted Franklin, in his public response, to note that “the poor distressed Inhabitants of the Frontiers . . . themselves do not wish us to go farther” in relinquishing powers to the executive, even for their own protection; they were the ones (in Franklin’s words) refusing to trade essential liberty for security. The statement was reprinted on the title page of Franklin’s 1759 Historical Review of the Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania, and it was delivered to Britain’s Prime Minister, Lord North, as a parting shot before Franklin’s departure from London in 1775. Patriots used it as a rallying cry in the years leading up to the Revolution, and it was widely anthologized in quotation collections in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 21st century, it became an academic and political catchphrase in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Yet the statement was not a call to arms against what might now be called surveillance or erosion of civil liberties; it was more a general statement about safeguarding the strength of representative government against tyrannical impulses (and thus, very much in line with the political thought that engendered the Revolution in the coming decades). Nevertheless, as a slogan, it has proven supremely adaptable, and its enduring appeal illustrates Franklin’s central place in American cultural memory. Chris Hubbles See also Free Speech; United States

Further Readings Flaherty, David H. Privacy in Colonial New England. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972.

408

Free Speech

Forde, Steven. “Benjamin Franklin: A Model American and an American Model.” In Bryan-Paul Frost and Jeffrey Sikenga (eds.), History of American Political Thought. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. Labaree, Leonard W., ed. The Papers of Benjamin Franklin. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959. Waldstreicher, David, ed. A Companion to Benjamin Franklin. Chichester, England: Blackwell, 2011.

Free Speech While the term free speech is generally easily defined based on the deconstruction of the two words that make up the term, free speech is actually a multilayered “right” that warrants considerable discussion. This entry focuses on the classification of free speech as a right, the philosophical defense of it, and a justification for limiting it. It is relevant to this encyclopedia because one’s right to privacy and a government’s interest in security in some cases justify limiting the exercise of free speech.

Right of Free Speech The justification for the right of free speech consists of two values that it is deemed to promote. One is the cognitive value of truth: Free speech is indispensable in the quest for truth. A second is the political value of liberty: Free speech is a necessary condition for a democratic polity. Free speech is the sine qua non of a civilized society. Yet free speech as an indefeasible right is a comparatively recent development in the West, inspired in large part by the European Enlightenment of the 18th century. It is a fragile growth requiring vigilance for its preservation. Authoritarian, fascist, and totalitarian regimes notoriously attempt to snuff out this freedom—think, for example, of the book-burning frenzy in Nazi Germany or the infamous Index of Forbidden Books compiled by the Roman Catholic Church and only recently scuttled. The loci classici for the defense of free speech are John Milton’s Areopagitica (1644) and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859). What kind of right is the right of free speech? Wesley Hohfeld identifies four kinds of rights: (1)  claim-rights, (2) liberties, (3) powers, and (4) immunities. A claim-right is one that imposes

a duty on another. Thus, employees have a claimright to the wages they earned, and their employer is duty bound to pay them. A liberty is one’s right to do something if no one else has a claim-right against it, and it imposes no duties on others. One thus has the liberty to own a dog, a right against which another has no countervailing claim-right, and that imposes no duties on others. A power is the right of one invested with proper authority to change the status of another’s rights. Thus, a judge, by sentencing a defendant found guilty of a crime, can significantly reduce the person’s civil rights. Immunity is a right that exempts one from having the status of one’s rights altered by certain powers. For instance, diplomatic immunity exempts a diplomat from the prosecutorial power of the foreign jurisdiction in which the diplomat serves. Hohfeld’s taxonomy of rights is crucial for classifying the right of free speech and for justifying restrictions on it. Free speech is in the first place a “right of liberty,” or more specifically what Isaiah Berlin identifies as a “negative” liberty, which is the absence of political interference whether in the form of censorship or control by a government.

Philosophical Defense of Free Speech Mill gives the classic philosophical defense of free speech, which is the argument from truth. He justifies free speech as the indispensable means to ascertaining truth; only when ideas are freely aired and discussed can truth emerge. Mill’s argument presumes that the truth, once publicized, will eventually prevail in the marketplace of ideas, a presumption of the American jurists Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Harry S. Frankfurter. It assumes that truth has the highest value, which Mill identifies as its utility. Mill provides the following grounds for free speech: (1) ideas suppressed for any reason may in the long term prove true, so to suppress them is to inhibit the march toward truth; (2) ideas, though ostensibly erroneous, may contain a grain of truth, so their suppression means that the whole truth may remain concealed; and (3) the surest safeguard for the truth of ideas is allowing every opportunity for their refutation. The best warrant for their truth is their success in running the gauntlet of tests to refute them. The truth of an idea is only as certain as the last failed attempt to

Free Speech

falsify it. The exercise of free speech, then, acts as a corrective to human fallibility. Implicit in Mill’s argument from truth is a method of disciplined inquiry underlying the explicit methods outlined in his System of Logic that form the core of the scientific method. This is less a formal method than an attitude: Inquirers ought to be always open to the possibility that they could be wrong, thereby recognizing their own fallibility and vulnerability to error. Consequently, they must actively invite criticism of their findings by publicizing them. Mill’s argument from truth, though, is objectionable in four ways. First, it is questionable whether freedom of speech is the only and the best means to truth. Showing a link between freedom and truth is critical to the success of Mill’s argument. This problem is avoided by defining truth as whatever beliefs survive the rigorous and systematic regimen of free and open inquiry— truth is nothing other than that consensus reached by expert inquirers following an established methodology. This might be called the consensus or survival theory of truth with its roots in pragmatism. Here, both the means to and the truth obtained are conflated in a single process so there is no necessity to establish a link between them. ­However, this consensus theory of truth is not unobjectionable. Defining truth as the consensus of experts ignores the possibility that there may exist an objective standard of truth to which that consensus ought to conform in order to qualify as true. Second, the freedom to contradict a belief, which Mill thought as indispensable in the quest for truth, is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its truth. The freedom to deny a belief may even be suppressed but without affecting its truth. Thus, in Germany, the public denial of the Holocaust is forbidden by law, but penalizing the denial of its historical truth neither derogates from it nor does its truth depend on the opportunity to deny it. Moreover, the merit of allowing or even encouraging beliefs contrary to well-established ones is diminished when one considers that the relative (short of absolute) certainty of a widely held belief is in inverse proportion to the rationale for entertaining a contrary one. The less probable the truth of a belief, the more reason to oppose it so as to expose its possible erroneousness; however, the more probable its truth, the less reason to

409

oppose it so as to validate it since the less likely it is that the cause of truth would be advanced by that opposition. Third, truth, in competition with error, will not necessarily prevail as Mill hoped. There have been long periods in which falsehood has prevailed over truth. It took the Copernican system of astronomy up to a century and a half to be universally accepted, and the theory of evolution is still being rejected by some. And although one may have faith that in the long term truth will win in the end, when exactly is doubtful. This objection, though, does not apply to the community of scientists where a rigorous regimen of testing and retesting theories is in place. Once a theory is decisively falsified, that is it. The case is decided. Fourth, the argument from truth maintains that a veracious and enlightened policy may be acted on while allowing the expression of a contradictory one. However, acting on it may be stymied by the publicized opinions and actions of those holding the contrary viewpoint. For example, action on the policy that apartheid is morally wrong might be inhibited by allowing defenders of apartheid to speak out in its defense. Allowing this might cause resentment on the part of those in groups previously victimized by apartheid, which might lead them to take to the streets in violent protest and invite a reactionary backlash. This would not serve the cause of progress with respect to racial equality, the very thing free speech is supposed to do. These four objections notwithstanding, in the realm of scientific discourse and inquiry, Mill’s argument from truth for free speech is especially compelling—indeed, indispensable. The argument from truth, particularly in the scientific realm, is characterized by Thomas Scanlon as a “natural” argument insofar as it derives from “natural moral principles” such as the “desirability of truth.” What is moral is not so much the desirability of truth, in both senses of being the object of desire and of having value, but the willingness to act on it.

Scientific Restrictions of Free Speech There are grounds for restricting free speech even within the community of scientists; there are certain necessary restrictions on a scientist’s freedom imposed by the discipline of scientific inquiry itself. Scientists have the “right of liberty” to

410

Free Speech

pursue their investigations wherever the spirit leads them without interference from the general public or the government so long as it does not violate the “claim-rights” of others. And their peers have the “right of power” to suspend their investigations if they do not conform to institutional norms. Moreover, they themselves have the “right of liberty” to disclaim anything scientists say publicly “off the record” that violates the standards or impedes the goals of the institution and may either censure or dismiss them accordingly. Scientists are not free to ignore or violate the methodological principles of their fields—to do so is to abandon their fields altogether. Investigators flouting such restrictions are automatically disqualified from speaking within and on behalf of their professions—though they have every right to do so outside it. Thus, a biologist who denies evolution or an astronomer who takes astrology seriously should not be permitted to state his or her eccentric views when speaking professionally or to allow their beliefs to interfere with their research. Indeed, it is precisely these restrictions that, paradoxically, make possible the very freedom to engage in the scientific enterprise and pursue its goals. Without them there is no true freedom, only anarchy. The institution of science would be like a rudderless ship unable to reach its destination and vulnerable to shipwreck.

Professional Restrictions of Free Speech It is not only science that necessarily restricts speech, in the name of truth, but other professions also do so, in the name of professionalism. Professionals are those who have been rigorously trained in certain skills and have acquired a specialized body of knowledge enabling them to perform special services for their clients. Examples of professionals are physicians and psychiatrists whose clients are their patients. The distinction between professional and client must be preserved. To allow someone without the professional credentials and expertise in a given field a voice and hand in the conduct of professional matters is to compromise the relationship between professionals and their clients and to even endanger the latter’s well-being. A profession barring a nonexpert from speaking or working within it is not gratuitous censorship but an exercise of its “right of

power,” and the person barred cannot legitimately appeal to the right of free speech. For instance, if a Christian scientist or a witch doctor is prevented by the conveners from reading a paper at a medical conference, he or she may complain of censorship, but it really is only a matter of his or her failure to comply with the methodological regimen sanctioned by medical science. Such people have no legal or moral grounds for complaint when the cause of truth is unharmed. If all voices were to be heard indiscriminately, then they would create a bedlam in which nothing constructive could be done. Publishers rejecting an author’s manuscript are not censoring it if it fails to meet the established standards for publication. The author does not have the right to be heard in print through the organ of that particular publishing house, though the author has every right to read the manuscript aloud to anybody willing to listen. However, there are values other than truth, such as justice; and the right to free speech may conflict with other claim-rights. Thus, it might compromise the right of a defendant to a fair trial were the press to publish facts damaging the case for the defense. It may conflict with the right to privacy were the press to release information about a political candidate’s medical records to undermine the campaign. In such cases, these claim-rights should take precedence over the “right of liberty” of the press to publish since the well-being of a person is at stake. Furthermore, suppressing the freedom of the press in these cases would in no way compromise the greater cause of truth, which is the rationale for free speech in the first place—scientific progress would not be impeded, since the truths the press would have published in these cases are trivial ones not in the public interest.

Public Interest Restrictions of Free Speech Arguably, the exercise of free speech might be restrained if it is deemed a threat to the public interest. However, appealing to the public interest to justify restraints on free speech is problematic for two reasons. One is the difficulty of determining what exactly the public is whose interest is threatened. The public is not monolithic but rather diverse, consisting of many “publics” with

Free Speech

different interests. What may be prejudicial to the interests of one of them might not be so to those of another and may even be advantageous to it. A second problem is determining precisely what is in the public’s interest, and what may not be in its interest in the short term may be so in the long term or vice versa. On the assumption that there is a public whose interest might be threatened by a particular exercise of free speech, a conflict might conceivably occur between that interest and the right to free speech. Two examples of this come to mind. One is research into the comparative intelligence of different ethnic groups. Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray conducted such research, and their conclusions were published in The Bell Curve (1994). They used statistics to explain variations in intelligence in American society and suggested that these were genetically determined. Publicizing such results—let alone conducting the research leading to them—might be considered prejudicial to the interests of a group stigmatized by being ranked lower on the scale of intelligence. But to justify curtailing their freedom of speech by forbidding the publication of Herrnstein’s and Murray’s findings, or stopping their research dead in its tracks, a specifiable claim-right of the stigmatized group would have to be identified as violated or empirical evidence adduced to show that its material interests (the only ones legally and morally relevant) have been harmed. Given that neither a claim-right has been violated nor any interests harmed in this case, the publication of these findings should by all means be allowed (however offensive), and it might even prove beneficial in two ways. It might goad other researchers into refuting Herrnstein’s and Murray’s claims, which would have the benefit of increasing our knowledge of human intelligence. Furthermore, the truth of their claims, if they withstood the test of time, might imply certain necessary reforms of educational and vocational policies. A second example of where speech might allegedly conflict with the public interest is historical research on the Holocaust that raised doubts about its actual occurrence. But again, justifying curtailment of a historian’s free speech by forbidding the publication of his findings or blocking the research leading to them would require the discovery of the violation of an identifiable

411

claim-right of the supposedly injured group or the presentation of evidence that its material interests had been harmed. As Mill insists, its offensiveness is not a sufficient condition for banning speech. Moreover, doubting or denying the Holocaust, however distasteful and contrary to historical facts as currently known, should be allowed because it may force historians to look again at the case for the historicity of the Holocaust and make it even more ironclad than before, a possibility that Mill acknowledges in such cases. The burden of proof, though, rests with the representatives of the public interest to show that the exercise of free speech in a particular case would either violate a group’s claim-rights or threaten its interests. But if the speech in question does neither, then there are no grounds for disallowing it. According to Frederick Schauer, in balancing the right to free speech against the so-called public interest where neither identifiable claimrights nor interests are jeopardized on the public side, the scales should be weighted on the side of free speech. The right to free speech is first among equals, particularly in the scientific community. Only in instances when it conflicts with other indefeasible rights or jeopardizes the public’s real interest should it give way to them. Schauer notes that when cases are in conflict, it must be determined which one has priority. There are issues as to whether priority should be determined by a hard-and-fast rule or on a case-by-case basis, and what juridical authority (e.g., a constitution, legislature, or court) has the authority to decide priority. But when all is said and done, there is no simple or fail-safe formula for fairly adjudicating conflicts between rights or p ­recisely weighing competing interests. In such cases, we can rely only on our discretionary ­judgment. According to 19th-century idealist philosopher Thomas H. Green, the true index of a society’s freedom is the extent to which its citizens have the ability and opportunity to realize the best in themselves and in others. This is the very freedom that speech should promote, and justifies its own status as an indefeasible right. Richard A. S. Hall See also Bill of Rights; Civil Disobedience; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Freedom of Expression; Privacy, Right to; Truth; Whistle-Blowers

412

Freedom of Expression

Further Readings Belaief, Gail. “Freedom and Liberty.” Journal of Value Inquiry, v.13 (1979). Feinberg, Joel. “The Nature and Value of Rights.” Journal of Value Inquiry, v.4 (1970). Feinberg, Joel. Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980. Hohfeld, Wesley N. Fundamental Legal Conceptions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1919. MacCallum, Gerald. “Negative and Positive Freedom.” Philosophical Review, v.76 (1967). Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2008. Scanlon, Thomas M. “Rights, Goals and Fairness.” Erkenntnis, v.11/1 (1977). Schauer, Frederick. Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Schauer, Frederick. “Can Rights Be Abused?” Philosophical Quarterly, v.31 (1984).

Freedom

of

Expression

In June 2013, Edward Snowden leaked a large amount of classified information to The Washington Post and The Guardian (a popular British daily newspaper). Snowden worked as a system administrator for the Central Intelligence Agency and as a counterintelligence trainer at the Defense Intelligence Agency before being employed by Booz Allen Hamilton, a subcontractor to the National Security Agency (NSA). Some experts have estimated that Snowden has in his possession more than 1 million documents involving foreign nationals and U.S. citizens’ intelligence reports, many of which have not yet been exposed. Snowden explained his actions for disclosing highly sensitive information as an expression of his First Amendment rights: I don’t want to live in a society that does these sort of things [surveillance on its citizens]. . . . I do not want to live in a world where everything I do and say is recorded. . . . My sole motive is to inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them. (Snowden, quoted in Hill, 2013)

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

The First Amendment is clear: individuals have certain protected rights. However, laws forbidding freedom of speech and freedom of expression are commonplace in the history of the United States. Indeed, no one contends that citizens are free to say anything anywhere at any time. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. observed, citizens are not free to falsely yell “Fire” in a theater. The task is to formulate principles that separate the protected from the unprotected. Cases in controversy have gone to the U.S. Supreme Court to be ruled on a case-by-case basis in support of privacy, speech, conduct, and self-expression. Thus, as discussed in this entry, the U.S. court system is at the intersection of individuals’ rights to free speech and surveillance.

Court Interpretations According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), individuals have a “right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth.” They also have a “right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.” As part of this protection, “the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion” (Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83, 1965). Laws that cause “inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought” bring the safeguards of those amendments vividly into operation. Although Griswald draws its strength from the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments’ language, parallels can be drawn from these judicial opinions to current issues regarding surveillance and intelligence gathering. For example, while discussions about data privacy tend to focus more on the Fourth Amendment right of privacy, First Amendment rights are equally

Freedom of Expression

implicated in electronic surveillance. The ability to keep one’s associations private is critical to preserving the right to freely associate. Although the Court struggles with speech, conduct, and expression as it relates to the First Amendment rights, the question becomes whether the words or expressions used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evils manifestly intended, as shown by the individual’s conduct.

Surveillance and Freedom of Expression Government surveillance, intelligence gathering, and secret warrants are not new in the United States. Following are some key milestones in the history of surveillance in the country: 1919—The U.S. Department of State approves the creation of the Cipher Bureau, also known as the “Black Chamber.” It was the first peacetime federal intelligence agency of the United States. 1945—The United States creates Project SHAMROCK, a large-scale spying operation designed to gather all telegraphic data going in and out of the United States. 1952—President Harry Truman issues a directive to create the NSA. 1976—Inspired by the Watergate scandal, Senator Frank Church leads a select committee to investigate federal intelligence operations. Its report detailed widespread spying at home and abroad and concluded that “intelligence agencies have undermined the constitutional rights of citizens” (U.S. Senate, Church Committee, 1976). 1978—Senator Church’s report also results in Congress passing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 2001—After the September 11 attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush signs off on a secret NSA domestic spying program. Congress passes the USA PATRIOT Act, a law designed to bolster U.S. counterterrorism efforts by expanding domestic surveillance capabilities. 2003—Congress votes to shut down the Pentagon Information Awareness Office, host of the proposed

413

Total Information Awareness Program, after public outcry that the computer surveillance program could lead to mass surveillance. 2013—President Barack Obama defends the government’s surveillance programs following media reports that federal authorities had gained access to personal emails and files through the servers of major technology companies and that the NSA had been reviewing phone records provided by major telecommunications corporations.

Recently, the use of domestic drone surveillance has brought the issue of First and Fourth Amendment rights to the forefront once again. Numerous states are now considering and some have passed legislation regulating the use of drones. Congress has ordered the Federal Aviation Administration to change airspace rules to make it easier for police nationwide to use domestic drones, but the law does not include privacy protections. The American Civil Liberties Union is actively pursuing constitutional safeguards that would focus on usage limits, data retention, a policy that is clear and open to the public, and the use of weapons mounted on surveillance drones. Although the United States has participated in international and domestic spying since the early days of the republic, this chronological timeline highlights some significant events in that history, though it is by no means comprehensive. This timeline also demonstrates that the 2013 NSA scandal is not unheard of and that significant public outcry is rare.

Future Directions It is likely that the Legislative and Executive branches of the U.S. government will continue to pass laws that at the time seem to be in the best interest of the country such as the Espionage Act of 1917 and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Conversely, these laws will at times challenge an individual’s right to privacy, speech, and freedom of expression and ultimately land on the doorsteps of the Judiciary. William T. Jones See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Cell Phone Tracking;

414

Freedom of Information Act

Corporate Surveillance; National Security Agency; National Security Agency Leaks; PATRIOT Act; Privacy, Right to; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; WikiLeaks; Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Further Readings A&E Networks Television. “Edward Snowden Biography.” Biography.com (n.d.). http://www .biography.com/people/edward-snowden21262897#aftermath (Accessed January 2015). E-Commerce & Privacy Group. “Summary and Analysis of Key Sections of USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001” (October 31, 2001). https://cdt.org/files/security/ 011031summary.shtml (Accessed December 2014). Hill, Kashmir. “Why NSA IT Guy Edward Snowden Leaked Top Secret Documents.” Forbes (June 10, 2013). https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/ 2013/06/10/why-nsa-it-guy-edward-snowden-leakedtop-secret-documents/#1b7dd2215673 (Accessed June 2017). The National Archives. “Newly Released GCHQ Files: UKUSA Agreement” (June 2010). https://www .nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukusa/ (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Department of Justice. “What Is the USA PATRIOT Web” (n.d.). http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/ highlights.htm (Accessed December 2014). U.S. Senate, Church Committee. “Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities” (1976). https:// www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/ investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (Accessed July 2017).

Freedom

of Information

Act

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a U.S. federal statute (codified in the U.S. Code at 5 USC §552). The FOIA provides U.S. citizens with access to federal agency records. The law provides this access in two ways. It requires federal agencies to make proactive disclosures of agency records, including, but not limited to, final agency opinions, policy statements, and certain staff manuals that affect the public. The FOIA also allows the public to request agency records that the agency does not voluntarily provide to the public through proactive disclosure. Agencies

fulfill the proactive disclosure requirement by creating publicly accessible reading rooms available online through agency website portals. Agencies also provide on-site reading rooms in their offices, where the public may visit and view federal agency records. After briefly reviewing the history of the FOIA and subsequent versions, this entry discusses the role of the FOIA in disclosing government surveillance programs and actions. ­ The entry concludes with a look at the FOIA’s limitations.

History The FOIA was created in response to government secrecy during the Cold War. The prior law governing agency transparency, a clause within the Administrative Procedure Act, was widely viewed as insufficient, to the point where it was called an “excuse for secrecy,” and even a “withholding statute,” instead of the disclosure requirement it was intended to be. When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the FOIA into law on July 4, 1966, he proclaimed that “a democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of the nation will permit.” As a law created with the purpose of improving American democracy, FOIA’s transparency privileges apply only to U.S. citizens. In 2002, after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the federal legislature amended the FOIA to explicitly prohibit intelligence agencies from responding to FOIA requests made by foreign governments and international governmental entities. The 1966 version of the FOIA was a somewhat powerless transparency decree. However, in 1974, after the Watergate scandal turned America’s attention toward the negative aspects of government secrecy, the FOIA was amended to close loopholes and make the law more effective in guaranteeing government transparency. The 1974 FOIA amendments included time frame requirements for the release of government information, fee waivers, and limits for certain types of FOIA requesters, and sanctions for agencies that improperly withhold information. Since the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, various administrations have either increased or decreased FOIA transparency via executive orders. In 1996, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments (popularly called the E-FOIA Act) brought the FOIA into the

Freedom of Information Act

digital records era. The revised statute officially added agencies’ computer databases and other electronic records to the FOIA’s purview and required agencies to provide records electronically if so requested. The electronic FOIA amendments also called for the creation of online access to agency records, which led to the widespread adoption of electronic reading rooms available through federal agency websites.

Government Surveillance Programs and Activities The FOIA is one of the only government transparency laws that provide the public access to government documents and information. For this reason, the FOIA is a major legal avenue to access surveillance records and information about American surveillance programs. FOIA is also widely used by journalists to access and publicize government information that would otherwise remain undisclosed to the public. Many privacy advocacy groups, civil rights organizations, and journalists rely on FOIA to track and expose the surveillance of U.S. citizens by their federal government. For example, journalists have exposed the Department of Homeland Security’s monitoring of citizens’ social media posts, revealed internal postal service guidelines allowing postal service agents to open and read the mail of private citizens, and provided records about the federal government’s surveillance of people planning antiwar gatherings. These examples of surveillance were revealed through FOIA requests. The records of actual surveillance activities, internal agency directives and memoranda, and specific surveillance plans and procedures would have, in lieu of the federal transparency law, remained hidden in federal agency annals. Through FOIA requests, journalists were able to discover the details and report them to the public. Privacy advocates also use the FOIA to reveal and advocate against unduly intrusive government surveillance. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a major Internet privacy organization, used the FOIA to obtain memos on the National Security Agency’s (NSA) secret Stellar Wind program, a post-9/11 program that allowed the government agency to engage in domestic wiretapping, email interception, and data collection without a warrant. In another FOIA-focused

415

advocacy campaign, the National Lawyers Guild, an attorney organization dedicated to civil rights, launched an FOIA project in 2014 to recover FBI records of the agency’s surveillance of attorneys who represented activist clients in the 1970s.

Limitations Although the FOIA is a major point of access to government records, there are some limitations to its utility as a gateway to surveillance information. First, the FOIA’s statutory exemptions protect swaths of agency records dealing with surveillance issues. Subsection (b) of the FOIA lists nine exemptions, including one for information deemed important to the preservation of national security. Other exemptions protect information deemed “confidential business information” by the agency, documents related solely to personnel and internal practices of the agencies, and information about private individuals. Determinations about which documents qualify for these exemptions are made by the agencies themselves, although FOIA requestors may appeal FOIA determinations if they feel that the federal agency is wrongfully withholding documents. Second, although the standard time limit prescribed by the FOIA for responding to requests is 20 working days, there is no guarantee that an agency’s FOIA officer will grant requests within that time period. Agencies contend with a large backlog of FOIA requests, and it often takes long periods of time to get a response. The FOIA does not guarantee a time limit on FOIA request completion, and some FOIA requests languish, unfulfilled, for years. Much of the FOIA litigation that occurs relates to FOIA requests that have not been fulfilled over long periods of time. For example, in 2012, Bloomberg News, an American news corporation, tested federal agencies’ FOIA offices, and they found that 19 out of 20 agencies did not respond in a timely manner to the journalists’ FOIA requests. Finally, those using the FOIA to obtain information about government surveillance must keep in mind that the window of transparency provided by the FOIA is limited to agency records. The agencies subject to the law do not include agencies that are not chartered or controlled by the federal government, including state and local governments, foreign governments, or municipal

416

Freedom of Information Act

entities. The agency records limitation also puts congressional and judicial records outside of FOIA’s reach, and it excludes corporate and nongovernmental entities from FOIA transparency. In addition, the term agency records is limited to records created or obtained by a federal agency, and under an agency’s control at the time of the FOIA request. The definitional limitations of agency records leave many types of government information out of FOIA requestors’ reaches. The FOIA’s limitations, and federal agencies’ failures to properly comply with timeliness and transparency requirements of the law, have led to many FOIA lawsuits filed by citizens trying to obtain surveillance records and information. Many lawsuits have been filed when agencies have failed to comply with FOIA requests for surveillance information and information about federally led surveillance programs. In 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a complaint against the FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ) after the agencies failed to comply with an FOIA request for records related to the FBI’s use and interpretation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows the government to apply for court orders that require the production of “any tangible things.” Similarly, in 2012, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Internet privacy advocacy group, sued the DOJ after their FOIA request for records about NSA email and telephone call surveillance after the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court found the NSA’s surveillance activities unconstitutional. Even the EPIC FOIA request for Stellar Wind program records took 8 years to complete, and it required another DOJ lawsuit in which the ACLU and the National Security Archive joined EPIC in a collective drive to obtain the records from the government. Despite its limitations, journalists, advocacy organizations, and private citizens utilize the FOIA to learn more about American surveillance projects, plans, and methods. The federal law requires federal agencies to provide records about agency activities, including those related to surveillance. Sarah Lamdan

See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Bill of Rights; Civil Liberties; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; Law; PATRIOT Act; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Right to; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Justice, 11-cv-07562 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Department of Justice, 12-cv-01441 (D.D.C. 2014). Green, Chris. “Curious About Surveillance? FOIA Has Answers” (June 27, 2013). http://sunshineingov .wordpress.com/2013/06/27/curious-aboutsurveillance-foia-has-answers/ (Accessed October 2014). Moro, Tasha. “NLG Releases Report on Government Spying on Legal Profession, Launches FBI FOIA Project” (April 24, 2014). https://www.nlg.org/news/ releases/nlg-releases-report-government-spying-legalprofession-launches-fbi-foia-project (Accessed October 2014). National Security Archive. “FOIA Legislative History” (n.d.). http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/ foialeghistory/legistfoia.htm (Accessed October 2014). Presidential Statement on Signing the Freedom of Information Act of 1966. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v.2 (July 11, 1966). Risen, James and Eric Lichtblau. “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts.” New York Times (December 16, 2005). http://www.nytimes.com/ 2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?_r=0 (Accessed October, 2014). Rumold, Mark. “How EFF’s FOIA Litigation Helped Expose the NSA’s Domestic Spying Program” (March 21, 2014). https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 2014/03/sunshine-week-recap-how-effs-foia-litigationhelped-expose-nsas-domestic-spying (Accessed October 2014). Senate Report No. 89-813, at 38 (1965). Snyder, Jim and Danielle Ivory. “Obama Cabinet Flunks Disclosure Test With 19 in 20 Ignoring Law.” Bloomberg News (September 27, 2012). http://www .bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-28/obama-cabinetflunks-disclosure-test-with-19-in-20-ignoring-law.html (Accessed October 2014).

G goal of bringing criminals back into line with the generally accepted norms of society, was a primary goal of punishment during that period of time. There was an assumption that this reeducation of criminals was possible and that after the criminals were rehabilitated, they could be released back into general society. This rehabilitative focus was in part based on, and in part reinforced by, the ability of the general public to identify with potential criminals. It was also in part based on, and in part reinforced by, generally accepted notions that nations’ citizens should not be unduly burdened by state demands for social control. In other words, part of the rehabilitative focus of punishment was based on the fact that citizens saw themselves as potential criminal defendants and desired protection from state overreach. It is in this area that Garland’s work bears special relevance to studies of surveillance and privacy. Because while rehabilitation was a primary goal of punishment, and society generally identified with criminals and believed that any member of the public might come to be in the crosshairs of the state, the public seemed to share a belief that the state should respect individuals’ privacy and that surveillance should be used only in response to proven necessity. Punishment was to be strictly limited by notions of proportionality, treatment of the causes of offenders’ criminality, and legal notions of due process (those limitations on state power that offer defendants legal protections in court and limit the state’s options in pursuing criminal investigations). But with the late 1960s and early 1970s came a series of broad changes in society that undermined,

Garland, David David Garland is one of the most cited sociologists in the world. Garland’s work on the sociology of punishment has become core reading in the education of any sociologist, but particularly of those interested in crime, punishment, and criminal justice. Garland uses a genealogical approach to analyze punishment, meaning that he looks to the historical factors that influence the values, sensibilities, and practices of punishment to explain the development of those practices and the roles they play in society. To Garland, punishment is not merely a tool of the powerful to maintain their power, or a tool of society to discipline deviants. Instead, punishment is a complicated phenomenon that both influences and is influenced by society’s morals, values, fears, and interests, as well as more practical governmental and institutional capabilities. This entry discusses Garland’s view that the focus of crime control policies shifted dramatically from rehabilitation in the 1960s to security today, and it examines his reasoning for that shift. The entry also highlights Garland’s most cited stance regarding the public’s shift in philosophy regarding protection and the state and describes why he has distanced himself from cultural explanations of contemporary crime control policies. Garland argues that the crime control policy of the United States has undergone a radical shift since the 1960s. In the 1960s, he argues, there was a universal (Western) focus on rehabilitative punishment. This meant that rehabilitation, the 417

418

Garland, David

and eventually decimated, social support for the rehabilitative ideal. Along with an increase in crime, massive demographic changes undermined feelings of security in the general public. The prevalence of mass media allowed members of the public to compare their situations with those of others, increasing calls for equality and further undermining the status quo. Crime dramas enhanced identification with victims rather than identification with offenders. The sudden spike in crime led overworked law enforcement agencies to neglect low-level criminality, which made the public feel crime was out of control and the state was not fulfilling its duty to protect its citizens. Political interests, and opportunism, acted to enhance this insecurity, as political actors realized that inspiring an “us versus them” mentality was an extremely productive method of getting voters to the polls. At the same time, criminological experts came to question the success of rehabilitation, and even its desirability. Instead, the value of personal autonomy (and therefore responsibility) led both liberal and conservative experts to prefer punishment of individuals to attempts to reeducate offenders so that they conform to social expectations. Together, these factors led to a nationwide sentiment of perpetual crisis, which remained long after crime rates stabilized, and even decreased. This crisis perspective created a need for, and a prioritization of, control of the criminal element. The rehabilitative ideal was abandoned. The concept of “victims’ rights” encouraged a tone of criminal justice policy that treated criminal justice as a zero-sum game, wherein any protections for offenders were seen as detracting from protection of victims. In what is perhaps one of Garland’s most cited ideas, he notes that Western societies have come to prioritize protection by the state over protection from the state. This means that the interest in limiting police power has massively decreased, overcome by an interest in facilitating state control of perceived threats. Particularly as societies lost faith in the ability of punishment to have an effect on crime, lawmakers (and voters) increasingly turned to alternatives to incarceration that typically avoid the due process guarantees (and civil rights) that are generally guaranteed only as a response to the possibility of a trial. It is this

shared priority of risk aversion and crime control, and the effects it has on penal policy, that Garland refers to as “the culture of control.” This “culture” has been relied on by countless criminologists to explain shifting perceptions of police power, the increasing surveillance state (and the increasing acceptance of the surveillance state), and diminishments of countless other civil liberties. Garland rarely yet specifically speaks to the public’s acceptance of surveillance cameras as routine. Yet Garland has carefully distanced himself from broad cultural explanations of contemporary policies. While his explanations certainly rely, at least in part, on shared values, morals, and the cultural role that punishment plays, he remains focused as well on the influence that developing technologies, institutions, and structural frameworks have for these processes. Practices of punishment (and, by extension, law enforcement) are determined not only by shared values or social interests but also by institutional needs and technological capabilities. For instance, he argues that the expansion of crime control has been greatly influenced by the development of the private security industry, which naturally carries its own financial and bureaucratic interests as well as shared notions of best practices. Similarly, with rehabilitation as an “organizing principle,” criminal justice developed to rely on experts in the field, who could better analyze each individual offender and determine what was necessary to rehabilitate that offender. But as these “experts” developed, such as parole officers and corrections officers, they too framed punishment to reflect their shared notions of best practices and their professional interests. Specifically referring to surveillance, Garland argues that surveillance is a necessary part of governance, but increasing technological capabilities are what grant its potential for authoritarianism, even before societies’ shared insecurities encourage that development. Garland’s account of the development of latemodern crime control is highly nuanced and specific and focuses on the penal sanction (i.e., postconviction treatment). Yet his theories, and the concept of “the culture of control,” have been used broadly in research on all aspects of law enforcement and crime control, particularly in

Gated Communities

those areas focusing on risk aversion, risk management, crime prevention, and the decreasing protection of individuals from the power of the state. Francesca Laguardia See also Capital Punishment; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Cultural Studies; Governing Through Crime; Punishment; Punishment and Society; Risk Society Thesis; Spectacle, The; Supermax Prisons

Further Readings Garland, David. Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Garland, David. “Panopticon Days.” Criminal Justice Matters, v.20 (1995). Garland, David. “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society.” British Journal of Criminology, v.36/4 (1996). Garland, David. “The Culture of High Crime Societies.” British Journal of Criminology, v.40/3 (2000). Garland, David. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Garland, David. Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Gated Communities Gated communities are a rapidly expanding fixture across the social landscape and an increasingly preferable housing option for homebuyers and renters. These communities span the United States, but are especially common in the “Sun Belt” region along the American South and Southwest, and are proliferating similarly in nations worldwide. In the United States alone, recent estimates suggest that more than 4  million gated communities exist, and this figure is steadily increasing. Scholars observe that the rise of gated communities coincides with a period of escalating public fear of crime and concerns for safety, arguing that gated communities are a form of modern “fortress building.” Although not all residents seek gated communities for fear

419

of victimization, these enclaves appeal to many because of the security, privacy, and seclusion afforded by mechanized gates and enclosing walls or fences. In addition, gated communities often feature internal governance structures that regulate residents’ behaviors, maintain surveillance within their borders, and uphold agreedon standards within the community. As described in this entry, gated communities utilize various forms of entry security to control who enters and exits the neighborhood, often provide additional barriers near the entrance or surrounding the entire community, and typically feature some form of internal organization and security. Gated communities, however, have faced some criticism regarding the symbolism of their barriers to the outside communities as well as their effectiveness as a crime deterrent. As its name implies, a gated community is a residential area where a gating mechanism controls the flow of traffic into the neighborhood and marks the boundaries of public versus private space. While the phrase gated community often connotes affluence and prestige, socioeconomic status varies considerably across these communities. For example, even some public housing complexes employ gating practices that control who may access the area. For many gated communities, entry is an automated process—for example, residents may use keycards or enter an access code to bypass the gate and continue inside—although some gated communities feature guard stations, where private employees moderate who may enter the complex. In these cases, entrants must provide acceptable credentials before the guard will open the gate. As an added measure, some gated community entrances implement speed bumps to regulate drivers’ speed or utilize security cameras to monitor who enters or leaves. Exterior walls or fences are another iconic feature of gated communities and serve several functions. First, these barriers further restrict access into the community. While gates create a semipermeable entrance for vehicle traffic, perimeter walls or fences offer additional control over pedestrian entry into the complex. The extent of these preventive barriers varies across gated communities. Some locations include only one wall or fence along the front of the complex, while other communities maintain walls that completely

420

Germany

encompass the property or even use natural barriers such as forests to complement existing walls. A second function of exterior walls and fences is to designate and reinforce the territorial boundaries of a gated community. A key element underlying gated communities is that formerly public space transforms legally and symbolically into private territory. A physical wall clearly indicates the claimed boundaries of a gated community to those on the outside and emphasizes the privatized status of the grounds within. Such barriers send an exclusionary message to anyone who passes by: Nonresidents without a legitimate reason to enter should stay out of the community. The interiors of these residential complexes often feature a system of private management and internal governance structures that also varies appreciably across gated communities. In some cases, this simply means that a community manager regulates the premises and enforces rules; however, other communities operate a more complex system of governance. Many gated communities maintain a homeowner association (HOA) comprising its residents, which means that the private space within the gated community is “shared” by all HOA members and that residents must comply with an explicit set of conditions and restrictions. Enforcement of these terms is commonly reserved for an elected council of community residents who resolve disputes and ensure that all residents uphold community standards. Many gated communities feature some form of organized security that provides surveillance over the community and guards against crime and deviant behavior. For example, some gated communities hire private security personnel who actively patrol the area within the community’s boundaries. The presence of these employees may deter crime, and these personnel may intervene in the event that a crime does occur. Given the cost of private security, however, this approach may be more common in wealthier residential areas. Neighborhood watch associations may also operate within gated communities, where organized groups of residents devote themselves to preventing crime and disorder within the community. Members of these associations patrol the streets inside the complex, keep watch over residents’ homes and property, and report suspicious behavior to the police.

Neighborhood watch signs around the community often signal the existence of a neighborhood watch association as a warning to those who enter. Although many people praise the development of gated communities, there are numerous critiques against their usage and meaning. One of the strongest arguments is that gated communities reify racial and class differences in contemporary society, unfairly excluding those with lower socioeconomic status and effectively segregating portions of the population. Moreover, critics suggest that the term gated community is misleading, as residential solidarity and amicable relationships are not guaranteed. Some scholarship also finds that gated communities may even hinder residents’ development of social capital due to the community’s restrictive and exclusionary nature. Even the protective effect of community gating against criminal behavior remains unclear, as a limited body of criminological research reaches mixed conclusions on the relationship between gated communities and crime. Nicholas Branic See also Community; Fear, Culture of; Privacy

Further Readings Blakely, Edward James and Mary Gail Snyder. Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. Dupuis, Ann and David Thorns. “Gated Communities as Exemplars of ‘Forting Up’ Practices in a Risk Society.” Urban Policy and Research, v.26/2 (2008). Grant, Jill and Lindsey Mittelsteadt. “Types of Gated Communities.” Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, v.31 (2004). Low, Setha M. Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America. New York, NY: Routledge, 2003.

Germany In postwar Germany, surveillance has always been a popular topic of discussion and study. With the legacy of two totalitarian dictatorships, first the

Germany

Nazi regime from 1933 to 1945 and then the communist surveillance state in the east of the country (German Democratic Republic, GDR, 1945–1989/1990), the topic continues to be a sensitive one. Consequently, the revelations made by Edward Snowden in 2013 about the farreaching international Internet surveillance practices by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and its British counterpart did not sit well with the German public. Practices for crime or terror prevention common in many other Western states such as closed-circuit television surveillance of public places are widely regarded as suspicious and comparatively used sparely in Germany. In general, there remains a good deal of skepticism against the increasing use of surveillance technology among large parts of the German public, even against usually benign practices such as population censuses (especially the one in 1983), using store cards or credit cards, and ordering online. This entry reviews the basic principles of individual rights and freedoms historically granted to German citizens during different time periods, and it concludes with a section about how new revelations of surveillance and threats of terrorism have altered people’s attitudes. The experience of the Nazi regime lay at the basis of the far-reaching guarantees for the private sphere in the Grundgesetz or “Basic Law” of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), including the inviolability of residences (Article 13) as well as the sanctity of mail and telephone communication (Article 10). These far-reaching guarantees were tested for the first time when in the 1970s and early 1980s the West German state was challenged by domestic left-wing terrorist groups, especially the Red Army Faction, also known by the names of its founders, Baader and Meinhof. The Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) and the police gained significant additional powers (e.g., Rasterfahndung, “dragnet investigation”) that were highly contentious at the time and pushed the boundaries of what was legally possible but, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., the wiretapping affair around the nuclear physicist Klaus Traube in 1974), by and large still continued to comply with the letters and spirit of the postwar constitution.

421

Since the end of the Cold War, it was particularly the legacy of the infamous and formerly omnipresent East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit), better known by its acronym Stasi, that shaped the debate about surveillance in modern-day reunited Germany. After all, when communism was toppled in 1989, the main ire of the revolutionary masses was directed at the Stasi spies. The organization’s headquarters in Berlin and Leipzig were stormed to shed light on the Stasi’s roughly 100,000 fulltime employees and 170,000 informants or “informal collaborators” (Informeller Mitarbeiter [IM]), in a population of 17 million. Treatment of the personal surveillance files on millions of citizens that survived the attempt at destruction by the falling regime remained contentious for a long time. Today, the files are looked after by a special government institution, guaranteeing every citizen access to their file, and periodically causing debates when politicians’ or other public figures’ real or alleged past as an IM comes to light. Accordingly, any attempt to widen surveillance for the purposes of crime and terror prevention meets high levels of skepticism and opposition, which has led to the resignations of ministers and the end of coalition governments. When in 1998, the Bundestag (German parliament) reformed the legislation (Article 13 GG), enabling the acoustic surveillance of residences for the purposes of crime persecution, the law became known as Grosser Lauschangriff ­ (literally translated “large wiretap attack” on private r­ esidences), as opposed to Kleiner Lauschangriff (“small wiretap ­operation” in public areas) and had to be reformed after large parts of the act were declared ­unconstitutional in 2004 by the German Supreme  Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). Finally, a reformed surveillance act that imposes very strict limitations and excludes, for example, journalists and lawyers from being targeted was passed in the parliament in 2005, without entirely silencing its critics. In a similar vein, Vorratsdatenspeicherung, the retention of telecommunication data such as call detail records and Internet traffic and transaction data for 6 months that have been introduced at the European Union level and been translated into German legislation in 2008, was declared unconstitutional in 2010. Data protection remains

422

Glasnost

important in Germany and has the status of an elementary right (Grundrecht auf informationalle Selbstbestimmmung, “elementary right on informational self-determination”), confirmed by the Supreme Court, even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution. In contrast, the Meldepflicht (resident registration)—the obligation of citizens to register their address with the municipality (as in many other continental-European countries) or risk being fined, and the subsequent issuance of identity cards—goes largely unchallenged. This is in stark contrast to countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom that do not have a similar obligation. In the case of the United Kingdom, the attempt to introduce identification cards by the former Labour government in 2008 led to major controversy. This discrepancy has been attributed to different conceptualizations of the “right to privacy” in the German and Anglophone legal traditions. Whereas the American legal tradition focuses on the “right to solitude” or being left alone by the government, freedoms that are described in part in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the German concept of “informational self-determination” echoes the definition of privacy as an individual’s right to decide what personal information is communicated to others and the circumstances under which such information is shared. The experience of terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent War on Terror also led to new debates and the questioning of previous practices in Germany. After all, the atrocities of 9/11 in the United States were planned and carried out by a cell of Jihadist terrorists based in the northern port city of Hamburg, Germany. On the other hand, Edward Snowden’s revelations, published by the Washington Post, the British Guardian, and the German current affairs magazine Der Spiegel since 2013, reinforced old suspicions that were, to an extent, also shared by German officialdom. The revelation that German chancellor Angela Merkel, who grew up under surveillance of the Stasi in the GDR, was targeted by the NSA (“Stasi 2.0”), caused tensions in German-American relations, which were haphazardly repaired by U.S. president Barack Obama’s public apology. Merkel’s government also agreed to do its part by

refraining from giving in to widespread demands to offer exile to Snowden in Germany, although other German politicians visited and negotiated with him in Moscow, Russia. Ulrich Tiedau See also Closed-Circuit Television; Cold War; National Security Agency Leaks; Privacy, Right to

Further Readings Flaherty, David H. Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Ross, Jacqueline E. “The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany.” American Journal of Comparative Law, v.55 (2007).

Glasnost Glasnost, a Russian word meaning “openness,” refers to a series of policy reforms implemented by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s. With these reforms, Gorbachev relaxed government surveillance and censorship of the news media, arts and literature, and public political debate. Although the initial goal of glasnost was simply to promote transparency in government and greater openness in political discourse, the resulting outpouring of domestic dissent was a contributing factor in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Rise of Gorbachev Gorbachev was born in 1931 to farmers living in the Caucasus region of Russia. While studying law at Moscow State University, he became a member of the Communist Party; over the next decades, he rose rapidly through the party ranks, first becoming a local official and, eventually, securing a spot in the Politburo. When his mentor, Yuri Andropov, became general secretary in 1982, Gorbachev became an influential policymaker. Subsequently, in 1985, he was elected general secretary of the Communist Party.

Glasnost

Gorbachev inherited a country fraught with problems. Domestically, the unwieldy bureaucracy of the Soviet state had proved unable to adapt to rapid economic change, and the Soviet economy had stagnated. Internationally, the administration of Ronald Reagan had renewed U.S. efforts in the Cold War, increasing defense spending and pledging to roll back communism around the world.

Glasnost and the Surveillance State On taking office, Gorbachev, the first leader of the Communist Party to be born after the Bolshevik revolution in October 1918, quickly made his reformist intentions clear. Publicly, Gorbachev argued that during the 1960s and 1970s, the Communist Party’s aggressive surveillance of political dissidents and censorship of the media and arts had resulted in an atrophied and corrupt political system. To rectify this, he advocated for greater press freedom, cultural and literary expression, and political debate. Gorbachev introduced glasnost as part of a broader reform effort aimed at promoting “socialist democracy.” In addition to permitting more debate and transparency, Gorbachev implemented perestroika, a far-reaching program of economic restructuring that allowed limited free enterprise, as well as demokratizatsiya, the establishment of multicandidate elections for Communist Party positions. Although Gorbachev did seek to overhaul the Soviet system, he remained committed to the core principles of socialism.

Glasnost, the Media, and Politics One of the most immediate and conspicuous changes brought by glasnost was more freedom for the Soviet press. Prior to the reforms, the Glavlit, a censorship agency created during the Lenin era, monitored all Soviet publications. More precisely, Glavlit was charged with ensuring that all news coverage promoted the idea of a class struggle and did not contain any information critical of the current government or its policies. As such, the agency screened every publication before printing and was able to shut down any newspaper or magazine that violated these rules.

423

Similar restrictions applied to radio and television newscasts; all broadcasts were subject to a 1-hour time delay to ensure that no unauthorized content reached the airwaves. Although glasnost did not signal a complete end to Soviet censorship, it did allow journalists to cover and debate topics that were formally prohibited. This included covering current economic and foreign policy debates, as well examining social issues, such as alcoholism and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Soviet Union. In particular, journalists were able to highlight divisions within the Communist Party, and by 1989, state media provided full coverage of the debates in the Congress of People’s Deputies, a governing body created as part of Gorbachev’s reforms. Moreover, the Glavit now permitted journalists to criticize public officials for their behavior, without fear of reprisal. For example, the newspaper Pravda published information about the lavish lifestyles of top party officials, charging them with hypocrisy. Under glasnost, news broadcasts began adding foreign viewpoints to their coverage. For example, in April 1987, state media aired a 50-minute program in which British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was interviewed by three Soviet journalists; during the interview, she praised the recent reforms and spoke out against Communist hard-liners. Later that same month, state media aired a 32-minute interview with U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz; in that segment, Schultz was sharply critical of the Soviet Union’s continued military presence in Afghanistan. In addition to debating contemporary policy issues, under Gorbachev, the Soviet government also permitted more open discussion of historical topics that had formerly been censored. For example, the government now permitted debate and discussion of atrocities committed during the Stalin era, including full discussion of Stalin’s show trials, forced labor camps, and execution squads. Concurrently, several prominent dissidents who had been expunged from Soviet history were rehabilitated. Red Army leader Leon Trotsky, who Stalin had expelled from the Communist Party, was reintroduced into the official history of the Soviet Union, and photos of him were placed in the Central Lenin Museum in Leningrad.

424

Glasnost

Similarly, the reputation of Nikolai Bukharin, a party member executed in 1938 for questioning Stalin’s economic policies, was also restored. The press praised Bukharin for his courage, and he even received a favorable mention in one of Gorbachev’s speeches. In light of glasnost, the government went so far as to revise the official history curriculum; in 1988, the government cancelled the annual examination for secondary students, citing a need to update all history textbooks.

Glasnost and Cultural Life Another area in which glasnost had a great impact was the arts—namely, literature, poetry, theater, and film. Prior to Gorbachev’s reforms, all books and artistic performances were subject to censorship to ensure that they did not contain content critical of the current government or of historical figures such as Lenin and Stalin. By the late 1980s, however, the government had relaxed many of these rules. Notably, in 1987, at the Berlin International Film Festival, Soviet censors permitted filmmakers to screen three films that had previously been banned. One film, titled Theme, documented the history of literary censorship in the Soviet Union; prior to its screening, it had been subject to a 7-year embargo. The relaxation on film censorship was far-reaching, with censors allowing contemporary American films, such as Patton and Amadeus, to be shown in Soviet theaters. The effects of glasnost were evident in other areas as well. In the late 1980s, censors allowed theaters to stage plays by Mikhail Shatrov, a Soviet dissident who dramatized the crimes of Lenin and Stalin. In addition, in 1988, the government permitted a Soviet literary journal to publish previously banned materials, including excerpts from George Orwell’s antitotalitarian novel 1984.

International Politics of Glasnost By Gorbachev’s own admission, glasnost evolved beyond his control, ultimately accelerating the demise of the Communist Party. In April 1988, at the Central Committee Meeting of the Communist Party, 110 high-level officials submitted

their resignations, citing concerns with the rapid pace of reform. In addition, Gorbachev’s push for political openness in Soviet satellite states angered the Communist leadership there; the pro-Soviet dictators feared that glasnost would lead to pressure for political reforms, including multiparty elections. These predictions proved correct; in 1989, a series of popular revolutions swept away the pro-Soviet leaders of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. In the West, Gorbachev’s reforms were met with strong support and were especially important in improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although Reagan was initially skeptical of Gorbachev’s intentions, after witnessing the Soviet leader’s far-reaching domestic reforms, he became more conciliatory. The two leaders held five summits and, eventually, negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Agreement, a major milestone in arms control policy.

Glasnost and Nationalism A key development stemming from glasnost was the growing public expression of nationalist sentiments within Soviet republics. With the relaxation of censorship came frequent protests by nationalist groups seeking greater political autonomy. For example, in 1988, in the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, citizens openly protested on the anniversary of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact; this agreement had allowed the Soviet Union to annex these countries. Eventually, these protests transformed into calls for independence from the Soviet Union. Similar protests took place in the Caucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. As a result, by the end of the 1980s, many Soviet republics had developed organized independence movements that refused to accept continued Soviet rule; Gorbachev’s decision to grant these republics autonomy rather than respond with force resulted in the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union. Kelly McHugh See also Cold War; Perestroika

Global Justice

Further Readings Cohen, Stephen F. and Katrina Vanden Heuvel. Voices of Glasnost: Interviews With Gorbachev’s Reformers. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1991. Gibbs, Joseph. Gorbachev’s Glasnost: The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991. Magstadt, Thomas M. “Gorbachev and Glasnost: A New Soviet Order? Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy” (Cato Policy Analysis No. 177). http://www.cato.org/ pubs/pas/PA117.HTM (Accessed June 2014).

Global Justice Global justice is the conception that justice, or fairness, needs to be applied globally to all people in the world. By justice, what is usually meant is either fair treatment or a fair and equitable system of distributive justice. Distributive justice is justice in the distribution of goods and property. So, in practice, global justice refers to the desired state wherein global distributive justice or a fair global system that benefits all will be achieved. Of course, it is obvious to see immediately that such a conception is highly subjective because individuals will differ in what they see as global justice. For this reason, theorists of global justice have written widely on what a “just global normative order” looks like. A just global normative order refers to a set of rules that governs how a truly just world should look like. There are two strands regarding global justice that are discussed here: (1) theories about a just global normative order and (2) international institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with the former attempting to conceive of how a fair world looks and the latter attempting to lay the foundation for such a world in reality.

The Just Global Normative Order Global justice is a relatively new concept. While religious groups have prayed for the well-being of their coreligionists for centuries, it is only in postEnlightenment thought that panhumanistic conceptions began taking hold. Ideas about the connection all humans have with one another, divorced from Aristotelian concepts of a hierarchy

425

of different types of people, brought about the notion that perhaps a just world was desirable. The project of creating a just world will be discussed in the next section. Theorists of international justice seek to describe what a just international legal and political system should look like. They call this project that of conceiving of and describing the just global normative order. Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher who lived from 1724 to 1804, was among the first Enlightenment thinkers to struggle with how a globally just world would look like. In his essay Perpetual Peace, written in 1795, Kant proposed that no country should have a standing army, so that no one’s job would be war. He also argued for a “pacific union,” a federation of states that would fight to ensure peace in the world. Kant believed that all countries should be republics so that the people would have a voice in the government. His reasoning was that if the people had a voice in foreign affairs, they would be unlikely to counsel war. Kant, finally, thought that countries should be “hospitable” to all people, allowing people to cross borders if so needed or desired. Kant’s arguments became the foundation of liberal international relations (IR) theory. However, IR theory has two flaws. The first flaw is that it only attempts to predict and explain; it does not have a normative dimension. Without a normative dimension, IR theory cannot be moral or aspirational. That is where the conception of global justice is introduced. The other issue is that IR theory provides the imperative for the fight to conceive of and create a just global normative order. IR theory looks at the world as it is: a world of states. To wit, it is a theory of inter-national relations. While each nation sets its own rules and fights for justice in its own way, there traditionally has not been anyone fighting for the good of all of the Earth’s people. A world of states, broken up by demarcated geographic boundaries that supposedly house different types of people, fragments the human species and makes achieving justice for some very difficult. In a world of states, individuals are subsumed by a government that rules over their state and their locality. Given the exigencies that determine our birthplace, whether an individual is born in a place that allows for opportunity and

426

Global Justice

flourishing or not is completely due to chance. For instance, a girl born in Saudi Arabia will not be allowed to leave the house without a male chaperone. Worse, if the same girl were born in Afghanistan, she would have virtually no rights. In Mauritania, she could be born a slave. In Sierra Leone, she could be raped with impunity. In Cambodia, she would have a higher likelihood of being trafficked or sold into prostitution. In Niger, she would have a higher likelihood of dying of malnourishment. Of course, if the same girl were born in a modernized country with a robust welfare system, she would have a much better life. Putting aside within-country disparities that surely are vast, these between-country disparities are seen as unjust by those who pursue global justice. Ensuring a basic foundation of rights for all, then, is one part of achieving global justice. This is an integral component of what the global human rights movement strives to guarantee. In addition to rights, those who pursue a just global normative order see global economic disparities as being grossly unjust. Here the work of Thomas Pogge is especially instructive. Pogge notes that about one third of all human deaths each year are due to poverty-related causes, including malnutrition and diseases easily preventable in the developed world. Tens of thousands of children and infants die each day around the world due to these causes. Pogge argues that if these deaths were occurring in a poor world or in a place where cures were not available, then perhaps we could argue that no injustice exists. But the fact that severe global poverty exists in a world where some people are very rich and where the diseases of the poor are easily and cheaply prevented in the wealthier and more developed nations defines the poor’s condition as an injustice. A global economic system that benefits rich, established countries and businesses and many times disadvantages poor, less-established ones also contributes to the injustice. Furthermore, the system of states where dictators in some countries are allowed to keep their people destitute and underfoot contributes to the injustice. Many times, these same autocrats are supported by the rich world due to their ownership of a wanted resource or their ability to provide security and stability. Pogge’s points amount to an argument that the rich are at least partially at fault for the

condition of the world’s poor. As such, to Pogge, a just global normative order would include remittances coming from the people of the rich world and going to the people of the poor world. In sum, a world of states creates the need to conceive of and create a just global normative order, also known as global justice. How such an order should look is certainly up for debate. But, at minimum, such a world would include robust human rights guarantees and a more equitable distribution of wealth. In the next section, international institutions that are laying the foundation for global justice are described.

International Institutions, NGOs, and Human Rights Global justice is not just the preoccupation of academics; it also inspires a very real movement to create a better world. Three routes to achieving global justice are described here: (1) international institutions, (2) NGOs, and (3) international human rights law. International institutions are organizations that create linkages between different countries. They also draft rules and laws to govern and coordinate the behavior of multiple countries. These organizations include the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the European Union. International institutions deal with issues ranging from ­economics and resources to security and the environment. The largest and broadest international institution is the United Nations, which deals with a wide range of global justice issues, including war and peace, climate change, and global poverty. Critics of the United Nations note that the organization reinforces the existing world of states that comes with the issues enumerated earlier. Specifically, the United Nations legitimates dictators and enshrines existing national governments as the representatives of all the people living within their borders. Proponents of the United Nations, however, note that through departments such as the World Health Organization, the UN Children’s Fund, and the UN refugee agency (United Nations High Commission for Refugees), the United Nations is making great strides in ushering in a more just world.

Global Mobility

NGOs are also working toward global justice. Groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Amnesty International, the International Crisis Group, Oxfam, and Human Rights Watch work tirelessly to gather donations to aid victims of global crises and war, provide health care to poor children, ensure that families have a safe place to sleep and clean water to drink, and draw attention to global injustices. These NGOs are free of the deficiency of being tied to the system of states that some say makes the world unjust, but they also have less power and money than organizations that draw on national governments. The United Nations and NGOs have worked together to establish a world where human rights are more well respected. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations soon after its inception in 1948. The document seeks to ensure basic human rights such as freedom of movement, speech, and thought; the right to freely and voluntarily marry; the rights to life, liberty, and security; and protections against slavery, among other rights and protections. Over time, the United Nations adopted more treaties and covenants seeking to ensure global human rights. All UN member states (so nearly every government in the world) have adopted at least one of these treaties. Still, the United Nations has done little to ensure compliance to these treaties and covenants, and this is where NGOs have become involved. Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have done great work in making global human rights laws real and enforceable. They cite and censure countries, governments, and subnational groups for human rights violations. Therefore, there has been a symbiosis, whereby NGOs have worked to provide compliance for international institutions in the area of human rights.

Conclusion Global justice refers to the concept that the world needs to be more equitable, fair, and just. This is usually placed within a framework of distributive justice, which leads to a concern for creating a just global normative order. While there are disagreements about how such an order should look (e.g.,

427

many would argue that a world of states undermines global justice), there is some agreement about the minimal standards that global justice requires. These minimal standards include at least basic human rights for all and a more just distribution of income worldwide. International institutions and NGOs are working toward a just global normative order in some ways, but they all have their own agendas and goals, so it cannot truly be said that the project of global justice is being achieved in our time. Still, it is clear that there is positive movement toward the creation of a just global normative order. Gabriel Rubin See also Amnesty International; European Convention on Human Rights; United Nations

Further Readings Beitz, Charles. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979. Kant, Immanuel. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In H. S. Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings (2nd ed.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Kristoff, Nicholas D. and Sheryl WuDunn. Half the Sky: Turning Oppression Into Opportunity for Women Worldwide. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2009. Monbiot, George. Manifesto for a New World Order. New York, NY: New Press, 2003. O’Neill, Onora. Bounds of Justice. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002. Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Global Mobility With around 232  million migrants globally (according to estimates by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs) and much higher levels of short-term human movement and undocumented migration, the topic of global mobility is a crucial one to consider. This entry examines the interplay between the overarching topic of global

428

Global Mobility

mobility and the three concepts of surveillance, security, and privacy. After a brief overview, this entry approaches the study through four key phases in the migration (and shorter term movement) process: (1) preentry, (2) border crossing, (3) internal controls, and (4) detention and deportation. Emphasis is often on national security, but this piece will also critique this approach and touch on global mobility as a matter of individual human security. One crucial aspect to consider throughout is the role of the private sector, both in the development of the security narrative of migration management and in the way in which it is enacted.

Global Mobility and Surveillance and Security Surveillance and security have been associated with the global mobility infrastructure for some time, particularly during periods of war or state breakup and instability. Jef Huysmans, a key scholar in the area of migration and security, observes the development of migration as a security issue particularly from the time of the Cold War. This has evolved differently in different regions. For example, during this period of decolonization, some regions saw solidarity in particular migration movements (e.g., the discourse of the Organisation of African Unity, the precursor to the African Union), while in others, these movements were associated with reorganization of postcolonial border systems (e.g., India’s partition in 1947 and then the creation of Bangladesh in 1971) and the security of the new border regimes. The assumption of human mobility as primarily a national security issue and in need of surveillance has developed more recently. Commentators, such as Gallya Lahav, chart a new discourse developing since the beginning of the 21st century, while others, such as Christina Boswell, argue otherwise. A common discourse is that key events over this period, including terrorist attacks in major global cities, sectarian and ethnic conflict spreading across state borders, and generalized economic difficulties, have contributed to an increased focus on security and surveillance.

Preentry Measures Preentry measures refer to those aspects of migration management with which the migrant comes into contact before reaching state borders. The number and nature of preentry measures have increased in recent decades, particularly in some regions, and those measures of the European Union have especially been the subject of critique. François Crépeau, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants, has emphasized difficulties caused by such preentry measures for migrants, particularly emergency migrants. This section presents both traditional preentry measures and newer developments. The modern system of passports developed in the period after World War I. While a passport is bestowed by an individual’s country of citizenship, a modern visa is granted at the discretion of a destination country, and today, it may come with requirements relating to personal circumstances as well as the provision of biometric, financial, and other data (e.g., Oman and Singapore have led the way in “body recognition” for immigration purposes). Today, large numbers of visa claims are processed globally, helped by private companies. Those processing particularly large numbers of claims for several countries include VFS Global and WorldBridge. Preentry measures also include state collaborations in migration management, such as those between the European Union and countries along its southern and eastern borders, through the European Neighbourhood Policy. The European border control agency, Frontex, has played an important role in this, and the growing budget of Frontex indicates a growing perceived importance of security and surveillance. When it was launched in 2006, Frontex was allocated €19.2 million. Its annual budgetary allocation in 2017 was €281 million. There is also a range of controls that carrier companies (whether maritime, air, or land) must perform. First, the advance passenger information requirement is imposed by an increasing number of states (the most recent list is available on most airline websites). This demands that carriers must send ahead information about the passengers they carry, enabling further screening prior to arrival.

Global Mobility

Related in nature is the “carrier sanction,” whereby carrier companies are not only required to collect information about passengers but also to check that they meet the receiving state’s criteria for travel, facing sanctions if they fail to do so. These preentry measures support both an increased border security infrastructure and a heightened surveillance of human mobility.

Border-Crossing Measures Once a migrant reaches a state border, he or she may encounter the security and surveillance ­infrastructure in more ways. For those crossing at recognized crossing points with required documentation, this involves the checking and recording of passport details, and in some cases the taking of fingerprints and iris scans. It may also include spot checks and physical searches. Apart from implications for privacy, those failing or drawing suspicions from the surveillance mechanisms at the border may go on to encounter the security infrastructure through examination, detention, and perhaps deportation. For those crossing borders elsewhere, the experience of the security and surveillance of the border may take different forms. For example, states contract private companies to erect security fences, and others supply surveillance equipment. Alongside securitized preentry measures, these securitized border-crossing measures restrict global mobility, particularly for the most vulnerable of migrants.

429

Detention and Deportation For the most part, only noncitizens can be deported from a state. A 2013 study from Monash U ­ niversity found large numbers of deportations, for example, from the Netherlands (13.1  million deportations in 2009), Norway (13.1  million deportations in 2011), and the United States (12.6 million deportations in 2011), with increasing levels of deportations particularly from the United States, France, and Australia. Deportation has come under scrutiny recently, with one theorist, Matthew Gibney, questioning the line between deportation and forced migration. In theory, immigration detention is not a punishment, but a tool used while a person’s deportation is being organized, or during other administrative processes, if there is a worry that the person may abscond. However, the Global Detention Project has observed detention of foreign nationals in all global regions in conditions resembling criminal detention, except perhaps there may be less access to legal processes. Detention and deportation may often be carried out by private security companies. The use of private security companies in itself indicates the security aspect of the measures; however, the rationale given is also security based. Some major companies and subsidiaries of those companies manage these sorts of migration control measures in several countries worldwide.

Internal Controls

When Surveillance and Security Mean Less Data and Less Security

The security and surveillance of global mobility does not only occur at physical borders. As Linda Bosniak has put it, the border may follow the migrant into the state. This may happen in different ways. Migrants may be required to report regularly to the police or other officials. They may be restricted to certain jobs and in their movements. These measures may be related to security per se as well as to security understood more widely. The use of private individuals and members of civil society (e.g., teachers, doctors, landlords, employers, and even taxi drivers in some jurisdictions) to surveil migrants within the territory of the state has also developed in recent decades.

Various studies have indicated that the use of these surveillance and security mechanisms may in fact reduce data availability and security. In the preentry and border-crossing phases of the migration process, when regular migration is made more difficult, persons must resort to moving by other means. Commentators such as Khalid Koser worry that increasing border security, rather than reducing movement, actually increases the employment of smuggling and trafficking professionals. This is corroborated by studies (see, e.g., ­Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sorensen, 2013). Within the state, other writers have lamented that increased reporting requirements and heightened threat of detention or deportation

430

Global Mobility

may encourage people to abscond. Moreover, fears of reporting by service providers such as doctors, teachers, police, and employers make those migrants who are already irregularly present less likely to use educational and health systems, and less likely to report contraventions of labor or criminal law to which they have been subjected, causing concern for public health, employment, and policing more generally. Some argue that this in fact leads to a situation of reduced security and reduced access to data, despite, and even because of, increased security and surveillance measures.

The Security and Privacy of Individuals Seeing global mobility as primarily a matter of security has ramifications for other priorities. That is, the security discourse can overshadow humanitarian and other commitments, perhaps preventing persons hoping to seek asylum from traveling to a place of safety, for example. It can also challenge the security, privacy, and dignity of individuals more generally. To move across international borders, it is necessary to hand over increasingly intimate personal information, including financial and health status, fingerprints, and iris scans. This information may need to be shared with officials at borders, while full-body scans are now the norm in some countries along with increasingly intimate physical searches. In some cases, this is even more personal, as spouse and family reunification visas may require information about a couple’s sex life, and asylum seekers may be required to tell intimate and distressing stories to border officials. The power of officials at borders to grant or refuse entry and their responsibility for safety and security puts all travelers in a position of forced compliance. As systems continue to develop, it will be increasingly crucial to consider whether prioritizing security and surveillance of global mobility fulfills its aims, as well as critiquing it from the perspective of human rights, human dignity, and the freedom to move. In recent decades, a further aspect can be observed: an erosion of the security of citizenship. Whereas in theory, citizenship is an absolute protection against immigration control measures and a citizenship, once obtained, is

inalienable, a combination of migration and security has in some cases led to deprivation of citizenship rights.

Global Mobility Before Security In his preface to the 2004 World Economic Survey, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan gave a list of 13 considerations and challenges related to migration, starting with human rights. He put national security at the end of the list. While it is crucial to examine the interrelationship between global mobility and security, surveillance, and privacy, critiquing this interrelationship is also crucial. Seeing migration as a matter primarily of security is relatively recent and is not global. Most people migrate for work, making migration in real terms more tied to skills sharing, labor provision, and economics. Other factors such as learning, culture, and the development of human relationships are also important to consider. For a relatively small proportion of migrants, migration is to escape extreme violence, persecution, climate change, or economic deprivation. For them, migration is primarily about safety and about humanitarian protection. There is a security aspect to global mobility, but this must be balanced with other aspects, including individual privacy, dignity, and the freedom to move. Tendayi Bloom See also Border Patrol Checkpoints; Citizenship; Deportation; Immigration; United Nations

Further Readings Bigo, Didier. “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease.” Alternatives, v.27 (2002). Castles, Stephen, et al. The Age of Migration (5th ed.). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas and Nina Nyberg Sorensen, eds. The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. Gibney, Matthew. “Is Deportation a Form of Forced Migration?” Refugee Survey Quarterly, v.32/2 (2013). Mauer, Victor and Myriam Dunn Cavelty, eds. The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012.

Global Surveillance Messina, Anthony and Gallya Lahav, eds. The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. Opeskin, Brian, et al. Foundations of International Migration Law. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Global Positioning Systems See United States v. Jones (2012)

Global Surveillance Global or mass surveillance is the periodic, continuous, or repetitive distributive monitoring or observation of an entire population—or a substantial fraction of the population—as a means of collecting desirable information. The surveillance of population groups is not a new phenomenon; however, progress in technologies allows a much larger scope for surveillance, and there are multiple platforms for systematic and high-tech data collection, extraction, processing, filtering, instantaneous analysis, and retention. Moreover, rather than an exceptional measure, mass surveillance is emerging as a rather routine practice, particularly as related to digital surveillance practices. The large-scale surveillance practices represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering and the recognition of new areas of intelligence emphasis, such as proliferation and terrorism as emergent threats to national and global security. The reconfiguration enables access to large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data and digital assets. Collected data may include stored data, phone numbers, phone usage, IP addresses, social network activity, and email addresses from computer and telephone networks. Due to technological advances, the movements and activities of people can be tracked almost anywhere in the world without observing them or listening to their conversations. A global and clandestine presence is considered necessary to maintain a minimum baseline intelligence contingency capability and to respond to ever-increasing intelligence collection needs.

431

This entry provides readers with an understanding of the collection and monitoring of telecommunications metadata and the growing use of electronic surveillance methods on a global level. It then investigates concerns regarding global surveillance and its potential to breach individuals’ privacy and rights. Governments often conduct mass surveillance with the stated purposes of protecting citizens and residents from actual or potential threats of harm posed by radicals, maintaining social control, and controlling and preventing general crime. Mass surveillance has the potential of violating privacy rights as well as individual social and political liberties and can result in a totalitarian state or a virtual police state. The purpose and the scale of surveillance are at the core of what differentiates democratic regimes from police states. The distinction between targeted surveillance incidents to criminal investigations—and clearly consistent with the rule of law—and indiscriminate largescale tactical interceptions or a target population surveillance where there is not particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, is a source of vigorous debate and legal arguments.

Telephone Metadata Collection The United States employed mass surveillance through an intelligence collection program under which the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained court orders to direct telecommunications service providers to produce bulk records referred to as telephone metadata. The National Security Agency (NSA) stored, queried, and analyzed the metadata for counterterrorism purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court authorized this program under the business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations provision of the amended Title V, Section 501, of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, enacted as Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. The USA Freedom Act of 2015 prohibited the continued bulk collection of metadata using Section 215, and the storage of bulk telephone metadata was moved from the NSA to telecommunications companies with legal restrictions on government access. Under the telephone metadata collection program, providers of telecommunications services

432

Global Surveillance

provided agents of the government principally with information regarding both domestic and international telephone calls. The provided information was limited to telephone numbers used to make and receive the calls, the times of the calls, and the lengths of the calls. The telephone metadata were analyzed for the purpose of determining whether suspected or known terrorists have been in contact with other individuals engaged in terrorist activities within or outside of the United States. Telephone metadata were collected to serve as an investigative tool in investigations of international terrorism. For example, in the months leading up to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the NSA intercepted seven calls made by hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar to an al Qaeda safe house in Yemen. The NSA was not tracking all phone calls made from the United States, and the overseas signal intelligence capabilities the NSA used could not capture al-­ Mihdhar’s telephone number identifier. The NSA therefore mistakenly concluded that al-Mihdhar was not located within the United States. Telephone metadata would have potentially furnished the location information, which could have prompted the NSA to inform the Federal Bureau of Investigation that al-Mihdhar was calling a Yemeni safe house from a location within the United States. The United States obviously learned from the deficiency and adapted to counter a terror network capable of arranging attacks around the world. Therefore, the bulk telephone metadata collection program was only one of many countermeasures initiated that may locate and isolate contacts among suspected terrorists by capturing, querying, and analyzing seemingly disconnected data. Querying the bulk telephone metadata for noncounterterrorism purposes is unlawful. Under the program, the government did not acquire the content of any communication, the identity of any party to the communication, or any cell-site locational information. However, the phone records can reveal a rich profile of individuals as well as a comprehensive record of one person’s association with another (e.g., familial, professional, political, religious, and personal). Metadata can produce vivid profiles of a caller when analyzed following aggregation.

Electronic Surveillance Mass surveillance can include the use of electronic equipment on aircraft to simulate cell phone towers for the purpose of indiscriminately collecting phone location and identification data from users. The potential for mass surveillance to track targets is also available via information in the central servers of U.S. Internet companies, such as extracted audio and video chats, photographs, emails, documents, and connection logs. Harvesting the images of people from intercepted communications such as emails, text messages, social media, and videoconferences conducted through global surveillance operations can be used in massive facial recognition surveillance programs. Smartphones, social media sites, email, tablets, and other forms of digital communications create quintillion bytes of new data daily. This explosive growth in digital communications has resulted in rapid progress in the ability to sift through the data to find patterns of suspicious behavior and identify possible terrorists. Consequently, the intelligence community’s data mining operations have grown exponentially to gather metadata for purposes of social network identification and patterns of suspicious behavior recognition rather than direct listening to conversations or reading the content of emails. Efficient mining of metadata, such as who is calling or emailing, has made wiretapping and eavesdropping on communications far less vital because the information associated with communications today is often more significant than the communications. When separate streams of data, such as credit card purchases, time and location data from cell phones, and E-Z pass uses, are integrated into databases, analysts are able to develop a picture of an individual’s affairs that would not be available by simply listening to the individual’s conversations. It is ­ also possible for data points to be used to identify callers. Many municipal governments from New York to London engage in some form or level of mass public surveillance. For example, mass public surveillance can be found in Mexico City with a population of 20 million where thousands of cameras are positioned atop utility poles, mounted over subway platforms, and placed inside transit buses to continuously capture activities and anomalies in real time. The captured images include

Global Village

residential streets, prison yards, and public transportation movement. The video feeds from the cameras are viewed via hundreds of monitors in a state-of-the-art intelligence center called C4I4. The center serves as a base for emergency operations to monitor and respond to events in cases of events such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes or acts of violence associated with drug-related conflicts and other crimes. The center is staffed with intelligence and research personnel and includes representatives from multiple public safety agencies. The center’s name signifies four Cs (command, control, communications, and computing) and four Is (intelligence, integration, information, and investigation).

Concerns Global and mass public surveillance programs oftentimes raise questions regarding accountability and the incidental collection of information related to innocent citizens while in the process of searching for legitimate surveillance targets that require further attention. There are also concerns regarding collective freedoms and democracy, often framed as a question of balance between data privacy and national security. Large-scale surveillance programs are also considered by some to be indiscriminate and arbitrary invasions for purposes of querying and analyzing data without particularized suspicion, clear oversight, reasonable transparency, or prior judicial approval. Absent specifically articulated instances in which the analysis of bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent attack or saved lives, such concerns will certainly continue. Governments must continuously review national laws, regulations, policies, and practices to ensure full and continuous conformity with privacy protections and international human rights laws. The practices of international intelligence agencies collaborating and exchanging metadata or permitting access to metadata that enable circumvention of domestic controls on obtaining forbidden data and surveillance restrictions by international intelligence agencies is yet another concern in the Digital Age. Regardless of the scope of the data collected or the means by which it is collected, effective aggregation and analysis will always be the critical

433

components in determining the data value and application. The ideal relationship between collection and analysis is one in which analysts assess and identify intelligence needs based on collected data and collectors translate those needs into targets and targeted data. Delmar P. Wright See also Cell Phone Tracking; Dataveillance; Global Surveillance; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of; Technology; Terrorism; Texting; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies; United States v. Jones (2012)

Further Readings Beckman, J. Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016. Doyle, Aaron, et al., eds. Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of Camera Surveillance. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. Lyon, D. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life. Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 2001.

Global Village The term global village is attributed to Marshall McLuhan, who used the term in his 1962 book The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man and again in Understanding Media (1964). Seen from his perspective, literacy, money, advancement in technology, and Christianization of Europe contributed to the homogenization of an otherwise heterogeneous world, such that people seem to perceive themselves as occupying a geographical area where they are fully connected and communicate with one another as if they occupy the same space. Yet this homogenization presents numerous challenges to society, including security challenges.

Factors Contributing to the Evolution of the Global Village Technology and the media created and promoted a network of relationships beyond city limits. News about products and happenings in faraway

434

Global Village

places are brought to living rooms through the power of the television. Today, people are able to communicate and connect with family members and friends thousands of miles away through the World Wide Web, telephones, and other communication technologies. Social media seems to have consolidated the reduction and metamorphosis of the world’s diverse populations by narrowing our differences, such as culture, religion, and political views, and thereby promoting interaction and understanding. Trading, marketing, and world politics have all contributed to the global village phenomenon. The benefits that come with shrinking distances between nations and peoples of the world through the use of the Internet, telephones, and increasingly affordable travel has brought with it other uncertainties and security challenges. Advancement in technology has created opportunities for criminal acts to be exported easily to other parts of the world. Thus, strategies for mitigating the problem of international criminal acts, such as installing and expanding surveillance cameras at strategic places, have become necessary. Other challenges to protecting people and their property against criminal acts include the impact surveillance cameras have on people’s freedoms and liberty. The inexorable march toward the global village according to McLuhan started with the invention of the printing press and the mechanization of other production processes during the Elizabethan era (1558–1603). According to McLuhan, these inventions seem to have thrown the Elizabethanera people into turmoil, as their lives were torn between their medieval corporate existence, to which they were accustomed, and modernism and its individualistic traits. Their society was experiencing drastic changes, which made it seem as though the world they were living in was at the same time dissolving and resolving. The progression from oral to written poetry also transformed people’s thought process, social organization, and politics. By implication, this meant that only educated people could participate in the written poetry activities. Thus, a division among the social classes was beginning to take place. Another factor that had a major impact on the social structure was the introduction of money into the economy. The transition from barter to

money economy transformed society in various ways, including transforming people’s culture, beliefs, values, and attitudes. Power shifted from feudal lords to mercantile lords. Money made it possible for people to move around more easily and also made trading possible. International trade and the discovery of other continents by Europeans was enhanced by the introduction of money into the economy. Money can also be viewed as a form of labor storage. Numerous other factors are also part of the evolution to the global village, including the progression in weapons from the use of the body for self-defense to the invention of nuclear and atomic bombs. Clothes, housing, and other conveniences to protect human beings from the elements prompted people to move in search of materials for their mass production—and money as a medium of exchange facilitated the procuring of these commodities. The development of languages and written words advanced the accumulation of knowledge and experience, which were key to commerce and industrialization. Commercial activities changed relationships from being based on tribal or other primordial affiliations to being based on exchange or interdependence through division of labor. In addition to these factors of change, the Christianization of Europe also contributed to the adaptation of society. This spiritual and cultural revolution unleashed by Christianization changed the discourse and basis of knowledge and ways of knowing. As can be seen from this discussion, literacy, money, technology, and Christianity are the foundations for the evolution of the global village.

Security Challenges The term global village has become a metaphor for how education, commerce, technology, the Internet, the World Wide Web, and social media have brought the world together despite geographical distances, language and cultural difference, and time differences. Through the Internet, people can now search for people and commodities of interest. With enhanced communication tools such as the Internet, people are able to read global news instantly. New products and ideas spread immediately to every corner of the globe

Globalization

through the Internet and other communication tools. Using the global village metaphor, the world has been reduced to a village where ideas and commodities are shared almost instantaneously. Klaus Kastle, the editor of The Nations Online Project, argued that to get a proper perspective of the global village, the global population of 7 billion people could be hypothetically reduced to a village of 100 people. Fifty percent of the village population would be males, and the remaining 50% would be females. Sixty-one of the 100 people would be from Asia, with 19 of them from China and 18 from India. Fifteen members of the hypothetical global village would be from Africa, 10 from Europe, 9 from South America and the Caribbean, and 5 of the village members would be  from North America, whose president would be the most powerful person in the world and control most of the world resources. In the global village of 100 people, 12 would speak Mandarin Chinese; 5 each would speak Spanish, English, Hindi, or Bengali; 3 would speak Arabic; 2 each would speak Portuguese, Russian, or Japanese; 1 German, and the remaining would belong to 1 of the 6,000 languages spoken in the world. Christianity would possess 33 members of the global village, 22 would be Islamic, 14 Hindus, 7 Buddhists, and 2 atheists. Eighty-two people in the global village would live on an average annual income of US$5,440, which translates to a disposable income of just $15 a day, with 51 of them subsisting on less than $2 a day. On the other hand, 18 of the global villagers would come from developed countries with an average annual income of US$32,470, which translates to an income of $90 a day. Only 33 of the villagers would have access to the Internet, but 77 of them would own mobile phones. In this hypothetical global village, 1% of the population would possess 40% of the global village’s wealth. Although factors such as literacy, religion, the World Wide Web, and social media, among others, have contributed to creating an interconnected contemporary network of relationships beyond city limits, such advancements have also created uncertainties and security challenges. One adverse effect of the closeness among people of the world is that weaker groups may feel that they are being robbed of their identities. Some scholars attribute hijacking and terrorism crimes to an attempt by

435

such groups to regain their identity and autonomy. From this perspective, violence is viewed as a quest for identity. Furthermore, the media, as a pivotal vehicle of the global village, can affect people across the world, even those in distant lands, for example, by influencing election outcomes. Security challenges associated with the global village phenomenon include cybercrimes, transnational crimes, organized crimes, corruption, violent extremism, and terrorism. Further exacerbating the security challenges is economic inequality and maldistribution of economic and other resources, which has created mistrust among members of the global village. Competition for cultural and economic advantages has made maintaining law and order in the global village a significant challenge. Some people anticipate the emergence of cultural genocide and are fighting back through any means necessary, including terrorism. Thus, the threat of terrorism is often cited as justification for the expansion of security surveillance with its attendant challenge of compromising people’s freedoms and liberty. O. Oko Elechi, Rochelle E. M. Cobbs, and Artiko Greer See also Globalization; Privacy, Internet; Religion

Further Readings Kastle, Klaus. “The Global Village: A Summary of the World.” http://nationsonline.org/oneworld/globalvillage.htm (Accessed October 2014). McLuhan, Marshall. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1962. Wellman, Barry. Networks in the Global Community: Life in Contemporary Communities. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

Globalization Globalization has become a fact of life in the modern world. While there are many detailed definitions of globalization, there is at least some general agreement that it includes increased connectivity between people in all parts of the world.

436

Globalization

The most obvious part of globalization has been the increases in economic connectivity among countries and their populations, including trade, foreign investment, financial and currency transactions, and exchanges of other types of services. The extent of globalization, however, goes beyond the economic sphere. There has been increasing social and cultural contacts and interactions as people from different parts of the world travel and borrow from one another. Furthermore, there have been recent increases in migration, including movement of educated individuals seeking opportunities for advancement as well as flows of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing persecution. Political interactions have also increased as governments have joined international organizations and cooperated in many different areas, including health, education, peacekeeping, surveillance, trade, and mutual security arrangements. Increases in levels of global connectedness have affected major political events such as spreading the ideas of democracy through social media in Arab countries in 2012 or facilitating and encouraging major terrorist attacks that have threatened the security of individuals and nations, such as the attacks of 9/11, the Madrid train bombings in 2004, or the attacks on the London transportation system in 2005. This entry explores globalization in the areas of economics, the environment, health care, culture and religion, migration, and surveillance and privacy.

disadvantaged by change. Increases in political instability and violence are an additional symptom as groups have challenged the economic effects of globalization.

Economics

Globalization has led to significant improvements in health care, but there have been some less positive effects. With rapid transportation systems, diseases such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), which started with poultry in Asia, or swine flu have spread very quickly. Global cooperation was able to keep the potential epidemic in check, but there were economic disruptions that came when individuals were hesitant to travel or when governments imposed travel restrictions. Of course, earlier increases in globalization that came with the age of European exploration resulted in epidemics. The native inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere were often devastated by European and African diseases introduced into populations that had no natural resistance. European diseases were similarly deadly to the inhabitants of the Pacific Islands. Better health conditions through

The interactions that come with globalization have had both positive and negative effects. In the economic sphere, there is no doubt that there have been increases in overall well-being and more efficient production at the global level. At the same time, local economic systems have been disrupted, and there have been inevitable losers as well as winners. At times, those who have lost ground in economic terms and who have not been compensated for those losses have engaged in disruptive political activity and even violence. Large-scale popular protests against the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international economic groups are a symptom of the concern present from groups that see themselves or their interests

Environment The increase in economic transactions has had damaging effects on the environment in a multitude of ways. Climate change is one of the latest manifestations; there have been earlier problems, including air and water pollution, the destruction of rain forests, the extinction of plant and animal species, overfishing of the oceans, and the deterioration of agricultural lands. These negative outcomes have generated political conflict between groups opposed to the destruction of the environment and groups that have had economic benefits from globalization. Further conflicts have centered on how to pay for the negative consequences and who should pay. Should the costs be borne by those adversely affected or ideally by those responsible for the adverse effects? Even without protests or challenges from environmental or other organizations, governments will increasingly have to deal with the consequences of this deterioration that could become increasingly expensive and thus negate many of the apparent economic advantages that have come with globalization.

Health Care

Globalization

437

inoculations, medicines, and improved sanitation have led to greater longevity and reduced mortality, which in turn have resulted in greater population pressures in a number of countries. The increases in populations have created social and economic dislocations that have been destabilizing, which can result in unrest and violence as there is heightened competition for the available resources.

they see as the negative effects of globalization have been in the forefront of the news, Islam is not the only religion with violent extremists who have opposed these changes. It has been suggested that the new source for many conflicts in the world will result from issues that separate different world civilizations that are based on different religions.

Culture and Religion

Increasing globalization has led to higher levels of migration in recent years. There have been previous waves of migration that have led to major population transfers. Europeans began the colonization of the Western Hemisphere and went in increasing numbers to these new (to them) lands. African groups steadily moved southward on that continent. Australia and New Zealand saw major flows of immigrants. All these earlier movements of people occurred with very negative consequences for indigenous peoples, which was one of the worst aspects of globalization in these periods. In the latter part of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, large-scale migration to North America occurred, with lesser movements to Latin America and Oceania. After World War I, this migration slowed, especially when the United States began to effectively limit immigration. One reason for the limitations was the fear in the United States that foreign immigrants were bringing in ideas that were threatening to American cultural values and ideals. With the onset of the Great Depression, most countries discouraged immigration since they were already dealing with high levels of unemployment and economic problems. In recent decades, migration has once again increased. Persons with employable skills have migrated to where the jobs are and frequently are welcomed for the skills that they bring. The economic disruptions attendant on globalization has led individuals from less privileged background or from countries experiencing economic difficulties to seek out opportunities in the more industrialized parts of the world such as Europe and North America. In other cases, there have been large numbers of refugees fleeing civil conflicts or persecution. Greater knowledge of the potential opportunities available elsewhere has fueled these movements, both legal and illegal.

Social and cultural interactions on a greater scale generate their own set of tensions within countries. One aspect of globalization is the fact that disparate groups can come in closer contact with one another than was likely in the past. Members of religious groups may feel threatened by the intrusion of outside ideas. There has been a noticeable trend toward more fundamentalist observance among Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and others around the world as a ­reaction to contact with outside values and concepts that are seen as threatening. This perception of threat may be connected to the appearance of other religions in a region, but more often is likely to come from increasingly prevalent s­ecularism. The secular values that come with modernization and globalization often originate in the West, resulting in religious defenses of values often ­taking on an anti-Western orientation. Increases in cultural interactions may threaten other values in a society, including the role that an extended family has traditionally played, reverence for ­ older individuals in social systems, reciprocal obligations between landowners and peasants ­ rooted in traditional values, or other types of social interactions and systems that had previously stood the test of time. There is little doubt that al Qaeda had appeal for many who saw its religious values and/or culture threatened, and the more diffuse attacks associated with the global jihad have continued to represent those opposed to the changes that have come with globalization. The Islamic State in Syria and the Islamic State in the Levant would also be an example of a very violent reaction to the changes and challenges that have entered into this portion of the world as a consequence of globalization. While Islamic groups opposed to what

Migration

438

Globalization

These movements have generated conflicts in the preferred host countries. One obvious byproduct has been increasing opposition to the new migrants in Europe and the United States. There have been political campaigns to limit the number of migrants who are accepted and calls for rounding up and deporting those who have entered and/ or remain illegally. The opposition has also used concerns about security from international terrorist attacks as one argument for limiting migration. In addition, there have been violent attacks against migrants that have been designed to deter immigrants from staying in the host countries and to deter others from coming. These situations not only increase levels of political strife but also raise very important questions about political and civil rights of the migrants.

Surveillance and Privacy With all the other changes that have occurred with higher levels of global interactions, it has also become possible for governments to increase their surveillance of individuals. The information on the surveillance activities of the National Security Agency in the United States leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013 demonstrated many of the things that were possible. It has become much easier for governments to track individuals around the world if they are willing to commit sufficient resources for doing so. Individuals can remain hidden from such surveillance if they are on a lower priority for a government or if they use extreme care. With access to significant resources and great determination, it took the United States more than 10 years to track down and kill Osama bin Laden. Of course, not all individuals who may be sought by a government have the resources to hide that he did. American drone strikes against individuals in the Middle East have demonstrated how effective such surveillance has been for tracking individuals. Such activities also raise significant questions of personal rights. When does reading emails and listening in on phone calls violate individual rights—or perhaps under what circumstances do these activities not violate individual rights? What are the criteria used to determine which individuals become targets for drone strikes? Obviously, individuals who have taken up arms against a

country can become targets, but what about others who limit themselves to propaganda attacks? Globalization and modern technology have clearly raised a number of significant new issues in this area. Globalization has meant that ideas, both good and bad, can quickly spread throughout the world. It is not always clear, of course, whether an idea is good or bad since it might seem to be extremely worthwhile from one perspective and tremendously threatening from another. Social media, satellite telecommunications, cell phones, and the Internet permit and will continue to permit people in virtually every part of the world to know more about what is happening elsewhere. Even groups that oppose the consequences of globalization somewhat ironically have been willing to use modern techniques to spread throughout the world their struggle and to attempt to recruit followers and supporters from around the world. Groups affiliated with al Qaeda, for example, have launched Internet magazines to promote their point of view of what the problems of the world and their region are and what should be done to resolve these problems. Modern technology that has come with globalization has been used to expose the perceived evils that have appeared and, at times, argue for a return to less modern practices. What is clear is that in the modern world, there will be a constant flow of information (and misinformation) that will influence the actions of people. James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz See also Immigration; National Security Agency Leaks; Terrorism

Further Readings Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 2000. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism.” International Security, v.27/3 (2002–2003). Dreher, Axel, et al. Measuring Globalisation: Gauging Its Consequences. New York, NY: Springer, 2008. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Goffman, Erving Margalit, Yotam. “Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent.” International Studies Quarterly, v.56/3 (2012).

Goffman, Erving As a microsociologist, Erving Goffman (1922– 1982) theorized the basic structure of social life through exploring the complexities of ordinary, everyday social interaction. That is, instead of focusing on large-scale processes (e.g., globalization, comparative political systems, the militaryindustrial complex), he sought to understand social life from the perspective of the individual within group life. As such, Goffman’s contribution to the scientific understanding of social life emphasized the ways in which individuals negotiate their sense of self throughout their mundane experiences in everyday life. Although he never explicitly focused his research on surveillance and privacy, his work—particularly in Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-toFace Behavior, and Presentation of Self in Everyday Life—provides theoretical context for understanding the microlevel social dynamics of living in a technologically assisted surveillance society. This entry examines Goffman’s work with specific emphasis on the concept of total institution, surveillance and how it affects the presentation of self, and interaction rituals commonly accepted by society.

Total Institution In Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, Goffman largely focused on conceptualizing a theory of the structure and processes within what he called a total institution. A total institution is a formal organization with a regulated social environment that encompasses, regulates, and monitors its participants’ entire public and private lives. Goffman identified five general types of total institutions: institutions that care for persons (1) believed to be both incapable of taking care of themselves and harmless to others (e.g., homes for the blind, the

439

aged, or the orphaned) and (2) thought to be at once incapable of looking after themselves and a threat to the community (e.g., sanitariums, mental hospitals), as well as institutions created to (3) protect the community from those perceived as dangerous (e.g., jails, penitentiaries), (4) complete work-like tasks (e.g., army barracks, boarding schools), or (5) establish seclusion for religious training and emersion (e.g., abbeys, monasteries, convents). Within such environments, individuals are under constant surveillance, their daily lives are preplanned, and they are required to perform very rigid social roles. Individuals living inside a total institution are referred to as inmates, and as inmates they are subject to the bureaucratic management of everyday activities. Inmates of a total institution lack some of the means that individuals outside a total institution use to construct their self-image, and they undergo a process that mortifies the self. Goffman notes that the procedures through which mortification of the self happens are somewhat standardized in total institutions located in the United States. On entering the institution, the authorities strip individuals of personal identity equipment and make them conform to the institution’s dress code. Further mortification of self occurs as inmates are restricted from communicating with family, friends, and acquaintances outside the institution who once functioned as a support system for the self. When inmates are allowed to communicate with individuals outside the institution, their conversations are often monitored. The aforementioned strategies allow authorities who are surveilling to easily spot inconsistencies or irregular behavior that may pose a threat to the status quo, even though they harm the inmates. Consequently, inmates often conform to institutional rules, present a good demeanor, and show deference to receive privileges or rewards as strategies to recover or preserve their self.

Surveillance Such environments are set apart from civil ­society. However, as a subtext within his larger t heory of the total institution, Goffman ­ ­acknowledges that elements of the total institution are applicable to other modern institutions, organizations, and even civil society at large. The

440

Goffman, Erving

characteristic of surveillance is important here. In the Internet era, all forms of technologically assisted surveillance ultimately originate within formal organizations. To be precise, individual companies or organizations provide the equipment and processes to facilitate the surveillance of people within organizations (e.g., in department stores, universities), home and online life (e.g., through home security systems, social networking sites, cell phone Global Positioning System), and even general civil society (e.g., using security cameras, traffic cameras, Street View on Google Maps). The overwhelming majority of individuals’ everyday life can potentially be monitored. Every cell phone call made, text message sent, and Facebook comment posted can be monitored and are often saved onto a server hard drive. Likewise, the mundane experiences of walking down a sidewalk or in a shopping mall are likely to be recorded by a series of cameras and available for retrieval at a later date. From Tiger Woods’s regrettable text message exchanges with his mistresses to the video retracing of the steps of the 2014 Boston Marathon bombing suspects, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, surveillance has extended far beyond Goffman’s total institution and into most areas of public and private life. Surveillance is the most pervasive and influential element of society, yet it often goes unmentioned in general conversation and unnoticed by the average person. Goffman, however, was quite attuned to the individual awareness of the watching eyes. Throughout Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-toFace Behavior and Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, he theorized a bifurcation between the internal, subjective experience of the individual self and the multitude of external constraints and expectations placed on individuals that create a situated social order. In much of his research, he was more generally concerned with understanding the structure of social situations by exploring the means through which individuals managed microstructures of self within everyday life. He claimed that individuals in the presence of others engage in impression management—performing self in a manner appropriate to the social situation and most advantageous to conveying one’s desired self-image to others.

Individuals do not simply present themselves to others in a manner purely associated with their subjective perception of themselves. Rather, they present themselves within the context of the general expectations of them, as members of particular social, situated roles. In this sense, he compared situated social interactions with the stage play, in which individuals prepare for their performance backstage before entering the situation, or front stage, with an internalized script assigned to their particular role in the performance. For example, the college classroom, as a front stage, involves implicit scripts and props for the roles of students and teacher. The actual performance of the students and the instructor are relative to the expectations the audience (i.e., everyone present in the situation) have of them.

Interaction Rituals Considering that people are tacitly aware of their activities online as well as their interactions within various organizations and civil society, broadly, they internalize a certain role that, at the very least, is characterized by not appearing suspicious. Such surveillance has become characteristic of what Goffman referred to as interaction rituals in public. Interaction rituals are effectively generally understood rules of conduct within social situations that individuals learn through general socialization. That is, interaction rituals arise naturally through collective interaction directed toward maintaining social order. Such interaction rituals involve substantive rules (e.g., laws, morals, ethics) and ceremonial rules (i.e., general perceptions of etiquette). In public space (including the publicprivate Internet/digital space), individuals negotiate their presentations of self with an awareness of the substantive and ceremonial rules of the situated interaction ritual. During interaction rituals within a surveillance society, individuals negotiate their presentations of self through two basic kinds of ritual activity: (1) demeanor and (2) deference. Demeanor is the behavior individuals engage in to express to those physically present and those who might be potentially monitoring them that they understand the rules of conduct and exhibit the desirable, and even undesirable, qualities relative to their situated social roles. Deference is the process of

Google

eliciting a positive evaluation of self by others through situationally appropriate behavior, such as compliments, salutations, apologies, and offerings that confirm their structured relationship to the recipient. Interactions in a surveillance society, similar to those in a total institution, are highly influenced by surveillance, rules, and reward systems established by authority figures. For example, at an airport, the interaction rituals for the social role of the travelers involve weaving through the screening line in rank-in-file order, presenting their official airline ticket and official identification card to the security officer (i.e., another social role), and removing shoes, jewelry, and the contents of their pockets when passing through security. The awareness of being monitored by various people and technologies induces travelers to adjust their demeanor and to follow the ceremonial rules in order to avoid further scrutiny. The ceremonial rules often consist of untying or removing shoes, removing electronics from carryon bags, preparing the ticket and identification for the security officer well in advance of speaking with the security officer, placing items on the X-ray machine, and passing through the metal detector, all the while undisputedly navigating the winding security line. Moreover, in most cases, travelers understand the informal expectation that they interact with the security officers in a polite, nonconfrontational, and unsuspicious manner, as they are aware that violating the expectations of such interaction rituals would catch the attention not only of the security officers present but also of those who are surveilling them at a distance. Goffman, therefore, was less concerned with the formal structures of the institution and the explicit power structure therein and was more interested in understanding the organic social processes occurring that every individual internalizes. Whether individuals are searching the Internet, posting on social media, shopping at a department store, or simply walking down a city street, the culture of everyday interaction rituals reflects an internalized feeling of being watched and monitored. In this sense, individuals often self-regulate their behavior relative to their perception of self and how they desire others to perceive and react to them, without having to be

441

overtly followed, filmed, or even reminded of the behavioral expectations relative to the social roles they perform. Brad Ictech and Steven Seiler See also Cell Phone Tracking; Foucault, Michel; Garland, David; Privacy, Internet; Public Health, Surveillance in; Smartphones; Social Control

Further Readings Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1959. Goffman, Erving. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1961. Goffman, Erving. Interaction Rituals: Essays on Face-toFace Behavior. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1967.

Google In the early days of the World Wide Web, the number of webpages was quite limited, and users were able to find the information they sought by moving from one page to another. But as the number of webpages grew exponentially, there was a need for a mechanism that would enable users to find the webpages that interest them more quickly and easily. Search engines were introduced to cover this need. A search engine is actually an online tool that is able to search for information on the web. Users submit queries that include keywords that describe the subject they are interested in, and the search engine sends back successive result pages that include links to webpages, images, and other types of files. One of the most widely used search engines in the world is Google. Google is a company that offers Internet services and products (e.g., search, advertising, cloud computing, software) that are employed by many Internet users. Google, in turn, is able to collect a great amount of information from every user, something that creates concerns for privacy issues. This entry reviews the history of Google before examining its products and services, which include a search engine and various productivity and social media tools, the operating systems associated with

442

Google

Google, and the company’s advertising program. The entry concludes with a look at some criticisms of Google, primarily with regard to claims of invasion of privacy.

production of the Nexus devices in the area of smartphones and tablets. Google is also considered to be the lead advertisement vendor on the Internet.

History

Google Searching

Archie was the first search engine, appearing in 1990; it searched in existing directory listings. The following year, Gopher was introduced in addition to Veronica and Jughead, two new search programs for documents. The first two web search engines appeared in 1993, soon after the beginning of the World Wide Web. In the following years, many search engines appeared, namely Wanderer, Aliweb, WebCrawler, Magellan, Excite, Infoseek, Inktomi, Northern Light, and AltaVista. In 1998, Google started operating and gradually became a dominant force in web searching. The Google search engine began as a research project of two Ph.D. students, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, at Stanford University. They developed the PageRank algorithm, which analyzed the relationships between websites. Initially, Page and Brin created a search engine called BackRub, which was based out of Stanford University, before changing the name to Google. The name “Google” derives from the word googol, which means the number 1 followed by 100 zeros. The Google search engine became popular, and thus it was moved out of Stanford, and the Google company was founded on September 4, 1998. In May 2011, Google reached 1 billion unique visitors per month, and as of May 2017, 3.5 billion search queries are submitted each day.

The Google search engine can be defined as an online service with its main function being to search for information on the web. The search is based on specified keywords entered by a user, and the search engine returns a list of the documents where the keywords are found. Search results are produced in a line of results called Search Engine Results Pages. The Google searching interface is usually quite simple, but there is also an advanced search interface and several filters that can limit the search to a certain language, time period, file type, or domain, for example. The Google search engine consists of three parts: (1) web crawling, (2) indexing, and (3) searching. The automatic web crawler (“spider” or “robot”) retrieves pages by following every link it collects. These pages are either not yet indexed or have been updated since they were last indexed. The contents of the collected pages are then analyzed to determine how they should be indexed in the search engine’s index database. The third part of the search engine process incorporates the search interface (accessible through Google’s webpage) and related software. When a user enters a query in a search engine, he or she is not searching the web but the search engine’s index. The user enters a number of relevant terms (keywords) that best describe what he or she is looking for. Google’s search engine accepts the user’s query and initially checks to match any advanced syntax and also, if the query is misspelled, to recommend more popular or correct spelling variations. It then assembles a catalog of search results that include webpages, images, and so on, relevant to the query. These results are ranked with the help of the Google search algorithm, which consists of various criteria (e.g., content, link citation data). Finally, the results are formatted and sent back to the user, usually with a list of relevant ads placed near the search results. To the user, this process appears to occur nearly instantaneously.

Products and Services Although when Google Corporation was first founded, its initial function was Internet searching, gradually it has expanded to other products, acquisitions, and partnerships. Specifically, it offers a wide range of software related to productivity, social media, and operating systems. The company develops and distributes the Android operating system for smartphones and tablets, which is currently installed in the majority of mobile devices around the world. It has also partnered with big electronic manufacturers in the

Google

Google Productivity Tools Google Chrome

Google Chrome is a free web browser that was introduced in 2008 and is employed by more than half the Internet users worldwide. It is available in more than 40 languages for Windows, OS X, Linux, Android, and iOS. Chrome is characterized as a secure, simple, minimalistic, and stable browser. Google has deployed the Chrome Web Store, through which users can download and install web applications as extensions to the browser. Gmail

Gmail is a free webmail service that was launched in 2004. It also supports SMTP, POP3, and IMAP4 protocols for using the email service via email clients from various operating systems. It is considered to be the most widely used email service, with approximately 1 billion users, as of 2016. The Gmail application for the Android operating system has more than 1 billion installations in smartphones and tablets. The service offers more than 15 gigabytes of free storage, shared with other Google online services. Gmail has been criticized for privacy issues related to its practice of using software to automatically “read” emails in order to improve the relevance of subsequent advertisements; Google claims that the emails are never read by a human being, only by the software. Google Calendar

This is a free time management web application that was introduced in 2006. To access it, users must have a Google account. Users can create and share single or multiple calendars with other users. The contents of Google calendars can be synchronized with applications across all widely used operating systems for mobile devices and as well as personal computer (PC) applications. Google Drive

Google Drive is a file storage and synchronization cloud service. It supports file storing, sharing, editing, and collaborating. This service also is

443

closely related to Google’s online office automation suite (Google Docs). Users have access to Google Drive via their Google account on both PCs and mobile devices. To synchronize files between different computers, the user must install a client application (available for Windows, Mac OS, Android, and iOS). Google offers 15 gigabytes of free online storage space that is shared with Gmail and other Google online services. Google Docs, Google Sheets, and Google Slides

These are free web-based office automation applications (word processor, spreadsheet, presentation) that work in conjunction with Google Drive (all files are saved to Google Drive). They support the online creation and editing of documents and also online collaboration with other users in real time. This office suite is available in more than 80 languages and is offered as a web application, as a Chrome app that works offline, and as a mobile app for Android and iOS devices. Google Translate

Google Translate is a free multilingual service that provides translation of written text from one language to another. The service currently supports more than 100 languages. Google Translate is offered via a web interface, mobile interfaces for Android and iOS, and an application program interface for creating browser extensions and applications. The service is utilized by more than 200 million users each day. Google Now

This is a free personal assistant application that is integrated into the Google search application for Android and iOS, and it is also available in Google Chrome for PCs. Google Now employs a natural language user interface to communicate with the user. It makes recommendations and displays information that will be helpful to the user based on a search history and other information it acquires from other web services that belong to the Google ecosystem.

444

Google

Google Books

Google Books is an online service that supports searching the full content of books and magazines that are stored in Google’s database. These books and magazines have been scanned and converted to text. It is estimated that Google has digitized more than 30  million books. With this initiative, Google attempts to create the largest online body of human knowledge. Nevertheless, this initiative has been criticized for copyright infringements.

Social Media Tools Google+

Google+ is a social networking and identity service that was introduced by Google in 2011. Google has defined it as a “social layer” that enhances many of its online properties and also as an authorship tool that associates web content directly with its owner/author. One of the most notable characteristics of Google+ is its circles, through which users can organize their connections into groups, thus allowing easy customization of their postings. YouTube

YouTube is a video-sharing service that was founded in 2005 and was bought by Google in 2006. It allows users to upload, view, and share videos. Blogger

Blogger is a blog-publishing service available in more than 50 languages. It was founded by Pyra Labs, which was acquired by Google in 2003. Google offers mobile applications for all major operating systems for posting from mobile devices. Google Hangouts

This is an instant messaging and video chat platform. It was introduced to replace other messaging applications that were employed in the Google ecosystem. Google Hangouts is the default application for text messaging for current Android devices. It supports text conversations between two or more users. This task can be accomplished

online through Gmail or Google+, or through mobile apps available for Android and iOS. Google News

Google News is a news aggregator that harvests news from thousands (more than 4,500 in the English version) of news sources published within the past 30  days. It was officially introduced in 2006, and as of 2015, it is available in 35 languages. Although it displays only a limited number of characters from each article, it does provide a link to its source. Google Analytics

This is a service that provides detailed statistics about a website (traffic, traffic sources, and conversions and sales measurements). The basic service is free, but there is also a premium service available for a fee. It is considered to be the most widely used website statistics service.

Operating Systems Chrome OS

Chrome OS is an operating system that is based on Chrome and ships on specific hardware from Google’s manufacturing partners. The system was built on a Linux kernel to work with web and installed applications. Chrome OS is installed in laptops that are called Chromebooks, and it has also been offered by some PC manufacturers. Android OS

This is an operating system for mobile devices (smartphones and tablets). It is based on Linux, and it is currently the most widely used operating system for mobile devices. It employs a user interface that is designed for touchscreens. Android is associated with the Google Play store, which includes more than 1  million applications. The source code of Android is available under open source license.

Advertising The majority of Google’s revenue comes from its advertising programs. Its subsidiary DoubleClick

Google Earth

provides Internet advertising services to advertising agencies and media companies. It supports interactive advertising campaigns. DoubleClick has been accused of spying through cookies to track how users travel from one website to another and which advertisements they view. AdSense is another advertising program. It allows publishers that belong to the Google Network of content sites to issue targeted advertisements based on site content or audience. AdSense utilizes tracking cookies, which some users feel threatens their privacy.

Criticisms of Google Every instant, Google collects an enormous amount of information from its users through its services. This information includes what users search, what sites they visit after performing a Google search, what they watch on YouTube, and what content is included in the emails they send through Gmail. Also it gathers information concerning the location of users through their smartphones, their credit card information, and what applications, music, books, and videos they purchase. Google’s privacy statement permits the company to share data across its services, which has resulted in various criticisms. Such criticisms include alleged misuse and manipulation of search results, intellectual property violations, compilation of data that may violate people’s privacy, censorship of search results and content, antitrust, monopoly, and restraint of trade. Since their inception, Google services have become popular tools for many Internet users. As long as users feel that providing personal information for free web services is a worthwhile trade, the power of Google will continue to grow. Andreas Veglis See also Email; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of; Social Media; YouTube

Further Readings Brin, Sergey and Lawrence Page. The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine. Paper presented at the Seventh International World-Wide

445

Web Conference (WWW 1998), April 14–18, 1998, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. Croft, Bruce, et al. Search Engines: Information Retrieval in Practice. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2010. Glossbrenner, Alfred and Emily Glossbrenner. Search Engines for the World Wide Web. Berkeley, CA: Peachpit Press, 2001. Gookin, Dan. Android Tablets for Dummies (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2014. Gunelius, Susan. Google Blogger for Dummies. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009. Kawasaki, Guy. What the Plus! Google+ for the Rest of Us. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education, 2012. Levene, Mark. An Introduction to Search Engines and Web Navigation. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011. Lewandowski, Dirk. Web Search Engine Research. Bingley, England: Emerald Group, 2012. Williams, Andy. SEO 2014 and Beyond: Search Engine Optimization Will Never Be the Same Again! Seattle, WA: CreateSpace, 2013.

Google Earth Google Earth is a virtual globe consisting of superimposed satellite images and aerial photographs. Originally developed by Keyhole, Inc., Google Earth was acquired by Google in 2004 and rebranded for public use in 2005. In subsequent years, Google Earth has expanded to include additional features ranging from Sky Mode to Street View to Historic Imagery, to name but a few. Its accessibility and range of applications have made Google Earth useful in several public and private sectors, including real estate, broadcast news, homeland security, educational classrooms, and even natural disaster relief efforts. For the same reasons, however, certain individuals and special interest groups have also criticized the program, citing privacy and security concerns. This entry offers a historical account of the creation, sale, and expansion of Google Earth; describes its diverse uses by the public and private sectors; and concludes with an examination of some criticisms of Google Earth based on privacy and security concerns. The information program now known as Google Earth was initially titled EarthViewer 3D. Inspirations for EarthViewer 3D included the

446

Google Earth

1977 educational films Powers of Ten by the architectural duo Ray and Charles Eames, the 1992 science fiction novel Snow Crash by Neal Stephenson, and the 1995 graphics demonstration “From Outer Space to In Your Face” by Silicon Graphics. EarthViewer 3D was consequently developed by Keyhole, Inc. a software development company located in Mountain View, California, that specialized in geospatial data visualization applications. Keyhole developed EarthViewer 3D with initial funding from Vicarious Visions, a subsidiary of Activision, as well as Sony Corporation, a multinational electronics corporation headquartered in Tokyo, Japan. Later funding for EarthViewer 3D came from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in its ongoing effort to remain abreast of the most advanced information technologies available. To acquire EarthViewer 3D, Google purchased Keyhole, Inc. in 2004. Google promptly rebranded the program as Google Earth and re-released it for use on personal computers in 2005. Google Earth was later released as a free download for smartphones in 2008. To date, the program has been downloaded more than 1 billion times worldwide. Google Earth constitutes a series of satellite images and aerial photos stitched together to create a digitally interactive globe. It displays a replete image of Earth as if viewed from approximately 30,000 to 50,000 feet above the planet’s surface. The superimposed images were originally two-dimensional, with varying resolution quality. The program’s image quality gradually improved over time. Developers at Google also integrated data from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission—NASA’s effort to map a digital elevation model of the Earth’s surface—to render three-dimensional (3D) images of the natural terrain and prominent structures. User-generated content soon supplied additional 3D renderings with even greater detail and texture. Using SketchUp, a computer modeling program popular among architectural and engineering firms, users submitted detailed renderings of buildings from around the globe. In 2007, Hamburg, Germany, became the first major city within ­ Google Earth to be shown entirely in 3D. In addition to 3D renderings, Google Earth has also expanded to incorporate a range of added layers and features: Geographic Web, Sky

Mode, Street View, Google Ocean, and Historic Imagery. In 2006, Google Earth introduced Geographic Web, which integrated location-specific information from Wikipedia—the open-access, online encyclopedia. In 2007, both Sky Mode and Street View were launched. Sky Mode was created in collaboration with the Space Telescope Science Institute, allowing users to view stars, galaxies, constellations, and animated depictions of planets in orbit. Street View was created in collaboration with Immersive Media and utilizes panoramic photography stitched together to provide a ground-level perspective of major metropolitan areas. In 2009, Google Ocean and Historic Imagery were integrated into Google Earth. Google Ocean allows users to explore underwater typography (i.e., bathymetry) beneath ocean surfaces. Historic Imagery allows users to view previous images of certain locations dating back to 1940, in order to see how those places once appeared as well as how they have changed over time. Additional features and add-ons include Google Mars, Google Moon, and an automotive version developed for the Audi A8. Due to Google Earth’s ease of use and range of applications, it has proven useful in a diverse range of public and private sectors: real estate, broadcast news, homeland security, educational classrooms, and even natural disaster relief efforts. Homebuyers and real estate p ­ rofessionals commonly report using Google Earth to research housing, neighborhood, and community options. Several broadcast news agencies utilize Google Earth to communicate locations of social and political unrest, particularly in the Middle East. Numerous military and governmental agencies use Google Earth to help ensure homeland security, with the U.S. Army and the U.S. Department of Defense serving as two of its earliest customers. Countless educators have used Google Earth in the classroom to discuss history, geography, astronomy, urban design, cultural differences, macroeconomics, and art and architecture, among other topics. Google Earth has also been used to assist during times of natural disaster. Following the 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti in 2010, Google Earth was used to view the area in the following days, helping plan both relief and rebuilding efforts. The utility of

Governing Through Crime

Google Earth—from real estate to news, to security, to education, to natural disaster relief— resulted in the founders of Keyhole, Inc. being awarded the Geological Society of America’s 2010 President’s Medal. Despite its success, the use of Google Earth has also been criticized over privacy and security concerns. Several individuals and special interest groups have denounced Google Earth as an invasion of privacy because of how it allows users to view the private property of others. These opponents argue that Google Earth puts expensive homes and neighborhoods at additional risk of burglary. Privacy concerns have also been expressed with regard to the automatic software that runs in the background to download program updates without users’ prior knowledge or consent. Other critics have condemned Google Earth for the amount of information it offers to potential terrorists. Several individuals have, in fact, admitted to using Google Earth to plan attacks: Lashkar-e-Taiba’s 2008 attacks across Mumbai, India; Michael Finton’s 2009 bombing of the Paul Findley Federal Building in Springfield, Illinois; and Hamas’s ongoing rocket attacks on Israel. Instances such as these have led to censorship of Google Earth in parts of India, Israel, Australia, South Korea, and even the United States. The program has been restricted completely in Iran, Sudan, and Morocco. In summation, Google Earth is a digitally interactive globe that was first developed by Keyhole, Inc. under the name EarthViewer 3D. The program was purchased by Google in 2004 and rebranded for public use on personal computers and cell phones beginning in 2005. Developers and users have since expanded Google Earth to include several added layers and features: 3D renderings, Geographic Web, Sky Mode, Street View, Google Ocean, and Historic Imagery. Google Earth has proven useful in a broad number of public and private sectors, including real estate, broadcast news, homeland security, educational classrooms, and even natural disaster relief efforts. The program has been criticized, however, over privacy and security concerns (e.g., aerial surveillance of private property, automatic software downloads, and critical information offered to potential terrorists). These criticisms have resulted

447

in the censorship of Google Earth in certain countries and the complete restriction of its use in other areas of the world. J. Jacob Jenkins See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; Big Data; Central Intelligence Agency; Computer Surveillance; Crime Mapping; Global Surveillance; Globalization; Google; Intellectual Property Rights; National Security; Public Health, Surveillance in; Terrorism; U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Further Readings Butler, Declan. “Virtual Globes: The Web-Wide World.” Nature, v.439 (2006). Goodchild, Michael F. “The Use Cases of Digital Earth.” International Journal of Digital Earth, v.1 (2008). Lisle, Richard J. “Google Earth: A New Geological Resource.” Geology Today, v.22 (2006). Patterson, Todd C. “Google Earth as a (Not Just) Geographic Education Tool.” Journal of Geography, v.106 (2007). Sheppard, Stephen R. J. and Petr Cizek. “The Ethics of Google Earth: Crossing Thresholds From Spatial Data to Landscape Visualization.” Journal of Environmental Management, v.90 (2009). Stahley, Tom. “Earth From Above.” Science Teacher, v.73 (2006). Thomsen, Charles E. and Robert W. Christopherson. Encounter Ecosystems: Interactive Explorations of Earth Using Google Earth. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2009.

Governing Through Crime The need for security is a requirement in any society. Crime and threat of criminal activity are powerful motivations for passing policy measures in government, and public safety is the primary goal of law enforcement agencies. Apprehending criminals and being aware of the potential criminal activity are tasks that contribute to meeting the goals of law enforcement. Yet security is about more than protection. The work of law enforcement and other power-based groups also involves community outreach and developing positive relationships in the community.

448

Governing Through Crime

There is a dual nature of security: On the one hand, cultivation of relationships of trust between the law enforcement and the public is necessary; on the other, law enforcement relies on the use of all available tools to identify and monitor criminal behavior. To achieve these goals, law enforcement agents take advantage of information and communication technology developments. Calls for increased security often go hand in hand with budget requests for new technology to aid in the fight against crime—the justification being that technology tools can replace individuals, thereby reducing the time and money involved in providing security. Technology tools can be used to surveil larger areas and share that information in real time, reducing the time it may take to physically call in and report suspicious behavior. This entry addresses surveillance, security, and privacy through an examination of predictive policing as a means to provide services to communities. As the official agency authorized to ensure public safety and security, the daily work of law enforcement officers incorporates tactics that require surveillance to provide security while protecting individual privacy. Law enforcement is a useful lens for this inquiry because officers must balance these three concepts continually. With the help of concerned citizens, this balancing act becomes more transparent and effective. Ubiquitous data collection and the ability to monitor data streams is a foundational part of predictive policing. This entry introduces the concept and practice of predictive policing as a means to govern through crime. Following the elaboration of the topic, case studies are presented to exemplify the impact of predictive policing on communities.

Elaboration of Predictive Policing Predictive policing is a law enforcement strategy to control criminal behavior and develop positive community relationships. The method relies on accessing data from multiple sources, analyzing them, and then using the information to anticipate and intervene in future criminal activity. The ubiquity of data gathering technologies provides law enforcement agencies that have the expertise in house or the budget to buy predictive analytics services to identify trends and patterns related to

criminal activity in their districts. The tremendous amount of data that are available are the key ingredients that make predictive policing different from earlier types of policing activity. Law enforcement strategies are continually being fine-tuned to address the needs of the community. A major initiative to address crime in the United States was started in 1994 following the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (108 Stat. 1796; Pub. L. 103–322). The law was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by then president Bill Clinton. Initially community policing was implemented to help law enforcement to better secure their districts. Community policing requires the presence of officers in the community to help develop a feeling of involvement and investment in the well-being and security of the neighborhood. This method requires officers who are working closely with individuals and are being seen and acknowledged as accepted members of the community. Creating a sense of belonging and commitment to individuals as well as the broader community requires time and face-to-face interaction. The goal is that once the community acknowledges that law enforcement are committed and trusted members of the community, residents will become more engaged and willing to watch out for one another. This should ultimately result in a more visible group of concerned citizens who are looking out for one another and the community at large. This should then ultimately reduce the need for a large police presence.

Cases The U.S. National Institute of Justice frequently publishes articles that include case studies of policing. Two examples of the use of predictive policing techniques were presented in an article by Beth Pearsall in 2010. New Year’s Eve celebrations often include random gunfire in the United States. As the clock strikes midnight, in addition to fireworks and champagne toasts, gunshots can be heard. In one community, the police looked back at data collected over the years, and based on that information, they planned an intervention by placing more officers in the areas where, in the past,

Governmentality

gunfire had been a problem. The year this practice was introduced, 2003, there was a 47% decrease in random gunfire and a 246% increase in weapons seized. In another case, officers compared data from residential burglaries to locations with land use code violations. The officers found that each code violation addressing abandoned or neglected structures resulted in nearly six times more residential burglary in the same area. Based on this information, the police department collaborated with other city agencies to address the full range of issues in these fragile neighborhoods.

Predictive Policing and Data Surveillance Each of these cases represents positive outcomes from using predictive analytics to make connections that relate to crime or neighborhood decay. While current predictive policing analytics have been successful in identifying where crimes may be committed, it is not a cure-all. The social ills behind crime are ever present. As Jonathan Simon argued in 2007, the “war of crime” does not necessarily address cause. Crime can be reimagined in medical terms as an illness that can be treated if not yet cured. Predictive analytics can also be effective when directed at prevention rather than apprehension. The algorithms behind predictive analytics can be trained to identify many different markers. The purpose of these data-mining programs are to find patterns, and they can be modified to identify potential causes of crime as well as indicators of crimes happening or likely to occur. Collecting and mining the data are only part of the life cycle of data use. What happens after the data have been collected? Who owns the data? Does the intervention prompted by predictive analytics start and stop at increased police presence or arrests? If so, do more arrests help make a difference in the quality of life for those in the community? This type of governing uses data surveillance as a tool to identify and target specific locations and individuals. Without additional participation from other agencies, the results of this type of surveillance may be neighborhoods where individuals are under a microscope, but nothing is being done to address the

449

broader socioeconomic issues that may lead some individuals to criminal behavior. Kristene Unsworth See also Crime; Crime Control; Policing and Society; Security, Concepts of; Social Control; Surveillance Deterrence

Further Readings Deflem, M., ed. Surveillance and Governance: Crime, Control, and Beyond. Bingley, England: Emerald, 2008. Lyon, D. The Electronic Eye: The Rise of the Surveillance Society. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Monahan, T., ed. Surveillance and Security: Technological Politics and Power in Everyday Life. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006. Pearsall, B. “Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?” NIJ Journal, 276 (2010). http://www .nij.gov/journals/Pages/welcome.aspx (Accessed October 2017). Perry, W. L. Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. Simon, J. Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Governmentality Governmentality is a concept developed by French poststructuralist philosopher Michel Foucault that seeks to explain how states maintain control over their populations, as well as the way governments (and governance) facilitate citizenry through the production of compliant subjects, with actual or perceived constant surveillance by the state playing a primary role in ensuring that compliance. Governmentality can be thought of as “the art of government,” as Foucault writes, or it can describe the methods and practices used to govern. Governmentality is thus aimed at how people exist within society and, specifically, how they react to the government’s directives, its formal institutions, and its associated ideologies. Governmentality can

450

Governmentality

be thought of through its etymological roots combining the French words for “govern” and “mentality.” This entry examines Foucault’s theory of governmentality by looking at how he defined it, as well as investigating the various concepts and forms of governmental control implemented to ensure citizen compliance. The idea of governmentality is based around poststructuralism’s amorphous understanding of institutions such as government, which Foucault would call the “conduct of conduct.” In other words, for Foucault, government is not solely an institution, but rather the mechanisms through which individual and group action are guided, mediated, and molded by outside forces such as the state and economy. These mediated relationships (which are governed) include the relation of an individual to himself or herself, between an individual and other individuals, between an individual and an institution, and between a citizen and the state, a worker and the economy, and so on. Foucault would argue that these forms of managed control are interconnected, opaque, and omnipresent. Therefore, in Foucault’s theory of governmentality, he is concerned with governance as an activity, not government as an institution.

Defining Governmentality During the 1977–1978 academic year, Foucault delivered a series of lectures as part of a Collège de France course titled Security, Territory, and Population. Included in this course is his essay on governmentality. In his “Governmentality” lecture (gouvernementalité in French), Foucault defines governmentality as follows: 1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target the population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means the apparatuses of security. 2. The tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led toward the preeminence over all other forms (e.g., sovereignty, discipline) of this type of power that may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of

specific governmental apparatuses and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of knowledges (saviors). 3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the 15th and 16th centuries, gradually becomes “governmentalized.”

In this definition, it is important to remember that while governments govern citizens, governmentality teaches citizens to govern themselves. Foucault developed this theory toward the end of his life, and the materials are largely contained in his Collège de France lectures (1975–1983), such as the one just cited, as well as a more in-depth discussion found in his course titled The Birth of Biopolitics, also taught at the Collège de France the following academic year (1978–1979). These lectures seek to explain and understand modern, neoliberal government—a topic that became Foucault’s focus toward the end of his life. Foucault’s idea of governmentality is closely linked to his discussions of “biopolitics,” “powerknowledge,” and “technologies of power/self/­ market” and can be exemplified by his discussion of the panopticon found in his book Discipline and Punish. For Foucault, governments desire certain types of citizens to organize the population economically, socially, and politically. These ideal citizens are said to have “docile bodies” and are therefore useful for the dual projects of state and capitalism. Once the state is able to facilitate the construction of these docile bodies, the theory posits that the citizens will self-govern (through “technologies of self”), obey without being punished, and produce without being managed. The methods of control and discipline intersect with Foucault’s other work, such as his writing on “biopower”: the micromechanisms through which the life (i.e., reproduction, birth, death) of populations is managed by power, as well as the construction of truth and knowledge, known as “knowledge/power.”

Concepts and Forms of Governmental Control The conceptualization of governmental control through governmentality incorporates older conceptions of hierarchical power from above and links

Governmentality

these to the influence of powerful institutions such as the educational system, health care system, and economic system, and the construction and legitimization of knowledge itself. For these institutions to be incorporated into government, they produce and reproduce sociopolitical realities while sanctioning those who resist. For example, although modern schools do not physically punish students who misbehave, they wield the ability to grant rewards and issue sanctions, which have meaningful social realities beyond the student’s grade. The institution of the school can thus instruct the student in dominant sociopolitical realities and work to internalize these lessons in the construction of a self-regulating student. This would be the same for a workplace ensuring the continuation of neoliberal capitalism, the medical clinic ensuring the privatization of expertise knowledge, and so on. This form of control seeks to ensure the smooth operation of the social order, the maintenance of hierarchical power, and the functioning of capital accumulation. Furthermore, the state seeks to maintain these standards without reverting back to the highly sensational, brutal, and visible violence associated with medieval states but, rather, by managing itself through institutions, ideologies, bureaucracies, and economics. In an example Foucault discusses in his “Governmentality” lecture, he argues that if a state is well managed, it will produce families of citizens who are well managed both socially and economically. He argues that both the family and the state are thus managed through similar principles, and that through a “downward line”—reminiscent of the idea of Reagan-era trickle-down economics—the management of the family becomes the management of the economy, which in turn constitutes the management of the state at large. Therefore, for Foucault, the essential task of the state becomes how to integrate the family into the apparatuses of control, as to do so ensures that those institutions “down the line” will function similarly. Throughout Foucault’s work, he tries to describe, interpret, and historically embed the notion of power and its changing nature. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault speaks of two main forms of power: (1) that of the sovereign monarch and (2) that of the society disciplined through omnipresent control. He explains that while the sovereign monarch was able to punish dissenters through public beheadings and other forms of

451

brutality, it was learned that similar control could be managed without the need to display such barbarity. In this newly evolved form of power, citizens are taught to self-police through the development of an atmosphere of totalizing surveillance. In other words, if the citizenry believe that they are constantly being observed and can face punishment if they transgress, they will cease to disobey and will become compliant. In Foucault’s developed history of power (what he would call a genealogy), one can trace a path from the visible violence of the sovereign monarch to the hidden disciplinary society of the panopticon, toward a third form of optimized control that produces citizens who are docile—governmentality. In his “Governmentality” lecture, Foucault dates this “era of governmentality” back to the 18th century and argues that it is precisely due to these measures that the state has been able to continue to exist. These evolving forms of social control mirror the evolution of the state itself from a “state of justice” (managed via known law and custom) to “the administrative state” (managed through bureaucracy and discipline), to a third era known as “a state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality . . . but by a mass of the population . . . a society controlled by apparatuses of security.” This third era of state governance can be called neoliberalism, managed through governmentality. Michael Loadenthal See also Agency; Citizenship; Foucault, Michel; Gramsci, Antonio; National Security; Panopticon, The; Policing and Society; Poststructural Theory; Power; Social Control

Further Readings Abrams, Philip. “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977).” Journal of Historical Sociology, v.1/1 (1977). doi:10.1111/j.1467-6443.1988.tb00004.x Burchell, Graham, et al., eds. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1977. Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977 (ed. Colin Gordon, First American ed.). New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1980.

452

Gramsci, Antonio

Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1990. Foucault, Michel. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976 (trans. David Macey). New York, NY: Picador, 2003. Foucault, Michel. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978 (ed. Michel Senellart, et al., trans. Graham Burchell, 1st ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979 (1st ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. May, Todd. The Philosophy of Foucault. Montreal, Quebec, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006.

Gramsci, Antonio Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) was a founding member of the Italian Communist Party, an intellectual, and an activist whose thought has had deep impacts on many different theoretical fields, including security studies. Besides being a politician and theorist, Gramsci, who was born in Sardinia, Italy, founded the newspaper L’Ordine Nuovo (The New Order). In his role as a politician, Gramsci helped organize factory councils, which were democratic entities elected by manufacturing workers. After founding the Italian Communist Party, he spent some time in the Soviet Union. On his return to Italy, he was appointed leader of his party and elected to Italy’s Chamber of Deputies. The Communist Party was outlawed by the Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini, and Gramsci was jailed in 1926. While in prison, Gramsci engaged in an extraordinary project, which would become the famous Quaderni del carcere (Prison Notebooks). The Prison Notebooks encompasses a wide-ranging historical study and theoretical analysis of Italian culture and society, and offers strategies for change. The remainder of this entry highlights Gramsci’s writings and beliefs on topics such as hegemony, the role of intellectuals in society, and his cultural theories of the time. Gramsci died in 1937 in Rome, soon after being released from prison. Although his ideas became known before that, it was not until the

1950s that the Prison Notebooks was published, and it wasn’t translated into English until the 1970s. His concepts and ideas have become a foundational stone of modern Marxist theory and political strategizing. His seminal thoughts on hegemony, and its cultural and political impact, have become particularly important in many academic disciplines, including security studies.

Hegemony According to Gramsci, hegemony is a type of social control. In his model, dominant groups in a capitalist society, including the ruling classes, keep their dominance by ensuring the consent of subordinate groups. Rather than using force or coercion, this is accomplished by way of constructing an ideological—and political—consensus between subordinate and dominant groups. In other words, dominant social groups manage to persuade other groups, by means other than transparency and reason, to accept their own moral values, political ideology, and cultural mores. This takes the guise of consent by the subordinate groups; that is, the dominated consent to their subordination and view these dominant cultural values as “common sense.” This pervasive common sense shapes people’s minds, both the dominated and the dominant, and secures each in their respective roles of leadership and submission. It also works to obscure the fact that there are deep inequalities in a capitalist society. The development of a class consciousness, in Gramsci’s view, helps illuminate the ways in which these dynamics operate. Other ways in which hegemony operates is through culture and cultural consumption. Thus, dominant classes strive to produce cultural goods that disseminate their views among the other classes and that are voluntarily consumed by them. These may take the shape of political and educational texts, but they also take the shape of popular culture. In some cases, the dominant classes cannot rule by hegemony alone. On such occasions, coercive forces are added to this moral and cultural persuasion. Hegemony in Gramsci’s view, however, is not a monolithic phenomenon. It is constantly negotiated and adjusted and can never be taken for granted, for it may change its form but not its function or character. There are, then, two basic types of social control: (1) consensual control and

Gramsci, Antonio

(2) coercive control. Consensual control occurs when people are persuaded to accept the dominant values and ideology as their own. As such, it takes the form of voluntary behavior. Coercive control takes place when dominant groups impose their worldview by way of direct threats or force. The latter occurs when a dominant group (e.g., the state) has not been able to develop a hegemonic leadership. On the other hand, in some cases the working classes may also develop their own hegemony to negotiate their own interests and even control the state. Gramsci explains that for this to be achieved, the working classes must take the time to organize a series of alliances with other minority groups, taking into account their needs and interests. These coalitions must act democratically, by respecting the autonomy and contributions of each group. By democratically uniting interests in one struggle, the working classes can lead the way toward a new socialist society. Ever so often, then, a shift may occur in which the dominant group begins to fracture or disintegrate, opening spaces for subordinate groups to transcend their strictures and organize an empowering social movement that may lead them to achieve hegemony. However, if they do not take advantage of the opportunity as it arises, power will eventually return to the traditional dominant class, and the latter will reestablish its hegemony, often by way of new alliances. Gramsci reenvisions Marx’s views by explaining the importance of political strategy. Marx had predicted that the masses will undergo a sort of spontaneous political awakening; however, Gramsci argues that a political awakening and action for change occur by forming a network of alliances or an alternative hegemony.

The Role of the Intellectual Gramsci developed great insights on the role of the intellectual in society. Historically, intellectuals of different persuasions have created ideologies that shaped the society in which they lived. These intellectuals often arise from and are ­supportive of the ruling classes. Therefore, the working classes need their own intellectuals to create a new ideology and hegemonic movement. Gramsci argues that the creation of a new society

453

requires different tasks, each of which requires, in turn, different types of intellectual ability and creative skills. Therefore, some individuals may be required to perform those tasks that are specifically intellectual in nature, while others are assigned other useful roles in the system. In some cases, these tasks are administrative, managerial, or technical. From these would devolve a necessary class of civil servants, economists, and political leaders, for example. However, each group needs intellectuals who represent the interests of its class and who also help the members build their class consciousness. In other words, the intellectual should represent the interests of the working class to the world and bring an understanding of the world to the working class. For Gramsci, ideally the revolutionary intellectuals must arise from the working class rather than be imposed on or adopted from outside it.

Gramsci’s Theories Because Gramsci was active in the political arena rather than in academic circles, his work is especially valuable to understand the ways in which ideology actually works and the benefits and dynamics of political organization. Although he was more of an activist than other thinkers, Gramsci’s theories have influenced disciplinary fields across the academic and ideological spectrums. He has been studied in fields as varied as political science, anthropology, communications, critical studies, cultural studies, security studies, sociology, and many others in the social sciences and humanities. Gramsci has proven greatly influential in the work of many renowned scholars. He is also considered much less dogmatic than other thinkers of his time and afterward. There is widespread consensus that his approach has been crucial for the emergence of a more critical take on fields in the social sciences as well as to understand the political nature of culture. The forms of domination and subordination that his work uncovers correlate closely to the ways in which culture is shaped, and shapes the minds and values of individuals in a society. Moreover, Gramsci takes on Marx’s work and reconceptualizes it for modern society. For example, where Marx assumes that social phenomena are always directly tied to economic structures,

454

Greece

Gramsci illuminates the role of culture. He also believes that Marx’s belief in the spontaneous nature of political awakening among the working classes was mistaken. In his view, such an awakening requires patience, hard work, and strategic organization. While today his concept of culture may be taken for granted in many fields, his theoretical concepts on the theme marked a radical shift in the cultural theories of the time, in particular how turning an ideology into a notion of common sense works to maintain class domination and, sometimes, even tyranny. Finally, many scholars point out that Gramsci’s work uncovers a dialectical relationship between the process of cultural production and the activities of consumption. His approach has many applications today in various contemporary fields, such as the constantly expanding world of mass media and technology. Dominant groups may use mass media and digital technology today not only to entertain the masses and disseminate ideology but also to keep a constant feed of information on the activities and preferences of its users, in order to perpetuate the dialectical and negotiation process of production and consumption typical of a capitalist society. At the same time, however, mass communication technology such as the Internet may prove an arena for emerging social movements to organize, network, and disseminate their views. Trudy Mercadal See also Adorno, Theodor W.; Fascism; Frankfurt School; Social Control

Further Readings Coutinho, Carlos Nelson. Gramsci’s Political Thought. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2013. Crehan, Kate. Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Ekers, Michael, et al. Gramsci: Space, Nature, Politics. Boston, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Gramsci, Antonio. The Prison Notebooks 1, 2 and 3. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011. Gramsci, Antonio. Selections From Cultural Writings. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2012. Santucci, Antonio A. Antonio Gramsci. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2010.

Thomas, Peter D. The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2011. Wolf, Eric R. Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Greece Greece has a long legacy of state surveillance, which has been exercised as a mechanism of sociopolitical control, and has been a prominent example of the benefits as well as consequences of state-sanctioned surveillance. This entry reviews the history of surveillance in Greece, which can be grouped into four distinct time periods. Also discussed is Greece’s surveillance for reasons related to economics as well as political activism. Greece’s postwar history can be categorized into four distinct surveillance periods. The first is the post–civil war repressive, anticommunist surveillance, which began at the end of World War II and continued until the end of the military dictatorship in 1974. During this period, the police, the military, and security agencies were exercising surveillance by using a network of informers spread throughout the country. Every individual and his or her family had a record that was called a dossier (fakeloi in Greek), which contained information about their “national loyalty” as well as about their ideological and political preferences. The second period began after the end of the Greek military dictatorship in 1974, when parliamentary democracy was recovered and the Greek Communist Party (KKE) was legalized. Surveillance during these years continued to be intense, although more discreet, and was focused on the newly formed left parties that were opposing the right-wing state positioning. The period lasted until 1981, when the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) came into power. From 1981 to 1996, when Greece had mainly PASOK administrations—with the exception of 1989 to 1993, when the New Democracy party came into power—“populist” and “Machiavellian” surveillance was exercised. During this period, the two main parties that were interchanging positions in power were organizing their own

Greece

networks of wiretapping. The fourth and final period started in 1996, and continues today, in which “new surveillance” practices were put into place. During this period, Greece entered the European Monetary Union and became a member of the Schengen Treaty. A well-known example of political surveillance in Greece from the latter surveillance period is the so-called Greek Olympic phone tapping scandal, which took place in 2004. This concerned the monitoring of the mobile phones of the Greek prime minister, his government, and top military and security officials, a case that is yet to be completely solved. What is exceptional about this case is that, although traditionally the Greek state has been the main source of surveillance—usually against the opposition and political activists—this was the first time the Greek state and its high officials were the target of surveillance. Spy software was installed at the telecommunications infrastructure of Vodafone Greece (one of the largest mobile telephony providers in the country), which allowed the surveillance of cell phone communication. It is still unclear whether Vodafone and/or Ericsson (the latter was responsible for Vodafone’s technical infrastructure) were aware of the tapping. What is known is that, 2 days after the discovery of the spy software and 1 day before Vodafone informed the Greek government, one software engineer was found dead, allegedly by committing suicide. The magnitude of these revelations made them the main topic of discussion in the Greek press at that time, and they still continue to be discussed sporadically. The political and psychological consequences for the broader public were imprinted in various surveys and opinion polls, as citizens felt powerless against such practices. Furthermore, in recent years, Greek society has experienced an unprecedented economic, social, political, and humanitarian crisis. Since the beginning of the Greek crisis—a period characterized by uncertainty, depression, corruption, and high levels of distrust of public and political institutions and actors—one can frequently find stories in the media about the state’s ubiquitous financial surveillance, targeting any organization, corporation, or citizen that may be involved in any sort of financial misconduct (e.g., tax evasion). Following state surveillance, arrests of citizens are presented in a dramaturgical way in the mainstream media,

455

along with blatant details of how the Greek Financial Crime Unit managed to arrest the suspected tax evaders after they had been put under surveillance. The high sense of urgency that the crisis creates and the fear of unintended consequences, such as the country’s bankruptcy, have also generated the necessary political legitimacy for the increase of surveillance. Another type of government surveillance that has been also frequently communicated via the media during the period of the crisis concerns surveillance of political elites or activists. This surveillance mainly focused on people and organizations on the far-left and far-right side of the political spectrum, usually on the grounds of their potential relation to terrorist groups and organized crime. A recent example is that of the surveillance of members of the main opposition, as well as civil society organizations and activists who participated in the anti–gold mining movement and protests, which have been taking place in the gold-mining area of Skouries, in northern Greece. Another case of government surveillance of a political organization is that of the electronic surveillance of the members—including parliamentarians—of the neo-Nazi political party Golden Dawn by the Greek National Intelligent Service (EYP) and the so-called Special Suppressive Counterterrorism Unit. In this case, the government was forced to publicly announce that a warrant from a judge had been issued and the members of the Golden Dawn party had been officially under surveillance after the public outcry that followed the assassination of an antifascist activist in Athens by members of this party. Soon after the assassination, the Greek government stated that important clues had been found that connect members of the Golden Dawn not only with the assassination but also with other criminal activities. The provoking aspect of this case was that the EYP had obtained incriminating conversations of the Golden Dawn military police before the murder took place, which showed that the Greek EYP was conducting preemptive, mass surveillance, like the United States’ National Security Agency. Dimitris Tsapogas and Vassilis Routsis See also Citizenship; COINTELPRO; Politics; Social Control; Social Sorting

456

Guantanamo Bay

Further Readings Samatas, M. “Debureaucratization Failure in PostDictatorial Greece: A Socio-Political Control Approach.” Journal of Modern Greek Studies, v.11/2 (1993). Samatas, M. Surveillance in Greece: From Anticommunist to Consumer Surveillance. New York, NY: Pella, 2004. Samatas, M. “The Greek Olympic Phone Tapping Scandal: A Defenceless State and a Weak Democracy.” In K. D. Haggerty and M. Samatas (eds.), Democracy and Surveillance. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010.

Guantanamo Bay Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp is a military prison owned and operated by the United States and located within the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in the southeastern part of Cuba (Oriente Province), 522 miles from Miami, Florida. The base, also referred to as G-Bay and GTMO, is situated on a 45-square-mile section of territory (land and water) that the United States has been leasing since 1903. As part of the lease, the U.S. government pays the Cuban government approximately $4,000 per year, but the practice of payment for leasing the land has not taken place since 1959. The Guantanamo Bay Detention Center came into operation in January 2002, shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, believed to be orchestrated by al Qaeda. As the terrorist attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan presupposed the construction of the detention center, its prisoners were originally said to be detainees of the global War on Terror. Although the base is the home of the infamous detention center, the main purpose of Guantanamo Bay is to act as a strategic logistics base for U.S. military forces, specifically the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, as well as to fulfill the demanding role of supporting counter-drug operations throughout the Caribbean. The naval base includes various commands, hospital and dental facilities, as well as parts of the Personnel Support Activity, Naval Atlantic Meteorology and Oceanography

Command, Naval Media Center, Naval Communications Station, Department of Defense Dependent Schools, and a Navy brig. As of early 2017, the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center, operated by Joint Task Force Guantanamo, was said to be home to 41detainees, but there have been a total of 780 since the detention center opened. Since January 2009, 4 detainees have died in custody, and 1 was transferred to the United States for prosecution. Since 2002, at least 7 detainees have died while in U.S. captivity. Former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld stated on January 22, 2002, that more than 150 detainees have warm showers, toiletries, water, clean clothes, blankets; regular, culturally appropriate meals, prayer mats, and the right to practice their religion; modern medical attention far beyond anything they could have expected or received in Afghanistan; exercise; quarters that I believe are something like eight by eight and seven-and-a-half feet high; writing materials, and visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross. (Sammon, 2003, p. 335)

Detainees at Guantanamo Bay are held there because the U.S. government has suspected them of being terrorist operatives. While many of the detainees are held because of their alleged connection with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations, groups, or cells, some detainees who are no longer suspected of terrorism or terrorism connections are simply awaiting relocation. It is estimated that approximately 175 former detainees have, as the U.S. government puts it, “returned to the battlefield” or have been “confirmed of reengaging.” A report issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2014 confirmed the numbers of detainees who have returned to fighting. At the height of the war in Afghanistan, there was much speculation about the exact number of former detainees who were able to find their way back to their previous lives as terrorists or as insurgent fighters. The numbers and names of those who reengaged were shared in testimony before the U.S. Congress. Since the detention center at Guantanamo Bay was opened, it has become a vivid symbol of gross

Guatemala

human rights violations by the U.S. government under the guise of fighting a global war against terrorism. A major criticism of the U.S. operations at Guantanamo Bay centers on the fact that neither U.S. nor international law applies and that even individuals suspected of acts of terrorism must be protected by the right to a fair trial and due process. Some of the detainees have not been charged with a crime, whereas others await trials that might not be held. Despite the U.S. government’s failure to charge or hold trials for individuals in its detention program, it continues to detain individuals, although the number is significantly fewer than in previous years. The U.S. Supreme Court has started to hear cases connected with the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center. As a result, the public has learned about some of the allegations made by the detainees about the conditions at the center and about their deprivation. Complaints include detainees being denied access to attorneys, being tortured, being denied bottled water, and having their sleep disrupted. Ann Fitzgerald, Director of Research and Crisis Response Program for Amnesty International, reasoned that the operations undertaken at Guantanamo are highly secretive and therefore often escape external oversight and transparency. As a result, the capacity for the external world to see what is actually happening inside the detention center is exceedingly limited. The Guantanamo Bay Detention Center may be interpreted as a small-scale version of the surveillance state and the infringement on civil liberties and freedoms that became prevalent after the declaration of the global War on Terror by the administration of former president George W. Bush. Accusations emerged about the U.S. government’s infringement on the privacy of attorneys who were defending some of the center’s detainees. Guantanamo Bay continues to attract much criticism internationally for its continued use more than a decade after the start of the global War on Terror. When Barack Obama assumed the U.S. presidency in 2009, he pledged to close the detention center. Currently, there are numerous worldwide advocacy programs and initiatives that call for the closing of the detention center and the release of its prisoners; however, the

457

center persists in its operations, though on a smaller scale. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk See also Al Qaeda; Internment Camps; National Security; 9/11; Taliban

Further Readings Fletcher, Laurel E. and Eric Stover. The Guantánamo Effect: Exposing the Consequences of US Detention and Interrogation Practices. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. Hansen, Jonathan M. Guantánamo: An American History. New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 2011. Khan, Mahvish R. My Guantanamo Diary: The Detainees and the Stories They Told Me. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2008. Sammon, Bill. Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism From Inside the White House. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003. Wittes, Benjamin. Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor After Guantánamo. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

Guatemala In 1996, Guatemala ended a 36-year civil war. Since ending this formal conflict, it has remained plagued by insecurity. Severe, systemic crime associated with drug cartels, gangs, and organized crime has resulted in the prioritization of public safety and security. Guatemala is committed to modernizing its security infrastructure, but changes in surveillance have also resulted in repressive measures that can target private citizens. The growth of private security forces and the expanded presence of military forces have contributed to this trend of repression. By all measures, Guatemala continues to be a dangerous region for journalists and activists, many of whom routinely experience surveillance in their home and workplace. This results in threats, intimidation, and pressure to terminate their work. Although Internet usage is still low in Guatemala, the state is progressively institutionalizing the use of different

458

Guatemala

forms of electronic surveillance. Government reports show that expanded reliance on public video surveillance is contributing to diminished crime rates, but violence remains a critical problem. Additionally, there are citizen concerns about the passage of laws that expand monitoring of electronic communication and phone records in the name of national security. This entry provides an overview of Guatemala’s surveillance practices, particularly in recent years, with a focus on its telecommunication surveillance, recent laws governing surveillance, and the expansion of video and cyber surveillance. Since 2011, surveillance of the electronic transmission of data and telephone communication has become prominent across Latin America. Only recently has Guatemala experienced restrictions on online expression, as noted in cases of alleged interference with social media sites such as Twitter. On Reporters Without Borders’ 2014 World Press Freedom Index, Guatemala ranked 125th out of 180. Its freedom rating had plunged 29 points from 2013. This drop was primarily caused by violence against journalists perpetrated by organized crime and drug networks, but press freedom was also stymied by governmental interference. Between late 2012 and mid-2013, the newspaper el Periodico experienced six cyberattacks. The government was accused of perpetrating the attacks to prevent the publication of allegations of government corruption, but it denied involvement. Suppression of dissent through cyberpower is a concerning trend for activists, but according to the Open Net Initiative, there is currently no evidence of government filtering of the Internet. In Guatemala, surveillance of electronic communication, Internet filtering, and data mining are less prominent than surveillance of traditional forms of communication such as telephones. Telephone surveillance has been furthered by the growing relationship between the state and private telecommunication companies. Guatemala has passed legislation that requires telephone companies to cooperate with police investigations and turn over intercepted communications from customers on request. Human rights nongovernmental organizations and journalists from newspapers such as Prensa Libre and La Hora have alleged that government officials, drug traffickers,

and corporate actors tap their phones to threaten them and attempt to influence their reporting. Such unauthorized surveillance is a violation of domestic law, but since 2007 Guatemala has passed several pieces of legislation that provide the state with greater oversight of telephonic communication. This has occurred while the government also enhanced its surveillance capacity, including the creation of a wiretapping center to facilitate criminal investigation. Although Guatemala has domestic legal protections for freedom of expression and has ratified international and regional conventions that preserve individual rights to privacy, the legal framework governing surveillance has shifted more power to the government. Two domestic laws— the Law of the Direction of Civil Intelligence (2005) and the Law Against Organized Crime (2006)—permit the government to record and monitor telephonic communications and use surveillance technology to gain intelligence that might prevent domestic attacks. In spite of challenges, the laws have been upheld by Guatemala’s Constitutional Court. The Law of the Direction of Civil Intelligence provides Guatemala’s intelligence agencies great discretion to monitor conversations in order to guarantee public safety, but the Law Against Organized Crime requires judicial approval of monitoring and restricts indefinite periods of monitoring. Following the passage of similar laws in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, in 2012 Guatemala passed the Mobile Registration Act for the Prevention of Cellular Theft and Extortion. This legislation mandates that mobile cellular customers, including users of prepaid phones, register their personal information and that companies share that information with the police. This law was presented as an effort to deter cell phone theft and identify the users of phones used in the commission of a crime, but it has produced some societal apprehension about the loss of privacy in communication. In addition to surveillance of telecommunications, in 2014 the state made a significant investment in video surveillance in Guatemala City. The National Police installed surveillance cameras in high-crime areas to capture individuals in the act of crime, track stolen cars with greater ease, deter crime, and potentially utilize facial recognition technology to identify suspects. Part of

Guatemala

Guatemala’s long-term plan for crime control involves integrating more surveillance technology into the intelligence sector and training security forces to share data and analyze patterns of criminal activity in order to enhance crime prevention. In keeping with trends throughout Latin America, this investment in surveillance technology has been facilitated by partnerships with international corporations and governments such as the United Kingdom and the United States. As Guatemala begins to utilize technology to increase its capacity to monitor and collect electronic data, there is fear of diminished privacy and freedom of expression. Similar to other countries in the region, Guatemala will have to weigh these concerns against the need to counter the growing cyberpower of organized crime groups. Kali Wright-Smith See also Cell Phone Tracking; Crime Mapping; Electronic Surveillance; Freedom of Expression; Policing and Society

459

Further Readings Flammini, Francesco, et al. Effective Surveillance for Homeland Security: Balancing Technology and Social Issues. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis, 2013. OpenNet Initiative. “OpenNet Initiative Country Profile: Guatemala” (2013). https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/ files/Guatemala_2013.pdf (Accessed December 2013). Reporters Without Borders. “Reporters Without Borders Releases 2014 Press Freedom Index” (2014). http:// en.rsf.org/reporters-without-borders-releases-12-022014,45849.html (Accessed January 2014). Rodríguez, Jorge. “Surveillance Cameras Help Police Reduce Crime in Guatemala City.” Díalogo: Digital Military Magazine (2014). https://dialogo-americas .com/en/articles/surveillance-cameras-help-policereduce-crime-guatemala-city (Accessed August 2017). Rodríguez, Katitza. “The Politics of Surveillance.” In Jo Glanville (ed.), Privacy Is Dead. London, England: Sage, 2011. “Vigente ley contra el robo de teléfonos celulares.” Prensa Libre (2013). http://chapinesunidosporguate .com/vigente-ley-contra-el-robo-de-telefonos-celulares (Accessed August 2017).

H to prisoners being held by the states in violation of federal law. Moreover, during the 20th century, the use of habeas relief continued to grow as certain amendments from the Bill of Rights were incorporated and applied to the states. A writ of habeas corpus is both a procedural remedy and a mandate issued by one court, sometimes a federal court, on another court, such as a state court. Specifically, a writ of habeas corpus orders that an individual be brought in front of the court issuing the writ, so that the court may then determine whether or not the individual is being held lawfully. It forces a particular court to give the legal basis for an individual’s detention or to release the individual. In very limited circumstances, per the Constitution, the right of habeas corpus may be suspended, such as in times of invasion or rebellion. For example, during the Civil War between 1861 and 1863, the right to habeas corpus was suspended by President Abraham Lincoln. The constitutionality of Lincoln’s actions, however, was called into question by some. Hence, in March 1863, Congress avoided a possible constitutional quagmire by passing a law allowing the president to suspend the right to habeas corpus when he believed it was necessary to protect the public welfare. During World War II, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the right to habeas corpus was suspended in Hawaii, which at that time was a territory of the United States. All state constitutions also guarantee the right of habeas corpus. Finally, both statutes and case law have solidified and clarified

Habeas Corpus In his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson said, “Freedom of the person under the protection of the habeas corpus I deem [one of the] essential principles of our government.” Unlawfully detaining an individual violates the basic tenets of liberty and individual freedom that the American legal system is founded on. The right to habeas corpus serves as an important safeguard for liberty and freedom by ensuring that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of their rights under the law. This entry first provides background information on habeas corpus. Then it discusses the application of writs of habeas corpus and recent policy and national security implications of habeas corpus challenges.

Background Literally translated, habeas corpus means “you have the body” in Latin. The foundations of habeas corpus can be seen in the English common law and date back to at least the 14th century. Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Suspension Clause, provides a legal basis for habeas actions in the United States. In 1789, Congress unequivocally gave the federal courts the authority to grant habeas relief to federal prisoners via the First Judiciary Act. In addition, after the Civil War ended, Congress extended the federal courts’ power to provide habeas relief

461

462

Habeas Corpus

an individual’s right to habeas relief, as well as the parameters of this right. Several Supreme Court cases have dealt with issues related to habeas corpus. Some of these cases are Brown v. Allen (1953), Harris v. Nelson (1969), Darden v. Wainwright (1986), Coleman v. Thompson (1991), Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993), and O’Neal v. McAninch (1995).

Applications for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Proceeding as a civil action against the state, an application for a writ of habeas corpus can be filed in a trial court, such as a federal district court. The individual seeking habeas relief must demonstrate that the court that ordered the imprisonment committed a factual or legal error. Moreover, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, the Supreme Court held that the error must have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, and as a result violated the defendant’s constitutionally protected due process rights. Hence, even a highly offensive action may not meet this standard. Applications for writs of habeas corpus are often filed by prisoners charged or convicted of a crime and claiming that they are being unlawfully imprisoned. Various federal laws afford the federal courts the power to grant habeas relief to state prisoners. When used by an individual after a criminal conviction, the right to habeas corpus is frequently utilized to challenge the legality of a certain aspect of the original proceeding that resulted in the individual’s conviction. Habeas corpus actions, however, may also be used by a defendant who is confined prior to a trial. Specifically, habeas corpus actions may be used for the following: to attack a particular court’s right to hear a case; to challenge a prolonged delay, in which an individual is being held without a hearing or a speedy trial as per the Sixth Amendment; to claim that an individual is being tried twice for the same crime, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, which protects citizens from double jeopardy; and/or to challenge the amount of bail set for a particular individual, as per the Eighth Amendment. The facts of a particular case, however, are not generally relitigated in habeas actions.

Policy and National Security Implications From a policy perspective, habeas challenges limit the finality of criminal cases and unlike appeals must be addressed if not explicitly in violation of a statute. Thus, in practice, some have argued that applications for unfounded writs of habeas corpus result in an inefficient judicial system by wasting judicial resources and placing an unnecessary burden particularly on the federal courts. In 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act transformed habeas corpus practice by imposing certain procedural restrictions that limited the use of habeas petitions in certain cases. Habeas corpus may also be used outside the realm of criminal law. For example, writs of habeas corpus may be used in cases involving immigration law and/or when an individual is being deported. In addition, habeas corpus may be used in certain family law cases involving the custody of a minor. Finally, habeas corpus may also be used by someone being detained by the military. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, habeas corpus was at the center of several Supreme Court decisions involving detainees being held at Guantanamo and identified as enemy combatants. In 2004, the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that detainees who were U.S citizens but classified as enemy combatants had the right of habeas corpus to challenge their detention. Other important Supreme Court cases related to the habeas corpus right of detainees from this time period include Rasul v. Bush, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush. In sum, the right to habeas corpus is a powerful judicial remedy that continues to evolve along with shifting national security agendas. Neil Guzy See also Terrorism

Further Readings 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).

Hamas Federman, Cary. The Body and the State: Habeas Corpus and American Jurisprudence. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997). Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969). Hawke, Anne. “Primer: Guantanamo Detainees’ Rights: NPR.” NPR (June 29, 2007). http://www.npr.org/ templates/story/story.php?storyId=11600605 (Accessed October 2014). Nowak, John E. and Ronald D. Rotunda. Constitutional Law. St. Paul, MN: Thompson/West, 2004. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995). Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).

Hamas Hamas, the acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic resistance movement, is a Palestinian terrorist organization mostly based in the Gaza and Jenin regions of the Palestinian territories. As a terrorist organization, Hamas has actively called for the destruction of Israel and its allies. Thus, from a security standpoint, Hamas is a threat to Israeli and Western democratic interests around the world. It presents a specific physical security threat to Israel as it continuously engages in campaigns of violence and attacks against Israel using any available means. Hamas also shares techniques and ideology with other terrorist organizations that threaten global interests. Like all terrorist organizations, the violence and obsession with destruction are a constant security threat, especially as Hamas’s ideology and viewpoints can inspire lone-wolf action around the world. The word Hamas in Arabic means enthusiasm. The organization is predominately focused on a Sunni interpretation of Islam. Hamas recruits from all walks of life, from the rich and the poor, the uneducated and the well-educated, each for their own purposes. Hamas is best known for extended campaigns of suicide bombings. Hamas has continuously interfered with and sabotaged the peace process in the Middle East, as peace in the Middle East is not in line with the Hamas

463

charter, unless Israel is removed from the region. While many Western and some Middle Eastern nations designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, other world powers, including Russia, do not; however, this does not change Hamas’s terroristic agenda and its threat to global security. This entry reviews the history of Hamas and discusses several of its tactics and campaigns.

History Hamas was officially founded in 1988 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, and Mahmoud Zahar as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, in response to a shift in the diplomatic methods of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) during the latter half of the first Intifada, or Palestinian uprising against Israel. Hamas has been in both competition and cooperation with the PLO since its inception; however, from the beginning, Hamas has presented a less diplomatic and more militaristic view of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, increasing their threat to Israel’s security. Since its inception, Hamas has actively called for the destruction of all Jews as a religious mandate, no matter where they live, thus threatening the security of all Jews worldwide. Before the 1988 foundation and charter, individuals involved with the organization had been engaging in violence against both Jews and Arabs accused of collaborating with the Jews and the West. Throughout its early years, Hamas competed as a political party against the PLO, and due to its more active role in the conflict with Israel, it gained more international financial support and membership than the PLO. The first Intifada was damaging to the Palestinian people, with hundreds killed and thousands imprisoned; however, it was quite beneficial to Hamas for recruitment and fund-raising activities around the world. Because the PLO and Hamas have been in regular competition for funding and for popular support and recruits, the two maintain an uneasy rivalry. In the 1990s, Hamas expanded its budget, its reach, and its operations. Focusing predominately on Israel, Hamas was responsible for a wide range of terrorist attacks against both military and civilian targets inside Israel. It expanded its fund-­ raising campaigns by creating a series of charities

464

Hamas

that both brought in and laundered money for the terrorist organization. Hamas also manipulated propaganda and media to embarrass Israel in the international press. In addition, Hamas formed both temporary and long-term alliances with other terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, while the PLO was best known for its links and contacts with the Irish Republican Army.

Suicide and Revenge Bombings Over the years, Hamas has engaged in an extensive suicide bombing campaign, a preferred tactic for Hamas as it can be carried out by small groups of people and requires limited funding and planning. A suicide bomber does not need extensive training or assistance. Often suicide bombers are recruited from expendable segments of the population—the elderly, the poor, or the infirm. Some volunteer and others have been convinced or coerced to become suicide bombers, the latter being most likely to not follow through on the attack or give themselves up. Hamas uses both male and, as of 2004, female bombers, young and old. Frequently bombers have been disguised to help them reach their targets with limited interaction with Israeli law enforcement or intelligence services. Bombers have been disguised as Israeli soldiers, Orthodox Jews, wedding party guests, police officers, and so forth. Hamas capitalizes on suicide bombers as martyrs, using photos, videos, and funerals for propaganda and commercial purposes. Commercials have been produced and aired on Palestinian television extolling the virtues of suicide bombers and encouraging the young to participate in suicide attacks. Furthermore, Hamas has provided death benefits to the families of some suicide bombers. Hamas has worked diligently over time to present its attacks as retribution against offenses first committed by Israel specifically or Jews individually or generally. This is often accomplished by Hamas providing press releases, interviews, or audio releases presenting a suicide bombing or  vehicle bombing as revenge for a specific Israeli or Jewish action. The primary campaign of revenge bombings lasted from 1994 to 2005. During the first year of this suicide campaign, the primary bomb maker for Hamas, Yehiya Ayyash, trained a wide range of bombers and bomb makers to spread his skills and knowledge throughout the various terrorist

networks operating in the region. His death sparked a wide range of deadly suicide bombings and led up to the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000.

Riots Riots are another popular Hamas tactic, especially violent ones where the riots become mob violence employing stones, clubs, guns, and knives to injure or kill as many Israelis as possible. These incidents help fuel the back-and-forth nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as tensions run high between both groups. Other times, Hamas engages in armed conflict, hardly dissimilar from actual warfare with Israeli forces, including launching rockets and grenades at both civilian and military targets, mostly from civilian areas, to greater discredit or embarrass Israel when civilians are injured, endangered, or killed when they return fire.

Recruiting Hamas regularly recruits from refugee camps and holds training throughout the Middle East, both inside and outside of Gaza and Jenin. In addition, it recruits Muslims around the world for attacks on Israeli and Western democratic interests. Much of the international recruitment is done through propaganda. Some of the propaganda are produced by Hamas purely for this purpose and some are created through misrepresentation, through which the Western media presents the Hamas agenda without full Hamas involvement. Throughout the Western world, Hamas has a linked network of charities, public relations, and speakers who seek donations, assistance, and supporters. Some of these charities have been outlawed in Western countries, and many schools and universities have attempted to limit access of Hamasassociated speakers to their campuses.

Other Strategic Operations Hamas has maintained a presence in Lebanon, where it previously controlled a state-shell, a territory that was solely managed and controlled by the organization and not the government of the country. Hamas also maintains a presence in Syria, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as within Israel itself and on the Egyptian border. These

Hate Crimes

various locations are used for a variety of strategic purposes. Hamas has presented itself as a lobbying organization focused on prisoner rights in Israel, a smuggling operation from the Egyptian border, a military force and political organization in Syria, Gaza, and the West Bank. Beyond these strategic locations for operations, Hamas members and supporters are found around the world. Because of its involvement in terrorism and unrest in the Middle East, Hamas is frequently under surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States and other agencies abroad. Surveillance flights and drone use have focused on Hamas as a point of concern, both for the United States and its allies in the Middle East. As Hamas has been detrimental to the Middle East peace process, surveillance of Hamas increases around any talk of Middle East peace or visits to the region by U.S. dignitaries. In 2006, Hamas members gained control in parliamentary elections over the Fatah party of the PLO. This raised concerns throughout the Western world, and diplomatic requests were made along with sanctions to attempt to bring about negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Animosity continued, resulting in the 2007 battle of Gaza in which Hamas gained control of Gaza at the same time that its political members were ousted from the West Bank. This began a blockade of the Gaza Strip by Israel and an increase in security measures between Israel and Gaza. At this time, it was also discovered that Hamas had created a series of tunnels under the border between Israel and Gaza, as well as between Gaza and Egypt. Such tunnels were used for smuggling, storing weapons and munitions, and kidnapping hostages. In 2011, Hamas announced that it would engage in joint political operations with the PLO’s Fatah party, though the partnership’s success is uncertain due to the history of competition between the two organizations. Despite repeated assassinations of high-ranking Hamas members, and the defection of Hamas members to other organizations, Hamas remains a strong and viable organization and a threat to global security. Clairissa D. Breen See also Israel; Terrorism; War on Terror

465

Further Readings Alshaer, Atef. “The ‘Other’ in the Discourse of Hamas and Hizbullah.” In R. Gleave and I. Nagy (eds.), Violence in Modern Islamic Thought. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, in press. Butler-Smith, A. A. and P. Roberts. Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Essential Reference Guide. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2014. Gunning, J. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010. Levitt, M. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. McGeough, P. Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas. New York, NY: New Press, 2010. Shanzer, M. Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Hate Crimes Hate crime is defined as a criminal offense against a person or property motivated by prejudice against a race, religion, ethnicity, disability, or sexual orientation. The term hate crime was introduced in the late 1970s by civil rights advocates, activists, and journalists to describe a series of violent acts perpetrated against African Americans, Asians, and Jews. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates a national annual average of 191,000 incidents reported to the police. This number may be underestimated, as only 44% of incidents are reported to the police. There are four primary categories of hate crime motivation: (1) thrill seeking, which involves a desire for excitement through criminal activity (66% of incidents); (2) defensive, which involves protecting a community from perceived outsiders (25% of incidents); (3) retaliatory, which involves acting in response to a real or perceived hate crime (8% of incidents); and (4) mission, which involves persistent commitment to acts of prejudice (less than 1% of incidents). Approximately 55% of hate crimes involve racial bias, followed by association (e.g., multiracial couples, adopted children) (31%), ethnicity (29%), sexual orientation

466

Hate Crimes

(18%), perceived characteristic (14%), religion (13%), and disability (11%). Distressed assertions regarding the societal impact of bias-motivated crimes prompted several legislative proposals during the final decades of the 20th century. In 1981, Washington and Oregon became the first states to pass hate crime legislation. In 2017, hate crime statutes existed in 45 states. Each state’s hate crime legislation varies with respect to the range of crimes addressed, the groups protected, and penalty guidelines. The majority of states and large metropolitan areas have task forces dedicated to hate crime prevention, awareness, intervention, and investigation. Community organizations often coordinate with hate crime task forces. Policy-level officials often initiate plans and procedures for such coordination of multiple agencies and organizations in efforts related to hate crimes. Many states have training requirements for law enforcement, guidelines for data collection, an array of predicate or underlying crimes, and provisions for civil remedies. The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1999 mandated national collection of data on reported hate crimes. The collected data are utilized to inform prevention efforts and facilitate public awareness, investigations, and legislation. However, as this entry discusses, the practice of gathering data to address hate crimes, as well as the increased surveillance of lawful hate activity, is not without privacy concerns.

Legislation and Prevention Efforts In the 1993 case of Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the U.S. Supreme Court found that penalty enhancement statutes for hate crimes do not violate First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution rights of expression. In the 1993 case of In re Joshua H., the 6th District California Appellate Court held that bias-motivated specific intent to deprive an individual of any clearly identified right protected by federal or state law is tantamount to a hate crime. In the wake of the murders of Matthew Shepard in Wyoming and James Byrd Jr. in Texas, new legislation expanded the federal government’s authority to prosecute violent acts and attempted violence that violates federal civil rights statutes. The 2009 legislation gave specific

mention to violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals. The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act allocates funding and technical support to local, state, and tribal jurisdictions to increase the efficacy of investigation, prosecution, and prevention. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been responsible for investigating bias-motivated crimes since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which declared that protection of civil rights is a federal function. In addition, the FBI maintains guidelines for national hate crime data collection under the Uniform Crime Reporting Program. Most FBI field offices participate in Hate Crime Working Groups. These groups unite community and law enforcement resources to strategize solutions to hate crime issues. Cases of historical alleged crimes may be reopened with investigative emphasis on bias motivation. The Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act of 2007 mobilized several federal investigative offices and local law enforcement departments to identify and investigate racially motivated murders from the civil rights era that had not previously received closure. The FBI is engaged in several prevention efforts, including the facilitation of yearly training for federal agents. The bureau also provides organizational, law enforcement, and community groups with seminars, training, and workshops to educate, promote cooperation, and decrease civil rights violations. Training programs include curriculum germane to investigative practices, data collection and reporting, scenario-specific interventions, interagency coordination, collaboration with affected communities, and working with victims. Several standardized curriculum packets for hate crime training have been ­developed and released by the U.S. Department of Justice. Many police departments have adopted policies that mandate hate crime training for patrol officers, detectives, and command officers.

Data Collection and Surveillance A growing trend exists in surveillance of lawful hate activity, which has been associated with ­subsequent criminal hate activity. Many nongovernmental

Hate Crimes

organizations, as well as government organizations, law enforcement agencies, and specialized task forces, regularly document hate-related incidents and allocate such data toward prevention, investigation, and prosecution. Such organizations and agencies include the Southern Poverty Law Center, Human Rights Watch, Center for the Prevention of Hate Violence, Anti-Defamation League, and U.S. Department of Justice. Law enforcement entities have utilized hate group monitoring since the 1960s, though with the advent of the World Wide Web, methods for collection of data on hate activity have evolved. Hate-focused intelligence operations have become wider reaching, more focused on hate network communications, and less dependent on intrusive measures, given the publicly accessible nature of the majority of web-based activity. On the whole, electronic communications screening and analysis has become a dominant method of hate activity investigation and monitoring of hate groups. In recent years, technologies have been used by organizations such as the International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination to create and maintain maps depicting the geographical locations in which hate groups have been active. Technology-assisted measures have been a primary tool in raising awareness and reducing risk of criminal hate activity.

Privacy Concerns Privacy continues to be a topic of contention with respect to hate crime prevention and information gathering. Civil liberties, particularly freedom of speech, remain topics of policy debate and public discourse. Many organizations and initiatives have advocated the development of policies and laws criminalizing offensive speech as “hate speech.” Many colleges and institutions have created and enforced speech codes, which, since the late 1980s, have been used to identify and punish verbal offense. The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and other nonprofit entities advocate the preservation of freedom of speech and association through legal action. The FBI asserts that hate itself is not a crime; thus efforts toward addressing hate crimes should not unduly threaten or impede essential constitutional freedoms. The gathering of intelligence related to hate

467

activity and hate groups is subject to legal restrictions and is only lawful once criminal predicate has been established. The proliferation of the Internet has extended the capabilities and reach of socially disruptive and destructive hate groups. Since the turn of the 21st century, tort laws have been developed to address privacy issues, bias-motivated threats, instigation of bias-motivated rights violations, crime organization and mobilization, and harassment in cyberspace. Such tort laws recognize the growing potential of bias-motivated harm as a result of technological capabilities. The laws encompass the plight of the individual as well as bases of social justice. The debate delineating hate speech and free speech is increasingly considerate of inflicted emotional distress, ­ defamation, discrimination, and incitement to ­ acts of harm.

Prosecution and Conciliation Hate crimes are often prosecuted in federal jurisdictions in the United States. They are federally prosecuted on the condition that the attorney general certifies a state or local court’s (1) unwillingness or inability to prosecute, or (2) preference for federal prosecution, or (3) failure of the trial or investigation’s findings to satisfy federal interest to combat bias-motivated crime. The rationale for hate crime legislation is that a single crime motivated by targeted hate can place entire groups of people at risk of subsequent threat, attack, discrimination, or civil violation. Hate crime statutes place additional penalties on individuals who are convicted of unlawful acts that are found to be motivated by prejudice. The Community Relations Service (CRS), an arm of the U.S. Department of Justice, provides conciliation services to local and state authorities and officials. CRS does not hold law enforcement or case investigation authority. The purpose of the CRS is to resolve and prevent ethnic and racial tension and conflicts, and bias-motivated criminal and civil disorder. The scope of the CRS includes technical assistance, public education and awareness, school-based programs, event contingency planning, and training curriculum. The CRS is available to police chiefs, school superintendents, mayors, and governors for assistance in quelling

468

Health Management Organizations

such issues. It confidentially develops resolutions and crisis interventions specifically engineered to address the concerns at hand. Debra Warner and Reginaldo Chase Espinoza See also Crime; Crime Mapping; Privacy, Internet

Further Readings American Prosecutors Research Institute. A Local Prosecutor’s Guide for Responding to Hate Crimes. Alexandria, VA: Author, 2003. Bleich, E. “The Rise of Hate Speech and Hate Crime Laws in Liberal Democracies.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, v.37/6 (2011). doi:10.1080/13691 83X.2011.576195 Bune, Karen L. “Law Enforcement Must Take Lead on Hate Crimes.” The Police Chief, v.71/4 (2004). Coker, C. T. “Hope-Fulfilling or Effectively Chilling? Reconciling the Hate Crimes Prevention Act With the First Amendment.” Vanderbilt Law Review, v.64/1 (2011). Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Hate Crimes” (n.d.). http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/ hate_crimes/overview (Accessed September 2017). McDevitt, J., et al. “Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology.” Social Issues, v.58 (2002). Michener, W. “The Individual Psychology of Group Hate.” Journal of Hate Studies, v.10/1 (2012). Perry, T. L. “Gendered Hate: Exploring Gender in Hate Crime Law.” Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, v.39/3 (2012). Roxell, L. “Hate, Threats, and Violence: A Register Study of Persons Suspected of Hate Crime.” Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology & Crime Prevention, v.12/2 (2011). doi:10.1080/14043858.201 1.623391 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 47 (1993).

Health Management Organizations Health management organizations (HMOs) were designed to coordinate the fundamental health care services of enrollees for one flat payment. HMOs provide these medical services through different models: (a) through their own staff, ­

(b) through a group organization of physicians contracted by the HMO to serve their patient population, or (c) through individual practice associations. Individual practice associations contract with independent physicians to be responsible for a certain number of patients while remaining free to contract with other HMOs or patients willing to pay for their services. Traditionally, patients were assigned a primary physician who provides most health care services and who must refer a patient for specialist care or hospitalization. A hallmark and major concern with the use of HMOs was the centralizing and analysis of patient data, which could have implications for patient privacy and security.

History Federal support for the development of HMOs began with the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, but subsequent legislation has considerably altered HMO requirements from the original act. Development of economically feasible HMOs proved difficult because factors such as a lack of qualified administration, high cost of treating medically underserved populations, varying levels of quality in existing provider networks, fluctuating federal reimbursement for providing Medicare and Medicaid care, changing legislation regarding requirements for HMOs, difficulty in negotiating antitrust legislation, securing viable prices for fulfilling prescriptions, promoting public acceptance and understanding of the potential benefits of managed care, and the need to compete with existing health care providers meant that an economically viable HMO would often need to compromise on promises of affordable and available health care to maintain quality and financial viability. Initial HMO growth continued from the founding of the act through the 1980s, but analysis suggests that HMO coverage has peaked at just under one third of the market. Contemporarily, the HMO model often ensures more basic coverage and is no longer coordinated by a gatekeeper but, instead, requires enrollees to pay additional fees to see out-of-network providers or obtain services not covered. The federal support for HMOs marked an increase in development of managed health care, though groups offering such care existed, such as

Health Management Organizations

the Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program and the Roos-Loos Medical Group. Central coordination of health care services was meant as an alternative to the prevailing indemnity (“fee-­ for-service”) plans, with the hopes to reduce medical spending while improving care quality and to address the need for affordable care for rural and urban populations traditionally underserved by the medical community.

Privacy and Security Concerns In theory, an HMO’s pool of paying enrollees guarantees a steady source of income. This income allows HMOs to compensate physicians either by salary or capitation, decoupling physician income from the amount of tests ­ or  ­ procedures ordered. This removes incentive for  unnecessary medical spending and allows increased emphasis on preventive medicine to reduce later medical costs. Centralized administrations also allowed the HMO to track physician spending and address any charges perceived as inappropriate by peer review in order to encourage physicians to reduce excess. This has been a large source of concern for privacy advocates who feel that HMOs should not be part of the physician-patient relationship. While in theory, large patient enrollment creates justification for the purchase of costly medical technology and physician specialization, many have cited HMO decisions to veto physicianrequested tests with the bottom line at interest, putting into question whether HMOs should actually have access to patient records, as many of them lack medical qualifications. This aim to make medicine more cost-effective also comes with the fear that such managed care promotes suboptimal care, as encouragement to reduce spending may hinder the use of more expensive procedures or more aggressive treatments. There was reluctance from physicians to join organizations, as conformation to HMO policies reduces practitioner anonymity and requires a new mindset of accountability in cost and effectiveness of treatment. A centralized administration allows tracking of patient’s health status, the health care received, and the outcomes of these practices. This includes

469

data such as the length of hospital stay; the procedures, tests, and type of medical care (inpatient vs. outpatient) utilized; and patient health outcomes following treatments. These data are used by the federal government and groups, including the National Committee for Quality Assurance and the American Medical Association, to (a) try and address the relative quality of health care offered by HMOs as opposed to other health care models and (b) enforce HMO compliance with standards of care, which were determined by the data collected. This method of centralizing patient data is claimed to increase individual patient quality of care—electronic data systems accessible to all the medical providers in the system increases efficiency of care, reduces redundant services and tests, and keeps a more accurate model of a patient’s history and needs. However, it also provides a clearinghouse of patient data in one location, leading to the potential for a wide-reaching security breach if not carefully protected. Despite this caveat, tracking health care practices in this way transformed how physicians approach practicing medicine. As standard treatments were defined and validated by patient outcomes, a new accountability of practicing medicine was defined by measurable quality of medical care. Linking financial analysis of services to patient outcome aims to objectively increase quality of care in the HMO, while simultaneously reducing ineffective medical spending. Annika C. Lee and Ian C. Clift See also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010; Privacy, Medical

Further Readings American Medical Association. “Report of the Council of Medical Services: Impact of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973.” Paper presented by Dr. Ardis D. Hoven (CMS Report 4-A04), 2003. http://www.ama-assn.org/meetings/public/ annual04/cms4a04.rtf (Accessed June 2015). Cameron, David. “Fixed Payments Not a Barrier to Quality of Care in HMOs.” Harvard Medical School: News (2013). https://hms.harvard.edu/news/fixedpayments-not-barrier-quality-care-hmos-7-8-13 (Accessed June 2015).

470

Hepting v. AT&T

Coombs, Jan Gregoire. The Rise and Fall of HMOs. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–222, § 1–2, 87 Stat. 914–936. http://www .gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE87-Pg914.pdf (Accessed June 2015). Health Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–460, § 1, 90 Stat. 1945–60. http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-90/pdf/STATUTE90-Pg1945.pdf (Accessed June 2015). Markovich, Martin. The Rise of HMOs (Dissertations: RGSD-172). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003. http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/ RGSD172.html (Accessed June 2015). Mueller, Marjoric Smith. “Notes and Brief Reports: Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973.” Social Security Bulletin (March 1974). http://www .ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v37n3/v37n3p35.pdf (Accessed June 2015). Skolnik, Alfred M. “Notes and Brief Reports: Health Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1976.” Social Security Bulletin (April 1977). http://www.ssa .gov/policy/docs/ssb/v40n4/v40n4p48.pdf (Accessed June 2015).

Hepting v. AT&T Hepting v. AT&T, 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011), was a class action lawsuit filed against AT&T Corporation by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The issue at stake in the case was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) as well as the FISA amendments. While many have concerns regarding privacy violations from the National Security Agency’s (NSA) surveillance practices, this case did not include the federal government or its agencies as a party to the action. The case started in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Prior to the commencement of the trial, the federal government filed a motion to dismiss the case on national security grounds. The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case. Retroactive legislation was passed by Congress the previous year, which made the basis of the lawsuit moot. This entry reviews the facts of the case, the amendments to the law in dispute, the subsequent court ruling, and the implications of that ruling.

Facts of the Case In 2002 to 2003, AT&T allowed the NSA to install hardware and software within its communications system. This software was capable of monitoring Internet traffic, as well as playback of all telephone calls made on its network. Mark Klein, a former engineer for AT&T, revealed the existence of this system. He also revealed similar systems operating out of cities along the western seaboard of the United States. This network allowed the NSA to monitor nearly all of the information passed through AT&T’s network. The lawsuit alleged that AT&T allowed the NSA to data mine client and customer records, information, as well as phone calls and text messages. The lawsuit was initiated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation on behalf of numerous AT&T customers, including Tash Hepting, who was the lead plaintiff. The lawsuit sought damages against AT&T. AT&T argued that trade secrets would be revealed if the case were to go to trial. The federal government invoked state secrets, hoping to dismiss the case. The lawsuit commenced in January 2006. Immediately following the start of the lawsuit, the federal government filed a motion to dismiss the case. In July 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California rejected the motion to dismiss. As a result, the case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the case was being argued and decided at the Court of Appeals, Congress passed retroactive legislation. The laws passed were an amendment to the FISA. These laws granted permission for AT&T and other telecommunication corporations to aid the NSA on the grounds of combating terrorism. The law gave immunity to any person or organization providing assistance to the intelligence community. As a result of this amendment, no civil action was able to be filed against AT&T. The case was then dismissed by the Court of Appeals in 2009 on grounds of mootness. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case.

Issue and Legislation The issue at hand is whether AT&T may allow a federal agency to data mine customers’ records and information without their knowledge and

Highway and Interstate Surveillance

consent. The law being questioned is the FISA, as well as the retroactive FISA amendments.

Holding The court held that the amendments passed by Congress rendered the lawsuit moot. The law gave civil immunity from lawsuits for anyone helping the intelligence community. There was no standing for Hepting or the Electronic Frontier Foundation to sue, as the law had been changed. Under the court’s decision, there was no wrongdoing by AT&T and the NSA.

Rationale The court decided that the amendments passed to FISA nullified the complaint. As a result of these amendments, there were no grounds on which to pursue a lawsuit. The federal government recognized the need for privacy; however, it must balance such needs against security and safety. This balancing test has allowed for a greater amount of federal intrusion in the post-9/11 world than was previously permitted. The amendments were passed to provide immunity and grant peace of mind to those willing to help the intelligence community.

471

used. Proponents of national security have argued that if there is notification of possible monitoring or if it is a widely known fact that surveillance may exist, then there is no expectation of privacy. However, critics of this stance point out that there may be no other way to communicate over long distances. This, along with the monopoly held by the communications industry, leads to the necessity that an expectation of privacy exist. Douglas Jordan See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Security, Concepts of; Warrants

Further Readings Cohn, Cindy. “Lawless Surveillance, Wireless Rationales.” Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, v.8/2 (2010). In re: National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation (Hepting v. AT&T), 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011). Pell, Stephanie K. “Systematic Government Access to Private Sector Data in the United States.” International Data Privacy Law, v.2/4 (2012). United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (USSC 1953).

Implications This case tacitly allows the federal government to continue surveillance on U.S. citizens. The court permitted the federal government to pass a law granting permission for past actions—in this case, the monitoring of phone calls and data mining. In addition, both the federal government and AT&T claimed privileges that allowed them to not have to answer for their actions in court. The government claimed state secrets, while AT&T claimed trade secrets. These privileges allowed each to not be accountable for its actions. State secrets are an evidentiary privilege extended to both state and federal governments to not have to answer for their actions in court. Hepting v. AT&T strengthened the power of this privilege. Established in 1953 under United States v. Reynolds, the state secret doctrine permits the government to refuse to answer questions about activities it claims are related to national security. While there is a method of oversight through the courts, it is rarely

Highway and Interstate Surveillance Surveillance of highways by law enforcement is a virtually ubiquitous phenomenon in developed countries, intended to deter reckless driving and increase traffic safety. Historically, surveillance of highways has concentrated on enforcement of speed limits and traffic laws, as well as the curbing of impaired driving. More recently, automation of speed enforcement has dramatically increased in some countries, as has the use of automated methods to levy tolls. Concerns over oppressive enforcement and data privacy, as well as methods of inverse surveillance, have surfaced as a result of automation developments. Police surveillance of highways is nearly as old as the automobile itself. Instances of speed

472

Highway and Interstate Surveillance

monitoring of vehicles via stopwatch date to the turn of the 20th century; the first recorded “speed trap” appears to have been set up in Westchester, New York, in 1902, where policemen ensconced themselves in false tree trunks, timed motorists, and telephoned down the road to set up a barrier to catch scofflaws. Pacing, or speed matching, of a police vehicle with a speeding motorist was once in regular use, but with advances in technology and concomitant expectations regarding legal evidence, it has become less common. As radar became widely available after World War II, it became an essential tool for accurate speed measurement, and was (and still is) routinely used in police patrol; later technologies, such as Vascar and Lidar, serve analogous speed detection functions. Speed enforcement via aircraft has also been employed in the United States and Australia. This typically involves the use of helicopters to determine infractions, in which case operators then radio the position and description of the speeding vehicle to surface police units. Manual patrol of highways may be accomplished using stationary or mobile vehicles, which may be marked or unmarked with police signage and which may operate in plain view of motorists or be concealed from the open roadway—all of which can have differing effects on driving behavior and surveillance response. Photographic enforcement of speed limits dates back to at least 1909, and New York State implemented rudimentary photo enforcement of speed limits in the 1950s, but modern photo-radar devices are primarily a product of the 1960s. The United Kingdom, continental Europe, and Australia widely adopted camera enforcement measures between the 1970s and 1990s, though their use in North America tends to be more in municipalities than on open highways. Both instantaneous measurements and mean-speed (distance over time) calculations over longer distances are used, and photo-radar cameras—often used in conjunction with automated license plate readers (ALPRs)—can also enforce other highway regulations such as on-ramp metering, truck weigh station compliance, lane changing restrictions, and high-occupancy lane use. ALPRs are now employed on toll roads to assess fees while keeping highway traffic moving. Some tollways (e.g., the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco,

California, and the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Tacoma, Washington) no longer have manned toll booths, instead using only ALPRs and radiofrequency transponders to charge motorists. As automated enforcement strategies have been developed, they have been embraced by governments and police as being more effective, fairer in the application of the law, and far less laborintensive and dangerous than traditional methods. While they can be unpopular among drivers, manual techniques for speed enforcement have typically been uncontroversial with respect to surveillance, though the development of police radar did stoke some fears in the 1950s. What debates did arise from manual surveillance tended to focus on the actions of police in traffic stops. Discussions centered on the privacy implications and constitutionality of warrantless automobile searches, the perception of equal protection failures in pulling over drivers of certain racial or ethnic groups for traffic offenses, the enforcement of mandates on personal safety devices such as motorcycle helmets and seatbelts, and the invasiveness of drunken-driving countermeasures, such as sobriety checkpoints and Breathalyzer tests. Automated enforcement, by contrast, has rankled privacy activists due to concerns over surveillance creep and data retention. Total enforcement of highway regulations strikes some as Orwellian in nature, particularly systems such as Australia’s, where covertly placed cameras, constantly shifting deployment, and flashless photography have been combined with a large-scale advertising campaign to promulgate the notion that speed limits can be silently enforced at all times in all places. Furthermore, information about drivers from cameras and ALPRs can be retained and used for other law enforcement or tracking purposes unrelated to the narrow original purpose of traffic safety, and many jurisdictions do not have policies restricting reuse or mandating periodic purging of such data. Combined with locational data from tracking devices such as “bumper beepers” used primarily by law enforcement, Global Positioning System units, vehicle event data recorders (“black boxes”), and cell phones, camera, and ALPR data make it increasingly easy to chart motorists’ movements and, thus, their habits and patterns of life through highway surveillance technologies.

Hobbes, Thomas

Highways have also seen use as platforms for inverse surveillance tactics. In the height of police radar usage, radar detectors were used by motorists to thwart speed controls, to the point where some states and countries banned the detectors entirely. Citizen’s band radio was once a popular medium for inter-vehicle communication of speed traps and surveillance locations. Atlases, Global Positioning System notifications, and mobile phone applications are available for locating speed monitoring areas in many countries. Recently, dashboard cameras have become popular as an inverse surveillance technique, particularly in Russia, where “crash-for-cash” insurance scams are prevalent and official enforcement is lax. Chris Hubbles See also Breathometer and Breathalyzer Machines; Traffic Control; Vehicle Tracking Systems

Further Readings Delaney, Amanda, et al. The History and Development of Speed Camera Use. Monash University Accident Research Centre Report No. 242, 2005. Miller, Robin. “Automated Traffic Enforcement Systems.” American Law Reports, v.26/6 (2007). Wells, Helen. The Fast and the Furious: Drivers, Speed Cameras, and Control in a Risk Society. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012.

Hobbes, Thomas Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was an English philosopher whose most influential work, Leviathan, was a treatise of political philosophy written against the backdrop of England’s tumultuous civil war. Hobbes’s erudition was far-ranging, and he wrote extensively (including in the Leviathan) about metaphysical matters, church-state relations, and the physical sciences, but it is as a political philosopher that he is best known. He is generally credited as the progenitor of modern social contract theory, and his conceptions of human nature and the legitimacy of state power, even at the expense of increased public surveillance and decreased civil liberties, have had an

473

enormous impact on subsequent thinkers in philosophy, law, and political science. This entry describes the path Hobbes took in becoming an influential English philosopher, which was shaped by his education, his early writings and translations, and his avoidance of potential punishment from political and religious leaders due to backlash from his often controversial writings. His philosophies regarding state power that were revealed in his writings are discussed, and the entry concludes with an examination of how his beliefs are perceived in modern-day society, which has debate and discussion on state-sanctioned surveillance and infringement of personal privacy and liberties.

Hobbes’s Early Influences and Writings Hobbes was the son of a clergyman and was sent to college in Oxford, England, around the age of 15. In 1608, he completed his bachelor’s degree and became employed by a wealthy Cavendish family as a tutor and assistant. In the 1620s, he completed the first English translation of The History of the Peloponnesian War (written in 431 BCE by the Greek historian and political philosopher Thucydides) from the original Greek, which proved an influence on his later dismissals of democratic governance. From the 1630s, he concentrated increasingly on science, particularly optics, as well as on political and religious philosophy. After the establishment of the Long Parliament in 1640, Hobbes feared that his political tracts, which by then were in wide circulation, would subject him to personal attacks by parliamentary supporters, and he fled to Paris. He wrote his most influential political works, including Leviathan, in France while waiting out the English civil war of 1642 to 1651. The publication of Leviathan in 1651 made him persona non grata among the Catholic clergy in Paris, and he fled back to England in December of that year. Settling in London, he wrote extensively on scientific matters and became increasingly subject to charges of atheism and heresy in the decades that followed. He spent his final years writing a verse autobiography and translating Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. In The Elements of Law (1640), De Cive (1642), and Leviathan (1651), Hobbes laid out

474

Hobbes, Thomas

and refined a theory of governance defending the position of absolute sovereignty, which had been challenged by Parliament and its supporters. Hobbes begins with an explication of human nature that takes the concepts of good and evil, as they are commonly understood, to be no more than personal pleasure or displeasure. Individuals express an appetite, or desire, for pleasing things and aversion to displeasing things, and there is much variability in what different people find pleasing. Consequently, there is no conception of good or virtue that can be universally agreed on as a basis for society. Human desires, however, can be subject to reason, and Hobbes finds that rational desire converges universally around the ideas of survival and self-preservation. Rational desires cannot run contrary to the goal of avoiding pain and death. Hobbes assumes that people in their natural state are essentially equal in their capabilities, but whenever two come to focus their desires on the same object (whether for continued existence or mere enjoyment), a violent encounter will inevitably ensue. The victor of this struggle in turn faces the constant fear of attack from others; there is no recourse to guard against this except the aggregation of power and the waging of war. In this state, all men are enemies of one another, even when there is no open battle, because there is no means of assurance that hostile action will not imminently be taken. Furthermore, even when one’s basic needs are met, human pride and lust for glory will again lead to blows; the threat of new conflict is inescapable. Hobbes famously described this condition of the state of nature as “continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” In such environs, there can be no such thing as justice, or right and wrong; anyone may rightfully lay claim to anything at all, including one another’s bodies. However, because all are equipped with reason, they will come to see a set of fundamental natural laws. First, in a state of war without justice or right, they are beset by a perpetual lack of security. As a result, it is in everyone’s best interest to seek peace or, if it cannot be obtained, to use violent means in selfdefense. Second, as a means to the pursuit of peace, it is rational for individuals to mutually agree to renounce their claim on all other things and place limits on their own liberties of action.

Hobbes and Social Contract Theory Hobbes was one of the principal early exponents of what came to be known as social contract theory. He asserted that people could only agree to leave the state of nature through a covenant stipulating that each individual relinquish power and confer it on a sovereign (supreme ruler) or an assembly. This governor or governing body is then charged with ensuring the preservation and contentment of its subjects; together, the arrangement constitutes the commonwealth (or the titular “Leviathan”). Hobbes took the rule of a single, absolute sovereign—monarchy—to be the strongest form of government, rather than rule by a parliament (aristocracy) or democracy. The sovereign is responsible for taking actions that ensure his or her own preservation and the preservation of his or her citizens, which Hobbes took to be, as a matter of natural law, in accord. Sovereigns who disregarded their citizens, however, could not justly be accused of malfeasance or deposed by their subjects. Indeed, because the contract establishes a tight connection between ruler and subjects, the actions of the ruler can also be attributed to the citizens, who may not protest or demand a new form of government and cannot revoke the contract that generated the commonwealth. Furthermore, the sovereign may take any action deemed necessary for the maintenance of peace, among which Hobbes explicitly names suppression of opinions and doctrines. Hobbes demanded total submission to leaders. All rights (apart from basic self-defense) had to be forfeited to the state as a condition for membership in the commonwealth. Whatever state resulted, for Hobbes, was preferable to the state of nature; thus, fear was a principal motivator for accepting Hobbesian governance. Hobbes did not believe that fear was inconsistent with liberty, and he considered fear of the law or of retribution to be the principal assurance of ethical behavior within the commonwealth. Since much of Hobbes’s work was written in response to the unfolding events of the English Civil War (his 1668 tome Behemoth was a retrospective analysis of its causes), it is perhaps unsurprising that he identifies civil war in general as something to be avoided at all costs. He believed that the turmoil of

Home Surveillance

mid-17th-century England was attributable in part to religious and aristocratic demagoguery, which corrupted the people, leading them to sedition and dereliction of their civil duties. Thus, rebellion, protest, and disobedience are all, for the most part, anathema to Hobbes’s conception of civil government. Despite this seeming antipathy toward political freedoms, there is some room in Hobbes’s thought for liberty and, in a way, even privacy. Hobbes allowed for broad liberty in action where the sovereign had not placed any prohibitions; the liberties of citizens, as he put it, “depend on the silence of the law.” Hobbes also placed some slight conditions on sovereign authority, by proposing that a citizen could not be compelled to commit suicide (as contrary to self-preservation) and, by extension, could not be compelled to self-incriminate. While he advocated that the state should have a single religion chosen by the sovereign, he allowed that individuals were free to privately hold differing beliefs, so long as they made no outward manifestation of them and followed the rituals of the state religion in public. Nevertheless, virtually all private affairs and liberties were in principle subject to curtailment by the sovereign.

Hobbes and Contemporary Surveillance Debates While his defense of absolute monarchy puts him squarely at odds with classical liberalism, some of his ideas, such as fundamental equality in the state of nature and certain aspects of the social contract, were carried on (with modifications) in the political thought of liberals such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the American revolutionaries. While he is rarely cited directly in debates over security and surveillance, modern scholars sometimes descriptively compare contemporary surveillance regimes with his philosophy, and it is not hard to see why. Hobbes offers a justification for almost unlimited expansion of state power in the name of ensuring peace and order, including large-scale surveillance, abridgment of civil liberties, and censorship. His focus on fear—as a primary motivator for adherence to the rules of the commonwealth, as well as a legitimate tool for sovereigns to employ in order to

475

convince subjects of the benefits of maintaining order—also appears compatible with some 20thand 21st-century state practices. Chris Hubbles See also Fear, Culture of; Politics; Social Contract Theory

Further Readings Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan (ed., C. B. Macpherson). London, England: Penguin Books, 1968. Lloyd, S. A., ed. Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Sorell, Tom, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Home Surveillance Home surveillance refers to watching over one’s own property to protect it from any form of criminal activity. To keep one’s house safe and secure, special systems are often needed. Such systems have evolved dramatically since their introduction. Not long ago, having fences and barbed wires around one’s house was almost enough to protect it from potential intruders. Nowadays, however, considering the continual development of technology, many people do not feel safe relying just on fences, so they set up cameras both within and outside their property. This entry reviews the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) and Internet protocol (IP) cameras for home security and provides information on protecting against security breaches of these Internet-based home surveillance systems.

Internet-Based Cameras CCTV has revolutionized our perception of security; in addition, it has also mechanized the onerous process by allowing a live feed to be broadcast to a specific, remote location. CCTV can be wired or wireless. Wired CCTV systems provide the best picture quality with zero interference; however, they can be more difficult to install and cannot be

476

Hoover, J. Edgar

easily moved to another location. Wireless CCTV cameras are easier to install and move around, yet they are greatly susceptible to signal interference, distributed via general Wi-Fi hotspots and routers. Another type of camera is the IP camera, which sends and receives data via the Internet; but these cameras are often more expensive than wired and wireless CCTV cameras. Connecting CCTV systems to the Internet is very common these days, as it gives users the ability to view and control their CCTV systems remotely and they generally are not targets for hackers. However, because modern CCTV or IP cameras often rely on web servers or file servers to configure the system using webpages, display video images, or download archived video footage, they can fall prey to any wide-scale distributed denial-of-service attack that is carefully planned and intended to interrupt normal services. Therefore, even though CCTV or IP home surveillance cameras may not be prime targets for hackers, serious system damage can result from a breached protocol attack. The remainder of this entry examines the reasons why a home surveillance system may be at risk of an attack and provides some methods to better protect CCTV or IP cameras from illegal access.

Home Surveillance System Attacks The most common reasons for an attack are as follows. The device responds to ping requests (i.e., the method to detect whether an IP device is connected online) or to Port Scan commands, allowing the intruder to see if the device is using common IP socket ports, such as port 80 (HTTP), port 21 (FTP), and port 23 (Telnet), or the default ports. Another common type of security breach occurs when a system runs on a weak password or the password has not been changed for a long time. Retaining old and predictable passwords makes the system susceptible to unsolicited connections from any source. The following steps resonate with what Giorgio Agamben regards as politicized measures taken by sovereign governments to improve their structure of dominance and control by controlling the effects rather than the causes of insecurity and lack of privacy. These steps, therefore, can be regarded as measures toward security and privacy as they tend to challenge what constitutes an internal and classical perception of security, rather

than potential forces from without that might threaten the infrastructure of a system. 1. Be certain that the CCTV system does not respond to ping requests. If the digital video recorder (DVR), or the router it is connected to, responds to ping requests, it may alert potential attackers that a target is available. Turn off the ping response in the router and the DVR to prevent this from happening. 2. Change the IP port that is used to access the unit over the Internet. If the DVR is using port 21, 23, or especially the notorious 80, see if these can be changed on the DVR itself. If that is not possible, change the router settings to use port forwarding so that traffic on a specific incoming port number will be forwarded to the correct port of the DVR on the network. 3. Update and reconfigure the firewall on the router. The firewall will allow you to limit access to the CCTV to certain IP address ranges or media access control addresses.

Shahriyar Mansouri and Elahe Tirandaz See also Dataveillance; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of; Security, Concepts of

Further Readings Agamben, Giorgio. “For a Theory of Destituent Power” (Public lecture in Athens, Greece, November 16, 2013). Chronosmag, v.10 (February 2014). http:// www.chronosmag.eu/index.php/g-agamben-fora-theory-of-destituent-power.html (Accessed December 2014). EC-Council Press. Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures: Threats and Defense Mechanism. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2010. Huizhong Sun. “A High-Speed Robust Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) Defense System.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Polytechnic University, Brooklyn, NY, January 2008.

Hoover, J. Edgar J. Edgar Hoover (1895–1972) has elicited strong public reaction to his name and actions as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

Hoover, J. Edgar

beginning during the 1920s and continuing even today. Hoover has been idolized and vilified for nearly 100 years, with much of the criticism centering on the FBI’s domestic surveillance programs and their progeny. Beginning with the Palmer Raids of 1919 and 1920 through the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) operations, with their beginnings in the 1950s, Hoover left a legacy of surveillance operations, many of which were illegal and of ambiguous, if not blatant, unconstitutionality. Although it may be argued that these practices either saved the country from communism or wreaked irreparable harm on American freedoms, the practices of Hoover’s FBI created the modern techniques of covert surveillance, which are still a key component of counterterrorism, drug interdiction, and day-to-day law enforcement operations. This entry sheds light on how Hoover’s early career and actions as director of the FBI shaped aggressive surveillance practices that served as a foundation for today’s surveillance programs. The entry highlights Hoover’s fight against “alien enemies” following World War I, his surveillance and information-gathering techniques as director of the FBI, and his fight against communism and questionable surveillance practices against organizations and civil rights leaders.

Early Career Hoover began his professional career as a clerk with the Library of Congress, working with the complex Dewey decimal filing system then in use, which suited his personality and seeming need for order. From this job, he acquired knowledge that he would use for developing the filing and information analysis systems made famous by the FBI in precomputer days—systems that had not previously been applied to law enforcement. Crime data and criminal information had long been collected, but Hoover developed the means of readily accessing this information and applying it to specific cases and problems.

Alien Enemies and Palmer Raids While working for the Library of Congress, Hoover attended the evening law school program at Georgetown College, graduating with a bachelor of law degree in 1916 and continuing for

477

another year to complete the master of law degree. Shortly after graduating with a master’s degree from Georgetown College, Hoover left the Library of Congress and transferred to the Department of Justice as a special agent. The United States had just entered World War I, and there was tremendous fear of alien enemies sabotaging the war effort and committing acts of terrorism; that fear led to the Alien Enemy Act, which allowed for the detention of foreign nationals on what amounted to very little evidence of subversive activity. Hoover’s job as a special agent involved reviewing cases of foreign nationals from belligerent nations (alien enemies) who had been slated for deportation or internment. Utilizing the clerical skills developed in the Library of Congress, he soon built a complex filing system for the Justice Department for the tracking of such persons. At the end of the war, Hoover began to work closely with Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in developing and executing the so-called Palmer Raids, intended to protect the United States from what was seen as impending communist subversion. Using a network of informants and infiltrators, the Justice Department investigated individuals and organizations for allegedly “subversive” activity (i.e., any activity that appeared to be a threat to the government). Hoover, as Palmer’s assistant, developed cases against thousands of suspected communists who were not citizens and obtained deportation orders against many, although in the end, few were actually deported. This exercise did accomplish two things. First, it turned Hoover into an expert on communism and a renowned anticommunist crusader. Second, it taught Hoover that one did not always have to make cases against a designated national enemy using ­constitutional means, as cases were often made using flimsy or fabricated evidence, perjured ­ testimony, and illegal surveillance. One method used in these cases came to be known in later years as “bag jobs,” which were actual burglaries of homes, businesses, and organization headquarters to obtain documents or other incriminating evidence.

The Bureau of Investigation With Palmer’s departure as attorney general, Hoover transferred to the Bureau of Investigation, a small subdivision of the Justice Department and

478

Hoover, J. Edgar

one with a rather poor reputation. Agents were often political appointees, with no other qualifications. Bribery and other forms of corruption were common among the agents. Hoover quickly rose to the number two slot in the bureau and, after working under two corrupt chiefs, became director in 1925 at the age of 29. Hoover moved quickly to rid the bureau of the corrupt, political appointees and raised standards for agents, such as the requirement of a law or accounting degree, something unheard of at the time. Hoover also demanded absolute loyalty from his agents. Hoover worked to develop a network of informants if not outright spies in the offices of his political friends. His agents placed numerous political figures as well as media figures and entertainers under other forms of surveillance, including telephone taps.

Early Methods of Surveillance Even though the Red Scare of 1919–1920 and the Palmer Raids had passed by on Hoover achieving the directorship, Hoover—the evervigilant anticommunist—insisted on collecting intelligence on left-leaning persons and organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Even while Hoover kept the ACLU under tight surveillance, complete with informants and infiltrators, through seemingly sincere assurances to the contrary, Hoover turned Roger Baldwin, the ACLU director during this era, into a friend and strong supporter of the FBI. Letters were obtained through Postal Service “letter drops,” in which agents were permitted to copy address information from envelopes; agents were also known to open and read letters. It is likely that even during the mid-1920s, electronic surveillance devices known as bugs were planted in the ACLU offices and the organization’s telephones were tapped, all on Hoover’s orders and without any evidence of actual criminality taking place. Hoover was able to obtain the complete membership list of the organization, copious notes from meetings of the organization’s executive committee, and even copies of Baldwin’s speeches before the speeches were delivered. The ACLU was not the only organization placed under such surveillance during Hoover’s early days as FBI director. Numerous labor unions, immigrant associations, and college political

organizations were also placed under surveillance. While the bureau was tracking the likes of the Barkers and John Dillinger, it was also tracking numerous organizations that Hoover felt represented a threat to the social and political stability of the nation. As the political and economic woes of the 1930s advanced toward another world war, Hoover shifted some resources toward the investigation of Nazi and fascist groups as well as those associated with communism; communism remained Hoover’s focus up to the entry of the United States into World War II in 1941. Although there were restraints imposed on the use of electronic surveillance even during the 1920s and 1930s, these standards were much more relaxed during Hoover’s tenure as director. Often, no more was required than a memo from the attorney general authorizing such surveillance on the basis of national security. In the absence of authorization, Hoover was known to order surveillance anyway, even allowing burglars to plant surveillance devices. By the time the United States entered World War II, Hoover’s FBI (Bureau of Investigation was renamed Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935) had perfected the means of surveillance, using informants, undercover agents, bugs, and wiretaps to both steal documents as well as to plant electronic surveillance equipment in the homes and offices of criminal suspects and others. Agents also conducted direct surveillance of persons in the form of line-of-sight observation and “tails,” interviewing neighbors and associates and even sifting through the trash of persons implicated not necessarily of crimes but often of being a communist or communist sympathizer. Such tactics carried over to surveillance of political opponents of President Franklin Roosevelt and friends of other Hoover allies, as well as persons who had made it to Hoover’s personal enemies list. Ironically, one person regarded as both a communist and a Hoover personal enemy was Eleanor Roosevelt, the First Lady, who had an extensive FBI file.

The Cold War, Civil Rights, and Vietnam Shortly after the end of World War II came the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Hoover put his elaborate spy network and technology at the disposal of the House Un-American Activities

Houston, Texas, Surveillance in

Committee (HUAC) and Senators Joseph McCarthy and Richard Nixon to investigate communist subversion. Although it was illegal for Hoover to feed information to HUAC as well as to the senators, much of the information had been obtained illegally anyway as agents often worked under Hoover’s orders alone and were encouraged to collect such information on their own initiative and report it to FBI headquarters, where it was analyzed and filed or leaked to Hoover’s supporters as Hoover deemed necessary. The rising civil rights movement and its leader, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., quickly became targets of Hoover’s illegal intelligence gathering. Bugging phones and hotel rooms, the FBI developed enormous files on King and other civil rights leaders. From the potentially embarrassing information in these files came the idea for a series of COINTELPRO operations during which, among ­ other things, information was leaked to discredit these persons or they were threatened with public exposure of the more personal sides of their lives. During the 1960s and 1970s, COINTELPROs were used against anti–Vietnam War activists (thought by Hoover to be communists) and the Ku Klux Klan, as well as leaders of the civil rights movement. Near the end of his tenure with the FBI, Hoover is believed to have begun destroying his personal files in mid-1970. Hoover’s death on May 2, 1972, touched off a flurry of document destruction at the FBI headquarters as well as at Hoover’s residence and FBI offices around the world. As a result, the extent of Hoover’s reach will likely never be known; it was discovered that, among many others, the bureau had files on Frank Sinatra, Bing Crosby, Julius “Groucho” Marx, Rock Hudson, Marlon Brando, Joe Namath, Muhammad Ali, Coretta Scott King, and numerous other civil rights leaders, as well as most members of Congress. That most of these people had no criminal records or contacts, or were not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing, was immaterial to Hoover or the agents who collected the information. Nor was Hoover, who consistently claimed to be a champion of the Constitution, known to have shown any concern that the collection or methods of collection of this information were often blatantly illegal and in violation of at least the First, Fourth, and Thirteenth Amendments.

479

Conclusion Hoover did much to professionalize U.S. law enforcement. His public image and the image he cultivated for his FBI was that of incorruptible public servants applying the latest technology to protect Americans from criminals and communists. In fact, he did much to advance the professionalization of law enforcement and scientific crime solving. Yet much of the personal image was purely that—image; Hoover thrust the FBI and other law enforcement agencies into a debate about “the means versus the ends.” Whether his contributions are outweighed by the negatives is an ethical, rather than a historical, question that can never be clearly resolved. M. George Eichenberg See also Civil Rights Movement; COINTELPRO; Cold War; Electronic Surveillance; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Surveillance During the Cold War; Surveillance During World War I and World War II

Further Readings Gentry, Curt. J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and His Secrets. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1992. Hoover, J. Edgar. J. Edgar Hoover Speaks Concerning Communism. Nutley, NJ: Capitol Hill Press, 1971. Medsger, Betty. The Burglary: The Discovery of J. Edgar Hoover’s Secret FBI. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. Powers, Richard G. Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York, NY: Free Press, 1987. Summers, Anthony. Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York, NY: Putnam, 1993. Weiner, Tim. Enemies: A History of the FBI. New York, NY: Random House, 2012.

Houston, Texas, Surveillance

in

Houston, Texas, is the United States’ fourth largest city (in terms of population) and home to more than 2 million people. It is also one of the many cities worldwide with municipal video surveillance systems in public places. Indeed, the Houston Chronicle reported in late 2014 that a person

480

Houston, Texas, Surveillance in

out in public in Houston might be on camera 90% of the time. These surveillance systems have been instrumental in detecting and responding to terroristic threats and incidents. They have also been instrumental in catching different types of violent and nonviolent offenders, including persons committing theft, vandalism, defacement of property (e.g., with graffiti), kidnapping, assault, and illegal dumping. Along with their role in crime fighting, these video surveillance systems also assist with performing services for stranded motorists. In Houston and its outskirts, if a person’s vehicle is malfunctioning or has a flat tire, the driver can call a number listed on each Texas state driver’s license for assistance. A local law enforcement agency will respond, typically after checking the cameras along the roadways to see the stranded motorist’s location. Furthermore, the video surveillance systems exist to deter misconduct. To this end, Houston has a number of signs along major roadways with an image of a law enforcement officer that read “The eyes of Texas are on you.” Law enforcement will also carefully monitor the city’s video surveillance systems during events with large crowds, as these are potential terrorist targets. The city of Houston installed 650 cameras with federal grant funds over a 5-year period. Many of these are in its downtown area; other cameraconcentrated areas are the NRG Stadium, the BBVA Compass Stadium, Tinsley Park, the Metro Rail lines, and the Texas Medical Center area. In addition to these municipal cameras at the city’s intersections and along major roads, Houston has video surveillance on its toll roads, largely to identify and to ticket toll violators. The records from these systems have often been utilized in legal cases, primarily to prove the mobility or location of a person. For example, Houston has implemented an EZ TAG system, whereby individuals can purchase a toll pass for their vehicle. As the vehicle passes through the tollways, cameras communicating with a mainframe computer note the vehicle’s comings and goings around the city. If needed, a person’s location can be established by reviewing the EZ TAG records and/or comparing the records with smartphone records. Moreover, a number of government entities, businesses, colleges and universities, and primary and secondary schools are equipped with video

surveillance systems. Houston Independent School District, comprising 282 schools, has more than 13,000 cameras. Convenience stores in Houston are required by law to have cameras outside the store. In addition, some private citizens as well as companies have installed their own camera systems, usually for security reasons. These may be located both within and without the properties, such as in parking lots, at building access points, by store cash registers, or in public arenas. Law enforcement agencies may request access to such video footage, if needed, when investigating crimes. Criminal suspects can also use surveillance data during their defense—for example, to establish their whereabouts or confirm their alibi. Some retailers rely on video surveillance systems, monitored by security analysts out of state, to identify suspicious activity. For example, one large retailer has conducted research on how long it takes for most female shoppers to choose a lipstick; if a shopper stands in an aisle beyond that time, in-store security will be alerted. Similarly, in airports, if a bag is left unattended for longer than a specified period, an alert goes into effect to investigate whether the bag poses a security hazard (e.g., contains an explosive device). In the fall of 2010, Houston gained notoriety for its legal battle over red light cameras. The city’s mayor and city council had contracted with an out-of-state company to install 50 cameras at specific intersections throughout the city, claiming that the cameras would deter traffic violations at the intersections and thereby increase traffic safety. A large coalition of citizens objected to this argument, claiming that the city’s real motivation was to increase its income from traffic tickets, an income of about $10 million per year. The citizens further argued that the cameras did not increase safety at intersections but, rather, increased dangers, as persons might stop suddenly at light changes to avoid a ticket. The matter made it onto the electoral ballot in 2010, and the citizens of Houston voted to have the cameras removed, at a cost to the city for terminating its contract with the vendor early. While the cameras were in place from 2006 to 2010, the Houston Police Department reported 4,100 accidents at the intersections involved; after the cameras were removed, from 2011 to 2014, it reported 9,000 accidents and an increase in related fatalities.

Human Trafficking

Not unlike major developed cities of comparable size, Houston is well saturated with surveillance systems to improve its service and security. The lack of privacy in this regard seems only likely to increase with time. Camille Gibson See also Closed-Circuit Television

Further Readings Christian, Carol. “Ubiquitous Public Surveillance Puts Urban Residents Often on Camera.” Houston Chronicle (September 4, 2014). http://www.chron .com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Proliferatingpublic-surveillance-means-U-S-5733862.php (Accessed September 2017). Pinkerton, James. “Crashes Double at Houston Intersections After Red Light Cameras Pulled.” Houston Chronicle (October 28, 2014). http://www .chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/ Crashes-double-at-Houston-intersections-afterred-5852853.php (Accessed September 2017).

Human Trafficking Human trafficking is generally defined as the movement of persons within or across national boundaries for the purposes of forced commercial sexual exploitation or forced labor. These two forms of exploitation largely affect different populations. Women and children make up the majority of victims of sex trafficking, whereas men represent the largest portion of slave labor. States utilize a variety of surveillance tools to detect and intercept traffickers, including passports, surveillance, intelligence gathering, and border screening. Human trafficking as modern-day slavery has intensified state surveillance of borders, international travel, and refugee and asylum claimants. Because of the clandestine and high-profit nature of human trafficking, detection poses the largest problem for national security forces. Measures undertaken by states either target the supply or the demand side of the human trafficking industry. This involves actions directed at the elimination  and/or criminalization of the demand for

481

commercial sex. Human trafficking can function alongside prostitution within a nation. Criminalization refers to the practice of making harmful activities illegal through a body of law. State surveillance of migration and prostitution as well as targeting Johns and Janes (male and female individuals paying for sex) allows for some level of monitoring to be maintained. This entry investigates the four different state strategies used to combat human trafficking. Most antitrafficking practices undertaken by state security organizations or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) fall into one of four categories of action: (1) prevention, (2) protection, (3) prosecution, or (4) partnership. The American Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act focuses on the first three Ps, with an emphasis on transnational and interstate partnership enforced within the execution of the other three actions. Similarly, Canada’s National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking places emphasis on all four Ps. The 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children outlines three criteria for a situation to be considered trafficking: (1) act (i.e., recruitment), (2) means (i.e., through the use of force or deception), and (3) purpose (i.e., for the purpose of forced labor). The Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings defines traffickers as persons who undertake the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or coercion. Overall, trafficking differs from human smuggling because it involves the forcible confinement of persons after their trafficking across international borders, whereas smugglers allow individuals to go free after payment.

Prevention The United Nations has framed human trafficking as a major violation of human rights resulting from extreme poverty. Transnational and state organizations have responded to prevent human trafficking in a number of ways. Factors such as poverty, unemployment, commercial demand for sex, institutional change, and globalization have contributed to the rise of the transnational sex trade. Inability to gain access across national

482

Human Trafficking

borders also creates a migrant population that is vulnerable to human trafficking as traffickers pose as human smugglers. Globalization has also led to increased volume and ease of migration across transnational borders. Likewise, technology has allowed traffickers to facilitate both demand and supply through Internet sites such as Craigslist. Investigators have subjected digital classified advertisements to increased scrutiny in an effort to evaluate the threat to women and children. Women and children are the primary victims of human trafficking. In addition, facial-recognition software has made finding abducted children and missing persons easier. The U.S. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons utilizes facialrecognition software to identify the victims of trafficking while utilizing pattern-recognition software to track the profiles of traffickers and collect digital evidence for prosecution. Furthermore, myriad social norms and structures have marginalized certain populations of women globally due to illiteracy, low skill level, and lack of regular income. This has allowed numerous women to become targeted by traffickers. The structured nature of trafficking operations makes preventing the entrance of women and children into trafficking networks a paramount priority for police, NGOs, and security agencies. The need for trafficking networks to rely on recruits, brokers, document forgers, transporters, brothel owners, and employment agencies creates a number of points for security forces to target. States use a variety of methods to ensure that their citizens are not recruited by traffickers. These programs include disseminating information on the dangers of trafficking, strengthening the capacity of surveillance, enhancing passport antiforgery measures, developing toll-free tip lines, utilizing shelters, improving labor laws, enhancing child labor laws, and maintaining inspection regimens. Various state organizations have also started to develop tool kits for law enforcement, service providers, health care providers, travel professionals, and emergency workers to raise awareness about human trafficking in order to allow for early detection. For example, in the United States, the Bilateral Safety Corridor Coalition and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provide training for frontline workers to screen vulnerable populations for trafficked victims.

Protection Protection of the victims of trafficking includes a number of different dimensions that relate to their human rights. This can include legal, medical, and psychological support for victims. Protection also encompasses the measures states undertake to protect citizens at risk of being retrafficked. For example, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking was created in the U.S. Department of State to provide millions of dollars in grants to organizations both within and without the United States in an effort to combat trafficking and ensure the safety and well-being of victims. Protection under this department may also include housing victims of trafficking and access to skills training. State funding and intervention in the NGO sector has yielded criticism because it creates the risk of deportation and monitoring for those who receive services from NGO programming. State restrictions on the granting of long-term residency status in countries such as the United States, Canada, and Great Britain have also generated challenges around service delivery. For example, NGOs such as Polaris support victims through offering housing, providing social services, engaging in outreach, and assisting with victim identification. Protection entails striking a balance between supporting NGOs, law enforcement, and helping victims heal. Within the United States, the Catholic Relief Society, Hagar International, American Center for International Labor Solidarity, and International Catholic Migration Commission offer vocational training for victims of trafficking to ensure their livelihood in the wake of their experiences. Protection has taken on a multidimensional meaning for ensuring the security of victims. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime, among other agencies, has implemented numerous victim funds globally to support the victims of trafficking. Victim funds allow victims to recover from being trafficked. Most states have developed some sort of measures to ensure that victims are not drawn back into trafficking. These include measures such as psychological counseling for victims as well as temporary residency or stay visas or permits.

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking can lead to a number of psychiatric problems in its victims. This in turn can create a high potential for revictimization at the hands of state authorities and traffickers. Revictimization refers to the possibility of a person who has already been the victim of a crime or has been marginalized within society to be subjected to similar treatment after rescue by the authorities. Stockholm syndrome has been attributed to the victims of sex trafficking. Stockholm syndrome refers to the situation in which a victim identifies with his or her assailant due to the long duration of captivity. Learned helplessness is also part of the sexual slavery dynamics of human trafficking. The victim is made to feel completely dependent on the trafficker for every aspect of life. Posttraumatic stress disorder has also been attributed as a long-term symptom in victims of trafficking. Law enforcement agencies attempt to balance victim health in relation to prosecution and investigation of traffickers.

Prosecution As of 2012, 134 countries and territories have put into law legislation that criminalizes human trafficking. Conviction rates remain very low for countries enacting this legislation. Although the majority of those recruited into trafficking networks are women and children, the majority of traffickers convicted under the legislation have been men. However, women occupy positions within trafficking networks that are more easily detected by the authorities. In 2000, the United States brought into force the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 to prevent and combat trafficking. This act contains a broad definition that includes activities that occur without force and without movement, and allows for a broader range of activities to be considered human trafficking in the United States. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement has developed a toll-free tip line to report suspected child exploitation within the United States. Homeland Security has also developed the Operation Predator initiative to monitor and prevent child exploitation. Still, gaps in service provision due to limited provincial and local resources represent a significant problem for victim recovery and prosecution in developing countries.

483

Partnership Partnership is critical not just for allowing for intelligence sharing between transnational, national, and local law enforcement but also with regard to having organizational links with care and treatment providers as well as frontline NGOs that have contact with the victims of trafficking. The United States provided funds to World Vision to facilitate public awareness, deterrence, and crime prevention projects overseas. The United States has also developed partnerships with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization members to support a zero-tolerance approach to trafficking. The UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT) allows for multiple UN branches to come together and coordinate policy approaches to combating human trafficking. ICAT and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime also attempt to enhance the role of UN peacekeepers in trafficking through education programming. Creating partnerships requires destination countries to work with transition and source countries. In turn, this has led to increased international evaluation and oversight of other transition and origin states by advanced industrial destination states. The zero-tolerance policy of the United States with regard to prostitution as a link to human trafficking has led it to evaluate other states’ capabilities to combat trafficking. As such, it supports states with weaker capacities. Moreover, the creation of events to facilitate partnership and information exchange both internationally and internally, such as the European Union AntiTrafficking Day, allows for knowledge and best practices to be shared among organizations. James FitzGerald See also Border Patrol Checkpoints; Immigration; Passenger Profiling; Smuggling

Further Readings Aradau, Claudia. Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics Out of Security. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

484

Hunger Games, The

Bhattacharyya, Gargi. Traffick: The Illicit Movement of People and Things. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005. Brysk, Alison and Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick. From Human Trafficking to Human Rights: Reframing Contemporary Slavery. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. Cameron, Sally and Edward Newman. Trafficking in Humans: Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions. New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 2008. Di Nicola, A., et al., eds. Prostitution and Human Trafficking: Focus on Clients. New York, NY: Springer, 2009. Drew, Sandhya. Human Trafficking—Human Rights: Law and Practice. London, England: Legal Action Group, 2009. Friman, H. Richard and Simon Reich, eds. Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007. Jonsson, Anna, ed. Human Trafficking and Human Security. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. Mishra, Veerendra, ed. Human Trafficking: The Stakeholders’ Perspective. New Delhi, India: Sage, 2013. Okubo, Shiro and Louise Shelley, eds. Human Security, Transnational Crime and Human Trafficking: Asian and Western Perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge, 2011. Scarpa, Silvia. Trafficking in Human Beings: Modern Slavery. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2008. Sharma, Nandita. “Anti-Trafficking Rhetoric and the Making of a Global Apartheid.” National Women’s Studies Association, v.17/3 (2005). Shelley, Louise. Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Siddharth, Kara. Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons” (February 2009). https://www.unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_ on_TIP.pdf (Accessed July 2012). U.S. State Department. “Trafficking in Persons Report 2014.” https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/ (Accessed July 2012).

Hunger Games, The The Hunger Games is the first in a series of four films based on the literary trilogy of the same name by author Suzanne Collins. The narrative of

the film, which was released by Lionsgate in 2012, is set 74 years after civil war has ravaged what was once North America, now known as Panem. This future dystopia presents an unequal surveillance society in which 12 impoverished satellite districts labor to support the luxurious living standards of the Capitol. To maintain a fragile state of peace, a perpetual state of “cold war” is practiced, in which each district must offer up one male and one female child as tributes in a televised pageant known as the Hunger Games. The film focuses on District 12 tribute Katniss Everdeen (Jennifer Lawrence), as she fights in the competition alongside Peeta Mellark (Josh Hutcherson), undermining the power of the totalitarian Capitol state, which is overseen by President Snow (Donald Sutherland). The writing by Collins, who also contributed to the movie’s screenplay, offers a subtle commentary on the role of monitoring in this dystopia through reality television as a mode of observation, which is related to the synopticon and the importance of the body as a site of surveillance. The remainder of this entry provides a synopsis of the plot of The Hunger Games, a description of how the storyline elicits a discussion of the body as a contested site of power and surveillance, and a review of some criticisms and protests against the movie. Collins has stated in interviews that the subject for the book came to her while “channel hopping” one evening between a reality television show and footage of the Iraq war. The two sets of images became blurred, fusing together into the concept of a gladiatorial-style fight to the death among teenagers that is publicly broadcast for the entertainment, and ostensibly edification, of the citizens of Panem (a state named after the concept of “bread and entertainment”). The film foregrounds the reality television format and related cult of celebrity by opening with an interview between Cesar Flickerman (Stanley Tucci) and head gamemaker Senaca Crane (Wes Bentley) discussing the Hunger Games, the tributes, and the coming spectacle of death as one would any other visual event. The cinematic audience is challenged to consider its place in the furtherance of what Thomas Mathiesen has described as a viewer society by highlighting the ethics of choice involved in viewing. The Hunger Games

Hunger Games, The

presents a clear critique of a society wedded to the model of the synopticon, in which the many (the television audience and, by extension, the film audience) watch the few. This framework is useful in its complex layers of spectatorship that force the cinema audience into a position of active viewing, but it is not without its flaws. For example, the “many” have no control over what they watch. This is dictated by mandatory viewing sessions, the content of which is determined by a few decision makers, who are primarily men. The group that decides the ratings figures for the tributes comprises all white men, and of the 32 gamemakers in the control center, only a handful are women, with even fewer blacks or ethnic minorities. This reinforces the gender/racial dynamics of traditional viewing paradigms, which undermines the potential radicalism of the film. The use of screens and projected images from these reality television broadcasts, and from hidden cameras in the arena, is important not only in the Capitol but also in the satellite districts. Here they are used as a form of social control to monitor the behavior of citizens and to ensure compliance with mandatory attendance at Reapings (where tributes are selected) and viewings of Capitol propaganda, as well as at the games themselves. The ubiquitous presence of screens and Capitol cameras leads to internalization of the logic of a surveillance society. Citizens and tributes moderate their behavior, and performances are enacted for the watchful eyes of the ruling authorities and the audience. Indeed, within the arena, the tributes are conscious of their performative status, knowing that they must put on a “good show.” Katniss deliberately searches for and acknowledges the hidden cameras in the arena to make clear that certain acts are carried out in defiance of the rules of the games, which in turn incites uprisings in the districts. This aspect of performativity also highlights the importance of the body as a contested site of power and surveillance. Citizens in the districts undergo various forms of visual surveillance, biometric monitoring, DNA sampling, and, in the arena, the insertion of tracking devices under the competitors’ skin. The location of the body in space is of especial importance, with each district being surrounded by electronic boundaries to

485

contain citizens, as well as a military unit of Peacekeepers to strictly enforce curfews and the presence of bodies in particular locations. The film presents a society that seeks to construct docile bodies—those that are productive for, but always under the control of, the Capitol. This concept of the body can also be related to a Foucauldian understanding of biopower, in which life itself is regulated after a model of war to maintain a fragile peace, as President Snow makes clear. It should also be noted that while repressive physical control of the body through surveillance can be identified in the districts, Capitol inhabitants also experience control of the body through extreme modifications and fashions. The premise for the film and books has proved to be controversial, as demonstrated by its inclusion in a 2011 list of books compiled by the American Library Association that readers attempted to have banned. The defiant threefigure gesture of resistance seen throughout the film was also appropriated by demonstrators at a 2014 coup d’état in Thailand. Lorna Muir See also Biometrics; Governmentality; Social Media; Synopticon, The

Further Readings Campbell, Timothy and Adam Sitze, eds. Biopolitics: A Reader. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013. Collins, Suzanne. The Hunger Games. London, England: Scholastic, 2011. Dunn, George A. and Nicolas Michaud, eds. The Hunger Games and Philosophy: A Critique of Pure Treason. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012. Flood, Alison. “Hunger Games Novels Join Most Complained-About Titles in US.” Guardian (April 10, 2012). http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/ apr/10/hunger-games-most-complained-about-us/print (Accessed July 2014). Foucault, Michel. Society Must Be Defended. London, England: Penguin Books, 2004. Mathiesen, Thomas. “The Viewer Society: Michel Foucault’s ‘Panopticon’ Revisited.” Theoretical Criminology, v.1/2 (1997). Medovoi, Leeron. “Global Society Must Be Defended: Biopolitics Without Boundaries.” Social Text 91, v.25/2 (2007).

I radical transparency bills that became known as the ­ Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI). The IMMI hoped to establish Iceland as the inverse of a tax haven by offering journalists and publishers powerful protections for free speech and investigative journalism, while at the same time rendering institutions in Iceland more transparent. IMMI featured an ultramodern version of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, whistleblower protections for those who step forward to reveal important matters in the public interest, and source protection or protection for anonymous sources that attempt to communicate to the public after a promise of confidentiality by a journalist or a media organization. With IMMI regulations and status as a European Economic Area state, Iceland is one of the few nations recommended by the European Union for hosting cloud-based data in compliance with its Directive 95/46/EU. Despite this strong record of privacy and transparency, Iceland has experienced a number of internal problems. The country’s journalists did not adequately report on the crippling 2008 financial crisis while it was in progress. The influence of business on the journalistic profession was unduly felt at this time, and some journalists censored themselves, not wanting to alienate employers or sponsors. Furthermore, journalists felt a lack of job security after the economy weakened. Tight budgets at media companies usually meant that the investigative journalism budget had to be cut. In addition, despite Iceland’s reputation as a place to protect whistle-blowers, they have been fired there. The sources of journalists were not

Iceland Iceland stands out among the countries of the world as one of the great open societies and a natural home for publishers. With a strong tradition of free speech and an admirable record of institutional integrity, the island nation was the destination of choice for Julian Assange’s orga­ nization, WikiLeaks, which hoped to expose corruption and promote business and corporate transparency throughout the world. Data privacy laws proposed by Iceland’s government are among the most powerful in the world. Businesses worldwide want to move their cloud data structures to Iceland, confident that its security system can resist National Security Agency–style spying. Despite such strong credentials, a balanced view of the country reveals certain flaws with respect to surveillance, security, and privacy. Like all advanced industrial nations in the post-9/11 era, the government struggles to protect its citizens from terrorists and other predators. Furthermore, police surveillance is frequently conducted to combat drug use among Icelanders. This entry examines Iceland’s privacy and transparency laws, while also revealing some shortcomings in selfreporting by the nation’s journalists.

Privacy and Transparency Iceland has some of the strongest privacy laws in the world thanks to WikiLeaks and Birgitta Jonsdottir, who worked to pass a collection of ­ 487

488

Identity Politics

protected until 2000, when courts ruled that they could be held secret. Iceland’s reputation as an open society, however, took a minor hit when it could not promise Edward Snowden, a National Security Agency whistle-blower who fled the United States to avoid arrest, a safe haven and freedom from prosecution due to its close relationship with the United States. The nation also sacrifices individual privacy to combat the social issue of Internet pornography. Iceland’s Internet service providers block child pornography websites. They also cooperate with national antipornography groups that participate in the International Association of Internet ­Hotlines project. If a member of the public or an organization finds a given link to be suspicious, he or she may report it to relevant authorities for verification. Further demonstrating its resolve against pornography, two bills proposed by the Minister of Interior beginning in 2012 would have limited citizen access to gambling and pornographic sites. The bills did not pass the parliament, and with the advent of a new government in 2013, the issues have not been resolved and continue to be debated.

officials in Iceland cracked down on drug use and users beginning in the 1960s. Drugs were anathema to Icelanders, whose values held that drugs defile the body and lead to a deterioration of health. Consequently, surveillance by undercover police was conducted much more frequently. By the late 1960s, Iceland’s narcotics laws were revised and extended to make cannabis and LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) illegal. A separate drug court was established in the 1990s alongside a separate drug police unit, and the two bodies were tied together tightly. Drug conviction rates were very high, while appeals of conviction were nearly nonexistent. Iceland will likely continue its anomalous path into the future. On the one hand, it is recognized worldwide as a beacon for personal privacy and institutional transparency. It will continue to be a popular place for governments to house sensitive data structures in an effort to insulate them from spying by the United States and other leading countries. At the same time, Iceland has demonstrated an appetite for strong undercover drug policing that undercuts the island nation’s reputation for openness and transparency. Stan Weeber

Military and Police As in most Western nations, Iceland is aware that it must be vigilant in protecting its citizens from terrorists and others who might exploit them. While no significant terrorist attacks have occurred in Iceland, the nation remains alert, yet its preparedness is a major concern given that Iceland has no standing army; a lightly armed Coast Guard is the only resistance to a military or terrorist attack. Businesses worldwide find Iceland to be a desirable place to relocate because they are certain that the home government will not be spending time spying on their affairs. The police are not overly militarized. They spend time working mostly local crimes, and the country has a reputation, borne out by official statistics, as a place with little crime. When compared with the rest of the advanced capitalistic countries, Iceland’s crime rate is very low. However, undercover policing has grown in the past decades in Iceland due to a moral panic that came about in the 1960s regarding use of drugs. Icelanders pride themselves on having a healthy climate and hardworking people who value good health. Probably due to a moral overreaction,

See also Cloud Computing; Law and Digital Technology; WikiLeaks

Further Readings Assange, Julian. Julian Assange: The Unauthorised Biography. Edinburgh, Scotland: Canongate, 2012. Greenberg, Andy. This Machine Kills Secrets: Julian Assange, the Cypherpunks and Their Fight to Empower Whistleblowers. New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2013. Gunnlaugsson, Helgi and John F. Galliher. “The Secret Drug Police of Iceland.” In C. Fijnaut and G. T. Marx (eds.), Undercover: Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law Enforcement International, 1995.

Identity Politics Identity politics refers to political arguments or movements that cater to the interests, perspectives,

Identity Politics

and concerns of social groups identified mainly on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, ideology, nationality, cultural preferences, medical conditions, professions, or hobbies. The relationship between identity politics and surveillance is multilayered; surveillance is often seen as a specific management of the relative visibilities and visibility asymmetries. In addition, the advocacy and the implementation of policies driven by identity politics carry a surveillance potential. Special forms of surveillance come up in the context of ethno-racial identity politics ­concerning the inherently arbitrary nature of official, politico-legal definitions for groups and membership criteria and the materialization of free choice of identity. In this entry, a more thorough understanding of the concept of identity politics is explored, criticisms of surveillance in relation to identity politics are reviewed, and surveillance in the context of ethnoracial minority protection is examined.

The Concept of Identity Politics The term identity politics signifies a collection of political projects, including both theory and activism, founded in the shared experiences of injustice, violence, exploitation, marginalization, or powerlessness of members of particular social groups that challenge dominant oppressive regimes and cultural imperialism and aim for greater selfdetermination and the reclaiming, redescription, and transformation of stigmatized accounts of group membership. Identity politics are i­ ntertwined with various social justice movements (e.g., feminist, LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender], disability) that may focus on individual justice aimed at reducing discrimination, group justice concentrating on redistribution and economic empowerment, the recognition of diverse identities, or social dialogue and representation of the group’s priorities and perspectives.

Concerns and Criticism Regarding the Relationship Between Identity Politics and Surveillance Integrated circuit, or microchip, technologies create new venues, fora, tools, and strategies for identity politics. Political and social engagement, as well as expressions of identities, once gone

489

digital, are persistent, searchable, valorized, and exposed to dataveillance. Socio-technical devices and visibility regimes are also technologies of power and are, thus, political, increasing opportunities to classify, monitor, and cross-check identities. The general criticism concerning identity politics is that mobilization around a single axis tends toward essentialism, as it assumes and implies that gender, race, or other group characteristics are fixed or biologically determined traits and that these features take priority in representing the self. Also, identity politics have been criticized for describing and dictating a selective and reductive self-understanding that group members should have. This effect is increased and reiterated by surveillance identification regimens that are crucial in creating inclusionary or exclusionary features for identity documentation and in the process of moving from self-identification to constituting and directly confirming identities via data matching or biometrical technologies, thus reducing personhood and the complexity of personal identity structures. Legislation and government policies for preferential treatment, minority rights, and targeted antidiscrimination measures (as well as antihate crime and hate speech legislation) presuppose identification, classification, and surveillance, which also create a potential for abuse. The Holocaust, the Rwanda genocide, and forced ­population transfers were all administered by relying on easily accessible official registries containing data on religious and ethno-national affiliation. In dataveillance societies, parents’ choices in religious education in schools may create lists open for potential profiling, and engagement in activism may also lead to discrimination, such as in the case of people infected with HIV/AIDS being discriminated against by employers, insurance companies, or resident communities. Data protection regimens usually prohibit the collection and processing of information pertaining to personality traits (e.g., race, ethnicity, religion, political opinion) that habitually serve as a basis for identity politics, but this shield disappears once these features actually become a part of the policies implementing preferential treatment or specialized protection, as these either constitute ex lege exceptions from privacy or require some form of initial consent from the individual.

490

Identity Theft

Surveillance in the Context of Ethno-Racial Minority Protection Surveillance is inevitable in the context of ethnoracial minority protection, since all such legal mechanisms need to institutionalize some kind of a definition for the targeted groups and/or membership requirements within the community in order to be effective. The failure to do so allows for the abuse by persons not having the targeted characteristic and enables state officials to refrain from applying the protective measures by claiming that they cannot identify the lawful recipients. Also, taxpayers arguably have a right to properly identify the beneficiaries of affirmative action and minority rights regimens because of the budgetary burdens of these policies. Ethno-national identity can be defined in several ways: through self-identification; by other members or elected, appointed representatives of the group; by outsiders, through the perception of the majority; or by outsiders but using “objective” criteria, such as names or residence. When it comes to choosing legal or policy means to identify community membership, usually the following m ­ ethods are used: for hate crimes and discrimination, the perception of the majority and the perpetrators is taken into consideration; in political representation, the perception of the minority community is in the center; and in preferential treatment (remedial measures and affirmative action), self-identification along with community identification or endorsement are the key features. With regard to social policy, anonymized ethnic data are a useful source for planning measures for socially excluded ethnic groups. Under international law, states are explicitly obliged to establish some criteria for group membership in order to draft affirmative action and ethnicity-based social inclusion policies and to effectively combat discrimination or bias crimes. In models used for indigenous or aboriginal communities, rigid membership requirements are set forth, in which the state either provides strict admin­ istrative definitions using some kind of objective criteria or officially endorses tribal norms. The European model for national minorities usually refrains from creating strict legal definitions for membership. In most cases, a formalized declaration suffices, with occasional additional objective requirements, such as proven ancestry (supported by some sort of official documents) or the proven knowledge of the minority language.

A related question concerns the individual’s freedom to choose from among the institutionalized (administratively recognized) identity clusters. Under international law, the right to free choice of identity as a sui generis right does not exist. Its core does entail the following: states cannot create mandatory ethno-racial or national classifications, states cannot deny the right of individuals not to affiliate involuntarily with any given group—most of all for statistical and census purposes, states cannot forcefully assimilate individuals into the majority, and insofar as individuals do not wish to make use of minority rights or preferential treatment, the state cannot make arbitrary ethno-racial classifications. András L. Pap and Lídia Balogh See also Agency; Equality; Identity Theft; Religion; Social Justice

Further Readings Amoore, Louise. “Governing by Identity.” In Colin J. Bennett and David Lyon (eds.), Playing the Identity Card. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. Barth, Fredrik, ed. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1969. Brighenti, Andrea M. Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Haggerty, Kevin D. and Minas Samatas. Surveillance and Democracy. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. Pap, Andras L. “Overruling Murphy’s Law on the Free Choice of Identity and the Racial-Ethnic-National Terminology-Triad.” In Kristin Henrard (ed.), The Interrelation Between the Right to Identity of Minorities and Their Socio-Economic Participation. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2012.

Identity Theft Identity theft and identity fraud are terms applied  to crimes in which someone steals and uses another person’s personal information such as his or her name, address, date of birth, Social Security number, medical or health insurance member number, birth certificate, death certificate, passport number, driver’s license number,

Identity Theft

student identification number, credit or bank account numbers, passwords (e.g., mother’s maiden name), or biometric data (e.g., fingerprints) to facilitate other unlawful activities. The information is typically used for fraudulent or deceptive purposes and for financial gain. The criminal activities associated with identity thefts can negatively affect a victim’s credit status and require the victim to expend time and financial resources in order to restore his or her credit standing and perhaps his or her reputation. In addition, identity theft can have implications for national security. This entry discusses threats and risks to personal and national security associated with identity theft schemes as well as actions aimed at addressing identity theft and reducing victimization.

Identity Theft Schemes The target of an identity theft may have no awareness of his or her victimization until financial consequences such as loan denials or credit collection attempts manifest as a result of the theft and associated fraudulent activities. Identity theft involving child victims may go undetected until they are adults and after considerable damage has been wrought through the use of their Social Security numbers and other identifiers. Individuals may discover that they have been the victims of medical identity theft when they receive billings for medical services, are contacted by a medical debt collector, file a legitimate claim and find that their benefits limit has been breached, or they are denied insurance. Criminal identity theft is often undisclosed until the victim becomes the subject of a failed criminal background investigation, is unable to renew his or her driver’s license, receives notice of outstanding warrants or citations, or becomes the subject of an arrest as a result of a perpetrator using his or her name and personal identification information. Identity theft is not a new phenomenon. Identity thieves have secured employment within agencies, organizations, and businesses in the past that allowed them access to student, customer, patient, client, or employee data, or they have c­onspired with employees having such data access. Such thieves have obtained discarded account and personal identification information placed in trash receptacles by unwitting potential victims. Identity

491

thieves have also stolen wallets and handbags as well as mail containing tax information, credit and bank account information, and preapproved credit offers. Burglaries and robberies involving the theft of driver’s licenses, credit cards, debit cards, or checkbooks have also resulted in subsequent identity frauds. Criminals may engage in a practice known as “shoulder surfing” and observe victims from close proximity as they enter telephone calling card numbers, personal identification numbers, or bank card and credit card numbers, or they may eavesdrop on verbal interactions that disclose such numbers. Telephone calls under the guise of legitimate motives or offers have also been used to elicit personal information. Contemporary identity theft threats and risks are far more pervasive, and the schemes, including computer and network intrusions and other online elements, are more sophisticated. For example, Internet identity theft may involve emails that appear to be from a credible source but could be a form of Internet identity theft called “phishing.” Phishing involves criminals sending out fraudulent emails that appear to be or claim to be from legitimate companies such as an Internet provider or a financial institution. The email recipient will be directed to a dummy site that resembles the legitimate company’s website and will be prompted to divulge personal information that the thief will use for illicit and illegal purposes. Many victims respond to unsolicited email referred to as “spam” and often originating from international Internet protocol addresses that request financial and personal information typically for malicious purposes. Another threat involves identity refund frauds that result in the acquisition of the victim’s date of birth and Social Security number and the subsequent filing of fraudulent tax returns using the acquired information and the direction of the refunds to prepaid debit cards or bank accounts under the control of the thief. Victims are often unaware of the fraudulent returns until they file their legitimate tax returns or receive a tax audit notice. Data breaches have been experienced by corporations including commercial data brokers,  institutions of higher learning, financial institutions, and government agencies. The stolen identity information may be used to obtain new credit including student loans, to make withdrawals from existing financial accounts, or to access

492

Identity Theft

and exploit restricted information. A thief can also use an individual’s name, photos, and other personal information to create accounts on social media platforms.

Identity Theft and National Security Stolen identities used as cloaks of anonymity by criminals and terrorists can not only negatively affect the financial and general well-being of individuals but may also threaten national security. Identity theft is particularly disturbing from a national security perspective. Each incident demonstrates the relative ease with which terrorists might be able to successfully exercise such criminal techniques to conceal their real identities, to evade detection, and to assist in eluding apprehension by law enforcement. Identity information stolen or purchased by terrorists can also be used to obtain passports and other travel documents, to access credit and cash in order to finance terrorist operations, and to open bank accounts for purposes of routing funds.

Addressing Identity Theft To address the problems of identity theft, the U.S. Congress passed or amended numerous laws. The 1998 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act amended Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1028, to include knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable state or local law.

This 1998 act made identity theft a separate crime against the individual whose identity was stolen and credit damaged, established the Federal Trade Commission as the federal government’s focal point of contact for reporting incidents of identity theft, increased criminal penalties for identity theft and fraud, and closed legal loopholes that identified the production and possession of false identification documents as criminal acts though stealing another person’s personal identifying information was not. Prior to 1998,

crimes now considered identity theft were often charged under “false personation” statutes dating back to the late 19th century. The 2004 Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act was passed by the U.S. Congress to establish penalties for “aggravated” identity theft. Aggravated identity theft involves using the identity of another person to commit felonies, including immigration violations, the theft of Social Security benefits due another person, and acts of domestic terrorism. The Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 amended Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3663(b), to further clarify that restitution orders in identity theft cases may include amounts equal to the value of the victim’s time devoted to remediating the actual or intended harm of the identity theft or aggravated identity theft. This 2008 law also allows the federal government to prosecute when the criminal and the victim reside in the same state. Previously federal courts only had jurisdiction if the identity thief used interstate communication to access the personally identifiable information of the victim. Other federal laws enacted to address the complexities of identity theft and identity fraud have included the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 that amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to strengthen and enhance the protections for the victims of identity theft. The FCRA promotes the fairness, accuracy, and privacy of credit reports. Under Section 605B of the FCRA, identity theft victims are entitled to significant protections that can assist them in a more timely recovery from the effects of identity theft. In addition, Sections 605B, 615(f), and 623(a)(6) of the FCRA permit an identity theft report to be used in permanently blocking identity theft–related fraudulent information from a victim’s credit report. Identity theft reports prevent continuing efforts at debt collections resulting from identity thefts and allow victims to place extended fraud alerts on their credit reports. Under Section 605B, the identity theft report is a police report that details the accounts and erroneous information resulting from an identity theft and includes information filed by the victim in a Federal Trade Commission ID Theft Complaint. U.S. states have identity theft and false personation laws, and state legislatures have passed laws to assist identity theft victims.

Immigration

Consumer protection organizations and some businesses endeavor to promote employee and consumer identity theft awareness in order to reduce victimizations. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies use crime prevention investigative, intelligence, and cyber resources to identify, recognize, and appraise identity theft risks in order to disrupt and stop individuals and organized crime groups. An accurate quantification of the occurrences of identity theft is challenging because law enforcement agencies are not uniform in their classification of identity theft crimes and because other crimes and violations such as credit card fraud, Internet fraud, or mail theft may be involved, charged, and reported in conjunction with or in lieu of identity theft. Despite the ever-increasing incidents of identity thefts, there are no proactive tools for absolutely preventing identity thefts. There are identity theft consumer services inclusive of credit monitoring, identity theft insurance, identity restoration, and identity monitoring. Delmar P. Wright See also Cybertheft; Email; Information Security; Privacy, Internet

Further Readings Barnard-Willis, D. Surveillance and Identity: Discourse, Subjectivity and the State. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016. Biegelman, M. T. Identity Theft Handbook: Detection, Prevention, and Security. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009.

Immigration Immigration is the process whereby individuals migrate to a new country and is often the result of displacement and refugee movements. Immigration has been a divisive and controversial topic throughout history and currently is linked with national security issues for many countries. However, immigrants as well as the threat to national security from immigrants are often the subjects of misconceptions—many of which are discussed in this entry.

493

Immigration and Crime Popular culture often depicts immigrants as criminally prone. These caricatures depict Latino immigrants as drug lords or gangsters and Middle Eastern immigrants as terrorists. The media also helps fuel these negative stereotypes. However, this trend has existed since the days of early immigration in the United States. Irish immigrants were depicted as alcoholics and Italians as mobsters. Every generation of immigrants has faced some assumptions about their criminality. Despite the popular assumption that immigrants are criminally prone, the literature on crime does not support that assumption. The literature on immigration and crime has consistently found that a rise in immigration does not result in an increase in crime. More important, there is widespread research that continues to find that a rise in immigration results in a decrease in violent crime. In fact, immigration status is considered a protective factor against crime. Immigrants are less likely to commit crime relative to those who are native born. This includes everything from petty crime to more serious crimes such as domestic violence and homicide. Criminologists have discovered what is described as an immigrant paradox whereby immigrants exhibit less antisocial behavior relative to nativeborn residents and, thus, engage in less criminal activity. Compared with native-born residents, immigrants are less likely to be criminals despite having fewer economic resources, less formal education, and residing in primarily urban areas. These findings hold true for immigrants across different regions including the United States, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Despite evidence showing that immigrants are not criminally prone and commit fewer crimes than nativeborn residents, they are the subject of discrimination and anti-immigrant legislation.

Europe and Immigration With the displacement of people due to war, famine, or conflict, individuals are often forced to migrate to other countries. In the host country, immigrants may be viewed as threats to the status quo, the economy, or the culture. As a result, they are vulnerable to discrimination.

494

Immigration

In recent years, a growing fear of immigrants and xenophobic attitudes have resulted in widespread nativist attitudes. For example, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia that began in 2014 has resulted in the migration of Ukrainians to Poland. The large number of unexpected migrants has fueled a fear that the Ukrainian immigrants are stealing jobs from Polish citizens as some companies have taken advantage of the labor provided by migrants. In some cases, Polish car factories have informed employees who go on strike that they will be fired and replaced by Ukrainians. Poland is experiencing low economic and employment rates, which contribute to a sense of ­ competition and resentment against immigrants. This results in a push for anti-immigrant legislation. Across Europe, the number of refugees and migrants has been increasing. Some countries have reacted to this change by attempting to or successfully passing anti-immigrant legislation. The aim of this type of legislative effort is to make it undesirable for immigrants to live in the host ­ country. Given the focus on the global War on ­Terror, Muslim immigrants are considered especially threatening. Some of the tactics used to dissuade their immigration are public campaigns that encourage immigrants to settle elsewhere, seizure of immigrants’ property, anti-Muslim laws, and bans from public places. The influx of refugees and immigrants in Europe has also fueled a wave of anti-immigrant legislation. In Germany, for instance, refugees are required to learn German and assimilate. Otherwise, they are at risk of losing their residency. Denmark passed a controversial law whereby enforcement officials are permitted to seize cash and valuables from refugees. In Switzerland, ­refugees can also have their assets seized when they amount to more than 1,000 Swiss francs. In ­Denmark, it is a crime to assist migrants coming into the county. One Danish city made it mandatory to serve pork in public institutions such as schools in order to preserve the Danish identity in the face of the increase in Muslim migrants. Other controversial laws across Europe have been met with a backlash for being discriminatory. In Norway, immigrants were forced to flee to ­Russia on bicycles during winter storms. Under pressure from Russia, the Norwegian government stopped the practice. Norway also started publishing

anti-immigrant ad campaigns. Countries such as Norway, Denmark, and Austria established etiquette classes and sexual education for migrants and refugees, relying on racial and/or religious stereotypes as justification. In another discriminatory action, Slovakia decided that it would accept only Christian refugees, using religious persecution to justify a Muslim ban. In Bornheim, Germany, immigrant males older than 18 years of age were banned from public swimming pools because of several sexual assault reports. However, that legislation was met with criticism, and the ban was lifted. Another controversial and discriminatory tactic involved a British city that required immigrants to wear a red wristband to receive food. In 2015, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights criticized the Czech Republic for its alleged immigrant detention tactics. The Czech Republic was accused of taking immigrants’ money to pay for their own detention and strip-searching them with the purpose of finding additional cash. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called for the Hungarian government to investigate allegations of abuse and violence against immigrants. In 2016, a poll was conducted by YouGov, an  international Internet-based market research firm, across European countries to measure anti-­ immigrant sentiments. Participants were asked whether or not they felt at home because of immigration. Italians were the most anti-immigrant country with 52% of respondents saying that “there are so many foreigners living here, it doesn’t feel like home anymore.” Also ranking high in anti-immigrant sentiment were the French (47%) and the Germans (44%). Almost 40% of British citizens said that they no longer felt at home due to immigration. The three least anti-immigrant countries were Romania (18%), Lithuania (17%), and Poland (15%). The poll found that agreeing with the aforementioned statement was strongly correlated with whether that person held authoritative views. For example, 70% of Italians who held authoritative nativist views agreed that they no longer felt at home due to immigration.

The United States and Immigration A person’s first unauthorized entry into the United States is a civil violation of the U.S. penal code

Immigration

and is treated as a misdemeanor. Title 8 § 1325 of the U.S. Code states: Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall, for the first commission of any such offense, be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both, and, for a subsequent commission of any such offense, be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.

If an individual is deported and reenters without legal authorization, the crime of reentry becomes a felony and can result in a 10-year sentence. The penalties are more severe for an immigrant who is convicted of an aggravated felony and attempts to reenter the United States. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, that individual would face a 20-year prison sentence. Consequently, immigration policy in the United States is focused on locating, prosecuting, and deporting undocumented immigrants. Some local and state legislators have drawn national attention to their efforts to deter immigration and punish immigrants. Perceptions of a threat from immigrants have fostered an anti-immigrant movement, and this movement has policy implications. The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance of 2006 passed in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, created sanctions for businesses that hired undocumented immigrants and the landlords who rented to them. Alabama passed House Bill 56, titled Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, into law in 2011. This legislative bill was considered the most restrictive anti-immigrant legislation piece at the time. Some of the restrictions that were put in place included requiring schools to check a student’s immigrant status and making jobs, leases, and child support contracts invalid. Local law enforcement agents were permitted to stop anyone who they considered looked like an undocumented immigrant. If an individual is stopped by law enforcement agents and cannot produce proof of legal status, then the

495

individual can be taken to jail, with the federal deportation process beginning soon after. The constitutionality of the bill was called into question, and the bill was blocked temporarily. In 2011, Georgia governor John Nathan Deal signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act. It allowed law enforcement officials to question suspects about their immigrant status. Similar to Alabama’s House Bill 56, individuals unable to produce proof of legal status could be jailed and deported. Another anti-immigration legislation, which made national headlines, was Arizona’s 2010 Senate Bill 1070 titled Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. Former governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law granting local law enforcement agents the power to question individuals about their legal status. Critics of Senate Bill 1070 argued that the law was meant to legalize racial profiling and was geared toward targeting Latino immigrants. The bill was temporarily blocked to examine its constitutionality, and in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a decision. While it blocked certain provisions of the law, the Court upheld the highly contested “show me your papers” provision. Local law enforcement agents maintained the power to inquire about an individual’s immigrant status during routine traffic stops. Critics argue that the aforementioned legislations serve to send a clear message to immigrants that they are not welcome.

Hate Crimes Immigrants are vulnerable to attacks motivated by their immigrant status coupled with their racial or ethnic makeup. In the United States, crimes committed by nativist extremists against suspected immigrants are on the rise. There has been a 20%  increase in reported hate crimes since the U.S. 2016 presidential election. Washington, D.C., reported the largest increase in hate crimes from 62 incidents in 2015 to 107 in 2016. This was followed by New York City, which reported a 24% increase within the same 1-year span. Civil rights leaders argue that the Trump administration will further alienate and target immigrants. In May 2017, the Trump administration announced that a former executive of an anti-immigrant group

496

Immigration and Naturalization Service

would be the new ombudsman for the Citizenship and Immigration Services branch, which is held in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This hire has been criticized, given that the ombudsman and the office are charged with assisting immigrants with cases and petitions. The rise of nationalist attitudes is not exclusively American. There are widespread nativist attitudes across Europe that have resulted in political changes, most notably the British vote to leave the European Union.

Brexit In 2016, British voters supported Britain’s exit from the European Union. It has been reported that some voters were motivated in their support of leaving the European Union because of antiimmigrant views, feeling as though they had lost control over immigration. A surge of Syrian refugees apparently has heightened fears that immigration was getting out of control. A 2013 British Social Attitudes study reported that 75% of ­Britons wanted immigration policies reduced, with 56% stating that they should be reduced “a lot.”

Immigration and Surveillance In the 21st century, the global threat of terrorism is often tied to immigration. To address this concern, the United States and other countries have taken measures to increase border security and surveillance. The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol employs drones to monitor the Arizona-Mexico border to locate undocumented immigrants who are attempting to cross the border. Proponents of the use of this type of surveillance technology argue that it assists enforcement officials in ­locating and responding to illegal crossings. Opponents of this technology argue that at a cost of $18  million dollars for a fully equipped drone, drones are not cost-effective. Some note that equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles, ­sensors, and detection equipment can be used for border surveillance. Other measures are taken to monitor individuals who attempt to enter the United States as visitors or with a visa. US-VISIT is an entry-exit enforcement system run by the U.S. DHS. USVISIT is a security measure that starts oversees

when an individual applies for entry into the United States. The process begins with an application for entry and follows the individual through arrival in and departure from the United States. Two of the goals of the program include e­ nhancing security and protecting the privacy of visitors. Both individuals who have nonimmigrant visas and those traveling under the Visa Waiver Program are subject to this form of surveillance. Biographic and biometric information is also collected and reviewed by officials at DHS. The aim of this technology is to prevent known criminals or terrorists from entering the United States. The current debate regarding immigrants includes issues raised about whether the increase of surveillance and new forms of technology violate immigrant civil liberties, including the right to ­ privacy. Mercedes Valadez See also Border Patrol Checkpoints; U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Further Readings Sampson, R. “Rethinking Crime and Immigration.” Contexts, v.7 (2008). Sayad, A. The Suffering of the Immigrant. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2004.

Websites U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): https://www.uscis.gov

Immigration Service

and

Naturalization

Created in 1933, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was an agency housed within the U.S. Department of Justice until it was reconfigured following the attacks of September 11, 2001, as the Department of Homeland Security. Its functions are divided between the following three agencies: (1) the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), (2) the U.S. Immigration

Immigration and Naturalization Service

and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and (3) the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). This entry reviews the history of immigration as well as the INS’s duties before and after its reconfiguration.

History Before 1900, the United States essentially had an open-door immigration policy. The first agency tasked with issues related to immigration enforcement and policy was created in 1864. During that time, immigration was highly encouraged. In fact, there were processes put in place to assist, ­transport, and settle newcomers. Also during that time, individual states were primarily charged with overseeing immigration matters. However, as migration to the United States continued to grow, so did concerns about restricting immigration. Thus, immigration laws were created to limit and oversee immigration. For example, individuals with serious criminal convictions, mental illness, or contagious disease were no longer permitted entry into the United States. Later, concerns about immigrants from certain countries and regions resulted in the establishment of quotas on immigrants from other countries. A U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1875 (Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275) found that the federal government rather than individual states was charged with regulating immigration into the United States. The Immigration Act of 1891 created the Commissioner of Immigration within the Treasury Department. It also granted federal jurisdiction over immigration processes. The New Office of Immigration consolidated immigration services and agencies. Thus, 24 inspection stations around both land borders and ports were opened. The most well-known port is Ellis Island, located in the New York harbor. When Ellis Island opened an immigration processing center in 1892, the INS was known as the Immigration Service. It employed fewer than 200 people. However, at the turn of the 21st century, more than 29,000 were employed. To reflect its growth and importance, the Office of Immigration was renamed the Bureau of Immigration. The duties of the Bureau were also expanded. In 1903, the Bureau was removed from the Treasury Department and transferred to the

497

recently created Department of Commerce and Labor. With the transfer of immigration services, naturalization procedures were also transferred to the Bureau of Immigration. This responsibility was solidified by the 1906 Basic Naturalization Act. It granted jurisdiction over naturalization processes to the Bureau of Immigration, which was renamed the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. In 1913, immigration and naturalization services were transferred to the Department of Labor. However, immigration and naturalization services were separated with the transfer. By 1933, the two entities were reunited to form the INS. During the mid-1900s, concerns about national security and immigration arose. The issue of immigration became centered on national security rather than on the economy. Thus, immigration and naturalization services were transferred to the Department of Justice.

Department of Justice Under the Department of Justice, the INS was tasked with handling issues related to both legal and illegal immigration as well as naturalization matters. Matters related to enforcing laws that regulated foreign nationals, immigration, admission of refugees, naturalization of foreign-born individuals, tourist visas, and student and extended stay visas also fell within the purview of the INS. In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act fused immigration and nationalization laws. One of the issues that became a national concern was the growing undocumented immigrant population. In addition, admission of refugees from Europe after World War II became an increasing concern. In response to both matters, the Immigration and Nationality Act was revised in 1965. In 1980, the Refugee Act reconfigured refugeerelated laws. Subsequent laws were passed through the 1900s to address issues related to the unlawful hiring of undocumented immigrants. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the INS led efforts to strengthen national security. It created new and more stringent guidelines for issuing visas. It also focused its efforts to increase surveillance over entries and exit land points and ports. The INS was also given expanded powers over detaining and questioning undocumented

498

Immigration and Naturalization Service

immigrants and visa holders. Their powers of enforcement and monitoring increased with the Mobilization Against Terrorism Act. This act allowed the INS to prosecute, remove, or deport foreign nationals who were alleged to be connected to terrorist groups. The INS became increasingly tasked with matters related to terrorism and national security. In 2003, following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security the year before, the INS was transferred to three agencies: (1) the CBP, (2)  the ICE, and (3) the USCIS.

Customs and Border Protection The CBP is responsible for enforcement related to immigration. It has become one of the world’s largest law enforcement agencies and, as of 2017, employs more than 62,000 individuals. The CBP is tasked with inspections of individuals who are entering the United States. In addition, it is charged with keeping terrorists and weapons out of the United States while facilitating trade and travel. The CBP takes a comprehensive approach to overseeing borders and ports. It focuses its efforts on preventing the illegal entry of individuals rather than searching and apprehending those already in the United States. Their operations are divided into 21 sectors, with 9 of those covering the southern border (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). Apprehensions around the southern border states constitute approximately 98% of all border apprehensions.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement The ICE also is charged with enforcing immigration laws. As of 2017, the ICE has approximately 20,000 employees in more than 400 U.S. offices and 46 foreign countries. Its strategic plan focuses on three main goals. First, protect the borders and counter terrorism. Second, protect the nation’s borders through efficient immigration enforcement. Third, operate an effective and efficient agency. The ICE’s annual budget primarily focuses on two directorates: (1) Enforcement and Removal Operations and (2) Homeland Security Investigations. These operational directorates are supported by the Management and Administration and the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor

(OPLA). Enforcement and Removal Operation is charged with identifying, apprehending, and removing undocumented immigrants. Homeland Security Investigations is tasked with investigating domestic and international issues related to the illegal movement of goods or individuals coming into, within, or leaving the United States. The Management and Administration supports the mission of the ICE through professional managers. OPLA is charged with being the exclusive legal representation for the United States during deportation and removal proceedings against undocumented immigrants, suspected terrorists, and alleged human rights abusers. The primary focus of OPLA is centered on providing legal support on matters including customs, ethics, torts claims, employment law, administrative legal issues, and cybersecurity.

Citizenship and Immigration Services The USCIS is tasked with overseeing lawful immigration into the United States. It is primarily funded through the immigration and naturalization fees that applicants and petitioners must pay to have their cases considered. Organizations or individuals filing immigration benefit requests deposit fees into the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, which constitutes roughly 95% of USCIS’s annual budget. As of 2017, the USCIS comprises approximately 19,000 government employees and contractors in 223 offices around the world. The mission of the USCIS is to secure the United States. It is tasked with providing accurate information to its customers. The USCIS also grants immigration and citizenship benefits. In addition, it promotes an understanding and awareness of citizenship and ensures the integrity of the immigration system. The USCIS focuses on strengthening the security of the immigration system. It supports immigrant integration and participation in U.S. civics. In addition, it promotes flexible immigration policies and programs. The USCIS also focuses efforts on strengthening the infrastructure that supports its mission and its core values of integrity, respect, innovation, and vigilance. Mercedes Valadez

Incapacitation See also Immigration; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; United States

Further Readings Kowalski, Daniel M. Immigration Law and Procedure (Desk ed.). New York, NY: Matthew Bender, 2017. Phelan, Margaret and James Gillespie. Law Handbook 2011. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Websites U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: https://www .uscis.gov U.S. Customs and Border Protection: https://www.cbp .gov U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: https:// www.ice.gov

Incapacitation Incapacitation as a crime control policy refers to a variety of policies and measures that attempt to increase the public’s security by restricting a criminal offender, through either confining to prison or surveilling the person in society (e.g., parole). From a conjectural basis, criminal and juvenile justice literature suggests that the use of incapacitation measures predominantly stem from two academic perspectives: (1) deterrence theory and (2) incapacitation theory. Based on the assumption that humans are rational, the deterrence theory argues that discouraging offensive behavior is probable by imposing certain severe penalties on individuals. In terms of incapacitation, this would suggest that the likelihood of experiencing incarceration or imprisonment may lead individuals to resist the urge to engage in offensive behavior. Another significant theory related to the use of incapacitation is the incapacitation theory. This theory is based on the assumption that only a small percentage of offenders are responsible for the volume of crimes committed. As a result of extended periods of imprisonment, these offenders are not able to engage in crime, thus reducing the rates of crime. Studies suggest that this process of selective punishment may deter others from engaging in crime without having to adopt costly

499

incapacitation measures in all areas of the criminal justice system. The use of incapacitation measures is not exclusively confined to certain geographical areas, regions, or countries. In fact, the use of incapacitation policies has been adopted in many countries, including the Netherlands, Great Britain, Australia, Hungary, New Zealand, and the United States. Historically, the use of ­incapacitation policies stems from public concern regarding the existence of crime as well as skepticism related to the efficacy of rehabilitation.

Examples of Incapacitation As mentioned, instances related to the use of incapacitation exist in both the United States and abroad. For instance, in California, the three strikes law has been employed against repeat offenders, including juveniles who were at least 16 years of age. In addition, there were alternative incapacitation measures geared toward addressing juvenile crimes in California such as Proposition 21, which provided the option that youth offenders, as young as 14 years of age, could be tried as adults for certain offences. In the Netherlands, selective incapacitation policies were used in a manner in which selectivity was prioritized. This involved the use of such measures only among adults who committed at least 10 serious offenses. Subsequently, these convicted offenders received an enhanced punishment in which judges were given the option of punishing the offenders with a 2-year prison sentence that included the option of rehabilitation and job skills training programs.

Effectiveness and Criticisms of Incapacitation A number of studies related to the impact of incapacitation reveal positive results regardless of the status of the offender (i.e., adult, youth). For instance, an increase in the imprisonment of property and drug offenders was associated with a decrease in the commission of robbery and assault among youth in Texas. It has been reported that California’s three strikes law resulted in a 20% reduction in reoffending among individuals who were considered second-strike offenders and a 30% reduction among third-strike offenders. Abroad, selective incapacitation policies in the

500

India

Netherlands reveal the existence of a crime-­reducing effect, especially in relation to the commission of certain offenses (e.g., property crimes) as well as the deterrence of other crimes. Research also highlights the deficiencies and negative outcomes related to incapacitation measures. Among youth, the use of incapacitation contradicts the rehabilitation philosophy that supports the existence of the juvenile justice system. This is evident in certain states, such as Texas, which has experienced an increase in youth imprisonment. In addition, incarcerating youth who may mature out of the propensity of engaging in delinquency and crime may lead to the prospect of detaining individuals who would have avoided crime in the future. Among adults, incapacitation measures have led to a decrease in funding related to rehabilitation and treatment models as well as the existence of increased economic expenses. Any unbiased assessment of incapacitation will consider the influence of both social and individual factors.

Incapacitation.” Journal of Law & Economics, v.42 (1999). Koeter, M. J. W. and M. Bakker. The Effect of PrisonBased Treatment of Drug-Addicted Offenders (Report No. 269). The Hague, Netherlands: Netherlands Department of Justice, 2007. Liedka, R., et al. “The Crime Control Effect of Incarceration: Does Scale Matter?” Criminology & Public Policy, v.5/2 (2006). Polinsky, A. M. and S. Shavell. “On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence.” International Review of Law and Economics, v.18/3 (1998). Stahlkopf, C., et al. “Testing Incapacitation Theory: Youth Crime and Incarceration in California.” Crime & Delinquency, v.56/2 (2010). Vollaard, B. “Preventing Crime Through Selective Incapacitation.” Economic Journal, v.123/567 (2013).

Patrick Webb

India is the largest democracy in the world; however, it is also widely recognized as one of the most corrupt. It also lacks a national privacy policy. Since 2011, instituting such a policy has been ­discussed, but none has yet emerged. As of 2016, only 18% of the population has Internet access, although more than 70% use cell phones. The country also has numerous serious internal and external security concerns, which necessitate a robust surveillance program. India’s privacy laws are examined in this entry, followed by a look at the nation’s internal and external security concerns. The current state and future of India’s surveillance programs are also reviewed.

See also Mass Incarceration; Parole; Prisons and Jails; Private Prisons; Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Further Readings Clear, T. and G. Cole. American Corrections. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth, 2005. Farrington, D. P. “Age and Crime.” In M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986. Garland, D. The Culture of Control. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Greenwood, P. W., et al. Three Strikes and You’re Out: Estimated Costs and Benefits of California’s New Mandatory-Sentencing Law. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994. Helland, E. and A. Tabarrok. “Does Three Strikes Deter? A Nonparametric Estimation.” Journal of Human Resources, v.42/2 (2007). Iyengar, R. I Would Rather Be Hanged for a Sheep Than a Lamb: The Unintended Consequences of California’s Three Strikes Law (NBER Working Paper No. 13784). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. Kessler, D. and K. Levitt. “Using Sentencing Enhancements to Distinguish Between Deterrence and

India

Current Privacy Laws In the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Anr (1997), the justices found that the right to privacy is “enshrined” in Article 21 of the Indian constitution, which says, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” Unfortunately, no judicial or legislative oversight exists to ensure the enforcement of privacy rules and laws. Since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, India has spent millions on Internet surveillance programs

India

501

and strategies. Established ostensibly to monitor terrorist activity, these programs also track private information such as bank accounts, passport information, and telephone records. India has created a National Intelligence Grid and the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems, which allow it access to intelligence, law enforcement, and citizen data sources. In 2013, India initiated the Lawful Intercept & Monitoring systems, which allow it to secretly intercept telephone calls and conduct keyword and key-phrase searches of Internet traffic. The Central Monitoring System is used to intercept telecommunications and store the data. The Central Monitoring System is part of a network that monitors, records, and stores information and makes it available to government agencies, which may then identify callers’ identities. The Aadhaar Act (also known as the Unique Identity Scheme), passed in 2016, assigns an identification number to Indian citizens (similar to Social Security numbers in the United States) and collects personal information like fingerprints, iris scans, date of birth, and other information that the government may specify. While the act lets the Indian government disseminate social benefits to citizens, it also leaves open the ability of the government to collect more information about individuals than what is specified by the act, and it is here that privacy and surveillance concerns arise.

brought about a wide gap between the rich and the poor, with the poor bearing the brunt of economic problems. Malnutrition and disease are problems in poor areas, but the government denies health care on the basis of the security concerns. Security problems are exacerbated by the number of poor ethnic minorities that inhabit border regions and by the Maoist insurgency, which represents and fights on their behalf. In some of these areas, there has been talk of secession, which makes governing these areas difficult. Frequent uprisings are met with military force, which further alienates ethnic minority groups. The government encourages attacks on the Maoists by right-wing and nationalist groups, such as the Shiv Sena and the Bajrang Dal. Bajrang Dal, which has been compared with the Taliban, is a fundamentalist Hindu group that focuses attacks on Muslims and Christians, groups it feels are trying to take over the religious and social landscape of India. It demands that these groups either leave or convert to Hinduism. Members of this group spend much of their time harassing those who they feel are not following Hindu religious practices. There are also Islamic extremist groups— Indian Mujahideen being the primary one—that commit terrorist attacks on India’s urban areas. There are an estimated 800 terror cells operating within India.

Status of Surveillance

External Security

It is clear that India regularly surveils its citizens. The Indian Telegraph Act and the Information Technology Act allow the Indian government to monitor Internet and telecommunications traffic in the name of public safety and the security of the state. Such phrases are opaque and are left to the government to interpret, which essentially leaves the government free to examine, record, and disseminate private information as it wishes. Because the government has never passed a privacy policy, there is no oversight of government surveillance.

Pakistan and China are the two major external security threats facing India. The possibility of a two-front war with China and Pakistan is a serious concern. Although China may have ­ ­supplanted Pakistan as the major regional threat, Pakistan remains a problem for two major ­reasons. First, there are a number of terrorist groups in Pakistan. Second, the United States has provided a large number of weapons to Pakistan to control these groups. There are also grave concerns about a nuclear war with Pakistan. The Mumbai terror attacks in 2008 highlighted how unprepared and overmatched was the Indian Army. Its weaknesses were the major reasons why India did not strike back at Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks. As a result, India is expected to spend more than $100 billion on arms through 2019.

Internal Security Internal security is affected by overpopulation. During the 20th century, the world population tripled; in India, it quintupled. Globalization has

502

Information Security

China, which has friendly ties with Pakistan, continues to exert a major influence in the region of the Indian Ocean. India competes with China for energy resources in the region, which makes Chinese influence in the border nations of Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka troublesome. China has been building ports and naval bases and making economic investments in these countries. In response, India has been expanding its navy to combat Chinese expansion and to search for energy resources. Even though India has the fifth-largest navy in the world, it continues to lag behind China in this regard.

Future of Surveillance India’s security concerns, and the fact that there is no meaningful oversight of surveillance programs, make it likely that India will continue to surveil telecommunications and Internet traffic. In addition, the existence of numerous technology companies in India that ensures access to current surveillance technology increases this likelihood. In response to Pakistani and Chinese cyberattacks, India has been developing the ability to launch cyberattacks of its own on these countries. The Aadhaar Act, while ostensibly a method to distribute social benefits, leaves the door open for the government to surveil and limit the privacy of Indian citizens. James Geistman See also Cell Phone Tracking; China; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Right to; Smartphones

Further Readings Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice. “The AADHAAR (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016.” https://uidai.gov.in/images/the_aadhaar_act_2016.pdf (Accessed March 2017). Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice. “The Constitution of India” (n.d.). http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/ coiason29july08.pdf (Accessed December 2014). Karim, Afsir. “India’s Security Concerns.” India Defence Review (May 4, 2014). http://www.indiandefence review.com/news/indias-security-concerns/ (Accessed September 2017). Karim, Afsir. “Threats to India in the Coming Years.” India Defence Review (August 17, 2014). http://www

.indiandefencereview.com/news/threats-to-india-inthe-coming-years/ (Accessed September 2017). Kugelman, Michael, ed. India’s Contemporary Security Challenges. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011. http://www .wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_100423_ IndiaSecurityFINAL.pdf (Accessed September 2017). Privacy International. State of Privacy India (n.d.). https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/975 (Accessed March 2017). Singh, Baljit. “India’s Security Concerns: National, Regional, and Global.” Indian Journal of Political Science, v.65/3 (2004). Xynou, Maria. “Big Democracy, Big Surveillance: India’s Surveillance State.” Open Security (February 10, 2014). https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ maria-xynou/big-democracy-big-surveillance-indiassurveillance-state (Accessed September 2017).

Information Security Information security refers to the protection of computer systems from intrusion and exploitation. As the major concern in protecting these systems is the integrity of data stored and transmitted, the term information assurance is also used. Security professionals refer to their role as guaranteeing confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information in their charge. There are several component fields and studies in information security, including cryptography, forensic analysis, intrusion detection, and incident response. Securing a system requires the implementation of both specific security measures, such as closing network ports to incoming connections or installing firewalls, and general practices that maintain the integrity of the system, such as identity management procedures. A complete perspective on information security must include both technical skills to protect the system from direct attacks and behavioral/interactive skills to protect the system from social engineering. Information security professionals ensure that data are only accessed or changed by those who have legitimate access, framing access in terms of privilege, and illicit access in terms of privilege escalation. As the main object of protection is data, there is a strong connection between information security and privacy. A secure system limits access to

Information Security

an individual’s sensitive information, a firm’s trade secrets, or a physician’s patient records. As more information storage and processing are relegated to computers, information security is a concern for most individuals and organizations in virtually any profession. This entry reviews access privilege and encryption techniques, as well as social vulnerabilities of digital data. Next, the entry examines user productivity as layers of security are added, and users’ trust of security professionals to breach data only to enhance security measures. Finally, the field of  digital forensics is introduced, and legal and ethical concerns regarding information security are discussed.

Access Privileges and Encryption Information security practice involves establishing and managing trust relationships. Information systems are secured through access privileges. Users must authenticate themselves to a system, typically by supplying credentials, the most familiar of which are the username-password ­ combination. These identity management systems are hence the most desirable to exploit because an intruder can obtain access to all privilege levels. Encryption is used to mask data in storage or transmission. This aspect of information security extends through the history of intelligence gathering and secure communications in the days of the Roman Empire. Classical substitution ciphers such as the Caesar cipher can be broken by modern computers through “brute force” (i.e., by trying all possible combinations). Contemporary encryption software employs sophisticated algorithms to resist brute force attacks. The strength of an encryption algorithm, along with control of the keys to decrypt the content, determines the security of data. Development of encryption software also entails a layer of trust; a developer could introduce vulnerabilities in encryption algorithms that allow the key to be guessed more easily. In addition, the exchange of cryptographic keys can serve as identity management. The PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) protocol calls for the exchange of asymmetric keys. Each user has a public key, known to everyone, and a private key. A message encrypted with the private key can only be decrypted with the public key, establishing the authenticity of the sender. Since the sender’s key is

503

publicly known, the contents of the message are not truly hidden. The PGP keys are used to sign patches and updates in the open source community, forming a web of trust by connecting specific developers to their code commitments.

Social Vulnerabilities Even a highly secure information system is vulnerable to social engineering. Ranging from email phishing to in-person confidence techniques, intruders who can convince users to give up their credentials can gain access or privileges. Good security practices include repeated training to prepare users for these scenarios. Likewise, physical access to servers can enable exploitation of a system, so traditional security practices, as in locked doors, also support information security. Ultimately, a system is only as secure as its operators and environment. The security of personal information is a prominent concern in the Digital Age. In developed societies, an individual is typically connected to a variety of service providers, each of which stores sensitive information. If these data are compromised, individuals could be exposed to blackmail, discrimination, or fraud. As such, providers of ­ health, legal, and financial services must attend to their responsibilities about client data and confidentiality. Likewise, government offices that oversee provision of public services often store citizen data and utilize identity management systems to ensure legitimate access. These databases must be stored in a secure fashion but must be accessible to accommodate efficient and effective service provision. Digital, networked databases not only allow for more efficient retrieval and transfer of records but also allow for extensive monitoring of data subjects. The aggregation of data sets across contexts enables the creation of sophisticated models intended to predict behavior. Private firms utilize these predictions for market advantage, and government agencies use them to identify potential security threats. While the controllers of private data have an interest in keeping their databases secure from intrusion, individuals are at the same time exposed to monitoring by the same firm that protects their data from intruders. Due to this asymmetric relationship, the European Union developed explicit data protection standards, with the first version of the Data Protection Directive taking effect in 1995, and an updated Data

504

Information Security

Protection Regulation taking effect in 2016. These regulations describe the responsibilities of data controllers and the rights of data subjects, requiring explicit consent from subjects for the processing of data and providing for deletion and mobility of personal information.

User Productivity As information technology has become commonplace, usable information security has become a prominent concern. Effective security always adds a layer of complexity to any task. Rather than simply sit at a computer and execute a task, a user must authenticate himself or herself to the system. While authentication can be as simple as entering a password, such simple measures are also the easiest to overcome. On the other hand, requiring users to adhere to elaborate security procedures can harm productivity or dissuade users from employing effective security. In an enterprise environment, security requirements must balance employee productivity, cost of breach, and effectiveness relative to effort. In the context of individual users, security measures must balance usability and effectiveness. Nevertheless, concerns about surveillance contribute to an increased demand for security measures that can be installed and properly configured by users without advanced security training.

Security Management and Trust Whether conducted by government agencies or commercial firms, Internet surveillance is conducted by exploiting shortcomings in information security measures. Edward Snowden’s exposure of Internet surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency raised concerns about the government agency requesting developers to include vulnerabilities or weaken security to facilitate monitoring. The allegations are especially disconcerting because they damage the trust between security professionals and users. Information security is symmetrical; a professional cannot secure a system if he or she does not know how to exploit the system. Clients and users must trust the security measures they use and the professionals who oversee them to know that their privacy is maintained. Along with concerns about government surveillance, online behavior tracking, and data mining, there is growing interest in

effective and usable information security to circumvent pervasive monitoring. Bruce Schneier, a leading information security researcher, has described the current landscape as an emerging security feudalism. Users can keep their information safe to the extent that they maintain control over their own security measures. As extensive security management is beyond the capabilities of the lay user, most users trust various service providers for security. Since users already trust the service provider enough to exchange personal information for services, extending this trust to security management acknowledges the access that the service provider already has and vests in them a responsibility to keep that information secure. While this trade-off appears to make sense for both the users and the service providers, there are conflicts of interest and asymmetries to the disadvantage of the user. Vesting information security management in service providers may result in an individual being more exposed. As discussed earlier, many firms collect and mine data from their users to support their operations. Users in effect give over their security to firms with an active interest in monitoring them. While such a relationship allows users to choose who will monitor them, it does not allow them to opt out of monitoring entirely, resigning users to privacy loss. Service providers also have little incentive to empower users to change security providers or negotiate the terms of service. Consumer protection regulations could mitigate some of these effects, but the security feudalism approach still fails to provide users with complete protection from monitoring, offering only a choice of monitor.

Digital Forensics Among the subdomains of information security, digital forensics merits special notice. As digital forensics is concerned with reconstruction and analysis of information storage, it plays a prominent role in litigation support and investigation. Forensic techniques can recover partially deleted data and identify illicit access to information systems. After an intrusion, forensic tools are used to analyze what happened during the breach, identify the vulnerability, and assess the damage done to the system. As such, forensic tools are incredibly useful for gathering information about the

Information Warfare

subject of an investigation, or alerting a vigilant subject to an intrusion.

Ethical and Legal Concerns Research and instruction in information security occasionally raise ethical and legal concerns. Information security is understood to be symmetrical such that to know how to defend a system, one must know how to compromise it. As such, research and training in “offensive techniques” is a necessary aspect of the field. In other words, security professionals must be trained to do what they are trying to prevent others from doing. Thorough security assessments must include “pen tests” or penetration testing in which the professional attempts to compromise the system to identify points of vulnerability. Symmetry in information security training follows a common distinction between “white hat” and “black hat” activities. White hat hackers attempt to exploit systems and identify vulnerabilities as a service in the interest of improving security for others. Black hat hackers do the same but for criminal motives, holding targets to ransom against the release of sensitive customer data or otherwise exploiting their skills for personal gain. The distinction, however, is a moral rather than a legal one, and white hat hackers have been charged with crimes, investigated by law enforcement, and dismissed from jobs in connection with their activities. Information technology revolutionized how data can be used and monetized. With increased data storage and retrieval, managing access to information becomes an important requirement. Establishing and maintaining trust regarding the confidentiality of data is a cornerstone of the profession. In the networked world, privacy and protection from surveillance increasingly depend on effective information security. Michael Falgoust See also National Security Agency Leaks; Network Security; Privacy, Internet; Researching Cybercrime

Further Readings Boyle, M. “Information Assurance Standards: A Cornerstone for Cyber Defense.” Warfare, v.13 (2014).

505

“Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data.” Official Journal of the EC, v.23/6 (1995). Greenwald, Glenn and Ewen MacAskill. “NSA Prism Program Taps In to User Data of Apple, Google and Others.” The Guardian, 7/6 (2013). Harris, Shon, et al. Gray Hat Hacking. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2007. Kaufman, Charlie, et al. Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002. Maynor, David, et al. Metasploit Toolkit for Penetration Testing, Exploit Development, and Vulnerability Research. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2007. Mink, Martin and Rainer Greifeneder. “Evaluation of the Offensive Approach in Information Security Education.” Security and Privacy: Silver Linings in the Cloud. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2010. Moglen, Eben. “So Much for Savages: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of Play.” New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, v.3 (1999). Schneier, Bruce. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2004. Thornburgh, Tim. “Social Engineering: The Dark Art.” In Proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference on Information Security Curriculum Development. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery, 2004. Zimmermann, Philip R. The Official PGP User’s Guide. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.

Information Warfare* Information warfare is a term that refers to the use of a broad range of capabilities involving information and the electromagnetic spectrum. Information warfare can refer to the use of information itself, to activities that affect information technology, to the creation of perception, or to the

*The views expressed in this entry are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

506

Information Warfare

denial of information to decision makers. As an  all-encompassing term with definite connotations of conflict, the concept of information warfare is most often associated with the security environment.

Background First used in the 1990s, the term information warfare was an umbrella term that covered a wide range of military and diplomatic tools and was based on the concept that information and information technologies were increasingly important to national security and that all conflict would eventually turn on the need to control information. Indeed, most of what was written at the time ended up using, somewhere in the paper, briefing, or monograph, the following quote from the 1992 movie Sneakers, starring Robert Redford: There’s a war out there old friend, a world war, and it’s not about who’s got the most bullets. It’s about who controls the information—about how we think, how we see and hear, how we work. It’s all about information.

To be sure, the concept was not based on popular culture alone. A collection of papers published by senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army wrote about the importance of information warfare, and one section concluded with the following observation: “Information warfare will be the most complex type of warfare in the 21st century, and it will decide who will win and who will lose the war” (Chang Mengxiong, 1997, n.p.). Martin Libicki, in his 1995 work for the National Defense University, argues that there was no such thing as “information warfare” as a distinct method of waging war but rather that there were seven variants of what was popularly referred to as information warfare: (1) command and control warfare, which targeted enemy decision-making capabilities; (2) intelligence­ based warfare, which consisted of design, protection, and denial of systems that seek knowledge of the battlespace; (3) electronic warfare; (4) psychological warfare; (5) “hacker” warfare; (6) economic information warfare; and (7) cyberwarfare (which he considered “futuristic”). The text written for the Joint Information Operations Staff

Officers Course at the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College saw the broadest nature of the concept as civil affairs, computer network attack, deception, physical destruction, electronic warfare, operational security, psychological operations, and even public affairs. One can see from this list of capabilities that information warfare as a broad concept has implications for and application to  the tension between security and privacy, and  to  the ability to conduct surveillance as well  as  the protection of oneself from unwanted surveillance. The last remaining definition used by the military services is that of the U.S. Air Force contained in its Information Operations Doctrine (AFDD 2–5): “The theory of warfare in the information environment that guides the application of information operations to produce specific battlespace effect in support of commander’s objectives.” This italicized definition applies only to the Air Force, however, and even then, the text includes the caveat that the definition is “offered for clarity only.” George Stein of the Air War College, in an article published in the spring 1995 issue of Airpower Journal, noted that information warfare is simply the use of information to achieve national objectives. Just as with tools like economic competition, diplomacy, and the use of more traditional military force, information in itself is a key aspect of national power. Information warfare, Stein argued, is in its essence about ideas and epistemology—the way in which humans think ­ and make decisions. Most notably, Stein asserted that information warfare was not about satellites, wires, and computers but rather about influencing human beings and the decisions they make. The target of information warfare, in this view, is the human mind—most important, those minds that make the key decisions of war or peace and, from  the military perspective, those minds that make the key decisions on if, when, and how to employ the assets and capabilities embedded in their strategic structures. In this view, information warfare is real warfare; it is about using information to create such a mismatch between a party and an opponent that, as Sun Tzu would argue, the opponent’s strategy is defeated before his first forces can be deployed or his first shots fired.

Information Warfare

Information “Warfare” or Information “Operations” The term information warfare has since been largely eliminated from common usage. In 2006, the term was removed from publications issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, including Joint ­Publication 3–13 and even the official Joint Publication for defining terms, Joint Publication 1–02. Now, all U.S. military doctrinal documents refer only to information operations. Joint Publication 1–02, published on ­November 8, 2010, defines information operations as the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called IO. (p. 110)

The U.S. Navy noted, in its 2013 doctrine documents (OPNAVINST 3430.26A), updated terminology, concepts, and guidance for IO due, in part, to the removal of information warfare as a mission area from references (a) and (b), and command and control warfare as a mission area from reference (c). Per reference (d), IO is defined as the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities (IRC) in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting the nation’s own.

Whether referred to as information warfare or information operations, the effort within the Department of Defense since the 1990s reflects a formal attempt by the U.S. government to develop a set of doctrinal approaches for its military and diplomatic forces to use and operationalize the power of information. The primary doctrinal difference between information operations and information warfare is that information warfare contains the seven specific warfare elements noted earlier and is mostly concerned with the conduct of operations during actual combat, whereas information operations is broader, intended to be conducted as a strategic campaign throughout the

507

whole spectrum of conflict from peace to war and back to peace. This explanation provides the greatest clarity in differentiating between the two concepts, and the broader, strategic nature of information operations finds a wider place in strategic as well as in doctrinal writings. In Joint Vision 2010, the ­Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted as follows: Throughout history, gathering, exploiting, and protecting information have been critical in command, control, and intelligence. The unqualified importance of information will not change in 2010. What will differ is the increased access to information and improvements in the speed and accuracy of prioritizing and transferring data brought about by advances in technology. While the friction and the fog of war can never be eliminated, new technology promises to mitigate their impact. (p. 16)

In setting forth the use of information at the strategic level, information warfare becomes a distinct concept once again: Sustaining the responsive, high quality data processing and information needed for joint military operations will require more than just an edge over an adversary. We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Information superiority will require both offensive and defensive information warfare (IW). Offensive information warfare will degrade or exploit an adversary’s collection or use of information. It will include both traditional methods, such as a precision attack to destroy an adversary’s command and control capability, as well as nontraditional methods such as electronic intrusion into an information and control network to convince, confuse, or deceive enemy military decision makers [italics added]. (p. 16)

This aspect of offensive information warfare is found most commonly as cyberwarfare. Cyberwarfare involves the actions by a nation-state or an international organization to attack and

508

Information Warfare

attempt to damage another nation’s computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks. RAND research provided recommendations to military and civilian decision makers on methods of defending against the damaging effects of cyberwarfare on a nation’s digital infrastructure. This topic is one for which articles, books, and monographs on the subject continue to expand at exponential rates. It is also a field in which the debate takes place in the legal as well as in the technical communities, with only recently even the beginnings of agreement on how cyberwarfare and information warfare fit into international law. Information warfare (and information operations) has a persuasive component as well, and in this capacity, the psychological operations and public affairs communities, both within the military and in the other branches of government, moved away from the use of the term warfare and focused instead on the critical importance of getting the message out and getting it right, regardless of the tools used. This focus on the narrative, the message, is referred to as strategic ­communication— defined within the Department of Defense in Joint Publication 1–02 and Joint Publication 5–0 as focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

Conclusion The promotion and protection of security invariably depend on information as well as on other tools of statecraft and of warfare. The expanding importance of information technology, not simply in normal decision making but also in the functioning of basic tools of statecraft and military operations, ensures that the fields of information operations and information warfare, with all of the components that are included therein, will remain important fields of study and application. R. James Orr

See also Cyberwar; National Security; Security, Concepts of

Further Readings Armistead, Leigh. Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power. Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2004. Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar Is Coming!” In In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997. Department of the Navy. OPNAVINST 3430.26A. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief Naval Operations, 2013. https://doni.documentservices.dla .mil/Directives/03000%20Naval%20Operations%20 and%20Readiness/03-400%20Nuclear,%20 Biological%20and%20Chemical%20Program%20 Support/3430.26A.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Harris, Shane. @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014. Libicki, Martin C. What Is Information Warfare? Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for Strategic Studies, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, 1995. MCA Universal Pictures (Producer) and Phil Alden Robinson (Director). Sneakers [Motion picture]. United States: Universal Pictures, 1992. Mengxiong, Chang. “Weapons of the 21st Century.” In Michael Pillsbury (ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/ndu/chinview/chinapt4.html (Accessed October 2017). RAND Corporation. “Cyber Warfare” (n.d.). http://www .rand.org/topics/cyber-warfare.html (Accessed October 2017). Schmitt, Michael, ed. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Shalikashvili, John M. Joint Vision 2010. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs. Stein, George. “Information Warfare.” Airpower Journal (Spring 1995). http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/ Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-09_Issue-1-Se/1995_ Vol9_No1.pdf (Accessed October 2017). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (November 8, 2010). https://fas. org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf (Accessed October 2017).

Infotainment

Infotainment Infotainment is a hybrid media type that seeks to present information in a highly stylized and entertaining manner. As the name suggests, it blends elements of news with entertainment and advertising in an attempt to simultaneously inform and titillate audiences, while also often serving as a thinly veiled inducement to consumerism. First emerging in the past decades of the 20th century, it has continued to grow and expand into the second decade of the 21st century. It has arguably become the dominant style by which information is transmitted by the mass media and not only structures the way in which audiences expect to receive information but also heavily influences the way in which individuals construct and present their own self-narratives through social media. The coupling of entertainment and information blurs traditional boundaries, creating a hybrid form of informative discourse whereby information cannot be provided without entertainment. This has spread from corporate news broadcasts to a far more personal format in which information is now made available to all through mediated platforms such as cell phones and computers connected to sites like Facebook, Amazon, and online search engines, expanding the object of the surveillance beyond traditional categories of celebrity as all users are enlisted to provide content.

Television Culture Traditionally, social scientists have identified three different types of mass media, compartmentalizing them largely, if not wholly, by their intended purpose: (1) to inform (news media), (2) to entertain (entertainment), or (3) to sell (advertising). For much of their history, these types of media were separate and distinct, with clear boundaries delineating them. However, beginning in the 1980s, a hybridization began, which continued in earnest into the 21st century. Infotainment’s earliest incarnations took the form of television programs produced by major networks that approximated the style of nightly newscasts or weekly investigative journalism programs (e.g., studio anchors, field reporters, prerecorded interviews) but covered “soft news” such as celebrity gossip and human

509

interest stories. In some respects, these programs were the televisual equivalent of gossip magazines and supermarket tabloids. By the mid-1990s, long-running infotainment programs, such as Siskel & Ebert at the Movies and Entertainment Tonight, were joined by a glut of daytime talk shows (e.g., Geraldo and The Jerry Springer Show) and early crime-based reality programming (e.g., America’s Most Wanted and COPS). These new programs covered salacious, scandalous, and sometimes quite dark themes. At the same time, the established network news media began to incorporate more of the content and style of infotainment into their broadcasts in an attempt to recapture dwindling audiences. This included less coverage of complex global and international issues, greater coverage of Hollywood (i.e., their parent company’s endeavors in the entertainment industry), heartwarming (or heartbreaking) human interest stories, and lengthier segments on consumerism that compared and evaluated parity products. The confluence of a growing number of media outlets, particularly the rapid ascension of the Internet, increasingly oligopolistic ownership patterns, and the concomitant pressure to maximize profits by reducing production costs, led to a scramble for inexpensive and readily available content. Surveillance footage, much of which originated from police vehicles’ dashboard cameras and private security footage from shopping malls and convenience stores, soon augmented “hidden camera” footage as the raw material for a host of television specials, ongoing series, and websites such as World’s Wildest Police Videos and America’s Dumbest Criminals. The narratives that inform much of this infotainment tend to trivialize human suffering and to reinforce simplistic images of crime and criminality as a monopoly of uneducated, poor, racialized people.

Social Media and Self-Surveillance Smartphones are a more recent conduit for infotainment. These devices quickly became a personal necessity for sociability—but are also responsible for shortening the time away from work and consumer practices. Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter obtain ­information through a seemingly benign process of self-surveillance wherein users offer up

510

Insanity

information to successfully interact with the platform. The information gathered from such practices serves as fodder for an endless bombardment of consumptive stimuli that intelligently highlight what it is that an individual will likely purchase. Similarly, ever-evolving and ubiquitous forms of infotainment apps, such as Snapchat, Vine, and Instagram, encourage consumers to capture moments of their lives and upload them, thereby providing a digital trail of their life. From the spectacular through the mundane, any aspect of one’s life is potentially subject to the gaze of digitized photography and recording. While such platforms can provide an enjoyable outlet for people to amuse themselves, this amusement is grounded in self-surveillance practices—which provide infotainment to “followers” and “friends” (those who embody these titles do not necessarily indicate an actual interpersonal relationship) as well as other valuable personal information to individuals, corporations, and, in some instances, government agencies so inclined and equipped to gather it. For example, the digital footprints that an individual creates provide useful information to companies who regularly scour social networking sites to screen current and potential employees. This type of surveillance into the personal aspects of one’s life by employers in some instances has resulted in the dismissal of employees who authored disparaging comments online about a boss or their place of employment. In other cases, employers were provided with sufficient grounds for firing employees who lied about being ill and skipped work—deduced through the truant employee’s personal social media accounts that show real-time activities taking place. Self-­ surveillance as infotainment has blurred people’s personal and professional lives. Stephen L. Muzzatti and Brandon Rigato See also Cell Phone Tracking; Closed-Circuit Television; Cloud Computing; Corporate Surveillance; Facebook; Global Surveillance; Online Shopping; Voyeurism, Digital; Work Surveillance

Further Readings Andrejevic, M. iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007.

Bauman, Z. and D. Lyon. Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2013. Postman, N. Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (20th anniversary ed.). New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2006. Rosenberg, H. and C. S. Feldman. No Time to Think: The Menace of Media Speed and the 24-Hour News Cycle. New York, NY: Continuum, 2008. Thussu, D. K. News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007.

Insanity The law recognizes the mental state of the offender as important in a criminal defense. Criminal law holds people accountable for their behavior and responsible for a crime unless they have acted under severe and external duress (e.g., in selfdefense, with a gun pointed at the head of the person) or they have a serious defect of rationality (i.e., being unable to distinguish right from wrong). The Model Penal Code requires the capacity for rationality: The defendant must be proved to have committed the crime while having a guilty state of mind. The physical elements that constitute a crime are called the actus reus (guilty act). The accompanied mental state is mens rea (guilty mind). Under the McNaughton Rule, every person is to be presumed to be sane. According to the 1843 McNaughton Case, to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the crime, the accused parties were laboring under such a defect of reason, from ­disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and the quality of the act they were doing, or if they did know it, that they did not do it under selfdetermination. An insanity defense is a legal defense that results in the removal of criminal responsibility. The prosecution bears the legal burden of proving not only that the criminal conduct was voluntary but also that the accused possessed the relevant fault elements that constitute the four major parts of mens rea: (1) intention (acting with the

Insanity

conscious purpose of engaging in a specific conduct that causes a specific result), (2) knowledge (being aware that a particular conduct is illegal), (3) recklessness (disregarding the risk involved), and (4) negligence (contributing to a known risk that could have been avoided if the duty of care by the person had been fulfilled). A defendant found insane is referred to as not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) or as not responsible by reason of insanity. Affirmative defenses—that is, those with the requirement that the defendant prove the defense, as opposed to negating the prosecution’s evidence of an element of the crime—include a plea of insanity, self-defense, and mistake of fact. By pleading the insanity defense, defendants acknowledge that they committed the crime but assert that they are NGRI. In the United States, much of the retooling of the insanity defense has involved criminal laws and affirmative defenses. The debate resides, on the one hand, on the defendant’s advocate arguing that a defendant’s mental capacity depends on the defendant’s ability to form the requisite criminal intent, and, on the other, on the adversaries who contend that insanity is more like an affirmative defense, because it may be invoked even if all the other elements of a crime are proved. Instead of trying to defeat the prosecutor’s aim of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the charged offense, defendants can introduce their own evidence that, if believed and accepted by the jury, will defeat the charge. A claim of self-defense might be one in which defendants assert that they, for instance, shot the victim only after the victim attacked the defendant. In such a case, the basic elements of a crime are present, insofar as there is no doubt that a person died because of being killed by another human who intended to do it. However, if the jury believes the defendant’s statement, the defendant will be acquitted. An affirmative defense could be a “noble” procedure, if the defendant is mentally incapable of forming the required criminal intent. A successful diminished capacity defense can reduce a specific intent crime to a general intent crime if the latter is a lesser offense within the former. However, an affirmative defense may constitute a ploy and put the defendant at a disadvantage. This could be the

511

case in which legislatures may constitutionally rule that a state may make a defendant demonstrate an element of a lesser crime as an affirmative defense, so long as it could convict the person of all the elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged. An example of this can be found under a New York law, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a second-degree murder conviction that required the defendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance as an affirmative defense. The defendant’s emotional state was not an element of that crime, and the Court reduced his charge from murder to manslaughter ­(Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)). Dissatisfaction over insanity defense verdicts stems from the assumption that focusing on cognitive impairments (i.e., McNaughton Rule) as the sole ground for an insanity acquittal is limited from various perspectives: scientifically unwarranted, psychiatrically unjustified, and ­inconsistent with the general purposes of the criminal law. The American Law Institute (ALI) developed the substantial capacity test and incorporated it into the Model Penal Code in 1962, so that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he/she lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of their conduct or to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.

The ALI test for mental illness is broad, moves away from the exclusively cognitive dimension of McNaughton, and adds the volitional component to insanity. The term appreciate suggests a more emotional and affective component of insanity. However, critics argue that the ALI rule is too inclusive, and too many defendants could be found to be insane. This encouraged the legal and mental health professionals to work together in an attempt to modify the insanity defense. The verdict of guilty but mentally ill or insane (GBMI) is supposed to provide treatment rather than punishment for mentally ill offenders. While few studies show the effectiveness of treatment provided to those found GBMI, the purposes served by GBMI verdicts seem ethically and clinically sound. Offenders with a GBMI verdict should receive treatment

512

Intellectual Property Rights

for their mental illness, in facilities separate from prison, and once they have recovered to sanity, they may serve out the rest of their sentence in prison or be released. Some experts claim that because the NGRI verdict does not achieve this dual purpose of treatment and punishment, the insanity defense may start to become unnecessary. Georgia Zara and Franco Freilone See also Psychological Assessment; Punishment; Responsibility

Further Readings American Law Institute. Model Penal Code. Philadelphia, PA: American Law Institute, 1962. Grachek, Julie E. “The Insanity Defense in the TwentyFirst Century: How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System.” Indiana Law Journal, v.81 (2006). Huss, Matthew T. Forensic Psychology: Research, Clinical Practice, and Applications (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2014. McNaughton Case, 8 ER 718, [1843] UKHL J16, May 26–June 19, 1843. Patterson v. New York, 32 U.S. 197, 1977. Rolf, Carol A. “From M’Naghten to Yates: Transformation of the Insanity Defense in the United States. Is It Still Viable?” Rivier College Online Academic Journal, v.2 (2006). Simon, Robert I. and Liza Gold. Textbook of Forensic Psychiatry (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric, 2010. Zara, Georgia and David P. Farrington. Criminal Recidivism: Explanation, Prediction and Prevention. Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2016.

Intellectual Property Rights Intellectual property rights intersect with surveillance due to data mining and privacy concerns. Much of the dataveillance that characterizes commercial tracking of behavior (online and off-line) is monetized through the creation of analytic products held as copyright by the firm. Information brokers that place data mining at the center of their business model rely on strong copyright

protection to monetize analytic products. Search algorithms and software developed for more effective or efficient data mining are typically held as proprietary, leaving the exact methods of analysis outside public knowledge. Enforcing intellectual property rights on entertainment media and software fuels debates over surveillance and monitoring of online file-sharing networks. This entry reviews four general types of intellectual property and how monitoring it affects individuals and corporations. It also discusses the enforcement of intellectual property rights, and concerns regarding surveillance and privacy.

Types of Intellectual Property As a general category of property rights, intellectual property includes copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret law. While these are four different legal institutions, they all concern ownership of intangible goods understood to be products of intellectual or creative labor. Copyright and patent share the most similarity in approach as they both concern property rights over creations, differing according to whether the creation is artistic or technological. Trademarks establish exclusive use of logos associating products with specific business entities. The most unusual member of the category, trade secret law, supports the confidentiality of technical processes, data, or records considered key to a firm’s business. In effect, trade secret law protects firms from corporate espionage and enforces nondisclosure agreements signed with employees as long as the firm takes active steps to maintain secrecy.

Monitoring Intellectual Property What is common to all forms of intellectual property is ownership rights over information. As surveillance in the Digital Age includes monitoring flows of data, the ownership of information is a highly relevant concern. Firms that build their business around gathering and analyzing information rely on copyright to monetize their products and remain competitive. Individuals concerned about maintaining privacy likewise have an interest in controlling personal information. If privacy is understood as the ownership of personal information, individuals would have

Intellectual Property Rights

some intellectual property interest in their data. On the other hand, gathering and analyzing the data is the source of its value, so the data processor also has an ownership interest. Analytic products are used to identify and track target demographics. The same techniques can be and are used to track and identify potential threats or suspicious activity. Bring-your-own-device policies that allow employees to use personal devices for work introduce problems for controlling employer-owned intellectual property, such as trade secrets. While employees may prefer using their own devices and employers prefer the reduced cost of not providing equipment, both are more exposed by such ­policies. To maintain the integrity of proprietary data, employers may require employees to install security software, including applications that can monitor activity on the device, wipe the device remotely, or activate GPS tracking (when available). As a result, employees must trade convenience for at least passive monitoring of their activity with the device. These concerns are brought into especially clear focus when considering termination procedures and the necessity of ensuring that no proprietary data leave control of the firm. During termination, the employee is likely to be subject to special scrutiny or review of activity logs to establish the integrity of the employer’s intellectual property. Even more pervasive monitoring has been at the center of debates about online file sharing. The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) that generated mobilized resistance from Internet-based firms and communities included provisions requiring sites to monitor user content for intellectual property violations and report such violations to copyright holders. At present, common carriage principles shield Internet service providers and hosting companies from liability for user activity. As SOPA would have weakened common carriage, these firms would have been required to monitor network activity more closely, essentially placing all users under explicit surveillance. As the peer-topeer file-sharing communities that began on ­Napster have migrated to websites that provide streams of pirated content and other communities where links to pirated content are shared, interest in monitoring Internet use has persisted.

513

The original prosecution of Napster and Grokster, two early file-sharing communities, included gathering records of user activity and tracking content uploaded and downloaded. In the decade that followed, the Recording Industry Association of America brought lawsuits against individuals for  sharing copyright content on peer-to-peer networks. The Motion Picture Association of ­ America has brought similar suits. In these suits, individuals are identified by IP address associated with uploaded content. The “take-down notices” made possible by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act also provide reason for copyright holders to monitor sites that feature user-generated or user-supplied content for potential violations and take-down orders. Critics of strong intellectual property rights compare these activities with vigilantism since private firms take on policing copyright violations, including engaging in covert monitoring of online activity. Controversies about misapplied take-down notices and the inability of users to contest these notices without potentially expensive litigation support the comparison.

Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights Controversy over enforcing intellectual property and censorship became a public issue in 2012 with the debate over SOPA and PIPA. Both versions of the act contained language that would require the removal of links to purportedly infringing content, disrupting the interlinked structure of the World Wide Web, in addition to provisions empowering monitoring network traffic for infringing files. After an advocacy campaign organized by online communities, including Wikipedia and Reddit, and advocacy organizations, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, SOPA and PIPA lost legislative support. Intellectual property rights have facilitated the economic boom brought about by information technology. Laws designed to establish ownership over creations have also allowed firms to profit from informational products. The generation of data and ownership claims on that data compete with concerns about privacy and surveillance. The availability of many public databases makes individuals vulnerable to data mining, but collapsing all privacy into information ownership raises enforcement problems and could disrupt businesses reliant

514

Intelligence Community

on analytic products. Digital media are also easier to distribute to paying customers and easier for customers to redistribute among themselves. Controlling this secondary market motivates monitoring by intellectual property owners, raising further concerns about surveillance. Michael Falgoust See also Big Data; Corporate Surveillance; Dataveillance; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings Benkler, Yochai. The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. Boyle, James. The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. Clarke, Roger. “The Digital Persona and Its Application to Data Surveillance.” Information Society, v.10/2 (1994). Hettinger, Edwin C. “Justifying Intellectual Property.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, v.18/1 (1989). Lessig, Lawrence. Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2008. Litman, Jessica. Digital Copyright. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2001. Merges, Robert P., et al. Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age: 2004 Case and Statutory Supplement. New York, NY: Aspen, 2003. Moore, Adam D. Intellectual Property and Information Control: Philosophic Foundations and Contemporary Issues. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001. Park, Sandra S. “Gene Patents and the Public Interest: Litigating Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics and Lessons Moving Forward.” North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology, v.15/519 (2014). Tehranian, John. Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Intelligence Community The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is a coalition of agencies and organizations that work both independently and collaboratively to gather

information and produce the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations while addressing increasingly different and more diverse national security challenges. The mission objectives of the IC are strategic intelligence, anticipatory intelligence, sustained operations, cyber intelligence, ­counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and counterintelligence. The IC is responsible for supplying accurate and useful information to national security decision makers and policymakers by converting acquired information into clear and comprehensible intelligence to satisfy national, transnational, and military requirements and needs. Readers of this entry will gain an understanding of how each of the various units contributes to the IC, the surveillance techniques utilized by the IC, and its global partnerships.

Member Agencies Members of the IC include the following: Air Force Intelligence, Department of the Treasury, Army Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Coast Guard Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Depart­ ment of Energy (DOE), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of State, National Security Agency (NSA), and Navy Intelligence. Each member agency operates under its own directives. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) provides oversight for the coordination of the organizations that form the IC. The DNI sets the priorities for and manages the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The DNI organization includes multiple mission support functions such as the National Counterterrorism Center and others. The IC is structured to promote collection synergy, a surge capability, a joint mission, the elimination of operational barriers, a commonality of practices, and the effective management of resources and overall capabilities. Air Force Intelligence

The Air Force’s IC component is the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

Intelligence Community

It  provides guidance to all Air Force intelligence organizations and trains, organizes, and equips forces to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence. Department of the Treasury

The Department of Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) is a component of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. The OIA was established in 2004 by the I­ ntelligence Authorization Act. OIA receives, analyzes, c­ ollates, and disseminates foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information associated with the operation of the Department of Treasury. Army Intelligence

The Department of the Army Intelligence is responsible for formulating policy and planning, programming, managing, evaluating, and overseeing the intelligence activities for the Army. It is also accountable for the overall coordination of the major intelligence disciplines within the Army. Drug Enforcement Administration

The DEA enforces U.S.-controlled substance laws and regulations. The DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence became a member of the IC in 2006. The goal of the DEA is to enhance the U.S. drug reduction efforts, combat global terrorism, and protect national security. Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA provides national security intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers. The CIA is divided into four basic components: (1) the National Clandestine Service, (2) the Directorate of Intelligence, (3) the Directorate of Science & ­Technology, and (4) the Directorate of Support. The components complete the so-called intelligence cycle, inclusive of collecting, analyzing, and distributing intelligence. Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI assesses threats to U.S. national security and penetrates domestic and transnational networks that possess the capacity and motivation

515

to harm the United States. The FBI National Security Branch (NSB) was established to combine the capabilities and resources of the FBI’s intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism elements. The NSB created the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate in 2006. The NSB includes the Terrorist Screening Center, which provides  intelligence to local and state law enforcement, and the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, a highly trained and experienced interagency group that collects information from terror suspects. Coast Guard Intelligence

Coast Guard Intelligence collects and reports intelligence that supports national objectives and the overall Coast Guard mission. It is able to provide unique information and expertise related to the maritime domain. Marine Corps Intelligence

The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) provides operational intelligence for battlefield support. The USMC IC component is responsible for intelligence and supporting activities within the USMC. The intelligence component ensures that there is a unified strategy for developing the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise. Defense Intelligence Agency

The DIA is a Department of Defense (DOD) combat support agency. The DIA is a major producer and contributor of foreign military intelligence and provides military intelligence to war fighters, force planners, and policymakers in the DOD and the IC. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

The NGA provides geospatial intelligence to support national security objectives. The NGA supports civilian and military leaders via contributions to the state of readiness of the U.S. military. Department of Energy

The DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is the focal point for the ­

516

Intelligence Community

counterintelligence and intelligence activities throughout the DOE. The office protects national security technologies and information and provides scientific and technical expertise to the U.S. government to aid responses to foreign intelligence, terrorist, and cyber threats and to address a range of national security issues. National Reconnaissance Office

The NRO is a DOD agency that designs, builds, and operates the nation’s reconnaissance satellites. NRO products warn of potential areas of concern and impending threats that may manifest around the world, assist in strategizing military operations, and monitor environments of interest. The NRO staffing consists of CIA and DOD personnel. Department of Homeland Security

The DHS OIA compiles information and i­ntelligence from various sources to identify, recognize, assess, and respond to threats to the United States. DHS Intelligence focuses on four strategic areas: (1) sharing information necessary for action, (2) managing intelligence for the homeland security enterprise, (3) promoting understanding of threats through intelligence analysis, and (4) collecting information and intelligence pertinent to homeland security. Department of State

The Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides analysis of global dynamics and real-time insights developed from intelligence products and activities incorporating all sources. The bureau makes use of all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, public opinion polling, and interaction with U.S. and foreign ­ scholars. National Security Agency

The NSA/Central Security Service is the U.S. cryptologic component of the IC that engages in highly specialized activities to protect U.S. information systems and to produce foreign signals intelligence information. The NSA is a leader in information and communications technology. The NSA is also a center of foreign language research

and analysis. The NSA was founded in 1952, and the Central Security Service was established by a Presidential Directive in 1972. Naval Intelligence

The Office of Naval Intelligence is the leading provider of maritime intelligence to the U.S. Navy, the joint war fighting forces, and the IC. The Office of Naval Intelligence was established in 1882 and provides specialization in the development and distribution of technical, scientific, military, and geopolitical intelligence for key global recipients.

Surveillance Techniques The IC uses six basic sources of information gathered through surveillances, intercepts, and other means for intelligence purposes. Signals intelligence is used in the interception of signals between people or machines, or a combination of the two.  Imagery intelligence involves media repre­sentations by optical means or electronically reproduced objects. The location, identity, and description of the characteristics of specific targets can be ascertained by scientific and technical intelligence gathered through measurement and signature intelligence collected by employing radio frequency, seismic, optical, acoustics, nuclear, and materials sciences. Human intelligence is the most historic method. Human intelligence relies on overt collections, clandestine acquisitions, official foreign government contacts, and debriefings of  persons who travel abroad. Open-source intelligence is developed from publicly available e­lectronic and print information. Geospatial intelligence involves geospatial and imagery data ­produced through an integration of imagery intelligence, imagery, and geographic information. The information is collected from satellites, aircraft reconnaissance, commercial databases, utility schematics, and other discretely available data related to locations on earth. The IC has multiple Intelligence Centers in the United States that serve as focal points for persistent intelligence issues.

Partnerships The IC partners with intelligence agencies such as the Government Communications Headquarters,

International Diplomacy

the Security Service (MI5), and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) of the United Kingdom, and many other foreign entities. These relationships have proven to be beneficial, as other nations often have intelligence of interest or value to the United States. Through international partnerships, the United States is able to access information about areas that it is unable to directly penetrate, gather and distribute data that will permit responses to threats in a time-sensitive manner, gain greater cultural insights into issues it might misconstrue, facilitate local military or political intervention in matters needing such attention within a particular country, and mask U.S.-led actions in foreign lands as localized actions. The United States works cooperatively with international police support organizations, such as INTERPOL, Europol, and Ameripol, to facilitate cross-border cooperation and coordination in order to address transnational organized crime and terrorist groups, drug trafficking, illicit immigration networks, human trafficking, arms trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering, counterfeiting, and many other transnational crimes. The IC has an Office of Inspector General established pursuant to Section 405 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2010. The Inspector General (IG) conducts audits, reviews, inspections, and investigations that ­identify, appraise, and address systemic vulnerabilities, risks, and deficiencies requiring attention or action. An IC Inspectors General Forum exists that is led by the IC IG and includes the  vast majority of the organizations that make up the IC to promote IG cooperation and coordination. Delmar P. Wright See also Counterintelligence; INTERPOL; Military Intelligence

Further Readings Goldman, Zachary K. and Samuel J. Rascoff, eds. Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Richelson, Jeffrey T. The U.S. Intelligence Community (7th ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016.

517

International Diplomacy* Scholar G. R. Berridge (2002) defined diplomacy as “an essentially political activity. . . . Its chief purpose is to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law” (p. 1). But this definition may be too limited, as truly effective diplomacy may not resort to the use of force; but certainly the threat of force, law and legal argument, the use of culture, economics, and persuasion are tactics that the United States and other governments have used as part of their diplomatic efforts. Diplomacy is one instrument among many that a government utilizes in its pursuit of the national interest and to promote and protect national security. Most commonly, these instruments of statecraft are referred to using an acronym such as DIME (for diplomacy, informational, military, and economic) or MIDLIFE (military, intelligence, diplomacy, law, information, finance, and economics). Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that international diplomacy is a tool used by nations (and increasingly nonstate actors) in addition to other tools such as actual or potential military force, economic power, intelligence gathering and operations, cultural and information or “soft power,” and relative degrees of national unity. None of these tools, including diplomacy, function in isolation from the other instruments of power; each may at times be emphasized as the situation warrants. This entry begins with a brief history of the evolution of diplomacy, with a focus on the United States. Then it discusses the several approaches to diplomacy used by the United States since World War II. It concludes with a brief discussion of international diplomacy in the present-day political environment.

History Diplomacy in the sense of formal state-to-state interaction through appointed emissaries dates from antiquity but arose most prominently on the European continent as a consequence of the *The views expressed in this entry are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

518

International Diplomacy

adoption of the Westphalian system. Diplomacy was a  product of fairly specific historical conditions. It  developed first in areas where the organization of internal space enabled, indeed compelled, governments to create a system for conducting their affairs on a rational basis. Its present form, or something very much like it, took shape within the common value system of Latin Christendom. In the United States, however, the diplomatic profession developed late. The European origins of formal diplomacy counted heavily against its early adoption by the Americans. There seemed no need to imitate the methods of the European states at a time when the principal interests of the United States were to stay out of European conflicts, and to organize its internal space and compose its  domestic discords. The 19th-century United States did not share the common values and assumptions on which European diplomacy was based any more than it shared the political and economic problems that European diplomacy was designed to mitigate. As a result, a career foreign service was not created until after World War I. Throughout its history, the United States tended to take relations with other states for granted until the emergence of some threat or crisis demanded otherwise. American diplomats represent a country that prizes its independence and is reluctant to define its national interests in terms of its relations with other states. Those who have studied the history of the ­American diplomatic corps see a decline in influence and prestige of the profession since World War II, which some suggest was a consequence of the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The creation of the National Security Council at that time “institutionalized,” as Charles Yost puts it, “the entrenchment of military officers at the heart of the foreign policy decision-making process” (quoted in Stearns, 1973, n.p.). This ascendance of the military role in diplomacy, coupled with the historic antipathy of U.S. policymakers toward diplomacy in general, was not the ideal environment for professional diplomacy, as it did not allow the government to avail itself of the services that career diplomats are best equipped to provide: low-keyed regulation of current relations and the anticipation of problems far enough in advance to do something about them before they reach crisis proportions.

Approaches to International Diplomacy To work effectively, diplomacy requires broad common assumptions and an agreed framework of rules. However, the ascendance of anticolonial powers, of communist ideology in the Cold War era, and the rise of Islamic extremism in the 21st century have complicated the environment. Not only do many groups and nations operate on vastly different assumptions about what is desirable, necessary, and permissible in creating a stable world order, they also often disagree about the value of stability itself. In addition, on issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, or smallarms control, there is a measure of consensus among the major ideological adversaries, but there is little or no consensus between them and the less-developed countries, let alone nonstate actors. As the United States has encountered more and more frustrations in implementing its foreign policy initiatives since World War II, and the balance of world power has shifted toward a more complicated equilibrium, the U.S. foreign policy has also become more subject to domestic political disagreements—some of them over specific U.S. commitments or initiatives, others over the r­elative priorities accorded domestic and foreign programs. For example, the broad political consensus  that supported the Marshall Plan and the North ­Atlantic Treaty Organization was severely weakened across the board as a result of the Vietnam War. In the post–Cold War environment, as a result, the scope of what is considered “international diplomacy” expanded. The most direct example of this was the use of the concept of transformational diplomacy by Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. secretary of state (2005–2009). Because t­echnology tended to collapse the distance that once clearly separated the United States from its threats, and because the greatest threats tended to emerge more from within the states than between them, she argued that diplomacy had to broaden its efforts. American diplomacy not only must integrate and advance its security interests but must also coordinate development efforts and actively promote democratic ideals. Rice defined the objective of transformational diplomacy as an effort to work with partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs

International Diplomacy

of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This shift built in part on the work of Joseph Nye, who wrote on the nature of power and emphasized transformation and on soft power, describing the concept of “co-opting people rather than coercing them.” This concept emphasized values intrinsically linked to a nation’s culture, political ideals, and principles, which would provide a sense of legitimacy of national policies in the eyes of others. This approach appealed to many in both the Bush and Obama administrations and affected much of the thinking of the roles of the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the lead agencies for foreign relations and development, respectively, and other aspects of diplomatic efforts. Under the Obama administration and then secretary of state Hillary Clinton, the concept of transformational diplomacy was refined by advocating more directly for a “whole of government” approach to foreign policy and national security objectives with the title “smart power.” Smart power, as it evolved and was explained, involved the making of strategic choices regarding the best form of influence to use under varying circumstances. This approach was supported by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, in a speech at Kansas State University and in a letter to the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) in support of the International Affairs budget. Defense Secretary Robert Gates often added his voice to this concept as well. Secretary Clinton also sought to improve and refine U.S. efforts in international diplomacy by adopting a planning tool used by the Department of Defense—a 4-year strategic policy document. The first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) set forth a sweeping reform agenda for the State Department and USAID. The starting premise of the QDDR was that civilian power in the world is not limited to the State Department and USAID alone but is needed to engage a wide number of civilian agencies that engage in international activities such as energy diplomacy, disease prevention, police training, and trade promotion. The QDDR resulted in a number of reforms and improvements. It realigned the State Department bureaus to create the positions of undersecretary

519

for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and the undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and implemented other reforms to deal with issues from cyber to postconflict reconstruction. New planning processes were adopted to tie resources to strategic goals and to improve monitoring and evaluation of grants and contracts. Joint development and diplomacy training programs for foreign service officers and civil servants were adopted. Partnerships were created and expanded on everything from clean cookstoves to child survival to ending deforestation in the supply chains for 450 companies. The State Department’s narcotics and law enforcement bureau launched partnerships with 50 state and local law enforcement agencies  to enable law enforcement professionals rather than contractors to implement programs overseas.

Present-Day Diplomacy Diplomatic successes are often difficult to identify. Successful diplomatic efforts often result simply in day-to-day activities taking place across borders or between nations without incident or controversy. Diplomacy also exists in areas of ongoing tension, such as with efforts of the United States and Europe to deal with the apparent resurgence of Russian adventurism, in the case of building security and law enforcement efforts to address continued threats of nonstate actors such as the so-called Islamic State, or with ongoing work within the United Nations and with individual nations to minimize the challenges of nuclear nonproliferation. The State Department has not regained its pre–World War II stature as the predominant agency for international relations; that role has shifted and for the most part remains with the Department of Defense. But the use of military power is, as was observed nearly two centuries ago, the continuation of politics and not its end. One area where international diplomacy plays a vital role is in balancing national and international norms of privacy protection with the requirements to ensure cybersecurity and to conduct surveillance of criminal and terrorist organizations. International security as well as the security of individual nations require cooperation between law enforcement and national security agencies. At the same time, each nation has an interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens and the information security

520

International Monetary Fund

of companies who need to protect trade secrets and other data. Because information crosses borders with ever-increasing frequency, developing norms of behavior are an increasing part of the diplomatic effort of nations. International diplomacy is a vital tool of U.S. national power, essential to its security, and most effective when employed strategically, in concert with military and economic tools. R. James Orr See also Diplomacy; National Security; Politics

Further Readings Berridge, G. R. Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (2nd ed.). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. In Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds. and trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Clinton, Hillary Rodham. “Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development.” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2010). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/northamerica/2010-11-01/leading-through-civilian-power (Accessed October 2017). Fenrick, Reed. “Diplomacy as an Instrument of National Power.” In J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. (ed.), The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Vol. 1. Theory of War and Strategy (4th ed.), July 2010. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/guide_ natsec_v1_2010.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2004. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy.” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-snye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grandstrategy (Accessed October 2017). Kruzel, John J. “Mullen Urges More ‘Soft Power’ in Afghanistan.” U.S. Department of Defense (March 3, 2010). http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. aspx?id=58170 (Accessed October 2017). Nolan, Janne E. Diplomacy and Security in the TwentyFirst Century. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2009. Rice, Condoleezza. Transformational Diplomacy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, School of

Foreign Service, January 18, 2006. http://2001-2009. state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm (Accessed January 2015). Singh, Vikram J. What the State Department’s First Strategic Review Accomplished (April 24, 2014). https://thinkprogress.org/what-the-statedepartments-first-strategic-review-accomplished33c7e0414765 Smith, Jordan. Secretary Gates and Veterans for Smart Power (August 26, 2010). http://www.usglc. org/2010/08/26/secretary-gates-and-veterans-forsmart-power (Accessed October 2017). Stearns, Monteagle. “Making American Diplomacy Relevant.” Foreign Affairs (October 1973). http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24469/monteaglestearns/making-american-diplomacy-relevant (Accessed January 9, 2015). Yost, Charles W. The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs. New York, NY: Random House, 1972. (Quoted in Stearns)

International Monetary Fund The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is based in Washington, DC, and as of March 2017 counts 189 countries among its members. The IMF is tasked with managing the world’s monetary systems and, relatedly, promoting inter­ national financial stability and monetary cooperation among countries. Within these tasks, sustainable economic growth, promoting international trade, and poverty alleviation are some of the other stated goals. The IMF issues loans to help countries suffering from economic hardship. However, the IMF has faced strong criticism in relation to this because of the conditions placed on such loans—the policies or actions a country has to pursue in return for the loan. Surveillance is one of the IMF’s core functions as part of working toward the aforementioned aims, with the IMF watching over international financial and economic processes. This s­ urveillance occurs at the level of individual countries, regional monetary unions, and on a global level. Yet the effectiveness of such monitoring processes has been contested. This entry focuses on the IMF’s membership provisions, some of its criticisms and failures, and the Triennial Surveillance Reviews

International Monetary Fund

(TSR) intended to report weaknesses in the IMF’s surveillance processes. Through membership of the IMF, a country agrees to allow its economic and financial policies to fall under the inspection of the IMF through regular monitoring. Part of this surveillance includes the provision of advice and guidance concerning a country’s policies to ensure that those policies fit more closely with the IMF’s stated aims. Surveillance covers a range of factors, such as exchange rates, monetary and fiscal policies, financial sector issues, assessment of risks and vulnerabilities, and institutional and structural issues. As part of the surveillance process at a national level, a team of IMF economists visit a country and meet with a range of stakeholders, and they assess the economic and financial policies of that country. At a regional level, currency unions such as the Euro zone and the West African Economic and Monetary Union are subject to IMF assessment of their policies. At a global level, global economic trends and developments are monitored. The IMF has been both lauded and criticized for the role it plays. Prominent economist and Nobel Prize recipient Joseph Stiglitz has been one notable critic. In his famous 2002 book Globalization and Its Discontents, Stiglitz notes how the IMF fosters inequalities through its policies. The IMF comes under criticism due to the strong conditionality attached to the loans it provides for countries (i.e., the policy responses a country must adopt in return for receiving an IMF loan). Such conditions can be viewed as being intrusive. The IMF has also faced criticism for not appropriately tailoring policies to the individual characteristics of countries and thus their specific need. A neoliberal policy agenda, for example, central to the IMF’s mission may run contrary to the best interests of an individual country. Transparency, or lack of it, has also been cited as an issue. In addition, the IMF has been seen to fail in notable instances, including the ongoing financial crisis in Greece. The IMF’s forecasting for the Greek economy proved to be widely inaccurate following the issuing of loans and the conditions attached to them. The Greek government was forced into adopting emergency austerity measures in return for the bailout funds. Those austerity measures proved to be severely damaging for

521

the Greek economy, with unemployment and gross domestic product levels fairing much worse than anticipated. The IMF had failed to foresee the extent to which the austerity policies would damage the Greek economy. The IMF has subsequently admitted that the measures forced on the Greek government—which in June 2015 became the first prominent nation to miss a loan repayment to the IMF—by them were wrong, and these had contributed to the economic turmoil. In light of such prominent financial crises of the recent past, often with profound global repercussions, the role of the IMF has been cast in sharp relief. The value of the IMF and its role in monitoring at local and international levels is apparent; yet at the same time, the organization is vulnerable to criticism for not preempting those crises or, in some cases, administering inappropriate policies that have exacerbated a crisis. However, the IMF has sought to reflect on its surveillance processes through subsequent TSR. These reports, published every 3 years, are meant to highlight the weaknesses in the IMF’s surveillance processes and to demonstrate how it will respond to this. The 2011 TSR points to issues in the organization’s precrisis surveillance. This states that the IMF was too fragmented and cites a lack of depth in the risk assessments undertaken. The 2014 review identifies five “operational priorities”: (1) integrate and deepen risk and spillover analysis, (2) establish mainstream macrofinancial surveillance, (3) pay more attention to structural policies (including employment issues), (4) deliver cohesive and expert policy advice, and (5) have a client-focused approach to surveillance. The IMF is a highly influential, yet controversial organization whose remit includes the governance of global monetary systems and surveillance of economies and global trends to promote economic stability and growth. It is possible to view the organization and its processes as being intrusive and promoting a specific ideological agenda allied to free markets and neoliberalism. Criticism has also related to failures in preventing and responding to recent crises. Yet the IMF remains an integral feature of the international governance landscape. Tony Murphy See also Global Surveillance; Globalization

522

International Relations Theory

Further Readings Masters, Jonathan. The International Monetary Fund. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. http://www.cfr.org/europe/international-monetaryfund/p25303 (Accessed January 2015). Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2002.

Website International Monetary Fund: http://www.imf.org/ external/index.htm

International Relations Theory International relations (IR) theory is a scholarly discipline established after World War I that brings together complementary and competing theories, ontologies, and conceptual and critical (rather than mainstream) frameworks to understand and explain events and phenomena existing in world politics, including domestic and international security. IR is used to explain how the international system is constructed and works, and it is a social science and a dimension of functioning world politics. Debates in IR, the result of methodological and theoretical approaches, are important for the development of social science overall. This entry focuses on the levels of analysis and theories of state behavior in IR.

Levels of Analysis Different levels of analysis are important to the field of IR and IR theory because they provide foundations for addressing questions of state behavior and for examination of interactions between states. It is referred to as the “level of analysis problem” in the discipline because different levels can be used to examine state ­ behavior. These include system level, state level, organizational level, and individual level.

Theories of State Behavior There exists an abundance of theories of state behavior in the field of IR. While some share

similarities, each one can be used to attempt to explain why states act the way they do. These theories are constantly being scrutinized by other scholars and can become modified over time. Classical realism is a state-level theory used to argue that all states seek the same thing: power. This theory accepts power as a zero-sum issue. States will always seek to augment their power while decreasing the power of others. States are considered aggressive and greedy. Peace can be maintained, however, with a stable balance of power. Neorealism stems from classical realism. It sees power struggles between states as a product of the international system as opposed to the actual nature of states. Neorealism is a modification of E.  H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Richard Niebuhr’s classical realist traditions. Neorealists also argue that power is the dominant factor of IR. Further branches of neorealism include offensive realism, defensive realism, neoclassical realism, contingent realism, specific realism, general realism, and many others. Liberalism (also referred to as idealism or utopianism) is a state-level theory that observes not only rivalry but also cooperation among states within the international system. The theory was informed by the work of Immanuel Kant, who wrote about perpetual peace, which contributed to the democratic peace theory. Although liberalism uses the states as a unit of analysis, factors such as international law, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations are also considered important for the understanding of world politics. Neoliberalism derives from liberalism. It is a system-level theory that emphasizes the role that various institutions can play in the international system and how they can affect state behavior. Institutions are seen as components of world politics that are able to produce and spread values and result in rule-based behavior. Postliberalism is a successor theory of liberalism and provides its own accounts of subjectivity and power in the international system. The system in which states exist and operate compels them to cooperate. The theory casts a reinterpretation of sovereignty and autonomy, and it takes the view that chaos is managed and that there can be order within a lack of order.

International Relations Theory

Constructivism (also referred to as social constructivism), rather than being a theory of IR, is an ontology that challenges the predominance of traditional IR theories. Alexander Wendt is considered an important constructivist within the academic field, and he is famous for his claim that “anarchy is what states make of it” (1992). Both realism and liberalism failed to predict the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Constructivism adopts persuasive ideas and collective values, culture, and social identities as critical dimensions of international politics. Marxism (and neo-Marxism) are structural approaches to world politics that, rather than focusing on conflict and cooperation between states, address the world as a separation of classes and emphasize economics and materialism within and between states. For the Marxist and neoMarxist paradigms, economics status is the most important aspect of world politics and replaces political motivation as a theoretical base. World systems theory and dependency theory are two dominant aspects of Marxism and neo-Marxism. The English School (also called liberal realism, rationalism, Grotianism, or the British institutionalists) centers on the shared norms and values of states and the role that they play in guiding and managing world politics. The theory argues that a “society of states” exists in the international system even in spite of the lack of an overarching authority or Leviathan. The English School draws considerably from functionalism. Functionalism sets the self-interests of states aside and focuses on the common or shared interests among states. It is a theory strongly associated with the phenomenon of European integration (i.e., the integrative process of and within the European Union). Cognitive theories encompass the role of psychological processes of perception, misperception, and systems of belief, and their impact on state behavior. This theory operates on the state, organizational, and the individual levels. Belief systems of an entire state, organization perceptions, and the psychological dynamics of people in power are at the core of cognitive theory research and debates. Feminism seeks to uncover the gender prejudices that exist within traditional IR theories. It emerged relatively late within the social sciences, with feminism scholars joining scholarly debates during the

523

1980s. While feminism has been accepted as making a considerable contribution to scholarly understandings of world politics, it remains a marginalized theory within the field of IR. Green theory in IR focuses on environment issues within world politics. It addresses international cooperation through the formation and work of international environmental regimes as well as the role of institutions (i.e., institutionalist perspectives within IR). Other critical theories of IR include queer and transgender perspectives. These seek to enhance the sexed scholarship many claim has gone unrecognized in IR theory for a long time. IR theory is an important academic instrument for analyzing and attempting to understand domestic and international security today. However, while many theories attempt to build constructive modes of interpretation and lines of communication across disciplines regarding issues such as surveillance, security, and privacy, their use has also resulted in competing definitions of these terms. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk See also Constructivism; International Diplomacy; Marxism; Politics; Poststructural Theory; Privacy

Further Readings Baylis, John, et al. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2013. Dunne, Tim, et al. International Relations Theories (3rd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2013. Frieden, Jeffrey A., et al. World Politics: Interests, Interactions, and Institutions (2nd ed.). New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2012. Reus-Smit, Christian and Duncan Snidal. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford Handbook of Political Science). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2010. Smith, Steve, et al. Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2012. Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization, v.46/2 (1992). Williams, Paul D. Security Studies: An Introduction. Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2012.

524

Internet Pornography

Internet Pornography It is estimated that 4% of the million most popular Internet websites contain pornography. Fourteen percent of Internet searches are related to pornography or erotica, and the number of people who have ever accessed pornography in Europe, North America, and Australia is estimated to be more than 70% for men and more than 50% for women. Internet pornography that depicts adults and children is widespread, and with the increasing availability of high-speed Internet, it has become easily accessible on either a desktop or mobile device, at home, office, or even on a commute. Due to the interconnected nature of the Internet, online pornography is regulated on a country-by-country (and often state-by-state) basis and affects not only accessing the material but also the hosting of illicit material on websites. Legislation prohibiting the creation, exchange, possession, and hosting of child exploitation material (CEM; often also called child pornography) via the Internet is in place in the majority of Western countries; however, there is no legislation prohibiting it (and therefore no surveillance of it) in the majority of countries around the world. After a brief introduction to Internet pornography, this entry examines how it is combated via surveillance by law enforcement, Internet service providers, and employers. The entry then examines how users and distributors of Internet pornography take steps to avoid the aforementioned surveillance. Surveillance of users of the Internet is often undertaken for a variety of reasons related to pornography: •• Law enforcement surveillance is fundamentally against CEM producers as well as users, but it is also for “revenge” pornography (where an ex-partner may post explicit images or videos online to shame and humiliate a former partner). •• Internet service providers (ISPs) undertake surveillance to ensure that the services of the ISP are not being used for criminal activities that the ISP may be liable for stopping. •• Employers utilize workplace surveillance to ensure that employees are not using workplace resources to access pornography.

Producers and consumers of CEM and other forms of pornography that are illegal in a specific country are typically aware of and may try to subvert this surveillance to ensure that they are not caught.

Law Enforcement Surveillance The continued growth in Internet-enabled smart technology (e.g., phones, handheld gaming devices, and even watches) has resulted in a rapid ­escalation of Internet pornography–related offenses. Often, however, the authorities do not have the resources in place to combat all the reports they receive from the public, from their investigations into other offenders, or from ISPs. The increase in electronically transmitted child exploitation material has resulted in new dilemmas for law enforcement in the surveillance and investigation of child abuse. Issues identified by law enforcement officials include the following: •• No standard definition of child pornography, even often within one country where there are local or state laws regarding child abuse and exploitation; for example, this can mean that in instances where there are images of naked children in the possession of the accused, if they are not deemed to be sexual in nature, then the accused cannot be charged with child pornography possession •• Identification of offenders beyond the individual possessing the images •• Lack of proper training and resources •• Difficulty collaborating with other agencies

The combination of Internet-enabled technology alongside the recent phenomenon of teenagers exchanging sexually explicit photographs and videos with friends or online “friends” has resulted in a proliferation of child pornography being produced by teens for the consumption of their peers that can and often does fall into the hands of child pornographers via peer-to-peer sharing networks, the Darknet, or chatrooms. Another emerging area for law enforcement surveillance vis-à-vis explicit images online is “revenge porn.” Again, due to a lack of legislation in many jurisdictions, there is little that law enforcement can do to combat the online posting

Internet Pornography

of explicit material that was made consensually by a previous partner. In most legislation, the online posting of this material is not illegal; however, if it is accompanied by stalking, harassment, or other threats, then law enforcement officials are able to press charges for these actions.

Internet Service Provider Surveillance The role of the ISP in the transmission of Internet pornography has increasingly been examined around the world. Due to the anonymity of the Internet, along with the way that it can connect people from all around the world, from jurisdictions with very disparate laws, the question has arisen about who should be responsible for stemming the access to child pornography or pornography that is illegal (e.g., bestiality or pornography depicting rape). Laws regarding the responsibilities of ISPs are different in each jurisdiction, and some nations have been faster than others in creating laws that require ISPs to report knowledge of child pornography and victimization to authorities. Often law enforcement would not know about child pornography offenses if ISPs did not report them. However, very few countries have ISP legislation in place. This is the result of several factors: (a) there is not adequate legislation in place regarding child pornography (no definition of it in the legal code), (b) the viewing or possession of child pornography is not illegal in the country, and (c) the technological capabilities of ISPs, citizens, and law enforcement officials in a specific country are not adequate enough to allow for ISPs to be responsible for reporting child pornography to the authorities.

Workplace Surveillance Surveillance of workplace computers and other electronic devices is regularly undertaken to ensure that company- or government-owned devices are not being used inappropriately. While pornography with consenting participants older than the age of 18 years may be legal in a given country, workplace rules often outline what content is deemed inappropriate to view or circulate via email or Internet communication in an office or professional setting. Courts across a variety of jurisdictions have agreed that an employer has the

525

right to monitor employee usage of in-house email and Internet access. Employers may also introduce policies against the access of pornography in the workplace to ensure that sexual harassment of employees does not take place, for example, through the printing or displaying of pornographic material in the office or leading certain employees to believe that the business is permissive of sexually suggestive comments about colleagues if it allows pornography to be viewed in the office. Pornography in the workplace has been shown to create a hostile work environment, and the sharing of pornography via email is now considered sexual harassment and is legislated against in criminal law.

Subverting Surveillance Individuals who create, access, or exchange CEM are typically aware that their Internet use may be monitored. Therefore, they often go to great lengths to subvert the surveillance that they believe they are under. Those who engage with CEM are generally aware that CEM is not accepted by society; therefore, there is a strong incitement on their part to protect their identity to ensure that they are not detected or prosecuted. However, accounts of how individuals subvert criminal justice or ISP surveillance are limited because information can be gathered only by those who have been unsuccessful in their attempts to bypass surveillance (researchers can only gather information from those who have been arrested and are currently or historically had been incarcerated for pornography-related offences). CEM offenders have two ways of evading surveillance— technological and social strategies—and they are often used concurrently. Technological strategies include choosing to use technology that is secure (making it more difficult for law enforcement officials to target and survey) and makes the user “invisible,” staying away from webpages, as these are often insecure, and preferring the use of peerto-peer networks. Use of technology can be wrought with problems of surveillance for offenders, and therefore, informal networks of people involved in CEM production and distribution often share their strategies regarding shielding themselves from surveillance with others in their network. Social strategies employed included

526

Internment Camps

using aliases online, never revealing their identities, not buying or selling material but swapping it, observing language use of the person they are interacting with (e.g., how fluent their English is) to discern further information, and paying attention to patterns about uploading and downloading of files by other users.

Conclusion There are multiple issues regarding Internet pornography and surveillance. The methods used by law enforcement, ISPs, and workplaces to combat Internet pornography are typically known by those who are experienced at attempting to access, download, or exchange sexually explicit material of children. Although the Internet has been widely available since the early 1990s, especially in Western countries, legislators have often been slow in creating laws that combat child pornography, with only a few jurisdictions having laws in place to tackle the issue. Generally, in these jurisdictions, the surveillance of Internet users is done between the ISPs and the law enforcement officials. Adult pornography uploading, downloading, and circulation are not under the same amount of surveillance unless the content of the adult pornography is considered to be illegal in a given jurisdiction. Victoria M. Nagy See also Sex Offender Laws; Sex Offender Registries; Sexting

Further Readings Eneman, M. “Counter-Surveillance Strategies Adopted by Child Pornographers.” International Journal of Technology and Human Interaction, v.5/4 (2009). International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children. Child Pornography: Model Legislation & Global Review (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author, 2008. http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/CP_ Legislation_Report.pdf (Accessed January 2015). McCabe, K. A. “The Role of Internet Service Providers in Cases of Child Pornography and Child Prostitution.” Social Science Computer Review, v.26/2 (2008). Ogas, O. and S. Gaddam. A Billion Wicked Thoughts: What the World’s Largest Experiment Reveals About Human Desire. New York, NY: Plume, 2012.

Panko, R. R. and H. G. Beh. “Monitoring for Pornography and Sexual Harassment.” Communications of the ACM, v.45/1 (2002).

Internment Camps Internment camps are not new in world history; during several periods, such as during the past century’s colonial wars and World War II, they were used as a means of neutralizing enemies or for racial cleansing. Most famous are probably the internment camps, which later became concentration camps or extermination camps, used by the Nazis in their ideological policy for the supremacy of the Aryan race during World War II. Other examples include Russian gulags, or forced labor camps, which were a recognized instrument of political repression during Joseph Stalin’s rule, and in the United States, shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Japanese Americans living in the West Coast were evacuated from their homes to internment camps. Internment camps have been condemned by all international and intergovernmental bodies as well as by the majority of countries that signed the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war (1949), the UN Refugee Convention (1951), and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000). Despite the idea that internment camps are something of the past strictly related to periods of war, it is possible to find several examples of similar institutions nowadays in different parts of the world. Their use is mostly related to immigration and efforts to control the flow of migration in a purported attempt to secure nations (primarily, developed nations) against an increasing number of migrants attracted to those nations. The belief that migrants can destabilize the welfare of a country, together with racism and intolerance of foreign cultures, can lead to a policy of repelling migrants in the name of safety. Internment camps serve as places through which immigration can be controlled and migrants can be kept monitored or surveilled. The terms Fortress Europe and Fortress Australia have been used to describe governmental policies to limit the invasion of economic migrants as well as of migrants escaping violence and

Internment Camps

ethnic-religious conflicts, and often, governments use internment camps to reach these policy goals. Many authors see such government policies as a prolongation of colonialism, or a postcolonial attitude, a kind of apartheid practice against mass displacements. This entry details the use of internment camps in Europe, including temporary centers created as a first shelter for refugees and migrants, and in Australia, where camps are located outside the national borders to avoid refugee regulations and other uses whereby security often prevails over human rights.

European Temporary Centers The case of Europe can be exemplary of the contradictory logic of fostering an unlimited mobility and freedom of goods, people, services, and capitals inside the different countries of the European Union and an immigration policy that tends to be guided by the principles of prevention, protection, and solidarity but often lacks the latter. As a result of the 1985 Schengen Agreement, internal border checks have all but disappeared in Europe; however, more recently, some people have noted that new and reinforced foreign borders as well as new policies are needed to control immigration, and internment camps have been proposed and utilized as a solution. Temporary Stay and Assistance Centers are the places where migrants are hosted after their arrival. Such centers are disseminated through the south coast of Europe and on the eastern borders of Greece, the most frequently used gateways to Europe from North Africa and other eastern shores. As of 2014, in Italy, there were six such centers (Centro de Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza, or CPTA) and two in both Spain and Greece. These camps are intended to be used for short stays in order to check the nationality and immigration status of the migrants before the receiving country makes a final decision about accepting their entrance. Many nongovernmental organizations, however, assert that refugees’ basic rights are not always respected. Because of increased instability in the Middle East and the African countries, migration flows are on the rise, and European countries have begun to use camps as temporary detention centers before entry

527

(or expulsion). In these countries, as in the rest of Europe, other detention facilities that work under different regulations and are often operated by police also exist. Contemporary internment camps are often prefabricated buildings, encircled by fences with barbed wire to keep the residents inside and separate from the surrounding urban areas. Problems may arise when stays become longer than anticipated and when the number of migrants exceeds the maximum number of places the camp was designed for. In such situations, the accommodations may become inadequate; as a result, overcrowding, poor hygienic conditions, human rights violations like degrading treatment, difficulties for asylum seekers in gaining access to the asylum determination process, and large-scale expulsions disregarding the nationality of the migrants become common practices. While migrants entering the asylum request process may be transferred to other facilities, fewer than half of the remaining are deported, and others may be released or escape—revealing the inefficiencies of this system. In some camps, such as those in the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the African continent, camp residents have the freedom to go out to the city. The design of these camps prioritizes transparency, with no hidden areas and no fences. As evidenced by the Temporary Stay and Assistance Center in Melilla, which is similar to other camps in Europe, the main space is occupied by pavilions, with several rooms with eight beds and a bathroom each, separated by gender, and the facility includes playgrounds as well as other infrastructures. Ultimately, in many of these facilities, a lack of respect for residents’ schedules and timetables, limited socializing or education opportunities, and policies of strong militarization and vigilance tend to make evident the fact that migrants are not welcome. This attitude is only possible, following Agamben Giorgio’s thought, for the state of exception in many developed countries, which permits the use of military tools and practices to address the problem of migration. Migrants, however, are often treated as threats rather than as humans who need help. Consequently, some European countries have signed agreements with transit countries (generally on the south and east shores of the Mediterranean

528

Internment Camps

Sea) to displace border controls and internment camps into these countries. For example, Italy signed a treatise with Libya in 2000; Spain did the same with Morocco in 2012. These agreements allow for the externalization of the migration processes, whereby migrants are displaced to these countries in exchange for investments and development assistance. However, such practices have raised ethical issues, as Libya and other countries outside Europe have not signed any treatise regarding the rights of refugees, and human rights violations may not be immediately known.

Fortress Australia The attempt to defend a welfare country from an increasing migration flow is also present in ­Australia, whose mode of operation is similar to that seen in Europe. In 2002, to limit the ­migration flows experienced, Australia introduced indefinite, nonreviewable detention for asylum seekers arriving in the country. Australia probably has the strongest migration regulation found today to reduce significantly the number of economic migrants and refugees reaching Australian coasts. As a result of agreements with Christmas Island, Papua New Guinea, Manus, and Nauru, before their arrival, migrants can be held at Immigration Reception and Process Centers far from Australia. This geography of exception makes it difficult for migrants to apply under Australian refugee rules. Asylum seekers who are able to reach Australia are placed in detention centers far from urban areas, where access to lawyers, translators, and family members is very difficult. The United Nations High Commission on Human Rights and several nongovernmental organizations have criticized the Australian government for violations of several conventions, among them the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Other Camps In addition to addressing migration and refugee issues, there are also other contemporary uses for internment camps. The Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp, created in the name of security and under rules of exception, is an interesting example. The war against terror issued by U.S. president George W. Bush after the 9/11 terrorist

attacks is based on the USA PATRIOT Act, passed by the legislative branch, giving the executive branch extreme powers to override civil liberties and common rights, especially with regard to foreign nationals. The Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp, located within the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, holds hundreds of detainees under military rules, depriving them of the basic rights as defined by the rules of the Geneva Convention related to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and any right granted to U.S. citizens. In fact, detainees do not have access to lawyers or translators, do not know the exact incrimination they face, and may stay in limbo for several years. All trials are directed and controlled by the U.S. Army, which acts as interrogator, defense, judge, and jury. Many nongovernmental organizations have characterized the treatment of these prisoners as torture, with the goal of obtaining information about terrorism, transforming this detention camp into a center for interrogation. Border controls, detentions, and expulsion practices do not prevent people from moving from their countries of origin, nor from reaching Europe or other welfare countries, but they do increase the dangers for migrants. Critics contend that today internment camps are used only sporadically as assistance centers and that many are centers to control immigrants and limit their possibilities to start an asylum process or to invoke their rights as refugees. Sometimes lost in the discussion of these camps are the migrants’ or refugees’ rights not to be expelled to a country where they might face torture or religious and race discrimination. Guido Cimadomo See also Concentration Camps; Deportation; Guantanamo Bay; Immigration; Mass Incarceration

Further Readings Giorgio, Agamben. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. Hannah, Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York, NY: Meridian Books, 1958. Saskia, Sassen. Guests and Aliens. New York, NY: New Press, 1999.

INTERPOL

Website Global Detention Project: http://www.globaldetention project.org

INTERPOL The International Criminal Police Organization, commonly known as INTERPOL, is an independent international organization with a mission to enable police throughout the world to combat and prevent crime through cooperation and innovation. Formed in 1923 and headquartered in Lyon, France, INTERPOL provides services in the areas of police communication, database support, and law enforcement capacity building. Since upgrading its system in 2003, INTERPOL was the first police organization to use Internet-based technology to securely deliver police information. INTERPOL’s I-24/7 global law enforcement system connects all  member countries (189 as of 2017) in real time.  INTERPOL receives more than 14 million messages on an annual basis. Its law enforcement  databases contain more than 30 million records, which include information on stolen vehicles, stolen works of art, fingerprints and DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) profiles, stolen and lost travel documents, and child sexual exploitation investigation. After an overview of INTERPOL and its history and organization, this entry examines INTERPOL’s notices system and its surveillance network, both of which assist member countries in border security and antiterrorism efforts. INTERPOL bridges gaps in international policing requirements and capacity by providing training to member country police agencies in the areas of skill development. Through various projects, INTERPOL provides tailored law enforcement training to hundreds of international police agencies and thousands of officers each year. INTERPOL is active in the international fight against terrorism; however, the access and misuse of notices systems and other law enforcement databases have generated concerns about how far INTERPOL should go in assisting member countries. Terrorism and counterterrorism programs have always been a concern for INTERPOL. In the

529

1970s and 1980s, INTERPOL passed several resolutions that urged member countries to cooperate with terrorist-related incidents. A resolution was passed in 1970 for member countries to cooperate with criminal investigations for acts against international civil aviation. The next year, an INTERPOL resolution was passed that required member agencies to take measures to prevent hostage incidents. The INTERPOL General Assembly decided, in 1979, to take action against organized groups that commit acts of violence, including kidnapping, hostage taking, interfering with civil aviation, arson, and bombings, which were considered the cause for serious jeopardy to public safety. In the 1980s, INTERPOL began a more proactive approach to combating terrorism. A resolution was passed in 1984 to clarify INTERPOL’s definition of terrorism and its involvement in combating the phenomenon. In the mid-1980s, INTERPOL created the Public Safety and Terrorism subcommittee to better address the issues of international terrorism. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, INTERPOL has rapidly expanded its antiterrorist activities. From September 24 to 28, 2001, the INTERPOL General Assembly held a meeting in Budapest, Hungary. During the meeting, the General Assembly passed Resolution AG-2001-RES-05 on the “Terrorist Attack of 11 September 2001.” The resolution condemned the September 11 attacks and resolved to make the effective tackling of organized crime and terrorism a priority. An INTERPOL fact sheet titled “The Fight Against International Terrorism” summarized the organization’s resolve to combat terrorism and detailed its current policy to do so. The emphasis on locating terrorists made INTERPOL’s programs such as notice systems and surveillance a priority in this effort. The INTERPOL notice system is an information tool that is fundamental to international police cooperation. The notice system provides member countries with crime and terrorist information that includes movement of known international subjects who are wanted for extradition or arrest. First introduced in 2005, the Mobile INTERPOL Network Database (MIND) and Fixed INTERPOL Network Database (FIND) are surveillance programs that are designed to facilitate searches for documents, vehicles, and people.

530

INTERPOL

However, INTERPOL was strongly criticized for failing to safeguard its notices systems against political abuse by governments targeting dissidents and other misuses.

The INTERPOL Notices System The INTERPOL International notices system is central to international police cooperation. The system provides member agencies with timely intelligence and crime-related data. The notices are sent through email by INTERPOL headquarters to member countries. Information contained in the notices may include wanted or missing person information with data such as physical descriptions, fingerprints, photographs, and other identification details. The notices system is broken down into four color-coded advisory messages (red, blue, green, and orange). The INTERPOL Red Notice is used when a country seeks extradition or arrest of a suspect. The Red Notice serves as a provisional arrest notice for some countries. The Blue Notice is used by countries to collect additional information about an individual’s location or identity related to a criminal matter. The Green Notice is used to provide criminal intelligence about persons suspected of committed crimes with a likelihood of committing future crimes in another country. An INTERPOL Orange Notice is used to warn law enforcement and member security organizations of potential threats from dangerous items, including hidden weapons and parcel bombs. Some concerns have surfaced about the improper use of the INTERPOL Red Notices by countries for illegitimate purposes. Countries such as Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Tunisia have allegedly used the Red Notice to strike back at political opponents. Research published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists analyzed more than 7,500 Red Notices issued by 145 countries. The research showed that approximately 25% of the countries that requested Red Notices were countries with restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, and 50% of the requesting nations were deemed corrupt by international observers. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists research study provided examples of Red Notices requested by former Venezuelan president Hugo

Chavez against bankers and former political leaders who opposed Chavez. The Red Notices begin with a police agency in a member country sending a domestic arrest warrant to INTERPOL. Once received, INTERPOL will then send out a Red Notice globally to member countries, which allows other countries to extradite or arrest suspects. The membership of INTERPOL spans from democratic countries to dictatorships. A request from a Western country such as Canada is treated the same as those from countries like Iran and Libya. The larger concerns appear to be the failure of INTERPOL to scrutinize the Red Notices that are being used by governments to capture political dissidents and human rights activists. One example is the slow investigation of a Red Notice placed against Patricia Poleo, a Venezuelan journalist. Poleo was threatened for previous reporting on Colombian rebels that caused the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to issue orders to ensure her safety. INTERPOL took 18 months to determine that the Red Notice was politically motivated.

INTERPOL’s Surveillance Network Another program fundamental to INTERPOL’s fight against terrorism is INTERPOL surveillance. Transnational crime and globalization result in greater instances of cross-border flows for commerce, information, crime, and terrorism. The rise in transnational crime forces the world community to work together in order to address the adverse consequences of greater international flow of terrorists and criminals. Created in 2005, MIND and FIND surveillance databases allow countries to screen people and documents during border crossings. MIND/FIND is used to search INTERPOL’s fugitive, stolen and lost travel document, and terrorist databases. Traditionally, access to transnational crime information was limited to a member country’s INTERPOL National Central Bureau. To make international crime information available to frontline officers, INTERPOL developed an integrated system that allows instant access to critical ­databases that contain information such as stolen and lost travel documents. The new technology emerged as the MIND/FIND systems and provides two separate ways of connecting

Inverse Surveillance

international law enforcement authorities to INTERPOL’s databases at field offices and border entry points. Javier Gardeazbal and Todd Sandler researched the role of MIND/FIND in the interdiction of terrorism since 2005. The researchers found that MIND/FIND surveillance allows countries to screen documents and people at border crossings in a systematic manner against INTERPOL’s databases. By using treatment-effect literature, their research established that countries using MIND/ FIND experience fewer terrorist attacks compared with those countries that did not adopt MIND/ FIND. The research established that during 2008– 2011, using MIND/FIND resulted in 1.23 fewer terrorist attacks per 100 million people—an almost 60% reduction. Kraig Kiehl See also Border Patrol Checkpoints; Dataveillance; Passenger Data; Terrorism

Further Readings Bray, Shawn. “INTERPOL Washington: When Transnational Crime Comes to Our Communities.” The Police Chief, v.80 (2013). Bromund, Ted and David Kopel. “Necessary Reforms Can Keep INTERPOL Working in the U.S. Interest.” Backgrounder, 2861 (2013). http://report.heritage .org/bg2861 (Accessed October 2014). Deflem, Mathieu and Lindsay Maybin. “INTERPOL and the Policing of International Terrorism: Developments Since September 11.” In L. Snowden and B. Whitsel (eds.), Terrorism: Research, Readings, and Realities. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005. Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. “Who Adopts MIND/ FIND in INTERPOL’s Fight Against International Crime and Terrorism?” Published Articles & Papers. http://www.utdallas.edu/~tms063000/website/MIND_ FIND_Final_Comp.pdf (Accessed September 2017). Gardeazabal, Javier and Todd Sandler. INTERPOL’s Surveillance Network in Curbing Transnational Terrorism. Paper presented at the 2014 Terrorism and Policy Conference, Center for Collective Global Action, Richardson, Texas, May 7, 2014. http:// webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/ SemPapers/20140606.pdf (Accessed October 2014). INTERPOL Educational Resource. About INTERPOL. http://www.interpol.it (Accessed October 2014).

531

Karlsson, Ira. “INTERPOL Accused of Undermining Justice.” Al Jazeera (March 20, 2014). http://www .aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/03/interpol-accusedundermining-justice-201432010467639126.html (Accessed September 2017). Lewis, Libby. “INTERPOL’s Red Notices Used by Some to Pursue Political Dissenters, Opponents.” Center for Public Integrity. https://www.publicintegrity .org/2011/07/18/5179/interpols-red-notices-usedsome-pursue-political-dissenters-opponents (Accessed September 2017). Simons, Jake. “Who Polices the World’s Police?” The Telegraph (May 8, 2014). http://www.telegraph .co.uk/culture/books/10801997/Interpol-who-policesthe-worlds-police.html (Accessed October 2014). Vaccani, Matteo. “INTERPOL: Connecting Police for a Safer World.” The Police Chief, v.78 (2011).

Inverse Surveillance While surveillance entails monitoring practices of society from above, inverse surveillance involves citizens monitoring and recording the activities of authorities from below. Inverse surveillance describes the practice of recording facts or events directly through the eyes of witnesses. Despite the concerns about digital surveillance, the debate on inverse surveillance practices and their effects is older than the advent of digital technologies and the concept of inverse surveillance. Joshua Meyrowitz addressed how the miniaturization of media technologies, such as cameras and video cameras, and their increasing accessibility to the broader public offer the opportunity to monitor authorities. In this context, the private space of political leaders is likely to become space public a lot easier than in the past, which Meyrowitz argues to be a condition key to enhancing transparency. In recent years, due to the increased use of mobile phones, digital cameras, and video recorders, inverse surveillance has become common practice, and its impact is more evident. In this context, people as simple members of the public have gained the capacity to constantly record authorities’ activities, facts, and events in which they are involved. Inverse surveillance is often used to record power abuses that people witness, such as institutional or police violence, corruption, fraud, or violations of human rights. Moreover,

532

Inverse Surveillance

using the disseminating capacity of the digital infrastructure and web tools such as social media, individuals can report and distribute information to a broader public more quickly than in the past. People can practice inverse surveillance with an agenda, or spontaneously, such as when ordinary citizens get engaged in recording and reporting incidents they witness in their everyday lives. The distribution of surveillance practices from the bottom up enhances monitoring of local neighborhood, remote areas, and environments, which might have positive effects on social justice. One of the first examples of empirical evidence on how the spread of low-cost and accessible technologies enhances inverse surveillance practices was in 1991, when Los Angeles police officials beating a citizen after a high-speed police chase were videotaped by a witness. The event shocked the public and generated days of protests and riots after the acquittal of the officers in 1992. Some years later, more formalized and organized forms of inverse surveillance practice were labeled media activism. During the mobilizations surrounding the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, activists developed strategies and tactics aimed at monitoring and recording any abuse of power of police against protesters. For this purpose, Indymedia was launched and is often referred to as the first transnational network  of media activists aimed at spreading and ­coordinating inverse surveillance practices worldwide. Indymedia’s slogan “Do not hate the Media, Become the Media” embodied the idea of spreading inverse surveillance tactics beyond protest events, into the daily life of ordinary citizens who, due to their role as directly witnessing events, were able to report even better and quicker than traditional media. The combination of the narrowing of the digital divide; the evolution of mobile phones; the converging with other media such as digital cameras; the improvements of network infrastructure, including the increase of mobile phone bandwidth capacity; and the advent of social media have, first, further strengthened people’s capacity to monitor their surroundings. Second, the proliferation of online platforms such as WikiLeaks enables the collection and publicizing of available information and documents released by whistle-blowers engaged in recording abuses that take place in their work environments,

including within companies and governmental offices. Finally, other online tools, such as Ushahidi, aim at giving visibility to inverse surveillance practices by combining mapping visualization and crowdsourced information reported by people engaged in monitoring their environments. Ushahidi has been successful in monitoring election frauds, violation of human rights, and conflicts worldwide. Today, inverse surveillance tactics are considered a powerful practice to strengthen transparency. Due to the spread of inverse surveillance capacity, citizens have gained an important role to play vis-à-vis their communities by watching and collecting information on authorities’ behavior. In  this context, more information is made available about public actors and their activities, and this is recognized to be key in enabling more informed elections of political representatives. Moreover, the dissemination of eyewitness ­testimonies through recorded video and images is having a deterrent effect so as to prevent such violations in the future, effectively protecting social justice and human rights. Finally, in the context of war and conflict, inverse surveillance might be a useful practice to quickly bring violence experienced on the street to the attention of a public far away from the events taking place, thereby potentially generating sufficient external pressure to prevent a worsening of the conflict. Andrea Calderaro See also Crime Mapping; News Media; Surveillance Deterrence; Whistle-Blowers; WikiLeaks

Further Readings Bock, J. G. The Technology of Nonviolence: Social Media and Violence Prevention. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012. Couldry, N. and J. Curran. Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World. Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Livingston, S. Bits and Atoms: Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2014. Mann, S., et al. “Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices.” Surveillance & Society, v.1/3 (2003).

Iran Meyrowitz, J. No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985.

iPhones

See Smartphones

Iran Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has assembled a complex set of institutions designed to monitor virtually all aspects of political and social life in the country. This includes traditional intelligence agencies that monitor opposition groups as well as agencies focused on enforcing strict Islamic mortality codes. More recently, the regime has worked to monitor and limit the use of the Internet by citizens of Iran. In the realm of foreign affairs, the Islamic government has expanded its regional influence, supporting terrorist and insurgent groups abroad and engaging in foreign surveillance and espionage.

Politics and Government in Iran Iran, which traces its origins to the Persian Empire, occupies a unique political and cultural position, straddling both the Middle East and Asia. It shares borders with seven countries, including Iraq, ­Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and it is one of only five Muslim countries in the world with a Shia Muslim majority population. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has been ruled as a theocratic republic, combining elements of Islamic law, electoral politics, and revolutionary ideology. The modern Iranian state was formed in 1921, after a group of military officers seized power from the ruling Qajar dynasty. By 1925, Reza Khan, one of the officers involved in the coup, was appointed by the country’s constituent assembly as the monarch (shah) of Iran. The shah, who founded the Pahlavi dynasty, ruled Iran until 1941, when the British forced him from power,

533

owing to his support for Nazi Germany. They replaced him with his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who ruled Iran until 1979.

State Security Under the Shah During his time in power, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi proved to be a reliable ally of the United States, taking a hard-line anticommunist stance at home and abroad. Key to this was the regime’s development of the powerful secret police known by its Persian acronym SAVAK. Officially formed in 1957, SAVAK agents received training from both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Israel’s national intelligence agency, Mossad. The shah gave the agency broad and largely unchecked powers to address internal threats to the regime’s security. SAVAK operated its own detention centers, and at one time, it employed more than 60,000 people. For example, Evan Prison, one of the facilities run by the agency, was initially constructed to hold 350 prisoners; by 1977, the facility held more than 1,500 political prisoners, many of whom were subject to torture. Beyond providing domestic security, SAVAK was also tasked with monitoring tens of thousands of Iranians overseas, including expatriates and students living in the United States.

The Revolution During the 1970s, opposition to the shah’s regime began to mount, due to several factors. First, in an attempt to modernize the country, the government implemented a wide-ranging modernization ini­ tiative, including elements such as land reform, nationalization of industry, and compulsory education. These reforms prompted opposition from the clergy and the landowners, who were unhappy about the rapid social and economic change. In addition, there was widespread public opposition to the brutal tactics of the secret police, as well as the pro-American tilt of Iran’s foreign relations. Finally, the growing gap between the rich and the poor undercut the shah’s popular appeal. This opposition was centered on several groups, including left-wing parties, university students, as well as the increasingly vocal Shia clergy. Exiled cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a longtime critic of the shah, emerged as the most prominent

534

Iran

opposition figure. Khomeini, who was living in Iraq, made sermons calling for the overthrow of the monarchy and the implementation of a strict Islamic government, free from Western influence. His supporters smuggled cassette tapes of these sermons into Iran, where they were circulated ­ widely. By 1978, there were widespread and violent protests against the shah’s regime. In an unsuccessful attempt to reassert control, the government deployed the Army and SAVAK to suppress the demonstrations; this resulted in the deaths of an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 Iranian citizens. By 1979, it became clear to the shah that the regime had lost its base of support, and in January, he and his family left the country, ostensibly to seek medical treatment in the United States. In February of that year, Khomeini returned to Iran, and in April, following a referendum, Iran officially became an Islamic Republic.

State Surveillance in the Islamic Republic Since the 1979 revolution, Iranian state security and intelligence agencies serve a key role in protecting the internal stability of the regime, as well as promoting Iranian influence in the broader region. The Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) primarily conducts foreign intelligence operations, while responsibility for domestic surveillance is shared by a number of organizations under the auspices of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). All 16 Iranian intelligence agencies are organized under the umbrella of the Council for Intelligence Coordination. The MOIS serves as Iran’s main agency for foreign intelligence operations and reports directly to the supreme leader of Iran. It is responsible for all major areas of intelligence activities; however, little is known about the internal structure of the agency. It is the successor to SAVAK, and although many members of the SAVAK forces were imprisoned or executed after the revolution, the new government did recruit some high-ranking members of the organization to work for the new agency. ­Estimates from the U.S. Department of Defense suggest that MOIS currently has 30,000 employees, putting it at twice the size of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in terms of manpower.

MOIS works in conjunction with the Revolutionary Guards on many of its foreign operations in the Middle East. Following IRGC’s founding in 1979, it was initially tasked with protecting the regime from internal threats and providing border security. Its role has since expanded, and the IRGC now houses several distinct intelligence agencies that conduct both foreign and domestic intelligence activities. There are an estimated 150,000 active duty members of the IRGC, making it the largest single agency of the Iranian state security apparatus. One of IRGC’s subsidiary agencies is the Quds Force, an elite unit primarily responsible for foreign covert operations. The organization employs an estimated 15,000 former and current Iranian Special Forces troops and operates a number of combat missions in the Middle East. This includes fighting against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (better known as the ISIS) in Iraq during the Second Battle of Tikrit in 2015 and intervening in support of the Assad government in Syria since 2011. In addition, Quds Force operatives have engaged in training activities for nonstate groups including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Since 2007, the United States has designated the Quds Force as an organization supporting terrorism. In addition to targeting political dissidents and foreign threats, Iran has also used its intelligence agencies to enforce strict Islamic morality codes. One agency, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, is responsible for censoring media and art deemed to undermine the regime’s values. In recent years, the ministry has made a special effort to restrict access to the Internet; dozens of popular Internet sites are censored in Iran, ­ i ncluding Facebook and ­Twitter. In 2016, the ­government also piloted its own version of the Internet, with more effective filtering of foreign content. Although citizens are permitted to use some social media sites, the government monitors them, and individuals can be punished for the material they post. For instance, in 2016, several Iranian models were arrested after the regime discovered that they had posted pictures of themselves on Instagram  without wearing mandated Islamic headscarves.

Iran

The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran According to Iran’s constitution, the supreme leader, an Islamic cleric, serves as head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces; the preferences of the supreme leader often drive Iran’s engagement with the outside world. Multiple other officials and agencies have a role in policy making, including the Supreme National Security Council, the parliament, the president, senior clerics, and the Iranian business community. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran’s foreign policy has been focused on two key goals: (1) protecting the regime from outside threats and (2) expanding Iran’s influence in the Middle East. The first major international incident for the Islamic Republic came in November 1979, after a group of Iranian college students seized control of  the U.S. embassy and captured a group of American hostages. The students demanded that the United States return Shah Reza Pahlavi, to Iran to face trial for his crimes. Khomeini sided with the students,  viewing the hostages as insurance against U.S. invasion of Iran designed to undo the revolution. The hostages were eventually released 444 days later, but this incident, along with the outpouring of anti-American rhetoric during the revolution, led the United States to fully sever diplomatic ties with Iran. Iran also faced an early threat from Iraq. In 1980, Saddam Hussein, the leader of neighboring Iraq, ordered his army to invade Iran. Hussein was concerned that Iran would attempt to export its revolution to Iraq by fomenting rebellion among the country’s Shia population. Although Iraq secured early military victories, by 1981, Iran’s forces had driven Iraq out of the country, and by 1982, Iran was on the offensive. The war, which lasted for 6 more years and cost the lives of more than 1 million people, led to a permanent rift between Iran and much of the Arab world, which had supported Iraq’s efforts to undermine the revolutionary Shia regime. Iran has focused much of its security policy on enhancing its influence in the Middle East using its extensive state security forces to arm, train, and fund various groups recognized by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European

535

Union, and Israel as terrorist organizations. Generally, Iran backs Shia groups and uses them to engage in indirect conflict with Israel, Saudi ­Arabia, and the United States, three states that Iran considers impediments to its goal of regional hegemony. Iran does not recognize the State of Israel and  has been one of the primary benefactors of Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The majority of the members of Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam, the militant wing of Hamas, are trained in Iran, as are many members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran is also the main benefactor of Hezbollah; the group, while primarily based in Lebanon, has engaged in two wars against Israel in South Lebanon and has also participated in two civil wars in Lebanon. Complicating the situation, Hezbollah functionally controls large swaths of land in South Lebanon and is a recognized party in the Lebanese legislature. In addition to Hezbollah, two other Iranian proxies functionally control their own territory. Since 2006, Hamas has controlled the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian territory bordered by Israel on the east and north. Another proxy, the Houthi insurgents in Yemen, control a large portion of the western half of Yemen and are opposed by the government of Saudi Arabia. Overall, Iran’s support for these groups has allowed it to avoid direct military confrontation with its geopolitical rivals while conducting operations designed to undermine the political influence of those adversaries. Kelly McHugh and Mordechai Wellish See also Arab Spring; Iran-Contra Affair; Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979); Iraq; Terrorism

Further Readings Abedin, Mahan. “The Iranian Intelligence Services and the War on Terror.” Terrorism Monitor, v.2/10 (2004). https://jamestown.org/program/the-iranianintelligence-services-and-the-war-on-terror-2/ (Accessed October 2017). Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.” Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ mideast/R44017.pdf (Accessed April 2017).

536

Iran-Contra Affair

Keddie, Nikki R. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. Takeya, Ray. Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of Ayatollahs. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Iran-Contra Affair The Iran-Contra Affair was a political scandal that occurred during the second term of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. The scandal resulted from the convergence of two national security challenges plaguing the Reagan administration. The scandal began after the administration decided to covertly sell arms to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the hopes of gaining Iranian aid in freeing American hostages held in Lebanon. Some members of the Reagan administration then diverted the profits from those arms sales to fund an anticommunist rebel group in Nicaragua; the ­ U.S. Congress had expressly forbidden this action. Although several high-level officials were implicated in the scandal, Reagan denied any direct knowledge of the events. This entry provides background information for understanding the Iran-Contra Affair and then discusses the scandal and its aftermath.

Background on U.S.-Nicaragua Relations During the more than 40-year rule of the Somoza family, Nicaragua was a reliable ally of the United States. In 1979, however, a revolution toppled Antonio Somoza, the staunchly anticommunist leader of Nicaragua. The new government, headed by the Sandinista rebels, implemented a socialist agenda and promised to reverse the excess and corruption of the Somoza era. Although the Carter administration in the United States was concerned about these developments, the United States offered aid to the new government, in the hope of cultivating a pro-American sentiment. The ploy failed; the Sandinistas accepted aid from Cuba, and the movement’s leaders spoke of a desire to export the revolution throughout Central America.

In 1981, following the inauguration of Reagan as U.S. president, the new administration took a hard line toward socialist regimes in Central ­America, arguing that the spread of communism in the region constituted a threat to U.S. national security. As such, the president elected to cut off all aid to the Nicaraguan government; moreover, through the Central Intelligence Agency, the ­Reagan administration began to actively aid anticommunist paramilitary groups—dubbed the “Contras”—in its quest to topple the Sandinista government. This aid took the form of weapons transfers, monetary support, and training at bases in neighboring Honduras. Following media coverage of the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Contras, the D ­ emocratic U.S. Congress moved to limit the administration’s ability to support the rebels. In 1982, Congress passed the first of two amendments proposed by Representative Edward Boland (D-MA); this amendment prohibited the administration from using funds appropriated by Congress to topple the Nicaraguan government. Reagan, however, was not deterred; the United States continued funding the rebels, with the administration claiming that the United States’ goal was not to topple the government but instead to promote democracy in Nicaragua. In explaining his decision to continue supporting the anticommunist paramilitaries, Reagan famously argued that the Contras were the “moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers.” In 1984, however, Congress passed a second Boland Amendment containing an unequivocal prohibition on funding any paramilitary groups in Nicaragua. At this point, the administration had no legal way to provide continued support to the Contras.

Background on U.S.-Iran Relations Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States’ alliance with Iran was crucial to U.S. strategy in the region. This alliance offered the United States a strategic foothold in the Persian Gulf, as  well as access to Iran’s oil reserves. Following the  overthrow of the pro-American regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi, however, the new fundamentalist  government headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah ­Khomeini adopted a hostile posture toward the

Iran-Contra Affair

United States, jeopardizing its position as the dominant outside power in the region. Subsequently, the United States terminated all diplomatic relations with Iran and named the country as a state sponsor of terrorism. Subsequently, during the early 1980s, the pro-Iranian terrorist group Hezbollah kidnapped several American hostages in Lebanon.

The Iran-Contra Link At this point, the Reagan administration devised an arms-for-hostages deal to secure the release of the Americans held in Lebanon. Specifically, the administration agreed that if Iran convinced Hezbollah to free the hostages, the United States would secretly sell arms to Iran to aid the country in its bloody and protracted war with Iraq. The  plan occasioned intense debate within the administration, with both Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger opposing it. Reagan eventually ­ accepted the plan; although the administration publicly maintained that it would not negotiate with terrorists, the first covert arms shipment to Iran took place in August 1985, and a second occurred 3 months later. In total, the United States shipped more than 1,500 missiles to Iran. Without the knowledge of the president, several other members of the administration, most notably National Security Advisor Admiral John Poindexter and NSC (National Security Council) Staffer Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, developed a plan to divert the profits from the arms sales into a Swiss bank account and use these proceeds to secretly fund the Contras. Of the $30 million that Iran paid for the American-made weapons, $18 million were eventually funneled to support Contra activities.

The Scandal The Reagan administration’s decision to sell arms to Iran was first exposed in November 1986 by a Lebanese newspaper. Following the revelation, Reagan made a televised address denying that the United States had engaged in an arms-for-hostages deal. He later retracted this statement, arguing that the decision to sell arms to Iran was driven by a sincere desire to promote U.S. interests.

537

A subsequent investigation by Attorney General Edwin Meese exposed the covert funding of the Contras. Although North had shredded many of the documents related to the funding scheme, he failed to dispose of the “Diversion Memo,” which outlined the plans in detail. Following the discovery of the incriminating documents, Poindexter resigned and North was dismissed from the NSC. In a press conference, Meese argued that the president and his cabinet had no knowledge of the illegal diversion of funds to the Contras. In the wake of a Congressional and public outcry, in November 1986, Reagan issued an ­ executive order appointing John Tower, a former U.S. Senator from Texas, to head a commission investigating the affair. The Tower Commission concluded that while Reagan and Vice President George H. W. Bush had no direct knowledge of Poindexter and North’s activities, the president’s failure to effectively manage his national security  team created a permissive context for the misbehavior. In May 1987, Congress initiated a hearing on the Iran-Contra Affair. During the 41 days of televised testimony, the president, vice president, and top officials denied any knowledge of the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan paramilitaries. North testified before the committee for 6 consecutive days; in his statements, he was unrepentant, arguing that he was motived by patriotism. Furthermore, he argued that he believed that he was acting in accordance with the president’s wishes. For his part, Poindexter made clear that the ­president had no knowledge of the funding ­diversion; he argued, however, that had he known, Reagan would likely have approved of the plans. Concurrently, Attorney General Meese authorized an independent counsel to investigate possible criminal wrongdoing. Following a multiyear investigation, 14 participants in the affair were indicted for violating federal laws, including the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act. Both North and Poindexter were eventually convicted of conspiracy and obstruction of Congress; an appeals court later overturned their convictions. In December 1992, in the final months of his term, President George H. W. Bush pardoned six Reagan officials who had been tried or were awaiting trial in connection with the Iran-Contra Affair.

538

Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979)

The Aftermath Although the affair temporarily damaged the president’s political standing, it seemed to have had little long-term effect on many of the key participants; when Reagan left office in 1988, he had one of the highest approval ratings of any modern president. Moreover, Vice President Bush won election to the presidency in 1988, after successfully deflecting questions about knowledge of the Iran-Contra Affair during his campaign. North was an unlikely beneficiary of the scandal; his testimony made him a national figure, and in 1994, he raised more than $20 million in his u ­ nsuccessful bid to represent Virginia in the U.S. Senate. Ultimately, the Reagan-era policies toward both Iran and Nicaragua failed to achieve their goals. Although Hezbollah did release three of the American hostages, the group quickly abducted three more Americans to replace them. In addition, despite U.S. support, the Contras failed to dislodge the Sandinistas from power; the socialist government remained in power until 1990, when it lost a general election. Kelly McHugh See also Cold War; Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979)

Further Readings The National Security Archive. The Iran Contra Affair 20 Years On. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/ (Accessed June 2014). PBS: The American Experience. The Iran Contra Affair. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/ features/reagan-iran/ (Accessed June 2014).

Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979) The Iranian hostage crisis began in November 1979 during U.S. president Jimmy Carter’s administration. Iranian students supporting fundamentalist Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who had recently returned to power in Iran) overran the American embassy in Tehran, taking 53 American officials hostage. Lasting throughout the remainder of Carter’s presidency (444 days), all the

hostages were finally released just minutes after Ronald Reagan took the presidential oath. Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had conducted surveillance in Iran since the end of World War II, it failed to predict the crisis even in the face of mounting evidence. To place the crisis in context, this entry briefly explores its origins— as well as key actors and events—within a framework of security and intelligence concerns and issues. Rescue attempts, which produced mixed results, are also described. In 1953, an intensely patriotic Iranian politician named Mohammad Mossadegh decided to oust the young shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and turn Iran into a republic. The United States, perceiving this as a move that would enhance Soviet influence and possibly convert Iran into a communist satellite, used the CIA to arrange a countercoup whereby the shah consolidated his power and removed Mossadegh. The United States thereupon became Iran’s principal supplier of technical, economic, and military aid. By the 1970s, Iran’s military forces, armed and trained by the United States, were the most powerful in the  Middle East. In addition, more than 25,000 Americans were working in Iran, most of them connected in some way to the buildup of the shah’s military forces.

False Sense of Security In late 1977, President Carter saw the monarchy in Iran as an island of stability, a view that had been confirmed and repeated by the CIA’s spies and analysts for 15 years beforehand. “Island of stability” was the phrase the shah used to describe himself. However, a senior CIA officer who travelled to Tehran a few weeks later reached the opposite conclusion. His work was so pessimistic that his superiors suppressed it, since it directly contradicted everything the CIA had said about the shah since the 1950s. The agency had reported nothing to suggest that the shah was in trouble. The CIA, in fact, informed Carter that revolution in Iran was nowhere on the horizon. Weeks later, there were riots in the streets. As they spread, the CIA’s top analysts sent CIA director Stanfield Turner a draft National Intelligence Estimate for his signature. It said that the shah might survive

Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979)

for another 10 years. Or he might not. Turner read it, deemed it useless, and shelved it. A few days later, in February 1979, the popular revolution that pushed the shah out opened the way for the exiled Khomeini’s return to Tehran. Thousands of Americans, including most of the embassy’s staff, were evacuated as the chaos in the streets grew. A secular prime minister still held power alongside a Revolutionary Council, and the CIA tried to influence and mobilize him against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, even sharing highly classified intelligence on Iraq. Few at the CIA believed that an ancient cleric could seize power and proclaim Iran an Islamic republic. However, the CIA underestimated the support Khomeini’s movement had. In March 1979, the CIA’s acting chief of station in Tehran met with a high-ranking officer of SAVAK, the shah’s brutal secret police, who had served the station loyally as an agent and informer. After passing the officer money and false documents to help him flee Tehran, the station chief ran into a cordon of Khomeini’s Revolutionary Guards. Though he escaped, he was beaten brutally by the guards, who shouted, “CIA! CIA!” Many Iranians thought that the CIA was an omnipotent force with immense power over their lives. In fact, in 1979, the CIA station was a fourperson operation, and all were new arrivals with little knowledge about Iran. Five months before, a  rabble of Iranian Marxists had overrun the ­American embassy. The Ayatollah’s followers led a counterattack, threw the communists out, and set the Americans free. Assuming that it would not happen again, the CIA’s Iran branch chief at headquarters had instructed the Tehran station not to worry about another embassy attack. Under intense political pressure from friends of the shah—notably, Henry Kissinger, former U.S. secretary of state—President Carter had decided in October 1979 to admit the exiled monarch to the United States for medical treatment. Two weeks later, a group of Iranian students, all followers of the Ayatollah, seized the American embassy, taking 53 hostages in the process.

Rescue Operations In January 1980, the agency executed an espionage  operation to extract six State Department

539

employees who had managed to find refuge across town at the Canadian embassy. The operation was the brainchild of the CIA’s Tony Mendez, whose specialties were forgery and disguise. As a cover for the mission in Iran, Mendez created Studio Six, a bogus Hollywood film production company, rented office space in Los Angeles, and took out full-page ads in magazines announcing the upcoming filming of Argo, a science-fiction fantasy with location shots in Iran. The script for the movie—and for the operation—included documents and masks for the six Americans. Armed with a portfolio of forged passports and phony publicity, he cleared his entry to Iran with the proper authorities and eventually met with the six State Department staff at the Canadian embassy. Mendez’s Argo operation proved successful, rescuing the staff. A later rescue attempt was made for the remaining hostages but to no avail. The Pentagon’s special operations forces were in charge of Desert One, the April 1980 mission to save the hostages at the American embassy. The effort relied heavily on the CIA, which provided intelligence on the  probable location of the hostages inside the embassy compound. Its pilots flew a small plane undetected into Iran’s desert to test the landing site for the mission. However, the mission ended in catastrophe, with eight commandos dying after a helicopter crashed into a transport plane. All the hostages were finally freed with the consent of their captors at the hour when President Carter left the White House for the last time. Their release had nothing to do with covert action or American intelligence. It was a political statement devised to humiliate the United States. According to a veteran CIA analyst of the Middle East, the taking of the hostages was an act of vengeance for the CIA’s 1953 coup in Iran. Steven J. Campbell See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; Central Intelligence Agency; Iran; Revolutions and Revolts; United States

Further Readings Christopher, Warren. American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.

540

Iraq

Farber, David. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter With Radical Islam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. Harris, David. The Crisis: The President, the Prophet, and the Shah—1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam. New York, NY: Little, Brown, 2004. Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter With Iran. New York, NY: Random House, 1985.

General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, led to the adoption of Ba’athism—a blend of Arab nationalism, socialism, and anti-imperialism—as the dominant political ideology in Iraq. Eventually, in 1979, Saddam Hussein, a key figure from the 1968 coup, became the president of Iraq, a position he would hold until 2003.

State Surveillance

Iraq Since its founding as a modern state after World War I, Iraq has been ruled by a series of governments that have failed to protect the civil and political rights of the country’s citizens. During his decades-long rule, Saddam Hussein made extensive use of his security forces to target dissidents, ethnic minorities, and foreign opponents of the regime. Following the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the removal of Hussein’s government, Iraq has experienced a series of internal conflicts that have undermined its stability. This entry reviews the history of Iraq, discusses state surveillance and military conflicts under Hussein, and concludes with a look at the security situation in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion.

History of Iraq The state of Iraq is located in the Middle East and is bordered by Syria, Jordan, Iran, Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Prior to the end of World War I, Iraq was a part of the Ottoman Empire; ­following its defeat in World War I, the victorious European powers divided up the empire’s territory, with the United Kingdom gaining control over the land that would become Iraq. The new Iraqi state contained a heterogeneous population; although the majority of citizens were Shia Muslims, there was a sizable Sunni Muslim ­ minority, as well as a large Kurdish community. In 1932, the British granted Iraq independence. The country remained a monarchy until 1958, when a group of army officers seized power and declared Iraq a republic. Iraq continued to experience political upheaval, with coups occurring in both 1963 and 1968. The latter coup, led by

Hussein’s time in power saw a massive centralization of state power in the hands of party loyalists. In particular, he created an overlapping set of security and intelligence agencies designed to suppress dissent and ensure the survival of the ruling party. The Ministry of Interior, which housed many of these intelligence agencies, grew to be the largest government ministry in Iraq. All security agencies reported directly to the president, allowing Hussein to exercise almost total control over the security of the state. The primary agency for domestic surveillance was the Directorate of General Security (DGS), commonly referred to as the secret police or Internal State Security. Hussein appointed Ali Hassan al-Majid to run the organization, and al-Majid transformed the DGS into a feared political force widely known for terror, kidnappings, rape, and murder. At the agency’s height, it employed an estimated 10,000 Iraqis and had broad powers to detain and interrogate Iraqi citizens and also target foreigners. In addition to expanding the DGS, Hussein created the Special Security Organization, an intensely loyal group of officers tasked with preserving the  regime’s stability and providing personal protection to the president and his family. The ­ 5,500  members of this organization primarily engaged in surveillance of other regime officials suspected of disloyalty to Hussein. During Hussein’s presidency, the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) played a central role in both domestic and foreign intelligence operations. In  1983, the General Intelligence Department of the IIS was responsible for the Dujial Massacre, a reprisal operation against Iraqi Shia civilians following a failed assassination attempt against Hussein. IIS agents identified and arrested 143 citizens suspected of plotting the assassination;

Iraq

many of them were later executed. The IIS was also responsible for the unsuccessful 1993 assassination attempt on former U.S. president George H. W. Bush while he was visiting neighboring Kuwait. The United States retaliated for this action in June 1993, launching missiles at the headquarters of the IIS. The Iraqi Republican Guards (IRG), a special paramilitary division of the Iraqi army, also participated in foreign intelligence operations. Created in 1964, the IRG consisted of more than 75,000 highly trained soldiers and were active in all major conflicts under Hussein’s Iraq, including the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the First Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), and the Second Persian Gulf War (2003). The IRG also played a major role in putting down the attempted uprising by Shia and Kurdish citizens following Iraq’s defeat in the First Persian Gulf War. At this time, IRG members carried out massacres against these ethnic minorities, killing more than 25,000 civilians.

Military Conflicts Although much of the Iraqi security apparatus was focused on targeting internal enemies, the country did engage in several major military conflicts during Hussein’s rule. The first, the Iran-Iraq war, began in 1980, when Iraq launched an invasion of neighboring Iran, hoping to prevent the country from exporting its Islamic revolution. Iraq, with a better-trained and better-equipped army, was ­initially successful in seizing Iranian territory; Iran, however, quickly mobilized its domestic p ­ opulation and was able to repel the offensive. The war, which finally ended in a stalemate in 1988, resulted in an estimated 1 million fatalities; moreover, the financial costs of the conflict contributed significantly to a weakening of the Iraq state. In 1990, Iraq again invaded a neighboring country, this time the small oil-rich state of Kuwait. Hussein, saddled with debts from the war with Iran, sought to gain control of oil fields in that country and also revive his popularity with a wave of nationalist sentiment. The attempt backfired, as the United States assembled a multinational coalition of forces that rapidly succeeded in pushing Iraq out of Kuwait. The war starkly demonstrated the weakness of the onceformidable Iraqi army; during the conflict,

541

coalition forces destroyed much of Iraq’s advanced weapons, and thousands of soldiers deserted the army.

The 2003 Invasion of Iraq and Aftermath Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the administration of U.S. president George W. Bush turned its focus to undemocratic states that were suspected of supporting international terrorism. Iraq became the test case for a new foreign policy doctrine, based on the idea that preemptive war against dictators would not only prevent future security threats but also offer the opportunity to foster democratic governments in the Middle East. In March 2003, the United States led a coalition of countries in an invasion of Iraq. The Iraq Army collapsed within weeks, and Hussein fled the capital and went into hiding. Following the fall of the government, the ­Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S.established transitional government, moved quickly to purge all vestiges of Hussein’s lingering influence from Iraq. The CPA’s first decree ordered that all civil servants, educators, and medical professionals affiliated with the Iraqi Ba’ath Party be removed from their jobs in the government and also be banned from holding a position in the new government. The CPA’s second order disbanded the Iraq army, which the United States believed to be loyal to Hussein. Together, these orders had the effect of creating a security and governance vacuum in Iraq, and in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, looters and vandals did $12 billion in damage to the capital city, in addition to destroying 17 of the 23 government ministry buildings. The United States struggled to provide adequate security in post-Hussein Iraq, and by 2004, an organized insurgency emerged, with former Ba’athists targeting Coalition forces, as well as Shia suspected of collaborating with the United States. In response, Shia militias emerged to fight the Sunni insurgents. Compounding the chaos, several international terrorist groups began operating inside Iraq’s borders. By 2006, the conflict had escalated into a civil war; in February of that year, foreign militants blew up the golden dome of

542

Israel

the Ali al-Hadi Mosque, a major Shia holy site, triggering an outburst of sectarian violence. In an attempt to reverse the deteriorating security situation, in January 2007, Bush announced that the United States would pursue a new counterinsurgency strategy; this entailed sending more U.S. soldiers to Iraq and focusing on population security. The approach yielded results, as violence in Iraq dropped significantly in the following years, allowing the United States to complete a full withdrawal by 2011. Although Iraq has held several elections since 2003, the country’s political leaders have struggled to provide stability and transparency. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who held office from 2006 to 2014, was dogged with accusations of corruption, with Sunni officials accusing him of favoring the Shia population and widening the sectarian divide. The ongoing civil war in neighboring Syria has also undermined Iraq’s security. In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a jihadist group that splintered from al Qaeda, launched a major offensive and gained control of several major cities in northern Iraq. Although a combination of Iraqi Army offensives and U.S. airstrikes have reversed some of these territorial gains, Iraq’s internal stability remains precarious. Kelly McHugh and Mordechai Wellish See also Arab Spring; Dictators and Dictatorships; Iran; War on Terror

Further Readings Hashim, Ahmed S. “Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq.” Middle East Policy, v.10/4 (2003). Makiya, Kanan. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998. Pfiffner, James P. “U.S. Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army.” Intelligence and National Security, v.25/1 (2010).

Israel Israel is a small, contemporary country located at the center of three continents: Europe, Asia, and

Africa. It retains prominence on the world stage due to its historical significance and association with modern conflict. The land is sacred for three major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, with a significant number of holy sites scattered throughout the country. Major archeological sites exist in Israel, such as the Western Wall and Masada, as well as one of the most famous rivers in the world (the Jordan River) and the body of water at the lowest point on Earth and with the highest salt content (the Dead Sea). Since its inception in 1948, Israel has fought numerous wars, faced intifadas and terrorist attacks, and has been the subject of intense international and diplomatic negotiations. Having experienced pervasive threats of terrorism as well as the sustained trauma from the reality of terrorism, Israel has come to rely on a variety of defense strategies to ensure its national security. After reviewing the origins of Israel’s statehood, this entry discusses some of the challenges faced by contemporary Israel and the various procedures it employs in the name of national security.

Origins Israel declared independence on May 14, 1948, following a historical process that spanned centuries. Although Israel’s statehood followed shortly on the heels of World War II and the Holocaust, it actually marked the culmination of more than half a century of Zionism. Political activist and writer Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) advocated for decades for the creation of a nation-state for the Jewish people in Israel, as a result of the growing Jewish population in Israel and the widespread European anti-Semitism around the turn of the 20th century. In 1917, Great Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, supporting the creation of a national homeland for Jews. For Jews in the land of Israel during the ­Holocaust and World War II, the defeat of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany and the survival of European Jews became a paramount concern. ­ Jews were smuggled into the land of Israel despite harsh British restrictions on immigration and severe punishments for violating these mandates. Jewish organizations in the land of Israel sought a political resolution but an agreement could not be reached.

Israel

Following the end of World War II in 1945, the insurgence of the Jews, combined with domestic complications, caused the British to invite the United Nations to determine the fate of the territory. The United Nations voted to convert the area into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab, with an international zone in Jerusalem. Jewish leaders agreed to the partition but Palestinian Arabs rejected the plan and a Jewish state. Many countries, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, recognized the newly formed state of Israel. However, the majority of the Middle East refused to acknowledge not only the statehood of Israel but its right to exist. An appeal for peace in the region was openly stated in ­Israel’s Declaration of Independence, but it was not to be realized at that time. Israel declared itself to be a Jewish state and a democracy. To say it is a Jewish state says more about national than religious identity, as many powerful and political figures were not major religious leaders. Israel does observe Jewish holidays and grants power to the religious around issues of marriage and death; however, a governmental balance of power prevents religion from gaining too much control and thereby preserves a secular society. Israel adopted a parliamentary form of democracy. Its governmental seat is the Knesset, which is the legislative body of Israel (equivalent to the Congress of the United States). A unique feature of the Israeli election process is that a citizen votes for a political party rather than a candidate, resulting in an emphasis on the party platform over the person. The government itself is secular, though certain parties are predominantly religious and advocate religious issues in their party platform. The government comprises numerous ­ parties, which evolve, disband, and/or form over time, with no single party large enough to assume control of the legislature. The political party that achieves a majority must create a coalition, pulling together a number of political parties to form a cohesive government. At the time the State of Israel was officially declared on May 14, 1948, the Israel Defense Force combined all of the militias providing military activity into one unified army. Shortly thereafter, the countries along Israel’s borders invaded, boldly predicting that they would propel the Jews into the

543

sea. Many did not expect that the fledging country could withstand the established armies of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan in a ­sustained and simultaneous attack, but Israel p ­ revailed, although it sustained heavy casualties. Despite the wartime loss of 1% of the population, Israel demonstrated its statehood and military might. In March 1949, Israel was admitted to the United Nations, while its neighboring Arab states did not establish a new state or recognize the borders of Israel.

Challenges Although national defense was a major concern,  the newly formed State of Israel needed to establish a government, grow an economy, and assimilate countless immigrants. Within 18 months of statehood, the number of immigrants almost exceeded the size of the former population, and the country doubled in size within 5 years. Hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors found refuge in Israel and brought with them their unique history of having been severely traumatized. However, Holocaust survivors were not the only immigrants to flee harrowing circumstances. Many of the Jews who immigrated to Israel arrived with traumatic histories and an impoverished financial state. The rate of immigration was unprecedented for a newly formed nation-state, but Israel welcomed wave after wave of newcomers, making good on the promise that every Jew has a right to immigrate to Israel. Israel faced additional challenges, such as lack of natural resources, difficult terrain, and a marked lack of water, not to mention constant threats of attack and terrorism. Israel was up against not just bordering countries that refused to build relations or allow means of transport but also countries that threatened reprisals against countries that cooperated with Israel. Israel set its sights on developing water technology, along with agricultural, computer, medical, and scientific technology, and achieved extraordinary success in these fields.

National Security As a result of ongoing terrorist attacks, Israel relies on a variety of defense strategies. All Israeli

544

Israel

citizens, with a few exceptions, are mandated into military service, which results in a common experience as well as a shared investment in the strength and protection of their country. When the military alone proved ineffective in protecting its citizens from neighboring terrorists, a security fence was constructed in 2002. The fence has been controversial, with some international criticism, but the fence achieved its primary goal of reducing violence against Israeli civilians. In just 1 month during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Israel sustained more than 4,000 rocket attacks. The country experienced physical and economic damage, and morale deteriorated. In response to the sustained rocket assaults, specifically against noncombatants, Israel developed the Iron Dome. The Iron Dome, designed to intercept rockets and missiles, minimized the rocket attacks against noncombatants, which emanated primarily from the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist organizations. The Iron Dome identifies the potential impact of incoming rockets, intercepting those intended for populated areas while ignoring those falling in open areas or at sea. The Iron Dome became operational in April 2011. Within the first year, 93 missiles were successfully intercepted. During Operation Pillar of Defense, the terrorist group Hamas fired 1,506 rockets at Israel from November 14 to 21, 2012. Of those 1,506 rockets, 421 were stopped, resulting in a success rate of 84%. Of the rockets that  penetrated the defense system, 58 rockets caused damage, killing 5 and injuring 240 Israeli citizens. The selection of the Iron Dome was not without critics, as other defense options existed. Protection and resilience proved more pivotal in the decision on national security, despite the cost and technical limitations of the Iron Dome. Israel does not rely on this one safety measure, however, employing a layered defense system that includes early warning sirens, extensive bomb shelters, and  fortified buildings. Israel also emphasizes the  management of acute stress reactions as a critical part of comprehensive care and national resilience. In the face of frequent terrorist-related mass casualty events, Israel has developed sophisticated emergency preparedness protocols, which influence emergency management techniques around

the world. Israel adopted an all-hazards approach that emphasizes core elements such as contingency planning, extensive training, mobilization of material and human resources, coordinated command, and capacity building. There have been a number of significant attempts at a peace accord between Israel and Arab countries, such as the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the Oslo Accord, and the Camp David Peace Talks. Israel has consistently negotiated in good faith and honored its promises, including giving land in exchange for peace. However, there is considerable political disagreement within Israel about the likelihood that such efforts will produce real and lasting peace or if such negotiations ultimately place Israel in positions of greater vulnerability. Israel increasingly seems of one mind that there is not a true partner for peace in the region and feels compelled to focus  on national security and counterterrorism measures. Nancy Zarse and Marcia Baruch See also Camp David Accords; Hamas; Nazism; Surveillance During World War I and World War II

Further Readings Adelman, J. (2008). The Rise of Israel: A History of a Revolutionary State. London, England: Routledge. Adini, B. and K. Peleg. “On Constant Alert: Lessons to Be Learned From Israel’s Emergency Response to Mass-Casualty Terrorism Incidents.” Health Affairs, v.32/12 (2013). Gilbert, M. The Story of Israel. London, England: Andre Deutsch, 2011. Grotverg, E. H. “From Terror to Triumph: The Path to Resilience.” In C. E. Stout (ed.), Psychology of Terrorism: Coping With the Continuing Threat (Condensed ed.). Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. Hobfoll, S. E., et al. “Trajectories of Resilience, Resistance, and Distress During Ongoing Terrorism: The Case of Jews and Arabs in Israel.” Journal of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, v.77/1 (2009). Rubin, B. Israel: An Introduction. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012. Shapir, Y. “Lessons From the Iron Dome.” Military and Strategic Affairs, v.5/1 (2013). Shitrit, L. “Israel.” In E. Lust (ed.), The Middle East. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014.

Italy

Italy Compared with other European countries, Italy arrived late to the formalization of a normative framework for the protection of personal data, as mandated by the European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 1981 and Directive 95/46/CE of the European Parliament on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. However, it serves as an ­exemplar for how such mandates can be legislated to protect the privacy and security of citizens in the digital environment. This entry offers a ­summary of Italy’s data protection legislation that was in place as of July 31, 2014. After an overview of the main acts and the key principles ­contained in them, the contribution will focus on biometrics and video surveillance, detailing what the rules, limitations, and safeguards in place are in each case.

General Overview In 1996, Italy passed law 675/1996, an act that served as the transposition into Italian legislation of the European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 1981 and Directive 95/46/CE of the European Parliament. This act also established the Autorità Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, the Italian Data Protection Authority. In an attempt to simplify the rules in place while strengthening the protection afforded to individuals, in 2003, Legislative Decree 196 (Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali, Data Protection Code) replaced law 675/1996; taken together, they contain the guiding principles that inform all Italian privacy laws. Essentially, these two bills introduced three notions: first, that control over one’s personal data rests with the individual concerned (defined in legislation as the data subject); second, that personal data must be protected; and finally, that the processing must always respect the principles of lawfulness, minimization, proportionality, and purpose specification. Data subjects have the right to know who stores information on them, who

545

has access to it, and why. They can ask for its update, rectification, or erasure; on legitimate grounds, they can also object to their data being collected in the first place. A very important distinction is also made in relation to the nature—be it public or private—of the data controller, as only public bodies can process personal data if this falls within their institutional tasks. Private entities, on the other hand, always need the explicit consent of the data subject, unless the processing itself is instrumental to the satisfaction of a legal obligation on the part of the controller or to the resolution of a contract between the parties. If data are being processed by the police for reasons of public order or security, the previously mentioned rights do not hold, with the data processing being regulated by an annex to the code issued by the Ministry of Interior. In much the same way, data collected and processed for purposes related to scientific, historical, or statistical research and news reporting are the objects of specific codes of conduct, also annexed to the code.

Biometrics While covered by the Data Protection Code of 2003, legislation specifically pertaining to the regulation and use of biometric data was the object of public consultation in Italy. To increase the level of protection afforded to citizens in relation to the use of biometrics, the national Data Protection Authority issued guidelines in late 2014 that make it possible for interested parties— be they private or public bodies—to implement biometrics-based systems without the need for prior authorization, as long as the limitations stated in the document are respected. As for legislation on personal data, it must be noted that the use of biometrics for public security, justice, and scientific research would not be covered by the present guidelines. Among the possible uses envisaged for biometrics are access control to restricted areas, the activation of electronic devices, and access to premises, though in this last case the explicit consent of users would be required, along with the possibility to opt out in favor of nonbiometric technologies for those who should wish to do so. The general principles that biometric systems will have to respect are those already mentioned

546

Italy

in the 2003 Data Protection Code, namely, lawfulness, data minimization, proportionality, and purpose specification. Additionally, the guidelines are explicit in considering the potential of biometric data for discrimination and surveillance, particularly in light of the possibility of the interoperability of different databases and in the capacity of biometric data to reveal information about the ethnicity or health of an individual. Attention is also dedicated to the risk posed by mobile-based biometric technologies, where the possibility of losing one’s device or having it stolen poses additional risks to the safety of the system and to the protection of individual rights.

and to put up surveillance cameras throughout cities to this end, the data retention period of footage is extended from 24 hours to up to 7 days. Appropriate signage must be used to mark the presence of cameras. Security measures are also tightened, with the introduction of personal credentials for each of the operators managing a system suggested as a way to decrease the risk of loss or destruction of data and unauthorized access to the premises. The same provision dictates that “smart” CCTV systems that allow for the automatic detection of deviant behavior or are coupled with technology that can collect and read biometric data must be checked by the Garante before its implementation. Francesca Menichelli

Closed-Circuit Television The regulation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) rests on the latest general provision of video surveillance, issued by the Italian Data Protection Authority on April 2010. The general principles that all CCTV systems must respect remain unchanged from previous legislation: (a) lawfulness, (b) data minimization, (c) proportionality, and (d) purpose specification. In light of the new attributions to municipal authorities with regard to policing and the provision of security in cities, which allow cities to coparticipate along with national police forces in the provision of order

See also Biometrics; Closed-Circuit Television; Privacy

Further Readings Italian Data Protection Authority. Personal Data Protection Code (English version), 2003. http://194.242.234.211/documents/10160/2012405/ DataProtectionCode-2003.pdf (Accessed July 2014). Italian Data Protection Authority. Video Surveillance (English version), 2010. http://www.garanteprivacy.it/ web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/ docweb/1734653 (Accessed July 2014).

J kidnapped, molested, and murdered by a stranger in 1989 while returning home from a local store with his brother and friend, neither of whom were harmed. On September 1, 2016, his remains, confirmed via dental records, were unearthed by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) in Paynesville, Minnesota. Jacob’s kidnapper, molester, and murderer was eventually revealed to be Danny James Heinrich, who had kidnapped and molested another young boy, Jared Scheierl, during the same year (1989). Although originally questioned in 1989 in Jacob’s disappearance, a lack of conclusive evidence prevented Heinrich from being charged. In 2015, Heinrich’s DNA was matched to DNA taken during the Scheierl case, and his house was raided. The raid resulted in Heinrich’s arrest for the murder as well as 25 charges of child pornography. Heinrich agreed to a plea deal, in which he pleaded guilty to one child pornography charge, testified about what he did to Wetterling, and led authorities to the location of the body in exchange for being sentenced to only one of the pornography charges and not being charged with Wetterling’s murder. The unresolved nature of this case at the time highlighted the need for some way to track sex offenders, as the existence of such a system could have possibly resulted in a more timely capture and prosecution of Heinrich.

Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, known more commonly as the Wetterling Act, is a federal mandate that requires each state to establish registries that track released offenders found guilty of crimes against children and sexually violent offenses. These registries were created through the process of annually obtaining verified addresses of all such offenders for a period of 10 years after their release. In addition, the addresses of those considered to be sexually violent predators are required to be reported on a quarterly basis for the rest of their lives. Although the Wetterling Act is legally optional for states to participate, it is enforced by the federal government through the risk of reduced federal funding to states that do not comply. Passed on November 20, 1993, by the 103rd U.S. Congress, the Wetterling Act was enacted as a part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Individual states were given time until September 1997 to become compliant with the Wetterling Act, with 2-year extensions for states exhibiting good faith efforts to achieve compliance.

Evolution of the Act

The Jacob Wetterling Case

As of 2017, the Wetterling Act has been amended three times. These include Megan’s Law in 1996, the Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and

The Wetterling Act is named in memory of Jacob Wetterling of St. Joseph, Minnesota, who was 547

548

Jennicam

Identification Act in 1996, and Section 115 of the General Provisions of Title 1 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act in 1998. The first, and most popular of these amendments, Megan’s Law, was passed in 1996 and required that states release information deemed relevant as necessary to protect the public. In addition, it also gave states a certain amount of discretion in deciding what to consider relevant and by what means they wished to disseminate this information. As a result, many states, in the name of public safety and transparency, began to release information on local sexually violent offenders and perpetrators of crimes against children. Thus, Megan’s Law is primarily responsible for the dissemination to the public of registry information of child offenders and sexually violent offenders. The Pam Lyncher Act, also passed in 1996, required a national database of sexual offenders and added lifetime registration requirements for offenders convicted of an aggravated sex offense or multiple offenses. The 1998 Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act amendments granted states leniency on procedures used to track offenders and added requirements that stated that offenders must register not only in their home state but also in any other state where they work or attend school. The 1998 amendments also required that states participate in the National Sex Offender Registry, which was established as a result of the Pam Lyncher Act.

Controversies Surrounding the Wetterling Act Although the Wetterling Act and subsequent amendments were readily adopted by states and considered an important piece of legislature in the curtailment of sexual offenses and the advancement of public safety, some components of the bill have sparked controversy among human rights activists. Of primary concern, the focal intent of the Wetterling Act has raised ethical questions, as it requires the deliberate tracking of individuals who have already served out their sentence. For instance, while some argue that public notification of released offenders’ criminal histories assists in

preventing future sexual violence or victimization of children, others have suggested that this stigmatization of sex offenders further ostracizes offenders, making it harder for them to reintegrate into their communities after incarceration. The moral and ethical dilemma of the Wetterling Act regarding the dissemination of this information is just one controversy still being debated and remains a disputed topic in criminal justice policy. Another major concern is that some of the offenders who are required to register may not pose any threat to the community, as the Wetterling Act requires everybody who commits any crime against a minor to register, including other minors. This “net-widening” effect can have unintended consequences because it includes crimes such as statutory rape, sexting, and fights between multiple minors. For obvious reasons, individuals not exhibiting sexually violent behavior or serious crimes against children yet nonetheless being mandated to register could significantly stunt the progression and reintegration into society of these past offenders. Brandon Dulisse and Megan Travers See also Megan’s Law

Website Office of Justice Programs, Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking: https://www.smart.gov/legislation.htm (Accessed August 2017).

Jennicam Jennicam was a website created in 1996 by 19-year-old college student Jennifer Kaye Ringley. Started as a “programming challenge” for the computer-savvy Ringley, she installed a webcam in her dorm room at Dickinson College and designed a webpage she called Jennicam.org, where the black-and-white images from the camera, refreshed every 3 minutes, were uploaded. Anyone with Internet access could observe the mostly mundane goings-on of the young woman’s daily life. Until Jennicam.org, live webcams had only transmitted still photos of mostly outdoor scenes. After her friends found out about the site, word spread

Jennicam

quickly and the webpage became increasingly popular and developed a cult following. At first, Ringley turned off the camera at certain times, but eventually she did not censor the broadcast and viewers were able to watch Ringley undressing, doing a striptease, and engaging in sexual activity. Jennicam was one of the first websites that ­continuously and voluntarily broadcast a person’s life, blurring the lines between the private and the public and ushering in new forms of voyeurism, exhibitionism, and surveillance as a key theme in popular culture. This entry reviews the groundbreaking actions Ringley took in becoming an Internet “celebrity,” examines how the entertainment industry capitalized on people’s desire for voyeuristic entertainment, and looks at how the Internet and social media enable individuals to pursue celebrity status. After graduating from college and relocating to Washington, DC, in 1998, Ringley added three more webcams in her apartment, including one in the bedroom and one in the living room. The webcams operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and uploaded 2-minute-long segments. At this point, in addition to maintaining limited free access to “Guest” visitors to her site, Ringley began charging “Members” $15 per month through PayPal for “premium” access to more frequent image uploads. She also added more pages to her website, including the “JenniSHOW,” a biweekly videotaped episode featuring Ringley speaking on various topics; “Jennicam Co-Stars” with her pets, which include three cats, two ferrets, and a hedgehog; “Jennicam Gallery,” a collection of ­ viewer-favorite Jennicam pictures; and an online journal, where she reflected on her life, romances, and her treatment by viewers. At its peak, Jennicam.org, which was online for 7 years and 8 months, was receiving 3 million to 4 million hits a day. As her popularity grew, Ringley received considerable attention. More than 100 media outlets did stories and interviews with her, including The Wall Street Journal, and she appeared as a guest on The Late Show with David Letterman, The Today Show, and World News Tonight with Peter Jennings. Ringley was dubbed the first “life caster” and “eWebrity,” and even a “conceptual artist,” and in 2007, PC World magazine claimed Jennicam.org was one of the 16 Greatest

549

Moments in Web History. Fans created news groups to follow her life and discuss her activities. Academicians began to write about her, with some considering Ringley’s groundbreaking venture in self-exposure a complex dialectic between subject and object and even considered her a new form of  gendered cyborg. She was also the target of critics—from conservatives and ­ ­ feminists—for exploiting her own body. Early on, the site was hacked and she received death threats, prompting her to reduce her public exposure by concealing her address and phone number. Throughout her exploits, Ringley defended her project, stating that it was not about pornography. In a frequently asked questions section on her webpage, she posted, You’re naked sometimes, is this pornography? Pornography is in the eye of the beholder. Myself, I do not think this constitutes pornography. Most often, pornography is defined as something explicit which is made with the clear intention of arousing the viewer. Yes, my site contains nudity from time to time. Real life contains nudity. Yes, it contains sexual material from time to time. Real life contains sexual material. However, this is not a site about nudity and sexual material. It is a site about real life.

In an interview with CNN, Ringley told a reporter that her website was an attempt to demonstrate that even average people are worth watching and learning from, too. “I’m trying to prove the point,” Ringley said, “that no matter what you look like, you’re still just as interesting as people on the TV or in the magazines.” Citing PayPal’s antinudity policy, Ringley shut her site down on December 31, 2003. But Ringley and her Jennicam had started something. Hollywood was quick to pick up on the theme of entertainment voyeurism and playful surveillance with films such as The Truman Show (1998) and EDtv (1999) in which central characters have their lives broadcast. The television show Big Brother (first broadcast in 1999 in the Netherlands) launched the reality-TV genre by ­ broadcasting private behavior to mainstream audiences, where, as David Bell suggests, the ­“logics, aesthetics and cultural understandings of

550

Jennicam

reality shows like Big Brother are intimately enmeshed in the culture of surveillance.” Ever since Ringley became an eWebrity, hundreds of “personal” websites touting “true” and “real” amateur exhibitionists have appeared that reverse key ideas of surveillance (“the few watching the many”) and demonstrate the phenomenon of sousveillance (“the many watching the few”). The sites range from noncommercial webpages run by people who participate in subcultures of exhibitionism to high-trafficked, profit-making portals that bring together hundreds of “cam girls” who are wannabe actors, strippers, and porn industry “stars” who will cavort, strip, and perform sexual acts for the audience for payment. Today, millions of people use social media, video-sharing sites, and other new media formats to promote themselves and hope that their popularity measured by the number of views and hits they generate will turn them into must-follow personalities. This activity demonstrates how the Internet has facilitated what

Charles Derber calls “the pursuit of attention” and “the democratization of celebrity.” William G. Staples See also Internet Pornography; Voyeurism, Digital; Women, Girls, and the Body

Further Readings Allen, Jamie. “‘Ed’ of the Internet: JenniCAM Going Strong After Three Years.” CNN.com (n.d.). http:// www.cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/Movies/9903/26/jennicam (Accessed December 2014). Bell, David. “Surveillance Is Sexy.” Surveillance & Society, v.6/3 (2009). (Accessed December 2014). Derber, Charles. The Pursuit of Attention: Power and Ego in Everyday Life. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000. Ringley, Jennifer. “JENNICAM: Frequently Asked Questions” (1999). http://archive.is/HzL80 (Accessed July 2017).

K courts, he began working in the insurance industry, taking a position with the state-run Workers’ Accident Insurance Company in 1908. There he not only evaluated claims and did statistical work but also visited factories and industrial plants to observe their conditions and safety provisions. In his spare time, he wrote short stories and worked on several novels, including The Trial, which he had completed by 1915 but did not publish. He also studied religion, becoming particularly interested in Judaism and, later in life, Christian philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard. His physical and psychological health deteriorated over the course of the 1910s, during which he routinely contemplated suicide, broke off two engagements with a fiancée, and contracted tuberculosis. In 1922, he took early retirement from the insurance agency and spent time at sanatoria in Berlin and Vienna before his death from tuberculosis in 1924. Kafka published little during his lifetime, though he was not completely unheralded. Shortly after his death, publication of his major works began, first with The Trial in 1925, and followed by English translations in the 1930s. Since then, Kafka has become a magnet for literary and scholarly commentary, and the themes he explored in his works have become instrumental to many analyses of 20th-century social, political, philosophical, and moral questions. Of particular interest is his focus on the organizing power of institutions. Kafka’s works are filled with individuals who respect the requests of authority figures, even to bizarre and selfdestructive ends. This is true both of official state institutions and of less formal social structures,

Kafka, Franz Franz Kafka (1883–1924) is considered one of the most important German-language writers of the 20th century. He is best known for Der Prozess (The Trial), Das Schloss (The Castle), “Die Verwandlung” (“The Transformation,” or “The Metamorphosis”), and “In der Strafkolonie” (“In the Penal Colony”). His body of work is slim—three posthumous novels and several volumes of short stories constitute the bulk of it, most of which were published after his death. Yet his tales of labyrinthine bureaucratic and legal systems, which make secret judgments on ordinary citizens via secret proceedings and based on secret laws, have remained potent metaphors, particularly in legal and public policy discussions, including recent debate about government surveillance. This entry briefly reviews Kafka’s education, early career, and time of writing. Kafka’s works are then examined, with a discussion of how themes in his writings reflect an often unquestioned and overreaching power by government and organizations. The entry concludes with a look at how Kafka’s writings have led to a term that is used frequently when discussing complex bureaucracy and institutions that have become too powerful or out of control. Kafka was born in Prague to a middle-class Jewish family, though he did not have a strong religious upbringing. He enrolled in a German university in Prague and studied law there, receiving his doctorate in 1906. After a year as a law clerk for the kingdom of Bohemia civil and criminal 551

552

Kafka, Franz

such as employment and the family. In “The Judgment,” a son who has incurred the wrath of his father is ordered to drown himself, and, wracked with remorse, he willingly throws himself off a bridge; in “The Transformation,” a man who has inexplicably turned into an insect frets over missing his train to work and is tracked down and scolded by a supervisor. Fears of official censure or loss of social status—often patently unreasonable ones—pervade the inner lives of Kafka’s characters. In these works, social institutions and arrangements are sources of oppression and neurosis, predicated on the acquiescence, or even approval, of the general public. Bureaucracy, as a species of institution, is omnipresent in Kafka’s work. Kafka lived through a period in which rational control, as famously theorized by Max Weber, was being increasingly employed in business and government, and most of his novels and stories concern middle managers and organization men, roles not unlike the one he played as an insurance bureaucrat in his own life. His longer works, such as The Castle and The Trial, explore the perils of bureaucratic proliferation most fully, depicting them as ineffectual morasses of regulation and procedure, to the point where their decisions appear illogical both to outsiders and to their own workers. In The Castle, a surveyor is summoned to a village ostensibly because his skills are needed, but he can find no official with whom to secure his appointment. He initially expresses faith in just treatment by government agencies, but when he finally speaks with a manager, he is told that he was sent for as a result of a bureaucratic error. Moreover, the governing body is convinced of the perfection of its own system, which makes it much harder to fix the mistake. Mountains of paperwork are generated by even the slightest inquiries, making resolution a dispiritingly protracted process, and long-outstanding concerns are suddenly settled by distant, impersonal offices and committees. The main characters in Kafka’s works navigate a frustratingly opaque chain of command, shuffling from faceless agency to faceless agency, desperately seeking an outcome they cannot see is futile. Kafka’s most celebrated novel, The Trial, pursues these themes in the specific context of legal proceedings. In The Trial, Josef K. is arrested, but

is not told why—those sent to arrest him do not even know. He is not confined, but merely informed of his status, and told to come to an interrogation in an obscure place, where a private inquiry is held, the terms of which he is not informed in advance. He soon finds himself embroiled in a legal system where the guilt of the accused is assumed, the charge is held secret, no records are publicly accessible, the rules of the proceedings are never revealed, and the authority figures are veiled from public scrutiny. Indeed, no actual trial ever occurs in The Trial; Josef K. merely strategizes with lawyers and low-level officials endlessly without progress. He is chastised by administrators, community members, and his family for not taking the case seriously enough and for flouting undisclosed conventions. A year after his initial arrest, officials come to execute him, and he freely submits to the punishment. In The Trial, Josef K. receives a death sentence for an infraction whose contours are never revealed; perhaps most troubling is the possibility that there never was an infraction in the first place, and the entire endeavor was utterly arbitrary. This motif of punishment grossly out of proportion to the crime is a recurrent one in Kafka’s output. Minor infelicities incur severe official retributions without any prior notice of what was expected or required, and the concept of due process is totally absent. In “The Knock at the Manor Gate,” a man is imprisoned merely for the titular offense, and in “In the Penal Colony,” a colonial soldier who fell asleep and failed to carry out an inconsequential nighttime duty is sentenced to torture and death. But even in works where there is no official punishment, the mere accusation itself suffices as condemnation, and the proceedings prove to be meaningless, even as they consume the lives of those indicted. Those who protest see the twisting of their evidential rhetoric, so that their supporters become convinced that they are guilty; even the assertion of one’s innocence is derided as a tactic that every criminal uses. Kafka’s nightmarish portrayals of institutions out of control have been vividly recast in many public debates in the century since The Trial was completed. The word Kafkaesque has even been coined to describe impenetrable and needlessly complex bureaucratic or legal regimes that offer

Katz v. United States (1967)

victims no route to resolution. Kafka is often set in comparison with George Orwell as offering alternate, but in some ways complementary, dystopian visions of how powerful agencies can come to exert control over citizens. For instance, in privacy and surveillance studies, Daniel Solove has argued that the commonly used Orwellian “big brother” metaphor of government monitoring and control ought to be melded with the Kafkaesque, to better explain the potential harms of recordkeeping and information processing. For Solove, Kafka’s allegory better captures the fears and ­inhibitions felt by members of a society in which personal data are constantly stored and aggregated in massive databases and in which major decisions regarding, say, credit, insurance, or employment are made according to nontransparent, incontestable rules and algorithms. Especially in the United States, references to the Kafkaesque appear frequently in analyses of the criminal justice system, and Kafka has been employed to deride bureaucratic and administrative absurdity in hundreds of legal decisions. Among other occurrences, the McCarthy antiCommunist hearings of the 1950s, the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay in the years following the September 11 attacks, the ­“no-fly list” of prohibited airline travelers, and the secret courts overseeing the surveillance requests of the National Security Agency have all been criticized as Kafkaesque. Chris Hubbles See also Orwell, George; Policing and Society; Punishment and Society

Further Readings Kafka, Franz. The Metamorphosis, In the Penal Colony, and Other Stories (trans. Joachim Neugroschel). New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1993. Kafka, Franz. The Castle (trans. Mark Harman). New York, NY: Schocken, 1998. Kafka, Franz. The Trial (trans. Richard Stokes). London, England: Hesperus Press, 2003. Robertson, Ritchie. Kafka: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2004. Solove, Daniel. The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Digital Age. New York: New York University Press, 2004.

553

Katz v. United States (1967) Over the past century, wiretapping and electronic surveillance have emerged as popular investigative practices among law enforcement agencies in many parts of the world. These investigative practices are governed to some extent, in the United States, by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment regulates the ability of government agents to conduct searches or seizures of citizens’ persons, houses, papers, or effects. It explicitly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires government agents to obtain warrants, based on probable cause, for all searches or seizures that would otherwise be considered “unreasonable.” The U.S. Supreme Court has held that searches, for Fourth Amendment purposes, may be physical or electronic in nature. In a decision from 1967, Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the use of an electronic listening device attached to the exterior of a public phone booth, without a warrant, violated individual privacy rights granted by the Fourth Amendment. The remainder of this entry discusses the test utilized in the majority opinion that has since become a benchmark in Fourth Amendment decisions. The entry also provides a history of Katz v. United States and overviews of previous Supreme Court rulings related to privacy rights and the Fourth Amendment. Justice John Marshall Harlan II, in his concurring opinion, elaborated what has become known as the “reasonable expectations of privacy test.” The test announced by Justice Harlan requires that, for a warrantless search to be unreasonable (and thus violate the Fourth Amendment), the person subject to the search must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and that such an expectation must also “be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Although not part of the majority opinion in Katz (and thus not binding as precedent in later cases), Justice Harlan’s two-pronged test was later adopted by the Supreme Court as the mechanism to determine whether any particular government-initiated search or seizure was unreasonable. The Katz decision overruled the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Olmstead v. United States (1928) and has remained the Court’s predominant test for reasonableness ever since.

554

Katz v. United States (1967)

In Katz, the defendant, Charles Katz, was convicted of using a public pay phone to make illegal gambling bets and wagers. Part of the government’s case relied on evidence obtained through the use of a listening device that the government had attached to the outside of the public pay phone frequently used by Katz to place his bets. The federal Court of Appeals upheld Katz’s conviction because the court found that the use of the listening device did not invade the physical space occupied by the defendant (i.e., the inside of the phone booth). The Court of Appeals based its decision on reasoning from Olmstead v. United States that warrantless government wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment unless it involved physical trespass (the trespass doctrine). In Olmstead, the Court stated that mere amplification of words transmitted over public telephone lines, without some physical trespass onto a physical area, was not enough to implicate the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. In the 1961 case of Silverman v. United States, the Supreme Court qualified Olmstead’s trespass doctrine, holding that the government only acts unreasonably when it intrudes onto a “constitutionally protected area.” However, when the Supreme Court was presented with the Katz case, it overruled Olmstead insofar as that case required physical trespass. The Katz court stated, famously, that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” and found that the Fourth Amendment protected the defendant’s right to privacy in his phone calls because he sought to keep them private, despite making his calls in a publicly accessible area, by closing the door of the phone booth. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated his now famous two-part test, stating that by closing the door of the phone booth Katz demonstrated that he expected privacy—an expectation the majority of the justices found to be objectively reasonable. The reasonable expectations of privacy test, though not part of the majority’s binding opinion in Katz, was cited positively by the Court in a number of cases in the succeeding years, beginning with Terry v. Ohio in 1968. The two-pronged analysis was finally accepted as the appropriate test by the majority of the Court in the 1979 case of Smith v. Maryland. In the intervening years, a few scholars have attempted to identify empirically, primarily through survey methodologies, whether the Supreme Court’s pronouncements

about what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable match popular sentiments, but the Court has not generally relied on empirical data when deciding cases or using the Katz test. Until 2012, the reasonable expectations of privacy test was generally employed by the Court in Fourth Amendment cases as the sole test for reasonableness. However, in United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that because of the Fourth Amendment’s historic ties to property, Katz had not actually overruled physical trespass as a means of implicating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search or seizure; rather, Katz had merely expanded the scope of Fourth Amendment protections to some situations that did not involve trespass. Thus, both Justice Harlan’s test and the historic trespass test could be invoked in future Fourth Amendment cases as means to invalidate government conduct and exclude evidence from criminal prosecutions. Bryce Clayton Newell See also Privacy; Search and Seizure; United States v. Jones (2012); United States v. Miller (1976); Warrants

Further Readings Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Blumenthal, Jeremy A., et al. “The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay ‘Expectations of Privacy.’” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, v.11 (2009). Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Kerr, Orin S. “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution.” Michigan Law Review, v.102 (2004). Kerr, Orin S. “Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations.” University of Chicago Law Review, v.82/1 (2015). Newell, Bryce Clayton. “Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks.” Richmond Journal of Law and Technology, v.17 (2011). Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979). Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Slobogin, Christopher. Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Slobogin, Christopher and Joseph E. Schumacher. “Rating the Intrusiveness of Law Enforcement

KGB Searches and Seizures.” Law & Human Behavior, v.17 (1993a). Slobogin, Christopher and Joseph E. Schumacher. “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at ‘Understandings’ Recognized and Permitted by Society.” Duke Law Journal, v.42 (1993b). Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).

KGB The KGB was the organization for state security in the Soviet Union from 1954 until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The KGB took on various forms from 1917 until its final organizational reordering in March 1954. The KGB acted as internal security, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence collection and was connected in many ways to the criminal police as well.

The KGB in the Soviet Bloc The KGB was tasked with monitoring the Soviet Bloc, or Warsaw Pact nations, during the Cold War. Spying operations, code-named PROGRESS, were initiated to monitor public opinion, to infiltrate subversive groups, and to watch for signs of ideological sabotage from Western countries. These operations began in Czechoslovakia and spread to Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, and Hungary. From 1969 on, the KGB was allowed to recruit agents and contacts in the Soviet Bloc to report back to the agency on the state of affairs in their respective countries. In 1971, there was an increased KGB priority in Romania, because President Nicolae Ceaus, escu was growing independent of the Warsaw Pact, the collective defense treaty between the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Ceaus, escu was also fostering a nepotistic version of neo-Stalinism. The KGB was ordered to collect intelligence on Romanian relations with the United States and China, the two powers the Soviet Union aimed to stem influence from. The largest KGB presence was in the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany, to combat the influence of opposition parties and Western

555

ideology from neighboring states. The KGB’s main concern in Hungary was the autonomy movement within the AVH, the Hungarian version of the KGB. The aim of the KGB in the Soviet Bloc was to report back to the Soviet Union on the state of affairs within the region. The Soviet Union wanted to make sure the bloc did not become subversive. Illegals, Russian sleeper agents under nonofficial cover, produced more grim reports of public opinion in the Soviet Bloc than did the KGB officials in the region because of the pressure to produce flattering results for the Soviet Union.

The KGB in the Third World The Soviet Union viewed the Middle East as a backyard of sorts, and thus, it attempted to spread its influence there by sending military advisers and KGB agents to the region—especially to Egypt and Syria. The closest Soviet relations in the region came with Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Soviet Union worked hard to flatter Nasser; when Nasser visited Moscow, it was the KGB, not the Soviet Foreign Ministry, that guided the president on a tour of the capital. Nasser turned Egypt into a cooperative socialist democracy and worked on freeing the country of Western influence, particularly with regard to the Suez Canal, which Nasser nationalized in 1956. After Nasser passed away and Anwar Sadat became the president of Egypt in 1970, the KGB worked to forge documents that showed that the United States was plotting against him. Also in the Middle East, the KGB infiltrated posts and cooperated with local intelligence agents in Syria, leading to a close relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union, one that has continued under the new Russian Federation. The Soviets also backed the Palestinian Liberation Organization. However, fear of discovery led them to conduct activities in European satellite states or through Arab regimes. The KGB also successfully penetrated Salvador Allende’s Chile and Ahmed Sékou Touré’s Guinea. With Allende, the Soviets sent KGB agents to target him before his election in 1970 with the purpose of ensuring a strong Chilean and Soviet intelligence relationship after his election. With Touré’s Guinea, the Soviets helped support his Marxist government, his one-party state, and his

556

KGB

dissolution of ties with France, Guinea’s colonial overseer. However, by 1978, Guinea’s ties with the Soviet Union began to dwindle after Touré turned back on his Marxist economic policies. The Soviets also influenced the revolution in Nicaragua, supporting the left-wing Sandinista revolutionaries, and later, the government founded by Daniel Ortega. The Soviets were also responsible for creating the urban legend that Latin American children were being kidnapped in order to provide organs for rich Americans, fostering fear of the United States in the region. The KGB also reinforced the paranoia of India’s Indira Gandhi and Algeria’s Ahmed Ben Bella. Gandhi and Ben Bella feared that the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. security and intelligence agency, was trying to depose them. This paranoia made the two leaders turn to the Soviet Union, leading to more bilateral cooperation and ensuring that the U.S. influence was stemmed. Asia was another region of interest for the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union craved recognition as a superpower on the same level as the United States. After the Sino-Soviet split, which occurred as a result of the growing divide over interpretation of Marxist ideology, Soviet espionage in China became impossible after China discovered the names of the KGB agents in China and began killing them off. China became even more of a worrisome concern for the Soviet Union because of this. Attempts to spy on China via Japan were also frustrated once the Japanese Communist Party aligned itself with China. The Soviet Union was reluctant to become involved with Southeast Asia’s communist parties. However, the Soviet Union began increasing trade with Malaysia in the 1960s. Malaysia established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on November 24, 1967. The first evidence of KGB activity in Malaysia came in June 1976 with the arrest of leading Malay journalist Abdul Samad Ismail. Two more arrests in November of that year under the Internal Security Act, a preventive detention law, of the government of Prime Minister Hussein Onn further confirmed KGB existence in Malaysia. The two people who were arrested were political aides of former prime minister Tun Razak-Datuk Abdullah Ahmad, Deputy Minister for Science, Technology, and Environment, and Abdullah Majid, Deputy Minister for Labor. In July 1981, three

Soviet officials were expelled for spying, which is the first time diplomats were expelled for espionage in Malaysia. This happened around the time the fourth prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, took office. His political secretary was also arrested for engaging in activities that went against national security; his secretary was believed to have been recruited by those three Soviet agents. The KGB in Southeast Asia wanted to subvert noncommunist governments through the “United Front” electoral strategy. Essentially, KGB activity in the region can be put into context of fear of China spreading their influence to this region with their sizable minority.

The KGB and the United States The United States was the major rival to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Thus, it is no surprise that the KGB was often sent to spy on the Western power. One such case of KGB espionage came in the 1960s in the space race. Soviet agent Anatoly Kotlobai, an American scientist of Russian descent, provided the KGB samples of formulas for solid rocket fuel in the 1960s. Kotlobai was a research chemist in the Reaction Motoros Division of Thiokol Chemical Company in New Jersey. He was responsible for conducting research in organic chemistry synthesis. Kotlobai was tasked with finding highly energetic materials that could be used for solid rocket fuel. He was arrested by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) in 1964 but was released shortly thereafter because of lack of evidence. Kotlobai and his wife then fled to Moscow. Despite Kotlobai’s espionage, Soviet ­ acquisition of the research had no impact on either the Soviet space program or the U.S. space program. However, the Kotlobai case is important in showing just how pervasive KGB influence was. The Bugged Embassy case is another instance of the Soviet KGB–U.S. rivalry. In 1969, the Nixon administration signed an agreement with the Soviet Union providing for new embassies to be built in Washington and Moscow. The eight-story building in Moscow was infested with spying systems planted by Soviet construction workers, instructed by the KGB. The embassy is largely regarded as one of the most embarrassing failures in U.S. intelligence and diplomacy. The United States spent $23 million on the building, but it ended up spending more than

KGB

twice that amount in an attempt to figure out how the Soviets transformed the building into a giant surveillance trap. After a string of suspicious behaviors by Soviet construction workers, electronic devices being discovered buried in concrete, and a secret cable to the American ambassador informing him of the nature of the embassy, construction was halted in what a 1987 Senate committee described as the most massive and sophisticated bugging operation in history. The United States was offered a site atop the Lenin Hills overlooking Moscow, but it opted for an 85-year-lease on a site more accessible and centrally located overlooking the Moscow River and in walking distance of both the ambassador’s residence and important Soviet governmental buildings. The Soviet embassy was to be located on an elevated site on Mt. Alto, a hill overlooking Washington, DC, perfect for espionage. For four years, negotiations struggled over the terms of the construction. Finally, in 1972, President Nixon ordered the State Department to reach an agreement; the agreement gave the Soviets control of the design and construction of the embassy in Moscow. The Soviets began creating precast concrete pieces in their own factories, away from the eyes of American security experts. Washington miscalculated that inspection of the pieces as they arrived at the site would be enough for security personnel to detect eavesdropping devices. The United States had the right to do all the finishing work. Because of this, they had little concern that the Soviets would be able to implant bugs that could not be detected. At the time of the groundbreaking in 1979, there was no clear American plan for on-site security needs. American intelligence officials in Moscow warned that they would not have the necessary equipment or personnel to handle the issue of bugging by the Soviets once construction began. By late 1979, thousands of precast elements were arriving at the building site, all of which had to be inspected. Technical security people stated that there were problems with the pieces, but they were not listened to. In 1982, a specially trained team of security experts was dispatched to Moscow with experimental X-ray scanning machines that could inspect the construction elements. This team invented inspection procedures as they went along.

557

Within a few months, they discovered that the Soviets had put permanent eavesdropping systems into the actual structure of the embassy building. The team discovered interconnecting systems so complex that they could not be removed from the concrete casts. Electronic eavesdropping packages were embedded where pieces of steel reinforcement in the flooring should have been. There were also decoys made to look like bugs and garbage from the construction process. The Soviets attempted to thwart security efforts. In 1983, when the American security team brought in new equipment to inspect structural columns, the Soviet construction workers went on a 2-week strike, citing health hazards. As work on the outer structure concluded, the Soviets wanted to speed up construction of the top floors, where secret embassy functions were to occur. A Soviet-owned freight elevator was also mysteriously disabled, requiring the Soviet workmen to gain more access to the inside of the embassy. Nonetheless, the American security experts never lost confidence that they could eventually disable the Soviet systems. The Senate Intelligence Committee confirmed in December 1986 that American intelligence analysts and engineers could neutralize the building. However, allegations surfaced in the spring of 1987 that U.S. Marine guards had dated Soviet women and allowed KGB agents to have access to sensitive information. Disclosures of the electronic penetration of the new American embassy in Moscow followed that April, and it became known to the public that Soviet spies had installed a variety of intelligence gathering and surveillance devices within the building. It also became known that the technology was not understood by the United States. The Bugged Embassy scandal shows that U.S. negotiators did not adequately take national security interests in hand when striking a deal. It also shows that U.S. intelligence officials were prideful by not admitting that they could not neutralize the threat in the embassy. The United States expected that the Soviets were going to bug the embassy, but not that they had the ability to neutralize the threat. They were wrong. R. Bruce Anderson and Anisha Koilpillai See also Cold War; Electronic Surveillance; Espionage; Russia

558

Knowledge

Further Readings Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of KGB. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999. Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin. The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2005. Castellano, Joseph A. “Rocket Science and Russian Spies: During the Cold War Between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Race to Develop Solid-Fueled Rockets Involved Secrecy, Explosions and Espionage.” American Scientist, v.96/6 (2008). http://www.jstor .org/stable/27859239 (Accessed April 2017). Nathan, K. S. “Malaysia and the Soviet Union: A Relationship With a Distance.” Asian Survey, v.27/10 (1987). doi:10.2307/2644845 Sciolino, Elaine. “The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong.” New York Times (November 14, 1988). http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/15/world/thebugged-embassy-case-what-went-wrong. html?pagewanted=all (Accessed April 2017).

Knowledge Organizations managing intangible assets face an array of asset types. Understanding the nature of these intangibles can be important for accumulating and protecting the firm’s own resources and/or for targeting those of competitors. Basic information can be useful but is typically only operational, straightforward to manage, and often of little interest to competitors. From a value point of view, what is often the key asset is knowledge— applicable at operational, tactical, and strategic levels and potentially of great interest to competitors. In the realm of intangible assets that may be of interest to organizations, knowledge has a fairly precise meaning. We all have a general idea of what knowledge is, but to employ it and protect it effectively, placing the concept in perspective and understanding its role as an individual and/or organizational asset, can be a great help. Knowledge is often portrayed as part of a continuum of intangible assets, running from data through information, on to knowledge, and ending with wisdom. Data are considered bytes or items; once organized they turn into information.

Information subjected to context, experience, or some similar processing becomes knowledge. So knowledge is understanding or know-how. Wisdom is a bit harder to define but has been referred to as “know-why” as opposed to knowledge’s “know-how,” suggesting a deeper level of understanding. In some more recent portrayals, especially in business studies, the level above knowledge is referred to as intelligence, with characteristics similar to wisdom but also bringing action and, often, a strategic level of decision making. So knowledge is an intangible asset at some level higher than raw data or information. As noted in the definition, it is thought to come from learning, education, experience, or some other considered reflection. It can also be grown through sharing between individuals and/or organizations as well as through individual creativity or insight. The latter can come from combining existing knowledge in a new way, from analysis of data, information, or knowledge, or from other means of creation. While growth in knowledge is typically an interest of both individuals and organizations, success in the process can depend on a variety of variables. Some can be related to the nature of the knowledge. One important distinction is whether knowledge is tacit or explicit. Tacit knowledge is hard to express, hard to explain, and, hence, often very personal. Explicit knowledge is easier to communicate and share. As a consequence, it can often be codified by writing it down or storing it in electronic form. The distinction is important if the knowledge is to be shared and, as we shall see, for choice of management technique. Other knowledge-related variables that can have an impact on how the assets are handled include the complexity of the knowledge and its stickiness or specificity (i.e., how tied it is to its original application or firm). Complex and/or sticky knowledge can be hard to apply to new or different circumstances. A pharmaceutical firm, for example, may have deep knowledge on developing a type of drug, optimizing production processes, and/or marketing and selling the drug given its relationships with health care providers and payers. But that knowledge, even if partially explicit, might be very difficult to transfer to another company, production process, or new drug, given the complexity of circumstances and specificity of the knowledge.

Knowledge

Individual or organizational variables can also have an effect. Preparation for learning new knowledge, termed absorptive capacity, can be important. If the subject does not have a full enough understanding of what came before, the subject can find it hard to take in, create, and/or fully understand new knowledge. Social capital (personal or organizational relationships by number and strength) and organizational culture (whether new knowledge is valued) are also important considerations. An organization with a strong existing knowledge base, an organizational culture that respects and rewards learning, and a social network with strong ties will be more likely to incorporate and effectively use new knowledge. Indeed, the organizations with the greatest social capital are often those with strong informal networks with nodes centered on the most respected sources of knowledge rather than formal hierarchies. Understanding the nature of the knowledge and the individual or organizational circumstances are precursors to deciding on a plan of action for growing that knowledge, particularly through exchange. Passing tacit knowledge along, resulting in new tacit knowledge in another individual, is very different from a tacit to explicit exchange, as are explicit to explicit or explicit to tacit exchanges. But if the circumstances are well understood, appropriate approaches can be planned and the right tools can be employed. For tacit knowledge, personal exchanges of knowledge are often best, whether mentoring, apprenticeships, communities of practice, or storytelling. One common anecdote, for example, concerns a study of Xerox technicians. Although processes and procedures were well-defined, the really valuable knowledge about how to repair the machines was often shared through stories in informal discussions during work breaks. The knowledge needed to be passed along face-to-face for the individual technicians to be accepting and for it to be fully understood. For explicit knowledge, information technology can often be employed. This can include traditional documentation of procedures and processes, more contemporary knowledge management, or even social networking systems. Regardless of the system employed, issues like motivation to use the tools, trust in the value of contributing or using knowledge, and other issues

559

will need to be considered as well. If the explicit management system was an information technology installation, for example, it can be modeled as a market. In a market, exchange becomes important. Suppliers of knowledge must be motivated to share what they know. They must be incentivized to contribute and be rewarded when they do so. Similarly, demanders of knowledge must also be motivated. If they take the time and energy to use the system, the knowledge they obtain must be worthwhile and useful to them. Without motivation to use and trust in the system’s promised rewards, the market breaks down. From a competitive intelligence point of view, explicit knowledge is often much more scalable because of its ease of sharing. And given its amenity to information systems, explicit knowledge is often distributed much more widely, into more hands, in more networked organizations, and in digital form. Its usefulness is increased but so is its vulnerability to competitive incursions. Special care must be taken, from a counterintelligence perspective, to ensure that valuable explicit knowledge stays proprietary. Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, often continues to exist only in the heads of key employees and, if transferred, would be done person-­ to-person. Competitive intelligence operations seeking value-tacit knowledge will more often rely on human intelligence, requiring input from individuals. These might be sources in the targeted firm’s wider network, new hires, or other personal informants, but the process and vulnerabilities are much different from those seen with more information technology–based explicit knowledge. Taking knowledge to the next level, to become wisdom or intelligence, also requires successful execution. In these cases, analytical techniques are  often employed, studying accumulated data, information, and knowledge to develop an understanding of competitor strategies (competitive intelligence), market direction (marketing intelligence), and business conditions (business intelligence), among others. The data or information, explicit knowledge, and tacit knowledge just discussed will often be the inputs of intelligence ­ operations. The goal is a higher level of understanding, allowing appropriate action, often strategic or tactical as opposed to more everyday operational decisions. And a key part of achieving that goal is

560

Kyllo v. United States (2001)

understanding the nature of the intangibles under the control of the firm or its competitors. G. Scott Erickson See also Information Security; Intellectual Property Rights

Further Readings Ackoff, Russell. “From Data to Wisdom.” Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, v.16 (1989). Bontis, N. “Managing Organizational Knowledge by Diagnosing Intellectual Capital: Framing and Advancing the State of the Field.” International Journal of Technology Management, v.18/5–8 (1999). Brown, John Seely and Paul Duguid. “Organizational Learning and Communities-of-Practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation.” Organizational Science, v.2/1 (1991). Cohen, Wesley M. and Daniel A. Levinthal. “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation.” Administrative Science Quarterly, v.35/1 (1990). Nahapiet, Janine and Sumantra Ghoshal. “Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage.” Academy of Management Review, v.23/2 (1998). Nonaka, Ikujiro and Hirotaka Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. Polanyi, Michael. The Tacit Dimension. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1967. Wenger-Trayner, Etienne and Beverly Wenger-Trayner. “Introduction to Communities of Practice.” http:// wenger-trayner.com/introduction-to-communities-ofpractice/ (Accessed August 2017). Zack, Michael H. “Managing Codified Knowledge.” Sloan Management Review, v.40/4 (1999).

Website Cognitive Edge Network: http://cognitive-edge.com/ (Accessed October 2014).

Kyllo v. United States (2001) Kyllo v. United States is a U.S. Supreme Court decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, decided on June 11, 2001. In the case, the Court decided

that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device by government agents to detect levels of heat emanating from the exterior of a private residence violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the citizenry to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, by government agents, of their persons, houses, papers, or effects. The Kyllo decision is important to questions of surveillance and privacy because the Court held, broadly, that the use of any technology (not just thermal imaging scanners) “not in general public use” to gather information about the interior of a person’s home was presumptively unreasonable. This entry reviews the background of the case, the arguments and lower court rulings, and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in overturning the case and preserving  Fourth Amendment freedoms in relation to the  use of technological enhancements and surveillance. In Kyllo, the Court drew from its reasoning in earlier cases, such as Katz v. United States (1967), finding that a person ought to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain situations— in this case, in the contents of and activities occurring within a person’s home. In fact, the Court held that this expectation should extend to situations that did not involve trespass onto the defendant’s property, an extension of the basic rule announced in Katz that Fourth Amendment violations need not involve trespass. The case itself arose out of facts occurring in Florence, Oregon, in the early 1990s. At that time, William Elliott, an agent of the U.S. Department of the Interior, began to suspect that the defendant, Danny Kyllo, was growing marijuana inside his home in violation of federal law. Because marijuana growing typically requires the use of highintensity heat lamps, Elliott and another man used a thermal imaging device to detect the levels of infrared radiation being emitted from parts of the roof and wall of Kyllo’s home. They conducted the thermal imaging from Elliott’s vehicle, which was parked on the streets outside Kyllo’s home, but they did not enter onto the property itself. The scans indicated that certain portions of the roof and wall of one part of the house were emitting considerably more heat than the rest of the exterior, evidence of unusually hot indoor temperatures at that location. Based on this evidence,

Kyllo v. United States (2001)

Elliott determined that Kyllo was in fact growing marijuana inside his home. Using the evidence obtained from the thermal imaging device, as well as tips from informants and information contained in Kyllo’s utility bills, a magistrate judge issued a warrant allowing officers to search Kyllo’s home. When executing the warrant, officers found more than 100 marijuana plants inside the house, and Kyllo was indicted in federal court for growing marijuana in violation of federal law. During his prosecution, Kyllo attempted to have the evidence found within his home suppressed, claiming that the use of the thermal imaging device violated his Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. Initially, the trial court refused to exclude the evidence, concluding that the thermal imaging device was a crude, nonintrusive device that did not penetrate the walls of Kyllo’s home or discover intimate details of activities occurring therein. The Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the trial court’s findings. Key to the appellate court’s decision was its finding that Kyllo had not tried to suppress the heat emanating from his home and therefore could not maintain a subjective expectation of privacy in the temperature of the outside of his house. If Kyllo could not demonstrate that he had maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in the information acquired through use of the thermal imager, then the search could not be unreasonable, under the reasoning announced by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States (1967). The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and ultimately reversed the appellate court’s findings. Justice Scalia, in his opinion for the five-justice majority, distinguished the facts of the Kyllo case from earlier cases holding that when officers gather information that is plainly visible from places where the officers have the right to be, no unreasonable search has occurred. Unlike aerial observation from public airspace, the Court stated, the technological enhancement offered by the thermal imaging device constituted “more than naked-eye surveillance,” thus implicating the Fourth Amendment. Because the search was conducted without a warrant, it was presumptively unreasonable and violated the defendant’s rights. Importantly, Justice Scalia’s opinion was not limited merely to thermal imagers. In fact, the Court found that any sense-enhancing technology that

561

would allow law enforcement to gain information that would have traditionally been only discovered through a physical intrusion into a person’s home would constitute a search, for Fourth Amendment purposes, as long as the technology was not in general public use. Scalia rejected the contention that “off-the-wall” surveillance (measuring emanations from the outside of a home rather than viewing activity inside) should be treated differently than “through-thewall” surveillance (which could actually peer through walls or windows to detect activity). Thus, the Kyllo decision was explicitly aimed at regulating the future use of a broad array of emerging and yet-to-be-invented technologies, based on a mix of traditional property-based Fourth Amendment ideas and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Katz. Bryce Clayton Newell See also Katz v. United States (1967); Policing and Society; Search and Seizure; United States v. Jones (2012); Warrants

Further Readings Bandes, Susan A. “Power, Privacy, and Thermal Imaging.” Minnesota Law Review, v.86 (2002). Clancy, Thomas K. “Coping With Technological Change: Kyllo and the Proper Analytical Structure to Measure the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights.” Mississippi Law Journal, v.72 (2002). Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Kerr, Orin S. “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution.” Michigan Law Review, v.102 (2004). Seamon, Richard H. “Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment.” Washington University Law Quarterly, v.79 (2001). Sklansky, David A. “Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law.” Mississippi Law Journal, v.72 (2002). Slobogin, Christopher. “Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance.” Minnesota Law Review, v.86 (2002). Slobogin, Christopher. Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).

L and group decisions, norms, and politics are deeply influential in the construction of knowledge. This entails a tendency to argue that knowledge is not simply discovered, but that it is created by institutions and made into tradition by people. Latour’s association with social constructionism is not unwarranted, as his early work is interested in how scientists’ daily habits and working practices contribute to both the scientific establishment and the production of knowledge (most notably, ­Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts). However, to focus on the social construction of knowledge, science, technologies, and objects is to possess a limited understanding of Latour. This is because Latour requires that we consider the influence of technologies and objects on social life. He argues that although objects and knowledge are permeated by human decisions, the reverse applies too: What we consider as “being human” or “human history” is utterly indivisible from the influence of objects, whether this be flint, cow guts formed into strings, wood pulp, packet switching, IP addresses, web cookies, or surveillance cameras.

Latour, Bruno Bruno Latour (1947– ) is a French philosopher, social scientist, and professor at the Paris Institute of Political Studies and is very influential in the ways in which other social scientists think about technology and science. Latour is well known because he believes that technology plays a more critical role in social issues than many of his contemporaries. This is because technologies possess properties, affordances, capacities to act, and the ability to influence and affect social situations. For Latour, this grants technologies a form of citizenship, by which he asserts that due to their capacity to make a difference in society, they should be granted greater social recognition of their contribution to history and social life in general. Although this has clear application for social scientists interested in surveillance technologies, security, and privacy, he is also relevant to this encyclopedia because his philosophical worldview encompasses the widest possible range of actors, and the ways in which actors of very different categories, modes, and types mingle, interact, and form what Latour refers to as new actants, which is another word for actors. The remainder of this entry focuses on Latour’s beliefs in relation to social constructionism, technology, and hybridity; his emphasis on process over substance; and his emphasis on multiscalar ontologies.

Perspectives on Technology Latour requires analysts to recognize the difference that technology makes to social life, particularly as people negotiate with objects and tools, their affordances, and technical and social histories. This has special relevance for surveillance studies as analysts in this field are required to deal with the affordances of new technologies and their capacity to affect politics, security, policing, how

Social Constructionism Latour is commonly associated with social constructionism, or the belief that language, human 563

564

Latour, Bruno

we communicate with one another, commerce, and other areas of contemporary social life. A Latourian approach to surveillance, security, and privacy requires that the analyst understand a multitude of processes that go into the formation of a phenomenon (be this, e.g., policy, laws, programming languages, software, hardware, business, competition, organizational structures, security services, or the behavior of citizens). Although wide-ranging, each influences the outcome of the final assemblage, phenomenon, or actant that is never a pure object or subject, but a hybrid. In studying how actants are made of both material and nonmaterial characteristics, Latour, working with John Law and Michel Callon, developed actor-network theory. This empirically explores how “black boxes,” or entities made of connections between humans and nonhumans, form reasonably stable actants (i.e., that which might play a role, affect, and make a difference). The key to the method is that it offers empirical suggestions on how to trace associations and relationships.

Hybridity Latour’s use of the term actants is used to remove traces of anthropomorphism and reflect one of his core arguments: Objects and subjects (humans) are not as distinct as we may think. In fact, there is no pure domain of people, humans, or subjects, nor is there a domain of objects somehow untainted or separate from people. Instead, we live in a state of hybridity. This refers to an endeavor to find less divisive ways of expressing the relationship between people and the domains in which we live, and the things therein. It problematizes the idea of pure objects or subjects, as both consist of significant traces of the other. For example, on hybridity, Callon refers to “engineersociologists” and the ways in which engineering is intimately connected to social knowledge. Rather than engineering simply being about technical answers to problems, the Latourian worldview sees economic, social, political, cultural, and social norms as very much built into technology. This means that technical solutions to problems cannot stand alone from social knowledge in the building of technology. Privacy is a good example in that the design of social networks, computers, mobile phones, wearable media, and other technologies

that involve flows of information are constrained by not just materials, processing speeds, and existing networks but also social-semiotic protocols of privacy (i.e., those codes of behavior we adhere to such as knocking before entering). Thus, actants we hold in our hands are not simply objects, but hybrids, because they are an outcome and assemblage of technical and social-semiotic processes. This means that any assessment of these actants requires consideration of multiple modes of being that form the topic of inquiry.

Process Versus Substance: Consequences for Understanding Privacy Underpinning Latour’s approach is a worldview that rejects substance-based views and materialism. Instead, he argues for a philosophy of associations, connections, and processes. Philosopher Alfred Whitehead is influential in this regard, and for Latour, process is always primary over substance. In Pandora’s Hope, Latour goes to some length to criticize the idea of substance, insisting we recognize it as that which represents the stability of an assemblage. Stability and fixity, however, are always temporary, whether the time period is brief or long. Elsewhere, in Science in Action, he develops the “black box” metaphor as a means of critiquing the substance-based premise that reality is made of bits, integers, or units. Here, what passes for stable building blocks are black boxes, or assemblages. It follows too that inside one black box are more black boxes. Latour’s black box is that “thing” that goes without question. Be this an equation, a social network, a door lock, a USB stick, liberty, Marxism, or God, it is that which we believe in without question. They are characterized by being a “durable whole,” and the more people that buy into black boxes without question, the stronger the box becomes. If people question and disbelieve, the box becomes weaker, which shows that the wholeness of the object dictates its constituent parts, although black ­ boxes can be opened up and challenged. For Latour, that which coheres into metastable black boxes proves resistant to change, as its associations are strong, although never safe. Whether these are cultural, scientific, political, financial, technological edifices, or most likely a combination of these, they are all prone to ongoing transformations and nascent processes.

Law

Multiscalar Ontologies According to Latour, ontology, or “what exists,” consists of affiliations, assemblages, relationships, and understanding of how these cohere and break. As with Latour’s notions of hybridity, this involves the capacity to affect across a plurality of scales of being (be this seemingly separate modes such as policy or hardware). Latour’s worldview consists of a coming together, or black boxing, of social, economic, political, technical, natural, and scientific entities. In An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence, Latour affirms the need to span modes of existence and hybridize symbols/things, culture/ nature, and the various ways in which these mutually inform and infuse one another so as to destabilize any premise of absolute categorical distinctiveness. This is a rebuttal of reductionist approaches in which things are “nothing but” brain waves, chemical activity, or economic practices. In contrast, the search to find an ultimate layer of ontological reality is defined by the capacity to affect. By rejecting materialism and reductionism, he allows a greater range of entities to exist. This grants the status of “real” to a wider range of actants, and allows both electrons and Mickey Mouse, for example, to both really exist. For Latour, just because things are created rather than found, this does not make them any less real  because realness is delivered due to the ­capacity for affect and perturbation. This premise is the basis for Latour’s novel sense of realism that refuses to divide “artificial” and “natural,” as it allows constructions a greater right to exist by means of recognition of metastability across scales. Latourian realism has consequences for how analysts may conceive of privacy. This is because Latour’s ontology allows for artificial and constructed actants and is based on the observations that reality is constructed out of affiliations, temporary connections, and relationships. Privacy is no different in that it is an outcome of situations derived from a broad range of scales (possibly involving human-human, human-object, or objectobject relations). Members of the privacy situation might be composed of laws and regulations on how data are collected and used, Internet users, the hardware and programming used to build a social network, management structures of that social network, advertising networks and advertisers, and governmental attitudes to information

565

industries. Centrally, however, privacy is a “real” protocol that emerges from these actants, but it may also transform the original members of a given privacy situation. Andrew McStay See also Privacy; Technology

Further Readings Latour, Bruno. Science in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. Latour, Bruno. The Pasteurization of France. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. Latour, Bruno. Aramis, or the Love of Technology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. Latour, Bruno. Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. Latour, Bruno. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences Into Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2005. Latour, Bruno. An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. McStay, Andrew. “Latour: Raising the Profile of Immaterial Actants.” In Privacy and Philosophy: New Media and Affective Protocol. New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2014.

Law* Law can be defined in various ways: (a) as a regime for ordering society, (b) as a collection of rules, or (c) as a process for making decisions. To understand the role law plays in society, one must consider the different theories about law, different ways in which law is developed and applied, and

*The views expressed in this entry are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

566

Law

a discussion about the sources of law. There are several different systems of law or legal culture, and there are a number of different philosophical approaches to law—systems of jurisprudence— that seek to define in broader terms what law is. This entry touches on many of these to provide an overview.

Sources of Law and Legal Rules The sources of what the law is are generally similar across cultures and jurisdictions. In his treatise “The Social Contract,” Jean Jacques Rousseau notes that “laws are the conditions of civil association.” As discussed later in this entry, in the most general and initial way, the law is expressed through cultural norms, religious teachings, and other traditions. These norms and traditions carry different weight in different cultures and systems, but they are almost always an initial and continuing source of the law, for these norms and values set forth expectations of behavior, establish concepts of duty and obligation and of liberty and freedom, and so find their way directly or indirectly into the other sources of law. Indeed, these norms, principles, and values are often more powerful influences on behavior, because these norms eventually find expression in the written codes and in the decisions of judges of whatever form may exist in a legal system. More formally, the sources of law often relied on include a foundational constitution, statutes enacted by legislative bodies, and administrative regulations adopted by government bureaucracies in manners set forth in the statutes and constitution, decisions of courts, and other authoritative statements, such as executive orders, decrees, or, in the case of religious legal systems, declarations of clergy. For example, in the United States, the foundation of law is the U.S. Constitution. It establishes the framework of government, the authorities of  the different branches of government, and in Article VI, states that this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in

every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

So the sources of law in the U.S. system include the Constitution and all laws and treaties made or entered into under that Constitution. Elsewhere in the Constitution is set forth the powers of the branches of government. Article I enumerates the authority of the legislature to make laws in specific areas but also to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for the carrying into execution” the powers of the legislature, the other branches of government, and the departments and officers of the government. Article II provides the authority of the Executive, and from that article comes the authority of the president to issue directives to members of his branch. Article III establishes the broad authorities of the judicial branch. From these come the other sources of law— authoritative decisions, regulations, and other enactments, which serve the function of being the law in the nation. As but one example, the Administrative Procedure Act governs the way in which administrative agencies of the federal government may propose and establish regulations, and sets up a process for the federal courts to directly review agency decisions. Another example of a statement of the sources of law comes from the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38 of that treaty states that 1.  The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b.  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c.  the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d.  subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

So the sources of law between nations are not unlike what is commonly considered to be law in

Law

any other form of human organization—general principles, custom and practice, conventions to regulate behavior, and judicial decisions.

Types of Legal Systems The sources of law find expression and carry authoritative weight as law in different ways around the world. Different nations and cultures have developed different approaches to law, and in understanding the meaning of the term law, it is useful to cover these different systems. The most common legal systems that exist include civil law, which relies on statutes and codes of law to say what the law is; the common law, in which rules of law can be developed and applied by the courts as well as by legislatures; religious law based on the teachings of religious scriptures; and cultural or traditional law, sometimes called tribal law, which relies on the rules of community handed down over time and applied or enforced by local elders. While some jurisdictions rely on one form of law predominantly, a combination of these exists. Civil law, based on the Roman system of law, is probably the predominant form of law. It finds its beginnings during the time of Justinian, who collected the laws into the Corpus Juris Civilus, consisting of Institutes (basic principles); a Digest or summary of scholarship; Codes, in which legislation, edicts, and other laws were collected; and Novels, a section for new laws to be collected. Civil law developed into two general trends: (1) a Napoleonic Code that was more general and sought to express the natural law principles of liberty and equality and (2) the Germanic trend that was more technical in nature and developed with a more “scientific” approach that sought to ensure that the law was a self-contained whole requiring little in the way of discretion and judgment. Civil law traditions were exported along with European colonialism, with the result that most of the legal systems of Africa, South America, and the Middle East incorporate some aspects of civil law. Even the Soviet systems, though influenced heavily by Marxist ideology, were expressions of the civil law approach rather than completely different legal cultures. While the civil law tradition developed on the European continent, in England, the predominant

567

system was that of the common law, based primarily on the rule of judges rather than on the prescriptions of legislatures. Judges were representatives of the king and, as such, held the authority to decide controversies and dispense justice. Records were kept of the decisions of judges, and the principle of stare decisis (“let the decision stand”) ensured that there would be stability in the law, with only the higher court having the power to set aside precedent in making a decision. The common law system spread with English colonialism to the American colonies, which became the United States, as well as to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and the rest of the Commonwealth. Because the rules of law developed through cases and controversies presented to the judges (and juries) who had decisional authority, the adversarial process also developed with each side using advocates, with the judge (and jury) charged to remain impartial through the proceeding, weighing the facts, evidence, and arguments presented. In this, the common law systems are also significantly different from the court proceedings in the civil law traditions. In civil law jurisdictions, the process is referred to as inquisitorial, with the judge taking an active role in the investigation of cases, directing the investigation so that all relevant facts are brought forth, thus ensuring that the proper rule of law can be applied. While the two systems—adversarial and inquisitorial—operate in very different ways, each has its supporters and detractors, each claiming that fairness and justice are best served. Religious law has been a part of what humankind considers “law” throughout history. Roman Catholic canon law continues to play a significant role in influencing European civil law, the Christian Bible influenced the development of Anglo-Saxon common law, the Jewish Talmud influenced Israel’s system of law, and the teachings of the Koran play a significant role in the legal systems of nations with a strong Islamic history. In most, if not all, of the countries where religious law has a strong influence, the legal system is in reality a mixed system, with influences from other aspects of the nation’s cultural heritage as well as any past colonial influences playing a role in the law. What is unique about religious legal systems is the concept that the highest law originates not from the

568

Law

government but from God (by whatever name called). Judges with religious training, sometimes along with but also sometimes instead of legal training, are considered to have the responsibility to reveal religious truths rather than objective facts, and the lines between politics and religion are blurred. Cultural or traditional law brings yet another set of cultural influences on the law. Historic traditions, perhaps based on religious teachings but also coming from tribal relationships, informal sources of authority, and decision making that emphasizes family and local ties, tend to be the common themes in bringing traditional law concepts to any legal system. In Asia, the Confucian philosophies influenced the legal systems well before colonialism and Marxism brought influences from those systems. In reality, even the civil law and common law legal systems reflect cultural and traditional concepts, but these systems have been viewed as the norm for so long that the cultural and traditional influences are often ignored. As the trends of first colonialism and now ­globalization have brought individuals from different legal cultures in contact with one another, more and more of the legal systems in place in nations reflect different levels of each of these influences. The United States, now an amalgam of English, French, and Spanish colonies with immigrants (and thus scholars, politicians, and judges) from nations all over the world, increasingly looks more like a civil law system that operates with common law overtones. Saudi Arabia, a nation most heavily influenced by its religious law heritage, nevertheless has a number of civil law characteristics.

Philosophies of Law and Jurisprudence Sources of law find expression and effect in different ways in each of the legal systems just discussed, but these are not the end of a discussion of law. This last section discusses different philosophies of law or jurisprudence. Humankind spends a great deal of time thinking about law—what is the law, what does the law mean, when must I obey the law, and when am I excused from obeying the law, or perhaps even expected to disobey the law. But law is a human invention, an outgrowth of the fact that humans

are communal creatures and, in any community, there will be a sense of order or of organization. People who live together and who must interact find ways to regulate behavior. Lawrence Lessig, in his essay on the concept of cyberlaw, determined that there are four modalities of behavior regulation: (1) architecture, or the physical world as we find it; (2) the market, where price and agreements form the basis for regulating behavior; (3) social norms, enforced not by any formal government but in an informal manner through societal pressures, encouragement and deterrence, and reward and punishment; and (4)  law, which in a more formal sense orders people to behave in certain ways, punishing departures from those rules and rewarding compliance. While Lessig, in this essay, limits his concept of law only to one of the four modalities of behavior regulation he identifies, he actually ­captures most of how humankind has chosen to consider the idea of law through history. One of the oldest approaches to thinking about law, yet an approach that continues to have tremendous influence, is the concept of natural law. While there is little dispute that individual laws are enacted by persons in authority, the basis for those laws is where the debate and discussion enter. For centuries, one of these concepts has been that all laws, rules, and even social norms have their basis in some higher law, a source of law that comes from outside of any individual’s or group’s ideas. One of the earliest explanations of this approach was put forth by the Roman philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero, who wrote about law as follows: True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect upon the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to alter it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws

Law

now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and at all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment. (De Re Publica [Of the Republic], book 3, para. 22)

Cicero’s definition sets out the basic themes found in natural law theories, themes expounded on in later works by Thomas Aquinas, the writers of the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods, and other writers to the present, including John Finnis and Lon Fuller. All these writers consider the themes set out in Cicero’s discussion as key— that laws emanate from a source greater than any one government or ruler; that these laws are universal in their application, regardless of culture or perspective; and that pronouncements that depart from these universal truths are not law in any meaningful sense and so have no validity or claim on those who may be subject to it. According to natural law theory, morality, social norms, and enacted laws are just different forms of the same self-evident truths. Thus, under natural law, there can be no such thing as an immoral law, for when a law departs from morality, it loses its authority as law and may be (indeed, perhaps should be) disregarded. Contrasted with the natural law theory of universal and self-evident rules that inevitably find expression is the view of positivism. Positivism is based on two tenets—first, that what counts as law in any particular society is fundamentally a matter of social fact or convention (the social thesis); and second, that there is no necessary connection between law and morality (the separability thesis). In the view of positivists, while morality and other social norms may serve to regulate behavior, there is no necessary connection between morality and law. Law, in this view, is simply the expression of authority by the community, whatever the political form or construct of the community, and so long as the rule was enacted according to the established process, it is binding. Positivism sets a distinction between the law as it

569

is (lex lata) and the law as perhaps it should be (lege ferende)—only the former is law. The criteria of legality as a matter of fact and not value, its source in the decision of the sovereign, does not mean it is without boundary. Law, in this approach, finds expression in a hierarchy of rules—rules that establish underlying validity (recognition), rules that create the powers to legislate or to adjudicate (authority), and rules that either expand or limit liberty by obligating certain behavior. So, in this concept, one could say that the Declaration of Independence and Constitution together provide the rules of recognition and of authority, while the statutes enacted by Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court provide the rules obligating behavior and thereby expanding or limiting liberty. So long as the processes set forth in the Constitution are followed, morality is immaterial—the law is binding because it is the law, properly enacted. Legal realism perhaps takes a further step away from the concept of natural law in that it is, simply stated, whatever the legislature and the courts have said it is and, since the law has no formal application on individuals until it finds its way into the courts, the law is simply whatever the judges have said it is. This view is of law as a tool for decision making, a way for people in a society to try and have some stability of expectations. So in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, law is simply a means of prediction: People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, . . . the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.

Karl Llewellyn (2006), in furthering the realist approach to law, started with the definition provided by Roscor Pound, as “the aggregate of authoritative legal precepts applied by tribunals as such in a given time and place” and the presupposition of a state to make such precepts and tribunals authoritative (p. 23). Llewellyn saw the law as a system of rules—rules that would be used to provide remedies for wrong, to create rights, or to give meaning to more intangible interests. Llewellyn (2006) also placed importance on the notion of administrative action as law as well,

570

Law

noting that “more often than not, administrative action is, to the layman affected, the last expression of the law on the case. It is in the interaction of government with the governed that law arises and has meaning” (p. 34). The last theory about law that this entry summarizes is the policy-oriented approach to law, often referred to as the New Haven School of jurisprudence. Formulated by the team of Myers McDougal and Howard Lasswell at Yale Law School in the 1990s, the theory is an outgrowth of the American Realist School. The most concise statement of the theory is as follows: The most useful conception of law is as a process of decision that is both authoritative and controlling. The function of the responsible jurist, advisor, or decisionmaker, who is a part of that process, is to develop an appropriate observational standpoint, clarify community goals, identify and then perform the intellectual tasks that will enable him or her to assist those who seek legal or policy advice in clarifying goals, and in implementing them in ways compatible with the common interests of the most inclusive community. (McDougal & Lasswell, 1997, p. xx)

These “common interests of the most inclusive community” included power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect, and rectitude. A community that provided these was described by W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner, and Andrew R. Willard (2007) as a “public order of human dignity” and was the goal toward which law should direct its efforts (p. 580). The theory proposed five intellectual tasks that are necessary for the actual decision making that results in the creation of law that serves this public order of human dignity: (1) goal formulation, (2) trend description, (3) factor analysis, (4) projection of future decisions, and (5) invention of alternatives. Holmes and Llewellyn saw the law as a body of rules—McDougal and Lasswell conceived of law as a process, a process that is intended to  aid   ociety in moving closer to this public order  of  human dignity. This was a particularly  American perspective—more specifically a postwar American perspective, and for that reason, the New Haven School is often criticized as having a bias. But in many ways, this approach,

whether accepted in toto or acknowledged as one in a series of developed and still-developing conceptions of law, has the advantage of being useful in guiding not just lawyers and judges but also those who advise on and make policy at whatever level of human organization it might occur. That is, after all, the advantage of legal r­ ealism— that the purpose of the law is to help those subject to it order their activities with some stability of expectations. Lewellyn’s caution—that, for the layperson, law is whatever actions are taken at the lowest level of administrative decision making— requires there be a process that can be applied whether the application comes in municipal law, at the national level, or even at the international level. Perspectives of ultimate rights and wrong, whether emanating from nature or from Nature’s God, or even as whether mere social constructs, find their expression in the imposition of duties, of the protection of rights and interests, in the affording of remedy for wrongs suffered. Law is, and has been, how society addresses these issues. R. James Orr See also Community; Ethics; Legal Moralism; Politics; Social Justice

Further Readings Banks, Christopher and David M. O’Brien. Courts and Judicial Policymaking. London, England: Pearson, 2008. Bix, Brian. “Natural Law Theory.” In Dennis Patterson, ed., A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1996. Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Re Publica [Of the Republic], Book 3, para. 22, quoted in Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory. In Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1996. Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law (3rd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2012. Holmes, Oliver Wendall, Jr. “The Path of the Law.” Harvard Law Review, v.10 (1897). Lessig, Lawrence. “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach.” Harvard Law Review, v.113 (1999). Llewellyn, Karl. “A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step.” In Dennis Patterson (ed.), Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory: An Anthology. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2006.

Law and Digital Technology McDougal, Myres S. “Preface.” In Harold D. Lasswell and Myers S. McDougal (eds.), Jurisprudence for a Free Society. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997. McDougal, Myres S. and Harold D. Lasswell. “Criteria for a Theory About Law” 44 S. Cal. L. Rev 363 (1971) at 374. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 2573. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2573 (Accessed October 2017). Reisman, W. Michael, et al. “The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction.” Yale Journal of International Law, v.32 (2007).

Law

and

Digital Technology*

Technology advances rapidly, and it is common today to hear discussions on how technology is changing society, relationships, politics, and, in this context, the law. The balance between security and privacy is one of the fronts of this battle involving technology and the law, as seen played out in the following maxim: That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. (Warren & Brandeis, 1890)

In the precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Only so much time and effort could be spent following suspects, or even, as technology expanded, tapping their phones. Recordings needed space, as did other forms of surveillance reports, and the indexing and search capabilities of law enforcement and security services alike were limited. This is no longer the case. Whether it is via the web, a thermal imager, or a clandestinely

*The views expressed in this entry are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

571

installed GPS (Global Positioning System) device, the government now has the capacity to surveil persons, houses, papers, or effects without citizens ever even knowing it. As scholar Steven B. Lichtman stated in 2015, “If constitutional privacy is going to remain a vibrant doctrine, especially in its specifically-enumerated criminal law context, philosophical adjustments are going to have to keep pace with technological advances.” Younger generations have grown up with these technologies seamlessly interwoven into their lives; it is likely that they have not carefully pondered the larger legal and constitutional ramifications of their use. Having never known a world without the Internet, cell phones, and pervasive surveillance cameras, they probably have an incomplete picture of the irrevocable changes these devices have produced. Use of electronic surveillance technology by local law enforcement is expanding, as is the use of unmanned aerial systems (drones) for uses such as law enforcement, firefighting, border patrol, disaster relief, search and rescue, military training, and other government operational missions as well as for uses by agriculture and other industries. Yet the U.S. legal system does not contain a comprehensive set of privacy rights or principles that collectively address the acquisition, storage, transmission, use, and disclosure of personal information within the business community. As a result, the approach tends to be a patchwork of laws from other time periods or reliance on the users themselves to establish standards. No comprehensive standards, legal or otherwise, exist for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data in cyberspace.

Technology and Privacy Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the ever-present demands for steps that must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what has been called the right “to be let alone.” But this is not new, for it was in 1890 that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote that “instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”

572

Law and Digital Technology

It took almost 50 years for the right to privacy about which Brandeis and Warren wrote to make its way into the laws regarding police surveillance. Not until the 1967 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United States was the concept that the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provided protection where there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy” recognized. And even then, where an individual released information to a “third party,” such as a bank (as in the case of United States v. Miller) or through a telecommunications company (as in the case of Smith v. ­Maryland), other case law ruled that no such reasonable expectation of privacy could exist. The scope of what is possible in terms of information gathering and surveillance capability is now so much greater than ever before. When most of the current laws and regulations regarding ­electronic communication were enacted, a desktop computer carried memory capacity and ­computing power measured by “kilo-” (thousand) ­designations—now even cell phones carry computing power measured by the “giga-” (billion) designation. This expansion in computing capability and communication technology has complicated the task of the intelligence and law enforcement community and given that same community both the need and the capability to search haystacks of data for the needle of information that, they argue, can lead to a successful law enforcement or counterterrorist effort. It is in the creation of the haystack that many fear abuse, regardless of what controls may be put to use. Laura Donahue asserts that the National Security Agency’s mass surveillance activities amount to the modern equivalent of the general warrant, the primary evil sought to be addressed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, in addressing the privacy impact of increased use by both the public and the private sector of unmanned aerial systems, a 2014 study by Wells C. Bennett examined the questions of which arm of the government (federal or state) ought to balance a proliferating technology’s benefits against its privacy costs and which drones (government or private) are likely to present the greatest threats to privacy. The U.S. legal system is cumbersome, is reactive, and relies on the existence of a specific case and controversy to respond. As such, it tends to be

more effective in addressing traditional privacy problems, such as intrusions that are physical in nature, disclosures of deep secrets, or distortion. These problems track traditional conceptions of privacy, and physical intrusions are problems that even people in ancient times could experience and understand. But the nature of the issues being addressed in 2018 is different and often does not track traditional conceptions of privacy. Today’s problems involve efforts to aggregate otherwise nonprivate information and, thus, gain knowledge about individuals without physically intruding or even gathering data directly from them. There are also concerns about the way in which the data are handled and maintained, the way in which the data are used by others, and the exclusion of the people whose information is involved from participating in its processing. Modern privacy problems emerge not just from disclosing that which others would keep secret but also from making obscure information more accessible or from consistent observation of or eavesdropping on what is done in public. In her concurring opinion to a 2012 Supreme Court decision involving GPS monitoring (United States v. Jones), Justice Sonia Sotomayor observed that the same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test of requiring both a subjective expectation of privacy on the part of the individual as well as the objective reasonableness of this expectation on the part of society by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations. As technology allows more of the type of aggregation of information that is considered to be otherwise nonprivate under Katz and the Third-Party doctrine, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise set forth in these cases that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach, Justice Sotomayor argues, is ill suited to the Digital Age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. In that same case, Justice Samuel Alito echoes a similar philosophical perspective, attacking the majority for largely disregarding what he (and, it can be surmised, Sotomayor) considers to be truly important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of

Law and Digital Technology

long-term tracking), instead basing its reasoning on an act that most would view as relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation). Alito’s concern is that if longterm monitoring can be accomplished without committing a technical trespass, then the Court’s theory would provide no protection. The technology to allow this exists for just about all cell phones. The legal community itself is struggling with the implications of these rulings. So much communication between attorneys and their clients, indeed between attorneys and their offices, takes place in an environment that cannot be considered secure, and without that security, the privileged nature of communication is lost. The attorney “work product” privilege is broader than the “communications” privilege. It protects the work that the attorney does in furtherance of such representations (e.g., who the attorney interviewed, the documents the attorney prepares). The privilege exists under the theory that the communications (or work product) would not exist but for the existence of the privilege. It does not act to conceal information that previously existed—it acts to promote the creation of new information (privileged communications) that would not otherwise exist. But the modern surveillance society in general and the National Security Agency’s activities with other intelligence agencies threaten to destroy the privilege. The predictable pathways of information are changing: The physical world itself is becoming a type of information system. In what is called the Internet of things, sensors and actuators embedded in physical objects—from roadways to pacemakers—are linked through wired and wireless networks, often using the same Internet protocol that connects the Internet. These networks produce huge volumes of data that flow to computers for analysis. These new technologies provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy. There is much to suggest that many people find the trade-off worthwhile, or if they do not, they are reconciling themselves to this development as inevitable. On the other hand, concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions.

573

But legislation may not be the only way for behavior in cyberspace to be regulated in ways that provide benefits while protecting privacy and other legal interests. Keeping statutes more general while promulgating specificity through implementing regulation may be both effective and flexible. Often, the best way to apply the law to specialized endeavors is through general rules. One expert in this field, Lawrence Lessig, suggests a perspective that considers behavior ­ as being addressed through four modalities of ­regulation—(1) law, (2) social norms, (3) markets, and (4) architecture. In Lessig’s approach, law regulates as an order backed by a threat directed at primary behavior. Norms are similar to law but are backed not by government but by the social behavior of a community. Markets regulate by price. Architecture regulates behavior by how the world in which behavior takes place is constructed. The “net regulation” of any particular policy is the sum of the regulatory effects of the four modalities together. Lessig suggests that architecture (the code) can regulate as well or in some cases more efficiently or effectively than the market or law/social norms. In a 2015 work sponsored by the Brookings Institution, it was noted that its study of the effect of technology on privacy and civil liberties suggested little agreement that salvation could only or primarily come from the courts, the legislatures, administrative agencies, or technologists. In this effort, the contributors endorsed a different mix of those various solutions.

Technology and International Law The role of international law is another aspect of the legal landscape coming more into play. Privacy is one of the most critical liberal rights to come under pressure from transnational intelligence gathering. Indeed, the expansion of technology related to surveillance is increasingly resulting in the discussion of the applicability of the right to privacy enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the work of national intelligence communities. Efforts to develop international law and norms are difficult. Yet progress has been made. Working under the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, a group of legal experts have developed

574

Law and Digital Technology

a comprehensive manual that identifies the state of international law on a wide range of topics, including sovereignty, human rights, and military operations. The effort to compile the information presented in the Tallinn Manual reflects the importance and the complexity of the topic. The legal landscape of the military is also at play. What was once only a military-industrial complex has turned, in the view of many, into a military-Internet complex. The use of technology has complicated the landscape not just in terms of surveillance but also in terms of actual conflict. By demonstrating how military coercion differs from diplomatic and economic coercion, analyst Michael N. Schmitt identified seven areas— (1) severity, (2) immediacy, (3) directness, (4) invasiveness, (5) measurability, (6) presumptive legitimacy, and (7) responsibility—in which ­ military operations differ qualitatively from nonmilitary ones. His analysis consists of applying a fixed quantitative scale (1–10) to each factor to describe any information operation as being closer to one end of a spectrum or the other. If any given operation were quantitatively “graded” in each of these seven areas, the results could be used to give a principled qualitative description of the operation, accurately classifying it as a use of force or not. These criteria are as follows: •• Severity: If people are killed or if property damage is extensive, action is probably military; the less the damage, the less likely the action is a use of force. •• Immediacy: When effects are seen within seconds to minutes (as when a bomb explodes), the operation is probably military; if effects take weeks or months to appear, it is more likely diplomatic or economic. •• Directness: If the action taken is the sole cause of the result, it is more likely to be viewed as a use of force; as the link between cause and effect attenuates, so does the military nature of the act. •• Invasiveness: A violated border is still an indicator of military operations; actions that are mounted from outside a target nation’s borders are probably more diplomatic or economic. •• Measurability: If the effect can be quantified immediately (e.g., a “smoking hole” where a target used to be), the operation has a strong

military characteristic; the more subjective the process of evaluating the damage, the more diplomatic or economic the operation will be considered. •• Presumptive legitimacy: State actors have a monopoly on the legitimate use of kinetic force, while other nonkinetic actions (i.e., attacks through or in cyberspace) are often permissible in a wider set of circumstances; actions that have not been the sole province of nation-states are less likely to be viewed as military. •• Responsibility: If a state takes visible responsibility for any destructive act, it is more likely to be categorized as a traditional military operation; ambiguous responsibility militates for a nonmilitary label.

Conclusion Technology has always been a factor with the landscape of the law and society. Introduction of the telegraph, of photography, of the wireless transmitter, each caused new concerns about the law to arise. Now all aspects of the law— intellectual property, contracting, tort and criminal law, and jurisdiction—are routinely affected by the capabilities of cyberspace and other forms of technology. Judge Frank Easterbrook’s recommendation that the best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general rules still holds true and provides a path for navigating the legal terrain. R. James Orr See also Cybersecurity Legislation; Information Security; Law; Privacy, Types of; United States v. Jones (2012)

Further Readings Banks, William C. “Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks.” Texas Law Review, v.88 (2010). Bennett, Wells C. “Civilian Drones, Privacy, and the Federal-State Balance.” Brookings Institution (September 2014). https://www.brookings.edu/ research/civilian-drones-privacy-and-the-federal-statebalance/ (Accessed September 2017). Bignami, Francesca. “Towards a Right to Privacy in Transnational Intelligence Networks.” Michigan Journal of International Law, v.28 (2007).

Legal Moralism The Brookings Institution. Constitution 3.0: Freedom, Technological Change and the Law. Washington, DC: Author, 2011. CBS NEWS. “ACLU: Baltimore Police Use ‘Invasive’ Surveillance Technology” (November 30, 2014). http://www.cbsnews.com/news/aclu-baltimore-policeuse-invasive-stingray-surveillance-technology/ (Accessed January 2015). Chui, Michael, et al. “The Internet of Things.” McKinsey Quarterly (March 2010). http://www.mckinsey.com/ insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/the_internet_of_ things (Accessed January 2015). Cooley on Torts, 2d ed., p. 29. Donohue, Laura K. “Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, v.37 (2014). Easterbrook, Frank. “Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse.” University of Chicago Legal Forum, 207 (1996). Harris, Shane. @WAR: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014. Heyes, J. D. “Did America Just Lose Its First Cyberwar, and Did Sony ‘Surrender’ to North Korean Hackers?” Natural News (December 26, 2014). http://www .naturalnews.com/048104_cyber_war_Sony_North_ Korea.html#ixzz3OQkxDndI (Accessed September 2017). Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Lessig, Lawrence. “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach.” Harvard Law Review, v.113 (1999). Lichtman, Steven B. “Review of Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change, edited by Jeffrey Rosen and Benjamin Wittes.” Law and Politics Book Review, v.22/6 (2012). http://www.lpbr.net/2012/06/ constitution-30-freedom-and.html (Accessed January 2015). Rasch, Mark. “Attorney Client Privilege and the NSA.” Blog Post (February 17, 2014). http://www .securitycurrent.com/en/writers/mark-rasch/attorneyclient-privilege-and-the-nsa (Accessed January 2015). Reidenberg, Joel R. “Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?” Federal Communications Law Journal, v.195/44 (1992). Schmitt, Michael N. “Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, v.37 (1999). Schmitt, Michael N., ed. Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations.

575

Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Schwartz, Paul M. “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace.” Vanderbilt Law Review, v.52 (1999). Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735 (1979). Solove, Daniel J. “A Taxonomy of Privacy.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v.154 (2006). United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___ (2012). United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. “Unmanned Aircraft System.” https:// www.faa.gov/uas/ (Accessed September 2017). Warren, Samuel D. and Louis D. Brandeis. “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review, v.4 (1890).

Legal Moralism The view that criminal law ought to prohibit immoral behavior has historically found favor among practicing jurists and legislators. Legal moralism is the view that criminal law has a legitimate responsibility to prohibit and impose sanctions against activities generally regarded as immoral, even if these activities are performed in private and with the consent of all adults involved, which speaks to the issue of a violation of one’s right to privacy. Some sexual behavior (e.g., homosexuality, sodomy, prostitution), gambling, drug use, pornography, and even suicide and euthanasia are defined as wrong and prohibited by law in some jurisdictions. While few dispute the legitimacy of law in enforcing some parts of morality (e.g., the immorality of murder), legal moralists maintain that criminal sanctions are necessary even when no obvious harm to others occurs. For example, consensual sex between adults arguably harms no one, yet Georgia state law prohibits sodomy, which was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186, 1986), and later effectively overturned in Lawrence v. Texas (539 U.S. 558, 2003), whereby the Court overturned a Texas statute criminalizing sexual conduct between members of the same sex. Legal moralism is not so much a single position as much as it is a category of distinct positions that share the common tenet of linking the justifiable employment of legal sanctions to a type of

576

Legal Moralism

behavior being deemed immoral. The proponents of legal moralism fall into two categories, referred to as positive and negative legal moralism. To the negative legal moralist, wrongdoing is a necessary condition of criminal liability and punishment. Conduct should not be criminalized unless it is in some way morally wrong, nor should criminal liability be imposed on those who are not morally culpable; but the wrongfulness of the conduct and the culpability of its agent do not give us justifiable reason to criminalize the act. The justifiable reasons for criminalizing the act lie elsewhere— for example, in the fact that it causes or threatens to cause harm to others. By contrast, a positive legal moralist holds that the moral wrongfulness of a type of conduct gives us legitimate reason to criminalize it—not necessarily a conclusive reason, since we might well find stronger countervailing reasons arguing against criminalization, but a legitimate reason to consider criminalizing it. Positive legal moralists believe that the central purpose of criminal law, as a distinctive mode of legal regulation, is to define and provide for the formal condemnation and punishment of various kinds of wrongdoing. Sir Patrick Devlin is considered one of the early proponents of the ideology of positive legal moralism. He maintains that criminal law is based on moral principles and that its function is to simply enforce a moral principle and nothing else. In his view, it is not possible to set limits to the power of the state to legislate against immorality. What makes a society of any sort is a community of ideas—not only political ideas but also moral ideas—about the way in which its members should behave and govern their lives. The structure of every society is made up of both politics and morals. Society is held together by invisible bonds of these common thoughts. Therefore, whatever threatens those common bonds threatens society. In response, society has a right to protect itself against threats to those common bonds. In other words, society is entitled, by means of its laws, to protect itself from dangers, whether from within or without. An established morality is as necessary as good government to the welfare of society. Therefore, society has a right to protect itself against anything that threatens its shared morality. John Stuart Mill is considered one of the early proponents of the ideology of negative legal

moralism. He proposed that law can be justifiably used to ban only actions that cause harm to others. He referred to this concept as the harm principle (it is justifiable to employ legal sanctions when a person’s behavior harms, or presents a clear and present danger of harm to another). When this principle is ignored and sanctions are imposed, it is referred to as paternalism. Legislation is paternalistic when it forces someone to do something for their own good—such as stop smoking, wear a seat belt or motorcycle helmet, avoid using certain drugs, and other similar restrictions. Paternalism exists when the government operates “like a father” in disciplining citizens for their own good even if it violates their right to privacy. Another form of negative legal moralism can be found in the Feinbergian interpretation of the harm principle, which advocates that the positive aim of a system of criminal law is to prevent harm by criminalizing and so reducing the incidence of conduct that causes or might cause harm. It further notes that the demands of justice set a coconstraint on the pursuit of that preventive goal, forbidding the criminalizing of conduct that is not morally wrongful. Dianne Williams See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Civil Rights Movement; Eugenics Industrial Complex; Military Industrial Complex; Paternalism and Parens Patriae; Privacy, Right to; Social Justice; War on Drugs

Further Readings Alexander, L., et al. Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Ashworth, A. J. and M. Redmayne. The Criminal Process (4th ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2010. Brink, David O. “Retributivism and Legal Moralism.” Ratio Juris, v.25/4 (2012). Duff, M. A. “Towards a Modest Legal Moralism.” Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 12-28, University of Minnesota Law School, 2012. Galvin, Richard R. “Legal Moralism and the U.S. Supreme Court.” Presented at the AILACT session on Wednesday, December 27, 2007, at the APA Eastern Division meeting in Washington, DC, 2007.

Libertarian Party Hart, H. L. A. Law, Liberty, and Morality. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963. Kekes, J. “The Enforcement of Morality.” American Philosophical Quarterly, v.37/1 (2000). Kuflik, A. “Liberalism, Legal Moralism and Moral Disagreement.” Journal of Applied Philosophy, v.22/2 (2005). Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism and On Liberty (ed., M. Warnock). Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2003. Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Another Look at Legal Moralism.” Ethics, v.77/1 (1966). Petersen, T. S. “New Legal Moralism: Some Strength and Challenges.” Criminal Law and Philosophy, v.4/2 (2010).

Libertarian Party The Libertarian Party is a political party in the United States. In a political system dominated by two major parties (the Republicans and the Democrats), it is the third largest political party in the country, claiming more than 350,000 members. The party was founded on December 11, 1971, by David Nolan. It is built around classical liberalism and supports the reduction of government involvement in the daily affairs of its citizens. Among some of its basic tenets, the Libertarian Party believes in an isolationist posture in foreign affairs, a reduction in the scope of the criminal justice system, open borders for immigrants, strict limits on surveillance of citizens, a free market economy, and an enhanced expectation of freedom for citizens, particularly regarding social issues. All the preceding beliefs will be examined in the remainder of this entry. The Libertarian Party’s conception of security and the role of government in providing security to its citizens runs counter to many existing U.S. government positions in both foreign affairs and the domestic criminal justice system. In foreign affairs, the Libertarian Party advocates a largely isolationist posture, particularly with regard to military matters. It believes that global security issues are a result of past American military interventions abroad and that the best way to ensure the elimination of these threats is to significantly reduce all American military commitments abroad and instead rely on defending the physical borders

577

of the United States. This runs contrary to the long-standing American military strategy that emphasizes the forward-basing of U.S. troops in countries around the world ostensibly to meet potential threats on foreign rather than American soil. Libertarians support the removal of the United States from collective defense organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and oppose virtually all foreign military intervention regardless of the political, moral, or religious justifications for such action. This philosophical stance has put the party at odds with many U.S. policies in the War on Terror that the government has enacted since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, particularly the U.S.-led military invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The party’s views on the American criminal justice system also differ in some significant ways from those held by the two major political parties in the United States. It believes that the purpose of law should be to prevent people from harming one another, and as a result, Libertarians oppose all laws that seek to regulate individual behavior in both moral and economic realms. They frequently oppose laws that regulate drug use and other activities they consider to be matters of personal choice. Members also oppose harsh punishment for the violation of laws and view prisons as a waste of taxpayer capital when used for low-risk prisoners. They especially oppose capital punishment. In the area of immigration, Libertarians generally support open borders as they believe that humans should have a right to escape tyrannical governments. The Libertarian Party does believe, however, in preventing the entry of people into the country who could pose a significant security risk to the country and its citizens. The Libertarian Party is largely opposed to any government surveillance on civilian populations. The party’s roots in classical liberalism promote individual sovereignty. Under this set of principles, it is generally inappropriate for the government to use any warrantless surveillance practices to gather information on its own citizens. The party is strongly opposed to legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act, which passed during the George W. Bush administration in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This legislation eased the requirements the government needs to meet to engage in

578

Libya

the surveillance of suspected terrorists. The Libertarian Party was also among the most outspoken critics when it became public knowledge that the National Security Agency was engaging in an extraordinarily broad range of electronic surveillance that included phone, email, and other electronic communications. On a related note, Libertarians consider government censorship of speech in any form to be inappropriate, particularly political speech. The Libertarian Party argues that one of the most important things that the government should do is to respect and protect the privacy of the individual. This is a core belief and it extends to both economic policy and social policy. In economic policy, the Libertarian Party promotes pure laissez-faire capitalism as defined by economist Adam Smith. It opposes nearly all regulation of private business by the government, instead preferring to let the free markets control the practices of businesses. This view is considered the only fair approach for the government to take, since Libertarians believe that the government should not be able to dictate the use of an individual’s property. U.S. government policies designed to provide a social safety net such as Social Security, minimum wages, and Medicaid are strongly opposed by members who insist that economic stability is the responsibility of the individual. These social safety net programs are viewed primarily as attempts of wealth redistribution by the government, an idea that Libertarians consider to be fundamentally unfair. This limited government perspective also applies to social policy. The Libertarian Party platform supports the choice of a woman to decide whether she wishes to have an abortion and actively opposes all attempts by the government to control it. This decision, Libertarians argue, is solely the prerogative of the individual, and there is no role for the government in it. The platform is also opposed to the involvement of the government in the definition of marriage. It specifically addresses the issue by stating that consenting adults should be able to engage in whatever relationships they see fit. Any prohibition of homosexual behavior, for example, by the government is considered to be a breach of individual liberty. Similarly, Libertarians oppose any government regulation of obscene or pornographic material as

a government infringement on the freedom of expression and an individual’s choice to determine what he or she will read and watch. Finally, the Libertarian Party strongly believes that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals’ right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense. As a result, it opposes government attempts to register or otherwise regulate firearms. Freedom, liberty, and a very limited conception of the role of government permeate Libertarian Party views. While this sometimes puts the group at odds with a majority of American voters, Libertarians’ response is that their emphasis on limited government and individual freedom is the political philosophy best in keeping with the Founding Fathers of the United States. Darren A. Wheeler and Grey Harris See also Equality; Free Speech; Freedom of Expression; Immigration; National Security Agency; Privacy, Right to

Further Readings Benedict, Wes. Introduction to the Libertarian Party: For Democrats, Republicans, Libertarians, Independents, and Everyone Else (1st ed.). Seattle, WA: CreateSpace, 2013. Boaz, David. The Politics of Freedom: Taking on the Left, the Right and Other Threats to Our Liberties. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2008 Kibbe, Matt. Don’t Hurt People and Don’t Take Their Stuff: A Libertarian Manifesto. New York, NY: William Morrow, 2014. Kyriazi, Harold. Libertarian Party at Sea on Land. New York, NY: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 2000.

Libya Libya is a country situated in North Africa, with a population of about 6,411,776; about 1 million reside in the capital city of Tripoli. Egypt is Libya’s closest neighbor to the east, while Sudan is Libya’s neighbor to the southeast. Libya is bordered to the north by the Mediterranean Sea and to the south by Chad and Niger, while Algeria and Tunisia are situated at the western part of Libya. Libya is the

Libya

fourth largest country in Africa and occupies an area of about 700,000 square miles. Libya gained its independence in 1951, and it adopted the name United Libyan Kingdom. In 1963, the name of the country was changed to the Kingdom of Libya. In 1969, following a successful coup d’etat led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the country’s name was changed again to the Libyan Arab Republic. Between 1977 and 1986, Libya’s name was changed again to Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and between 1986 and 2011, its name was the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In 2011, however, the country adopted the name Libya. The Gaddafi administration’s adoption of the socialist ideology meant that the Libyan government had full control of the political, economic, and social life of the people. The government did not allow any opposition political party or any open dissent. To maintain power and check opposition, the government of Libya employed extensive surveillance technology in the country to gather intelligence and to monitor the activities of the opposition and human rights activist groups. Typical of authoritarian regimes, government operations as a result are shrouded in secrecy, and the human and civil rights of the people are compromised as well. Thus, rather than using surveillance to protect the people and enhance security in the country, it is used to protect the government and to checkmate the operations of groups opposed to the authoritarian regime. The remainder of this entry reviews the history of Libya and the state of the country under Gaddafi.

History The original inhabitants of Libya are the AfroAsiatic ancestors of the Berber people who settled in the area at about 8000 BCE. By the 5th century BCE, the Phoenicians established a trading post in present-day Libya. Carthage, one of the Phoenician colonies, extended its rule over Libya and other parts of North Africa. The ancient Greek empire also extended into Libya and founded the city of Cyrene. Persia took over the control of Libya in 525 BCE and remained in control of the area for about two centuries. Many other ancient empires such as Egypt and Greece as part of the Ptolemaic Kingdom held sway in Libya until

579

74 BCE, when the Romans seized power. Emperor Claudius introduced Christianity to the eastern part of Cyrenaica. During his reign (189–199 CE), Pope Victor I was stationed in Libya when the country converted to Nicene Christianity. Following the decline of the Roman Empire in the 5th century, the Vandals, a Germanic tribe, invaded North Africa, contributing to the destruction of Libya. By the time the Vandals entered the area, the Byzantine Empire had extended its rule to the area. However, the Byzantine dominance was weak due to frequent rebellion by the Berber. By the 7th century, the Byzantine control weakened, giving room for the Muslims to successfully overrun the area. Abdullah ibn Saad captured Tripoli in 647 and imposed Islamic rule. Some historical accounts indicate that the Berber tribes accepted the Islamic faith but resisted the political authority instituted by the Arabs. In 750, the Abbasids took over control of Libya from the Umayyads, bringing Libya under the Bagdad’s regime. Toward the end of the 9th century, the Shiite Fatmids hijacked control of the western part of Libya and appointed Bologhine ibn Ziri, a Berber, as governor of Libya. However, his regime was short lived, as he broke away from the Fatmids and aligned instead with Sunni Abbasids of Baghdad. The Fatmids’ punishment for Ziri’s act of disloyalty was to flood Libya with more Arabs, completely altering the ethnic and linguistic structure of Libya. Further weakening Ziri’s power was the secession from the country in 1001 by the Berbers of the Banu Khazrum. In 1510, Habsburg Spain invaded Tripoli and remained in charge of the area until 1551, when Ottoman admiral Sinan Pasha became the paramount ruler of Libya. During this time, European colonial authorities settled many blacks from Sudan and other African tribes in Libya. During the early 19th century, Tripoli fought many wars, including one with the United States in which the United States prevailed, leading to a peace treaty favorable to the United States. In 1912, Italy colonized Libya; however, by 1943, Libyans resisting the Italian colonization succeeded in overthrowing the Italian government that was already weakened following its involvement in World War II. The Allied Forces occupied Libya from 1943 until 1951, when Libya gained its independence and renounced its ties with Italy.

580

Lie Detector Instrumentation

Libya Under Gaddafi The discovery of oil in 1959 transformed Libya’s economy. But wealth from the oil was concentrated in few hands, which created discontent. Gaddafi led a group of rebel officers to overthrow the government of King Idris during the popular so-called Al Fateh Revolution in 1969. In 1977, following the declaration of Libya as a socialist state, Gaddafi claimed himself the symbolic figurehead of state, with all powers of governance resting with the General Peoples’ Committees. In this system of government, the country was divided into about 2,000 political subdivisions, each with its own local governing committees. Votes from the local committees were supposed to dictate the outcome of national policies. The political revolution known as the Arab Spring movement also spread to Libya in 2011. Gaddafi’s government was able to withstand the movement, but a civil war resulted. Rebel forces took over the control of a section of Libya. Gaddafi, in an attempt to regain control, used what the United Nations condemned as excessive force and a violation of international law. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, approving the establishment of a no-fly zone to protect civilians within the rebel enclave. The Security Council vote was 10 to 0, with India, Germany, Brazil, China, and Russia abstaining. As a result of this resolution and the enforcement of it by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, the Gaddafi regime collapsed, and rebel forces arrested and killed Gaddafi. Since the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, Libya has not known peace, as several political factions continue to jostle for control of the government. The vacuum created by Gaddafi’s exit has many security implications for Libya in particular and for the West African subregion, as well as the world as a whole. Many militias have sprung up and created their own fiefdoms, threatening the power of the central government. Furthermore, the proliferation of arms resulting from the political conflict in Libya has created additional security challenges in the North and West African subregions. O. Oko Elechi and Noel Otu See also Arab Spring

Further Readings Cole, P. and B. Mcquinn, eds. The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2015. Cooley, J. K. Libyan Sandstorm: The Complete Account of Qaddafi’s Revolution. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1982. St. John, R. B. Libya: From Colony to Independence. Oxford, England: One World, 2008.

Lie Detector Instrumentation Societies have long tried to find a way to detect when a person is lying. Through advancements in medical knowledge, criminology, and technology, it became possible to create instruments that could detect lies. Based on the premise that people have physiological reactions when they lie, lie detector instrumentation measures and records those reactions to determine truthfulness. Since 1921, when the first modern lie detector (also known as the polygraph) was created, controversy has surrounded it. Proponents argue that lie detectors have a high accuracy rate and that they can be used to extract confessions; exonerate the innocent; promote trust, honesty, and loyalty of employees; and ensure national security. However, critics argue that the lie detector has a much lower accuracy rate, that it lacks validity in the scientific community, that it amounts to psychological “third degree” (coercive interrogation techniques), that it is easy to misuse, and that it violates U.S. ­constitutional rights that protect privacy and self-­incrimination. In this entry, the history and development in technology of lie detector instrumentation is reviewed, as is the lines of questioning used when administering a polygraph test. Applications of lie detectors are then discussed, which include national security, criminal prosecution, and corporate hirings. Criticisms of lie detectors that focus on invasions of privacy are also considered.

Developments in Technology and Polygraph Testing Credit for the first modern lie detector is frequently given to John Larson, a Berkeley, California, police officer, for his “cardio-pneumo-­ psychograph” in 1921. Influenced by the work of others, Larson

Lie Detector Instrumentation

created a machine that would continuously record both respiration and blood pressure to determine a person’s truthfulness. Larson’s lie detector sat on a 6-foot-long plank and connected the recording instrument to the interviewee by tubes and wires. The interviewees were instructed to sit in a chair while a rubber hose was wound around their chest to measure their breathing and a blood pressure cuff was strapped around their bicep. As soon as the lie detector was turned on, the black recording paper would begin to turn and two needles began to scratch the blood pressure and the respiration measurements onto the paper. All movement by the interviewee was recorded, so to obtain accurate results, the interviewee had to remain as still as possible. By the early 1930s, Leonarde Keeler patented the first portable lie detector, the Keeler Polygraph. In addition to making his lie detector smaller, Keeler changed the tambour, which transfers information from the interviewee to the pens, making it more sensitive and more reliable. Keeler also added a third measurement, perspiration, which is measured through electrodes attached to the interviewee’s fingertips. Since then, measuring respiration, blood pressure, and perspiration has remained unchanged. However, in 2012, the American Polygraph Association added a fourth measurement, body movement, which is measured not to determine truthfulness but as a countermeasure to “beating the machine.” Although the measurements have remained the same, technological advancements have allowed for several improvements. The pneumatic sensors that relied on air pressure were replaced by electric sensors, which were then replaced by computerized sensors. The black scrolling paper was replaced by paper that more clearly recorded and preserved the measurements. In the 1990s, the scrolling paper was replaced by computer screens. Computerized algorithms were also created to help examiners determine the level of truthfulness. In lie detection, the questioning is just as important as the technology. Larson first used a combination of relevant and irrelevant questions that required only yes or no answers, with the irrelevant questions helping to establish a baseline. Since then, several other styles of questioning have been used, with two proving to be the most

581

effective. The first, and most common, is the Control ­Question Test. In this test, a combination of introductory, neutral, control, and relevant questions are asked with only yes or no responses. The neutral and control questions serve to identify a baseline. The second is the Guilty Knowledge Test and is commonly used by law enforcement as an investigative tool. In this test, interviewees are asked a series of questions designed to identify if the interviewee knows more specific information regarding the crime. It is generally not used as a determinant of truthfulness. The success of the lie detector in the United States led researchers to identify other physiological responses to lying and to develop technology to measure those responses. In the 1960s, research turned to voice stress analysis, which detects changes in voice and tone to determine a person’s truthfulness. Lasers have been used to detect muscular, circulatory, and other bodily changes. Identification of blood pooling around the eyes when a person is lying has led to the development of facial thermal imaging to measure blood flow in the face. The functional magnetic resonance imaging examines the person’s brain activity to determine when they are lying. Since all of these different forms of lie detection rely on machines to enhance or identify a person’s physiological responses, critics claim that they violate a person’s psychological integrity and, therefore, are a violation of privacy, just as technology that pierces through the walls of a person’s house is a violation of privacy.

Applications Throughout the 1920s, the lie detector was primarily used by law enforcement to help streamline their investigations and to eliminate the use of violent third-degree interrogation techniques. Despite the federal court ruling in United States v. Frye (1924) that questioned the lie detector’s ­scientific validity and created a temporary ban on polygraph evidence being admissible in court, law enforcement increased their use. During the 1930s, the lie detector became a tool for whatever the circumstances needed, as polygraph examiners sought out different uses for the polygraph in American society. The lie detector’s ability to determine emotional truthfulness allowed it to

582

Life Sciences Surveillance and Security

perform many functions. It was used to diagnose mental illness, to help in marriage counseling, to aid advertisers in the marketing of consumer products, to teach people what they wanted, and to fine-tune the emotional content of movies. Big businesses, including banks and department stores, used the lie detector to identify and deter employee theft and to determine who they could trust when hiring. During World War II, the U.S. government added political loyalty and national security to the uses of the lie detector. Polygraph tests became a condition of employment for applicants of sensitive government positions. The first time the polygraph was used to determine political loyalty was on German prisoners of war. During the Cold War, when national security concerns increased, so did the use of the polygraph. Government employees were subjected to repeated polygraphs to confirm their continued loyalty and integrity. Attempts to balance national security and a person’s liberties, including privacy, did not always work, and polygraph testing began to be more invasive. Increasingly included were questions that would identify communists, spies, homosexuals, and other behaviors that were deemed a threat to preserving national security information. The Central Intelligence Agency was among the first government agencies to require all employees to undergo continuous polygraph examinations, even though they trained many of them in techniques to beat the machine. By the 1950s, more than 2 million tests were being conducted in the United States each year. Even though government investigations found ­little scientific validity for the polygraph, its use increased. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, labor unions, academic scientists, and civil libertarians strongly criticized the increased use of the polygraph and claimed that it was a violation of personal privacy, a violation of the right against self-incrimination, and inordinately coercive. In 1983, when President Ronald Reagan issued the National Security Decision Directive 84 that authorized all federal agencies to conduct polygraph investigation to identify any disclosures of classified information, critics responded immediately. Their criticisms, including that the polygraph violated a person’s right to privacy, led to  the passing of the 1988 Employee Polygraph

Protection Act, which restricted how the polygraph could be used in the private sector. While the Employee Polygraph Protection Act decreased the number of tests being conducted each year, polygraph testing continued. In the private sector, polygraphs can still be used by businesses in internal investigations, and in the hiring process if the company deals with money or security. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the federal government once again began conducting more polygraph tests, especially as a way to identify terrorists and as an interrogation and intimidation tool. The lie detector is used by state and local government agencies as an employment screening tool to help streamline background checks and as a probation and parole condition, especially for sex offenders. Courts have begun to be more accepting of polygraph evidence, but variations exist with regard to admissibility in court and the criteria for admissibility. Once again, the United States is faced with balancing personal civil liberties and national security in its use of lie detectors. Jessica Schmidt See also Central Intelligence Agency; National Security

Further Readings Alder, Ken. The Lie Detectors: The History of an American Obsession. New York, NY: Free Press, 2007. Bunn, Geoffrey C. The Truth Machine: A Social History of the Lie Detector. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. White, Richard D., Jr. “Ask Me No Questions, Tell Me No Lies: Examining the Uses and Misuses of the Polygraph.” Public Personnel Management, v.30/4 (Winter 2001).

Life Sciences Surveillance and Security Life sciences is a broad term covering a wide variety of topics. There are life sciences involved in clinical, medical, and scientific research; pharmaceutical research; medical devices; devices and/or

Life Sciences Surveillance and Security

equipment that may be surgically implanted (e.g., hip replacements, breast implants); and many other areas that might require surveillance. Related topics include active surveillance for localized prostate cancer; animal disease surveillance; blood safety and surveillance; infectious disease surveillance; radiological effluent surveillance; pharmaceutical surveillance; food safety, food-borne disease, and food contaminant surveillance; environmental contaminant surveillance; tuberculosis and drug-resistant tuberculosis surveillance; immune surveillance; medical device surveillance; patient surveillance after cancer treatment; primary liver cancer surveillance; children’s health surveillance; and viruses in food and water surveillance. In business terms, security for life sciences companies may be listed as being of corporate level, or C-level, importance. C level indicates the highest level in an organization and may often include the chief risk officer. One approach suggests that companies do more than monitor, but they begin by actively understanding potential threats and working to be responsive in an adaptive manner. There is a growing number of companies that offer security to life sciences companies (e.g., pharma security). The intent is to maintain critical control and to protect intellectual property. However, collaboration is a key component of the scientific endeavor. In each of these disparate areas, there are ongoing projects that may have different levels of confidentiality, as well as the dichotomous need for communication with others in the field. This dichotomy is at the heart of the security issue—the need to provide open “windows” for communication without having open “doors” for theft of intellectual properties. Computer security is also a key factor of importance. With the increased use of devices and cloud services, the ability to provide security and the range of considerations have become much broader.

Postmarket Surveillance Postmarket surveillance is the monitoring of medical devices and their effectiveness, or lack thereof, in patients following a surgery. For example, a company called PIP manufactured breast implants that used a low-grade silicone, causing ruptures, inflammation, and many medical issues. The

583

resulting outcry, and serious harm done to patients, led to changes in legal directives relating to medical devices, and companies have initiated serious postmarket surveillance of their products. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has initiated a National Medical Device Post-Market Surveillance System (MDS). An outline of the MDS includes (a) establishing an MDS board to identify the appropriate structure for governance in creating a postmarket surveillance system for ­ medical devices; (b) establishing a unique device identification system and have this incorporated into any health information that is kept electronically; (c) working toward international and national registries for devices; (d) updating all reporting of incidents, particularly aiming at record keeping and unified information; and (e) modernizing methods of data analysis and promulgating of said data to medical professionals as well as other interested parties. A goal is to have real-time data from actively practicing clinicians with respect to incidents concerning their patients. The intent is to have on-hand information concerning device performance, as there may always be problems despite the best premarket testing. Often, such data will provide useful information about long-term benefits as well.

Public Health Surveillance Life science surveillance would also include public health surveillance, defined as the process focused on health-relevant threats: (a) contamination of food or water supplies, (b) radiation leaks, and (c)  potential bioterrorist threats. This is surveillance at broad levels—from local, regional, state, national, to global—and involving a diverse number of organizations, including hospitals, public health organizations, and pharmacies, with both state and national oversight. Some attention is being focused on the use of computerized data collection and analysis to aid in more rapid oversight.

Communicable Disease Surveillance Other disease and medical threats also fit under the life sciences surveillance umbrella—for example, measles and Ebola virus. In the United States, physicians dealing with communicable diseases

584

Life Sciences Surveillance and Security

have mandatory requirements for reporting these to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Examples in this area include keeping track of patients who have been infected with or exposed to the Ebola virus, as well as outbreaks, whereby the report includes the first patient who has measles as well as following the trail of infection, say from a Disneyland visit of a measlesinfected person. Other personnel are also required to report communicable diseases, including any individuals and/or facilities providing health care services, day care directors, state institutions, school nurses, and laboratory directors.

Specific Health Issue Surveillance There is already a considerable drive toward increased surveillance with respect to certain diseases. One example is the Nationwide Framework for Surveillance of Cardiovascular and Chronic Lung Diseases from the National Academies of Science. The surveillance data include not only vital statistics, administrative health data, registries of disease, cohort studies, and population studies but also daily reports from clinicians. The intent of the National Academies of Science is to develop a central system to collect information concerning these types of chronic diseases, to learn how they affect the population of the United States, and to both track efforts for prevention and identify priorities for public health. A key focus is to move beyond any disparities in gender, race, age, income, and region.

Blood Surveillance Blood is critically important for humans and other mammals, so having a safe blood supply is also of critical importance. With regard to blood transfusions, there are both risks and strategies to prevent risks, many involving surveillance, particularly given the risk of disease transmission. In the United States, surveillance of blood products is an important issue, as is accurate reporting of certain diseases such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis (said to be underreported). Blood and blood product surveillance include a federal regulatory oversight, as well as training programs, professional standards, risk analysis, and risk reduction. In part, ensuring a healthy blood supply requires monitoring for transfusion-transmitted infectious diseases, particularly

HIV/AIDS and hepatitis. Several important monitoring aspects are ­ necessary: (a) awareness of the demographics of ­HIV-seropositive patient locations, (b) prevention of such individuals from donating blood, (c) education and assessment as to why infected individuals might seek to donate blood, and (d) assessment concerning the questionnaires used for blood donors, and whether they adequately screen out HIV-seropositive individuals. The United States, France, and England have established formal surveillance programs for posttransfusion disease. In France, the hemovigilance program is a formal reporting and assessment regime, similar to the English program for Serious Hazards of Transfusion. However, these two programs may not be as rigorous as that of the United States, which requires reporting of HIV infection in some states and reporting of AIDS and viral hepatitis in all states. The latter is of concern, because it is believed to be underreported and not all cases are investigated.

Outcomes Positive factors from such health surveillance include a clear-cut reduction in transmission of hepatitis by transfusion. As many as 8,760 transfusion-associated AIDS cases are known; however, only 39 of these could be demonstrably shown to have occurred after the onset of testing for HIV. Surveillance remains an important step in the various life sciences industries for estimation and prevention of risk. Laura A. Andersson See also Bioengineering; Bioinformatics; Biosurveillance; Computer Surveillance; DNA Technology; Information Security

Further Readings Accenture. Active Defense: Adapting Pharma Security to Threats. http://www.accenture.com/us-en/Pages/ insight-pharma-security.aspx (Accessed March 2015). Bioportfolio. Surveillance: Biotech, Pharma and Life Science Channel. http://www.bioportfolio.com/ channels/surveillance (Accessed March 2015). Linden, Jeanne and Celso Bianco, eds. Blood Safety and Surveillance. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, 2001.

Life Without Parole National Academies of Science. A Nationwide Framework for Surveillance of Cardiovascular and Chronic Lung Diseases. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Mandatory Reporting of Infectious Diseases by Clinicians. Atlanta, GA: Author. http://www.cdc.gov/ mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001665.htm (Accessed March 2015). U.S. Department of Health. Communicable Disease Reporting. New York, NY: Author. http://www.health .ny.gov/professionals/diseases/reporting/communicable/ (Accessed March 2015). U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Moving Toward a National Medical Device Postmarket Surveillance System. Silver Spring, MD: Author. http://blogs.fda .gov/fdavoice/index.php/2015/02/moving-toward-anational-medical-device-postmarket-surveillancesystem/ (Accessed March 2015).

Life Without Parole Life without parole (LWOP) gained attention soon after Furman v. Georgia (1972), whereby the U.S. Supreme Court essentially abolished the death penalty in the United States. It remained after Gregg v. Georgia (1976) reinstated the death penalty. LWOP is the most severe sentence in states without the death penalty. It is used as an alternative to death in death penalty states, although it has also been used for other serious crimes, such as being found guilty of being a drug kingpin. It is also used as punishment for a “third strike” in states with three strikes laws. A person sentenced to LWOP is sentenced to die in prison. The major difference between LWOP and death is the date on which the prisoner dies. Under a death sentence, the date is fixed after appeals are exhausted; under LWOP, the date is unknown. The main similarity is that those under both sentences do not leave the prison alive. Many argue that the difference between the sentences is merely semantic. This entry reviews the arguments for and against LWOP and discusses LWOP for juvenile offenders.

Arguments LWOP has supporters and detractors. Those who support it argue that, like death, it incapacitates

585

the perpetrator, thus ensuring that as long as he or she is incarcerated, the prisoner poses no harm to free society. This increases a sense of security in society. They also argue that it is retributive, since the perpetrator forfeits his or her life as a free person, and that it serves as a deterrent to future criminals. It provides justice to survivors of murder victims. It satisfies death penalty supporters by offering them an acceptable alternative to death and assuages their fears that the convict will be pardoned at some later date. Similarly, LWOP prevents faulty parole decisions that result in a parolee committing a serious crime. Some even argue that, given the nature of life in prison, LWOP is more punitive than death. Finally, they note that it offers relief from wrongful convictions. Detractors of LWOP argue that it makes prisoners hard to control, especially early in their sentences, thus raising security issues in the prison. Since prisoners are never going to be released, they may have no incentive to obey the rules. Detractors argue that LWOP takes away any hope for rehabilitation or redemption—should prisoners attain either or both, they will never be able to rejoin the free world. Finally, there is the cost. It puts a great burden on the corrections system, which is forced to keep inmates even though their age and health problems keep them from being a threat to society but at the same time make them a huge financial liability for the state. Detractors feel that LWOP is the harshest penalty next to death. Because it offers no hope of freedom, many see it as inhumane and harmful to human dignity. Those under LWOP are not defended with anywhere near the same zeal as are those who are given a death sentence. LWOP is politically expedient in ways in which death is not; for ­ instance, there are no organizations dedicated to the ­ abolition of LWOP; basically, the prisoner lives and dies out of sight and mind. Unlike those sentenced to death, inmates sentenced to LWOP are offered only one automatic appeal. They are also not provided a court-appointed attorney after this appeal.

Juvenile Life Without Parole In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for juveniles, ruling that anyone who committed a murder prior to

586

Locke, John

attaining the age of 18 years could not be sentenced to death. The major reason for this decision was that juveniles were immature, and this limited their culpability. Five years later, in ­Graham v. Florida (2010), the Court banned the sentence of LWOP for juveniles who had not committed murder. Two years later, in the joint decision of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs (2012), the Supreme Court ruled that juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. This decision affected 29 states and the federal government. No longer could states and the federal government make the sentence of LWOP for juveniles mandatory. Judges needed to be able to consider certain mitigating factors that might qualify the juvenile for a lesser sentence. For instance, research has shown that the human brain does not fully develop until age 25. Other considerations included juveniles’ difficulty in making rational decisions (making them less likely to assist counsel at trial), their troubled upbringings (including physical and sexual abuse), the race of the victim (those convicted of killing white victims were significantly more likely to be given JLWOP), the cost of incarcerating juveniles for a lifetime, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. It is important to note that Miller did not abolish JLWOP, did not change the sentences for juveniles already sentenced to JLWOP, and did not require states to pass new laws. While it did rule that states could not make LWOP mandatory for teens who committed certain crimes, it did not rule out the imposition of the sentence in certain cases (e.g., a juvenile who commits murder may still receive an LWOP sentence). The decision also left vague whether the ruling was to be retroactive. Approximately two thirds of the JLWOP sentences occurred in only five states: California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Since Miller, California has passed legislation mandating review of the sentence at 15 years, while the state supreme courts of ­Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have decided that the ruling does not apply retroactively. James Geistman

See also Capital Punishment; Crime Control; Incapacitation; Prisons and Jails; Punishment

Further Readings Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S.Ct. 1733 (2012). Johnson, Robert and Sandra McGunigall-Smith. “Life Without Parole, America’s Other Death Penalty: Notes on Life Under Sentence of Death by Incarceration.” Prison Journal, v.88/2 (2008). Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2010). O’hear, Michael M. “The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?” Federal Sentencing Reporter, v.23/1 (2010). Rovner, Joshua. Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate on Life Without Parole. Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2014. Rovner, Joshua. Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview. Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2017. Villaume, Alfred C. “‘Life Without Parole’ and ‘Virtual Life Sentences’: Death Sentences by Any Other Name.” Contemporary Justice Review, v.8/3 (2005).

Locke, John John Locke (1632–1704) was an English philosopher and physician. He is often considered one of the most influential enlightened thinkers and philosophers of all time. Locke is known as the “Father of Classical Liberalism.” Many of Locke’s most well-known philosophical beliefs have greatly influenced major historical events, such as the formation of the Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence, the American Revolution, and the French Enlightenment. Moreover, much of Locke’s work is still referenced and acknowledged by contemporary society and is often studied by modern philosophers. While Locke wrote about and greatly influenced public opinion on a variety of topics, his views on liberty and security constitute some of his most important and significant work. In Two Treatises of Government (1689), Locke argues that men are both free and equal as opposed to the notion that God made all people

Locke, John

to be at the discretion of a monarch or sovereign. Instead, he believes that people have inalienable rights (rights they cannot give up), mainly the rights to life, liberty, and property that are separate and independent of any of society’s laws or other constructions. While Locke believes that men are naturally free, he also argues that individuals transfer some of their rights to their government, and in return, the government protects and ensures its citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and property. This symbiotic relationship is often called the social contract. Locke believes that it is only through the social contract between the government and citizens that political power is legitimized and given to governmental leaders—with the consent of the general public. Locke argues that government is only made legitimate with the consent of the governed. Since government is required to provide citizens with the protection of rights, and should encourage “public good” under the social contract, Locke believes that governments that fail to do so should be seen as illegitimate and replaced with a new government that will uphold its portion of the social contract. This is one of Locke’s most significant assertions, because it is essentially a defense of political revolutions. America’s founding fathers used Locke’s argument to support their actions. The Declaration of Independence states, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to affect their safety and happiness. The Declaration of Independence was written in 1776, which is 87 years after Locke wrote Two Treatises of Government. Locke himself carried out his right to overthrow an unjust government when he participated in the Glorious Revolution and the overthrow of King James II of England in 1688. While Locke’s belief of the right to overthrow an unjust government is widely accepted and supported today, some people speculate that Locke initially argued the right to revolution to justify his own participation in a revolution. Locke also argues in support of two different democracy principles: (1) separation of powers and (2) rule of the majority, both of which, he

587

claims, further protect individual liberties. In ­Second Treatise of Government, Locke declares that the same individuals or governmental bodies should not have the power to both create and enforce laws or statues. This is because if the same people are given both legislative and executive powers, they have the ability to either exempt themselves from following the laws they create or they could create laws that suit their own personal interests instead of the interests of the state as a whole. Overall, Locke believes that government bodies that make laws need to be subject to the laws they make. As a result, he believes that the most effective way to ensure that laws are wellwritten and enforced appropriately is to establish two separate branches of government: (1) a legislative branch responsible for creating laws and (2) an executive branch responsible for enforcing laws. Locke also supports a third type of governmental power, federative power. For Locke, federative power deals with society as a whole and that branch’s main job is to interact with foreign governments. Leaders holding federative power would be responsible for tasks such as making treaties and alliances, peace and war, and other relationships with foreign governments and states. While the powers themselves are different, Locke believes that it is most beneficial for federative powers and executive powers to be unified into one branch of government because both powers rely on the will and force of the public. He believes that to separate executive powers and federative powers would lead to uncertainty in government in general. Locke’s backing of the principle of majority rule connects directly to his theory of the importance of the consent of the governed. He claims that majority rule is necessary because it would be impossible for every single individual to consent to a particular law. When citizens enter into the social contract, they must agree to majority rule, because if they do not, they might as well remain in a “state of nature.” In Locke’s state of nature, there is no natural hierarchy among humans, and every individual is naturally free and equal, but they would have no choice but to enforce the law, as well as to obey it, since there is a lack of hierarchy or governing body. Locke states that majority rule is the most logical way to rule a commonwealth since some men may be unable to

588

London, England, Surveillance in

participate in the political process. Both the principle of separation of powers and the principle of majority rule help legitimate governments provide society with security for individual liberties. Both majority rule and separation of powers are seen in action in many modern-day democracies such as the United States, where both principles are embedded explicitly in the U.S. Constitution. A final liberty that is defended by Locke is freedom of religion. In Futility of Intolerance, Locke argues that God has never given authority to anyone to care for the souls of another person; God has never given one person the authority or right to compel another individual to follow one specific religion over another. Locke also believes that power consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion consists of the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. Finally, Locke states that while rigor of laws and the force of penalties are capable of convincing and changing men’s minds, it would not lead to salvation of an individual’s soul because religion requires true conviction that cannot be coerced. Overall, this leads Locke to conclude that government should not get involved in salvation of souls, thus preserving an individual’s freedom from religious persecution. Since a government should not promote a state religion, citizens have the freedom to practice the religion of their choice. R. Bruce Anderson and Matthew J. Geras See also Bentham, Jeremy; Civil Liberties; Franklin, Benjamin; Governing Through Crime; Hobbes, Thomas; Security, Concepts of; Social Contract Theory

Further Readings Cranston, M. “Locke and Liberty.” Wilson Quarterly, v.10/5 (1986). “Declaration of Independence,” Text Transcript (July 4, 1776). http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/ declaration_transcript.html (Accessed October 2017). Dunning, W. A. “The Political Philosophy of John Locke.” Political Science Quarterly, v.20/2 (1905). Rosen, M., et al. Political Thought. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1999. “Transcript of the Constitution of the United States.” Official Text (March 4, 1789). http://www.archives

.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html (Accessed October 2017).

London, England, Surveillance  in The events of 9/11 have had a profound influence in security in the Western world, including that of England’s capital, London. With a population of 8.6 million persons and encompassing 1,572 square kilometers in 2015, the task of securing the city is a monumental one. The sheer size of London and its population have accelerated the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance as a means of crime solution, crime prevention, and monitoring public and private spaces, particularly in the wake of terrorist attacks and the perceived mounting threat of homegrown terrorism in the city. The pervasive nature of CCTV cameras in the city, which record the movement and activities of citizens in public places, private businesses, and a wide variety of other venues, raises troubling questions about the rights of citizens to anonymity and privacy. This entry reviews the increased use of CCTV surveillance in London and then discusses the concerns and criticisms regarding this form of surveillance.

CCTV Surveillance In London, the introduction of public surveillance through the use of CCTV cameras dates back to at least 1960, when temporary cameras were installed to observe crowds at large events and in significant locations such as Trafalgar Square. Since then, CCTV surveillance began to proliferate as a response to crime and vandalism. The Irish Republican Army bombings of the 1970s accelerated the process of the installation of permanent cameras that could be used to identify and apprehend suspects both at the scene of crimes and following their commission. From 1970 to 2014, surveillance cameras appeared at council estates, in schools and universities, on rail systems, at soccer stadiums, in Heathrow airport, and on the motorways and streets that connect London. Surveillance in ­London is arguably directed at preventing crime,

London, England, Surveillance in

including vandalism on council estates and in the urban interstices, fare evasion and property damage to British Rail and other forms of transportation, soccer hooliganism, and various forms of street crime. However, the need to ensure the security of London’s citizens was heightened following the bombings in 2005 wherein four bombs were detonated, three on underground trains and one on a double-decker bus in the core of the city. Fifty-two civilians were killed in the bombings, while 700 others were injured. The bombings occurred the day following the city’s successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games, so the public perception of the relative security offered by the city was also damaged by these terrorist attacks. Within days following the incidents, CCTV camera footage was used to identify the four men responsible for the attacks. The success of the cameras in forging a solution to the terrorist attacks prompted police leaders in both New York and Los Angeles to introduce more surveillance into their respective cities, and was followed by increased adoption of this technology in many major U.S. cities. CCTV surveillance subsequently played a significant role in identifying the individuals responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013.

Criticisms and Concerns Opponents of the increase in surveillance in ­London since the 1960s have argued that CCTV cameras infringe on the personal liberties of British citizens, allowing the government to track them throughout the city. They have also presented arguments that CCTV cameras are not effective in preventing crime. To this point, research by ­Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington (2012), which reviewed several forms of CCTV use, found that “overall it might be concluded that CCTV reduces crime to a small degree” (p. 45). In addition, opponents of the surveillance occurring throughout London suggest that the public lacks clear knowledge concerning how CCTV camera– recorded information is used, implying that they may present a danger to freedoms, anonymity in London, and civil liberties. Data are constantly being collected and recorded on individuals with few, if any,

589

regulation by the government. A report prepared for the British Security Industry found that there are 6 million CCTV cameras in Britain, and it estimated that the number of cameras controlled by government, police, or other state authorities accounts for only 1.2% to 1.7% of all cameras in use. The study found that there are 70 times more cameras that are not under the control of the police or other government agencies but rather under the control of private businesses and private citizens (The Evening Standard, 2014). Although estimates vary, a repeated figure estimates the number of cameras at 1 for every 11 persons in the United Kingdom. Some indication of the extent of the use of CCTV cameras for crime prevention, public safety, and medical response in one area is the report that there are 13,000 cameras located in the Tube (subway) network of London, which reflects a doubling of capacity since 2004. Some analysts, such as Rebecca J. Rosen, have suggested that London has more cameras in use than any other major metropolitan center in Europe. The end result, some critics have argued, is that a panoptic society or surveillance state has been created wherein citizens are under constant surveillance and their movements and activities being recorded for purposes that are not clearly articulated. Some have raised the following questions: Who is watching the watchers? How will recorded information be used? When does recorded information infringe on human rights and freedoms in a democratic society? Surveillance in London, as with all large metropolitan areas, can be useful in locating and responding to “trouble” in a timely manner—for example, in the case of medical emergencies or attacks on public transport, where a quick response can mean the difference between life and death. The cameras also proved useful during the London riots of 2011, assisting police in responding to escalating situations and, later, in identifying key perpetrators of violence and property destruction. However, the high cost of operating large numbers of CCTV cameras has been argued to be excessive and could be better spent on employing thousands more police officers working in the streets of London. Surveillance can play an important part in providing evidence in court regarding criminal ­

590

London, England, Surveillance in

activities, vandalism, and terrorist activities, as well as in cases of motor vehicle accidents and traffic offenses. However, surveillance cameras also watch and, in some cases, record health information (via hospital cameras), eating habits, shopping and spending patterns, use of leisure time, and other seemingly innocuous activities. The Surveillance Studies Network, consisting of academic researchers in the field, reported in 2006 that the United Kingdom was the country with the greatest use of surveillance of any Western industrialized country. For some observers, surveillance in London, and the United Kingdom generally, is ­ endemic given a lack of laws governing the collection and use of data, as well as those intended to protect privacy in the city. These concerns have been echoed in reports by the House of Lords that have raised concerns about the use of surveillance and its threat to both constitutional rights—­ personal and societal freedoms. Although employing CCTV cameras had generated successes in high-profile terrorist investigations, its less demonstrated use in crime prevention, deterrence, and investigation when research studies are reviewed has raised questions as to its costs versus benefits. The increasing rate of technological innovation in surveillance equipment will likely mean the introduction of greater numbers of both private and public CCTV cameras in ­London. This underscores the need for considered legislation to regulate how, when, and where

surveillance may be properly used and governance over the appropriate uses of the data it produces. However, given the current lack of strict regulation, particularly in the private sector or in cameras for personal use, there are likely to be ever more unwelcomed intrusions into the lives of the citizens of London. Thomas Fleming See also Closed-Circuit Television; Municipal Surveillance; Terrorism; United Kingdom

Further Readings Ericson, Richard V. and Kevin Haggerty, eds. The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2006. Lyons, David, ed. Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond. London, England: Routledge, 2005. Rosen, Rebecca J. “London Riots, Big Brother Watches: CCTV-Cameras Blanket the UK.” The Atlantic (August 9, 2011). “Spy Britain: Six Million CCTV Cameras—And Most Are in Private Hands.” The Evening Standard (November 1, 2014). Welsh, Brandon C. and David P. Farrington. Crime Prevention Effects of Closed Circuit Television: A Systematic Review. London, England: Home Office Research Study 252, August 2002.

M in machine learning, before concluding with the ways in which machine learning is applicable, including in surveillance and in security efforts.

Machine Learning Machine learning is attributed to a scientific discipline that investigates algorithms and methods aimed at teaching machines how to respond autonomously to specific tasks, thus automating various processes, which usually involve handling data. Data can represent physical phenomena that have been captured and transferred in the digital world (e.g., scanned or digitally captured photos, images, and/or handwritten text; recorded digital audio and video); it can also be related to information that has been originated directly in the digital world, such as typed text and coded ­messages, vector-graph images, animated graphics, synthesized audio, and various multimodal representation/visualization sequences. Their combination constitutes the case of today’s Internet and social media landscape, where big volumes of content are massively exchanged among different users and social networking sites. With the rise of Web 2.0 and user-generated content, this kind of big data exchange results in various security issues and, therefore, the need for surveillance (i.e., monitoring of Internet data streams, textual messages, audiovisual sequences captured from public security and/or traffic cameras). Machine learning, also referred to as data mining or predictive analysis, is the core technology in these big data analysis tasks, which are also dominant in surveillance and security applications. This entry begins by providing a background on the history and formation of machine learning; it then describes the basic methods, tools, and applications utilized

History and Types of Machine Learning An early definition of machine learning dates back to 1959 and is attributed to Arthur Samuel, who described it as a “field of study that gives computers the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed.” Later, a more formal definition was provided by Tom M. Mitchel, who specified machine learning as the process of a computer program learning from experience, which is associated with specific classes of tasks and can be measured through the use of applicable performance metrics. In general, there are various tasks that can be encountered in machine learning (both in security/ surveillance uses and in more generic application areas), such as function modeling, time series prediction, pattern classification/recognition, data clustering, information retrieval, knowledge discovery, and data mining. These tasks are also associated with statistics and the probabilistic properties of the involved data. While machine learning is strongly related to artificial intelligence and optimization methods and algorithms, there is not a strict definition that could crisply discriminate machine learning from other related disciplines. Some argue that preexisted data sets (inputs and known/desired outputs) are used as training pairs in machine learning, thus guiding this learning-by-experience process, while data mining is an unsupervised/exploratory data analysis concept, where previous experience is not 591

592

Machine Learning

involved. Still, similar attributes and principles are also encountered in unsupervised machine-learning algorithms, where hidden patterns are discovered and clustered without the use of prior class-­labeling information. Besides these two cases (supervised and unsupervised learning), reinforcement learning is a kind of subset of supervised learning that is encountered in more dynamic environments, where the whole process is conducted live, with machine interaction simultaneously evolving during training.

Theory and Methods, Tools, and Applications Machine learning aims at training, modeling, and/ or configuring a decision-making system to provide desirable outputs for specific inputs. These inputs usually provide abstract representations of content, which are known as features (it is rather unusual for the entire data sequence of a digital object to be utilized). Features act as characteristicsalient descriptors, which are extracted through statistical and other mathematical operands and transformations of the involved text sequences, audio and video signals, and so on. Different descriptors are regularly combined, forming the input feature-vectors, whose purpose is twofold: (1) exclude any redundancies, keeping only useful information that can efficiently discriminate and map inputs into the desired outputs and (2) reduce the amount of the involved data, thereby reducing the computational load and the complexity of both the learning and the “machine.” In general, the higher the feature-vector dimension, the more likely the majority of the signal attributes will be adequately presented; however, this also bears the risk of memorizing inputs, thus deteriorating the ability of the training system to generalize (i.e., to perform well when unknown samples are fed into the input), unless high-population data sets are involved in the training process. Outputs are usually assigned with labels that represent different classes of various kinds (e.g., natural language processing outcomes, emotional states, audiovisual patterns, content/story topics and other higher-level semantics, as well as more analytic text characters, symbols, and numbers, like in the case of optical character and speech recognition tasks). Regarding machine-learning

algorithms and architectures, there are many approaches, such as artificial neural networks, decision trees, association rules, support vector machines, Bayesian networks, clustering, fuzzy logic rules, genetic algorithms, and others, which are usually combined in hybrid expert systems, encompassing statistical, syntactic, and hierarchical decision rules, or even self-learning approaches. Considering that machine learning is an emerging field that is rapidly expanding and can be applied in many different areas, related tools and environments have been massively implemented in recent years for both feature extraction and training (i.e., explicit tools and libraries of popular programming languages such as C/C++, Python, OpenCV; Java implementation such as Matlab, WEKA). Similarly, various annotation tools have  been developed and utilized for content labeling in supervised learning (e.g., Anvil, ELAN, ­EXMARaLDA, Praat). As already mentioned, there are many related application examples, including in the field of surveillance, security, and privacy. Machine learning can be deployed in intelligent monitoring in video surveillance and/or in threat detection in computer networks (e.g., child pornography, organized crime, trafficking information related to the illegal trade in human organs, unauthorized e-commerce transactions, elimination of unwanted messaging such as spam/trash emails or even “e-bullying,” data and privacy protection). Applications also apply in watermarking and cryptographic technologies for intellectual rights protection, semantic analysis for threat identification in Internet and social networking sites, optimization of searching technologies especially in forensic data analysis, and others. Charalampos A. Dimoulas See also Big Data; Corporate Surveillance; Data Mining and Profiling in Big Data

Further Readings Indect (FP7-218086-Collaborative Project). “D9.19: Report on Methodology for Applying Existing Machine-Learning Methods for Behavioural Profiling.” http://www.indect-project.eu (Accessed January 2015).

Martial Law Richert, Willi. Building Machine Learning Systems With Python. Birmingham, England: Packt, 2013. Symeonidis, Andreas L. and Pericles A. Mitkas. Agent Intelligence Through Data Mining. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2006. Witten, Ian H. and Eibe Frank. Data Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques. Burlington, MA: Morgan Kaufmann, 2005.

Martial Law Martial law refers to the temporary control and governance of a state or territory by military forces. Martial law is most commonly enforced when intense civil disturbance or warfare disrupts the region’s civil authorities’ capability to enforce laws. Martial law refers to provisional domestic military rule, whereas military occupation of a foreign territory is called military government. Martial law is imposed with the intent to preserve national security during tumultuous times of cultural, social, and  political dissension, and military may assume control of judicial, economic, and administrative functions. The use of martial law is limited by international laws, which require reconciliation between a state and defense in domestic affairs. Martial law must be exercised with restraint and not as a means by which human rights violations may be perpetrated by government entities or persons operating under government supervision. Protracted utilization of martial law may increase potential risks of  extra-legal abuses of power. In the following entry, procedures for implementing martial law in the United States are outlined, international martial law policies are described, and concerns with regard to martial law are examined. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 allows for imposition of martial law during public emergencies. During such periods, the president may assume control of the National Guard units without the consent of the local government. Provisions for martial law are a component of the National Defense Resources Preparedness Executive Order. The fullest extent of martial law would involve suspension of the U.S. Constitution and a military takeover or temporary appointment of the military’s highest-ranking general as head of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.

593

The United States is restricted by its own Constitution in its employment of martial law. Civil courts hold the ultimate discretion as to the limits of martial law; thus, it is an extension of common law. Article 1, Section 2, subsection 2, of the Constitution states that martial law may only be enacted, if necessary, for public safety. Civil courts determine the necessity and duration, though the president, governors, and local officials may determine the necessity for martial law in an immediate crisis during which civil courts are unable to assess the situation. The federal armed forces may be used to support the civil authorities during disturbances of public safety, though the federal armed forces are not intended to supplant the civil authorities. Martial law is considered unconstitutional when the territory’s civil courts are ­currently operating. Commitment of the federal armed forces to a local region is accompanied by the dissemination of information pertinent to restrictive measures and rules of conduct during the federal intervention. During martial law, the military may suspend or augment select civil liberties and safeguards outlined in the Constitution and its amendments. The writ of habeas corpus may be temporarily suspended for individuals who are arrested or detained during periods of rebellion, dissension, or riot. For a petitioner to be remanded to military detention, warranted cause must be demonstrated by the arresting authority. However, during ­martial law, it is ostensibly possible that persons may be held without a specific charge. In cases not involving suspension of writ of habeas corpus, ­ judicial inquiry may be pursuant to a writ. In such  instances, a civil court may issue a writ of habeas corpus, compelling an agency to produce the detainee and substantiate the reasons for detaining the individual.

International Policies The United Nations upholds the Declaration of Human Rights on an international scale. It participates in investigations and interventions pertinent to oppressive government activity carried out during martial law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates global standards for freedom, liberty, and law. The standards pertinent to individual liberties, procedural fairness,

594

Martial Law

security of a person, and political autonomy supplement international consensus on the limitations of martial law. Military coups may be executed to overthrow an existing regime. In instances of newly assumed government forces, an incumbent government may invoke martial law to retain authority during transitional periods. Martial law may be enacted during natural disasters or other periods of sudden and severe duress, often qualifying under the legal construct of a “state of emergency.” Nations such as Taiwan, Turkey, Poland, and Chile experienced protracted periods of martial law during the 1970s and the 1980s. In the 21st century, Egypt and Thailand have demonstrated the invocation of martial law. Since the turn of the 21st century, data collection and surveillance have grown in use during the periods of martial law. Additionally, increased stringency of media and speech censorship typically accompany martial law, due to social unrest and volatile responses to government actions. Censorship most often serves a nationalistic or sectarian itinerary, against which free speech may pose a threat. Some nations, such as Thailand, have historically prohibited publication and broadcasting altogether for the entire duration of martial law.

Concerns The term martial law is closely tied to the fear of disruption of civil liberties, due process of law, forceful siege, and freedoms. Concerns arise, in part, due to the potential for martial law to be utilized for the purposes of suppressing rights to free speech and assembly. With the increase in publicized national threats and antiterrorist initiatives, debate over the emergence of a police state and exercises of martial law has become commonplace. Although police state is a term reserved for discussions germane to violation of civil liberty, police state and martial law are very different. A police state is a government that exercises repressive control over the social, economic, and political aspects of society through arbitrary legislative, police, and military measures. Martial law may closely resemble aspects of a police state. The use of surveillance to obtain information regarding threats to democratic systems and public safety evokes suspicion as to the legality, rationale,

ethics, and effectiveness of civil liberty violations. During periods of martial law, role convergence of military and law enforcement may be imminent. Such role shifts also occur in police states. As global conflicts persist, receiving increased media coverage and public attention, concerns regarding the use of martial law grow. Temporary suspension of civil liberties and individual freedoms affects all who reside in or within the proximal range of domestic military rule. The restriction of freedoms under martial law may include sanctions against certain types of free speech, dissemination of media materials, and assembly and mobilization. Historically, the use of martial law has been associated with concentration camps, extra-legal detainment of persons, and circumvention of legal due processes. Although martial law may be invoked with the intent of maintaining security or stabilization during times of public emergency, public concerns pertain to destabilization of democratic freedoms, discretion in exercises of power, jeopardy of safety, coerced cooperation with government and military initiatives, and reduction of domestic security. Debra Warner and Reginaldo Chase Espinoza See also Civil Rights Movement; Police State

Further Readings Campbell, Donald J. and Kathleen M. Campbell. “Soldiers as Police Officers/Police Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States.” Armed Forces & Society, v.36/2 (2010). Davenport, Christian. “Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, v.43/1 (1999). http://journals.sagepub. com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002799043001006 (Accessed October 2017). Freeman, Michael Elliot. “Freedom or Security: Protecting Democracy From Terrorism” (Order No. 3029487, The University of Chicago). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses (December 2001). https:// search.proquest.com/docview/304740176 (Accessed October 2017). Kohn, Richard H. “Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow.” Chicago Journal of International Law, v.4/1 (2003). Retrieved from http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent .cgi?article=1201&context=cjil

Marx, Gary T.

Marx, Gary T. Gary T. Marx (1938– ), professor emeritus at ­Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has written extensively over several decades on the topics of surveillance, privacy, social control, and policing. He has sought to define what he calls new surveillance and to explain how it differs from the old surveillance. He explores the various ways in which this new surveillance takes place and argues that it must be viewed in the social context in which it takes place. He also discusses privacy issues that are raised by this surveillance as well as the ethical questions that must be answered in its use. He outlines the use of technology and surveillance as mechanisms for social control as well as nontechnological forms of surveillance such as undercover policing. Marx’s works have been published in more than 300 books and journals, including non-English translations, and have had a major influence on the development of the field of surveillance studies. This entry examines Marx’s definition of new surveillance, how he believes that surveillance and information gathering contribute to social control and increased policing, and how privacy and borders are affected by surveillance.

New Surveillance Marx defines traditional surveillance as close observation, particularly that of a suspected person. The purpose of surveillance is the gathering of information either about people or about groups, and he notes that surveillance has been a feature of all societies, though it has differed in form and content across societies and history. The new surveillance, on the other hand, is more comprehensive, intensive, and extensive. It is defined as scrutiny through the use of technical means to extract or create personal or group data, whether from individuals or from contexts. Marx also defines it as the use of technical means to extract or create personal data. This definition suggests that surveillance goes beyond what may be obtained by using the unaided senses. Surveillance may now be conducted from a distance rather than up close. It does not just extend the senses; it is also invisible or has low visibility. Persons being

595

surveilled are not likely to know that they are under surveillance. Modern surveillance encompasses contexts, not just particular persons. It looks at settings such as geographical places and spaces, time periods, and categories or aggregates of persons. This form of surveillance allows for the looking at patterns of relationships between people and places. Data that are collected may be cross-classified to look for meaning within them. This data collection is now done by computer rather than by machine. It is a continuous surveillance, done in real time, and allows for looking at the past and the present and can be used for the prediction of the future such as in crime analysis by the police. Another characteristic of new surveillance is that it also looks at categories of people; for example, all airport travelers are searched rather than just those who are suspects.

Social Control Marx argues that new surveillance is related to, and used for, social control. Innovations in surveillance technology are used for social control purposes. These social control measures, which are mostly invisible and can be aimed at anyone, are capable of operating through time, space, and other physical boundaries. Marx describes this as a maximum surveillance society in which people are closely monitored not only through technological means but also monitor themselves. This society has computerized records of everybody. Decisions are made on the basis of risk and actuarial records that are based on memberships and categories in which people are placed. Furthermore, everyone is a suspect. Another feature is transparency in the sense that the traditional barriers and borders that once protected information are weakened by technology. Finally, people tend to monitor themselves, often voluntarily. Marx argues that surveillance is important to social control in that surveillance is the exercise of power, and knowledge is key to the exercise of power. The use of technology to gain knowledge, and to use this knowledge once it is acquired, has changed greatly, leading to a massive expansion in data collection that covers more areas of life than ever before. Data collection has become embedded and automated as it is part of routine activity; for

596

Marx, Gary T.

example, data can be obtained through the use of credit cards, rather than being imposed on persons. In this technological model of social control, the line between the controllers and the controlled is great, as is the power of the state. The surveilled are often passive, and even cooperative, as a result  of ignorance, deception, or manipulation. Marx termed this soft control, and this includes ­techniques that are of either low visibility or invisibility. These techniques may be built into the environment and thus may not even be viewed as mechanisms of control. An example of this would be the GPS (Global Positioning System) tracking device in a cell phone.

Policing via Surveillance An important purpose of surveillance is to gather personal information on people. Marx notes that this coincides with the growth of bureaucracy and the regulated, welfare state. Surveillance expands to collect personal information so that conformity to the growing number of laws and regulation can be verified, as well as eligibility for various state intervention programs. As the bureaucratic state grows, the bureaucracy self-perpetuates to administer an expanding set of rules that apply to the economy, public welfare, and morals regulation. Managing this requires the systematic collection of information on people, which is accomplished through surveillance. The growth of surveillance used in this fashion is tied to what Marx calls high policing. High policing is defined as intelligence gathering for the purpose of protecting and preserving society. It also includes the prevention of threats, and its work is characterized by secrecy and deception. This is distinguished from low policing, which is traditional law enforcement. In addition, high policing makes use of informants, casts a wide net for information, and may be extralegal in means. It is like a sponge soaking up all information and is laser-like in its ability to focus on profiles. It is dependent on new surveillance to accomplish its goals. This allows for many new ways by which to watch people and to gather information. Marx warns that there could be danger in relying on technology rather than on people: There is no soul in the new machine. A reliance on technology could lead society down a dangerous road of

an increased reliance on both coercive surveillance and coercive social control. The use of technology is not neutral; its value is determined by its application in a social context. In addition, this technologically driven surveillance raises issues of ethics and privacy. There are moral differences between what can be known through the unaided senses and what can be known through technologically enhanced senses.

Privacy Privacy is an important social and individual value. Privacy is valued because the control of personal information is important to our sense of self and autonomy. This ability to control information is also of importance in the protection of borders. Borders refer to the personal boundaries that people have to protect their privacy, and there are various types of borders. Natural borders are those that protect information that can be gathered by the senses alone. Social borders refer to the protection of information we share with people whom we trust either because of a social role, such as an attorney, or because of a relationship, such as a family member. Temporal and spatial borders separate information from various p ­ eriods or aspects of a person’s life. This assumes that information is either compartmentalized or isolated. It is in this realm that technological surveillance plays a role. The gathering of information by the crossing of borders without consent ­violates the dignity of the person and also violates trust. Marx referred to this as informational rape. Surveillance and information gathering also raise issues of power differentials that may contribute to inequality and social stratification. There is a connection between knowledge and power. The ability to decide what behavior is right or wrong as well as how to treat people involves power. Differential access to information favors the privileged—those who are in power and who have the advantage in the development, control, and use of technology. Marx warns that surveillance continues to increase in intensiveness and extensiveness. There needs to be not only awareness of this trend but also an application of ethics and law to the discussion. Marcel F. Beausoleil

Marxism See also Biometrics; Policing and Society; Privacy; Social Control; Surveillance, Theories of

Further Readings Deflem, Mathieu. “The Invisibilities of Social Control: Uncovering Gary Marx’s Discovery of Undercover.” Crime, Law, and Society, v.18 (1992). Marx, Gary. “An Ethics for the New Surveillance.” The Information Society, v.14/3 (1998). Marx, Gary. “What’s New About the ‘New Surveillance’? Classifying for Change and Continuity.” Knowledge, Technology & Policy, v.17/1 (2004). Marx, Gary. “Seeing Hazily (But Not Darkly) Through the Lens: Some Recent Empirical Studies of Surveillance Technologies.” Law & Social Inquiry, v.30/2 (2005a). Marx, Gary. “Surveillance and Society.” In George Ritzer (ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005b. Marx, Gary. “High Policing.” In Gerben Bruinsma and David Weisburd (eds.), Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice. New York, NY: Springer, 2013.

Website Home page of Professor Gary T. Marx: http://web.mit .edu/gtmarx/www/garyhome.html

Marxism Marxism, a belief based on economic, political, and social theories and strategies derived from Karl Marx (1818–1883), is one of the most feared ideologies in world history. From its emergence in the mid-19th century to the late 20th century, those in power have used every means possible—from peaceful to forceful—to tamp down its spread. During particularly fearful times, security trumped privacy. The emergence of communist regimes in Russia (1917), China (1949), and Cuba (1959) sent shockwaves of fear through the West. Following World War II, the Cold War shaped the contours of world diplomacy for nearly 50 years. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of the Cold War. Since then, the War on Terror has taken center stage in global politics and security studies. This entry provides an in-depth examination of the life

597

of Marx and his philosophies that helped shape the economic, political, and social belief system of many nations throughout the world. Marxist views that helped lead to the Russian Revolution are discussed, as well as the growth of communism and the Western world’s fight against it.

Marx’s Early Influence A philosopher and social scientist of German descent, Marx’s economic and political treatises predicted the collapse of industrial capitalism and the rise of communism. It takes a stadial view of history, wherein the class struggle serves as the prime engine of historical change. In Marxist terms, workers, exploited and alienated by industrialization, would come together and lay the basis for state control by the people themselves. The change would not be a product of social reform, but of revolution. The emphasis on violence made Marx and Marxists targets of surveillance and repression. Political and industrial leaders worried about being dispossessed not only of state power but also of private property. Marx developed intricate analyses of the capitalist economy. These arguments were best elaborated in Capital, the first volume of which was published in 1867. Marx’s experiences are indicative of how Western governments would deal with Marxist threats. Marx’s career as a radical writer and thinker began in the 1840s. After he received his doctorate, he was unable to secure a university position because of his antiauthoritarian but prerevolutionary ideas. Instead, he returned home and started writing for a newspaper critical of the Prussian government. His writings led him to be exiled from Prussia, whereupon he moved to Paris, and continued his crusade against the Prussian state. It was while in Paris that Marx met the man who would become his long-time collaborator, Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). Prussian officials kept tabs on Marx, exerting pressure on French officials to exile him. Exiled again, he found a new home in Brussels. During the revolutions of 1848, he was forced to leave Brussels, returning to France and then to Prussia to stoke the flames of discontent. Following the 1848 revolutions, he went where many exiled revolutionaries went, London, England, it being more

598

Marxism

open to political refugees than anywhere else in Europe. Others fled to the United States. The treatise most widely laying out Marx’s revolutionary ideas is The Communist Manifesto, first published in February 1848. It is often argued that the Manifesto played a crucial role in the ­German Revolution; however, the seeds of discontent were already sowed. For generations to come, the Manifesto would introduce radicals and would-be radicals to Marx’s explanation for why workers needed to unite in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie. “Workers of the world, unite!,” the last line of the Manifesto, would become M ­ arxists’ internationalist, revolutionary clarion call. During his years in London, Marx not only continued to develop his ideas about capitalism and communism but also helped organize the International Working Men’s Association (IWMA) in 1864. Retrospectively, the IWMA is referred to as the “First International,” the initial post-1848 effort to bring about an international, revolutionary class consciousness across the West. Blamed in part for inciting the Paris Commune of 1871, Marx’s notoriety as a threat to law and order was further cemented. The repression of radicals in the wake of the Paris Commune brought the First International to an end. The 1870s and 1880s were low points in the international working class struggle. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck passed the antisocialist laws in 1879. These laws outlawed socialist organizations, limited the freedom of the press, and allowed for the confiscation of radical literature. About 1,500 Germans were arrested and imprisoned. Noncitizens were deported. The law was not repealed until 1890; however, it was not particularly successful. Despite the socialist movement being driven underground, support for it continued to expand. In 1889, Marxist leaders came together to found the “Second International.” One of its first initiatives was to create an international day of protest (May 1), which laid the basis for International Workers’ Day, or May Day. From Marx’s time, communist activists tended to do as much infighting as they did to fight capitalism. Vehement disagreements emerged over means and ends, which, combined with personality  conflicts, set a trajectory of purges, factionalism, and recrimination. These disagreements were

stoked to good effect by undercover agents, who infiltrated radical organizations across the West. During the Second International, the biggest internal conflict occurred over how the transformation to socialism would be achieved. On the one hand, there were the revolutionary socialists, who were the heirs to Marx’s revolution-throughviolence approach. On the other hand, there were the evolutionary socialists—social democrats— who looked to the ballot box as an instrument of change. Karl Kautsky (1854–1938) exemplified the voice of Marxist orthodoxy, while Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) was the voice of Marxist revisionism. The matter was settled at the 1904 Amsterdam Conference of the Second International: The orthodox Marxists prevailed.

The Russian Revolution The outbreak of the Russian Revolution of 1905 seemed to harken a new age of revolutionary struggle, confirming in the minds of many orthodox Marxists that communist control of Western governments was only a matter of time. Like the Paris Commune, the 1905 revolution was defeated and set off another wave of repression in the West. In Russia itself, the Tsar enacted reforms in the wake of the revolution, including the creation of the Duma, but he also resorted to imprisonment, exile, and executions of dissidents to contain the situation. Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) and Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) emerged from the 1905 revolution as the intellectual and strategic leaders of Russian communism. Exiled, they returned during the revolution of 1917. The Second International floundered during World War I when the international Marxist movement split over what position to take on the war. The Russian Revolution of 1917 ushered in the era of the “Third International,” which was also known as the Comintern. It was in this period that Marxists in Russia—renamed the Soviet Union—went from being oppressed to the oppressor. Indeed, Lenin, as Josef Stalin (1878–1953) would do on an even grander scale, did much to neutralize his enemies. Soon after the October Revolution, a reign of terror against bourgeois ­elements in Russia began. Their property was confiscated, they were imprisoned, and they were tortured.

Marxism

The Red Scare Outside Russia, there was a massive Red Scare; Western leaders feared Bolshevik-style revolutions in their own countries. In the United States, radical groups were surveilled, infiltrated, and forcibly disbanded. Beginning during the war, antiwar radicals who spoke out against the government were arrested and imprisoned. Among them was Eugene V. Debs (1855–1926), a five-time candidate for president on the socialist ticket. Debs received a 10-year prison sentence for an antiwar speech he gave in Canton, Ohio, in 1918. The precursor to the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Civil Liberties Bureau, was founded in 1917 as a response to this tamping down of free speech. The Red Scare reached its zenith in 1920. In January, the U.S. attorney general—A. Mitchell Palmer (1872–1936)—led a series of concerted raids across the country. Several thousand radicals were arrested. Homes and offices of radicals were ransacked and papers seized. Radicals who did not have U.S. citizenship were deported, including anarchist Emma Goldman (1869–1940). Palmer’s longest-lasting legacy was to name the virulent antiradical J. Edgar Hoover (1895–1972) as head of a new Bureau of Investigation, the precursor to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hoover led the Federal Bureau of Investigation until his death in 1972. The Communist Party of the United States was driven underground in the 1920s. American communists were kept tabs on not only by U.S. government agents but by Soviet agents as well.

The Great Terror After Lenin’s death, Stalin used his finely tuned political apparatus to take the mantle of leadership in the Soviet Union. He continued the battle against bourgeois elements in Russian society. In the late 1920s, he sought to aggressively collectivize agriculture (as part of his first Five-Year Plan) and eradicate the bourgeois family structure by undermining privacy for communalism. Although neither effort was successful, they helped engender a culture of conformity wherein citizens surveilled one another for breaches of ideological purity. Stalin dealt with perceived threats to his power harshly. Counterrevolutionaries were sent to forced

599

labor camps in Siberia as part of the gulag system. He began large-scale purges from the Communist Party in 1933. And then came the Great Terror of 1937 and 1938. More than a million and a half people were arrested by Soviet secret police, and  more than 600,000 executed. Stalin justified the Great Terror as a way to cut off counterrevolutionaries from colluding with Nazi Germany, whose imperial aspirations were coming to fruition.

The Cold War The Cold War, which pitted capitalism against state communism, marked the peak of anti-Marxist activism, state sponsored and otherwise. The Red Scare of the early 1950s was an especially repressive period. Fears were exacerbated in 1949 when the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb and communist Mao Zedong (1893–1976) rose to power in China. At the height of the Cold War, in both capitalist as well as communist states, national security tended to trump privacy. The McCarthy Era of the late 1940s and early 1950s—named after U.S. ­Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin (1908–1957)—was a chilling period in the history of free expression. U.S. government officials went to great lengths to root out suspected communists in every arena of American life, especially in the government itself, the labor movement, the education system, and mass entertainment industry. Teachers, for example, were forced to sign loyalty oaths in order to work. The House Un-American Activities Committee and the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held hearings at which hundreds of suspected subversives were subpoenaed and asked about their past activities. If those investigated atoned by naming names, they were able to return to some semblance of a normal life. If one refused, it could lead to being blacklisted and socially rejected. A number of celebrities were brought before the House Un-American Activities Committee, including Orson Welles (1915–1985), Charlie Chaplin (1889–1977), and Paul Robeson (1898–1976). The Communist Party of the United States was driven underground again and infiltrated with hundreds of informants. It had no more than a few thousand members, and it played only a minor role in the upheaval of the 1960s and the early 1970s.

600

Mass Incarceration

The inheritors of the revolutionary Marxist tradition—Mao in China, Fidel Castro (1926– 2016) in Cuba, and Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) in Vietnam—continued to feed Western fears of Marxism. Like Soviet communism, these communist leaders relied on repressive regimes to remain in power. In the early 1950s, for example, more than a million counterrevolutionaries were executed in China. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War highlighted the continuing threat communists posed in the 1960s and 1970s. The end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and the opening up of China to Western trade, however, have diminished that fear to a great extent. Jason D. Martinek See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Anarchism; Berlin Wall; Cold War; Cuba; Cuban Missile Crisis; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hoover, J. Edgar; KGB; McCarthyism; Revolutions and Revolts; Russia

Further Readings Figes, Orlando. Revolutionary Russia, 1891–1991. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2014. Johnson, Haynes. The Age of Anxiety: McCarthyism to Terrorism. New York, NY: Mariner Books, 2006. Sperber, Jonathan. Karl Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life. New York, NY: Liveright, 2013. Zumoff, Jacob A. The Communist International and U.S. Communism, 1919–1929. Boston, MA: Brill Academic, 2014.

Mass Incarceration Mass incarceration refers to the substantial increase in the number of persons confined to jail or prison in the United States since the 1980s. Criminologists and other scholars commonly agree that incarceration acts as a means to incapacitate individuals who have in some sense brought harm to other individuals and the community. Incapacitation prohibits further harm to society from those who have violated society’s laws, values, and norms by physically removing the offenders from society, making it nearly impossible for them to victimize others outside the

confines of the correctional institution. A significant conundrum faced by criminal justice systems and lawmakers is deciding which individuals have committed enough harm to  society to justify a sentence of incarceration. Morals, values, and societal fears may factor into the decisions of legislatures and policymakers. This entry looks at the factors that led to mass incarceration as well as its implications on society.

The War on Drugs While violent crime is a legitimate problem in the United States and a concern for the public, views may be skewed based on media coverage and political agendas. Politicians often approve of policies that are rooted in the notions of personal responsibility and retribution as means to justify harsh punishments. Drug crimes and drug offenders are often targeted as the cause for violent communities, related crimes, and the social breakdown of American communities. The War on Drugs, which was the U.S. government’s attempt at curtailing illegal drug use and trade, was officially announced during the early 1980s under the leadership of the Reagan administration. The American public, with the assistance of a preponderance of media coverage, was exposed to the horrors of crack cocaine, including its role in the creation of violent addicts and other street criminals, and its effect on innocent victims, specifically those born to addicted mothers (known as “crack babies”). Because high-profile events may garner intense attention, myths and misconceptions regarding actual crime trends may proliferate. As a result, the public may call for immediate action and deem it essential to elect lawmakers who will take a harsh stand against such threats to society and exhibit dedication to public safety.

Three Strikes Laws and “Get Tough” Strategies “Get tough” strategies as solutions to crime have been proposed by many politicians as part of their election campaigns. Such strategies, when enacted, have led to increasing numbers of persons incarcerated. One example of a get tough strategy for crime involves sentencing policies. Some had argued that sentencing policies were too lenient to

Mass Incarceration

combat serious crimes. As a result, some states implemented three strikes laws. Under such laws, persons convicted of a third felony are auto­ matically sentenced to life in prison. This has ­generated more offenders serving longer sentences, filling correctional institutions to and above capacity. As of 2017, American correctional institutions housed more than 2 million inmates. This number equates to roughly 1 out of every 100 adults in the United States being behind bars. On a global scale, the United States incarcerates its citizens at a higher rate than any other country. Consequently, U.S. correctional institutions have become increasingly overcrowded and underfunded due to an influx of nonviolent, low-level offenders incarcerated under strict penalties.

Threats to Institutional Security Resulting From Mass Incarceration Overcrowding is often discussed as a major concern for correctional administrators, staff, and department of corrections personnel. Overcrowded conditions likely threaten the safety and security of both staff and inmates. As institutions become overcrowded, violence becomes more prominent, and so does the spread of disease and illness. With greater numbers of inmates to supervise, budgetary expenditures are often made on surveillance equipment, with a focus on securing the institutions rather than on providing educational, vocational, mental health, and medical programs for the inmates. Reentry programming is also threatened by limited budgets. Without necessary treatment and acquisition of the skills needed to reintegrate back into society, recidivism is likely for those released from incarceration—once again compromising the security of communities.

Societal Consequences Resulting From Mass Incarceration The mass incarceration of Americans has left clear impacts on the social structure of the United States. Some communities and groups of offenders have been affected more severely due to strict sentencing guidelines. For example, the chances of incarceration are higher for young African American men than for any other demographic.

601

Whereas overall, men still constitute the greater number of incarcerated populations, women, specifically African American women, are the fastest growing population of inmates in the state prisons. Not only are certain groups removed from their communities and families at disproportionate rates, but former prisoners may also lose certain rights and privileges, even after serving their sentences. For instance, in many jurisdictions, felons may be denied employment opportunities, may be excluded from voting, or may be ineligible for governmental funding programs such as financial aid. Denial of such benefits and opportunities can create a challenging situation for those returning to society, hoping to live on the outside as productive, law-abiding members of society. Lisa M. Carter See also Incapacitation; Life Without Parole; Punishment; War on Drugs

Further Readings Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crowe: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York, NY: New Press, 2012. Jensen, Eric L., et al. “Social Consequences of the War on Drugs.” In E. J. Latessa and A. M. Holsinger (eds.), Correctional Contexts: Contemporary and Classical Readings (4th ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pew Center on the States. “One in 100: Behind Bars in America.” In E. J. Latessa and A. M. Holsinger (eds.), Correctional Contexts: Contemporary and Classical Readings (4th ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pratt, Travis C. Addicted to Incarceration: Corrections Policy and the Politics of Misinformation in the United States. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009. Thompson, Heather A. “Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History.” Journal of American History, v.97/32 (2010).

Mass Surveillance See Global Surveillance

602

Matrix, The

Matrix, The The Matrix, a 1999 film written and directed by the Wachowski Brothers, depicts a dystopian future in which humans have been subjugated by machines only to have their biological energy harnessed in order to fuel the mechanized new world order. Humans are maintained by artificial means in large storage facilities containing specially created pods designed to provide sustenance for the biological fuel cells. Truly independent thought and action are replaced with a computerized, neural interactive artificial reality in which humans are under constant surveillance by their machine custodians. Themes of the film revolve around the concepts of free will and surveillance as humans are unable to escape the ever-watchful eye of their machine guardians. The film’s protagonist, Thomas Anderson, or Neo, played by Keanu Reeves, works in a monotonous corporate day job as a computer programmer. However, he also operates as an accomplished computer hacker, going by the moniker of Neo in the online universe in which he plies his skills. After encountering the phrase “The Matrix” repeatedly while working online, Neo begins to believe that something is seriously amiss with the world in which he lives. Despite his inability to determine the precise nature of the problem, he becomes convinced that the world is faulty after receiving the cryptic message “Wake up Neo; The Matrix has you; Follow the white rabbit; knock knock Neo.” After being contacted by a woman called Trinity, played by Carrie-Anne Moss, he is informed that a man by the name of Morpheus, played by Laurence Fishburne, can provide the information he so desires. However, unbeknownst to Neo, his efforts at uncovering the truth have not gone unnoticed because he has been under the careful surveillance of Agent Smith, a sentient computerized overseer played by Hugo Weaving. As he is attempting to  uncover more information about Morpheus and the Matrix, Smith and his agents attempt to  apprehend Neo as he is working. After a brief pursuit, Neo escapes and agrees to meet M ­ orpheus in an effort to uncover the truth about  the Matrix and his perceptions of what ails his world.

In his meeting with Morpheus, Neo is given a choice. He is offered two pills—one red, the other blue. If he opts for the blue pill, he will be able to return to the life he knew. If he chooses the red pill, he will be able to learn the truth about the world, regain freedom, and recapture independent thought. After swallowing the red pill, Neo awakens in a pod filled with a viscous liquid, designed by his machine captors to maintain his bodily needs, only to be flushed out into the waste water. It is here that he is rescued and brought aboard the Nebuchadnezzar, Morpheus’s ship, where they embark on a voyage to speak with the Oracle. Morpheus and others among the rebel army are convinced that Neo is the One who a prophecy decries as the savior of humanity. Here, the film begins to examine the concept of faith, not as religiosity but as the conviction underlying the search for truth. Morpheus maintains faith in the face of opposition that Neo is, in fact, the savior. Gradually, Neo develops an expertise in functioning within the Matrix, where he is able to thwart the attempts of the agents to stop the rebel’s plans. In the end, Agent Smith is defeated, while the ­Nebuchadnezzar and the rebel army are able to detonate an electromagnetic pulse, disabling the attacking computer sentinels. A recurring subject in the film is the unrelenting threat of surveillance by the machines. Several scenes in the film depict the mechanized overseers being able to take over the bodies of various human beings, thus widening the threat of surveillance that anyone, including family or friends, could be an agent of the machines. Since the Matrix was created by the machines, it is therefore under their constant control because the world itself is a product of their creation. The critically acclaimed film won four ­Academy Awards and an equal number of BAFTAs (British Academy Film Awards). Rounding out the principal cast was Joe Pantoliano, who played Cypher, a  man who regretted taking the red pill and wanted nothing more than to return to the safety of the Matrix. In addition, Gloria Foster played the role of the Oracle, a prophet who resided within the Matrix but assisted the rebel army with her foresight and wisdom. Visually, The Matrix was considered groundbreaking. The often utilized “bullet time” effect, in

McCarthyism

which the actors appear to be moving in slow motion while the camera appears to move at regular speed through the scene, was created specifically for the film. In addition, the use of “wire fu” techniques in the staging of fight scenes was instrumental in giving the characters the ability to hover in space and time during action sequences. Many viewers have developed a deeper appreciation for The Matrix, for the film makes references to Buddhism, Christianity, Gnosticism, Hinduism, and Judaism, while also pulling from various literary works. Many understand that the movie as an allegory for contemporary existence and the heavily commercialized, media-driven societies in which we live. Wendy L. Hicks See also Agency; Kafka, Franz; Privacy, Internet; Technology

Further Readings Constable, Catherine. Adapting Philosophy: Jean Baudrillard and “The Matrix Trilogy.” Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2009. Diocaretz, Myriam and Stefan Herbrechter. The Matrix in Theory. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Online Books, 2006. Maiorani, Arianna. “‘Reloading Movies Into Commercial Reality: A Multimodal Analysis of The Matrix Trilogy’s Promotional Posters.” Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, v.166 (2007). Smith, Warren, et al. Science Fiction and Organization. New York, NY: Routledge, 2003. Yeffeth, Glenn. Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy, and Religion in The Matrix. Dallas, TX: BenBella Books, 2003.

McCarthyism McCarthyism is a word created with reference to the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, treason, or subversion without proper regard for evidence. The term originated from the antics of the U.S. senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-WI), and his years in the senate (1947–1957) marked the height of McCarthyism in the United States. Ever since the rise of communism and its growth as a

603

threatening political force, the United States had been fearful of communism’s allure and development. This fear, associated with the rise of communism and policies that many saw as communist-like, led many to adopt a type of McCarthyism, well before the tenure of Senator McCarthy. This First Red Scare was promptly silenced with the onset of World War II because of a temporary alliance with communist countries such as Russia in an effort to defeat fascism. Following the end of World War II, the United States immediately began to attempt to stop the growth of communism, culminating in the birth of the Cold War and a resurgence of fear known as the Second Red Scare. After discussing the Second Red Scare and the rise and fall of McCarthyism during the Cold War, this entry examines whether McCarthyism has reemerged with 21st-century debates regarding government surveillance, national security, and individual right to privacy.

Second Red Scare and Communism As the new Soviet Union spread across Eastern Europe and mainland China fell to communist supporters, the United States was besieged with uncovered plots and arrests by communist spies and defectors. The theft of atomic information as well as confidential foreign policy strategies by Soviet agents led to heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within the United States, these acts of espionage and treason created a fear in the general public that led to anticommunist committees, in federal, state, and local governments, most notably the House Committee on Un-American Activities. All these factors laid the foundation for McCarthyism to thrive in U.S. politics with Senator McCarthy leading the way. The rise of anticommunist rhetoric in the United States after World War II allowed ­McCarthyism to spread from the government into cities and private companies. This new cultural phenomenon of accusing Americans of harboring sympathetic ties with communist countries and organizations led to more than 100 investigations between 1949 and 1954 by various committees in Congress. The peak of McCarthyism occurred in 1950, when Senator McCarthy made the nowinfamous speech in which he proclaimed to have the names of more than 200 Americans who were

604

McCarthyism

members of the Communist Party and were attempting to subvert the state department. When McCarthy was asked to provide further information regarding these names and how he came to obtain them, he changed the number multiple times and was unable to produce more than nine names. The lack of evidence and sweeping accusations made by the senator in an attempt to induce fear into the general public is perhaps the most popular example of McCarthyism during this time. Despite the senate opening an official investigation into McCarthy’s public accusations, the report was burdened with political infighting, with neither side coming to a consensus on the actions of Senator McCarthy. In addition to the direct accusations in the media by the senator, McCarthyism was used to further other political agendas through the use of fear and propaganda. Acting under the veil of McCarthyism, many politicians and groups adamantly opposed internationalism, social welfare provisions, and public health services such as vaccinations and mental health services by accusing such ideas as procommunist. The House Committee on Un-American Activities even went so far as to investigate the Hollywood film industry and its supposed ties with the Communist Party. Although very few charges were ever brought forth through these investigations, the reputations of many who stood accused by government officials were damaged. Over time, the blatant and destructive nature of McCarthyism began to sway the American public, who started to view it as a political tactic rather than a response to the spread of communism.

The Fall of McCarthyism As the hysteria of a complex communist plot began to wear off, questions regarding the intentions of McCarthyist policies and the civil rights of many accused of communist ties began to abound. Senator McCarthy himself lost a tremendous amount of public support after he was unable to produce credible details and the names of nearly more than 200 Americans who he claimed to have known were subverting the government. The detrimental effect on the political culture from exploiting the fear of communism was succinctly summarized by Congressman

George Bender: “McCarthyism has become a synonym for witch-hunting.” The baseless defamation and mudslinging associated with McCarthyism led many to lose trust in those employing its tactics and to a decline in support for these types of accusations. The use of McCarthyism as a political tactic was fueled by a wave of fear constructed from the United States’ attempt to answer the rumors of Communist espionage and international growth. The lack of evidence presented with many of these accusations, however, led the public to doubt McCarthyism as a “call to arms” and more like “smoke and mirrors.” The creator of this political rhetoric was also heavily criticized. After yet another unpopular and unfounded attack by the senator, this time on the U.S. Army, McCarthy was censured by the U.S. Senate in 1954. This marked the end of the Second Red Scare, but the nature of making speculative accusations of subversion or disloyalty to one’s country remains a possible concern for many Americans today.

Neo-McCarthyism and the Advance of Technology The rise and fall of McCarthyism during the Cold War raised numerous issues about civil rights and political affiliations. Questions regarding the level of intrusion a governmental body should be allowed into the lives of citizens and the amount of evidence needed for formal investigations into previously protected rights like political affiliation are still being analyzed today. In the 1940s, much of the information provided to McCarthy and his collaborators was provided through eyewitness testimony and hearsay. Since then, technology has advanced to a point where much more information can be compiled in a shorter duration with less effort. This has created a thin line that the U.S. government is burdened with maintaining: balancing the privacy of individual citizens with ensuring the security of the United States. The expansion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the policies of the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover in the 1950s describe a more modern example of McCarthyism. Hoover, one of the United States’ most fanatical anticommunists, used the power of surveillance and monitoring in an attempt to uncover communist spies and plots

McCarthyism

against the government. While the creation and expansion of the FBI under Hoover was considered a successful task and led to the greater security of many Americans, Hoover had near limitless power, and many historical records have illustrated the abuse of surveillance and monitoring techniques during his tenure. Hoover’s administration in many instances was seen as “above the law” since Hoover and his FBI agents were many times allowed to keep the identity of their informers secret. Moreover, many of those accused by the FBI during this time were not even told what they were accused of. Instead they were released from their government jobs and were stigmatized as communist sympathizers. This is just one of the many examples of how McCarthyism carried over after the tenure of Senator McCarthy. The lingering fear of communism and disloyalty in the U.S. government permitted the tolerance of governmental departments (e.g., the early FBI) that had near complete control of the surveillance and monitoring of individuals without any of the accountability required to protect the rights of the accused. More recently, the debate concerning how surveillance and monitoring should be used by government agencies has been thrust into the forefront of U.S. politics. In many ways, the 21st century has become an appropriate time to reevaluate how surveillance should be used in the United States. Recent policies such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the exposure of the National Security Administration’s vast surveillance network have created a new conversation revolving around an individual’s right and expectation of privacy. Presently, the U.S. government has the infrastructure and ability to observe many daily activities of citizens that were previously considered private. Requests by the government to enhance security can be accomplished in many cases only by the relinquishing of certain aspects of privacy. As new laws are designed to enhance the security of the United States, many individuals are concerned with how these laws will affect their right to privacy. This issue has shaped a new national conversation on McCarthyism and its potential reemergence. Those who support increased surveillance argue that it is imperative to  protect national security, whereas those who oppose it suggest that their individual liberties are  being stripped away. In many ways, this

605

dispute over how much surveillance is acceptable in s­ociety and questions regarding whether ­McCarthyism is an effective tool in rooting out potential threats to security are reminiscent of the Second Red Scare. The effects of McCarthyism have the opportunity to manifest themselves again in the 21st century with contemporary issues regarding the surveillance, accusation, arrest, and prosecution of those who are believed to be subverting the U.S. government. During the Second Red Scare, McCarthyism was used by governmental authorities to increase surveillance and monitoring of individuals without any evidence. Many of these cases never went to trial or resulted in overturned convictions based on the unconstitutionality of the investigations. In more modern times, the National Security Administration has shown the ability to data mine emails, telephone calls, and web browsing history of most Americans. This technology has given the government a vast array of surveillance and monitoring systems exponentially more effective than those of previous administrations. There are many similarities between the Second Red Scare and the early 21st century that suggest a potential resurgence of McCarthyism. The use of terrorist “watch lists” is eerily similar to the Communist “blacklists” during the 1950s. Key provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act’s surveillance procedures are reminiscent of Hoover’s undisclosed “evidence gathering” missions. Politicians both in the 1950s and in the present day have invoked the Second Red Scare and the War on Terror, respectively, in political campaigns and for the creation of new laws and departments, which has served to increase the power and scope of the federal government. One important difference, though, resides in the proliferation of the Internet and whistle-blowers such as Edward Snowden, Bradley Manning, and WikiLeaks. This new development has allowed many citizens to gather classified information regarding how the U.S. government carries out mass surveillance and monitoring of individuals. The debate continues as to whether McCarthyism is still alive in the United States, but one thing is certain—this era will be unique from the previous period of McCarthyism and must be compared with caution when examining its present use. Brandon Dulisse

606

Medieval Castles

See also Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s; COINTELPRO; Cold War; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hoover, J. Edgar

Further Readings Freeland, Richard M. The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948. New York: New York University Press, 1985. Gibson, James L. “Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century After McCarthyism.” American Journal of Political Science, v.52/1 (2008). Morgan, Ted. Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America. New York, NY: Random House, 2004. Schrecker, Ellen. The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History With Documents. New York, NY: Bedford/ St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Schrecker, Ellen. Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. Steinbock, Daniel J. “Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists.” Seattle University Law Review, v.30/1 (2006).

Medieval Castles The need for security and protection is as old as the first human settlements, which needed to be protected from wild animals and human enemies. The origins of medieval castles can be found in the Roman outposts and villages built during Rome’s expansion to defend the domains conquered and to limit the attacks at the outer edges of the Empire. This entry reviews the origins, functions, and architectural design of medieval castles, with an emphasis on the security that they afforded the citizens.

Origins The origin of the word castle comes from the Latin word castrum (meaning “fortification”), which also defines the Roman settlement, an orthogonal village enclosed by a moat and a wall with towers to defend Roman legions against the hostile inhabitants of the land they went to conquer. After the fall of the Roman Empire, and especially after the capitulation of Charlemagne,

feudalism became the most common force governing Europe. The lack of a strong governing authority led to insecurity, instability, and turmoil, requiring the rise of defenses in the transition period between 850 and 980 CE when castles and walls were built all over Europe. Castles were used not only as defensive places but also as offensive vanguards in the fight to gain more land, and ownership could often change according to these changes.

Functions The principal functions of the castles were defense against foreign attacks and residence for the aristocracy, which are reflected in the architectural elements of the castles (see next section). During the 11th century, the number of castles built increased significantly, especially due to the military raids by the Normans. In Italy alone, more than 20,000 new castles were built; castles were also common in Spain, France, and England. ­Crusades to free the holy places, the first of which was launched by Pope Urban II in 1096, resulted in the creation of new states, which needed new fortifications to defend them. The time needed to build a castle was much shorter than for any other building of the medieval period (e.g., cathedrals), and all citizens and vassals participated on the orders of the owners. For these reasons, castles are indivisible from the development of Europe. The medieval castle evolved dramatically during a period of 500 years, reflecting the changes of society and warfare of the Middle Ages. The slow evolution of the castles’ defensive systems during the first period of the Middle Ages is due to the fact that battlefield technology had not evolved since Roman times; a strategic location, such as the top of a hill or a rock, made castles unassailable. The discovery of gunpowder and the evolution of artillery in the 15th century led to the decline of castles. The Allegory of the Good ­Government, painted by Ambrogio Lorenzetti at the end of the 14th century, can be considered representative of the changing model of government, from feudalism to city-states. As a result of this change in governmental system, castles lost favor, as cities began to develop new defensive systems capable of repulsing continuous attacks. Castles did not disappear; they evolved into living

Megan’s Law

quarters for aristocracy (known as palaces) where defenses became less important. Castles had also a leading part in the development of European settlements. They were part of an organized system of disseminated points that allowed surveillance of borders and the territory. They had an important role in monitoring and alerting others of possible attacks by enemies and also in controlling strategic sea, river, and land communications. For this reason, they can be considered as spaces of control, aimed at the protection of land from foreign threats. They were outposts of a wide political system centered on the expansion of kingdoms, based on the vassalage relation of the feudal system. In some cases, the weak central power of this age eventually converted castles into vanguards with offensive functions, showing the improved status of their owners who challenged their king.

Architectural Design Castles, commonly known as keeps (from the Middle English kype), had a very basic organization, with a ground floor designated as a warehouse and a first floor where the noble owner lived with his family. The main defensive structure was the structural walls, which were built of thick stone and often reinforced with embedded arches. As the Middle Ages progressed, the quality of construction improved: Blocks of stone used for castles were larger and were often carved with great detail, and the quality of the mortar and fill-in mortar increased their resistance. French architect and theorist Eugène Viollet-le-Duc (1814–1879) studied the technology used to build Middle Ages castles by restoring the fortress of Carcassonne, an outstanding example of a medieval fortified town. Various construction elements were used to provide protection and security. For example, arrow slits were vertical openings in the walls and towers, aimed at protecting archers from the fire of attackers. Doors to access the baily were defended with wooden or metal grids to reinforce the weakest defensive element and when possible with a drawbridge. Other defensive elements of castles were a moat, often filled with water, and machicolated battlements, floor openings from where stones and boiling oil could be dropped on attackers. Many defensive tactics were focused on

607

keeping attackers away from the base of the defensive walls, making it more difficult to break the defense. The original Roman design was square; however, the shape of the castles evolved according to various cultural patterns. A circular design, which was less vulnerable and eliminated blind zones, was eventually introduced. English keeps became polygonal, whereas France introduced the quatrefoil shape. Castles evolved during the Middle Ages not only as a result of improved defensive systems but also as a way to reflect the power and influence of their owner. Towers started to enlarge in order to provide barracks for both the garrison and for the villagers and craftsmen, who found security within the castle walls. This public interior space, called baily, was often enclosed by a curtain wall, usually studded by towers to defend it from sieges. As castles and fortresses began to share the same defensive systems, the differences between them started to fade. Guido Cimadomo See also Community; Security, Concepts of

Further Readings Emmanuel, Viollet-le-Duc Eugene. Castles and Warfare in the Middle Ages. New York, NY: Courier Dover, 2013. Oliver, Creighton and Higham Robert. Medieval Castles. London, England: Shire, 2003. Sidney, Toy. Castles: Their Construction and History. New York, NY: Courier Dover, 1985.

Megan’s Law Megan’s Law refers to a federal law, as well as various state laws, in the United States that require law enforcement to provide public information about sex offenders. On July 29, 1994, a 7-yearold girl named Megan Kanka was last seen riding her bicycle in front of her home in Hamilton, New Jersey. A day later, Megan’s body was discovered not far from her residence. Megan had accepted an invitation into the home of an unfamiliar neighbor across the street (Jesse Timmendequas)

608

Megan’s Law

under the pretense of being shown his new puppy. Timmendequas had two prior convictions for sexual assault, had been released from prison after serving a maximum sentence in a New Jersey correctional facility, and was living in a home with two other sex offenders. Timmendequas was eventually arrested for the abduction, rape, and murder of Megan. The fierce outrage that was expressed by the community in the aftermath of this killing resulted in far-reaching changes. More than two decades later, the legacy of Megan’s murder lives on in a variety of registration and notification laws at the state, federal, and international levels that affect the surveillance of sex offenders and the security of the community. This entry provides background information, describes the three-tier classification of sex offenders, and discusses the implications of Megan’s Law with regard to public safety, privacy, and security.

to the public through law enforcement websites, newspapers, pamphlets, and other venues within communities. After the establishment of a federal Megan’s Law, every state enacted some version of Megan’s Law with discretion for establishing the criteria needed for disclosure of information to the public. The 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act provided Megan’s Law with additional registration requirements as well as a three-tier classification system for the offenses that require sex offender registration. Additional legislation, such as the International Megan’s Law of 2011, expands notification legislation to registered sex offenders wanting to travel to and from the United States. To date, Megan’s Law is considered one of the most important sex crime laws.

Background Information

States will typically place sex offenders into one of the several tiers that represent the potential risk for reoffending. Risk assessment instruments are used to assess the likelihood of reoffending. The first tier (or Tier 1) usually indicates a low risk of reoffending and may only require that notifications be provided to law enforcement and victims. Generally, low-risk offenders are being supervised on probation or parole. Offenders who are classified and placed on the second tier (or Tier 2) may have a moderate or even moderate-to-high risk for reoffending, and notifications may be necessary for organizations such as day care centers or schools. A Tier 2 classification usually results from a demonstrated lack of compliance with supervision, the inability to maintain employment, ongoing issues with alcohol or drugs, or a continued history of watching, lurking near, stalking, or otherwise inappropriate involvement with children. The third level (or Tier 3) suggests the greatest risk for reoffending and, therefore, has a more far-ranging notification process. An entire community may be notified through public distribution of flyers, pamphlets, or posters. What places a Tier 3–level offender at high risk for reoffending is not only the assessment score but also an ongoing lack of self-control or compulsive behavior, a strong sexual preference for children, and an unwillingness to undergo and complete treatment.

In 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the Jacob ­Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, after an 11-year-old Minnesota boy was abducted and never found. This law requires states to create registries that verify addresses and maintain registration requirements for sex offenders. The registries were c­ reated to more easily track known sex offenders and apprehend them quickly when an offense occurs. After Megan Kanka was murdered, New Jersey became the first state to pass Megan’s Law as a 1996 federal amendment to the existing Jacob Wetterling Act. Megan’s Law allows law enforcement agencies to quickly and consistently disseminate offender registry information to the public. Megan’s Law is a sex offender registration and notification law. After being released from prison, sex offenders are required to register their addresses with local law enforcement officials within a certain period of time after release. Once registered, the general public is then made aware of the offender’s presence in the community with details such as the offender’s picture, name, address, nature of crime, and incarceration dates. Failure on the part of the sex offender to register or update information is a felony in most jurisdictions. The information is typically made available

The Three-Tier Classification System

Megan’s Law

Public Safety, Privacy, and Security The purpose of Megan’s Law is to help make communities safer by letting the public know that they have a potentially dangerous sex offender living among them. This critical information allows parents to be more watchful and to help their children know who to avoid, as well as make it more difficult for a sex offender to find potential victims. Advocates of the law contend that it helps prevent violent sex crimes. Initially, the registration requirements for sex offenders and the notifications to the public were intended to be two separate policies with two distinctive objectives. The arrival of the Internet changed that by compelling law enforcement agencies to shift from holding community meetings and distributing flyers as a means of disseminating information to utilizing online sex offender registries. In many states, sex offender registries are open to the public through state-level open records law. Some legal scholars have challenged the constitutionality of public notifications surrounding sex offenders based on questions of privacy rights. While issues of privacy rights come into question for the offenders, public access to sex offender registry information tends to be viewed as a natural consequence of, and purpose for, having sex offender registries. Compliance with sex offender registration, then, is viewed by many as a public safety and security need that overshadows the privacy rights of sex offenders. Over time, policies addressing sexual offenders have shifted the focus from identifying and treating sexual offenders to concentrating on addressing public fears and questions of safety. Many supporters of Megan’s Law believe that such laws are needed for tracking and monitoring sex offenders in society. Some studies and public opinion polls indicate that the public anticipates reoffending by sex offenders and, therefore, want to regularly know where sex offenders live in order to increase their feelings of safety in the community. Law enforcement, probation, and paroling agencies typically verify sex offender data through inperson contacts. The verification process can greatly affect public safety resources in policing and community correction agencies. Critics of Megan’s Law have suggested that such legislation is often passed quickly as emotional reactions to heinous or sensationalized

609

crimes, without adequate research being conducted and without the benefit of community discussions. Some of the research indicates that notifications about sex offenders are not only less effective than once thought, but they can also actually increase anxiety for some residents. Furthermore, the focused attention on public notifications has the potential to create damaging collateral consequences for sex offenders trying to reintegrate back into society. In some cases, family members of sex offenders have reported harmful effects as a result of sex offender registries and notification requirements. Another of the negative outcomes of Megan’s Law is believed to be a greater potential for vigilantism and the overall security of the sex offender. Retribution toward sex offenders has reportedly involved job losses, threats, harassment, property damage, and arson. Juvenile offenders, too, can get caught up in the consequence of sweeping legislation that was not intended for the types or classification of crimes committed by some juveniles. More than 20 years have passed since Megan’s Law was enacted. Since then, the United States has witnessed a new level of registration and notification laws in the state, federal, and international jurisdictions. Megan’s Law was passed with good intentions and continues to be researched because of its impact on public safety, privacy, and security issues involving sex offenders living in the community. Patricia P. Dahl See also Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006; Privacy, Internet; Sex Offender Laws; Sex Offender Registries

Further Readings Bratina, M. P. “Sex Offender Residency Requirements: An Effective Crime Prevention Strategy or a False Sense of Security?” International Journal of Police Science and Management, v.13/3 (2013). Craun, S. W. “Are the Collateral Consequences of Being a Registered Sex Offender as Bad as We Think? A Methodological Research Note.” Federal Probation, v.78/1 (2014). Hynes, K. “The Cost of Fear: An Analysis of Sex Offender Registration, Community Notification, and Civil Commitment Laws in the United States and the

610

Mental Disability Laws

United Kingdom.” Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, v.2/2 (2013). Kring, J. R. “Caught in the Cycle of Sexual Violence: The Application of Mandatory Registration and Community Notification Laws to Juvenile Sex Offenders.” Widener Law Review, v.18/1 (2012). Levenson, J. S., et al. “Megan’s Law and Its Impact on Community Re-Entry for Sex Offenders.” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, v.25 (2007). Matson, S. and R. Lieb. “Megan’s Law: A Review of State and Federal Legislation” (Document No. 97-101101). Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 1997. Mustaine, E. E., et al. “Criminal Justice Officials’ Views of Sex Offender Registration, Community Notification, and Residency Restrictions.” Justice System Journal, v.36/1 (2015). Vess, J., et al. “International Sex Offender Registration Laws: Research and Evaluation Issues Based on a Review of Current Scientific Literature.” Police Practice and Research, v.15/4 (2014). Witt, P. and N. Barone. “Assessing Sex Offender Risk: New Jersey’s Methods.” Federal Sentencing Reporter, v.16 (2004). Zgoba, K., et al. Megan’s Law: Assessing the Practical and Monetary Efficacy (Document No. 225370). The Research and Evaluation Unit, Office of Policy and Planning, New Jersey Department of Corrections, 2008. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 225370.pdf (Accessed October 2017).

Mental Disability Laws There are various mental conditions and disorders (e.g., dementia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, depression) that can result in disability. Although severity and permanency of the condition are important, they are not the only factors that must be considered. For example, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission advises that the symptoms that an individual may experience in the absence of medication and therapy are to be taken into consideration. Excluded from its definition of disability are conditions such as pedophilia, kleptomania, voyeurism, transvestism, and illegal drug use. This is done to guard against vagueness and to prevent abuse of the statute’s purpose. Like other disabled individuals, those with mental disabilities have rights, which include but are not limited to the right to be treated with

dignity and respect; the right to receive age- and culturally appropriate services; the right to understand available treatment options and alternatives; the right to receive care that does not discriminate on the basis of race, age, and/or type of illness; and/or, importantly, the right to privacy. However, people with mental disabilities have been and ­continue to be subjected to rights violations and pervasive discrimination due to their mental incapacities. Mental disability laws encompass a number of laws that aim to safeguard the interests of this particular group. In the United States, these laws include the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Fair Housing Accommodation Act, the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. This entry focuses on the ADA, the primary act in the United States that governs individuals with mental disabilities, and then turns to privacy and security concerns associated with mental health interventions.

Americans with Disabilities Act In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA and extended the protections granted under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The ADA defines disability to include “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” While the ADA does not require individuals to produce documentation (e.g., a certificate) from a doctor, psychologist, or psychiatrist in order to be covered by its provisions, employers can request medical documentation to help evaluate how long and to what degree an employee needs to be substantially limited in major life activities. The ADA encompasses a wide range of civil rights laws that aim to protect individuals with physical and mental disabilities from discrimination in areas such as employment, public services and activities, public accommodation and services operated by private and commercial entities, and public transportation and communications. This makes it similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, the ADA extends to address areas such as “reasonable” accommodation in the workplace and the provision of mental health–related leave and imposes accessibility requirements on public

Mental Disability Laws

accommodations. Under the Fair Housing Amendment Act, landlords cannot discriminate ­ against people with disabilities and must make reasonable attempts to accommodate them. Similarly, people who are institutionalized are protected by the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. This act allows the attorney general to investigate public facilities that house individuals with disabilities and to fix any problems that may hamper the care and safety of these individuals. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is designed to assist children with disabilities achieve quality education through the provision of reasonable accommodations, equal access to programs and services, and free and appropriate public education. Under this act, public school systems are required to create and develop a curriculum for each child with a disability based on his or her unique needs. Congress enacted the first revision of the ADA with the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which revoked two Supreme Court decisions that abridged the initial protection that Congress intended to provide for employees. In the first case, Sutton v. United Airlines (1999), the Court stipulated that because medication could alleviate medical or physical impairment, these individuals did not have impairments that limited their major life activity of work and thus were not protected by the ADA. In the second case, Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky Inc. v. Williams (2002), the Court held that “substantially limits” means that impairment has to prevent or severely restrict individuals from taking part in activities of central importance in daily lives. The Court emphasized that an impairment effect must be permanent or long term before individuals are entitled to protection under the act. These decisions were rescinded when the ADA was revised in 2008. For example, under Title I of the ADA, the definition of disability was broadened, making it easier for employees, especially those with epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, and other mental ailments, to prove that they were exposed to workplace discrimination.

Privacy and Information Security for Mental Health Interventions Crucial to the overall success of any health intervention is the accuracy, correctness, and credibility of the information exchanged as well as the rights of individuals to control the disclosure of their

611

personal information. Indeed, American society places a high value on individual rights, independent decision making, and the protection of the private domain from government or other intrusion. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act regulates and establishes the security and privacy requirement of patient data. The act’s privacy rule stipulates that protected health information be made available only by a court order or by authorization of the patient. However, health systems’ increasing use of the cloud computing paradigm for storing, sharing, and integration of patients’ medical records can trigger risks in terms of security and privacy and may lead to unauthorized access to protected health information. Mental disability laws comprise a wide variety of legal topics that relate to people with a diagnosis or a possible diagnosis of a mental health condition and to practitioners and other individuals who are involved in managing or treating them. In the civil arena, there are laws that focus on involuntary commitment and guardianship and the right to refuse treatment. Deinstitutionalization and aftercare are also addressed. Laws that govern treatment professionals focus on areas such as licensing laws, confidentiality, privacy and security, informed consent, and medical malpractice. In the criminal trial process, mental disability laws act in conjunction with criminal laws and rules to protect individuals with mental illness in areas such as fitness for trial or execution, incompetency to stand trial, and the insanity defense. For example, the M’Naghten Rule is based on the conclusion that a defendant who has a defect of reason, or a disease of the mind, that prevents him or her from knowing the nature and quality of his or her actions, should not be held criminally responsible. These laws also direct and have significant impact on the admission of expert testimony or other psychiatric evidence in court proceedings. Nelseta Walters See also Health Management Organizations; Mental Health Inpatient Facilities

Further Readings Bennet, K., et al. “Security Consideration for E-Mental Health Interventions.” Journal of Medical Internet Research, v.12/5 (2010). https://www.jmir.org/2010/5/e61

612

Mental Health Inpatient Facilities

Frieden, Lex. NCD and the Americans with Disabilities Act: 15 Years of Progress. Washington, DC: National Council on Disability, 2005. http://files.eric.ed.gov/ fulltext/ED485686.pdf (Accessed January 2015). Russo, Charles J. and Allan G. Osborne. Update on the Americans with Disabilities Act. Reston, VA: Association of School Business Officials International, School Business Affairs, Legal and Legislative Issues, 2009. http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ918596.pdf (Accessed January 2015). Stefan, Susan. Unequal Rights: Discrimination Against People With Mental Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act (The Law and Public Policy: Psychology and the Social Sciences Series). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001.

Website Americans with Disabilities Act: http://www.ada.gov

Mental Health Inpatient Facilities In the age of surveillance and with the ease and accessibility of electronic medical records, serious privacy concerns arise for persons with mental illness who are psychiatrically hospitalized. Although in the United States there are fewer people who are institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals since the deinstitutionalization movement began in the 1950s, the treatment of persons with mental illness in inpatient facilities still raises constitutional and ethical issues. Inpatient facility medical records often incorporate records from past psychiatric hospitalizations, outpatient treatment providers, family members, and correctional facilities. When a person challenges his or her inpatient hospitalization, these medical records then become part of the court proceeding. The right to privacy is especially important for persons with mental illness because of the stigma and shame that surrounds mental illness. Therefore, treatment providers have to balance the ability to share information in order to allow for more effective treatment with protecting the person’s right to privacy. Although in the United States there is no explicit constitutional right to privacy for persons with mental illness seeking treatment, there

are federal laws that protect the confidentiality of  a person’s medical information and forbid ­discrimination based on an illness. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA) governs whether covered entities, such as hospitals or medical facilities, can disclose protected health information to other parties. However, there are exceptions to this confidentiality. When a person with mental illness challenges his or her inpatient hospitalization through civil litigation or refuses psychotropic medication and the hospital seeks a court order to medicate the person, there is no confidentiality. When a person is acting in a way that could be dangerous, the therapist is often required to report the person or warn a potential victim. This disclosure is an exception to the traditional rule of doctor-patient confidentiality. In addition, HIPAA does not prevent a hospital from gaining access to a patient’s previous psychiatric hospitalization history. Moreover, patients are often asked to sign HIPAA waivers in order to be discharged from the hospital and obtain courtordered outpatient treatment. This raises issues as to whether such a waiver is truly voluntary and free from any coercion. Many patients do not want to disclose their mental illness to others, let alone the fact that they have been psychiatrically hospitalized. The Americans with Disabilities Act protects persons from facing discrimination based on their disability. It applies to broad issues like housing and employment. When a person is psychiatrically hospitalized, it may create employment issues for the person on discharge, so the person may not want his or her employer to know about the hospitalization. Yet many of the protections that prevent employers from discriminating against someone because of mental illness do not apply unless the person discloses the illness to the employer. ­Furthermore, being institutionalized can lead to feelings of isolation and shame for a person with mental illness. This encourages persons with ­mental illness to keep their illness a secret and can discourage them from seeking treatment. A person who is institutionalized has the right to the least restrictive alternative and can challenge continued retention in a hospital through civil litigation. In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Americans

Mental Health Inpatient Facilities

with Disabilities Act requires states to provide community-based treatment and that unjustified isolation is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability. International law, specifically the UN Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, also guarantees the right for persons with disabilities to live in the community. However, once a person challenges his or her continued inpatient retention through a court proceeding, his or her medical records and private information typically become part of the court record. This can include information regarding past psychiatric hospitalizations, criminal histories, and information from outside sources such as family members and outpatient treatment providers. This information, which may be helpful and necessary to treat someone with mental illness, may be divulged to the public, because by requesting release from inpatient retention, the person has put his or her own mental state at issue. Despite the fact that the information from outside sources is considered hearsay and therefore inadmissible, there are exceptions to the hearsay rule, and medical records are routinely admitted in psychiatric hearings. In addition, often the person testifying in court against the patient is the treating psychiatrist, which can damage the therapeutic relationship by breaking doctor-patient confidentiality. Advances in the effectiveness of psychotropic medications have also changed how persons with mental illness are treated in inpatient settings. With a focus on psychotropic medication, the medication that a patient takes or has taken in the past can be very important information for the treatment provider. Health insurance coverage can  determine which psychotropic medications are available both in an inpatient and outpatient setting. With the ease of access to electronic medical records, a patient’s history can be repeated throughout hospitalizations and across different hospitals, including various diagnoses, the number of times the person has been psychiatrically hospitalized, and the psychotropic medication the person has taken. If there is a mistake in the medical record, it is often very difficult to correct, since information is sometimes copied over and may appear in more than one place. If a patient had previously been forced to take medication through a court order, that information may also be ­accessible to the current treatment providers. In

613

general, the legal standard for whether someone can receive forced treatment through a court order is whether the benefits of the treatment outweigh the risks. Institutionalization for persons with mental ­illness includes providing not only mental health inpatient facilities but also transitional living residences and adult homes. This is known as ­ ­transintutionalization, which is the transfer of a population from one institutional system to another as an inadvertent consequence of deinstitutionalization. With stricter constitutional standards as to the requirements of inpatient hospitalization and the requirement of a least restrictive approach, persons with mental illness are likely to spend less time in an inpatient setting than in the past but may be involved in mandatory outpatient treatment or spend time in a transitional living residence. Many correctional facilities have also become de facto mental health inpatient facilities as more persons with mental illness are being incarcerated. The same privacy issues arise for persons in these settings as for persons in psychiatric hospitals. Because mental illness is still stigmatized, inpatient hospitalization for persons with mental illness raises even greater privacy concerns. Persons who are institutionalized have a constitutional right to the least restrictive alternative and to refuse medication; however, by asserting these constitutional rights, persons with mental illness can end up divulging private information in a court proceeding. Advances in technology have made it easier to share information across treatment providers, which can lead to more effective and more consistent psychiatric treatment. Nevertheless, persons with mental illness have a right to privacy and to be free from discrimination and shame. Naomi M. Weinstein See also Mental Disability Laws; Psychotherapy; Public Health, Surveillance in; Specialty Courts for Mental Health; Stigma

Further Readings Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990 & Supp. 2010). Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-9 (2010).

614

Methadone Maintenance

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). Perlin, Michael L. Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal (Vol. 3). New York, NY: Michie, 2003. Perlin, Michael L. and Naomi M. Weinstein. “‘Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame’: Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation.” Southern California Review of Law & Social Justice, v.24 (2014). United Nations Treaty Collection. UN Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities (CRPD). (2008). https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang= en (Accessed October 2017).

Methadone Maintenance In the late 1950s and the 1960s, efforts were made  to find alternative methods to treat heroin addicts that today would be classified as “harm reduction” in intent and result. One of the most successful, yet controversial, was methadone maintenance. This is a “substitution” technique that involves substituting a longer-acting opioid, methadone, which is dispensed under medical supervision, for the short-acting street drug, ­heroin. Though generally successful, this mode of treatment is not a universal panacea and has attracted criticism from hard-line drug warriors for “sending the wrong message on drugs.” Much information, however, about drug addiction and withdrawal has been garnered from drug testing of in-program addicts and those in aftercare. This entry provides a background of methadone maintenance before examining the importance of clinical surveillance and monitoring of participants in such programs, and some criticisms of methadone maintenance programs.

Background Methadone maintenance began in 1964 as a reaction to the perceived problem of urban heroin abuse that occurred in the decades following World War II. The early program started by researchers Vincent Dole, Mary Jeanne Kreek, and Marie Nyswander operated under several assumptions that pointed to benefits for the client. Providing a long-acting opioid would relieve the craving for short-acting heroin. This would also alleviate

withdrawal symptoms noted with the cessation of heroin use. Used in appropriately measured clinical amounts, methadone would not provide a euphoric “high” and would allow the client to work and to participate generally in society. Society benefits through lessened crime, in that participants would not have to steal in order to feed their habit; they could work and otherwise desist from crime. Clients are divorced from the world of street drugs and do not have to put t­ hemselves and others at risk through involvement with that volatile and usually violent drug market milieu. Because methadone is taken orally, and only once a day, the incidence of blood-borne diseases transmitted by addicts decreases as the use of intravenous (IV) drugs mostly ends. Even more apposite is that methadone maintenance therapy (MMT) clients have 30% lower death rates than addicts not in the program. Family involvement and quality of family life improves, pregnancy is noted early through blood tests and outcomes improve, and risky sexual behavior may decrease. Initially it was hoped that addicts would transition gradually from drug use and ultimately desist from opioid use and achieve complete sobriety. That assumption proved to be unduly optimistic, and it is now accepted that most clients of methadone clinics will be in the program for lifelong maintenance. This is seen as a realistic and harm-reducing outcome with which most advocates of the program are satisfied.

The Importance of Surveillance and Monitoring Importantly, having addicts in MMT as clinical clients allows their off-site behavior to be observed and monitored. The fact of having to report regularly to a clinic to obtain their dosage of the drug and to be urine tested has a dampening effect on crime and addict victimization, simply by eliminating the time that one has to spend on the street obtaining money for the drug (through crime or the sex trade), finding the illicit drug, dealing with quixotic and dangerous street pushers, and finding a place to inject the drug. People unfamiliar with “the life,” as hard drug users call their existence, do not realize that it is invariably a 24/7 routine that precludes all other commitments. That is, the heroin user or “junky” is “on the job” of feeding his or her habit constantly, which

Mexico

eliminates regular, productive work; strains or eliminates meaningful relationships; and militates against having family relationships. Clinical surveillance, manifested mainly through frequent urine testing, gives those monitoring the clinical clients information about the clients’ health, use of other drugs, and assurances that they are actually using the methadone. The assurance is important in preventing pharmaceuticalgrade methadone from being diverted from the clinical setting and getting into the street market drug stream. When that occurs, it could mean that the client has returned to heroin use or that he or she may need a smaller dosage of methadone. That notwithstanding, testing reveals that the greatest drug problem for in-program MMT clientele is alcohol, as large numbers apparently selfmedicate with that drug. Additionally, monitoring has revealed that most clients need 80 to 120 milligrams per deciliter to relieve craving and to repress withdrawal symptoms from recurring for 24 to 36 hours. At that preferred dosage, it also blocks the effects of heroin and the concomitant euphoria and emotional impairment that occur under heroin intoxication. In some cases, however, heavy heroin users or those who are used to stronger strains of heroin may require a heavier methadone regimen, while others who are used to weaker heroin dosages could require less. A common complaint from clients is that the general dosage level of methadone is too weak to work effectively. While MMT is generally seen as successful, it continues to be attacked by more traditional combatants of drug abuse and some within the recovery field as sending the wrong message about drugs. Their general point is that one should not substitute one addictive drug for another and that the addict should learn to live without drugs altogether. Moreover, buprenorphine, another synthetic opioid, is presently making inroads as a substitute drug for heroin users. For reasons too complex for elaboration in the present context, it is becoming the dominant mode of substitution therapy in Europe and is becoming more common in the United States. Francis Frederick Hawley See also Drug Testing; Drug Therapy

615

Further Readings Dole, V. P. “A Medical Treatment for Diacetylmorphine (Heroin) Addiction: A Clinical Trial With Methadone Hydrochloride.” Journal of the American Medical Association, v.193/8 (1965). Faupel Charles E., et al. The Sociology of American Drug Use. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Joseph, Herman, et al. “Methadone Maintenance Treatment (MMT): A Review of Historical and Clinical Issues.” Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine, v.67/5–6 (2000). Levinthal, Charles F. Drugs, Society, and Criminal Justice. New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 2012. Lyman, Michael D. Drugs in Society. New York, NY: Anderson, 2014. Mosher, Clayton J. and Scott M. Akins. Drugs and Drug Policy: The Control of Consciousness Alteration. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014.

Mexico Surveillance, security, and privacy in Mexico need to be understood both within the context of the ongoing war on drugs and the need to lower crime rates in big cities such as Mexico City, ­Guadalajara, and Monterrey. Moreover, as security along the U.S.-Mexico border has become a pressing issue for U.S. foreign policy, it is also important to perceive surveillance in Mexico as a  phenomenon that is deeply connected to U.S.Mexico relations. The future of U.S.-Mexico ­relations is tied to the need of securing the border, combating drug trafficking, and lowering the levels of violence in Mexico. While bilateral cooperation in terms of security and surveillance has meant the modernization of Mexico’s law enforcement agencies, it has also reinforced the presence of the United States in Mexican affairs. For example, the U.S. Congress, via the Merida Initiative—a bilateral partnership that began in the fiscal year 2008—has appropriated around $2.3 billion to jointly fight organized crime and associated violence in Mexico. The initiative has funded the purchase of X-ray scanners, air mobility for Mexican police forces through the delivery of specialized aircraft and training for pilots and technicians, and the delivery of 400 canines trained for the detection of explosives,

616

Mexico

drugs, and ammunition. Moreover, this program has provided funding for the development of a cross-border communication system that enables Mexican and U.S. authorities to share valuable information at a faster pace. Although the Merida Initiative was conceived within the context of fighting organized crime, it has also had a large impact on the daily lives of Mexicans, particularly on privacy matters. For instance, as the war on drugs rages on, Mexicans have become accustomed to seeing the Mexican armed forces in the streets. Furthermore, as the Merida Initiative has transformed the perception of how to battle against organized crime, local police departments across the country have been largely militarized. The war on drugs and the need to achieve security and stability in the country have also led to a larger number of surveillance measures, such as road checkpoints in all major federal routes and the use of X-ray machines for the scanning of vehicles and people. Surveillance efforts to lower crime rates in Mexico have shown mixed results. The biggest issues have been in the area of privacy. For instance, in 2012 and 2014, the Mexican ­Congress approved a legislation that demands telecommunications companies to store up to 24 months of their clients’ information on a daily basis. Information gathered by telephone, cell phone, and Internet providers can contain users’ locations, websites being visited, details of payments made over the phone or the Internet, and a wide array of personal information. This legislation also allows Mexican authorities to request the information gathered on clients without any warrant or review by a judge. While these new measures have been championed by the federal government as modern tools for combating organized crime more effectively, it is important to note that the lack of checks and balances in the application of this legislation could ultimately mean a threat to privacy rights. While federal legislation allowing the collection and release of private information seems to mimic the powers granted by the USA PATRIOT Act to the U.S. federal authorities, it is important to consider the phenomenon of security and surveillance in Mexico as one that does not only involve the Mexican federal government or the U.S. foreign policy. Local and state governments have also

shown a growing interest in acquiring surveillance equipment. The logic underlying the need to acquire new surveillance technologies—such as intelligent cameras that can track the license plates of a vehicle—is that they will enable the authorities to lower crime rates and to provide better services to the citizenry. Local governments in major cities in Mexico, such as Guadalajara, Puebla, and Monterrey, have implemented the use of cameras in busy areas to reduce crime and to speed up police response. These cameras are monitored by the police on a 24-hour basis. The case that may better illustrate recent improvements in security and surveillance in Mexico is the one of its capital city. As one of the largest metropolitan areas of the world, and with 8.5 million tourists flooding the city streets every year, the local government of Mexico City has decided to implement a program named Ciudad Segura (safe city). Mimicking law enforcement programs in cities such as Chicago, New York, and Jerusalem, the specific goals of Ciudad Segura are to lower crime rates, increase law enforcement presence, create stronger networks between the citizenry and government authorities, and improve emergency response. The program’s main focus is the supervision of almost 14,500 cameras that are scattered throughout the city and are monitored from five different command centers. Law enforcement agencies in Mexico City also make use of unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor protests and traffic jams. While Mexico City’s local government claims that the Ciudad Segura program has lowered crime rates as well as police response time substantially, it is difficult to determine whether these results are directly related to the use of surveillance cameras or whether they have to do with other factors. It is also important to understand this program within the context of an increasing global trend that favors the use of surveillance tools to support law enforcement efforts. This new reality represents an opportunity for Mexican and foreign corporations, who now see their participation in the provision of security as a business that promises high returns. For example, the case of the ­Ciudad Segura program brings to light how ­Telmex (the largest data and communications provider in Mexico) and Thales (a French security, defense, and aerospace corporation) have partnered to

Military Industrial Complex

install the surveillance cameras currently operating in Mexico City. In addition to the cameras, Telmex and Thales have provided the technology and infrastructure for the construction of five command centers, as well as of two mobile command units and 250 intelligence positions. The cost of the first phase of this program was $35.6 million for the provision of more than 8,000 surveillance cameras. Telmex and Thales were selected again as providers to increase the number of cameras in the city to nearly 14,500. For the two private companies, this represented additional substantial revenues. The modernization of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies has essentially been geared toward technological developments for improving security, such as the acquisition of better weaponry and surveillance systems. Notwithstanding such actions, the relationship between these institutions and the Mexican citizenry has not visibly improved. This can be illustrated by the recent atrocities and human rights abuses com­ mitted by Mexico’s security forces in Apatzingán, Tanhuato, Tlatlaya, and Ayotzinapa, which have severely eroded citizens’ trust in Mexico’s authorities. Finally, it is difficult to assess whether recent surveillance and security measures implemented in Mexico have had positive effects. While confidence in law enforcement officials continues to be low, and accusations of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture by such actors have not been infrequent, it is true that crime rates have lowered in certain parts of the country. However, it remains difficult to find a clear correlation between the use of security and surveillance measures and a decrease in the levels of crime and violence. Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera and Carlos Daniel Gutierrez-Mannix See also Closed-Circuit Television; Municipal Surveillance; Privacy; United States; War on Drugs

Further Readings Pallito, Robert and Josiah Heyman. “Theorizing CrossBorder Mobility: Surveillance, Security and Identity.” Surveillance & Society, v.5/3 (2008).

617

RAND Corporation. “Security in México: Implications for U.S. Policy Options.” http://www.rand.org/ content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_ MG876.pdf (Accessed December 2015). Reuters. “Mexico Ramps up Surveillance to Fight Crime, But Controls Lax.” http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mexico-surveillance-idUSKCN0S61WY20151012 (Accessed December 2015). Selkee, Clare and Flinkea Cristin. “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond.” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700. https://www .fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf (Accessed December 2015). Thales. “Mexico City, the World’s Most Ambitious Urban Security Programme.” https://www.thalesgroup .com/en/worldwide/security/case-study/mexico-cityworlds-most-ambitious-urban-security-programme (Accessed December 2015). U.S. Department of State. “Merida Initiative.” http:// www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/index.htm (Accessed December 2015).

Military Industrial Complex World Wars I and II saw the establishment of the armaments industry as an economic powerhouse in the United States. Through each major subsequent international conflict since the world wars, the armed forces and the defense industries that supplied them have emerged as a priority in the United States’ budgetary allocation. President Dwight D. Eisenhower observed this transformation and warned the American people about the implications of the emerging construct. In January 1961, President Eisenhower delivered his farewell address to the American people. It was during this speech that he coined the term military industrial complex. He used the term to describe the intimate relationship between the military establishment, the political structure, and the defense industry. Eisenhower cautioned that this relationship between an immense military establishment and a large arms industry would become the new American experience and that total influence—economic, political, and even ­spiritual—would be felt in every city, every state house, and every office of the federal government. According to Eisenhower, although he recognized the need for this development, the American

618

Military Industrial Complex

people must be aware of its implications: The resources and livelihood of every citizen would be affected, as would the very structure of American society. Therefore, the American people must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought by the military industrial complex. Importantly, he felt that the potential for the rise of misplaced power already existed and would persist. The military industrial complex was therefore defined as the  relationship between policy and monetary relationships. Eisenhower further warned that the American people must not let the weight of this combination endanger their liberties or democratic processes or, as has become more relevant, their security and their privacy. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry could compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with peaceful methods and goals, such that security and liberty might prosper together. In essence, Eisenhower was warning the American people to be vigilant in guarding against the power of the military industrial complex because, if left uncontrolled, it would lead to a state of constant war. The rationale is that the military industrial complex in the United States and the institutions involved derive profit from war. The military industrial complex thrives in times of war, and the industries involved, which appear to be the dominant partners in the relationship between industry, politics, and military, stand to profit from all conflicts and wars. When the industries that flourish during wartime, primarily the arms and oil industries, are closely affiliated and linked with the political and military institutions, it could ultimately lead to a state of constant war or, in the eyes of the war industry, constant profits. Historians have documented that in World War II, many private corporations made fortunes funding both sides in the war, with some even supposedly receiving a number of contracts from the Third Reich, which began with Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. The contracts included running railroads, organizing concentration camp slave labor, undertaking the task of identifying and categorizing all German and European Jews and other minorities whom the Nazis identified as being invalids, and manufacturing many of the

vehicles that Hitler used in the military campaign he waged across Europe. Hitler also reportedly received financial support from American business tycoons who allegedly gave financial support for Nazi Germany and illegally conveyed important technologies to the Third Reich, while some prominent American families have been accused of profiting from slave labor at a concentration camp. Thus, it has been argued that the military industrial complex provided support and resources to Hitler in pursuit of his Nazi ideology of total war and world domination in World War II. In more recent times, the military industrial complex has maintained its pursuit of profit but has evolved with the changing times. The military industrial complex has become more advanced, intricate, and global. The evolved military industrial complex is fueled by the neoconservatism ideology (neoconservatism means “new conservatism” but is far removed from the traditional understanding of conservatism). This entry first explores the relation of neoconservatism to the military industrial complex and then discusses the role of the military industrial complex in security, primarily after the attacks on September 11, 2001.

Military Industrial Complex and Neoconservatism Traditionally, conservatives believe in the concept of a small government and the idea that the ­government that governs the best is the one that governs the least. Conservatism also tends to advocate gradual change and is steeped in traditional views and morals. Contrary to this belief system, neoconservatives believe in a strong, powerful, authoritative state where the power of the state is of paramount importance. Whereas conservatives basically believe in a noninterventionist foreign policy, neoconservatives promote an imperialistic foreign policy that seeks to reinforce the United States as a superpower with maximum global influence. Unlike conservatives who support slow and gradual change, neoconservatives advocate rapid and revolutionary change in military, politics, economics, and culture. Neoconservatism advocates the concept of ­preemptive war, a war that is launched not as a response to an attack but one that aims to

Military Industrial Complex

preempt a possible attack, and therefore removes the threat before it occurs. Neoconservatives believe that the state and society should be led by an intellectual elite and that the infringement of some civil liberties is necessary to suppress opposition and to create a robust, central power with the capacity to export America’s power around the world in order to create a new American empire. Although neoconservatives proclaim the need to spread liberty around the world, the preservation of the state is also a main objective. In January 1998, the neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century wrote to then president Bill Clinton calling for the removal of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to prevent the threat he posed through his possession of weapons of mass destruction. In keeping with the principles of neoconservatism, the letter outlined the objective of making the United States a global empire, with total control of land, sea, and outer space. It also called for the removal of “rogue” regimes such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, which were later referred to as the Axis of Evil by then president George W. Bush in a speech. The Project for the New American Century specifically advocated for a massive increase in defense spending and felt that the process of transformation, even if it brought revolutionary change, would likely be a long journey, unless a catastrophic and catalyzing event took place. One year later in September 2001, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon occurred, providing the opportunity for the military industrial complex to launch a new phase of expansion.

The Military Industrial Complex and the War on Terror The U.S. government’s reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in increasing military budgets, which were justified as part of what the Pentagon and the Bush administration referred to as the overall global War on Terrorism, or the War on Terror. This approach yielded hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts for private companies and security-related awards from the State Department and the Department of Energy. The intelligence community and the Department of Homeland Security have provided tens of

619

billions of dollars in additional business to these firms. The budget increases that began after 9/11 continued throughout the 2000s. The Pentagon’s base budget plus expenditures on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan pushed total military spending to more than $700 billion per year, the highest level since World War II. Of this figure, more than $400 billion were disbursed to private companies. Several large contractors saw their Pentagonawarded contracts nearly double between 2001 and 2008, with some individual companies allegedly receiving more federal dollars in 2008 than the Environmental Protection Agency ($7.5 billion), the Department of Labor ($11.4 billion), or the Department of Transportation ($15.5 billion). Despite the increased budget, the Pentagon’s awarding of contracts was highly concentrated over this period, with five contractors—Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics—accounting for more than one third of all Pentagon contracts. Many of the same companies that benefited from increased Pentagon and war spending were also top contractors for other security-related agencies. For instance, Lockheed Martin was one of the top contractors for the Pentagon, as well as for the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Although contracts awarded by these agencies were only a fraction of the levels awarded by the Pentagon, they were nonetheless significant: Publicly available information indicates that the Department of Homeland Security awarded $13.4 billion in contracts in 2008, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration $15.9 billion, the State Department $5.5 billion, and the Department of Energy $24.6 billion. Additionally, the number of military contractors is steadily increasing, and the U.S. government is becoming progressively dependent on them. According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States can no longer conduct large or sustained military operations or respond to major disasters without heavy support from private contractors. As a result, it has been estimated that the United States engages a minimum of one contractor to

620

Military Industrial Complex

support every soldier deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. In August 2011, there were more than 260,000 private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than the number of ground troops in both countries. Between December 2008 and December 2010, the total number of private security contractors in Afghanistan increased by 413%, while troop levels increased by 200%. Private contractors provide a number of services, including transport, construction, drone operation, and security services. There are three main types of contractors who  have profited from the post-9/11 military budget increases: (1) rebuilding and supporting contractors, (2) private security contractors, and (3)  weapons makers. The support and security contractors comprised the majority of private contractors engaged by the U.S. government. The support services include the serving of meals, doing laundry, maintaining and repairing vehicles, and transporting fuel and equipment. The largest rebuilding and support contractor since the War on Terror began has been Kellogg, and Brown and Root, which, until 2007, was a division of the Halliburton Corporation. Halliburton’s contracts increased more than tenfold from 2002 through 2006 simply on the strength of contracts to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure and to provide logistical support to U.S. troops in Iraq. The Halliburton contracts ignited debates on several fronts, from the circumstances under which they were awarded to the high incidence of cost overruns, to the conflicts of interest in the company’s relationship with the Bush administration’s vice president Dick Cheney. Halliburton’s first Iraq-related contract was awarded before the war even began. It was an open-ended, 7-year contract for work in the oil industry, from putting out oil fires to rebuilding and operating Iraq’s oil infrastructure in the wake of the U.S. intervention. The private security sector also benefited greatly from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Firms were awarded contracts to guard embassies, to serve as bodyguards, to protect infrastructure such as oil pipelines, and to train Iraqi security forces. A major challenge facing the use of private  security since the onset of military operations  in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a lack of

accountability. The private security contractors have operated with virtual legal immunity in the execution of their duties. At the beginning of the Iraq war, the private security contractors had immunity from local law and were not covered under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. One example of this challenge was the case of private contractors involved in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal in Iraq. Despite the fact that all of the translators working at the prison worked for a private contractor (the Titan Corporation) and almost half of the interrogators worked for another private contractor (CACI), no private contract employee faced charges as a result of the scandal. The third set of recipients of the war-related contracts is composed of companies like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, which supply the weapons actually used in the conflicts. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan created a large market for weapons acquisition and repair. New weapons procurement alone totaled more than $215 billion from 2004 through 2010. It is estimated that additional tens of billions will be requested for “reset” activities, which is defined as restoring the equipment of military units to prewar levels. Moreover, fraud, mismanagement, and corruption have been frequently associated with the U.S. government’s use of military contractors. It was found that the government’s funding for at least  15 large-scale programs and projects in Afghanistan grew from just over $1 billion to ­ nearly $3  billion, although the government had questions about their effectiveness or cost. One program, which was approved as a modest wheat program, e­ventually grew into one of America’s largest counterinsurgency projects in southern Afghanistan, although there were concerns about its impact. The work of another multi-billiondollar project, which resulted in the construction of schools, clinics, and other public buildings, was found to be of substandard quality, raising concerns that the buildings will not be able to withstand a serious earthquake and must be rebuilt. Another example of controversial expenditure is the $300-million diesel power plant that was built by private contractors even though it was known that the facility would not be used regularly because the Afghan government could not afford

Military Intelligence

to maintain its operations. Even expenditures of local contractors were called into question. RWA, a group of three Afghan contractors, was selected to build a 17.5-mile paved road in Ghazni province. They were paid $4 million between 2008 and 2010 before the contract was terminated with only two thirds of a mile of road actually having been paved by the contractors. The global War on Terror has enabled the military industrial complex to erect a financial empire, echoing the cautions identified by President ­Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell speech. Dianne Williams See also Iran; Iraq; Weapons of Mass Destruction

Further Readings Belasco, Amy. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. Black, Edwin. IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America’s Most Powerful Corporation. New York, NY: Crown, 2001. Black, Edwin. Hitler’s Carmaker: The Inside Story of How General Motors Helped Mobilize the Third Reich. Washington, DC: HNN History News Network, 2007. http://globalresearch.ca/index .php?context=va&aid=5571 Dunne, Paul K. and Elisabeth Sköns. The Military Industrial Complex. Bristol, England: University of the West of England, Department of Economics, Discussion Papers, 2009. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Farewell Address to the Nation (January 17, 1961). http://www.ourdocuments.gov/ doc.php?doc=90&page=transcript (Accessed October 2017). Harrison, Todd. Analysis of the FY2012 Defense Budget. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011. Hartung, William D. The Military-Industrial Complex Revisited: Shifting Patterns of Military Contracting in the Post-9/11 Period. Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, 2014. Kosiak, Steven, M. “Funding for Defense, Homeland Security, and Combating Terrorism Since 9/11: Where Has All the Money Gone?” In Security After 9/11: Strategic Choices and Budget Tradeoffs. Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2003.

621

Kristol, Irving. Neo conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea. New York, NY: Free Press, 1995. Marshall, Andrew G. Financing Fascism: The MilitaryIndustrial Complex and the Rise of NeoConservatism (2012). www.journalof911studies.com/ letters/b/MarshallMilitaryIndComplexPNAC.pdf Quinn, James. The Economic Cost of the Military Industrial Complex (2008). www.envirosagainstwar .org/docs/EconomicCostofMilitary-IndustrialComplex .pdf Schwartz, Moshe and Joyprada Swain. Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. Squeo, Anne Marie and Andy Pasztor. “Pentagon’s Budget Becomes Bullet-Proof.” The Wall Street Journal (October 15, 2001). Whitehead, John W. “Privatizing the War on Terror: America’s Military Contractors.” Huffpost (Updated March 18, 2012). https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ john-w-whitehead/privatizing-the-war-onte_1_b_1209086.html (Accessed October 2017).

Military Intelligence One of the most important factors in military operations is effective (meaning accurate, timely, relevant, and actionable) intelligence, and surveillance is a primary means of acquiring it. Military intelligence (MI) surveillance has three levels: (1)  strategic, (2) operational, and (3) tactical. At the strategic level, surveillance collects intelligence about long-term military factors, as well as economic, political, and social information about the enemy. At the operational level, military commanders want to know all they can about the environment in which they are operating; this includes not only collecting intelligence about specific enemy forces but also information about their supply lines, civilian populations in the area, weather, and topography. At the tactical level, surveillance is primarily concerned with collecting intelligence about events on the battlefield or enemy activities directly preceding or during a battle, and it focuses more on the enemy’s specific location, weapons, and casualties. In addition, there are two general types of MI  surveillance: (1) overt and (2) covert. Overt ­military surveillance operations use ground units,

622

Military Intelligence

manned aircraft, and/or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Covert military surveillance operations use human scouts (in ground vehicles or on foot) or concealed observation posts. Covert operations are often ineffective in places where the enemy or civilian population is nearby and alert (especially in heavily populated urban and suburban areas). In these places, it is very difficult for military scouts to conduct surveillance without being observed by enemy forces (or civilians who may tip them off). Similarly, small groups of scouts make attractive targets for enemy attacks if their presence is discovered. For these reasons, using a human intelligence (HUMINT) network and/or overt aerial surveillance platforms to collect intelligence are preferable to ground surveillance in such environments. Commanders must weigh the benefits of covert surveillance operations with the potential cost of being discovered by enemy forces. The term reconnaissance is sometimes used interchangeably with surveillance, but there is a precise distinction, with reconnaissance generally referring to a “one-shot” type of military operation (heading out, taking a quick look at what the enemy is up to, and then zipping back to base). The term surveillance is usually used to describe a more continuous “round-the-clock” intelligence collection effort. Battlefield reconnaissance has been conducted by military forces and armed factions since violent conflicts have been fought, whereas long-term battlefield surveillance (while always of practical importance) has only come into more widespread usage in modern times, due mainly to the rapid development of technology. In modern U.S. terminology, these types of missions and operations are usually collectively referred to as ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). Modern overhead imagery ISR systems seek to “see” what is below either through unrestricted line of sight (LOS) or via technological means such as infrared or thermal capabilities. UAVs, satellites, and manned overhead surveillance ISR assets aid in detecting, identifying, and targeting an enemy (imagery intelligence, or IMINT). Signals intelligence (SIGINT) surveillance efforts aim to intercept enemy electronic communications and other types of electronic signals emanating from enemy equipment.

Development When aerial surveillance first began (with hot air balloons during the French Revolution), it was used solely for tactical battlefield ISR. The first military use of the airplane (in the early 20th century) was also for reconnaissance and surveillance. The two most important developments in military ISR during the later 20th century were not technological advancements but, rather, involved revolutionary rethinking of the purposes, targets, and abilities of reconnaissance and surveillance. During World War II, it became obvious that there was a need for intelligence about the enemy’s long-term plans and activities as much as for short-term battlefield information. This led to the birth of strategic ISR, which was then followed by a second key development: the decision to continue conducting aerial ISR after the war had ended. That decision, in turn, led to the development of the U-2 and SR-71 spy planes, as well as spy satellites. The first U.S. attempts to conduct aerial spying on the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, however, used huge, unmanned, camera-carrying balloons. These were launched with the hope that prevailing winds would carry them over the Soviet Union to the Sea of Japan, where they could be shot down by U.S. planes and recovered. But if the United States could shoot them down, then so could the Soviets (and so they did). In addition, the intelligence they gathered was of little value, as there was no way to control where they would fly or what their cameras could photograph.

Cold War U-2

The failure of the post–World War II balloon effort led to the development of the first highaltitude jet ISR aircraft. The primary one used by the United States in the early Cold War was the RB-47, a medium-range reconnaissance aircraft. The problem with the RB-47 was that it was large and slow and had a ceiling of only 40,000 feet, making it an easy target for surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. It simply did not have the speed, altitude, or range to fly over significant military targets (e.g., intercontinental ballistic missile bases deep within the Soviet Union).

Military Intelligence

Lockheed Aircraft’s famous aircraft designer, Clarence “Kelly” Johnson (who had designed America’s first jet fighter in World War II), came up with a solution: a new airplane that could fly over 70,000 feet for an extended period of time. (Soviet SAMs at the time had a ceiling of only 60,000 feet.) The result was a radically different kind of aircraft—one that was a hybrid of a glider and jet, with the lightness of the former and the speed of the latter. The plane itself was designated simply the Utility-2 or U-2 (later nicknamed the “Dragon Lady”). Its first ISR flights over the Soviet Union began in 1956. The Soviets dubbed this new aircraft “the Black Lady of Espionage.” By 1960, however, Soviet SAM technology had developed to the point of being able to reach the U-2’s flight ceiling, and (in a famous Cold War event) U-2 pilot ­Francis Gary Powers was shot down and captured by the Soviet Union. While this forced the United States to end U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, the aircraft still proved extremely valuable conducting ISR missions elsewhere. In another famous Cold War event, U-2 aircraft flying over Cuba in 1962 provided photographic evidence of Soviet nuclear missiles being deployed there, sparking the Cuban Missile Crisis. The U-2 continues to be a primary U.S. ISR aircraft, even up to the present time. SR-71 Blackbird

The SR-71 was the successor to the U-2, growing out of the Central Intelligence Agency’s A-12 aircraft program. It became operational in 1966 and (although retired in the 1990s) still holds manned aircraft world records in speed (2,194 miles per hour and flight ceiling (over 85,000 feet). Ironically, the U-2 (which it was designed to replace) has far outlived it. The advent of advanced digital imagery satellites ultimately doomed the SR-71.

Modern Manned U.S. ISR Aircraft The U.S. Armed Forces currently operate a large inventory of manned ISR aircraft. Each is packed with electronic equipment and now produce their information in real time or near real time. In the past, an IMINT reconnaissance aircraft had to land to enable its film to be taken and processed,

623

whereas today, the information is saved digitally and may be transmitted in such a format in real time, as it is collected, thus saving a great deal of time. This, in turn, enables the information to be placed in the hands of commanders (at any or all levels of operations) much more rapidly so that they can utilize it and respond at a much faster pace. These aircraft rarely operate autonomously but are typically just one component of a much larger system that consists of a variety of ISR collection platforms, which are networked both with one another and with other ground, air, and/or naval elements. This 24-hour ISR coverage capability has become an inescapable and indispensable aspect of modern military operations. E-2C Hawkeye

The U.S. Navy’s E-2 was the first carrier-based aircraft designed from the outset for all-weather airborne early warning and command and control. It performs these functions for the Navy’s carrier strike groups and has become known as the “eyes of the fleet.” It also performs the additional missions of coordination of surface surveillance, control of strike and interception missions, guidance of search-and-rescue operations, and communications relay. It is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft and has a large radar dome on top of its fuselage. E-3 Sentry

The Boeing E-3 Sentry introduced a totally new concept of airborne warning and control system to air and land warfare. Based on a modified ­Boeing 707 commercial airframe, it has a huge, rotating, saucer-shaped radar dome on top of its fuselage. The aircraft’s powerful radar provides coverage of the Earth’s surface up into the stratosphere, over land or water, and out to a range of more than 250 miles. The radar also includes an Identification Friend or Foe subsystem. Thus, the E-3 can perform surveillance, identification, weapons control, battle management, and communications functions in real time. Its missions typically last for 8 to 10 hours, but air-to-air refueling and on-board rest facilities enable much longer missions to be undertaken when necessary. E-3s are often among the first U.S. military assets deployed in a crisis.

624

Military Intelligence

EP-3E

These aircraft are known as ARIES II (Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System II) and are land-based SIGINT platforms used by the Navy. Each is powered by four turboprop engines. Normally the missions of the EP-3E have been shrouded in secrecy, but one hit the world’s headlines in April 2001, when it was involved in a major incident with two Chinese air force fighters. The Navy aircraft was on a routine patrol in international airspace off Hainan Island when it was intercepted, and one fighter flew too close and hit one of the EP-3E’s propellers. The Chinese aircraft crashed, killing its pilot; the EP-3E was damaged and forced to land on Hainan Island. The event sparked a brief diplomatic crisis between the United States and China, but the crew and aircraft were ultimately returned to the United States. E-8C Joint STARS

The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) is a joint U.S. Air Force–Army program. It consists of two components: (1) the E-8C airborne element (a converted Boeing 707 with a multimode radar system) and (b) a ground element of Army-operated, vehicle-mounted ground station modules. The aircraft carries radar that provides targeting and battle management data to all Joint STARS operators, both in the aircraft and in the ground station modules. These operators can then call on aircraft, missiles, or artillery for fire support. The radar is reported to have a range of 155 miles and can cover an estimated 386,000 square miles in a single 8-hour sortie. The radar operates in wide area surveillance and moving target indicator modes and is designed not only to detect, locate, and identify slowmoving targets but also to differentiate between wheeled and tracked vehicles. Another capability is the synthetic aperture radar/fixed target indicator, which produces a photographic-like image or data map of selected geographic regions, showing precise locations of large nonmoving targets (e.g., bridges, harbors, airports, buildings, stationary vehicles). P-8 Poseidon

The P-8 is the U.S. Navy’s twin jet engine replacement for the P-3. Current plans are to

replace the P-3 fleet (including the EP-3Es) with Poseidons and UAVs. RC-12 Guardrail

The RC-12 is a fixed-wing, twin-engine turboprop electronic reconnaissance aircraft. It provides corps-level, near real-time SIGINT collection and targeting for the U.S. Army. The aircraft typically operate in three-plane formations, staggered across a battle area. RC-135

This aircraft is a four-engine jet plane. It is known that there are three distinct types of this aircraft in service, but their roles and equipment are so highly classified that there may be more (unidentified) variants. The RC-135S Cobra Ball detects and tracks foreign missile launches. The mission of the RC-135U Combat Sent is to detect hostile electronic signals. The primary and most common variant is the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint. These aircraft are fitted with sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment used to monitor the electronic activity of adversaries. This involves SIGINT intercepts of enemy activity up to about 150 miles. U-2

The venerable U-2 is still in service, although it is being replaced by the UAV RQ-4 Global Hawk. Plans are to permanently retire the U-2 by 2019. Its official mission is “day or night, highaltitude, all-weather, stand-off surveillance.” With its standard electronic package, the aircraft is capable of collecting multisensor photo and electro-optic, infrared, and radar imagery; however, if fitted with the “Senior Span” electronic platform on top of its fuselage, the U-2 can also collect SIGINT.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles While battlefield ISR is often performed by manned aircraft and vehicles, one of the most effective (and increasingly utilized) means of gathering such intelligence is the use of UAVs (or drones). A UAV is any craft that is flown remotely by operators on the ground. UAVs are sent over

Military Intelligence

hostile territory to collect intelligence, which may then be electronically transmitted back to its base. The United States has developed UAVs in three main categories: (1) tactical (with a range of less than 125 miles), (2) strategic (with a range of more than 125 miles), and (3) micro. Unarmed UAVs are designated with an “RQ”; armed UAVs are designated with an “MQ.”

625

endurance is more than 32 hours, but it typically flies 24-hour missions. The Global Hawk is capable of both direct LOS communications with a ground station and also beyond LOS communications via a satellite link. RQ-7 Shadow

The Shadow is an unarmed tactical UAV used by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. It is launched RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator either by a conventional wheeled takeoff or from The Predator was the first UAV to be put into a trailer-mounted rail launcher, with a hydraulic widespread usage. It is a long-range, long-­ catapult. It can either make a conventional wheeled endurance UAV that may be unarmed or armed. landing or can be recovered using a deployable Predators are typically employed in a system of arresting hook on the aircraft and ground-based four UAVs, a ground control station (GCS), a satcables. Shadows are typically deployed in systems ellite communication suite, and 55 personnel, all comprising three UAVs plus ground support, all of of which are usually (but not necessarily) colowhich are mounted in vehicles and trailers. Each cated at the same airfield. Each Predator carries Shadow possesses a remote video camera, which three cameras transmitting full-motion video (one provides commanders with near real-time video in the nose, a daylight television camera, and a surveillance. The Shadow was first used in 2002. low-light/night infrared camera). Each UAV and It has a maximum speed of about 127 mph, a its sensors are controlled by a team of four at the range of about 68 miles, ceiling of 15,000 feet, GCS, which is air transportable by a C-130 airand an endurance of 6 to 8 hours. craft. The satellite suite provides communications between the GCS and the aircraft when it is RQ-8/MQ-8 Fire Scout beyond LOS and also links into other networks. The Predator can operate at up to 25,000 feet but The Fire Scout is a vertical takeoff and landing usually flies at 15,000 feet. It has a maximum (VTOL) tactical UAV used by the U.S. Navy since speed of 135 mph, a range of about 450 miles, 2000; the armed version has been in use since and can operate for up to 24 hours. In 2001, the 2009. It has a maximum speed of about 140 mph, United States began to arm the Predator with two a range of about 100 miles, and a ceiling of Hellfire missiles. While the Hellfire is an antitank 20,000 feet. It has an endurance limit of 8 hours missile (used on the AH-64 Apache helicopter), it and can carry a payload of up to 600 pounds. It was found to be the only missile in the U.S. invenhas typically been used as an unarmed UAV, but its tory at the time that was light enough, yet effecarmed version is capable of carrying weapon systive enough, to be carried by the Predator. The tems such as rocket pods. first known armed Predator strike was in ­February 2002 in Afghanistan. MQ-9 Reaper RQ-4 Global Hawk

The Global Hawk is the world’s first high-­ altitude, long-endurance, strategic UAV. It provides high-resolution, near real-time imagery of large geographic areas. It carries cloud-penetrating imaging radar, a ground-moving target indicator, and electro-optical and infrared sensors. Its maximum speed is 391 mph, with a range of more than 14,000 miles and a ceiling of 60,000 feet. Its

The Reaper was created to replace the Predator and was first flown in 2007. It typically operates at 25,000 feet but can fly up to 50,000 feet. It can operate for up to 40 hours and has a maximum speed of 300 mph. Its range is about 1,150 miles. It carries up to 14 Hellfire missiles or four Hellfires and two 500-pound bombs. In 2011, Reapers began to carry the Gorgon Stare wide area surveillance system (nine video cameras that provide nine different simultaneous feeds).

626

Minority Report

RQ-170 Sentinel

The Sentinel, whose unofficial nickname is Wraith, is a tailless flying wing stealth UAV that became known in the press as the “Beast of ­Kandahar” after it was spotted in Afghanistan in 2009. It was first flown in 2007, and operational information about it is classified. In 2011, a Central Intelligence Agency Sentinel crashed in ­ Iran. Despite claims from Iran that it had brought the UAV down, U.S. officials asserted that the crash was due to mechanical failure. Micro Air Vehicles

Micro air vehicles are UAVs smaller than 6 inches across in size. This concept originated in the Department of Defense’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The known designs conduct real-time imaging, have ranges up to 6 miles, and speeds up to 30 mph. Their mission times are anywhere from 20 minutes to 2 hours.

Analytical Techniques Several analytical techniques have been developed for battlefield and theater surveillance. A common one is the use of indication and warning (I&W) analysis. In this technique, information regarding specific types of enemy and/or civilian population behavior is requested by analysts. The information is then compared with an index of indicator behaviors to attempt to provide advanced warning of significant events (e.g., an upcoming attack, major unrest in the civilian population). A similar technique used in counterinsurgency operations is an “Hourly Insurgent Activity Array.” Using this technique, enemy attacks and other related activities are recorded in a 24-hour, 7-day grid, and analysts look for patterns in enemy behavior. Finally, metadata are being increasingly utilized in MI. Various types and forms of intelligence (e.g., biometrics, document and media exploitation, human intelligence, IMINT, SIGINT, tactical reports) are collected and entered into a database. Analysts then look for correlations between t­argeted individuals, locations, organizations, and/or units. From that data, a “pattern of life” analysis is ­formulated. The analysis is then used to create a threat characterization, and that, in turn, is used to further modify and optimize ISR coverage. Mark Wintz

See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; Central Intelligence Agency; Cold War; Cuban Missile Crisis; Drone Strikes; Drones, Commercial Applications of; Surveillance During the Cold War; Surveillance During World War I and World War II

Further Readings Clark, Robert M. The Technical Collection of Intelligence. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011. Johnson, Loch K. National Security Intelligence. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012. Johnson, Loch K. and James J. Wirtz. Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010. Jordan, Amos A., et al. American National Security. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2015. Richelson, Jeffrey T. The U.S. Intelligence Community. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016.

Minority Report In 1956, science fiction writer Philip K. Dick published a short story titled “The Minority Report” in the magazine Fantastic Universe. A meditation on free will and determinism, it was concerned about a future United States in which mutants with psychic abilities predict crimes for the police, who preemptively arrest the would-be perpetrators. The story was adapted into a film and was released in 2002 as Minority Report (sans definite article), directed by Steven Spielberg and starring Tom Cruise and Colin Farrell. Minority Report was a box office and critical success, and it has loomed large in law and policy debates in the years since its release as an illustration of the potential perils of nascent surveillance technologies. After a summary of the film, this entry provides an analysis of how the film is situated within an ongoing discussion of current and potential technology utilized in the criminal justice system to prosecute offenders and to prevent crime. Dick’s original work is quite short, and Minority Report fills out the storyline and philosophical implications considerably. The film is set in 2054 in Washington, DC, where Anderton (Cruise) is the chief of the city’s Precrime police division. Precrime relies on the reports of three humans who

Minority Report

have precognition; they have premonitions of murders hours or days before they will occur. The visions of the “precogs” are analyzed, the perpetrator is identified, evidence is brought before a panel, and the suspect is arrested before the crime is committed. The system is slated to be deployed nationwide, and Witwer (Farrell), a regulatory official, probes about its reliability, raising questions about the possibility of false positives or tampering with the precogs’ evidence, as well as the metaphysical implications of arresting people who have not actually committed a crime. Early in the movie, as in the story, the precogs file a notice that Anderton himself is soon to murder a man he does not know. Anderton immediately turns paranoiac and runs, but his escape is complicated by the ubiquitous use of optical scanners for identification, a wrinkle unique to the movie version. They are used for security checkpoints, for surveillance of public places such as the subway, and on advertisements, which constantly scan retinas and audibly offer passersby personalized pitches. To avoid detection, he engages the help of a surgeon in the city’s seedy underworld, who provides him with a new set of human eyeballs. In one of the movie’s most suspenseful scenes, the police deploy spiderlike scanning units in an apartment building, which invasively crawl onto people’s faces to ­identify them, but the search is called off when Anderton’s own eyes scan as someone else’s. Anderton eventually discovers that the precogs are not infallible. Each of the prognosticators may receive a different vision, and there can be disparities as to the exact sequence of events, including  whether the murder will happen at all. The “minority report” of one of the precogs may be overridden by the reporting system if the other two are in agreement. Anderton breaks into police headquarters (by holding up his old eyeballs to the  optical scanner) and secures the memories of  the dissenting precog. The story and the film treat the denouement quite differently. In the story, each precog gives a different report, and the later reports are time-shifted, predicting Anderton’s fate with the knowledge that he has already seen the earlier ones. He uses this information to scuttle an attempt to publicly discredit the Precrime system, and in the end consciously fulfilling the prophecy and killing the predicted victim to preserve the status quo. In the film, the reports of the precogs

627

are much less clear, and Anderton resolves to follow the clues in the prophecies to figure out why he was implicated in a murder in the first place. In doing so, he walks into a setup and inadvertently fulfills the prophecy. He is imprisoned, but his exwife exposes a cover-up by Precrime’s director, who commits suicide and thus ensures the dismantling of the Precrime enterprise. The film’s portrayal of a numbing, hyperbureaucratized dystopia built on mass surveillance, preemptive arrest, and foreshortened jurisprudence has made it an attractive metaphor for critics of current and proposed technological and criminological systems. The large-scale deployment of retinal scanners to track and monitor citizens has struck some commentators as reminiscent of urban closed-circuit television programs, which could be combined with facial recognition or gait analysis algorithms to achieve a purpose similar to that envisioned in the film (defense contractor Raytheon even hired the film’s scientific consultant to help develop gesture technology systems). Similar comparisons were made with recent programs of warrantless information gathering and detention without due process, including those authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act. Civil liberties in the film are routinely discarded for police purposes, and the evidentiary basis for all “future murder” convictions (as they are termed in the film) is the report of three persons who have, in  essence, been enslaved for the benefit of the greater society. Both the story and the film, however, outline a precriminal justice system that, for at least some length of time, is successful in using prediction and monitoring to reduce major crimes to nearzero levels. The works presuppose that such an endeavor is possible in practice; in both accounts, the regimes are undone not because of some essential flaw but because of malicious manipulation. This vision of predictive justice is reflected in recent attempts to reconfigure criminology as essentially anticipatory and risk-based, rather than reactive; the term precrime has even been adapted by some criminologists. For instance, several U.S. cities implemented predictive policing programs in the past decade and subsequently saw drops in property crime. Proactive forensic profiling—­ correlating attributes or behaviors unearthed via searches of large databases of personal information for the purpose of identifying potential future

628

Modernism

wrongdoers—has also seen comparisons with Minority Report. Chris Hubbles See also Closed-Circuit Television; Crime Control; Public Health, Surveillance in

Further Readings Bond, Cynthia D. “Law as Cinematic Apparatus: Image, Textuality and Representational Anxiety in Spielberg’s Minority Report.” Cumberland Law Review, v.37 (2006). Dick, Philip K. Minority Report. London, England: Victor Gollancz, 1987. Vest, Jason P. Future Imperfect: Philip K. Dick at the Movies. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2007.

Mobile Phones See Cell Phone Tracking; Smartphones

Modernism Modernism, a time of tremendous cultural change, flourished between 1900 and 1930. This entry reviews the evolution of Modernism from Premodernism to Postmodernism, discusses the key characteristics of Modernism and influential Modernists, and considers the effects of Modernist thinking on various aspects of society, ­including surveillance.

Evolution The period of time that begins with the advent of writing up to 1650 is called Premodernism. Knowledge during this period came primarily from the church. The world was viewed through a theological lens in which everything that happened from why the sun rises in the east and sets in the west (the Sun God Apollo was moving the sun that way in his chariot) to why bad things happen to good people (it was God’s will) was seen as caused by a higher power (or higher

powers, depending on one’s religious persuasion). Knowledge was therefore in the hands of religious authorities because (a) they knew God’s will and  intentions better than anyone else and (b) they were the most (and many times, the only) educated. Around 1650, however, Modernism evolved. People were seeking answers to questions and not relying on religion. Around this time, the Enlightenment, which emphasized knowledge based on empiricism (gained through the use of one’s sense) and reason, started. For example, John Locke’s (1632–1704) empiricism argued that rather than events being predetermined by a higher power, we were a tabula rasa, a blank slate, and experience would influence who we became. The scientific evolution followed closely on the heels of the Enlightenment, thus ushering in the age of Modernism. Rather than relying on the traditions of religion (referred to as superstition by some Modernist thinkers) for knowledge, notions such as development, growth, advancement, and progress became hallmarks of Modernism. However, later Modernism would redefine itself, while a few Modernist scholars would cling to the original meaning. For example, the philosophers in the Vienna Circle tried to keep metaphysics and aesthetics away from their philosophical discourse in their attempt to create a scientific philosophy. In addition, the art school Bauhaus in Germany eliminated art from architecture with a focus on functionality that was grounded in scientific principles. However, many others moved Modernism away from Enlightenment thinking in much the same way that Enlightenment thinking moved away from religion. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, ­Modernism became a far-reaching mode of thinking that became part of art, literature, music, and movies. This change was caused by the development of cities and reaction to World War I, which was not only the deadliest war up until that time but also the first war in which almost as many civilians as soldiers were killed. Many people believed that the traditional forms of art, literature, philosophy, and religion were not suited for the new economic, political, and industrialized world. Modernism was a rebellion against tradition as well as cultural and moral absolutism. Modernism became a socially progressive trend

Modernism

that affirmed human beings as creative, expressive people who could change their current environment through experimentation. Seen through this light, Modernism sought to reexamine every aspect of life to determine what was holding society back. By 1939, Modernism was essentially over as it gave way to Postmodernism. Postmodernism, according to social psychologist Walter Truett Anderson (1933–), is made up of four different ideas: (1) truth is socially constructed; (2) truth is discovered through rational, scientific inquiry; (3) truth is found in acquiring harmony with nature; and (4) truth is found in the traditions of American and Western civilization.

Key Characteristics and Influential Modernists Nihilism, the rejection of all moral and religious principles as a means of social progress, was an important characteristic of Modernism. Modernists were not necessarily atheists (though many were). Their rejection of the conventional morality was based on its control over people, and therefore, they questioned, if not outright repudiated, all systems of thought and belief. People began rejecting European culture for having become too complacent, and they believed that social norms were restricting the human spirit. Modernists believed that people would not be free, and, therefore, would not progress, until they rejected all preexisting modes of thinking and creating. A new culture was needed that would undermine tradition and transform society. Modernism flourished between 1900 and 1930. At the turn of the century, there were many scientific and technological innovations that were not only transforming society but also doing so at almost breakneck speed. The combustion engine, electricity, radio, X-ray, cars, airplanes, and so on were transforming the nature of humans and social interaction. Day-to-day life was changing, and it seemed like each new invention was being ­followed by another new invention. As a result, Modernist thinkers were adamant about distancing themselves from tradition (why ride a horse when you can drive a car?) in all aspects of life. Some important thinkers of the late 1800s and  early 1900s had a tremendous influence on

629

Modernism as a movement in the world. Philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) was one of the first thinkers to say that the world was an irrational place. In The World as Will and Representation (1819), he called into question the optimism in society at the time when he said that the world, far from being orderly and predictable, was the product of an insatiable metaphysical will. This work influenced the thinking of Frederich Nietzsche (1844–1900), whose philosophy stated that psychological drives, especially the “will to  power,” were more important than objective facts in the world. Philosopher F. H. Bradley ­(1846–1924) in Realty: A Metaphysical Essay (1893) introduced the idea that an object in reality is dependent on the perception of the observer, which encouraged people to doubt what they ­considered to be reality. Also, philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941) went so far as to argue that chronological time can be called into question and that time is lived, that is, time exists as it is ­experienced individually. Central to his work was the elan vital, the life force, which is the origination of creation. Psychologist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) believed that all reality was subjective and was based on unconscious drives and instincts. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), he argued that for humans to be part of society, they had to suppress their natural uncivilized urges against the imposition of societal values. This suppression was the source of neurosis. Freud encouraged people to look inward at unconscious motivation and realize that psychological events can exist outside conscious awareness. Another psychologist, Ernst Mach (1838–1916), argued that life was lived through the subjective interplay of parts of the mind and not the seemingly objective rules of society. Physicist Albert Einstein’s (1879–1955) theory of relativity stated that if the speed of light is constant, and if all natural laws are the same, then all time and motion are relative to the observer. In the art world, artists questioned the prevailing art at the time for its lack of freedom and strict adherence to outmoded methods of communicating images. Modernist artists created many new styles, including secessionism, fauvism, cubism, expressionism, surrealism, and Dadaism. Dadaism was not so much a new art form as it was a rebellion against all art at the time. It has been

630

Monitor Versus Merrimac

described as antiart (and yet they made works of art) and a protest movement, which fit very well with Modernism’s rejection of everything that came before. Interestingly, Dada was the one new art form that was named by the artists themselves (art forms are typically named by art ­critics). Modernist artists included Pablo Picasso ­(1881–1973), George Grosz (1983–1959), Hannah Hoch (1889–1978), and Raoul ­ Hausmann (1886–1971). In literature, Modernism’s influence might best be represented by Ezra Pound’s (1885–1972) maxim to “Make it new!” Literary Modernism was motived by a desire to overturn traditional modes of writing and expression. T. S. Eliot’s (1888–1965) The Waste Land (1922) was an introspective work that explored the darker side of human nature. Novelist James Joyce’s (1882– 1941) works Ulysses (1922) and Finnegans Wake (1939) are examples of Modernist literature; they used the literary techniques of stream of ­consciousness internal monologues as well as storytelling from multiple points of view. Sherwood Anderson’s (1876–1941) work Winesburg, Ohio (1919) is also considered a work of Modernism for its emphasis on the psychological insight into its characters. Other Modernist writers include Joseph Conrad (1857–1924), Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), Gertrude Stein (1874–1946), D. H. Lawrence (1885–1930), Dorothy Richardson (1873–1957), Eugene O’Neill (1888–1953), Samuel Beckett (1906–1989), Marcel Proust ­ (1871–1922), and William Faulkner (1897–1962). They all wrote fragmented, introspective, and multiperspective works. Stein’s writing was even ­ compared with the artwork of cubist Pablo Picasso.

Modernist Thinking and Surveillance With all the emphasis on freedom and breaking with traditional society, some expected a backlash from powers in the state and those who wished to maintain the status quo. The effect on Modernist thinking and surveillance can be seen more directly in the works of George Orwell (1903–1950) and Aldous Huxley (1894–1963). In Brave New World (1932), Huxley paints a picture of a dystopian future (AF 632, or 2540 CE), where the government controls its citizens through genetic engineering and indoctrination classes. Orwell’s 1984

(1949) is a story of a society under constant surveillance by Big Brother and a branch of government called The Ministry of Truth, which literally controls the information that all citizens see and hear. P. J. Verrecchia See also Gramsci, Antonio; Marxism

Further Readings Conversi, D. “Modernism and Nationalism.” Journal of Political Ideologies, v.17/1 (2012). Erjavec, A. “Adorno and/With Heidegger: From Modernism to Postmodernism.” Dialogue and Universalism, v.13/11–12 (2003). Snell, J. “Meta Modernism: An Introduction.” Education, v.137/2 (2016). Vrahimis, A. “Modernism and the Vienna Circle’s Critique of Heidegger.” Critical Quarterly, v.54/3 (2012).

Monitor Versus Merrimac The estuarine Civil War naval engagement between the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia (also incorrectly called the Merrimac), in the waters of Hampton Roads, Virginia, marked the end of the age of wood and the beginning of the modern “iron age” of warship construction. The success of the CSS Virginia in destroying two capital Union vessels on March 8, 1862, demonstrated to the world that iron warships were the wave of the future. The following day’s naval engagement between the two iron ships, however inconclusive, demonstrated the importance of turrets over fixed batteries, and the critical value of ships’ maneuverability in future naval engagements. Interestingly, both sides, though attempting to preserve secrecy, were well aware of the existence of their opponents’ ships and progress in construction in their respective naval yards as they were informed by spies and newspapers. Reports of construction progress provided both sides with impetus and sped construction. This entry provides a background on the construction of the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia, details the battle between

Monitor Versus Merrimac

the two ships, describes the espionage and surveillance tactics used in the lead-up to the battle, and concludes with a review of the battle’s legacy.

Background At the outbreak of the Civil War, the Confederate States had almost no naval facilities, and of course, no naval vessels whatsoever. The Union Navy, when abandoning the naval yards at Norfolk, Virginia, unsuccessfully attempted to destroy all assets remaining there. Much was salvaged by Virginia state militia troops who occupied the naval yards, including cannon ships and several half-burned ships that had been under repair, among them the USS Merrimac. Following formation of the Confederate government, Secretary of the Confederate Navy Stephen R. Mallory, after unsuccessfully trying to buy ironclads from France, fixed on restoring the Merrimac, rechristened the CSS Virginia, as a “floating battery” or ironclad. Extraordinary efforts and expense were involved in this effort as some officials of the new nation hoped that such a warship could break the Union blockade on Southern ports and could possibly take the war to Northern ports. By mid-July 1861, work was under way. Designs were submitted and finely tuned. Iron was brought from Richmond, Virginia, by rail; skilled workmen were engaged; and men with artillery and naval experience were drafted from nearby Confederate and Virginia army units. Skilled naval officers who had served in the “old [U.S.] Navy”— some of whom had served on the USS Merrimac prior to secession—were recruited to serve on the new ship. Plans were made to destroy the Union fleet at Hampton Roads and sail up the Potomac River and threaten Washington, DC, or up the East Coast to shell New York. Had fate in the shape of the USS Monitor not intervened, the CSS Virginia could have destroyed the fleet at ­Hampton Roads; however, its deep draft would have made the use of that ship impossible in rivers. Its lack of maneuverability was to prove equally problematic. The ship had 10 cannons, four on each side and one each on the bow and stern ends. The ironclad cabin enclosed most of the ship’s hull, protecting the gunners and crew. Additionally, the  ship was built with a sharp iron ram on the bow end.

631

In Washington, Secretary of the Union Navy Gideon Welles was alarmed by reports he had received about the Confederacy’s naval ambitions. Since “industrial secrecy” did not exist at the time, he had little trouble keeping track of developments in Norfolk. In June 1861, he submitted a request for $1.5 million to foster the design of three experimental warships. From this public submission, the USS Monitor was to emerge and a naval arms race was to develop. The Swedish inventor John Ericsson designed a flat-bottomed vessel with a single, central turret mounted on a flat deck. This vessel had the advantage of presenting a smaller target, being maneuverable in rivers and coastal waters, and its turret, being built so that it could fully rotate, was able to fire its limited armament (only two large guns) in all directions. Its main disadvantage was that due to its shallow draft, the ship was not very sea­ worthy, as subsequent events were to prove. It was expeditiously built at ironworks in New York, first at Greenpoint, Brooklyn, and then at the Brooklyn Naval Yard.

The Battle On March 8, 1861, the CSS Virginia steamed out of its home at the Gosport Naval Yards and into Hampton Roads. With little effort and almost no damage to itself, it destroyed the USS Cumberland and the USS Congress and left the USS Minnesota hard aground and a proverbial sitting duck for destruction on the following day. The era of wooden warships was at an end. When the USS Monitor, having steamed from New York and almost sinking in high seas on the way, showed up the following day, providentially for the Union fleet, it proved most inopportune for Confederate naval hopes. The ships battled for 4 hours and sustained almost no damage. Both ships withdrew to refit, and the battle was not renewed. The USS Monitor participated in minor river engagements later that year but sank on New Year’s Eve 1862 off Cape Hatteras, North ­Carolina, in heavy seas. Its successful design gave rise to a fleet of Union ships of the same basic design. The CSS Virginia was destroyed to prevent capture on May 11, 1862, much to the despair of the Confederate Navy and government. While both sides claimed victory during and after the

632

Moral Panic

war, historians agree that the battle ended inconclusively. The CSS Virginia, which sank two important Union ships on the battle’s first day and forced the USS Monitor to withdraw when its captain was blinded by a Confederate shell, may have a stronger claim in this regard. However, the Union blockade was not broken, and the Confederate ship played no further military role.

The Role of Espionage and Surveillance Due to the public nature of the bidding process, newspapers in the North kept the public abreast of the USS Monitor’s progress. These same papers found their way to Richmond and into Confederate hands. Although the work on the CSS Virginia was more secretive than that done on the USS Monitor, Southern papers were replete with braggadocio about the damage the ship would do to Union naval pretentions. These papers found their way to Northern hands, creating much alarm and provoking Union naval officials to push Ericsson to make haste on his own vessel. Additionally, at least one Confederate agent described as “a young man” received a pass to visit the USS Monitor while under construction and sent details to Richmond. However, the North had the advantage in the surveillance contest as several workers in the ­Confederate Naval Yards and Union loyalist civilians residing near the yards sent extremely detailed reports to Union ships and to Fort Monroe, in Union-occupied Virginia. One report, from a “Russian” worker who defected from the Confederate naval works, dispelled any doubts Union officials might have harbored about the progress of the CSS Virginia. Additionally, an “Irishman” similarly brought intelligence, sewed inside the lining of his coat, to Union officials at Fort M ­ onroe with detailed information on the CSS Virginia and its plans to attack the USS Cumberland and the USS Congress. Freed slaves and “contrabands” (runaway slaves) are reported to have also brought information to Northern outposts that were forwarded on to Washington. French and English observers also passed information to both sides.

Legacy This battle revealed that the Confederacy, with its limited resources, could not successfully compete with Northern naval assets. More immediately, it

established that surveillance and the intelligence gathered from various sources had enabled the Union to build a ship with such expediency that it arrived to save its fleets from complete destruction. Such intelligence arriving in the South only provided marginal utility, however, as the Confederacy did not have the wherewithal to translate any information it might receive into concrete, constructive, and innovative devices on a large scale. Finally, and most significantly, the battle showed the navies of the world that the age of wood was at an end and the age of iron had commenced. Francis Frederick Hawley See also Civil War; Espionage

Further Readings Anderson, Bern. By Sea and By River: The Naval History of the Civil War. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Davis, William C. Duel Between the Ironclads. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994. Jones, Virgil C. The Civil War at Sea: Vol. 1. The Blockaders. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960. Holtzer, Harold and Tim Mulligan. The Battle of Hampton Roads: New Perspectives on the USS Monitor and CSS Virginia. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2006.

Moral Panic Moral panic as a concept describes the way in which society perceives and responds to a particular (usually deviant) behavior and the impact such a response can have on the actors and their conduct. Examples of moral panics include concerns about witchcraft, terrorism, rap music’s ­connection to delinquency, surveillance, homosexuality, and even video games. Principally, according to the moral panic concept, something or someone is perceived and defined as a threat to the community or to values that society holds in high esteem. The media then reinforce the societal depiction of the act or actors and amplify the danger or significance to societal demise. As a result of the media reports, public

Moral Panic

633

concern regarding the acts or actors quickly increases. Then, in an effort to take control, or show that they are in control, authorities (e.g., politicians, opinion makers, law enforcement agents, government agents) respond in kind. If the moral panic does not recede quickly, the outcome could be social change. A possible response to moral panic by the authorities, particularly government and law enforcement authorities, is to institute surveillance of the specific actors and the communities where these key actors reside, or both. Although the particular mechanism of surveillance introduced may compromise the rights of community members, such as the right to privacy, authorities may justify the surveillance on the need to maintain law and order and to safeguard the security of citizens and the community. This entry examines the various theories of moral panic and discusses concerns that may arise due to surveillance as a response.

values and safety of society, a majority of the populace may already consider the threat a concern; however, with a moral panic, elite interest groups are able to “hijack” the concern for their own interests, often at the expense of much of the public. Some theorists have proposed that moral entrepreneurs are the originators of moral panic because they seek to maintain a certain social order due to their social and religious views, rather than to an economic interest. Goode and Ben-Yehuda argue that moral panics are often the unintended consequences of moral crusades. The moral crusaders seize on what may seem to be a threat to the social order and exaggerate and ­distort the real impact. The media, which are often controlled by the same elite, then expand the ­coverage of such events and offer predictions on how, if such behaviors or actors are not contained, the demise of the society or social order can be brought about.

Theories

Concerns

One of the key proponents of the moral panic concept is Stanley Cohen, who wrote Folk Devils and Moral Panics (2002). According to Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda’s 1994 article titled “Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction,” for moral panics to exist, the following five elements must be present: (1) concern, (2) hostility, (3) consensus, (4) disproportionality, and (5) volatility. Goode and Ben-Yehuda used a comprehensive analysis of moral panic based on prior research, but instead of providing a complex definition, they described moral panic by identifying elements and types. Although various definitions of moral panic exist in the literature, all the definitions agree that a moral panic involves a threat to social order, which causes concern or fear in society, and to deal with the threat society will want some type of action or change. In addition, some scholars argue that moral panic is elite engineered, meaning that it is created by the political, economic, and religious elites of society, who deliberately exaggerate and distort the impact certain individuals or events have on the social order. Such elite “interest groups” perceive certain individuals or acts as a threat to their ­economic or political interests and, through campaigning and fearmongering, mobilize society to resolve the threat. When there is a threat to the

A logical outcome of society’s response to a moral panic is the introduction of additional surveillance technology. For example, in the United States, law enforcement and government agents have used audio and video surveillance as investigative tools in criminal investigations as well as in the war against terrorism, which began after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Although law enforcement and government authorities may insist that they are safeguarding the security of their citizens, surveillance can encroach on people’s human and civil rights; thus, many people have raised concerns about such surveillance. In the United States, for example, these concerns include protecting people’s privacy and personal information, which may be jeopardized by some forms of surveillance technology. Brandi Williams, O. Oko Elechi, and Rochelle E. M. Cobbs See also Social Control

Further Readings Cohen, Stanley. Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. London, England: MacGibbon & Kee, 1972.

634

Morality

Goode, Erich and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. “Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction.” Annual Review of Sociology, v.20 (1994). Kappeler, Victor, E. Constructing Crime: Perspectives on Making News and Social Problems (2nd ed.). Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2006. Krinsky, C. The Ashgate Research Companion to Moral Panics. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013.

Morality Ethics or morality is about what actions an individual or a member of an occupation ought to do, and it is about what kind of character an individual or a member of an occupation ought to have. It is also about what features the organizations that employ members of specific occupations ought to have and, at a more fundamental level, what organizations there ought to be. These latter questions, or sets of questions, pertain to what might be referred to as institutional ethics, as opposed to the ethics of individual behavior and attitudes outside institutional contexts. This entry elucidates the distinctions between morality and ethics and discusses normative theories and moral pluralism, illustrating these concepts with examples related to surveillance, security, and privacy.

Morality and Ethics Sometimes, ethics is distinguished from morality. One way of making the distinction is as follows. On the one hand, morality is about minimum standards of behavior and attitude. Do not kill the innocent; do not tell lies; do not steal; do not commit fraud—these are all minimum standards of behavior; they are moral principles. On the other, ethics is a wider notion. Ethics involves ideals and aspirations; it goes beyond minimum standards. In thinking and reasoning about moral or ethical questions, there are a number of key concepts, distinctions, and theoretical standpoints that are typically deployed. First, one needs to distinguish between actions, habits, and attitudes. Actions

Actions are morally right—whether morally required or morally permissible (e.g., rescuing a

child drowning in a swimming pool), morally wrong (e.g., punishing the innocent), or neither (e.g., drinking a cup of coffee). Here one needs to distinguish between actions and their consequences. Lying is an action that is morally wrong considered in itself but might have good consequences (e.g., if one lies to Nazis concerning the whereabouts of a Jew hiding in one’s house and thereby saves the Jew’s life). Some actions are morally significant by virtue of complying or failing to comply with minimum moral standards (e.g., refraining from stealing from one’s employer or from murdering one’s business competitor). Other actions are undertaken in conformity with ideals or aspirations (e.g., engaging in unpaid voluntary work for charitable organizations or not taking advantage of one’s competitor when they are in an unfortunate situation due to bad luck). Notwithstanding the distinction between minimum moral standards and ideals, the boundary between these is blurred; there is a considerable gray area. Moreover, it is important to note that attending only to minimum standards—and especially being a “rule addict” and eschewing ideals— is an ultimately unsustainable position. Rule addicts will tend to lose sight of the underlying principles and values, including the ideals, that inform even the rules embodying minimum standards; ultimately, this is corrosive of conformity to minimum standards, as well as corrosive to the realization of ideals. Habits

Habits are dispositions to action that are typically performed by a person. For example, ­Winston Churchill evidently had the habit of smoking cigars. Habits include virtues (e.g., courage, ­honesty, determination) as well as vices (e.g., cowardice, corruption, dishonesty). However, virtues (and, for that matter, vices) are more than just habits, since, for example, virtues are ethically good habits practiced for good reasons, whereas this is not necessarily the case with habits. For example, Winston Churchill was said to be a courageous leader because he frequently, indeed habitually, made hard decisions but did so in the service of his country. Once again, vices tend to call for moral condemnation; people who are corrupt or dishonest

Morality

fail to meet minimum standards. In contrast, persons possessed of virtues tend to be seen as ethical; they have dispositions to do what is good. They do more than merely avoid wrongdoing. However, once again, there is a gray area here between minimum standards and ideals. As noted earlier, the key property of virtues and vices is that they are elements of character; they are to do with what a person is (and, therefore, what a person regularly, or, at least, reliably, does), as opposed to what a person might do on some particular occasion as a one-off action (i.e., an “out of character” action). Clearly, character and, thus, virtues and vices are of central importance in ethics, including institutional and, specifically, occupational ethics. Attitudes

Affective attitudes, including feelings, sensations of pain and pleasure, and emotions, are not actions as such; nor are they habits or merely dispositions to act. A person can obey all the rules, even do so as a matter of habit, and yet have a “bad attitude,” at least in the short or medium term. In the long term, this inconsistency is much less likely because emotions, including attitudes, tend to influence dispositions and actions. As with actions and habits, affective attitudes can be classified into those that are by and large good (e.g., caring, sympathetic, or sensitive attitude) and those that are for the most part morally wrong (e.g., an attitude of hatred or contempt). Naturally, some attitudes would not normally be regarded as either good or morally wrong (e.g., the attitude or feeling of excitement generated at the thought of being paid a large salary). Moreover, there is a gray area here between morally problematic attitudes (e.g., hatred) and attitudes that one ought to ideally have, but ought to not suffer moral condemnation if one did not readily experience them (e.g., friendliness).

Normative Theories: Consequentialism, Teleology, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics In contemporary moral philosophy, a threefold distinction is often made between so-called deontological, consequentialist, and virtue-based theories of morality. A further distinction is between objectivist and relativist—also referred to as

635

subjectivist—theories. According to objectivist theories, moral claims (e.g., that murder is morally wrong) are or can be objectively true (or objectively false). According to relativist theories, there is no truth of the matter when it comes to moral claims. Relativist theories, at least in their unsophisticated forms, are not influential among academic philosophers, albeit they have supporters elsewhere in the humanities and social sciences. Deontological theories emphasize the intrinsic moral properties of an action, such as that it is one’s duty not to do it or that one has a moral right to do it. Here, the contrast is with the consequences of the action. For instance, deontologists might argue that an act of intrusive surveillance is a violation of a past offender’s right to privacy and, therefore, is morally wrong and ought not to be performed, even if it has good consequences in terms of ensuring security. Deontological theories are also typically defined in part by recourse to the so-called formal principle of universalizability in one or other of its variants (e.g., “Act only on a principle if you could will that everyone act on that principle”). In contrast, according to consequentialist theories, such as utilitarianism, what matters morally are the consequences of actions rather than any inherent properties they might have (e.g., “An action is right if it maximizes the greatest happiness of the greatest number and wrong if it does not”; principle of utility). Finally, according to virtue-based theories, an action is right if it is the action that a virtuous person would perform. Deontological theories are associated with Immanuel Kant, consequentialist theories with J. S. Mill, and virtue-based theories with Aristotle. While there is a need to maintain the threefold distinction between actions, habits (including vices and virtues), and the consequences of actions, the construction of competing moral theories that give pride of place to one or other of these ­conceptual categories at the expense of the others has been questioned. Moreover, it has been suggested that the application of any of these theories to the behavior and attitudes of individual role ­occupants independently of adequate normative theories of the occupations in question and the institutional settings in play is likely to yield adequate and/or misleading results. Hence, the need, it is claimed, for the provision of appropriate occupational and institutional normative theories

636

Morality

(e.g., the normative theory of government or of the university, of journalism, or of nursing). Some normative theories of social institutions and occupational roles are teleological. Teleological theories give pride of place to the telos or point or aims of actions and organizations. Accordingly, on such theories, the identification of the virtues that define an occupational group will crucially depend on the aims of that occupation. Thus, the role of a police officer might be defined in terms of the organizational aim of security, understood as maintaining law and order. Accordingly, the virtues of a police officer might include familiar ones such as courage and honesty but also others such as suspiciousness and the ability to discover information from sometimes unwilling witnesses and suspects. At times, the exercise of these virtues might involve the infringement (but presumably not the violation) of the rights of suspects in particular, such as a surveillance operation that infringes on a suspect’s privacy rights. Although teleological and consequentialist ­normative theories are often conflated, they ought not to be. According to consequentialism, the rightness or wrongness of actions, procedures, or policies is logically dependent only on their outcomes and, therefore, is not logically dependent on whether or not they were intended or otherwise aimed at. The arguments for and against consequentialism in its various permutations have a long history and are detailed and complex: far too detailed and complex to revisit here. However, one influential argument is that sometimes good consequences are overridden by the intrinsic wrongness of an action, as in the case of imprisoning an innocent person to maximize the happiness of a community. In contrast with consequentialism, according to teleological theories, the intentions and, in particular, the outcomes aimed at, the ends, are in part definitive of the rightness or wrongness of actions, procedures, and policies—and, indeed, of social institutions themselves. On this kind of view, the outcome of an action cannot be morally significant—as opposed to good or evil in some more general sense—unless it was in fact intended, or could have been intended (or was, or could have been, otherwise aimed at or known about). In relation to the alleged conflict between deontological theories and virtue-based theories, it might be argued that the moral rightness of an action cannot be accounted for simply in terms of

its being one that a virtuous person would perform; for the notion of a virtuous person will itself be in part determined by recourse to a notion of morally right action (virtuous persons are persons who, at least, habitually perform morally right actions). On the other hand, the fact that someone habitually performs morally right actions does not necessarily make that person virtuous in the required sense, because the person might do so for the wrong reasons; so, it is argued, virtues are not reducible to right actions.

Moral Pluralism This suggests the possibility of moral pluralism. On this view, the distinctions between, say, intrinsically right action, virtues, and morally significant consequences are just that: conceptual and morally relevant distinctions that need to be respected as basic, rather than set against one another in the service of a monistic ethical theory that seeks to privilege one of these conceptual categories at the expense of the others. Moral pluralism might be substantive, as opposed to formalist, in character. This means that purely formal or otherwise highly abstract principles, such as the principle of universalizability and the principle of utility maximization, have a relatively minor role to play in theoretical and practical ethics, and, certainly, in individual and collective moral or ethical decision making. Is there, for example, a viable criminal justice system anywhere in which the principle of utility is taken to override the principle of convicting the guilty and ensuring that the innocent go free, utilitarian philosophers notwithstanding? What of the principle of universalizability: Does it provide much-needed guidance in the kinds of institutional contexts in question? No doubt the principle of universalizability has a contribution to make, but some claim that it is a limited one. Here, the suggestion is that it is little more than a consistency test, and, as such, it offers only very limited guidance to moral agents seeking to know what they ought to do or not do. Arguably, moral decision making relies heavily on substantive principles; purely formal ones are far from sufficient on this view. Seumas Miller See also Ethics

Mountain Surveillance

Further Readings Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (trans. R. Crisp). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Gert, Bernard. Common Morality: Deciding What to Do. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2004. Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (trans. Mary J. Gregor). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. http://www.gutenberg. org/files/11224/11224-h/11224-h.htm (Accessed October 2017). (Reprinted from Fraser’s Magazine, London, 1879) Miller, Seumas. The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge. England: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Nagel, Thomas. The Last Word. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1997. Scheffler, Samuel, ed. Consequentialism and Its Critics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Mountain Surveillance Mountaintops provide a naturally advantageous point from which to conduct surveillance and communication activities. The utility of high ground for military reconnaissance has been recognized since antiquity, and communication networks using mountaintops or watchtowers were developed in many European and Asian civilizations in response to military and political exigencies. Additionally, mountains are important sites for environmental surveillance and security assurance. Extensive networks of fire lookout towers were constructed across North America and Europe in the 20th century and remain in use, though to a lesser extent than in previous decades. Today, control of forest fires and volcanic mountains is increasingly accomplished through stateof-the-art surveillance technologies. This entry examines the origins of mountain surveillance and  many of its early uses before discussing the ways in which technology has gradually replaced traditional surveillance methods in mountainous regions. The taking of high ground as a military strategy is ancient; Sun Tzu recognizes its importance in The Art of War, and the Great Wall of China is  an example of its implementation. Elevated

637

terrain allows for easier reconnaissance of surrounding forces, advance warning against attack, and strategic advantage in battle, since it is harder to fight uphill and projectiles have greater range from high points. Watchtowers and fortifications were often built on hilltops, and early ­cities were sometimes founded on hills for the sake of defensive benefit. Coastal batteries and observation towers (known as fire control towers) were essential components of naval and aircraft defense strategies in World War I and World War II, and, like lighthouses, they were often sited on elevated headlands and bluffs. Since high points offer visibility at a distance of some miles, they have been used for thousands of years as platforms for optical and auditory communication, often to facilitate military readiness or relay news of battle. Accounts of beacon smoke and fire signals from towers or hilltops can be found in Homer, Aeschylus, and the Old Testament. As with carrier pigeons, relay stations could be constructed to move messages over longer distances. The English, for instance, famously made use of an extensive beacon warning system in 1588 to alert the entire island of an impending attack by the Spanish armada in a matter of hours. In addition to light and smoke, flags, horns, and loud-voiced criers were also employed as rudimentary transmission media. The expressive capabilities of smoke and fire signals were limited—usually giving only a single yes/no response to an agreed-on question—but they could be augmented by code systems that varied in temporal length, color, spatial orientation, or repetition of signaling. While such systems were described by the ancient Greeks, and African tribes could transmit messages through drum ­patterns, it was not until the standardization of Morse code in the mid-1800s that hilltop communication became truly robust, allowing for more complex messages to be easily transmitted. The installation of semaphore towers in the late 18th century and the development of electric telegraphy in the 19th century replaced antiquated beacon systems for the most part, but flag semaphore, signal lanterns, and heliography (the use of reflective devices—some as simple as a hand ­mirror—to transmit encoded flashes) saw continued ­mountain use in the 19th and 20th centuries by militaries, land surveyors, and wilderness rescue operations.

638

Movie Theater Security

Mountaintop lookouts were most prominently used in the 20th century in the service of fire suppression efforts. Manned lookouts equipped with alidades (devices for locating fires using a directional sight and a topographic map), binoculars, telescopes, and communication devices could rapidly detect fire outbreaks and send response crews to their locations. Land topography determined lookout placement and effectiveness; for instance, in the southeastern United States, towers up to 120 feet high were constructed with the intent of covering a 6- to 8-mile radius, while shorter towers placed atop peaks in the mountainous West served a radius of 15 miles or more. Simple wooden towers or treetop posts were built as early as 1870 in Montana, but systematic erection of permanent wood, stone, or steel structures began only after a massive conflagration in 1910 spurred a national policy of total wildfire suppression. Construction boomed in the 1920s and 1930s, and during World War II, many lookouts in the American West were manned continuously to alert in the event of an air raid by Japan. Fire lookout personnel identified and quickly responded to a fire set in southwestern Oregon by a Japanese incendiary bomb in 1942, the only instance of an air raid on the continental United States during World War II. By 1953, there were more than 5,000 lookout towers in the United States, but this number was drastically reduced in later decades, for several reasons. Forest road building improved response times, aerial monitoring and response (through the use of planes/helicopters and smoke jumpers) became more common, the total suppression policy was replaced by a more holistic management strategy, and many disused towers were dismantled after a 1965 law affirmed government liability for personal injuries occurring on federal land. In general, human fire surveillance is gradually being replaced by electronic means. Installation of video cameras at lookouts was explored starting in the 1960s, and wireless vision and sensor-based technologies have been developed, though their effectiveness is sometimes limited by terrain, weather, and atmospheric conditions. Unmanned aerial vehicles are likely to come into use for fire observation in the near future. Aside from fire monitoring, wilderness surveillance has included camera deployment to catch timber thieves and to prevent vandalism of natural

features or historic petroglyphs. High-resolution satellite imagery is used to combat illegal logging operations. Surveillance of mountains themselves also occurs in the case of active volcanoes. Like forest fires, volcanic eruptions result in high human, environmental, and economic costs to nearby communities; additionally, they present the possibility of mass disruption of civil aviation. Seismic and ground deformation monitoring, thermal cameras, real-time or near-real-time aerial and satellite photography, and other remote sensing techniques are all used to detect and predict volcanic activity. Chris Hubbles See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; Carrier Pigeons; Environmental Security

Further Readings Burns, Russell W. Communications: An International History of the Formative Years. London, England: Institution of Electrical Engineers, 2003. Pyne, Stephen J. Introduction to Wildland Fire. New York, NY: Wiley, 1996.

Movie Theater Security Movie theaters, as well as other popular places for amusement, are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. Theaters are desirable targets because groups of people are in close quarters in a mostly darkened space for a set and predetermined period of time. Individuals interested in engaging in an attack of violence on a movie theater also have the advantage of the film soundtrack drowning out the noise from their attack or assisting in creating a diversion or confusion. For example, in a Detroit movie theater in 1989, a shooting scene during the movie Harlem Nights created a diversion for a simultaneous shooting in the theater. However, since the mass shooting on July 20, 2012, at the Century Movie Theater in Aurora, Colorado, in which 12 patrons were killed and 70 injured, movie theater security has increasingly become a concern. This entry reviews the reasons why theater companies have employed security and the

Movie Theater Security

ways in which it is provided from the front entrance to the screening theater itself.

Reasons to Employ Security Theaters in general have been a security concern for centuries. As a means of entertainment, political and government figures have long attended the theater. While their security may be provided by an external organization, this does not mean that theaters are not accessible at these times. One prominent example is the assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes Booth in Ford’s Theater, Washington, DC, in April 1865. While many political and “high-value” targets now rely on home theater systems for entertainment to remain out of the public eye, the general populace that still choose to attend the theater continue to be at risk. Movie theater security began predominately for economic reasons. Managers of theaters have long sought to prevent individuals from slipping into a dark theater to watch a film without purchasing a ticket. Another point of concern involves making illegal copies of a film, whereby some individuals may bring recording devices into a theater to create a “bootleg” copy. As technology improves and recording devices become smaller and easier to conceal, this practice has become more difficult to prevent; additionally, more avenues are available for the sharing of the bootleg copies, such as file sharing sites on the Internet.

Methods for Ensuring Security For many movie theaters, the foremost element of security is based on the entrance and exit points of the theater. The main entrance of most theaters has a box office for selling tickets, usually enclosed by glass and with a pass-through for the ticket seller to slide tickets and change to the purchaser, which is intended to protect the employee from theft or most other threats. Once inside the theater, typically, little is done with regard to ensuring physical security. To date, metal detectors or X-ray machines are not  found at theaters, as such security instruments would likely decrease attendance at films. Some theaters employ security personnel, but these individuals are in place primarily to intercept individuals attempting to sneak into a film

639

theater without purchasing tickets. These personnel are rarely if ever armed with more than a radio for communication. Some movie theaters employ security cameras in high-traffic and economic areas (e.g., in the lobby, in the box office, around the concession counter, and in the hallways between the theaters). Some theaters have included security cameras inside individual screening rooms as well. Generally, these cameras are positioned to film the audience in order to prevent individuals from attempting to illegally film the movie and to intervene in the case of customer altercations or disputes. Historically, fire was a concern in theaters due to the close quarters within the individual screening theaters as well as the flammable nature of film material. While technological advances have decreased the likelihood of a film igniting in the projector, this historical problem has resulted in theaters having exit doors that open directly to the outside. However, to prevent individuals from entering the screening theaters from these doors without purchasing a ticket, many of them have handles only on the theater side of the door. Although the doors may not have handles on the outside, this does not mean that the doors always shut completely or that they cannot be opened from the inside and propped open to allow for reentry, as was the case with the Aurora, Colorado, mass shooting. To assist patrons as they leave and reenter the screening theater during the film without injury, exit signs are typically lighted and low lighting is provided on the floor in the aisles to allow for maneuverability within the theater. In addition, theater employees may assist individuals leaving and reentering the screening theater by using a flashlight or other illumination device. Theater employees are also typically charged with monitoring what is occurring inside the theaters, though rarely do they stay in the screening theaters to watch the film or the audience. Typically, if a disturbance occurs inside a screening theater, it is up to the patrons to inform theater management of the disturbance. Clairissa D. Breen See also Shopping Mall Security

640

Municipal Surveillance

Further Readings Berman, S. J. “View at Your Own Risk: Gang Movies and Spectator Violence.” Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal, v.12 (1992). Byers, S., et al. “An Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in the Movie Production and Distribution Process.” Telecommunications Policy, v.28/7–8 (2004). Klein, A. A. American Film Cycles: Reframing Genres, Screening Social Problems, and Defining Subcultures. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011. Lee, G., et al. “The Relationship Between Crime and Private Security at U.S. Shopping Centers.” American Journal of Criminal Justice, v.23 (1999).

Municipal Surveillance Municipal surveillance refers to video surveillance that is used in public places such as high traffic areas, intersections, public parks, shopping malls, squares, sidewalks, and privately owned (but publicly accessible) areas to enable cities and ­ towns to provide safety, protection, and awareness to their consumers and citizens. Through the years, surveillance usage has progressed drastically, and the laws pertaining to it have progressed as well. This entry investigates the history of municipal surveillance and how it has increased and evolved due to technological advances and concerns of terrorism. The benefits of limiting crime as well as holding government officials, who may also be under surveillance, to higher standards are then discussed. The entry concludes with a look at some criticisms of municipal surveillance and how courts have ruled concerning its legality.

Uses of Municipal Surveillance Since the 19th century, closed-circuit television (CCTV) has been employed by governments throughout the world to monitor individuals or groups whom they perceive as a threat to their authority. For example, during the Palmer Raids era (1919–1920), groups or individuals suspected of being communists and anarchists were often targeted and their actions and movements closely watched. Many countries since the 1990s rely on CCTV to enhance the safety of people and their property. Many U.S. municipalities see value in

CCTV to bolster security by monitoring public spaces, schools, and other important installations. Since 2001, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, more municipalities have come to rely on CCTV to monitor people’s behaviors in the public arena. “Cybercities” and/or “cybertowns” are fast emerging, and surveillance has become more prevalent, hidden, concentrated, passive, mobile, functional, and diversified in many developed countries in the 21st century to monitor behaviors of city employees and citizens of municipal buildings and properties and nuisance behavior (e.g., alcohol consumption, littering, loitering, panhandling, and indecent exposure) in privately owned public open spaces. For example, municipal surveillance tools such as employee identification badges and proactive audio/video systems are employed as surveillance instruments. These gadgets are becoming a more mobile means of ­ activating human and technological surveillance to manage municipal assets, workers, and properties. For example, the use of municipal operating systems and facilities by employees and citizens are now widely utilized to monitor peoples’ behaviors in public spaces and buildings. There has been an increased emphasis on and employment in the overlapping of surveillance by the public and private sectors, such as municipal corporate security units, in the United States, France, Japan, and Canada. These surveillance tools are utilized by governmental agencies, privately owned business organizations (i.e., private security firms, gated communities), and citizens. For example, one advantage of the CCTV video surveillance is that it can be used passively to monitor peoples’ actions in public buildings and spaces as a supplement to the active monitoring and security provided by security agents and personnel. Law enforcement officials in many cities in the United States such as Baltimore, San Diego, and Memphis employ surveillance technology in the monitoring of public buildings and spaces. CCTV is used to monitor most of the United States’ municipally operated systems. At times, volunteers and private entities, such as private security ­personnel, can conjointly work on various projects to monitor behavior in public spaces such as city parks, stores in retail strips, condominium

Municipal Surveillance

complexes, schools, residential areas, commuter transportation hubs, and vehicles. Schools use CCTV surveillance systems to actively and passively monitor—in combination with other security arrangements—behaviors at school. The quality and level of sophistication of the CCTV monitoring systems depend mostly on the resources available to the schools and their perception of their security risks.

Crime Prevention and Monitoring of Officials The goal of the audio and video surveillances and other technology used to visually monitor the public and private arena is to discourage and prevent crime and other deviant behaviors. Not only do police have access to government-controlled cameras, but also there is now a proliferation of public and private camera surveillance systems that can be utilized, such as use of mobile phone cameras by citizens who often document, record, and publicize criminal behavior and police misconduct, such as the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles, California; the Bay Area Rapid Transit police shooting of Oscar Grant in Oakland, California; and the death of Ian Tomlinson in ­ London. Available records suggest that CCTV video surveillance is effective in reducing and preventing crimes. Above all, it is useful and aids in the successful prosecution of individuals caught in the act of committing a crime and also aids in holding the police accountable when they engage in misconduct. For example, there are surveillance cameras at some stoplights to record traffic violators in action. These cameras at traffic lights can document the type, make, model, and tire size of vehicles. Similar cameras are employed in police vehicles or even on the officers themselves to document or record behaviors of citizens and the police. The surveillance technology can also be said to enhance democracy by its application in holding police officers and other governmental employees accountable.

Criticisms of Municipal Surveillance It is fair to argue that surveillance has made a major impact on crime and social control in our society, and law enforcement claims that it has

641

also provided cost savings resulting from the prevention of lawsuits against the municipality and the protection of assets such as the protection of employees, places, and things. However, opponents to the proliferation of public surveillance find it problematic because they believe that ­public video surveillance undermines the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizure. Others believe that recording police officers’ behavior in their encounters with citizens is illegal. However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights are not being violated by surveillance cameras being placed in public areas. If an illegal act is committed in public where it can be potentially seen by the general public, then the Fourth Amendment rights cannot be said to be violated as a result. For example, when driving a vehicle on a public street or highway, actions caught on camera that were done in the car could be held as evidence in court. Since the act was done on a public roadway where others could potentially see the act (people could see inside the car), the act was done in the public’s eyes. In the case of United States v. Knotts (1983), the court ruled, A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When [an individual] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.

However, the test case was the issue of governmental agencies placing a tracking beeper on the automobile of a defendant without his consent or court warrant. The Supreme Court decided that the beeper placed on the individual’s vehicle without his consent or court order violated the defendant’s rights as guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court decided that the monitoring of the beeper violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, all evidence obtained through the placement of the beeper was not admissible in court because

642

Myspace

it violated the defendant’s right to privacy and was therefore illegal. Thus, the traditional “probablecause forever” view of the Fourth Amendment protections is adequate, and it makes sense in this technological age because the governmental agents do not have an open check to intrude into citizens’ privacy without probable cause. Given the security situation in the world today following the expanded operations of terrorists, it  is understandable why cities and towns have expanded their use of surveillance to monitor activities in governmental buildings and public spaces. Governments that are unable to protect their people and their properties are failed governments. Yet the need to balance the protection of citizens and their properties with the protection of their rights to privacy remains important. Citizens have expectations that their governments will protect them against violence such as acts of terrorism. They also have expectations that their privacy guaranteed by the Constitution would be respected. The extensive application of surveillance technology must be conjoined with the respect for the protection of citizens’ rights to privacy. Furthermore, it is also understood that surveillance technology enhances the accountability of government officials who are also being monitored. Rochelle E. M. Cobbs, Ashanti Weathers, and O. Oko Elechi See also Closed-Circuit Television

Further Readings Hallberg, Karen. Nationwide Survey of Companies With Security Expenses. Boston, MA: Cahners, 1996. Lippert, Randy and David Murakami Wood. “The New Urban Surveillance: Technology, Mobility, and Diversity in 21st Century Cities.” Surveillance and Society, v.9/3 (2012). Lippert, Randy and Kevin Walby. “Municipal Corporate Security and the Intensification of Urban Surveillance.” Surveillance and Society, v.9/3 (2012). Lyon, David. “Technology vs. ‘Terrorism’: Circuits of City Surveillance Since September 11th.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, v.27/3 (2003). Neito, Marcus. Public Video Surveillance: Is It an Effective Crime Prevention Tool. Sacramento: California State Library, California Research Bureau,

1997. https://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05/crb97005.pdf (Accessed September 2014). United States v. Knotts, 468 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2013/11/unitedstates-v-knotts-case-brief.html (Accessed September 2014).

Myspace Myspace (originally known as MySpace) is a social networking service established in July 2003 as “an online community that lets you meet your friends’ friends.” From 2005 until 2008, Myspace was the largest social networking site in the world. At its peak, the website had more than 100 million registered users—a large percentage of them were under 18 years of age—and received more page views than the popular search engine Google. Myspace’s popularity eventually declined as Facebook rose to become the dominant social networking service. In 2012, the social networking site announced a new focus as a showcase for musicians and artists, and a place for fans to connect online. As of July 2017, Myspace had more than 53 million active users. In 2008, at the height of Myspace’s popularity, the Pew Internet & American Life Project reported that 35% of all online adults—and 65% of teens online—had accounts on social networking sites such as Myspace. By 2015, 75% of online adults (65% of all adults) reported using social networking sites, while 89% of all teens indicated that they use social media sites regularly. As the popularity and ubiquity of social networking have increased dramatically, so has the concern over its impact on user privacy, and Myspace was among the first such sites to raise significant privacy concerns.

User Profiles Like most social networking platforms, Myspace collects a large amount of personal information from its users. When creating a Myspace account, users are required to enter a valid email address, their first and last name, country and zip code, date of birth, and gender. Uploading a profile

Myspace

image is optional, but most users do so. Once the initial profile is set up, users are encouraged to add much more personal information to their Myspace account, including additional photos and videos, personal biographies, mobile phone number, links to favorite websites, personal interests, sexual orientation, relationship status, hometown and school information, and the like. Once the profile is created, users can connect to other profiles, send emails and instant messages within the platform, create and maintain a personal blog, post comments on other users’ profiles, create and join user groups, and listen to music. For millions of users, Myspace represents a central repository of personal information and (ostensibly) private communications.

Targeted Advertising Possessing this wealth of user data was not only a core element of Myspace’s function as a social networking platform—allowing users to find one another and interact based on common traits and interests—but also its business model. As a free service, Myspace relied on online advertising as its primary source of revenue. Leveraging the personalized data stored in its user profiles, Myspace enabled advertisers to target narrowly focused ads based on users’ personal interests. Recognizing the gold mine this wealth of user information represents, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation purchased Myspace in 2008 for $580 million, providing News Corporation direct insight into the content habits and brand choices of America’s youth market. Myspace’s reliance on targeted advertising posed increasing threats to the privacy and confidentiality of user data. On its acquisition of Myspace, News Corporation indicated a desire to collect even more user data to help boost advertising rates, including tracking a user’s visits to specific profiles or interest groups. While online marketers typically never receive personal data on individual users, it was discovered that numerous social networking sites, including Myspace, had been sending data to advertising companies that could be used to identify consumers’ names and other personal details. In Myspace’s case, the social networking site was sharing a persistent

643

unique identifier, called a “Friend ID,” assigned to each user profile. Advertisers could use the Friend ID to locate a user’s Myspace profile and obtain personal information, including, in many instances, the user’s full name. With this information, advertisers could link the user’s real name and other personal data provided in their Myspace profile with other online activity already tracked and collected. Myspace’s unauthorized sharing of user profile data with advertisers spurred one of the first major backlashes against social networking sites with regard to user privacy. Numerous state attorneys general launched investigations, and the Federal Trade Commission brought an action against Myspace accusing it of violating its privacy policy and terms of service, which promised users that the social networking site would not share users’ personally identifiable information, or use such information in a way that was inconsistent with the purpose for which it was submitted, without first giving notice to the users and receiving their permission to do so. In 2012, without admitting or denying the Federal Trade Commission’s charge, Myspace agreed to a consent order that requires it to implement a comprehensive privacy program; subject itself to regular, independent privacy audits for the next 20 years; and bars Myspace from making any future privacy misrepresentations.

New Focus Lessens Privacy Concerns In 2012, faced with a drop in popularity due to Facebook’s dominance, News Corporation sold Myspace to a group of investors, including the popular musician Justin Timberlake. In 2013, Myspace redesigned itself to make the site more explicitly music focused, providing tools for users to discover new music, follow artists, build playlists, and connect with one another. This new focus for Myspace represented somewhat of a shift in its business model, moving away from the reliance on collecting and sharing vast amounts of personal information to drive advertising as its primary revenue stream, and instead partnering with music labels and other content creators. The site no longer asks for personal information beyond a user’s name, birthdate, gender, and a 150-character-­maximum biographical statement. This recent iteration of

644

Myspace

Myspace does not require users to provide their real name, and it also allows the creation of fake or parody accounts, thus offering a higher degree of anonymity than the previous versions of the site. While threats to user privacy persist on Myspace, as with any other social network, the site’s current focus has eased out many of the worries that dominated during the height of its popularity. Michael T. Zimmer See also Facebook; Privacy, Internet; Social Media

Further Readings Barnes, Susan B. “A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United States.” First Monday, v.11/9 (2006). http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index. php/fm/article/view/1394/1312 (Accessed October 2017). Dwyer, Catherine, et al. “Trust and Privacy Concern Within Social Networking Sites: A Comparison of Facebook and MySpace.” In Proceedings of the

Thirteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Keystone, Colorado, August 9–12, 2007. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10. 1.1.95.2959&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Accessed October 2017). Hansell, Saul. “For MySpace, Making Friends Was Easy. Big Profit Is Tougher.” New York Times (April 23, 2006). http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/business/ yourmoney/23myspace.html (Accessed October 2017). Hodge, Matthew J. “The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the New Internet: Facebook.com and Myspace.com.” Southern Illinois University Law Journal, v.31 (2006). Madden, Mary, et al. Teens, Social Media, and Privacy. Washington, DC: Pew Internet & American Life Project, Pew Research Center, May 21, 2013. http:// pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Teens-Social-MediaAnd-Privacy.aspx (Accessed October 2017). Verini, James. “Will Success Spoil Myspace?” Vanity Fair (March 2006). https://www.vanityfair.com/ news/2006/03/myspace200603 (Accessed October 2017).

N At first glance, narcissists are popular with other people because they show positive attributes (e.g., a charming facial expression) and positive behavior (e.g., verbal humor)—as research by Mitja Back, Stefan Schmukle, and Boris Egloff has demonstrated. However, the self-aggrandizing tendency of narcissists makes it difficult for them to establish and maintain long-term social relationships because they show negative social behavior such as aggressiveness or the tendency to control others. Thereby, narcissists craving for admiration from others undermine the achievement of this goal through their own behavior toward others.

Narcissism Narcissism refers to a personality factor that occurs on a nonclinical level. Generally, personality factors can be understood as characteristics that are distinctive between individuals and relatively stable over time. These characteristics influence a person’s way of thinking, feeling, and acting. Narcissism as a personality factor occurs to some degree in every person. In this entry, ­narcissism is described, followed by a summary of  research investigating the role narcissism plays in areas related to surveillance, security, and privacy.

Surveillance, Privacy, and Security The following paragraphs summarize the research that investigates the role of narcissism in topics related to surveillance, privacy, and security. First of all, the stronger the narcissism, the more activity a person shows on social networking sites (SNS) such as Facebook. This also means that people with higher narcissism are more likely to have more friends and write more posts than people with low narcissism—as research by Laura Buffardi and Keith Campbell has demonstrated. This type of interaction on SNS, which is characterized by effortless initiation of “friendships,” a relatively open communication visible to many, and strong control over how one presents oneself, facilitates the narcissistic goal of receiving positive feedback about oneself from other people. Research, furthermore, has addressed the influence of narcissism on the intention to control privacy settings or on actual privacy settings on

Narcissistic Personality The most comprehensive model that describes the narcissistic personality and explains its influence on thinking, feeling, and behavior is the dynamic self-regulatory model of Carolyn Morf and ­Frederick Rhodewalt. In this model, a grandiose yet vulnerable self-concept constitutes the basis of the narcissistic personality. Thus, people with strong narcissism believe that they are extraordinarily magnificent; at the same time, though, this belief is not very strong. This is not surprising because the assumed grandiosity of a narcissist is not (fully) grounded in reality. Due to this extraordinarily magnificent but vulnerable self-view, ­people with strong narcissism seek affirmation of their grandiosity through other people. Thus, narcissists need other people who confirm that they are magnificent. 645

646

Narcissism

SNS. If such settings are rather lenient, they allow others to exploit private information. Since narcissism is associated with more activity on SNS, the question arises whether people with strong narcissism are also more likely to be affected by security risks on SNS. Research by Karen Smith and colleagues showed that narcissism is associated with privacy concerns. This means that the more narcissistic a person is, the more the person will be concerned that others have access to his or her personal information and that this information will be abused. However, although narcissism is related to privacy concerns, it is also negatively related to the strength of privacy settings. This means that the more narcissistic a person is, the more lenient the person’s privacy settings are. Taken together, the relationship between narcissism and privacy concerns and settings yields a picture that Susan Barnes has described as the “privacy paradox.” On the one hand, people are concerned with privacy and the intrusion thereof by others (e.g., governmental authorities, companies), but on the other hand, they make private information accessible on, for example, SNS. Generally, narcissism seems to be a psychological trait that fosters this paradoxical behavior. However, Hongmin Ahn and colleagues have recently put forward a more fine-grained analysis of the relationship between narcissism and privacy control. They referred to a well-known distinction between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism. These two forms of narcissism share core features, such as the grandiose self-view and the exploitation of others; however, they are also characterized by specific differences. Whereas grandiose or overt narcissists show an immediate expression of their self-importance and are openly aggressive toward others, vulnerable or covert narcissism is characterized by insecurity and defensiveness. The research by Ahn and colleagues demonstrated that vulnerable narcissism is related to the behavioral intention to control privacy settings (whereas grandiose narcissism is not). Further research is needed to show whether actual privacy settings differ for vulnerable and grandiose narcissists. If so, initiatives that aim at changing users’ concern for privacy and their privacy settings could increase their success by taking personality traits such as narcissism into account.

To give an example, a campaign that solely emphasizes the danger of loose privacy settings might affect the behavior of vulnerable narcissists (who are already more concerned with privacy) but not the behavior of grandiose narcissists. The latter could probably be better addressed with special add-ons when applying stricter privacy settings, such as more dimensional feedback options for their friends (e.g., liking, cleverness, attractiveness). This could be appealing for grandiose as well as vulnerable narcissists. Taken together, the research on narcissism and privacy thus far underlines the importance of psychological approaches to better understand the factors that determine privacy behavior. Markus Denzler See also Authoritarianism; Political Psychology

Further Readings Ahn, Hongmin, et al. “Two Faces of Narcissism on SNS: The Distinct Effects of Vulnerable and Grandiose Narcissism on SNS Privacy Control.” Computers in Human Behavior, v.45 (2015). Back, Mitja, et al. “Why Are Narcissists so Charming at First Sight? Decoding the Narcissism-Popularity Link at Zero Acquaintance.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, v.98 (2010). Barnes, Susan B. “A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United States.” First Monday, v.11 (2006). http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/ index.php/fm/article/view/1394/1312 (Accessed August 2015). Buffardi, Laura and Keith Campbell. “Narcissism and Social Networking Web Sites.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, v.34 (2008). Morf, Carolyn and Frederick Rhodewalt. “Unraveling the Paradoxes of Narcissism: A Dynamic SelfRegulatory Processing Model.” Psychological Inquiry, v.12 (2001). Rhodewalt, Frederick and Benjamin Peterson. “Narcissism.” In M. R. Leary and R. H. Hoyle (eds.), Handbook of Individual Differences in Social Behavior. New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2009. Smith, Karen, et al. “Narcissism as a Predictor of Facebook Users’ Privacy Concern, Vigilance, and Exposure to Risk.” International Journal of Technology and Human Interaction, v.10 (2014).

National Security

National Security Throughout the history of academia, the term national security has been the subject of much semantic debate. As a part of their discourse on national security, researchers Prabhakaran Paleri, Luís Tomé, Monageng Mogalakwe, and Arnold Wolfers all refer to the concept of national security as elusive, keenly contested, controverted, and ambiguous. Interestingly, the term national security has been given a variety of reference points by academics, heads of state, politicians, policymakers, military leaders, and researchers to mean a policy objective, a field of study, and/or an analytical concept. Author Shubhda Chaudhary cogitates that there is no clear definition of what constitutes national security in international jurisprudence as there are multiple layers of meaning and history associated with it, and Kim R. Holmes in her work on national security complements C ­ haudhary’s position as she points out that the literature today throws up all kinds of “national securities.” In spite of the definitional conundrum surrounding the term, any discourse on national security must be premised on a clear understanding of the concepts associated with it, as there are different schools of thought surrounding the term national security as well as a plethora of definitions. National security is also an important concept that is premised on the existential nature of mankind and one that must be contextualized. With this in mind, this entry begins by conceptualizing national security and explaining political and economic interests as components of national security; it then provides a brief history of national security, discusses the elements of national security, and explains the causes of national insecurity. It concludes by providing an overview of national security threats and outlining the measures used to achieve national security.

Conceptualizing National Security National security has been defined in both the traditional and the contemporary manner; however, traditional definitions of national security have been narrowly constructed in terms of military power and protection from external threats.

647

This narrow construction of national security is evident in the writing of Menggang Li (2013), who points out that “traditionally, national security views military security as the foundation and main content of national security” (p. 29). However, for some academics, researchers, and even world leaders, national security in the 21st century is still equated to military power. It is against this background that Louis Beres’s observation in 1979 that world leaders “continue to act as if the national security of their respective states is based upon a steady increase in armaments” (p. 98) remains current even today. Starting possibly in the 1980s, authors such as B. I. Finel and Tomé in their work on national security began pointing out that there has been a divide over the meaning, nature, and scope of national security and that this divide has widened as the traditional view of national security seems to have waned. A traditional definition of national security emanates from Renaud François (2009), who submits that defense and security, which constitute national security, are state prerogatives aiming to ensure, in all places, at all times, and in all circumstances, the integrity of a state’s territory, the protection of its population, and the preservation of its national interests against all types of outside threats and aggressions, (p. 24)

whereas national security is contextualized (though partially) by Jane Evans as the preservation of the state from physical threats. The traditional definitions of national security by François and Evans have been challenged by new research scholarship that contends that those definitions are antiquated. It is argued that contemporary definitions of national security should now include other areas, such as homeland security, human security, social security, environmental security and energy, and natural resources security. For example, James Wirtz and Tomé point out that modern definitions of national security should now include newer and broader meanings and tend to include nonmilitary threats to security, such as resource scarcity caused by population growth and rising living standards, Third World urbanization and the attendant strains on fragile governments, overpopulation, health, and

648

National Security

migration flows. Interestingly, Evans submits that national security must be redefined for a new era where conventional war is no longer the primary physical threat to a state. The position of Wirtz, Evans, and Tomé has found support from Emmanuel Wekem Kotia and Kim R. Holmes. Starting possibly in the 1980s, newer concepts and definitions of national security began emerging and continue to emerge today as acts of insecurity against nation-states continue to evolve. This continuous evolution of insecurity facilitates the need for newer, more contemporary definitions of the term, as national security, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, is a dynamic, evolving concept. Newer definitions of national security have been submitted by Richard H. Ulmann as well as by Joseph J. Romm, who in his 1993 work on national security defined it as follows: A threat to national security is an action or sequence of actions that (1) threatens drastically and over a brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to provide nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state. (p. 6)

Waltraud Queiser Morales (1989) complements Ulmann’s definition of national security by noting that national security first entails defence in its narrowest concept—the protection of a nation’s people and territories from physical attack; and second, the more extensive concept of the protection of political and economic interests considered essential by those who exercise political power to the fundamental values and the vitality of the state. (p. 149)

National security is now being described by Samuel M. Makinda and Segun Osisanya as the ability of a state to cater to the protection and defense of its citizenry. According to M. V. Naidu, national security refers to state sovereignty, nonintervention in domestic affairs, and nonaggression, whereas Sheila Ronis points out that national security can include anything that adds to the strength of a nation, such as the strength of a nation’s infrastructure, strong societal and moral

codes, the rule of law, stable government, leadership, and social, political, and economic institutions. This definition also includes a nation’s schools and educational programs to ensure a knowledgeable citizenry and lifelong learning—a must for a democracy. In his discourse on national security, Kotia submits that the concept of national security is considered in its broadest sense and concerns state security, which means security of persons, institutions, properties, and national territory, whereas Osisanya argues that national security now revolves around the conduct of the affairs of the state, including provisions that safeguard the performance of human activities; thus national security also pertains to the responsibilities of the state toward its inhabitants and population. In sum, the earlier definitions of national security that appeared to obfuscate its nature and scope have been slowly whittled away due to the proliferation of newer conceptualizations of the term. The definitions in the preceding paragraphs serve to assist in the amplification of more contemporary definitions of national security in the context of a nation’s ability to protect its internal assets from internal and external threats. However, perhaps the most comprehensive and allembracing definition of national security comes from Upeka Premaratne (2016), who defines the term as “safeguarding the sovereignty, territorial integrity, citizenry and socioeconomic functionality of a nation from an aggressor intent on undermining a particular valued aspect of a nation through violent or unjust means.” Based on the aforementioned definitions of national security, it is clear that the traditional definitions of national security have been replaced by newer, broader, and all-inclusive definitions of the term. Contemporary definitions of national security now encompass foreign and domestic components that are predicated on particular interests and consist of strategies to support national security. In sum, national security definitions now include the protection of the citizenry from internal, external, natural, and human-made threats.

State Interests as Components of National Security When thinking of the concept of national security, it is important not to view it in a vacuum as only

National Security

a policy objective but also in the context of the means for its pursuit via a national security policy or strategy. This is predicated on Wolfers’s notion that the national security of a country is premised on (a) national security as a policy objective and (b) the creation of a mechanism for its pursuit (i.e., national security policy). Wolfers’s position has found support from G. John Ikenberry, who posits the importance of a national security strategy (NSS) for the implementation of national security for a country. Ikenberry argues that an NSS is really bundles of security, economic, and political strategies based on assumptions about how best to advance national security. Therefore, the national security of a nation flows from its NSS, which is an aggregation of the state’s interests (inclusive of economic and political interests) and seeks to prioritize them for the protection of the state from internal and external threats. Interestingly, the concept of national security extends beyond military power to include a wide array of interests. This is consistent with the views of Alexandra Homolar, who submits that there is a complex relationship between politics, economics, and national security issues, and Dakota L. Wood, who posits that these interests include political interests (the stabilization of a region of critical interest) as well as economic interests (the preservation of freedom of movement within the global commons through which the world conducts business). Ronis (2011), for example, complements the view that economic and political interests are linked to national security; she submits that “we cannot be strong without a viable way to power our cities, feed ourselves, and move from one place to another” (p. viii). That economic and political interests are important components of national security has also been echoed by Wood, who surmises that a review of relevant top-level national security documents issued by a long string of presidential administrations in the United States makes clear that three interests are consistently stated and these interests  consistently include political and economic interests. Norrin M. Ripsman is also of the view that political and economic interests have a direct bearing on national security, while Homolar submits that national security is linked to the political interests of a country via the pursuit of political agendas. Ronis adds her voice to the discourse

649

surrounding the link between economic interests and national security as she posits that the economy has an effect on national security and that the economic interests of a country are intertwined with its national security, while Holmes points out that a nation’s economic well-being is inextricably linked to its national security. Extending on her worldview that the national security and economic interests of a country are inexplicably linked, Ronis postulates that there can be no question of the need to include the economic viability of a nation as a major element of national security, because without capital, there is no business; without business, there is no profit; and without profit, there are no jobs. Ronis also notes that a strong economy is an essential ingredient of a global superpower. Ripsman adds to the discourse by pointing out that economics and national security are heavily intertwined and that there are several features of the contemporary era that shape the political economy of national security in the 21st century. Daniel Yergin points out that in 1946, Ferdinand Eberstadt, a key architect of the emerging institutional changes in Washington, DC, posited that national security is linked to economic interests, while Harold Brown, as cited by Cynthia Ann Watson, sought to and did enlarge the definition of national security to include economic interests. Indeed, it is increasingly being recognized that there exists a relationship between the national security of a country and its development via its economic interests and policies. While the term development carries various connotations (e.g., economic, infrastructural, human capital), the development of a nation-state is often linked to its economy/economic interests, and national security is linked to the country’s economy/economic interests. Homolar points to an artificial division between (inter)national security issues, on the one hand, and economic issues, on the other. In spite of this artificial division, the extant literature on national security points to economic interests and economic well-being as providers of stability to a country, and this is inextricably linked to the country’s ability to protect itself and its citizenry via the national security apparatus. This position is evident in the NSS of the United States, which points to the importance of economic interests as  an integral and key component of national

650

National Security

security by advancing prosperity and freedom. The NSS notes that policies that foster economic growth create new jobs and higher incomes and allow people to lift their lives out of poverty, spur economic and legal reform, and fight against graft and corruption. With this in mind, national security encompasses economic interests, and it is imperative that nation-states address economic interests within the national security agenda. The view that economic interests are a component of national security has found support from C. Richard Neu and Charles Wolf. David J­ ablonsky also points out that there is a linkage of national security to many interdependent factors and submits that these factors may be political, economic, psychological, and/or military. In his work on security, Jablonsky also submits that these factors or interests have expanded the boundaries of national security from its previously narrow meaning. In other words, contemporary national security now encompasses the safety and security of nation-states as managed through the exercise of economic and political power, hence the importance of a state’s economic and political interests in the context of its national security. Criminologists and others in academia may question the relationship between economics and national security as well as between politics and national security. However, it is argued that economic and political interests tend to influence the national security of sovereign states and that those factors shape as well as constrain the strategies chosen to pursue that security. In fact, Ronis complements this view as she submits that the economy has an effect on national security. Therefore, according to Ronis, for states that are desirous of pursuing a national security agenda, an important aspect of such an agenda is economic interests. The viability of a nation’s industrial infrastructure, which provides jobs for its people, creates and distributes wealth, and leverages profits, is essential. Without jobs, the quality of peoples’ lives deteriorates to a point where society itself can disintegrate. Finally, Ronis notes that due to the increasing level of globalization, which has created an interdependent world economic system, the national security of nation-states can be affected by economic interests as national security policy objectives can be attained by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions

and economic incentives. While there are many interests that may affect national security, political and economic interests are two fundamental interests that lie at the core of national security. National security (as political-economic interests) is relevant to surveillance, security, and privacy for a variety of reasons. For example, the national security apparatus can be used as an instrument of abuse by authoritarian and even democratic governments to oppress their non­ supporters; suppress freedoms of information, movement, and expression; and silence political opponents. National security policies can also be used to illegally infringe on the rights of citizens by unfairly targeting them for surveillance and thus negatively affecting their privacy rights. Furthermore, when national security is viewed ­ through the lens of political and economic interests, it may seek to protect the politico-economic base of a nation-state to the exclusion of other relevant aspects of national security, such as the environment and human security. In addition to this, some national security issues are often shrouded in secrecy, whereas others are nonjusticiable (i.e., cannot be questioned). The nonjusticiable nature of some national security matters is often compounded by the sometimes justifiable secrecy that surrounds it, and this facilitates governmental actions that are often exaggerated. This creates situations where fear is injected into the populace and allows for the acceptance of national security claims that in retrospect may be unwarranted. In addition, under the guise of national security (sometimes justifiably so), governments may invade privacy and curtail freedom of speech, expression, and information. National security (as political-economic interests) is also relevant to surveillance, security, and privacy because elements of national security can intrude on citizens’ freedoms and feelings of security and privacy.

A Brief History of National Security Researchers did not stumble on the concept of national security in its contemporary form; the concept is of some vintage. Mogalakwe points out that the concept of national security seems to have been derived from a socially constructed and essentially Western concept; however, irrespective

National Security

of its origin, ensuring national security is an important concern of all modern nation-states. The origins of the concept of national security can be found in the different historical formulations of the concept of national interest. Elements of national interest include, but are not limited to, economic and political interests and can be traced back to the thoughts of James Madison (1751–1836), Charles Beard (1874–1948), and ­ Hans Morgenthau (1904–1980). Holmes posits that modern concepts of national security arose in the 17th century during the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and the Civil War in England. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia established the idea that the nation-state has sovereign control not only of domestic affairs such as religion but also of external security. Holmes also submits that the preWestphalia international system was based on the assumption that there existed a universal principle governing the affairs of states led by emperors, popes, kings, and princes. Instructively, Holmes argues that herein lies the foundation of national security as a concept that was extended on and is in use today. In its contemporary form, the concept of national security gained global preeminence immediately after World War II. This was evident, for example, in the United States, when in 1947 the U.S. Congress passed the National Security Act that established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. The early 1950s saw the global proliferation of national security councils, national security strategies, and national security laws that were modeled after those of the United States. As insecurity continues to mount in the global sphere, national security continues to be of immense importance to the polity in the modern era, and this facilitates the continued evolution of conceptualizations of the term national security.

Elements of National Security The notion that national security is multifaceted and complex has found support from a host of researchers, including François, Wirtz, Tomé, Kotia, Osisanya, and Holmes. It has been pointed out that national security today encompasses a wide range of securities (border, informational, cyber, genomic, and health). A compilation of various elements of national security is provided

651

here; however, the list is not exhaustive or limited to the following: •• Military security—the capability of a nation to defend itself and/or deter military aggression •• Political security—the stability of the social order, specifically addressing threats to sovereignty; political security also includes measures against political repression and human rights abuses •• Economic security—the freedom to follow a choice of policies to develop a nation’s economy in the manner desired, as well as creation of employment and measures against poverty •• Environmental security—environmental issues (environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, and pollution) that threaten the national security of a nation in any manner •• Human security—peoples’ safety from hunger, disease, and repression, including harmful disruptions of daily life; over time, this concept has expanded to focus on social and economic causes and an assumed international “responsibility to protect” people from violence, and it includes economic security, environmental security, food security, health security, personal security, community security, political security, and the protection of women and minorities, along with measures against physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, and child labor •• Food security—measures against hunger and famine, as well as physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life •• Health security—measures against disease, unsafe food, malnutrition, and lack of access to basic health care •• Community security—measures against interethnic, religious, and other identity tensions •• Security of resources—the security of water and sources of energy, land, oil, and minerals that are vital to a country’s economic viability

Causes of National Insecurity National insecurity refers to a real or perceived sense of vulnerability experienced by the residents of a country as its leaders struggle to cope with

652

National Security

new and existing security threats. There are numerous causes of insecurity that can challenge the national security as well as the national security apparatus of a country. For example, Kotia has argued that countries that experience economic and financial difficulties and whose economies are weak will struggle to confront public discontent, which can lead to national insecurity. Folashade B. Okeshola points out that small-arms proliferation and the rise of armed groups, religion-based violence, election fraud, poverty, and unemployment are all causative factors for insecurity. In addition, Kotia argues, weak and/or failing states or states that find it difficult to exert their authority throughout the national territory, to control all of the country’s activities, or to meet the needs of their population are vulnerable to insecurity. Another possible cause of insecurity is the presence of dictatorial regimes. A growing body of scholarly literature argues that a country whose governmental system is dictatorial or totalitarian deprives its population of their rights and prevents freedom of expression, which may be a precursor to frustration, discontent, and revolt. Furthermore, in nation-states where injustice, exclusion, discrimination, and corruption are rife, such practices may lead to national disorder, rebellion, and coup d’état attempts. To broaden the causes of national insecurity, one should cast a glance at multiethnic societies. For example, Okeshola argues that in countries with populations that are not homogeneous, allegiance to one’s ethnic group, intracultural and interethnic antagonism, hostility, aggression, bitterness, and hatred can all lead to national insecurity. In his work on national insecurity in Africa, Kotia points out that a country that lives in political instability is an insecure country. He also notes that countries that are politically unstable tend to attract criminals, terrorists, and actors who are willing and capable of taking advantage of the disorder. Indeed, political instability, as the state’s weakness, does not enable a country’s institutions to function normally, which causes disorder and insecurity.

National Security Threats to Nation-States Threats to the national security of nation-states are a global problem due to the interconnectedness of the modern word. With this in mind, Tomé

posits that security threats should not be allowed to escalate, as they can affect the interconnected global system. In sum, security threats are not confined to the national borders of any one country; they are interrelated and they must be dealt with at the national, intrastate, regional, and international levels. National security threats in the 21st century are diverse, multifaceted, and complex; however, the following points have been identified as ­notable national security threats that are almost universally applicable: •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• ••

International and internal terrorism Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction Failing states Transnational organized crime Cybercrime Graft and corruption Organized crime Poverty Climate change Biological weapon attacks Ethnic, religious, and cultural conflicts Natural and human-made disasters and environmental issues Threats of external aggression from state and nonstate actors Economic disparity between rich and poor nations Electronic sabotage Emerging and reemerging diseases and their pandemic potential Large-scale illegal immigration

Measures Used to Achieve National Security The importance of national security to any nationstate cannot be understated or overemphasized. In the realm of national security, there are numerous measures that can be taken to ensure the security of nation-states. Globally, different countries utilize different measures and strategies to achieve national security, as there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach that is manifestly correct or incorrect and is no silver bullet to achieve this phenomenon. Indeed, there is a plethora of measures that are used to attain national security. These measures are wide-ranging in nature and scope and not unidimensional in approach.

National Security

In their work on national security as well as insecurity, Kotia and Holmes submit that the measures used to achieve national security include, but are not limited to, the use of diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats, the marshaling of economic power to facilitate or compel cooperation, ensuring the resilience of critical infrastructure, maintaining an effective armed force, and the development of national security awareness among the populace. Furthermore, Holmes submits that an array of measures can be utilized to achieve national security for nation-states, including implementation of civil defense and emergency preparedness measures such as antiterrorism legislation and national disaster law. Other measures that can be utilized to achieve national security include the following: •• The use of counterintelligence services and/or the police to protect the nation from internal threats •• Reinforcement of intelligence services •• The use of intelligence services to detect, defeat, or avoid threats and espionage and to protect classified information •• Strengthening good governance through transparency, accountability, inclusion, and participation •• Improving the living conditions of people by providing human and social security as well as job creation •• Global and domestic biosurveillance •• Economic development •• Collaboration between public and private sector security services, diplomatic representatives, and international organizations •• Close cooperation in capacity building and exchange of knowledge and sensitive security information

For governments, making national security a priority can help them maintain established forms of democracy, sustain treasured values and beliefs, and ensure that the safety, security, and welfare of their citizenry are maintained and enhanced. Importantly, the national security of nation-states in the contemporary era is also important for maintaining the rights of all citizens as enshrined in their respective constitutions. Wendell Codrington Wallace

653

See also Civil Liberties; Diplomacy; Governmentality; International Diplomacy; National Security Council; Securitization; Security, Concepts of; Security Theater

Further Readings Ackah-Arthur, Jemima. “The Rhetoric in Human Security in the 21st Century: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria.” Unpublished thesis submitted to the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, October 2015. Baldwin, D. A. “Power and International Relations.” In Walter Carlsnaes, et al. (eds.), Handbook of International Relations. London, England: Sage, 2013. Beres, Louis Rene. Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979. Brown, Harold. Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. Evans, Jane. “Pandemics and National Security.” Global Security Studies, v.1/1 (2010). Farah, Paolo Davide. “Sustainable Energy Investments and National Security: Arbitration and Negotiation Issues.” Journal of World Energy Law and Business, v.8/6 (2015). François, Renaud. Why Should World Governance Be Evaluated, and for What Purpose? (Forum for a New World Governance Proposal Papers Series) (January 2009). http://world-governance.org/IMG/pdf_WGI_ full_version_EN.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Grizold, A. “The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary World.” International Journal on World Peace, v.11/3 (1994). Holmes, Kim R. “What Is National Security?” In 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2015. Homolar, Alexandra. “The Political Economy of National Security.” Review of International Political Economy, v.17/2 (2010). Ikenberry, G. John. American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror (Department of National Security and Strategy Textbook, Vol. 4). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003. Jablonsky, David. The State of the National Security State. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. Kotia, Emmanuel Wekem. Emerging Threats to National Security and Development in Africa. Paper presented at the New Ghana Parliament Induction Training, Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, Accra, Ghana, February 5, 2013.

654

National Security Agency

Lederman, Gordon. “National Security Reform for the Twenty-First Century: A New National Security Act and Reflections on Legislation’s Role in Organizational Change.” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, v.3 (2010). Li, Menggang. Research on Industrial Security Theory. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2013. Luckham, Robin, et al. “The Two Faces of Security in Hybrid Political Orders: A Framework for Analysis and Research.” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, v.2/2 (2013). Makinda, Samuel M. “Sovereignty and Global Security.” Security Dialogue, v.29/3 (1998). Mogalakwe, Monageng. “Deconstructing National Security: The Case of Botswana.” Sacha Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies, v.3/1 (2013). Naidu, M. V. “From the Editor’s Desk: National Security & Civil Liberties: Definitions and Delimitations in Theory and Practice.” Peace Research, v.23/2–3 (1991). Neu, C. Richard and Charles Wolf. The Economic Dimensions of National Security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994. Okeshola, Folashade B. “Violence and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Bane of National Development.” European Scientific Journal, v.7/26 (2011). Onoja, A. “Fifty Years After: Rethinking Security/ National Security Discourse and Practice to Reinvent Its Future.” African Journal of History and Culture, v.6/8 (2014). Osisanya, Segun. “National Security Versus Global Security.” UN Chronicle (2015). https://unchronicle. un.org/article/national-security-versus-global-security (Accessed October 2017). Paleri, Prabhakaran. National Security: Imperatives and Challenges. New Delhi, India: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008. Premaratne, Upeka. Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Use of Reasonable Consequentialism for the Conundrum of National Security and Fundamental Rights. Paper presented at the 9th International Research Conference of General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, Ratmalana, Sri Lanka, September 8–9, 2016. Ripsman, Norrin M. “The Political Economy of Security: A Research and Teaching Agenda.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, v.3/1 (2000). Ripsman, Norrin M. and T. V. Paul. Globalization and the National Security State. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2010. Romm, Joseph J. Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects (Pew Project on America’s Task

in a Changed World, Pew Project Series). New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. Ronis, Sheila, ed. Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011. Tomé, Luís. “Security and Security Complex: Operational Concepts.” JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, v.1 (2010). Ullman, Richard H. “Redefining Security.” International Security, v.8/1 (1983). The White House. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: Author, 2002. https://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/63562.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Williams, Paul D., ed. Security Studies: An Introduction. London, England: Routledge, 2008. Wirtz, James. “A New Agenda for Security and Strategy?” In John Baylis, et al. (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World (2nd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007. Wolfers, Arnold. “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol.” Political Science Quarterly, v.67 (1952). Wood, Dakota L., ed. 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2015. Yergin, Daniel. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. Zwierlein, C. and B. Graaf. “Historicizing Security: Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive.” Historical Social Research, v.38/1 (2013).

National Security Agency The National Security Agency (NSA) is an entity of the U.S. Department of Defense and an element of the U.S. Intelligence Community that was ­officially established after World War II. Since that time, it has undertaken two principal missions vital to the security of the United States: (1) signals intelligence (SIGINT) and (2) information assurance. The agency has also been integrated with the U.S. Central Security Service, which consists of the various U.S. military intelligence units involved in clandestine cryptologic efforts such as code making and code breaking. The NSA/U.S. Central Security Service collected information concerning foreign intelligence activities throughout the Cold

National Security Agency

War. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the agency’s activities have been focused primarily on obtaining relevant information to identify, prevent, disrupt, and apprehend individuals suspected of having committed or conspiring to commit attacks against the United States and its citizens. Some activities of the NSA in this regard have caused substantial controversy relative to the legality of its methods under U.S. federal law. This entry reviews the establishment and early years of the NSA, describes laws and orders intended to provide checks and balances to the NSA’s powers, examines the benefits and criticisms of the NSA’s surveillance practices, and reveals how one of its contractors altered the NSA’s landscape of secrecy.

Establishment and Early Years of NSA On November 4, 1952, the U.S. secretary of defense—pursuant to directives from the National Security Council—issued a directive establishing the NSA. Created from the Armed Forces Security Agency, the NSA continues to exist as a U.S. military organization that is led by a general officer who serves as its director. The deputy director of the NSA is a civilian member of the senior executive service. The NSA is a member of the U.S. intelligence community with a classified budget and an organizational structure that is not widely known. It is composed of a number of directorates including those involved in capturing relevant intelligence from spy satellites, surveillance aircraft, telecommunications systems, and tailored access operations, the latter involving the engagement of foreign computer systems for the purpose of cyber espionage. The ultimate mission of the NSA is to aggressively pursue cryptologic ­activities in relation to SIGINT and Information ­Assurance in order to protect the United States and its allies. Counterterrorism is its number one priority. The NSA’s modern counterterrorism ­activities— using sophisticated electronic surveillance and codes—are a far cry from the early days of the agency. The NSA was created during the Cold War, but with predecessor agency military heritage long before the two World Wars. Accordingly, the primary mission of the agency involved efforts relating to the Soviet Union and the threats posed

655

by military and intelligence operatives—including the Committee for State Security, better known as the KGB—working on both sides of the Iron ­Curtain. Those efforts were not always successful. In fact, NSA SIGINT efforts failed to detect any relevant information concerning the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in 1962, which became known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. These SIGINT failures continued into the 1960s and 1970s surrounding hostilities in South Vietnam. Indeed, it is now widely believed to have been uncorroborated SIGINT that triggered the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident that officially led to the United States’ involvement in the war. Although the NSA ­correctly reported a final North Vietnamese offensive to capture the capital city of South Vietnam, the U.S. ambassador disregarded the intelligence. The fall of Saigon, just a few days later, is often depicted by the images of South Vietnamese citizens frantically trying to board a U.S. Marine helicopter that was lifting off from atop the U.S. embassy. The 1970s were prominent years for the NSA from at least two perspectives. They had renewed success in collecting SIGNIT from the Soviets. However, NSA technology and equipment were employed domestically within the United States. Project Minaret and Project Shamrock are examples of NSA operations that involved targeting and eavesdropping on U.S. citizens within the United States. Without any form of judicial oversight or court-authorized warrants, the NSA intercepted electronic communications of individuals who had been placed on a watch list. It is estimated that more than 1,600 U.S. citizens were placed under the watchful eye of the NSA. The NSA subsequently provided information about the activities of these private citizens to the ­Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which was the predecessor agency of today’s Drug Enforcement Administration. Among those on the watch list were ­Muhammad Ali, Jane Fonda, and Martin Luther King Jr. The United Kingdom’s Government ­Communications headquarters, which is an agency with capabilities similar in scope to the NSA, aided the NSA in these surveillance enterprises. These and other unlawful activities engaged in by the NSA and other intelligence community

656

National Security Agency

agencies led to the passing of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. FISA ­contains numerous provisions and procedures surrounding electronic surveillance activities that fall under the scope of the NSA. The new law also provides for a FISA court to authorize warrants or other court orders relating to activities protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. But the court itself is known to have ordered the production of private data that many argue contravened the U.S. Constitution. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12333. This action governs U.S. intelligence activities domestically and abroad and enumerates which specific agencies constitute the intelligence community. As expected, the NSA is included. Consequently, the restrictions on surveillance activities and other collection means in connection with U.S. citizens apply to the NSA. For all intents and purposes, the collection of information on U.S. persons is prohibited unless specifically authorized by an executive order. Some authorizations include information regarding foreign intelligence or counterintelligence matters, protecting hostages, and protecting the United States from international terrorists.

Surveillance Ever since the events of 9/11, counterterrorism has quite naturally been the number one priority for the NSA. Accordingly, the NSA has devoted its technological and personnel assets to this purpose. As to whether the NSA has been successful in such endeavors, many reports indicate that there has been no documented success in this regard. However, such statements overlook the fact that the NSA is a secret organization. What is known is that a clear threat to the United States and its citizens remains around the world, and the NSA works aggressively to collect relevant and actionable intelligence with the aim of preventing future terrorist attacks. However, one result from these activities is renewed claims of illegal surveillance against or involving U.S. persons. Indeed, such controversies did not end with the Minaret and Shamrock projects, and neither the FISA nor ­ Executive Order 12333 put an end to privacy violations. For example, it is known that the NSA cultivated a close relationship with Google for the

purpose of collecting information on the United Nations and foreign allied officials. Many organizations and individuals allege that the NSA also shared metadata on U.S. persons with law enforcement agencies outside the scope of what is authorized under Executive Order 12333 or relevant federal law—although it should also be noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration are also official members of the U.S. intelligence community. The public’s awareness of some of the contemporary surveillance and privacy violations undertaken by the NSA came by way of a former NSA contractor named Edward Snowden. Snowden intentionally and admittedly leaked information gained from his access as a federal employee holding a top secret security clearance. He provided classified information that revealed the NSA’s illegal surveillance activities to journalists he met in Hong Kong for that specific purpose. It is estimated that Snowden leaked hundreds of thousands of classified documents. Snowden was subsequently indicted by the U.S. government on charges under the Espionage Act. Snowden claims that all he did was disclose to the public information on the NSA’s illegal eavesdropping on private citizens. In many ways, Snowden views this as his duty, on the one hand, and a form of civil disobedience, on the other. However, U.S. government officials allege that the vast majority of the leaked documents were related to the military and clandestine capabilities of the United States and allied countries. In a redacted 2012 U.S. government report with an original security classification of top secret, the auditors reported thousands of FISA incidents—although the report goes on to say that the majority were “unintentional.” In fact, FISA courts have ruled that some of the activities undertaken by the NSA were unconstitutional. All of this asks the question as to the proper balance between maintaining the national security of the United States and its citizens and protecting civil liberties that are guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. The NSA now has an Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy. With the stated aim of increasing transparency and improving the public’s trust, the NSA proclaims the notion that Americans deserve to know that the NSA cares about their privacy. Whether that is actually the case remains to be seen. From one perspective, it

National Security Agency Leaks

will be the courts that attempt to ensure that the Constitution and the relevant federal laws and executive orders are followed. From another, the question will always remain whether the NSA actually follows the orders of the judicial branch of the government. After all, the NSA is a secret organization by its very nature. Despite any of its shortcomings or genuine criticisms, the rank-and-file members of the NSA work to protect the United States. Because of the very nature of their work, this is something about which many Americans are unaware. Located at  the National Cryptologic Museum, the NSA Cryptologic Memorial Wall serves as recognition of the efforts of these men and women—nearly 200 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians—who died while serving their country ­ and who “served in silence.” John R. Cencich See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Bill of Rights; Cell Phone Tracking; Central Intelligence Agency; Citizenship; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Computer Surveillance; Counterintelligence; Global Surveillance; Military Intelligence; National Security Agency Leaks; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; PATRIOT Act; Privacy; Privacy, Internet; Smartphones; Spies; WikiLeaks

Further Readings Bamford, James. The Shadow Factory: The NSA From 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America. New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2009. Betts, Richard. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009. Burns, Thomas. The Origins of the National Security Agency: 1940–1952 (U). Fort Meade, MD: National Security Agency, 1990. https://www.nsa.gov/newsfeatures/declassified-documents/cryptologic-histories/ assets/files/origins_of_nsa.pdf (Accessed November 1, 2017). Greenwald, Glenn. No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2014. Harding, Luke. The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2014.

657

The Washington Post. NSA Secrets: Government Spying in the Internet Age. New York, NY: Diversion Books, 2013.

National Security Agency Leaks The National Security Agency (NSA) leaks refer to the release of a large volume of confidential data from the NSA to the press (specifically, the Guardian) by Edward Snowden, an NSA contractor. In 2013, Snowden breached legal and moral confidentiality/secrecy obligations by engaging in unauthorized accessing, retrieving, and/or releasing of the data. The data in question pertained, in particular, to the NSA’s large-scale collection of data on U.S. and other citizens. The NSA leaks, also known as the Snowden leaks, are regarded by many as a victory for individual privacy and freedom of the press. However, others regard them as morally problematic on the ground that they may have damaged the intelligence capabilities of Western democracies by revealing their methods of intelligence agencies to hostile states and terrorist groups. This entry considers the morality of Snowden’s action—whether the release of the data to the press was morally justified by the public’s right to know (i.e., the public’s right to know that the NSA was engaged in an extremely large-scale collection process of the metadata of U.S. and other citizens) or constitutes pro tanto serious moral wrongdoing because it potentially undermines legitimate security purposes and processes, and/or puts security personnel and others in harm’s way. Whether or not Snowden’s action was morally wrong, all things considered, depends on the countervailing moral weight to be attached to Snowden’s fulfilling the public’s right to know about the NSA’s metadata collection and related activities. Here, three sorts of data collection need to be distinguished: (1) interception of phone calls and emails content, (2) metadata, and (3) social media. Moreover, three important separate moral values are in play: (1) privacy, (2) security, and (3) freedom of the press. This entry begins with a brief consideration of these three moral values before turning to a consideration of the three sorts of data collection in light of these three values.

658

National Security Agency Leaks

Moral Values Privacy

The notion of privacy has proven to be a difficult one to explicate adequately. Nevertheless, there are a number of general points that can be made. First, privacy is a moral right that people have in relation to other people with respect to (a) the possession of information about themselves by other people or (b) the observation or perceiving of themselves—including their movements and relationships—by other people. Second, the right to privacy is closely related to the more fundamental moral value of autonomy. Roughly speaking, the notion of privacy delimits an area—namely, the inner self; however, the moral right to decide what to think and do is the right to autonomy, and the moral right to decide who to exclude and who not to is an element of the right to autonomy. So the right to privacy consists of the right to exclude others (right to autonomy) from the inner self (the private sphere). Third, a measure of privacy is necessary for a person to pursue his or her projects, whatever those projects might be. For one thing, reflection is necessary for planning, and reflection requires a degree of freedom from the intrusions of others (i.e., a degree of privacy). For another, knowledge of someone else’s plans can enable those plans to be thwarted. Autonomy—including the exercise of autonomy in the public sphere—requires a measure of privacy. Fourth, the data owned, and “actions” performed, by organizations and groups—including businesses and government agencies—or by individual persons in their capacity as members of organizations or groups may also be regarded as private, or at least confidential. For example, law enforcement agencies’ investigative activities must be kept confidential if they are to lead to prosecutions. Indeed, confidentiality is often necessary if the lives of informants and others are not to be put at risk. Accordingly, while the activities of the NSA were an infringement, if not a violation, of the privacy rights of individual U.S. citizens and others, it is also the case that the Snowden leaks and subsequent publication in the media were an infringement, if not a violation, of the confidentiality rights of the NSA.

Security

The notion of security is a somewhat vague one. Sometimes, it is used to refer to a variety of forms of collective security, for example, national security (in the face of external military aggression), community security (in the face of disruptions to law and order), and organizational security (in the face of fraud, breaches of confidentiality, and other forms of misconduct and criminality). Other times, it is used to refer to personal physical security. Physical security in this sense is security in the face of threats to one’s life, freedom, or personal property, the last being goods to which one has a human right. Threats to physical security include murder, rape, assault, and torture. Personal (physical) security is a more fundamental notion than collective security; indeed, collective security in its various forms is in large part derived from personal security. Thus, terrorism, for example, is principally a threat to national security precisely because it threatens the lives of innocent citizens. However, collective security is not simply to be identified with aggregate personal (physical) security. For example, terrorism might be a threat to the stability of a government and, as such, a national security threat. The Snowden leaks were a breach of security in the sense that they infringed NSA confidentiality requirements and, indeed, U.S. secrecy laws. However, the larger question is whether they ­ undermined collective security in the stronger sense; for example, did they put the lives of security personnel and, ultimately, citizens at risk? Freedom of the Press

The Guardian published some of the material leaked to it by Snowden. In doing so, it relied on the important moral value of the freedom of the press. Print and electronic media organizations in liberal democracies have a particular role as institutions of public communication. Specifically, they have an institutional role as the free press in the service of the public’s right to know—the role of the Fourth Estate alongside the executive, legislative, and judicial within a liberal democracy. Presumably, the public has a right to know that the NSA is engaged in large-scale data collection of a kind that infringes on their privacy. On

National Security Agency Leaks

the other hand, newspapers have obligations with respect to national security. Accordingly, the question arises as to their specific institutional rights and duties that are also moral rights and duties in the context of the Snowden disclosures. For example, it is conceivable that even if it was, all things considered, morally wrong for Snowden to leak the information he did, it was not morally wrong, all things considered, for the Guardian to make this information known once leaked or, at least, to make known selected parts of it so as to ensure, for example, that lives were not put at risk. Again, there are important questions pertaining to the nature and scope of the public interest at stake; for example, “Which public?”—U.K. citizens, c­ itizens of the world, or the aggregate of individuals whose privacy rights and/or personal security is potentially at risk? In light of these three fundamental values—­ privacy, security, and the freedom of the press— this entry now considers in turn the three different forms of data collection mentioned earlier.

Data Collection Wiretaps: Interception of Content of Communications

While privacy is a fundamental moral right, it can be legitimately infringed under certain circumstances. Accordingly, in most liberal democratic states, legislation has been developed in relation to wiretaps in domestic criminal investigations that more or less mirrors underlying ethical principles and that may help give some direction to wiretaps with respect to other investigations of interest in the context of the Snowden disclosures (e.g., of suspected terrorists domiciled in foreign liberal democratic states). The latter ethical principle includes the need to protect other fundamental moral rights, such as the right to life—or by exceptional circumstances, such as might be obtained in wartime. The more intrusive and sustained the infringement of the right to ­privacy, the more serious the crime needs to be and the higher the standard of evidence that ought to be required to prove that the person whose right to privacy is to be infringed is implicated in  this crime. Moreover, law enforcement officials  must be subject to stringent accountability

659

requirements, including the issuing of warrants in circumstances in which the justification provided is independently adjudicated. Accordingly, insofar as the Snowden leaks pertained to the interception of content by the ­ NSA, then, arguably, already existing legally enshrined moral principles can be used to determine whether these leaks were justified on the grounds that the NSA activities were a violation of these principles. Metadata

The development of data mining and related technologies has led to much faster and more efficient interception and analysis of huge volumes of data, greatly extending the “epistemic reach” of intelligence agencies. A specific catalyst has been the War on Terror since 9/11. The collection of bulk metadata is morally problematic in that, as  discussed previously, there is a presumption against the gathering of personal information on citizens by government officials, including law enforcement and other security personnel. This problem is evident in the metadata collection arising in the Verizon and PRISM controversies. The Verizon controversy involved the NSA’s collection of metadata from calls made within the United States, and between the United States and any foreign country, of millions of customers of Verizon and other telecommunication providers, whereas the PRISM controversy involved agreements between the NSA and various U.S.-based Internet companies (e.g., Google, Facebook, Skype) to enable the NSA to monitor the online communications of non-U.S. citizens based overseas. While privacy laws tend to focus on the content of phone calls, emails, and the like, the Verizon episode draws attention to the metadata (e.g., the unique phone number or email address of the caller or the recipient, the time of the calls and their duration, and the location of the caller or the recipient). It has been argued that since these data are not content, their collection is morally unproblematic. To this it can be replied, first, that such metadata are collected to facilitate the communication ­purposes of callers, recipients, and their telecommunication providers and is consented to only for this purpose. Second, metadata enable the

660

National Security Council

nonconsensual construction of a detailed description of a person’s activities, associates, and movements, especially when combined with financial and other data. The availability to security ­agencies of such descriptions can be considered an infringement of privacy and, therefore, needs justification.

privacy or press freedom depends in part on the extent of the national security threats and what is required to combat them. It is not simply a matter of taking sides, because one is inclined to favor privacy and press freedom over national security, or vice versa.

Social Media

See also Autonomy; National Security Agency; Security, Concepts of; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Right to; Privacy, Types of

The accessing, collection, and analysis of data emanating from social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, by the NSA give rise to the privacy concerns already discussed with respect to wiretaps and metadata collection. Arguably, these privacy concerns in relation to social media are much reduced given that the users of social media in many cases ought not to reasonably expect the same high level of privacy accorded, for example, to those whose emails are being intercepted or whose phone data are being collected. On the other hand, depending on which forms of social media are in question, the users of social media have not necessarily explicitly or implicitly consented to, or might not otherwise reasonably expect, such interception and collection by persons outside the social group in question and for security purposes. Accordingly, their behavior might be far more guarded if they knew that their communications were being accessed, collected, and analyzed in this manner. Moreover, in some such cases, it may be that their privacy is being unjustifiably infringed—for example, users with respect to whom there is not an antecedent reasonable suspicion of unlawful and immoral activity of a serious nature.

Significance The NSA leaks issue is significant by virtue of the importance within liberal democracies of three central pillars—namely, (1) individual rights (and the right to privacy in particular), (2) the freedom of the press (as a guarantor of individual rights but also as upholding the public interest in security), and (3) national security (and the need of intelligence agencies to collect intelligence in particular). When the problem is framed in this way, the ­complexities of the Snowden leaks come into view. For example, the degree of morally legitimate

Seumas Miller

Further Readings Benn, Stanley. A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Bok, Sissela. Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1989. Greenwald, Glenn. No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State. London, England: Hamish Hamilton, 2014. Kleinig, John, et al. Security and Privacy. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2011. Lowenthal, M. Intelligence From Secrets to Policy. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2012. Mascalo, G. and B. Scott. Lessons From the Summer of Snowden. Washington, DC: Open Technology Institute, 2013. Miller, Seumas and I. Gordon. Investigative Ethics: Ethics for Police Detectives and Criminal Investigators. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2014. Miller, Seumas and Patrick Walsh. “NSA, Snowden and the Ethics and Accountability of Intelligence Gathering.” In Jai Galliott (ed.), Ethics and the Future of Spying: Technology, Intelligence Collection and National Security. London, England: Routledge, 2015. Nagel, Thomas. Concealment and Exposure: And Other Essays. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002. Walsh, Patrick. Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis. London, England: Routledge, 2011.

National Security Council The National Security Council (NSC) is a White House–based organization that serves the president by providing advice on foreign policy issues— especially ones involving national security—and

National Security Council

coordinating the foreign policy-making process overall. Utilized increasingly by presidents since Harry Truman, the NSC has evolved over time into a form unlike its predecessor, the National Intelligence Authority. This entry examines key developments within the NSC as well as its main functions and structures, including its membership. The central foreign policy role played by the national security advisor is also highlighted along with the controversy that currently surrounds the NSC. Since its creation in the 1947 National Security Act, the NSC has evolved into an NSC system that bears little resemblance to the original council. Where once a decision-making council was important, it has subsequently declined and been superseded by an NSC system involving a national security advisor, NSC staff, and an NSC interagency process whereby foreign policy is planned, implemented, and assessed. The purpose of the National Security Act was to rationalize the national security process and force the president to be more responsive to formal lines of authority in the foreign policy bureaucracy, especially within the military. The act’s formulation and passage was a response to what many people, in both ­Congress and the Executive Branch, thought was a chaotic national security policy-making process during World War II. In addition, many people were unhappy with President Franklin D. ­Roosevelt’s management style. Roosevelt avoided formal channels of communication and chains of command, bypassing many high-level military officials in the process. These concerns increased with the rise to the presidency of Truman, who lacked experience in foreign policy. To force the president to comply with a more formal process and adhere to the chain of command, the membership of the NSC was set by law and composed largely of members of the newly created National Military Establishment (forerunner to the Department of Defense). Modeled after the British war cabinet, it was a means of imposing a cabinet government on the president when national security decisions were involved. The only legal flexibility that the original act gave the president was the ability to invite officials to NSC meetings in addition to the statutory members. The original statutory members of the NSC included the president, the chairman of the

661

National Security Resources Board (responsible for emergency planning and civil defense), and the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. A small staff, headed by a civilian executive secretary, provided support for the formal council advisory meetings, helped coordinate the policy process, and conducted long-range planning. The NSC’s two primary functions are to provide foreign policy guidance to the president and coordinate the policy-making process among executive departments and agencies. Housed within the executive office of the presidency, it is the key agency on which presidents rely. The national security advisor is one of the key appointments the president makes, becoming one of the most important policy advisors to the president and coordinator of foreign policy making throughout the executive branch. The NSC staff serves the national security advisor and, therefore, works directly for the president as his personal foreign policy staff. Typically, the national security advisor and the NSC staff are at the heart of the NSC interagency process. With the exception of the first 6 years of President Ronald Reagan’s administration, there has been a general trend toward relying on the national security advisor to exercise institutional control over the foreign policy bureaucracy and process, and the role of that adviser as a central player is ­generally accepted.

Changing Patterns in the NSC Presidents have found the NSC, as originally designed, to be both a potentially useful tool and a source of frustration in managing foreign policy. Presidents have used those aspects of the NSC that they have found useful while ignoring or circumventing those aspects that they have found constraining. One major change to the original ­ NSC under postwar presidents is evident: The NSC staff (and the national security advisor, a position created in 1957) has become more significant over time, while the NSC as a decision-making body has declined in importance. Since presidents can invite anyone they wish, attendees may include the vice president, the national security advisor, the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, the secretary of state, the secretary of

662

National Security Council

defense, the secretary of the treasury, the attorney general, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, heads of organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, and various presidential advisers and assistants, depending on the issues and presidential predilections. Basically, presidents will interact with those policymakers they trust the most and will avoid officials with whom they have policy disagreements or personality conflicts. The NSC system has proved to be highly malleable over the years, assuming different shapes and roles in each presidential administration. Presidents Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, for example, viewed the NSC warily, relying instead on their secretaries of state for advice. John F. Kennedy was the first president to use his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, as an active policy advocate. The national security advisor’s power peaked in the Richard Nixon administration, when Henry Kissinger dominated the U.S. foreign policy process as no one else had before or since. By the time George H. W. Bush appointed Brent Scowcroft as his national security advisor, a consensus had emerged on the importance of the position as both central process manager (and honest broker) and policy adviser. President Barack Obama made his own mark on the NSC’s design when he merged its staff with that of the Homeland Security Council, forming a unified National Security staff in the White House. The formal meetings of the NSC, particularly those during a crisis, tend to draw the most media and public attention. The bulk of the council’s work, however, involves the day-to-day examination of foreign policy problems and options by the NSC staff. Three aspects of this work have been objects of controversy and criticism. The first concern relates to the staff’s emergence as an independent power center within the security complex and a rival, rather than a partner, of other federal agencies (most notably the U.S. Department of State). Critics allege that NSC staff members have overstepped their bounds by taking formal policy positions, interacting with foreign governments, and appealing to the public through the news media. A second, related concern is that Congress is left out of the workings of the NSC, negating the  checks and balances written into the U.S.

Constitution. Unlike cabinet secretaries and other high-level presidential appointees, the national security advisor does not require Senate confirmation. These foreign policy managers are beyond the reach of congressional oversight. In a pinch, their action can be kept secret by a presidential claim of executive privilege. Finally, the secretive nature of the NSC raises concerns about potential abuses from the concentration of power in the presidency. This fear was realized in the 1980s when NSC staffers conducted secret, “off-theshelf” paramilitary operations in the Middle East and Central America, which led to the Iran-­Contra scandal. Although Reagan was the last president to permit such an operational role, his successors have consistently turned to the NSC staff, knowing that their deliberations would be less likely to be revealed outside the White House. Overall, the policy-making process and the NSC system at the presidential level have tended to operate at two overlapping levels: (1) an informal process (face-to-face meetings or private phone calls) among the president’s closest advisers and (2) a formal NSC interagency process through the use of the national security advisor and the NSC staff. As the executive branch has grown in size and complexity, the NSC has come to be the major institution involved in managing the foreign policy bureaucracy, though not as originally intended. The president has come to rely increasingly on a foreign policy process managed by the national security advisor and staff. Ultimately, the NSC system exists to provide structure and process for the president to receive the best information, make the best decisions, and ensure that those decisions are carried out. As the role of the United States in the world has grown, so too has the footprint of the foreign policy bureaucracy, which has helped speed the development of a White House–centered system. Steven J. Campbell See also Cold War; Intelligence Community; Iran-Contra Affair

Further Readings Best, Richard A., Jr. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. New York, NY: Novinka Books, 2001.

Nazism Inderfurth, Karl F. and Loch K. Johnson, eds. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004. Prados, John. Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council From Truman to Bush. New York, NY: William Morrow, 1991. Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2005. Zegart, Amy B. Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Nazism Nazism refers to the ideas and practices of the people associated with the National Socialist German Worker’s Party from 1919 until 1945. Core ideals of Nazism include a belief in the racial superiority of the Aryan race, extreme German nationalism, and a commitment to a strong, paternalistic government with control over political and social life. During its time in power, the Nazi government under Adolf Hitler used policing and surveillance to detect and punish dissidents. The three main policing groups, (1) the Sturmabteilung (SA), (2) the Schutzstaffel (SS), and (3) the Geheime Staatspolizei, known more commonly as the Gestapo, had the authority to arrest, torture, and even execute anyone whom the government perceived to be an enemy of the state. In addition to policing, the Nazi government also engaged in political repression, censorship, and the dissemination of propaganda to prevent the circulation of dissenting ideas. Although the Nazi party is now banned in Germany, neo-Nazi groups around the world still adhere to these views. In this entry, the ideology of Nazism, the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany, and the politics of the party are discussed. Then the policing practices of the SA, the SS, and the Gestapo are reviewed. The entry concludes with a review of how the Nazi Party utilized propaganda and censorship to advance its cause.

The Ideology of Nazism Nazism represents a variant of fascism, an ideology that gained wide appeal in Europe in the

663

interwar years. More precisely, fascism is a form of extreme nationalism, where the good of the nation as a whole is privileged over the preferences and the rights of the individual. As such, fascists reject electoral democracy, believing that it thwarts the ability of the natural ruling elite to govern effectively. Similarly, fascists also reject liberalism, arguing that its emphasis on compromise and cooperation dilutes national purpose and promotes weakness in the international arena. In line with this, fascists tend to emphasize the importance of military power and the necessity of using force to achieve political aims. Hitler’s own particular interpretation of f­ ascism relied heavily on the racial elements of German national identity and the purported threat from lesser races. Specifically, the Nazis idealized the notion of the Aryan race, typified by blond-haired, blue-eyed Germans. In line with this, German racial purity laws, based on pseudoscience, ranked individuals based on how closely they fit with this Aryan ideal. Other races and ethnic groups, most specifically Jews, blacks, and the Roma people, were portrayed as racially inferior; moreover, the Nazis asserted that non-Aryans were nefarious forces that were controlled by outside powers. Under the Nazis, these groups were treated as second-class citizens, and the government eventually attempted to exterminate them. The Nazi Party was also violently opposed to Marxism and communism, warning that these belief systems falsely emphasized the equality of all individuals. Overall, Nazism represented a totalitarian ­ideology; Hitler’s Nazi Party aspired not just to control political life but also to co-opt art, music, religion, and sport for national purposes.

The Rise of the Nazi Party in Germany Although Hitler did not found the Nazi Party, by the 1920s, he had assumed control of the nascent organization, transforming the party into a mass movement. As the leader of the party, he developed its governing ideology and policy positions. He especially capitalized on the German public’s feelings of humiliation after World War I; he called on the German government to abrogate the Versailles Treaty, which required Germany to assume blame for the conflict and pay reparations to the Allies.

664

Nazism

Under the charismatic leadership of Hitler, the party quickly gained followers, and in 1924, its members staged a failed coup. Hitler was then jailed, and the government banned the Nazi Party. After his release from prison, however, Hitler began to rebuild the party, setting up a network of local offices and recruitment centers. The Great Depression and its disastrous impact on the already fragile German economy proved to be a boon for the Nazis, allowing them to recruit new members from the ranks of the jobless and the impoverished. By the time of the 1932 elections, the Nazi Party had strong popular support, and it succeeded in winning the largest bloc of seats in the German parliament. The next year, Hitler was named chancellor, and he moved quickly to consolidate power in his office. By 1934, Hitler had named himself Fuhrer, making him the supreme military and civilian authority in the country. The Nazis ruled Germany until the regime was defeated and occupied by the Allies in 1945. After World War II, the Nazi Party was banned, and the surviving Nazi officials were tried as war criminals.

Politics in the Nazi Era Although the Nazi Party initially gained power through electoral victories, they were only able to achieve total domination over the political system by employing undemocratic tactics that banned political competition and stripped citizens of their rights. After becoming chancellor in 1933, Hitler orchestrated the passage of the Enabling Act. The law, officially called the Law for Removing the Distress of the People and the Reich, gave the German chancellor extraordinary power in times of national emergency. Specifically, under the act, the chancellor was allowed to pass new laws without the consent of the parliament; this effectively nullified the legislature and allowed Hitler to govern single-handedly. Moreover, the act revoked many of the civil and political liberties guaranteed in the constitution of the Weimar Republic. Notably, the act was proposed several days after the infamous Reichstag fire. Many historians suspect that the Nazi Party secretly set the fire to create a crisis atmosphere; however, the arson was ultimately blamed on communists. During the debate over the Enabling Act, Nazi deputies

warned that failure to pass the law would result in more Reichstag-style catastrophes triggered by political dissidents. The act was passed with 441 votes in favor and 84 against; the Socialists were the only party refusing to support it. Following the passage of the Enabling Act, ­Hitler moved quickly, banning opposing parties and arresting political dissidents. By 1934, the SS chief Heinrich Himmler announced the opening of the Dachau concentration camp near Munich. This camp was initially used to house political prisoners, including socialists and communists. To maintain complete control over German citizens, the Nazis developed a sophisticated police state, using highly trained, specialized policed units, such as the SA, the SS, and the Gestapo. In 1936, Hitler ordered that all police and security forces be centralized, with Himmler serving as the chief of all police units.

The Sturmabteilung The SA was a group of paramilitary men who were directed by the Propaganda Ministry, led by Joseph Goebbels. The SA and the Propaganda Ministry were permitted to censor all forms of communication in Germany, including newspapers, magazines, books, speech, art, music, and radio. Anything that could pose a threat to the governing ideology was eliminated and replaced with pro-Nazi programming. The SA enlisted rank-and-file party members to assist it with this censorship; in the spring of 1933, Nazi student organizations, professors, and librarians made up long lists of books that they thought should be removed from German libraries and stores. Subsequently, on May 10, pro-Nazi groups raided bookstores and libraries, chanting antiSemitic slogans and burning approximately 25,000 books. Some of the targeted books were written by Jewish authors, such as Sigmund Freud, whereas other banned books were written by authors, such as Earnest Hemingway and Jack London, who held political beliefs contrary to those of the Nazi Party. Eventually, the SA even directed that textbooks be rewritten to promote Nazi values among German students. For example, the revised his­ tory  textbooks blamed Jews for many historical crimes, such as the destruction of Rome and

Nazism

Egypt. Schools also used anti-Semitic children’s books written by Julius Streicher; one, titled Never Trust a Fox in His Green Meadow and Never Trust the Oath of a Jew, portrayed German Jews as foxes who preyed on children.

The Schutzstaffel The SS was originally designed as a paramilitary organization; it was tasked with providing security during party meetings and personal bodyguards for Hitler. The organization, headed by Himmler, was also the only Nazi group authorized to gather intelligence for Hitler; this included gathering information on the activities of domestic political opponents and spying on Nazi Party members suspected of disloyalty. To join the SS, applicants were required to go through a rigorous screening process, including proving their racial purity. By 1934, this group had more than 50,000 members. Overall, the SS was designed as a political unit, charged with detecting and punishing critics of the regime as well as targeting groups deemed to be racially inferior. Members of the SS were also selected to implement the “Final Solution,” the elimination of European Jews and the Roma people. As a result, the SS was responsible for some of the worst crimes committed by the Nazi regime. One faction of the SS, the Totenkopfverbände, or  “Death’s Head Squads,” was responsible for running Nazi concentration camps in Germany and  Poland. Another division of the SS, the ­Einsatzgruppen, operated execution squads in the territories captured by Germany and was responsible for killing more than 1 million people. In addition, members of the Waffen-SS acted as combat troops, fighting alongside the German army.

The Gestapo The Gestapo was a secret police force created by Hermann Goering. The organization was originally established in 1933 to torture and obtain confessions from accused enemies of the Nazi state; it gained a reputation for extreme brutality. In addition, the Gestapo operated its own court system; with Gestapo members acting as both judge and jury, the conviction (and sometimes execution) of alleged enemies of the party was almost assured.

665

The practices of the Gestapo were designed to create a climate of fear and self-censorship within Germany; the Gestapo could arrest an individual for simply telling a joke about Hitler or other Nazi officials. To track down alleged dissidents, the Gestapo relied on a network of informants. The Gestapo required local police to create lists of individuals whom they suspected of opposing the government, and the group called on citizens to report anyone in their communities whom they suspected of disloyalty. Once the Gestapo targeted an individual, an officer traveled to the home of the accused and gave the person 3 minutes to gather his or her belongings. From there, the person was transported to the nearest police cell and forced to sign Form D-11; this form constituted a confession of disloyalty.  Most prisoners were then transported to a ­concentration camp. Many of these detentions were designed as short-term punishments, and the prisoner was eventually released. Once released, however, the former prisoner would often tell members of his or her community about the poor conditions in the camp, including hard labor and lack of food and water. This, in turn, would dissuade others from speaking out against the government.

Propaganda and the Nazi Regime In addition to using surveillance and intimidation to quash political dissent, the Nazis also used ­propaganda to shape public opinion about both domestic and international politics. In 1933, Goebbels established the Ministry of Public ­ Enlightenment and Propaganda. Nazi-era propaganda was targeted at adults and children alike, and it sought to cultivate unquestioning loyalty to Hitler and the Nazi Party. In addition to extolling Hitler’s leadership, the propaganda also emphasized the superiority of the Aryan race and blamed social ills on unpopular groups such as Jews and communists. In addition to traditional forms of propaganda, such as posters and leaflets, Goebbels believed that movies were one of the most effective means to transmit political messages to the masses. Under his direction, the ministry created several films that promoted Nazi ideals in narrative form. One example of this is the 1940 movie The

666

Nazism

­Eternal Jew; the film relied on footage filmed in the ghettos in Poland after the German invasion in  the autumn of 1939. The film portrayed the Jewish population as violent and uncivilized, depicting images of people who were impoverished and seriously ill. Moreover, images of the Jewish population were interspersed with images of vermin, such as rats, and the narrator recounted the purported crimes of the Jewish people against the German population. This film, however, was a commercial failure. Other Nazi films sought to demonize communists by contrasting their brutality with the purported moral superiority of the Nazis. For example, Hitlerjunge Quex, released in 1933, recounted the story of an impoverished young man raised in a communist household. After meeting members of the Hitler Youth, he was inspired to join the movement, but his mother attempted to kill him in order to prevent this. Although the Hitler Youth rallied to his defense, he was eventually murdered by communists, but he chanted the Nazi march song as he lay dying. In addition to film, the Nazis also used mediums such as comic books, novels, fairy tales, and music to promote their ideology to the public.

Censorship in Nazi Germany In addition to intimidating political dissidents, the Nazi Party also engaged in widespread censorship of the print media, radio, and various forms of artistic expression. Newspapers were one of the first targets of the Nazis; by the late 1930s, 1,600 newspapers were closed down, and by 1938, 10,000 publications had ceased production. Once the Nazis had eliminated independent news sources, the party established a newspaper of its  own called Volkischer Beobatcher (People’s Observer). All content in the newspaper had to be preapproved by Goebbels and had to promote the party’s agenda. The Ministry of Propaganda also censored ­German radio broadcasts to ensure that no content critical of the government or its policies reached the airwaves. Eugene Hadamowsky, ­Goebbels’s subordinate, was tasked with preapproving the content of all German daily news broadcasts. In addition, he had to ensure that any

international programs broadcast on German radio were preceded by music from Germany’s best orchestras and closed with a message from Hitler regarding his views on world events. Radio stations were also required to carry Hitler’s ­frequent public addresses. In addition to monitoring the content of radio broadcasts, the government also made it illegal to transmit or listen to unapproved broadcasts from international sources. Any person caught doing so could be charged with treason and be placed in a concentration camp. Despite these stiff penalties, illegal broadcasts were popular; for example, ­during the first years of the war, more than 1,500 people were arrested and jailed for listening to such broadcasts. Nazi censorship of radio was so thorough that the government saw radio as another way to promote the Nazi agenda and thus encouraged all German citizens to obtain one. More specifically, to ensure that everyone could purchase a radio, the government developed ­inexpensive “People’s Receivers,” which cost only 76 marks. Nazi censorship extended to cultural life, and censorship of art was widespread in the Third Reich. Hitler considered himself an art expert; he objected to surrealism, cubism, impressionism, and expressionism, believing that the only function of art was to provide a realistic depiction of human suffering. Moreover, he took a populist view of artwork, holding that good art was that which had the ability to appeal to the common person. In accordance with this, art in Nazi Germany was highly regulated. Hitler granted 42,000 artists permission to create art so long as they joined the Reich Chamber Visual Arts and adhered to his artistic standards. Specifically, H ­ itler preferred Roman-style art, which he believed depicted the Aryan ideal. To illustrate his preferences, Hitler would host art shows, displaying what he considered to be “degenerate” modern art, including works by Van Gogh and Picasso. Any artist who did not join the Reich Chamber Visual Arts was prohibited from teaching art, displaying art, and even creating art. In addition, Nazi officials provided art stores with lists of banned artists whose paintings could not be sold. Gestapo officials monitored these stores to ensure compliance.

Neighborhood Watch Programs and Citizen Patrol

Many popular films and music styles were also banned from Nazi Germany. For example, both the jitterbug and jazz were banned because these were art forms developed by African Americans, considered by the Nazis to be an ­ inferior race. Similarly, the film All Quiet on the Western Front was censored as it showed ­German soldiers questioning the wisdom of war. During a premier of the film on December 5, 1930, the SA entered the theater and threw smoke bombs and sneezing powder at the patrons. Other banned films included Tarzan, which featured scantily clad lead actors, and the Shirley Temple film Susannah of the Mounties, which depicted a friendship between a white child and a Native American.

Conclusion Although the Nazis were in power for less than two decades, they succeeded in creating a totalitarian state that controlled virtually all aspects of the lives of German citizens. This was accomplished through a variety of tactics. Primarily, the German government used a vast network of police and security forces to intimidate ­German citizens; the harsh punishments meted out to those who challenged the regime dissuaded others from speaking out. In addition to using terror to obtain political control, the Nazis went further, limiting the information available to citizens and effectively indoctrinating the population through the news media, radio, and film. Censorship, combined with extensive propaganda efforts, allowed the regime to lead public opinion rather than follow it. Kelly McHugh and Kira Ramirez See also Concentration Camps; Dictators and Dictatorships; Germany; Police State

Further Readings Browder, George C. Foundations of the Nazi Police State: The Formation of Sipo and SD. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004. Johnson, Eric A. Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000.

667

Passmore, Kevin. Fascism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Neighborhood Watch Programs and Citizen Patrol Neighborhood watch and citizen patrols are groups of organized citizens developing horizontal surveillance practices to serve as tools for crime prevention. They require people’s involvement in horizontal surveillance with the aim of deterring crime and antisocial behavior. Oftentimes, neighborhood watch schemes are official programs fostered by law enforcement and security bodies, who train citizens to exert informal social control in their communities. Citizen patrols are groups of people patrolling the streets with similar aims, but not necessarily as part of an official government program. The structure of citizen patrols is fragmented and complex, and the methods they use, the composition of their schemes, and the crimes they target vary between countries and evolve over time. Their effectiveness in terms of reducing actual crime rates has been questioned, although their impact in social cohesion is widely accepted as a formal example of informal social control. Along with the benefits, the risks that these groups pose to people’s privacy, fundamental rights, and freedom from discrimination have been raised by some scholars. This entry briefly summarizes the formation of neighborhood watch programs and citizen patrols before examining their internal structure, the contextual issues, and the effectiveness, as well as risks, of such groups. Crime prevention systems based on citizens’ involvement in watching other citizens have their roots in medieval society, although modern schemes were first established in the United States and the United Kingdom. The first recorded neighborhood watch program was put in place in New York in 1964 amid a burglary epidemic. The turning point was a murder of a woman who cried for help for more than an hour, yet nobody assisted her. The investigations revealed that several bystanders had heard her, but their failure to help her resulted in her death. This event prompted a movement for greater involvement of citizens in

668

Neighborhood Watch Programs and Citizen Patrol

the prevention and protection against crime and the creation of neighborhood watch programs. These programs crossed the Atlantic for the first time in 1982, when the first U.K. program was implemented in Cheshire. Since then, community safety groups have spread to other countries, although in different shapes and forms.

Internal Structure The main purpose of contemporary neighborhood watch programs is to prevent crime in a given community or area. These groups target crimes (against residents, against property, or any crime occurring in the watched area) as well as antisocial behavior that is seen to increase feelings of insecurity (e.g., drug dealing and addiction, prostitution, poverty, or deviant uses of public space). Their “eyes on the street” are seen as a complement to the work of the police. The watchers are mostly residents who volunteer to do such tasks on a regular basis, either on foot or using vehicles, even though there are rare cases in which the resident watchers are paid by other residents or in which the watchers receive a salary from a government agency or department. When the citizen patrols are part of a larger neighborhood watch program, the latter is more likely to be the case, and in such cases, the watchers need not necessarily be residents of a particular area. When the patrols are set up by citizens themselves as a response to a perceived increase in the insecurity of the area, their members are most often volunteer residents. As a complement to the work of the police, neighborhood watch or citizen patrol members look after other people’s property, secure access lanes, observe other residents’ or visitors’ behavior, and report any suspicious activities, behavior, or incidents to the police. In this sense, they are different from vigilantes, as neighborhood patrol members are not supposed to take justice into their own hands, carry weapons, or deal directly with the offender(s). When the watchers are part of a government-sanctioned program, they receive formal training on basic crime prevention strategies (e.g., how to observe, how to react, and how to report to police) by the local police forces. They even may have a direct contact with the local police so as to increase coordination, and the

presence of the program is rendered visible by street signs and posts to deter potential offenders. Citizen patrols, on the other hand, are not formally set up or recognized by the local authorities and lack specific training or communication channels with the police. With the proliferation of information and ­communication technologies, the communication mechanisms used by such groups have been changing. Whereas traditionally radios and intercoms were the most common technologies, today social media and networks facilitate contact between residents, patrollers, and the police. Today reporting practices can be more immediate, direct, and even anonymous. The widespread use of mobile phones also allows for the capture, storage, and sharing of pictures and videos, and instant messaging makes it easier for program members to communicate.

Contextual Issues The specific nature, role, and composition of these groups are closely related to the culture of security in each country. This includes their political history and the actors traditionally wielding the legitimacy to deal with crime and disorder. The concept of “culture of security” comprises not only institutional forces but also how much room has been given, historically, to informal surveillance groups at the local level. Consequently, formal neighborhood watch programs are more commonly found in countries where the idea of community policing is well rooted and there is a tradition of sharing police responsibilities with residents. Anglo-­ American countries have such tradition, so formal neighborhood watch programs are common in those nations. On the contrary, in central and southern Europe, states have kept a monopoly on security issues, and residents look to the state and police forces for solutions. When the residents’ expectations in terms of security are not met, or when citizens feel areas or regions are being neglected by police, informal citizen patrols emerge, often as a way to demand a reaction from the authorities. These are usually short-lived and not favored by the institutions of power, and can even lead to the creation of counterpatrol schemes, integrated by those who see the actions of the original patrollers as aggressive or discriminatory.

Neighborhood Watch Programs and Citizen Patrol

Sociodemographically, neighborhood watch programs and citizen patrols are more likely to exist in poor and middle-class neighborhoods and not necessarily in areas with high crime rates. There are a few studies addressing the social composition of these groups, but their membership seems to be dominated by middle-aged men. More affluent areas can privately pay for increased ­security in the form of fences, alarms, or private security guards. When patrols emerge in such areas, they tend to be focused more on antisocial behavior than property crime. The forms and levels of commitment of neighborhood watch members (volunteers, paid residents, or hired guards) differ between areas. Volunteering or becoming a member of a patrol is in fact a form of social participation. The willingness to participate is not only related to fear of crime or direct victimization but also linked to a general tendency to take part in volunteering programs and community involvement programs. The areas under surveillance by neighborhood patrols also vary, from single blocks to whole neighborhoods with thousands of dwellings. The life span of these organizations also varies; the formal programs tend to be more stable, but informal citizen patrols may come and go as the perception of insecurity changes, usually as a reaction after a spike in crime rates or one major incident.

Effectiveness and Risks Neighborhood watch programs are usually associated with crime reduction. There is a consensus that community involvement in community safety issues increases the sense of security among residents and improves police and community relations. The actual impact on objective crime rates, however, is contested. The most systematic review of the effectiveness of such programs, carried out in 2007, concluded that the presence of organized groups to surveil specific areas and prevent crime caused crime rates to fall approximately 20% in most of the cases. However, in some areas, crime rates were found to increase during the existence of the patrols. Improved communication between the residents and the police and better knowledge of the community safety challenges faced by the community seem to be a clear benefit of neighborhood watch programs and citizen patrols.

669

In terms of social cohesion, such schemes carry a double message, because although their emergence can be a reflection of the community coming together to increase informal social control and build trust, they can also show how prior mechanisms have failed to create a sense of security and community among members. Moreover, the patrols can also exert an intangible pressure on individuals to behave in accepted and expected ways and to punish deviancy or unusual behavior. There is also the risk that such community programs reinforce the boundaries between those who belong and those who don’t (e.g., deviants, foreigners, the poor). While neighborhood watch programs and citizen patrols can be effective in terms of reducing feelings of insecurity and improving social cohesion and crime prevention (which are clear benefits for members and residents of the area under surveillance), there are also risks, like the stigmatization of certain groups or behavior, or the reduced privacy of residents and visitors, as their unusual attitude or appearance may raise suspicion and put them under the spotlight for no justified reason. In addition, fostering informal surveillance can create a telltale dynamic that can result in the opposite effects being sought in the first instance. Giving formal authority to certain members of the community can also be problematic, as lack of training and supervision can lead to individual members of a program taking matters into their own hands. The fatal shooting of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin in 2012 by the neighborhood watch coordinator of a gated community in ­Sanford, Florida, is a case in point. While the resident alerted the police, he also decided to engage in a fight with the young man, who was talking on a mobile phone outside his girlfriend’s house.

Final Thoughts Neighborhood watch programs and citizen patrols are groups of people performing surveillance while primarily acting as complementary eyes and ears to the police and reporting suspicious behavior or incidents to the authorities. The specific form of such programs may depend on historical and cultural factors that have guided the relationship between the police and the community. In countries where the relevant institutions have been and are willing to share their responsibility for

670

Network Security

community safety, neighborhood watch programs are typically formalized and officially accounted for, as is the case in most Anglo-American countries where such programs exist. In areas where surveillance and policing have always been the monopoly of the state and its institutions, citizen patrols emerge informally and as a way to get the attention from the authorities to address what is perceived as a security problem. While the specific impact of such programs in crime rates is far from conclusive, it does contribute to social cohesion. The right to privacy, freedom of movement, and ability to be different may be infringed on, however, by the emergence of neighborhood watch programs, and a culture of suspicion can emerge at the community level, offsetting the benefits to social cohesion. In extreme cases, bad management or training can have fatal consequences. Gemma Galdon Clavell See also Civil Liberties; Crime Control; Policing and Society; Social Control

Further Readings Ball, Kirstie (Coordinator). D3.2. Surveillance Impact on Open and Democratic Societies, Public Deliverable of the IRISS Project (Increasing Resilience in Surveillance Societies, Grant Agreement No. 285593) (2014). http://irissproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ D3.2-Surveillance-Impact-report1.pdf1.pdf (Accessed July 2014). Bennett, Trevor, et al. The Effectiveness of Neighborhood Watch. Philadelphia, PA: The Campbell Collaboration Reviews of Intervention and Policy Evaluations, 2007. Hourihan, Kevin. “Local Community Involvement and Participation in Neighborhood Watch: A Case Study in Cork, Ireland.” Urban Studies, v.24/2 (1993). Rosenbaum, Dennis P. “The Theory and Research Behind Neighborhood Watch.” Crime and Delinquency, v.33 (1987). Wakefield, Alison and Jenny Fleming, eds. The SAGE Dictionary of Policing. London, England: Sage, 2009.

Network Security The term network is widely used across the field of security. For example, in light of the strengths of crime and terror networks (so-called dark

networks), it has become popular to argue that “it takes networks to fight networks.” Network in this context is used more as a metaphor rather than other uses of the term, including referring to a method of analysis, a mode of organizing, or technological assemblage. A network is a descriptive concept that loosely refers to a set of relationships among security agencies or nodes. The term also has a prescriptive connotation; for example, in the field of national security, the term calls attention to the lessons identified in the 9/11 Commission Report and related inquiries concerning the extent to which agencies share information and otherwise work together. However, if we move on from the standard divide between hierarchical and network modes of organizing, it becomes clear that the field of national security is characterized by networks. For example, the Department of Homeland Security must clearly work with a large number of government agencies to actually provide “homeland security.” We have seen new networks established that are referred to as fusion centers, which aim to create ties among actors or agencies constituting the security field. We have also seen a significant increase in the use of boundary spanners, by way of liaison networks, which further aim to create networks or “connect the dots” among security agencies. Networks are therefore ubiquitous across the security field, involving important questions about the ways in which such networks form and function as well as how security nodes work together in and through networks. This entry approaches the topic of network security by first expanding on the term network and then reviewing security networks, with a thorough examination of the ­ dynamics, effectiveness, and organization of such networks.

Networks Network security is an amorphous, multidisciplinary topic. It can refer to the security of networks, particularly in relation to information and communication technology networks, or it can refer to network modes of organizing security. The key term that needs to be defined is network. The concept of a network is typically used to refer to one or more of the following: a method of analysis (e.g., analyzing the ways in which a set of actors are networked), a unit of analysis (e.g., a specific

Network Security

form of organization), or a technological system (e.g., computer networks). In network analysis, a network can be defined as a set of actors (or nodes) that have relationships (or ties). Actors can be people, groups, organizations, or technological systems, for example. Relationships can be of any type, and each type can define a different network. The idea of network analysis is to map the pattern of relationships among actors and to analyze the implications of these relationships for the network and, more p ­ articularly, for the actors in the network. A large body of literature applying social networks analysis exists, and this method is becoming increasingly popular as a tool for analyzing and (potentially) disrupting various forms of dark networks. As a form of organization, a network refers to a specific form of coordination or governance in contrast to the ideal types of hierarchies and markets—a form that is often viewed as having a number of advantages over these other forms. Hierarchical forms of governance are differentiated horizontally (as in divisions between units) and vertically (as in levels of authority), and they are principally controlled through administrative means. Markets involve no consciously designed organizational structure as such, with the logic being that activities are loosely coordinated through price and contractual arrangements and the law is used as an instrument for resolving disputes among parties. Network forms of governance involve repeated exchanges between a set of autonomous but interdependent organizations to achieve individual and shared objectives. Networks largely balance the reliability of hierarchies with the flexibility of markets, making them an efficient way for organizations to acquire resources and manage risk and an effective means to manage complex problems requiring coordination among organizations. Computer networks can also be viewed from a similar perspective. These networks are defined simply as a collection of group systems (usually three or more) that are linked together in some way. Computer networks are usually characterized in accordance with their geographical parameters (e.g., local area networks, wide area networks) and the various protocols used (e.g., Internet, Ethernet). While there are many different types of computer networks and components involved,

671

from a broader network perspective we view each system as a node and the precise protocols as ­governing the ties among these nodes. Important surveillance and security questions accompany computer networks. For example, network security in a strict technical sense refers to the policies and provisions implemented by network administrators to monitor and control the use of computer networks. This might include access to data as well as restrictions on the sharing of these data  (something that is indeed almost taking on new meaning in light of Edward Snowden’s leaking of classified documents of the National Security Agency). A key theme in the cybersecurity literature also concerns the security of these systems from outside attacks (often referred to as “hacking”).

Security Networks The term security network is a concept that analysts have used in various ways to describe the relationships among agencies across the security field. For example, the literature tends to identify at least four ideal types of security networks: (1) local security networks, (2) institutional security networks, (3) international security networks, and (4) technological security networks. Local security networks are referred to as those networks that connect a diverse set of state and nonstate actors to develop responses to local security problems. Institutional security networks are defined as networks that aim to enable the amalgamation of resources across government agencies. International security networks are referred to as those networks that operate across national borders. Technological security networks are defined as the information and communication systems that facilitate communication and exchange of information among security actors. These networks are very different in terms of the ways in which they form and function. Much of the scholarly focus on security networks follows a broader trend in the criminological literature concerning the “governance of security.” The term governance is used to make the point that security involves a number of institutions, which include, but are not limited to, those of the state. That is, security is pursued through networks of public, private, and hybrid actors that are working together (or not) to provide security

672

Network Security

for the benefit of internal or external stakeholders. This applies particularly to local security networks, as that is where the pluralization of security governance is most visible. However, security networks also form as a means of managing what are often referred to as “wicked” problems (i.e., problems that cannot be divided into neat parts and allocated to individual security nodes to address on their own). Many security problems fall under this category, and this is the logic underpinning institutional security networks as well as all other security networks involving actors across professional disciplines (e.g., law enforcement and intelligence agencies) and jurisdictional boundaries. In this context, a security network is viewed as an organizational form whereby agencies are required to work together in order to achieve their own goals and also a collective goal.

Security Networks: Dynamics, Effectiveness, and Organization Security networks are organizational networks designed to achieve security-related objectives. Organizational networks tend to involve two basic types of properties: (1) structural and (2) relational. Structural properties include attributes such as the design and size of a network as well as the level of goal consensus and the importance of the tasks that the network performs. Analysts have used the method of network analysis to show how the design of a network determines the pattern of information and knowledge sharing. An obvious example concerns how some networks are brokered through a central actor, resembling more of a “hub” design, whereas other networks are loosely structured, with little internal coordination. It is important to consider how network structures are formed and how they evolve in response to particular contingencies. Network structure can also relate to the internal governance of networks, such as the role of lead organizations in controlling activities within networks. These questions considerably shape the ways in which security networks form and function. Relational properties refer to the relationships among nodes or network members, including relationships among individuals, work units, and organizations. Analysts have usually focused on

the formal relationships, such as those among organizational units or organizations. It is well established that networks require relatively high degrees of trust to operate at their optimum level of performance, particularly when compared with hierarchical forms of organization. Trust also shapes the optimal form of network structure. Networks characterized by high degrees of trust may require less formal control, whereas networks with limited trust may need a centralized network design due to a higher risk of conflict. Informal interpersonal relationships are important for various reasons, including the ways in which they shape formal relationships and, as network analysts have found, for understanding how work really gets done, as security agents work together “on the ground.” To the structural and relational properties of networks, we should add a further three levels of analysis to better understand the internal dynamics of security networks and the conditions shaping their performance: (1) culture, (2) policy, and (3) technology. Culture involves those beliefs, values, and attitudes that may be shared by network members (network culture) or differentiated between actors (organizational cultures and subcultures). We know that cultural barriers between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, for example, have resulted in problems with the exchange of information and their capacity to work together. Culture is likely to have a profound impact on the extent to which collaboration takes place in security networks. Policy refers to the rules or regulations specifying how a network is intended to operate. It can be imposed from above (e.g., mandated by government), be established at the network level (e.g., agreed to by network members), or come from below (e.g., from network members). The most obvious example concerning networks in the field of national security is the requirements placed on the protection of national security information, including the “need-to-know” principle. This principle specifies that information is shared not only with those who have the appropriate levels of access but also with those who need to have that information in order to perform their professional duties. There are significant risks accompanying this principle, since it is not easy for one actor to truly know what another actor needs to know.

Neuroscience and Brain Biology

Technology forms the basis of many network ties, such as in terms of processing information among network members, and is central to information-intensive networks. In this context, computer networks can be assessed in accordance with their broader purpose of enabling security agencies to work together—or cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate—rather than be viewed as ­independent networks. The same technological questions remain, however, including how information and communication networks are designed to support the broader objectives of security networks. In security-sensitive fields, one of the overriding considerations is balancing information protection with information sharing, which is a considerable challenge for many security networks. Chad Whelan See also Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Network Security; Social Network Analysis

magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) have produced images that are allowing scientists to gain a better understanding of the structure of the brain. At the same time, positron emission tomography, single photon emission tomography, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are enabling new insights into how the brain functions and its association with human behavior. Such technology promises an ever-clearer picture of both how the brain works and what it does. Critics, however, voice concerns that these advances may well come at the expense of privacy, freedom, and human dignity. This entry begins with predictions about the advancement and use of neuroscience and brain biology; then it discusses its potential in detecting lies and bias in individuals. The entry concludes with an examination of some potential privacy ramifications regarding how data from neuroscience technology would be stored and accessed.

Prediction

Further Readings Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Crime, Terror, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001. Brodeur, Jean-Paul and Benoit Dupont. “Introductory Essay: The Role of Knowledge and Networks in Policing.” In Tom Williamson (ed.), The Handbook of Knowledge-Based Policing: Current Conceptions and Future Directions. Chichester, England: Wiley, 2008. Dupont, Benoit. “Security in the Age of Networks.” Policing & Society, v.14/1 (2004). Morselli, Carlo, ed. Crime and Networks. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Provan, Keith and Patrick Kenis. “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, v.18/2 (2008). Whelan, Chad. Networks and National Security: Dynamics, Effectiveness and Organisation. London, England: Ashgate, 2012.

Neuroscience

673

and

Brain Biology

Technological advances have propelled the ­scientific understanding of the human brain at an extraordinary rate. Computer-assisted tomography and

What neuroscience reveals about brain biology may contribute greatly to knowledge about human behavior. Even more, as neuroscience identifies the parts of the brain associated with different human actions, human behavior could become more predictable. In itself, such information is not inherently problematic, but how information of this sort is used by others could cause significant moral and legal dilemmas. In the realm of criminal justice, for instance, a criminal defendant might rely on brain biology to argue that he or she was predisposed to commit whatever crime he or she has been charged with. This would pose a challenge for both prosecutors and juries for serious crimes that requires a showing of mens rae, or an intention to committing an act. A valid showing of predisposition to violence, for instance, would go  a long way toward mitigating a defendant’s conduct or perhaps acquitting himself or herself altogether. In other contexts, though, neuroscience prediction can lead to the curtailing of liberty and civil rights. This is already true in the case of sex offenders. In many states, sex offenders are subject to civil commitment or registration for monitoring beyond their prison sentences. This is justified on  the grounds that some sex offenders have a

674

Neuroscience and Brain Biology

compulsion to sexually assault others and the offender cannot resist that compulsion. Civil commitment or monitoring is thus necessary to protect society from sex offenders whose brain biology, according to neuroscience, makes it inevitable that they will offend again. The U.S. Supreme Court has even upheld civil commitments for sex offenders. In Kansas v. Crane (2002), the Court ruled that Kansas could order the civil commitment of sexually violent predators on a showing that an offender lacked the capacity to control his violent impulses. As neuroscience advances, however, there is a question as to whether such incarceration and monitoring will remain limited to just sex offenders. It is not a leap in logic to see such an approach taken to individuals whose brains reveal propensities to violence of any sort and, perhaps, other types of crimes.

Detecting Lies One of the more controversial aspects of emerging neuroscience is the possibility of developing foolproof lie detection devices. Unlike current machines that measure sympathetic nerve responses in the body to various questions, fMRI lie detectors analyze blood flow in the brain to reveal the places in the brain where neuron activity is more active. By monitoring these neurons, scientists can tell when the parts of the brain associated with lying are being engaged and when a subject is telling the truth. Testing on such devices has shown a great deal of promise, and two companies are now producing such machines. Neuroscience lie detectors, however, have been criticized for a number of reasons. First, most of the testing of these machines has taken place in controlled lab conditions that may not resemble testing environments in the real world where the stakes of lying could be much higher for an accused criminal than a laboratory volunteer. Whether these laboratory results translate into everyday conditions has yet to be fully determined. Second, the fMRI machines cannot detect a person who is lying but believes that he or she is telling the truth. Faulty memory or head injury could cause a person to remember facts or details of an event incorrectly, causing the person to provide an inaccurate account of things but believing the account to be true. Finally, courts have thus far

been unwilling to admit fMRI lie detection into evidence. That being said, judges have indicated that the technology may become admissible with further testing, development, and peer review validation. Even more, some speculate that a perfected fMRI lie detection system could even become compulsory for use in criminal investigations.

Bias Neuroscience technology has the potential to be applied toward the problem of bias in society. From prospective jurors to prospective employers, neuroimaging could ensure that the subject does not act with negative bias toward certain groups of people or certain issues. In law, such technology could be used to weed out bias in judges, jurors, witnesses, attorneys, and even plaintiffs and defendants. Such technology would also not need to be limited to just the characteristics of protected groups but could be applied to other salient criteria such as physical characteristics.

Privacy Beyond these issues, however, neuroscience technology raises a number of specific privacy concerns, both for individuals and society. First, there are fears about compulsory lie detector testing using brain scans. One of the main reasons why current lie detectors are inadmissible is their lack of reliability. If an fMRI could correct for these reliability issues, it is unclear whether privacy concerns alone would be sufficient to deny the state or other authorities the ability to compel citizens to take lie detector tests. Parents and school administrators testing children, employers testing employees, and legal professionals testing suspected offenders all raise significant apprehension about the cost to privacy. Second, concerns are raised about the use of neuroscience technology in the private sector. Brain scans could become an integral part of the hiring and firing process, job performance evaluations, and workplace safety initiatives. Transportation carriers such as commercial airlines could rely on such scans to identify potentially dangerous passengers. Scans could also become instrumental in the interrogation of suspected criminals and enemy combatants. How or when privacy concerns will be addressed in such scenarios is largely unclear.

New Penology

Finally, there is fear about how the data gleaned from brain scans will be stored and potentially shared with third parties. Assuming that neuroscience can advance to a point where prediction of human behavior is reliable, there is a need for accountability for what is done with the information gathered about individual brains. Ideally, the individual would have complete control over how such information was disseminated. Some people fear, however, that legal and illegal sharing of information will take place that could significantly compromise an individual’s privacy rights. A test for an employer revealing a disposition to certain unhealthy activities, for example, could end up in the hands of an insurance company, thereby significantly increasing coverage rates. This and other possible situations make clear that privacy concerns cannot take a back seat to neuroscience progress. Eric C. Sands See also Parental Surveillance; Privacy, Medical; Privacy, Right to; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. “Gray Matters: Integrative Approaches for Neuroscience, Ethics, and Society,” 2014. http:// bioethics.gov/node/3543 (Accessed February 2015). Richmond, Sarah, et al., eds. I Know What You’re Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012. Satel, Sally and Scott O. Lilianfeld. Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2013. Shen, Francis X. “Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, v.36/2 (2013). http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/ wp-content/uploads/2013/04/36_2_653_Shen.pdf (Accessed February 2015).

New Penology In a series of papers published between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, Malcolm Feeley and ­Jonathan Simon coined the term new penology to

675

describe the shift toward actuarial practices in the field of crime control that took place in the United States between the 1970s and the 1980s. It was during that period that a series of transformations in the narratives, objectives, and techniques to be used to control crime and offenders led to the emergence of a new conception of penal policy. Risk management strategies based on actuarial practices were established, with focus placed on aggregates, quantification, and formal and systemic rationality, and attention devoted to the statistical distribution of risks within the population. Consequently, crime control strategies became concerned with the identification, classification, and management of groups based on their dangerousness to society at large and with the regulation of unruly groups, all as part of a strategy, which included surveillance, to maintain order. This entry first differentiates between old and new penology, then describes the techniques and surveillance practices employed in new penology, and concludes with a debate on the merits of new penology. Whereas old penology used social strategies targeted at individual offenders to transform and rehabilitate them, with the ultimate goal of reintegrating them into society, new penology is built on the idea that changing individuals is difficult and that, as a result, the efficiency of power is increased if we tackle groups rather than single persons. Additionally, because crime is seen as an unavoidable feature of society, the aim is no longer to eliminate it but, rather, to make it tolerable through increased systemic coordination. This goes together with the reformulation of the goals to be pursued and the adoption of new criteria for success. Recidivism rate is no longer considered meaningful, with evaluation now based on the control of aggregates rather than on individual cases of success or failure. As a result of this shift, the very understanding of justice also changes, to become a formal system of inside rules, where internal coherence is stressed and preferred to a discussion on the distribution of powers within the system. On a practical level, new techniques have been developed to translate into reality the new discourses and the new objectives of new penology. While the common feature all these instruments share is the targeting of offenders as an aggregate,

676

New York, New York, Surveillance in

they can be divided into two separate categories. On the one hand, we have those technologies used for the identification and classification of both risks and people, such as systems for the electronic monitoring of offenders and statistical tools to predict and assess risks. On the other, the theory of incapacitation has provided theoretical support to the search for cost-effective forms of custody. This assumes that crime levels can be reduced by modifying the distribution of offenders within society, so the length of custodial sentences is adjusted to the risk profile to which a given offender belongs, selectively incapacitating those who are deemed too dangerous to be set free. Overall, economic concerns are key to both classes of techniques presented here, as the need to manage a permanently dangerous population is coupled with the demand for maintaining the system operative and functional at the lowest possible cost. From a surveillance perspective, the idea that a part of society cannot be integrated into the wider whole is particularly relevant, as the existence of an urban underclass provides justification for many of the surveillance measures now commonly adopted for the policing of urban space. The use of closed-circuit television to target marginal people loitering in public space, the zero-tolerance policing of minor offenses, and the rise of the gated community as a desirable living solution all speak to the idea of the permanent marginality of some, who need to be managed, controlled, and kept separated from law-abiding, productive citizens for the greater good of all. The formulation of the new penology thesis has sparked a lively debate within criminology. While raising a number of issues, a large part of the critiques has focused on three main points. In a diachronic perspective, we can problematize the novel character of new penology and ask to what extent it marks a definite break with the crime control strategies of the past, as Feeley and Simon explicitly claim. Scholars have argued that the theory overestimates the discontinuities between the present and the past, while at the same time underestimating the continuities. Historical studies have shown how actuarial practices were used much earlier than the late 1900s, while scholars have also argued that probation practices have not changed throughout the 20th century as radically as the authors suggest. In a synchronic perspective, the theory has been accused of disregarding local

variation in crime control strategies, and of a general lack of empirical depth. In contrast, empirical works have demonstrated how the ideal of rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders has not been abandoned and how different criminal justice systems deviate from the new penology model. Finally, the new penology thesis fails to account for the resurgence in punitivism that other observers, most notably David Garland, have noted. Garland’s idea of the culture of control provides a theoretical framework within which managerialism and expressive justice can coexist, though analytically this operation is possible only if we move attention away from an exclusive consideration of the field of penology and consider the changes that have occurred within this field in light of the wider transformations that fall under the rubric of late modernity. Francesca Menichelli See also Closed-Circuit Television; Crime Control; Garland, David; Gated Communities; Risk Society Thesis

Further Readings Feeley, Malcolm M. and Jonathan Simon. “The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications.” Criminology, v.30/4 (1992). Feeley, Malcom M. and Jonathan Simon. “Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law.” In David Nelken (ed.), The Futures of Criminology. London, England: Sage, 1994. Garland, David. The Culture of Control. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001. Simon, Jonathan and Malcolm M. Feeley. “True Crime: The New Penology and Public Discourse on Crime.” In Thomas G. Blomberg and Stanley Cohen (eds.), Punishment and Social Control. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995.

New York, New York, Surveillance in Any review or explication of surveillance in New York City necessarily focuses on the history of criminal, political, and terrorism-related investigations undertaken by the New York City Police

New York, New York, Surveillance in

Department (NYPD). As one of the United States’ oldest municipal police agencies, as the nation’s largest municipal police agency, and as the primary law enforcement agency in the nation’s largest and most diverse city, the NYPD has a rich history of involvement in surveillance activities and has had a fairly robust intelligence-gathering and analysis capability for well over a century. The length and richness of that history are attributable in part to the sheer number and variety of the investigations the NYPD has undertaken over the years and in part to the controversial nature of some investigations and the substantive, legal, ethical, and political concerns they have brought to public attention. Surveillance activities by law enforcement may always have the potential  for controversy and may always potentially have legal, ethical, and political implications, and the history of surveillance by the NYPD is no exception. Surveillance activities conducted by the NYPD have become increasingly sophisticated over the years, in large measure due to advances in available surveillance technology and the increasing ease with which it can be employed. As will be discussed in this entry, the history of surveillance activities and operations by the NYPD can be nominally divided into three periods, each entailing a slightly different set of subjects and foci, each involving the predominant threats of the day, and each successive era marked by increasing use of surveillance technology. This history also reveals increased interaction, investigative collaboration, and information sharing over time with external law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Notwithstanding the advances in the methods and use of surveillance technology, however, intelligence-gathering activities continue to involve one of the oldest and most basic modes of lowtech surveillance: gathering of human intelligence by police agents who infiltrate and/or observe and monitor target groups or observe and monitor individuals.

Early 1900s to 1960s One of the earliest examples of NYPD surveillance and infiltration involved the creation, in

677

1908, of the Italian Squad—a squad of detectives of Italian descent headed by Lieutenant Joseph Petrosino and tasked with infiltrating and interdicting the criminal activities of the Black Hand, an organized crime group that became the New York Mafia, as well as anarchist groups. Reflecting the cosmopolitan nature of New York City and the international criminal linkages, the Italian Squad’s notable cases included its infiltration of the Brescia Circle, an Italian anarchist group responsible for the assassination of King Umberto I of Italy. That assassination plot began in New York, and Petrosino claimed that federal authorities ignored the intelligence provided by members of his squad who had infiltrated the group. In 1914, when members of the Brescia Circle attempted to detonate bombs in St. Patrick’s Cathedral, the undercover detectives among them abandoned their cover to extinguish the bombs’ fuses and subdue the bombers. Petrosino was murdered by Black Hand operatives in Palermo, Italy, in 1909, while on a secret undercover assignment there. During World War I, NYPD detectives were seconded to work with military intelligence and naval intelligence in and around New York City, and this “neutrality squad” focused on surveillance and infiltration of antiwar activist, anarchist, and German nationalist groups. These neutrality squad detectives and members of the bomb squad interdicted several German sabotage plots and arrested a number of German agents. Following the war, the neutrality squad conducted operations against other dissident groups perceived as a threat to national security and to public safety within the city. James Lardner and Thomas Reppetto noted that in 1923 the squad was designated the “radical squad,” in 1931 it became the “alien squad” and was tasked with pursuing the German American Bund and the anti-Semitic Christian Front, and in 1946 it was renamed the Bureau of Special Service Investigations (BOSSI). The NYPD’s surveillance of radical groups would continue under BOSSI, which was redesignated the Intelligence Division in 1970. The primary focus of the NYPD’s surveillance attention in this early period was politically active foreign national groups perceived as a threat to national security and public order, and that focus—which principally involved physical surveillance and infiltration—continued through the

678

New York, New York, Surveillance in

1960s. Among the better-known individuals and groups that BOSSI monitored in the 1960s were Malcolm X and the Black Muslims (Malcolm X’s bodyguard on the day of his murder was an undercover NYPD detective), the Black Panthers, and the Black Liberation Army. The ideology of the latter two groups condoned violence, and their members were involved in crimes that included the assassination of police officers in New York and other U.S. cities.

was taking place, and it generally prohibited the sharing of information from investigations involving political activists and political groups with other agencies.

Post-9/11

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and in recognition of the intelligence failures in not having produced sufficient warning of those attacks, the NYPD refocused many of its intelli1960s to 2001 gence operations on the threat of international With the emergence of violent domestic terrorist terrorism. The attacks of September 11, 2001, groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s came a represent a watershed event in the history of the shift in the targets of NYPD surveillance and infilNYPD’s surveillance and intelligence operations, tration. These groups included the Marxist-­ and the agency’s vigorous and robust response Leninist Weather Underground, which engaged in ushered in the third era in that history. a series of bombings (including the bombing of The NYPD dramatically expanded its Intellithe U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, and the NYPD gence Division, placing it under a newly appointed headquarters) to protest the Vietnam War as well deputy commissioner who had previously served as the imperialism and racism it claimed had peras deputy director of operations at the CIA. It cremeated the American system, and the Fuerzas ated, staffed, and resourced a new CounterterrorArmadas de Liberation Nacional (FALN, Armed ism Bureau—the first counterterrorism unit Forces of National Liberation), a Puerto Rican established in any U.S. police agency—and sought separatist group with a communist ideology that to initiate more robust surveillance operations was responsible for numerous bombings from the geared toward identifying and interdicting terrormid-1970s through the early 1980s. ist plots within the city, across the nation, and Inevitably, the NYPD’s surveillance and infilabroad. The NYPD increased its role and particitration of groups with political and religious agenpation in the NYPD-FBI Joint Terrorism Task das brought various constitutional (specifically Force, adding detectives and expanding collaborathe First Amendment) issues to public attention, tion and intelligence sharing. The agency sought and legal action ensued. In 1971, an alliance of to increase its sharing of information and resources activists filed a federal lawsuit accusing the NYPD with entities in law enforcement and the intelliof fostering a pattern of surveillance and infiltragence community, including the FBI and the CIA, tion calculated to repress lawful dissent, in violabut it was to a large extent constrained by the tion of the Constitution’s free speech protections requirements of the Handschu agreement. (Handschu v. Special Services Division, 1971). The In 2002, the NYPD petitioned a federal court Handschu case was not resolved until 1985, and to amend the Handschu agreement on the grounds the resulting consent decree generally prohibited that its limitations imposed untenable restrictions the NYPD from investigating political activities on the surveillance and investigation of terrorist unless related criminal activity was suspected. Any groups. In February 2003, the federal court investigation of suspected criminal activity by amended the decision, permitting the NYPD to political groups required the approval of a threevisit and conduct surveillance on any place or member Handschu commission and could only be event that is open to the public, to conduct open undertaken by the Public Security Section of the source investigations of online sites and forums NYPD’s Intelligence Division. The agreement also available to the public, and to develop general placed significant restrictions on police video reports and assessments of groups for the purpose recording and photographing of public gatherings of strategic or operational planning. Some restricin the absence of evidence that criminal activity tions on information sharing were also eased.

News Media

The limits of these expanded powers were tested in 2011 when a series of Associated Press articles detailed the operations of the NYPD Intelligence Division’s Demographics Unit, which allegedly sent undercover officers into Muslim neighborhoods to conduct surveillance and to generate detailed files on the locations where Muslim residents prayed, congregated, socialized, and shopped. The articles alleged that members of the unit conducted electronic and video surveillance at several mosques, used informants to record sermons, and infiltrated Muslim Student Associations at several colleges and universities inside and outside New York City, collecting the names, addresses, and other data of the associations’ members. These operations were reportedly designed and initiated by a top-ranking CIA official seconded to work with the NYPD’s Intelligence Division in 2003. The Associated Press team earned a Pulitzer Prize in 2012 for this series of articles. Despite the NYPD’s initially strenuous defense of the legality and legitimacy of these surveillance activities and its attempts to deny or explain many of the activities alleged in the Associated Press series of articles, in light of negative public reaction to the articles and to a number of leaked Demographics Unit reports revealing the extent of the surveillance conducted within the Muslim community, in April 2014, the NYPD disbanded the unit and discontinued the unit’s surveillance programs. Vincent E. Henry See also Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Municipal Surveillance; 9/11; Policing and Society

Further Readings Apuzzo, Matt and Adam Goldman. Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s Secret Spying Unit and bin Laden’s Final Plot Against America. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2013. Apuzzo, Matt and Adam Goldman. “New York Drops Unit That Spied on Muslims.” New York Times (April 15, 2014). http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/ nyregion/police-unit-that-spied-on-muslims-isdisbanded.html?_r=0 (Accessed October 2014). Handschu v. Special Services Division, 605 F. Suppl. 1384, affirmed 787 F.2d 828.

679

Lardner, James and Thomas Reppetto. NYPD: A City and Its Police. New York, NY: Macmillan, 2001. Silber, Mitchell. “Who Will Defend the Defenders?” Commentary (June 1, 2012). http://www .commentarymagazine.com/article/who-will-defendthe-defenders/ (Accessed October 2014).

News Media News media have a history as long as the existence of the United States. While the reporting of crimes began as brief, straightforward accounts, increases in technology and increased use of new media have caused an evolution in the way in which news media now report. Broadcasting videos related to crime recorded by bystanders has raised concerns about privacy; yet at the same time, it has also increased awareness of police misdoings, creating a greater desire for enhanced public surveillance in some instances. This entry reviews the history of news media before exploring the 24/7 news cycle and the Internet and cable network news stations, which have changed the landscape of news media and the consumption habits of their audience. The entry concludes with an examination of how questionable or illegal actions by police officers being caught on personal recording devices and broadcast by news media has created a desire for increased public surveillance.

Early Forms of News Media The earliest forms of crime news in the United States came in the form of pamphlets and broadsheets. These media frequently contained brief accounts of criminal trials that typically involved the most severe criminal penalties. Broadsheets were replaced by the mass market penny press in the 1830s. The penny press often presented crime as human interest stories, relying on witnesses and taking a critical approach to the justice system. These human interest stories often portrayed society as oppressive and manipulated by the wealthy. The success of the penny press opened the gates for other weekly forms of crime media such as crime magazines and dime novels.

680

News Media

By the 1890s, yellow journalism, which emphasized dramatization and sensationalism rather than facts, arose, providing crime details but using police and court personnel as the primary source of information. Newsworthiness moved from a market model (one in which worthiness was largely determined by the public interest) to a manipulative model, in which the media organization determines newsworthiness. This form of media tended to distort reality, working to shape public opinion and to maintain the status quo. Yellow journalists brought out a new form of news known as infotainment via its dramatization of the facts. At the same time, relying on the police to provide the facts of a crime gave an impression of forensic journalism. By the early 1900s, radio news obtained a broader reach, circumventing traditional socialization by parents and schools. In the 1950s, radio gave way to television, and by the 1980s, new media took hold via the video camera. Also in the 1980s, the establishment of the 24-hour international news channel Cable News Network (CNN) changed the nature of news media.

24/7 Cycles and On-Demand News In 1980, CNN established a new method of providing the news: a 24/7 cycle. CNN was able to provide 24-hour coverage of events such as the Rwanda genocide; Beijing’s Tiananmen Square protest in 1989; the fall of East Germany, the Soviet Union, and the Berlin Wall; the Persian Gulf War; and the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles, California. CNN was declared to have had such a profound effect on international policies that the term the CNN effect was coined. By 1994, newspapers took to the Internet and thus were able to provide a 24-hour presence. By 1997, half of all daily newspapers had a webpage; however, updates did not typically occur more than once a day. By the early 2000s, online newspapers were updating stories throughout the day, providing true 24/7 cycles of news. Today, many online news media do not print hardcopy newspapers. In addition, with the introduction of social media, the news media have taken on new characteristics. As Ray Surette discusses in his 2011 book Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice, new media such as digital interactive media—most

commonly the Internet—have enabled news media to have more pronounced looping and narrowcasts, to provide on-demand news, and to be interactive with their audience. Media looping occurs when an event is repeatedly cycled and recycled. This may occur with the retelling of a crime throughout the day as news media attempt to provide updates. The event may start with the crime and then be updated with police investigations releasing new information. The event may then get updated as the prosecutor announces criminal charges. The event may also have been recorded by an individual via a smartphone and posted on a video-sharing site such as YouTube. Various other websites may pick up the story, and it may also be discussed by comedians and television show hosts. With the continuous looping, fact and fiction become blurred. Looping also works to imply that crimes of such a nature are increasing within society when, in fact, only one story is being covered. The 24/7 cycles and the use of new media have resulted in narrowcasting. Instead of broadcasting to wider audiences, 24/7 cycles tend to target a smaller, homogeneous audience. The consumer can find highly focused news on most online news websites. For example, some cable channels, such as Fox News and MSNBC, have become known for catering news coverage to consumers with a specific political leaning. This results in on-demand news in which the consumer has greater control. Furthermore, within the news stories, viewers are encouraged to interact via Twitter, chat rooms, and blogs. The 24/7 cycle, thus, has brought interpersonal communication into the news.

Surveillance, Security, Privacy, and News Media One of the earliest and well-known crime events to be looped in the 24/7 news cycle in the era of new media was the 1991 Los Angeles Police Department beating of Rodney King, which was caught on video and broadcasted on a daily basis. The event, captured by personal sousveillance, was looped from the beating through the state trial of four officers charged with the use of excessive force, to the riots that occurred on their acquittal in 1992. It then moved to cover the officers’ subsequent federal trial for violating King’s

News Media

civil rights and the final verdict (two officers were acquitted, and two were convicted). Since that time, many officers have been caught via smartphone cameras and videotaping engaging in excessive violence, predominantly against African American males. Although news media still rely on the police to provide a forensic account of a crime, there is now an additional reliance on social media, which undermines the effects of forensic journalism. On the one hand, because forensic journalism relies on police accounts, the police are assumed to be competent in providing an account of the facts they have uncovered via their expert investigations. Social media, on the other, provides documented accounts that are seemingly irrefutable by police accounts. The beating of Rodney King being caught on camera was unprecedented. At that time, it was speculated that with the increase of personal camcorders, more of these occurrences would be recorded. Yet it was not until the 2000s—with the invention of smartphones with videotaping capacity and the advent of social media—that these types of police activities began hitting the media in large numbers. There have been many well-publicized cases of police brutality, such as the Arizona police officer driving his cruiser into an armed suspect, a Virginia officer shooting a teen with a Taser and pulling him out of the car, a South Carolina officer shooting Walter Scott in the back and killing him as he fled a traffic stop, an Oklahoma volunteer deputy mistakenly shooting a suspect when he thought he was reaching for his Taser, a New ­Jersey police officer kicking a 16-year-old boy in the head, New Mexico police officers shooting a homeless man during an arrest, the choking and eventual death of Eric Garner by a Staten Island officer, and the arrest and eventual death of Freddie Gray by the Baltimore police. The few ­ cases mentioned here have sparked protests and riots that have also been covered in the 24/7 news cycles. Looping these stories on 24/7 news cycles has increased awareness of abuse of power by police personnel, and many people have demanded that all police officers wear body cameras. Many of the well-publicized cases were captured by police car dashboard cameras, body cameras, or closed-­circuit television systems located around commercial areas

681

in towns and cities. By using this form of surveillance, it is hoped that the public will be protected, while simultaneously holding the police accountable for their actions. Some researchers claim that official surveillance systems tend to work to control people through identification, tracking, and monitoring. Many of these videos have, however, found their way into the news, holding the police personnel accountable. However, another concern regarding the use of surveillance is that capturing innocent bystanders within the videos may be considered a violation of privacy. Video uploads to social media sites typically do not blur the identities of individuals not involved in the crimes. When news media pick up the videos, they tend to blur the identities of unrelated individuals; however, members of the public can still search online for the unedited version. Researchers have found that surveillance technologies make a story newsworthy. This interactivity of the news increases its on-demand nature and puts more control in the hands of its consumers. This use of new media, such as personal videos and official surveillance, gives the news media a global character. With the elimination of geographic constraints, people around the world can keep track of a story’s development, minute by minute. A negative impact of such interactivity in keeping abreast of the news around the world is that news consumers tend to limit their searches to specific interests and specific points of view. This limitation tends to skew one’s understanding of the events. Furthermore, news reported in one part of the country and viewed in another can still affect consumers’ views of their own reality. Venessa Garcia See also Closed-Circuit Television; Crime Control; Globalization; Infotainment; Policing and Society; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of; Smartphones; Social Control; Social Media; Sousveillance; YouTube

Further Readings Barnard-Wills, D. “UK News Media Discourses of Surveillance.” Sociological Quarterly, v.52 (2010). Gilboa, E. “The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations.” Political Communication, v.22 (2005).

682

Nigeria

Monahan, T. Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010. Surette, R. Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice: Images, Realities and Policies (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth, 2011.

Nigeria Nigeria is a federal republic in West Africa, bordered on the west by the Republic of Benin and on the east by Chad and Cameroon. Nigeria’s population is estimated at 170 million, making it the most populous country in Africa, and its economy is reported to be the largest in Africa. Because of its dominant size and economy, which positions it as a regional power, Nigeria is often referred to as the African giant. As such, Nigeria sees itself as having the responsibility to provide security for its population, the West African subregion, and the whole of Africa. Nigeria also believes that its security needs are tied to the security of other African states. In its quest to meet its domestic and African security needs, Nigeria has established various types of surveillance. However, some human rights lawyers and activists have expressed concern that the privacy rights and freedom of speech of Nigerians are being eroded with the expansion of surveillance programs without adequate legal framework and oversight. Many Nigerians believe that the expanded, pervasive snooping technology, used ostensibly in the fight against terrorism, undermines the privacy rights of Internet users— cell and fixed phone subscribers especially. This entry provides background on Nigeria and then discusses the security challenges Nigeria faces and the surveillance strategies employed to address those challenges.

capital territory, Abuja. Lagos is the most populous state, with about 21 million inhabitants, and it is the commercial capital of Nigeria, whereas Abuja is the administrative capital. According to the World Bank, Nigeria is a lower-middle-income and emerging-market country, and its economy is classified as a mixed economy. It has an abundant supply of natural resources, including oil, natural gas, coal, bauxite, gold, tin, ore, limestone, and zinc. Oil accounts for about 40% of Nigeria’s gross domestic product and 80% of its foreign exchange. With a total land area of 923,768 square ­kilometers (356,699 square miles), Nigeria’s landscape varies from coastal plains in the southwest and southeast to hills and mountains forming the Mambilla Plateau in the middle of Nigeria. The southernmost parts of Nigeria have a rainforest climate, whereas the far north is semiarid desert climate. Nigeria is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with about 300 languages spoken in the country. The four largest ethnic groups in Nigeria are (1) the Yoruba (21% of the population), (2) the Hausa (21%), (3) the Igbo (18%), and (4) the Fulani (about 11%). Nigeria is also religiously diverse: 50.4% adhering to Islam, 48.2% practicing Christianity, and about 1.4% adhering to the Animist and other religions. There are three major legal systems in Nigeria. The laws of Nigeria’s states are modeled after the British common law. The second set of laws is the customary law, which is derived from African indigenous traditions and norms. Some parts of Nigeria (primarily in the north) are predominantly Muslim and thus operate under Sharia law. The Nigerian constitution nonetheless remains the supreme law of the land.

Background

Security Challenges and Surveillance Strategies

The history of modern Nigeria dates back to 1914, when the British colonial authorities amalgamated the northern and southern protectorates. However, available records show that many civilizations flourished in the area now known as ­Nigeria between 500 BCE and 200 CE. Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in 1960 and presently comprises 36 states and the federal

As the country with the largest and best-equipped and -trained armed forces in West Africa, viable and efficient surveillance is critical for Nigeria’s protection. Until 1990, Nigeria was under autocratic military rule. The military government of Nigeria employed extensive surveillance to repress the ensuing resistance, quell rebellion, and maintain power. Today, terrorism is one of Nigeria’s

9/11

major security challenges, requiring an expanded use of surveillance and various surveillance technologies to combat it. Another major security challenge for Nigeria is sectarian tensions and the violence that often erupts among the various ethno-linguistic groups. Ethnic rivalry along with endemic corruption and abuse of the electoral process have been cited as causes of the Nigerian Civil War, which occurred between 1967 and 1970 and resulted in the deaths of about 1 million to 3 million Igbos. Ethnic violence remains a recurring problem in Nigeria. For example, Boko Haram, an Islamist movement advocating for the abolition of secular government in Nigeria, has killed several thousand ­Nigerians since 2002. Another security challenge facing Nigeria is organized crime. Nigeria is a major transit center for the trafficking of drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, from Asian countries to the United States and Europe. Human trafficking is also a major problem in Nigeria, with many children and Nigerian women and girls being trafficked to Europe and Africa for domestic servitude and sexual exploitation, respectively. Nigerians have also achieved international notoriety for operating Internet scams. Piracy and kidnapping for ransom have recently become major crimes in Nigeria. To deal with these myriad security challenges, extensive covert and overt surveillance programs have been established to provide a system of early warning and to track criminal elements. Believing that effective surveillance systems reduce crime, the federal government has installed surveillance cameras in strategic places. The Nigerian government has also given permission to the U.S. government to employ drones in tracking the Boko Haram terrorists who kidnapped more than 200 Nigerian girls in 2014. The new surveillance regime remains a serious threat to the privacy of Nigerians, which some fear is a reversal to the military dictatorial past, when Nigerians were denied with impunity their fundamental human rights. O. Oko Elechi and Rochelle E. M. Cobbs See also Crime Control; Human Trafficking; Security, Concepts of; Terrorism

683

Further Readings Alli, Warisu. “The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy.” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (October 2012). http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/09372.pdf (Accessed September 2014). Ekanem, Samuel A. and E. D. Simon. “Social Conflict and Political Violence: A Philo-Literary Appraisal of the Nigerian Situation.” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, v.6/1 (2012). Onwudiwe, Ihekwoaba D., et al. “In Defense of the Nigerian Homeland.” African Social Science Review, v.8/1 (2016). U.S. Department of State. “Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru (November 13, 2013). https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/266565.htm (Accessed October 2017).

9/11 The attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) dramatically transformed the way terrorism is perceived, both globally and in the United States. Before the attacks, terrorism was considered a minor aspect of violent political conflicts and thus received limited attention from policymakers, practitioners, and academics. More than 15 years later, countering the impact and consequences of terrorist campaigns constitutes one of the most important objectives of many countries’ foreign and domestic policies. Particularly in the United States and other Western nations, the response to the attacks encompassed significant parts of the political and social spheres. New legislation was introduced, which restructured the balance between security needs and civil liberties, as well as reshaping the normative priorities of many communities. New governmental bodies were established, and existing authorities experienced significant reforms, resulting in major shifts in the balance of power within governmental bureaucracies. On the societal level, numerous studies demonstrated how the threat of terrorism, which intensified significantly after the 9/11 attacks, influenced social attitudes and behaviors and shaped new sets of values, practices, and norms in many communities. For this reason, understanding the nature and ongoing influence of the 9/11 attacks is crucial for comprehending current

684

9/11

political and social dynamics in the context of security policy.

as a continuation of an ongoing campaign and not an isolated incident.

Motives

Operational Planning and Preparations

The 9/11 attacks were planned and executed by al Qaeda, a jihadist organization that consolidated in the early 1980s in Afghanistan. Led by Osama bin Laden and other associates, the framework that would become al Qaeda focused initially on mobilizing Arab volunteers to fight against the Soviet Union during the civil war in Afghanistan, with the goal of protecting what they considered “Muslim lands.” In later years, after the end of the civil war, the organization gradually changed its ideological focus, developing a strong opposition to Western involvement in regions dominated by Muslim countries. Al Qaeda opposed both direct Western involvement, such as in the case of the first Gulf War (1990–1991), and indirect Western involvement, manifested mainly via cooperation with, and the support of, some Arab governments, which in the eyes of al Qaeda were “apostate” regimes. In two important fatwas (i.e., religious legal opinions or interpretations), which were published in 1996 and 1998, bin Laden put forward the fundamentals of what he perceived as a necessary violent struggle against the enemies of the  jihadi movement, pointing out specifically nations such as the United States and Israel, which in his view were occupying or having a military presence in Muslim lands. In November 2002, in a document titled “Letter to the ­American People,” bin Laden further elaborated on the motives of al Qaeda’s anti-American violent campaign, emphasizing the American support of Israel, sanctions on Iraq, American support of apostate Arab regimes, exploitation of natural resources located in the Middle East, and presence of U.S. military troops in the holy Muslim land (i.e., Saudi Arabia) as well as in other ­Muslim countries. In the spirit of these ideas, al Qaeda perpetrated a series of successful attacks against American targets, most notably against the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 and, 2 years later, against the USS Cole at the port of Aden, Yemen. Consequently, many scholars and policymakers view the 9/11 attacks

The plan to perpetrate multiple coordinated attacks via airplanes on the American homeland was probably devised initially in the mid- to late 1990s by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a wellknown figure in jihadist circles who was engaged previously in other anti-American terrorist plots. In early 1999, after the initial approval by bin Laden, the various aspects of the attacks were set in place. Although initially Mohammed suggested hijacking more than 10 airplanes and crashing them into various targets all over the United States—including in Chicago, Illinois; Boston, Massachusetts; and Los Angeles, California— eventually the decision was made to focus on a smaller number of targets on the East Coast, including the World Trade Center in New York, and the Pentagon and the Capitol buildings in Washington, DC. The perpetrators who bin Laden selected can be divided into two functional groups. The first were the operational leaders of the attacks, who were supposed to pilot the hijacked airplanes. They mostly belonged to what was known as the “Hamburg cell.” The second group of perpetrators were recruited mainly at al Q ­ aeda’s training camps in Afghanistan and were supposed to provide assistance with the actual hijacking of the airplanes (the “muscles”). The Hamburg cell was formed in the mid- to late 1990s and ­ further established during 1998, when Mohamed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi, and Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh rented together an apartment in Hamburg, Germany, which would become a meeting place for anti-Western and jihadi indoctrination. Other prominent members of the cell were Ziad Jarrah, originally from Lebanon, and Said Bahaji and Zakariya Essabar, originally from Morocco. All the members of the cell were immigrants who arrived in Germany for various personal reasons, whether to study (Atta, Jarrah, Al-Shehhi) or as asylum seekers (Al-Shibh), and became radicalized after participating in various engagements with local religious leaders. After considering

9/11

traveling to fight in Chechnya, a meeting with a  major al Qaeda operative by the name of Mohamedou Ould Slahi led them eventually to travel to al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan. At the training camps, they met with bin Laden, who selected Atta as the leader of the planned attacks in the United States. Before returning to Germany, they were instructed to enroll in flight schools. Their selection was a result of their familiarity with the Western lifestyle, which bin Laden hoped would help them avoid attracting the suspicion of law enforcement, as well as acquire the technical skills necessary for the successful completion of such a sophisticated attack. In 1999, several additional individuals were recruited for the operation to serve as pilots. As with the Hamburg cell, they were also specifically selected by bin Laden. Hani Hanjour was included in the plot since he had a commercial pilot’s license, and two Saudi citizens—Nawaf al-Hazmie and Khalid al-Mihdhar—were recruited because they had operational experience in the civil war in Bosnia. However, al-Hazmie’s and al-Mihdhar’s inability to acquire the technical skills necessary for piloting a commercial aircraft eventually led to their relegation in later stages to the role of “regular” hijackers. During the year 2000, most of the hijackers who were supposed to fly the hijacked airplanes entered the United States and enrolled in local flight schools. Al-Shibh, however, failed to acquire a visa, so he was left behind to provide logistical and financial support for the plot. In the meantime, bin Laden continued to fill the ranks of the groups that were supposed to accompany the “pilots” and assist them in the hijackings of the airplanes. These included Abdulaziz al-Omri, Waleed al-Shehri, Satam al-Suqami, Wail al-Shehri, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Mohand al-Shehri, Majed Moqed, Ahmed al-Nami, Ahmed al-Haznawi, and Saeed Al-Ghamdi—all Saudi citizens who attended al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan at some point during the late 1990s and early 2000s and then were dispatched to the United States between April and June 2001. The only individual for whom the circumstances ­leading to his inclusion in the plot are less apparent is the United Arab Emirates citizen Fayez Banihammad.

685

The Attacks As the date of the attacks was approaching, the perpetrators were divided into four teams. Each team included a leader, who was supposed to “pilot” the aircraft and crash it into its target, and three or four assistants, who were supposed to act as “muscles” and keep the passengers under control. The first team, which hijacked American ­Airlines Flight 11, targeting the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, included Atta (the pilot), Abdulaziz al-Omri, Wail al-Shehri, Satam al-Suqami, and Waleed al-Shehri. The second group, which hijacked United Airlines ­ Flight 175, targeting the South Tower of the World Trade Center, included Marwan Al-Shehhi (the pilot), Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Fayez Banihammad, and Mohand al-Shehri. Both flights left from Logan Airport in Boston in the early morning (the first at 7:59 a.m. and the ­second at 8:14 a.m.) and were on their way to Los Angeles. In both flights, the hijackers executed a similar plan: About 15 to 20 minutes after takeoff, the hijackers used multifunction tools with knives and blades to stab the members of the crew, then took over the cockpit and directed the aircraft toward their destination in New York City. Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower at 8:46 a.m., and 15 minutes later, Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower. Both towers experienced escalating and catastrophic fire, which eventually damaged their internal structure and led to their collapse a little more than an hour after impact. Among the 2,753 people who were killed in these two attacks were the passengers of the flights, people who worked at the World Trade Center and could not or did not have the time to evacuate the towers, and the firefighters and other first responders who were in the midst of rescue operations. The third team included Hani Hanjur (the pilot), Salem al-Hazmi, Nawaf al-Hazmie, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed. They boarded American Airlines Flight 77, which departed at 8:20 a.m. from Dulles International Airport in Washington, DC, en route to Los Angeles. A little more than half an hour later, the hijackers took control of the cockpit while concentrating the crew and most of the passengers in the back of the

686

9/11

cabin. At that point, the aircraft was crossing from West Virginia to Ohio, but Hanjur turned the plane back eastward and at 9:37 a.m. crashed it on the western side of the Pentagon building, killing all 58 people on board and another 125 in the building, who were mostly Department of Defense and military personnel. The final and fourth team included Ziad Jarrah (the pilot), Ahmed al-Nami, Ahmed al-Haznawi, and Saeed Al-Ghamdi. They hijacked United Airlines Flight 93, which departed from Newark International Airport at 8:42 a.m. on its way to San Francisco, California. This was the only flight that did not crash on its supposed target, probably the Capitol building in Washington, DC. Close to 10:00 a.m., the passengers tried to retake control of the plane by breaking into the cockpit. Jarrah tried initially to roll the aircraft in order to prevent the passengers from advancing to the cockpit. However, a few minutes after 10:00 a.m., as probably the passengers were about to break into the cockpit, or had already done that and were struggling with the hijackers, Jarrah crashed the aircraft into an empty field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing all 44 people on board.

The Response Protecting the Homeland

The 9/11 attacks exposed numerous deficiencies and vulnerabilities across the various spheres of government operations, including in the mechanisms that were supposed to allow tracking and prevention of illegal, violent activities. Immigration The fact that most of the perpetrators were not U.S. citizens and were able to enter the United States via student, business, or tourist visas, as well as that some of them received a visa despite suspicious indicators and were able to stay in the United States illegally, led to a reform of the U.S. immigration system. As national security became the primary focus, the new system focused on improved visa controls, monitoring and screening of international travelers, and compilation of related digital interlinked databases. The latter included, among others, the IDENT (automated biometric identification system), SEVIS (Student

and Exchange Visitor Information System), and ESTA (Electronic System for Travel Authorization). From a structural perspective, all immigration functions were placed under the responsibility of the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Intelligence and Surveillance James Clapper, who in 2010 was appointed U.S. Director of National Intelligence, described the 9/11 attacks as the greatest strategic surprise on American soil since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Thus, it is not surprising that the 9/11 attacks exposed several fundamental problems in the functioning and culture of the U.S. intelligence community. Among these were the lack of effective information sharing and operational coordination (even in cases when this was highly necessary), the overfocus on the threat from nation-states, structural rigidity, overreliance on technological intelligence (SIGINT and TECHINT) while underutilizing experts with useful linguistic and cultural skills (HUMINT), and in general the lack of frameworks that can help identify and thwart substate developing threats. Thus, postattack reforms focused on creating an infrastructure that will foster cooperation and sharing, as well as innovative thinking and flexibility. In terms of data collection, several new systems were introduced to facilitate the identification of potential plots and relevant data, via information sharing between law enforcement at different levels. These include the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting, which is used to share suspicious activity reports; the National Data Exchange, which includes criminal justice information; and the e-Guardian system, which is an unclassified information-sharing system hosted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal Justice Information Services. From a structural perspective, several national and regional bodies were formed to facilitate further interorganizational counterterrorism efforts. At the national level is the office of the Director of National Intelligence and the  National Counterterrorism Center, which is responsible for analyzing and integrating all terrorism-related intelligence. At the local level, the  formation of DHS’s fusion centers and the regional Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which

9/11

brought together law enforcement from various bodies, helped enhance the capabilities of regional law enforcement counterterrorism and surveillance. Legislation The 9/11 attacks convinced many within the political echelons that terrorism cannot be perceived and treated anymore as a conventional crime. Thus, law enforcement should be given special powers to deal with this growing threat. In professional terms, the United States, like many other Western countries in the 1980s and 1990s, adopted an expanded version of the criminal justice model to deal with terrorist campaigns. The most important act of legislation was passed in late October 2001, several weeks after the 9/11 attacks, and was named the USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act. This act allowed some law enforcement to conduct “sneak and peak” searches (i.e., searches without warrants); expanded the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s authority to issue requests for information from, and about, American citizens from various commercial institutions (e.g., banks, Internet providers); and reduced restrictions on the gathering of information and conducting of surveillance on various platforms of communication. The act also broadened the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting suspects and expanded law enforcement’s abilities to monitor and regulate financial activities related to foreign individuals or entities. Additional legislation was enacted in subsequent years. Some of the more influential pieces of legislation were the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which established the office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center and made DHS the main agency responsible for enhancing airport security measures (hence, it placed the Transportation Security Administration under the DHS), and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which allowed the U.S. government to monitor American citizens’ international communications without warrant if one of the parties seems to be located outside the United States.

687

In the more than 15 years since the 9/11 attacks, similar reforms were implemented in many other countries, especially since the threat of jihadist terrorist groups proliferated to various regions. At the same time, criticism was directed against some of these reforms, which focused both on the tendency of some of these measures to undermine civil liberties and democratic principles and on the limited benefits of some of the more intrusive and extreme measures, such as the collection of mass private data. Offensive Dimensions

Just 3 days after the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. Congress approved the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF) to allow the president to utilize the armed forces against those responsible for the attacks. In what was known as the “War on Terror,” the U.S. government aimed to destroy the infrastructure that enabled al Qaeda to perpetrate attacks against American interests, eliminate the organization and its allies, pressure via various means state actors that are sponsoring or enabling terrorist campaigns, as well as change the conditions that serve as a breeding ground for the jihadi movement. To obtain the objectives of the War on Terror, the United States and its allies engaged in multiple ­military campaigns in the years following the 9/11 attacks. One major military effort was Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, which began in October 2001 and aimed to destroy al Qaeda’s military infrastructure and, as an extension, end the Taliban regime that enabled al Qaeda. In the following years, the operation expanded to other areas, including the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and Trans-Sahara. Two years after the 9/11 attacks, a U.S.-led coalition initiated Operation Iraqi ­Freedom. Considered by some as an extension of the War on Terror, the operation was rationalized via the assertion that Iraq had obtained weapons of mass destruction, had provided assistance to al Qaeda, and in general represented a threat to American interests in the region and to the United  States’ ability to accomplish the objectives of the War on Terror. In both campaigns, the ­ongoing military efforts to stabilize the countries were accompanied by an attempt to restructure new regimes, based on democratic practices, thus

688

9/11

corresponding to the idea that democratization is necessary to achieve long-term stability. While opinions regarding the long-term effectiveness of these operations are still varied, in general, those supportive of the operations point out the undermining and almost complete destruction of al Qaeda, the promotion of democracy, and the fact that the homeland is safer. Critics of the operations argue that in both cases, stability was not achieved, that the military campaigns eventually led to a further proliferation of the Jihadi movement, and that they triggered more hostility toward Western countries. In addition to direct military operations, the post-9/11 response also included additional methods to undermine terrorist groups’ infrastructure outside the United States. Most notable are the use of “targeted killings” of members of terrorist groups and the use of renditions of individual terrorists. The method of targeted killings refers to the intentional killing of terrorist leaders with explicit governmental approval. They were usually justified as the last means available when other options are not viable or too risky, and the targeted individual represents a direct threat to American interests and lives. The operational rationale sees these operations as effective in disrupting terrorist activities, removing experienced leaders, creating deterrence, and in leaving a limited footprint, thus avoiding the need to use large numbers of military troops that may further endanger the civilian population. Critics of this method usually point out the lack of due process and limited transparency, the violation of other countries’ sovereignty, and the potential for collateral damage or mistaken identity. The practice of extraordinary or irregular renditions (i.e., the abduction and extrajudicial transfer of individuals from one country to another) was used by the United States before the 9/11 attacks; nonetheless, the program was expanded significantly with the declaration of the War on ­Terrorism against those who were considered as “illegal enemy combatants.” While supporters of the program emphasize the necessity to use special measures against global terrorist networks that disregard national borders, and use some countries as safe havens to plot terrorist campaigns, those critical of the program indicate the lack of due process and transparence, as well as the lack of explicit criteria regarding when it should be used.

Nature of Terrorism and the Impact of the 9/11 Attacks Apart from the extremely high number of victims, other factors contributed to the immense impact of the attacks on U.S. political and social arenas, as well as the general public’s and policymakers’ perceptions regarding the terrorist threat. First, the attacks targeted the symbols of two domains, which are the pillars on which the United States’ status as a superpower was built: (1) its global financial influence (the World Trade Center) and (2) its military might (the Pentagon). In many ways, the 9/11 attacks were direct assaults on the American way of life and notions that define the role of the United States as a global power. Second, for many years terrorism was perceived as a foreign policy problem, hence detached from the daily lives of most Americans. The attacks on the homeland reflected a dramatic shift in this regard and especially exposed the great vulnerability and lack of preparedness of the West to domestic terrorist campaigns. Third, and related to the previous point, the attacks revealed significant deficiencies in the structure and functioning of the authorities who were supposed to provide an effective response to the terrorist threat. Finally, the extreme revolutionary ideology of the jihadi movement facilitated a perception of a zero-sum game conflict, thus also contributing to the elevated sense of threat. The attacks illustrate the effectiveness of terrorism as psychological warfare, in which the goal of the terrorists is twofold: (1) to shape the public’s (including their own constituency) and policymakers’ perceptions regarding specific political issues and (2) to heighten the perception of their actual capabilities among the target audience. Arie Perliger See also Al Qaeda; Civil Liberties; National Security; Terrorism; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; War on Terror

Further Readings Dwyer, Jim and Kevin Flynn. 102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers. New York, NY: Times Books, 2005.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Helfstein, Scott and Dominick Wright. “Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of al-Qa’ida.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, v.34/5 (2011). Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. Thomas, Kean, ed. The 9/11 Comission Report. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2004. Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Towers: al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization* The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective defense alliance that came into being as a response to the devastation of the two World Wars and the fear that humankind would not ­survive a third. Originally founded in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the creation of the alliance was part of a broader effort to serve three fundamental purposes: (1) deterring Soviet expansionism, (2) forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and (3) encouraging European political integration. In part, the founding of the alliance was the next step in a process of collective defense begun through the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), whose primary purpose was to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

The concept of collective defense was not new; indeed, the language of the charter expressly recognizes that the right of individual and collective *The views expressed in this entry are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

689

defense is an inherent right of sovereignty, a right protected by the charter itself in Article 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense [italics added] if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

After providing background information for understanding the creation and development of NATO, this entry reviews its structure and its relationship with the UN and other partners. The entry concludes with a brief glimpse at the future of NATO in the 21st century.

Background It is important to understand the extent of the devastation that existed in Europe after World War II. Approximately 36.5 million Europeans died in the conflict, of which 19 million were civilians. This is in addition to the millions who died in the concentration camps and does not include the tens of millions of Russians who perished. Millions of orphans wandered the ruined cities of Europe, and the infant mortality rate was one in four. The rise of the Soviet Union threatened even more conflict and suffering. In February 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, backed by the Soviet Union, overthrew the democratically elected government in that country. In reaction to the democratic consolidation of West Germany, the Soviets blockaded Allied-controlled West ­Berlin in a bid to consolidate their hold on the German capital. The West responded with an airlift of supplies, but the threat remained. In response to these pressures, several Western European democracies began working on various approaches for greater military cooperation and collective defense. One political effort included the creation of the Western Union in 1948, later to

690

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

become the Western European Union in 1954. In the end, though, it became clear that only a truly transatlantic security agreement could deter Soviet aggression while simultaneously preventing the revival of European militarism and laying the groundwork for political integration. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949 by the representatives of 12 nations (­ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and later ratified by all these nations. This established the alliance, though not the organization, as it is not mentioned by name in the North Atlantic Treaty. The genesis of the organization as it now exists can be traced to the establishment of the North ­Atlantic Council (NAC) in Article 9 of the treaty, which was authorized to create (and subsequently did create) other subsidiary bodies “as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.” At the first session of the NAC, it was decided that the “normal” membership of the council would comprise the member nations’ foreign ministers, and there soon followed the creation of the Council Deputies (consisting of deputies representing their foreign ministers), who were to remain in permanent session. A few years later, as part of reorganization, a council comprising permanent representatives appointed to it by each member state replaced the Council Deputies. This council was to remain in permanent session, exercising all effective powers of decision. Several of the NATO countries, particularly the United States, had armed forces serving in the territories of other NATO countries in connection with the operations of the North Atlantic Treaty. Effective military security of the NATO countries required the creation of an integrated military force under a supreme commander supported by an international staff, and accordingly the council confirmed General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

NATO’s Structure NAC and the International Staff

NATO’s headquarters, located in Brussels, Belgium, is the political headquarters of the ­

alliance and the permanent home of the NAC, the principal decision-making body within NATO. The NAC brings together high-level representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. In sum, it provides a forum for wide-­ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their security. The NAC has effective political authority and powers of decision. It is the only body that was established by the North Atlantic Treaty under Article 9. The NAC is invested with the authority to establish “such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary” for the purposes of implementing the treaty. The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) have comparable authority for matters within their specific areas of competence. Each member nation is represented in the NAC by an ambassador, often called a permanent representative. Permanent representatives are supported by a national delegation comprising advisers and officials who represent their country on different NATO committees. The delegations, with permanent offices at the NATO headquarters, are similar in many respects to small embassies. Under the chairmanship of the secretary general, the NAC discusses and approves NATO policy. The items discussed and decisions taken at the meetings of the NAC cover all aspects of the organization’s activities and are frequently based on reports and recommendations prepared by the subordinate committees at the NAC’s request. Equally, subjects may be raised by any one of the  national representatives or by the secretary general. The council and other senior-level policy committees (principally the DPC and the NPG) also meet in Brussels, or in other alliance capitals, at higher levels, involving foreign ministers, often called “ministerials.” From time to time at summit meetings, heads of state appear on behalf of their nations. The decisions taken by each of these bodies fully represent the agreed policy of the member countries, irrespective of the level at which they are taken. Subordinate to these senior bodies are special­ ized  committees, also consisting of officials ­representing their countries. The committee structure p ­rovides the alliance its consultation and decision-making capability, ensuring that each

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

member nation is represented at every level and in all fields of NATO activity. The program of the NAC is prepared by committees with responsibility for specific areas of policy. Such committees play a key role in policy development. The NATO headquarters also houses the secretary general and the international staff (IS). The secretary general is the chief executive of NATO, responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation and decision making within the alliance. The secretary general does not have any directive authority but serves as the chair of the NAC, the DPC, and other senior NATO committees, as well as directing the IS in its support of the NAC and its subordinate committees. Members of the IS, while drawn from the member countries, are responsible to the secretary general and owe their allegiance to the organization. The IS of about 1,300 civilian members is organized into several divisions, directorates, and subordinate bodies. Military Committee and International Military Staff

The NATO headquarters also houses national military representatives, the chair of the ­Military Committee (MC), and the International Military Staff (IMS). The MC is the senior military authority in NATO. The MC works under the overall political authority of the NAC, the DPC, and the NPG. The MC assists and advises the NAC, the DPC, and the NPG on military matters. The MC also provides military guidance to the NATO’s strategic commanders, whose representatives attend its meetings. The IMS supports the work of the MC, preparing and following up its directions. The MC comprises the chiefs of defense staff of each member nation that contributes forces to the integrated NATO commands. To function continuously with effective power of decision, each country maintains a permanent military representative appointee, who represents the nation’s chief of defense in Brussels during the year. The MC normally convenes three times a year at the level of chiefs of defense. Two of these meetings occur in Brussels (April/May and November/ December), and one (in September) is hosted by

691

the NATO members on a rotational basis. The MC meets in permanent session at the NATO headquarters at the level of the military representatives, in principle following the weekly NAC meetings. The chair of the MC is elected by the NATO chiefs of defense, normally for a 3-year term. The chair represents their consensus-based views as the principal military adviser to the secretary general, the NAC, and other senior organizations of the NATO. He or she guides the NAC’s agenda and deliberations, listening to the different views and working to reconcile divergent national positions or policy differences in order to fashion advice that all can agree to. The chair is assisted by a deputy chair. The IMS is the executive agency of the MC. It provides staff support to the MC and is responsible for the preparation of assessments, studies, and other papers on NATO military matters. The IMS, under its director, is responsible for planning, assessing, and recommending policy on military matters for consideration by the MC, as well as ensuring that the policies and decisions of the committee are implemented as directed. The IMS provides the essential link between the political decision-making bodies of the alliance and the NATO strategic military commanders and their staff. The IMS comprises approximately 380 military personnel. It is, therefore, considerably smaller than the IS. IMS personnel come from all the member nations, with the exception of Iceland, which has no military establishment. The IMS is organized into five functional divisions (plans and policy, operations, intelligence, cooperation and regional security, and logistic, armaments, and resources) as well as a number of branches and support offices. International Military Headquarters

NATO has no standing forces but consists of the NAC, the NATO headquarters, and a series of subordinate international military headquarters (IMHQs), which are responsible for planning and,  when so authorized, oversight of the forces from contributing nations that are assigned to an operation. This procedure of establishment is based on the authority found in Article 9 of the North Atlantic

692

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Treaty (also referred to as the Washington Treaty) that allows the NAC to establish subsidiary bodies. In the NATO context, commands are established by an act of the NAC called “activation,” which gives the IMHQs international status under the Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North ­Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Paris Protocol). This international agreement ensures that an IMHQ, when so established, a. possesses international status, b. conducts an identified NATO mission that is truly international in character, or c. consists of an organization that is substantially multinational in character.

Automatic international status is granted to military bodies identified in either Article 1(b) of the Paris Protocol, for a supreme headquarters or equivalent strategic command, or Article 1(c) of the Paris Protocol, for an IMHQ immediately ­subordinate to a supreme headquarters. There are three tiers of command: (1) strategic, (2) operational, and (3) tactical or component. At the top or first level are the supreme headquarters. Historically, there were two: (1) the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) and (2) the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. These headquarters are commonly referred to as strategic headquarters or as being at the strategic level. The military structure within NATO was reorganized in mid-2003 as a major component of the transformation of NATO. The new command structure is based on functionality rather than geography. At the strategic level, there is now only one command with an operational function, Allied ­ Command Operations, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. It performs the duties previously undertaken by Allied ­Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. The latter has now become Allied Command Transformation. ­Commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), it is responsible for promoting and overseeing the ­continuing transformation of alliance forces and capabilities, especially

through training and development of concepts and doctrine. Using its authority to create supreme headquarters, the NAC disestablished the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and the headquarters of the SACT (HQ SACT) was established, commanded by the SACT. Allied Command Europe became Allied Command Operations. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe retained that title, as did SHAPE. The change was effective September 1, 2003. SHAPE, the sole entity with juridical personality within Allied Command Operations, retained its name in light of existing treaties, international agreements, and contracts. Supreme headquarters and any IMHQ immediately subordinate to a supreme headquarters that is set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty are referred to collectively as allied headquarters in the Paris Protocol. Under the current military structure, therefore, the second level of allied headquarters, for the purposes of the Paris Protocol, are Joint Force Commands, one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy. The component or tactical level consists of Joint Force Component Commands, which provide service-specific—land, maritime, or air— expertise at the operational level. In addition to these component commands, there are Combined Air Operations Centres. There have been, from time to time, mission-specific headquarters established, such as the International Security Assistance Force, the NATO-led headquarters running operations in Afghanistan. Other Types of Entities in the NATO Structure

There are other types of organizations that in the strict sense of the Paris Protocol are not IMHQs. Usually, they are the so-called memorandum of understanding (MOU) organizations, where cooperating nations establish the organization by signing an MOU and offering its services to NATO. As a recent practice in NATO, organizations other than IMHQs are usually established initially by the sponsoring nations, which is the origin of multinational sponsorship. Then, after the organization has fulfilled the necessary requirements on the request

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

of either the sponsoring nations (e.g., in case of Centers of Excellence) or one of the strategic commanders, the NAC decides to activate it, which means that the NAC shifts the entity’s status under the Paris Protocol. Even if they are not IMHQs in the sense of the Paris Protocol, they can be either military headquarters or other military bodies. NAC derives this authority from Article 9 of the Washington Treaty and Article 14 of the Paris Protocol, which allows the NAC to apply the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement and the Paris Protocol to other organizations as well. Activation by the NAC gives the entity status under the Paris Protocol, but it does not change the internal affairs of the organization; therefore, the original membership, sponsorships, and responsibilities do not change. As discussed earlier, it is not crystallized yet in the literature and practice of these organizations whether the activation by the NAC would give them international legal personality. It is fair to say, however, that in the absence of clear guidance, legal personality at the international and domestic levels depends on the status that was granted to the organization by the founding nations. Also, activation does not necessarily mean that these entities become automatically part of the military structure and hierarchy of NATO. This depends on other arrangements and the intention of the parties establishing the foundation documents. Such MOU organizations include the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the numerous Centres of Excellence. The NATO school was initially established by the United States and Germany. It began in 1953 as a U.S. Army Special Weapons School. In 1974, Germany and the United States signed an agreement on the school and renamed it. In 1975, a charter of the school was issued by SHAPE, defining the school as an international activity under the operational control of SHAPE. On June 17, 2003, when HQ SACT was activated by the NAC, HQ SACT assumed all obligations and tasks to which SHAPE was a party, which included subordination of the NATO school to HQ SACT. On September 15, 2004, the NATO school was formally activated as an international military organization under ­Article 14 of the Paris Protocol.

693

A NATO Centre of Excellence is a nationally or multinationally sponsored entity that offers recognized expertise and experience for the benefit of the alliance, especially in support of transformation. It is not part of the NATO Command Structure but forms part of the wider framework supporting NATO. Centres of Excellence provide opportunities to enhance education and training; to improve interoperability and capabilities, assisting in doctrine development; and/or to test and validate concepts through experimentation. The Centres of Excellence, although granted international status in accordance with Article 14 of the Paris Protocol, are nonetheless multinational bodies, entirely manned and funded by the sponsoring nations. Involvement in Centres of Excellence activities is open to all allies, but granting access to partners, other nations, and international organizations to Centres of Excellence products and services is the responsibility of the sponsoring nations.

NATO and the United Nations Originally, the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America would be considered an attack against all of them. Therefore, in accordance with the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, they agreed to assist the parties attacked to restore and maintain peace and security. In addition, the parties were obligated to report the use of armed force to the Security Council. NATO’s post-9/11 policy, however, has attained a global scope. Indeed, at the Prague Summit on November 21, 2002, NATO “approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come” (Prague Summit Declaration, para. 3). Prior to this, however, NATO, in the post–Cold War period, had undertaken a number of UNrelated missions. In July 1992, NATO ships and maritime patrol aircraft began monitoring operations in the Adriatic Sea to support a UN arms embargo against all of the former Yugoslavian republics. Later, NATO and the Western ­European

694

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Union conducted enforcement operations supporting UN Security Council resolutions designed to preclude escalation of the conflict. Subsequently, close air support was provided for the UN Protection Force, air strikes were made to protect UN safe areas, and operational contingency planning took place to provide the UN with additional options. As a result, NATO military authorities prepared operational plans for air strikes in close coordination with the UN Protection Force. On August 9, 1993, the NAC approved a number of operational air strike options for BosniaHerzegovina recommended by a NATO MC. The options concentrated on the target identification process and NATO/UN command-and-control arrangements. These command-and-control measures included providing liaison officers. Later, on July 11, 1995, the UN requested close-air support to secure UN peacekeepers threatened by the Bosnian Serb forces attacking the UN-declared ­ safe area of Srebrenica. Nevertheless, Srebrenica fell to the Bosnian Serbs despite air support from NATO. After the negotiation of the Dayton Accords on December 14, 1995, NATO received a UN mandate based on UN Security Council Resolution 1031 to execute the military provisions in the peace agreement. The NATO Implementation  Force (IFOR) began operating in BosniaHerzegovina on December 16, 1995; it was replaced a year later by a NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). These two forces cooperated closely with international and humanitarian agencies, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN International Police Task Force. From the inception of the conflict in Kosovo in 1998, the UN and NATO maintained close contacts. NATO took actions to support UN Security Council resolutions during and after the conflict. The Kosovo Force was deployed, based on the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 dated June 12, 1999, to provide a security presence and facilitate the establishment of peace and security in Kosovo. Then, in 2000 and 2001, NATO and the UN collaborated effectively to prevent civil war in the former Yugoslavian republic of Macedonia. Integrated planning for civil-military cooperation between NATO and civilian organizations was inaugurated in 2001, and the report of the UN secretary general’s High Level Panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change was published on December 2, 2004. This document made recommendations for strengthening the UN to enhance collective security for the 21st century. The document establishes a broad framework for collective security by addressing particular threats and the policies and institutions necessary to neutralize them by emphasizing “development because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system” (p. 16). From 2004 to 2011, NATO operated a mission in Iraq training and equipping the Iraqi forces under UN Security Council Resolution 1546. In  addition, NATO provided disaster relief to ­Pakistan in 2005. Also in 2005, NATO in cooperation with the UN and the European Union agreed to support the African Union’s deployment of troops to Darfur, Sudan, to quell the spiraling violence. NATO airlifted soldiers to Sudan and provided expert advice on commanding a multinational military headquarters and processing intelligence. In 2011, NATO provided air and maritime forces as Operation Unified Protector in support of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing military operations in Libya. Importantly, NATO and the United Nations have cooperated in Afghanistan. The alliance assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN-mandated force, on August 11, 2003. Initially, ISAF was tasked with enforcing security in and around Kabul. Later, a number of UN Security Council resolutions endorsed the expansion of its authority into the rest of Afghanistan to support the extension of the central government’s authority and to assist in development and reconstruction. The NATO-led operation in Afghanistan was, and remains, the most significant effort of the alliance, one that will continue to play a role in NATO’s strategic decision making for some time.

NATO and Its Partners Since 1991, NATO has developed a network of structured partnerships with countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean region, and the Gulf region, as well as individual relationships with other partner nations around the world. In all, NATO is formally involved with some 41 partner countries and engages actively

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

with other international actors and organizations on a wide range of political and security-related issues. One of NATO’s three essential core tasks is cooperative security. This concept is based on the premise that security is best assured through a wide network of interdependent relationships, where interests are shared and burdens distributed. This resulted in a new partnership policy, which was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011. Recognizing the essential role that partners play in addressing security threats, at the Wales Summit in 2014, the allies launched two initiatives to deepen NATO’s security cooperation with partners. The Partnership Interoperability Initiative aims to maintain and deepen the ability of partner forces to work alongside allied forces, while the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative builds on NATO’s extensive track record and expertise in supporting, advising, assisting, training, and mentoring countries requiring capacity-building support from the alliance.

The Future of NATO In September 2014, NATO held a summit meeting in Wales, where a number of issues were addressed that make clear the continuing relevance of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO leaders reaffirmed their commitment to supporting Afghanistan. They called on the two presidential candidates to work together and to conclude the necessary security agreements as soon as possible. The Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan pays tribute to the ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces and sets out future actions and support measures in Afghanistan. The threat of instability caused by extremist groups, specifically the group calling itself the Islamic State, was a focus of the meeting, as was the resurgence of Russian adventurism and conflict with Ukraine and its neighbors. At a meeting with Ukraine president Petro Poroshenko, NATO leaders pledged to provide strong support to help Ukraine improve its own security. In 2015, the first year in many years to come, a small increase in defense spending was seen across all nations of the alliance. Estimates for 2016 and 2017 showed a further projected increase of 3% across European allies and Canada, representing

695

billions of U.S. dollars of increased support by European nations to collective security. At its summit meeting held in Warsaw, Poland, in July 2016, the alliance continued to respond to a dynamic international security environment through a series of decisions that tripled the size of the NATO Response Force, set up eight new headquarters to facilitate training and reinforcements in the eastern part of the alliance, augmented the defense of Turkey with AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance planes and defensive missile systems, and developed strategies to deal with hybrid threats and complex challenges from the South. The year 2016 marked the Initial Operational Capability of the NATO ballistic missile defense system, enabling U.S. ships based in Spain, ground-based radar in Turkey, and the interceptor site in Romania to work together under NATO command and NATO control. The Warsaw Summit was also the occasion for the nations of NATO to formally recognize cyberspace as a new operational domain, joining land, air, and sea. Since the summit, NATO headquarters and agencies have increased their focus on developing cooperative approaches to the protection of networks, missions, and operations, with more focus on cybertraining and cyberplanning. The allies also pledged to strengthen their own cyberdefenses and to share more information and best practices. Finally, despite the increased tension between the NATO nations and Russia, the 2016 Warsaw Summit declaration emphasized a desire for constructive dialogue with Russia, seeking to ­ ­continue the use of the NATO-Russia Council as an important tool to manage this relationship. NATO’s very existence was questioned after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, but the recent actions of Russia under Valdimir Putin in Georgia and in Ukraine have reawakened the need for the Atlantic Alliance to serve as a mechanism for ­collective defense. Whether NATO again undertakes a collective security mission, as it did in the ­Balkans, in Afghanistan, or even in a more limited fashion in Libya, remains to be seen. Given the present strategic environment, future strategic engagements are to be anticipated as normal. Accordingly, additional political and operational measures as well as increased efforts to develop the means and capacity for sharing expertise should be expected. This will be driven by

696

North Korea

necessity because the operational spectrum requires the transformation of military capabilities and civil government and economic institutions to meet the threats posed by the current strategic environment. R. James Orr See also International Diplomacy; National Security

Further Readings Moore, Rebecca. “Lisbon and the Evolution of NATO’s New Partnership Policy.” Perceptions, v.17/1 (2012). http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ RebeccaMoore2.pdf (Accessed October 2017). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO’s New Strategic Concept (2010). http://www.nato.int/ strategic-concept (Accessed October 2017). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Prague Summit Declaration (Updated May 6, 2014). https://www .nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm? (Accessed October 2017). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty (March 21, 2016). http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/official_texts_17120.htm (Accessed October 2017). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Relations With the United Nations (Updated June 21, 2016). http://www .nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321. htm?selectedLocale=en (Accessed October 2017). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Alliance’s Role in Peacekeeping and Peace-Support Operations (n.d.). http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en2006/Part4.pdf (Accessed October 2017). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A Short History of NATO (n.d.). http://nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/ declassified_139339.htm (Accessed October 2017). United Nations. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (Report of the Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change) (December 2, 2004). http://www.un.org/en/ peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world .pdf (Accessed October 2017). United Nations. Charter of the United Nations (n.d.). http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index. html (Accessed October 2017).

North Korea To understand the privacy restrictions and surveillance practices of North Korea, it is important to

address the political, social, and legal structure of this reclusive nation. The political philosophy known as Juche became the official state ideology of North Korea, which officially is called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in 1972. Juche literally means being the master of revolution and reconstruction and rejecting dependence on others. Related to the ideology of Juche is the principle of Songun, which means military first. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, DPRK has become the most politically and socially isolated nation in the world. Although there is an armistice between DPRK, the United States, and South Korea, a state of war technically exists, since no formal treaty was signed. The 38th parallel, also known as the demilitarized zone, separates the two Koreas and is considered the most protected border in the world. This entry highlights the laws and rights of citizens and visitors in North Korea, the state’s widespread surveillance practices, the security concerns of the government, and the future of surveillance in North Korea. After the Korean War, Kim Il-sung ruled DPRK from 1953 until 1994. On his death, his son Kim Jong-il assumed control. Following the latter’s death in 2011, his son Kim Jong-un inherited the title of “Dear Leader” and military commander. DPRK is a communist nation where the rule of humanity supersedes the rule of law. The population of DPRK is estimated at 25 million; the vast majority live in poverty, with no property rights and the constant threat of food shortages. The capital city of Pyongyang has a population of approximately 3 million citizens. The city is considered the cultural, educational, and government center of DPRK, where living conditions are much better than in the rest of the country. Residing in the city is considered a privilege that can be revoked if one falls out of favor with the regime; thus, housing, schooling, and employment opportunities, as with most repressive regimes, are tightly controlled by the government.

Laws and Rights in DPRK The repressive laws of North Korea are similar to those of other communist states where state-­ controlled censorship exists and laws are applied unequally. The government is a highly centralized system focused on controlling the populace and limiting individual freedoms and rights. The major

North Korea

trading and foreign relations partner of DPRK is China. All travel and tourism into DPRK is through China. Foreign travelers are restricted as to where they can travel and what they are permitted to see. Guides or minders accompany all travelers, permitting the taking of photos only at approved locations, such as museums, and of select objects, such as statues of the Kim family. Bringing unapproved items, such as religious materials, into DPRK can result in arrest, as happened to an American tourist who was arrested and detained for 6 months in 2014 for leaving a Bible in a nightclub. The 171 articles of the DPRK constitution state that its citizens have many rights and freedoms, such as the freedom of expression and the right to vote. In reality, these freedoms are illusory since the regime wields great discretion as to who gets arrested and punished and who is elected. Elections in North Korea are noncompetitive and have only single-candidate races. There are criminal laws prohibiting theft, assault, and so forth, but as with most repressive governments, the most serious offenses are treason or offenses against the state. While laws and rights are outlined in the constitution, protesting and/or saying anything critical of the regime are viewed as treason, resulting in confinement and torture. Attempting to escape DPRK, for example, is considered a treasonous act punishable by torture, death, or lengthy internment. The enforcement of laws is highly discretionary, depending on citizen status. It is also common to bribe party officials for favored treatment or special privileges. The judiciary is a rubber stamp for the regime; the practice of judicial review does not exist, as in Western nations. The military and security forces often interfere with the judiciary, with most cases predetermined. The Supreme People’s Assembly, which is the legislative branch of DPRK, passes all proposals of the government into law during its sessions, with no debate or modification, and to dissent is considered a serious violation. The lengths to which the regime will go in keeping its citizens in check also extend to its own party membership. In recent years, as many as 50 senior members of the North Korean government and military have been publicly executed, according to South Korea’s intelligence agency. The victims of these so-called purges include members of the ruling Workers’ Party who were executed by

697

firing squad for watching South Korean soap operas, for bribery, or for womanizing. Many of the officials singled out by Kim Jong-un, the current North Korean leader, were reportedly close to Jang Song-thaek, Kim’s uncle, who was arrested in December 2013 and executed for a series of crimes against the state, such as having a lavish lifestyle and watching South Korean television. The ongoing elimination of Jang’s allies indicates that Kim Jong-un is getting rid of potential sources of opposition and building his own power base. In 2013, investigations into human rights abuses by the United Nations Human Rights Council revealed ongoing allegations of “systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights,” especially in the detention camps. A United Nations human rights commission of enquiry found that there are approximately 200,000 political prisoners held in the six prison camps. Some camps are termed “re-education camps,” where prisoners receive instruction on the teachings of the Kim family. Some of these prisoners are released after several months or years, but they are continually monitored by security forces for the rest of their lives. Other camps are more brutal, and many prisoners are tortured or worked to death. It is not unusual for parents to be imprisoned in one of the detention camps and have their children born and living their entire lives in the camp. Survival in the camps often depends on prisoners spying on one another to garner favor with the guards. Reporting on a fellow prisoner for making antigovernment statements or not working hard enough, for example, may result in  better food rations and living conditions for the  informant. Fear and paranoia are pervasive throughout the camps.

Surveillance in DPRK Media censorship is strictly enforced, and deviation from the official government line is not tolerated. The regime prohibits listening to foreign media broadcasts, with violators reportedly subjected to severe punishment. However, defectors from North Korea have revealed that pirated versions of South Korean and Chinese television programs are widely available in North Korea and are frequently traded on the black market. Senior party officials have good access to the foreign media. It is reported that only 5% of the

698

North Korea

population representing the elite and residing in Pyongyang have access to cell phones and the Internet. Privileged government workers residing in Pyongyang have limited access to the Internet, which mostly involves government business or surveillance activities. Some university students and others are allowed to use the Internet, but most usage is restricted to the intranet, which only includes DPRK-based websites. Usage is highly controlled, with violations or misusage resulting in punishment or internment in one of the prison camps. A further example of controlling the populace is evident in relations with foreign friends. Officials holding important positions, such as party secretaries, must obtain approval directly from party leaders or from Kim Jong-un before meeting with other dignitaries. When receiving foreign dignitaries, more than two people must be  present, and meetings are often wire-tapped and recorded. If party secretaries want to invite a foreign friend home, they have to explain the reasons in a personally written report and fax it to party officials to obtain permission. The results of the visit must be reported through a written report or by fax. All telephones are tapped. The homes of party officials and employees of important government agencies are all wire-tapped, and all their movements are closely monitored by surveillance posts or security. It is common knowledge that people cannot express antiregime thoughts at home for fear of being monitored. As a form of devotion or reverence (or subliminal intimidation), every home is required to have photos of Kim Jong-il and his father, Kim Il-sung, in plain view. All adult Koreans must wear a lapel pin of one of the Kims above their heart while in public. According to Hwang Jang Yop, former international secretary under Kim Jong-il, privacy is so restricted that it is rare to receive a letter sent by another. Letters are inspected by National Security Ministry agents, and letters are often not returned to the sender regardless of their contents. Letters or books sent from overseas are intercepted by the Ministry of National Security or the Board of Publication Censorship. To add to the regime’s appetite for surveillance, South Korean sources reported that in 2014, North Korea purchased 16,420 closed-circuit surveillance cameras from China. This is in addition

to the 85,570 cameras that were purchased in the previous 3 years. Many of the cameras are positioned along the long Chinese border to detect and capture defectors from DPRK. The regime is also increasing surveillance of anyone using a mobile phone by jamming signals to interfere with communications across the border and to deter smugglers from bringing in banned newspapers, books, or recordings of television programs.

Key Security Concerns There are many potential security concerns with DPRK. North Korea reportedly is attempting to hack into smartphones in South Korea. Some 20,000 smartphones in South Korea are infected with malicious apps as a result of a recent North Korean hacking campaign. National Intelligence Service data revealed that the apps were posted by  North Korean hackers on South Korean ­websites. Once infected with the malicious apps, smartphones are reportedly vulnerable to eavesdropping and clandestine videotaping. Although it was denied by North Korean officials, the 2014 hacking into SONY Corporation has raised security concerns as to the ability of DPRK to disrupt commerce in the United States. The Korean People’s Army, an umbrella organization comprising ground, air, naval, missile, and special operations forces, ranks in personnel numbers as the fourth largest military in the world. About 4% to 5% of North Korea’s 25 million people serve on active duty, and another 25% to 30% are assigned to reserve or paramilitary units. The emphasis on military buildup is a major concern for other nations in the region. It is estimated that nearly 70% of the military force of DPRK is stationed within 100 kilometers of the demilitarized zone. North Korea has been an exporter of conventional arms and ballistic missiles for several decades. Exporting weapons is a major source of income for the regime. Some of its major customers are Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Along with the threat entailed in North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, there is a fear that terrorist groups may purchase nuclear materials. It has also been reported that DPRK has a stockpile of biological and chemical weapons. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile

Nuclear Treaties

programs and other weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to U.S. national security and to international peace and security.

Future of Surveillance The regime’s two greatest security concerns are opposition from within its populace and from outside forces, primarily from South Korea. As discussed, DPRK’s surveillance of its citizens and threats of brutal punishment and imprisonment underscore the regime’s control. North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and its development of long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected in the December 2012 and April 2013 display of a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, are of concern for South Korea and Japan. These provocations do not make North Korea more secure. Far from achieving its stated goal of becoming a strong and prosperous nation, North Korea has instead increasingly isolated and impoverished its people through its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. The country spends most of its resources on weaponry and the military, while most of the population struggle for a meager existence. The danger posed by North Korea’s threatening activities warrants further swift and credible action by the international community, as currently practiced with embargos. However, the Kim regime is expected to maintain its control as long as Kim Jong-un enjoys the support of the military and the elite enjoy the privileges bestowed on them. Surveillance of its citizenry and distrust of  foreign intervention, and further pursuit of a  strong military are expected to continue in the coming years. Robert J. Meadows See also Computer Surveillance; Electronic Surveillance; Espionage; Nuclear War; Torture

Further Readings Demick, Barbara. Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea. New York, NY: Spiegel & Grau, 2009. Harden, Blaine. Escape From Camp 14: One Man’s Remarkable Odyssey From North Korea to Freedom in the West. New York, NY: Viking Press, 2013.

699

Lee, Grace. “The Political Philosophy of Juche.” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, v.3/1 (2003). Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Annual Report to Congress). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a596219.pdf (Accessed September 2017). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Human Rights Council, 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/CommissionInquiryon HRinDPRK.aspx (Accessed October 2017). Park, Y. (2014). “Policies and Ideologies of the Kim Jong-un Regime in North Korea: Theoretical Implications.” Asian Studies Review, v.38/1. Ryall, Julian. “North Korea Steps Up Surveillance of Citizens With 16,000 CCTV Cameras.” The Telegraph World News (January 15, 2013). http://www .telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/ 9801850/North-Korea-steps-up-surveillance-ofcitizens-with-16000-CCTV-cameras.html (Accessed September 2017). Worden, Robert L. North Korea: A Country Study. Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 2008. https://www.loc.gov/ item/2008028547/?q=north+korea (Accessed September 2017). Zhebin, A. “North Korea: Impervious to Change.” Far Eastern Affairs, v.42/3 (2014).

Nuclear Treaties Nuclear treaties are documents that attempt to place restrictions on the flow and use of nuclear material. There are many such examples of these treaties; however, the most notable are the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), and Nonproliferation Treaty. All of these agreements seek to limit nuclear weapons in some way. Moreover, 123 Agreements (the name derives from Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954), which regulate the legal use of fissile material acquired from the United States for peaceful means, such as nuclear energy and scientific research, and nuclear-weapon-free treaties, which

700

Nuclear Treaties

ban the use, development, and deployment of nuclear weapons in the treaty areas, also qualify. Nuclear treaties all attempt to limit the scope and use of nuclear weapons in one way or another. These treaties developed at the intersection of a 19th- and early-20th-century belief that international agreements were the best way to regulate the behavior of nations, as embodied by the Hague Convention, Geneva Protocol, and Treaty of Versailles, among others, and the understanding of certain members of post–World War II governments worldwide that an unregulated arms race might very well lead to the destruction of the world as a whole. Global security and human survival hinge on the success or failure of these documents. So far, they have been largely successful. Today, these documents stand as the hallmark of the antinuclear movement, the bulwark against the expansion of nuclear weapons, and a bastion of international security agreements.

The Acheson-Lillienthal Report The Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, more commonly known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, was a report published on March 16, 1946, by members of the Harry Truman administration who favored limited sharing of nuclear technology. After the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, the cabinet split over whether or not the United States could maintain its nuclear monopoly. Secretary of War Henry Stimson argued that the principles behind the atomic bomb were scientific in nature and therefore the secret could not be maintained for very long. Secretary of State James Byrnes felt the opposite. President Truman, being undecided on the matter, commissioned a report from Dean Acheson, then undersecretary of state (later secretary of state), and David Lilienthal, then head of the Tennessee Valley ­ Authority and future head of the Atomic Energy Commission. The resulting document was the first real proposal to bring nuclear development under international regulation. Truman’s insistence on maintaining a monopoly over nuclear weapons ultimately killed any possibility of that occurring.

“Atoms for Peace” and 123 Agreements In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his famous “Atoms for Peace” speech before the United Nations General Assembly, proposed that an international body be created to regulate and support the peaceful use of fissile material worldwide. The practical application of this resulted in a U.S. proposal in 1954 to the General Assembly that an internationally controlled nuclear storehouse of fissile material be created. The Soviets blocked international control of fissile material, but they supported the idea of an international regulatory body to handle the exchange of material. Thus, the International Atomic Energy Agency came into being in 1957 as a body devoted to the safety and security of fissile material, to the expansion and transmission of knowledge as it relates to safer and more efficient uses of fissile material for peaceful purposes, and to being a locus of international nuclear cooperation to meet those ends. Eisenhower, however, still seeking the peaceful exchange of nuclear technology as a way to maintain control over the expansion of nuclear power, utilized the American state as the tool of exchange. Following the passage of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the United States began to exchange fissile materials with nations that wanted to expand or start their own nuclear power program. The section governing the legal use of the material is Section 123, hence the term 123 Agreement. Under normal circumstances, the right to reprocess spent fuel is retained solely by the United States for fear of nuclear proliferation. In certain cases, however, such as Japan, countries are granted the right to reprocess freely. Others, such as China, reprocess solely after special permission is granted. This can complicate a geopolitical situation immensely. As Japan seeks to further rearm itself in opposition to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and push against Chinese power in East Asia, its status as the most nuclearly latent country in the world, because of this 123 Agreement, is increasingly troubling to stability in the region.

SALT The SALT were the result of efforts to create a less dangerous geopolitical situation through strategic

Nuclear Treaties

arms reduction. SALT II, signed in 1969 in Helsinki, Finland, resulted in the Anti-Ballistic ­ Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1971, which severely limited the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to build and deploy an infinite number of antiballistic missiles. Practically, this was little more than a gesture of goodwill. That said, it established trust as a basis for future negotiations. SALT II were a series of negotiations between the 1972 ABM Treaty and the 1979 SALT II agreement aimed at reducing the production of nuclear weapons. The agreement created parity by limiting each signatory to a total of 2,250 nuclear delivery systems. Although U.S. president Jimmy Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed SALT II in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan half a year later led the U.S. Congress to not ratify the bill. While the SALT negotiations were important stepping stones to real arms reduction, they failed to have their intended effect because of contingent factors. The SALT negotiations paved the way for more progressive arms reduction talks a little over a decade after SALT II.

START The START were a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union (and later, Russia). START I, signed on July 31, 1991, limited each signatory to 6,000 warheads in total, regardless of the delivery device. Its implementation resulted in the removal of 80% of the nuclear warheads in existence at the time the treaty came into force, and it is the most successful nuclear weapon limitation agreement to date. START II, however, was not as successful. The 1993 treaty, which banned the use of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles, though ratified by both parties, failed as Russia withdrew in 2002 in retaliation against the American withdrawal from the ABM treaty. START III, which sought to limit the size of stockpiles, failed to produce a mutually agreeable document. Although the 2003 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty brought down the number of nuclear warheads deployed, it did little to limit stockpiles. Its successor, the new START treaty, which cut down active missile launchers in both countries by half,

701

also failed to decrease the size of stockpiles, the greatest threat to global security.

Nonproliferation Treaty The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a 1968 international treaty that grants the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States, the Soviet Union (and as its successor state, Russia), China, France, and the United Kingdom—the status of nuclear weapons states. All other states that are signatories agree that in return for never acquiring nuclear weapons, disbanding any program they have with the goal to do so, and the right to use fissile material for peaceful purposes, the nuclear status states are free to exchange nuclear technology with a signatory. There are three countries— Israel, India, and Pakistan—that have never signed the NPT because they have well-developed nuclear weapons programs and by signing would have to give up their programs. North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, never came into compliance with the treaty, and withdrew in 2003. In addition, as of September 2014, South Sudan has yet to sign the treaty.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones Nuclear weapon free zones are areas created by international treaty where proliferation of nuclear weapons is prohibited and where there are increased regulations for member parties regarding the handling of nuclear material and waste. Article 5 of the Antarctic Treaty (1959) prohibits its signatories from the use of nuclear weapons or the depositing of nuclear waste on the continent of Antarctica, due to its international status. The 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, which came into effect in 2009, requires that its signatories, all members of the African Union, do not develop, possess, research, or take any other step toward the states’ ownership of a nuclear weapon. In addition, the signatories agreed to remove peaceful nuclear installations from the list of potential military targets. While ratification still has not occurred in 10 member countries, the presence of nonstate actors throughout the continent limits the effective reach of the treaty over what is otherwise the largest nuclear-free zone in

702

Nuclear War

the world. Ultimately, these zones are increasingly complex. The more states in the prescribed region and the less stable it is, the harder it is for the treaty to have any real-world ramifications.

continues to grab headlines and the attention of global leaders.

Zachary Kopin

The events of August 6 and August 9, 1945, are some of the most contentious in the history of the world. In the shadow of the mushroom cloud lay the fall of an empire, the victorious domination of another, the emergence of a bifurcated world, and a complex web of ethical issues surrounding the events. Classically speaking, the bombings were justified by the Truman administration because they ended World War II. Since the U.S. historian Gar Alporivitz’s 1965 thesis in which he argued that the true purpose of the bomb was not to force a Japanese surrender but rather to scare the ­Soviets off expansionist intentions in the Far East, diplomatic scholarship has been led increasingly away from the classical understanding of the events surrounding the dropping of the two atomic bombs in August 1945. While historians, especially those with ideological motives, may debate Truman’s decision to drop the bomb, ultimately it was dropped. The dropping of the two bombs, therefore, provides a singular case study for the effects of nuclear war as a tool. A tremendous amount is known about the bomb and its effects, due in large part to a series of controversial practices that nevertheless yield important information on the event. Neither the Enola Gay nor the Bockscar flew the mission to drop its payload, including scientific instruments to measure the blast, alone. A number of other aircraft tasked with observing and recording information about the blast accompanied them. In Hiroshima, the “Little Boy” atomic bomb yielded a blast equivalent to 16 kilotons of TNT (2,4,6-trinitrotoluene; the Hiroshima bomb has since become a standard by which to measure progressive advancements in blast yield based on orders of magnitude greater than the blast yield of “Little Boy”), temperatures as high as 5,400° F, and a 50,000-foot-tall mushroom cloud. While officially only 3,242 Japanese soldiers died, estimates of civilian deaths in 1945 alone hover around 140,000. In Nagasaki, where the “Fat Man” atomic bomb exploded over the largest Catholic cathedral in Asia, about 70,000 people died as a result of the blast in 1945, a number that

See also Antinuclear Movement; Antiwar Movement, History in United States; Cold War; Nuclear War; Surveillance During World War I and World War II

Further Readings Kuznick, Peter, et al. Untold History of the United States. New York, NY: Gallery Books, 2012. Reed, Thomas C., et al. Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation. New York, NY: Zenith Press, 2010.

Nuclear War Since the first field use of an atomic weapon over the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the world has feared the use of these weapons en masse. This theoretical notion of nuclear war, and the threat to human survival it engenders, is a complex and multifaceted issue. The concept of nuclear war exists on two planes: (1) a physical one, as experienced by the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and (2) a theoretical one, as experienced by those who lived through the Cuban Missile Crisis and as manifested in popular culture. The former engages a cult of memory revolving around the decision to use a new and dangerous weapon, the suffering of those affected by the mushroom cloud, and the triumphalism of those who deployed it, while the latter engages with the cultural complexities of the apocalyptic narrative, an ever-present fear of a world after nuclear war, in which the living would envy the dead. For much of the history of nuclear weapons, the threat of nuclear war has hinged on negotiations between the East and the West; in the 21st century, however, nuclear proliferation has minimized the risk of an all-out nuclear war but has increased the risk of nuclear attack. Nuclear war, therefore, largely remains an existential threat to global security, even as it

Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Nuclear War

703

doubled by 1950. The survivors, known as hibakusha, were carefully examined by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, and later the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, but not treated; this led to accusations that the Japanese and American governments were using hibakusha as guinea pigs—not to mention the fact that the same institutions failed to address the social needs of the survivors as well, because those exposed to both the  bomb and the subsequent black rain became increasingly ostracized by the larger Japanese community. This raises the question whether the dropping of the bomb did in fact end the war. This was the  famous argument made by President Harry Truman and his supporters in defense of the action. It is important to remember, however, that by August 1945, U.S. bombers had leveled more than 60 Japanese cities. In many respects, the Japanese viewed the bomb as a different weapon yielding the same result; practically, it was little more than novel. Conversely, what dominated the headlines throughout Japan between the first and second bombings was not the use of the bomb but, rather, the Russian entry into the war against Japan. Those Japanese officials familiar with the decision to surrender similarly cited this, not the bombings, as the primary reason behind the Japanese surrender. Undoubtedly, at least as a singular event leading to the cessation of hostilities, the empirical evidence suggests that the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki played a minimal role in Japan’s decision to surrender. At least in the two practical cases in which it was applied, the use of nuclear weapons failed to gain significant enough leverage for the acting country to force an end to the conflict.

basic power of the universe, transport it across the ocean, and use it to end a devastating war against an illogical enemy. In this narrative, the triumphant Americans came to inherit the Earth because of their hard work, ingenuity, and heroism. In opposition stands the victim narrative, the way in which those on the ground in Japan saw the same events of August 1945. Notably, however, this narrative—unlike the triumphant narrative, which includes only Americans—is inclusive. Not only were Japanese civilians and military personnel, as well as Korean laborers, present in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but so too were Western prisoners of war, including Americans. For those who survived, the hibakusha, in both the short and the long term, this event was necessarily a violent and traumatic experience. To those afflicted with the physical and mental reminders of surviving, there was nothing heroic about the bombing— only an event to be seen as unnecessary pain issued by a cruel and soulless other. The third, and final, narrative—which combines elements of the other two and most likely will go on to become the overwhelming narrative, as those with firsthand understandings of the events pass away—is the apocalyptic narrative. The followers of this narrative believe that, if nothing else, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a case study of what may come about in nuclear war—even more worrying because of how the primitive “Fat Man” and “Little Boy” compare with today’s multiwarhead intercontinental ballistic missile. In these three narratives lie the basis for fear of nuclear war, both real and imagined.

Narratives of Nuclear War

All three narratives are memorialized in cultural space. While in Japan the bombings are commemorated through the maintenance of peace parks, containing peace monuments to the deceased as well as peace museums, and commemoration ceremonies, the United States displays its triumphant narrative passively through the exhibition of the Enola Gay and Bockscar at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum’s Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia, and the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force in Dayton, Ohio, respectively. The American public

The theoretical basis for the understanding of narratives of nuclear war, both actual and envisioned, lies in the triumvirate of narratives: (1) the triumphant, (2) the victim, and (3) the apocalyptic narrative. The triumphant, sometimes known as the heroic, narrative, is the story of the discovery and use of nuclear weapons as it has traditionally been told in the United States: that Americans—humans more generally but specifically Americans—by virtue of their hard work were able to harness the

Cultural Manifestations

704

Nuclear War

participate in their heroic narrative p ­assively, while the victim narrative is actively commemorated in Japan. More important, in Hiroshima especially, where the annual commemoration is a multilingual event for the world, the apocalyptic narrative is actively engaged as the tone of the annual event bears the need for future action rather than mere remembrance. While these sites in the United States may be the presenting points for contentious public history, the victory culture they engender receives comparatively minimal space. After all, the event the bombing classically caused, the victory over Japan, is celebrated in only one U.S. state, Rhode Island. These manifestations of the understanding of nuclear war in public places, however, are not the only cultural representations. As the world entered the nuclear age, it increasingly became preoccupied—especially after the Soviets successfully tested the nuclear bomb RDS-1 in 1949—with representations of the apocalyptic narrative in literature, visual culture, and music. The first vision of the apocalyptic world created by nuclear war appeared in John Hersey’s field study of Hiroshima, first released in The New Yorker in 1946 and later in a book titled after the city. In his text, Hersey vividly describes the physical damage the atomic bomb wrought not only on the city but on its inhabitants as well. While the world would later learn of the problematic nature of World War II bombing policies in works such as Kurt Vonnegut’s 1969 Slaughterhouse-Five, Hersey’s depiction of his subjects’ struggles to maintain their humanity in the wake of nuclear war set the standard for the disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Although Hersey’s depictions would influence much of the later literary world on the subject of nuclear fear, such as Tim O’Brien’s fearful young protagonist in his 1985 work The Nuclear Age, who lines his fallout shelter with pencils in the hope that their lead will block out radiation, it also engendered a critical response to the possibility of the expansion of Hersey’s postbomb world. Films such as Godzilla (1954), On the Beach (1959), The Day After (1983), Testament (1983), and Threads (1984) evidence the cultural tensions between the defense planners supporting nuclear

weapons as a necessary precaution and the people they are supposedly protecting. Similarly, the satires of Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove (1964) and Tom Lehrer evidence a culture that is uncomfortable with the potential that world nuclear war could create. With two blatant exceptions, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear war exists as a theoretical concept in the minds of academics, politicians, and the average person on the street. Except for an increasingly smaller subsection of the Japanese population, nuclear war is not something that the populace of the globe has any real knowledge of. This, however, has not prevented the populaces of America, Britain, and, importantly, the world as a whole from engaging with the concept of nuclear arms, both theoretical and real. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whether they are assessed from the standpoint of the heroic narrative of the Enola Gay or the victim narrative of  those injured in the event, both share a piece of  the apocalyptic narrative. It is this narrative that threatens the entirety of humanity and captivated the world in the decades since the first use of nuclear weapons. This narrative galvanizes the antinuclear movement, feeds the contingent culture and, ultimately, is reflexive of the notion that intrinsic to nuclear weapons is the possibility that their use in any significant way could wipe out the world. The avoidance of this catastrophe hinges on a worldwide public debate over what the role of nuclear weapons should be, if any—a debate that is very much still undecided. These narratives not only color the debate but also fuel the global antinuclear movement. Largely because of the fears of what the use of nuclear weapons, in either war or peace, could bring, countries spent the last half of the 20th century negotiating their way off the nuclear cliff. Yet the effects of that movement are limited. While the bigger powers are backing off the threat of nuclear annihilation, in the 21st century smaller nations in antagonistic relationships with larger powers have turned to nuclear weapons power and research as leverage. Any nation that maintains nuclear weapons threatens the continued existence of a global population. The debate on nuclear weapons, and the potential use of nuclear war in the name of security, is an important one that requires careful

Nuclear War

assessment. Ultimately, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. Zachary Kopin See also Antinuclear Movement; Antiwar Movement, History in United States; Cold War; Nuclear Treaties; Surveillance During World War I and World War II

Further Readings Alporevitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1996.

705

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan. Cambridge, England: Belknap Press, 2006. Hersey, John. Hiroshima. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946. Masahito Hirose. Voices of the A-Bomb Survivors of Nagasaki. Nagasaki, Japan: Nagasaki Testimonial Society, 2003. Yamazaki, James N. Children of the Atomic Bomb: An American Physician’s Memoir of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Marshall Islands. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.

O participate in offender reentry programs include law enforcement, social services, mental health agencies, substance abuse treatment providers, and victim advocacy groups. The need for offender reentry programs is an acknowledgment that programs designed to rehabilitate offenders in prison are ineffective in reducing recidivism. According to the National Institute of Justice, more than 60% of released offenders were rearrested within 3 years of their release. The primary goal of offender reentry programs is to break this cycle of crime.

Offender Reentry Programs Offender reentry programs are designed to enhance offenders’ transition from prison to the community. Offender reentry programs also address released offenders’ needs with regard to social and job skills, education, and health, mental health, and substance abuse issues. The ultimate goal of offender reentry programs is the reintegration of offenders back into the community, the reduction of recidivism and victimization, and the restoration of justice to the communities and victims. Offender reentry programs also provide opportunities for the surveillance of released offenders as they adjust back to life in the community, including the monitoring of their behavior and/or activities. For instance, some states use GPS (Global Positioning System) surveillance to monitor ex-offenders, especially sex offenders, in the community. Government agencies, individuals, and corporations have been known to operate surveillance cameras, with the purpose of deterring property crimes and other crimes. In addition, government agencies may employ surveillance for intelligence gathering and prevention of criminal behavior. However, human rights activists and civil libertarians are often opposed to surveillance, even for released offenders, because of its intrusion into peoples’ privacy. Although surveillance is not the primary goal of offender reentry programs, these programs create opportunities for monitoring offenders through the coordination and strengthening of community resources and support networks. Agencies that

Factors Affecting Reentry Research has shown that many repeat offenders share similar characteristics—namely, that they often come from troubled backgrounds. Some of them lack parental or other adult guidance. Some have dropped out of school and lack basic educational skills such as counting, reading, and writing. In addition, many prisons are not adequately equipped to prepare inmates for life outside the prisons. On release from prison, many released offenders have little or no money, lack family support or meaningful supervision, and carry a stigma associated with being incarcerated—these factors can make it difficult for released offenders to adjust to life after prison. Other factors affecting offender reintegration into the community include the age and gender of the individual offender. Many offenders are young males and, as such, typically engage in risky behaviors, such as substance abuse, and are susceptible to peer pressure. Other factors that inhibit 707

708

Offender Reentry Programs

adjustment to law-abiding life in the community include an individual’s self-esteem and the social support available to them.

Effective Reentry There are many programs and policies that are likely to make offender reentry into the community more effective. Some experts on offender reentry identify the different stages to target society’s offender reentry efforts: the preprison, during prison, and postprison stages. Daniel P. Mears and Joshua C. Cochran argue that proactive policies and practices are more effective in reducing recidivism. A proactive process starts the moment an individual is convicted of a crime and before the individual embarks on his or her prison journey. According to Mears and Cochran, while housing and treatment facilities are instrumental to an offender’s reentry into the community, it is more important to prepare the offender mentally about prison life. This will likely help the individual cope, reduce the shock of incarceration, and facilitate adaptation to prison life. To do so, counseling with offenders begins while the offender is in jail, before being transferred to prison, and includes a needs and risk assessment. Part of the assessment aims to identify the criminogenic, educational, and employment needs of the offender. While offenders are serving their sentences in prison, policies, programs, and practices that enhance offenders’ reentry into the community should be implemented, according to Mears and Cochran. The prison environment must be as hospitable as possible, with prison officials trained to adopt a prosocial role and implement programs and services to prepare inmates for life inside prison and beyond. Prison programs should emphasize educational and vocational, interpersonal, financial, and life skills that inmates need to succeed after prison. Adequate mental and physical health programs should also be provided to address the physical and mental well-being of inmates, especially those with substance abuse problems. It is also important to provide programs that promote family connection and interaction in order to enhance the social and mental well-being of inmates. Mears and Cochran argue that if the preprison and during prison programs are faithfully

implem­ ented, then the postprison policies and programs will have a better chance of succeeding. They also state that it is unrealistic to expect correctional agencies to have adequate resources to provide the support, supervision, and services that inmates require to succeed after they leave prison, so they suggest several postprison policies that they purport to have a higher chance of succeeding when judiciously implemented. According to Mears and Cochran, governments should invest in programs that assess the criminogenic risk factors of offenders. This will make it possible to determine who is more likely to recidivate, and address their needs. In addition, by identifying released offenders’ educational and job skill needs, appropriate resources can be provided to address these specific needs. Providing released offenders with employment mentors who can assist them in securing and keeping their jobs is crucial for their desistance from criminal behavior. Efforts should also be made to provide released offenders access to affordable homes. Moreover, released offenders’ physical and mental health should be examined periodically and relevant treatment provided, including treatment programs for those with substance abuse problems. Mears and Cochran also recommend that released offenders be offered cognitive behavioral interventions as well as interventions to enhance their skills with interpersonal conflict negotiation. Above all, released offenders must be encouraged to participate in programs organized by community support groups and those programs that promote family reunification and guidance. Providing released offenders with the necessary family and social support, educational and employment skills, and community environment that fosters their reintegration is important for reducing recidivism and victimization and for protecting the community. Surveillance cameras may not only act as effective deterrents to future criminal acts, but they may also be used to observe and monitor the behavior of released offenders. With surveillance cameras, released offenders can be monitored from a distance, thus saving costs. GPS surveillance may also be employed to monitor the whereabouts of released offenders, especially sex offenders, in the community. On the one hand, despite the privacy implications, such surveillance of released offenders may positively influence

Online Shopping

their behavior and thus enhance reintegration goals. On the other hand, surveillance mechanisms may actually undermine the goal of reintegration by decreasing the offenders’ civic engagement, weakening their social bonds, reducing their social capital, and limiting their engagement in prosocial activities in the community. O. Oko Elechi and Alaba Oludare See also Crime; Prison and Jail Segregation Units; Private Prisons; Supermax Prisons; Victim-Offender Mediation

Further Readings Benson, M., et al. “Reintegration or Stigmatization? Offenders’ Expectations of Community Reentry.” Journal of Criminal Justice, v.39 (2011). Mears, D. P. and J. C. Cochran. Prisoner Reentry in the Era of Mass Incarceration. Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2015. Schlager, M. Rethinking the Reentry Paradigm: A Blueprint for Action. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013. Shanhe, J. and T. L. Winfree. “Social Support, Gender, and Inmate Adjustment to Prison Life: Insights From a National Sample.” Prison Journal, v.86 (2006).

Online Shopping Online shopping is a form of commerce that allows consumers to purchase products or services over the Internet. It is also called e-commerce, online retailing, and e-tailing. Using various devices, such as computers, tablets, and smartphones, consumers can find a broad range of products and services with the help of online searches. Customers need to have Internet access and a form of payment accepted by the online store, including credit cards, debit cards, PayPal, and bitcoins. The retailer then ships the physical products through the postal system or couriers or uses an in-store pickup system. Electronic products are usually delivered digitally. Online shopping entails both business-to-consumer and business-to-business relations, and it can also include retailers that use multiple retail forms, including brick-and-mortar stores. This entry

709

reviews the history of online shopping and discusses the benefits and risks, including security and privacy risks.

History When online shopping emerged for the vast consumer market, there was a flurry of ventures in different areas, with attempts to sell products and services in various industries and online commerce in different forms. However, the first attempts were revolutionary and, although sometimes forgotten, are the basis for the widely available online shopping that we know today. The British entrepreneur Michael Aldrich created one of the first forms of online commerce in 1979 by using videotex, a two-way messaging service, with the help of a modified television and a phone line. In 1981, Thomson Holidays in the United Kingdom created a business-to-business online service. In 1982, Mintel was created, a videotex online service accessible by telephone lines, to make online purchases and train reservations. In 1984, Tesco created the world’s first business-to-consumer online shopping system, along with the concept of the online shopping basket. Also in 1984, CompuServe announced the opening of the Electronic Mall, similar to contemporary e-commerce systems. In 1994, Net Market Company performed the first retail transaction on the Internet using a readily available version of powerful data encryption software designed to guarantee privacy. In the first transaction, consumers paid for a Sting CD with their credit cards. In 1995, Amazon was founded as an online bookstore operating in a two-car garage, and eBay emerged the same year. There were various retailers and service-offering websites that developed after this. The numerous online shopping ventures included mega stores such as Shopping.com, shopping agents such as NetBot, price aggregators, and buyers’ clubs. Many of the websites established during the dot.com era failed, such as Garden.com and Pets.com, due to poor business models and high advertising costs, but they contributed to the successful evolution of the modern online retailers. For example, approximately half of U.S. consumers preferred to shop online in 2017, while global online retail sales were at about 8% of the total retail spending.

710

Online Shopping

Online Shopping Benefits and Risks This form of retailing has grown in popularity over the years, mainly because individuals find it convenient to shop from the comfort of their home. Due to advancements in technology, online shopping is extremely accessible for consumers through computer and mobile sources, which makes online shopping an integral part of the electronic revolution. The most significant advantage of online shopping is convenience, in terms of both time and effort. Considering that many consumers now have the Internet at work, at home, and on their mobile devices, the shopping process is easy and fast, and the merchandise arrives at their home without significant effort and travel. Unlike in traditional retailing, customers can access an online store anytime and from anywhere with little effort, making it extremely convenient for many categories of individuals. Another aspect is related to the ability to search for information about products and services, compare prices, and read online reviews regarding quality much more easily than in the context of a brick-and-mortar store. Customers can easily find a significant amount of information about a product they are interested in, compare its price in different online stores, and read reviews about the quality of the products and the retailers. Consumers have at their disposal not only retailer websites but also sites that offer user reviews, aggregate prices from different retailers, and compare goods or brands, which can help consumers make a purchase decision in a short amount of time. Moreover, individuals who prefer a varied assortment of products and like to compare shops can also benefit from the extensive offerings available through online stores. Price can also be an advantage for the consumer, as many businesses can save costs through the online channel and are willing or forced by the competition to pass these savings to consumers through lower prices. The main risks that consumers face are related to fraud and security. Because consumers are not able to see the product they are buying, they need to rely on user reviews, the seller’s return policy, and manufacturer warranties, which can make them vulnerable to fraud. A major issue is

represented by fraud and the security of electronic payment transactions. Customers face the risk of unknowingly doing business with an unreliable retailer, which may lead to credit card theft or even identity theft. Even with reputable retailers, there have been cases of data breaches and losses of consumers’ personal information. Moreover, many retailers have to continually guard against individuals who purchase items using stolen or fraudulent credit cards, as well as hacking attempts to access their database of consumer profiles and credit card information. Overall, future developments in technology represent opportunities for the online shopping industry, especially considering the estimated increase of Internet usage and the spreading of mobile technologies across the globe. In addition, the evolution of the logistics industry is also benefiting online retailing and allowing for more product categories to be suitable for online shopping, shipping, and delivery. Security technologies are also evolving, making online transactions safer than in 1994, when the first encrypted retail transaction on the Internet was performed. Moreover, national and international regulations regarding privacy of personal information are evolving, which will be able to offer increased protection to online consumers and entice more people to the Internet shopping environment. Maria Petrescu See also Cybermarketing; Privacy, Internet; Shopping Mall Security; Unregulated Cyber Currencies

Further Readings Grewal, Dhruv, et al. “Internet Retailing: Enablers, Limiters and Market Consequences.” Journal of Business Research, v.57/7 (2004). Mahajan, Vijay, et al. “The dot.com Retail Failures of 2000: Were There Any Winners?” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, v.30/4 (2002). Mallapragada, Girish, et al. “Exploring the Effects of ‘What’ (Product) and ‘Where’ (Website) Characteristics on Online Shopping Behavior.” Journal of Marketing, v.80/2 (2016).

Open Source Computing Rosen, Kenneth T. and Amanda L. Howard. “E-retail: Gold Rush or Fool’s Gold?” California Management Review, v.42/3 (2000).

Open Source Computing Open source computing refers to software distributed along with the source code. The source code is the human-readable instructions that define the operation of an application. Releasing the source ensures that anyone can modify the software, either to improve it or to alter its functionality. By contrast, closed source or proprietary software is not released as source code but as compiled, executable files. Proprietary software is more difficult to reverse engineer, and supporters argue that it is more secure since vulnerabilities cannot be read from the source code. On the other hand, open source advocates argue that source code can be more thoroughly checked for bugs and security flaws when more developers are able to study and modify it. Releasing a project as open source generally involves releasing it under an open license that defines user rights to the code. Open source software can refer to individual applications or entire operating systems. After a review of the early years of open source software creation, this entry highlights the development of the foundational operating system and programs and concludes with some benefits and potential drawbacks of open source computing with regard to software and system security. The open source movement began with Richard Stallman, a researcher at Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Artificial Intelligence Lab. As software companies began to assert intellectual property rights over their code, Stallman drafted the first version of the GNU General Public License (GNU GPL or simply GPL). The GPL is a software copyright license that asserted Stallman’s Four Software Freedoms: (1) to use, (2) to study, (3) to share, and (4) to modify the code. These four freedoms have come to define the sense of “free” in “free and open source software,” which is another label widely embraced by the open source community. The most remarkable feature of the GPL is its “viral” quality. The GPL states that any computer code interacting with GPL code must be

711

GPL compatible, which is to say that it must be licensed in such a way as to protect the Four Software Freedoms. The viral quality of the GPL creates an ecosystem of open source software as it is not permitted to combine proprietary and open source code. Rather than stifling open source development, this feature of  the GPL has given rise to a wide range of open  source projects, including stand-alone applications and operating systems, all organizing around overlapping communities of users and developers. Free and open source software advocate Eric S. Raymond characterizes open source development models in terms of the “cathedral” and the “bazaar.” Proprietary software, like the building of a cathedral, requires the work of many hands but is centrally designed and organized. Open source development more closely resembles the distributed and self-organized efforts that characterize the chaotic sprawling market activity of a bazaar. Since anyone can read the source code and release modified versions, open source development exploits the community of users and ­codevelopers to write, refine, and update software. Projects that attract attention develop large ­communities, but some small projects will be maintained by just a handful of volunteers. While larger projects tend to demonstrate more organization, open source computing is to some extent defined by distributed development models. Stallman’s first major open source project was the development of a fully open operating system that is known as GNU, a recursive acronym meaning “GNU’s Not Unix.” The name originates from the adoption of an operating system with the Unix design philosophy but without any Unix code (hence Unix-like, rather than Unix-based). The kernel for GNU, the program that handles how individual processes make use of system resources, was provided by Linus Torvalds, a computer science student at the University of Helsinki. Torvalds based his kernel on Minix, an educational operating system developed by Andrew Tanenbaum. The name “Linux” is a combination of “Linus” and the “-nix” ending of Minix and Unix. As GNU and other open source projects began employing the Linux kernel, Linux or GNU/Linux served as an umbrella term for open source operating systems. The various open source

712

Orwell, George

operating systems in wide use today, Fedora, Ubuntu, Debian, and SUSE, share this kernel in common, so they are sometimes collectively referred to as Linux-based or GNU/Linux-based systems. Proponents of open source computing tend to cite flexibility and transparency as merits of open source software. Any user can see and modify the source code to adapt open source software to fit very specific uses, which developers of proprietary software do not always have market-based incentives to do. The transparency of open source software frames a unique security paradigm. Open source security assumes that most users will not be malicious, and it makes the code available so that vulnerabilities and exploits can be patched. Proprietary software developers rely on “security through obscurity” to protect their code from exploitation by keeping it secret. In addition, the open source approach to security prevents the inclusion of hidden “backdoors”—secret vulnerabilities that allow unauthorized privilege escalation or the execution of arbitrary code. Any maliciously planted vulnerability could be found by other developers during inspection or review of the source code. Open source communities rely on trust between the developers and the users. These networks of trust are especially attractive for users concerned about security and privacy. Transparency and the need to cooperate keep developers focused on serving their user base. Michael Falgoust See also National Security Agency Leaks

Lessig, Lawrence. The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. New York, NY: Random House, 2002. Moglen, Eben. “Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright.” First Monday, v.4/8 (1999). Pathan, Al-Sakib Khan. “Analyzing Trust and Security in Computing and Communications Systems.” In Sabu M. Thampi et al. (eds.), Managing Trust in Cyberspace. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis, 2014. Raymond, Eric. “The Cathedral and the Bazaar.” Knowledge, Technology & Policy, v.12/3 (1999). Stallman, Richard. Free Software, Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. Stallman. Boston, MA: Free Software Foundation, 2002.

Orwell, George George Orwell was an English writer and novelist. Although he created both nonfiction and fiction works, his most famous novels, Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, are particularly relevant to discussions of surveillance, security, privacy, and government power. Both of these books projected his fears of what the future would hold and the types of governments that could result from popular revolutions. His expectations for the future were quite pessimistic, and it is obvious that he felt that the prospects for maintaining privacy and avoiding surveillance by government authorities would be difficult. Both novels have become iconic volumes that reflect popular concerns about personal liberty and the ability that future governments could manipulate information and use the power of information to dominate society and the personal lives of citizens.

Further Readings Barlow, John Perry. “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.” Electronic Frontier Foundation (February 8, 1996). http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/ Declaration-Final.html (Accessed October 2017). Coleman, E. Gabriella. “The Social Production of Ethics in Debian and Free Software Communities: Anthropological Lessons for Vocational Ethics.” In Stefan Koch (ed.), Free/Open Source Software Development. Hershey, PA: Idea Group, 2005. Lessig, Lawrence. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999.

Animal Farm Animal Farm, which was first published in 1945, is an allegory of how societies become totalitarian political systems. It presents a rather depressing view of the prospect that revolutions undertaken to help the average citizen will inevitably be perverted to exploit those citizens. The setting for the novel is a farm where the operator continually mistreats the animals and overworks them. The end result is a system of oppression and exploitation. The poor

Orwell, George

treatment finally drives the animals to revolt and take over the farm; they then begin to run the farm for themselves and for their benefit. The revolt is a parallel for a workers’ uprising to overthrow an unfair capitalist system. Initially, the farm revolt is successful in leading the animals to hope for a better future. The new system is one where all the animals are equal. There are new laws that are designed to protect every animal and to ensure that they are treated fairly. With the passage of time, however, the new system deviates from the high principles and begins to resemble the old oppressive regime. Differentiation begins to occur with the pigs who take charge of running the farm. They eventually give themselves more food and special privileges in the process. Napoleon, one of the pigs, becomes the leader of the farm, and he is increasingly dictatorial. He uses a number of rationales to justify his position of leadership, the increasing inequality, and the need to adopt measures to protect the revolution against bad thoughts and anything that would undermine the utopia that will be somewhere in the future. He takes advantage of real threats from humans to regain control of the farm in order to establish a police force to discover and eliminate threats. The security forces are then used to deal with threats from alleged spies and traitors from within the ranks of the animals. With the passage of time, the pigs begin to assume more human characteristics and to resemble the capitalists they had displaced. They proceed to engage in entrepreneurial (capitalist) activity that provides benefits for them but not for the farm and the other animals. The novel is an analogy for the replacement of exploitive capitalist societies by the egalitarianism of communist society, although in the case of the farm the promise is not fulfilled. A new administrative class rises to gain special privileges and benefits, and the workers are now exploited by a new elite. Orwell has anticipated observations by others that a new administrative class would arise with communism. Some of the major characters in the volume correspond to important figures in the early history of the Soviet Union. Old Major, a pig who dies early in the book just before the revolt, is the theorist, as was Vladimir Lenin in the Soviet Union. Napoleon is Joseph Stalin complete with

713

his cult of personality. Snowball is another pig who is particularly effective in defending the farm from an attack by the humans, similar to Leon Trotsky’s role in leading the Red Army to victory in the Russian Civil War. Snowball becomes a threat to Napoleon just as Trotsky was to Stalin. He is later charged with treason against the animals and is driven into exile. Under Napoleon, the security service enforces the decisions of the leadership, detects any animals suspected of disloyalty, and carries out executions ordered by the leaders. There is another pig who develops an effective propaganda system to support Napoleon’s regime. This member of the ruling circle is much more reminiscent of Joseph Goebbels and the Ministry of Propaganda in Nazi Germany than it is of any person in the Soviet Union. Orwell borrows from aspects of both contemporary and totalitarian societies that he was familiar with in the period before and during World War II, and both of these systems contributed to his fears of what the future might be. Animal Farm also supports a number of early academic views about the role that elites will play in political systems. Although Orwell may not have been familiar with such theories, his discussion of the rise of a new elite corresponds to Robert Michels’s observations that in democratic settings, an elite will always appear as expertise, and organizations are required to run the system. The material in the book also agrees with Vilfredo Pareto’s ideas that when one elite group leaves power, it will be replaced by a new one. As a novelist, Orwell came to the same pessimistic ­ assessment as these social scientists. These views that appeared in Animal Farm continued to be developed in Nineteen Eighty-Four.

Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell’s second novel, originally published in 1949, deals even more directly and with more emphasis on security, propaganda, and surveillance (and the corresponding lack of privacy). In this futuristic novel, three superpowers are in continuous conflict with one another, but none of the three is able to win over the other two. Orwell’s protagonist, Winston Smith, works in the Ministry of Truth. His task is to rewrite history in order to correspond to the current “truth” that the political

714

Orwell, George

leadership wants to convey to the public. Winston, a party member but not a member of the inner circle, becomes discontented with his situation, and he begins to have significant doubts about the ruling party. He even decides to keep an illegal diary so that he has some record of the actual happenings. His discontent has to be hidden because he is under constant surveillance at home and at work. At home, two-way video screens provide him with a constant flow of propaganda from the party and government while at the same time providing the security officials with a method to observe him and other party members. Posters everywhere remind him and the other citizens, quite accurately, that “Big Brother Is Watching.” Winston tries to evade the surveillance, but he is eventually discovered by security agents who are everywhere and entrap him in even more illegal activity. He is subjected to torture and brainwashing by the security forces. Having seen the error of his ways, he is eventually released and now believes in the system and becomes a loyal party man. Orwell once again exposes what he sees as the excesses of totalitarian societies, and he demonstrates his thoughts of what such a future society could look like. Nineteen Eighty-Four extends Orwell’s indictment of totalitarian systems and their efforts to control the flow of information and to mold the citizens into loyal, unthinking followers. His focus is on a high surveillance society where the security personnel are able to keep track of anyone. The system allows the secret police (shades of the Gestapo or the KGB) to identify and entrap those who would even think about opposing the regime. A person can even be arrested for wrong thoughts. In this society, children are taught that they need to inform on their parents if their parents express antisystem views, much as occurred in Nazi Germany with the Hitler Youth and the Soviet Union with the Young Communists. The surveillance techniques envisioned by Orwell anticipated at least some of the technical advancements of later years that would make surveillance easier. In the society of 1984, there is absolutely no privacy for party members. It is somewhat ironic that the poorer citizens who toil in factory jobs with very few privileges actually have more privacy than those in better positions in the society.

Personal Experiences Orwell’s antipathy toward totalitarian systems, even while recognizing the problems of capitalism, is a reflection of his experiences during the Spanish Civil War of 1936. He fought on the side of the Republicans, demonstrating his opposition to fascism as a democratic socialist. He was wounded at one point while serving on the front lines. While in Spain, he also saw firsthand what could happen when communists came to power, as they did toward the end of that struggle. The local Spanish communist groups had the support of the Soviet Union, which was the key foreign ally of the Republicans. When they gained power, they began to purge actual and potential opponents to their rule. Those who did not wholeheartedly support the new regime ran the risk of being accused of being fascist collaborators and counterrevolutionaries. Orwell, who was not a communist and was known for his opposition to communism, was able to get out of Spain, but he was later tried in absentia for being a fascist collaborator. Many of his contemporaries were not that lucky. The communist regime spent time and resources eliminating these domestic opponents when those efforts could have been devoted to fighting the forces of Franco. While it is unlikely that the Republicans would have won the civil war even with greater unity, the dissension generated by the purges weakened the military effort. The plot of Animal Farm clearly reflects his personal experience in the last days of the Spanish Republic and helps explain why he was so concerned about how revolutions could go wrong and destroy their own. His experiences in Spain are also present in Nineteen Eighty-Four in a more subdued form.

Relevance to Surveillance, Security, and Privacy Nineteen Eighty-Four has been more influential than Animal Farm or his early literary efforts. He was racing to finish it because he was terminally ill with tuberculosis. Literary critics have noted some problems with the plot and other attributes of the novel as a consequence of his rush to finish the book. Even so, the volume has become a classic even with the marginal literary difficulties that are present. His ideas as to how technology could

Orwell, George

be used to spy on citizens clearly foreshadowed the current era. He likely would not have been surprised to discover that the National Security Agency listened in on conversations of citizens and foreign leaders, including allied ones. His pessimistic view of a future society sends a warning of what could occur. The phrase that “Big Brother Is Watching” has become a catchword for what an overbearing government can do with surveillance techniques, the potential for invasions of privacy, and the idea that government agencies are in a position to control the flow of information. Other terms such as groupthink and thought control that appeared in the book have become common and are used to describe efforts by governments to control the content and flow of information in order to influence the views of the public. An ultimately minor failing of the novel was the idea that the necessary technology for such government influence would be routinely possible by 1984. His view of technological development was more optimistic than the actual progress. It took longer for such technology to become available than the 35 years that he envisioned. Computers, miniature cameras, activation of devices by remote control, and other advances, however, have confirmed what he suspected would become possible. While Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four focus on surveillance and lack of privacy, it is important to remember that they are also indictments of fascist, Nazi, and communist societies, demonstrating what can occur when totalitarian movements come to power. The combination of totalitarianism, no tolerance for dissent, and the potential for invasive surveillance demonstrates the very real potential for the future that Orwell feared. It is somewhat ironic that some (although clearly not all) of the popularity of both books was due in part to financial support from the ­British and the American governments during the Cold War. They subsidized the dissemination of the books since they were an indictment of the Soviet Union and they so clearly demonstrated the dangers that could occur with communism. His books about propaganda became part of a propaganda effort notwithstanding the fact that the threat he identified was very real.

715

In both Animal Farm and Nineteen EightyFour, Orwell created situations in which the future was quite negative. He apparently believed that these kinds of political systems could come to exist. These books were a warning as well as his hope that his literary efforts would alert people to the danger and help prevent the establishment of the type of society that he feared. Especially in Nineteen Eighty-Four, he was identifying the potential problems that societies in the future could face and providing a warning about the dangers inherent in the use of technology as was present in the political systems of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. He recognized that totalitarian systems such as these could only exist in a time when technology would provide the political leaders with the necessary options for control. The danger that he identified explains the staying power of Nineteen Eighty-Four more than 60 years after it was written and why references to the danger of surveillance and the lack of privacy remain as major concerns. It would be intriguing to know what his views would be of the Internet and the social media, which provide at least some opportunities to bypass government propaganda and to provide alternative viewpoints and sources of information. James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz See also Cold War; Propaganda; Surveillance, Culture of; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies

Further Readings Mulvihill, Robert, ed. Reflections on America, 1984: An Orwell Symposium. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986. Orwell, George. Animal Farm. London, England: Secker & Warburg, 1945. Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty-Four. London, England: Secker & Warburg, 1949. Research Services, Library of Congress, ed. George Orwell & Nineteen Eighty-Four: The Man and the Book. Washington, DC: Author, 1985. Shaw, Tony. “Some Writers Are More Equal Than Others: George Orwell, the State and Cold War Privilege.” Cold War History, v.4/1 (2003).

P if that were the object, would require that each person should actually be in that predicament ­during every instant of time. This being i­mpossible, the next thing wished for is, that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary. (p. 14)

Panopticon, The The panopticon is a physical building design and theoretical concept that allows a single individual to monitor an entire institution without the observed subjects being made aware of their observation. The idea of the panopticon presumes that if individuals—such as prisoners, students, workers, or citizens—understand that they may be under observation at any time, these individuals will act as though they are under examination; in other words, they will self-police. This presumption by the subject is essential, as physical ability prevents a single individual from observing a large group simultaneously; thus, the power of the panopticon is the projection of omnipresence, not its functional ability to surveil. This entry describes the specifics of the panopticon as conceptualized by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, as well as its functional purpose, and then reveals how the French poststructural philosopher Michel Foucault expanded on the idea by equating it to a modern disciplinary society. While the idea for the panopticon was made famous by Foucault, it was originally developed by Bentham. In a series of letters written in 1787, Bentham (2011) explains the logic of discipline that presupposes the panopticon, stating,

Bentham’s ideas regarding observation and discipline are for the formation of a physical prison designed to accomplish the social task of observation. As Bentham (2011) describes it, the prison should meet the following broad specifications: The building is circular. The apartments [cells] of the prisoners occupy the circumference. . . . These cells are divided from one another, and the prisoners by that means secluded from all communication with each other by partitions in the form of radii issuing from the circumference toward the centre. . . . The apartment of the inspector occupies the centre [the inspector’s lodge]. . . . [You will also] have a vacant space or area all round, between such centre and such circumference. . . . Each cell had in the outward circumference, a window [to provide light]. . . . The inner circumference of the cell is formed by an iron grating, so light as not to screen any part of the cell from the inspector’s view. . . . To cut off from each prisoner the view of every other, the partitions are carried on a few feet beyond the grating into the intermediate area. . . . The light, coming in this manner through the cells, and so across the intermediate area, will be sufficient for the inspector’s lodge. (p. 35)

The more constantly the persons to be inspected are under the eyes of the persons who should inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have been attained. Ideal ­perfection, 717

718

Paparazzi

Bentham goes on to describe systems of l­ighting,  additional partitioning, doors, sound/­ communications, temperature, and precise measurements, but the crux of his design can be seen in the previously quoted design-level text. A prison of this style would require far less staff to guard the same number of inmates and will pass on some of the responsibility for regulation to the imprisoned subjects themselves. Bentham lays out the creation of a completely atomized prisoner who is constantly observable by a central authority (the inspector’s lodge), yet he or she is unable to determine if such an authority is present. Beyond Bentham’s detailed discussion of specific physicality, his concepts are integral to a discussion of surveillance and self-policing. Bentham’s logic posits that the more frequently an individual is the subject of surveillance, or the more often the individual believes himself or herself to be so, the more likely the individual will behave to the “purpose of the establishment.” Ideally, such a totalizing surveillance should be constant, but since that is likely impossible, in the best scenario, an individual will think of himself or herself as being under constant surveillance yet will be unable to prove otherwise. Bentham (2011) later writes of the “essential points of the [Panopticon] plan,” reasserting the totaling logic of the system. Perhaps it is the most important point, that the persons to be inspected should always feel themselves as if under inspection, at least as standing a great chance of being so, yet it is not by any means the only one. . . . What is also of importance is, that for the greatest proportion of time possible, each man should actually be under inspection. (p. xx)

As he describes it, Bentham’s panopticon functions effectively as a prison, a school, a factory, or any other site where a need for totalizing observation exists. Foucault employed Bentham’s idea of panopticonal surveillance in his 1975 book Discipline and Punish, embracing the prison design as a metaphor for a modern, disciplinary society—a society wherein order is maintained through the fear of observation and punishment, not brutal, violent force. In this book, Foucault (1975)

explains, “On the whole, therefore, one can speak of the formation of a disciplinary society in this movement that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, a sort of social ‘quarantine,’ to an indefinitely generalizable mechanism of ‘panopticism’” (p. 216). For Foucault, the metaphor of the panopticon demonstrates an individual’s ability to consciously embody the domination of state violence without the need to don handcuffs and chains. By internalizing the violence of state surveillance, for Foucault, the power of hierarchy can be imposed invisibly while remaining powerfully present. According to Foucault, in his lectures on “The Birth of Biopolitics,” the idea of the panopticon develops to become “the formula for the whole government, . . . the very formula of liberal government.” Bentham’s work in the development of the panopticon serves as a strategic reimagining of a  newly observable yet visually open (liberal) society—a manner of observing completely without the requirement of an ever-present observer. Michael Loadenthal See also Closed-Circuit Television; Foucault, Michel; Global Surveillance; Police State; Poststructural Theory; Prisons and Jails; Privacy; Social Control; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies

Further Readings Bentham, Jeremy. The Panopticon Writings (ed. Miran Bozovic, 2nd ed.). New York, NY: Verso Books, 2011. Foucault, Michel. Discipline & Punish. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1977. Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979 (1st ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Semple, Janet. Bentham’s Prison: A Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Paparazzi Paparazzi are freelance photographers who pursue celebrities to get and then sell photographs of them. The word originates from Italian filmmaker Federico Fellini’s 1960 film La Dolce Vita

Paparazzi

featuring a news photographer called Paparazzo. What distinguishes paparazzi from other professional photographers such as Annie Leibovitz or Helmut Newton is their relentless stalking and harassment of public figures and celebrities by invading their personal space and selling their photographs to tabloid newspapers, their online editions, and international gossip magazines. Thus, tensions are created between the ­paparazzi’s freedom of expression and the right to privacy  of  those photographed—which this entry explores.

Right to Privacy Paparazzi photographs are often taken in a climate of continual harassment, which may induce in the individual concerned a strong sense of intrusion into his or her private life or even of persecution. In European human rights law, under Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), freedom of expression extends to the publication of photographs, and Article 8(1) provides for an individual’s right to privacy. Through the years, the tensions between the freedom of expression and an individual’s right to privacy are evident in case law. Such cases have examined the rights and reputation of an individual and the importance of a photograph, concerning the “ideas” the image might convey and whether the information conveyed by the image is taken in a “private” or “intimate” situation. In some instances, the decisive factor in balancing freedom of expression and the right to privacy lies in the contribution that the photographs and the accompanying articles make to a debate of general public interest. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis argued that privacy was the most cherished of freedoms in a democracy and should be reflected in the U.S. Constitution. However, in the 21st century, the Internet has rendered the territorial demarcation of national jurisdictions ineffective. On the one hand, many individuals choose to lay their private lives bare, including highly personal photographs via Twitter and Facebook; on the other hand, some, such as celebrities, seek privacy actions via superinjunctions in the courts, especially when the information published in the media does not please them.

719

One such example is the case of actors ­Catherine Zeta-Jones and Michael Douglas with regard to photographs from their wedding at the Plaza Hotel in New York in November 2000. They had contracted OK! magazine to publish their photos, but Hello! magazine spoiled the exclusivity contract by obtaining clandestine paparazzi photos. The U.K. Court of Appeal did not award the Douglasses privacy rights under Article 8 of the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) (Douglas v. Hello! Ltd, 2001, QB 967). In September 2012, Prince William and his wife, Catherine (Middleton), launched a privacy action in the French courts against Laurence Pieau, editor of the French magazine Closer and its Italian-based magazine Chi—both part of the Mondadori media group and owned by former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. The magazines had published paparazzi photos of topless Middleton while she was sunbathing in the private gardens of a French chateau in Provence. Defense lawyers for the French and Italian media outlets argued that the Duchess of Cambridge was in a privileged position that came with responsibilities  and that the public interest test had been established as per the von Hannover (No 1) ruling in the Strasbourg Human Rights Court (Von ­Hannover v. Germany [2004] EMLR 21). In von Hannover No 1, Princess Caroline of Hannover (Caroline of Monaco married to Ernst August von Hannover) applied to the Strasbourg Human Rights Court invoking her privacy rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. Princess Caroline filed the case after the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany had refused a permanent injunction against the publication in glossy G ­ erman magazines because the German courts considered her a contemporary “public figure” and therefore had to tolerate the publication of photographs of herself and her children in a public place, even if they showed her in scenes from her daily life rather than engaged in her official duties. The Strasbourg Human Rights Court balanced Articles 8 (privacy) and 10 (freedom of expression) and considered the contribution that Princess ­Caroline’s photographs and the articles made to a debate of general public interest. The ECHR decided that the general public did not have a legitimate interest in knowing the applicant’s whereabouts or how she behaved generally in her private

720

Paparazzi

life, even if she appeared in places that were not private. The court ruled that everyone, including celebrities, have a “legitimate expectation” that their private lives be protected. There had been a violation of Article 8.

Legal Measures One of the most successful paparazzi agencies has been Big Pictures, owned and founded in 1993 by Australian-born Darryn Lyons. Big Pictures has faced a number of lawsuits for invasion of privacy and harassment in the British courts, including cases brought by Sienna Miller, Lily Allen, J. K. Rowling, Hugh Grant, and Elizabeth Hurley. In July 2012, Ting Lang Hong, the mother of actor Hugh Grant’s baby, received a British High Court “permanent undertaking” from the picture agency not to pursue, doorstep, or harass her or her child (Ting Lang Hong and Child KLM v. XYZ and Others [2011] EWHC 2995). An illustrated article had appeared in the News of the World on April 8, 2011, headlined “Hugh’s Secret Girl.” At the time of the publication, Hong had no idea that she was being followed and photographed. The London High Court ruling by Mister Justice Tugendhat set the precedent for ­ such future celebrity actions, providing enhanced legal measures in the United Kingdom for protection against paparazzi photographers, particularly regarding children. The case brought by J. K. Rowling concerned the publication of a photograph of the Harry Potter author’s son, David Murray, in the Sunday Express magazine in April 2005, accompanied by an article on Rowling’s attitude to motherhood (Murray v. Big Pictures and Express Newspapers, 2008, EWCA Civ 446). The child, 19 months old at the time, was photographed by a Big Pictures paparazzo in a stroller on High Street in ­Edinburgh. The English CA was asked whether parents can validly waive their child’s right to privacy. The CA ruled that they cannot: A child’s right to privacy is distinct from that of its parent. The court ruled that the circumstances in which a child has a legitimate expectation of privacy are wider than those in which an adult has such expectations: Adults can expect a greater degree of intrusion as part of their daily lives, while a little child may be unaware of media hype.

In the United States, in early 2013, actors J­ ennifer Garner and Halle Berry joined together to introduce new laws in California aimed at protecting children of celebrities from the activities of paparazzi photographers. They argued before the State Assembly in Sacramento that the offspring of celebrities were not responsible for being born into the public eye and should not face daily harassment by photographers. In September 2013, legislation was signed into law curbing paparazzi from aggressively photographing children. In addition, the so-called Paparazzi Reform Bill (California AB 1256) amended California privacy law to include within the definition of privacy “personal and familial activity” activities of children occurring at private and public schools, activities occurring at various medical facilities, and activities occurring where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists at other locations. This bill also created buffer zones around entrances and exits at specified facilities, including schools and medical facilities, to prevent barriers and obstructions from impeding ingress and egress to and from such facilities and to prevent the interruption of important and vital functions of such facilities.

Drone Journalism In 2016, there were nearly 2 million registered unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) or unmanned aerial vehicles as they are known in Europe—also known as drones in the United States. Once the preserve of the military, UAS are now being used by paparazzi for aerial photography and surveillance. Because drones can now fly over private properties and public land, new legal issues are emerging. Most commercial photographers now possess U.K. or U.S. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) licenses to  operate small unmanned aircrafts or drones to take aerial shots, yet the law pertaining to the use of drones is unclear. Since the mid-2000s, European Union (EU) surveillance laws and policies have come under scrutiny. In short, if a drone has a camera, its use is covered by the U.K. Data Protection Act 1998. There is also potential interference with an individual’s right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg ruled in 2014 that EU legislation on mass surveillance contravenes EU law. The case

Paparazzi

was brought before the ECJ by Digital Rights Ireland, together with the Austrian Working ­ Group on Data Retention (Judgment of the ECJ in “Digital Rights Ireland data retention challenge,” Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Luxembourg April 8, 2014). In its judgment, the ECJ stated that Directive 2006/24/EC did not lay down clear and precise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. In particular, the court criticized the untargeted nature of the surveillance measure and highlighted the absence of any objective criterion by which to determine the limits of the access of the competent national authorities to the data. As of 2017, in the EU, there is nothing to stop an individual from buying a drone and taking it out flying, as long as the drone weighs less than 20 kg (45 pounds) and the device is not used for commercial reasons. The only restriction is that the operator must avoid flying it within 150 meters (493 feet) of a congested area and 50 meters (164 feet) of a person, vessel, vehicle, or structure not under the control of the pilot. The European Aviation Safety Agency, the EU’s authority for aviation safety, released a regulatory framework in March 2015 focusing specifically on drone operations and unmanned aviation. In April 2014, Robert Knowles from Cumbria in the northwest of England was the first person in the United Kingdom to be successfully prosecuted by the U.K. CAA for the dangerous and illegal flying of an unmanned aerial vehicle. He was found to have flown the drone in restricted airspace over a nuclear submarine facility. Analysis by the police of the video footage taken from a camera fitted to the drone revealed that during its flight it had skimmed over the busy Jubilee Bridge over Walney Channel, well within the legally permitted 50 meters separation distance required. Both offences breached the U.K.’s Air Navigation Order. Knowles was found guilty of flying a small unmanned surveillance aircraft within 50 meters of a structure (contra Article 167 of the Air Navigation Order 2009) and flying over a nuclear installation (contra Regulation 3(2) of the Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Nuclear Installations) Regulations 2007). Knowles was fined £800 ($1,240) and paid costs to the CAA  of £3,500 ($5,430) at Furness and District ­Magistrate Court.

721

In December 2014, Eddie Mitchell, a freelance photojournalist carrying out aerial photography work using a flying drone in the United Kingdom, was arrested by British police officers for “dangerous behavior” when filming near Gatwick Airport in the South of England. He was later released because the police were not quite sure about the law relating to drone photography. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration regularly receives reports of potentially unsafe drone incidents (238 in 2014 and double that number in 2015). The federal government and many U.S. states have enacted dozens of UAS-related laws— some aimed at protecting the privacy of individuals and others at addressing safety concerns. California, for example, has advanced several bills that make drone operators responsible for personal injuries they cause and require them to buy insurance. The Federal Aviation Administration has implemented a comprehensive plan for drones. The small UAS rule came into effect on August 29, 2016. Similar to the existing regulations in the United Kingdom and the EU, the UAS rule outlines how high drones can fly; provides limitations with respect to the airspace within 5 miles of airports, stadiums, and heavily populated areas; mandates owners to operate drones within line of sight; and requires registration of UAS that weigh between 0.55 and 55 pounds. However, the rule does not address privacy issues or paparazzi drone photography. As in the EU courts, U.S. courts are struggling with the issue of drone use and privacy. As drone use becomes more widespread, individuals’ expectation of privacy may begin to be negated. For example, in State v. Davis, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that aerial surveillance from a helicopter at 50 feet amounted to an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, reversing a lower court determination. Although as of 2017 the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on drones and privacy specifically, it has issued decisions on aerial surveillance and expectations of privacy, ruling that surveilling a fenced backyard from an airplane at 1,000 feet (California v. Ciraolo [1986]) and a covered greenhouse from a helicopter at 400 feet (Florida v. Riley, 1989) does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Ursula Smartt

722

Paramilitarization

See also Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance; Drones, Commercial Applications of; European Convention on Human Rights; Privacy, Right to

Further Readings California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). Smartt, U. “Twitter Undermines Superinjunctions.” Communications Law, v.16/4 (2011). Smartt, U. Media and Entertainment Law (2nd ed.). Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2014. State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1177 (2015). State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 907 (2014). Wacks, R. Privacy and Media Freedom. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2013. Warby, Mark, et al., eds. Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (2nd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2011. Warren, S. D. and L. D. Brandeis. “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review, v.4/5 (1890).

Paramilitarization Paramilitarization refers to the changing nature of the security environment in operations of warfare and domestic law enforcement. The blending of military/war strategies and techniques with police and crime control initiatives has come to represent processes of paramilitarization that alter traditional notions of warfare and policing on a larger scale. However, and more particularly, paramilitaries refer to statutory and/or civil society forces that embody military characteristics and enforce de facto or legal policing powers. The actual expression of paramilitaries differs according to the legal and cultural context where they operate. For instance, some paramilitaries exist in civil war contexts as nonstate or parastate paramilitary forces such as citizen militias, whereas other paramilitaries refer to police units, gendarmaries, or other specialized policing units known as police paramilitary units (PPUs), which are more popularly known as special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. The paramilitarization of the domestic law enforcement is a growing trend in the criminal justice system. Law enforcement is recognized as being increasingly characterized by

reliance on the military/war model in its responses to urban crime, narcotics control, political protest, migration, and border control, as well as in counterterrorism operations. This entry highlights the previously clear-cut distinction between military and police units, defines militarism and militarization, examines the four dimensions of militarism, and finally reviews the various facets of militarization in modern society. Traditionally, the military is acknowledged as the organization responsible for managing the external practice of war, and the presence of paramilitaries refers to de facto civil militias that embody military characteristics and exact violent force and control on civil society. The police force, by contrast, maintains internal security through the enforcement of laws and statutes. The term paramilitaries, when applied to the domestic policing context, is often interchangeable with militarization and is a more common way to consider the blurring that takes place between law enforcement and war in domestic policing contexts. The concept of paramilitaries and militarization hinges on a distinction between militarism and militarization. Militarism refers to the ideology of warfare and violent conflict, which are shaped through the adoption of military force techniques, military strategies, tactics, and technologies by police agencies. According to the scholar Peter Kraska in his 2007 article in the journal Policing, as an aspect of militaristic ideology, militarism directly refers to a set of “beliefs, values, and assumptions that stress the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems” (p. 505). Militarism, as a constellation of ideas, beliefs, and values, valorize the violent use of force as an effective means to manage or solve a particular situation. Militarization, by extension, refers to the actual implementation of the ideology of militarism within the institutional culture and practices of domestic law enforcement.

Militarism The institutionalization of militarism (militarization) occurs through four main indicators, as noted by Kraska: (1) material, (2) cultural, (3) organizational, and (4) operational dimensions.

Paramilitarization

Material Dimension

The material dimension refers to the acquisition and use of military weaponry, equipment, and advanced military technology. Military equipment and technologies are commonly acquired by police forces around the world to augment special riot control police units, counternarcotics task forces, counterterrorism, and emergency response teams. The growth in the material dimension of paramilitarism in the United States has been significant  in recent decades. The Byrne Program, the ­Pentagon’s 1033 Program, and the U.S. Department of Defense’s Excess Property Program have largely fueled the flow of military equipment into local law enforcement agencies. In 2009, the Byrne Program received a $2 billion injection (the largest in the program’s 20-year history) from President Barak Obama. The Excess Property program forwarded $4.3 billion in equipment and weaponry. The Department of Homeland Security grants, however, surpass the Byrne grants, the 1033 ­Program, and the Excess Property program with an additional $34 billion in antiterror grants spread across a number of local police departments in the United States. These grants are commonly used to purchase armored vehicles, M-16 assault rifles, grenade launchers, camouflage gear, and other nonlethal weaponry such as “flash-bang” grenades, which are commonly used in “no-knock” house raids by SWAT teams and protest policing. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security is increasingly lending the police unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e., drones) that have been previously deployed as a surveillance technology in battleground situations of Afghanistan and Iraq. And while these influxes of material resources are significant, it also furthers the institutionalization of the cultural elements of militarism in domestic policing environments. Cultural Dimension

The cultural variable of paramilitarization refers to the use and effects of martial language. Of particular note in the cultural transformation toward paramilitary policing is the use of war metaphors that are often popularized in government and media. War is often used as a descriptive

723

metaphor to represent public policy responses and has covered “the War on Crime,” “the War on Drugs,” “the War on Gangs,” and “the War on Terrorism.” Each of these war metaphors has been used to describe government responses to social and political problems and in doing so valorize the cultural ideals of militarism. Along with the specific language of militarism, the stylistic adoption of military dress, beliefs, and values is a further characteristic of paramilitary culture. Organizational Dimension

The organizational variable refers to how institutional arrangements are patterned on military models (e.g., command-and-control centers) and the use of elite Special Forces squads as opposed to conventional regular police units such as beat patrol. The professionalization of policing, which gave rise to the modern police organization as a centralized bureaucratic authority premised on crime control, also gave rise to the militarization of policing. The adoption of best practices that reflect military operations in specialized task force responses to specific crime problems, such as in counternarcotics strategies, protest policing, or terrorism, became increasingly common. Operational Dimension

The operational variable, according to Kraska’s (2007) journal article, refers to “patterns of activity modeled after the military” in areas of “intelligence, supervision, handling high-risk situations, or war making/restoration” (p. 503). The use of advanced surveillance activities to provide realtime intelligence and situational awareness reflect a further operational convergence between military and policing models in the domestic policing environment. The notable convergence between intelligence-led policing and intelligence-led smallscale military operations reflects a further blurring between military and policing paradigms. Each is premised on a preemptive risk logic that relies on advanced surveillance and hacking techniques to interdict and disrupt criminal networks. Specific sites of analysis where each of these variables is most recognizable in specialized domestic policing initiatives (e.g., public order policing, narcotics

724

Paramilitarization

response, borders and immigration, and counterterrorism) have become areas of academic inquiry and media scrutiny unto themselves.

Militarization In public order policing, the increasing use of military equipment and spatial control tactics borrowed from military field manuals are permeating police approaches to crowd management. The use of less lethal weaponry and small-scale rapid deployment teams to quell disorder is reminiscent of foreign occupation missions. Authorities might also declare a state of emergency during protracted social disorder, thereby enacting martial law that involves the direct use of paramilitary forces, such as the U.S. National Guard or other military forces that are trained in domestic crowd control techniques. The rise of PPUs, however, is most recognizably attributable in relation to the War on Drugs in the United States. The emergence of zero-tolerance policies under President Ronald Reagan was supported by the earlier creation of the first U.S. SWAT team in Los Angeles under the Los Angeles Police Department Chief Darryl Gates in the 1960s. The growth of PPUs, or SWAT units, has ballooned in recent decades. In 1982, 59% of the U.S. police departments contained a PPU. By 1995, this number had grown to 89% of the U.S. police forces relying on common deployment of PPU initiatives. Accompanying this growth has been hundreds of PPU “no-knock” raids and other SWAT operations that, as of 2014, number in the tens of thousands per year and that routinely result in injury and death of unarmed (both nonviolent and innocent) civilians, police officers, and domestic animals. The militarization of migration and border control is another ongoing phenomenon. Border security and the militarization of immigration policy are characterized through enhanced persistent surveillance techniques that rely on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, VADER (Vehicle ­Dismount and Exploitation Radar) systems that have been explicitly developed for military use in Afghanistan, Blackhawk helicopters, marine vessels, and a range of imaging devices and sensors that boast video collection, night vision, and fiberoptic inspection scope capabilities. Border zones

are also synonymous with enhanced ID management systems that tap into integrated database networks to scrutinize and verify the authenticity of people and objects that traverse points of entry. Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the militarization of police in counterterrorism and disaster response/emergency management initiatives has been significant. One of the most notable catalysts for the emergence of paramilitary style policing in the War on Terror has been the exponential growth in the private sector that offers technologyled solutions and special equipment for antiterrorist services that trend toward the adoption of military-specific responses as part of a comprehensive risk management strategy. In addition to the private sector push, growth in intelligence-led policing initiatives, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, reflects a harmonized approach between military techniques of cyberespionage surveillance during asymmetric warfare missions and domestic criminal or counterterrorism operations. Adam Molnar See also Martial Law; Policing and Society; Terrorism; War on Drugs; War on Terror

Further Readings American Civil Liberties Union. War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing. New York, NY: ACLU Foundation, 2014. Balko, R. Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2013. Dunn, Timothy J. “Border Militarization via Drug and Immigration Enforcement: Human Rights Implications.” Social Justice, v.28/2 (2001). Dvorak, K. “Homeland Security Increasingly Lending Drones to Local Police.” The Washington Times (December 10, 2012). http://www.washingtontimes .com/news/2012/dec/10/homeland-securityincreasingly-loaning-drones-to-l (Accessed October 2017). Friesendorf, Cornelius. “Paramilitarization and Security Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police.” International Peacekeeping, v.18/1 (2011). Gillham, Patrick F., et al. “Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of Occupy Wall Street Protests in New York City, 2011.” Policing and Society: An

Parental Surveillance International Journal of Research and Policy, v.23/1 (2013). Graham, S. Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. London, England: Verso Books, 2011. Haberman, C. “The Rise of the SWAT Team in American Policing.” New York Times (September 7, 2014). http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/us/the-rise-ofthe-swat-team-in-american-policing.html?_r=0 (Accessed October 2017). Harris, S. @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex. New York, NY: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014. Kraska, P. B. “Militarization and Policing: Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.” Policing, v.1/4 (2007). Kraska, P. B. and V. E. Kappeler. “Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units.” Social Problems, v.44/1 (1997). Tierney, K. and C. Bevc “Disaster as War: Militarism and the Social Construction of Disaster in New Orleans.” In D. L. Brunsma, et al. (eds.), The Sociology of Katrina: Perspectives on a Modern Catastrophe. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. U.S. Senate. “S.744 Amendment.” (2013). https://www .congress.gov/amendment/113th-congress/senateamendment/1183/text (Accessed October 2017). Wood, L. J. Crisis and Control: The Militarization of Protest Policing. New York, NY: Pluto Press, 2014.

Parental Surveillance Most discussions of surveillance focus on state officials’ monitoring of individuals. But, with respect to children’s privacy, parents are far more powerful than the state officials, who generally need to apply to a judge for a warrant before they can listen to someone’s phone calls or read their emails. In contrast to the states, parents are free to surveille their children as much and as often as they like. As developments in technology, society, and the market make parental surveillance easier and more pervasive, evidence suggests that parents are taking advantage of their freedom more than ever before. This entry provides an overview of the current practices around parental surveillance, the motivations driving parents and companies, and the potential costs and benefits of it. A vast array of parental surveillance products are currently available and continue to flood the market, especially in technologically developed

725

economies such as the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan. A brief overview of these products gives some indication of what is possible in terms of parental surveillance. From baby monitors to nanny cams and clothing enabled with radio-frequency identification, products allow parents to monitor their child in a range of ways. Technologies available on the market in 2017 can monitor the following: (a) where a child is at any time, via body-worn or clothing-­embedded GPS tracking devices; (b) how fast a teenager is driving and where he or she is going; (c) what he or she eats at school, by means of an in-school credit card; (d) whether a daughter is sexually active, by means of a home-use semen-detection kit that can be used on clothing or sheets; (e) who children call and when, via mobile phone chargers that secretly download and transmit logs of all activity to a parent’s device; and (f) the content of all of a child’s online communications. Parents can also monitor their children on the school bus (in the United States) or while at nursery school (in Denmark) via live closed-circuit television feeds that are transmitted to parents online. Software allowing parents to monitor children’s online communications appears currently to be the most popular of these products. In 2013, Allied Business Intelligence research reported that the global market for parental control software alone was estimated to be worth more than $1 billion. A 2013 study by the Pew Research Centre in the United States found that more than half of the parents had used this kind of software. Studies have shown that some, typically welleducated and professional, parents use surveillance to build intimacy with their children, as monitoring helps them feel part of their children’s lives and communicate with them from a distance—an approach that has become known as helicopter parenting. But the primary reason parents use surveillance is to reduce perceived risks to the safety and security of their children. These risks include unwanted threats toward a child from external sources as well as threats arising from the child’s own voluntary behavior. Examples of the former include pedophiles, would-be sexual partners, bullies, drug dealers, and bad influences more generally. Examples of the latter include drug taking, poor dietary choices, promiscuity, unsafe driving, and other kinds of apparently reckless behavior.

726

Parental Surveillance

Companies marketing parental control technologies promote their products as a win-win solution for parents and children: Children can benefit from the freedom to do many things unaccompanied by their parents, and parents can feel confident that they are protecting their children from the risks associated with these activities, but without literally leaning over their shoulders. While it is true that many surveillance technologies are vulnerable to hacking and other kinds of security threats, overall these risks are far lower than those the technologies are designed to protect against. Parents have legal and moral duties of care toward their children that surveillance technologies can help them discharge. Indeed, surveillance or “watching over” of some sort is clearly necessary if parents are to protect their children against basic risks to their well-being. But is there such a thing as too much surveillance? If so, how much is too much? Companies that market surveillance technologies suggest that their use is harmless and that no risk to a child’s safety or security is too small to be managed effectively through surveillance. They also suggest that parental anxiety about their children’s safety is always legitimate grounds for surveillance; the possibility that such anxiety might itself be unfounded, irrational, or excessive and thus itself a problem is not acknowledged. In reality, it is unclear whether parental anxieties are more responsive to changes in actual risk or to the occurrence of moral panics in society, often fueled by media reports. Children have a right to privacy under international law that has been ratified by most countries in the world. Respect for the right to privacy is often defended as essential to the exercise of autonomy— the power and freedom to decide how to live one’s life independently of external influence or control. Children become more autonomous the older they get, so it would seem that age and claims for privacy against parental surveillance would increase together in a linear way. But it is also true that risks to children’s safety and well-being do not all decrease as children become more autonomous. Teenagers are particularly vulnerable to serious harm and at the same time particularly untrustworthy. Parents may be more justified in using deceptive methods to monitor teenagers than they would be in doing the same to younger, less autonomous children. Trust, in the sense of being trusted and learning how to be trustworthy, is a necessary ingredient for autonomy.

To the extent that surveillance of children communicates mistrust, as it surely sometimes does, this can interfere with children’s confidence and ability to take responsibility for themselves. Autonomy is not the only value promoted by privacy from parents. Privacy from parents also enables the development of important and meaningful relationships between children and other adults. For example, parents must be absent, both literally and virtually, if children are going to build natural and secure relationships with grandparents, let alone with child care professionals. Finally, deceptive surveillance, if revealed, can damage relationships between parents and children. Katerina Hadjimatheou See also Cell Phone Tracking; Closed-Circuit Television; Drug Testing; Electronic Surveillance; Privacy, Right to

Further Readings Helsper, E., et al. “Country Classification: Opportunities, Risks, Harm and Parental Mediation.” EU Kids Online Project (2013). http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/52023 (Accessed July 2014). Livingstone, S. Children and the Internet. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2009. Margaret, Nelson. Parenting Out of Control: Anxious Parents in Uncertain Times. New York: New York University Press, 2010. Marx, G. and V. Steeves. “From the Beginning: Children and Subjects and Agents of Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society, v.7/3–4 (2010). Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Surveillance Technologies and Children. Research Paper. (2012). https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/ research-recherche/2012/opc_201210_e.asp#_ftn12 (Accessed July 2014). “Parental Control Software and Filtering Technologies to Drive Child Online Protection Market.” ABI Research (August 2, 2013). https://www.abiresearch.com/press/ parental-control-software-and-filtering-technologi (Accessed July 2014). Pew Research Centre. Internet & American Life Project Teens and Privacy Survey (July 26 to September 30 2012). http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/ many-parents-act-to-control-or-monitor-teens-onlineactivities/ (Accessed July 2014). Rooney, Tonya. “Trusting Children: How Do Surveillance Technologies Alter a Child’s Experience of Trust, Risk and Responsibility?” Surveillance & Society, v.7/3–4 (2010).

Parks Valentine, G. and S. L. Holloway. “On-Line Dangers? Geographies of Parents’ Fears for Children’s Safety in Cyberspace.” The Professional Geographer, v.53 (2001).

Parks Parks, which are publicly owned land set aside for recreational use and open to the general public, are both praised and vilified with regard to their safety and security. Proponents see parks as neighborhood amenities, places where community members of different socioeconomic status interact and play together while building strong community identities and enjoying the tranquility of natural surroundings. Opponents believe that parks can be frightening and dangerous places, easily taken over for undesirable activities, including living spaces for the homeless, markets for drug dealers, and places that act as delinquent behavior magnets for juveniles. Parks are often seen in this negative light because many legitimate users believe that parks lack adequate surveillance and guardianship, especially when located in urban environments. Recent research supports these claims. This entry reviews research on the topic of community parks and crime, describes how a park evolves into an area of high crime, and concludes with strategies for how community and law enforcement can ensure the safety of legitimate park users.

Community Parks and Crime Although problem parks are frequently mentioned in the media, there is limited research that specifically connects parks and crime, except through earlier studies that focus on fear and perceptions of safety. Researchers have learned from these older studies that the community considers a park “safe” when the following signs are evident: Many parents with children visit the park, females visit as often as males, the elderly regularly utilize the park, and workers frequently take lunch or other breaks at the park. Increased fear at parks is associated with social incivilities (e.g., rowdy youth, alcohol and drug use), physical disorder (e.g., graffiti, litter, and poor maintenance), and poor park design, especially that which is associated

727

with decreased surveillance (e.g., trails with poor sight lines, benches, restrooms in secluded places, and little night lighting). Recently, a few researchers have specifically examined the crime-park relationship. Several studies have shown that the presence of parks in neighborhoods is related to significantly higher levels of burglary, possibly because they allow easy and unseen access to adjacent properties during hours of low park usage and because they attract more potential offenders into the neighborhood than would have been there had it not been for the presence of the park. In addition, studies in  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Louisville, ­Kentucky, found that neighborhoods containing parks experienced higher violent, property, and disorder crime densities than did the cities as a whole. A closer examination of the data revealed that parks experienced lower levels of crime when they contained facilities that tended to attract more legitimate users for longer periods of time (e.g., organized sports fields or courts and night lighting in Philadelphia; benches, improved walkways, drinking fountains, restrooms, and parking lots in Louisville). The authors argue that natural surveillance and guardianship are increased because of the presence of the additional legitimate users attracted to the parks by these particular facilities.

Development of High-Crime Parks A study examining parks in the United States and Canada found that high-crime parks develop in a series of stages. The onset is characterized by visible signs of depreciation, including graffiti, vandalism, and litter. Offenses of this nature may seem mundane but can serve as a gateway to more serious forms of deviance. The second stage is characterized by increasing conflicts between criminal and legitimate users as they struggle for “ownership” of the park. It is during this time that the number of legitimate park users begins to decline, making the location more ideal for crim­ inal activity. The presence of fewer legitimate users  means a decreased likelihood that crimes will be witnessed, deterred, and reported. In the third stage, the park becomes known for criminal activity and is labeled by the community as a dangerous place. Those seeking deviant opportunities are attracted to the park, and law-abiding citizens

728

Parks

know to stay away. In the final stage, the community takes back the park by reestablishing guardianship and actively recruiting legitimate users to lessen the park’s vulnerability to crime.

Intervention Strategies Research and experience suggest intervention strategies that law enforcement, park officials, and concerned neighborhood residents can employ to take back a problem park. Common themes for these interventions include increasing surveillance and guardianship over the park by attracting more legitimate users and through better environmental design. To attract legitimate users to parks, good maintenance is vital. Quick repair of damaged property and removal of graffiti communicate a sense of ownership and control over the park, leading to reductions in the fear of crime. This is likely to increase the number of legitimate users. The aforementioned Philadelphia and Louisville studies showed that the type of facilities available in parks were also important to users and crime levels. Parks with sports fields and courts used for organized recreation use in Philadelphia tended to have significantly lower crime rates. This was credited to attracting more legitimate users to the park, including recreational participants, coaches, and referees. The Louisville study argued that the presence of basic amenities, including restrooms, drinking fountains, benches, and parking lots, attracted more legitimate users for longer periods of time, resulting in more guardianship, surveillance, and lower crime levels. Lighting walkways and sports fields at parks encourages more legitimate use during hours of darkness. With the use of these amenities, frequent users of the park are more likely to develop a sense of territory and have a protective mind-set over the park. Parks with fewer activity generators have fewer participants who would play this role. Encouraging community members to take a role in park maintenance and planning may contribute to more legitimate park use and guardianship as well. Some parks achieve this through community awareness programs such as citizen patrols and park watch programs that assist in protecting parks through added surveillance. When neighborhood residents volunteer their time to park cleanups, beautification projects, and watch programs and have a say in the design and event planning for a

park, a sense of ownership among residents is developed. This in turn often leads to the acceptance of more responsibility for watching over the park and the activity occurring there. Along with attracting more legitimate users and the additional surveillance they provide, park officials can make environmental changes that make it more difficult for crime to occur. Common techniques include installing video camera surveillance systems, increasing overall visibility by trimming shrubs and tree canopies, improving lighting to enhance nighttime use and visibility, building perimeter fences to control after-hours access, and posting signs communicating park rules and regulations. The police, of course, can provide ample surveillance and guardianship to parks. Foot patrols by uniformed officers, especially during high-crime hours, not only reduce crime and disorder but also improve police-community relations. Scheduling park events and programs for legitimate users with police or security personnel present communicates positive control, formal surveillance, and effective management of the park. Police can also collab­ orate with park and recreation departments in developing sponsored athletic leagues. Enforcement of truant and curfew laws will remove young offenders from parks during low-use school and late-night hours, protecting both minors and the general public. As with other public places, parks often become “contested spaces” between the law-abiding ­public and those involved in crime and disorder. Research and experience suggest that both the cause and the fix revolve around available amounts of surveillance and guardianship. Eric S. McCord and Jason Nicholson See also Community

Further Readings Groff, Elizabeth and Eric McCord. “The Role of Neighborhood Parks as Crime Generators.” Security Journal, v.25/1 (2012). Hilborn, Jim. Dealing With Crime and Disorder in Urban Parks (Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Response Guide Series No. 9). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2009. http://www.popcenter.org/Responses/ pdfs/urban_parks.pdf (Accessed October 2014).

Parole

729

about potential parolees, just as courts have when determining probation.

Parole Parole is a conditional release from prison into society allowing an individual to begin the reintegration process while continuing to be watched and controlled by a supervising authority. In many ways, parole is an extension of incarceration. Parole follows an offender’s prison sentence and serves two goals: (1) reintegrating the offender back into society as a contributing member and (2)  controlling any potential threats to the larger society by keeping the individual under careful government surveillance. These goals contribute to the decision-making process at each step in the parole process, from eligibility to revocation, and require a delicate balancing between society’s security and an offender’s individual rights. At various times in the history of parole, balancing the twin goals of parole has proven difficult and has resulted in an increasingly one-sided supervision regimen. For example, today, while one of the twin goals of parole is the facilitation of the successful reentry of a parolee, many scholars suggest that surveillance and security are the primary purposes of parole. Increasingly, conditions of parole require that parolees relinquish much of their privacy. Paroling authorities often argue that without such relinquishments, control of surveillance and control of former offenders is impossible.

Role of the Parole Board Parole boards are administrative committees consisting of 7 to 10 people who collectively decide whether and when inmates should be released on parole. Members of the parole board are appointed by the federal or state governments. The entire board may make decisions, or smaller groups within the board may make decisions on behalf of the entire committee. Requirements for being on a parole board vary by jurisdiction and sometimes include working within a specific field, such as criminology, sociology, or psychology. However, some states have no threshold requirements. A parole board is statutorily empowered and may have broad discretion, little discretion, or no discretion. Parole boards also have investigatory ­ powers to issue subpoenas for relevant information

Eligibility and Granting Not all felons are eligible for parole. Some crimes are legislatively ineligible for parole depending on the offense, the offender, and the victim. Serious crimes, including capital crimes and many sex crimes, are usually ineligible for parole. In addition, offenders with extensive criminal histories or those labeled as violent or dangerous may lose parole eligibility. Furthermore, those who commit crimes against vulnerable victims such as children or the elderly may be ineligible for parole. Once an inmate becomes parole eligible, the parole board then reviews and evaluates whether parole should be granted. Eligibility and review come up only after the inmate has completed a statutorily prescribed time period, frequently expressed as a percentage of the sentence. Inmates are notified of  their review date, and they may choose to attend or not. Parole boards create their own guidelines to follow when determining whom to parole, focusing on whether the offender is likely to assimilate as a productive member of society. One prominent consideration for most parole boards is evidence of an inmate’s remorse for his or her actions, usually manifested as an admission of guilt. Additional factors that boards may take into consideration include prior criminal history, institutional behavioral record, vocational training while incarcerated, educational accomplishments while incarcerated, any signs of rehabilitation, and postincarceration plans. Boards likely consider other unwritten factors, such as the degree of overcrowding in the prison, the prisoner’s health, whether there is any further benefit to either the prisoner or the institution from further incarceration, and the public’s reaction to the inmate being paroled. Certain factors that should never be considered by the board are an inmate’s race, religion, national origin, sex, and decision exercise of the court system. If parole is denied after the initial parole board review, the inmate will have future opportunities for review. Parole boards review inmates regularly as long as the time lapse between reviews is reasonable. Depending on the state, the time between reviews may be months or years.

730

Parole

Conditions Parole conditions are the limitations placed on a parolee by the parole board to assist in the reintegration process. Conditions are based on the nature of the crime committed, specific needs of the parolee, and other conditions set by the parole board ensuring control and compliance. Conditions serve the twin purposes of keeping the parolee under supervision while he or she is reintegrating into society and ensuring that society is protected from any further criminal activity. There are three levels of discretion regarding parole conditions. The first allows the parole authority no discretion in setting conditions outside the statutory prescriptions. The second allows the parole authority limited discretion in determining parole conditions. In this instance, the statute not only provides general parole conditions applicable to all parolees but also includes a catchall provision allowing the supervising authority the flexibility to create or sometimes modify conditions as the parolee’s reintegration progresses. Most supervising authorities are not given the power to make conditions more lenient, but specifics are found in applicable statutes. The third allows parole authorities complete discretion to set conditions. Common conditions include following all laws, travel restrictions, alcohol restrictions and treatment programs as necessary, curfews, and restrictions on associations with other felons, as well as requiring employment, drug testing, and routine check-ins with the parole officer. Certain classes of crimes have additional parole requirements. Sex crimes, for example, may require sex offender registration and additional travel restrictions. Waiving rights granted under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is one of the most debated general parole conditions. Parolees must give up the privacy afforded to general citizens or stay in prison for the remainder of their sentence. Courts have held that the nexus of parole to incarceration justifies the waiver because the supervising authority needs the heightened control over the parolee. Waiving one’s Fourth Amendment rights means submitting to searches of self or residence at any time by the parole officer or, sometimes, by any law enforcement officer. However, the breadth of the search depends on

whether the search is supervisory or investigatory. If a search is based on a parole officer’s supervisory responsibilities, the extent of the evidence allowed to be admitted against the parolee or others in the household is different from that which is admitted if the search is investigatory.

Revocation Parole revocation is initiated in one of two ways: (1) technical violations of the conditions of parole or (2) committing new crimes. However, technical violations do not automatically revoke parole. A parolee is entitled to a hearing before parole can be revoked. Nine revocation guidelines have emerged. First, the person must be on parole. Second, the condition must be legal and must have been imposed on the parolee. Third, the parolee must be able to perform the condition. Fourth, conditions cannot be contradictory. In other words, if following one condition will inherently violate another condition, the parolee will not likely have committed a violation. Fifth, the condition must have been imposed by a person or entity with the authority to impose conditions, such as the parole board or the supervising parole officer. Sixth, the parolee’s actions must violate the condition in question. Seventh, the parolee’s conduct must be the type the condition was intended to prohibit. Eighth, depending on the jurisdiction, the parolee’s conduct must have been willful and substantial. Finally, the conduct in question does not have to be a violation of law in itself. Parolees are entitled to have a hearing to determine whether their parole conditions have been violated and what sanction imposes an appropriate remedy. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that due process is necessary during parole revocation but not to the full extent that one enjoys while on trial. Due process during revocation hearings is limited to ensuring the accuracy of the information and veracity of the facts supporting revocation. These hearings take place in two parts. The first hearing is to determine whether there are reasonable grounds for revocation. If reasonable grounds are found, the parolee can request a second hearing, called the final parole revocation hearing, at which he or she may present favorable testimony or evidence. These hearings must take place within a reasonable amount of time after the parolee is

Passenger Data

taken into custody. Since parolees do not have the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, there is no right or authority to grant bail. If parole is revoked, the parolee may be sanctioned by warning, modified conditions, paying additional fines or restitution, having the term of parole increased, or serving the remaining parole term in prison. If the parolee is convicted of new crimes, the term of incarceration may include the remaining parole term plus the sentence for the new crime.

State Versus Federal Parole Today, in the United States, parole refers only to the states’ systems. The federal government abolished parole for individuals who committed crimes after November 1, 1987. The federal courts now use a system of supervised release. Although frequently used interchangeably, the difference is that parole is discretionary, and supervised release is part of sentencing. For example, in a modern federal court, a person may be sentenced to a period of incarceration followed by a nondiscretionary supervised release. James M. Binnall See also Life Without Parole; Offender Reentry Programs; Prisons and Jails; Probation

Further Readings Cohen, Neil. The Law of Probation and Parole (2nd ed.). St. Paul, MN: West, 1999. Criteria for Determining Date of First Release on Parole, Model Penal Code § 305.9. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). “The Parole System” [Special issue]. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v.120 (1971).

Passenger Data After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Western countries, most notably the United States and the members of the European Union (EU),

731

decided to intensify the fight against terrorism. An example of the countermeasures taken has been the large-scale analysis of stored personal data. The intent of this practice is to prevent terrorism or serious crime. Passenger data collection, within the framework of air transportation, illustrates perfectly the debate surrounding the choice between security, considered as indispensable, and liberty, threatened by infringements on fundamental rights. This entry first reviews the various mechanisms utilized by the United States to collect passenger data and then examines the ethical and legal considerations of passenger data collection and analysis.

U.S. Control Mechanisms The Electronic System for Travel Authorization is a dedicated website managed by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); a valid passport, a credit card, and the communication of personal data are enough to apply for an authorization. It concerns all citizens of the countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program, which allows travel to the United States without a visa for tourism or business activities for stays fewer than 90 days. By performing checks against law enforcement databases, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identifies travelers seen as potential risks. Authorization will be granted only if certain requirements are fulfilled (e.g., criteria relative to contagious diseases, drugs addiction, arrests or convictions, visa cancellation or measure of expulsion). The airline has the responsibility to check the Electronic System for Travel Authorization website before boarding, to be sure that the DHS has delivered an authorization. Secure Flight, managed by the Transportation Security Agency, an agency of the DHS, is a behindthe-scenes program that covers both domestic and international flights through the use of improved watch list cross-referencing. Travelers provide additional data to the airline, particularly a possible “known traveler number” or “redress number” (the latter, issued by the DHS, redresses a misidentification inside the watch list, e.g., because of homonymy). The airline submits information to Secure Flight to prevent the boarding of individuals listed on, for instance, the No Fly List, or the Secondary Security Screening Selectee List. These lists regroup people either banned from flying or subjected to more stringent control.

732

Passenger Data

The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) is a system that allows carriers to transmit to the CBP data on passengers and crew members arriving into, or departing from, the United States. Its electronic version (e-APIS) is a website allowing passengers to submit manifests. APIS is the standard that enables DHS to prevent the boarding of potentially dangerous persons onto flights. The Passenger Name Record (PNR) contains data concerning passengers traveling to the United States; it is unchecked information and is stored by the airlines. The batch, composed of 19 different types of information (see Table 1), is transmitted to the CBP prior to departure to be checked by the Automated Targeting System—Passenger. Data are used within three complementary time frames: (1)  reactive mode (continuing an investigation), (2) real time (preventing crime), and (3) proactive

mode (assessing a potential risk from some passengers). Any individual, regardless of citizenship, can access the PNR database, under the Freedom of Information Act. A specific PNR agreement allows the transfer to the DHS of data of European citizens traveling to the United States. The PNR agreement, consistent with EU law, offers a robust data protection regimen, a strict purpose limitation, rights of access, rectification and erasure, and a controlled duration of storage.

Some Ethical Issues and Legal Aspects Regarding Personal Data Collection All these provisions are inspired by the same ends: security. Increasing control around borders (before, during, or after crossing) is done in an effort to try to limit illegal immigration and identify terrorism’s threats, as well as those resulting from transnational

Table 1 The 19 Different Types of Data Required in a Passenger Name Record (PNR)  1

PNR record locator code

 2

Date of reservation/issue of ticket

 3

Date(s) of intended travel

 4

Name(s)

 5

Available frequent flyer benefits information (i.e., free tickets, upgrades, etc.)

 6

Other names on PNR, including number of travelers

 7

All available contact information (including originator of reservation)

 8

All available payment/billing information (e.g., credit card number)

 9

Travel itinerary for specific PNR

10

Travel agency/travel agent

11

Code share information (e.g., when one air carrier sells seats on another air carrier’s flight)

12

Split/divided information (e.g., when one PNR contains a reference to another PNR)

13

Travel status of passenger (including confirmations and check-in status)

14

Ticketing information, including ticket number, one-way tickets, and Automated Ticket Fare Quote fields

15

Baggage information

16

Seat information, including seat number

17

General remarks, including Other Service Indicated, Special Service Indicated, and Supplemental Service Request information

18

Any collected Advance Passenger Information System information (e.g., Advance Passenger Information that is initially captured by an air carrier within its PNR, such as passport number, date of birth, and gender)

19

All historical changes to the PNR listed in numbers 1 to 18

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Passenger Name Record (PNR) Privacy Policy (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/pnr_privacy_3.pdf).

Passenger Data

crime. However, the economic constraints are at least as important as the security imperatives. A globalized world has to take into account the delays caused by the strengthening of checks at airports, which can be an obstacle to the smooth functioning of the economy. Therefore, the challenge is to ensure effectiveness of controls made in airports (security objective) while making them more fluid (econom­ ical objective). Presently, there is an ongoing debate among those who prefer tighter borders and increased monitoring and security and those who desire an environment that decreases the burden and increases the privacy of travelers. The most common objection against increased security measures is the infringement of fundamental liberties, particularly to the right to privacy guaranteed by the protection of personal data. One recent example is the opinion by a U.S. court that constitutionally protected liberty interests in traveling internationally are affected by the No Fly List. Regarding Secure Flight, this program is exempted from several provisions prescribed by the Privacy Act of 1974, which forbids the secret storage of the personal data of U.S. citizens. However, the TSA has developed a comprehensive plan to incorporate privacy laws and practices in all areas of Secure Flight. Moreover, the PNR agreement between the United States and the EU in 2012 has been the source of a deep transatlantic misunderstanding caused by the differences concerning the right to data protection. For the EU, this fundamental right, defined by Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (which is part of the European treaties), is a mandatory constraint on the EU Parliament and on all the member countries, as soon as the bodies concerned apply or implement the EU law. In the United States, the dominant concept is privacy, recognized and guaranteed by the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Privacy Act is limited to personal data handled by the federal government, and it only protects American citizens. Therefore, major criticisms have been raised in the EU against the PNR agreement. One of them is based on the limitation of its purposes (i.e., the spectrum of the ends balanced against the means). Purposes are ­formulated—from a European point of view—in a too wide or ambiguous manner, opening the door to the use of data for objectives other than the fight against terrorism (e.g., immigration control). The

733

length of time that the data can be stored (limited to 15 years, although then indefinitely stored after being “anonymized”) was also deplored. The proactive use of data as a real profiling action is specifically targeted by the European point of view, not being in conformity with the requirements of Article 8 of the Charter, in addition to the European Convention of Human Rights. Finally, the presence of sensitive data, which may reveal sexual orientation, religion, or political opinion, has also been heavily criticized. An important point of contention was also the absence of the possibility to search for a judicial redress in the U.S. courts for EU citizens. These obstacles would probably disappear within the framework of the so-called Umbrella Agreement between the United States and the EU, defining data exchange processes for law enforcement purposes. The PNR file is an illustration of the challenge in finding a balance between the fight against terrorism and the protection of fundamental rights. If nobody disputes the legitimacy of the former (the security being considered as a “duty” of the statecraft), many voices rise to dispute the consequences of the latter, resulting in the restrictive measures on liberties inherent to the PNR regulations. The most important question of concern is the opportunity of such regulations with regard to their intrusive nature for the a priori innocent traveler: Is the use of personal data effective in preventing a terrorist threat? Sylvie Peyrou See also Airport Terminal Security Screenings; Global Surveillance; Passenger Profiling; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Right to; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings De Hert, Paul and Rocco Bellanova. Transatlantic Cooperation on Travelers’ Data Processing: From Sorting Countries to Sorting Individuals. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ transatlantic-cooperation-travelers-data-processing (Accessed July 2014). Kuhelj, Alenka. “The Twilight Zone of Privacy for Passengers on International Flights Between the EU & USA.” U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, v.16 (2010).

734

Passenger Profiling

Peyrou-Pistouley, Sylvie. “Droits fondamentaux versus diplomatie, ou le pot de terre contre le pot de fer: réflexions sur la conclusion de l’accord PNR entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union européenne.” Europe, v.22/7 (2012).

Passenger Profiling Passenger profiling at airports consists of using various data sets to assess the potential threat of those passing through airports and preparing to board airplanes. It has been heralded as the new way of smart security in aviation. Profiling at the airport is now used in multiple ways, ranging from commercial interests to the War on Terror. However, analyses of passenger data have raised concerns both in terms of social sorting that categorizes individuals in discriminatory fashion and in terms of privacy and data protection. This entry examines the current security practices at airports and describes how obtaining and analyzing data from passenger profiling could improve the  traveling experience for those affected by increased security measures. Privacy concerns, along with concerns that passenger profiling could lead to discrimination and social sorting, are also discussed. Airports have been at the center of attention for security policies ever since politically motivated and much publicized hijackings occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s but arguably even more so since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Since 2001, several additional security measures and policies have been introduced to make sure that no further harm could be inflicted through the aviation system by hijacking or blowing up aircraft. Most parts of airport security are centered on the actual security screening checkpoint that each passenger must pass through on his or her journey. However, this seems to be not sufficient anymore. Aviation experts and practitioners alike agree that there can be in fact only so many protocols (e.g., no liquids, no dangerous objects, removal of shoes and jackets) and technologies (e.g., metal detectors,  full-body scanners, explosives detection devices, X-ray scanners for luggage) before security

screening slows down airports to such an extent that it becomes unbearable for both passengers (in terms of convenience) and commercial stakeholders (airport operators, airlines). Thus, in an effort to render airport security more efficient and uninterrupted, experts have called for new ways to identify possible threats and risks at an early stage, even before travelers arrive at the screening checkpoint or at the final destination of their journey. The solution for this has been framed as quite simple: Collect data on every passenger and then decide, based on this information, whether he or she poses a threat. If not, according to this logic, security measures might be considerably reduced to speed up the process (and save costs). However, if the passenger is believed to pose some kind of harm to security, then screening could be tightened and reinforced through additional measures. Subsequently, passengers at the airport are categorized into distinct profiles. With such profiles, so the argument goes, resources could be reallocated flexibly as needed, and at the same time, air travel would become more convenient for the majority of passengers. More recently, a number of concrete proposals in this vein have been put forward, the most wellknown one by the International Air Transportation Association, titled Checkpoint of the Future, which proposes physically sorting passengers and scrutinizing them with more or less screening technologies based on how they have been classified beforehand. Other profiling practices have already been implemented for quite some time now. For instance, for passengers flying from the European Union to the United States, a Passenger Name Record data set is automatically collected and transferred to the U.S. authorities prior to the arrival of the actual flight. Based on those data, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement seeks to identify terrorists, criminals, and illegal immigrants and prevent them from entering the country in the first place. There is, however, a normative twist to a priori analytics of passenger data. What essentially happens in such practices is what David Lyon has identified as “social sorting.” Social sorting describes the grouping of the analyzed population into distinct categories—in the case of airport security, there would, for instance, be a distinction

Paternalism and Parens Patriae

between low-risk travelers, medium-risk travelers, and high-risk travelers. Accordingly, well-known “trusted travelers” would benefit from their assigned low-risk status, whereas high-risk individuals would have to undergo intense scrutiny. The decisive question then becomes how those categories are constituted and through which criterion an individual would become sorted into one of them. The most “classical” way to build such a profile would in fact be through the domain expertise of security professionals who would then define what to look for. Most notably, such a way of profiling passengers at the airport has been intensely criticized in the immediate period after 9/11, when multiple reports of discrimination against travelers from the Middle East surfaced. There is, of course, no causal connection between being a young, male Muslim from Iraq and being a terrorist—yet travelers with such characteristics were increasingly selected for intensive screening and questioning by the airport security. Others have argued that with sufficient computational power, profiles now more and more come into being through data mining in passenger data sets, looking for suspicious patterns to create new knowledge about threats, resulting in what Louise Amoore calls a “mobile norm.” On the other end of the airport security continuum, a profile can be used not only for the establishment of suspicion but also for the establishment of trust. This is most notably the case with trusted traveler programs and frequent-flyer clubs that many airports and airlines offer to their customers. Increasingly, such programs are also adopted by immigration and border control agencies around the world. For the purpose of more efficient security screening, those programs offer several incentives (e.g., bonus miles, lounge access, fast lanes, facilitated border crossing) in exchange for additional information about their members. From such additional data, better risk assessments can be derived, and thus, security screenings can be improved and border control can be rendered more efficient. Considerable critique has been put forward with regard to the fact that such programs are almost exclusively used by the wealthy parts of the global population and thus exclude the poor from facilitated travel.

735

As indicated at the beginning of this entry, most profiling practices rely on some kind of data—be it personal, locational, or behavioral. Thus, concerns have also been put forward in terms of privacy and data protection, especially when commercial sector data are transferred to authorities, as is, for instance, the case with Passenger Name Record data. At airports, there is no way to circumvent the disclosure of data and ensuing analysis for the purpose of profiling. Discrimination is a functional part of profiling; however, it can easily turn into social sorting with detrimental effects. Authorities must thus be careful to make sure the antidiscrimination law is strictly enacted. Matthias Leese and Michael Nagenborg See also Airport Terminal Security Screenings; Dataveillance; Passenger Data; Privacy; Social Sorting

Further Readings Adey, Peter, et al. “Profiling the Passenger: Mobilities, Identities, Embodiments.” Cultural Geographies, v.19/2 (2012). Amoore, Louise. “Data Derivatives: On the Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our Times.” Theory, Culture & Society, v.28/6 (2011). Hildebrandt, Mireille. “Defining Profiling: A New Type of Knowledge?” In Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds.), Profiling the European Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer Science, 2008. Leese, Matthias. “The New Profiling: Algorithms, Black Boxes, and the Failure of Anti-Discriminatory Safeguards in the EU.” Security Dialogue, 2014 45(5): 494–511. Lyon, David, ed. Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination. London, England: Routledge, 2003.

Paternalism

and

Parens Patriae

Paternalism is the state mandating certain behaviors of individuals, without their consent, because the state is acting in a parental capacity: It knows better, and it is operating on those individuals’ behalf. It is a promotion of safety, health, or welfare at the

736

Paternalism and Parens Patriae

expense of liberty. Parens patriae is the state’s license or authority to engage in paternalism or to act in a parental manner. Both concepts are controversial due to the impact they have on individuals’ rights, such as the right to liberty and to privacy.

statutory, or constitutional principle that had been cited by the Quakers while securing approval for their plan—likely because none existed. The first legal challenge to the House of Refuge system reached the appellate courts in 1839, in Ex parte Crouse. In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revamped parens patriae so as to serve as Origins of and U.S. the state’s license and duty to raise poor and atInterpretation of Parens Patriae risk children; no longer was the doctrine limited Parens patriae traces back to 14th-century­ to (or perhaps even relevant to) financial planning England. The doctrine referred to the authority of for rich kids. the king to appoint a financial guardian or manBy the beginning of the 20th century, parens ager for children of nobility who had become patriae had been transformed further into the orphaned. This arrangement was beneficial for state’s authority to strip all constitutional rights both the children and the king. The children mainfrom children who had been charged with a crime tained their estate and were not exploited by in the juvenile court. Thus, youths, who had previwould-be thieves, and the king did not lose valuously been guaranteed the same constitutional able members of the nobility and the financial and rights as adults when prosecuted in criminal court, personal support they might give to the monarchy. were denied these rights because their case was However, parens patriae did not emerge in the being processed in the juvenile court. Once again, United States until the 19th century. In the early it was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Com1800s, the United States was undergoing some monwealth v. Fisher (1905), that offered the now radical changes: from a rural, agrarian society to twice-revised version of parens patriae and sancan urban, industrialized one. Together with widetioned the denial of rights to youths. spread immigration, cities were experiencing sigEventually, the U.S. Supreme Court would state nificant social problems, especially poverty and that this complete denial of rights was too extreme crime. The Quakers, who were dedicated social and would adjust this status by granting a few reformers, believed that poverty led to crime and constitutional rights to juvenile court defendants. that children grew up to follow in their parents’ The Court performed this adjustment in In re footsteps. To break the cycle of children growing Gault, in 1967. Interestingly, the Court described up to be poor and criminal like their folks, the the parens patriae doctrine as having a “murky Quakers believed that they needed to create special meaning,” “dubious relevance,” and “debatable institutions where the children could be housed constitutionality.” apart from their parents and provided with the As of 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court has not education they needed to learn a trade and escape revisited parens patriae in the juvenile court conpoverty. To operationalize this reform effort, the text, but it should be noted that the doctrine has Quakers opened Houses of Refuge; they secured a also been applied to the authority of a state’s charter for these facilities from legislatures in New attorney general to file antitrust litigation in a York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania in the federal court so as to protect the state’s economic 1820s (and later in other states). The children were welfare. Finally, the doctrine has also been incarcerated in these houses without being afforded employed to benefit adults who are mentally unfit any rights (e.g., counsel or trial). Differing from to care for themselves. those who were institutionalized in poorhouses and workhouses, these children were removed Nature and Elements of Paternalism from their families, even though they had not committed a crime. Poverty, bad language, one’s attiPaternalism reflects a conflict or tension between tude, or perhaps even clothing could qualify a the state taking care of an individual and the libchild for admission to a House of Refuge. erty of that individual. Inasmuch as children are Although legislatures had bought into the regarded as not having a right to liberty (at least Quakers’ plan, there was no legal provision, ­ not before the age of 16 or 18 years), this conflict

Paternalism and Parens Patriae

is particularly acute only when the individual is an adult. On the one hand, there is an argument that the state is best positioned to know what is best for its people and that it has an obligation to enforce whatever propositions would further that protection. Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Saint Thomas Aquinas endorsed this view, although they disagreed about the amount of control the state should exercise (absolute vs. ­ qualified) or the nature of the protection (physical vs. virtue or moral) the state should provide. On the other hand, philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill regarded paternalism as an assault on one’s liberty and the right to be let alone—to make one’s own decisions in life (no one knows the interests of a person better than that person). Antipaternalists would consider any limit on liberty as a greater danger than the state’s inability to prevent the alleged harm it perceives as necessary to avoid. Moreover, these opponents would argue that the only legitimate basis for state interference with one’s autonomy is to prevent harm to another person rather than to prevent harm to the individual against whom the state is intervening. Paternalism can be either “soft” or “hard.” Soft paternalism is temporary interference with liberty (e.g., not letting someone cross a bridge that the person doesn’t know has collapsed but ultimately letting the decision to cross be that person’s choice) or guiding a person to make a right choice (e.g., educating people as to the dangers inherent in certain behaviors, hoping they will choose correctly once they “know better”). The decades-long antismoking campaign (i.e., warnings on the pack of cigarettes) would be an example of the latter type of paternalism as would the use of signs that caution against swimming when no lifeguard is present. Hard paternalism is the state’s forcing the behavior of people typically through making the commission or omission of the behavior in question illegal. Numerous activities such as not making Social Security payments, and the prohibition against prostitution and the use of certain controlled substances, would fall into this category, as would helmet requirements for motorcycle riders and seat belt use for automobile passengers. The earlier swimming example would become “hard” if the “caution” were replaced with a strict prohibition, backed up with a citation or arrest for ignoring the sign.

737

Paternalism (the hard kind) has a long and established history with children in the United States. Children have neither a liberty interest, generally, nor the requisite wisdom to know what is best for themselves. In addition, children do not have a privacy interest (e.g., parents can give permission to the police to search their children’s rooms against the youths’ consent). Consequently, juveniles are subject to compulsory education laws requiring their schooling usually until the age of 16 years. Juveniles do not have the same Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protections against searches vis-à-vis school personnel enjoyed by adults in higher education settings. There are numerous other behaviors that are not crimes for adults but are illegal for children, known as status offenses (the status being age); both parents and school officials, arguably acting as state representatives, can charge juveniles with being incorrigible or beyond control, while youths are also not allowed to drink or drive, among other activities. Paternalism among adults (both soft and hard) has been more limited in nature due to both the liberty interests adults enjoy and the basic political aversion to state interference with people’s autonomy that have marked U.S. history to date. Adults, also, have a serious and thus far respected right to privacy that would militate against paternalism.

Future Outlook Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of paternalism is its potential future. It is possible that paternalism could become more inclusive and intrusive than it has been. Two potential developments could possibly expand the cause of paternalism. The first is the state becoming the sole provider of health care. Should this happen, the state would develop a vested interest in the health of its citizens. This interest would result from the state’s having to control the supply and demand of health services, which historically resided mostly in the private sector. If too many are becoming ill or unhealthy and are then draining too much of the state’s resources, paternalism could become “hard” and could include prohibitions against smoking, drinking alcohol, and eating certain products such as red meat or items containing an abundance of sugar. Beyond diet, the state could also be forceful in demanding an exercise regimen

738

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010

of all people and requiring everyone to become an organ donor. To be sure, the paternalism here might never occur or could begin and end as “soft.” There might be no more than a campaign to educate and persuade, rather than to enforce. If the soft approach fails, however, the state could turn to hard paternalism. The second possible development is the adoption of certain human rights propositions. Particularly relevant is the argument that there should be a duty to protect others similar to that required of certain groups such as parents, police, spouses, and owners of business establishments, all of whom have legal duties to others. Human rights advocates argue that just having a moral duty to rescue is insufficient because ignoring that duty has no legal consequence; thus, it is necessary to make it a crime not to intervene. In this context, all people would become a state representative obliged to act paternally toward everyone else. Opponents, though, argue that it would not take a quantum leap to extend the duty to protect from imminent harm to a duty to report others’ violations (e.g., of the diet and exercise regimens). Such scenarios could affect the historical rights to the liberty and privacy people have enjoyed in the United States. Arguably, everyone’s security and physical welfare would be enhanced, since the state and every person would be liable to ensure the protection and positive physical development and health of everyone else. In addition, tracking and surveillance devices could provide the state with the means to be able to keep tabs on everyone’s behavior and to act in a very paternalistic manner. Joseph B. Sanborn Jr. See also Autonomy; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Privacy, Right to

Further Readings Cogan, Neil H. “Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of ‘Parens Patriae.’” South Carolina Law Review, v.22 (1970). Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905). Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd ed.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Wharton 9 (Pa. 1839). In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

Pickett, Robert S. House of Refuge: Origins of Juvenile Reform in New York State, 1815–1857. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1969. Rendleman, Douglas R. “Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court.” South Carolina Law Review, v.23 (1971). Sanborn, Joseph B., Jr., et al. The Juvenile Justice System: Law and Process. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury, 2005. Santorius, Rolf, ed. Paternalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. VanDeVeer, Donald. Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds on Benevolence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), alternately referred to as the Affordable Care Act or Obamacare, is President Barack Obama’s signature legislative initiative, signed into law on March 23, 2010. The law uses a variety of measures to provide more Americans with health insurance, including the creation of state and federal insurance exchanges, as well as the expansion of eligibility for Medicaid. Before and after its passage, the law was the subject of intense political debate, and several legal challenges and controversies, including privacy concerns, continue to exist.

Passage During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama, the Democratic candidate, promised that if elected, reforming the U.S. health care system would be among his top legislative priorities. Democrats had long held the goal of expanding access to health care; in the 1990s, the Clinton administration was forced to abandon an ambitious plan for health care reform after facing strong Congressional opposition. Specifically, Obama sought to model national health care reform on a successful plan implemented in Massachusetts by the former governor Mitt Romney. To reduce the rate of uninsured persons in that state, the Massachusetts plan required

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010

739

all residents to obtain coverage or pay a penalty. In addition, to make plans affordable to all, the state offered subsidies for low-income residents and also mandated that more employers offer plans to their workers. The 2008 elections resulted in a unified government, with Obama winning the White House and the Democrats holding control of both Houses of Congress. Subsequently, in 2009, both the House and the Senate authored health care reform bills. Although many members of the Republican Party were initially supportive of some type of health care reform, party leaders objected to the individual mandate, namely, the legal requirement that all individuals obtain insurance or face a penalty. When the Democrats incorporated the individual mandate into the legislation, Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell encouraged all members of his party to vote against the law. Subsequently, during the summer and fall of 2010, public opposition to the law grew. During this time, Congressional Republicans were unified in publicly arguing that the law was an unconstitutional government takeover of health care. Moreover, vocal critics, such as former Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin, charged that the law would mandate “death panels” allowing the government to end health care coverage for handicapped or terminally ill individuals. Progress toward the passage of health care reform suffered a setback in January 2010, after Massachusetts senator Ted Kennedy, a Democrat, passed away, and Republican Scott Brown was elected to fill his seat. This deprived the Democrats of a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and allowed Republicans to prevent a vote on a final bill. To avoid legislative gridlock, the Obama administration chose to proceed with a bill that had previously been passed by the Senate, rather than pursuing the more ambitious proposal designed by the House Democrats. On March 21, 2010, the House passed the Senate’s version of the health care reform bill; all 178 Republican House members who were present voted in opposition. Obama then signed the bill into law on March 23, 2010.

that coverage more comprehensive and affordable. The central—and perhaps most controversial— provision of the law was the individual mandate. Specifically, this provision required all citizens to obtain health care; if a person did not receive coverage through his or her employer, the individual was required to purchase it through the federal or state insurance exchanges. The architects of this provision sought to increase the number of young, healthy people who paid premiums to insurance companies but consumed few services. This, in turn, would help offset the increased costs associated with providing comprehensive coverage for those with serious and chronic medical conditions. To ensure that plans offered through the exchanges were affordable, the government gave individuals earning between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty line subsidies that reduced the costs of their premiums. Moreover, to increase the  number of individuals who were covered by their employers, the law required all businesses that employed more than 50 people to provide their employees with health care coverage; if a business failed to do this, the government would fine its owners. The law also planned to cover more Americans through the expansion of Medicaid, a federal program originally created to provide health care to impoverished Americans. Under the PPACA, individuals earning up to 138% of the federal poverty line were now eligible to receive Medicaid coverage. Another provision, which allowed children to stay on their parent’s insurance until the age of 26 years, was designed to provide coverage for a segment of the population that has traditionally lacked insurance. In addition to insuring more people, the law was also designed to reduce the costs of health care and prevent insurers from refusing to provide coverage to chronically ill individuals. To this end, the law prohibited insurers from refusing to cover medical costs associated with preexisting conditions. The PPACA also banned insurers from instituting lifetime caps on medical expenses.

Major Provisions

Legal and Political Challenges

The overall goal of the legislation was to ensure near universal health care coverage and also make

From its inception, political attitudes toward the PPACA were polarized, with Democrats largely

740

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010

supporting it and Republicans opposing it. As a result, the new law became a central issue in the  2010 mid-term elections. Many Republican candidates campaigned on promises to repeal the  law, warning that the PPACA would lead to tax increases, substandard health care, and higher medical costs. Opposition to the PPACA also fueled the growth of the Tea Party movement, populated by conservatives who used the rhetoric and symbols of the American Revolution to indicate opposition to the Obama administration’s policies. Members of the Tea Party argued that the law was a threat to freedom; some went so far as to allege that the PPACA was a government takeover of health care and the first step in plans to implement a socialist government in the United States. This opposition to the law proved to be a boon for the Republican Party. In the 2010 elections, they managed to regain control of the House of Representatives and also reduced the Democratic majority in the Senate by six seats. After gaining control of the House, the Republicans, led by Speaker John Boehner, pledged to repeal the PPACA; by 2014, the House had voted 50 times to repeal portions of the law. Lacking control of the Senate or the presidency, however, these votes proved to be purely symbolic. The PPACA faced a major legal challenge in 2010, when the Supreme Court decided National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. The plaintiffs in this case challenged the constitutionality of the individual mandate, arguing that it represented an improper exercise of Congress’s power. In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, and joined by the Court’s four left-leaning Justices, the court held that the individual mandate was constitutional, as an exercise of Congress’s power to impose taxes. The Justices, however, did find that the law’s mandatory Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional; the majority argued that although the states could voluntarily accept funds for the expansion, Congress could not use punitive measures to force the states to comply.

Continuing Controversy More than 7 years after its passage, the PPACA remains the subject of much debate. The law reemerged as a subject of public debate in October

2013, when the government launched Healthcare .gov, the website for consumers to purchase policies from the federal health insurance exchange. Due to a design flaw, the website was incapable of handling a high volume of traffic; as a result, few uninsured individuals were able to select and enroll in health care plans. Critics of the website also cited privacy concerns, warning that the poorly designed website was vulnerable to hacking and could expose the personal data of enrollees. In addition, the law faced a legal setback in mid-2014, when the Supreme Court ruled against the Obama administration in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. More specifically, the Court found that PPACA’s requirement that employers cover most forms of birth control violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. After the ruling, the government was forced to grant exemptions to some private companies that stated a religious objection to contraception. Proponents of the PPACA, however, argue that despite multiple setbacks, its success can ultimately be measured by the number of people who have gained coverage under the law. According to a report published in the New England Journal of Medicine, as of mid-2014, 8 million people had enrolled in insurance plans through the federal and state exchanges; moreover, the law allowed 7.8 million young adults to stay on their parent’s insurance, while millions of others gained coverage through the Medicaid expansion. Kelly McHugh and Corey Koch See also Health Management Organizations; Privacy, Medical

Further Readings Blumenthal, David and Sara R. Collins. “Health Care Coverage Under the Affordable Care Act: A Progress Report.” New England Journal of Medicine, v.371 (2014). Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). Mulvey, Janemarie and Hinda Chaikind. Individual Mandate and Related Information Requirements Under ACA. Washington, DC: The Congressional Research Service, 2012. https://fpc.state.gov/ documents/.../194780.pdf (Accessed July 2014). National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 597 U.S.___ (2012).

PATRIOT Act Smith, Emily. “Timeline of the Health Care Law.” CNN .com (June 28, 2012) http://www.cnn. com/2012/06/28/politics/supreme-court-healthtimeline/ (Accessed July 2014).

PATRIOT Act The USA PATRIOT Act, an acronym for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, is a 2001 law passed in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The law, which was subsequently reauthorized in 2005, 2009, and 2011, enhances the surveillance powers of the federal government, ­ expanding the use of wiretaps and property searches and allowing intelligence agencies greater access to electronic data. Although the PATRIOT Act passed with bipartisan support, in subsequent years, the law has been subject to widespread criticism; there have also been several legal challenges regarding the act’s potential to violate the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This entry details the passage and provisions of the PATRIOT Act, the various reauthorizations of portions of the act, and the ongoing debate about the value of expanded governmental agency powers versus individuals’ right to privacy.

Passage Following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many intelligence officials asserted that if the government had more intelligence-gathering capabilities and coordination among agencies, the attacks could have been prevented. In response, the U.S. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act. The final bill was more than 300 pages in length and passed with overwhelming support in both houses of Congress. President George W. Bush signed it into law in October 2001. Much of the core of the PATRIOT Act represented an expansion of the government’s powers delineated in the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This earlier act outlined the parameters for investigations monitoring “agents

741

of foreign powers.” Specifically, it contained rules regarding search warrants, wiretaps, and other intelligence-collection practices. In addition, FISA created a separate set of courts—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts—to review requests for  warrants and wiretaps from intelligence agencies.

Key Provisions The preliminary sections of the PATRIOT Act provide an expanded definition of terrorism and outline harsher penalties for those who plot and commit acts of terror against the United States. Specifically, the law defines and criminalizes bioterrorism, acts of terrorism on mass transportation, and the harboring of a terrorist. Moreover, it also increases the minimum penalties for various types of terrorism-related crimes and eliminates the statute of limitations on crimes related to terrorism. The remainder of the PATRIOT Act details a revised set of rules governing terrorism investigations. Under the new rules, intelligence agencies and law enforcement are not subject to the same constitutional standards that prevail in domestic criminal investigations. For example, Section 206 of the PATRIOT Act allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to use so-called roving wiretaps. Standard wiretaps must adhere to the Fourth Amendment’s standard of “particularity,” meaning that they can only be used to authorize the monitoring of a specific telephone line at a specific location. In contrast, the PATRIOT Act allows the government to obtain a single wiretap authorization to monitor all the devices that a suspect may be using. In some cases, a tap could legally be placed on a line without the government identifying who was using the line; in the view of the FBI, such “John Doe” wiretaps are a necessary tool that prevents a suspect from evading detection by using multiple phones. Critics, however, argue that this provision casts an excessively wide net and subjects even casual acquaintances of the target to unjustified surveillance. The act also grants the FBI greater access to records held by third parties. More precisely, the act permits the agency to issue National Security Letters (NSLs) that could compel a business to

742

PATRIOT Act

turn over data on its clients, including phone logs or financial records. The FBI is able to issue these requests without prior judicial authorization, and the third-party recipient of the NSL is prohibited from disclosing the request to any outside party, including the target of the investigation. Section 215 of the act outlines a similar provision for gathering physical and digital data. More precisely, this provision gives the FBI the ability to demand that an individual or business furnish “any tangible things” relating to a terrorism investigation; this includes materials such as books and documents. In contrast to an ordinary criminal investigation, Section 215 does not require the FBI to demonstrate probable causes before obtaining these records, and the recipient of the order may not disclose its existence. The PATRIOT Act also includes relaxed rules for the use of search warrants in terrorism investigations. Specifically, the act allows law enforcement to use delayed notice or “sneak-and-peak” warrants; these warrants permit officials to search the property of a suspect secretly, without prior notice. In a typical criminal investigation, a law enforcement agency is required by the Constitution to provide a suspect with a contemporaneous notice that a search warrant will be executed. One of the most controversial provisions associated with the PATRIOT Act was added in 2004, as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This measure, referred to as the “lone wolf” provision, allows the government to use extraordinary measures to investigate potential lone wolf terrorists—namely, individuals who are not directly linked to a foreign power or terrorist organization. This represented a significant expansion of the powers the government previously enjoyed under the 1978 FISA law; as per that law, the government could use such extraordinary measures only if a suspect could be directly linked to a foreign power. Notably, this provision may not be used against U.S. citizens; it only applies to foreign nationals.

Reauthorization Congress gave many of the surveillance and intelligence-gathering provisions of the PATRIOT Act

on its expiration date of December 31, 2005; Congress sought to ensure that these new powers could be subject to periodic review to guard against abuse. At the request of the Bush administration, in 2005, the 109th Congress passed legislation authorizing a renewal of the expiring provisions. Specifically, the reauthorization made permanent 14 of the 16 provisions scheduled to expire. Congress gave 2 of the expiring provisions, pertaining to wiretaps and Section 215 orders, a new sunset date of December 31, 2009. Congress also simultaneously extended the sunset date for the lone wolf provision of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In the Senate, the vote for reauthorization was 89 in favor and 10 against; in the House, 251 representatives voted in favor, and 174 voted against. Notably, most of those opposing the reauthorization of the act were Democrats. In addition to reauthorizing provisions of the original PATRIOT Act, Congress also passed a separate bill, the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006. This legislation increased Congressional oversight of controversial provisions of the act. Specifically, each year, the attorney general is required to submit a report to Congress detailing the use of roving wiretaps, NSLs, and Section 215 orders; the report must contain information about the number of orders requested and granted. The additional reauthorizing of amendments also narrowed the scope of several of the most controversial provisions, including the use of NSLs and Section 215 requests. Specifically, in Doe v. Holder (2009), a district court found that NSLs violated the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In response, Congress instituted a provision allowing recipients of the letters to challenge them in court. A similar safeguard was put in place for Section 215 orders. Under the new legislation, the FBI is required to demonstrate that it has “reasonable grounds to believe” that the information would aid an ongoing investigation. Moreover, Congress required that the FBI director, the FBI deputy director, or the executive assistant director for National Security directly approve Section 215 requests for sensitive items, such as library records, firearms licenses, and medical records.

PATRIOT Act

The PATRIOT Act and the Obama Administration In 2009, when several provisions of the PATRIOT Act were again scheduled to expire, President Barack Obama asked Congress to pass a multiyear extension of the provisions concerning roving wiretaps, tangible materials requests, and lone wolf investigations. This request, however, prompted intense debate in Congress, with elected officials from both parties questioning the continued necessity for these surveillance tools. Ultimately, in February 2010, Congress passed a 1-year extension of the expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act; subsequently, in 2011, Congress passed a 4-year extension of the same three provisions. The vote for the second extension was 72 to 23 in the Senate and 250 to 153 in the House. Following the expiration of this extension in 2015, Congress passed the USA Freedom Act, which provided for a 4-year reauthorization of several provisions of the PATRIOT Act, including Section 205, roving wiretaps, and lone wolf surveillance. The new law, however, did not reauthorize Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which permitted the government to collect bulk metadata from U.S. citizens, such as phone records. After considerable debate, this new law passed the Senate by a vote of 67 to 32 and the House by a vote of 303 to 121.

Debating the PATRIOT Act With each subsequent reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, Congressional opposition has grown, in tandem with declining public support for many of the act’s provisions. The law became the subject of intense political debate in June 2013, when the Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald revealed that for the past 7 years, the National Security Agency (NSA) had been collecting the phone records of U.S. citizens. His source was Edward Snowden, a former contract employee at the NSA. According to Greenwald’s reporting, the U.S. government had obtained data from Verizon under a Section 215 order from the PATRIOT Act. The order allowed the government to collect metadata from domestic calls; specifically, Verizon

743

provided intelligence agencies with call logs, including the phone numbers and the duration of the calls but did not maintain any recording of the content of these calls. Following the disclosure of the government’s collection of domestic metadata, legislators authored 16 proposals designed to modify Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and limit the NSA’s ability to collect domestic phone records. One proposal, introduced by Senator Patrick Leahey and Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, was eventually passed into law as the 2015 USA Freedom Act, following the expiration of several of the surveillance measures contained in the PATRIOT Act. This new law, which had the support of several major technology companies, including ­ Google, Microsoft, and Facebook, bans U.S. intelligence agencies from collecting bulk metadata. Supporters of the PATRIOT Act, however, point to several cases where the PATRIOT Act’s enhanced intelligence-gathering provisions have allowed the government to detect, and ultimately prevent, acts of terrorism against the United States. For example, in 2002, federal agents were able to capture six Yemeni Americans who traveled to Afghanistan in the spring of 2001 to train with al Qaeda. The so-called Lackawanna Six were captured in an investigation that involved coordination between drug-trafficking investigators and counterterrorism investigators; su­ ch interagency coordination was not common before the passage of the PATRIOT Act. The men were eventually convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda. Another foiled act of terrorism credited to the PATRIOT Act was the capture of the “Portland Seven.” In 2001, seven Muslim men living in Portland, Oregon, attempted to travel to Afghanistan in order to join the Taliban in fighting against the United States. During their investigation into the  Portland cell, the FBI discovered that one of the men, Jeffrey Battle, had been planning to attack synagogues and Jewish schools in the United States. Owing to sections of the PATRIOT Act that permit secret phone surveillance, prosecutors were able to determine the identity of Battle’s associates and build a case against them. Six of the members of the Portland cell were eventually convicted and imprisoned.

744

Peace Talks and Peace Agreements

The American public remains sharply divided on the PATRIOT Act. In a poll taken in July 2013, shortly after the NSA scandal, 50% of those surveyed indicated that they approved of the domestic data collection, whereas 44% disapproved. A 56% majority, however, agreed that there still were insufficient checks on the government’s surveillance powers under the PATRIOT Act. Kelly McHugh and Kira Ramirez See also Bill of Rights; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; War on Terror

Further Readings Doyle, Charles. The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis (CRS Report for Congress). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2002. https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf (Accessed January 2017). Rosenzweig, Paul, et al., eds. The Patriot Act Reader. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2004. http:// www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/09/thepatriot-act-reader (Accessed July 2014). Sanchez, Julian. Leashing the Surveillance State: How to Reform the Patriot Act Surveillance Authorities (Policy Analysis No. 675). Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2011. http://www.cato.org/publications/ policy-analysis/leashing-surveillance-state-howreform-patriot-act-surveillance-authorities (Accessed July 2014).

Peace Talks Agreements

and

Peace

Peace talks and peace agreements are efforts to bring an end to conflict through processes of negotiations. Ending a war at the bargaining table has the potential to promote international security by bringing the violence to a quick conclusion and establishing new rules and mechanisms that are intended to prevent the reemergence of conflict. The discussion here provides an overview of the processes of peace talks, with a particular focus on the role of mediators. It then turns to a consideration of some of the common provisions of peace agreements that result from these negotiations.

Peace Talks For peace talks to be initiated and to generate an agreement, the parties to the conflict must believe that it is in their best interest to pursue compromise rather than unilateral victory. I. William Zartman thus suggests that the most propitious wartime environment for the holding of peace negotiations is when a conflict takes the form of a mutually hurting stalemate. Such a stalemate is apparent when parties to a war not only are enduring substantial costs in terms of blood and treasure but have also come to recognize that they lack the capacity to defeat their enemies. If combatants are amenable to seeking a peaceful resolution to the war, third-party mediators typically act as the facilitators of the bargaining process and efforts to establish peace. Drawing a distinction between Track One and Track Two mediation offers a useful means of categorizing the mediators that participate in negotiations to end war. Mediators associated with Track One represent intergovernmental organizations or individual states. The intergovernmental organization that most frequently engages in mediation is the United Nations; representatives from regional organizations such as the African Union and the European Union have also acted in this capacity. Track Two diplomacy is apparent when nonstate actors volunteer to serve as mediators. Examples of mediators associated with Track Two are representatives of the Catholic Church, as well as individuals such as former U.S. president Jimmy Carter and former president of Finland Martti Ahtisaari. While this discussion has highlighted the ­distinction between Track One and Track Two mediation, it should be kept in mind that it is often the case that multiple mediators are involved in any individual attempt at negotiating a peaceful end to conflict. As a result, it is common practice for mediators associated with both Track One and Track Two to work side by side in efforts to produce a peace settlement. Based on the work of Saadia Touval and ­Zartman, scholars commonly categorize the tactics available to mediators seeking to encourage combatants to reach a peace settlement as formulative, facilitative, or manipulative. Formulative tactics focus on structuring the interactions between belligerents through strategies such as

Peace Talks and Peace Agreements

determining the frequency and location of meetings, or setting the agenda to be considered during negotiations. Facilitative tactics center on mediators serving as conduits of information between the parties to the dispute. This tactic has the potential to increase the likelihood of an agreement as mediators address misperceptions and suspicions between rivals and highlight areas of agreement and potential cooperation. Last, manipulative tactics are actions by mediators to provide both incentives for cooperation and disincentives for intransigence in the context of negotiations. Rewards for cooperative behavior might include promises of increased foreign aid assistance; punishments for a failure to reach a settlement may take the form of threats to end the mediation effort or ending existing financial assistance. There is evidence to indicate that efforts to bring wars to a peaceful end through negotiations have been increasingly successful. More wars are currently resolved through bargaining than through military victory. One popular explanation for this trend is that the end of the Cold War has provided potential mediators, such as the United Nations and regional organizations, greater freedom and flexibility to offer their assistance to the states involved in conflict.

Peace Agreements Should mediation prove successful and a negotiated agreement is produced, this does not guarantee that peace will endure. There remains the possibility that the settlement will fail and that the parties will return to violence. Barbara Walter argues that the risks of settlement failure are greatest in the context of civil wars rather than international wars. This is the case as civil wars lack an international border that may be used to separate former combatants. The fact that enemies must continue to live together in a single state after civil war heightens the sense of postwar insecurity and the potential for a quick resumption of violence. Recognizing the potential for a return to war following a settlement, peace agreements typically include a range of provisions intended to minimize the risk of conflict reinitiation. One way in which this is accomplished is including provisions in an

745

agreement for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants. Disarmament is the collection and disposal of the weapons of war such as guns, ammunition, and explosives. Demobilization takes the form of the discharge of soldiers from the militaries involved in the conflict. Last, the process of reintegration involves having ex-combatants rejoin civilian life and secure alternative forms of employment outside of the military. Another frequent aspect of negotiated agreements is a commitment by third parties to assist in the war-to-peace transition. The most prominent means by which this external assistance takes place is by way of the deployment of peacekeepers under the leadership of the United Nations. The personnel who participate in these UN missions are drawn from the contributions by member states. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis divide the evolution of peacekeeping missions over time into three “generations.” The first generation of peacekeeping focused solely on the inserting of UN troops between ex-combatants with the intention of establishing a secure environment. Second-generation peacekeeping has proven far more ambitious. These missions go beyond simply separating former enemies and have as their agenda engineering social, economic, and political reforms that address the root causes of the war. The defining characteristic of thirdgeneration peacekeeping missions is the willingness of the United Nations to engage in peace enforcement. In these efforts, the United Nations employs military force against those entities or individuals who violate the terms of a peace settlement. A third common feature of peace agreements is commitment by former enemies to share power. These provisions only prove appropriate to settlements associated with civil wars, as former enemies must continue to live together within the postwar state rather than retreat across an international border. Power sharing is thought to enhance the likelihood of an enduring peace by addressing the issues of political and economic exclusion that may have been the initial impetus for conflict. Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie identify four different mechanisms of post–civil war power sharing. Political power sharing requires proportionality in

746

Perestroika

the distribution of central state authority. Collectivities are guaranteed a degree of representation  within governing institutions based on their group affiliation. Military power sharing distributes authority within the state’s coercive apparatus; the most straightforward means of accomplishing this is to integrate the antagonists’ armed forces into a single state security force. Territorial power sharing divides political influence among different levels of government by creating territorially based forms of decentralized government such as federalism. Finally, economic power sharing distributes wealth, income, or control of a country’s natural resources on the basis of group identity. This is not an exhaustive list of the common aspects of peace agreements, particularly those settlements associated with civil wars. Other items that might also be discussed include provisions that address concerns regarding the repatriation of refugees, justice for the victims of wartime human rights abuses, and the holding of the initial, postwar elections. The decision to highlight peace agreement provisions associated with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; peacekeeping; and power sharing is based on the perspective that these items have the greatest potential to prevent a war’s recurrence. Matthew Hoddie See also Civil War; UN Peacekeeping and Security Forces

Further Readings DeRouen, Karl, Jr. An Introduction to Civil Wars. Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2015. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Hartzell, Caroline A. and Matthew Hoddie. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007. Sisk, Timothy D. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996. Touval, Saadia and I. William Zartman, eds. International Mediation in Theory and Practice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Wallensteen, Peter and Isak Svensson. “Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts.” Journal of Peace Research, v.51/2 (2014).

Walter, Barbara F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Perestroika The term perestroika, which means restructuring, has existed in the Russian political vocabulary since the 18th century, but today, it is inextricably linked with the reformation movement initiated in 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev, who at the time was the secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Scholars see the content  and the influence of perestroika differently. According to one view, it was a genuine democratic movement initiated and implemented by that part of the Soviet elite that opposed authoritarianism and criticized the inefficiency of the Soviet system. According to a second interpretation, perestroika was about the domestic struggle for power, within which one side used the democratization card. In a third interpretation, it was an attempt to reform the inefficient Soviet system without actually challenging the authority and power of the CPSU. This entry details how perestroika is associated with surveillance reforms in the Soviet Union by first reviewing Gorbachev’s rise to power and his desire for economic, political, and social reforms and then describing some of those reforms, which played a major role in reshaping the former Soviet Union’s system of economic enterprise as well as the surveillance and censorship of its citizens and the media. In March 1985, Gorbachev became secretary general of the CPSU. Criticizing the inefficient and stagnant Soviet economic, political, and social system, he proposed reformation through perestroika, glasnost (openness), acceleration, and democratization. His objectives were officially announced in the 27th Congress of the CPSU (February 1986), in the plenum of the central committee of the CPSU (January 1987), and in the 19th Conference of the CPSU (July 1988). In 1985–1986, perestroika comprised primarily the economic reformation, but the January 1987 plenum gave it a more pronounced political dimension.

Perestroika

During perestroika (1985–1991), Gorbachev advanced at least 10 major economic reforms, including the Law on Individual Economic Activity (1986), the Law on State Enterprise (1987), the Law on Joint Venture (1987), and the Law on Cooperatives (1988). The Law on Individual Economic Activity aimed at creating the legal framework for the development of private enterprises in the USSR. It legalized the household-level businesses but did not allow the hiring of nonfamily members in these businesses. The Law on Cooperatives permitted unrelated persons to enter into businesses together but preserved many restrictions with regard to the hiring of labor and the type of economic activities they could engage in. It permitted private ownership of businesses in services, manufacturing, and foreign trade sectors and allowed regional and local organizations and individual state enterprises to conduct foreign trade. By September 1991, 6.5 million people were involved in private and individual economic activity. The Law on State Enterprise established the economic and legal basis of the activities of a Soviet state enterprise, regulating its tasks and functioning principles. The enterprise remained subordinated to the state economic plan, but, considering the demand from other enterprises and from the consumers, it could freely determine its output levels, could freely negotiate contract prices, and had the right to sell, purchase, or lease machinery, equipment, or raw materials. The enterprise had to work on principles of full-cost accounting and self-financing, having to meet its expenses from its income. The elected workers’ collectives became involved in the management of the enterprise on the basis of the principle of “democratic centralism,” which combined central control with self-management of labor collectives. Emphasizing self-accounting, self-financing, and self-management, this law aimed to achieve a greater autonomy for enterprises but was never fully implemented, and its economic impact was not overly positive. The Law on Joint Venture allowed foreigners to  form joint ventures with Soviet enterprises, ­ministries, and cooperatives. Initially, the foreign share was limited to 49%, and the management had to be done by Soviet citizens, but eventually, these regulations were revised, allowing majority  foreign ownership and foreign management. Although foreign investors were cautious and

747

preferred certain economic sectors (services, engineering), between early 1988 and early 1990, the number of joint ventures increased from 23 to 1,572. These laws placed more emphasis on the market forces, but they kept the economic development within the constraints of the planned economy, comprised contradictory stipulations, and were never fully implemented. The economic reforms were accompanied by political ones, such as glasnost and democratization. Glasnost was initiated by Gorbachev in 1985 to secure the openness of the political debate and the transparency of the political or economic decision-making process. In practical terms, it meant relaxation of censorship and decreasing the  party’s control over the media; criticism and reevaluation of the Soviet Union’s past, political, and economic debate—which in theory was supposed to reduce the probability of the central authorities’ errors in the state’s management; and more openness to the West. In this context, Gorbachev criticized the previous practices of ­ mass surveillance and admitted that wiretapping and other surveillance methods violated human rights. During perestroika, there was considerable debate regarding the control of the undercover work and the usage of surveillance devices, but very little was actually achieved, as the attempts to reform the law enforcement and the criminal justice system were partial and inefficient. In 1987, a Department of Public Relations was created within the Soviet Ministry of the Interior, designed to coordinate the interaction between the public and the ministry. In March 1991, a new Law on Soviet Police was promulgated, replacing the 1973 law according to which the role of the police was to build communism under the guidance of the CPSU. The new law stipulated that the role of the police was to protect the citizens’ personal security and prosperity, respecting the principle of transparency and the rule of law, and taking into consideration the public opinion. This law, however, was in force for only 1 month. Democratization as part of perestroika was launched in 1987, when it took the form of multicandidate elections for positions in the bodies of the local CPSU and the Soviets. One part of historiography argues that, through democratization, Gorbachev intended to eliminate the fierce

748

Play-Dates and Play-Spaces

opposition that one side of the party bureaucracy manifested toward perestroika. The call for democratization was reinforced during the 19th Conference of the CPSU, when the decisions to organize competitive party elections and to limit the mandate of party officials to two 5-year terms were made. These reforms were never fully implemented either. Not only did perestroika not reach its daring objectives, but it also contributed to the further deterioration of the economy, the rise of political opposition, and the erosion of the CPSU’s power. In terms of foreign policy, perestroika marked improved relations with the United States and with the West, in general, and a new approach to Eastern Europe. In 1987, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed. By early 1989, the Soviet troops left Afghanistan. Socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe without any Soviet intervention. In 1990, Germany reunified. In August 1991, the CPSU collapsed, and by the end of the year, the USSR disintegrated, which marked the end of the Cold War. Elena Dragomir See also Cold War; Glasnost; KGB; Russia

Further Readings Bandelj, Nina. From Communists to Foreign Capitalists: The Social Foundations of Foreign Direct Investment in Postsocialist Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. Boettke, Peter J. Why Perestroika Failed. Abingdon, England: Routledge, 1993. Fijnaut, C. J. C. and Gary T. Marx, eds. Undercover: Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1995. Lavigne, Marie, ed. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Global Economy. London, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Leitzel, Jim. The Political Economy of Rule Evasion and Policy Reform. Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2003. Moskoff, William. Hard Times: Impoverishment and Protest in the Perestroika Years: The Soviet Union, 1985–1991. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. Semukhina, Olga B. and Kenneth Michael Reynolds. Understanding the Modern Russian Police. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013.

Phishing

and

Scams

See Email; Identity Theft

Play-Dates

and

Play-Spaces

Play is, and always has been, central to childhood experience. Where children play and with whom they choose to play are key factors that shape how children come to learn about themselves and the world. Traditionally, children’s play activities have been watched over by those close to the children (e.g., family, teachers, or other children), relying on in-person supervision in the early years, with the gradual removal of this as children develop new skills and independence. The proliferation of surveillance technologies is changing the landscape of childhood play. Closed-circuit television cameras, webcams, and nanny cams are now present in many play-spaces. Global Positioning System tracking devices embedded in clothing and  mobile phone applications allow children’s daily activities to be monitored. At the same time, the spaces of childhood play have expanded into the global reaches of a merging virtual/physical world. While this has opened new play opportunities, it has also widened the potential for surveillance through the digital capture of children’s gaming and social media data. The long-term impact of these changes remains unknown. What is clear is that children cannot be seen as isolated from or unaffected by the broader expansion of surveillance in society. This entry reviews the ­benefits children experience from play, the benefits and drawbacks of surveillance play-dates and  play-spaces, and how recent technological advances have made surveillance of children’s play easier both in and out of the home. It also examines the children’s role in “playing” with the surveillance technology and how using social media to record children’s play-dates is cause for some debate. The benefits of play in childhood are widely acknowledged as key to the development of a range of social, emotional, and physical skills, as well as  providing important experimental and creative

Play-Dates and Play-Spaces

opportunities. Very little is required for children to play—a person or an object to play with and a space to play are often sufficient conditions. Spaces that allow some private and secret play have long been sought out by children to explore their creativity away from adult supervision. One factor that can affect the free and often uninhibited nature of children’s play is intrusive and highly regulated oversight by adults. As technologies used for surveillance become more accessible and affordable, they are more readily available as a tool for use by individuals. Parents, families, and friends now have at their disposal the technological capacity to record, track, and monitor children’s activities. This gives children the perception of privacy that some of them desire while giving those surveilling a peace of mind. In the home, a video baby monitor can allow a young child to be watched from another room, and a webcam allows parents to remotely view their children via the Internet anytime from anywhere. Out of the home, technologies such as Global Positioning System tracking devices can alert and show parents the exact movements of their child, including, for example, where they have stopped off to play on their way back home from school. Spy software, discretely installed on a child’s mobile phone or computer, has the capacity to record detailed data about online activity and communications. This capacity to watch and record, often from a distance, brings new forms of power and knowledge to the spaces of children’s play. It also raises new types of dilemmas. These are often framed as a conflict of the need to maintain the safety and security of children versus the tendency to overprotect children in ways that take away opportunities for free and independent play. Adults with responsibilities for children therefore face complex decisions in deciding if and when to use surveillance to monitor children and how much freedom to afford children in both physical and online play-spaces. The play activities of childhood are also subject to scrutiny by corporate and government entities. Commercial marketing practices rely on consumer data, and the targeting of children to obtain individual profile and play statistics is no exception. When children play online, information about

749

with whom they play, how long they play, and what they chat about is monitored and/or recorded. Government-initiated surveillance of children (e.g., via closed-circuit television or database collections) occurs in schools and public spaces such as parks and streets that have long been places of children’s play. These influences highlight key factors that form part of the overall social, political, and cultural context of children’s play. While the changing surveillance play-scape brings increased potential for control and monitoring of children’s spaces, it also affords new play opportunities as children discover, encounter, and create new worlds together. These could be virtual worlds, or worlds where children’s play seamlessly transitions between physical and virtual spaces, creating fluid sites of meaning and expression. In this changing context, children have opportunities to “play” with the surveillance technology itself, perhaps taking on the role of “watcher,” using technologies for alternate purposes, or otherwise subverting the practices designed to monitor and control. The blurred boundaries between the use of social media and surveillance practices add a further complexity to children’s play-spaces. Children engaged in a play-date may find the moment recorded, uploaded, shared, and commented on, even before the play-date is over. While this practice may not be surveillance in the strictest sense, it raises pertinent questions about the value of children’s privacy, the changing potential of technology, and the role of the child in having some control over data that are recorded and shared. As our broader understanding of surveillance expands from the traditional “power over” model to something more complex and multifaceted, children’s play-spaces provide a useful site of exploration. These spaces highlight the influence of changing surveillance practices in blurring the boundaries between private and public domains, show the complexities involved in balancing security and freedom, and ultimately reveal both the serious challenges and playful potential of emerging surveillance technologies. Tonya Rooney See also Moral Panic; Parental Surveillance; School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools

750

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Further Readings Katz, Cindi. “The State Goes Home: Local Hypervigilance of Children and the Global Retreat From Social Reproduction.” In T. Monahan (ed.), Surveillance and Security: Technological Politics and Power in Everyday Life. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006. Marx, Gary and Valarie Steeves. “From the Beginning: Children and Subjects and Agents of Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society, v.7/3–4 (2010). Rooney, Tonya. “Childhood Spaces in a Changing World: Exploring the Intersection Between Children and New Surveillance Technologies.” Global Studies of Childhood, v.2/4 (2012). Taylor, Emeline and Tonya Rooney. “Digital Playgrounds: Growing up in a Surveillance Age.” In Surveillance Futures: Social and Ethical Implications of New Technologies for Children and Young People. London, England: Routledge, 2017.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Plessy v. ­Ferguson (1896), upholding a Louisiana state law requiring separate but equal train coaches, did not specifically discuss questions of surveillance, security, and privacy; however, there are implications in it regarding all three issues in the Court’s judgment. Homer Plessy, a man of mixed race who was considered “black” by Louisiana law, challenged a Louisiana state law that required all rail companies to provide separate but equal coaches for blacks and whites. If passengers did not comply with the law, they were subject to fines and imprisonment. The law only applied to those coaches that would travel within the state boundaries (i.e., those that could be considered intrastate commerce). Plessy paid for a first-class passage and sat in the “white” coach. He was ordered to sit in the coach for the “colored race,” and on refusal, he was arrested and taken to jail. Although the Supreme Court opinion focused on issues of legal equality under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, issues of surveillance, security, and privacy were present as well. It was also the first case in which the constitutional right of equal protection was used in conjunction with these

ideas. The remainder of this entry describes in detail the implications of surveillance, security, and privacy that resulted from the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.

Surveillance Surveillance, in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, is the monitoring of people’s choice of seats on train coaches. This may seem almost quaint by today’s standards, but the surveillance could lead to ejection, fines, and jail time. The Louisiana law gave state courts the power to punish citizens for not behaving in the “proper” way on the trains. Furthermore, the law gave the train conductors sole discretion so as to determine the race or racial mix of each passenger and whether to change their coaches or remove them from the train. While surveillance by the government and its agents may not be detrimental in and of itself, the use of the information to enforce certain behaviors, actions, and ideas can have a detrimental effect on security and privacy.

Security Security is touched on in this case in two ways. First, the rights protected by the Constitution are interpreted to implicitly give citizens the right to secure travel from one place to another without undue interference, harassment, or delay by the government. By allowing rail conductors to act as agents of the state, under training who is black and who is white, while forcing seating changes on pain of punishment, the Supreme Court gives constitutional weight to the side of government interference and refuses to find for the personal security of Americans. The security of rights is the second form that security takes in Plessy v. Ferguson. In the Court’s opinion, Justice Henry Brown argued that the Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments were the security that blacks have as legal citizens of the United States and that they should feel secure in  these rights; however, Justice John Marshall ­Harlan, in his dissent, argued that public segregation can make a citizen feel less secure of his or her rights under the Constitution. If a train conductor, acting as a government agent, can remove someone from a train and with the very real threat of

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

fines and jail time, security in legal rights cannot occur. Justice Harlan stated that the U.S. Constitution does not allow for the consideration of race when protecting the enjoyment of civil rights; however, the Louisiana law using race as a determinant of segregation was doing just that—that is, considering race when protecting the civil right of privacy and free travel. Finally, Justice Harlan argued that the Thirteenth Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, not only abolishes slavery but also “prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude” (p. 555). These points by Justice Harlan forcefully argued that the majority Court is denied, based on race, security of civil rights. Chief Justice Earl Warren picked up this argument and expanded on it in the unanimous Supreme Court opinion of Brown v. Board of Education (1954).

Privacy The issue of privacy is more profoundly affected by Plessy v. Ferguson than surveillance or security. There are two main areas that identify with the issue of privacy. First and foremost is the privacy as an individual. The Louisiana law allows the train conductors to determine race on observations of the person. This surveillance of facial features and skin tone is all that is used to determine the racial makeup of the train passenger. Plessy testified that he was seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood. Information regarding an individual’s ancestral heritage is usually seen as a matter of personal privacy, just as are one’s political views, income, or religion. By upholding the law, the Court was encouraging government interference in private matters that have little or nothing to do with train travel. A second issue of privacy is the idea of travel. Most citizens do not think twice about traveling from one town to another or from one state to another. There is an understanding that the decision to travel and the mode of that personal or business travel should not be interfered with by the government, but this is what the Court condoned when it upheld the law. The law recognized that Louisiana did not have the authority to require separate but equal train coaches of passengers traveling through Louisiana from one

751

state to another. Federal law had barred such restrictions under the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Louisiana was requiring the enforcement of separate but equal accommodations in all traffic that originated and terminated within the state boundaries. The law was interfering with the implied private right to travel at will by American citizens. Furthermore, if passengers did not comply with the law—that is, by either arguing that it was unfair or arguing that they could sit in the coach of choice—the passengers were ejected from the train, thus having their trip derailed by the government. This cancellation, and possible fines and imprisonment because of seat choice, is a violation of the private choice to travel. The last issue in Plessy v. Ferguson is the Court’s rejection of the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection argument that the law was unconstitutional. This argument is important, as it is the basis for the Court’s decision to overturn Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education almost 60 years later. In the late 1800s, the Supreme Court was not prepared to apply the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the private actions of citizens of the United States or individual states’ residents. Justice Brown clearly argued that this clause was only for legal status of citizens before the law in the areas of being on a jury, for voting, and being a defendant in court. Justice Harlan in his dissent rejected this, stating that as the law was written to segregate whites from blacks, by allowing other races such as Asians, Hispanics, or Indians to sit with the white passengers, the law denied equal protection to blacks regardless of how the Court majority defined it. Mary L. Carver See also Brown v. Board of Education (1954); Privacy, Right to; U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Caldas, Stephen J. and Carl L. Bankston. “A Re-Analysis of the Legal, Political, and Social Landscape of Desegregation From Plessy v. Ferguson to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.” Brigham Young University Education & Law Journal, v.2/2 (2007).

752

Plethysmograph

Golub, Mark. “Plessy as ‘Passing’: Judicial Responses to Ambiguously Raced Bodies in Plessy v. Ferguson.” Law & Society Review, v.39/3 (2005). McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

Plethysmograph The penile plethysmograph (PPG), or p-graph, is an individually applied physiological test that measures the flow of blood to and from the genital area. The p-graph is currently being deployed in hundreds of adult and juvenile sex offender treatment centers in the United States and in several countries around the world. Sex offenders have relatively high rates of reoffending, and in the United States, many state legislatures have responded by passing restrictive legislation, while courts frequently mandate close supervision and surveillance of release of these offenders. In most cases, the clinicians are asked to evaluate individuals accused or convicted of sexual offenses for an assessment of dangerousness, risk for recidivism, involuntary commitment determinations, inclusion in sex offender registry, or criminal responsibility. Since PPG is considered the only objective means of assessing the deviant or pedophilic sexual interest in males, clinicians use the device to conduct these assessments. However, concerns have been raised regarding the validity and reliability of the assessment itself, the data collected, as well as the legal and ethical basis of the test. Kurt Freund, a Czech-born Canadian physician and sexologist, is credited with developing phallometry, or the objective measurement of sexual arousal in males, in the 1950s. Early in his career, Freund was commissioned by the Czechoslovakian military to use penile plethysmography to determine if certain recruits were attempting to evade military service by falsely claiming to be homosexual. He was also involved in early attempts at “conversion therapy,” a process designed to change the sexual orientation of homosexuals to heterosexuality through the use of aversion behavioral therapy. Later, Freund’s work focused on the detection and diagnosis of sex offenders, particularly preference pedophiles, with a view to more appropriate treatment guidelines.

Two types of penile plethysmography used today measure changes in either penile volume or circumference. Volume plethysmography measures the displacement of air in a cylinder enclosing the penis, while circumferential plethysmography—a narrow metal or rubber band that is placed around the penis—directly measures changes in penile diameter. Once fitted, the individual subject is exposed to erotic stimulus material, such as visual displays, or asked to read erotic content or listen to erotic audiotapes. The changes in air displaced within the cylinder is then used to calculate an indirect measure of penile volume or the band directly measures variation in the circumference of the penis and hence the subject’s “sexual desire.” The digital signal produced is transmitted to a computer, and the accompanying software enables the examiner to know which stimulant produced an arousal and the relative degree of the subject’s erection. During the procedures, the tester and the subject are in separate rooms, and the individual may be exposed to erotic stimuli depicting numerous sexually stimulating child, adolescent, and adult fantasies of both genders and also consenting and nonconsenting situations. While the subject is exposed to the sexual stimulus, the plethysmograph is graphically recording the changes in the subject’s penis. These recorded measurements are used to determine whether the subject is overly stimulated to an inappropriate fantasy as compared with an appropriate image. The assessment recommendation is based on the ratios of inappropriate and appropriate responses. Despite the widespread use of PPG, various concerns have been raised. First, while a supposed “objective” measurement of sexual desire is secured, the assessment is based on a subjective presentation and determination of what is considered “deviant” sexual activities versus those defined as “normal” or “appropriate.” Moreover, visual images deployed may depict multiple characters or mixtures of gender, age, and race, making interpretation of the subject’s stimulation pattern quite difficult. Second, one recent study found that approximately one third of the men who had offended sexually failed to demonstrate any sexual arousal to either “normative” or “deviant” stimuli using the PPG. Freund himself pointed out that one of the most significant limitations of

Police State

the PPG is that some participants can readily suppress sexual arousal in the laboratory and, thus, falsify the results. Third, given the considerable variation in assessment procedures, test stimuli, measurement equipment, and no standards for data interpretation, it is difficult to generalize the findings from one treatment setting to the next. Finally, recent legal rulings have brought to the fore a number of fundamental questions regarding the use of PPG. For example, in late 2013, a ruling by the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Manhattan freed a former police officer of a requirement that he submit to penile plethysmography after he completed a sentence for a sex offense. Having pled guilty to producing child pornography 10 years earlier by taking topless photos of his 13-year-old daughter for what he insisted was an attempt to advance her modeling career, David McLaurin, a registered sex offender, had to submit to PPG examinations as directed by the probation officer. McLaurin later appealed this part of his sentence. Calling the procedure “extraordinarily invasive,” the court stated that the PPG risks violating the premise that even convicts retain their humanity. The three-judge appeals panel said it saw a “clear distinction” between penis measurement and other conditions of supervised release such as restrictions on where sex offenders may live, their association with children, or their access to pornographic material. The Second Circuit judges wrote that the procedure “inflicts the obviously substantial humiliation of having the size and rigidity of one’s penis measured and monitored by the government under the threat of incarceration for a failure to fully cooperate.” William G. Staples See also Deviance; Sex Offender Laws; Sex Offender Registries

Further Readings Balmer, Andrew S. and Ralph Sandland. “Making Monsters: The Polygraph, the Plethysmograph, and Other Practices for the Performance of Abnormal Sexuality.” Journal of Law and Society, v.39/4 (2012). United States of America, Appellee, v. David C. Mclaurin, Appellant. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Docket No. 12-3514-cr. Decided: October 3, 2013.

753

Police State A country in which the government gives the secret or political police extensive powers to control the social, political, and/or economic life of its citizens—whose rights, freedoms, and privacy are drastically limited and who are often under mass surveillance—is usually referred to as a “police state.” Arguing that it acts on behalf of national security, the police state fights against “the enemies of the state” and suppresses and eliminates political dissent and civil liberties. In a police state, the secret police are employed to investigate, monitor, and identify any (real or imagined) opposition to the government in power and any (real or imagined) contestation of the policies and values promoted by the executive. This entry reviews types of police states and the various security forces they utilize, describes characteristics and methods of police states, and details privacy violations that are common for citizens under such regimes.

Types of Police States and Security Forces The political regimes depicted in Yevgeny Z ­ amyatin’s We (1924) and in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) are the most famous fictional police states, and they have influenced the way in which the term is used today. Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler (1933–1945); the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin (1929–1953); East Germany, Romania, and other Eastern European Soviet satellites during the Cold War; Cuba under dictator Fulgencio Batista (1952–1959); Chile under dictator Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990); and interwar Japan are the best-known examples of historical police states. Today’s China is often identified as the ultimate example of a police state capitalism— an authoritarian communist regime employing elements of central planning and capitalism, doubled by severe repression and mass surveillance. North Korea is another modern-day police state based on coercion, control, mass surveillance, and punishment. To enforce its illegitimate authority, a police state uses a range of security forces—secret police, militia/regular police, military, paramilitary organizations, civilian informants, and spies—that

754

Police State

rarely if ever operate under the provisions of the national laws. Some of the worst examples of secret police forces are the Nazi Germany’s Gestapo (Secret State Police) and SS (Schutzstaffel, i.e., Protection Squadron), the Fascist Italy’s OVRA, the Soviet NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and KGB, the East German Stasi, the Romanian Securitate, Chile’s DINA under dictator Augusto Pinochet, the State Security Council in Apartheid South Africa, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In a police state, security forces might arrest, detain, torture, and/or even murder any suspect for no reason, without having a warrant or a court order and without informing the family about what happened with the disappeared ones. For instance, the Gestapo and the SS were exempted from responsibility in administrative courts and could detain and imprison people without any judicial proceedings; thousands of political prisoners in their custody simply disappeared.

Characteristics of Police States A police state is characterized by a generalized culture of fear and suspicion. Even the most innocent comment or gesture that may be heard by an informant or by an undercover political police officer or recorded by a closed-circuit television camera may be interpreted as an act of dissent and opposition and may result in detention, arrest, and torture. In a police state, the (real or imagined) opponents of the regime are often tortured to provide names of collaborators, and often, they give the names of some innocent citizens just to stop the torture, and the “deletion” process continues. The Gestapo’s customary investigative methods included harassment, blackmail, threats, sleep deprivation, planting evidence, and torture, while its targets were political and ideological opponents, the Roma people, the religious organizations, homosexuals, the handicapped, and, above all, the Jews. In a police state, whole families and even small children may be detained, interrogated, and tortured to provide the security forces with information about the enemies  of the state. In this respect, Nazi Germany is  famous for its Sippenhaft—the family liability punishment—which was a form of collective punishment that meant that families shared the responsibility for a crime committed by a relative. Family

punishment was also employed in Stalinist Soviet Union or in early Cold War Eastern Europe.

Methods Used by Police States Genocide, assassinations, disappearances, and torture are instruments that may be used by the secret police to prevent, investigate, or punish (real or imagined) opposition. Opponents are incarcerated in prisons, concentration camps, or psychiatric hospitals, with or without a court order. For instance, modern-day Chinese security forces forcibly make writers, human rights activists, lawyers, bloggers, students, and critics of the regime “disappear.” The disappeared are often violently abducted, denied the right to trial or to contact their families, and are at high risk for torture while in custody. Some are eventually released, while others remain “disappeared” forever. Moreover, in recent years, China developed the system of the so-called black jails—a network of secret and illegal detention facilities where abducted petitioners are held without a court sentence and are subject to severe abuses. Often, police states appeal to the so-called people’s courts or to military tribunals to legitimize their actions. However, in a police state, there is no separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive systems, and the courts are simply executors of the orders of the secret police. For instance, between 1934 and 1945, the Nazi people’s courts condemned to death, for political reasons, more than 12,000 civilians and sent thousands more to concentration camps. In Stalinist Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of “enemies of the people” were tried and convicted by the NKVD special courts martial to death or sent to gulag concentration camps. According to some estimates, in 1937 and 1938 alone, the NKVD detained more than 1.5 million people, of whom more than one third were shot. China, under Mao Zedong ­(1949–1976), used forced labor camps to a large scale in a ­system generally referred to as the “laogai.” Besides criminals held under normal criminal law, the laogai system also detained political prisoners, and it is estimated that during Mao’s regime about 10 million people were detained in any given year in the Chinese prisons and labor camps and that about 10% of them died every year due to poor living conditions and severe abuses.

Police State

Oppression, repression, terror, murder, summary executions, mass executions, propaganda, mass control, and brainwashing are often the means of ruling used by a police state that operates outside the legal norms of a constitutional state. One of the most notorious and infamous brainwashing experiments in Eastern Europe’s history took place in Romania, in the political prison of Pite¸sti, a small town about 120 kilometers northwest of Bucharest, notorious for the so-called Pite¸sti experiment or Pite¸sti phenomenon that happened there between 1949 and 1952. The four-stage experiment aimed to “re­educate” the (real or imagined) opponents of the regime and was based on monstrous psycho­ logical and physical tortures. Besides cruel and unimaginable tortures, the prisoners were forcefully subjected to the most hideous, humiliating, degrading, and dehumanizing acts. Thousands of people died in the process, some who were “reeducated” became torturers, and many of the survivors either took their own life or ended up in mental institutions. Forced population movements and mass deportations are also instruments used by police states to punish or control their subjects. For instance, in 1944, Stalin ordered the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar population from the Crimean peninsula under the accusation of c­ ollaboration with the Nazi occupation in 1 ­942–1943. More than 230,000 people were deported, and by 1947, about half of them died due to disease and starvation. Between June 1940 and June 1941, and again between 1949 and 1953, the Soviet occupation deported about one tenth of the population of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and L ­ ithuania) to slave labor camps in Siberia or to Arctic Russia. Between 1939 and 1941, a quarter of a million Poles were deported from the Polish regions annexed by the Soviet Union. In April and May of 1940, the NKVD carried out the so-called Katyn massacre, a series of mass executions of 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia. In June 1951, the Romanian communist regime deported some 45,000 ethnics from the region bordering ­Yugoslavia to the Ba˘ra˘gan plain (a steppe plain in southeast Romania). However, the most infamous deportations of the 20th century are the Holocaust deportations of the Jews, the Roma people, ­homosexuals, or Poles to the extermination camps,

755

where, according to ­estimates, more than 3 million were executed.

Privacy Violations In a police state, security forces have no respect for the human rights, and especially for the right to privacy. Letters are opened, telephones are tapped, informants are employed, and people are followed, photographed, and filmed. The Stasi files, for instance, included not only antiregime allusions, comments, and activities but also details about sexual preferences, drinking habits, and debts. The Stasi’s far-reaching surveillance was one important factor that helped erode the East Germans’ sense of security and privacy, and even the most unthreatening acts were recorded, such as taking out the garbage or visits to the bathroom. In East Germany, everybody was treated as a potential enemy of the state, and the regime considered that it was vitally important to know everything about everybody. In a police state, mass surveillance of everyday life is one of the most important tools that the political regime uses to secure domestic national security and political and social obedience. Although surveillance and terror are two main attributes of the police state, they do not have to accompany each other at all times. In the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Romania remained surveillance police states, but they were no longer under the terror that they had witnessed in the early stages of their communist regimes. According to some estimates, the Stasi—the East German secret police—employed the most efficient, long-lasting, and comprehensive surveillance system in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, with 95% of its budget used to spy on the East German population. By 1989, Stasi had about 91,000 employees and more than 174,000 informants whose job was to identify and stop any opposition to the political regime. Any educational, military, or economic institution had its informants, and it is estimated that for every 63 people, there was one secret agent or informant, and for every 180 people, there was one full-time Stasi employee. By 1989, at a population of 16 million, Stasi kept files for 6  ­ million citizens, although only 2,500 of them were identified as political opponents and only 60 ­individuals were seen as radical opponents.

756

Policing and Society

Today, Chinese cities are among the most watched in the world, with millions of closed-­ circuit television cameras covering their streets. The surveillance quality is also continuously improving, with digital cameras capable of recognizing faces and vehicles and identifying suspicious gatherings. China is also well-known for its severe control and censorship over the Internet and has the capacity to intercept online communication and hack into websites and emails. In conclusion, the term police state may be applied to a range of political regimes that are different in terms of economic development, political ideology, or social structure but that have in common an abusive government that exercises power arbitrarily through its secret police. The police state is associated with authoritarian regimes, whether dictatorial, fascist, or totalitarian, and although the degree of repression varies among police states, it is inherently repressive. Elena Dragomir See also Authoritarianism; Berlin Wall; China; Global Surveillance; Totalitarian Surveillance Societies

Further Readings Davis, Fergal, et al., eds. Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism. Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2014. Funder, Anna. Stasiland: Stories From Behind the Berlin Wall. London, England: Granta Books, 2004. Greene, Jack R., ed. The Encyclopedia of Police Science (Vol. 1, 3rd ed.). Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2007. Kotkin, Stephen. Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of Communist Establishment. New York, NY: Modern Library, 2009. Loeffel, Robert. Family Punishment in Nazi Germany: Sippenhaft, Terror and Myth. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Polian, Pavel. Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migration in the USSR. Budapest, Hungary: CEU Press, 2004. Schmeidel, John Christian. Stasi, Shield and Sword of the Party. Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2008. Segel, Harold B. The Walls Behind the Curtain. East European Prison Literature, 1945–1990. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012. Tipton, Elise K. The Japanese Police State: Tokkô in Interwar Japan. London, England: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012.

Policing

and

Society

The influence of policing on society is critical in  many respects. Policing functions for society include crime prevention and control, order maintenance, and service provision. Although police officers may think of themselves as professional crime fighters, they invariably end up serving as peacekeepers and social workers. While many people consider police as the last resort for societal conflicts and issues, often police officers directly confront and respond to the full scope of human and natural activities as first responders. Law enforcement is at the front lines of the problems associated with recent economic, political, and social dislocations (deindustrialization, federalization, and postmodernism) and changes with criminalization and moral panics associated with drugs and gangs, increased income inequality, deinstitutionalization of mental health systems and related reduction of welfare, growth of information technology, and increased population diversity. Importantly, police have been historically and presently significant to the segregation, management, and processing of people and places as service providers and peacekeepers. Police operate on territories—political, economic, social, cultural, and even moral—and reinforce territorial boundaries (including cultural) existing in society. Police maintain boundaries of everyday activities as well as political, social, and cultural distinctions directly through encounters, resolutions, and dispositions of crimes, disputes, and conflicts. Policing cultures, organizational and peer ones, operate on moral boundaries corresponding to geographical (environmental) and individual profiling, whereby citizens and vulnerable populations require protection from undesirables, predators, and outsiders in their jurisdictions. With porous borders and an advanced information-based economy, policing is on a path toward the intensification of tactics and intelligence-led policing, mostly in larger and more specialized police organizations that have and will continue to dominate policing of nontraditional crimes. The expansion of policing outward and more centrally at the national levels poses challenges to accountability. This entry begins with a look at policing types and trends. Next, it examines the changes in policing

Policing and Society

as a result of politicization and discusses innovations and reforms. The entry concludes with an analysis of surveillance and accountability.

Policing Types and Trends A related, crosscutting trend in policing is the constantly evolving functional division of labor by jurisdiction, main specialty or expertise area, offense types, and constituencies and populations served. Federal and state law enforcement agencies are more specialized and much smaller in terms of numbers than county, municipal, and local agencies. Localized organizations cannot manage and respond to interjurisdictional crimes and related issues, which result in a highly fragmented system of policing for local offenses and criminals and a more centralized system for national offenses and criminal groups. High policing involves specialized agencies ­targeting organized offenders and offenses accom­ panied by a security emphasis necessitating intelligent, planned, and coordinated interventions and responses. Low policing is largely reactive and individualized on a case-by-case basis that reflects strict enforcement of criminal laws. Both forms of policing coexist today as in the past with variation dictated by the prevailing socioeconomic conditions. Greater securitization valued by high-policing agencies is observed in highly militarized or neoliberal regimes, whereas low-policing agencies are prominent in societies and time periods in which government roles in ensuring economic and societal equilibrium are valued. The blurring of these distinct policing types in the domain of civilian policing at local levels can be observed. Newer policing innovations at local levels converge to maintain security and enforcement of laws by focusing on career criminals, gangs, and organized crime groups. Political protests and government opposition demonstrate these tendencies for convergence across the landscape of police agencies. Security and crime are one and the same in these contexts. Surveillance by the police (the low end with the local police agencies and the high end with the federal and state agencies) is divided by function, target, and jurisdiction. The convergence in surveillance tactics is largely limited but has become significant with the wars on crime, drugs, gangs, and organized

757

criminal groups. As a result, policing has become politicized. The division of labor is complex and loosely coupled within law enforcement agencies and policing’s relation to the other entities comprising criminal justice systems and governmental institutions. Legal and political institutions need law enforcement to enforce criminal laws, maintain order, and legitimize justice processes and outcomes. Police depend on legal and political institutions for their existence and sustenance. As sovereigns of and providers of the rule of law, courts and governments establish policing priorities and accountability. Law enforcement is closely consulted and remains the main technical expert on the means to control crimes. The mutual dependence of governments, courts, and the police ­produce (1) almost complete autonomy in terms of their specific and specialized functions to society and (2) relatively little interest in providing oversight threatening the respective domains of each institution. The police benefit from the narrow focus on procedural justice and the continuance of crime fighting that has dominated crime policy. Order maintenance is often subsumed within crime-fighting functions, accelerating and supporting the tough-on-crime stance taken by politicians, attorneys, and police officers in recent decades. Policing is politicized by the ends and means defining police work and establishing police officers’ professional standing. A constant in the history of policing up to the present is the determining of police ends by more powerful political, economic, and social forces from the outside and the assertion by the police on being the professionals and the experts on the means to achieve these ends. The latter control of means is guarded heavily by the police and is the source of many controversies around policing such as police corruption, brutality, and discrimination, as well as continued distrust with particular populations and groups in modern societies. Self-regulation is preferred by law enforcement, and courts limit their involvement in extreme situations where police have failed miserably and where pervasive patterns and practices of abuse exist. Early formalized policing involved police provision of welfare functions (including handling juvenile delinquents) along with strictly criminal ones; current policing more strictly involves crime,

758

Policing and Society

emergency/disaster, and order maintenance. The focus of crime control gained momentum from the later part of the 19th century with closer cooperation with prosecutors and consolidated with the police-led professionalization movement beginning in the early 20th century. Since the 1970s, police increasingly are the first resort resulting from the deinstitutionalization of the mental health systems and the growth of social welfare populations seen in recent decades. Order maintenance has been a constant in policing throughout its history and facilitated the creation of formal police departments. This function includes resolving interpersonal conflicts, managing political dissent, and quelling economic strikes. Police have resisted efforts for them to confront societal issues but accept changes in their practices derived from their political sovereigns and allies.

Politicization and Changes in Policing One of the most important forces driving changes to policing in the United States is the increased federalization and politicization of crime policy, where political and legislative priorities among others dealing with pornography, alcohol, sexual offenses, terrorism, and gangs have become police priorities as well. Conventional consensus on the federal effects on policing and crime suggest limited and minimal effects, especially in comparison with the more significant influence by federal courts on legal practice and punishment. The efforts, thought of as largely symbolic, depend on the police in terms of implementation, but the power of the purse for fiscally constrained police departments is significant. Crime does emerge as a major political issue in the federal and state elections, but government agencies at the federal and state agencies are critical agents behind the emphases on criminal justice and policing priorities. The growth of agencies tied to drugs, gangs, and terror creates incentives to maintain their existence and expand the policing component of the criminal justice industrial complex. The federal government heavily funded and promoted community policing beginning in the 1990s to address rising violent crime until funding was drastically reduced after a decade. Professional police associations and agencies participate in the federal and state legislative hearings relating to crime, terrorism,

and related issues to represent their own interests as well as being called as experts in defining problems and developing solutions. Their influence has been significant in relation to the funding and priorities given to particular crimes and offenders. At the local levels, typically, politics are not dominated by police and larger interest groups, but neither funding nor strategic decisions are determined in these political forums. Wars on crime and drugs define policing to the  present and have accelerated policing crimefighting emphases and deepened controversies relating to use of force, militarization of police departments, racial profiling, and continued poor relations with minority ethnicities (particularly African Americans) and lower socioeconomic groups and communities. Newer policing innovations from team policing to community policing and to intelligence-led policing reflect the seriousness and sensitivity taken by the police toward improving a long history of poor relations while maintaining their crime-fighting effectiveness. However, the implementation of softer policing approaches with noncrime goals is limited; these strategies and solutions are largely selective, and traditional policing still dominates. The politicization of policing becomes apparent with the approaches that are promoted as making significant changes in the policies and practices, but ground-level realities remain essentially unchanged. The police are politicized when greater attention is given to their responses to politically defined crime problems and their contributions to defining and promoting these problems. Police leadership and executives are more politically aware and concerned than in previous decades. Notably, civil unrest, political protest, and police corruption and brutality are visible issues as a result of identity politics and the growth of expressive individualism in modern societies. The urge to disengage and sustain a professional distance from political issues is present in some police officers and police leadership, in part for practical reasons of satisfying a large number and a range of demands placed on them. Managing expectations by police organizations, whether at local, regional, national, or international levels, is an integral part of modern policing. The coverage of crime and policing in local media news and pressures to lessen bias, discrimination,

Policing and Society

excessive force, and abuse of police powers are prominent areas of focus. Large policing departments devote resources and personnel for press and public relations, and keeping the public informed has become vital for increasing levels of legitimacy. Police support for victim rights and advocacy also helps build support during times of crises and controversies. Police organizations often default to the standard model of policing even with these changes. Crime control dictates that the focus of policing organizations be placed on chronic offenders, organized crime groups, and serious violent and property offenders. Investigations of serious violent criminals and, at the direction of prosecutors as chief law enforcement officers, criminal investigations remain visible aspects of police work and receive the bulk of media and public coverage of the police. Traditional policing continues to be directed at street criminals, but large police departments and the state, federal, and international police agencies have increasingly developed expertise and given considerable attention to computer and cybercrimes and criminals. Similar to most workers in modern economies, the police are emerging as information or knowledge workers by collection, maintenance, analysis, and application of data and databases. Expectations are ordered by police sovereigns (politicians and political agencies), property and corporate interests, citizens and community leaders, and the public as a whole. Consequently, police may end up focusing on the usual suspects and do little to engender community cohesion by ignoring the less vocal, visible, and malintegrated populations and groups in their jurisdictions. Managing expectations and the intense pressures to demonstrate effectiveness may influence the police to legitimize their preferred strategies and approaches. Selectivity and targeted tactics may prevail due to scarce resources and a desire to maintain professional autonomy and command-and-control orientation.

Police Reforms and Innovations Police must respond to all criminal law violations, but the range of encounters and situations goes well beyond these types of violations. The mandate for law enforcement agencies is vague and

759

broad, and derived from legislation and politics, leaving the police to manage expectations from a diverse range of actors and constituencies. Being organized bureaucratically along quasimilitary lines, police departments stress hierarchical command-and-control allocation of tasks and responsibilities for different ranks that limit both internal and external communications and interactions between different ranks within police agencies and outside actors. Similar to most modern institutions, policing has professionalized and sought to remove political considerations in the execution of its functions. With considerable discretion available and exercised by all ranks from police chiefs to rankand-file officers, informal and extralegal factors, including variance in citizen demeanor, compliance, or appearance, result in varied outcomes in terms of arrest, use of force, and profiling. In particular, young and socioeconomically disadvantaged minority males, but poorer males and females, more generally, have the greatest contacts with the police, leading to disproportionate concentrations in police and criminal justice statistics. Given the history of poor relations between the police and these populations, there have been efforts to increase focus on gaining trust and getting consent through attention to procedural justice and due process. Police recognize not only the importance of legitimacy but also value strategies and tactics that they see as effective, such as profiling. Furthermore, many of the gains from building trust are public relations or symbolic ones and have not translated into reduction of rates of violence in places and populations where concentrations of poverty, unemployment, and other social problems are commonplace. Policing innovations, which emerged in the latter half of the 20th century, such as zero tolerance/ broken windows policing, problem-oriented policing, and community policing, stress the importance of understanding and addressing persistent community or jurisdictional crime problems and seem to acknowledge greater attention to these seemingly intractable problems. Such approaches are consistent with the notion that communities are the best crime fighters on their own and over the police. Community policing is advanced to promote cooperation between the public and the police.

760

Policing and Society

Removing outsiders from the community to strengthen communities is at the heart of zerotolerance policing. Problem-oriented policing is driven by data analysis and evaluation to target and solve underlying root conditions associated with the reoccurrence of significant community crime problems. Innovations in policing are highly uneven in terms of adoption and implementation, with policing approaches that are closer philosophically and operationally, such as zero-tolerance, problemoriented, and intelligence-led policing, obtaining greater acceptance. Instrumental aspects of policing innovations that allow the police to continue to shape the crime-control agenda and to gain legitimacy from achievement of success in fighting and reducing crime dominate in a climate governed by fear of crime, drugs, gangs, and terror. Diversifying the police has been offered as a critical solution to the considerable distance between the police and citizens and communities. Considerable agreement exists in policing scholarship about the positive impacts of greater representation of minorities in policing, most notably African Americans and Hispanics; limited but some progress for women officers and executives; and to a much lesser extent in terms of sexual orientation. Gains from diversification are thought to dilute and weaken the informal policing subculture that has been influential in policing since its formalization and evolution. The evidence of the weakening and disappearance of policing subcultures is premature and largely undocumented. Policing subcultures—that is, informal values and norms differing significantly from idealized political and organizational cultures thought to define police—not only persist but have also been strengthened in the contexts of the wars being against society and necessitating distance from the enemies within society. Police are generally distrustful of groups that challenge their mandate and methods and participate in the politics of problem framing and development of solutions to crime problems. Random patrols and responding to calls for service are the main methods used in modern policing. Patrol is the core of police activities and defines traditional policing. Modern police receive significant weapons training, and physical competencies are considered vital to the performance of police tasks. The potential and actuality of lethal,

deadly use of force through aggressive policing tactics underpins the isolation and contentious relationship that the police have with poorer and minority populations. Police are selective in enforcing violations of the law and continue to profile and classify individuals, situations, and areas for crime control, order maintenance, and service provision purposes. Use of force and p ­roactive ­aggressive policing remain and are likely to continue as prominent issues in policing in the future, given their concentration in particular places and with particular populations. De-­escalation of force ­alternatives training has been offered as a resolution to persistent excessive force incidents but seems to have little resonance with proactive ­policing and policing organizational cultures and subcultures.

Policing Futures: Surveillance and Accountability The War on Terror has the potential to change the nature of police surveillance along with the deepening of proactive policing. Surveillance at the peak of the War on Drugs (and continuing to a lesser extent today) favored covert methods with the use of specialized officers and tactics. This largely remained focused on investigations centered on major criminals and organized criminal groups locally, regionally, and nationally. The landscape of criminal threats changed considerably since the last decade of the 20th century. Cybercrimes, economic and financial crimes, and the crossing of boundaries by criminal groups that are highly organized and networked pose threats, requiring intensive and well-organized surveillance. Surveillance has become a necessity for high-policing agencies. Invisible surveillance tools and secretive methods are favored by the police to  allow for more effective investigations and ­prevention of crime, mass shootings, political violence, and terrorism. With many potential offenders and targets and difficulties in choosing whom to surveil, covert means offer the advantage of surprise over traditional methods. The benefits of covert means are weighed against the costs (violation of rights, profiling, and other social and economic harms) to individuals, populations, and groups. For many, security is considered more important than fighting crime.

Policing and Society

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the security rationales for surveillance, especially the federal and state police, were powerful. Coupled with the rapid development and proliferation of technologies allowing for greater opportunities for surveillance, the War on Terror has accelerated the form and visibility of how police target and legally justify using surveillance. Legal standards have been loosened, and permission to access personal data is much more direct than in the past. The nexus of federal prosecutors and federal police leaders in consolidating resources and surveillance tools to fight the War on Terror portends tighter coordination of surveillance in the near future. Intelligence-led policing reflects an emphasis on  intelligence gathering, analysis, and making this intelligence actionable. It has strong surveillance components and connects with law enforcement investigations, including those with a focus on the financing sources of terrorists and radicalization leading to violent extremism. Large police departments, notably the New York Police Department, are funded and supported by the federal government, as part of its fight against the War on Terror. The New York Police Department’s surveillance of mosques in neighboring New Jersey is a prominent, albeit controversial for violating jurisdictional boundaries, example of federal-supported and local police–implemented effort that places the police in the front lines of counterterrorism. Surveillance is likely to be consistent with counterterrorism methods, and the fusion of these methods into policing with large police departments exists and will likely deepen further. Another avenue of technology-led surveillance is the use of military equipment and tactics (as some say the militarization of policing) in police departments, which started with the wars relating to crimes and popularized with large, urban police departments. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department uses helicopters for policing and justifies the costs in terms of the numerous benefits to fighting the War on Gangs. Police agencies’ choices regarding how to allocate scarce resources and the funding of surveillance remain keys to limiting surveillance for the majority of police organizations. Without the federal government’s various wars (e.g., on drugs, on gangs, on terror), surveillance would have remained limited to local policing, and without the political

761

and monetary incentives provided to these agencies, the need for and value of surveillance would have reduced. A related criticism is a lack of checks and balances. Without clear accountability and due to the secretive nature of surveillance methods, legal means remain the only viable avenues to ensure that the costs of the use of surveillance are not excessive and uneven in terms of their impacts. Proactive policing at all levels is difficult to address with little incentive for prosecutors and legislators to publicly or legally challenge the same agencies they depend on to fight their wars. Police accountability has emerged as a critical issue with few clear solutions with regard to policing overenforcement or underenforcement. Most view reducing racial bias as significant due to the strong connections with racial profiling and discrimination with policing cultures. There is considerable support to the argument that class and inequalities are equally critical to the selectivity of policing practices. Police organizations are prone to failures of corruption, abuse, and inefficiencies due to the interplay of increased politicization, growth pressures, loss of legitimacy, deepening societal inequalities, and the potential for greater use of surveillance technologies. The likelihood of policing remaining consistently focused on crime control and order maintenance remains high, as well as the realities that the police depend less on the public for their existence than their political sovereigns, and successful policing changes are engendered not externally but internally. Police leadership and management are crucial for healthy police accountability. Democratizing police bureaucracies by collectivizing the policing profession and building the cognitive capacities of the police rank and file can ensure that the police themselves and their organizations are simultaneously fair and effective. Sanjay Marwah See also Autonomy; Fear, Culture of; Law; Marx, Gary T.; Moral Panic; Profiling, Racial; Securitization; War on Terror

Further Readings Brodeur, Jean-Paul. The Policing Web. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

762

Political Action Committees

Cockcroft, Tom. Police Culture: Themes and Concepts. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. Coleman, Roy and Michael McCahill. Surveillance and Crime. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011. Deukmedjian, John. “Making Sense of Neoliberal Securitization in Urban Policing and Surveillance.” Canadian Review of Sociology, v.50/1 (2013). Epp, Charles, et al. Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Joplin, Jerry and Sanjay Marwah. “Democratizing Police Professionalization and Division of Labor.” Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies, v.13 (2013). Miller, Lisa. The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010. Newburn, Tim, ed. Handbook of Policing. Cullompton, England: Willan, 2008. O’Hara, Patrick. Why Law Enforcement Organizations Fail: Mapping the Organizational Fault Line in Policing. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2012. Skogan, Wesley and Kathleen Frydl, eds. Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2004. Walker, Samuel and Carol Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014. Weisburd, David and Anthony A. Braga, eds. Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Political Action Committees A political action committee (PAC) is a privately organized group assembled for the purpose of raising and distributing funding for political campaigns in the United States. For the purpose of this entry, attention will be focused on the PACs that have a vested interest in swaying public support and congressional votes with regard to surveillance and security. This entry first details the spending limits and other restrictions applied to PACs and their spin-offs, then describes the involvement of PACs specifically related to defense contracting and telecommunications, and concludes with a review of how privacy and other issues can be affected by the influence and spending of PACs.

Various limits on campaign finance have been implemented since the post–Watergate era when the U.S. Congress established the role of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in restricting contributions to candidates and PACs. In 2002, the McCain-Feingold law enacted rules on the unlimited “soft money” spending by corporations, unions, and others. PACs can give up to $5,000 to a candidate committee per election, $15,000 annually to any national party committee, and $5,000 annually to another PAC. Additionally, PACs may receive up to $5,000 from any one individual, PAC, or party committee per calendar year. Following the landmark rulings in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) and SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission (2010), a new kind of PAC, known as the super PAC, emerged. Super PACs are allowed to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money in attempts to advocate for or against political candidates; however, super PACs must report their donors to the FEC and, unlike traditional PACs, are barred from directly funding or coordinating with political candidates. Full transparency seems elusive because donations to super PACs during the final 3 weeks of elections are not reported until December, a month after elections take place. Watchdog organizations argue that this reporting gap and resulting lack of disclosure have serious implications for democracy, as it prevents voters from scrutinizing political candidates’ ties to certain donors. Organizations also utilize 501(c) nonprofit and taxexempt “social welfare” groups that can engage in political activity, but they must spend less than 50% of their money on politics. Despite this restriction on political spending, 501(c) groups have outspent super PACs by a 3 to 2 margin in recent years. These 501(c) groups are attractive to some organizations because, unlike super PACs, 501(c) groups are not required to disclose their donors. Both PACs and super PACs have attempted to develop a considerable degree of influence on elections, legislation, and policy. They represent labor union interests, businesses and sectors of industry, and ideological viewpoints. In 2008, Republican consultants recognized the growing discontent within their party and launched the PAC Our Country Deserves Better, which became the influential Tea Party Express. In 2010, Democrats

Political Action Committees

initially criticized the Citizens United decision and resisted super PAC spending, but they realized that Republicans were outspending them, as with Karl Rove’s conservative American Crossroads super PAC. By the 2012 election cycle, Republicans were spending more, but Democrat/liberal PACs and super PACs pushed spending on President Barack Obama’s reelection and efforts to maintain the Senate majority status. In the 2012 election cycle, conservative 501(c) groups spent more than $263 million, while liberal 501(c) groups spent less than $35 million. Often, organizations will have multiple arms, including a 501(c) group and a super PAC. Crossroads GPS, for example, is a 501(c) group affiliated with the American Crossroads super PAC. The top spenders in the 2014 election cycle were the liberal NextGen Climate Action super PAC ($76 million) and Senate and House Majority PACs (more than $53 million and $29 million, respectively) and the American Crossroads super PAC for Republicans. According to FEC reports, as of October 29, 2014, 1,228 groups organized as super PACs reported total receipts of close to $600 million in the 2014 cycle. Top PAC contributors to candidates in the 2014 election cycle include realtors, defense contractors (primarily favoring Republicans), telecommunications (Republicans), unions (Democrats), and the banking and financial industries (Republicans). Multiple industries utilize PACs to serve their political interests, including agriculture, electronics/ communications, construction, defense, energy, financial institutions, health, and others. PACs with roots in the defense industry and telecommunications sector have pressed for policy related to surveillance and security that best aligns with their interests. In the 2014 election cycle, 72 PACs representing the defense and telecommunications industry accounted for nearly $17 million in campaign contributions. Defense industry and telecommunications industry PACs have contributed to both sides of the aisle. For example, in the 2014 election cycle, about 61% of the total defense industry PAC contributions were made to Republicans, with 39% made to Democrats. By making contributions to candidates from both political parties, defense industry PACs attempt to influence decision making regardless of who is elected into office.

763

Defense Contractors The defense industry is a prime example of an industry that utilizes PACs to serve its political interests. In the 2012 election cycle, 49 PACs from the defense sector combined to contribute more than $15 million to federal election campaigns. Recently, campaign funding from defense PACs has attempted to sway lawmakers to vote for or against reforms of surveillance practices. Six of the largest private contractors who work for the National Security Agency (NSA) and other U.S. intelligence agencies have accounted for more than $16 million in funding to lawmakers since 2007. The defense industry prefers continuation of the NSA surveillance program because private contractors analyze the massive amount of data that are gathered. Significantly, as much as 70% of the NSA’s budget pays private defense contractors for the purpose of data analysis. By promoting the renewal of the PATRIOT Act and other surveillance programs and favoring candidates through its PACs, the defense industry is able to continue to secure government contracts and benefit financially. Defense industry PACs have also been active in lobbying for the use of various types of technology, including drones. Advocates of drone usage claim that unmanned vehicles save money on defense, help better patrol the nation’s borders, and provide a useful tool to law enforcement agencies. Opponents of drones are concerned that  the use of drones domestically may invade Americans’ privacy. While some opposition to drone use exists in the United States, opponents of drones are largely outspent by defense industry PACs lobbying for their use. A group made up of several Congressmen, called the Drone Caucus, has played an important role in promoting the use of drones by the government. Eight members of the Drone Caucus also sit on the House Committee on Appropriations, which holds a lot of power with regard to government spending. Many of the members of the Drone Caucus receive contributions from the defense industry; since 2011, 58 members have received a total of $2.3 million in contributions from PACs affiliated with drone manufacturers. Through the use of the Drone Caucus and PACs, the defense industry has been

764

Political Action Committees

successful in acquiring government contracts; since 2005, the federal government has awarded more than $12 billion in contracts for private services related to drones. Nonetheless, the defense industry is not alone with regard to the use of lobbying and PAC contributions.

Telecommunications Telecommunications companies comprise another sector relying on dedicated PACs to contribute donations to federal political candidates. From 2002 to 2012, organizations associated with the three largest U.S. telecom companies (Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint) spent a combined $52.7 million on campaign contributions. Some of this money was dedicated to influencing surveillance policy, including recent proposed reforms of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The massive expenditures may be an attempt by the telecommunications industry to protect its interests in the increasingly expanding national security state. From 2002 through 2012, Verizon made contributions of more than $787,000 to members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the lawmakers tasked with constructing the laws dealing with phone surveillance and legal immunity. AT&T gave $1,373,000 to those same committee members. Intense lobbying in this regard appears to have succeeded; the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 states that in exchange for participating in the NSA’s surveillance operations, telecommunication companies are granted legal immunity from civil lawsuits. Despite multiple lawsuits challenging it, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 has been upheld and continues to provide immunity to telecommunications companies that take part in aiding surveillance practices.

Privacy The influence of PACs on legislative decision making holds serious implications for privacy. Specifically, PACs have utilized campaign contributions to promote policies that some argue allow for the invasion of Americans’ privacy. In June 2014, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the defense appropriations bill that cut off funding to the NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency for installing surveillance “backdoors” into software and physical devices, a practice that some consider

a gross violation of privacy. The amendment also blocked these agencies from using funds appropriated by the bill to gather intelligence information about U.S. citizens without a warrant. The bill passed, but, on average, representatives voting against reform received 113% more contributions from defense contractors than representatives who voted in favor of privacy-protecting reform. The influence of defense industry PACs has led to the increasing use of drones domestically and exacerbated privacy concerns. Opponents of drones are concerned that the use of drones domestically may threaten Americans’ privacy. In recent years, U.S. law enforcement and private contractors have greatly expanded the use of domestic drones for purposes of surveillance. Privacy advocates, like the American Civil Liberties Union, worry that the use of drones in the United States would bring the country closer to a surveillance society in which every aspect of Americans’ lives is monitored, recorded, and scrutinized by the government. Privacy advocates argue that strict regulations should be placed on domestic drone use to promote and protect the public’s privacy. As of 2014, legislation aimed at regulating drone use has been introduced in 36 states but has only been enacted in 4 states. The influence and spending power of defense industry PACs pose a serious challenge for the enactment of regulations on domestic drones and other privacy-protecting reforms.

Other Influences of PACs Recent evidence suggests that PACs and super PACs are broadening the scope of their spending activity into state judicial elections and other political issues such as redistricting. Watchdog groups are raising concerns about outside financial influence now affecting impartiality of judges, defendants’ rights in court, and suppression of voting rights due to redistricting and voter identification laws. Some argue that more outside money spent in elections means more free speech and communication, such as advertisements and mailings, which provides more information to voters and enhances voter participation. Civil liberties groups are challenging government surveillance powers in court, and the influence of PACs on judicial elections and decision making deserves further attention. Colin Burke and Lynn Jones

Political Dissidents See also American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010); Hepting v. AT&T; Privacy; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Higgins, Michael. “Political Action Committees.” In C. H. Sterling (ed.), Encyclopedia of Journalism (Vol. 3). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009. SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 08-5223 (2010).

Political Dissidents Dissident, derived from Latin dissideˉre (meaning “to sit apart,” “to be in contradiction with,” and “to disagree”), refers in a broad sense to someone who challenges the status quo by protesting. Accordingly, dissent is understood as a practice. If a dissident’s disagreement is followed by a rejection of an aspect of the governing political order or of a certain dominant narrative of the state or society, then the term political dissent can be used. This form of dissent includes a critique of governance and frequently overlaps with religious, cultural, or social forms of dissent that reject predominant norms, values, or customs. Such is the case with the suffragettes fighting for women’s right to vote, which subsequently changed the view on gender equality. As a concept, dissent is historically and culturally relative and highly contextual. In times of the German Democratic Republic, the government of West Germany reserved the word dissident for those from the East, thereby endowing it with the connotation of fighting against the Socialist government, whereas they called dissidents from the West “troublemakers.” The semantics conveyed by the term shift depending on the context. If dissent is conceptualized in opposition to conformism and conformists are linked to the protection of social interests, then dissidents are portrayed as selfish individualists due to the contrast. It is therefore meaningful if dissidents are self-identifying as dissidents or if they are labeled as such (e.g., being labeled “unpatriotic” or “un-American” by the media or through biased coverage).

765

A political dissident does not have to be part of a political movement, however, as dissent can be either collective or individual. The concept of dissent can refer to various forms of protest. Whistleblowing is closely linked to dissent and presupposes the element of hint giving. Since the opposition is often conceptualized as governmental and institutional, political dissent includes not only opposition but also political opposition outside the legal structure of the state. Nevertheless, through cooptation, a dissident can become institutionalized, as can be seen from the emergence of green political parties in Western Europe in the course of the anti–nuclear power mobilization. Another related term is civil disobedience, which would imply the intentional breach of rules and a concrete neglect or a temporal and demonstrative violation of the law. This entry discusses various examples of and responses to political dissent and concludes with a discussion of political dissent in the Digital Age, including implications for surveillance, security, and privacy.

Manifestations of Political Dissent There are numerous ways in which political dissent can be expressed. One can organize a demonstration, a protest march, or a sit-in, which were especially popular during the environmental movement of the 1970s and 1980s. Riots are another form of expressing dissent often linked with property damage and arson. A strike can be seen as a form of political dissent if it has a political aim. Another manifestation is the boycott, such as the boycott of buses in Montgomery, Alabama, launched by M ­ artin Luther King Jr. in the 1950s. The dissident can in addition give a speech, write a letter or an article, sign a petition, or post a blog entry or a video online. Protest can also be silent. The Silent Sentinels, a group of women who advocated women’s suffrage, protested in silence in front of the White House for 6 weeks in 1917. Another silent gesture performed as a political protest was the 1968 Olympics Black Power Salute. Brandishing signs or slogans can be another form of dissent. Mary Beth Tinker wore a black armband to school to protest the Vietnam War in 1969 and was punished according to a policy introduced by the Des Moines School District principals. Famous examples for art as an expression of political dissent are the projects of Chinese artist Ai Weiwei and Banksy, an anonymous British graffiti

766

Political Dissidents

artist. The feminist punk group Pussy Riot opposed Vladimir Putin’s governance and expressed its dissent inter alia through guerilla performances. Political dissent is not “progressive” in character. There is liberal, conservative, or even radical political dissent. For example, the legalization of abortion by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) gave rise to the pro-life movement that seeks to return to the policies that existed before the Roe decision. One major dissent issue of the early 21st century is the broad topic of  globalization (e.g., regulation of multinational corporations, sustainability, and fair trade). Related thereto is the beginning of the antiglobalization movement through the protests against the 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization ministerial conference. In globalized public spheres, political movements can consist of looser connections such as the Occupy Movement, which emerged with its first action, Occupy Wall Street, in 2011 as a protest against bank bailouts. Political dissent can merely criticize the established source of authority or it can aim to ­overthrow it. It can therefore evolve into an independence movement, resulting in the emergence of a new state, as happened with the Boston Tea Party, which led to the American Revolutionary War against the British Empire. Political dissent can also turn radical, as in the case of the Red Army Faction, a West German terrorist group that had its roots in the student protest movement in the 1970s.

zones can be misused if they are removed to remote areas and thereby withdraw public attention. An indirect suppression also takes place if dissidents are surveilled. In 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Lawyers Guild brought a lawsuit against the Boston Police Department for monitoring peaceful demonstrations and filing reports about several activist groups and even interrogating several participants as extremists. In the 1950s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation developed a surveillance program called COINTELPRO to persecute and prosecute political dissidents suspected to be potential KGB spies. Political dissent peaked during the Vietnam War, leading to a mass arrest of nearly 13,000 antiwar demonstrators in spring 1971. The antiwar protestors were also surveilled by the government, and in Laird v. Tatum (1972), they tried to challenge the surveillance at the Supreme Court but failed because the plaintiffs could not allege any specific harm inflicted on them. The reinforcement of national security is often accompanied by  the criminalization of political dissent. In the  aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, which expanded the possibilities for surveillance practices and introduced a new classification of “domestic terrorism.” The government was monitoring and spying on activist groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Greenpeace, and Veterans for Peace through federal law enforcement agencies.

Dealing With Political Dissent

Political Dissent in the Digital Age

Dissent can lead to political confrontation, because it aims at a response from political actors. It can transform latent conflicts into manifest ones and thereby shape societies. In general, political dissent is an element of the democratic public: first, as a contribution to the public debate, and second, as an opportunity to check governmental abuses of power. The U.S. Constitution lacks an explicit right to dissent, although the First Amendment serves as a prerequisite to allow it. Yet there are many historical as well as current examples of silencing criticism by hindering, undermining, or disrupting dissent. An obvious instrument to suppress political dissent is censorship. Moreover, so-called free speech

The channel the dissident chooses for public disclosure can be digital. The idea of unlimited access and of untraceable and anonymous leaking is the concept of the Internet platform WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks became famous inter alia for Iraq War documents and the so-called collateral murder video leaked by Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning. Manning, like other whistle-blowers in the United States, was charged under the Espionage Act of 1917, which had been created originally to prosecute spies. Edward Snowden’s revelations about the all-encompassing surveillance practices of the National Security Agency sparked protests and gave rise to a new awareness about the importance of data protection debates. A need for privacy and

Political Psychology

its protection are concerns of certain movements, such as the activist and the hacktivist collective Anonymous. The Digital Age opens up new arenas for political dissent, but online protest remains similar in nature to the offline protest, and both should therefore be considered interconnected. Arab Spring revolutions in early 2011 were among the  first protests to make excessive use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube for scheduling the protests, coordinating actions, and telling the world about the protest activity. However, besides offering new opportunities for dissidents, new forms of censorship arise in the digital sphere. In April 2017, Turkey blocked the online access to all language versions of Wikipedia. Miriam Piegsa and Manuela Sixt See also Arab Spring; Civil Disobedience; Espionage; Free Speech; Revolutions and Revolts; WhistleBlowers; WikiLeaks

Further Readings Chang, Nancy. Silencing Political Dissent. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2002. Fahlenbrach, Kathrin, et al. Protest Cultures. A Companion. New York, NY: Berghahn, 2016. Lovell, Jarret S. Crimes of Dissent: Civil Disobedience, Criminal Justice and the Politics of Conscience. New York: New York University Press, 2009. Malone-France, Derek. Political Dissent: A Global Reader: Vol. 2. Modern Sources. London, England: Lexington Books, 2012. Martin, Robert W. Government by Dissent: Protest, Resistance and Radical Democratic Thought in the Early American Republic. New York: New York University Press, 2013. Sunstein, Cass R. Why Societies Need Dissent. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. Young, Ralph F. Dissent: The History of an American Idea. New York: New York University Press, 2015.

Political Psychology At a general level, political psychology is the application of psychological research findings to the study of politics. The foci lie on the psychological

767

conditions and antecedents as well as on the psychological consequences of political processes. Thereby, political psychology fosters an understanding of political elites’ as well as of citizens’ behavior. Typically, political psychology focuses on the application of psychology to international relations, to mass political behavior, or to intergroup relations. In this entry, the focus is on the psychological factors that influence the dynamic relationship between governmental surveillance—as a political measurement—on the one side and privacy and security on the other. The aim is to demonstrate which psychological processes play a role in the interplay of security, privacy, and surveillance— more specifically which factors influence the acceptance of surveillance measurements among individuals. Although the emphasis is on the acceptance of governmental surveillance measurements, the identified factors might as well be relevant for other forms of surveillance (e.g., private surveillance). Against the background of the tense relationship between liberty and security in democracies, it is important to understand which factors influence the acceptance of governmental security measurements (e.g., surveillance) that potentially restrict the liberty of individuals as well as potentially increase the security of many. Although direct research on the interplay of surveillance measurements and privacy is scarce, up to now a consistent picture emerges. Research in political psychology and related fields has identified several psychological factors that moderate individuals’ acceptance of (governmental) security-related measurements, particularly of surveillance measurements. In the following sections, several such moderating factors are discussed. Later, these factors are linked to the general processing of political information by individuals.

Privacy Concerns Privacy concerns play a vital role in the psychological underpinnings of the liberty-security relationship. Privacy concern is the translation of the abstract concept of privacy into a psychological phenomenon. It is the perception of the degree to which privacy is (not) given and the subjective importance or relevance of privacy in a given context. In this sense, privacy concerns are a means to

768

Political Psychology

the end of experienced liberty: The decision—that is, which information about oneself is shared with a third party—rests solely with the individual. The individual has the freedom to decide with whom personal information is to be shared. Thus, any political measurement that has the potential to be perceived as a threat to one’s own liberty activates or increases privacy concerns. Therefore, most governmental surveillance measurements will inevitably activate privacy concerns—as soon as the individual becomes aware of its existence. However, the activation of privacy concerns might not also necessarily affect subsequent behavior. Sören Preibusch has described, for example, how little the use of privacy-enhancing technologies has increased after government contractor Edward Snowden revealed the 2013 National Security Agency surveillance programs. Never­ theless, the attitude toward (governmental) sur­ veillance measurements might be affected when privacy concerns are activated. The public ventilation of these privacy concerns might also affect political decision makers and the political climate in general. Therefore, it is important to understand which factors might affect the intensity of privacy concerns. One crucial factor is transparency.

Transparency Privacy concerns can be cushioned or reduced by transparency, which in turn increases the acceptance of surveillance measurements. Antii Oulasvirta and colleagues have shown that transparency of the intention of surveillance decreases privacy concerns. Given that governmental surveillance measurements have the intention to increase security, transparency about those measurements should probably reduce privacy concerns in most individuals. In addition, transparency has the advantage of legitimizing governmental measurements. Although it is obvious that not all processes, and especially methods of governmental surveillance measurement, can be made transparent to everyone, the need and necessity for surveillance measurements should be transparent as well. Thus, transparency should not only concern obvious benign intentions but should also demonstrate the necessity of the measurement through the weighing of privacy against security. Transparency about the intentions and the necessity of a governmental surveillance measurement can

constitute a crucial step in addressing privacy concerns and consequently increasing the acceptance of those measurements.

Risk Another moderating variable is the risk perceived by citizens. The perception of risk can increase anxiety-related feelings, which in turn might cause a stronger acceptance of surveillance and security measurements. Thus, if surveillance is seen as a means to reduce risk and threats (and thereby ultimately reduce anxiety), citizens might more readily accept the surveillance of personal information. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that closed-circuit television (CCTV) installations are accepted by a majority of citizens (although remarkable differences across demographic groups exist), even though the effect on the reduction of crime is modest. This underlines the importance of a psychological perspective in security research: Although objective security is not dramatically increased by CCTV, the acceptance rate is substantial, because it serves a subjective security, a feeling of being safe and secure. Thus, if the subjective security is threatened because of potential risks, the acceptance of surveillance measurements will be enhanced. In the following section, the interplay between the three variables is described.

The Interplay Between Privacy Concerns, Risk, and Transparency Privacy concerns serve liberty; risks and subjective risk perception address the need for security. Thus, both relate to fundamental human needs. However, privacy concerns are—at least in peaceful democracies—proximal. This means that anytime one opens an Internet browser, receives an email, makes a phone call, or crosses a public place with CCTV, privacy concerns can become a current concern. In contrast, risks and in particular subjective risks are in those societies rather distal, in the sense that a high (especially subjective) risk is scarce. In addition, privacy concerns can be activated in everyone, whereas the likelihood to become a victim of, for example, a crime or a terrorist attack is regarded as low. Thus, distal risks to security have a weaker impact on individuals than the proximal threats to liberty. Therefore, the

Politics

kind of transparency can play a vital role in balancing the individual weighing of privacy concerns (liberty) against subjective risks (security). Transparency regarding surveillance measurement should also address—besides the aforementioned intention and necessity—successes of those measurements. Failures related to such measurements (e.g., a terrorist attack) become inevitably public. However, successes need to be actively made public as well, because such transparency will make the rather distal need for security more proximal. This will most likely contribute to a change from an imbalanced individual emphasis of privacy concerns to a more equivalent weighing of liberty and security. Besides these content-related factors, the mode of information processing influences the individual balancing of liberty and security.

measurements due to a superficial informationprocessing mode also activate privacy concerns. Second, as also described earlier, privacy concerns can be easily activated and therefore have a processing advantage over security- and riskrelated information, especially when it comes to automatic processing. Up to now, for many political processes, it is difficult to activate a systematic information-processing mode. Therefore, it is necessary that through transparency much more knowledge of and understanding of governmental surveillance measurement is created. This can lead to an automatic activation of security-related concerns, when confronted with surveillance measurements. In the end, individuals will more readily consider both, their need for liberty and for security, when they determine their acceptance of governmental surveillance measurements.

Processing of Information Related to Privacy, Risk, and Transparency After bringing the three pieces—privacy concerns, transparency, and risk perception—together, one might wonder how rational the information processing of individuals is, when it comes to political issues, such as the liberty-security relationship. First, most information processing (also of political information) occurs automatically, which means in particular without awareness and without effort. Thus, information is not processed in a systematic way, which is rather effortful and time-consuming. Applying this distinction to the Snowden revelations, most people might have heard about Snowden and the related documents, although most likely only a small number would have read and systematically processed all the documents that have been revealed. This superficial processing of information through secondhand sources (e.g., newspapers, TV, online blogs), however, is sufficient to activate privacy concerns. As described earlier, transparency can affect privacy concerns. However, for this, an automatic information-processing mode is not sufficient for mainly two reasons: First, most individuals do not know much about “surveillance measurements,” the political and legal processes supervising the installation and the use of such measurements. Thus, the stored knowledge that will be activated in this mode when confronted with transparency will inevitably be privacy concerns. Ironically, failures of such

769

Markus Denzler See also Deviance; Privacy; Security, Concepts of

Further Readings Dinev, Tamara, et al. “Internet Privacy Concerns and Beliefs About Government Surveillance: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Strategic Information Systems, v.17/3 (2008). Huddy, Leonie, et al., eds. The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (2nd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2013. Oulasvirta, Antti, et al. “Transparency of Intentions Decreases Privacy Concerns in Ubiquitous Surveillance.” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, v.17/10 (2014). Preibusch, Sören. “Privacy Behaviors After Snowden.” Communications of the ACM, v.58/5 (2015). Smith, H. Jeff, et al. “Information Privacy Research: An Interdisciplinary Review.” MIS Quarterly, v.35/5 (2011).

Politics Surveillance and privacy are more and more associated with the world of information and ­ communication technologies (ICTs). As political and governance issues, privacy and surveillance are complex and multidimensional, with regard

770

Politics

to both their regulation and their normative understanding. Before the explosion of the ICT that has been taking place since the mid-1990s, privacy violations were mainly considered twofold. On the one hand, the most discussed kind of privacy invasion was considered to be associated with the media reporting on the lives of public figures. On the other, state surveillance of citizens’ private lives, such as the U.S. Counterintelligence Program in the 1950s and 1960s, took aim at leftwing activists and political elites. The dilemmas of privacy no longer affect only elites or highly politicized citizens, but they also affect everyday  citizens’ and users’ daily experiences. Public and corporate agents can today, often almost unchecked, surveil citizens’, users’, and customers’ electronic interactions for a variety of purposes. Two factors are considered to have played a determinative role in the rapid expansion of computerized surveillance practices. First is the radical development of ICTs and networked computing devices, which was made possible due to the increasing availability of inexpensive and efficient  data storage. The second factor that has contributed to what is often ­characterized as a “surveillance society” was the creation of a culture of fear of terrorism, especially after the attacks in New York, Madrid, and London in 2001, 2004, and 2005, respectively. This entry examines in detail the politics of privacy and its governance—internationally as well as specifically in the United States and Europe—before looking at the impact of the National Security Agency leaks by Edward Snowden. The entry then turns its attention to the politics of surveillance, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between surveillance, privacy, and citizenship.

The Politics of Privacy Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s work has unquestionably influenced the way in which the right to privacy has been perceived and regulated for more than a century. With their seminal article “The Right to Privacy” that was published in 1890 in the Harvard Law Review, the authors noticed the implications that the growth of technology had on media practices and more specifically on the press: “Instantaneous photographs and newspaper

enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’” In particular, they argued for the protection of the right to determine to what extent and under which conditions an individual’s thoughts, “sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.” Warren and Brandeis were concerned with the impact of the social world in the space of interiority, deep thought, and spiritual connection among people and in particular in the space of family and intimacy. In this sense, it is contemplation and spirituality (as an affair of the mental state of human beings freed from the excesses of materiality—but not asceticism) that can only be achieved when individuals are safe in a “quiet” place, by renewing and understanding eternal moral principles. Privacy allows for the exercise of judgment and the rule of reason as an aspect of human conduct that promotes democratic deliberation and ethical self-development. Privacy for Warren and Brandeis was not subordinated to ­ property, but the other way around, since, for example, economic and political concentration and “bigness” (of business, of state) insults human dignity and leads to corruption and arbitrarity, among other things. The essay on the right to be let alone was a profound work that promoted the development of the conception of privacy. The idea of privacy is related to the desire to act within a zone that is “private,” away from the scrutiny of others. Thus, it defines an individual’s relationship with society and implies the existence of the “public,” which is a prerequisite of its existence. Jürgen Habermas has highlighted the importance of the public sphere in forming public opinion in his book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989). Habermas emphasized that the existence of a private sphere is necessary for keeping important parts of our social lives protected from the control of the ruling powers. Critics of the aforementioned conceptions of privacy reject the value of a specific right to privacy on the basis that all private interests can be explained and protected by other basic rights, such as the right to property and security. Others argue that privacy is protected in ways that are economically inefficient and that it should only

Politics

be  defended when access to information would reduce its value. In addition, in the U.S. context, as some claim, the right to privacy does not derive from any preexisting right or natural law, but instead, it is a newly created right with no foundation in the U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights. Finally, other commentators point out that academic analyses of privacy tend to focus only on its positive aspects, ignoring possible negative issues related to its political economy. According to this view, privacy is an “ideological mechanism that helps reproducing and deepening inequality.” A prominent example that can be considered is the high level of anonymity of bank accounts and transactions that can be found in certain countries, such as Switzerland, which increases social disparities by allowing money laundering and by hiding wealth inequalities. Despite the rich debate by philosophers, legal theorists, jurists, and academics on privacy, it is difficult to describe privacy in a single way or as one single idea, as its meaning and usage have been linked to many individual rights. Privacy is linked to both positive and negative freedoms. In terms of positive freedom, privacy expresses the set of rights for a person’s ability to control four broad areas of legal concern: (1) freedom of personal autonomy, (2) the right to control personal information, (3) the right to control property, and (4) the right to control and protect personal physical space. As a negative freedom, privacy is understood as the absence of invasion of privacy by the government, business, or other actors into the space considered personal. In relation to autonomy and information, privacy is the freedom that allows individuals to make choices without the fear of being scrutinized and judged by others, a process that involves a “safe” place to withdraw and contemplate. For some, “privacy-sensitive” information is therefore information considered off limits, intimate information, which when revealed in public will not add to a general public interest but rather would affect personal judgment on the basis of biases.

The Politics of Privacy Governance There is no specific surveillance legal framework that regulates explicitly all practices and aspects of

771

surveillance. Surveillance regulation can be instead located at the broader privacy and data protection policy environment in Western societies that shapes the possibilities and conditions for data manipulation and protection in the context of digital media. Policies designed to regulate privacy focus on the fate of personal information and how this is manipulated. The underlying assumption is largely related to the sense of self-governance and control over information about a person that is considered too “personal” to be freely available to third parties, such as information related to the intimate sphere of sexuality and love and relevant lifestyle choices, information about one’s cultural and political inclinations, and intimate details about everyday life and persons related to these aspects. International Policy

The implications are, of course, far-reaching and important, which is the reason why the right to privacy is recognized in international legal instruments under the supervision of the United Nations. More specifically, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to privacy is protected under Article 17, which states the following: 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks upon his honor and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

In our technology-centered times, correspondence takes various forms, from emails to messages on social networking services, as well as the generation of computerized information. The United Nations Guidelines on Computerized Personal Data Files provide specific principles to states, and at the same time, they also define in which cases they may not be valid. These guidelines “should be made applicable, in the first instance, to all public and private computerized files as well as by means of optional extension and subject to appropriate adjustments, to manual files.”

772

Politics

However, as the guidelines clearly mention, a different approach may be authorized only if they are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morality, as well as, inter alia, the rights and freedoms of others . . . provided that such departures are expressly specified in a law or equivalent regulation.

U.S. Policy

Privacy and data protection policies in the United States are based on the federal model and have favored a self-regulatory environment. Privacy is mainly regulated by the Privacy Act of 1974, which is the code of fair information practices mandating how federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, should maintain records about individuals. The Privacy Act of 1974 was amended by the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 that added a number of protections for the subjects of privacy acts records that are used in automated matching programs. The U.S. Department of Justice established the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Office and the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, with responsibility to protect privacy and civil liberties. The Privacy Act of 1997, the privacy provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, the Federal Information Security Management Act, and further policy directives that are created as extensions of these acts are the main policy tools. Still, certain privacy rights are being protected with supplementary laws, as, for example, with children’s online safety that is protected by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. Moreover, certain states, such as California, regulate privacy independently in their state constitutions. The ­California Online Privacy Protection Act demands that online companies that deal with personal data inform their users with a privacy policy. However, the California Office of Information Security and Privacy Protection accommodates a more self-regulatory approach, leaving space for the companies to form their privacy policy. Taking into consideration that the most important international online companies are headquartered in California, it is needless to say that U.S. policy is particularly important internationally.

European Policy

In Europe, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) issued by the Council of Europe recognizes the right to privacy under Article 8: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” There are limitations on this right, however, in the case of “national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Indeed, the ECHR recognizes that secret surveillance can undermine or even destroy democracy on the grounds of defending it. However, the governance of surveillance often consists of balancing conflicting rights and interests, whose task is usually performed by courts, on a case-by-case basis. The Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, known as Convention 108, demands that collaborated states respect every individual’s right to privacy. The Consultative Committee of the Council of Europe is currently considering updating the convention to synchronize it with rapidly growing telecommunication technologies. Furthermore, within the European Union (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights, data protection is included as an autonomous fundamental right under Article 8, in which “an independent authority” is also responsible for controlling the application of the rules. The creation of the Data Protection Directive in 1995 was an effort to harmonize national laws on privacy and data protection. This directive moved Convention 108 further, by detailing the criteria according to which data processing is legitimate. It applied to “any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,” called “processing” of data. According to Article 3(1), the directive applied to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.

Personal data were defined as

Politics

any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.

However, there are cases in which the restrictions do not apply, in particular in the case of public security, defense, and state security. The 2002 ePrivacy Directive was drafted as an extension of the Data Protection Directive to cover certain provisions, such as cookies, spam, and confidentiality of communications. Within the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, data protection is included as a fundamental right, under Article 8: 1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right to access to data, which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.

The European Data Protection Supervisor is a new “instrument,” an independent authority responsible for supervising European institutions and bodies regarding privacy and data protection issues; it has already come into conflict with the European Commission over measures to allow data retention. In particular, the Data Retention Directive of the European Commission demands that all providers of telecommunication services within the EU retain all of their customers’ traffic and location data for the period of not less than 6 months and not more than 2 years from the date of the communication. The European Commission’s evaluation of the directive argues that it is “a valuable tool for criminal justice systems and for law enforcement in the EU.” However, the European Data Protection Supervisor has stated that

773

the retention of telecommunications data clearly constitutes an interference with the right to privacy of the persons concerned as laid down by Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. . . . [It] has failed to meet its main purpose, namely to harmonize national legislation concerning data retention.

Within the EU, privacy and data protection are still being regulated by a particularly old law, of which the proposal was firstly conceived more than 20 years ago, in the early 1990s, long before the phenomenal developmental improvements of digital technologies and the Internet. Efforts for the modernization of the general privacy and data protection environment include a number of policy processes, of which an important milestone was the establishment of the Treaty of Lisbon that was put into force in December 2009 and has given the European Parliament increasing power over the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. In addition, it provides a reference to the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, reinforcing the charter’s full legal effect. The Treaty of Lisbon “is the new legal basis for the adoption of new data protection laws.” In 2012, the European Commission announced the forthcoming reform of the EU’s data protection policies. In particular, the European Commission acknowledged the inefficiency of the 1995 Data Protection Directive to ensure the right to personal data protection and pointed to the fact that there is no harmonization at the level of member-state legislation. To address these deficiencies, the new regulation “will do away with the fragmentation of legal regimes across 27 Member States and remove barriers to market entry, a factor of particular importance to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.” To make things even more complicated, the European Court of Justice declared in 2014 the Data Retention Directive to be invalid.

Snowden Revelations and Impact Edward Snowden, an American former intelligence agency member, with the collaboration of The Guardian, The Washington Post, Der Spiegel,

774

Politics

and a number of other media outlets, revealed— and most important attested to—the extent of the American, British, and other intelligence agencies’ surveillance activities. These activities included mass online, mobile, and landline telephone surveillance and data collection, covering nearly all possible communicative transactions. It all began on June 5, 2013, when the British newspaper The Guardian published the first exclusive story on the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) collection of millions of landline and mobile telephone calls. In particular, according to the report, the U.S. Foreign Surveillance Court had supplied the NSA with a secret order that could force Verizon—the largest U.S. telecommunication company—to provide the NSA with access to its networks for the purposes of data collection. The magnitude of this revelation lies in the fact that this was an undeniable truth that the U.S. government had been surveilling not only suspects of illegal activities but also citizens who had not done anything wrong. Following this and during a growing media sensation, the American newspaper The Washington Post put out the second revelation that showed that the NSA was also collecting in a similar manner millions of Internet users’ metadata from prominent Internet services, such as Google, Facebook, Apple, YouTube, Skype, Microsoft, and PalTalk. This concerned a vast range of data, such as emails, Internet calls, photos, videos, file transfers, and social media activities. However, it was not only the U.S. intelligence services that were reported to be conducting mass surveillance. The Guardian revealed on June 21, 2013, that the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had also been involved in similar surveillance practices. More specifically, under a secretive program with the nickname “Tempora,” the GCHQ had been given the possibility and permission to collect vast amounts of calls and Internet data, by directly intercepting the world’s cable networks. In another article that was also published by The Guardian, it was revealed that the GCHQ had been actively collaborating with other EU member state agencies on mass surveillance schemes. Over the next few months, more revelations were published, amid a well-sustained mediated public debate. Apart from monitoring massively

whole populations, the aforementioned intelligence agencies were reported to consistently and over a long period of time have spied on other countries’ leaders, with an example being the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. It was revealed that the NSA had been intercepting telephone communications of Germany’s political leader. Other notable surveillance cases concern the monitoring of the EU offices; the International Atomic Energy Agency; the EU embassy in Washington, DC; embassies and consulates around the world; and the EU’s mission to the United Nations in New York. These revelations had numerous disadvantageous effects for the various surveillance stakeholders for a litany of reasons. First, citizens were now aware of the extensive intrusions of their privacy. Second, in many cases, as the revealed documents have shown, some of the motives behind both strategic and tactical surveillance were related to the economic interests of various industries rather than being related to national security. Third, U.S. president Barack Obama and U.K. prime minister David Cameron saw their popularity decrease and their diplomatic relations with some of their counterparts deteriorate. In addition, companies that were exposed to be collaborating with the national security agencies or had given them access to their networks, such as Verizon, Google, Facebook, and others, suffered a loss of trust in their companies and their services by their users. Finally, citizens were deeply frustrated and/or enraged when they realized the extent and the implications of such intrusive surveillance practices. As Snowden’s revelations have shown, although the aforementioned privacy and data protection framework constitutes a set of important safeguards against the potential dangers that surveillance provides, in many cases it has failed to prevent the development and proliferation of surveillance technologies, given that many of the surveillance practices were in fact operating outside the law.

Surveillance and Politics In examining a country’s political history, it is important to understand how citizens perceive and manage surveillance practices. The main difference between the two opposing political systems—that

Politics

of democracy and that of dictatorship—is the level of accountability. The more democratic a state is, the more the surveillance practices by the state are subject to review; on the other hand, the more dictatorial a state, the more the accountability tends to disappear. The countries that formed the former Soviet bloc all had created a large network of surveillance, composed of various institutions and informants, whose task was political and social control of its citizens. Some examples include the KGB of  the Soviet Union, the Stasi in East Germany, the  STB in Czechoslovakia, the Securitate in Romania, and the III/III Division in Hungary. Some argue that, despite some important national and cultural differences in these states, surveillance came about with similar implications. By keeping the “internal enemies” of the state under surveillance, the network of surveillance agencies and their civilian informants perpetuated a situation in which everyone was suspect about how much of their lives was private. This belief of being perpetually under surveillance caused a deterioration of personal and social relationships within those nations. State-sanctioned surveillance was not just occurring in ex-communistic countries. In Greece and Portugal through 1974, and in Spain through 1975, the authoritative regimes of those countries relied on a vast bureaucratic network of informants and profiling. The main difference, however, was that the target of surveillance was citizens who could be categorized as left-wing members and communists. The targets of surveillance in these countries reacted in various ways. In most cases, citizens had to normalize their behavior, especially when they felt a potential surveillance threat. As some commentators have pointed out, citizens ­frequently prompted one another not to disclose some types of information over the phone. Although in the aforementioned countries their authoritative regimes were replaced by more democratic ones, the legacy of surveillance continued to affect their societies. Some of the reasons for this phenomenon were the plethora of problems that these countries didn’t manage to solve during the transition to a more democratic nation, as well as because of the nature of patterns of resistance and resilience toward surveillance. Furthermore, many of those who actively participated in the

775

conduct of surveillance in these regimes, after the transition, either remained a part of the national intelligence services or joined other political and/or private organizations and elites. Yet another reason was the fact that fear of surveillance was replaced by a fear of crime. The latter process also contributed toward the radical development of a new security industry, as well as toward the legitimization of an even higher level of surveillance (postauthoritatively). One of the popular contemporary attitudes toward surveillance and the intrusion of privacy, especially by young people, is the so-called “I have nothing to hide” philosophy. Certain scholars argue that patterns of conformity toward the political system may also play a part in the belief that “if you have done nothing wrong or have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” Since the terrorist attacks in New York, L ­ ondon, and Madrid, a growing public insecurity has been the main driving force for the growing securitization and militarization of societies. This public pressure for governments to react to real or perceived security threats affects policy processes in significant ways. Various policy incentives have managed to provide a feeling of security, rather than actual security, which has been characterized as a “security theater.”

Surveillance, Privacy, and Citizenship Citizenship can be broadly defined as the participatory relationship of individuals with their political community. The legal status, political agency, and identity of citizenship in each sociohistorical context are, however, not fixed but, rather, fluctuate in space and time, determined by correlations of power between dominant and dominated social actors. In this state of flux, citizenship is dialectically connected with privacy and surveillance. In any society, the dominant notion of privacy and the degree of its restriction by social surveillance influence the relation between individuals and political communities, and vice versa. Hence, today, privacy is prevalently considered as crucial for the political agency and identity of citizens and is, therefore, embedded in the legal status of citizenship as a fundamental right, whereas excessive surveillance is regarded as having the capacity to corrode personal autonomy and political participation. In this

776

Politics

context, the rising phenomenon of pervasive and intensive surveillance intervenes in the contemporary social relation of citizenship to enhance the power of dominant actors and structures and the capacities of social control. Various stories around contemporary surveillance are being covered by different types of mainstream and alternative media and play a significant role in modifying citizens’ level of awareness, understanding, and perceptions of privacy, data protection, security, and surveillance. Such media narratives—often characterized by exaggeration, dis­ tortion, questionable analysis, and symbolization— contribute to the creation of a culture of fear and insecurity, with further implications for democratic citizenship. Surveillance can negatively influence important societal values, such as individual freedom, autonomy, privacy, solidarity, equality, nondiscrimination, trust, and the rule of law. Such values are of paramount importance for the structure of a democratic system and the support of key democratic processes, such as the creation of associations, political interests, constructive and alternative ideas, and the raising of criticism. The human right to privacy—according to which no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home, or correspondence, and anyone shall be protected by law against such interference—is considered as one of the foundations of a democratic society. In relation to personal autonomy, the right to privacy establishes a zone in which citizens have the opportunity to withdraw, contemplate, make choices, and relate to one another without being subjected to the control of ruling powers. By protecting and facilitating personal autonomy, this private zone acts as a prerequisite for the existence of a democratic public sphere, because it empowers citizens to effectively engage in activities of collective self-determination. Yet the ways in which privacy is instituted today not only protect but also shape citizenship and in c­ertain ways may even promote citizens’ surveillance. By recognizing individuals’ right to freely market elements of their private lives in exchange for goods/services, privacy as a commodity has become the dominant manifestation of instituted privacy. The often vague, unclear, and outdated legal framework around privacy, data protection, and

security, as well as the increase in covert—and often illegal—antiterror legislation, frustrate citizens even further due to the unpredictable consequences of their actions. The democratic prerequisite of the rule of law has often been disregarded, as various revelations and publications around surveillance have shown. This decreases the already low level of trust of citizens toward private and public authorities. In this environment of uncertainty, citizens tend to be more careful regarding their social interactions, which in turn limits the possibilities of solidarity, which together with trust, are the basis for meaningful political organization. Social sorting—informational structures of ­citizenship—such as electronic identification cards and databases, can be employed by states to implement certain types of citizenship categorization and discrimination in terms of entitlements, responsibilities, or access to space and public ­services. If surveillance acts as a techno-social substrate to relations of domination and subordination, then it undercuts freedom and democracy. It can, therefore, reasonably be assumed that the intensification of surveillance leads not to freer and more equal societies but to societies in which relations of exploitation and domination are ­deepened and multiplied. Citizens are shaped by infrastructures of surveillance in the direction of self-constraint from modes of behavior considered as deviating from the norm. Yet citizens also engage in social struggles against state/corporate surveillance as a means to guard their personal and collective autonomy and reshape instituted concepts of privacy toward wider protection of their private and interpersonal  spheres of activity. Thus, the Digital Age reveals a dialectical relationship between citizenship and privacy/surveillance, both complex and mutually shaped. In contrast to various technodeterministic approaches, the decisive factor in this dialectical process is not technological but genuinely social (i.e., the outcome of the correlations of power between citizens’ organizations and pro-surveillance state/market forces). Dimitris Tsapogas and Vassilis Routsis See also Foucault, Michel; Global Surveillance; National Security; National Security Agency Leaks; Privacy

Port Security

Further Readings Hagerty, Kevin D. and Minas Samatas, eds. Surveillance and Democracy. London, England: Routledge, 2010. Macaskill, E. and G. Dance. “NSA Files: Decoded. What the Revelations Mean for You.” The Guardian (November 1, 2013). http://www.theguardian.com/ world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-filessurveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1 (Accessed June 2014). Solove, Daniel J. Understanding Privacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Warren, S. D. and L. D. Brandeis. “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review, v.4/5 (1890). http://www.jstor .org/stable/1321160 (Accessed September 2012).

Port Security Ports—sites adjacent to oceans, lakes, and rivers, where cargo is loaded or unloaded from ships— have had high rates of crime ever since passengers and goods were first transported by water. As a result, crime control activities in ports and the surrounding cities have been carried out for thousands of years. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, however, there has been increased monitoring of large ships, their cargo, and crews, primarily to counter potential terrorist activities; this surveillance is being carried out by navies, law enforcement agencies (including coast guards), and private security firms. The levels of scrutiny and inspections that ships undergo depend on the threats that have been assessed and the size of the ports, as smaller facilities often have less sophisticated security arrangements. Altogether, the surveillance of ports and sharing that information are an important component in crime, terrorism, and drug reduction strategies. This entry reviews the types of illegal activity at ports that officials attempt to curtail, the long-range surveillance capabilities that help monitor ships prior to arrival in ports, and the various security and surveillance efforts put in place in ports.

Crime, Terrorism, and the Global Shipping Trade Up until 2000, most enforcement-related arrangements were established in ports to respond to

777

crimes such as piracy, slavery, theft, drug ­smuggling, and victimizing ship crew mates. Although concern remains about those offenses, since the 9/11 attacks, there has been growing awareness of the vulnerability of seaports as an entry point for weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, or initiating weapons of mass destruction attacks including “dirty bombs” (a conventional explosive that disperses radioactive materials) in ports adjacent to large metropolitan areas. Moreover, vessels docked at ports are vulnerable to attacks, such as the 2000 boat attack on the USS Cole warship in Yemen. Last, hijacking and running a large oil tanker aground in a port could cause an ecological disaster. Many of the maritime crime reduction and antiterrorism strategies that emerged since the 9/11 attacks have focused on reducing the flow of unauthorized items into ports. These activities are challenging given that approximately 140 million square miles of the earth’s surface is covered by water, and there are more than 4,700 ports located in 196 countries. Furthermore, most of the goods purchased have been transported by ships, including those on inland rivers (e.g., the Mississippi River) and shipments originating overseas. About two thirds of items shipped are transported in containers (the standard size is 20 feet in length by 8 feet in width and 8 feet high). Because less than 2% of the 11.5 million shipping containers that arrive at U.S. seaports each year are hand searched, the likelihood of illicit items, including weapons and drugs, entering the United States in these containers is high.

Long-Range Surveillance of Shipping Coast guards, law enforcement agencies, and navies across the globe monitor the whereabouts of large ships using long-range identification and tracking systems that collect information from Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). AIS are signals sent by transponders that are required on all large vessels and passenger ships; these systems report a ship’s location, speed, and heading. Monitoring AIS enables agencies to track ships, including those from nations that sponsor terrorism or are owned by shipping companies that have previously been involved in criminal or terrorist activities. A growing number of these surveillance and

778

Port Security

information-sharing activities are coordinated, such as the European Union’s Common Information Sharing Environment. The United States has also entered into agreements to share information about potential risks with other trading nations. Surveillance of ocean-going ships takes a number of different forms, including being monitored by satellites, aircraft, coastal patrol vessels, and naval warships. A number of private companies and nations are also using satellites to track a ship’s AIS. Regardless of how these ships are monitored, the intent of these activities is to identify potential threats before a ship arrives at a seaport. In the United States, these activities are coordinated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency that operates under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security.

Port Security Once a vessel assessed as being at high risk of containing illicit goods arrives at a port, it can receive an enhanced inspection. Evaluating the risk level of a ship or its cargo starts with an investigation of the ship’s owners, its travels, and whether the vessel, its company, or personnel had been involved in prior incidents. Computerized programs are sometimes used to identify or prioritize containers for further inspection. As part of its Container Security Initiative, the CBP lists three core strategies: (1) identify high-risk containers, (2) prescreen and evaluate containers before they are shipped from the port of departure, and (3) screen high-risk containers using X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices after their arrival in the United States. Using this approach, some ships or containers identified as high risk are inspected at more than 50 foreign ports prior to their departure to the United States. Levels of security and surveillance are high at large ports. In the United States, this surveillance is carried out by the public police and private security officers, who augment the activities of CBP officers as well as of officials from other Homeland Security agencies. With respect to the public police, some officers working for municipal police departments are assigned to ports, although some ports employ sworn officers who specialize in this form of policing. The Los Angeles Port Police, for example, employed 128 officers in March 2014.

The activities of these officers are also supplemented by security officials, who either are hired directly by the ports or are contract employees of security agencies. Size matters when it comes to the amount of surveillance that a port carries out. Large ports, such as the Port of Los Angeles that occupies 7,500 acres adjacent to the city, will have a high degree of security that is coordinated by personnel working in a high-technology operations center. Security personnel in these facilities monitor images collected by hundreds of cameras that track movement on the docks and surrounding areas. These large ports’ security services often deploy high-resolution closed-circuit television cameras that have the capability to detect motion (e.g., persons walking in unauthorized areas), and when this occurs, the operator is alerted. Infrared and long-range cameras are also used to detect intruders in low light and to monitor potential threats outside the port’s perimeter. Although most large U.S. ports have comprehensive security arrangements, their smaller counterparts in remote locations or alongside rivers and lakes have few security personnel and relatively unsophisticated surveillance systems (e.g., few CCTV cameras). As these ports receive few (or no) international or high-value shipments, and the risk of a terrorist attack is low, spending on security is not considered a priority. As a result, security for these diminutive facilities is often carried out by private security officials (although they may be supplemented by officers from municipal police departments or sheriff’s offices), and the physical security is often limited to a fence around the facility’s perimeter. As a result, the levels of surveillance decrease along with the size of the ports. Rick Ruddell See also Closed-Circuit Television; Terrorism; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Further Readings Bichou, Khalid, et al., eds. Maritime Transport Security: Issues, Challenges and National Priorities. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2014. Christopher, Kenneth. Port Security Management. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009.

Postcolonialism McNicholas, Michael. Maritime Security: An Introduction. Burlington, MA: ButterworthHeinemann, 2008

Postcolonialism Postcolonialism refers to the diffuse body of work that takes as its central concern the impacts of colonialism (occupation of land by settlers) and imperialism (conquest of territory). Postcolonial studies broadly examine how control of colonial physical territory and/or racialized bodies has been orchestrated through zoning, cultural representation, the colonial gaze, and economic structures. Since its emergence in the period of mass decolonization from 1818 to 1965, postcolonial studies have examined a variety of issues including migration, refugee policy, war, and civil rights. Critically, surveillance is central to the colonial and neocolonial world. Postcolonialism assumes that colonial narratives still inform security agents and transnational structures such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and/or the European Union. Hence, postcolonial studies attempt to examine how colonial structures of race, power, and violence still inform how the populations of the global South are treated in relation to  those of the global North. This field of study examines four subject areas: (1) space, (2) culture, (3) identity, and (4) knowledge. This entry reviews postcolonialism as it relates to zoning and race, mass surveillance, racial profiling, subaltern studies, and economics and international trade. As a theory of knowledge, postcolonial studies give priority to the views of the non-Western world to disrupt Eurocentric accounts of history, progress, and civilization. Two different narrative approaches emerge from postcolonialism: first is literature and academic work that examine the international relationship between the global North and the global South and second is the study of history resulting from the decolonization of the states in the global South. As a study of power, the first approach owes its intellectual lineage to Marxism, philosophy, psychology, feminism, postmodernism, and post­ structuralism. As a lens of analysis, postcolonialism has expanded to examine the complex relationship  between race, class, and gender/sexuality, on

779

the one hand, and world order, on the other. Individual scholars, however, need not adopt both the approaches. Hence, postcolonialism as a study of power reveals inequalities in relation to surveillance, privacy, and security between the global North and the global South.

Zoning Zoning refers to security practices that enclose land and deploy narratives of race and modernity to justify the enclosure and segmentation of space. Zoning as articulated by Frantz Fanon, in The Wretched of the Earth, referred to the practice of the colons (French colonialists) of containing native populations within urban ghettos and/or peripheral shanty towns while managing the population through criminalization. The concept has since been used to examine the restriction of migration, the deportation of noncitizens, the incarceration of visible minorities, and the creation of urban spaces that facilitate surveillance of undesirable populations. Postcolonial scholars attribute the ghettoization of black populations in the global South and the global North as endemic of racism. The process of white flight from urban centers (e.g., Detroit, Michigan) to guarded gated communities reveals the quarantining of spaces based on the perceived dangerousness of black populations. Likewise, the historic economic marginalization and police surveillance of the black population within Paris, France, reveals the role that racism plays in assigning surveillance resources. In addition, the mass detention of migration populations globally points to the construction of people of color as an inherent threat to security. Sites such as Guantanamo Bay, Australia’s Christmas Island detention camp, and Abu Ghraib prison reveal the dehumanizing and degrading impact that racism and prejudice based on skin color can play in separating the world and excluding populations from human rights. The mass surveillance directed toward colonial subjects seen as inferior, dangerous, and inept has been referred to in postcolonial studies as the colonial or colonizing gaze that objectifies the native population and affords subjectivity to the colonizer. Orientalism as a field of study of the Orient produces knowledge within the colonial gaze about the people of the Orient. Edward Said’s

780

Postcolonialism

discussion of the narrative created between the Occident (Europe) and the Orient (Asia) reveals the ability of a narrative premised on a system of knowledge that inherently constructs groups as dangerous, as passive, or as uncivilized as inherently problematic. In relation to security, the narrative deployed by U.S. president George W. Bush in relation to the War on Terror acutely resembles and has been described as an Orientalism narrative by Said, as it created an artificial knowledge that draws distinct geographic spaces and desperate peoples together as a threat. The War on Terror narrative has largely created fixed narratives about the Middle East, terrorism, and security in relation to world order and the United States. The Orientalist narrative within the War on Terror has allowed for dehumanization, mass detention, drone warfare, and increased surveillance of populations perceived as dangerous in the Middle East and elsewhere. Similarly, scholars who explore the increasing restrictions on migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees point to the exclusionary and surveillance-generating implications of a “West versus the rest” approach to migration.

Racial Profiling The increased use of racial profiling at airports and by law enforcement within the United States of racialized minorities has been a critical dimension of the post-9/11 period. Postcolonial scholars have compared the racial profiling of Arab Americans with that of black and Latin Americans during the U.S. War on Drugs as part of a process of monitoring and infringing on the legal rights of popu­ lations constructed as dangerous despite the actual threat they posed. Postcolonial critiques have deconstructed the categorical thinking deployed by racial profiling as logically unsound, a waste of limited law enforcement resources, and a practice that risks victimizing populations already marginalized within the state. In addition, the detention of Arab Americans and citizens of various foreign nations without charge at Guantanamo Bay has been linked to the mass detention of Japanese Americans during World War II. Furthermore, the monitoring and interception of digital and telephone communications of Arab and Muslim diaspora populations without warrants has been an invasive security practice followed by domestic intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency and those of

other states. The American Civil Liberties Union has criticized the use of illegal wiretaps and datamonitoring programs. Fear and racial prejudice that infringe on the civil liberties of nonwhite Americans and foreign citizens have been used as tools to reinforce unequal protection by the law and to further monitor and police vulnerable immigrant populations.

Subaltern Studies Subaltern studies have produced a large body of work that examines not just how identity is understood but also the complex relationship between subjectivity and mobility. Subaltern as described by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak refers to a group that has historically and materially been marginalized from entering the established structures of the colony and colonial process. In her study of India’s caste system and capitalism, Spivak associates this term with the undercastes within India. Subaltern studies foreground gender, race, and class as they examine how subaltern groups are required to engage in Western forms of knowing (i.e., science) in order to be heard. This field critiques the interconnection between knowledge, power, and understanding. The need of state security apparatuses to examine all non-Western bodies is seen most explicitly around the veil. Surveillance and security identification practices require the visibility of a face for biometric and facial-recognition technologies to operate. Postcolonial studies that examine veiling in relation to security practices of unveiling to confirm identity point to the relation between power and knowledge that is being appropriated and exercised. The practice of unveiling has a long history within colonialism. However, subaltern scholars attempt to ascertain the localized meaning of the veil for the women who wear it as opposed to imposing exterior meaning onto it. Critics of unveiling by security agents point to the practice of modesty as opposed to intended deceit. Subaltern studies advocate engaging marginalized populations on their own terms rather than imposing inaccurate exterior logics that obscure meaning.

Economics and International Trade In the sphere of economics and international trade, postcolonial studies examine the increased economic surveillance and reporting burdens placed

Poststructural Theory

on various governments of developing countries in the wake of structural adjustment programs of the 1980s that various countries of the global South participated in when receiving loans, in which they were subjected to provisions based on conditions meant to facilitate neoliberalization. This is the process of making a deregulated economy. The loans required ongoing surveillance and monitoring of developing nations by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to ensure that these conditions and debt repayments are being met. Postcolonial scholars point to the neocolonial dimensions that these development practices have played by, imposing increased social insecurity and debt onto developing nations. James FitzGerald See also Poststructural Theory; Profiling, Racial; Terrorism; War on Drugs; War on Terror

Further Readings Ashcroft, Bill, et al. The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures. New York, NY: Routledge, 2002. Ashcroft, Bill, et al. Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007. Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. Fannon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York, NY: Grove Press, 1968. Mbembe, Achille. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1979. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York, NY: Methuen, 1987. Young, Robert J. C. Postcolonialism. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Poststructural Theory Poststructuralism is a way of engaging knowledge, language, history, and culture that primarily encompasses the intellectual developments of certain mid-20th-century French and Continental philosophers and theorists. Because the movement is more a strategy of deconstruction and critique than a cohesive theory, it is difficult to summarize.

781

However, poststructuralism may be broadly understood as a body of distinct responses to the empiricism, positivism, and totalizing analogies of structuralism, which argues that all elements of human culture must be understood in terms of their relationship to a larger, overarching system or structure. The precise nature of the revision or critique of structuralism differs with each poststructural theorist, though common themes include the rejection of the self-sufficiency of structures, an interrogation of the binary oppositions that constitute those structures, and a claim that all forms of knowledge production are inescapably shaped by the knowledge producer. Although many theorists commonly referred to as poststructuralists have inherently rejected the label—as they do most labels—thinkers whose work is often characterized as poststructuralist include Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and Jean Baudrillard. This entry further defines the poststructural movement and then examines the poststructuralist stance to language, meaning, and deconstruction, before concluding with a look at the history of poststructural beliefs relating to surveillance, security, and privacy. In many regards, the poststructuralist movement is closely related to postmodernism in that it is critical of the foundational assumptions, Enlightenment predispositions, and universalizing tendencies of Western philosophy. In an attempt to dislodge the Western subject from its place at the center of  knowledge production, poststructuralists like ­Foucault seek to highlight the ways in which the self is a product of actions that are culturally specific and generally unconscious. According to ­ ­Foucault, we can only know things in relation to other things that we know, draping our knowledge and our reality in an omnipresent relativity. According to poststructuralism, the self is touched by political, cultural, social, and technological influences and biases, meaning that it is impossible to step outside of discursive practices and survey any situation objectively. Therefore, by employing a self-reflexive epistemology grounded in fluid ­ subjectivity, poststructuralism deconstructs the ­ metanarratives of language, meaning, and history to expose structuralism as a textual tradition masquerading as “reality,” a way of manipulating “knowledge” twisted by positivism and rationalism, a particular reading of Western modernity professing to be trans­historical and transcultural “fact.”

782

Poststructural Theory

Discursive Practices of Language, Meaning, and Deconstruction As poststructuralism is primarily concerned with the relationship between human beings, the world, and the practice of making and reproducing meanings, semiotics—the study of signification, analogy, metaphor, and communication—is one of the central focuses of poststructural analyses. After all, language, understood in a broad sense to include all signifying images and symbols, gives us access to information. Command of new knowledge often amounts to learning the appropriate use of a new vocabulary and syntax. A professional grasp of any of the fields such as mathematics, computer science, medicine, or literature requires the ability to communicate fluently using the language of the discipline. In this sense, language intervenes between human beings and their world; it represents a way of understanding reality, of differentiating between things, and of relating them to one another. Language or “texts” are not a natural reflection of the world but rather our interpretation of it. As such, poststructuralists reject the idea that language can have a single purpose, a single meaning, or a singular existence. Meaning does not depend on reference to the world, or even ideas—if it did, and the things and concepts that language names existed outside language itself, words would have exact equivalents across all languages; people would never get lost in translation. Poststructuralism proposes that the distinctions we make are not necessarily given by the world around us but are instead produced by the symbolizing systems we learn. As such, consciousness is not the origin of the specific languages we speak and the images we recognize so much as it is the product of the meanings we learn and reproduce. After all, if language is not ours to possess, but always preexists us and comes from the outside, there is no final answer to the question of what any particular example of language in action ultimately means. Barthes points out that a speaker’s or author’s intended meaning is secondary to the meaning that the listener or reader perceives, and every individual listener or reader creates a new and individual purpose, meaning, and existence for a given speech or text. This is not to say that poststructuralism claims perpetual subjectivism, which is the view that a textual interpretation by an individual reader, whatever it might

be, is a perfectly correct account of a text’s meaning. Instead, poststructuralism argues that we all interpret language in different ways, and thus, it is impossible to know for certain which interpretation is “right.” It is important to clarify that poststructuralists are not ingenuously claiming that everything— and thus nothing—is “true.” Rather, as Derrida explains, because every claim to “know” tends to unravel as one probes deeper into its foundational assumptions and literary gestures, poststructuralism is a way of deconstructing what exactly it means to say that something is true. Every text is a contested terrain in that what it appears to say on the surface cannot be understood without reference to the concealments and contextualizations of meaning that mark the text’s significance. All texts contain a legacy of these assumptions, and as a result, speech and text can be deconstructed through an awareness of the hierarchies implicit in language—good over evil, mind over matter, man over woman, speech over writing, and so on. As such, all texts exhibit what Derrida calls “difference”—they allow multiple interpretations. Meaning is diffuse, not settled. Texts always give us a surplus of possibilities, yet we cannot stand outside of texts to find objectivity. The consequence of this deconstructing process is that certainty in textual analysis is impossible. There may be competing interpretations, but there is no uninterpreted way to assess the validity of these interpretations. Rather than basing their philosophical understanding on undeniable truths, poststructuralists turn the rigidity of structuralism into the shifting sands of a multiplicity of interpretations.

Archaeologies of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy While the central focus for Derrida is the deconstruction of the discursive practices that lay claim to knowledge largely in terms of their truth, poststructuralists such as Foucault analyze discursive practices in terms of their history or genesis. Instead of presenting a monolithic version of a given period, Foucault emphasizes the plural and contradictory nature of the past to reveal traces of the influence that power has had on claims to truth. For ­Foucault, historical descriptions are ordered not by the past but by the present state of knowledge, and as such, any given period has several pasts and several

Power

hierarchies of importance. In developing this counterhistorical “archaeology of knowledge,” Foucault seeks to uncover the genealogy of truth claims in an attempt to show how the development of knowledge has been intertwined with the mechanisms of politics to increase the power of the state over the individual in the modern era. In tracing this archaeology of knowledge through questions of surveillance, security, and privacy, Foucault and his contemporaries invoke the idea of the panopticon—an institution designed to allow a single watchperson to observe all the inmates without the inmates being able to tell whether they are being watched—as a metaphor for modern disciplinary societies and their pervasive inclination to normalize security in the current climate of so-called global terrorism. For poststructuralists, the fear of extremism makes the panopticon an ideal symbol for the current surveillance society because technology has created a consciousness of permanent anxiety as a form of power, where citizens willingly surrender privacy in the name of security. Internet service providers track users’ activities online, closed-circuit television cameras monitor public spaces, and mainstream media fixates on violence and conflict. As such, Foucauldian archaeologies of surveillance, security, and privacy attempt to bring to light the ways in which Western discourses of terrorism are being used to manage populations and further entrench the power of the state. It is important to reemphasize that poststructuralism is not a unified body or system of theory. There are many disagreements between different theorists within the poststructural discourse. In the end, what poststructuralism offers is an opportunity and cause for reflection, a realization that there are no definite underlying structures that can explain the human condition, and a recognition that it is impossible to step outside of discourse and survey any situation objectively. It proposes a lexicon of deconstruction, a vocabulary of critique, and an indication of the ways in which truth and history are manipulated through language and meaning to embed certain structures of power. Poststructuralism is the reflexive study of the ways in which we come to “know,” and thus, it is more useful in prompting the uncertainty of questions than in delivering the finality of answers. In that respect, in its emphasis on the degree to which we

783

make our own story, subject to certain specifiable constraints, poststructuralism is simultaneously skeptical toward inherited authority and affirmative about future possibilities. A. T. Kingsmith See also Foucault, Michel; Panopticon, The; Subjectivity

Further Readings Barthes, Roland. The Death of the Author. New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 1977. Beasley, Katherine. Poststructuralism: A Very Short Introduction. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995. Sarup, Madan. An Introductory Guide to PostStructuralism and Postmodernism. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993.

Power The concept of power is acknowledged as one of the few steady axes around which the social sciences have been revolving at least since the first half of the 20th century. In fact, very few concepts have been as pervasive and generative. Equally undisputed is the lack of a shared understanding among social scientists of what power is. This situation has been clearly encapsulated by the claim of power as an “essentially contested” concept (i.e., neither empirically settled nor conceptually commonly defined). To reduce the complexity of the many faces of power, two main limitations can be imposed. First, from a metatheoretical viewpoint, the focus is posited on the different conceptual uses of power within the social sciences. Even if no one feature is common among all the conceptual uses, it is still possible to realize how they are connected by a series of overlapping “family resemblances” that simply make it possible to talk of power as such. Second, from a theoretical viewpoint, the reference to the concepts, practices, and institution of surveillance helps narrow down the field, guiding the selection of the many and

784

Power

different conceptual uses. Therefore, emphasis is placed on what might be called the modernist matrices of power in the social sciences—those theoretical frameworks that keep inspiring, as reference points or critical targets, scholarly reflections on power today—and then on disciplinary and postdisciplinary theories of power, recognizing the seminal role of Michel Foucault’s contri­ bution to any discussion about power and surveillance. This entry, therefore, first undertakes an examination of the work of three philosophers whose concepts and theories shaped the meaning of power. It then reviews in detail the concepts of disciplinary power and postdisciplinary power.

Modernist Matrices The works of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and ­Friedrich Nietzsche can be accredited as modernist matrices of the main current concepts and theories of power in the social sciences. Their reflections have offered foundational images, ­metaphors, and storylines on the meanings and relations between power, the individual, and ­society. Apart from their seminal role, few common threads might be identified among them. Marx and Weber both seem to endorse a conception of power that is causationalist (power as cause), distributive (one either has power or does not), and commodified (power as object). They offer agency-based (power as the causal effect of a  social agency) or structure-based (effect of a social, economic, or political structure) accounts, conceiving of power as a causal relationship between intentional individuals or groups. Moreover, power is conceptualized as a property whose gain or loss by one of the participants in the social relationship is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of power by another participant. According to Nietzsche, the idea of power is less systematically elaborated and much more philosophically oriented. Nietzsche (like Marx) sees power as linked to conflict and expressed by a set of ubiquitous relations of forces informing and homogenizing both the human and the nonhuman realm. Marx understands power as the social function of keeping a specific arrangement of relations of productions tightly connected to and promoting class domination. This arrangement circularly

makes possible the development of certain forces of production in a given historical period. In this systemic perspective, power is expressed as a structure-based course of action causally aiming to maintain the social conditions essential for developing capital accumulation. Power is concentrated in a range of legal, political, economic, and social institutions that work toward the conservation of the prevailing economic system, securing the position of those who effectively own the productive resources. In this perspective, power is not  only a political matter. It is also diffused beyond the state, in terms of the “needs of ­capital,” requiring legitimation and conditions for social acceptance. The concept of ideology fulfils this requirement. Ideology, as an integrated system of cultural and normative assumptions responding to the needs of capital within as much as beyond the state, secures obedience and acceptance of the social order (i.e., of a given distribution of the means of production, supporting the prevailing class interests). Ideology is pervasive inasmuch as a “false consciousness” makes the working class fail to realize their acceptance of the ruling class ideology as their own. In a Marxist view, power cannot be exercised in a legitimate way unless the working class reaches control of the means of production. Only the socialized ownership of the means of production might render power as something different from the domination and subordination of social classes based on the relations of production. While Marx deliberately neglects the role of individual and strategic agencies in exerting or facing power within a given historical social-­ economic context, Weber acknowledges that while power is derived from owning and controlling the means of production, it is indeed not reducible to ownership and nonownership of them. Weber’s overall idea of power, embedded in his understanding of the rationalization process of Western modernity, points to how power is also resulting from the knowledge of how production actually works, reflecting the differential ability to control methods of production. People are not passively bewitched by the false consciousness but  by the intentional actors of social relationships, who are able to make strategic use of their own knowledge of the production process. Thus, the foundation and maintenance of positions of

Power

dominance are not simply grounded in economically defined class relation, as Marx argues, but also subject to the strategic action of individuals operating under socially constructed “structures of dominancy” (i.e., norms socially constituted), which legitimize authority and consistently privilege certain ways of thinking and doing. Weber operationalizes this overall conception by distinguishing between power (macht), which can function whether or not it is legitimate and whether or not it wins voluntary compliance, and domination (herrschaft), which implies some element of voluntary compliance and legitimacy (i.e., rationally, traditionally, or charismatically based). Power is then described by Weber as the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his or her own will despite resistance and regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. Domination, on the other hand, is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of people. In both cases, it is clear how power is understood as a social relationship that necessarily includes an agentive role for both parties, a form of voluntary compliance (i.e., a differentially shared interest). Nietzsche rejects the idea of power as a human cause of certain effects as well as its objectified and distributive nature. He emphatically claims that all reality is “will to power.” This vaguely defined and contested concept can be variously interpreted. In a metaphysical sense, it seems to say that everything that exists is the will to power (i.e., that reality has only one basic character or intrinsic quality: the will to power). In a biological/organic sense, the will to power appears specifically related to all life, as its constant tension toward change is an instinctual drive toward self-preservation, while in a psychological perspective, it seems to be related to living creatures as a will or desire in competition with other human drives. Finally, in a methodological sense, the will to power might be thought of as a principle of interpretation for reality, a lens through which we can signify and understand the world. “Power” in “will to power” is a concept characterized by intrinsic relationality: Power is only power in conflictual relation to another and opposite power. In his early writings, Nietzsche claims that the primordial strength (kraft) that may be exercised by anything possessing it is sublimated

785

for creative purposes by the opposite idea of power as self-overcoming (macht). In the same way, the “Apollinian” power (pleasure giving, productive, and creative) is tied to the “Dionysian” power (destructive and negative) to create, in their interplay, the achievements of culture and any meaningful historical development. The relationality as a specific feature of power does not exclude the idea that the result of interaction between powers might end up in creating a hierarchical order. Actually, any change or transformation is nothing but a symptom of both the formation of a new hierarchical order and the breakdown of a previous one. Finally, power must be understood as necessarily striving for more power, as characterized by a natural and purposeless tension to expand and overcome itself. In Nietzsche’s view, nothing has existence and meaning outside the “game” of power relations, because there is no withdrawal from this game. The ­Nietzschean idea  of ubiquitous, value-neutral, productive, and dynamic relations of power was further elaborated on in the 20th century by Foucault.

Disciplinary Power Foucault elaborates on the concept of power within his history of the different modes by which, in Western civilization, human beings are made subjects. In this context, power cannot be viewed as a causal effect of subjective agency or social structure, since it is itself informed and even constituted by power. Power is not a flow of commands exercised from the top down, expressed by law and centralized in institutions aiming at subjugating, repressing, or dominating. Foucault sees power as relationally diffused, detached from the form of law within which it has been so far confined, always implying resistance. Power is not just repressive and negative, but it is also productive and positive: It fashions subjectivities, produces truths on how the world is, and shapes ranges of conduct. Power is relational—it consists of intentional and nonsubjective relations that aim at achieving something without being reducible to individuals’ intentions. The existence of a centralized, repressive, juridical-discursive power (puissance) is not rejected but enriched and complemented by this understanding of power (pouvoir) as a productive, ubiquitous set of precarious trans­ individual relations that entail the possibility of

786

Power

freedom and resistance as opposed to and permanently linked to power. During the first half of the 1970s, Foucault elaborated on a specific and now famous understanding of power—the disciplinary power—which has since been inspiring and challenging surveillance and security scholars. The panopticon is first and foremost a diagram of power, a metaphor of the modernist strategy for the creation of subjectivity. By adopting a Nietzschean perspective, Foucault views the panoptical gaze as exercising a “positive”—in analytical and political terms— effect on individuals recorded. This effect is expressed by extracting, organizing, sorting, and arranging individuals in social categories to produce knowledge about the social world (connected to the emerging human sciences) and to subjectivize/normalize individuals (docile bodies/manageable souls for the emerging political and economic arrangement). This power is relational insofar as even the inspector is caught in the mechanism of power. It is disciplinary insofar as it creates a specific form of freedom consistent and functional to the liberal state, binding together individuals, the state, and the market through surveillance. Operationally, the disciplinary power works by compelling the inmates to internalize an automatized and deindividualized gaze. The inmates are induced by the same organizational and spatial arrangement within which they are confined to watch over themselves—to adopt the inspector’s gaze. The main consequence is a form of self-­ surveillance (or discipline) that shapes inmates’ behavioral patterns and induces certain modes of being and becoming. The disciplinary power works then as a subjectivating process, which is the production of certain experiences of ­ourselves—the organization of our self-consciousness mediated by an internalized sense of visibility that orientates individual actions. This account echoes the works of Jean Paul Sartre and Louis Althusser. According to Sartre, the gaze of the other deprives the subject of his or her freedom. The subject’s endless possibilities of being are shaped according to the other’s definition and desires, resulting in being reduced, fixed, and objectified. Likewise, according to Althusser, the subject’s formation is made possible by an external interpellation (i.e., by hailing individuals into

definite structures of meaning organized by ideological apparatuses). The gaze’s power exerted by an internalized inspector, an objectifying “other,” or by ideological apparatuses is commonly operationalized by Sartre, Althusser, and Foucault through the modelling of behavioral patterns and the formation of subjectivity. The disciplinary power captures the relationship between visibility, subjectivity, and discipline, which, even if originally situated within specific architectural forms (e.g., prison, factory, madhouse), is not theoretically and practically limited to them. It implies instead a movement toward the social diffusion of visibility as a disciplinary mechanism across an indefinite range of institutional structures and organizational arrangements, all at work to turn individuals into “docile bodies.” The overall context of this movement is the epochal transformation in the political, economic, and social order, away from the sovereign power embodied by the political paradigm of the ancient régime toward the liberal society based on individual rights and free market, where the freedom is produced and consumed by a disciplining surveillance, widely diffused in society.

Postdisciplinary Power As Zygmunt Bauman has argued, whatever else the present stage in the history of modernity is, it is also, probably above all, postpanoptical. The expression “postpanoptical” (or postdisciplinary) refers to the critical overcoming of the Foucauldian power model elaborated on in the mid-1970s. There have been many different attempts to rethink, develop, or criticize the Foucauldian perspective; its hierarchical scheme; the focus on the body; or the seemingly static spatiality of the cell as a site of the disciplinary power. Within the security and surveillance studies, the criticism toward the panoptical model has taken many different forms. In general, it is claimed that the disciplinary power has been overcome by forms of power that reduce and even neutralize distance, transcend time, and focus on prevention. They are decentralized, invisible, diffused, and they focus on personality more than body. The panoptical model is then replaced by a social sorting, working through a discriminatory technology that identifies, classifies, and assesses individuals based on all the information produced

Power

by them to produce economic value. It has been argued that subjects are no longer under the gaze, but now, the model consists of data about him or her and the “surveillant assemblages” that are in place by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows and then reassembling them in different locations as discrete and virtual data doubles. All these theoretical attempts to overcome the disciplinary power model are based on various concepts of power, some of which are derived from the modernist matrices, some of which are derived from the same Foucault beliefs of the late 1970s, and some of which are derived from seemingly new conceptual intuitions. A Marxian attempt to go beyond the Foucauldian model (like that of Bauman) would criticize the inmates’ immobilization as integral to disciplinary power, stating that the late modern access to the means of transportation and the resulting freedom of movement have laid the foundation for new forms of power. In this perspective, the warden becomes the bourgeois, in economic terms, while the inmate becomes the proletariat in the context of liquid modernity, in which freedom is depoliticized due to the closing down of spaces of active political engagement and the increasing feeling of uncertainty and nomadism. Postpanoptical, however, does not necessarily mean post-Foucauldian. Foucault himself has offered tools to overcome the panoptical model, namely, the concept of biopower. Actually, the panoptical/disciplinary power can be thought of as conceptually and historically functional to biopower, as the disciplinary society is functional to the biopolitical paradigm. The biopower is a model of power that appeared in the late 18th century, and unlike the theory of sovereign power (of life and death), it is not focused on the practice of ruling over the individual body but on the empowerment of human population as a totality of living beings. The biopower aims to regulate human population in a preventive way, rendering biological life as the main issue and target of politics. This model of power is deployed through mechanisms of control and intervention that are “immanent” to all areas of life such as the control of rate of reproduction, the regulation of fertility of a population, or the drafting of birth policies. If disciplinary power is about individual shaping of human bodies,

787

biopower is about empowering the population as a political resource, managing the births, deaths, reproduction, and illnesses. It is possible to see biopower as complementing the disciplinary power insofar as the latter aims at producing a collection of separated individualities, as an object of knowledge, as manpower for the capitalist market, and as citizenry for the liberal state. This “threefold product” is taken as a target by biopower as a control apparatus exerted over a population as a whole, focusing on all aspects of life under its gaze and creating the human conditions for the further development of the neoliberal market and society. A concept of power different from the ideas of both disciplinary power and biopower is that of control as elaborated by Gilles Deleuze, who argues that the disciplinary society has long ceased to exist. The closed institutions of prison, hospital, factory, school, and family are in a generalized crisis. The institutions of postindustrial societies are more unstable than the institutions embedded and functional to the disciplinary power. The effect of this epochal transformation is to decouple the panoptical dyad of seeing/being seen, destabilizing the panoptic gaze and space. Deleuze proposes that control has replaced discipline. Discipline as a mode of power relies primarily on material, cultural, or psychical enclosures. Control instead encourages mobility in an attempt to manage the wider territory and not just the social space of enclosures. Whereas discipline is analogical and molding, control is digital and modulating. While discipline stabilizes and objectifies bodies, control modulates them. Control does not act on individual bodies but on “dividuals” (i.e., individual doubled as data). The panoptical gaze deprived of the inmate’s body (replaced by its data double) as a privileged target loses its conceptual salience and practical condition of possibility and is supplanted by data analysis. Power as control represents a new form of a subjectivating process and is diffused, silent, and discreet, made possible by the capacity of digital technology to generate and manipulate data doubles of citizen subjects. Giuseppe Maglione See also Deleuze, Gilles, and Fe´lix Guattari; Foucault, Michel; Panopticon, The

788

Power

Further Readings Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation).” In Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Bauman, Zygmunt. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2000. Clegg, Stewart and Mark Haugaard, eds. The SAGE Handbook of Power. London, England: Sage, 2009. Deleuze, Gilles. “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” October, v.59 (Winter, 1992). Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1. An Introduction. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978. Foucault, Michel. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975–76. New York, NY: Picador, 2003.

Haggerty, Kevin and Richard Ericson. “The Surveillant Assemblage.” British Journal of Sociology, v.51/4 (2000). Lukes, Steven. Power: A Radical View. London, England: Macmillan, 1974. Marx, Karl. Capital: Critique of Political Economy (Vol. 1). London, England: Penguin Books, 1990. (Original work published 1867) Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1966. (Original work published 1886) Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1968. (Original work published 1901) Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. New York, NY: Philosophical Library, 1956. (Original work published 1943) Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Oakland: University of California Press, 1978. (Original work published 1922)

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY

For my father, Anthony C. Arrigo: friend and family man to those who love him, educator and mentor to those who admire him, and Inspector General to those who respect him.

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY 3 Edited by Bruce A. Arrigo University of North Carolina at Charlotte

FOR INFORMATION: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2018 by SAGE Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

SAGE Publications Ltd. 1 Oliver’s Yard 55 City Road London, EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd. B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044 India SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd. 3 Church Street #10-04 Samsung Hub Singapore 049483

Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Arrigo, Bruce A, editor. Title: The sage encyclopedia of surveillance, security, and privacy / editor Bruce A. Arrigo, University of North Carolina, Charlotte. Description: First edition. | Thousand Oaks : SAGE Publications, [2018] Identifiers: LCCN 2017058118 | ISBN 9781483359946 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Electronic surveillance—Social aspects. | Electronic surveillance—Encyclopedias. | Privacy, Right of—Encyclopedias. | National security—Encyclopedias. Classification: LCC HM846 .S26 2019 | DDC 323.44/82097303— dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017058118

Acquisitions Editor: Andrew Boney Developmental Editors: Matthew Brann, Carole Maurer

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Reference Systems Manager: Leticia Gutierrez Production Editor: David C. Felts Copy Editor: QuADS Prepress (P) Ltd. Typesetter: Hurix Digital Proofreaders: Ellen Brink, Caryne Brown, Barbara Coster Indexer: Will Ragsdale Cover Designer: Candice Harman Marketing Manager: Jennifer Bourque

18 19 20 21 22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Volume 3 List of Entries  vii Entries P (cont.)   789 U 1055 R   847 V 1095 S   875 W 1109 T 1009 Y 1137 Index  1141

Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE publishes more than 1000 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. Our growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company’s continued independence. Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

List of Entries Abortion Abu Ghraib Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 Adorno, Theodor W. Advertising and Marketing Research Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Affordable Healthcare Act. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Agency Airport Security Airport Terminal Security Screenings Al Qaeda Alcoholics Anonymous AMBER Alerts American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center American Protective League Amnesty International Anarchism Ancient Greek Surveillance Anonymous Anti-Defamation League Antiglobalization Antinuclear Movement Antipsychiatry Movement Antiwar Movement, History in United States Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s Apartheid Apple Arab Spring ATM Cards Australia Authoritarianism Autonomy

Berlin Wall Biblical Surveillance Big Data Bill of Rights Bioengineering Bioinformatics Biometrics Biopolitical Tattooing Biosurveillance Blockades Border Patrol Checkpoints Botnets Brazil Breathometer and Breathalyzer Machines Brown v. Board of Education (1954) Camp David Accords Canada Capital Punishment Carrier Pigeons Castration, Chemical Castration, Surgical Catholic Church and the Sexual Abuse of Minors Cell Phone Tracking Cell Phones. See Cell Phone Tracking; Smartphones Central Intelligence Agency Chain Gangs Chicago, Illinois, Surveillance in Child Pornography. See Internet Pornography China Choice: Security or Civil Liberties Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) Citizenship Citywide Sweeps of the Homeless Civil Commitment Civil Disobedience Civil Liberties Civil Rights Movement

Beck, Ulrech Beijing, China, Surveillance in Benjamin, Walter Bentham, Jeremy vii

viii

List of Entries

Civil War Closed-Circuit Television Cloud Computing COINTELPRO Cold War Colonialism Commodification of the Body Communication Studies Community Computer Surveillance Concentration Camps Constructivism Cookies Copenhagen School Copwatch Corporate Personhood Corporate Surveillance Cosmopolitanism Counterintelligence Creeping Crime Crime Control Crime Mapping Critical Security Studies Cuba Cuban Missile Crisis Cults Cultural Studies Curfews Cyberbullying Cybercities Cybermarketing Cybermurder Cyberprostitution Cybersecurity Legislation Cyberstalking Cybertheft Cyberwar Data Mining and Profiling in Big Data Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis Data-Doubles Dataveillance Death Penalty. See Capital Punishment Death Row Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari Deportation Détente Deviance

Dictators and Dictatorships Digital Divide Digital Passwords Digital Privacy. See Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of Diplomacy Diplomatic Envoys Disease Model in Psychiatry Disinformation Campaigns Djibouti DNA Technology Domestic Terrorist Groups Drone Strikes Drones, Commercial Applications of Drug Testing Drug Testing Kits Drug Therapy Drug Trade. See Smuggling Drug Trafficking Dumpster Diving E-Government Electronic Harassment Electronic Monitoring. See Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices Electronic Restraint Devices Electronic Surveillance Email Embargoes Emergency Alert Systems Eminent Domain Environmental Security Equality Espionage Espionage in Ancient Egypt Ethics Ethiopia Eugenics Industrial Complex European Convention on Human Rights Facebook Fascism Fast Capitalism Fear, Culture of Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act Fingerprints

List of Entries

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Foucault, Michel Frankfurt School Franklin, Benjamin Free Speech Freedom of Expression Freedom of Information Act Garland, David Gated Communities Germany Glasnost Global Justice Global Mobility Global Positioning Systems. See United States v. Jones (2012) Global Surveillance Global Village Globalization Goffman, Erving Google Google Earth Governing Through Crime Governmentality Gramsci, Antonio Greece Guantanamo Bay Guatemala

Information Warfare Infotainment Insanity Intellectual Property Rights Intelligence Community International Diplomacy International Monetary Fund International Relations Theory Internet Pornography Internment Camps INTERPOL Inverse Surveillance iPhones. See Smartphones Iran Iran-Contra Affair Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979) Iraq Israel Italy Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act Jennicam Kafka, Franz Katz v. United States (1967) KGB Knowledge Kyllo v. United States (2001)

Habeas Corpus Hamas Hate Crimes Health Management Organizations Hepting v. AT&T Highway and Interstate Surveillance Hobbes, Thomas Home Surveillance Hoover, J. Edgar Houston, Texas, Surveillance in Human Trafficking Hunger Games, The

Latour, Bruno Law Law and Digital Technology Legal Moralism Libertarian Party Libya Lie Detector Instrumentation Life Sciences Surveillance and Security Life Without Parole Locke, John London, England, Surveillance in

Iceland Identity Politics Identity Theft Immigration Immigration and Naturalization Service Incapacitation India Information Security

Machine Learning Martial Law Marx, Gary T. Marxism Mass Incarceration Mass Surveillance. See Global Surveillance Matrix, The McCarthyism

ix

x

List of Entries

Medieval Castles Megan’s Law Mental Disability Laws Mental Health Inpatient Facilities Methadone Maintenance Mexico Military Industrial Complex Military Intelligence Minority Report Mobile Phones. See Cell Phone Tracking; Smartphones Modernism Monitor Versus Merrimac Moral Panic Morality Mountain Surveillance Movie Theater Security Municipal Surveillance Myspace Narcissism National Security National Security Agency National Security Agency Leaks National Security Council Nazism Neighborhood Watch Programs and Citizen Patrol Network Security Neuroscience and Brain Biology New Penology New York, New York, Surveillance in News Media Nigeria 9/11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization North Korea Nuclear Treaties Nuclear War Offender Reentry Programs Online Shopping Open Source Computing Orwell, George Panopticon, The Paparazzi Paramilitarization Parental Surveillance Parks

Parole Passenger Data Passenger Profiling Paternalism and Parens Patriae Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 PATRIOT Act Peace Talks and Peace Agreements Perestroika Phishing and Scams. See Email; Identity Theft Play-Dates and Play-Spaces Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Plethysmograph Police State Policing and Society Political Action Committees Political Dissidents Political Psychology Politics Port Security Postcolonialism Poststructural Theory Power Prison and Jail Segregation Units Prisons and Jails Privacy Privacy, Internet Privacy, Medical Privacy, Right to Privacy, Types of Privacy Act of 1974 Private Law Enforcement Private Prisons Probation Profiling, Racial Propaganda Protection Orders Psychological Assessment Psychotherapy Public Health, Surveillance in Punishment Punishment and Society Radio-Frequency Identification Devices Religion Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 Republican Party Researching Cybercrime Responsibility Restraining Orders. See Protection Orders

List of Entries

Revolutions and Revolts Riot Control Risk Society Thesis Russia Scandals, Political Scanners School Surveillance: Colleges and Universities School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools Search and Seizure Secure Fence Act of 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission Securitization Security, Concepts of Security Screenings at Sporting Events Security Theater Segregation, Residential Self-Deportation Sex Offender Laws Sex Offender Registries Sexting Shopping Mall Security Situationists Slave Trade Smart Borders Smartphones Smuggling Social Contract Theory Social Control Social Justice Social Media Social Network Analysis Social Sorting Sociality Society of Captives Thesis Solitary Confinement Sousveillance South Africa Sovereignty Spain Spam. See Email Special Operation Forces Specialty Courts for Domestic Violence Specialty Courts for Mental Health Specialty Courts for Substance Abuse Spectacle, The Spies Spyware. See Cybertheft

xi

Stand Your Ground Laws Stigma Stop and Frisk Stuxnet Virus Subjectivity Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities Supermax Prisons Surveillance, Culture of Surveillance, Theories of Surveillance & Society Surveillance Art Surveillance Deterrence Surveillance During the Age of Reason Surveillance During the Cold War Surveillance During World War I and World War II Surveillance Investigator Surveillant Assemblage Swatting Hack Synology Surveillance Station Synopticon, The Syria Taliban Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) Tasers and Other Less-Than-Lethal Devices Tea Party Technology Telemetric Policing Terrorism Tet Offensive Texting Threat Assessment Torture Totalitarian Surveillance Societies Traffic Control Traitors Transparency Trinidad and Tobago Truman Doctrine Truth Twitter. See Social Media UFO Surveillance (History, Purpose, Examples) UN Peacekeeping and Security Forces U.S. Constitution U.S. Customs and Border Protection U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Secret Service

xii

List of Entries

U.S. Transportation Security Administration United Kingdom United Nations United States United States v. Jones (2012) United States v. Miller (1976) United States v. Spy Factory, Inc. (1997) Unregulated Cyber Currencies Vagrancy Laws Vehicle Tracking Systems Victim-Offender Mediation Violence Against Women Act Voting Voyeurism, Digital

War on Drugs War on Terror Warrants Watchdog Groups Watergate and White House Tapes Weapons of Mass Destruction Whistle-Blowers WikiLeaks Wire Taps. See Electronic Surveillance Women, Girls, and the Body Work Surveillance Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices Youth Detention Centers and Facilities YouTube

Prison and Jail Segregation Units

Prison Units

and

Jail Segregation

Surveillance and security in prisons and jails are primary concerns for correctional administration. Prison and jail segregation procedures and the resulting detrimental effects are nearly identical to all jail segregation units. Commonly referred to as isolation, special housing units, or “the hole,” these units are isolated, solitary cells used for punishment, protection, or observation. Prison administrators are solely responsible for sending inmates to segregation. The decision is largely unregulated and subject to the broad discretion of prison administrators. Segregation is ideally a last resort, and the decision to segregate an inmate must be substantiated by more than an inmate’s crime or affiliations. Lowlevel segregation is confinement to one’s cell, and high-level segregation is placement in a supermax prison where all the inmates are isolated from one another. In addition, segregation may be short term or long term depending on the purpose. This entry begins by reviewing the logistics of and reasons for segregation. It then considers segregation in the context of mental health. The entry concludes with a discussion of standards regarding the treatment of prisoners.

Logistics Logistically, segregation cells are made of concrete with solid doors that may have a small window or may only have a pass-through for food. Inmates in segregation units are confined to their cells for 23 hours per day with little social contact, including contact with correctional officers, allowing for maximum efficiency for security and surveillance for the correctional facility. Segregated inmates are excluded from most privileges that inmates in the general population enjoy, including work assignments and educational programs. Some segregation units have lights in each cell that cannot be turned off but may be slightly dimmed. Segregated inmates are generally allowed clergy visits unless they abuse that privilege, in which case future requests to be visited by clergy may be denied. Segregated inmates eat alone and frequently have limited diets and water. These conditions can

789

be especially dangerous during times of intense heat and humidity for part or all of the year and have, in some instances, even led to death. In addition to losing social contact, privileges, and other stimuli, being segregated can be detrimental to early release programs, like good time credits. Furthermore, additional infractions are easily incurred because segregated inmates are under greater surveillance than inmates in the general population.

Reasons for Segregation Prison and jail inmates may be segregated from the general prison or jail population for a variety of reasons. Punishment for nonadherence to regulations is the most common reason for segregation. When an inmate is known or suspected to have broken prison regulations, the administration holds a disciplinary hearing to determine the proper punishment. Depending on the nature of the regulation at issue, inmates may be segregated during the investigation before a final determination is made. Prison administrators have broad discretion, and prisoners have little recourse when claiming procedural disciplinary injustice. Courts have held that prisoners have neither a liberty interest in living in the general prison population nor in being free from state action while incarcerated. Furthermore, any liberty interest that an inmate may have is statutorily created and varies based on jurisdiction. In addition, inmates may be segregated when they are, or may become, the victim of another inmate’s actions. When an inmate has been convicted of a sensitive crime (e.g., child molestation), prison administrators may proactively segregate that inmate to prevent physical violence against him or her by other inmates. In addition, inmates may request protective custody, but oftentimes, both the victimizer and the victim are punished for an unorderly disruption. Medical conditions can also necessitate segregation. Prisoners with infectious diseases may be isolated until the contagion passes. However, segregation unit cells are ill equipped to handle the unique needs of inmates with mental or physical limitations. One example is the use of solid doors instead of barred doors, which do not allow one to call for help, thus intensifying the trauma experienced in isolation.

790

Prisons and Jails

Segregation and Mental Health Segregation is often used as a poor alternative to mental health treatment. Historically, those with mental illness were those most commonly placed in a segregation unit. Inmates with mental illness often struggle with assimilation into the jail culture and following rules, meaning that they are frequently disciplined instead of treated. Although mental health treatment in prisons and jails is progressing, sometimes metal illness is misdiagnosed as rebellion. At the time of intake and classification, some inmates with mental illnesses may not be formally diagnosed. Therefore, the use of segregation units instead of treatment may sometimes be an oversight. The stress of being in prison or jail can exacerbate acute mental illness, but even relatively healthy inmates experience physical and psychological impairments from the depth of deprivation one faces while in a segregation unit. Many of the negative aftereffects of segregation can be attributed to the complete lack of social or sensory stimuli while in a segregation unit. Suicide and self-harm are ever-present concerns of inmates in isolation. One administrative solution for inmates with known suicidal ideations is to place such inmates in isolation and monitor them for 24 hours a day. However, many inmates develop suicidal ideations while in segregation, and the signs are not always apparent to their caretakers.

Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners The American Bar Association (ABA) approved the standards for the treatment of prisoners in 2010 (published in 2011 as the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Treatment of Prisoners) in an attempt to ensure humane conditions for segregation units. In addition to mandating basic necessities, these guidelines suggest providing social and physical stimuli, when possible, without endangering the segregated inmate or other inmates and correctional workers. These stimuli include social contact, writing space, beds and mattresses off the floor, and allowing for exercise. The ABA is particularly concerned with lessening the inmates’ deprivations, especially when the purpose of segregation is not surveillance and security but

punitive. The ABA also suggests that the correctional officers in charge of surveilling the segregation units keep logs of each inmate’s daily condition and activities to ensure early detection of any physical or mental health deterioration. James M. Binnall and Amanda M. Fisher See also Prisons and Jails; Punishment; Supermax Prisons

Further Readings American Bar Association. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Treatment of Prisoners. Washington, DC: Author, 2011. Haney, Craig, and Mona Lynch. “Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement.” New York University Review of Law & Social Change, v.23 (1997). Reiter, Keramet. 23/7: Pelican Bay Prison and the Rise of Long-Term Solitary Confinement. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016. Schlanger, Margo. “Regulating Segregation: The Contribution of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners.” American Criminal Law Review, v.47/4 (2010).

Prisons

and

Jails

In the United States, prisons and jails are a significant part of the judicial system. Society depends on these institutions to secure the public by incapacitating and, ideally, rehabilitating offenders so that they may rejoin society as law-abiding citizens. Jails are the entryway into the system because they are the first contact a person has with incarceration. Jail time can frequently lead to prison time, but jails also function in a wholly separate manner apart from their capacity as preprison institutions. The primary function of prisons and jails is the control of those who have committed criminal offenses. To achieve such control, prisons and jails rely on a variety of tools—from structures to interpersonal rules—to monitor prisoners. Such surveillance helps prison officials secure facilities charged with housing inmates. As part of the surveillance regimes of prisons and jails, prisoners are required to give up much of their personal privacy.

Prisons and Jails

Phone calls are monitored, cells are searched, and body pat downs for concealed items (e.g., weapons, drugs) are routine. After reviewing the history of confinement and the differences between jails and prison, this entry focuses on the various models of prisoner behavior.

History of Confinement Prior to the advent of penitentiaries, punishment in the United States was focused on the infliction of pain or humiliation. Stocks and pillories, shaming techniques, and torture or death were frequently utilized as punishment. The Penitentiary Era (1790–1825) began with the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia. The Walnut Street Jail replaced the High Street Jail, which was formerly a simple housing unit with two buildings, one for criminals and the other for debtors. The separate system, also called the Pennsylvania system, originated at the Walnut Street Jail. The hallmark of this system was solitary confinement, including complete silence. None of the inmates interacted with one another or any of the guards. All activities, including manual labor and meals, took place in the inmates’ individual cells. When the inmates were moved around in the penitentiary, they had to wear a hood or a mask. All these steps were taken so that the inmates were able to reflect on their actions and pay penance. Proponents of the separate system also lauded these techniques as preserving privacy, so that when an inmate was released back into society, no one who had been imprisoned together would know the others’ identity. The government was able to keep close watch on those individuals who had not followed the laws, but the separateness shielded the inmates from the public humiliation that was prepenitentiary punishment. Both incapacity and punishment were the theories supporting these early penitentiaries. The second system during the Penitentiary Era was known as the congregate system, or the Auburn system. It originated at the Auburn Prison in Auburn, New York, in the 1820s as an alternative to the Pennsylvania system. Despite the name, this system was similar to the separate system in several respects. The inmates were allowed to work and eat together, but all the inmates observed complete silence. Other aspects of the Auburn

791

system include the lockstep system of single-file marching, striped prison garb, and keeping space between cells and inmates at all times to preserve the silence and curb the temptation to interact. Proponents of the separate system criticized the congregate system for allowing the inmates to see one another because seeing one another could spark the desire to attempt communication. The Auburn system gradually replaced the P ­ ennsylvania system in the United States, but Europe stayed with the separate system. The theory behind this system, while punitive, was also focused on how society could utilize prisoners for the greater good of the community. Proponents of the congregate system viewed it as being more productive than the separate system because allowing prisoners to work together meant a higher quantity of labor output, as well as the ability to take on larger tasks. During this time period, women and minorities were housed separately. They were not considered malleable and thus could not be housed with the inmates who were deemed to have the ability to change their ways. The Mass Incarceration Era (1825–1876) followed the Penitentiary Era. During this time, new prisons were built and followed the Pennsylvania system. The Reformatory Era (1876–1890) focused on religion as a means of rehabilitation. Every person having the misfortune of finding himself or herself in the system should be able to leave the system as a Christian gentleman or a Christian gentlewoman. This was accomplished by sending the men to boot camps to enforce discipline and responsibility, and the women were taught domestic skills. Younger offenders were targeted for this system because they were seen as more malleable. Zebulon R. Brockway is credited with the founding of this system at the Elmira Reformatory in New York. Brockway used a system of marks, similar to  the Australian system created by Alexander Maconochie, which awards points or credits for good behavior, and a certain number of points or credits was required for release. The indeterminate sentences became a source of contention because inmates had no way of knowing how long they would be imprisoned before release. The theory behind this system was both punitive and, for the first time, rehabilitative. Despite the rehabilitative intent, this system was violent and was not successful in the long term. However, the belief that

792

Prisons and Jails

prisoners have the ability to be rehabilitated remains. In addition, parole was established during this era as a means for helping inmates reintegrate back into society after serving their sentences. Parole has gone through many changes and adaptations across jurisdictions but remains, in differing capacities, across the nation. During the Industrial Era (1890–1935), using prisoners as sources of labor became popular, and industrial prisons rose to the forefront as the most effective U.S. prison system. Because the Reformatory Era was considered a failure and the cost of housing inmates was increasing, the country needed a solution that would keep prisoners incapacitated but was also cost-effective. In addition, the U.S. society became generally more focused on humanitarian efforts. Some civil rights activists took notice of prison reform. The conditions of early prisons were deemed reprehensible by many who toured the U.S. prisons systems. In balancing these concerns, prison labor became a big business. Prison officials contracted with private entities for prison labor. Either goods could be made in the prisons under complete control of prison administrators, or prison officials could supervise the inmates at the location of manufacture, known as the convict lease system. Prison chain gangs also emerged in this era as a way of maintaining public utilities such as roadways and government structures. In the South, prison labor was being used on farms. Goals of the industrial prisons included keeping inmates busy with work that would both allow them to repay their debt to society through hard labor and allow them to earn minimal wages while learning skills that would potentially be helpful during reintegration. Despite the popularity of prison labor, prison industries were effectively shut down by the Ashurst-Summers Act of 1935, when Congress severely limited interstate commerce of prison wares as a response to the Great Depression. The Punitive Era (1935–1945), although shortlived, was marked by intense boredom and monotonous routine. The “big house” was the typical prison during this time. The big house had no grand purpose or scheme and was notorious for its violence. Programs for prisoners were no longer offered, and the number of maximum security facilities increased across the nation. The amount of violence and the number of prison riots significantly increased during this era, speculatively, due

to increased inmate frustration and lack of positive outlets. Punishment and incapacity were the two driving forces for this type of prison. The era was a reflection of society’s opinion that prisoners did not deserve to have any privileges while incarcerated. The drawback to this reasoning was that lack of programming not only left prisoners idle and frustrated during incarceration but also did not prepare them for life after prison. Without adequate means of improvement, former inmates were likely to reoffend. Alternatively, the Treatment Era (1945–1967) focused on individual needs and treatment. Inmates were viewed as patients needing care rather than as criminals needing punishment. The terminology shifted to “corrections” during this time period, because prisons were deemed to have the ability to effect positive change in the inmates’ lives. The Community-Based Era (1967–1980) introduced reintegration programs like work release. The ability to rehabilitate offenders while keeping them completely isolated from society was questioned, spawning the desire to help prisoners get back into the workforce while still being supervised. The Warehouse Era (1980–1995) abandoned all hope of treatment for offenders and focused on more frequent and longer periods of incapacitation. Three-strikes laws became popular during this era, allowing states to sentence a person convicted of a third felony to life imprisonment. In addition, truth in sentencing and mandatory minimums became popular to ensure that inmates were not enjoying too much leniency with earlyrelease programs. This era simply aimed at containment of social deviants and outcasts. The “nothing works” doctrine played a role in the pessimistic attitude toward corrections at this time. Robert Martinson popularized this view that none of the prior corrections models were successful and, therefore, the only option is to incarcerate people for longer periods of time. One prominent effect resulting from this mentality is prison overcrowding. Presently, the United States is considered to be in the Just Deserts Era (1995–present), which strives to match an appropriate punishment to the crime. This theory suggests that punishment is an unavoidable and deserved consequence of breaking the law; therefore, individual assumption of responsibility is encouraged. Depending on the

Prisons and Jails

jurisdiction, prisons across the country encompass many of the different theories. For example, some prisons offer a wide variety of programs to inmates, whereas others offer none. A prominent factor in differentiating these prisons is the level of  security. Low-security prisons are more likely to  provide a range of opportunities to inmates, whereas high-security prisons are less likely to provide as many options. The reasons for this vary, but the type of crime is a determining factor in how likely it is for an inmate to be released and how soon the release will occur. Even though the country is still considered in the Just Deserts Era, another framework is emerging through the scholarship of Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon called the New Penology. Feeley and Simon propose a movement away from focusing on rehabilitating the individual and, instead, focusing on managing the aggregate by utilizing evidence and statistics. Their framework has three central propositions. The first is shifting the focus away from treatment and rehabilitation and toward actuarial risk assessment techniques. The second proposition suggests focusing on the internal structure and controls to assess areas of improvement rather than focusing on external factors that are potentially uncontrollable. Third is the actual implementation of the techniques targeted at the aggregate. The New Penology is an evidence-based corrections system that takes the individual out of the equation.

Jails Versus Prisons Although the terms are frequently conflated, jails and prisons are different in significant respects. Jails are used for temporary confinement of individuals and operate under local or state authorities. Reasons for this temporary confinement range from being held after arrest but prior to court appearance or trial, being held for a transfer, being held as a material witness or in protective custody, or serving a sentence of up to 1 year. Jails typically are smaller than prisons and located near city centers because they are meant only for temporary confinement. Jails are less secure than prisons, physically in their structure, and also relationally because of the revolving-door nature. Prisons house only those offenders who have been sentenced to 1 year or longer. Due to their

793

long-term nature, prisons are more stable in the sense that they do not experience the phenomena associated with having a revolving door. Prisons are located in rural areas and have differing levels of security based on the type of offenders housed. The more severe the crimes, the higher the security demanded by society. In the 1980s, a debate emerged over whether prisons and jails should be privatized. Up to this point, many internal services offered in prisons, such as health care and food services, were already being handled by private organizations. However, there was never a question about how much control the state had over the prisoners. With the possibility of privatizing entire prisons, concern over who would be in control of the prisons increased. Currently, many prisons and jails are jointly operated by public and private entities.

Institutionalization and Prisonization Although institutionalization and prisonization are also frequently used interchangeably, these terms are at the opposite ends of the inmate behavior spectrum. They both refer to the way in which a person learns to cope with and adapt to life in prison. They also both occur gradually over a long period of time. However, institutionalization is the ultimate acceptance of the regulations of the prison administration. From the prison administrator’s perspective, an institutionalized prisoner is likely to be considered the model prisoner because he or she is passive and compliant. Institutionalized prisoners make the administration’s task of supervision and control easier. From the prisoner’s perspective, institutionalization can have many meanings. Some prisons seek medication for mental illness that induces the passivity accompanying institutionalization. Prisonization is different from institutionalization because it involves internalizing the culture of the prison. This means living by the “convict code” and complying with all of the unofficial rules of surviving prison. The convict code is the way of life in prison. It is the implied rules that inmates impose on one another that must be followed for everyone to live together with any amiability. Donald ­Clemmer, credited with coining the term prisonization, explains that inmates bond with one another and against the system through their collective

794

Prisons and Jails

experience. Clemmer further explains prisonization as a means to criminalization in the sense that once a person internalizes the prison culture, he or she becomes immune to conventional social structures. This proposition has been rejected by some, who insist that a process of deprisonization occurs prior to an inmate’s release. The postrelease effects of institutionalization and prisonization are considerable. Those inmates who have either been in prison long enough to become institutionalized or who have lived in a medicine-induced institutional state may have problems reintegrating because they have become so dependent on the prison structure. Furthermore, those inmates who have become prisonized may have difficulty letting go of the convict code and resuming life as a member of society.

Deprivation and Importation Models of Inmate Behavior In trying to understand and explain prison culture and prisoner behavior, researchers have created several models. One of the two chief models for shaping prisoner behavior is the deprivation model. According to Gresham Sykes, credited as one of the founders of this model, the pains of imprisonment cause the convict code to arise. Sykes explains that the deprivations of liberties, goods, services, and relationships angers inmates against the system and steers them toward following the convict code. Inmates are innovative in finding ways to fill the void left by the severe deprivation. Examples include heterosexual males engaging in homosexual activity, smuggling and modifying food, and breaking small procedural rules to gain a sense of power and autonomy. Furthermore, Erving Goffman’s work on stigma relates to the deprivation model by helping explain the effects of labeling and alienating certain groups of people from the larger society. Deprivation is criticized for focusing only on the prison experience without considering any other preexisting variables that may inform prisoner behavior. Factors used to assess the deprivation model include sentence length, level of security, type of crime committed, and participation in programming. The second chief model of prisoner behavior is  the importation model, which suggests that ­prisoner behavior is a magnification of the same behavior engaged in prior to coming to prison.

Idiosyncrasies of prison life are born out of the idiosyncrasies of street life, not vice versa. Importation scholars focus on the variables present in a person’s life prior to entering prison, or simply outside prison life. Factors used to test the importation model include race, sex, employment status, marital status, and social class.

Integration and Situational Models of Inmate Behavior Although importation and deprivation are the two chief models of inmate behavior, other models have also emerged. Integration combines preprison, prison, and extraprison variables to explain prisoner behavior based on a framework of general strain theory. General strain theory, developed by Robert Agnew, explains that the stress of trying to achieve unrealistic goals combined with the disappointment of not being able to achieve the desired result because of limited legitimate means leads to criminal behavior. According to Wayne Gillespie, combining the importation and deprivation theories allows for a more comprehensive analysis of prisoner antisocial behavior when applied to a prison setting. While the deprivation model is based on longterm deprivations, the situational model explains behavior based on short-term deprivations. According to Pamela Steinke, a person’s behavior and attitude will change depending on the environmental or situational factors. Factors may include location, season, or relationships. For example, when assessing an inmate infraction, a researcher would want to know where in the prison the altercation took place, the season, the time of day, and who was involved, including inmates and guards. James M. Binnall See also Offender Reentry Programs; Parole; Prison and Jail Segregation Units; Private Prisons; Supermax Prisons

Further Readings Blevins, Kristie R., et al. “A General Strain Theory of Prison Violence and Misconduct: An Integrated Model of Inmate Behavior.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, v.26/2 (2010).

Privacy Feeley, Malcolm, and Jonathan Steven Simon. “The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications.” Criminology, v.30, 1992. Foucault, Michel. “Panopticism.” In Discipline and Punish (trans. Alan Sheridan). New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977. (Original work published in French as Surveiller et Punir) Haney, Craig. From Prisons to Home: The Effects of Incarceration on Children, Families and Communities. Santa Cruz: Craig Haney University of California, 2001. http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/prison2home02/haney .htm (Accessed October 2017). Irwin, John. The Warehouse Prison. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury, 2005. McDonald, Douglas C. “Private Penal Institutions.” Crime and Justice, v.16 (1992). Moynahan, J. M. The American Jail: Its Origin and Development. 1977. Sykes, Gresham M. The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. Thomas, Charles W. “Theoretical Perspectives on Prisonization: A Comparison of the Importation and Deprivation Models.” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, v.68 (1977).

Privacy To account for privacy and how it has been addressed in the academic literature, this entry notes the difficulties in defining the concept and then highlights its conceptual, theoretical, and philosophical origins. It begins by emphasizing the most simplistic approach to privacy that involves dualisms of inside-outside, mine-yours, interior-exterior, and private-public. It progresses to examine the influence of liberal philosophies that today are virtually synonymous with privacy. Keywords associated with this include autonomy, rights, consent, control, and management. More recent thinking has focused on the role of context and interaction. This maintains the spirit of much liberal philosophy but better recognizes that privacy is contingent on contexts, group norms, and the ways in which these develop. The entry then highlights the relationship between privacy and what is considered taboo in different cultures. Having delineated contextual, systemic, and ethnocentric accounts of privacy, this

795

entry frames privacy as an affective protocol that regulates the way in which elements of social systems interact and behave.

Defining Privacy Although passionately argued for and defended, privacy is not an easy word to define. It is slippery in that when we think we have it pinned down, a new inflection can be provided that allows it to slip between our fingers. For example, the online Oxford Dictionary defines it as “1) a state in which one is not observed or disturbed by other people; 1.1) the state of being free from public attention.” This is the argument of seclusion, or privacy, as that which involves being alone. It is an overly simple, isolationist, and negative account of privacy that fails to take into account a basic observation: Privacy does not just involve being alone but how we connect and interact with others and how we control and manage access to ourselves and those to whom we are close. There is a key point here in that privacy also involves being open to others. The negative dimension of this lay definition has deep roots. Plato, for example, in The Laws phrases privacy in negative terms that readily connect with the well-known refrain of “having something to hide.” For Plato, privacy was a threat to the social good. He held that people should be well-known to one another and should not be kept in the dark about a person’s character and that every citizen of every state should make an effort to show that “he is straightforward and genuine, not shifty.” The idea that privacy might have a positive dimension does not occur to Plato anywhere in The Laws. More recent academic exposition in the social sciences tends to involve words such as autonomy, control, dignity, management, sharing, context, and setting, broadly seeing privacy as how we manage and control our negotiations with others so to have a degree of autonomy. There is more to it, but this will suffice for an opening definition. Although privacy is intensely fought over today in a digital context, particularly in light of whistleblower Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013 about the surveillance of U.S. and U.K. citizens by their intelligence agencies, it is useful to first consider privacy outside digital contexts because by doing this we can see that there is no question of

796

Privacy

privacy disappearing. We will not surpass it, it will not go out of fashion, and it will always matter. This is because it is a fact of living in groups—we will always have intimacies (simultaneously very open to some but closed to others); things that are taboo; confidences and secrets (again both open and closed); things of value such as mementos, photos, and diaries; doors, curtains, and other ways of organizing our homes; and, as intensely discussed today, online informational privacy. Another truism of privacy is that we have less privacy today than we previously enjoyed. This belief is open for debate. Although we live in a world of global surveillance of telecommunication, we are also less familiar with our neighbors, more of us had our own bedrooms when growing up than previous generations, religion (and confession) plays less of a role than it used to, families are more dispersed (smaller family units), and more of us drive our own cars than use public transportation. In many important ways, then, we are more private than ever. One more assumption to be quickly overturned is that privacy is always a positive outcome. In many ways, privacy is positive because it involves control of our lives and those we care about, but privacy may also have a repressive character. Feminist critique of privacy, particularly in work inspired by Catharine MacKinnon, has highlighted that privacy norms may be used as a shield for domestic abuse at home. This means that privacy may serve as a control mechanism to maintain imbalanced power relationships. This leads feminists interested in privacy to question the connection of privacy with autonomy, because historically men and women have not enjoyed the same levels of autonomy. Instead, the home may represent a domain where women are deprived of both power and recourse to legal protection (on battery, marital rape, and women’s exploited domestic labor), due to the historical unwillingness of the liberal state to intervene in private domains. For MacKinnon, this is why feminism has to make the personal political, and to make what occurs at home a public matter. Privacy seen this way is a negative condition that acts as a hermetic seal against public visibility so to facilitate unaccountable behavior. The “right to be let alone” then, is, for MacKinnon, the right for men to oppress women. Moreover, abuse is not unidirectional (male > female). Data, for example,

from the U.K.’s Home Office and British Crime Survey show that men constituted 40% of domestic violence victims each year between 2004 and 2005 and between 2008 and 2009. Liberal feminists such as Anita Allen interested in privacy have critiqued MacKinnon and, while recognizing the historical imbalances between the sexes, have emphasized the value of domestic privacy as a means of facilitating richer, deeper, and more significant relationships. Although aware of abuse, they argue that to reject the private sphere is to toss out the baby (privacy) with the bathwater (confinement and inequality). Journalism also complicates the premise that privacy is innately a good thing because much of what journalists investigate are cover-ups (that which people would prefer others do not know), abuses of power, financial wrongdoings, and secret deals. At the level of principle, journalism exists to make situations publicly known and transparent. However, journalism also depends on privacy to protect sources so no authorities or courts should be able to require a journalist to reveal the identity of an anonymous source. This involves a paradox in that transparency cannot be encouraged without privacy.

Borders and Concentric Accounts At the most basic level, privacy tends to be thought of in binary terms including in-out, mine-yours, inside-outside, interior-exterior, and private-public. This, for example, might involve the home that might subsequently be thought of in terms of home versus outside, or the carving up of spaces within the home subdivided into spaces, each with their own character for its inhabitants. Teenagers’ bedrooms illuminate the point well. This dualistic conception of privacy entails what Julie Cohen in Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice calls the “interest against exposure” so to allow for development of the self away from unwanted attention and surveillance. Privacy seen this way is less about protecting already fully formed selves from unwanted attention but allowing for uninhibited growth and development of the subject. In addition to growth of intellect and personality, there is a more basic function of space and borders. The need for identifiable territory serves several functions across

Privacy

human and animal domains, including propagation of species, as spaces for breeding of people/ animals, and as a frame of reference for groups (where people and animals can learn, make mistakes, play, and relax). In general, privacy promotes well-being and space for intimacy. A border-based conception is not just physical (doors, walls, animal scents, or even sunglasses), but it may also be behavioral. This might include averting one’s gaze or being excessively polite (so as not to have to engage the real private self). As is developed later in this entry, privacy and borders are not fixed. They are ethnocentric and depend on the social history of the inhabitants of a given culture. Even in societies in which privacy is commonly believed to be less pronounced than our own, possibly because of communal living, privacy norms are apparent by means of coverage of the face, aversion of eyes, going to one’s mat, facing a wall, maneuvering without touching others, and speech acts (e.g., decorum, measured delivery, and emotional restraint). As pointed out throughout this entry, privacy is best conceived as the means by which we regulate our engagement with other people and grant them either greater or lesser access to ourselves or to a group of which we are a member. On ethnocentric borders, Edward Hall in The Hidden Dimension provides a useful study on the relationship between nationalities and desire (or lack) for personal space. Here, proximity and the extent to which people are comfortable being physically close to others is found to alter depending on nationality.  In North Americans, Hall found four spatial zones of interaction, consisting of (1) the intimate zone (0–18 inches) associated with people in close relationships; (2) the personal zone (1.5–4 feet), which is the typical boundary of people in everyday interactions; (3) the social zone (4–12 feet), which involves day-to-day business and impersonal contacts; and (4) the public zone (12–25 feet and further), which is reserved for high-status people in public and formal settings. The spatial zones in other nationalities that Hall studied differed from these. Criticisms can be levied at border and concentric perspectives. Despite having simplistic con­ ceptual appeal, they do not always handle the practicalities of privacy well. For example, we can often experience greater anonymity in public spaces

797

such as within crowds. Moreover, if someone enters a person’s home without the person’s permission,  there is quite a clear breach; however, if someone assembles information about a person from disparate sources, borders may not have been breached, but we may feel that a mark has been overstepped. Problems with border metaphors have been identified in the surveillance literature, where the idea of enclosure as a means of control has fallen out of favor, for surveillance to take place in an Orwellian “world without walls.” This refers to the idea that borders tend to be local and often tangible (as with walls and doors), but modern surveillance is different. It is characterized by watching from afar; it involves a scale of monitoring we find difficult to comprehend, and we have little understanding of how information is analyzed and processed, and what is done with the outcomes of this information. Physical walls mean little in an era of ubiquitous unconsented-to surveillance of telecommunications.

Control, Autonomy, Management, and Property Today, privacy is conceptually inextricable from liberalism. Understanding the origins and principles of liberal philosophies provides a theoretical and practical counter to the fallacy that privacy equates to “having something to hide” (or the shifty citizen found in Plato’s The Laws). This is because privacy is better understood in terms of control, dignity, and respect for selfhood regarding what one wishes to share, reveal, or allow others to access. Privacy today is indivisible from liberalism in that it is associated with the development of the self and subjectivity, and allowing people to experience some of what they are without scrutiny. This echoes Alan Westin, an early commentator on privacy and information technologies, who in the 1960s depicted privacy as the ability to control how much of ourselves we reveal to others. In a control-based account of privacy, something is private if a person is able to control access to the “something” (be this a diary, a part of the body, a computer file, the home, or even how one is portrayed in public—e.g., how one appears in a news article). This is very close to the management dimension of privacy, or the capacity to manage

798

Privacy

how one appears to others—to have a say over information flow and to be able to maintain borders. Privacy as control and management involves duty to others so as to allow others to pursue their own ends and wishes (assuming these do not negatively affect others). This is exemplified by the international charity Privacy International, whose stated aim is to ensure that state and corporate surveillance practices are consistent with the rule of law. On its website, it defines privacy as the right to know that your personal communications, medical records, metadata and bank details are secure, but it is also about ensuring that they are under your control. Privacy is essential to human dignity and autonomy in all societies. . . . The right to privacy is a qualified fundamental human right—meaning that if someone wants to take it away from you, they need to have a damn good reason for doing so.

The point about privacy as a qualified right is an important one. In the hierarchy of rights, privacy is not an absolute right (unlike the right not to be tortured), but it is a right that can be encroached on  if there are other more important interests involved. The emphasis on control and management clearly echoes liberal philosophies that collectively tend to the belief that despite possible risk to the wider social body, people must be accorded personal freedom—assuming no negative impact on others. Ideas about human rights, noninterference, freedom, autonomy, consent, and nonviolation of personal freedom all find expression in the works of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Benjamin Constant, and Alexis de Tocqueville. For example, Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, written in 1690, provides roots on privacy as a natural right, the connection of privacy with property and origins of modern ideas about consent. Likewise, Mill’s On Liberty, written in 1859, continues to indirectly act as a manifesto for privacy rights and the watchfulness of governmental involvement in our lives. Mill argues that a person is not accountable to others as long as his or her interests do not concern others. The social goal for Mill is the creation of conditions that provide a person with freedom to choose and to be left alone if that is what one seeks. On tensions

between authority and wider society, Mill seeks to limit the power that can be exercised by society over the individual. This is because without autonomy and the capacity to live as one wishes in areas of life that do not affect others, free ideas will not come to be, thus retarding the scope for innovation, originality, and moral courage. However, the premise of autonomy as a moral matter is fully attributable to Kant’s An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? written in 1784. Selfguidance, self-definition, and the ability to choose are for Kant the basis of a moral life. This is in stern contrast to any philosophy that sees morality in terms of obedience. The “privacy as property” view sees the right to privacy as stemming from older rights—property rights and right to bodily security. The property view of privacy is an important one because it links well with the idea that information is property, that it has exchange value, and that, without consented-to exchange, it is beyond the legitimate concern of others. This means information is that which we own and, because of the nature of property that involves belonging, a person is afforded rights over informational property. Such a view of privacy places it in the domain of exchange and markets. The consequence of this view is that the analytical and ethical usefulness of privacy is reduced. Rather than being a right in and of itself, the principle of privacy is secondary to entitlement of rights through the logic of ownership and exchange, and thereby defined by society through its markets. Privacy is only respected to the extent that is consistent with market mechanisms. The property-based view is an attack on the integrity of privacy itself because it requires the analyst to  ask, “Is privacy as a stand-alone proposition coherent and is there something distinctive about privacy that transcends other related topics?” One way of assessing this question is to ask whether property adequately covers all privacy matters and themes. If property is about ownership, is it correct to say that we own our thoughts, personal identification numbers, birth dates, preferences, website visits, or past illnesses? The question is this: In boiling privacy down to a market-based commodity, is something lost in the process? A firmer nail in the coffin for the privacy-as-property view is exemplified by the Snowden leaks of 2013. This is because privacy as a tradable commodity

Privacy

today falls apart in face of state surveillance, and given that state surveillance poses one of the greatest threats to privacy of our time, a marketbased account is of little practical use.

Consent The online environment is populated by requests to “Agree,” “Accept,” and consent to a variety of data processes such as cookies and sharing information with third parties. Consent is a matter covered in some depth by liberal philosophers. For example, tacit consent (which is unexpressed but inferred by the person seeking consent) is a point addressed in full by Locke, who describes that it involves enjoying the benefits of land, lodging, or carriage within the territory of a given government or domain. People in this account are free to leave, or, in more contemporary parlance, opt out. Tacit consent is silently given, and unless actively dissented against, consent is assumed. There are arguments to be made against this because we are often unaware of what is taking place. In 1753, this principle led David Hume, in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, to comment that this is akin to being carried onto a ship asleep and being said to consent to the dominion of the shipmaster.

Self-Determination Although privacy is a principle of living in groups that far exceeds the digital economy and telecommunication, academic discussion today frequently focuses on privacy in relation to informational selfdetermination (informationelle Selbstbestimmung) that arose in Germany. This entails the obligations of organizations in light of processing capacities of computational technologies. This is a point addressed by Colin Bennett and Charles Raab in The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective. They summarize the literature on informational privacy and surveillance by arguing that privacy is an individual right, that privacy is something we once had and is now eroding, that the source of the privacy problem is structural and involves impersonal and remote forces that together contribute to the declining ability of individual agents to control the circulation of information that relates to them, and that organizations that

799

are responsible for privacy invasion can be observed, resisted, and regulated because they are subject to a set of obligations that stem from principles as embodied in the laws of discrete and bounded liberal democratic states. Informational privacy perspectives are deeply tied to liberal conceptions of privacy (control, management, informed consent) as modern informational approaches involve assessment of the extent to which people have control over the circulation of their personal information. That which challenges this control is surveillance. Although there are disciplinary and methodological deviations and amendments to this definition, there is little substantial disagreement from mainstream contemporary privacy and surveillance scholars.

Systems, Contexts, and Protocols A systemic approach sees privacy as an organizational principle that regulates institutions, practices, modes of interaction, and social and individual life more generally. Seen this way, privacy has a governing function within a given system or social arrangement. This applies to situations involving people and also those including machines, networked media, and information processes. Systems-based accounts of privacy reject the premise of privacy as a “wish to be alone.” Instead, it recognizes that privacy is about having influence over relationships with others, be those people or computer servers. This is an important distinction because being alone is just that—being alone, or in total absence of others. This means no connection at all with human or machinic others. Being private means something different because it involves managing relations with others and developing agreeable norms of interaction. Privacy is thus a code or protocol that regulates the way in which parts of social systems interact and behave. Although privacy clearly depends on the parts of a social system for its existence, it also steers and guides behavior. This view acknowledges that social life is complex; we move between different domains (e.g., home, school, work, medical appointments), and we interact with different people (e.g., parents, teachers, bosses, doctors, close friends, acquaintances, boyfriends, people we meet for the first time). Because we have so many different relationships that we try to manage, life takes on a dynamic

800

Privacy

nature, characterized by change and activity. This is an ecological view of privacy, because privacy is seen as a behavioral norm that guides the emergence of groups, relationships, interacting parts, and behavior. Irwin Altman expresses this best in The Environment and Social Behaviour: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowding, agreeing with the point that privacy is that which mediates and regulates behavior between people. Within the privacy as ecology view, there is an important point in that as norms and circumstances change, so will patterns of privacy behavior. This provides privacy a pragmatic quality, and rather than being something that is fixed, certain, forever, and deontological, it is subject to change as circumstances, norms, and people develop. This recognizes situation dependency—that privacy norms (and violations) emerge from interaction with others (and is not just about seclusion) and that different norms apply depending on the situation, whom we are dealing with, and what is at stake. Although privacy is local, situation dependent, relative, and constructed, this should not remove the significance to the people involved within that situation. For people on the inside of contexts and privacy situations, norms equate to a fact of how things are and should be. The proposition that local conditions, wishes, and specific actors might determine  privacy norms is encapsulated in Helen Nissenbaum’s approach in Privacy in Context: ­ Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life. This eschews binary terms (e.g., access/denial of access, open/shut, public/private), preferring instead to account for privacy in term of appropriateness, context, the type and nature of information, or what and with whom information is being shared. This also reflects the principle that people do not require complete privacy; privacy is not simply a tap of information flow to be turned on or off. Different norms apply in different circumstances depending on who or what is being dealt with, and people will happily share information with others as long as certain social norms are met. Nissenbaum’s account involves a range of factors, including roles, activities, norms, and values. This refers to the roles of individuals in a given context and situation involving privacy (e.g., student, lecturer, medical receptionist, or waiter); activities in terms of what individuals are

seeking to do or achieve (e.g., buy a product online, vote, monitor personal health on smartphones, or share photos online); norms that define the duties, expectations, actions, privileges, and what is acceptable for a person or technology fulfilling a role; and values that refer to the goal of a system or arrangement (be this education, communication, or health). The understanding of norms is critical as contextual integrity (or the integrity of contexts) is maintained when norms are met. It is breached when a new or unexpected process offends the norms within a given relationship. A contextual approach allows for the development of new processes, technologies, and ways of processing information. However, it requires consideration of the overall purpose of the system (e.g., health care) and the extent to which the new informational process violates or complies with the existing privacy norm.

Taboo What is distasteful, rarely discussed, and out of bounds sits at odds with liberal-inspired ideas about privacy. Nevertheless, it is an important characteristic. There are two parts to a taboo-­ oriented approach: The first has to do with what sins privacy might hide and cover up and the second has to do with a more general sense of privacy relating to embarrassment. This includes locks on bathroom and toilet doors, lockers in changing rooms, and other barriers that stop people from seeing, hearing, or sensing what others are doing. Privacy from this viewpoint comprises border-based conventions that mitigate isolation if we feel ourselves to be strange or different in some way, indignity, and the possibility of humiliation. On toilets, defecation has a ritualistic character, and it is deeply connected with ideas about pollution and disgust. It is connected to ritual because if conducted or done the wrong way, or in the wrong place, it meets with moral disapproval. This is learned behavior, mostly acquired at a young age. Moreover, across a wide variety of different types of societies, nowhere is it permitted to defecate in the cooking area. Beyond connection with pollution, there is also the fact that we are highly vulnerable and to an extent immobilized.

Privacy, Internet

Furthermore, with regard to sex, seclusion of some form is desirable in all cultural contexts, although this is subject to much variation. There are a number of reasons for this, but one suggestion is that people prefer not to be observed in order to be able to fully engage themselves in the act and be an immersed participant. In The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia, written in 1929, Bronislaw Malinowski and Havelock Ellis found that though not always possible because of living arrangements, privacy during sex is an overwhelming preference. Furthermore, it tends to be the case that in societies where people have intercourse indoors, they tend to do it in partitioned rooms. Those without partitioned domestic arrangements tend to do it during the day in secluded areas outdoors. Historically, there are exceptions. Margaret Mead, in the 1928 Coming of Age in Samoa, illuminated how different Samoan teenagers were from American teenagers with regard to privacy, sexuality, bodies, and matters of life and death. She found Samoans to be at the far end of the openness scale, as there was little that was taboo and not open to the community (although Mead notes that girls are more secretive than boys about masturbation practices). The consequence is that what is privileged in respective societies and how these are governed are subject to different protocols that affect the behavior of groups of actors in different ways. Although it appears clear that privacy exists in  all societies, or at least in those studied, it is contingent on physical, social, historical, technological, and environmental conditions. In less permissive societies, there are also “moral holidays” that break with normal restraints. In general, although privacy does change across societies and is contingent on context, privacy is a universal norm that to a greater and lesser degree transcends Western culture. The suggestion that privacy is a decadent Western premise, where other societies live in harmony without privacy, is a fallacy because it is present and valued by all in different ways. Andrew McStay See also Civil Liberties; Locke, John; National Security Agency Leaks; Orwell, George; Parental Surveillance; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of

801

Further Readings Altman, Irwin. The Environment and Social Behaviour: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowding. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1975. Bennett, Colin J. and Charles D. Raab. The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006. Boyd, Danah. It’s Complicated. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014. McStay, Andrew. Privacy and Philosophy: New Media and Affective Protocol. New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2014. Nissenbaum, Helen. Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010. Westin, Alan. “The Origins of Modern Claims to Privacy.” In F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1984. (Original work published 1967)

Websites Privacy International: https://www.privacyinternational.org

Privacy, Internet When dealing with the Internet, the concept of privacy—the protection of one’s personal ­information—seems almost illusionary, as information on the Internet is often freely accessible and difficult to protect in general, much less in the specific. There are myriad avenues of potential informational releases, and attendant breaches, of personal privacy. This entry begins by first defining privacy in general and then Internet privacy specifically. It then drills down into two distinct types of privacy desired when using the Internet: (1) proactive and (2) reactive. Privacy, as a whole, is a relatively modern concept with roots in the pre-Enlightenment era but more carefully developed in the Enlightenment era, as greater personal economic worth permitted the development of luxuries such as protecting information concerning one’s personal life. One example of the development in a lifestyle of personal privacy may be found in

802

Privacy, Internet

modern Western architecture: The increase in personal wealth has permitted the development of single-family homes in large cities where it is no longer necessary for families to live together in one communal room. Indeed, the development of something as simple as a corridor in private homes is a clear reflection of the development of the private life and an accompanying interest in protecting one’s own privacy. In this schema of protecting our personal privacy, the primary determinative factor has been preventing others from learning what we do, what we intend to do, and what we think. In terms of the modern digital world, this has taken on two primary aspects: (1) protecting our personal information from any external incursions and (2) protecting our privacy when we ourselves carry out excursions into the cyberworld. In other words, privacy on the Internet has two primary factors to be considered: (1) the ability to seek out information without the knowledge of where one is looking being made public and (2) the right to have one’s own information protected from others who do their own seeking. In some ways, this can be seen as both proactive privacy and reactive privacy.

Proactive Privacy The proactive or searching mode is that which seems clearly fraught with personal privacy issues. After all, where one voyages on the Internet, what one examines, what one seeks out, and what one reads are a reflection of one’s interests, one’s concerns, and, even to some extent, one’s thoughts. In some respects, it is analogous to determining what parts of a library a user utilizes. If an individual seeks out information concerning a particular type of political involvement, it is clear that the individual must have some kind of interest in that topic, whether as a student or as a practitioner. In the same respect, if the individual seeks information on a topic that is publicly condemned, it may be assumed that the individual has a personal interest in that topic, again whether as a student or as a potential practitioner. It must be remembered that as individuals move through the cyberworld, they leave a trail, which an experienced investigator may be able to follow.

In the early days of the Internet, some who surfed the web quickly came to understand that accessing these disparate sites did indeed leave a trail. To avoid having their personal privacy exposed, some utilized anonymous sites in jurisdictions outside of what they perceived as being accessible by their own country’s investigative bodies. As time went on, however, it became clear that the use of such anonymous sites led to the perception of a seamy underbelly to the Internet, wherein those who used such sites hid their identities while carrying out potentially malevolent activities. This has, in turn, led to challenges, legislative alterations, and diplomatic negotiations, all of which have resulted in the closure of some of those anonymizing sites. Although surfing the web under an anonymous identity has been a common method of officially hiding where one moves through the electronic world, it is a mechanism that is far from foolproof in ensuring personal privacy. For example, many sites utilize software additions, picked up and added to browsers when visiting a site, which are known as “cookies.” Originally intended to provide a quick and simple linkage between a browser and a previously visited site, tracking cookies often amass a great deal of information concerning the browsing habits of the surfer, information that is then transmitted back to the originating site. In this manner, information concerning the habits and interests of the individual doing the surfing continues to be collected through a variety of venues. In yet another fashion, an individual’s privacy when surfing may be challenged through the media of those enabled to access the individual’s browsing history, either through the individual’s service provider or by other, more technical methodologies. In the case of service providers, there is a complete history of wherever an individual ventures in the cyberworld. Even when utilizing the privacy options inherent in many modern browsers, there remains a trail that can be followed through all stopping points, which include points as to questions asked and information sought. Where the service provider is protecting the information (and there are a number of examples where the provider may actually be engaged in selling the data to commercial interests to provide for directed advertising), there still remains the strong possibility that the information may be

Privacy, Internet

accessed under court or legislative order. Thus, in the same way as a court may order a tap be placed on a telephone line, so too can a judicial order or warrant permit the gathering of information from providers or directly from the user’s own device. It must be clearly stated that this court-­ mandated data collection may not even be directly aimed at a particular individual or cause. A number of nation-states have already directed their intelligence or law enforcement agencies to spread a wide net in order to gather all data, either through anyone using a service provider in their nation or scanning devices carried through a nation’s territory, even if only through an airport. In addition, some larger national intelligence agencies have been known to scan all cyber communications, looking for any communication that they might find to be of interest. When that happens, the privacy interests of all those who surf the Internet are directly challenged and threatened, to the extent, as previously stated, that there can be no real privacy afforded to those who might travel the electronic highways and byways of the modern world.

Reactive Privacy As for those who reactively wish to have their information protected, their privacy interests have a number of direct challenges, from the information they themselves place outside their control to the information placed about themselves on the Internet by others. Thus the privacy interests move from information that we must take some responsibility for to that information which is outside our perceived control, and as such outside our ability to attempt to ensure any degree of personal protection. In a world where many individuals place some of the most private information imaginable into some form of digital repository, it must be understood that by doing so they abrogate some of their own rights to protect these data. For example, in a case where individuals place photographs, opinions, dates, and facts about themselves on social media, they are doing so in the belief that this information is protected, but the question must be asked as to whether that faith is fully warranted or justified. Certainly, the social media in question will endeavor to protect the information, but there

803

have been sufficient security breaches involving prominent social media sites to demonstrate that what one individual can lock down another individual may be able to liberate. People use these sites under an expectation that the information will always be protected, an expectation that may not always be upheld. Aside from malicious hackers, though, users of these sites themselves have often created the greatest potential for a privacy breach by giving access to the information to those whom they trust. Unfortunately, history has amply demonstrated that this trust may in some circumstances be misplaced, and once the information is circulating on the web, it is nearly impossible to recapture. One piece of evidence as to the fact that this cyber trust may be misplaced can be found in the plethora of intimate photographs circulating through a wide variety of Internet sites. The photographs may once have been shared with a loved one, but once they start to circulate, there is little that can be done to abate the harm. Sending intimate photographs or messages, commonly called sexting, has led to extremes of sharing. Even when the sharing is thoughtlessly done, it is an activity that harms all those who have participated, and the existence of so-called revenge porn, whereby individuals have deliberately leaked intimate images of a former loved one with the direct intent of causing harm, shows that the mere existence of such images challenges old-line perspectives of attainable privacy. Further to such obvious forms of personal information, there exist online many other avenues by which an individual’s personal privacy may be challenged, even when the source of the data is not oneself but rather is an offshoot of the modern penchant for posting information or data. An organization may proudly post information about its members, and in doing so, it provides a great deal of data concerning members’ addresses, contact information, or their interests or opinions. When an individual has been mentioned in a newspaper, these bits and pieces of information may be easily drawn out and shared through various search engines, so that whatever information is contained therein may be freely accessed. The presence of this information has led to some interesting legislative and judicial challenges. In the European Union, for example, in a 2014

804

Privacy, Medical

case, an individual challenged the retention or rather the accessibility of information through a search engine that allowed users to note that the complainant had once had financial difficulties, which the complainant indicated no longer existed, but a history of which nonetheless harmed the complainant’s current economic status. In a groundbreaking decision, the European Court of Justice ruled that an individual had a “right to be forgotten.” The court ruled that the search engine must remove all links to a news story concerning this individual, because the story, even though factual and accurate, harmed the person’s present interests. This “right to be forgotten,” though, had very narrowly defined parameters, and applied only to that version of the search engine officially subject to the rule of the European court, and in no way affected the data on the site where the engine found it—a newspaper. It should clearly be seen, though, that such a ruling, no matter how articulated, of necessity must include a number of problematic issues and is in no way a panacea for issues of personal privacy. The information that the complainant wished to be protected persists in its existence in a digital format on the Internet. In fact, in one curious note, the ruling itself clearly states all the information the complainant wished to hide, a ruling that by its very nature as a court document must be publicly accessible. The problems inherent in the European ruling demonstrate what has already been stated, that the protection of personal information in a digital world is at best an ideal and at that a demonstratively unobtainable one. Even the slightest bits of data may be brought together through data accretion tools to create a mosaic image of an individual—bits of data that most would not recognize as being a significant breach of privacy but that together form a clear depiction of the individual. The use of this mosaic effect illustrates that Internet privacy is nearly a contradiction in terms. According to one old aphorism, two people may keep a secret if one of them is dead; but if the secret is stored on the World Wide Web, the secret is loose, and nothing can be done to lock it up again. Users of the Internet must clearly understand that in using tools and search engines, shopping

online, or conducting banking online, with each posting made, they have left a clear path, announcing to at least some segment of the world their activities and their presence in a cyber universe. In doing so, they have waived at least some of their ability to protect their personal privacy, an ability increasingly marginalized by the capabilities of the modern era. This is not to indicate that individuals should not use the Internet, but as a recommendation that by doing so Internet users should recognize both the benefits and the pitfalls of using these electronic tools. Daniel German See also Cookies; Cybermarketing; Electronic Harassment; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Right to; Privacy, Types of; Sexting

Further Readings Mendel, T., et al. Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression (UNESCO Series on Internet Freedom). Paris, France: UNESCO, 2012. Morozov, Evgeny. “The Real Privacy Problem.” MIT Technology Review (October 22, 2013). http://www .technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520426/the-realprivacy-problem/ (Accessed October 2014). Trepte, Sabine and Leonard Reinecke, eds. Privacy Online: Perspectives on Privacy and Self-Disclosure in the Social Web. Heidelberg, Germany: SpringerVerlag, 2011.

Privacy, Medical Providing appropriate medical treatment demands that a patient be able to candidly communicate with health care professionals. Hence, in the United States, medical privacy is recognized as an important policy objective. To varying degrees, depending on the jurisdiction, medical privacy is also protected by the law, as well as by the facts of a given situation. This entry examines the national medical privacy standards set forth by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), various court rulings that have affected medical privacy, patient-privacy privilege, and how technology is affecting the future of medical privacy.

Privacy, Medical

Health care is a complex industry involving a panoply of individuals and organizations. Moreover, legal issues related to medical privacy go far beyond to whom a health care entity and/or a health care professional is permitted to disclose information. Rather, these issues may also encompass the manner in which confidential information is collected, the manner in which confidential information is stored, and/or the manner in which confidential information is transferred among entities and/or professionals. The right to privacy is not explicitly delineated in the U.S. Constitution. Various Supreme Court decisions, however, have relied on several amendments to protect the privacy interests of U.S. citizens in certain circumstances. Specifically, the amendments relied on include the First, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth, the Ninth, and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, various Supreme Court decisions have attempted to address the parameters of the zone of privacy, as well as the standard that the government must meet in order to infringe on an individual’s privacy interests.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Prior to 1996, individual states had different statutes that were designed to protect confidential medical information. In 1996, however, the HIPAA became federal law. The HIPAA was groundbreaking in that it mandated baseline standards to ensure that patient confidentiality was protected uniformly across the country. The HIPAA transformed medical privacy from a mere aspiration at the federal level to a legal requirement. Specifically, the HIPAA contains various general requirements, known as standards. One of these standards is known as the Privacy Rule, which is intended to protect private health information, which is information that contains data characterized as patient identifiers such as the individual’s name, Social Security number, and date of birth. This information may be in the form of a verbal statement, a written order, or an electronic file. Regardless of its form, any such information obtained by a health care provider must be safeguarded from disclosure. Moreover, ensuring that such information remains confidential requires different initiatives depending

805

on the form in which the protected information is acquired or maintained. Another HIPAA standard is known as the Security Rule. This standard articulates certain rules designed to ensure that protected health care information remains safeguarded. Specifically, it is designed to ensure that certain security mechanisms such as antivirus software are in place when protected health information is transmitted electronically. The HIPAA guidelines provide a framework for health care entities to appropriately manage protected health information. Many medical facilities have individuals whose main task is to ensure that the facility maintains compliance with HIPAA standards. Additionally, it is often the norm for a medical facility to train new hires and retrain seasoned employees in order to ensure that these individuals consistently comply with the HIPAA. Originally, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services was responsible for overseeing the law. Enforcement of the law was divided between two agencies within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: (1) the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and (2) the U.S. Office for Civil Rights, which enforced the privacy component of the HIPAA. Individuals or professional organizations, including certain agencies that transport HIPAA com­ munications electronically, by law must follow the HIPAA standards. These individuals and/or organizations are known as covered entities per the ­verbiage of the HIPAA. Pharmacies, hospices, chiropractors, and/or massage therapists may all be classified as covered entities, in that any of these individuals or organizations may transfer HIPAA communications electronically. If two covered entities transfer information between each other, the entities must abide by the HIPAA-mandated transaction standards. Individuals or organizations that violate the HIPAA may face criminal and/or civil sanctions. Additionally, if an individual state’s that privacy standards or privacy laws are more demanding than the national standards outlined in the HIPAA, the state standards take priority.

Court Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court has also issued several rulings related to medical privacy. In Roe v. Wade

806

Privacy, Medical

(1973), the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute banning abortion because the Court held that women have a liberty interest in choosing not to bear children. Specifically, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy, including a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, against state action. In Whalen v. Roe (1977), New York State, per a statute, created an electronic database maintained by the New York Department of State. The database stored both the addresses and the names of the individuals who legally had a prescription for all Schedule II drugs, which were also frequently sold illegally. Specifically, physicians were mandated to report the name of the prescribing doctor, the pharmacy that filled the prescription, the specific drug, the specific dosage, as well as the age, name, and address of the patient. Additionally, the statute imposed a penalty for the unauthorized release of the information. Opponents of the statute argued that it would dissuade patients from obtaining necessary medications and that it represented an unnecessary infringement on a doctor’s abilities to practice. The Supreme Court ruled that New York State could legally maintain the centralized database for administrative expediency without violating the patient’s constitutionally protected zone of privacy. The Court found that the database fell within the policing power of New York State and limited the holding to the particular facts of the case. In the majority opinion, Justice John Stevens contended that there were two distinct interests implicated by the zones of privacy. The first was the right to avoid disclosing personal matters and the second was the right to independence in making certain decisions. One of the more recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with medical privacy was decided in  2001. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court held that the Medical University of South Carolina, a state hospital, violated the Fourth Amendment by performing drug tests on patients in the hospital without their consent to obtain evidence of a patient’s illegal conduct for law enforcement purposes. Specifically, the medical facility established a procedure along with law enforcement to address the increasingly prevalent problem of pregnant drug addicts and infants being born addicted to drugs in the community. The women would unknowingly be tested, and if

the medical test came back positive, the results would be shared with law enforcement or nonmedical personnel without the patient’s permission. Although the purported goal was to get these addicted individuals into drug treatment programs, the Court felt that the main objective was crime control. Moreover, since neither consent nor a valid warrant existed, the Court found the medical tests to be an unreasonable search not within the limited parameters of the “special needs” exception of the Fourth Amendment. As Roe v. Wade, Whalen v. Roe, and Ferguson v. City of Charleston demonstrated, medical privacy is often balanced against other important public policy objectives within the social context of a particular issue. These public policy objectives may revolve around public health concerns involving the spread of diseases and/or medical research, as well as the prosecution of certain crimes including illegal drug trafficking and/or fraud. A recent example of this intersection between medical privacy and relevant public policy debates occurred when the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act was challenged as unconstitutional. In addressing this challenge, the U.S. Department of Justice issued subpoenas for medical records from various medical facilities, including various Planned Parenthood facilities located in various states. Some states upheld the subpoenas, while other states quashed them.

Physician-Patient Privilege Although not recognized by the Federal Rules of Evidence, many states recognize a physicianpatient privilege that protects medical privacy. Specifically, the physician-patient privilege is a rule of evidence that protects confidential communications between a physician and his or her patient. In practice, the rule prevents statements made to a physician from later being used against the patient in court. Additionally, this privilege is applicable to information gained only while providing medical treatments or services. Thus, information shared between a doctor and a patient when medical services or treatments are not being administered would, generally, not fall under the umbrella of the privilege. Moreover, the privilege may be codified via a statute and/or recognized in case law depending on the jurisdiction. The scope of the privilege in particular jurisdictions or states

Privacy, Right to

will also likely vary. For example, depending on the jurisdiction, this privilege may only apply in criminal cases or apply in both civil and criminal cases.

Technology and the Future of Medical Privacy Technology has affected and will continue to present new challenges with regard to medical privacy. For example, privacy concerns and questions pertaining to genetic information will continue to become more common and more complex as technology continues to advance and evolve. Additionally, as more health care workers access confidential information across networks and in new capacities, the health care industry must continue to adapt. The range and parameters of constitutionally protected privacy interests related to medical information as well as the standard of review utilized by various courts to compare an individual’s privacy interests with the need for state interference differ depending on jurisdiction. Neil Guzy See also Health Management Organizations

Further Readings Center for Democracy and Technology. Health Privacy. Washington, DC: Author. https://cdt.org/issue/healthprivacy/ (Accessed October 2014). Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). Nowak, John E. and Ronald D. Rotunda. Constitutional Law. St. Paul, MN: Thompson/West, 2004. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Health Information Privacy. Washington, DC: Author. http:// www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ (Accessed October 2014). Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n. 28 (1977).

Privacy, Right

to

The right to privacy is a right unknown to many, at least as long as it is not violated. Yet once people realize that their private spaces have been invaded, privacy then becomes a tool to remove unwanted scrutiny. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 definition of privacy as “the right to be let

807

alone” has been enriched over time. Today, according to Alan Westin, privacy is the right to control the use to which others make of the information about individuals. At a time when the Web 2.0 has become an important tool for the construction of the personality, the number and type of information that circulates on individuals has value in the construction of individuals’ social images. As the set of public information about individuals affect their relationships, the right to privacy is now more than ever an indispensable tool for the development of personality. This entry examines how privacy rights are affected and usually surrendered by the growing use of the World Wide Web, and then it investigates the balance between the right to privacy and the right to security.

Privacy and the Web The right to privacy is a right to preserve individuals’ intimacy or private sphere, freely choosing either what information is made public or what information they want to be made accessible into their private sphere. An example of this is the amount of information that individuals release when they start searching on the web. All the data are used to identify preferences (known as data mining) in order to build a composite picture of an individual’s interests and capitalize on that information: If today an individual searches for “Canary Islands” on a web browser, tomorrow he or she will likely find in his or her search engine web advertisements for flights, accommodations, and travel packages to the Canary Islands. The web browser remembers and removes the individual’s right “to do not know,” the right to limit accessibility, which fades more and more as one advances through web searches for more information. It is difficult to determine the proper balance between the two—between the overproduction of information and the freedom of being able to look for it rather than see the information imposed. Yet while individuals debate about that proper balance to maintain or regain privacy, they continue to write and socialize on the web, allowing for the accumulation of data about them to grow. This accumulation of personal data can have such an impact that it affects individuals’ egos and reputations, to the point that they are not what they say they are but rather what the web says they are. It is

808

Privacy, Right to

difficult for individuals to totally protect their private sphere because personal data accessible on the Internet largely unveils a private identity from public information. While privacy is desired, it is often trumped by the desire to not be isolated and to belong to a “community,” which is a sense of belonging and relating with others that is today more often derived from social media participation. This is because talk among friends may start offline and continue online, or vice versa, and what individuals see and share on the web is also what they continue discussing and debating when meeting with friends in person. For this reason, not being able to communicate through a social network used by everyone can make individuals feel isolated, outside the group, and excluded not only from the virtual community but also from their actual community. “Following” and “liking” people and posts are socially accepted and common when using Facebook and other social media tools, although this allows individuals’ friendships, preferences, and habits to be constantly observed. But these are the limits of freedom that individuals have chosen to surrender (although often unknowingly) in the name of belonging to a group or a community on the web. Each time individuals create and publish their public profiles on the web and every time they use social media to communicate their ideas or moods, reveal their friendships with others, and publish a comment on a news story or relevant issue, a piece is added to the puzzle that identifies their electronic identity. This “body” that is exhibited, often much more willingly than the physical one, not only becomes a reputation of an individual on the web but also shapes the individual’s actual identity and sense of self-worth. This creates a great danger for misunderstanding individuals’ “true” identities because false representations of oneself online can lead to a misrepresentation of individuals, leading to things such as group exclusion or discriminatory behavior because the online identity is perceived by others to be accurate.

Right to Privacy Versus Right to Security The need for security is rapidly spreading in ­Western democracies due to the rise of international terrorism, and the globalization of markets

and economies as well as the opening of states’ borders make the topic of security one of widespread importance both politically and socially. The need for security has brought together public and private interests, and it has gained a prominent place on the political and economic agenda. The fear of the unknown and the demand for strengthened security measures have somehow legitimized the increasingly widespread use of techniques to gather information on people, store personal information, verify identity, and at the same time emphasize differences. In the name of the need for greater national security, however, the states started an indiscriminate control over individuals, accumulating personal data as if to get more information meant to have more security. The freedom of citizens is thus bartered for acceptance of control measures and tracking that is often so pervasive that it can be viewed as illegitimate. The surveillance systems are increasing, from the measurements of border control to the homeland ones. The collection and storage of fingerprints of all citizens and identity cards and electronic passports have become surveillance technologies that find their social acceptability in a general climate of insecurity and fear. But this overprotection can have harmful consequences for liberal societies. The price for security often leads to an invasion of privacy and personal freedoms. Through the use of new information technologies, governments also focus their electronic eye on citizens in the name of a need for greater national security. The instruments for guaranteeing citizens’ safety put up by the governments have created primarily only an illusion of security, producing more insecurity. At the same time, the security industrial complex is growing considerably, and some of the largest companies in the world have made the governments their core market—in the United States, the number of companies in the security sector has dramatically increased since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as well as the lobbying firms registered as homeland security consultants. The risk in heading in this direction is the end of privacy and the creation of a “networked person”—constantly on the web, gradually configured to transmit and receive impulses that allow governments and agencies to trace and

Privacy, Right to

reconstruct the person’s movements, habits, and contacts, thus changing the meaning and content of a person’s autonomy. The ongoing debate is between the right to security and the right to privacy. It is clear that after the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the balance between the needs of the government to access information and those of citizens to protect their privacy has been altered. If it is true, as Anthony Giddens argues, that surveillance is a necessary condition for the administrative power of the states, it is a power that they must be careful not to abuse. Some governments offer new technology as a means of facilitating more convenient access to services through a personal code of authentication, yet they know that it is a means to extend and make more effective social control. The technology thus becomes a political asset as it can help create an open society, which offers free access to all, or a secret and closed society, which uses information technology to monitor and control. One example of such technology is the use of closed-circuit television cameras, which have become a widespread tool for urban security. The use of surveillance technology is favored by citizens not only because of a widespread feeling of fear of the other but also because of their desire to watch others for entertainment purposes. Through the use of these technologies, the intrusion into the lives of citizens is becoming increasingly silent. It is the duty of governments to rebalance this situation of surveillance-providing security versus surveillance-invading privacy rights. David Lyon suggests that there is “an ethic of surveillance” to prevent surveillance from invading privacy. Privacy has to be “balanced” against correlative rights and responsibilities to the community. If, as 18th-century Swiss-French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed, the freedom of individuals is guaranteed by the government of laws and not by human beings, then to reaffirm that freedom even in the virtual space, we must think of a new scheme of “free government” guaranteed by a regulated power. Monica Zuccarini See also Closed-Circuit Television; Information Security; Law and Digital Technology; Privacy; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of

809

Further Readings Bennett, Colin J. Regulating Privacy: Data Protection in the United States and Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992. Bennett, Colin J. and Rebecca Grant. Visions of Privacy: Policy Choices for the Digital Age. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1999. Bennett, Colin J. and Charles Raab. The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Press, 2003. Clarke, Roger. What’s “Privacy”? (2006). http://www .rogerclarke.com/DV/Privacy.html (Accessed August 2014). Flaherty, David. Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. Garfinkel, Simson. DataBase Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly, 2000. Goold, Benjamin and Daniel Neyland, eds. New Directions in Surveillance and Privacy. Cullompton, England: Willan, 2009. Lowi, Theodore J. At the Pleasure of the Mayor. Glencoe, NY: Free Press, 1964. Lyon, David. The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Lyon, David. “Globalizing Surveillance: Comparative and Sociological Perspectives.” International Sociology, v.19/2 (2004). Lyon, David. Surveillance Studies. An overview. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2007. Lyon, David and Elia Zureik, eds. Surveillance, Computers and Privacy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. Marx, Gary T. Undercover: Police Surveillance in America. Berkley: University of California Press, 1988. Miller, Arthur. The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks and Dossiers. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971. Regan, Priscilla. Legislating Privacy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. Rodotà, Stefano. La vita e le regole. Tra teoria e non diritto. Milano, Italy: Feltrinelli, 2006. Warren, Samuel and Louis Brandeis. “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review, v.4 (1890). Westin, Alan F. Privacy and Freedom. New York, NY: Atheneum, 1967. Whitaker, Reg. The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance Is Becoming a Reality. New York, NY: New Press, 1999.

810

Privacy, Types of

Privacy, Types

of

The complexities surrounding contemporary questions and analyses of privacy are compounded through consideration of the various modalities through which the concept unfolds. There are numerous types of privacy, spanning across both physical and digital realms, manifesting through both material and ideological forms. A particularly important factor contributing to these types of privacy are spatial-structural and sociodigital forms that constitute, articulate, and manage privacy types. As an object of analysis, privacy is not only subject to these factors but also challenged by the contexts through which privacy is experienced therein. Contemporary understandings of how privacy types are experienced thus depends on consideration of the pervasive nature of contemporary surveillance that infiltrates, permeates, and often supersedes the different types of privacy, as well as the sociocultural dynamics affecting how, when, and where privacy is experienced. Moreover, comprehending and exploring the different types of privacy are challenged by specific empirical and conceptual obstacles to contemporary surveillance, security, and privacy research. This entry examines the definition and examples of spatial-structural privacy and sociodigital privacy before concluding with a discussion on how certain obstacles make it challenging to understand and analyze the types of privacy.

Spatial-Structural Privacy Through this categorical vein, privacy can be loosely understood as a structured space where an individual or group experiences privacy. Spatial-structural types of privacy thus unfold around spaces or places where one feels private, particularly through the presence of material, physical structures that enclose an occupied space. Historical scholarship examining the emergence and subsequent decline of Western public life in the name of private existence denotes the ways in which privacy emerges as a retreat from public life. For example, the open-air buildings (i.e., stoas and agoras of marketplaces) that were prominent in early democratic life in ancient Rome and Greece—sites for business, politics, and communal interaction—were relatively loud and noisy, thus making private one-on-one or

small-group exchanges challenging. Moreover, the regularity of political persecution of minority groups, especially Christians, similarly compelled retreat from public life. Accordingly, numerous historical conditions can be identified as centripetal forces in the emergence of private spaces—such as the physical interiority of the household—as one of the earliest spatial-structural types of privacy. Numerous lines of intellectual lineage denote how privacy has socialized in and around places that provide a separation from public gaze, noise, and other related forms of interference that affect daily life. Modern incarnations of spatial-­structural types of privacy thus unfold within, for example, interview rooms of a physician’s practice, the interior of an automobile whose aluminum body and tinted windows insulate the occupants within, and side streets whose walls provide both varying degrees of acoustic and aesthetic insulation from pedestrians nearby. This category of privacy is not limited to the large-scale physical buildings that structure enclosed spaces but extend to smaller material arrangements that facilitate other capacities for private experiences as well. The clothes that individuals wear, such as hoodies, ball caps, or sunglasses, as well as the objects they carry on their person, such as purses, wallets, and umbrellas, play a role in affecting how individuals delineate and experience privacy. Moreover, software programs— although less physically tangible—are no less important as factors forming spatial-structural privacy. For example, the software of many email clients are designed with certain coding protocols that encrypt the content of emails and even conceal regional information by blurring the remaining octet of Internet protocol addresses. Privacy-sensitive software programs, such as The Onion Router, are specifically designed to fragment data into segments and send them through different routers across the plant in order to hide the origin of the information. The significance of such software to spatial-structural manifestations of privacy is thus its ability to regulate and as such dissimulate human interaction across the Internet. Although personal information and communication technology artifacts such as the smartphone or tablet tend to be conceptualized within contemporary security or surveillance as  gateways for surveillance and openness, the

Privacy, Types of

materiality of these devices plays a role in delineating a spatial-structural private experience. For example, the content displayed on the screens of many such devices cannot be so easily visually comprehended because of tinted coatings that prevent angled gaze. An important dynamic to consider within this  category is the human senses that affect and frame an individual’s sense of private experience. Although the aforementioned tend to be largely aesthetic concerning sight (ophthalmoception), hearing (audioception) is a similarly salient sense that affects spatial-structural types of privacy as well. For example, the extent to which larger- and smaller-scale physical structures acoustically insulate an individual or group plays a role in comprehending the kind of spatial-structural type of privacy the inhabitants occupy. Some closed-door offices of a physician’s examination room may insulate sound and noise more effectively than others. Moreover, most contemporary information and communication technology artifacts tend to facilitate verbal exchange through microelectromechanical systems microphones, which are programmed to identify background noise so as to remove it from the phone call—a technique that promotes acoustic clarity in the conversation, thus invariably framing the effectiveness and privateness of the call itself. Two significant analytical features of this category of privacy, which sets it apart from the sociodigital form, is the way in which individuals can delineate their own spatial structure of privacy and how this type of privacy can facilitate mobile private experiences that can be controlled, to varying degrees and extents, by the individual.

Sociodigital Privacy Most commonly alluded to in the category of privacy within contemporary privacy discourse, sociodigital privacy refers to ideological conceptions of privacy. Generally articulated by companies, organizations, digital communities, and governments, this privacy type tends to be most contemporarily articulated through networked forms of communication such as the Internet. Sociodigital types of privacy emerge through two forms: (1) as a definition and (2) as a condition.

811

The former unfolds around forces and actors invested in requiring privacy to be understood as a solidified denotation, one that becomes galvanized and not easily alterable. Conversely, the latter emerges through forces and actors invested in privacy being operationalized as a condition of existence, a loosely organized ideal. Sociodigital Privacy: Definition

Privacy often emerges as a definition across numerous sources, both online and offline. The more conventional understandings of privacy as a definition tend to be located within the privacy policies of corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and social institutions, as well as within the legislative and juridical apparatuses of domestic and international governmental bodies. Definitions of privacy tend to be framed and informed via legal frameworks that interpret domestic and/ or international law for ideas about how privacy ought to be represented on paper. It is important to note that most Western governments do not provide a constitutional, legal guarantee to privacy; privacy tends to derive its definitional legal meaning through the interpretation of ongoing legal disputes, court rulings, and policies established by different institutions. Alternately, privacy definitions can also emerge as a way of solidifying, insulating, and advancing certain stakes and interests. Accordingly, these definitions of privacy tend to emerge by identifying for who, what, how, and why privacy is required. For example, and especially in consideration of Internet-based interactions, privacy tends to be defined as an institution’s commitment to the protection of personal information and/or the freedom of individuals to share this personal information in confidence. Due to the ongoing development and emergence of privacy-related concerns, especially through ubiquitous government and private sector Internet-based surveillance, privacy as a definition is a pervasively preferred method of deploying privacy, for it facilitates the ability to mitigate legal risk. Sociodigital Privacy: Condition

More loosely organized and expressed than a definition, privacy here is referred to as an ideal

812

Privacy, Types of

about how experiences, interactions, and exchanges both online and offline ought to be conducted. Rather than a word fixed in meaning, a condition of privacy is more contingently realized and expressed. This is particularly due to the U.S. Constitution and the desires of the actors involved in articulating it as such. For example, Internet-based groups such as open source communities, hacktivist communities, and community forums collectively create and circulate ideals about what privacy represents on their own terms. Although the collaborative task of discussing “privacy” appears to manifest similarly here as a definition, the distinguishing feature resides in the ephemeral nature of “privacy” ideals—a highly ephemeral referent idea that is recursively (re)produced as a means of reflecting how a sociocultural group identifies, responds to, and deals with invasive surveillance practices affecting the group’s interactions. For example, a closed Internet community may continuously discuss a recent hacker attack that exposed the email addresses of the collective, thus compelling members to discuss their ideas about privacy in an attempt to mobilize software safeguards—an endpoint inconceivable without a basic agreement over what privacy notifies, what kinds of people and interests it seeks to insulate, and to which interactive aspects of the social environment it ought to refer. Privacy as a condition implies that it is also constantly evolving in accordance with prevailing sentiments, mentalities, and attitudes. Privacy here is thus contingently expressed and produced, often subjective in meaning and value. Nevertheless, an important analytical feature of privacy as a condition is the way in which it facilitates the participation and representation of numerous voices and interests. Because the production of definitional privacy tends to happen within the privileged purview of companies, institutions, and governments, conditions of privacy are more open to daily ideas, conversations, and interactions within the public sphere.

Privacy and Privacy Types There are a number of conceptual and empirical obstacles that challenge the ability to comprehend and analyze privacy types, primarily situated around how differences in the meaning of privacy

itself form their own unique interrelationships with privacy types. One such obstacle begins with contemporary government-based ubiquitous surveillance. Due to the ways in which surveillance tends to piggyback or reverse-engineer alreadyestablished information flows across different networks, the privateness of a privacy type is always susceptible to being infiltrated, undermined, and superseded. In other words, and despite the seeming congruity and stability of a category or type of privacy, contemporary surveillance has become so invasive on daily life that the category or type itself should not be treated or identified as a space, structure, condition, or impenetrable, guaranteed right. For example, although definitional privacy is the preeminent type through daily sociopolitical life throughout the West, few examples exist in which the legal, legislative, or policy backbone of definitional privacy is guaranteed; the U.S. National Security Agency’s PRISM and QUANTUM programs essentially establish an indefinite connection to people and their devices despite their geophysical location throughout the world. Accordingly, and despite a preexisting definitional guarantee to privacy through domestic law, through their employer’s policies or those of the social media networks they access via their smartphone, definitional privacy is indefinitely challenged. Moreover, spaces and conditions of privacy are just as susceptible; the sheer ubiquity of contemporary surveillance implies that even the most seemingly sanctified spaces of privacy are targeted, and the opportunities for individuals and groups to dialogue, determine, and establish their own condition of privacy are undermined by the mass collection, recording, and analyzing of Internet-based communications. Analysis and understanding of privacy types are further complicated by whose privacy is considered, and what the content and meaning of that privacy may be. The integrity of the type is dependent on given individuals’ and groups’ perception, awareness, and value of privacy—characteristics that are, in turn, dependent themselves on sociocultural norms, ideas, and objectives. Accordingly, certain individuals and groups may feel more private under certain contexts or provided by different privacy types than others. Contemporary research into privacy types thus must contend with both the empirical challenges presented by ubiquitous

Privacy Act of 1974

surveillance on virtually all types or manifestations of privacy and the factors dictating how certain individuals and groups enter into relationships with the “world of privacy” itself, on their own terms.

813

agencies from releasing personally identifiable information to anyone other than the person to whom the information applies. In addition to preventing the release of personal information ­ to  ­others, the law requires government agencies to  disclose personally identifiable government Thomas N. Cooke records to those citizens on request. Citizens can review and make copies of agency files about See also Big Data; Data Mining and Profiling in Social themselves. Essentially, the Privacy Act allows U.S. Network Analysis; Privacy; Surveillance, Theories of citizens a glimpse of their appearance in the eyes of the federal government. In addition, if an indiFurther Readings vidual feels that the records are inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete, the individual may Bauman, Zygmunt and David Lyon. Liquid Surveillance: seek to amend his or her personal agency records. A Conversation. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2013. The Privacy Act also governs the way in which Huysmans, Jef. “Security! What Do You Mean?” agencies collect data about citizens of the United European Journal of International Relations, v.16/83 States. It makes agencies responsible for establish(1998). ing and following fair information practices when Nissenbaum, Helen. Privacy in Context: Technology, they collect and handle personal data about U.S. Policy and the Integrity of Social Life. Stanford, CA: citizens. The information practices governed by Stanford Law Books, 2009. these protocols include situations where agencies Senate, Richard. The Fall of Public Man. New York, NY: collect, maintain, and disseminate personally idenW. W. Norton, 1992. tifiable records. Fair information practices require Solove, D. J. Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff agencies to restrict data sharing and use when Between Privacy and Security. London, England: Yale records contain personally identifiable informaUniversity Press, 2013. tion, including Social Security numbers. The law contains provisions prohibiting the punishment of any citizen for refusing to identify his or her Social Privacy Act of 1974 Security number. In 2003, a federal court found that a Georgia voter registration requiring the presentation of a Social Security number to vote The Privacy Act of 1974 (popularly called the Priviolated the Privacy Act. vacy Act) is a federal statute (codified in the U.S. The law also requires agencies to publish Code at 5 USC §552a) that regulates the collecdetails about all their systems of records that hold tion, maintenance, use, and dissemination of perpersonally identifiable information in the Federal sonal information by federal agencies. It is the Register. The Federal Register “systems-of-records most comprehensive federal law dealing with prinotices” must include descriptions of intended vacy. The act was created to address concerns uses of the system, and they must allow for public about the effects that the federal government’s feedback to the agency in charge of the particular collection of personal data had on individual citisystem of records. Agencies must also tell the zens’ privacy rights. It was passed in the same Office of Management and Budget, the Commityear that the Watergate scandal revealed that fedtee on Government Operations of the House of eral agencies had illegally investigated and tracked Representatives, and the Committee on Governmembers of the American public and in an era that saw the introduction of computer data–­ mental Affairs of the Senate when they introduce or change a system of records so that the groups gathering activities by the federal government. can evaluate the effects of the systems on individuals’ privacy rights. Privacy Protection To be protected by the Privacy Act, an agency The Privacy Act does several things to protect citirecord must be part of a system of records. To be a zens’ privacy. For one, the act restricts government system of records, according to the law’s definitions,

814

Privacy Act of 1974

the agency must retrieve the records by individuals’ names or some number, symbol, or other identifying signal linked to a person’s identity. Courts have found that items like the Office of Research Integrity’s scientific misconduct investigations files (which are traditionally retrieved using institution’s names, not people’s names) are not “systems of records” governed by the Privacy Act. Additionally, subsection (b) of the Privacy Act places 12 conditions on what agencies can disclose within a system of records. If one of the conditions applies, an agency may reveal personally identifying records. Exceptions that allow agencies to disclose personal information include disclosures to the Census Bureau for census surveys and disclosures made pursuant to court orders or legislative proceedings. When agencies do disclose personally identifiable information, they must keep accurate accounts of when the release occurred and to whom the information was given. The Privacy Act also provides for civil and criminal remedies should agencies violate the law. Citizens can sue agencies that refuse to amend a personal record on request or that fail to release their personally identifiable records to them on request. If any agency violates any other section of the Privacy Act intentionally or willfully, the court can make the U.S. government pay actual damages to the individual who suffered as a result of the violation. Criminal penalties can arise if it is discovered that a government agency employee knowingly and willfully disclosed personally identifiable information or willfully maintained a system of personally identifiable records without disclosing the existence of that system. Also, any person can be charged with a misdemeanor for knowingly and willfully requesting an individual’s record from an agency under false pretenses. From a surveillance standpoint, the Department of Justice deems the act as a way “to balance the government’s need to maintain information about individuals with the rights of individuals to be protected against unwarranted invasions of their privacy stemming from federal agencies’ collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of personal information about them.” Federal courts have, in some instances, required agencies to turn over surveillance records in response to Privacy Act litigation. In one circuit court case, the court found that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

violated the Privacy Act’s requirements for systems of records when it kept a file containing surveillance reports about a tax protester named Robert B. Clarkson without going through the proper procedures. After Clarkson discovered that undercover IRS agents had attended a meeting he held at a Tax Protest Day demonstration in 1979, he filed requests for IRS records about him pursuant to the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Clarkson’s rights under the Privacy Act allowed him access to the surveillance records as well as the right to require the IRS to amend or expunge parts of the records.

Limitations Despite the privacy-focused goals of the Privacy Act, the law has many limitations. First, many government agencies involved with law enforcement do not have to follow the rules prescribed by the Privacy Act. The exemptions for law enforcement purposes exist to prevent criminal suspects under surveillance from having the ability to request files on current investigations about them. For similar reasons, law enforcement agencies whose main goal is the enforcement of criminal laws can exempt themselves from many Privacy Act requirements. Because of this limitation, many people choose to invoke the FOIA in order to access personal files from agencies that often engage in surveillance activities, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the Privacy Act contains many exemptions that allow the government to withhold or release personally identifiable information against the public’s interest. For example, the FBI provides a list of nine Privacy Act exemptions on its website. The FBI will withhold personally identifiable information from an individual if the information is compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil proceeding or if it pertains to criminal law enforcement, if it involves intelligence sources or methods, or if the person who furnished the information was promised anonymity. The Privacy Act also contains a “routine-use” exemption in subsection (b) that is often used by federal agencies to avoid compliance. The imprecise language of the statute allows agencies to deviate from its purpose. The definition for

Private Law Enforcement

“routine use” in subsection (a)(7) of the statute describes it as “the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.” Because the statute says that the purpose can be “compatible,” and not necessarily the use intended by the system of record’s creators, agencies can expand the scope of a system of record’s routine uses until the scope of the data’s use exceeds the goals originally cleared with the legislature and the Office of Management and Budget. Other limitations in the Privacy Act also restrain the reach of the law. Like the FOIA, the Privacy Act applies only to U.S. citizens, limiting the protection of personally identifiable information from noncitizens. Also, like the FOIA, the Privacy Act governs only federal agencies, so any personally identifiable information held by state and municipal government offices, federal legislative offices, and judicial offices are not regulated by the Privacy Act. Although the purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974 is to regulate the federal government’s collection and confidentiality of personal information it gathers about U.S. citizens, the law’s language is imprecise, its legislative history is limited, and, even decades after its passage, the vagueness of the statute has gone largely unresolved in administrative and judicial analysis. The means that federal statutory privacy guarantees in the law are somewhat limited, even as government surveillance increases and the amount of personal data gathered by agencies grows exponentially over the decades. Sarah Lamdan See also Bill of Rights; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of

Further Readings Clarkson v. Internal Revenue Service, 678 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir. 1982). Electronic Privacy Information Center. The Privacy Act of 1974. Washington, DC: Author. http://www.epic .org/privacy/1974act/ (Accessed October 2014). Federal Bureau of Investigation. Privacy Act Exemptions. Washington, DC: Author. http://www.fbi.gov/services/ records-management/foipa/foia-pa-overviewsexemptions-and-terms (Accessed October 2014).

815

Fisher v. Nat’l Institutes of Health, 934 F. Supp. 464 (D.D.C. 1996) aff’d, 107 F.3d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Schwier v. Cox, 439 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2006). U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974. Washington, DC: Author, 2012. https://www.justice .gov/opcl/policy-objectives (Accessed July 2017).

Private Law Enforcement Throughout history, organized communities have been attentive in providing their citizens and their property with safety, security, and freedom from fear and danger. One of the earliest known recorded forms of private law enforcement either as a supplement to public policing or for the protection of the wealthy people and businesses was in ancient Rome and Greece. In contemporary times, private law enforcement refers to private entities or organizations that provide security-related services to individuals, businesses, or governmental agencies for a fee. This entry reviews the origins of modern private law enforcement; discusses how those agencies are utilized by individuals, corporations, and governments; and highlights some concerns with private law enforcement.

History of Modern Private Law Enforcement Many trace the history of modern private law enforcement to 1833 when Eugene Francois Vidocq, a French soldier, ex-convict, and privateer started a private detective agency in France called Le bureau des renseignments (Office of Intelligence). Other private for-profit law enforcement agencies that emerged during that era undertook investigations on matters that their clients wanted and that the public police was either not equipped to carry out or just was not willing to embark on. Private law enforcement agencies acted as pseudo lawmen, especially with regard to employee-employer labor conflicts. Private law enforcement agencies also came in handy in monitoring radical employees who fanned the revolution embers, especially following the French Revolution. By the 1800s, some private law enforcement agencies acted like mercenaries or thugs in recovering debts or enforcing

816

Private Law Enforcement

contracts for private individuals or businesses for a fee, and some were involved in organized crime or informal social control. In 1850, Alan Pinkerton established the ­Pinkerton National Detective Agency, which performed security and detective services. According to available records, Pinkerton’s fame was boosted after he foiled an assassination plot on the then presidentelect Abraham Lincoln. The Pinkerton National Detective Agency provided security services for individuals and businesses and even acted as a private military contractor. It is said that at the height of its existence the Pinkerton National Detective Agency had more officers than the U.S. Army. It has also been reported that the state of Ohio outlawed the agency out of fear that it might be rented out as a private army or a militia to overthrow or intimidate the government. During the labor unrest of the 19th century, Pinkerton agents were often hired by corporations to provide security against strike agitators or suspected labor unionists. Governments and wealthy individuals also hired Pinkerton agents to track down outlaws or troublemakers. The term private eye, often used to refer to private law enforcement agents, has its origin in the Pinkerton National Detective Agency logo—an eye with the inscription “We Never Sleep.” Private law enforcement agencies have their uses in modern society. There are many functions that the agencies can perform better than the public police. For example, there may be fewer legal restrictions placed on private law enforcement agencies than on public police, which allows private law enforcement agencies more latitude ­ during investigations. Private law enforcement agencies can also be more effective in carrying out their investigative functions: Because their pay is based on their performance, they tend to avail themselves of the latest training and equipment needed to carry out their duties. There has been a steady growth in the number of private law enforcement officers in the United States. In the early 1970s, there were an estimated 429,000 private law enforcement officers in the United States, as opposed to 694,000 state police officers. The number of private law enforcement officers is expected to grow from the estimated 1 million in 2010 to about 1.2 million in 2020 according to Malcolm K. Sparrow. A 2012 survey

by ASIS International and the Institute of Finance and Management even estimates the number of full-time private law enforcement personnel to be between 1.9 and 2.1 million. On the other hand, there are about 1.1 million sworn state and federal law enforcement agents in the United States. Contributing to the growth and expansion of private law enforcement are individuals and business entities for security details that serve their unique needs. Furthermore, governments all over the world contract security services to private law enforcement agencies. For example, during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government hired private security companies to provide additional security and other services to aid its war effort. Governments also hire private law enforcement agencies to carry out public service duties that public police are unable to perform due to reasons ranging from a lack of resources to legal restrictions.

Individual and Business Uses of Private Law Enforcement During the prosperity of the 1920s, individuals in America began to have the resources to hire the services of private law enforcement agencies. In contemporary times, people hire private law enforcement agencies to investigate matters such as their spouse’s infidelity, to provide protection for their goods, and to ensure their safety. In the business world, there are many different uses for private law enforcement. Insurance companies may hire private law enforcement agencies to investigate insurance fraud. Criminal defense attorneys may hire them to carry out investigations on behalf of their clients. Shopping malls, department stores, and banks are examples of businesses that hire for-profit private companies to perform security functions. In the United States, one of the largest private law enforcement agencies is the railroad police contracted by the major railroads. In Canada, as in the United States, the two largest rail carriers, Canadian Pacific Railway and Canadian National Railway, use the services of private law enforcement agencies to provide security for their property and passengers. The private law enforcement companies that provide security for both the Canadian

Private Law Enforcement

and the American railway services have operational jurisdictions that extend beyond their countries.

Government Use of Private Law Enforcement Private law enforcement agencies have become a regular feature of the social control apparatus in modern societies. These for-profit security entities, in addition to providing security to individuals and businesses, may also be governments contractors. Governments that are cognizant of their inability to provide the full security needs of their citizens may engage private law enforcement companies to perform police functions. Sometimes, when governments hire the services of private law enforcement, the officers are sworn in as government employees to ensure their full compliance with the law. Private law enforcement agencies provide the needed services that the public police are unable to provide, a service that is commonly called “subscription-based patrol.” In many countries, including Australia, some European countries, and South Africa, private and public police perform parallel functions, although the public police retain authority superior to that of private law enforcement. For example, private law enforcement officers may lack the power of arrest that government law enforcement agencies possess. They may, however, have the same power to arrest that other citizens have if they witness a crime occurring. With a high crime rate in South Africa, many South Africans rely on the services of private law enforcement agencies for their protection and that of  their property. In the United Kingdom, security is  maintained in the ports by mostly private law enforcement agencies. In South Carolina in the United States, private law enforcement officers have broad legal authority: They can respond to services, make arrests, operate traffic radar, issue traffic tickets, and arrest traffic violators. In Boston, ­Massachusetts, as in other large cities in the United States, private law enforcement agents may be employed to patrol and provide security for residential properties, such as low-income apartment buildings. In general, though, private law enforcement agencies focus on loss prevention rather than on crime control and are concerned with crime prevention rather than punishment. Unlike the public

817

police, whose functions include arrests and participating in the prosecution of suspects in criminal courts, private law enforcement functions center on primarily private justice, such as issuing no trespassing orders or warnings to shoplifters. The dominion of authority of private law enforcement is limited mostly to private property, unlike the public police, whose jurisdiction covers both public and private property.

Concerns About Private Law Enforcement Private law enforcement agencies have been in the forefront in the design, manufacture, and provision of modern surveillance technologies for the protection and promotion of other political, security, and economic interests of individuals, ­ business entities, and governments. One major justification for the installation of closed-circuit television camera surveillance is its presumed deterrence of crime and deviance. A major ­concern some people have with private law enforcement agencies’ extensive involvement in surveillance is that private law enforcement agencies may not operate under the same ethical standards or be held accountable to the same level as are governmental agencies and public police. In addition, private law enforcement agencies may not hire qualified personnel or train their employees properly to meet the highest ethical and legal standards. Rochelle E. M. Cobbs, Brittany Lakes, and O. Oko Elechi See also Law; Policing and Society; Social Control

Further Readings Dempsey, John S. Introduction to Private Security. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2008. Hess, Karen M. Introduction to Private Security (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009. Hess, Karen M., and Henry M. Wrobleski. Introduction to Private Security (4th ed.). Los Angeles, CA: West, 1996. Sparrow, Malcolm, K. Managing the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing (New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin). Washington, DC: U.S. Department

818

Private Prisons

of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2014, NCJ 247182. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247182 .pdf (Accessed October 2017). Stenning, Philip C. “Powers and Accountability of Private Police.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, v.8/3 (2000).

Private Prisons A private prison is a correctional facility where offenders are physically confined by a third-party private operator, who is contracted by a government entity. Today, private prisons confine nearly 9% of the 2.3 million people incarcerated in the United States. This entry reviews the history and rise of private prisons and then discusses the pros and cons as well as the privacy and security implications associated with private prisons.

History Although the original concept of prison privatization in the United States dates back to more than 150 years with the establishment of San Quentin in 1852, very few privately operated correctional facilities existed until the 1980s. The creation of the modern-day private prison industry coincided with the establishment of the nation’s “war on drugs” and the implementation of legislation labeled as tough-on-crime, which included the Drug Offenders Act of 1984, the Crime Control Act of 1984, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the Omnibus Drug Abuse Act of 1988, and numerous other state-­ mandated drug policies. These laws have increased drug enforcement funding for criminal investigations and dramatically expanded mandatory minimums for drug-related crime offenders. In the 1980s, largely due to these policies, drug arrests increased more than 126%, creating an initial dearth in correctional facility management across the country. This void was filled by the private prison industry. In 1984, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), one of today’s largest privately contracted prison corporations in the nation, was awarded a contract to manage a correctional facility in Hamilton County, Tennessee, marking the first time that any government entity in the nation

had contracted out the complete operation of a jail to a private operator.

The Private Industry Boom Since the 1980s, the incarceration rate in the United States has increased nearly 500%, with more than 2.3 million adults and more than 70,000 juvenile offenders under physical confinement, and the number of privately operated prisons has increased nearly 1600%. According to the Department of Justice, more than 135,000 offenders are housed in privately owned prisons across 27 states within the United States, making up approximately 8.4% of the overall U.S. prison population. Federal inmates make up more than 19% and state offenders nearly 7% of those housed in the more than 160 privately operated and managed correctional facilities in the United States. Three of the largest and the most financially successful companies contracted to operate privately managed prisons in the United States are (1) the CCA, (2) the GEO Group Inc., and (3) Youth Services International (YSI). Tennessee-based CCA manages more than 65 adult correctional and detention facilities with a capacity of more than 90,000 beds in 19 states, including the District of Columbia. The GEO Group out of Florida manages more than 56 adult facilities with a capacity of 61,000 beds, including the world’s largest private prison, the Reeves County Detention Complex in Pecos, Texas. This privately contracted correctional facility has a capacity to house 3,763 offenders in its complex. The GEO Group also operates 12 privately operated youth correctional facilities across the country. The state of Texas has the highest number of CCA and Geo Group privately contracted prisons with more than 24 corrections and detention-based facilities. Florida-based YSI operates juvenile correctional facilities in more than 16 different states across the country, physically confining more than 40,000 boys and girls over the past decade.

The Pros and Cons The private prison industry has been the subject of a conflicting narrative and a lack of consensus with regard to both supportive accolades and harsh criticism. Issues such as cost, efficiency, performance,

Private Prisons

transparency, quality of services, and profits have plagued the private prison movement since its inception. Supporters argue that private prisons have helped curb government prison spending, modernize an outdated penal system philosophy, and stimulated economic growth in communities across the nation. However, critics point out that any monetary savings are over­ shadowed by the inadequate delivery of correctional services (e.g., food, health care, security), the emergence of a more oppressive criminal ­justice system, and the corruptive profits earned by the contracted companies involved in prison privatization. In 2013, the CCA and the GEO Group reported annual profits exceeding $3.4 billion. The YSI has contracts exceeding $100 million. Each of these private prison corporations and others throughout the nation has faced allegations of questionable political lobbying practices, unsafe facility conditions, and escalating inmate abuse. Studies have also indicated that racial disparities are exacerbated in the private prison industry. Once sentenced, black and Hispanic offenders are more likely than their white counterparts to serve time in private prisons, which reportedly have higher levels of violence and recidivism, and a dearth in health care and educational programming compared with government-managed correctional facilities. In addition, nearly 50% of immigrant detainees are housed in private prisons. In 2008, the “kids for cash” scandal surfaced in  Scranton, Pennsylvania, involving PA Child Care and Western Pennsylvania Child Care, both subsidiaries of the private prison corporation ­ Mid-Atlantic Youth Services Corp. The federal indictment indicated that two judges, President Judge Mark Ciavarella and Senior Judge Michael Conahan, accepted $2.8 million in kickbacks from the owner of these privately operated juvenile detention facilities. In exchange for the kickbacks, both judges agreed to close down Luzerne County’s own juvenile detention facility, which would have competed with the privately operated facilities, and guarantee that juvenile offenders from their court would be sentenced to these same private juvenile detention facilities. The judges were convicted and sentenced to federal prison terms for 28 and 17.5 years, respectively.

819

Immigration, Surveillance, and Lower Expectations of Privacy According to the Pew Research Center, 11.2 million undocumented immigrants reside in the United States, and for the first time in American history, immigration violations now make up more than half of all federal prosecutions, outpacing drugs, fraud, organized crime, weapons charges, and other crimes. In 2016, Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Clearinghouse reported that in the past fiscal year, 52% of all federal prosecutions—69,636 cases—involved an immigration violation, compared with 63,405 prosecutions for all other federal crimes. In 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union noted that private prisons incarcerate nearly three quarters of all federal immigration detainees.  These growing immigration prosecution and incarceration rates raise concerns about increased police investigative resources and surveillance. With  the election of Donald Trump as the U.S. president, executive orders mandating new immigration enforcement policies, increased levels of electronic surveillance, and the hiring of more than 15,000 additional federal Customs Enforcement and Border Patrol Agents, lower expectations of individual privacy and increased profits for private prisons are likely. In fact, according to a 2016 American Civil Liberties Union report, the market shares of CCA and GEO Group have increased to 43% and 21%, with share prices soaring to 75% and 54%, respectively. Tony Gaskew See also Crime; Crime Control; Mass Incarceration; Prisons and Jails

Further Readings American Civil Liberties Union. “Private Prisons” (2013). https://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/private-prisons American Civil Liberties Union. “Perhaps the Saddest Profit Motive Yet” (November 4, 2013). https://www .aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights-criminal-law-reform/ perhaps-saddest-profit-motive-ever (Accessed October 2017). American Civil Liberties Union. “Private Prisons” (2016). https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration/ privatization-criminal-justice/private-prisons (Accessed October 2017).

820

Probation

Carson, E. Ann. Prisoners in 2013. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, September, 2014. https:// www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Kirkham, Chris. “Prisoners of Profit: Private Prison Empire Rises Despite Startling Record of Juvenile Abuse.” The Huffington Post (October 22, 2013). http://projects.huffingtonpost.com/prisoners-ofprofit (Accessed October 2017). Light, Michael T., et al. The Rise of Federal Immigration Crimes. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, March 18, 2014. http://www .pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federalimmigration-crimes/#fn-20132-1 (Accessed October 2017). Minton, Todd D. and Daniella Golinelli. Jail Inmates at Midyear 2013: Statistical Tables. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 2014. https://www.bjs.gov/ content/pub/pdf/jim13st.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Passel, Jeffrey S. and D’Vera Cohn. Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project, November 18, 2014. http://www .pewhispanic.org/files/2014/11/2014-11-18_ unauthorized-immigration.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Petrella, Christopher and Josh Begley. “The Color of Corporate Corrections: The Overpresentation of People of Color in the For-Profit Corrections Industry.” Radical Criminology, v.2 (July 2013). http://journal.radicalcriminology.org/index.php/rc/ article/view/27 (Accessed October 2017). The Sentencing Project. “Drug Policy.” http://www .sentencingproject.org/issues/drug-policy/ (Accessed October 2017). The Sentencing Project. “Incarceration.” http://www .sentencingproject.org/issues/incarceration (Accessed October 2017). Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Clearinghouse. “Immigration Prosecutions” (2016). http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/446 (Accessed October 2017).

Websites Corrections Corporations of America: http://www.cca .com GEO Group, Inc.: http://www.geogroup.com

Probation Probation is a court-ordered form of correctional supervision in which people convicted of a crime are monitored in the community. Although a probation sentence is generally given in lieu of ­ incarceration, there are some circumstances in which a probation sentence can be given following a period of incarceration. Through various approaches designed to reduce the likelihood of recidivism (reoffending), including surveillance of probationers’ activities, probation departments ultimately seek to minimize threats to public safety and security. This entry summarizes the main characteristics of the probation population, the history of probation in the United States, the multiple purposes or goals of probation, and the experiences of both probation officers and individuals subject to probation supervision.

The Probation Population Characteristics According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice statistics, as of 2015, there were 4,650,900 adults on probation in the United States. More than 4 million adults either moved on to or off of probation during that year. These figures translate to approximately 1 out of every 53 adult residents in the United States being under probation supervision at any given time. With only 132,800 of these individuals serving terms of probation in the federal system, the vast majority of probation sentences are served at the county or state level. County and state probation sentences are usually given as a sentence in and of themselves (without a term of incarceration), but federal probation sentences are often given in the form of a split sentence in which a period of probation supervision follows a term of incarceration. Similar to other parts of the correctional system, the probation population is composed disproportionately of males and racial minorities. In 2015, 87% of probationers were male, 38% were black, and 16% were Hispanic, according to a report commissioned by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The probation population consists of a variety of different types of offenders. More than half of the  population is serving a sentence for a felony offense. Approximately 32% of probationers are

Probation

on probation for a violent offense, 21% for a property offense, and 31% for a drug offense.

History The earliest referenced examples of probation in the United States are in Boston in the early 1840s. One Bostonian, John Augustus, was particularly concerned with the treatment of alcohol-involved criminals in the local court system. He originally requested that the Boston Police Court would release criminals whose offenses involved alcohol problems into his custody. He soon started requesting the provisional release of other types of offenders as well. Nearly 2,000 defendants were released into Augustus’s custody by 1858. Loosely following Augustus’ model of supervision, Massachusetts became the first state to pass legislation formally authorizing the use of probation in 1869. The Probation Act of 1925 subsequently made probation a legitimate sentencing option in the federal system, and by 1956, all 48 states were operating probation departments for both adult and juvenile probationers.

Purposes Probation departments handle two main tasks: (1) preparing presentence investigation (PSI) reports for judges and (2) managing a caseload of offenders under probation supervision. PSI reports are comprehensive descriptions of an individual’s entire life circumstances that are made available to judges before a defendant is sentenced. Probation officers are responsible for recounting the circumstances of the current offense as well as detailing prior criminal activity in the PSI report. These reports also include information on a defendant’s history and current status related to his or her mental and physical health, substance abuse issues, education level, employment, financial situation, gang affiliation, family and peer relationships, and anything else deemed relevant to the sentencing decision. PSI reports may also include victim impact statements in which the victims detail the financial and/or psychological damage caused by their victimization. To compile all these pieces of information, probation officers may conduct extensive interviews with relevant parties as well as review public and private records. Thoroughly

821

documenting all such information is very important because PSI reports influence the severity of an individual’s sentence as well as any potential conditions or requirements related to the sentence. Managing a caseload of individuals under probation supervision is the second main task of probation departments and involves three separate goals: (1) providing offenders with treatment services, (2) diverting offenders from incarceration, and (3) supervising offenders. Although providing treatment or rehabilitation services may help individuals improve their lives and avoid more severe criminal justice sanctions, many probation departments view the provision of treatment services mainly as a method of protecting public safety and security. Probationers may be able to access social services directly in the probation office or they may receive referrals to community-based service providers from their probation officers. Examples of the types of social services that probationers may receive include education, vocational training, drug treatment, physical and mental health care, parenting assistance, legal services, cognitive behavioral therapy, transportation assistance, and housing assistance. Another important purpose of managing offenders on probation is to divert some people from more severe or restrictive criminal justice sanctions, such as incarceration. Probation is commonly seen as an alternative to incarceration for offenders who are believed to pose minimal risk to public safety and security but who still require some level of punishment or justice system intervention. Critics of using probation as a punishment instead of incarceration assert that even low-level offenders still pose some level of risk to the public and that probation may not be a severe enough punishment for some types of offenders. In contrast, supporters  of using probation as a diversion from incarceration emphasize the cost savings to taxpayers associated with probation in comparison with incarceration. Supporters also point to probation’s advantages of allowing offenders to maintain positive ties to their families and/or employment, both of which may help reduce recidivism. Many probation departments view the sur­veil­ lance and supervision of offenders as their primary role. By placing a variety of restrictions on individuals’ behavior and requiring regular meetings with a probation officer, probation departments

822

Profiling, Racial

hope to catch people who pose a threat to public safety and security. While earlier models of probation supervision defined success as helping an offender avoid new criminal activity, a shift to what has been called the “new penology” has defined success as catching offenders who have committed a new offense. Probation supervision has thus shifted from an emphasis on service to offenders to the surveillance of offenders. A variety of strategies help probation departments provide appropriate levels of surveillance. Some probation departments use specialized ­caseloads based on offense types. For example, one probation officer may have only domestic violence offenders on his or her caseload, and another probation officer may specialize in supervising sex offenders. Most probation departments also categorize people according to their risk of recidivism. Risk classification is often done using information about an individual’s criminal history, recent offense type, and personal life circumstances. Low-risk offenders have fewer restrictions placed on them, such as less frequent meetings with a probation officer, while more frequent reporting is required for high-risk offenders. Offenders who are believed to pose the greatest risk to public safety and security may be placed on intensive supervision ­caseloads, which involve the most restrictive conditions and the most frequent reporting.

Probation Officer Experience Probation officers may be responsible for managing anywhere from 20 offenders to several hundred offenders depending on the risk level of their caseloads. Managing offenders on their caseloads entails meeting with offenders in the probation office as well as in the field. Officers may conduct home visits to assess the offenders’ residences as well as visits to their places of employment. All phone and in-person interactions with probationers require lengthy documentation of these meetings. Accordingly, probation officers’ jobs involve a great deal of paperwork. A fair amount of time is also usually spent in court because officers must attend hearings for the individuals on their ­caseloads and may need to provide testimony. Recall that probation officers are also responsible for conducting the interviews and review of records necessary to complete presentence investigation reports. Considering all of these responsibilities,

this occupation can be not only very rewarding but also very challenging.

Probationer Experience All individuals serving probation sentences are subject to a variety of standard conditions. These generally include avoiding all criminal activity, notifying the probation officer of any changes to current home address or employment, maintaining or be actively seeking employment, requesting permission before any travel outside the jurisdiction, and meeting with the probation officer when requested. Additionally, at the time of sentencing, the judge may impose a variety of special conditions that must be met as part of the probation sentence. These conditions may stipulate that the individual avoid contact with known felons or past criminal associates, pay restitution, be placed on house arrest or in a halfway house, register as a sex offender, or participate in drug treatment, mental health care, community service, or drug testing. If a new crime is committed (referred to as a direct violation) or if a condition of supervision is not met (referred to as a technical violation), probationers may have their probation sentence revoked. Probation revocation may result in a more restrictive punishment, such as incarceration. Considering the plethora of conditions that probationers may be responsible for meeting, many individuals describe the experience of being on probation as walking a tightrope or being set up to fail. Caitlin J. Taylor See also Crime Control; Parole; Punishment

Further Readings Barton-Bellessa, et al. Community-Based Corrections: A Text/Reader. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012. Kaeble, Danielle and Thomas P. Bonczar. Probation and Parole in the United States, 2015. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2016.

Profiling, Racial Racial profiling is one of the most controversial techniques of surveillance, and debates about its effectiveness, legality, and fairness have been increasingly

Profiling, Racial

fierce since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This entry defines racial profiling, describes its uses and provides examples of such profiling, includes reasons used in defense of racial profiling as well as points debating its success, and concludes with an examination of the ethical and legal concerns of racial profiling as they have arisen in the fields of security and medicine.

Defining Racial Profiling Racial profiling can be defined as the systematic association of sets of racial or quasi-racial characteristics with certain other traits, which are then used as a basis for making decisions, usually about how to treat people. Racial profiling involves the use of racial or quasi-racial characteristics as proxies for other traits, usually because these other traits are difficult to discern, whereas racial and quasiracial characteristics are often highly visible. Racial traits might include an official register of racial or ethnic background, such as a census or genetic record, or skin color. Quasi-racial traits include other kinds of ethnic appearance, language, ­nationality, and religious affiliation. The difference between racial, quasi-racial, and ethnic traits is not distinct in practice, and the term racial profiling is often used to describe the reliance on all three— although it is worth noting that in Europe the term ethnic profiling is generally preferred. It might be argued that every time a person makes a decision about how to treat another person on the basis of that person’s race, it is an example of racial profiling. But debate and research around racial profiling is usually concerned with more formal methods of making ­useful generalizations on the basis of racial characteristics, among others. When scholars talk about racial profiling, they are usually concerned with practices or policies that employ racial traits as proxies for other traits. To fix attention on policies and practices, it makes sense to define racial profiling as a systematic association of racial characteristics and other traits. The systematic nature of racial profiling is particularly apparent in the use of racial profiling as a basis for surveillance. Surveillance refers to the monitoring, sorting, and control of individuals in the pursuit of specific goals. The goals most typically pursued by means of racial profiling by state actors fall within the categories of security and medicine.

823

Sometimes, racial profiling is defined as the reliance on racial characteristics exclusively to make decisions about how to treat people. Such reliance is an example of racial profiling. But most paradigmatic and typical examples of racial profiling involve the reliance on a combination of racial and other characteristics (e.g., age, sex, location, behavior) as a proxy for other traits. As long as the profile relies mainly or strongly on associations, generalizations, statistical correlations, or stereotypes about the link between certain traits and other traits, it will generally be accepted as an example of racial profiling. Typical examples of racial profiling in the field of security include its use by police on U.S. highways as a method for deciding which cars to stop and search for drugs, its use by security officials at airports as a means of selecting people for more thorough questioning and luggage checks on the basis that they pose a heightened risk of terrorist activity, and its use by government officials in ­Germany between 2001 and 2003 as a basis for searching through records from immigration, social services, and universities (a process known as data mining) to identify individuals who might be of interest in counterterrorism investigations. Typical examples of racial profiling in the field of public health include the use of race as a basis for making diagnostic and treatment decisions. For example, research on how well different kinds of patients respond to the same treatments often distinguish between patients on the basis of race as well as a range of other factors. The results of such research then feed into doctors’ treatment decisions.

Defense of Racial Profiling Racial profiling is defended as a comparatively efficient means of allocating scarce law enforcement and health resources. If research shows that people of certain racial backgrounds respond much better to a certain treatment than people of  another racial background, taking this into account when prescribing treatment should improve health outcomes overall. Similarly, if evidence reliably demonstrates that people of certain racial appearance or background are significantly more likely to be transporting drugs or involved in terrorism, then it would be inefficient not to focus more resources on scrutiny of them. In principle, racial profiling is more likely to be efficient if the

824

Profiling, Racial

correlation between the racial characteristic and the trait it is associated with is very strong and if the trait is one with a high incidence. One likely reason why racial profiling in counterterrorism has been so apparently ineffective is the fact that very few numbers of people are in fact involved in terrorism, and racial traits have not been constant across every terrorist. Using statistical analysis, William Press argues that profiling in general is a less effective strategy for detecting crime than random sampling, because a profile will keep picking out the same people, even when they have been shown from past scrutiny to be nonsuspicious, and will therefore focus fewer resources than it should on those criminals who do not fit the profile. This mathematical argument applies most successfully to profiles applied over a single population many times.

Debating the Success of Racial Profiling It has been argued that the inclusion of racial traits in criminal profiles can have the unintended effect of actually reducing the efficiency of that profile as a crime detection technique. Evidence cited in support of this position concerns the case of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which in 1998 drastically improved the rate at which it successfully identified drug smugglers at airports when it removed racial traits from the profile its officers were using. Why was this? It appeared that customs officers had been overestimating the extent to which race acted as a reliable indicator of drug smuggling. This led them to give too much weight to the racial characteristics and too little to the other traits included in the profile. Removing the racial characteristics refocused officers on these other factors, thus improving their “hit rate.” A significant strand of research by U.S. economists is devoted to analysis of the efficiency of racial profiling for drugs on highways. Overall, this research supported the claim, made by police, that racial profiling can increase the hit rate or the ratio of cars stopped in which drugs are found to cars stopped overall. But these findings have been strongly challenged. In particular, it has been argued that relying on the hit rate of stops as an indicator of effectiveness overlooks the fact that racial profiling on highways can change the distribution of crime between racial groups in a way that increases crime overall. In a seminal work on the topic, Bernard

Harcourt argues that a policy of stopping and searching more black and Hispanic drivers on highways sends a message to the white drivers that they are more able to get away with drug trafficking. Depending on how responsive different racial groups are to the threat of being stopped and searched as a deterrent, the white crime rate may rise faster when compared with the fall in the crime rates of blacks and Hispanics, leading to an overall rise in drug trafficking on highways.

Ethical and Legal Concerns In addition to concerns about its effectiveness, a range of ethical and legal objections have been advanced in opposition to racial profiling. The most commonly voiced ethical objection to racial profiling is one of racial discrimination. Racial profiling, it is argued, is based on bogus and prejudicial stereotypes about the tendencies of certain racial groups to engage in certain kinds of crime. But although this may be true of some examples of racial profiling, it need not be true of all; it is possible to imagine a case in which there is a sound evidence base for a policy of racial profiling. This is not to claim that most actual cases of racial profiling are not in fact cases of racial prejudice, nor is it to deny that racial profiling may actually aggravate preexisting racial prejudices, if it confirms and thereby reinforces preexisting stereotypes. A further objection to racial profiling for security rests on the claim that it is used unfairly. Specifically, it is argued that racial profiling is most often used against already discriminated-against racial groups but not against dominant racial groups, even when it promises to be just as efficient in the detection of crimes committed by the latter. Using racial profiling only against certain ethnic groups implies that their interests are valued less than the interests of other members of society. Equal respect for racial groups requires that profiling should only be used against one racial group if it is used consistently across racial groups. Apart from racial prejudice and unfairness, it has also been argued that racial profiling for crime is humiliating, because it publicly associates people with criminality, and thus presents them to others in a degrading manner. People should be able to avoid being associated with criminality by choosing to live their lives in a respectable and

Propaganda

law-abiding manner. Being targeted for racial profiling sends a message to people that their choices and achievements in life will be overlooked by society in favor of aspects about them that bear no necessary connection to their character and that are entirely out of their control. The extent to which these ethical concerns arise depends on the weight given to race in a criminal profile. This is recognized in many laws and regulations. Racial profiling that relies on race as the exclusive ground for a law enforcement search is outlawed in a number of Western jurisdictions, including the European Union, and in the United States. For example, in Williams Lecraft v. Spain (2006), the United Nations Human Rights ­Committee became the first judicial authority to find that the use of race or ethnicity as the basis for a police identity check infringes the human right to nondiscrimination. The case concerned a naturalized Spanish citizen who, in 1999, was pulled out of a crowd at a Spanish train station for an identity check on the ground that she was black. However, the use of race in conjunction with other factors indicating suspiciousness is generally permitted by law as a basis for law enforcement action. The ethical objections to racial profiling described here apply with greater force to racial profiling in crime than in medicine. There are at least three reasons for this. First, racial profiling in medicine generally does not use race as a proxy for intentions to do wrong or other undesirable traits. Second, when racial profiling is used in medicine, it is used equally against all racial groups, so claims of unfair application of racial profiling do not tend to arise. Third, the benefits of racial profiling in medicine are distributed equally between racial groups, unlike the benefits of racial profiling in crime, which are greater for those people whose racial background is not associated with criminality. Having said that, there are concerns that medical researchers could end up relying too much on genetic differences among races and not enough on the economic and social factors that often correlate with racial background. This might reduce the political will to change those factors in ways that could improve health outcomes for disadvantaged groups. Katerina Hadjimatheou See also Crime Control; Passenger Profiling; Public Health, Surveillance in; Search and Seizure; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; United Nations

825

Further Readings American Civil Liberties Union. About the Campaign Against Racial Profiling. https://www.aclu.org/other/ about-campaign-against-racial-profiling (Accessed October 2017). Davies, Sharon. “Profiling Terror.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, v.45 (2003). Dominitz, Jeff and John Knowles. “Crime Minimization and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn From Police Search Data?” Economic Journal, v.116/515 (2006). Elton, Catherine. “Why Racial Profiling Persists in Medical Research.” Time (August 22, 2009). http:// content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1916755 ,00.html (Accessed July 2014). Harcourt, Bernard. Against Profiling: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Lever, Annabel. “Why Racial Profiling Is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, v.33/1 (2005). Lillquist, Erik and Charles Sullivan. “Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine.” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, v.39 (2004). Press, William. “To Catch a Terrorist: Can Ethnic Profiling Work?” Significance, v.7/4 (2010). Risse, Mathias and Richard Zeckhauser. “Racial Profiling.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, v.32/2 (2005). Rosalind Williams Lecraft v. Spain. (CCPR/ C/96/D/1493/2006). http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/ spain_t5_iccpr_1493_2006.pdf (Accessed July 2014).

Propaganda A key element of any system of state security is the capacity to gather support, whether for a political or societal position or objective. Propaganda is the art of persuading an intended audience to follow, cooperate, or support such an objective. The misuse and manipulation of facts in some propaganda have lent the word a pejorative connotation; but as long as there is a truthful presentation of the facts, propaganda has a legitimate and potentially positive role to play. This entry reviews the use of propaganda in both the modern era and prior eras. The legitimate use of propaganda rests on how it is used, not the motives or the intent of the creators of the propaganda. A ruthless totalitarian regime may use propaganda correctly to support its measures, as long as it does not mislead those it is attempting to persuade, while a democratic

826

Propaganda

government may, with the best of intentions, create an abusive propaganda campaign if in order to  craft its message it manipulates the facts to the  extent that its message bares limited resemblance to the truth. The manner in which propaganda can be utilized may vary, but the essentials include the constant repetition of a simple, easyto-understand message intended to convince the subjects of the propaganda of the “rightness” of the message being conveyed.

Propaganda Before the Modern Era An early use of propaganda can be seen in the words and actions of Roman orator Cato the Elder (234–149 BCE), who is credited with having repetitively used the phrase Carthago delenda est (“Carthage must be destroyed”), referencing the primary Roman competitor and adversary at that time. The legitimacy of the message rests on Cato’s belief that as long as Carthage remained, Roman hegemony was threatened. Although the use of propaganda can be traced to the ancient world, the term propaganda has its origin in the period of the Counter-Reformation (1545–1648 CE). In 1622, Pope Gregory XV created an agency to spread the Roman Catholic faith, the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, or the Congregation to Propagate or Spread the Faith. It was from this beginning that the modern understanding of propaganda, as a tool for spreading or convincing people as to a particular belief, came to be established. During the next few centuries, methods of propaganda included published tracts, illustrations, and posters. In fact, some propaganda posters became iconic images. For example, during the First World War (1914–1918), English graphic artist Alfred Leete drew an image of British military commander Lord Kitchener pointing with the words wants you, encouraging viewers to enlist. Although the illustration was originally produced for the front of a commercial publication, the visual impact was so effective that it was quickly reproduced in a variety of formats, including the iconic poster, to encourage recruitment. Other nations soon followed suit, using their own identifiable figures to urge their viewers to enlist. Through the use of emotive techniques, such as  indicating an “atrocity” evidently committed

by  the “enemy,” some propaganda exhorted the target audience to support its cause based on portraying the opposition as reprehensible. For example, during the First World War, many British and  U.S. posters referenced to the case of Edith Cavell, a British nurse who was executed in 1915 in German-occupied Belgium for assisting in the escape of Allied soldiers. This form of propaganda, known as “waving of the bloody shirt,” is actually a recurrent theme in propaganda both long before and long after Cavell’s death. Widely published or repeated statements about what different religious groups have or have not done have been a common refrain during periods of religious ferment or discord. The long-established, but clearly fraudulent, claim that Jewish religious rites included using the blood of Christian children, a claim which has come be known as the “blood libel,” is a clear example of this form of propaganda. It served to whip up a potentially racist audience with wild claims about the evils of their opponents. Subsequent instances of this form of propaganda have also relied on base human emotions. Examples include the incubator claims that emerged during the First Gulf War (1990–1991). At that time, a coalition of forces was being formed in opposition to the government of Iraq, which had invaded and conquered the neighboring nation of Kuwait. In gathering support for a military response to this invasion, a Kuwaiti woman publicly testified before hearings in the United States that she had personally witnessed Kuwaiti infants being thrown from incubators so that the devices could be shipped back to Iraq. Her statements were frequently used by representatives of the U.S. government, even though the  story had some flaws, including the identity of the witness, who although initially only partly identified, was eventually fully identified as the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States. Investigations into the story have been unable to substantiate the woman’s claim. Nevertheless, the horror of the tale was effective in gathering support for the military action against the Iraqis.

Propaganda in the Modern Era New methods of presenting ideas and of convincing audiences were introduced during the late 19th century and the 20th century: film, sound

Propaganda

recordings, radio, television, and the Internet. Propagandists of the modern era came to embrace these assorted methods of conveying information to better spread their ideology. In some ways, the audiences of early films were easily convinced of the merits of a cause presented through this new medium, believing that if they could see something, it must be real, and that if they could see it, it could not be manipulated. For example, many of the newsreels shown to U.S. audiences during the First World War showed trench warfare at its grittiest, with charges over the top, bloody fighting, and dramatic explosions, without the audience ever seeming to question how  the cameras were set up in no man’s land between the trenches, without the German forces ever shooting the cameramen. In reality, most of these films were shot at the Edison Studios in New Jersey. Similarly, shots of the Spanish Fleet during the Spanish-American War of 1898 were actually filmed using giant floating models under controlled circumstances. Thus, some of the most convincing propaganda took place on the movie screen, often the result of celluloid manipulation of the truth. As the 20th century progressed, some of the new fascist regimes increased their use of propaganda such as film propaganda. In 1930s Germany, the Nazi Party was an early adherent to this form of information projection. German filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl has been credited with adept filmmaking in her creation of the 1935 film Triumph of the Will, a study of a rally in Nuremburg celebrating the rise of Nazi Germany. With her skilled camera and sound work, Riefenstahl made the head of the Nazi Party, Adolph Hitler, appear as an almost magical speaker, rousing the German people from their post–World War I depression to come alive with a vigor that triumphed over their problems. In carrying out this depiction, she did not indicate in the film the underlying problem within the Nazi  party—its reliance on racist ideology and imperialist dreams—but instead focused on the impact of dramatic speeches, militaristic displays, and nationalistic fervor to illustrate the vitality of the new German state. Other propagandists also recognized the ­potential power of propaganda films. For example, in  the former Soviet Union in 1925, Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein produced Battleship Potemkin, in which he described a 1905 mutiny,

827

an event that was later cast as a forerunner of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Although some have described the film as one of the most influential propaganda films, Eisenstein manipulated an actual historic event of a mutiny as being rooted in communism, suggesting that the problem with the mutiny was that the leaders were not better Bolsheviks, whereas in reality they may have been socialists, with potentially limited affection for a communist revolution. In the later 1930s, as tensions grew between the European powers, Eisenstein once more used a historical event to base another leading piece of cinematic propaganda. In 1938, he produced Alexander Nevsky, a historic epic dealing with 13th-century Russia. Eisenstein employed the symbolism of the Russian people coming together to face their foes, foes personified by an aristocratic German religious military order, while simultaneously struggling with their boyars and religious leaders who resisted fighting the invaders, to influence and embolden the Russian people. Eisenstein wrote an article for the press in which he drew a direct comparison between his hero Nevsky and Joseph Stalin, the leader of the former Soviet Union. The film provided encouragement for the Soviets to resist first the influence and then the armed actions of Nazi Germany. Both Eisenstein and Riefenstahl worked with the approval and support of their governments, which was quite common, even when a film was ostensibly made for commercial purposes. For example, in 1941, British filmmakers Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger created The 49th Parallel, depicting for the then-neutral United States the presence of a war just over its northern border. Not commercially released until 1942, it was nevertheless effective in gaining U.S. support. It no doubt heartened the film’s surreptitious financial backers: the British Ministry of Information, which was responsible for that nation’s propaganda operations during the Second World War. Another propaganda technique used in the modern era is to declare as fact something about the opponent that the side making the statement either knows or should know is incorrect. For instance, in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed a plenary session of the United Nations Security Council, in which he proclaimed that the government of Iraq

828

Protection Orders

was creating weapons of mass destruction, a speech that was credited with swaying many to support the invasion. Since then, some critics have asserted that not only was the speech based on faulty data but also that he should have realized that the data were obviously flawed. Pursuant to the invasion and conquest of Iraq, no weapons of mass destruction, or plans for their immediate construction, were ever found.

Future Directions Despite the questionable tactics employed to convince audiences of the merits of a particular cause, or even questions as to the morality of such activities, propaganda has been an effective tool in gaining support for a cause. For this reason, it will likely continue to be used by governments, politicians, political movements, and private citizens— anyone who wishes to convince someone of something, anything, that the creators of the propaganda feel to be important. Daniel German See also Iraq

Further Readings Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1973. Fielding, Raymond. The American Newsreel 1911–1967. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972. Marlin, Randal. Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion. Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 2002. Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda From the Ancient World to the Present Day (3rd ed.). Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2003. Thomson, Oliver. Mass Persuasion in History: An Historical Analysis of the Development of Propaganda Techniques. Edinburgh, Scotland: Paul Harris, 1977.

Protection Orders Protection orders, also known as restraining orders, are used in the criminal and civil justice systems to restrain a person from harassing another person. Protection orders do not require

that the person restricted by the order be monitored or surveilled. Rather, protection orders serve to prohibit the recipient of the order from engaging in harassing or abusive behavior against the person who requested the order. Some aspects of protection orders have generated criticism and questions about their effectiveness in reducing violence and providing security to the person requesting the order. Although protection orders can be issued for any type of dispute (e.g., neighbor disputes), they are often used in cases where there is domestic abuse of a spouse or partner. While protection orders are standard in some states as part of divorce proceedings, the issuance of protection orders as directly related to domestic violence increased in the 1990s. It was widely believed at the time that those who were granted protective orders against abusive partners were less likely to experience further abuse. Currently, evidence concerning the effectiveness of protection orders in reducing domestic violence is mixed and is discussed later in this entry. There are several types of protection orders that can be issued. The type of order that is issued is largely based on whether the case is in a civil or a criminal court. In general, civil protection orders are issued in domestic relations cases, such as divorce proceedings. Depending on the jurisdiction, civil protection orders may or may not be enforceable by the police. Criminal protection orders are issued in response to some type of crime that has been committed with the intent of protecting the victim of the crime. These orders are enforceable by the police. While protection orders can be a useful tool for the police, caution is warranted because these orders do not offer physical protection from harm. The success of a protection order depends on the willingness of the person against whom the order was issued to abide by the order’s rules. In the United States, protection orders issued in one county of a state are enforceable in other counties of that state. Similarly, protection orders issued in one state are enforceable in other states. This is known as full faith and credit. However, the practice used to enforce the protective order is determined by the jurisdiction in which the violation occurred. In some counties or states, the violation may be a civil issue rather than a criminal issue that can be addressed by arresting the person who violated the order.

Psychological Assessment

One issue related to enforcement is a lack of knowledge about the law. Some criminal justice professionals, those protected by the orders, and those restricted by the orders, may not know that protection orders can be enforced in jurisdictions other than the one in which the order was issued. Some states, such as California, have a statewide system for registering protection orders so that they can be readily accessed by the police. Other states do not have such a system, and the criminal justice or civil justice systems must rely on the protected party for information. It is unclear how effective protection orders are in achieving their goal of reducing violence and ensuring the safety of those who granted protective orders. Many protection orders are violated, but it is difficult to determine the number of violent or abusive incidents resulting from these violations. There is evidence that physical violence is reduced after the issuance of protective orders, but it is difficult to determine if this reduction is a result of the order itself or due to other factors. Some research suggests that permanent protection orders are more effective in reducing violence than temporary protection orders. In addition, abused individuals may return to the abusive relationship after having had a protection order issued, and some research indicates that these individuals are at a high risk for physical violence. One criticism of protection orders is that they require the removal of firearms from the possession of the person against whom the order is issued. The goal of this federally mandated removal is to reduce the likelihood of intimate partner homicide. Critics contend that the firearm removal requirement violates a person’s constitutional right to bear arms. There are also concerns about uniformity of enforcement of the weapons ban because of discrepancies between state laws and the federal mandate. Moreover, people may have unregistered weapons in their possession, an obvious difficulty when determining if weapons need to be removed. There have also been reports of judges failing to impose the weapons ban or refusing to issue protection orders because of the weapons ban. In some instances, a judge may issue a mutual protection order against both the parties in a case. Domestic violence advocates have criticized this approach, arguing that it implies that the victim is  at fault. In addition, the victims of abuse who are  subject to protective orders may feel further

829

victimized by the criminal justice or civil justice systems and be reluctant to seek additional assistance, even if they experience continued abuse. While the issuance of protection orders is not without criticism, advocates of the use of protection orders maintain that the reduction in physical violence against victims of domestic violence warrant their continued use. Wendy Perkins See also Civil Liberties; Policing and Society

Further Readings Fritsche, Olivia M. “The Role of Enticement in a Violation of a Protection Order.” Washington and Lee Law Review, v.71/2 (2014). Logan, T. K. and Robert Walker. Civil Protective Orders Effective in Stopping or Reducing Partner Violence (Carsey Institute Policy Brief No. 18). Durham, NH: Carsey Institute, 2011. http://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1130&context=carsey (Accessed October 2017). Price, Margaret. “All’s Fair in Love and War: Or Is It? Domestic Violence and Weapons Bans.” American Journal of Family Law, v.28 (2014). Russell, Brenda. “Effectiveness, Victim Safety, Characteristics, and Enforcement of Protective Orders.” Partner Abuse, v.3/4 (2012).

Psychological Assessment Psychological assessment is a process that primarily involves a descriptive examination of an individual’s cognitive, emotional, and psychological abilities and difficulties, impairments, deficits, competences, and resources. It then provides evaluations about the inner and outer functioning of a person, yielding valuable information for diagnosis, potential intervention, treatment needs, prognosis, and responses to treatment. Psychologists are involved with the study of individuals and of their characteristics that make them unique and similar to others. Their aim is to understand the way in which these characteristics are organized to make an individual different from others and to make more precise and verifiable evaluations. Psychological assessment and measurement have evolved together, both stemming from the study of individual differences.

830

Psychological Assessment

The concern is to establish similarities and differences in people and to develop methods that can reliably, validly, and objectively measure such differences. This entry details the process of conducting psychological assessments, describes the various types of assessments and instruments, and discusses the role of rigor and ethics in psychological assessments.

Conducting Assessments Conducting assessments requires answering specific questions and making relevant decisions. The entire process is designed to assist the tasks of gathering relevant information and data and to describe, predict, explain, diagnose, and make decisions about a person. To accomplish this, psychologists must integrate a wide range of data and bring into focus diverse areas of knowledge; they are not merely administering and scoring tests. A psychometric approach uses tests to obtain data; its task is perceived as emphasizing the technical aspects of testing and measuring, which lead to a series of traits or ability descriptions. A psychological approach attempts to evaluate an individual in a problematic situation so that the information derived from the assessment can help address the problem; its focus is on problem solving and decision making. Measurement, using quantitative tests, questionnaires, or protocols, constitutes only one component, however relevant, of a wider process. Described in this way, psychological assessment is a metaprocess that involves the following: 1. Informed consent procedure 2. Clinical interview 3. Choosing a battery of tests and instruments 4. Administering, scoring, and interpreting results 5. Integrating information 6. Writing a report 7. Providing evidence-based views and presenting the different possibilities available to tackle the problem

After the informed consent is given by the person under examination or by a legal representative, the clinical interview is the most common

form in any initial assessment for gathering information about the following: the client’s current symptoms (onset, duration, intensity, frequency); the client’s medical and mental health history; past treatment results; the client’s coping strategies, strengths, resources (prior to and after the mental problem or trauma); substance abuse issues; the client’s expectations; and the client’s compliance and adherence to treatment. A mental status examination of affect, mood, thought and language processes, concentration, memory, and risk issues may be incorporated within the interview. It may also be important to gather information about any co-occurring or comorbid psychological symptoms not initially mentioned but relevant to the current mental state of the person. Moreover, clients with no recent physical exam are often encouraged to have a medical checkup to rule out possible medical conditions that mimic mental health problems. The interviews could take the form of structured diagnostic, semistructured, or unstructured interviews. Structured interviews standardize how questions are asked, what questions are asked, and how diagnostic criteria are applied to yield a final diagnosis. There are concerns about using this format because it may hamper and interfere with the relationship building that is crucial in the first session. Semistructured interviews integrate structured protocols regarding psychological symptoms but may include more open-ended questions to combine other information besides diagnosis (e.g., client’s expectations, strengths). Unstructured interviews do not follow a preorganized protocol. The interaction with the person evolves freely; personal expression of emotions and thoughts is significant for learning how the client perceives the inner and outer world.

Types of Psychological Assessments Psychological assessments can be distinguished as clinical assessment (projective), actuarial assessment (statistical and objective), or clinical professional structured assessment (integrative). Projective Assessment

Clinical or projective assessment methods are based on the assumption that the manner in which a person perceives, interprets, reacts, and responds

Psychological Assessment

to the test materials or task is influenced by his or her psychological functioning, cognitive abilities, perception, memory, and personality dynamics. Most projective tests are r­ elatively unstructured in the nature of the task and/or in the ambiguity of test stimuli (e.g., R ­ orschach Inkblot Test). The person confronted with a problem-solving task responds to the ambiguity and unstructuredness of the task by activating complex psychological operations. The person’s behavior is an expression or reflection of his or her personality. The assumption behind this approach is that of a continuity of personality, so that the basic psychological characteristics of the person are likely to play a dominant role in influencing how the person responds to situations; the responses are expected to be consistent across situations and times. There is controversy over the validity and reliability of projective methods and tests; their subjectivity makes them less prone to pass the test of falsifiability. The impetus for these approaches is to encourage clinicians to be more familiar with the psychometric properties of the tests they use and how to use them. No single psychological assessment instrument can be used in isolation; when projective tests are used, they are typically part of a test battery. Some concerns are raised as to whether some of these methods can meet judicial and forensic requirements. Nonetheless, some tests are administered in civil and criminal cases, and expert testimonies are allowed at court hearings. Malingering, defensiveness, and resistance are important issues that the clinician in a forensic context is often invited to assess. Research shows that the Rorschach test might be a useful tool for identifying signs of dissimulation, and the Minnesota Multiphasic ­ Personality Inventory—2 might recognize signs of malingering (i.e., plus getting or faking bad) and defensiveness (i.e., faking good). The projective methods can be paralleled to what in the risk assessment practice is called the first-generation assessment (or intuitive clinical judgment). Objective Assessment

Objective assessment methods are used to assess and establish how a person thinks, feels, and behaves. The framework is within a structured interview, and standardized instruments and tests

831

are employed. In such a structured setting, the psychologist elicits the relevant and specific information to score a set of defined items on a rating scale. The focus is on attributes of people, situations, or events, and a set of rules are used to quantify these attributes. The methodology is clear, and the procedure of measurement follows well-established and easy-to-apply rules. Scaling (i.e., determining how much of an attribute is present) and classification (i.e., defining the fitting of an attribute to a category) are some of the relevant features of these methods. The assessment is based on anchoring the results to statistics that  allow for generalization and comparison; this method reduces the standard error, minimizes s­ ubjective interpretation, and permits theories to  be tested. This method can be assimilated into the second-generation assessment (or actuarial/statistic judgment). Integrative Assessment

Integrative assessment methods are used to assess how a person thinks, feels, and behaves. The framework involves a structured interview, standardized instruments, and tests. They are constructed to provide empirically validated, structured decision ­ making. Extensive research findings suggest that these methods are likely to respond best to any form of psychological assessment because of the focus on the person, on the scientific method and generalizability, and on the treatment. These methods can be part of the third- and fourth-­generation assessments. This systematic integration of a broader range of factors (dynamic, acute, stable, and static) and behaviors, with the information collected in the interview and through an anamnestic analysis, allows for a complete assessment of how the person functions and which areas to target. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition has integrated the categorical approach with a dimensional approach to diagnosis and classification. The former refers to the process of noting if a symptom is present or not and then counting and assessing if a number of symptoms are present to indicate a particular mental disorder. The latter not only allows for evaluations of patients over the full range of symptoms they may be experiencing but also assesses how they function. Information about cognitive style, depressed mood, emotional dysregulation,

832

Psychological Assessment

anxiety level, sleep quality, and substance use would be important for clinicians to know regardless of the client’s diagnosis. The dimensional approach allows a clinician further latitude in assessing the severity of a condition; it does not imply a concrete threshold between “normality” and a disorder.

The Importance of Rigor Within Assessment Psychological assessment should be organized within the framework of the scientific method: (a)  making hypotheses and testing them to rule out possibilities while incorporating others and (b)  using multiple methods and multiple tests, which provide more solid data and allow the assessor to be much more confident in the findings. There is a great deal of variability in what assessment is selected to achieve these multiple and integrated purposes. If the aim of psychological assessment is to reach a comprehensive description of how the individual being assessed is currently functioning, then to combine multiple methods of evaluation is necessary to develop a more accurate view of current functioning. While inferences about past functioning and future prognosis can be made, professionals should always be aware that assessment results cannot predict future behavior or adjustment to life with 100% accuracy. Furthermore, the tests themselves are measuring individuals at a particular moment in time. Hence, no flawless measure exists, and any method of measurement should not be proposed in absolute terms. No expert report is without bias; no test reaches perfect reliability and validity.

Instruments Instruments can be organized on the basis of their content of measurement, on the basis of the context of their use (clinical or forensic), and on the basis of the people they are designed for (elderly, adults, adolescents, children). Some of the most known instruments used for psychological assessment for adults are the Adult Attachment Interview, the Beck Depression Inventory—II, the General Ability Measure for Adults, the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery, the M ­ illon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory—III, the ­Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—2,

the Personality Assessment Inventory, the Psychopathy Checklist—Revised, the Rorschach Inkblot Technique, the Thematic Apperception Test, the Trail Making Test, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—IV, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Assessment instruments for adolescents/children include the Achenbach System of Empirically Based Assessment, the Adolescent Psychopathology Scale, the Children’s Apperception Test, the Cognitive Assessment System, the Draw-A-Person Test, the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, the Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Adolescent, the Psychopathy Youth Version, and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Third Edition.

Ethics in Psychological Assessment Psychological assessment is a powerful instrument. Misused or used negligently and irresponsibly, psychological assessment can provoke distress and discrimination and can lead to wrongful decision making. Unscrupulous and incorrect decisions can have long-lasting effect on the individual and his or her family. The risk behind poor assessment is pervasive in every context of application. Children have been separated from their parents because of mistaken evaluations of parental competence, individuals have relapsed into panic symptoms and anxiety because of inappropriate assessment, individuals have lost their jobs because of bad decisions, and inmates have been confined in isolation because of inadequate risk assessment. The American Psychological Association and the  British Psychological Society deal extensively with issues across the discipline of psychology and provide supplementary guidance on psychological assessment, risk assessment, measuring, and testing: Psychological assessment requires scientific knowledge, competence, and professional expertise. Profes­ sionals involved should have the appropriate training and should be responsible for the conservation and protection of the material and data collected. Psychological assessment entails reducing the allegiance and fidelity bias when administering the chosen instruments and tests. Psychological assessment needs a scientific method, rooted in the principles of falsifiability, validity, ­reliability, and generalizability.

Psychotherapy

Psychological assessment involves impartiality and independence in testing, analyzing, and communicating the results. Psychological assessment demands a climate of fairness, ethical adherence, transparency, and the informed consent of the clients or patients.

833

which psychotherapy can be considered a form of surveillance and can potentially infringe on privacy. These include (1) psychotherapy in the context of formal state surveillance, (2) psychotherapists as agents of informal surveillance and facilitators of conformity, and (3) psychotherapy as encouraging and entrenching self-surveillance.

Georgia Zara and Franco Freilone See also Ethics; Insanity; Responsibility

Further Readings Ægisdottir, Stefanìa, et al. “The Meta-Analysis of Clinical Judgment Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction.” Clinical Psychology Review, v.34 (2006). American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: Author, 2013. Anastasi, Anne and Susana Urbina. Psychological Testing (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. Chabert, Chaterine. La psychopathologie a l’epreuve du Rorschach (2nd ed.). Paris, France: Dunod, 1998. Coaley, Keith. An Introduction to Psychological Assessment and Psychometrics (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014. Dawes, Robyn M., et al. “Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment.” Science, v.243 (1989). Freilone, Franco. Psicopatologia clinica e Rorschach: La valutazione psicodiagnostica [Clinical Psychopathology and Rorschach: Psychodiagnostic Assessment]. Turin, Italy: UTET, 2005. Freilone, Franco and Barbara Fratianni. Lezioni di psicodiagnostica proiettiva [Lesson of Projective Psychoadiagnosis]. Genova, Italy: Fratelli Frilli, 2008. Groth-Marnat, Gary. Handbook of Psychological Assessment (5th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009. Zara, Georgia and David P. Farrington. Criminal Recidivism: Explanation, Prediction and Prevention. Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2016.

Psychotherapy This entry briefly describes the use of psychotherapy as it relates to surveillance, security, and privacy. It begins by providing a brief definition of psychotherapy as well as an overview of its use as a medical intervention. The entry then critically discusses psychotherapy, detailing three ways in

Definition and Overview Psychotherapy is a type of treatment in which a trained psychological clinician meets privately with an individual client (or more than one client in rarer cases) to address psychosocial issues negatively affecting the client’s life. Sessions usually last approximately 1 to 2 hours per week and can continue over the course of weeks, months, or even years. The psychotherapist can use a range of techniques and methods that aim to help change a client’s beliefs, behaviors, attitudes, thoughts, and emotions toward a desired direction. A common goal of psychotherapy is to promote insight and change from within, as well as to decrease suffering and to enhance well-being. It is medically noninvasive and based mainly on dialogue and communication between the psychotherapist and the client. Psychotherapy can be used for many reasons. These include helping in recovery from mental illnesses such as anxiety and depression. It can also be used to help with “problems in living,” including difficulties at work and relationship issues. Sometimes, it is used to help promote physical health—for example, in smoking cessation or alcohol reduction. Regarding the use of psychotherapy in mental health treatment, there is some evidence supporting its effectiveness, particularly in treating disorders such as depression. In all these endeavors, psychotherapy often involves goal setting, with the psychotherapist monitoring the achievement of said goals. Psychotherapy emerged as a form of treatment in the early 20th century, stemming largely from the work of Sigmund Freud. Prior to the 1950s, few forms of psychotherapy existed, with the majority based on Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis fell out of favor with the medical establishment as the 20th century progressed, with critics arguing that it was not an evidencebased intervention. Popular psychotherapies in the present include cognitive behavioral therapy,

834

Psychotherapy

dialectical behavior therapy, and interpersonal psychotherapy, which are supported by research as evidence-based practices. There are numerous other forms of psychotherapy, some of which are targeted beyond an individual. These include marital therapy, family therapy, and group therapy for mental illnesses. Psychotherapy is an umbrella term that encompasses a diverse range of approaches. That said, all approaches are grounded in the same underlying principles of communication, dialogue, and self-­ initiated change prompted by the therapist. The corrective function of psychotherapy has implications for its role in surveillance, security, and privacy of the individual. Indeed, social ­science critics have argued that psychiatric services serve as a form of formal and informal surveillance, simultaneously infringing on privacy and encouraging conformity to social norms. These arguments are based largely on the ideas put forth by the French philosopher Michel Foucault, who argued that surveillance through self and others is central to control in bourgeois societies.

Psychotherapy in the Context of State Surveillance In accordance with the aims of psychotherapy, the client must divulge personal thoughts, emotions, and details to the psychotherapist, who then uses this information to form a treatment plan. In countries where the profession is regulated, standards of professional practice require psychotherapists to maintain accurate, up-to-date records of all sessions. These records can be subject to examination by certain agencies of the state (e.g., the legal system). Court orders and subpoenas are two ways in which confidential information shared during psychotherapy sessions can be made public. These can require psychotherapists to release medical records, as well as to testify in court. Courts themselves may order independent psychotherapists to conduct evaluations. This is particularly common in child custody cases as well as in criminal court cases. In both types of cases, information disclosed in psychotherapy is typically used to build a case for or against an individual. Moreover, the mere fact that an individual has sought out psychotherapy in the past or the present can be used against the client in the legal system as well, particularly when

it involves treatment for mental health issues. This information can be shared in open court and reported in the media, which threatens privacy of the individuals concerned. In this sense, psychotherapy could be considered an instrument that the state can use for the formal surveillance of certain citizens deemed potentially threatening. In police states, psychotherapists and psychiatrists frequently went one step further, acting more overtly as agents of state surveillance. For example, political dissidents in the then Soviet Union were frequently (mis)diagnosed with mental illness and committed to mental hospitals. More recently, governments have enlisted psychotherapists and other clinicians in their endeavor to stop the so-called Islamic extremism. For example, in the United Kingdom, all clinicians now have a legal duty to report people considered at risk for radicalization. Media reports suggest that more than 1,000 such people have been reported in recent years.

Psychotherapy, Conformity, and Informal Surveillance In every society, there exist certain norms, lifestyles, and values that are encouraged by the state. The state can encourage these norms and values formally through laws or informally through other institutions. The overarching aim of psychotherapy—to modify behaviors, thoughts, and emotions toward a desirable end—reinforces the notion that certain behaviors can be viewed as normal and desirable, while others can be viewed as deviant and undesirable. Indeed, pressure to conform can be so great that it leads people to seek out the services of a psychotherapist to change. For example, homosexuality was considered a correctable mental deviancy by the medical establishment until the 1970s. As such, homosexuals would receive psychotherapy in an attempt to transform them into heterosexuals. This occurred at a time when heterosexuality was considered normative as it was linked to wider societal values of marriage, reproduction, and the nuclear family. In contrast, homosexuality was widely considered perverse. The aforementioned example is often used to illustrate how the prevailing norms and values permeate the practice of psychotherapy. Indeed, a core aspect of psychotherapy involves changing or correcting a client’s beliefs, behaviors, attitudes,

Public Health, Surveillance in

and emotions in pursuance of a goal. These can include, for example, finding or maintaining a marriage partner or quitting practices such as smoking, alcohol use, or promiscuous sex. As such, psychotherapists could be considered as engaging in informal surveillance of their clients, often encouraging the setting of goals that conform to prevailing societal norms and values. In this way, psychotherapists could be considered akin to priests of old; they draw a moral line between right and wrong, and they monitor and intervene as necessary. This intervention is commonly in the interests of the state, attempting to transform people who are potentially bothersome societal burdens to those who produce and contribute.

Psychotherapy and Self-Surveillance Self-surveillance is a process by which people monitor their own actions, attitudes, behaviors, emotions, and physical appearance. During this process, people often rely on societal norms and values to assess themselves and change accordingly. It has been argued that self-surveillance is particularly acute in modern times, given the rise of social media and “selfie culture,” where people are constantly comparing themselves with (and frequently trying to one-up) others. This has also contributed to a concomitant decline in privacy, with people sharing details of their personal lives freely (and sometimes not so freely) to the world via the Internet. By its very nature, psychotherapy could be ­considered as encouraging and intensifying self-­ surveillance. A psychotherapist often meets with his or her client weekly, where goals will be set. Clients are expected to make strident efforts to meet these goals and report back the success (or lack thereof) of their efforts to their psychotherapist. In between meetings, clients may engage in serious selfsurveillance to ensure that they are meeting these goals. This can involve self-surveillance of behaviors such as smoking, drinking, eating, or sex. It might also involve self-surveillance of cognitive activity such as positive/negative thinking or positive/negative self-talk. It could also involve social activity— for example, assessing the quality and quantity of social interactions or even microbehaviors in specific social contexts. In short, intense self-surveillance can (and should) occur in almost all spheres of life when an

835

individual is in psychotherapy. Psychotherapists explicitly encourage clients to use the techniques and methods discussed in the clinic on a daily basis. That way, clients can internalize the voice of the psychotherapist (which often echoes the voice of society), thus engaging in considerable selfsurveillance to assess and change their behaviors.

Conclusion Psychotherapy is considered by the medical profession as a useful modality of healing for mental illnesses, as well as for changing behaviors that can improve individual functioning in society. However, critical social scientists have argued that psychotherapists can be witting or unwitting agents of the state, conducting surveillance and correction of potentially bothersome people. Psychotherapy thus remains a controversial intervention, as it has been throughout its history. Victoria Carmichael and Rob Whitley See also Deviance; Power; Privacy; Social Control; Surveillance, Culture of

Further Readings Cialdini, Robert B. and Melanie R. Trost. “Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity and Compliance.” In Daniel Todd Gilbert, et al. (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Everstine, Louis, et al. “Privacy and Confidentiality in Psychotherapy.” American Psychologist, v.35/9 (1980). Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977. Lambert, Michael J. Bergin and Garfield’s Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behaviour Change (6th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2013. Pylypa, Jen. “Power and Bodily Practice: Applying the Work of Foucault to an Anthropology of the Body.” Arizona Anthropologist, v.13 (1998).

Public Health, Surveillance

in

Surveillance in public health is a complex, multilevel mechanism aimed at providing evidencebased data on population health status and health-related events. Generally speaking, it is an

836

Public Health, Surveillance in

ongoing process of systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of health-related data. This continuous monitoring generates information to be used for planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice. In this context, monitoring and data sharing with “those who need to know” are the basis for a wide range of surveillance activities, oriented to that end. This is organized under a cyclical approach. In this entry, public health surveillance is explained based on a multidisciplinary approach, combining epidemiology and surveillance studies. For this reason, after exposing the basic definition, origins and functioning, risks, and further impacts on privacy or data reliance are explored. An extensive section is devoted to critically discussing data flows, data management, and privacy concerns. Last, the risks for surveillance in public health in the context of global health security and the information era (e.g., of big data) are discussed.

Origins and Evolution Originally, public health was reactive and focused on infectious diseases. When an outbreak affected a given population, attention was focused on those who presented with the symptoms or were suspected of having been in contact with the infected people. The data collected referred to the pattern of infection and disease. In the 1960s, epidemiologist Alexander Langmuir, working in the United States with patients infected by malaria, set a new procedure. He filled his control sheets with far more information about patients as individuals. Beyond the observed symptoms, he promoted the collection of personal data: name, age, gender, and further characteristics of the patients, which were collected, managed, and shared. As this seemed to be an effective approach, the World Health Organization adopted Langmuir’s proposal a decade after. Thus, surveillance in public health was institutionalized as the process of collecting, managing, and communicating large amounts of health data. The focus of surveillance in public health broadened further: Far from observing infectious diseases only, public health began to consider chronic, noncommunicable diseases. The definition of ­epidemics or pandemics was expanded to those illnesses affecting large populations, including cardiovascular

disease, cancer, and motor vehicle injuries; environmental and occupational health; as well as risk and health behaviors. The inclusion of all these diseases has an economic rationale, as health-related issues are among the most expensive duties of any government. Since 2001, the World Bank and the World Health Organization have considered health control to be “an essential function of a public health system.” Pathologies affecting wide sectors of the population are a threat not only for the health care budgets and the general health statues but also for social stability. Therefore, great efforts are dedicated to understand, control, react to, and prevent against outbreaks to perform as expected. The surveillance of public health is therefore innately tied to imperatives of economic efficiency and flexibility. In recent decades, health surveillance has operated at national and international levels. The movement of pathological agents has paralleled the growth and quickening of global interconnections. This new interconnected context has brought about a paradigm of global health security. The shift has been backed by the World Health ­Organization, by creating global surveillance networks. These “networks of networks” are facilitating disease management across countries and the strengthening of health surveillance.

The Information Cycle of Surveillance Surveillance systems are often described and depicted as an information cycle, comprising a set of stages or processes. In the case of public health, these include planning and system design, data collection, data analysis, interpretation of results or generation of information, timely dissemi­nation and communication of findings, and the application of such information to health programs and practice. These systems also involve different stakeholders. The cycle begins with the occurrence of disease and the reporting of cases by the health care providers to the health authorities. Data about these cases are collected, analyzed, and interpreted to be later reported and disseminated. The cycle is not completed until the generated information is conveyed to the decision makers for taking action (normally referred to as those who need to know). Resulting actions have to do with disease prevention and control, and since most of the stakeholders have responsibilities for

Public Health, Surveillance in

these, it is conceivable that they should receive appropriate feedback of surveillance information. The information cycle yields different surveillance systems and strategies depending on the intensity (active or passive) of surveillance. Passive surveillance refers to the reports presented by hospitals or clinics based on routine health information (i.e., routine disease reporting) and health information management systems. On the contrary, active surveillance systems involve health care providers specifically instead of institutions. These professionals, through regular and direct contact initiated by health authorities, supply data on specific diseases and health conditions. Data quality and timeliness differ between both strategies: active ones are more accurate and timely, and consequently more expensive, than passive systems that provide incomplete reports. Selection of the surveillance system depends on the needs: Different objectives require different data and, therefore, different systems. For instance, prevention of the spread of epidemics asks for a quick answer to intervene and stop it; health managers need rapid and accurate information from an active system. On the other hand, monitoring the effects of a control program can be done by means of periodic population-based health surveys. Nevertheless, active surveillance is usually fomented by incentives and consequently normalizes surveillance as a rewarded activity, thus difficulty is a critical consideration of its further implications. Active surveillance plays a crucial role during disease outbreaks. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an outbreak is defined as the occurrence of more cases of disease than normally expected within a specific place or group of people over a certain period of time. Typically, outbreaks have been recognized either based on increased reports of notifiable diseases or by health providers who alert about clusters of disease. Major outbreaks are commonly detected through health surveillance and, preferably, at the earliest possible stage. Timeliness (lapse of time from exposure to the disease agent, to initiation of public health intervention) and validity (operational definition of the outbreak) of surveillance approaches are key factors for outbreak detection. Rapidness and accuracy are also key factors for stressing control for the sake of public health.

837

Surveillance strategies are basically designed and implemented according to the needs of the controllers. Some of the most used are (a) sentinel surveillance (samples of reporting sources that report all cases of defined diseases or conditions to detect health problems or indicate trends in an entire target population), (b) periodic populationbased surveys (repeated on a regular basis, they provide prevalence data and require careful methodology to allow for generalization of the results and avoid bias), (c) laboratory-based surveillance (used for infectious diseases surveillance, it requires resources, facilities, and training, as well as a central reference laboratory for quality control), or (d) integrated disease surveillance and response (known as IDSR; the strategy was first developed in Africa to link epidemiologic and laboratory data from communicable diseases). Surveillance of public health responds to the needs generated by the particular outbreak. Surveillance systems applied to public health vary depending on contextual factors. Environmental hazards and exposures, including toxic chemical agents, physical agents, biomechanical stressors, and biologic agents located in air, water, soil, food and other media, may cause health problems in the population; therefore, monitoring of subclinical, unapparent effects or clinical, overt diseases, injuries, or disabilities is critical in environmental surveillance. Besides traditional sources of health information (e.g., disease registries, vital statistics, or hospital data), environmental surveillance asks for sophisticated measurements of pollutants and toxins. Injuries are among the leading causes of death and disabilities worldwide, and their surveillance include monitoring the incidence, causes, and circumstances of both fatal and nonfatal injuries, either unintentional or violence related. In this case, additional surveillance settings such as forensic departments, coroner offices, law enforcement agencies, or medical examiners capture important data. The detection and control of infectious disease outbreaks also takes into account the possibility of biological terrorism, which requires early event detection and management. Environmental surveillance systems, notifiable disease reporting systems, and syndromic surveillance for early detections are the investigational approaches to monitor pertinent disease indicators. Other special surveillance systems are

838

Public Health, Surveillance in

those dealing with complex emergencies, such as disasters, and displaced, refugee populations; their goals are identification and elimination of preventable causes of morbidity and mortality, based on the general principles of surveillance. The final stage of the information cycle for surveillance is the application of the information generated by the system to health programs and practice. This applied element of “information for  action” includes control and corresponding response, policy development, and the inclusion of feedback. Further actions taken must be assessed to evaluate their impact on a population’s health. Evaluation of health surveillance systems commonly ensures that important health problems are being monitored efficiently and effectively. The intent of the evaluation is to focus on how well the systems operate to meet their purposes and objectives. Public health surveillance systems tend to be evaluated periodically, and the evaluation serves to identify ways to improve quality, efficiency, and usefulness. The systems may vary in method, scope, and purpose, and different attributes that are important to one system might be less important to others. Engaging the stakeholders in the evaluation process can provide input to ensure that the system addresses appropriate questions and assesses pertinent attributes and that the results will be acceptable and useful. In that context, stakeholders have been defined as those persons or organizations that use data for the promotion of healthy lifestyles and the prevention and control of disease, injury, or adverse exposure. However, generally speaking, current approaches leave out important issues that are not strictly medical.

Risks for Surveillance in Public Health Langmuir (1963) affirmed, “Good surveillance does not necessarily ensure the making of right decisions, but it reduces the chance of wrong ones.” The epidemiological perspective considers “good surveillance” to have accurate control and data collection on a wide range of details of patients and outbreaks. Right decisions are those that control, predict, and prevent effectively. But good and bad, right and wrong, are relative dichotomies. Although the benefits of promoting healthy populations are numerous, the societal costs of intensive and routine surveillance are not always considered. The

surveillance of public health raises concerns relating not only to personal data and privacy but also to dignity and stigmatization. Reporting health records to public authorities and interested third parties inevitably poses legal and ethical concerns about privacy and data protection. Health, much like security, is often seen as a societal value to be traded off with privacy and public health surveillance—as an information cycle—and implies data flows and data sharing that may challenge privacy rights. Beyond health agencies, research agents and policymakers might be interested in using the information produced to make better decisions and prospective or planning interventions for improvement. However, the approach by pharmaceutical or insurance companies to health databases has raised public debates on the ethical aspects and legitimate purposes of their data treatment. Public health surveillance is often premised on three assumptions: (1) that more information is better information, (2) that there is a clear distinction between healthy and unhealthy, and (3) that big data are good data. The More, the Better

It is taken for granted that the information cycle ends when the evidence produced reaches those who need to know. It is also believed that involvement of multiple stakeholders not only strengthens the surveillance process but also improves competences, participation, and engagement. However, it is worth considering that the more stakeholders are involved, the greater are the privacy risks. The questions to ask are what do they need to know and why. Do they need all the information or only subsets of the data collected (i.e., is it proportional)? Is it just for general knowledge or is it critical for decision making (i.e., is it for a legitimate purpose)? Do patients (data participants) know that they are being monitored and by whom, or how to exercise their data access and erasure rights to any of the data controllers or processors (transparency)? Healthy and Unhealthy

Surveillance practices targeting health are in the end forms of socially controlling risk-taking

Public Health, Surveillance in

behaviors, tracking avoidable people, and maintaining the “normal pattern.” Although health and illness have a biological basis, the dimension of social construct of health differentiating individuals according to their health statuses and their potential threat to others’ health is ultimately a form of social sorting. This social construction also defines those who are under surveillance and those who decide the purpose, the system, and the target. Recent investigations support the creation of risk maps for preventing the spread of infectious diseases. Visualizations of disease risks, usually through mapping, have potentially deep social effects such as stigmatization of people living in an area considered a hot spot for infection or even simply in an area deemed at risk. Big Data, Good Data

Since the advent of new information and communications technology and the Internet, data gathering and storage capacities have increased exponentially. For instance, tools have been developed to monitor health status through social media surveillance. This data gathering for representing individuals can lead to the creation of data doubles—sets of data that duplicate a real, physical person with varying degrees of fidelity. Google’s Flu Trends tool, which monitors keywords to derive predictions about flu patterns, illustrates the often unreliable nature of algorithmic deductions in public health surveillance: Google Flu Trends was found to be persistently overestimating flu prevalence. If decisions would have been made according to these results, health care providers would have been overprepared. More data do not mean better information or even valid information.

Information Era Electronic health or eHealth is a rapidly expanding industry due to the growing deployment of electronic health records, telemedicine, and cybermedicine. Individuals and patients are also driving this growth, using mobile apps for self-monitoring of health, which are in turn enabled by “wearables,” fully equipped with sensors and homebased hardware: Tracking physical activity, blood pressure, heart rate, or sleeping hours is now

839

­ ossible for anyone with a smartphone coupled p with the variety of wearables available on the market. In turn, all this information is generally stored in cloud-based systems. The generation of data always goes hand in hand with data management systems, in compliance with legal frameworks and without threatening the right to privacy of any individual. The challenge in the information era is to avoid indiscriminate data production and collection, turning public health into a form of “infodemiology” or “infoveillance.” Technological evolution brings new opportunities to control more but not necessarily in an acceptable and desirable manner. Epidemiologists, health care providers, and decision makers know that appropriate evaluation of public health surveillance systems becomes paramount as these systems adapt to new health-related events, the latest information technology, and current requirements for protecting patient privacy, data confidentiality, and system security. The future of public health surveillance is indeed reliant on health care providers, decision makers, and technological capacity. All the stakeholders involved in design, implementation, and evaluation of public health surveillance systems are trying to develop impact assessment tools— particularly where the expectations on technological capacity can lead to threatening privacy or surpass ethical safeguards and therefore to social rejection. Asking who those are who need to know, what they need to know, and why are fundamental questions. The deployment of increasingly powerful and infallible health surveillance technologies will succeed only when they meet with trust, desirability, and acceptability by society at large. Liliana Arroyo Moliner, Emília Sánchez Ruiz, and Philippe M. Frowd See also Big Data; Biometrics; Disease Model in Psychiatry; Drug Therapy; Health Management Organizations; Segregation, Residential; Social Sorting; Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Further Readings Armstrong, David. “The Rise of Surveillance Medicine.” Sociology of Health & Illness, v.17/3 (1995).

840

Punishment

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Surveillance Systems.” Morbidity and Mortality Week Report, v.50 (2001). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “CDC’s Vision for Public Health Surveillance in the 21st Century.” Morbidity and Mortality Week Report, v.61 (2012). Choi, Bernard C. K. “The Past, Present, and Future of Public Health Surveillance.” Scientifica, v.2012 (2012). doi:10.6064/2012/875253 Fairchild, A., et al. Searching Eyes: Privacy, the State, and Disease Surveillance in America. Berkeley: California University Press, 2007. French, M. “Gaps in the Gaze: Informatic Practice and the Work of Public Health Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society, v.12/2 (2014). French, Martin A. “Woven of War-Time Fabrics: The Globalization of Public Health Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society, v.6/2 (2009). Langmuir, A. D. “The Surveillance of Communicable Diseases of National Importance.” New England Journal of Medicine, v.268 (1963). Nsubuga, P., et al. “Public Health Surveillance: A Tool for Targeting and Monitoring Interventions.” In Dean T Jamison, et al. (eds.), Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006. ISBN-10: 0-8213-6179-1. Thomas, L. “Pandemics of the Future: Disease Surveillance in Real Time.” Surveillance & Society, v.12/2 (2014). Weir, L. and E. Mykhalovskiy. Global Public Health Vigilance: Creating a World on Alert. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010.

Punishment Punishment is universally accepted as the instrument for the restoration of conformity and order in society. The primary goal of punishment is to deter or prevent crime. Punishment is related to surveillance in that both are geared toward the prevention of crime, both have been employed in deterring citizens from committing crime, and both have benefited from advancement in technology. Punishment, as well as surveillance, can be applied both retroactively and reactively. Three factors have facilitated the application of surveillance for crime prevention in recent times: (1) improvement in digital technology, (2) capability for centralized surveillance, and

(3) the general public’s perception that surveillance is effective in preventing crime. Punishment may be organized informally or formally. An example of informal punishment is when parents employ sanctions against their recalcitrant children; an example of formal punishment is when government agents who have the requisite authority apply sanctions against erring members of society, often after a public finding of fault. It is important to  observe that punishment can be effective to the extent that there is general acceptance among the populace on the goals of punishment, especially the legitimacy of the institutions through which punishment is employed. Again, efforts are made to link the rationale of punishment with the values and norms of society, which is often a reflection of the modes of economic production. Therefore, for the surveillance apparatus to be effective, it must be tied to the changing forms of economic production and the resultant values of the society. Surveillance as a social control instrument is intended to promote or reinforce the sociocultural goals of society. The following discussion on punishment is focused on formal punishment, first discussing the concept of punishment and then exploring the various rationales for imposing punishment in society.

What Is Punishment? To fully understand the concept of punishment, the following six criteria must be taken into account according to Lucia Zedner. First, it is understood that there can be no crime without law. In other words, a behavior has to be first defined as a crime by a constituted authority before the individual who is involved in that behavior can be punished for the behavior. In the same vein, punishment cannot be applied without law. Second, the application of punishment presupposes that society is showing its disapproval of certain behavior or conduct. Participation in a behavior prohibited by law has to attract some kind of sanction, notably an imposition of pain or deprivation of some sort that the recipient will find unpleasant. Third, punishment can only be imposed by a state agency with the authority to do so. Other nonstate actors can impose punishment, but it is often carried out through state agencies with the mandate to enforce the law.

Punishment

The fourth criterion for understanding punishment, according to Zedner, is on recognize on whom and when the pain of punishment can be inflicted. The fifth factor for understanding punishment is to appreciate its social significance—that is, that punishment promotes and reinforces the collective conscience and works to support and uphold the position of those holding political power in society. The sixth and final criterion for understanding punishment is to account for its justification to deter people from committing a crime. In addition, punishment can be applied to ensure that people who violate the norms and laws of society make amends for their behavior that harmed other people and society. Punishment can be employed to protect people and property from dangerous people or to promote and reinforce society’s values and bonds. Last, punishment can also be imposed in retaliation for the wrongs done by an individual.

Rationales for Punishment Broadly speaking, there are four main justifications for imposing punishment in society: (1) deterrence, (2) rehabilitation, (3) incapacitation, and (4) retribution. A fifth rationale for punishment is for traditional reasons: We punish because we have always done it. Society has always applied punishment in some form in response to behavior it finds problematic. Another response to deviant behavior is to persuade the offender to “right the wrong” or pay restitution to the victim. Deterrence

The primary goal of punishment is to prevent crime by deterring people from committing crime. Following the deterrence rationale, offenders are likely to be deterred from future nonconforming behavior due to the unpleasantness they experienced as a result of the punishment imposed for their nonconforming behavior. There are two parts to the deterrence argument, namely, that of general deterrence and individual deterrence. General deterrence is the predominant rationale for the imposition of punishment. Following this principle, people who violate society’s norms and laws are punished to teach the general public a lesson that involvement in such behavior is not

841

approved and will attract sanctions. Informing this perspective is the understanding that offenders, like all other human beings, are intelligent and rational people who made decisions to engage in a deviant behavior because it serves their selfish interest. Punishment is therefore an attempt to teach offenders and others in society that crime does not pay. The second part of the deterrence argument is specific or individual deterrence. This perspective operates under the assumption that the offender premeditated before engaging in a deviant act. In other words, the offender weighed the pros and cons of committing the crime. Because the offender derived tangible and intangible benefits from committing the crime, society seeks to punish the offender as a cost for committing the crime. The cost should outweigh the benefit the offender sought to derive from the act. As rational actors, people are likely to desist from behaviors that society finds problematic, knowing the costs associated with such behaviors. Many people have questioned the deterrence justification for punishment. Chief among the critics is Thomas Mathiesen. According to Mathiesen, deterrence suggests that offenders thought through the benefits and costs of committing a crime. Available evidence suggests the contrary is the case, as a majority of convicted offenders acted under the influence of alcohol or drugs and so were not in a position to premeditate the benefits of their actions. In addition, the high recidivism rate suggests that neither the punishment nor the prospect of committing a crime is capable of deterring many offenders. Punishment may actually contribute to higher crime rates due to the habituating and socializing effects of incarceration. The general deterrence rationale for punishment is also challenged on moral and practical grounds. Many find it morally objectionable that society should punish someone just to frighten other law-abiding citizens. Most of those on the receiving end of society’s punitive policies are often those who are politically and economically marginalized in society. Punishment is therefore tantamount to double jeopardy, as the majority of offenders receiving harsh punishment are already victims of societies’ economic policies. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine the level of punishment that is effective and capable of deterring

842

Punishment

an individual offender and the general public to desist from committing a crime. Rehabilitation

The Positivistic school of thought advocated rehabilitation instead of retribution. This justification operates under the assumption that there are scientific bases to explain deviant behavior. The reasoning here is that the causes of delinquency are scientifically discoverable and therefore treatable. All society needs to do to prevent crime is to provide the offender the treatment he or she needs in order to avert the situation from getting worse and becoming more of a problem to society. From this perspective, rehabilitation is not intended as punishment, as it is for the offender’s good, given that the offender is a sick person. Questions about the effectiveness of rehabilitation in restoring offenders to law-abiding citizens abound. Rehabilitation, especially within the walls of prisons, is hardly effective, given the high recidivism rate. One reason for the failure of resocialization is the harshness of prison life, causing offenders to erect defenses that counteract the impacts of rehabilitation programs. Mathiesen further observed that the goal of rehabilitation is the restoration of the offender to a condition of competence that supposedly existed prior to offending, which is not always the case. Incapacitation

Another rationale for punishment is incapacitation, which is intended to constrain offenders from involvement in future deviant acts. This perspective assumes that society lacks the capacity to prevent or reduce crime and questions the efficacy of rehabilitation programs. Furthermore, because individual deterrence and general deterrence are difficult to achieve, incapacitating offenders by rendering them physically harmless or by limiting their ability to operate is probably the best way to protect society from dangerous individuals. Two known approaches to incapacitation are (1) collective incapacitation and (2) selective incapacitation. Collective incapacitation describes the policy of prescribing prison sentences to broad categories of repeat offenders of certain crimes. In this case, no attempt is made to predict who among

the suspects has a high risk of offending. Selective incapacitation refers to the policy of selectively incarcerating certain individual offenders who meet the particular criteria for being high-risk offenders. Imprisonment for a limited period of time is an example of temporary incapacitation; electronic tagging or home detention is another form of temporary incapacitation. Examples of permanent incapacitation include chemical castration for sex offenders, which makes it difficult for them to commit rape, and the death penalty, an extreme form of permanent incapacitation that makes it impossible for the offender to pose further threat to society. Criticisms against the incapacitation principle are that it undermines a fundamental legal principle in that people are punished based on speculation that they will commit a crime in the future instead of punishing them for having actually committed a crime. Moreover, offenders are punished out of concern that social factors such as their drug use, their unemployment, or even their race are risk factors that might predispose them to engaging in crimes in the future. Last, the incapacitation principle operates on the assumption that only individuals are to be blamed for their criminal acts, thus suggesting that the socioeconomic system is not a major contributor to crime. Retribution

The retribution justification for punishment follows “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” and the “just deserts” doctrines. Simply put, the offender must get the punishment he or she deserves. The goal of the retribution approach is not to rehabilitate the offender or prevent the offender from committing further crimes; the underlying principle is that the offender, being a rational, intelligent, and well socialized individual, conscious of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors in the community, chose to violate societal norms for selfish reasons and so deserves to be punished. The only option left for society is to make sure that the punishment is proportional to the gravity of the offense; that is, equally serious punishments are applied to equivalent types of offenses. Beyond teaching offenders the lessons they deserve for the harm they caused to society, punishment also has other social functions. According to sociologist Émile Durkheim, punishment reinforces

Punishment

society’s commitment to and respect for its norms. Furthermore, punishment bolsters society’s solidarity and commitment to protecting certain values. It  reassures other members of society that conforming conduct is appreciated and that those who choose to infringe on society’s rights are outcasts. Punishment also has educational values, in that it is an opportunity to teach community members the conducts that are prohibited. Over the years, the target of punishment shifted from the body to the mind. In the Middle Ages, inmates were whipped, stoned, branded, and/or mutilated as punishment. Other instruments of punishment used during the Middle Ages included execution through hanging, beheading, disemboweling, and drowning. According to philosopher Michel Foucault, prisons emerged to target an offender’s mind and to provide indirect control of the general public. Other explanations for this shift include society’s change in consciousness to perceiving physical punishment as cruel and inhumane and to recognizing the failure of such punishments in order to deter or reform offenders. Tradition

The review of the extant literature on the justification for punishment would not be complete without a brief discussion on tradition as a justification for administering punishment on community members who violate the norms and laws of society. Vilhelm Aubert observed that many societies punish because that is how their forebears responded to behaviors they found offensive. It is inconsequential that punishment has not deterred or prevented many from committing crime. Punishment is carried out because that is how it has always been done. Restorative Punishment

A recent justification for instituting punishment is that it is important to restore the victim of crime as well as society to the position they were in prior to their victimization as much as possible. Because victims of crime have suffered some harm, the primary goal of punishment from this perspective is the restoration of the victim’s emotional and material losses. The offender is held responsible for the victim’s losses and is made to pay restitution to the

843

victim. With restorative justice, the goal is not to punish the offender but to hold him or her responsible for paying reparation to the victim. Advocates of restorative justice view this doctrine as an alternative to punitive justice as its goal is the restoration of the victim and the community, as well as the reintegration of the offender into the community. One underlying assumption of the restorative justice principle is that justice can be accomplished without necessarily inflicting pain on the offender. Victimization is recognized as an opportunity for the reexamination of the social and economic conditions of society. Victimization presents an opportunity for the teaching and relearning of the values of society; therefore, rather than punishing the offender for punishment’s sake, the offender is held accountable by making him or her pay restitution and “right the wrong” for the victim and the community as much as humanly possible. Other forms of punishment under the restorative justice model include community service and compensation, both of which are geared toward making offenders better persons through learning from their mistakes. As a strategy, restorative justice works by identifying and taking the necessary steps to restore the harm caused by the victimization. The process involves all stakeholders to the crime, including the victim, the offender, the community, and relevant others. O. Oko Elechi and Rochelle E. M. Cobbs See also Crime Control; Incapacitation; Prisons and Jails; Social Control; Victim-Offender Mediation

Further Readings Aubert, Vilhelm. Continuity and Development: In Law and Society. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian University Press, 1989. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish (trans. Allan Sheridan). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1977. Mathiesen, Thomas. The Politics of Abolition. London, England: Martin Robertson, 1974. Tonry, Michael, ed. Why Punish? How Much? A Reader on Punishment. London, England: Oxford University Press, 2011. Zedner, Lucia. Criminal Justice. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 2004.

844

Punishment and Society

Punishment

and

Society

Punishment refers to chastisement whether legislated or not. There are four guiding principles that usually define punishment: 1. It is ordered and/or dispensed by a figure of authority. 2. It is in response to an act of wrongdoing. 3. The wrongdoer would experience some sort of loss. 4. The wrongdoer is the person deemed responsible for the act of wrongdoing.

While there have been arguments for and against various forms of punishment, the primary objectives are still relevant. After reviewing the history of punishment, this entry focuses on various aspects of punishment, including its role in deterring or changing behavior, and explores the relationship between punishment and surveillance.

Historical Context In ancient times, barbaric forms of ad hoc punishment were unfairly meted out for various acts of wrongdoing; today, this still holds true for some crimes in some parts of the world. Long ago, some of the more popular forms of punishment included quartering, flogging, boiling alive, execution in public, maiming, stoning, burning alive, and sentencing to the pillory. However, in the days of old, there were no formal codes for punishment— hence the unjust and ad hoc manner in which punishment was administered. In contemporary society, confinement in prisons is regarded as punishment for criminal offending, whereas many years ago, confinement in prisons was a prelude to the actual punishment such as maiming and flogging; prisons were in effect holding cells where the offenders were kept until the punishment was administered. Concerns expressed over the type of punishment and the extent of the punishment administered led to significant changes in society’s response to criminal offending.

Nature, Effect, and Extent of Punishment In contemporary society, the degree of punishment can vary, and this variance can be dependent on

several factors such as the country in which it takes place, the legislative framework, and the nature of the offense itself. Fear of crime is also a contributory factor: A perception that crime is on the rise or that an individual is likely to be a victim of crime, whether accurate or not, can hinder the creation of a safe society (or the perception of one). The manner in which punishment is administered is also extremely important. Many studies in the academic literature suggest that many of the same problems experienced with various forms of punishment in ancient times still exist today. Therefore, the true value of punishment cannot really be assessed in such instances. Many white-collar criminals, for example, have received a “slap on the wrist” following their convictions. In some countries, one’s socioeconomic position determines the punishment received, if any; whereas in other territories, barbaric forms of punishment mirror what existed in ancient days. For instance, today, in Papua New Guinea, persons who are believed to be witches are killed in front of onlookers, sometimes being burned alive. In Iran, public executions continue to be carried out. Stoning criminals to death, particularly for adultery, is still a form of punishment in places like Pakistan, Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and Nigeria. Many of these countries are deeply religious, and their criminal laws are generally interconnected with their spiritual beliefs, which begs the question, “Should the religious belief of the society be the primary or only consideration?” Many would agree that it must be given due consideration because culture determines the basis for the drafting of the laws in terms of what is considered socially acceptable or unacceptable. Many scholars have reasoned that punishment must also be fair, balanced, and in a proportionate amount to offset the pleasure derived from the crime. However, there are instances where these ideals have not been realized. For example, in 1995, a black man in California who was caught stealing a pair of socks valued at $2.50 was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined $2,500 in restitution. In 2004, in Iran, a 16-year-old girl was hanged for adultery and crimes against chastity; it was later revealed that her confession was extorted by torture and coercion and the judge also later confessed to a cover-up. Such events bring to the fore the inefficiencies and injustices that exist worldwide in the criminal justice system.

Punishment and Society

Punishment and Deterrence The punishment meted out to criminals plays a crucial role in society, particularly as it relates to deterrence and the maintenance of social control. Punishment is also a fundamental principle in socialization, as it is deemed a part of the pedagogy of a society to correct unwanted behavior. Some scholars contend that if the ability to punish offenders is taken away from society, the cloak of  protection from unwanted behavior will be removed and replaced by lawlessness and deviance. Thus, the institutions established under the criminal justice system are critical in achieving the objectives of punishment. On the one hand, some have questioned whether offenders have actually been punished since the punishment may not have the expected deterrent effect. On the other hand, others have argued that some form of punishment, when dispensed, is simply sufficient to constitute punishment. If the essence of punishment—that is, preventing the offender from engaging in a certain type of behavior in the future—is not achieved, then the offender would not have been punished, even though the punishment was administered. Conversely, although punishment may not have served a deterrent effect, it can cause harm to the offender. The harm may not be sufficient to deter the offender, but it may result in one or more of the punishment objectives being achieved. According to this argument, the harm incurred becomes indelible in the mind of the individual punished, which itself can serve as a deterrent. However, since the mid-1990s, penal theories have focused more on reform and rehabilitation and less on deterrence.

Punishment and Behavior The question has always been asked, “Should punishment be used to change the behavior of individuals or should other methods be employed?” While this entry cannot address all the merits and demerits of this argument, it can examine three of the key points in advancing such an argument. First, it has been established that punishment sometimes fails to curb undesired behavior and therefore does not fulfil its purpose. In addition, the argument that punishment breeds violence suggests that undesired behavior is further perpetuated with punishment. However, while this may be true in some instances, this statement

845

c­annot be accepted as a rule. Even if one were to  accept this, then how can one explain those instances when punishment was administered and the offender refrains from engaging in future criminal conduct? Second, criminological literature has advanced that certainty of punishment has a deterrent effect. In other words, after an offender engages in criminal conduct, punishment would naturally follow. It may be important here to test such a theory in different parts of the world by identifying when a criminal offence was committed and comparing it with the time span between the offense and the administration of the punishment in determining the applicability of such a theory. Finally, it has often been said that punishment and abuse can sometimes be interchangeable. Where punishment inflicts serious injury—whether it is physical, mental, psychological, or e­ motional— it can be considered abuse, but other questions arise: Isn’t punishment intended to leave an indelible impression on an offender? Where does one draw the line when it comes to punishment for criminal offending? Is abuse bad when it comes to punishing an offender for wrongdoing? Such questions have been and continue to be examined and analyzed in the criminological and criminal justice literature.

The Changing Sociocultural Relationship Between Surveillance and Punishment Surveillance and punishment are inextricably linked to the sociocultural dynamics of many countries. In some Asian and African countries, the sociocultural dynamics seem to be more entrenched with a significant link to religion based on tradition, habits, and beliefs. The strong influence of religion in some societies determines the severity of punishment. While adultery in many countries is not considered a crime, Zina and Zina-bil-jabr (adultery and rape by someone who is married) are still crimes in Pakistan, which result in offenders being stoned to death. In Saudi Arabia, beheading is still used today to punish offenders for crimes such as robbery, murder, and the formulation of an armed gang, with the punishment being carried out in public view with a sword (it is seemingly the lone country where this method of punishment is still enforced). Lethal

846

Punishment and Society

injection, hanging, firing squad, beheading, and electrocution are common forms of capital punishment exercised in some countries, although other forms of punishment such as imprisonment and fines are predominantly used in many Western societies. In some countries, particularly African and Asian countries, traditional forms of punishment are still relevant and in some instances more respected than methods used in the contemporary criminal justice system. However, in other countries, such as in North America and Europe, since the mid-1980s, surveillance and punishment are more reflective of the significant advances in information and communication technology. These advances have led to new methods of surveillance and, ultimately, punishment. In many large societies, the form and type of punishment varies from one state to another. For example, the introduction of closed-circuit television has provided an additional avenue to monitor would-be offenders and those who are imprisoned. In addition, some prison authorities have introduced cell phone jammers, scanners, and other technological equipment in response to the challenges being experienced with inmates. Thus, while traditional forms of surveillance continue to be used, other more advanced technology methods are simultaneously being used. Nevertheless, for the most part, a legislative framework now forms the basis for identifying and punishing acts of wrongdoing, with a criminal justice system the vehicle through which the criminal conduct is  identified and ruled on and the punishment administered. To prevent offenders from committing similar crimes in the future and/or to promulgate making amends, many countries have incorporated other

aspects in punishing offenders, including rehabilitation, restitution, retribution, and reintegration. Therefore, one might conclude that if punishment were effective as it was originally intended, there may have been no need to introduce these other aspects. However, while these “new” forms of punishment are seemingly more humane, their effectiveness is debated as crime in some countries continues to increase and criminals are inventing new and innovative ways by which to carry out their criminal acts. Policymakers must therefore focus their attention on the advantages and disadvantages of these new methods in an effort to find the most suitable forms of punishment for criminal offending. However, the method of punishment selected will likely be based on the cultural dynamics of the society in which it takes place since the religious and cultural influences often dictate the method of punishment. However, criminal offending is a global issue that crosses perceived cultural and religious borders, to which contemporary societies must now give due consideration. Karen Lancaster-Ellis See also Capital Punishment; Probation; Punishment; Victim-Offender Mediation

Further Readings Hood, Roger. “Capital Punishment: A Global Perspective.” Punishment and Society, v.3/3 (2001). Ward, David A. and Thomas G Werlich. “Alcatraz and Marion: Evaluating Super-Maximum Custody.” Punishment and Society, v.5/1 (2003). Warr, Mark. “Poll Trends: Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment.” Public Opinion Quarterly, v.59/2 (1995).

R and government entities to surveil and track citizens’ movements, consumer consumption, medical information, financial transactions, and any other activities that could potentially be monitored by RFID technologies.

Radio-Frequency Identification Devices Radio-frequency identification devices (RFID), often called tags or chips, utilize radio waves to identify or locate an object, product, animal, or person through integrated circuitry that combines transistors, transponders, microprocessors, and a tiny silicon computer chip that is usually the size of a grain of sand. The integrated circuit is coupled with a flat, metallic microcoil that serves as an antenna to transmit and receive radio wave signals over short or long distances either to or from an RFID reader, and the circuitry stores and processes the data in the computer chip. Unlike Universal Product Codes, RFID technology does not require line of sight for a reader to communicate information from a distance because it functions via electromagnetic energy. The effi­ ciency, convenience, and practicality of RFID technology make it useful for a variety of applications in numerous private and public sector industries, including manufacturing, retail, pharmaceuticals, the health care system, financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, correctional facilities, the U.S. military, and other emerging markets. Although RFID technology has been hailed in many circles for revolutionizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the services provided by various industries, it has also opened up a renewed debate on the potential for unlawful intrusions into constitutionally protected privacy rights of citizens if this technology is used unethically by corporate

Types and Applications There are two types of RFID tags in existence: active and passive. Active tags are able to actively transmit information without requiring a reader to initiate the transmission because these tags have an internal power source. Active tags also have the capacity to have new data written to and stored on them. Conversely, passive tags need an RFID reader to solicit a signal from them because they lack their own power supply. Active tags can store larger amounts of data and transmit over farther distances than passive tags, which make them ideal for commercial use and government-based agencies. The use of RFID tags to streamline and fully automate the supply chain management systems for large-scale retailers has proven to be quite successful at reducing costs and increasing the speed and efficiency of inventory management. With RFID tags, especially active tags, the ability to track products from manufacturing to distribution warehouses and from pallets for shipping to retail store delivery allows for a simplified process that enhances quality control and data collection. With this technology, product recall procedures can be expedited and stock inventory manifests automatically updated to maintain adequate product supply without having to check shelves or 847

848

Radio-Frequency Identification Devices

respond to customer complaints. Data may also be collected to determine trending consumer ­habits, tastes, or preferences. With regard to the pharmaceutical industry, tagging medicines with RFID tags allows the Food and Drug Administration to authenticate drugs for pharmacies and combat drug counterfeiting. Some drugs, such as Sudafed, can be used to ­produce methamphetamine, so it is likely that purchases of large quantities may be for illicit drug sales. RFID technology enables regulatory agencies like the Food and Drug Administration to minimize drug theft and counterfeiting while also increasing the efficiency of drug recalls. In addition, RFID tags have become useful for nurses and physicians working in hospitals and clinics, because these tags can be placed on medical devices and instruments for tracking. Patients and newborn babies can wear wristbands fitted with RFID tags for patient identification and monitoring. This can reduce the risk of infant abductions or medical mishaps where patients might mistakenly receive medical services intended for another patient. Financial institutions that issue credit cards have now embedded RFID technology into particular cards, which will allow for EZ-Pay transactions so that card swiping is no longer necessary. RFID credit cards are loaded with a personal identification code that is automatically authenticated, and the customer’s account is charged while a digital transaction record is documented with the store and the financial institution. Cash currency permits anonymity with its use, whereas RFID credit cards will maintain an electronic record of all purchases made, which can be searched and data mined later. Similarly, RFID technology is used in E-ZPass devices, which are mounted inside vehicles, allowing motorists to drive through tollbooths without having to stop, because the RFID reader at the booth elicits the credit card information from the E-ZPass and charges the toll automatically to the customer’s account. An electronic transaction record is also stored by the tollbooth reader, which would not be documented if the customer paid with cash. The development of injectable tags that are encapsulated in a tiny glass tube have made it possible for RFID tags to be implanted into millions of household pets and livestock animals. The

capsule protects the active RFID tag and its digital hybrid circuitry, which can store data regarding the animal’s owner and other identifying information. RFID implants make it easier for lost pets to be reunited with their owners and for livestock farmers and ranchers to monitor their herds from birth to slaughter. VeriChip Corporation has developed an RFID chip for human implantation. The potential types of information that could be stored on VeriChip human implants include medical records, financial information, citizenship status, and even one’s location if the chip is combined with Global Positioning System (GPS) technology. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is contemplating the use of RFID implants in soldiers to monitor their vital signs, health information, and location during combat in order to expedite medical evacuations and minimize casualties. David Barash and Charles Webel speculate that because RFID chips are being developed for military application, it is plausible that they could also be used in espionage or to do harm from within the body as a form of torture. There are numerous applications in which RFID technology can be employed by law enforcement agencies and correctional facilities. For instance, this technology is behind the LoJack stolen car recovery system. When a person has the LoJack transceiver affixed in a hidden location on his or her vehicle, the unit and the car’s vehicle identification number are registered with a database that interfaces with the National Crime Information Center, which is used by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. If a car with the LoJack system is stolen, then law enforcement personnel can use these computer systems, antenna system arrays, and tracking units that are housed in police cruisers or police aircraft to locate the stolen vehicle. Electronic monitoring is a procedure in which former incarcerates on parole are fitted with an anklet that contains RFID transponders, which will alert local law enforcement if the parolee goes beyond the range of the receiver in an attempt to violate the conditions of his or her parole. Electronic monitoring is also used for those on probation in the community. These anklets have GPS capabilities that allow probation and parole officers to track and monitor the real-time location of probationers and parolees, respectively. Correctional facilities

Radio-Frequency Identification Devices

in many states, including California, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio, currently use an RFID tracking system that requires inmates to wear a tamperresistant, wristwatch-sized transmitter and correctional officers to wear a belt-mounted transmitter, which are both detected every 2 seconds by antennae arrays strategically placed throughout the facility. These RFID tracking systems are intended to enhance the surveillance of inmate populations and minimize institutional infractions, riots, and unauthorized leave. Passports may soon be embedded with RFID chips for those wishing to travel internationally. Currently, enhanced driver’s licenses and U.S. passport cards contain RFID chips that make for a more convenient process of reentering the United States when American citizens travel to Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, or the Caribbean through land or seaports. These identification cards have a vicinity-read RFID chip, which signals a secure system to look up the travelers’ biographic and biometric data for the border patrol officer to inspect as the traveler approaches the border crossing. The Department of Homeland Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs with the Department of State claim that these forms of personal identification do not have any other form of personal information written on the chips and that these chips only have a unique number that identifies a stored record within secure government databases. However, these cards are issued with protective sleeves for security reasons because if left exposed another person could elicit the information stored on the chips by getting close enough and using an RFID reader, which can be purchased easily and inexpensively online. Similar security concerns have been raised for RFID credit cards.

Security and Privacy Concerns There are numerous crime-related activities in which criminals can infiltrate and manipulate RFID technology for personal gain. First, individuals can use an RFID reader to steal personal information from someone’s RFID credit cards for the purpose of identity theft or fraud, which is a process called sniffing. Spoofing refers to cloning or copying information from an RFID chip and loading it onto a different chip to commit theft or

849

other crimes. Criminals might be able to use RFID technology to stalk or track unwary citizens by harnessing this technology’s GPS capabilities. Also, there are various types of signal-jamming devices that can be used by criminals to create denial-of-service attacks on RFID systems. Last, computer-generated viruses can be created and used to crash RFID databases or wipe information clear from chips. Although proponents of RFID technology commend its efficiency and speed, some scholars and privacy rights advocates have raised concerns about how RFIDs could serve a panoptic function for private and governmental entities to constantly monitor citizens’ movements, their consumer habits, and any other information that can be potentially stored on these chips. For example, Brian Sellers and Bruce Arrigo argue that the surveillance capabilities of RFID technology, as well as its widespread adoption across various industries, may give private corporations and governmental agencies an unprecedented ability to infringe on the privacy rights of citizens without proper warning. Case law precedence has found implicit support for the public’s reasonable expectation of privacy, as understood by the interpretation of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, unless a legitimate state interest, such as public safety or national security, is at stake. At such times, the state’s security needs will presumably outweigh the individual privacy rights of citizens. The perceived threat of global terrorism following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States created the impetus for several policy shifts in the surveillance practices of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The potential use of RFID technologies to vigilantly track and monitor citizens, or those deemed high risk, has revived the relevance of the risk society thesis, which suggests that social control through new forms of surveillance technologies that seek to balance the risks of victimization against the otherwise unwarranted intrusion into citizen privacy and other rights deprivation may become an institutionalized norm. Brian G. Sellers See also Panopticon, The; Privacy, Right to; Risk Society Thesis; Technology

850

Religion

Further Readings Albrecht, Katherine and Liz McIntyre. Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track Your Every Move With RFID. Nashville, TN: Nelson Current, 2005. Anderson, Amber and Vladimir Labay. “Ethical Considerations and Proposed Guidelines for the Use of Radio Frequency Identification: Especially Concerning Its Use for Promoting Public Safety and National Security.” Science and Engineering Ethics, v.12/2 (2006). Barash, David and Charles Webel. Peace and Conflict Studies (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014. Erickson, G. Scott and Eileen Kelly. “International Aspects of Radio Frequency Identification Tags: Different Approaches to Bridging the Technology/ Privacy Divide.” Knowledge, Technology, and Policy, v.20/2 (2007). Nellis, Mike. “Surveillance, Rehabilitation, and Electronic Monitoring: Getting the Issues Clear.” Criminology & Public Policy, v.5/1 (2006). Sellers, Brian and Bruce Arrigo. “Radio Frequency Identification Technology and the Risk Society: A Preliminary Review and Critique for Justice Studies.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology, v.1/2 (2009).

Religion Discourses surrounding religion and surveillance are complex, due not so much to their association as to how they have evolved, both contingently and in relation to each other. High technology has brought much ease to everyday life. With a few clicks or swipes, one can connect with people across the globe, becoming familiar with distant neighborhoods and lands. Generally, people are accepting of the fact that their information is recorded—a fair trade-off for their technologically enhanced and alleviated lives. The intersecting crossroads between high technology, the Internet, social media, and one’s image and sense of self have been interesting topics in recent scholarship. Scholars, fully aware of technology companies’ godlike ability to know intimate details about individuals, question whether or not these companies’ algorithms are in fact crafting people’s identities controlled by external prevailing forces. This entry discusses the scholarship pertaining to what truly constitutes the nature of religion

and surveillance, describes their connection and evolvement in modern times, and examines a particular case study and its related implications.

The Nature of Religion Numerous scholars, through different avenues of study, have drawn similar conclusions about the nature of religion. According to Peter Beyer, religion is simply a function, a communication system based on self-reproduction and expansion. This function, a binary function to be precise, differentiates between the “blessed” and the “cursed.” Consequently, the patterns of communication— labeling the “other” and performing analogous rituals—generate a sense of collective identity and thus provide meaning as well as closure. This function system is explanatory of the numerous typologies and extremes seen in the Abrahamic faiths as well as in new religious movements. If anything, religious movements can be seen as a means to reinforce one’s identity within the sphere of surrounding events. This view is also profoundly pronounced within the works of David Lyon. Lyon’s “Jesus in Disneyland” illustrates the notion that “there is no one size fits all” and our numerous identities, be they religious zealots or religion-hating atheists, are all a means of finding content and relief. Charles Taylor discusses notions of the “social imaginary,” which is a set of values, institutions, laws, and symbols that become common to particular social groups and the corresponding society through which people imagine their social whole. These values and symbols of religion are inherently culturally constructed categories. Political configurations of power are seen as fundamental in determining if something is religious or political. Theologian Karen Armstrong expands on this idea, detailing how religion was a creation of the early-modern period. The isolated concept of holiness had no place in traditions prior to the Protestant Reformation. The Arabic word din means an entire way of life; the Sanskrit dharma covers law, politics, and social institutions as well as piety; and the Hebrew Bible has no abstract concept of religion. Interestingly, as Armstrong highlights, no word in either Greek or Latin corresponds to the English religion or religious.

Religion

The numerous writings surrounding the nature of religion, although occurring on different pathways, converge to recognize that religion is merely a means of cultivating a sense of belonging, a sense of self, and an overarching identity that is reinforced by differentiation.

Relinquishing Control The etymology of surveillance is rooted in the French word suveiller, defined as “to watch over” and understood as any focused attention to personal details for the purpose of influence, management, and control. Surveillance is considered liquid according to Lyon, as it is wide-ranging, mobile, and flexible and includes everything from face-to-face encounters and reading someone else’s email to babysitting and reconnaissance by a state’s military intelligence unit. Intellectuals have long been infatuated with the notions behind surveillance. Lyon explores the long trajectory of such analyses, from Karl Marx’s evaluations of labor intensification and Max Weber’s examination of military-bureaucratic record keeping to George Orwell’s 1984 and Michel Foucault’s “Panopticon.” Lyon’s research points out that surveillance is not merely a mechanism of the state but also occurs in corporations. Relevant to modern society and its obsession with social media is Lyon’s argument regarding society at large and its willingness to engage in selfsurveillance. According to Lyon, surveillant subjects do not just accept their assigned roles in surveillance systems, but they also reconfigure their identities as a result. This theory, in line with Foucault’s “Panoptic surveillance,” alludes to the modification of behavior by those in power; when it is coupled with Lyon’s self-surveillance theory, further elaborations can discern the process of religious radicalization.

Projecting Secrecy Surveillance and secrecy have been viewed as the building blocks on which religion was built. This is ubiquitous across the spectrum of religions, regardless of geographical location or time period. According to all three mainstream Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), not only does our world begin and end with surveillance

851

and secrecy, but also everything in between consists of being watched. Robin Tudge highlights the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden and how they were made aware of their nakedness and wore fig leaves to cover their genitals after eating the forbidden fruit. The prophecies, including those of Jesus, bring light into the world, representing goodness, because it allows everything and everyone to be watched. Similarly, the Qur’an states, “Most surely your Lord is watching.” According to Islamic tradition, each and every one of us has two angels on our shoulders; the rightshouldered angel records our good deeds and the angel on the left, our bad deeds. Abrahamic faiths believe in the Day of Judgment, where all of our recorded deeds will be judged, determining our fate in the afterworld. Secrecy and surveillance, however, are not limited to the mainstream Abrahamic faiths; they are prevalent in numerous other forms and rituals. In the more mystical practices of the Abrahamic faiths (i.e., Sufism, Jewish Kabbalah, and Christian Gnosticism), according to Donald Bishop, elements of secrecy, including the secret knowledge of the divine, are associated with the various rituals that bring about inward spiritual enlightenment. Furthermore, Douglas Brooks and Daniel Cozort’s discussions on Eastern traditions emphasize the secretive esoteric practices of Buddhism and Hinduism, expressed through Tantra, whereby continuous methods, techniques, and practices are believed to bring one closer to the divine. Roger Bastide underlines the secret knowledge, rituals, and symbols that shape the Indigenous and African diaspora traditions, through which they are able to define their differences from the outside world. New Age religious movements, such as the Church of Scientology, also claim to possess secret knowledge unavailable to mainstream society. Nevertheless, numerous scholars look toward such religious movements with suspicion when the secret knowledge is attainable only through financial compensation; journalist Louis Theroux refers to such practices as “spiritual hamburgers.” As academics have noted, secrecy and religion have traditionally gone hand in hand. But in today’s more contentious globalized world, notions of religious secrecy can be detrimental. As more recent scholarship has suggested, this clash

852

Religion

is not a result of civilizations as much as economic resources projected through one’s occult identifications. These physiologically inherited traits for survival and economic sustenance can create extremes for both the oppressor and the oppressed.

Case Study As seen from the previous discussion, surveillance is contextual, transcultural, and transreligious. It has been presumed that Saudi Arabia has a mass surveillance program on its Shia Muslim community and that Pakistan has an extensive surveillance program on its Hindu and Christian communities. The particular case study presented in this section examines an often discussed surveillance program in the United States: the documenting and profiling of Muslim Americans by the New York Police Department (NYPD), the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Mapping Muslims

According to investigative reports from the Associated Press, in the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the NYPD stepped up its aggressive policing practices and surveillance on concentrations of American Muslims throughout metropolitan New York City. The clandestine unit, set up within the Intelligence Division and initially known as the Demographics Unit, was later denoted as the Zone Assessments Unit. Such discriminatory practices were not new for the NYPD as it has a long history of spying on anarchists, among other rebellious, politically active groups, individuals, and populations. Throughout the 1930s to 1960s, various political activists (e.g., communists, ­anarchists, labor activists, and civil rights activists) were subjected to NYPD surveillance. The investigative reports of NYPD describe the religious profiling of Muslims, the targeting of prominent Muslim religious and community leaders, and the placement of undercover agents in mosques, student associations, organizations, and businesses. Motives behind the NYPD surveillance program can be found in the 2007 NYPD Intelligence Division report titled Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. Numerous experts on Islam have regarded the report as prejudiced

based on its broad definition of radicalization. Accordingly, Muslims who simply harbor Islamic beliefs, engage in religious practices, wear traditional clothes, grow beards, abstain from alcohol, and become involved in social activism are to be treated with suspicion as they are taking part in “radicalization.” Documented investigations have raised awareness of the numerous methods practiced by the NYPD to surveil Muslims communities. First, neighborhoods were mapped out in accordance with areas that were predominately occupied with “ancestries of interest,” as well as areas with high concentrations of black American Muslims. Excluded from these mapping activities were nonMuslim ethnic heritages, such as Iranian Jews and Coptic Christian Egyptians. Second, NYPD officers took pictures and recorded video footage of license plates in mosque parking lots. Third, informants were selected from a pool of arrestees, known as “mosque crawlers,” and were instructed to create conversations about jihad or terrorism within public Muslim gatherings and to report the responses to the police. Fourth, police “rakers” were deployed in Muslim communities based on their ability to blend into them through shared language or ethnic heritage, while reporting all their observances to the police. The fifth practice involved tracking individuals on the basis of name changes. Those who were known to be converts to Islam or Muslims who simply wanted to “Americanize” their names were also investigated. Last, the NYPD Intelligence Division placed thousands of Muslim American names in secret police files in an intelligence database to generate intelligence reports. In addition to the Associated Press’s investigation, files leaked by the U.S.-government contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the FBI and the National Security Agency had profiled notable Muslim Americans, including prominent lawyers, civil rights leaders, and academics. According to the documents, the FBI instructed its counterterrorism agents in the likelihood of mainstream American Muslims would become terrorist sympathizers and that the Islamic practice of giving charity is no more than a funding mechanism for combatants. According to the FBI, the more devout a Muslim, the more likely he or she is to be violent.

Religion

Five identified Americans included in the Snowden leaks—all with Muslim American backgrounds—were (1) Faisal Gill, who served as a top advisor for the Department of Homeland Security in the George W. Bush administration; (2) Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney for ­al-Haramain and other clients involved in national security cases; (3) Nihad Awad, executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations; (4)  Hooshang Amirahmadi, a Rutgers University professor; and (5) Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at California State University and champion of Muslim American civil liberties. Findings

According to a joint study by the City University New York School of Law and the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition, with the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility and the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund as contributing authors, the social profiling and surveillance of Muslim communities has resulted in resounding repercussions not only for mainstream Muslim populations but also for society at large. Arguably, the most substantial consequence of the NYPD surveillance program concerns the suppression of safe religious practices for Muslims. Many Muslims, aware that mosques in metropolitan New York City are under surveillance, have become paranoid and suspicious about attending prayers and community gatherings, which has consequently interfered with their spiritual and personal lives. Imams (Muslim religious leaders) have been known to record sermons to ensure that the messages are not taken out of context. The surveillance programs have resulted in Muslims exercising extreme caution in their daily practices, avoiding expressing any outward depictions of their Islamic faith that are otherwise ordinary and peaceful. Mosque attendance has declined since the revelation of the Associated Press’s investigations. The suspicions imposed on Muslims have fostered an atmosphere of unease and distrust within their communities. Newcomers to mosques or recent converts experience the greatest marginalization based on the possibility of their being informants. The high levels of anxiety have led to self-censorship on many religious and political topics, mostly

853

for fear of being taken out of context. The word jihad, which simply means “to struggle,” has become imbued with violent connotations, and many Muslims fear using it because it may be misinterpreted or falsely defined. Stigmatization, not only of Muslims by nonMuslims but also of Muslims by other Muslims, has ensued from the practices of the NYPD. ­Theorists have argued that the NYPD surveillance tactics are modeled in part on Israeli military tactics employed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and that they intentionally seek to divide Muslim communities, preventing the development of a united religious body. A growing number of young educated Muslim professionals express concern about how their colleagues would perceive them based on the NYPD’s surveillance program. The suspicion and perceived dangerousness of Muslims has also resulted in a reported rise in hate crimes against Muslims in New York City.

Modern-Day Mythology Scholarship has generally viewed religions as merely identifications; they are how we situate ourselves in the world, create feelings of contentment, and perhaps represent a means of coming to terms with the unknown. In addition to religions defining our roles, experts see them as delineating roles for everyone around us too, dividing people into teams based on likeness and arbitrary similarities. Surveillance, then, is a tool used to entrench these identities, to put them into practice, to define and redefine them based on a variety of factors ranging from social and economic to political. It comes in a plethora of packages and manifests in various ways depending on the user. When surveillance is used as a tool of control and redefines the identities of its subjects in a way that directly conflicts with their interpretations of themselves, the lines can become blurred and the slope slippery. In the case of NYPD surveillance of Muslims in New York City, an atmosphere of suspicion has threaded its way into the fabric of these communities. While the surveillance attempts to reconstruct and resituate Muslims in the minds of the broader community, Muslims are also reconstructing and resituating the power base doing the surveilling, whereby they inadvertently internalize the radical notions to which they are accused of subscribing.

854

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

As Armstrong points out, when anything is applied by force, it provokes a fundamentalist reaction. Thus a religious free market is imperative to creating peaceful, unperturbed societies. Zeshaun Saleem See also Federal Bureau of Investigation; Identity Politics; National Security Agency; National Security Agency Leaks; New York, New York, Surveillance in; Surveillance, Culture of

Further Readings Ackerman, Spencer. “FBI Teaches Agents: Mainstream Muslims Are Violent, Radical.” Wired (September 14, 2011). http://www.wired.com/2011/09/fbi-muslimsradical/ (Accessed September 2017). Apuzzo, Matt and Adam Goldman. “AP’s Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations.” Associated Press (July 2015). http://www.ap.org/Index/AP-In-TheNews/NYPD (Accessed July 2015). Armstrong, Karen. “The Myth of Religious Violence.” Guardian (September 25, 2014). https://www .theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/25/-sp-karenarmstrong-religious-violence-myth-secular (Accessed July 2015). Barkun, Michael. “Religion and Secrecy after 9/11.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, v.74 (2006). Bauman, Zygmunt and David Lyon. Liquid Surveillance. London, England: Polity, 2012. Beyer, Peter. Religions in Global Society. London, England: Routledge, 2003. CUNY School of Law. “Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its Impact on American Muslims” (n.d.). http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/ immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf (Accessed July 2015). Fin, Roger and Brian J. Grim. The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Greenwald, Glen and Murtaza Hussain. “Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On.” The Intercept (July 9, 2014). https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/09/undersurveillance/ (Accessed July 2015). Lyon, David. Jesus in Disneyland: Religion in Postmodern Times. London, England: Polity, 2002. Lyon, David. Surveillance After Snowden. London, England: Polity, 2015.

Tudge, Robin. The No-Nonsense Guide to Global Surveillance. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: New Internationalist, 2011.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) was an attempt by the U.S. Congress to reinstate the compelling state interest standard of judicial review of state laws that was abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) for a standard that stated that the law must be one of equal applicability between secular and religious groups. The act recognizes that the government must respect the free exercise of religion, an unalienable right in the eyes of the U.S. Constitution framers. The act also states that while a law may be neutral toward religion, it may nevertheless pose a burden on citizens’ free rights to exercise their religion. Congress saw this as a governmental intrusion into the privacy of citizens. Yet states had an equally compelling reason to support the change made by the Supreme Court. States argued that while they do not want to burden free exercise, their police powers demand that they protect the health, safety, and morals of their citizenry. This entry reviews Supreme Court cases that helped establish RFRA as well as subsequent cases that have continued to shape its interpretation. The entry also investigates how RFRA affects individuals’ privacy and security, and it concludes with a look at how a more recent case has once again stirred the debate about RFRA and its application.

Relevant Supreme Court Decisions RFRA has a controversial history since its passage. The legal basis for the act can be found starting in Reynolds v. United States (1878), wherein George Reynolds’s conviction of bigamy was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court found that while Reynolds could believe anything he wanted as a Mormon, it did not give him the right to act on it. As Utah gave up legalized bigamy to enter the United States, that ban was applied to

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

everyone equally and was good law. Eighty-five years later in Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Court established the Sherbert Test, which inquired into the sincerity of the belief, whether the law created a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and whether there was a compelling state interest to create the burden. Fewer than 30 years later, in Employment Div. v. Smith, the Court reverted back to its Reynolds support of laws of equal applicability. RFRA was passed 2 years after Smith by a near unanimous Congress determined to correct what it saw as a gross error on the part of the Court. In City of Boerne v. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio, et al. (1997), the Court overturned RFRA, finding that Congress had violated separation of powers by interpreting the Constitution, the sole job of the Court. While the Court did take exception to RFRA, it did not overturn the law completely, only the application of it to the states; the Court continued to apply the act to federal laws, such as in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal (2006) and again in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014). The issues of security and privacy are the same ones that occur in all matters regarding civil liberties protected from government intrusion enshrined in the Bill of Rights. While the Supreme Court has pointed out that no liberty or right is absolute, citizens must be vigilant against undue government limitations of these rights.

Security and Privacy The security of citizens and their rights is of paramount importance in enforcing the Bill of Rights, including the Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In many civil rights cases, the Court finds that the insecurity of citizens in their liberties can lead to dominance of the minority by the majority and limitation on all rights. By changing the free ­exercise standard to laws of equal applicability from compelling state interest, Congress believed that the Court was placing undue burdens on the rights of minority religions. Any law could limit the fundamental right to practice one’s faith as long as it also applied to those who do not p ­ ractice the same faith. No one was arguing that extreme forms of religious worship activity that put society at risk as a whole were protected (i.e., human sacrifice),

855

but religious worship activity that did not affect society was the focus of the protection. Privacy walks hand-in-hand with security. Religion is not always a strictly private matter that can be left at home. Many faiths require their members to participate in public and private actions. Private actions may include the attendance at religious services and prayer, as well as the ingestion of solids and liquids. Many faiths also use incense, candles, or the burning of papers or other items in an effort to communicate or become closer to their deities. If the state determines that the private act of ingesting a substance, such as peyote, is unlawful, government is interfering with the private act of worship. Furthermore, if the substance is found to be illegal, then the government is now involved in the surveillance of a constitutionally protected action, which is behavior by the government that the Constitution was trying to prevent.

Current Debate RFRA is being pushed into new areas of religious jurisprudence. The application of RFRA’s need for a compelling state interest has been solely applied to individuals or to individual religious organizations. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court, for the first time, applied religious freedoms to a corporation, thus expanding the entities that are protected under RFRA. This is not the first time that the First Amendment was applied to corporations; most would argue that media corporations should have free speech and free press rights. What is unique about the Hobby Lobby case is that the religious convictions of the board of a closely held company were to be considered, and protected, when it came to company policy. The debate over RFRA’s constitutionality as to compelling state interest over laws of equal applicability seems to have been settled. The Supreme Court has accepted Congress’ law as applied to the federal government, and many states have followed suit by passing their own compelling interest laws. The debate over the application of RFRA will likely continue well into the future as Hobby Lobby opens a new venue of jurisprudence of religious freedom and avoiding federal regulations. Mary L. Carver

856

Republican Party

See also Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010; U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Bridge, Dave. “Religious Freedom or Libertarianism: What Explains State Enactments of Religious Freedom Restoration Act Laws?” Journal of Church and State, v.56/2 (2014). Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ___ (2014). City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Edwards, Joshua A. “Yellow Snow on Sacred Sites: A Failed Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.” American Indian Law Review, v.34/1 (2009). Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). Peterson, Kristina. “Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Ruling Ignites Debate Over Religious Freedom Law: Decision Cites Two-Decades-Old Religious Freedom Restoration Act.” The Wall Street Journal (June 30, 2014). http://online.wsj.com/articles/supreme-courtshobby-lobby-ruling-ignites-debate-over-religiousfreedom-law-1404155510 (Accessed October 2017). Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

Republican Party The Republican Party of the United States was formed in a period of intense debate regarding governing and slavery. The divisive issue of slavery split the Whigs into northern and southern allegiances, as smaller, single-issue parties struggled to bring their issues into national discussion. Citizens from Michigan and Wisconsin, united against slavery, created the first Republican Party. Since that time, the Republican Party has played a significant role in shaping U.S. security and surveillance policies that, to this day, continue to be debated. This entry provides a background of the Republican Party; investigates how the party played a leading role in shaping security and surveillance policies after the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001 (9/11), with the creation of the USA

PATRIOT Act; looks at a neoconservative faction of the Republican Party that has claimed a prominent role in the political landscape; and concludes with a look at how the Democratic Party has leveraged some authority away from the Republican Party with regard to security and surveillance.

Background Beginning with the election of President Abraham Lincoln in 1860, the Republican Party dominated national politics until the election of Democratic president Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. The growth of conservatism in the party in the 1960s, corresponding with the growth of liberalism in the Democratic Party at the same time, realigned the Republican Party. In the second half of the 20th century, the strength of the conservative voice in the Republican Party led the charge to limit the growth of the national government and speak against intervention in foreign policy. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan led a Republican Party that began the process of asserting the interests of the United States by supporting the growth of democracies abroad, including through military intervention. Reagan sent troops to Grenada, escalated the Cold War through the buildup of the U.S. military, and supported anticommunist regimes throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Despite this interventionist foreign policy agenda, Reagan and his successor, George H. W. Bush, led a party that advocated limited government at home. In 2000, the election of George W. Bush began an era of tremendous change for the Republican Party regarding security and surveillance. These changes caused members of the Republican Party to become the leading advocates for increased infringements on privacy and created a conflict within the party over whether those infringements reflected party values.

Surveillance Policies The 9/11 terrorist attacks changed the way in which Americans viewed security and the limits to be placed on privacy. Republicans had an advantage in this arena, both due to a Republican president being in charge when the terrorist attacks happened and due to voter perceptions about the party’s strong position regarding national security.

Republican Party

In response to the new terrorism threat, Congress and the then president George W. Bush passed the USA PATRIOT Act and created the Department of Homeland Security. Both of these developments created a new environment in which surveillance and privacy became contested grounds for partisan politics. In the wake of 9/11, Congress granted the executive branch broad powers to ensure the security of the nation. One of the ways in which Congress granted these powers was through the PATRIOT Act, which gives various agents of law enforcement the power to secure American borders from terrorist groups through broad legal powers in terms of surveillance and evidence. The act was passed with overwhelming support from both political parties due to the recent events. Bush benefited from a tremendous rally bump in public approval ratings, which were greater than those for President Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor and President John F. Kennedy after his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The positive public response to Bush’s actions to secure the nation extended well beyond the typical lifts in ­popularity the events would have caused, resulting in the Republicans ultimately gaining control of the House and the Senate in 2002. This feat had never been performed by a political party before in midterm elections. The Republican Party benefited from a presidential head of the party who leveraged the symbols of 9/11 to positive voter results at the polls. The PATRIOT Act has also been a lightning rod for controversy as questions regarding civil liberties have arisen. The phrase “domestic terrorism” was a new term added by the act to respond to terrorism threats that originate inside the United States. The PATRIOT Act relies on secret investigations and a dramatic broadening of police powers. Some members of the Republican Party have asked if the PATRIOT Act has allowed too much government intervention through surveillance. This criticism has resulted in coalitions with liberal supporters of the Democratic Party who oppose the PATRIOT Act due to threats against civil rights and civil liberties. Created under Bush’s administration, the Department of Homeland Security was another measure taken in the post-9/11 world. It oversees the domestic sphere of government, responding to

857

emergencies and threats whether natural or human-made. The department acts through the work of the many agencies it manages, including immigration, customs, and border patrol. It also provides grants to cities and states to develop their own programs to prevent terrorist attacks. “Homeland security” itself carries a cultural connotation that resonates with Republicans focused on foreign policy. In this case, the phrase generates the image of distrusting foreign sources, protecting borders, securing national symbols such as monuments, and intimidating foreign governments and groups to desist from planning an assault against the United States. Republican presidential candidates since Bush have echoed these cultural sentiments when defining and describing plans for foreign policy. However, these sentiments have also shaped the Democratic Party’s foreign policy, especially the campaign and rhetoric of President Barack Obama, who inherited conflicts in the Middle East and addressed new threats to national security. Republican candidates in state and local political races have utilized the phrase “homeland security” in their bid to raise more income to protect their ­cities and towns from domestic terrorism and disasters of all kinds. In 2002, besides the Republican control of the Senate and the House, Republican victories meant that the majority of governors were also Republican. In spite of this electoral sweep, Bush faced intense criticism for not providing more funds to allow governors to increase their efforts to provide better security for their citizens. He ultimately released more funds to local and state governments, engendering an expectation that Republican candidates would continue to be advocates for this extra funding for future preparedness.

Factions A conservative faction within the Republican Party has arisen to offer its own strong interpretation of Republican national security aims. The Tea Party, a neoconservative subset of the Republican Party, supports a foreign policy that seeks to protect the United States by eliminating regimes that harbor extremists and potentially possess weapons of mass destruction. Tea Party campaigners are comfortable with the United States working

858

Republican Party

unilaterally to destroy these threats without consultation with international allies. This has resulted in a Republican Party that has become increasingly polarized between neoconservatives, who desire the elimination of threats to national security, and moderates, who want to create a more secure world through negotiation, mediation, and alliances with other nations. In one additional area, the Republican Party has historically advocated a specific domestic policy to provide better domestic security. Portraying itself as the party of law and order, Republican candidates advocate tougher sentencing guidelines, including mandatory sentences for specific offenses and the use of capital punishment. Starting with the election of President Richard Nixon in 1968, multiple presidential candidates appealed to poorer white voters who desired security and protection in their towns and neighborhoods. The appeal of Republican slogans that portrayed the party as tough on crime spread to governor races and resulted in opposing candidates utilizing similar rhetoric and platforms to appeal to a broader base of voters. That is another reason why Republican candidates claim political authority regarding domestic security. In the decade after 9/11, when the perception of the threat of terrorism lessened and the war in Iraq continued with less public backing, bipartisan support for security policies, and for the Republican Party itself, declined. In spite of the Republicans’ claim of their perceived dominance regarding matters of national security, the prolonged war in Iraq resulted in a growing number of Americans believing that the Democratic Party was equally suited to handling these issues. The election of President Obama in 2008, and his reelection in 2012, reflected the continued sense that Democrats are on firmer ground regarding matters of surveillance, security, and privacy. Over the course of his two terms, Obama signed into law several reauthorizations of parts of the PATRIOT Act, making him and the Democrats the current definers of the limits and expansions of domestic programs to protect Americans. With the election of the Republican candidate Donald Trump to the presidency in 2016, the Republican Party has regained ground regarding matters of national security. Time and future elections will tell to what

degree the Republican Party will influence surveillance, security, and privacy policies and laws. Annette L. Varcoe See also Capital Punishment; Civil Liberties; Civil Rights Movement; PATRIOT Act; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; United States

Further Readings Burney, Brett. “The Patriot Act.” GPSolo, v.24/5 (2007). Coats, R. Morris, Gökhan Karahan, and Robert D. Tollison. “Terrorism and Pork-Barrel Spending.” Public Choice, v.128/1 (2006). Donohue, Laura K. “Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, v.96/3 (2006). Farrier, Jasmine. “The Patriot Act’s Institutional Story: More Evidence of Congressional Ambivalence.” PS: Political Science and Politics, v.40/1 (2007). Goble, Hannah and Peter M. Holm. “Breaking Bonds? The Iraq War and the Loss of Republican Dominance in National Security.” Political Research Quarterly, v.62/2 (2009). Gould, Lewis L. Grand Old Party: A History of the Republicans. New York, NY: Random House, 2003. Gregg, Gary L. “Crisis Leadership: The Symbolic Transformation of the Bush Presidency.” Perspectives on Political Science, v.32/3 (2003). Jacobs, David and Stephanie L. Kent. “The Determinants of Executions Since 1951: How Politics, Protests, Public Opinion, and Social Divisions Shape Capital Punishment.” Social Problems, v.54/3 (2007). Jacobson, Gary C. “Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm Elections.” Political Science Quarterly, v.118/1 (2003). Kam, Cindy D. and Jennifer M. Ramos. “Joining and Leaving the Rally: Understanding the Surge and Decline in Presidential Approval Following 9/11.” Public Opinion Quarterly, v.72/4 (2008). Kitfield, James. “Mitt Romney’s Neocon Puzzle.” The National Interest, v.121 (2012). Krane, Dale. “The State of American Federalism, 2002–2003: Division Replaces Unity.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, v.33/3 (2003). Malhotra, Neil and Elizabeth Popp. “Bridging Partisan Divisions Over Antiterrorism Policies: The Role of Threat Perceptions.” Political Research Quarterly, v.65/1 (2012).

Researching Cybercrime Mead, Walter Russell. “The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism.” Foreign Affairs (2011). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/67455/walter-russell-mead/the-tea-party-andamerican-foreign-policy (Accessed October 2014). Milkis, Sidney M. and Jesse H. Rhodes. “Barack Obama, the Democratic Party, and the Future of the ‘New American Party System.’” The Forum, v.7/1 (2009). Olsen, Henry. “The Republican Battlefield.” The National Interest, v.123 (2014) Saunders, Paul J. “The GOP’s Identity Crisis.” The National Interest, v.123 (2014) Tirman, John. “Security the Progressive Way.” The Nation (2005). http://www.thenation.com/article/ security-progressive-way# (Accessed October 2014). Tonry, Michael. “Sentencing in America, 1975–2025.” Crime and Justice, v.42/1 (2013).

Researching Cybercrime Since the 1990s, Internet crime, or cybercrime, has increasingly caught the imagination of academics, policymakers, and security services. This is reflected in the rise of related literature and policy documents over that period and is a result of an important recognition that we must sit up and take seriously the evolving threats posed by individuals and organized crime groups (including terrorists) who use integrated networks to commit crime. Cybercrime relates to acts whereby integrated networks are used as a means to commit crime, or the network itself or devices on the network are the target of the crime. This involves instances where technology can aid or enhance traditional forms of crime and also where technology creates new types of crimes. However, as discussed in this entry, our ability to fully understand such acts is hindered by a number of methodological barriers associated with research in this area: (a) technological shifts, (b) accurate detection and recording of offenses, (c) the nature of samples available, and (d) the possibility for inaccurate reporting by individuals and companies. The rapid advances in technology in recent years have created innovative and efficient means of committing acts of crime, and this has posed ever-complex implications and challenges for law

859

enforcement and security processes. The value of researching and understanding cybercrime has never been greater, given the general consensus that incidents across the various domains of cybercrime are on the rise. This is correlated with advances in technology, a lack of guardianship online, increases in Internet consumption, and, relatedly, increasing dependence on integrated networks for everyday activities such as work, shopping, banking, socialization, and education, to name a few. To develop policies to tackle the threats of cybercrime, foster effective policing and legal responses, and educate society about the threats, effectively researching and understanding cybercrime must be a priority. A number of important texts exist that explore cybercrime in depth, demonstrating the breadth of research in this area to date. One example, Yvonne Yewkes and Majid Yar’s Handbook of Internet Crime, offers a broad coverage of cybercrime, as well as the related law enforcement landscape. The text also offers detailed accounts of various distinct types of cybercrimes. Yet despite such expansive materials, it is difficult to understand the full scope of cybercrime, and there are many questions to be answered. How much cybercrime exists? How are offenses being committed? Who are the offenders? Who are the victims? What are the impacts? What are the scales involved? Some of these questions can be answered, but often, we only have estimates to guide us. Our understanding also becomes outdated very quickly, as our current knowledge may not reflect recent shifts in technology and modus operandi. This lack of certainty stems from difficulties in recognizing, detecting, and effectively examining such acts, and thus, a number of methodological problems exist in terms of being able to research cybercrime. This means that our knowledge of cybercrime is often incomplete or inaccurate. Criminologists use the term dark figure to describe what we do not know about the amount of crime in a given society and, thus, what we do not know about the nature of offenders, victims, processes of committing crime, and so on. This is created by barriers to recognizing, accessing, and counting crimes. This idea is particularly significant in the context of cybercrime. Victims may not know that they have been a victim of a crime, or

860

Responsibility

if they do, they may not report this because the act might be deemed as trivial, or they feel somehow responsible or even embarrassed. The Internet also offers offenders stealth of use and of access, and anonymity. These issues create problems for policing, whereby detection becomes difficult. Thus, official data on cybercrime, which is collected by law enforcement agencies, must be treated with caution. Research methods such as interviews and surveys are also problematized by a lack of access to offenders and victims for research purposes; complete sampling frames or populations are nonexistent. Detection, and thus our knowledge of some offenses, has been aided by the role played by banks and other financial institutions in monitoring customers’ accounts and suspicious transactions. This information may then be shared with law enforcement bodies. However, research from industry has to be treated with some caution given that companies have vested interests. On the one hand, some companies, such as financial institutions, may not want to report accurately in order to avoid reputational damage. One the other hand, some companies may be motivated to play up the threats because these companies are part of an industry that provides security (e.g., security software) to companies and individuals. In recent years, researchers have embraced methodological innovations to access offenders. Although these innovations may be better suited to some offense types than to others, the use of online forums, message boards, social media websites, and law enforcement intelligence tools, for example, have proved fruitful, but they are not a panacea. A 2010 discussion paper by Stefan Fafinski and colleagues set out some of the issues associated with examining the scale and scope of cybercrime, including methodological issues and broader ­problems of data collection. This was the result of discussions among academics, industry representatives, and law enforcement personnel. The paper summarizes many of the problems in this field, including underreporting due to reputational damage, biased samples, and insufficient technical competencies among law enforcement actors. Thus, although a better body of knowledge concerning

c­ybercrime is developing, researching this field remains p ­ roblematized by a range of methodological problems. Tony Murphy See also Computer Surveillance

Further Readings Fafinski, Stefan, et al. Mapping and Measuring Cybercrime. Oxford Internet Institute, OII Forum Discussion Paper no.18, 2010. www.oii.ox.ac.uk/ publications/FD18.pdf (Accessed January 2015). Jewkes, Yvonne and Majid Yar. Handbook of Internet Crime. Cullompton, England: Willan, 2010.

Responsibility The notion of responsibility considered within a framework of surveillance, security, and privacy has many dimensions. Different stakeholders hold varying perspectives on how and to what extent community safety and security should be enhanced by surveillance. There are also contrasting viewpoints concerning who should be held responsible for the implementation of surveillance and the associated privacy issues. A number of different perspectives relating to what the notion of responsibility means are presented before providing a contemporary example of how it relates to surveillance, security, and privacy. The context of the U.S. college and university environment provides a contemporary example of responsibility in this realm, with comparisons involving similar contexts in the United Kingdom and Australia. Unlike many other contexts in which surveillance and security are identified as the source of an existing tension with an individual’s privacy, in the U.S. college and university context they seem to be relatively widely accepted as part of today’s surveillance society. Responsibility in many cases concerning U.S. colleges and universities parallels to some extent that in the United Kingdom but is less similar to that in Australia. This framework presents an example of how different organizations and individuals accept or delegate responsibility for issues concerning safety and security.

Responsibility

The notion of responsibility is often referred to with little explanation of what it actually means. Frequently, it is associated with having the ability to meet obligations or debts, or a demonstration of authority. Alternative explanations relate responsibility to having an obligation to deal with something or to have control over someone (e.g., a child). Other perspectives connect responsibility with blame or culpability. Barry Goldson, for instance, aligns the term closely with juvenile justice and the varying ages in different national jurisdictions at which a child may be held criminally responsible. The even more complex notion of “responsibilization” has been explained by John Muncie as being associated with shifting the state-based responsibility for the prevention of crime to individuals, groups, and organizations. Regardless of the many and varied interpretations of the term responsibility, it has long been central to individuals’ behavior. Often it is viewed from an individualistic perspective in that one must take responsibility for oneself. However, in a world where the surveillance of individuals and organizations is increasingly becoming the norm, the notion of responsibility takes on a new guise. Organizations and individuals tend to view responsibility from the perspective of who is responsible or who should take responsibility for good and bad outcomes. There is also a common view that those who are charged with a responsibility should have the necessary knowledge of events that fall within their jurisdiction or their constituency (i.e., for whom they must take responsibility). Claims of lacking knowledge relating to particular events tend not to exonerate one from responsibility. How this information is obtained also varies greatly. In the contemporary world, the safety and security of individuals and their property are often reliant on surveillance of others. As a consequence, surveillance of individuals and organizations is increasingly becoming the norm. This is the case in U.S. colleges and universities, where in many instances police and security departments are based on or near campuses. The use of surveillance assists campus police and security personnel in their role of ensuring as best as possible the safety of staff, students, and the nearby community. Surveillance of individuals is used in line with concern for the safety of the campus and the wider

861

community. Thus, surveillance is presented and generally accepted as being part of the responsibility of colleges and universities and necessary for the purpose of security. This has been the case particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). While reports vary considerably, it is consistently believed that one or more of the perpetrators entered the United States on a student visa. Hence, surveillance of international students entering the United States has intensified. Nonetheless, the surveillance of students is thought by some to be an intrusion of privacy. There is a tension between the notion of increased surveillance for the purposes of individual and community safety and security and the perspective that the approach encroaches on the privacy of individuals. It appears that institutions generally prioritize safety above privacy issues. There appear to be trade-offs when it comes to surveillance and who should be responsible when things go wrong. That is, surveillance is expected when security is threatened; however, when privacy is encroached, surveillance is negatively viewed. The United States is believed to have a high level of surveillance relating to political and security dimensions as well as corporate, educational, and economic factors. Furthermore, it is generally thought that individuals are in part responsible for their own personal safety and that of others. That is, collective responsibility is a common expectation. Indeed, the notion of community responsibility highlighted by Muncie seemed to have strengthened after 9/11. Responsibility for student safety and security in the United States tends to be attributed to education institutions, the community, the police, students’ parents, and the students themselves. However, there tends to be a view that students are not inclined to take sufficient measures to diminish the risk of being a victim. Other nations are different. For example, in the United Kingdom, the situation is similar, although students are believed to take more individual responsibility. Australia provides further disparity by presenting a context in which a greater level of individual responsibility is expected. The acceptance of surveillance as a means of contributing to safety and security has led to student expectations of active responses. Colleges and universities are expected to take responsibility

862

Revolutions and Revolts

for student safety, and in most cases, the expectation is believed to be fulfilled. However, at times, the expectation is unrealistic, and individuals may shift responsibility entirely to the institution by not exercising care for their own personal safety or the security of their belongings. For example, in many instances, students leave their belongings unattended, including expensive computers or other equipment, or do not securely lock their bikes. Colleges and universities largely accept responsibility for more serious safety and security concerns, as expected by students and their families, and government regulation. The notion that colleges and universities should take responsibility for the safety and security of students is more formally approached in the United States than in other jurisdictions. This is attributed by many to the Jeanne Clery Act of 1990 (previously known as the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act), which was introduced in response to a campaign by the parents of a college student who was raped and murdered in her campus residence. The Clery Act was introduced to ensure that U.S. colleges and universities play a primary role in providing safety and security for students on campus and in the nearby surroundings. In the United States, the Clery Act is believed to play a large part in ensuring effective monitoring, which in turn helps provide a safer environment. The act appears to have shifted the state’s responsibility to colleges and universities. The act mandates that colleges and universities record and make publicly available crime reports relating to student safety issues. This contrasts with the United Kingdom and Australia, where, without comparable legislation, governments are regularly called on to take greater responsibility for the safety of international students in particular. Nonetheless, it appears that in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia there has been a general trend toward responsibility for safety to be shifted to the individual and the community. Despite the skepticism of many sociologists and criminologists with regard to allocating responsibility to the community, the idea continues to be put forward by governments. It seems that the state has effectively delegated the responsibility for student safety to communities and organizations, particularly in relation to those students who have crossed borders to undertake an international education.

College and university security and personal safety support staff in the United States tend to accept much of the responsibility for student safety, thus confirming a shift of the responsibility from the state. This approach to responsibility contrasts with the United Kingdom, where there tends to be more ambiguity about whether or not universities should be responsible for student welfare issues that are not specifically related to being on campus. Compared with the United States, tertiary students in the United Kingdom, and even more so in Australia, are expected to fulfill an adult role in taking greater responsibility for their own personal safety. Nonetheless, it is generally expected that responsibility should be shared by individuals, families, communities, and government and nongovernmental organizations. What tends to be a topic of continuing debate is what proportion of responsibility should be allocated to each of the parties involved. Helen Forbes-Mewett See also Australia; Crime; Crime Control; United Kingdom; United States; War on Terror

Further Readings Clery Centre for Security on Campus, 2012. http:// clerycenter.org/our-history (Accessed October 2014). Forbes-Mewett, Helen, et al. “Responsibility.” In International Students and Crime. London, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. Goldson, Barry (2001) “Juvenile Justice.” In Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie (eds.), The SAGE Dictionary of Criminology (2nd ed.). London, England: Sage, 2001. Muncie, John. (2001) “Responsibilization.” In Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie (eds.), The SAGE Dictionary of Criminology (2nd ed.). London, England: Sage, 2001.

Restraining Orders See Protection Orders

Revolutions

and

Revolts

Surveillance is defined as a systematic response to influencing, managing, or controlling the flow of

Revolutions and Revolts

information. It is, therefore, a systematic collection of private data. Surveillance encompasses paying close and continuous attention to another person. In addition, the enterprise is not to pay attention to an anonymous person but to a specific individual or group and for specific reasons. Surveillance includes not only observation but also recording—for example, bugging a telephone conversation or writing down when individuals gather. Surveillance affects privacy, which is defined as a space where citizens feel their personal area will not be invaded or infringed. Society values privacy, as it affords people the opportunity to create relationships. Privacy fashions trust such that citizens believe that as a result of their interactions and beliefs they will not be harmed by state entities whose job it is to protect them from groups that might challenge their legitimacy. In this instance, the state creates security organizations. In the process, however, state security may intrude on individual or group privacy and affect individuals’ and groups’ feelings of being protected. Revolutions affect whole societies, including their values, class affiliations, and, at times, religious orientation. Revolutions seek to change governments, social classes, and political and economic institutions and to redefine the social contract. Successful revolutions are less frequent but bring into their fold all social classes. Revolutionary groups seek regime change. Revolts, or rebellions, are distinguished from revolutions in that they seek not to change a government but to address a grievance or grievances within a society. Significant revolutions occurred in North America, France, Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran. Major revolts arose in China, Ireland, and the United States, including the Taiping, Boxer, Easter, Shays’, and Nat Turner’s Rebellions. This entry discusses each of these revolutions and rebellions, intertwined with the concepts of surveillance and privacy.

The American Revolution The American Revolution (1765–1783) introduced radical ideas that produced philosophical changes within the early colonial society and government, ultimately ending British rule in the colonies. Among the significant achievements of the revolution was the establishment of a representative government answerable to the people. Before

863

and after the revolution, it was clear that the lack of personal space would yield little information to the British of ensuing rebel movements. Surveillance and privacy were quite restricted in the colonies due to the strict religious morality codes that were part of the Puritan ethics, common in the colonies—for example, taking care of families and being aware of strangers in their midst. However, despite these restrictions, surveillance was successfully employed by the British. Colonial women played a key role in gathering information concerning where important meetings were to be held, effectively acting as spies. Thoughtlessly, men presumed women were too meek to understand the multifaceted military strategy; thus, they spoke without apprehension as spies socialized among them, cloaked as peddlers or pretending to search for lost loved ones.

The French Revolution The revolution in France from 1789 to 1799 arose from the impoverishment of the king and, therefore, the state. The financial disaster of the regime was due to the growing expenses of government and two devastatingly costly military engagements. These costs could not be offset by increasing taxes. The taxation system overwhelmed the middle class and peasants alike but did not affect aristocrats, who were exempt. People called for sensible taxation and a fairer society. Years of severe harvests burdened the economy, resulting in urban and rural bitterness against the wealthy nobility and clergy. The crisis led to the assembly of the Estates-General, which increased their militant call for change. The revolution commenced with an attack on the Bastille and citizens marching on the Palace of Versailles. However, various conflicting political views concerning how the country should be governed, combined with a conservative king who desired to end all reforms, caused the revolutionaries to proclaim a republic and execute many in power, including the monarch. The French Revolution transformed every institution within its boundaries, attacking the aristocracy and the power of the church and radicalizing the lower classes. The revolution incorporated an extensive body of Enlightenment values concerning citizenship and unassailable rights. Even without government intervention, the Committee of General Security, created by radicals,

864

Revolutions and Revolts

operated as a police force during and after the revolution, creating the republic’s surveillance system. Its principal function was to scrutinize reports of treason and refer suspects to the Revolutionary Tribunal for trial and possible execution. To this end, privacy was replaced with terror and security with suspicion.

Russian Revolution During the Great War (1914–1918), the Russian military lacked food, clothing, weapons, and the ability to match German forces on the battlefield. Having suffered a large number of casualties after 3 years of sustained warfare, and with no end to the fighting in sight, many soldiers lost confidence in Czar Nicholas’s ability to lead a nation already rampant with corruption. By 1917, crowds paraded through the streets asking for bread, and mobs of marchers destroyed police stations. As the protests increased, soldiers of the Petrograd garrison were ordered to suppress the uprising, and security and surveillance became important instruments for staving off a major revolt. The czar used his secret police, the Okhrana, whose specific task was to search for political criminals. They gathered most of their intelligence through agents who shadowed suspects, while disguised as street vendors, concierges, or cab drivers. They followed up stakeouts by interviewing neighbors and associates of anyone thought to be dangerous to the regime. They also employed undercover agents and provocateurs. With the country in complete chaos, Nicholas and his imperial regime resigned when soldiers joined the protesters. In the aftermath, a provisional government ruled the country. A more radical faction known as the Bolshevik Party, under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, staged a coup, overthrowing the new cabinet, which had filled the political void after the czar left power. Lenin took the reins of power in the country, whose name changed from Russia to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Chinese Revolution The Chinese Revolution was a sequence of political upheavals that raged across China from 1911 to 1949. A nationalist uprising, in 1912, toppled the imperial Manchu Dynasty and assumed power.

Under the direction of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalists, or Kuomintang, were challenged by a growing communist movement that also sought power. Its members called for an end to a Western-style governance, more rationed food for the peasants, and a government responsible to the people of China. The differences between communist and nationalist ideologies embroiled the country in a civil war. Chiang called for the elimination of all communists within the cities. Forced from the metropolitan areas, Chinese forces sought haven in the countryside, marching 10,000 kilometers to safety in what became known as the Long March. These units relocated to the mountainous northwest region of China, from 1934 to 1935, ensuring continuous Kuomintang harassment. At this juncture, Mao Zedong became the undisputed leader of the Chinese armed forces. Throughout World War II, various Chinese political groups combined their military assets to combat the invasion and occupation of China by Japan. During and after the war, to maintain power, Chiang allowed Dai Li (head of internal security) to create private police forces that used surveillance, espionage, kidnapping, mass arrest, and assassinations to eliminate rivals. From 1938 to 1949, the Nationalist Chinese government operated concentration camps, which held communists, intellectuals, and outspoken noncommunists critical of Chiang. The chaos that consumed the country impeded any idea of privacy; its principal concern was security. Despite Chiang’s efforts to stave off revolution, Mao’s troops formed the basis of what became known as the Red Army. Under Mao’s command, a renewed civil war in 1946 against the Nationalists led to their defeat in 1949. The Kuomintang troops fled to Taiwan. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the People’s Republic of China was born.

Cuban Revolution General Fulgencio Batista deposed the president of Cuba, Carlos Prìo Socarrás, in 1952, and promptly canceled all future elections. This act enraged a young lawyer, Fidel Castro, who for the next 7 years sought to overthrow Batista’s regime. Castro led an armed group against the military barracks in Santiago, on July 26, 1953, but was

Revolutions and Revolts

defeated, culminating in his detention. Castro received a 15-year sentence in prison for creating havoc, though Batista released him 2 years later. Castro left the country, amassed a new group of rebels in Mexico, and returned to Cuba. On December 2, 1956, his guerrilla forces were crushed by Batista’s army, after which he escaped to the Sierra Maestra. Using asymmetrical tactics of hit and run, Castro engaged Batista’s troops. With the aid of other rebel units fighting throughout Cuba, he was able to seize and hold parts of the inland. Batista’s secret police publicly tortured citizens who dissented against his government. This public display of humiliation and dehumanization was meant to dissuade anyone who rebelled against his regime. However, Batista’s violence incited more people to join rebel groups, especially the one directed by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. As the insurgent forces closed in on the capital, Havana, Batista resigned and left the country. Castro’s military advisors and combat troops were involved in insurgencies in Venezuela, Guatemala, Bolivia, Congo, Angola, and Namibia. Cuba’s foreign policy often clashed with that of the United States in many geopolitical areas. The Cuban Revolution was an exception rather than the rule in contemporary history. It proved that a small body of dedicated individuals could unite the populace, urban and rural, behind a common ideological cause and overthrow a well-armed government. For many underdeveloped nations living under oppression, the Cuban Revolution stood as an example of how to end colonialism through armed insurrection.

The Iranian Revolution The Iranian Revolution, also known as the Islamic Revolution, overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and saw the emergence of the first Islamic republic under the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Major rallies against the Shah began in January 1978, followed by strikes and demonstrations that paralyzed the country. The Shah’s paramilitary police force, Savak, controlled all facets of political life. Its main task was to suppress opposition to the government by using brutal methods. The Shah fled Iran for exile in mid-January 1979, resulting in the return of Ayatollah Khomeini from exile. Shortly afterward, the

865

imperial regime collapsed when dissident troops armed civilians and overwhelmed soldiers loyal to the Shah. Iranians voted overwhelmingly, in national elections, to bring to power the first Islamic Republic. The theocratic constitution brought Khomeini to power as their Supreme Leader. The turn of events in this revolution was exceptional; it lacked many of the fundamental components that constitute revolutions: (1) military defeat at war, (b) blatant economic crisis, (c) peasant revolts, or (d)  disgruntled military forces. It was immensely popular, dislodged a regime heavily fortified by outside military forces, by an exaggeratedly financed army and police, and was replaced by a theocratic monarchy founded by Islamic Jurists. The Islamic Republic was a democratic revolution against modernity.

Taiping Rebellion The Taiping Rebellion was a massive revolt that raged from 1850 to 1864 against the rule of the Qing Empire in China. The uprising, led by army and civilian units, was inspired by the teaching of Hakka and self-proclaimed shamans Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqing. Hong was an eccentric Christian convert, who saw himself as the messiah and his younger brother as Jesus Christ. Yang not only interpreted the will of Hong and his brother but also served as their representative on Earth, giving direction and guidance to their followers. Yang and his supporters established an organization known as the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace in southern China. The cause of the Taiping Rebellion was opposition to the alleged oppressive rule of the Qing emperors. A series of natural disasters, high taxes, and the decadent imperial lifestyle persuaded a large number of Chinese (who were culturally Han) that the Qinq emperors (ethnically Mongolian) were incompetent and deceitful rulers. The Taiping Rebellion was a collision between imperial authorities and traditional Chinese norms. By 1860, the Manchu sovereigns, ravaged by internal rebellions and beleaguered by the Western military powers, had to respond to these challenges if the kingdom was to endure. To subdue the uprisings, they turned to Chinese scholar-officials, who raised armies in the countryside.

866

Revolutions and Revolts

The uprising had a long-term impact on the economic growth of China and severely impeded the royal family’s ability to govern the country. The Taiping Rebellion was one of the bloodiest in history, eclipsed only by World War II in the number of casualties during a given conflict.

Easter Rebellion is historically significant, because it marked Ireland’s wish to search for self-rule and its need to forge a unique identity and have a rightful place among nations.

Boxer Rebellion

Shays’ Rebellion (1786–1787) was the outcome of a series of farm foreclosures in Massachusetts. It represented the gulf between the rich and the poor in the American republic. Demonstrators and rioters demanded an end to the high salary paid to the governor, court costs, and the assembly’s disregard in curbing inflation that disproportionately affected the poor. The disagreement was at first limited to meetings with and petitions to the governor, but these went nowhere. Opposition coalesced around economics. Daniel Shays, a Revolutionary War veteran, spoke out against these inequalities. The Massachusetts Supreme Court demanded that those leading the revolt be indicted and brought to court on charges of sedition and disorderly conduct. Shays sided with the protestors and raised a militia, including many Continental Army veterans. They marched to Worcester County, closed the commonwealth’s Supreme Court, and released imprisoned debtors from the local jail. The protesters also burned the barns of governmental officials. In response, the State of Massachusetts ordered General Benjamin Lincoln to end the rebellion. Once his forces engaged the rebels, the uprising collapsed. An armed response to an internal threat proved that the new government would respond to infringements against established laws. Shays’ Rebellion also pointed to the need for the Articles of Confederation to be amended to protect all members of the society.

The Boxer Rebellion was a violent antiforeign and anti-Christian crusade in China, during the end of the Qing dynasty, 1898 to 1900. The uprising took place during a period of severe drought and the creation of European spheres of influence in China. After months of increasing violence directed against the presence of foreign and Christian presence in Shandong province and the North China plain, Boxer fighters converged in Beijing. They marched, chanting support with “Qing eliminate the foreigners.” Europeans and Chinese converts to Christianity found sanctuary in the Legation Quarter. When Empress Dowager heard of an armed insurrection, she supported the uprising by calling for war against those who sought shelter in the European Quarters. Under siege for 55 days, the combined military forces of Eight Nations came to their aid, defeating both the Boxers and the Empress Troops. The siege was lifted but left the dynasty weakened as Europeans reclaimed their right to have spheres of influence in China. A country under siege had little need for surveillance.

Easter Rebellion On Easter 1916 in Dublin, Ireland, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, a secret group comprising Irish nationalists, launched an armed insurrection against the British rule. Assisted by radical Irish socialists, they encouraged widespread rioting and attacked British administrative headquarters, seized the Irish Post Office, and, within a few days,  controlled most of the city. Following their successes, they proclaimed an independent Ireland. The rebellion was the culmination of years of harsh British control, severe anti-Catholic restrictions, punitive laws, and the loss of thousands of peasants during the Irish Potato Famine. The British government soon afterward launched a counteroffensive crushing the uprising. Nevertheless, the

Shays’ Rebellion

Nat Turner’s Rebellion Nat Turner led the only sustained slave rebellion in U.S. history. His uprising in 1831 created terror and fear among Southern plantation owners. As a result of his uprising, Southern states passed laws forbidding slaves from learning to read and write and restricted their ability to assemble. When Turner was a youth, he was educated by his master’s son. He was also given a Bible to learn

Riot Control

867

its contents to become a more informed and governable slave. Turner intensely read the Bible and combined his theological beliefs with abolitionist ideology. His philosophy influenced other slaves and freemen, who called him a prophet. By 1831, after being sold multiple times, Turner, having seen a solar eclipse, believed it was a sign from God to end slavery. Turner sought to capture an armory and with his fellows marched to the county seat to gather more recruits, killing some slaveholders along the way. His insurgency, however, was crippled by lack of discipline among his supporters and by the fact that only a handful of slaves joined his ranks. Armed opposition from resident whites and the arrival of a vast number of the state militia overwhelmed him and his rebels. His rebellion caused many slaveholders to hire armed guards and road gangs to search for runaways while enacting laws to restrict slave movements.

otherwise manage instances of public disorder or civil unrest. The term riot control is commonly used interchangeably with crowd control, crowd management, public order policing, protest policing, civil disorder, disturbance control, and mobile field force, although each of these terms assumes a slightly different meaning depending on the context to which it refers. For instance, the term riot control denotes an elevated response to disorder or civil unrest that deploys a greater degree of force than for crowd management. Put another way, crowd management, public order policing operations, and the policing of protest can all escalate into a full riot control response. This entry reviews the history and evolution of riot control and then examines the three primary riot control techniques: (1) spatial containment, (2)  surveillance, and (3) information management.

Cranston S. Knight

In the 1950s, specialized crowd control units emerged as a way to control and manage populations. The 1960s in the United States saw a number of political flashpoints and social unrest, which were often met with escalating police force and a heavy-handed approach to crowd control that relied on mass arrests. Many violent riot control tactics resulted in serious injury, death, and property damage. Subsequent public reaction and criticism of the police tactics gave rise to a softer, collaborative approach between the police and crowds. During the 1970s, riot control relied on more proactive administrative cooperation between the police and political protestors. The authorities attempted to limit the potential for disorder by using a standardized permit system to negotiate, manage, and regulate protest. This preemptive strategy sought to limit the potential for violent confrontations between the police and civilians. By enforcing restrictions surrounding time and place, this strategy established boundaries to separate legitimate protest from “illegitimate” protest and thus limit the need for police intervention. As a result, this highly regulated, managed form of riot control made protest regimented, routinized, and highly predictable. Many began to insist that the intended political effects of social protest were neutralized.

See also Cuba; Locke, John; Marxism; Russia; Social Contract Theory; United States

Further Readings Goodwin, Jeff. No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Gross, Feliks. The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 1979. Guevara, Ernesto. Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. New York, NY: Praeger, 1961. Hingley, Ronald. The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian, and Soviet Political Security Operations. New York, NY: Dorset Press, 1970. Salert, Barbara. Revolutions and Revolutionaries: Four Theories. New York, NY: Elsevier, 1976. Zedong, Mao. On the Protracted War. Beijing, People’s Republic of China: Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

Riot Control Riot control refers to strategies, tactics, and operations used by the police, the military, or other security authorities to control, disperse, arrest, or

Evolution of Riot Control

868

Riot Control

The 1999 World Trade Organization protest in Seattle signaled the end of the negotiated, management style of protest policing. Public order police squads clashed in the streets with thousands of demonstrators. The police widely viewed these riot preparations as extremely deficient, as they were unable to effectively allocate resources to control the unpredictable and disruptive tactics of the protestors. The fallout from the so-called Battle of Seattle signaled a significant turn toward greater formalization of urban riot control practices. Since then, trends in global riot policing have become increasingly standardized as a set of “bestpractice” strategies and tactics. Protests surrounding major public spectacles, such as sporting events and political summits, have become a key focal point for the continued development and professionalization of riot control strategies and tactics. Present-day trends in riot control are characterized by the adoption of military techniques and technologies that rely on strategies of spatial containment, surveillance, and increased sensitivity to information management.

Spatial Containment Strategies of riot control entail the configuration of divided and controlled spaces as part of a broader spatial containment strategy. Prior to the event or during a civil disturbance, the police separate physical (predominantly urban) space into distinct areas that are regulated according to differing degrees of access and control. Scholar Patrick Gillham and his colleagues have identified four distinct spatial containment zones that characterize protest policing. First, hard zones are designated “high-security” spaces, and access is strictly prohibited. These spaces include critical infrastructure, as well as key sites to be protected against vandalism, disruption, or symbolic repurposing, and are often protected with barricades and temporary fencing. Second, free speech zones refer to access-controlled zones where the police authorize the presence of protests or crowd congregation. Third, soft zones refer to areas adjacent to hard zones. In these spaces, most rights to speech, expression, and assembly are temporarily suspended during an event. Individuals who enter these areas are considered to be “transgressive” and are, therefore, perceived by the authorities to

be subject to greater degrees of control, such as arrest, a controversial spatial control tactic known as “kettling,” and the use of less lethal weapons to incapacitate, detain, and/or force dispersal. Mass arrests and temporary detention are also commonly deployed during major events. Fourth, free press zones are locations that police designate for reporters and the media to operate. These locations are far away from the other zones and, as such, are widely seen as an unnecessary infringement on citizens’ right to information and the freedom of the press. Riot Control Technologies

A range of specialized riot control technologies accompanies the strategy of spatial containment. Riot control officers are equipped with riot shields, protective body armor, and truncheons (batons), in addition to other less lethal or nonlethal weapons that are often used to control and manage civil unrest. These technologies can include water cannons, capsicum spray (pepper spray), tear gas, plastic/rubber bullets or “bean bag” rounds, and flash grenades. Control tactics may also include the use of the long-range acoustic device—a “sonic cannon” that emits a highfrequency sound to disperse crowds—and “netguns” to corral groups for arrest. Many of these weapons have come under public scrutiny given their dual use by military organizations and domestic police forces and their capacity to cause significant injury or death in public order situations. One of the notable issues surrounding the decontextualized adoption of military technologies by local law enforcement agencies is the increased risk of inadequate or poor training protocols, which can result in more instances of bodily injury and death.

Surveillance and Information Sharing Riot control strategies also entail surveillance and information sharing as a means of regulating protest and suppressing dissent, before and during protest activities or events. During the event, video images collected via closed-circuit television networks provide real-time intelligence. Increasingly, the authorities aim to preemptively interdict and disrupt a real or perceived potential for individuals

Risk Society Thesis

and groups to cause a disturbance. Surveillance of specific groups through open source Internet surveillance, undercover group infiltration, and access to information that has been otherwise collected and shared across a range of authorities all provide opportunities for the authorities to disrupt activities. Such information-collection strategies might often be supplemented with a targeted arrest strategy prior to an event. The increase in surveillance as a mechanism for crowd control is a strategy that has come under significant criticism because of its encroachment on free speech and association rights. Adam Molnar See also Antiwar Protest Surveillance, 1960s; Freedom of Expression

Further Readings Balko, R. Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2013. Boykoff, J. Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States. Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2007. Gillham, Patrick F. “Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of Protest Since the 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attacks. Sociology Compass, v.5/7 (2011). Gillham, Patrick F. and J. Noakes. “More Than a March in a Circle: Transgressive Protests and the Limits of Negotiated Management.” Mobilization, v.12/4 (2007). Gillham, Patrick F., et al. “Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of Occupy Wall Street Protests in New York City, 2011.” Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, v.23/1 (2013). Kitchen, V. and K. Rygiel. “Privatizing Security, Securitizing Policing: The Case of the G20 in Toronto, Canada.” International Political Sociology, v.8 (2014). Marin, Andre. “Investigation Into the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services’ Conduct in Relation to Ontario Regulation 233/10 Under the Public Works Protection Act: ‘Caught in the Act.’” Ombudsman Report (2010). http://www .ombudsman.on.ca/Resources/Reports/Caught-in-theAct.aspx?lang=en-CA (Accessed April 2014.) McPhail, Clark, et al. “Policing Protest in the United States: 1960–1995.” In Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter (eds.), Policing Protest: The Control of

869

Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. Noakes, J. A., et al. “Whose Streets? Police and Protesters Struggle Over Space in Washington, DC, 29–30 September, 2001.” Policing and Society, v.15/3 (2005).

Risk Society Thesis Though many have contributed to the risk society thesis, it is most commonly associated with German sociologist Ulrich Beck and British sociologist Anthony Giddens. They argue that we are living through a second age of modernity, the world risk society. It is distinguished from the first age of modernity, the industrial society, by a shared social awareness of the improbable but potentially catastrophic risks (e.g., climate change, nuclear war, financial crisis) inherent in the application of science and technology to the social problem of scarcity and the unprecedented global production and distribution of goods. This ­awareness—a realization of “the paradox of progress”—has led to significant social upheaval and reorganization, as an emerging collective ethos based on a new ontology and epistemology of risk has begun to reshape society. The risk society thesis demands new concepts to analyze risk and its effects on social change as well as new institutions to regulate and monitor the development and proliferation of new technologies and their impacts. This increasingly self-aware transformation ought to be understood as necessary to the completion of the process of modernization itself, where the greatest risks are manufactured in, and as a result of, the world risk society itself. This entry examines how risk is defined in both the first and second ages of modernity and then looks at the effects of technology and social transformation on risk society. Risk is not something unique to risk society, but  neither should risk be assumed to mean the same thing across space and time. According to the  risk society thesis, in the premodern world, what we know now as risk would have been more accurately described as uncertainty. The uncertainty of life and the risks of death from violence, illness, famine, natural disaster, or accidental injury were explained with reference to supernatural or

870

Risk Society Thesis

theological powers. The first age of modernity, in contrast, was informed not only by what we would now identify as important cornerstones of modernity, the scientific method, and the Enlightenment but also by the hubris of progress that accompanied the scientific revolution. Uncertainty remained, but increasingly, it was a problem that could be solved by the application of scientific and technological innovation. The only risk, it might be said, was the risk inherent in not embracing scientific and technological solutions to the problems of premodern societies. Science and technology promised solutions to a litany of long-standing social challenges, scarcity most prominent among them. Finally, the second age of modernity, what Beck and Giddens call reflexive modernity, is characterized by a more critical stance vis-à-vis scientific and technological solutions to risk. The wealth imperative and the distribution of goods so important in the golden age of industrialization—and complemented by the hubris of scientific progress—are replaced with a focus on managing the contradictions inherent to a global industrial capitalist modernity as well as the consequences of our “scientization” of the natural world. However unintended, it is the unanticipated effects of the very success of industrial society that calls into existence the reflexive modernity that characterizes world risk society. Both the private insurance companies of the world and the welfare states entrusted with public insurance against the variety of social damages caused by processes of modernization have been forced to reckon with the contingencies of modernization, and this reflexivity is key to understanding the transformations wrought by risk society. The once dominant optimism of technical and scientific expertise in the calculation of the incalculable—that is, the distribution of the potential catastrophic effects inherent to industrial society—has been challenged by the sober realities of insuring against risk. This leads to a defining truth of risk society: It is not insurable in the modern sense. For instance, if one’s car is wrecked in a crash, it still exists in the future because insurance replaces the loss. Similarly, a house survives a fire thanks to the fire department services provided by the state. In the case of risk society, however, we cannot secure the future existence of our society because the potential

fallout from disasters (however improbable) could prevent the reconstitution of modernity. Risk society must be understood, therefore, as a paradigmatic shift, one propelled by new and unique logics, as discussed, and visible in currently occurring shifts in values, beliefs, aspirations, and imperatives. In particular, the work of Beck and Giddens is influenced by earlier theorists such as Theodor Adorno, Lewis Mumford, Jurgen Habermas, and Langdon Winner, all of whom express a fear of the potential dangers inherent in technology. Not only is technology increasingly detached from social oversight, but it is also frequently now a tool of social control. Moreover, as Beck and Giddens so insightfully explain, the transformations wrought by industrialization, though undoubtedly vast, were eased in the industrial society by the continuation of the inherited customs and traditions of the premodern society. The full effect of this social transformation, however, is only now being felt as the predictability of traditions such as social status, gender, marriage, family, lifetime employment, and secure retirement disappear without familiar structures to replace them. This transformation of individual lives and individual experiences of anxiety, insecurity, and uncertainty reflects a collective consciousness that is dislocated, alienated, fragmented, and discontented. Julian von Bargen See also Adorno, Theodor W.; Beck, Ulrech; Modernism

Further Readings Beck, U. World Risk Society. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1999. Beck, U., et al. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. Beck, U. and M. Ritter. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage, 1992. Ericson, R. V. and K. D. Haggerty. Policing the Risk Society. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. Jarvis, D. “Risk, Globalisation, and the State: A Critical Appraisal of Ulrich Beck and the World Risk Society Thesis.” Global Society, v.21/1 (2007).

Russia

Russia The Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR) was one of the first states to conduct mass surveillance of its citizens. With a network of more than 1 million informers, the KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, or “Soviet State Security Committee”) assisted the Soviet authorities in maintaining strict control over society. As the Soviet Union dissolved and the  communist state disappeared, the mass ­surveillance disappeared with it. The new constitution, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1993, mandated that people would be free of the type of surveillance that had been ­characteristic of the Soviet Union. Article 23 of the constitution states, 1. Everyone shall have the right to the inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, the protection of honour and good name. 2. Everyone shall have the right to privacy of correspondence, of telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other messages. Limitations of this right shall be allowed only by court ­decision.

To limit the power of the KGB, the organization was split up into different, smaller organizations. With the economy in decline and the state weakened, these organizations remained poorly funded throughout the 1990s. Because of these circumstances, the extent of surveillance in Russia in the 1990s was heavily reduced compared with what it had been during the Soviet years. Under President Vladimir Putin, the surveillance of citizens has again increased, although it is unlikely that it will become as pervasive as it was in the totalitarian Soviet Union. The Russian state has become more authoritarian and more centralized since Putin’s ascent to the presidency in 2012. Putin himself started his career in the KGB and served as director of the FSB (Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, “Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation”), the  main successor organization of the KGB, before being appointed prime minister in 1999. There are  some indications that the increase in

871

surveillance in Russia is related to Putin’s personal views and experience as a KGB operative. In the early 2000s, most of the different security and intelligence services were merged with the FSB. Due to an economic surge, improved tax collection, and overall strengthening of the Russian state, the FSB also became much better funded during the 2000s. The actual extent of surveillance in today’s Russia is difficult to assess, but it has likely expanded considerably since the 1990s. This entry describes Russia’s surveillance technology, reviews Russian laws pertaining to surveillance, and discusses the use of surveillance to monitor political opposition and the Internet.

Surveillance Technology In Russia, as much as elsewhere, surveillance today rests less on informers and more on tech­ nology. The centerpiece of Russia’s surveillance technology is the System for Operative Investigative Activities (Sistema Operativno-Rozysknykh Meropriyatiy, known by its Russian acronym SORM). SORM has been developed gradually since the 1990s. The initial system, which was established in 1996 and is generally referred to as SORM-1, required telephone companies to install equipment that enabled the security and intelligence services to intercept telephone calls. SORM-2 imposed a similar obligation on Internet providers in 2000 so that the security and intelligence services would now also be able to monitor Internet communications. A third major development in SORM, SORM-3, occurred in 2014. The new technology of SORM-3 makes it possible to collect more, and more detailed, information on the users of telephone and Internet services. According to the regulations of SORM-3, providers of telephone and Internet services are now also required to store all Internet traffic and telephone calls for at least 12 hours. The FSB is the main organization that conducts surveillance of telephone and Internet communi­ cations. Seven other investigative and security agencies, however, also have the right to access SORM. These are (1) the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (2) the Police, (3) the Federal Tax Police Service, (4) the Federal Protective Service, (5) the Kremlin Regiment, (6) the Presidential Security Service, and (7) the Parliamentary Security Service.

872

Russia

SORM is operated through equipment (a “black box”) that providers of telephone and Internet services are required to install at their expense. The use of the system is often regarded as infringing on people’s constitutionally guaranteed basic rights. Government agencies with access to private communications through SORM have to request permission to access SORM in each individual case through a court order in line with Subarticle 2 of Article 23 of the constitution. According to some reports, these permissions are granted on a rolling basis and are considered not much more than a formality. Some sources even suggest that the FSB does not bother to obtain the court orders. In most countries with surveillance of telephone and Internet communications, the relevant government agencies must send a request to providers of telephone or Internet services to intercept communications for them, or the providers of telephone or Internet services are asked to submit information to security and intelligence services about the users of their services. The SORM equipment, however, allows the FSB and other agencies to directly intercept communications without notification to the providers of telephone and Internet services. Those providers, therefore, cannot choose in principle not to cooperate with the FSB and other agencies and automatically submit information on private communications to those agencies. The use of SORM and its related technology is not limited to Russia. Since its initial introduction, Russia has shared the technology with other former Soviet republics that have less expertise and know-how in surveillance technologies. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan have all put into place systems that are similar or nearly identical to SORM-1 and SORM-2. The use of SORM in these countries has been seen as facilitating authoritarian rule through the surveillance of regime opponents. In addition to the interception of telephone and Internet communications, other forms of surveillance are conducted in Russia as well. In particular, Russian authorities have worked on establishing databases with the fingerprints and photographs of individuals. Foreign citizens traveling to Russia have been fingerprinted at the border since late 2014. The databases are believed to now contain

the fingerprints and photographs of tens of millions of individual Russians and foreigners. Foreign governments are concerned about the possibility that Russian authorities or nongovernmental actors could hack into Internet and telephone connections and steal sensitive data. It has been alleged that Russian authorities used the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in particular to collect records on large numbers of foreign visitors and guests. The U.S. State Department has warned that anyone traveling to Russia take precautions, for instance, by switching off wireless signals, to avoid getting hacked.

Legislation The Russian Doctrine of Information Security of 2001, an official document, perhaps for the first time made clear that Russian authorities had regained an interest in keeping an eye on the media and the Internet. Among other things, the Doctrine of Information Security stated that the media and Internet communications should respect the stability of the constitutional order, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Russian political, economic and social stability, the unconditional ensuring of legality, law and order, and the development of equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation.

There are different laws in place that grant the FSB and other agencies the right to conduct surveillance on persons and legal entities. One of these laws is the 1995 Law on Operational Investigations, which provided the impetus for the original SORM. The law stipulated that the security services were entitled to monitor different sorts of communication on the condition that they obtained a court order. Another piece of legislation that is central to surveillance by Russian authorities is the law On Communication, adopted in 2003. Article 64 of this law stipulates that communication operators are obliged to provide authorized state organs which conduct operative investigative activity or guarantee the security of the Russian Federation with information about the users of communication services and about the communication services provided to them, as

Russia

well as other information that is necessary for the fulfillment of the duties of those organs in cases that are established by federal laws.

It is in general unclear whether the authorities always comply with the laws concerning the surveillance of citizens. It is also unclear on what legal basis private communications are monitored and intercepted in the case of individual citizens, especially when it concerns controversial cases of surveillance, such as that of opposition activists. A considerable portion of all surveillance efforts in Russia are probably targeted at real and suspected terrorists. Russia has seen a large number of terrorist attacks since 1991, with some 2,500 casualties in total. While it is not always successful in preventing terrorist attacks, the FSB each year claims to have prevented a large number of terrorist attacks as a result of its surveillance activities. A second category of persons whose communications are widely monitored are persons who are suspected of extremism. Russia first adopted a law against extremism in 2002. In the original law, the definition of extremism was largely confined to the planning or carrying out of violent acts that undermine public security, as well as the incitement to such acts. In the years since, the definition of extremism has been widened in the law through consecutive amendments to include, among other things, sowing national, racial, or religious discord; propagating racist and other extremist views; and threatening public officials. In large part because of the broad and imprecise official definition of extremism, the law against extremism and its application are often criticized for allowing the authorities to potentially crack down on many different types of individuals and organizations at will. The Main Directorate for the Counteraction of Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is the main institution that monitors the media and the Internet for indications of extremism. Another law that serves as a legal justification for the surveillance of citizens is the law On Protecting Children From Information Harmful to Their Health and Development, adopted in 2010. A controversial amendment to this law, adopted in 2012, established a blacklist of websites that were deemed harmful to minors and that were to be temporarily or permanently blocked. Another controversial

873

amendment, adopted in 2013, listed the promotion of “non-traditional sexual relationships” as content that is deemed harmful to minors. The Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications, which falls under the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications and is known by its Russian acronym Roskomnadzor, monitors the media and the Internet for utterances that, according to the law, are deemed harmful to minors.

Opposition and the Internet The surveillance of citizens in Russia is conducted largely for purposes that are most often associated with surveillance, namely the prevention of terrorism and other forms of instability. Russia in this sense is not different from most other countries. Surveillance in Russia, however, has also been employed to crack down on regime opponents. In 2012, for instance, recordings of the private telephone conversations of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, who was slain in 2015, were published on a pro-government news site. The publication of the recordings, in which Nemtsov criticizes other members of the opposition, was obviously intended to discredit Nemtsov himself and the opposition movement in general. Also in 2012, a prominent opposition politician, Aleksei Navalny, announced that he had found bugs (electronic eavesdropping devices) in the office of his anticorruption organization. Because of these and many similar reports, opposition activists now widely assume that their telephone conversations are intercepted and that their offices are bugged. Russia is formally a federal state with 85 regions (including Crimea and Sevastopol, which are not internationally recognized as part of ­Russia). Each of the 85 regions has a regional FSB office. The extent and nature of surveillance in each region depend in part on the regional authorities and the regional FSB offices. In regions with a comparatively liberal political climate, surveillance of opposition activists may be minimal. On the other end of the spectrum are regions with dictatorial regional regimes, where opposition activists are routinely followed. The surveillance of opposition activists appears to have increased following a wave of antigovernment demonstrations in 2011 to 2012, which

874

Russia

for the most part were organized through social networks on the Internet. As noted, since 2014, Internet service providers have had to store all Internet communications for at least 12 hours. Arguably, the most far-reaching development, however, has been the implementation of deep packet inspection since 2013. Deep packet inspection makes it easier for the authorities to peek into Internet communications. At the same time, it is still difficult, if not impossible, for Russian authorities to monitor the content of private communications on non-­ Russian social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter. Because of this, the authorities have repeatedly demanded that servers containing data about Russian users of Twitter, Facebook, and others be moved to Russia. The authorities have also developed strategies to monitor, and intervene in, discussions about political issues on the Internet. According to some reports, the authorities use data mining tools such as Semantic Archive to monitor the Internet. Several reports have also documented the existence of special centers, established since 2012, where employees attempt to manipulate public opinion about social and political issues through the Internet. They do so mainly by publishing webposts with a pro-government p ­ osition and by criticizing and ridiculing antigovernment messages. Among the tools that are also employed are Twitter accounts that automatically generate messages that are favorable to the government and distributed denial-of-service attacks against undesirable websites inside or outside Russia. Max Bader See also Authoritarianism; Cold War; Electronic Surveillance; KGB; Privacy, Internet

Further Readings Borogan, Irina and Andrei Soldatov. A Near Doubling in Russian Wiretaps Over Five Years—and That’s Only the Legal Stuff! (June 1, 2012). https://www .opendemocracy.net/od-russia/irina-borogan-andreisoldatov/near-doubling-in-russian-wiretaps-overfive-years-%E2%80%93-and-that (Accessed December 2015). Bourgelais, Peter. Commonwealth of Surveillance States: On the Export and Resale of Russian Surveillance Technology to Post-Soviet Central Asia (n.d.). https:// s3.amazonaws.com/access.3cdn.net/279b95d57718f0 5046_8sm6ivg69.pdf (Accessed December 2015). The Constitution of the Russian Federation. http://www .constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm (Accessed September 2017). David, Maxine. “New Social Media: Modernisation and Democratisation in Russia.” European Politics and Society, v.16/1 (2015). Deibert, Ronald and Rafal Rohozinski. “Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace.” In Ronald Deibert, et al. (eds.), Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. Giles, Keir. “Internet Use and Cyber Security in Russia.” Russian Analytical Digest, v.134 (2013). “Russia.” Freedom House (2013). https://freedomhouse .org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013_ Russia.pdf (Accessed December 2015). Soldatov, Andrei and Irina Borogan. “The Kremlin’s New Internet Surveillance Plan Goes Live Today.” Wired (November 1, 2012). http://www.wired.com/2012/11/ russia-surveillance/all/ (Accessed December 2015). Soldatov, Andrei and Irina Borogan. “Russia’s Surveillance State.” World Policy Journal, v.30/3 (2013). Soldatov, Andrei and Irina Borogan. The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia’s Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2015.

S John Kennedy engaged in many extramarital affairs while president of the United States, but this behavior is not what defined him for most people. In fact, he is regularly regarded as one of the most popular presidents in U.S. history. Conversely, President Bill Clinton’s sexual indiscretions while president in the 1990s earned him widespread public disapproval, even if only for a few years. The spread of technology has also played an important role in the reporting of political scandals. While political scandals have always been around, it was previously more difficult for the media to discover and report on them. Improved technology has made it easier to discover things that had historically remained private (e.g., diaries, conversations). These private aspects of politicians’ lives are now exposed for public view. Satellite technology and the 24-hour news cycle make it seem as if political scandals are more prevalent than ever, when, in reality, the likelihood is that what has changed is that the tools to discover and report on this type of behavior have increased tremendously. The rise in investigative journalism has also increased the amount of surveillance (electronic and otherwise) of political officials, so it often seems that they are under constant public scrutiny. This in turn has multiplied the exposure of previously unreported events.

Scandals, Political Political scandals are events in which political officials are caught engaging in acts condemned by the general public. While many political scandals involve illegal behavior, not all do. In many instances, the key to whether an event is considered a scandal is tied to the extent of public disapproval of the behavior in question. Scandals can be highly contextual and vary significantly in type, scope, and intensity. Behavior that results in a political scandal for one individual may not be so for another. Similarly, some scandals are shortlived, while others are far more enduring. Political scandals can affect who governs, how they govern, and the relationship between those who govern  and the governed. The proliferation of technology and the ever-present surveillance of high-ranking public officials have exposed previously private personal events, often with devastating consequences for politicians.

Political Scandals, Social Norms, and Technology While political scandals can take many forms, one thing they have in common is that the behavior in question violates some social norm. People expect particular types of behavior from politicians and political institutions. Politicians who violate those expectations run the risk of incurring public backlash. Norms and expectations can change over time, too. It was well-known that in the 1960s,

Political Sex Scandals Political sex scandals are a common type of political scandal. A political sex scandal can be 875

876

Scandals, Political

defined as a situation in which a politician engages in sexual behavior that is deemed unethical by the general public. As sexual and societal norms change, though, what is considered scandalous can change as well. Sometimes, it is not the specific act that the public is upset with but rather a lie or a cover-up that follows the behavior in question. Political sex scandals are nothing new to American politics, and examples are numerous. Each time a new scandal erupts, so does the debate about whether the sexual activities of a public official are private matters or acts that affect their ability to effectively serve the public. Even presidents have not proven to be exempt from political sex scandals. In the 19th century, Presidents Thomas Jefferson and Grover Cleveland were alleged to have fathered children out of wedlock. Both before and during his presidency, Bill Clinton was accused of having sexual affairs with a number of women. The most publicized example of this was the Monica Lewinsky affair. Lewinsky was an intern at the White House during Clinton’s presidency, and it was eventually revealed that the two engaged in an ongoing sexual affair. Clinton’s response to the subsequent investigations led to accusations of perjury and obstruction of justice against him that ultimately resulted in his impeachment. However, there were not enough votes in the Senate to remove him from office. The controversial nature of the Lewinsky affair was reflected in public opinion polls at the time. Many felt that Clinton’s sexual dalliances warranted his removal from office, whereas others—though not condoning the behavior—concluded that the conduct was a private matter that had no bearing on his duties as president. In fact one angle of the story that received considerable attention was the impact that media reporting of the scandal had on Clinton’s longtime marriage to his wife, Hillary Clinton. Political sex scandals have also affected numerous candidates who were running for president. In 1988, Democratic presidential candidate Gary Hart, frustrated with numerous media attempts to prove that he was having extramarital affairs, finally invited the media to follow him around as proof that he was innocent of the allegations. When a photo of Hart and his alleged mistress,

Donna Rice, aboard a yacht named Monkey Business surfaced, Hart—who continued to deny the allegations of infidelity—suspended his candidacy for the presidency. In a political sex scandal that sparked outrage on many levels, 2008 presidential hopeful John Edwards admitted to a lengthy affair with a former campaign worker. He engaged in the affair over a period of several years, during a period of time when his wife was suffering from breast cancer that would eventually claim her life. The affair also resulted in a child fathered by Edwards. In 2012, Republican candidate Herman Cain suspended his primary campaign after numerous women came forward to accuse him of inappropriate sexual conduct. Members of Congress have also suffered from numerous sex scandals. In the early 1990s, Oregon Senator Bob Packwood was investigated following allegations that he had sexually harassed or assaulted more than a dozen women. Packwood’s personal diary—one of the most private things an individual can have—became the centerpiece of the investigation when it became known that he had chronicled his sexual activities in its pages. Packwood ultimately resigned his Senate seat when it became clear that the Senate would move to expel him for his ethical misconduct. In 2006, Florida Republican Congressman Mark Foley resigned from office after allegations that he used the Internet to solicit sex from teenage boys who served as House pages became public. In 2007, Republican Senator Larry Craig pleaded guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct stemming from an incident in an airport men’s restroom where he was accused of soliciting gay sex. Anthony Weiner, a New York congressman, was forced to resign his House seat after it became public that he had engaged in sexting (i.e., sending sexually explicit images of himself via cell phone) with numerous young women. Two years later, during a campaign for the mayor of New York City, Weiner was once again caught in a sexting scandal. However, political sex scandals do not always mean the end of one’s political career. In June 2009, Former South Carolina governor Mark Sanford told family and staff that he would be taking a short vacation and doing some hiking on the Appalachian Trail. After being incommunicado

Scandals, Political

for almost a week, it was discovered that he was instead spending time with his mistress, a reporter from Argentina. Despite this scandal, Sanford would later win a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, and in 2014, he won reelection when he ran unopposed.

Political Corruption Many people believe that governments are full of corruption—and, indeed, there have been many political corruption scandals that would appear to support this belief. While some political scandals, like political sex scandals, are intensely personal, other political scandals are more diffuse, affecting political agencies and institutions or even presidential administrations. Corruption can be defined as the abuse of political power to suit one’s private wants, and it can take many forms, ranging from bribery to the commission of other crimes under the color of political office. One noteworthy 19th-century example of accepting bribes is the scandal known as Teapot Dome. The Teapot Dome scandal was a political corruption scandal that took place during Presi­ dent Warren Harding’s administration. Harding’s Secretary of the Interior, Albert Fall, used his power and influence to make money by accepting bribes. Private oil companies bribed Fall into leasing petroleum reserves to private oil companies at rates lower than market value. As a result, the private companies were able to make a larger profit because they did not have to compete with other private oil companies. One of the biggest political scandals in U.S. history is known as Watergate, which occurred in 1972. Five men were caught breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex to find information to help President Richard Nixon’s reelection. Investigative journalists and eventually criminal investigators ultimately widened the scope of the probe to include high-level members of the Nixon administration. The scandal eventually engulfed President Nixon himself, even as his administration attempted to cover up any connection to the break-in. It was discovered that the president kept secret tapes of conversations in the Oval Office. Prosecutors sought access to these tapes in an effort to determine whether they would shed light on the ongoing

877

criminal investigation. Nixon initially refused to release the tapes, and then, under pressure, he agreed to release redacted versions of the tapes. Prosecutors balked at this arrangement, and the case ultimately went before the U.S. Supreme Court who, in United States v. Nixon (1974), ordered the president to turn the tapes over to prosecutors. The Watergate scandal ultimately resulted in the convictions of dozens of officials and the resignation of President Nixon, making Nixon the only president ever to resign from office. The scandal left such an indelible mark on U.S. politics that very often the suffix “-gate” is used to describe subsequent political scandals. In a separate matter, Spiro Agnew, Nixon’s vice president, was forced to resign from office as the result of a criminal probe accusing him of corruption, fraud, and extortion while serving as a political official in Maryland and subsequently as vice president. Agnew resigned and pled no contest to a charge of tax evasion. This makes Agnew the only vice president in U.S. history to resign from office over criminal charges. The specter of a White House surveillance system rose once again in early 2017 when President Donald Trump fired Federal Bureau of Investiga­ tion Director James Comey. Director Comey was investigating allegations that the Trump campaign conspired with Russia to improperly influence the 2016 presidential election. Perhaps fearing that a disgruntled Comey might take his side of the story to the press, President Trump tweeted that Comey had “better hope that there are no ‘tapes’ of our conversation before he starts leaking to the press.” The White House subsequently refused to divulge whether there actually was an audio surveil­ lance   system, but the mere possibility that there might be raised comparisons with the Watergate scandal. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a sting operation in which agents posed as investors from a fictitious Arab company attempting to bribe public officials in exchange for favorable business terms. The scope of the investigation ultimately expanded to include more than two dozen public officials, resulting in criminal convictions for six members of the House of Representatives and one member of the U.S. Senate.

878

Scanners

In the mid-1980s, the administration of Presi­ dent Ronald Reagan became engulfed in the IranContra Scandal. The scandal involved the sale of arms to Iran in exchange for the release of U.S. hostages. The money from the sales was then to be diverted to the Contras, a pro-democracy political group in Nicaragua. This created two problems. First, the U.S. government’s public position was that it would never negotiate with certain countries (e.g., Iran) for the release of hostages. Second, the Boland Amendment prohibited any U.S. government entity from funding the Contras in Nicaragua. When the scandal became public, there were extensive congressional hearings and a presidential commission (the Tower Commission) in an attempt to determine whether laws were broken and whether President Reagan knew of the armsfor-hostages plan. The Tower Commission Report ultimately concluded that Reagan had no knowledge of the scheme, though he was criticized for not having better control and oversight over his national security team. All those convicted in this scandal were later pardoned in full by President George H. W. Bush. Barack Obama was a sitting member of the U.S. Senate from Illinois when he was first elected president in 2008. According to state law, this meant that the state’s governor, Rob Blagojevich, had the power to appoint someone to fill the Illinois Senate seat that Obama would vacate when he became president. An undercover investigation, which included electronic surveillance, eventually revealed that Blagojevich attempted to parlay his appointment power into personal benefits for himself. He was convicted of more than a dozen corruption-related charges in this “pay for play” scandal and sentenced to 14 years in a federal prison.

Surveillance These examples illustrate the plethora of the ways in which politicians can engage in ethical shortcomings, which often result in not only removal from office but also criminal charges and convic tions. While these may be among the most noteworthy examples, there are hundreds more. Advances in technology have gone hand in hand with a seeming increase in the number of political scandals. Technology makes it easier than ever

for the media, ordinary citizens, and political enemies to engage in surveillance of all types into areas of politicians’ lives that were usually considered private. As a result, scandals will continue to be an important part of politics. Darren A. Wheeler and Jessica Ratel-Khan See also Iran-Contra Affair; Sexting

Further Readings Puglisi, Riccardo and James M. Snyder Jr. Media Coverage of Political Scandals (NBER Working Paper No. 14598), 2008. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/ w14598.pdf (Accessed January 2015). Thompson, John B. Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000. Tumber, Howard and Silvio Waisbord. “Introduction: Political Scandals and Media Across Democracies, Volume I.” American Behavioral Scientist, v.47/8 (2004).

Scanners Since the mid-1990s, the application of scanners has become prolific. Examples include converting information into digital formats, monitoring environments, and reading predetermined information, such as barcodes. Evident in supermarkets, hospitals, universities, or government buildings, to name but a few, scanners’ efficiency, accuracy, and security functions have changed the way in which many organizations and institutions now operate. With regard to the impact of this technology for surveillance, security, and privacy, much comment has focused on the compromises inflicted on civil liberties and human rights, especially with regard to full-body scanners at airport security. Full-body scanners look through clothing to reveal any hard or metal objects that may be concealed—it is much like a “soft” X-ray scan that penetrates only as far as the skin—thus highlighting materials, such as guns, drugs, explosive materials, or flammable liquids, carried through security checkpoints. While scanners have been celebrated for their security potentials, they have also incited concerns about privacy and the rights

Scanners

of passengers—due mainly to the near-naked images produced and the lack of clarity as to how these images are analyzed and controlled. Despite such concerns, and at times protests against their presence, scanners remain part of the airport security landscape. In 1992, Steven W. Smith prototyped the SECURE 1000, the first full-body scanner. The technology stemmed from medical imaging used primarily to see the interior body. However, Smith reduced the intensity of the X-ray so that it penetrated only through clothes, thus revealing any objects concealed on the body. The technology was developed and enhanced throughout the 1990s, with the security company Rapiscan, as well as the U.S. military, taking the lead. Two prominent scanning techniques emerged during this time: (1) millimeter wave scanning and (2)  backscatter X-ray scanning. The millimeter technique reflects high-frequency radio waves off the body; the reflected waves use energy emitted from the body and nonpassive devices, such as metals, to form an image. The backscatter X-ray is based on traditional X-ray techniques; however, the X-ray waves are disrupted and scattered to dilute the frequency of the waves, and as a result, the X-ray is less invasive. During the 1990s, airport security and the screening of passengers mainly involved the use of metal detectors to identify objects on passengers, the X-raying of passenger luggage, and pat-downs (i.e., physical searches by security staff). These security measures had come to prominence during the 1970s because of the threat of terrorist hijacking. The events of September 11, 2001, played a dramatic role in recasting aviation security. Following the 9/11 attacks, airport security worldwide intensified—for example, between 2001 and 2005, the U.S. government spent $15 billion on improving aviation screening. By 2011, it was reported that there were 247 backscatter and 241 millimeter-wave machines in operation at 78 U.S. airports. Later events such as the “Underwear Bomber” continued the impetus and security calls to widely employ technologies such as full-body scanning. On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk ­Abdukmutallab breached airport security when he concealed plastic explosives in his underwear onboard an Amsterdam flight bound for Detroit—he attempted and failed to

879

detonate the explosives in U.S. airspace. For many governments and public commentators, the event demonstrated  the failings of pat-down and X-ray securities and led to intensified calls for the introduction of full-body scanners at all international airports. However, the effectiveness of full-body scanners has been called into question, and a number of breaches have highlighted the limits of its powers of detection. Full-body scanners have also been challenged by civil and human rights groups. Four main challenges have been laid at the scanners: (1) privacy and the use of images, (2) health and the risks associated with radiation, (3) claims that the technology itself is ineffective and expensive, and (4) the legality of using body scanning imaging on children. For some legal experts and civil libertarian groups, the production of scanned images are unconstitutional due to the invasiveness of their content and the health and ethical dimensions that ensue. Moreover, controversies remain over the storage of the images as well as reported abuses in the means of capturing images and the derogatory comments made by security staff. Resistance and protest against the scanners have culminated in “strip” demonstrations, as it happened at Berlin’s airport in 2010. Nevertheless, concern remains as to the protection of the images being produced—who controls the data and what data protection rights are provided—as well as the increased levels of discomfort and embarrassment meted out to passengers subjected to such security measures. Indeed those who opt out of a scan (as is the choice offered to all passengers) invariably face alternative forms of screening, most likely a full-body search conducted in a private room. Today, the most common form of security faced by passengers is the pat-down or X-ray. Full-body scanners, however, remain relatively peripheral to airport security and are not a security measure dedicated to all passengers. Within Europe, the European Commission states that the machines may be used in airports but under strict controls. In the United States, the Transportation Security Administration introduced a legislation in 2013 stating that the scanners must not show actual physiques but body-masked images. Nevertheless, with continued agitated states of security worldwide and real and perceived threats to security

880

School Surveillance: Colleges and Universities

abounding, such devices, it would appear, are here to stay, along with their relevance to issues of surveillance, security, and privacy. Keith Spiller See also Airport Security; Airport Terminal Security Screenings; Passenger Data; Passenger Profiling

Further Readings Abeyratne, Ruwantissa. “Full Body Scanners at Airports: The Balance Between Privacy and State Responsibility.” Journal of Transportation Security, v.3 (2010). “Airport Worker Given Police Warning for ‘Misusing’ Body Scanner.” The Guardian (March 24, 2010). https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/mar/24/airportworker-warned-body-scanner (Accessed October 2017). Dodge, Martin and Kitchin Rob. “Flying Through Code/ Space: The Real Virtuality of Air Travel.” Environment and Planning A, v.36/2 (2004). European Commission. “Impact Assessment on the Possible Use of Security Scanners at EU Airports” (March 23, 2011). https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/ transport/files/modes/air/security/doc/scanners_ impact_assessment.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Ferran, Lee. “U.S. Airport Full Body Scanners Too Unreliable to Use, Germany Says.” ABC News (September 1, 2011). http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ us-airport-full-body-scanners-unreliable-germany/ story?id=14428581 (Accessed October 2017). Greenberg, Andy. “Researchers Easily Slipped Weapons Past TSA’s X-Ray Body Scanners.” Wired (August 2014). https://www.wired.com/2014/08/study-showshow-easily-weapons-can-be-smuggled-past-tsas-x-raybody-scanners/ (Accessed October 2017). Klitou, Demetrius. “Backscatter Body Scanners: A Strip Search by Other Means.” Computer Law & Security Review, v.24 (2008). Kula, Eric. “Full-Body Scanners, Live Information and Rights in the Airport: A Theoretical Perspective on Information Circulation.” APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper (2011). Mironenko, Olga. “Body Scanners Versus Privacy and Data Protection” (University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2011-20) (2011). Mitchener-Nissen, Timothy, et al. “Public Attitudes to Airport Security: The Case of Whole Body Scanners.” Security Journal, v.25/3 (2012). Parks, Lisa. “Points of Departure: The Culture of US Airport Screening.” Journal of Visual Culture, v.6/2 (2007). “Watch It: ‘Germans Strip to Protest full Body Scanners.’” Flickfilosopher (November 23, 2010).

http://www.flickfilosopher.com/blog/2010/11/watch_ it_germans_strip_to_prot.html#axzz1sWCcD039 (Accessed January 2015). Watson, Paul. “Scannergate: Facts Contradict Heathrow Claim That Naked Images Can’t Be Printed.” Plant Prision.com (February 10, 2010).

School Surveillance: Colleges  and Universities The provision of audio and visual surveillance on college and university campuses in the United States was not a standard security practice until the early 2000s, when the seeming frequency of school shootings moved schools and the government to seek ways of protecting students and staff from shootings on school premises. Some people believe that the surveillance of college and university campuses is a nuisance and unnecessary, yet others believe that surveillance provides a sense of security. In the 21st century, campus police and surveillance are common features on many college and university campuses. For instance, the flow of students and visitors on and off campus may be monitored by campus police as well as by video. Students may be required to show or scan their school ID to be permitted onto the campus or into certain buildings; such scanning provides a record of who is at a particular location, when they arrived, and when they departed. However, there are unique challenges faced by colleges and universities as they seek to provide security for their students and staff. University campuses are situated in large acreages of land with multiple buildings, which creates monitoring challenges because some universities cannot afford the cost of installing sufficient surveillance equipment and adequate lightning, so sexual predators and other criminals may seek out and lurk in places that are not protected. Given the budgetary constraints of many universities, it is a daunting task for them to install surveillance and security equipment in every corner of the campus, as well as to employ qualified security personnel. An additional concern is that access and movement of students and staff may be restricted by the surveillance apparatus. However, questions arise as to what extent college campus surveillance enhances students’ safety. How can a good balance between

School Surveillance: Colleges and Universities

students’ security and their privacy be ensured? What oversight can be put in place to hold school authorities accountable with the massive amount of personal data collected through the college campus  surveillance apparatus? This entry reviews the benefits and controversies associated with surveillance on college and university campuses and explores their use of surveillance technologies.

Benefits Some people feel that having surveillance cameras on college campuses damages the image of colleges as being safe places for students, whereas others assert that cameras enhance the safety of college campuses. Some college and university administrators argue that the main reason for surveillance is the security of students. Studies have shown that college students tend to be careless about their surroundings, which can put them at risk of being targeted by dangerous people. In addition, because of the number of persons on and around college campuses, it may be difficult to identify “strangers” who pose an imminent threat. Thus, colleges and universities generally require some form of identification to enter their campuses, including dormitories and student living areas. Some areas of the campus, such as poorly lit areas, may be at risk for crimes such as robbery, vandalism, and rape. Thus, security cameras and campus police patrol can increase students’ sense of security. Some surveillance cameras are capable of identifying disturbances or are equipped with facial recognition technology. In such cases, the cameras not only provide a sense of security to students but also serve to prevent crimes such as thefts, break-ins, and vandalism.

Controversies Typically, surveillance cameras are mounted on ­sensitive areas around college campuses, such as dormitory entrances, parking areas, public walkways, and cashiers’ offices. A controversial issue regarding surveillance and security on college campuses is whether students have the right to know the locations of surveillance cameras. Some argue that to be effective, the locations of cameras must remain discreet. Those who support this

881

approach argue that disclosing the locations of cameras undermines campus security because such information will result in the displacement of criminal activities to areas where cameras are not placed. Others argue that withholding the location of cameras is a direct violation of students’ right to privacy. With administrators and campus police having direct access to the video feed from cameras, some fear the misuse of this technology for “peeping” or even “stalking” activities. Some officials respond that surveillance cameras are not designed to be invasive of one’s personal space but simply serve as an electronic security guard. There have even been instances in which colleges or universities have concealed surveillance cameras outside students’ apartments. While school officials argue that the cameras are used specifically for safety, some students reportedly feel that these cameras could very well be intruding and recording activities inside their homes via windows and glass doors, despite officials’ statements that the cameras only record activities outside the apartments and “black out” all glass windows and doors. On other campuses, the cameras are visible and recognized, and it is common for them to be placed in academic buildings, student union, student living quarters, and other high-activity or high-risk areas. Administrators believe that students are more likely to reside in these areas if they know that in the event that a crime does take place, it will be recorded and the police will have the information needed to identify and apprehend the violators. It has been argued that not only do visible cameras increase the assurance of security but they also decrease the risk of vandalism, theft, and other altercations.

Surveillance Usage The basic use of surveillance is to alert the appropriate personnel of the occurrence of dangerous or high-risk situations; however, advanced security technology can alert security officials of criminal activities through texts, email, or phone. There are two general methods used to monitor video surveillance: (1) active surveillance and (2) inactive surveillance. Active surveillance describes the act of officials continuously monitoring the video feed from security cameras; this is also referred to as video patrol. The officials watch a live video feed

882

School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools

from a central control room, looking for signs of a disturbance. With inactive surveillance, staff do not actively monitor the video feed; they only review the footage in the event of an incident. The latter is the most common security surveillance practice in college campuses. As reassuring as that may seem, there is still the need for the provision of rigorous oversight to ensure that the process is not abused. Rochelle E. M. Cobbs, Andrea Henry, and O. Oko Elechi See also Crime; Crime Control; School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools

Further Readings Boven, H. Lee Van. “Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in State Legislative Control.” California Law Review, v.57/5 (1969). http:// scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/ vol57/iss5/4 (Accessed July 2014). “Campus Security Camera Systems.” Video Surveillance. com. http://www.videosurveillance.com/campus.asp (Accessed July 2014). Kittle, Jesse T. “A Study of Surveillance and Privacy Rights.” Electronic Theses and Dissertations (Paper No. 1170) (2013). http://dc.etsu.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=2325&context=etd (Accessed March 2017). Repenning, K., et al. “Demystifying School Violence: A Local, State, and National Perspective on the Phenomenon of School Violence.” Journal of Security Administration, v.24/1 (2001). “University Surveillance: Case Studies.” Midwest Surveillance. http://www.midwestsurveillance.com/ University-Surveillance-s/138.htm (Accessed July 2014). Young, Jeffery R. “Smile! You’re on Campus Camera: Colleges Debate Increased Use of Surveillance Devices.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, v.49/40 (2003).

School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools Primary and secondary schools have long engaged in surveillance practices. These include physical obser­vation, attendance registers, classroom arrangement, uniforms, assessments and exams,

and publishing of rankings or league tables. In recent years, with advancements in surveillance technologies, some primary and secondary schools have expanded their use of technology to surveil students. For example, some secondary  and primary schools have introduced ­closed-circuit television cameras (CCTVs), metal ­detectors, face and fingerprint recognition technology, chipped identity cards, electronic registers, cyberspace surveillance, and even electronic systems to log students’ lunch choices so that parents can check their child’s diet. Although reasons of health and personal safety (e.g., the reduction of bullying, theft, smoking, junk food consumption, and truancy) are sometimes cited, in general, the implementation of surveil lance devices tends to be justified on grounds of security. Fears of violent incidents such as the stabbing of head teacher Phillip Lawrence in London in 1995 and the massacre in a primary school in Dunblane, Scotland, in 1996, in which an outsider shot and killed 16 children and their teacher, and school shootings in the United States, such as at Columbine High School in 1999 and Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012, have provided the impetus for the introduction of new surveillance technologies. Some argue that teachers need protection from violent young people and need assistance with searching students for weapons, drugs, and alcohol. A 2010 study conducted in Scotland by Carolyn Black and colleagues suggests that the presence of a police officer tends to improve feelings of security. However, there is evidence to suggest that surveillance systems do not ensure security—for instance, Columbine High School had a video surveillance system and an armed guard assigned to the school. There have also been reports of physical abuse from school police officers and students being arrested for noncriminal offenses such as being late or wearing the “wrong” clothes. Some scholars have suggested other interconnected reasons for the use of surveillance in schools. These include a culture of fear, commercial gain for security device businesses, a wider culture of control of socially and economically disadvantaged young people, the wider securitization of societies that is pervading both private and public spaces, and the counterterrorism agenda.

School Surveillance: Primary and Secondary Schools

Others argue that the devices are perceived differently according to social group. In a 2010 project on the “surveilled,” Mike McCahill and Rachel Finn examined the social impact of new surveillance technologies on the lives of 13- to 16-yearold children in the United Kingdom. The research­ers examined three schools and found that young people of lower socioeconomic classes were more likely to feel that they were the target of surveillance and were more likely than middle-class young people to adjust their behavior when they felt watched, including staying away from spaces under surveillance. Middle-class young people did not tend to feel they were the target of surveillance; rather, they felt that surveillance devices were installed for their own security. In addition, females were more uncomfortable with surveillance than were males. According to Emmeline Taylor, there is a lack of legal regulation around surveillance in schools. U.K. and U.S. legislation provides little protection for young people in school settings when it comes to surveillance. However, resistance to new technologies of school surveillance has occurred. For instance, in 2009, pupils at an East London school walked out in protest after CCTV cameras were installed in their classrooms without consultation, claiming their civil liberties had been infringed. There is still a lot that is not known about the impact of surveillance technologies in primary and secondary schools. For example, there is as yet, a lack of research mapping the surveillance devices in schools, even though some have argued that they have been unevenly installed. There is also virtually no data on what is done with the CCTV tapes, who watches them, or whether they are watched at all. Charlotte Chadderton See also Closed-Circuit Television; Fear, Culture of; School Surveillance: Colleges and Universities; Surveillance, Culture of

Further Readings Black, C. Homes, et al. Evaluation of Campus Police Officers in Scottish Schools. Edinburgh, Scotland: Scottish Government Social Research, 2010. http:// dera.ioe.ac.uk/1225/1/0095816.pdf (Accessed October 2017).

883

Casella, R. “Safety or Social Control? The Security Fortification of Schools in a Capitalist Society.” In T. Monahan and R. D. Torres (eds.), Schools Under Surveillance: Cultures of Control in Public Education. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010. Chadderton, C. “Secondary Schools Under Surveillance: Young People ‘as’ Risk in the UK: An Exploration of the Neoliberal Shift From Compassion to Repression.” In E. Cudworth, et al. (eds.), Technology, Society and Inequality: New Horizons and Contested Futures. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2013. Furedi, F. Politics of Fear. London, England: Bloomsbury Academic, 2005. Giroux, H. A. Youth in a Suspect Society: Democracy or Disposability? New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Harris, J. “School Surveillance: How Big Brother Spies on Pupils.” The Guardian (June 9, 2011). http://www .theguardian.com/uk/2011/jun/09/schools-surveillancespying-on-pupils (Accessed October 2017). Hope, A. “Panopticism, Play and the Resistance of Surveillance: Case Studies of the Observation of Student Internet Use in UK Schools.” British Journal of Sociology of Education, v.26/3 (2005). Hope, A. “CCTV, School Surveillance and Social Control.” British Educational Research Journal, v.35/6 (2009). Marx, G. and V. Steeves. “From the Beginning: Children as Subjects and Agents of Surveillance.” Surveillance & Society, v.7/3–4 (2010). McCahill, M. and R. Finn. “The Social impact of Surveillance in Three UK Schools: ‘Angels’, ‘Devils’ and ‘Teen Mums.’” Surveillance & Society, v.7/3–4 (2010). Monahan, T. and R. D. Torres. “Introduction.” In T. Monahan and R. D. Torres (eds.), Schools Under Surveillance: Cultures of Control in Public Education. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010. Simmons, L. “The Docile Body in School Space.” In T. Monahan and R. D. Torres (eds.), Schools Under Surveillance: Cultures of Control in Public Education. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010. Taylor, E. Surveillance Schools: Security, Discipline and Control in Contemporary Education. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. “Teachers Hit Back at ‘Permanent Surveillance’ in the Classroom.” Big Brother Watch (April 22, 2014). https://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/2014/04/ teachers-hit-back-permanent-surveillance-classroom/ (Accessed October 2017). U.K. Press Association. School Dinners Spy Website Launched (2009). http://latestnews.virginmedia.com/ news/tech/2009/10/08/school_dinners_spy_website_ launched

884

Search and Seizure

Search

and

Seizure

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides for the protection and respect of the privacy of every citizen. Law enforcement agencies are the only governmental agencies with authority to use coercive force or threat of coercive force against a suspect, ideally as a last resort, in the enforcement of law and in the maintenance of law and order in society. In carrying out this onerous responsibility, law enforcement officers may intrude into the personal space of an individual to control crime or prevent it from happening. This proactive approach to crime control may necessitate the search and seizure of a person by law enforcement officers. Except for certain stipulated conditions, the search and seizure of an individual is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which states, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be  searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, has through rulings over the years reinforced the protection of the privacy of citizens from the intrusion of the state as represented by law enforcement actions. According to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Court rulings, law enforcement officers may search or seize an individual or his or her property under the following circumstances: The officer has a valid search warrant, a valid arrest warrant, or a belief that when evaluated by the law courts rise to probable cause, suggesting there is sufficient evidence to show that the suspect may have committed or is planning to commit a crime. This entry reviews the exceptions to the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment and discusses the implications that advances in surveillance technologies may have on these protections.

Exceptions Although law enforcement must have a valid search warrant before undertaking a search, there are exceptions to this rule. For example, a property owner may consent to the search. The consent must be voluntary, although how this is determined can be contentious and left open to the courts to determine, as officers are not required to advise individuals that they have a legal right to refuse a search. Furthermore, when an individual is not in a position to expect “reasonable expectation of privacy,” such as when disposing of evidence in a public garbage can or transferring information through a third party in public view (e.g., on an envelope), he or she does not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment protection. There is also an automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment—evidence in an automobile that can be spotted by an officer looking in the vehicle is not understood to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Through their rulings, the courts have also allowed exceptions known as exigent circumstances. For example, if officers have good reasons to believe that the commission of a crime is imminent, they may act to prevent the crime from occurring; similarly, if they believe that if they do not act immediately, evidence may be destroyed or removed, they can act. Another exigent circumstance is when law enforcement officers believe that they need to act to protect people or property from imminent danger, such as in the case of actively pursuing a fleeing felon. In addition, the courts have granted law enforcement officers limited authority to search without a valid search warrant during an investigatory stop or incident to an arrest, or when the crime evidence is in plain view. Patting down the outside of a suspect’s clothing in search of a weapon requires “only reasonable suspicion” by the officers as opposed to the higher level “probable cause” required for a search. Public schools is another context in which searches are not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In the New Jersey v. T.L.O., a juvenile, the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant was not warranted for the school authorities to search school lockers if they have reasonable suspicion that they will find evidence of criminal

Secure Fence Act of 2006

behavior. The ruling, however, noted that the search should not be “excessively intrusive,” given the age and gender of the students. Another case that challenged the Fourth Amend ment protection against search and seizure is the case in which the Supreme Court ruled that dog sniffing for drugs outside the home of a suspect is a violation of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights (see Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ____ (2013)). According to the ruling, the use of a trained dog to obtain evidence in a private space for which the owner had not expressly granted officers permission to search and the officers had no valid search warrant to that effect is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This ruling may be challenged in the future when advances in technology allow evidence to be obtained from a distance without intruding into the private space of the suspect. Many advocates of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are concerned that with the use of sophisticated modern surveillance technology, law enforcement might be able to obtain damaging evidence against an individual without physically intruding into his or her private space. The question then becomes which right is more legitimate: the privacy right of an individual or the need to protect the lives and property of citizens?

Implications of Advancement in Surveillance Technologies Amid concerns of terrorist attacks and cybercrimes, among other deviant activities, governments all over the world have instituted surveillance technology in their efforts to protect their citizens and maintain law and order (e.g., the use of Global Positioning System devices to monitor and/or track the location of citizens). This raises numerous questions. For example, if in the United States, it is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to search and seize without a valid search warrant, a valid arrest warrant, or probable cause by an officer, is intrusion into the privacy of citizens through technology without their consent also unconstitutional? Further complicating the issue is the power and technological know-how controlled by private agencies and corporations. For instance, credit card companies have the

885

capability to monitor consumers’ movements and activities through their shopping habits. This raises the following questions: “Should the state directly or indirectly through private institutions have the power to monitor the activities and movements of citizens without their consent?” “Does the need of governments to protect people and their properties, enforce laws, and maintain law and order in society override citizens’ constitutionally protected right of freedom from government intrusion into their privacy?” These are key issues that will need to be considered as surveillance technologies advance and their availability increases. Rochelle E. M. Cobbs, O. Oko Elechi, and Arlinda Carter See also Fourth Amendment and Surveillance; Challenges and Changes to the Fourth Amendment; Due Process; Law and Legislation; Law Enforcement and Surveillance; Policing and Society; Privacy; Privacy, Right to; U.S. Constitution

Further Readings Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___ (2013). Gray, David. “Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones.” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, v.103/3 (2013). Kerr, Orin S. “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution.” Michigan Law Review, v.102/801 (2004). Larkin, Paul. “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies.” http://www.heritage.org/research/ reports/2013/09/the-fourth-amendment-and-newtechnologies (Assessed November 2014). New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Posner, Richard A. “Privacy, Surveillance, and Law.” University of Chicago Law Review, v.75/245 (2008).

Secure Fence Act

of

2006

The Secure Fence Act of 2006 was signed by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2006. The bill authorized the construction of 700 miles of double-reinforced fence in areas where illegal smuggling of drugs and persons were prominent

886

Secure Fence Act of 2006

in the southern border of the United States. In addition, the bill appropriated funds for the use of state-of-the-art technology to help the Department of Homeland Security in its efforts to secure and manage the border with Mexico.

Legislative History of the Secure Fence Act of 2006 The bill was introduced by Representative Peter T. King (R-NY) on September 13, 2006. The next day, September 14, 2006, the bill was referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security. The bill was passed in the House of Representatives with a vote of 283–138 on the same day. On September 29, 2006, the bill was passed by the Senate with a vote of 80–19. On October 23, 2006 the bill was presented to President Bush, who signed the bill on October 26, 2006. That same day, the bill became Public Law No. 109-367.

Provisions of the Secure Fence Act of 2006 Section 2 of the act commends the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to take the necessary steps to achieve and maintain control of all international land and maritime borders of the United States. To do so, the Secretary of the Depart­ ment of Homeland Security is encouraged to effectively use technology and personnel in order to conduct proper surveillance of all international borders of the United States. This includes the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar coverage, and cameras. In addition, the act provides for enhancement of physical infrastructure to prevent the entry of illegal aliens and goods into the United States. Physical infrastructure enhancement includes the use of additional checkpoints, all-weather access roads, and vehicle barriers. Section 3 of the act amends Section 102(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and commends the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to build two layers of reinforced fencing and the installation of cameras, sensors, lighting, and additional roads and physical barriers in specific areas along the southern border. These areas include specific parts of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The act provides that the surveillance camera system be installed by May 30,

2007, and that the construction of the fence should be completed by May 30, 2008. Section 4 of the act directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a study on the viability of installing a state-of-the-art infrastructure security system along the land and maritime northern border of the United States. The study should include considerations about the need, cost, and economic impact of such security system. The Secretary of Homeland Security should report the findings of the study 1 year after the enactment of the act. Section 5 of the act instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security to, in 30 days after the enactment of the act, assess the authority of U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents to stop vehicles that enter the United States illegally and refuse to stop when ordered. This assessment should be compared with the authority of the U.S. Coast Guard to stop vessels. This comparison is intended to serve as basis for deciding whether the authority of U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents should be expanded. In addition, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should assess the equipment used by agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and whether new and better equipment should be given to such agents. Finally, Section 5 directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to evaluate the training received by agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to stop vehicles that entered the United States illegally. All findings should be reported no later than 60 days after the enactment of the act.

Controversy The enactment of the Secure Fence Act was not without controversy. Those who favor the act and the construction of the fence believed that the economic impact that illegal immigration has on the U.S. economy is burdensome. They argue that building a physical barrier between Mexico and the United States will stop the influx of drugs and illegal immigrants into the United States. In addition, they contend that by not enforcing immigration, the federal government would essentially be providing blank amnesty to those who entered the country illegally by enforcing some laws while ignoring others, effectively providing for their stay. Thus, the fence will force individuals to choose

Securities and Exchange Commission

legal channels to use to immigrate to the United States instead of breaking the law. Conversely, those who do not favor the act and the construction of the fence believe that the fence would be a public relations disaster for the United States in the international arena and that diplomatic relations with Mexico would suffer an irreparable damage. In addition, they argue that the building project will take a very long time, and they doubt its effectiveness. Last, detractors of the act point out the negative environmental impact that a fence may have in the natural spaces along the border and that many people may be injured trying to overcome this physical barrier. The cost of building the double-layered fence between Mexico and the United States has been a highly contentious issue. Between 2006 and 2009, U.S. Customs and Border Protection spent $2.4 billion to complete 670 miles of border fence. The vast majority of this portion was single layer. In 2009, 38 miles of 19-foot fence near El Paso, Texas, were completed. The cost for this segment of fence was $170 million. The payoff of the segments of fence already built is indeterminate. In a March 2013 report, the Government Accountability Office reported that illegal entries to the United States fell 69% between 2006 and 2011; however, drug and other contraband seizures nearly doubled. The Government Accountability Office pointed out in the same report that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection could not account for the impact of the fence on these numbers. The building of a wall along the border of the United States and Mexico continues to be controversial. During his 2016 presidential campaign, President Donald Trump promised to build the wall totally financed by the Mexican government. This created a negative response from the Mexican government and from multiple organizations within the United States that support comprehensive immigration reform. Marcos L. Misis See also Border Patrol Checkpoints; Immigration; National Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Further Readings Connor, Tracy. “Price Tag for 700 Miles of Border Fencing: High and Hard to Pin Down.” NBC News

887

(June 21, 2013). https://www.cnbc.com/id/100835156 (Accessed October 2017). Government Printing Office. “Public Law 109-367: Secure Fence Act 2006.” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/PLAW-109publ367/pdf/PLAW-109publ367.pdf (Accessed October 2014). Ibrahim, Sara, et al. “United States Border Control and the Secure Fence Act of 2006.” Administrative Law Review, v.59/3 (2007). Library of Congress. “H.R.6061: Secure Fence Act of 2006.” https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/ house-bill/06061 (Accessed October 2017). Martin, Philip L. “Election of Donald Trump and Migration.” Migration Letters, v.14/1(2017). Messerli, Joe. “Should the U.S. Build a Fence Across the Entire Border With Mexico to Slow Illegal Immigration?” Balancedpolitics.org. http://www .balancedpolitics.org/border_fence.htm (Accessed October 2014). Phelps, James R., et al. Border Security. Durham, NC: Carolina Press, 2014. White House. “President Bush Signs Secure Fence Act.” http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2006/10/20061026.html (Accessed October 2014).

Securities and Exchange Commission The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an independent federal government agency of the United States created under Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The act provides rules and regulations for controlling the trading of securities, defined to include notes, stocks, and certificates of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, bonds and debentures in the United States. In the act, exchange is defined as any organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes the market place and the market facilities ­maintained by such exchange.

888

Securities and Exchange Commission

History Events after World War I led to industrialization and prosperity for the United States. There was increased trading and investment in stocks and shares. However, high levels of deregulation, fraudulent activities, and lack of proper reporting contributed to the stock market crash of 1929. Efforts to resolve the dilemma led to certain restructurings, including the need to effectively regulate commercial activities involving the issuance and trading in bonds, stocks, and other securities. The U.S. Congress passed momentous security laws in quick succession to protect investors, restore order and confidence in the stock and trade system, and facilitate the creation of investment income. Legislation that gives the SEC powers for general securities industry surveillance and regulation of investment activities in the United States includes the following: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, the Public Company Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility Act of 2002 (SarbanesOxley Act), the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), the Jump­ start Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act 2012, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (repealed in 2006). The common goal of these laws is to promote the principle that all investors should possess access to basic facts that would encourage informed judgment before buying or dealing in any form of securities. In other words, the SEC ensures that there is free flow of important market-related information to maintain fair dealing and protect against fraud. The ability of the SEC to enforce the enabling laws, as well as to alter existing rules or make new regulations, is essential for the successful and effective oversight.

Duties of the SEC The basic duties of the SEC include the protection of investors, maintenance of nondiscriminatory orderly markets, and enabling of capital creation. As of 2017, the SEC manages more than 27,000

market participants, including investment advisers, mutual funds and exchange traded funds, broker-dealers, transfer agents, and national securities exchanges. The SEC is primarily concerned with ensuring that important market-related information is disclosed, dealings are fair, and fraud is eliminated. Although the SEC is mandated to protect investors, it is not authorized to act on behalf of individual investors. In relation to these duties, the SEC conducts law enforcement and surveillance activities. Law Enforcement Activities

The SEC’s law enforcement authority is a very crucial element to its ability to fulfill its mandate. The Enforcement Division is responsible for conducting investigations into probable violations of the federal security laws and prosecuting federal civil cases and administrative proceedings. In a civil case, the commission may obtain an injunction to stop future violations, and violators of such injunctions may be subjected to fines or imprisonment for contempt. The commission may also seek civil monetary penalties, disgorgement of illegal profit, or an order to preclude individuals from acting as corporate officers or directors. Common types of violations prosecuted by the SEC include insider trading, accounting fraud, manipulating market prices of securities, stealing customers’ funds or securities, selling unregistered securities, and providing false or misleading information about securities and issuers. The administrative proceedings often start as complaints, which may lead to sanctions, including the issuance of a cease and desist order and revocation and suspension of employment of regulated bodies, including brokers, dealers, investment advisers, and their employees. The SEC keeps an electronic repository of administrative cases, which is updated daily. One such case was an administrative proceeding against Lebenthal & Co., LLC (respondent), on April 28, 2017, for failure to account for $4 million borrowed in loans when calculating and reporting its net capital. Lebenthal & Co. submitted an Offer of Settlement (offer), which was accepted by the commission. The purpose of the offer was not to admit or deny the findings but to assent to the commission’s jurisdiction over the respondent and

Securities and Exchange Commission

the subject matter. The SEC found that Lebenthal & Co. had erroneously calculated its net capital and willfully violated provisions of the Exchange Act that require broker-dealers to maintain minimum net capital, to keep current books and records, and to make certain reports and filings with the commission. The commission, therefore, ordered the imposition of sanctions, including a cease and desist order to stop Lebenthal & Co. from committing or causing any violations and payment of civil penalties in the sum of $150,000 to the government within 10 days, with interest on late payment. Surveillance Activities

The SEC carries out market surveillance activities utilizing investors as useful sources of information. The SEC supervises and delegates parts of the surveillance of securities markets to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) empowered to conduct various degrees of surveillance. To safeguard compliance with rules and regulations, the SEC ensures that appropriate checks and balances are implemented by the SROs with regard to detection, reporting, investigation, prosecution, and followup on violations. The SEC also regularly inspects the operations and programs of the SROs through random spot checks of records for noncompliance or suspected trading conditions as well as through market surveillance. In addition, SEC surveillance activities include the review of trading in all markets, filed disclosure documents by issuers, and financial and operating documents by registered brokers, examinations, and investigations.

Management of SEC The SEC has five commissioners appointed by the president of the United States with the consent of the Senate. To maintain political neutrality, only three commissioners may belong to the same political party, and the appointment of commissioners must be rotated among the various political parties. One of the commissioners is appointed as the chairman and serves as the chief executive officer of the commission. Each commissioner may continue to serve for a period of 18 months after the expiration of his or her term provided he or she has not yet been replaced.

889

The  terms of service of the commissioners are arranged to make one commissioner’s term expire on June 5 every year. Commissioners are precluded from engaging in other businesses or employment and dealing directly or indirectly in the stock market. The SEC has about 4,600 employees, including attorneys, economists, and examiners who are assigned to five major divisions: (1) Corporation Finance, (2) Investment Management, (3) Enforcement, (4) Trading and Markets, and (5) Economic and Risk Analysis. The SEC is further subdivided into 23 offices: (1) Office of Acquisitions, (2) Office of Administrative Law Judges, (3) Office of Chief Accountant, (4) Office of Chief Operating Officer, (5) Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, (6) Office of Credit Ratings, (7) Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, (8) Office of E ­ thics Counsel, (9) Office of Financial Management, (10) Office of FOIA Services, (11) Office of General Counsel, (12) Office of Human Resources, (13) Office of Information Technology, (14) Office of Inspec­ tor  General, (15) Office of International Affairs, (16) Office of Investor Advocate, (17) Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, (18) Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, (19) Office of Minorities and Women, (20) Office of Municipal Securities, (21) Office of Public Affairs, (22) Office of Secretary, and (23) Office of Support Operations. Alaba Oludare See also Corporate Surveillance; Securitization; United States

Further Readings Bryan, Dan. “The Great (Farm) Depression of the 1920s.” American History USA (March 6, 2012). https://www.americanhistoryusa.com/great-farmdepression-1920s/ (Accessed October 2017). Foner, Eric and John Garraty, eds. The Reader’s Companion to American History. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1991. “Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.” https://www.sec .gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf (Accessed October 2017).

Websites

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: https:// www.sec.gov

890

Securitization

Securitization Securitization seeks to provide solutions and tools to combat feelings of fear and insecurity through a process of constructing defensive mechanisms— architectural, physical, and, to some extent, psychological. Its effectiveness can be more directly tied to a decreasing sense of insecurity rather than to effective elimination of risks and threats. Included in the process of securitization are architectural approaches and elements designed to counter violence and insecurity; these range from creating unique spaces to installing objects and perimeter protection devices to the computerization of everyday activities for security purposes. However, the securitization of a place does not necessarily mean that the space actually becomes more secure; rather, it is a practice that may end up being more psychological than actually effective in reducing risks. Thus, securitization refers to the implementation of techniques and devices with the aim of providing security, but it is not necessarily a guarantee that such techniques and devices are effective in actuality. Through the process of securitization, security is transformed into a commodity. Cityscapes may be changed through the purchase and application of devices and architectural elements characterized as necessary for security or crime control. However, when analyzed more deeply, such securitization attempts may require elements that some people consider undesirable. Examples can include, but are not limited to, surveillance systems, electric fences, and barbed wire. In addition, devices and architectural elements may be installed to expel the presence of certain groups that are also considered to be undesirable (e.g., beggars, drug users, street vendors, prostitutes). Such practices are evidence that present-day society embodies a sense of intolerance toward the other, creating confusion between the fear of violence and the fear of difference. As historian Jacques Le Goff points out, the use of space as an instrument of segregation is far from exclusive to contemporary era: From the Middle Ages, public fear has materialized in segregationist policies. Hygienism, for instance, which was originally thought of as a set of sanitary

norms for improving public health standards, was soon transformed into social hygienism aimed at banishing from urban centers not only diseases but also their transmitter agents: the poor. Modern urban planning reflects an appreciation of the street as a space of circulation, flow, and ordering of public life. For this fluidity to be achieved, various techniques and strategies are undertaken to suppress any meeting between differences and to promote a sociospatial segregation of the same undesirables. Others, especially the poor, embody the role of an enemy to be fought, an evil to be expelled from the coexistence of other citizens, and the target of segregation processes implemented in the guise of securitization. It can be argued that fear finds its embodiment in the figure of the stranger, the undesirable, and the deviant, effectively criminalizing these groups for the discomfort they cause to some and using the discourse of fear, insecurity, and securitization to justify certain practices that are aimed more at promoting control and segregation than at security. Thus, security is often used to justify the process of securitization, to define certain spaces for the exclusive use of some, or to promote the sociospatial segregation of others. Even the discourse of fear as it relates to securitization reflects more the fear of the other than the fear of crime itself. Diego Coletti Oliva See also Community; Crime Control; Fear, Culture of; Gated Communities; Social Control

Further Readings Caldeira, Teresa P. R. Cidades de muros: Crime, segregação e cidadania em São Paulo [City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo]. São Paulo, Brazil: Edusp, 2000. Le Goff, Jacques. Por amor às cidades: conversações com Jean Lebrun [For Love to the Cities: Conversations With Jean Lebrun]. São Paulo, Brazil: Fundação Editora da UNESP, 1998. Melgaço, Lucas. Securização Urbana: da psicoesfera do medo à tecnoesfera da segurança [Urban Securization: From the Psychosphere of Fear to the Technosphere of Security]. São Paulo, Brazil: University of São Paulo, 2010.

Security, Concepts of

Security, Concepts

of

One of the findings of surveillance studies, certainly since 2001, has been the observation that the term security has become a rhetorical trump card. This trump card situation has been called securitization—that is, the rhetorical process of turning more and more issues into security matters, and security into the priority goal. No matter how often Benjamin Franklin’s warning—“They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety”—is repeated, securitizing arguments continue to prevail, claiming that privacy, autonomy, freedom of speech, or freedom of assembly, for example, must be relinquished for the sake of security. Aiming to provide a better understanding of the concept of security and the argument that value trade-offs are necessary for security, and aiming to improve the quality of assessments that evaluate security measures and their tradeoffs, this entry discusses a number of concepts that are used as conjugates, synonyms or nearsynonyms, tools/enablers, hindrances, and antonyms to security.

Security, the Noun The word security comes from the Latin for “without worry.” In modern English, its primary meaning has come to be the state of being safe, protected from harm. By logical extension and verbal abbreviation, security measures—things done to maintain safety, such as surveillance, walls, and armed guards—are also sometimes simply called security. By further extension, areas where security measures are carried out—for example, the areas at airports where passengers are checked for weapons before boarding a flight—are also simply called security. While without worry can mean having no objective need to worry, it can also mean simply not worrying. So too with security: It can mean an objective state of freedom from danger or also a subjective state of freedom from fear or anxiety. These four meanings of security are of primary interest in a surveillance context, but first this entry takes a brief look at the remaining meanings of the term.

891

Security can also refer to the stability and solidity of material objects. For instance, one might ask if a fragile-looking bridge is “secure” as in “safe to walk across” or if a house has been “secured” to its foundations. In the economic sphere, the word also refers to tokens or pledges deposited as economic guarantees, as when pledging a property as security for a mortgage. Again by extension, the word is used for economic instruments ostensibly backed up by such pledges or deposits. Thus, the term extends to a number of more or less related usages: (a) objective safety, (b) perceived safety, (c) measures taken to achieve objective or perceived safety, (d) areas where such measures are carried out, (e) solidity of material objects, (f) reliability of economic promises, and (g) tokens offered to guarantee economic reliability. Note that for all these, invoking the term security also evokes its opposite: Why speak of safety if there is no such thing as danger? Why ask if the bridge is secure if it does not look somewhat rickety? Why require a deposit if there is no possibility of default? Why proclaim “I’m not worried!” if not in recognition that others might reasonably be worried under similar circumstances? So security and insecurity are conceptual Siamese twins. Indeed, the suspicion has been voiced that security measures may be deployed with the intent not only of easing fear but also of spreading it. The term sometimes even drifts toward meaning the opposite, much the way credit means debt or an insurance premium is a payment due, not a prize received. In the case of the term security, suppose a deed has been deposited as security for a mortgage loan. That loan can in turn be deposited as a token to another bank, which buys the secured loan debt as a security (now in the double meaning of a financial instrument backed by a deposit or token, which in turn can itself serve as a token). This second loan can now also be called, and sold as, a security, and so on, in a chain of transactions through which lenders may become decreasingly aware of the creditworthiness of the initial borrower or the market value of the original token and, furthermore, increasingly unworried about creditworthiness or market values since it is possible to sell the risk before it falls due. This turning of evermore forms of financial transactions into securities is, by the way, another meaning

892

Security, Concepts of

of the term securitization. As was seen in the financial collapse of 2007–2008, securities can in this way become dangerously insecure. For the remainder of this entry, the scope will be narrowed to the first four meanings of security, the four most closely related to surveillance. The entry explores those meanings by examining the synonyms, antonyms, and values rhetorically positioned as trade-offs for security. Through mapping this rhetorical territory, the aim is to arrive at a number of questions one can mobilize when evaluating proposals for security measures.

Security Synonyms As “the state of being safe” is part of the definition of security, why not just call it safety? There is some nuance of difference between the two, and that difference lies in their further definitions. While the two terms can be used almost interchangeably, each carries the implicit baggage of its respective further definitions. In this regard, safety is not only the state of freedom from danger but also carries the hint of one’s own efforts to avert and also not cause danger and injury, the action of keeping (oneself) safe, and certain mechanical devices designed to prevent accidents. Security refers not only to the state of being safe but also to the efforts made—especially by others and through tactics referred to as security measures— to create it. This nuance of shift—away from the self as a source of one’s own and others’ safety and toward others’ efforts at keeping oneself safe—brings security closer in meaning to two other synonyms: protection and assurance. Relative to protection, which is a broad term regardless of how protection is provided, security measures have come to refer to a limited scope of tools and social arrangements. Relative to assurance, which may ultimately rely solely on one’s trust in another person and his or her promises, security measures tend to be more policiary or even military. Turning back to safety, its implications of one’s own autonomous efforts at averting danger and injury bring it conceptually close to the concept of resilience. Resilience refers to the ability to recover from injury—rebounding, returning to one’s original form or state. Thus, one means of achieving safety might be to build one’s resilience, perhaps

not averting the initial danger but surviving it without any lasting damage. The concept of resilience raises another question. Consider the case of our personal resilience. Obviously, we are never entirely identical to some former state, even without having been exposed to danger or injury. We age. We grow. We learn. We forget. If we have survived some danger or injury with no lasting damage, we are hopefully wiser. Some changes are desirable, and some we try to avoid. So what aspects of the self are we seeking to maintain at or restore to the desired state? Similarly, for national security or resilience, “What aspect of the nation do we seek to maintain unchanged?” “What is it that makes a nation ‘the same’?” Is it some cultural aspect, the geographical location of its boundaries, the style of political discourse, basic legal tenets, or dominance of a particular political party or social group? Innumer­ able aspects shape our perceptions of any given entity (e.g., a person, an organization, a nation). Yet even as they are all parts of a perceived whole, some parts are in conflict with one another within that whole. Preserving or restoring one part may damage another. Thinking in terms of resilience points out the need to think clearly on what aspects, precisely, we seek to keep stable within the entity we seek to keep secure. There is also the matter of which entity we seek to secure. Not all uses of the word security serve as a security trump card in political discourse. Security ranges from the intimately personal, at times ridiculed (e.g., security blanket) to the national and overnational and generally unquestioned (e.g., national security, or even global security). Of these, it is only national security that is regularly used as a rhetorical trump card, blocking all other arguments. Legality, democracy, evidence of effectiveness—none of that seems to matter when measured against national security. In fact, all counterarguments are classified as dangerous and therefore inadmissible in the discourse on national security. However, pointing this out, pointing out the narrowness of such a discourse, and pointing out its self-contradictory features may open up a more rational and balanced discussion of security measures. Summing up in terms of synonyms for security in its primary meaning and the forms, sources, and degrees of safety these synonyms imply, one set of

Security, Concepts of

questions we might ask when addressing proposals for security measures: •• What entities, and what aspects of those entities, do we seek to secure, and in what order of priority? •• What are the specific dangers we seek to protect them from? •• Who should or could be responsible for keeping us safe from these dangers? •• How much autonomy do we have in terms of avoiding these dangers? •• How nondrastic could the security measures be and still be adequate to protect us, within the limits of our own resilience? And vice versa: How drastic can they be before they endanger our resilience? In other words, are the measures proposed proportional when weighing their effects against their costs?

The last question points toward the next meaning of security—namely, security as a short name for security measures. Given the broad range of meanings of security as a state of being, and exercising our imaginations, there is no end to measures we could come up with that would promise to increase security. The term, however, is used to refer to a more limited set of tools and measures— for the most part various forms of espionage, surveillance, arms, armor, and access control. Apart from the aforementioned efficacy, safety, and proportionality issues, three further concerns are highlighted when thinking about security in terms of security measures. First is the narrow scope of tools presented under the umbrella term security measures and the narrow scope of approaches to security these imply. If only tools for disclosure, defeat, and exclusion or imprisonment of purportedly dangerous individuals are deemed to be security tools, then that also means those individuals are excluded from the realm of ordinary human discourse. That makes it all the more difficult to learn to know them, to understand the reasons why they represent danger, and to deal with the danger’s root causes. While such measures may well be useful, even necessary in some instances, stretching our collective imagination to a broader view is also worthwhile. Second, looking at how security tools are developed and marketed, we can see how conflicts

893

between different security goals result in a “security arms race.” Type the term security measures into a web browser, and you will find an ongoing competition between espionage and surveillance tools designed to collect communications metadata, for instance, for national security purposes, and cryptography and robot-blocking tools designed to protect personal and commercial data security. At the same time, measures are constantly being expanded beyond their initial limitations and regulations in a process called function creep. In all, this whole process of dodging and expanding security measures is part of the larger process of securitization. Third, this security arms race is evidence that security measures themselves contribute to a sense of insecurity. In fact, that may sometimes be their intent, creating a commercial market for the sale of further security measures and a political climate for their acceptance. Security measures in the form of access control are the basis for short naming as “security” the places where such measures are carried out. Tools such as metal-detector portals and X-ray machines form visible boundaries between presumably secure and insecure areas. Those tools may also be linked to other security measures, less visible and less bounded in space. At major airports, databases alert security staff to passengers’ respective preclearance and extra caution statuses. Those databases are in turn linked to data collection tools that acknowledge virtually no geographical boundaries. Furthermore, even the visible barriers themselves function as outposts and “inposts” for national borders, which may be whole continents and oceans away. Thus, security as place is a highly distributed place, only symbolically bounded by the cordoned queues and detector portals with which such places are associated. Finally, security is also a subjective state, the state of feeling safe, one’s objective situation notwithstanding. The subjective state of security is, up to a point, a desirable one—as long as we are not deluded to the point of endangering ourselves and others. It is a legitimate goal of security measures to improve our subjective state of security, even apart from any improvements (or lack thereof) in our objective safety. The opposite is not equally true, since egregious harm is never a legitimate goal. While it may be a legitimate goal of

894

Security, Concepts of

security measures to make us more cautious if that would improve our objective safety, it is not a legitimate goal to make us more fearful if the resulting degree of fear is unhelpful and unwarranted. Yet, perhaps unavoidably, security measures will always serve as a reminder that there is some reason for them, some danger (or other antonym of security) we might reasonably be afraid of. Before moving on to a discussion of antonyms of security, the following summarizes the discussion of synonyms with a list of questions they actualize when considering surveillance measures: •• What are the specific dangers we are confronting? What are the root causes of those dangers? How many measures can we come up with to address those root causes, and which of these measures seem—after evaluation—most likely to succeed? •• How robust are the security measures proposed, and vice versa, how easily avoided or subverted? By corollary, how robust are the regulations of those measures, how easily avoided or subverted by function creep? •• How will the proposed measures change our overall political geography and patterns of social relations? Would this change who we are in some existential way? That is, are these changes concordant with or inimical to resilience? •• What are the psychological effects of the measures proposed? Do we feel more or less secure when and where they are implemented? How and to what extent is that sense of (in) security productive or counterproductive?

Security Antonyms If synonyms are thought tools that help us open up for productive questions, perhaps antonyms can contribute further to the discussion. Thesaurus searches produce a long list of antonyms, of which five are particularly close opposites to security in the senses relevant to this article: (1) insecurity, (2) vulnerability, (3) danger, (4) risk, and (5) uncertainty. Of these, insecurity is a simple opposite, adding little to the discussion. The remaining four, however, bring in new nuances and questions.

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary offers three definitions of vulnerability: (1) capable of being physically or emotionally wounded, (2) open to attack or damage (e.g., vulnerable to criticism), and (3) liable to increased penalties but entitled to increased bonuses after winning a game in contract bridge. The first definition resonates with security in both its objective and subjective meanings. The second, not least the example given, highlights the need to be specific: Where are we open and to what sort of attack or damage? This can be a useful question to ask when considering security measures, including the example’s implicit warning to be alert to vulnerability to criticism or loss of legitimacy. The third definition may seem far from this entry’s security context, but there are some parallels where vulnerability entails certain rights or advantages, for instance, in an asylum institution. Danger points outside the self to the sources of potential harm. As with the second definition of vulnerability, attention to danger entails asking what the specific sources of attack and potential for damage might be. The concept of risk adds an aspect of predictability. Whereas insecurity is a general notion of danger and susceptibility to harm, risks are calculable. To the extent that we are facing a calculable risk, we may also be able to calculate the costbenefit value of measures that reduce that risk. Uncertainty points to the incalculable aspect of danger. Where calculable risks invite us to plan and manage countermeasures, uncertainty must be met with a general preparedness to adapt to the unknown; uncertainty is best dealt with by nurturing resilience. Considering these antonyms adds some new aspects to the questions posed before: •• In what ways are we vulnerable to harm, and are any of those vulnerabilities potentially helpful to us? To what extent would security measures open new vulnerabilities, for instance, vulnerability to criticism? •• Can we point out specific sources of danger we seek protection from? •• Can we calculate the extent of our risk for harm from (some of) those sources of danger? If so, what is the balance of costs (e.g., economic,

Security Screenings at Sporting Events

social, political) between the security measures proposed and the degree of risk reduction they are likely to produce? •• How well prepared are we to adapt to unknown dangers? What are our resources and weaknesses in terms of resilience and how might we best nurture those resources and heal those weaknesses?

Purported Allies and Enemies of Security Antonyms are, by definition, opposites of a given term. Rhetorically, however, almost anything can be posed in opposition to or alliance with a term. In the case of security, privacy and transparency have been rhetorically posed as opponents, and surveillance and weaponry as allies. Yet if privacy and transparency are cultural values a society holds in esteem, then has that society already been harmed as soon as they are offered in exchange for security? If we seek to defend ourselves from espionage and war, surveillance and arms may be necessary, but how do we keep them from being turned against us? It has been the aim of this entry to provide tools for steering security discourses away from polarizations, generalizations, accusations, and absolutes, and toward practicalities, specifics, and productive questions. Ann Rudinow Saetnan See also Risk Society Thesis; Secure Fence Act of 2006; Securities and Exchange Commission; Securitization; Security Screenings at Sporting Events; Security Theater

Further Readings Aas, Katja Franko. “(In)Security-at-a-Distance: Rescaling Justice, Risk and Warfare in a Transnational Age.” Global Crime, v.4 (2012). Aas, Katja Franko, et al., eds. Technologies of InSecurity. The Surveillance of Everyday Life. Oxford, England: Routledge Cavendish, 2009. Balzacq, Thierry, ed. Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve. Milton Park, England: Routledge, 2011. Beck, Ulrich. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London, England: Sage, 1992. Beck, Ulrich. World Risk Society. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1998.

895

Beck, Ulrich. World at Risk. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2009. Dahl, Johanne Yttri and Ann Rudinow Sætnan. “‘It All Happened So Slowly:’ On Controlling Function Creep in DNA Databases.” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, v.37/3 (2009). Duffield, Mark. Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. London, England: Zed Books, 2001. Harrington, Jason Edward. “Dear America, I Saw You Naked and Yes, We Were Laughing. Confessions of an Ex-TSA Agent.” Politico (January 30, 2014). http:// www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/tsascreener-confession-102912.html#ixzz3ImDJHbEe (Accessed November 2014). Kaufman, Charlie, et al. Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002. Sætnan, Ann Rudinow. “Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear? Assessing Technologies for Diagnosis of Security Risks.” International Criminal Justice Review, v.17 (2007).

Security Screenings Sporting Events

at

Security screenings at sporting events is not a new phenomenon. The recent trend toward a mixture of private and public security and digital surveillance that has been ongoing since the 2000s marks a shift in the intensity of security screenings at organized sporting events. Security screenings can be described as any practice that is meant to assess the potential threat of spectators or nearby crowds. The rise of terrorism has sparked a reimagining of how security screening is undertaken. Screenings take on a number of different configurations, from private security firms to public police, military, and state security resources. Increased threats to public safety have produced the need for sporting organizations, both local and mega-sporting events, to develop improved screening methods in order to evaluate crowds. This entry first discusses the multilateral approach to security screenings at sporting events and then focuses on the techniques and approaches, including increased militarization, used for m ­ ega-sporting events.

896

Security Screenings at Sporting Events

Multilateral Approach The events of September 11, 2001, and the rise of transnational terrorist networks have prompted a more multilateral approach to security screenings at sporting events. Sport security involves the creation of a controlled zone that allows for persons entering a stadium or arena to be searched, monitored, and subjected to surveillance. Screenings deploy a variety of technology, including metal detectors, body scanners, explosive detection, closed-circuit television (CCTV), data monitoring, and aerial surveillance from helicopters to drones. From local sporting events held at a local stadium or arena to mega-sporting events, security screenings are now a regular part of organized sporting events. Local sporting events now make use of CCTV feeds, metal detectors, nonlethal restraints and weapons (e.g., Tasers—electroshock weapons), private security teams, and electronic access cards to control access to sporting facilities. Vehicle inspections and searches (frisks) are regular parts of sport screenings. The difference between mega-sporting events and local sporting events is one of scale. Mega-sporting events, such as the summer and winter Olympic Games, Common­ wealth Games, and International Federa­ tion of Association Football (FIFA) World Cup, attract attendance in the thousands, with viewership often in the millions, and require a significant infrastructure and security investment, but they give a high reward of earnings for the host nation. What is innovative about mega-sporting events is that security screenings are now conducted prior to a person even entering the stadium. Advanced security screening utilizes transnational intelligence networks, borders, checkpoints, digital monitoring, and surveillance of land, sea, and air to ensure that event security is maintained. This subjects participants to multiple levels of surveillance.

Mega-Sporting Events Mega-sporting has seen an increase in security practices in response to the risks posed by terrorism and international crime in recent years. The 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, saw the trend of increasing military involvement at the

Olympics with 4,000 soldiers deployed as well as the use of aerial surveillance and radar control. Similarly, the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, witnessed 10,000 soldiers deployed in security roles. The increasing military, intelligence, and security forces present at the Olympic Games, and other mega-sporting events, reflect a heightened response to threat assessment. Hosting agreements, such as those with FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, clearly outline the intended level of security and necessary security resources to be mobilized by the host government in order to secure the bid for the event. For example, for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, China, approximately $6.5 billion was spent to strengthen the security infrastructure of Beijing. The 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Canada, saw the deployment of 6,000 police officers, 4,500 Canadian Forces, and 6,000 private security agents to oversee security at an expense of $7 billion. Similarly, the 2014 FIFA World Cup witnessed the deployment of 200,000 troops, drones, antiaircraft tanks, and missile defense systems. In 2014, for the Summer Games in Sochi, Russia, the Russian government, in response to risks posed by Islamic insurgents, protests, and Sochi’s proximity to the Georgian territory, deployed a number of screening practices. As with the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, and the 2012 Summer Olympics in London, the Russian government deployed substantial military and security assets to create its security perimeter, including 40,000 police to establish security and vehicle checkpoints, 5,500 CCTV cameras, and 10,000 troops to secure the surrounding countryside. Unlike the hosts of previous games, Russia maintained the right to lawful interception of all electronic information, allowing for the state to monitor all digital trafficking within its national borders. The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (successor to the KGB [Committee for State Security]) utilized the computer system SORM-3 to monitor all Internet traffic in Sochi in order to detect potential disruptions. Similarly, the free Wi-Fi offered by Russia’s Rostelecom allowed the Federal Security Service to install Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) software into any mobile devices connected to the wireless

Security Theater

network. DPI software examines the data sent out by a computer. In the case of the Winter Olympics in Sochi, this DPI software facilitated the tracking of conversations and allowed security personnel to undertake key word searches of all data received. All intercepted messages were collected and stored for up to 3 years after the event. This led to a number of privacy concerns from media commentators and attending delegates. The 2014 Winter Olympics also marked the first official use of drone surveillance by law enforcement personnel in the history of the Olympic Games. James FitzGerald See also Stop and Frisk; Threat Assessment; Traffic Control

Further Readings Boyle, Philip and Kevin D. Haggerty. “Planning for the Worst: Risk, Uncertainty and the Olympic Games.” British Journal of Sociology, v.63/2 (2012). Petrowski, T. J. “The Human Cost of the FIFA World Cup.” Global Research (July 5, 2014). http://www .globalresearch.ca/the-human-cost-of-the-fifa-worldcup/5390001 (Accessed October 2017). Rishe, Patrick. “How Does London’s Olympics Bill Compare to Previous Games?” Forbes (May 5, 2011). http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/08/05/ how-does-londons-olympics-bill-compare-to-previousgames/ (Accessed July 2014). Sandford, Daniel. “Russia’s Olympic Wall of Security Surrounds Sochi.” BBC News (February 3, 2014). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25985678 (Accessed July 2014). Soldatov, Andrei, et al. “As Sochi Olympic Venues Are Built, So Are Kremlin’s Surveillance Networks.” The Guardian (October 6, 2013). http://www.theguardian .com/world/2013/oct/06/sochi-olympic-venueskremlin-surveillance (Accessed July 2014). Steinbach, Paul. “Stun Guns Increasingly Used at Sporting Events.” Atlantic Business (December 2008). (Accessed July 2014).

Security Theater Security theater describes the implementation of security and surveillance measures that create the

897

appearance and feeling of security, without actually improving genuine security. The term is ­generally critical and somewhat derisive in tone: It suggests that whatever measures are being taken are mere window dressing that (at best) are ineffective and unnecessary and (at worst) actually make us less secure by misallocating attention and resources away from real risks and threats. The term is most typically employed in counterterrorism contexts, especially in the context of air travel security measures taken after September 11, 2001. Security theater involves the optics of security— high-visibility measures that appear to be addressing threats, while the genuine risks to security may, in fact, be quite inchoate in nature and more difficult to address. This entry reviews the origins of the term, provides a few examples of security theater, and discusses the pros and cons of security theater measures.

Origins of Term The origins of the term security theater are generally attributed to computer security expert Bruce Schneier. Schneier began using the term around 2003 as a descriptor for random bag searches and other actions taken by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration at airport screening checkpoints. Security theater hearkens back to the notion of the spectacle as a disciplinary technique, as described by Michel Foucault. Foucault suggests that one way in which states have historically enacted social control is through very visible public demonstrations of punishment. Security theater applies a similar logic to the modern security state: Security theater is intended to control behavior by virtue of being conspicuous.

Examples of Security Theater The security theater is quite visible in U.S. airports. Before boarding a flight, airline passengers are expected to engage in a series of detailed tasks and to comply with myriad rules and restrictions, in the name of ostensible security. Passengers wait in long lines to remove their shoes and belts, to pass through full-body imaging scanners meant to detect firearms and other hidden objects worn on the body, and to empty their pockets of coins and

898

Security Theater

keys. Bottles of water are not allowed—nor are pool cues, realistic toy guns, or large snow globes. Each passenger is allowed one clear plastic zip-top bag of liquid toiletry items, of which none may contain more than 3.4 ounces per container. Passengers are informed repeatedly of the rules via prominent signs (which also sometimes communicate information about the success of the security regime, e.g., the number of firearms detected by employees in the last month) and Transportation Security Administration employees announcing rules and directing passengers through the checkpoints; some passengers are pulled out of the line for more detailed screenings and pat-downs. This is high-visibility security: There is no avoiding the sense that security is “happening” here. Measures like these do much to create the feeling of security; but the critical view is that their connection to actual threats or previous acts of terrorism can be tenuous and may divert attention from more significant security “holes” (e.g., the ease with which counterfeit boarding passes and photo IDs can be produced). Airport screenings are not the only sites commonly derided as security theater. Harvey Molotch describes the New York City subway system’s “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign in similar terms. The well-advertised campaign encourages subway passengers to report unattended bags or suspicious behavior to police officers and employees of the Metropolitan Transit Authority. This effort commands significant public attention, and substantial resources are expended in following up on concerned passengers’ tips. Yet, as Molotch describes, relatively little attention is paid to other security threats, such as the poor systems for communicating information and evacuating trains and subway stations. In Molotch’s view, subway passengers’ actual security would be  far better served by efforts to improve infrastructural elements such as physical accessibility  and repair, audio information systems, and ventilation. Nonphysical examples exist, as well. For instance, some critics point to the emphasis on frequently changing passwords and easily thwarted website security questions as security theater, noting that while they may make us feel more secure about our online data, they may present little obstacle to a determined hacker.

Pros and Cons of Security Theater Measures The critical connotation of the term security theater suggests that the measures it describes are considered to be relatively ineffective. In reality, the effectiveness of security theater is difficult to measure empirically. The measures it demands are not unconnected to real potential security risks; for instance, there might be a shoe-bomb plot that is thwarted by making airline passengers remove their footwear. Visible, conspicuous security might serve a significant deterrence purpose, scaring unsophisticated terrorists or others with malicious intent from executing their plans or, at least, diverting their attentions to less visibly “protected” targets. The empirical difficulty is that, in the absence of a counterfactual s­ ituation— in which the resources devoted to security theater could, potentially, be directed toward other less visible but more salient threats—it is very difficult to know how comparably successful such measures are. In addition, as Schneier points out, the creation of the appearance of security is not always negative; it can serve positive social purposes. For example, Schneier describes tamper-resistant packaging for over-the-counter drugs (as a response to the risk of medication poisoning in the 1980s—a risk that was, in fact, minimal, but created a fair amount of social panic) as being a fairly theatrical measure; in fact, it would have been fairly easy for a determined poisoner to tamper even with sealed medications. But, as Schneier points out, tamperproofing measures did quite a bit to quell public anxieties around the risk of poisoning, ultimately serving a net social good by bringing public expectations into closer alignment with the real magnitude of the threat. On the other hand, security theater may be dangerous or detrimental if efforts to create the appearance of security trump the protection of actual security. If government resources and public attention are disproportionately allocated toward visible countermeasures to the detriment of less visible (but potentially more effective) strategies, security theater tactics may make a population less safe. In this way, security theater can create a counterproductive “false sense” of security. Karen E. C. Levy

Segregation, Residential See also Airport Security; Airport Terminal Security Screenings; Foucault, Michel; Passenger Profiling; Security Screenings at Sporting Events; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Transportation Security Administration

Further Readings Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977. Molotch, Harvey. Against Security: How We Go Wrong at Airports, Subways, and Other Sites of Ambiguous Danger. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Schneier, Bruce. Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. New York, NY: Copernicus Books, 2003. Schneier, Bruce. “In Praise of Security Theater.” Wired (January 25, 2007). http://archive.wired.com/politics/ security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/01/72561 (Accessed October 2014).

Segregation, Residential Residential segregation in its various manifestations has been inextricably intertwined with social constructions of security, as the history of racial segregation or the evolution of privately developed housing estates (i.e., gated communities) shows. The term residential segregation refers to the spatial separation of social groups in a specific region (e.g., a city). That is, specific populations tend to inhabit specific areas where the quality of the area often corresponds with the social status of the inhabitants. For example, certain areas of a city may tend to be inhabited primarily by students, immigrants, poor or wealthy people, middle-class families, or elderly people. Social status, ethnicity, religion, and age, next to claims for security, constitute the main criteria for the development of segregated residential areas in a city. Much scholarship on the topic differentiates between voluntary and coercive segregation, even though the boundaries between the two concepts are blurred. Voluntary segregation or self-segregation implies the decision of a large number of people sharing a set of similarities regarding, for example, income, religious beliefs and worldviews, or cultural traditions to prefer living in one and the same area

899

that corresponds to their needs and expectations as well as their visions of security. The consequences of segregation are highly debated, but it has been noted that the increasing social cohesion resulting from voluntary segregation may result in the construc­ tion  of social networks and a sense of collectivity beneficial for the health outcome of the community’s members. By contrast, coercive segregation refers to the separation of space, related resources, and often also social services that is not motivated by individual choice and self-determination but, rather, is the result of outside forces such as political efforts, real estate and housing market dynamics, forms of social, economic, and legal pressure, and dominant groups’ claims of social control. While some have pointed to the benefits that the cultivation and preservation of cultural values, rites, and traditions as well as the exclusive circulation of social capital within one community might have for minority groups inhabiting spatially separated areas, much scholarship has been committed to stressing the debilitating consequences of social isolation and/or exclusion for segregated communities. In spatial terms, coercive segregation has led to ghettoization (i.e., concentration of minority groups in a distinct section of the city). While the term ghetto originally referred to state-instituted Jewish enclaves in European cities, it has come to designate disadvantaged urban neighborhoods where minority groups (are forced to) live out of economic and social pressure. Research has shown that members of segregated communities—often pathologized as poor and/or deviant in popular, academic, and medial discourses—have unequal access to social privileges and economic opportunities and worse health outcomes than more privileged groups. In that context, some scholars like Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have claimed that coercive segregation is harmful for all members of a society. Beyond that, they argue that social inequalities related to segregation patterns and practices in one country might give rise to similar developments in other countries. Segregation has variously manifested itself in different social and geographical contexts, but the division of and access to space tend to reflect the social inequalities and thus, by implication, the social hierarchies prevailing at the time. That is, the logic of appropriating and controlling physical

900

Segregation, Residential

space that governs segregation is highly symbolic of power relations and dominant social values. The history of segregation in the United States has been closely connected to the history of immigration and race relations. It thus suggests the significance of overlapping discourses of race, ethnicity, and class for constructions of citizenship.

Racial Segregation Constituting a form of segregation along racial lines, the term racial segregation designates the socially and/or legally enforced separation of public facilities, services, and activities for people of different races. In the United States, the racial segregation of African Americans assumed specific regional manifestations after 1870: While restrictions on land ownership, education, and voting rights had been placed on blacks in the American West even before the Civil War, the system of de jure segregation (i.e., segregation by law), established in the U.S. South between 1870 and 1890, focused on denying African Americans equal access to public facilities. In response to the legal and political, economic, and social transformations of the Reconstruction era, in which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution had been ratified to grant equal legal and civil rights to former slaves, many southern legislatures implemented the so-called Jim Crow laws at the state or local level, which worked to deprive African Americans of equal rights and privileges in the political, economic, and social arenas: African Americans were not allowed to vote, serve in jury pools, bring suit in court, or run for office. Black workers were denied equal employment opportunities; and in the social realm, African Americans had to use separate public facilities, including schools, restaurants, hospitals, parks, water fountains, restrooms, theaters, and transportation cars. The segregation of social space and services in the South found its explicit visual expression in signs such as “No Colored Allowed” or “For Whites Only,” which ascribed and reinforced the social values of blackness as that which is negated and of whiteness as that which is affirmed. Repre­ senting reminders of panoptic control in the Foucauldian sense, these signs suggested an omnipresent potential of social surveillance that is not

located in a specific architectural model but rather in the configuration of segregated social space itself. That is, the installing of segregation signs at public sites, where they were seen by everyone, fostered the construction of an invisible white gaze, observing and avenging any act that could be interpreted as a violation of segregation laws. The power of this invisible, potentially omnipresent white gaze materialized itself in violent public spectacles directed against African Americans, particularly in the form of lynching perpetrated by self-proclaimed defenders of white supremacy, such as the Ku Klux Klan, paramilitary organizations, or white vigilante mobs. Not only was the intimidating power of the Ku Klux Klan based on the tactics it used to appropriate the black body through arbitrary physical violence, but it was also grounded in the fact that it constituted an extreme manifestation of the specular power of an invisible white gaze that controlled social space and, by extension, social behavior. Racial segregation, thus enforcing the potential of constant surveillance and violent control, affected the social experience of blacks in all aspects. The 1896 U.S. Supreme Court decision in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson asserted the “separate but equal” doctrine and thus legitimized the extension of Jim Crow practices and laws within and beyond the region of the U.S. South. Although generally not mandated by law, de facto segregation (i.e., segregation as a result of social and economic forces) structured race relations in the Northeast and Midwest. That is, public facilities such as schools, hotels, trains, restaurants, and churches as well as residential areas, particularly in industrial cities, were racially segregated. The residential segregation in the growing urban centers was accelerated by the Great Migration. In the period from 1910 to 1930, an estimated 1.6 million African Americans moved from the southern United States and the Caribbean to cities of the Midwest, Northeast, and West, triggering the mass movement of the Great Migration, which lasted well into the 1960s. The main reasons for African Americans leaving the South were the region’s poor working conditions, the threat of lynching, and racial discrimination. Unlike the predominantly rural southern states, industrial cities such as Chicago, New York, Boston, Detroit, and Cleveland offered

Segregation, Residential

a broader range of employment opportunities and therefore constituted promising metropolitan areas for those who were seeking upward economic and social mobility. The consequences of these demographic shifts were double-edged and far-ranging. According to Roland Anglin, between 1910 and 1920, the number of African Americans hired in industry, especially in the steel, automobile, shipbuilding, and meatpacking industries, almost doubled, from 500,000 to 901,000. Constituting competition in the labor market, however, African American migrants at the same time faced racial discrimination by the urban working class, especially by European Americans from Germany and Ireland who had formed early ethnic enclaves in U.S. cities in the 19th century. In addition, the increase in population rates in the northern industrial cities due to African American mass migration and a new wave of European immigration in the 20th century, especially from Southern and Eastern Europe, led to housing shortages and rising social conflicts, often forcing African Americans to live in overcrowded neighborhoods. As a consequence of the discriminatory policies of the Federal Housing Administration, created as part of the 1934 National Housing Act, business practices such as redlining (i.e., the denial of investment by banks in minority neighborhoods in the city that had been outlined in red and thus experienced limited access to services such as banking, mortgage discrimination, and restrictive covenants) exacerbated urban decay. By contrast, white Americans and second- or third-generation European immigrants who had attained middle-class status began moving to the outskirts. The years following World War II marked the beginning of the so-called white flight (i.e., the move of middle-class and upper-class whites to rather homogeneous suburbs), which reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s and continued into the 1970s. Their relocation was facilitated by higher wages and often supported by federally subsidized home mortgages available to whites only, while African Americans were prevented from moving to the suburbs through governmental efforts and zoning laws and were thus confined to the inner city. Suburbanization and the subsequent decimation of tax bases in the cities, the tendency of heavy industry to move from

901

cities to suburbs and from the North to the South, and the growing globalization of the economy contributed even further to the urban crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. The practices and policies of racial segregation prevailing during the Jim Crow period, from 1876 to 1965, throughout the country—whether in the form of de facto or de jure segregation—served to reinforce notions of black inferiority as opposed to white superiority, thus echoing Chief Justice Roger Taney’s line of argument in the 1857 Dred Scott decision, which denied the rights and privileges of U.S. citizenship to all people of African descent. It was only in 1954 that the Supreme Court overturned its 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, which declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional. The decision, reflecting the move toward more lib­ eral legislation by the Supreme Court in response to  the presidencies of Democratic candidates Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, and the rising (inter)national influence of Civil Rights activism, is said to represent the foundation of the Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed racial segregation in public schools, the workplace, and public accommodations, as well as other discriminatory practices; the Voting Rights Act of 1965 outlawed racial discrimination in voting; and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 provided for equal housing opportunities regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin. The Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s marked the official end of de jure segregation. It incited a process of social and political reform that has not yet been concluded. African Americans and other ethnic minorities were granted equal civil rights but have been hindered from fully realizing them as public and private discriminatory policies, practices, and programs continue to maintain and reinforce de facto segregation and concomitant social inequalities along racial and/or class lines in even more complex ways. Exploring the dynamics of residential segregation in the post–Civil Rights period of the 1970s and 1980s, urban sociology has formulated new theories of social inequality. In that context, the term the urban underclass was coined, pathologizing what is identified as the (primarily black) urban underclass as passively

902

Segregation, Residential

poor or deviant in their social behavior. The concept problematically collapses constructions of decayed space, more specifically the ghetto, with criminal behavior and thus reinforces essentialist notions of African American inferiority that also informed justifications of racial segregation during the age of Jim Crow. Directing attention to the present mass incarceration of young black and Latino men, which is related to constructions of the urban underclass as criminals inhabiting dangerous neighborhoods, some scholars such as Michelle Alexander have termed the 21st century the age of the New Jim Crow.

Gated Communities Categories of race and class continue to be key factors for the dynamics of social and spatial segregation in a time that is characterized by the proliferation of gentrification and the growth of gated communities. Gated communities are residential developments that restrict access of nonresidents to what would normally be public space through the use of physical barriers such as fences or walls and other security devices, such as electronic codes or closed-circuit television systems. The concept emerged and expanded in the United States in the 1970s—in response to the fears and needs of white middle- and upper-class Americans, who increasingly abandoned their homes in the suburbs that had been built between 1920 and 1950 to occupy larger houses in presumably more safeguarded suburban areas—and spread to Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. The rising popularity of these privately developed housing estates in Western cities in the past few decades reflects and epitomizes the political, medial, and academic currency of issues regarding security, social control, and surveillance. Privatizing public space in the name of what is construed as physical, social, and economic security, gated communities represent one of the latest and harshest manifestations of spatial segregation and its socio-symbolic significance for the question of who belongs: They award residents, mostly middle- and upper-class families, with the illusion of security and social solidarity, predicated of their power to literally buy themselves into what are construed as exclusive utopian islands. Intended to prevent outsiders from intruding into the private domain, gated communities literally and figuratively rely

on mechanisms of social exclusion to fence off nonresidents from the imagined ideal of their residents’ community.

Gentrification Besides the development of gated communities, processes of gentrification affect the dynamics of residential segregation in urban areas. Gentrifica­ tion refers to the reinvestment in and revitalization of previously debilitated urban neighborhoods, resulting from the relocation of middle- and upper-middle-class residents. Since the 1970s, gentrification has changed the social dynamics in major cities such as Atlanta, Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C., where neighborhoods were rehabilitated as the arrival of new investment, social capital, and tax bases allowed for the opening of new shops, boutiques, and restaurants, creating new housing opportunities and establishing higher-wage jobs. While previous residents may occasionally find employment in the newly established service sectors and construction jobs, they generally do not benefit from gentrification as increased housing and living costs push lowwage and low-skilled workers out of these areas. Gentrification changes cities in social, economic, and potentially physical terms. The renewal efforts may also involve attempts to forward aesthetic innovations, for example, through the creation of parks and infrastructure or through obedience to specific design guidelines for the construction of new and the restoration of old buildings, with the effect that social conflicts erupt when the aesthetic sensibilities of and lifestyle endorsed by the new middle-class residents clash with or suppress the customs and values of earlier residents. Gentrification has been detrimental to low-income minorities, not only because  they were replaced by new arrivals in some cities but also because it has increased— rather than decreased—the residential segregation of African Americans and Latinos in disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Segregation Studies The dynamics of residential segregation, still structuring urban contexts primarily along class and racial lines, have been complicated by these recent developments. While segregation studies

Self-Deportation

have put race relations between whites and African Americans at the fore in exploring the history of racial segregation in the United States, contemporary research has shifted the focus to the experience of segregation of other ethnic minorities, focusing on the history of Little Italys and Chinatowns, multiethnic concerns, and the impact of globalization on the dynamics of segregation, for example. The methods and analytical tools for measuring residential segregation on a local and a national scale not only vary from country to country but have also undergone change in the past 60 years. Segregation studies and research on segregation in the social sciences, which has increased since the 1950s, are concerned with revising their methodology in response to the changing availability and accessibility of data. While research on segregation in the social ­sciences has mostly relied on ecological data or spatially aggregated census data to make a statement about the state of residential segregation and potential future developments, in the United Kingdom new methods of collecting population data resembling the procedures in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have been examined; in the U.S. context, the American Community Service seems to offer a promising tool for collecting socioeconomic and housing data in the future. Related to that, segregation studies are involved in theoretical debates regarding definitions of segregation. While conceptions of segregation as a static pattern, which dominated early scholarship, have given way to a more nuanced view of segregation as a dynamic process, recent research has made a claim for rethinking the concept in relation to a revised understanding of populations in terms of “ambient populations,” thus hinting at the social mobility of people who are traversing space-time geographies for different activities. Considering these recent developments and theoretical debates, the study of segregation represents a field undergoing constant change and critical self-reflection and promises to produce differentiated insights into complex local and global socio-spatial dynamics. Carmen Dexl See also Brown v. Board of Education (1954); Gated Communities; Governing Through Crime; Plessy v. Ferguson (1896); Surveillance, Theories of

903

Further Readings Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarce­ ration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York, NY: New Press, 2010. Anglin, Roland. “African Americans and Work.” In Carl E. Van Horn and Herbert A. Schaffner (eds.), Work in America: An Encyclopedia of History, Policy, and Society (Vol. 1). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003. Blakely, Edward James and Mary Jail Snyder. Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. Carr, James H. and Nandinee K. Kutty, eds. Segregation. The Rising Costs for America. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. Nightingale, Carl H. Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012. Schelling, T. “Models of Segregation.” American Economic Review, v.59 (1969). Uslaner, Eric M. Segregation and Mistrust: Diversity, Isolation, and Social Cohesion. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2012. White, Michael J. American Neighborhoods and Residential Differentiation. New York, NY: Russel Sage Foundation, 1987. Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett. The Spirit Level: Why Equality Is Better for Everyone. London, England: Penguin Books, 2010.

Self-Deportation Self-deportation, also referred to as attrition through enforcement, is a comprehensive immigration strategy aimed at reducing the number of undocumented immigrants illegally residing in the United States. The process is executed through the enforcement of laws, at all levels, making it almost impossible for these individuals to participate in society. The strategy is based on the premise that if the federal government commits to enforcing existing immigration laws, if states and other local authorities take on additional immigration control responsibilities, and if the police, schools, employers, and other state agencies check for immigration and identification documents at routine encounters with the public, the costs and risks of staying in the United States will increase considerably for undocumented immigrants. The expectation is that undocumented immigrants will then voluntarily resort to self-deportation to their

904

Self-Deportation

countries of origin when confronted with these continuing restrictions and hardships. The concept of self-deportation has existed for many years but became part of the national discourse when it was proposed as a means of addressing immigration issues in the 2012 presidential primary debate. It has formed the basis of immigration enforcement legislation for states such as Arizona, Virginia, Oklahoma, Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama. For example, some public schools in Alabama are required to establish students’ immigration status before enrolling them. Police officers in Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia are required to ascertain the immigration status of all individuals booked into jail. It has been estimated that in 2016, there were approximately 11.1 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States, with almost a half residing in the country since 2000 and a half of this amount residing in the country since 1996. Many undocumented immigrants have established families, have assimilated into U.S. culture, have forged sustainable ties to their communities, and provide economic, psychological, and social support to their children. Given this profile, some people have questioned self-deportation as a legitimate response to immigration. Nonetheless, increases in immigration laws have not resulted in the predicted attrition, and there is little evidence that the expected large numbers of undocumented immigrants are leaving the United States in the face of targeted enforcement efforts. The impact of this strategy is felt not only by undocumented immigrants but also by legitimate U.S. citizens. For example, citizens who employ an individual in their home or business now have the responsibility of verifying the immigration status of the individual employed. Employing undocumented immigrants, whether knowingly or unknowingly, can result in criminal charges being brought for harboring or transporting undocumented immigrants. For businesses, the verification process may result in delays in transacting business, which may give rise to financial losses. In Alabama, for instance, the due date for businesses to obtain or renew business licenses was deferred due to the additional document verification requirements.

Public safety may be compromised because undocumented immigrants may be afraid to report crimes due to fear of being detained and deported. Public health may also be compromised, should undocumented immigrants fail to seek treatment for potentially communicable diseases due to barriers to health care and other social services as a result of their undocumented status. In addition, state economies have felt the impact of the self-deportation strategy. Proponents argued that this strategy would decrease unemployment and save the state money in its implementation. However, some employers have found it difficult to find U.S. citizens interested in accepting jobs originally filled by undocumented immigrants. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the implementation of enforcement laws, some undocumented workers refused to report for work. Although the self-deportation strategy has not had the results predicted by proponents, its continued implementation as an immigration policy places ongoing hardship on undocumented immigrants and their families. Interactions with governmental authorities, such as police officers, social workers, or health care personnel, are potential immigration checkpoints. In addition, not having the documentation necessary for employment in the United States limits their prospects for making a living. Furthermore, a fear of deportation may prevent them from claiming benefits on behalf of their children, even if their children are U.S. citizens. Such circumstances perpetuate continued marginalization and further restrict undocumented immigrants’ inclusion into the society to which many of them have contributed and into which their children were born. As an immigration tool, failure to monitor cases of self-deportation can affect surveillance and security practices. Because individuals who self-deport are not documented, any societal threat that they may present, by virtue of their criminal affiliations, will remain undetected. Moreover, large numbers of undetected cases of self-deportation can have budgetary ramifications if those numbers are suddenly realized without having been accounted for. Dianne Williams and Kaisha Phillips See also Deportation; Immigration; Immigration and Naturalization Service

Sex Offender Laws

Further Readings Banks, Angela. The Curious Relationship Between “SelfDeportation Policies” and Naturalization Rates (William and Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-209). Williamsburg, VA: William & Mary Law School, 2013. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2044823 (Accessed November 2017). Binshteyn, Nataliya. New Republican Party Platform Calls for Mandatory E-Verify and Self-Deportation. National Law Review (September 3, 2012). Committee on Community Health Services, American Academy of Pediatrics. Health Care for Children of Immigrant Families. Chicago, IL: Author, 1997. Dart, Tom. “Fearing Deportation, Undocumented Immigrants Wary of Reporting Crimes” (with Sam Levin, contributing reporter). The Guardian (March 23, 2017). https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/23/ undocumented-immigrants-wary-report-crimesdeportation Filindra, Alexandra. The Myth of “Self-Deportation”: How Behavioral Economics Reveal the Fallacies Behind “Attrition Through Enforcement.” Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, Immigration Policy Centre, 2012. Fragoso, Jorge R. “The Human Cost of Self-Deportation: How Attrition Through Enforcement Affects Immigrant Women and Children.” Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender and Society, v.28/1 (2013). Krikorian, Mark. Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2005. Waslin, Michele. Discrediting “Self-Deportation” as Immigration Policy: Why Attrition Through Enforcement Strategy Makes Life Difficult for Everyone (Special Report on Immigration). Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, Immigration Policy Centre, 2012.

Sex Offender Laws Few crimes inspire more outrage than sex crimes, especially against children, and few criminals are more reviled than sex offenders. Sex offender laws that curtail the rights of convicted offenders rarely engender much sympathy from the public. Yet others argue that this lack of compassion toward these types of offenders is precisely why these laws should be subject to greater scrutiny. There is, no

905

doubt, a desire on the part of the public to provide security for children against would-be child molesters and to make sure that these predators cannot harm innocent kids. But how far society goes in the name of security may be a measure of its ultimate commitment to individual rights and liberties. This essay traces the background of sex offender legislation and provides an overview of how sex offenders are treated under the law. The essay then examines how sex offender laws have been treated by the courts. Finally, the essay summarizes leading criticisms of sex offender laws in terms of how they balance security and individual rights.

Jacob Wetterling Act In 1989, Jacob Wetterling, his brother, and a friend were biking home from a video store. A masked man approached the boys with a gun. He ordered the children off their bikes and told Jacob to remain behind while the other boys were ordered to run off into the woods. Jacob was never found and the perpetrator never caught. During the ensuing investigation, however, it was revealed that sex offenders were being sent to live in halfway houses in the area. Four months later, Jacob’s parents established the Jacob Wetterling Foundation; the foundation was tasked with making recommendations on sex offender registration. At the federal level, these recommendations came to fruition in 1994 in the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act. The act established federal guidelines for states to track sex offenders and required all states to track sex offenders through confirming place of residence for 10 years after their release into the community. If the sex offender was convicted of a violent sex crime, the states were required to monitor the offender quarterly for the rest of his or her life. States failing to comply with these guidelines were subject to a 10% reduction in federal grant funding under the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program.

Megan’s Law The Jacob Wetterling Act was followed in 1996 by Megan’s Law. Megan’s Law was named after

906

Sex Offender Laws

Megan Kanka, a 7-year-old girl who was raped and killed in New Jersey by a known child molester who had moved across the street from her family. Her murder instigated widespread outrage, and hundreds of thousands of signatures were placed on petitions demanding that New Jersey implement the first state law requiring that communities be made aware of the location of sexual predators. In 1996, Congress enacted Megan’s Law. The law required public dissemination of information from state sex offender registries and allowed information from the registries to be disclosed for any purpose permitted under state law. The law also required state and local law enforcement agencies to release information about persons registered in state sex offender programs to protect the public.

Pam Lychner Act Pam Lychner was violently assaulted at her home by a felon who had been twice convicted for similar crimes. Her husband arrived at the house in time to save her life, but her experience led her to organize Justice for All, a Texas-based victims’ rights advocacy group devoted to lobbying for tougher sentences for violent criminals. Lychner and her two daughters were later killed in the TWA Flight 800 tragedy in 1996, but a new bill to provide greater safeguards against sex offenders was named after her, and she was credited with helping draft much of the key language of the legislation. The Pam Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 required the Attorney General to create a national database, the National Sex Offender Registry, to allow the FBI to track sex offenders. The act required sex offenders who lived in states without minimally sufficient sex offender registries to register with the FBI. It also required the FBI to verify the addresses of sex offenders covered by the act and to assist local law enforcement with background checks. Finally, the act established notification procedures when a registered sex offender moved to a different state.

Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act In 1997, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act to improve and better integrate

existing sex offender laws. The act changed the way state courts made determinations about whether a sex offender should be considered a sexually violent offender to allow the opinions of victims’ rights advocates and law enforcement representatives rather than just those of treatment experts. It required registered sex offenders who change states to register under the new state’s laws. Sex offenders were required to register in states where they worked or went to school if those states were different from their state of residence. All states were directed to participate in the National Sex Offender Registry. States were also required to set up procedures for registering outof-state and federal offenders and were allowed to register individuals not falling under the Wetterling Act’s definition of offenses. The act concluded by requiring the Bureau of Prisons to notify state agencies of released or paroled federal offenders.

Additional Legislation In 1998, Congress passed the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act, which directed the Bureau of Justice Assistance to carry out the Sex Offender Management Assistance program to help states comply with registration requirements. The Act also prohibited federal funding to programs that gave prisoners access to the Internet without supervision. In 2000, Congress approved the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act. The act required anyone on a state sex offender registry to inform the institution of higher learning of his or her status as a sex offender and to notify the institution of any change in his or her enrollment or work status. Colleges and universities were also required to disclose campus security policy and campus crime statistics, as well as how information on registered sex offenders could be obtained. Moreover, Congress mandated that all states maintain a website with registry information under the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act.

Adam Walsh Act The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act was named after Adam Walsh, a young boy who was abducted from a department store and was

Sex Offender Laws

later found murdered. His father, John Walsh, became a leading voice for victims of violent crime and hosted the television program America’s Most Wanted. The act sought to create a new baseline standard for jurisdictions to implement regarding sex offender registration and notification. The definition of jurisdiction, for instance, was expanded to include the recognized Indian Tribes. The act also expanded the number of sex offenses that must be captured by registration jurisdictions to include all state, territory, tribal, federal, and Uniform Code of Military Justice sex offense convictions, along with any foreign convictions. In addition, the act established a sex offender management assistance program within the Justice Department.

Courts and Sex Offender Laws In general, the Supreme Court has upheld both federal and state sex offender laws and given government broad latitude in trying to protect the public from the dangers that sex offenders present. In Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), for example, Leroy Hendricks challenged a civil commitment statute in Kansas, arguing that the law violated the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution. The Supreme Court disagreed, however, ruling that the law featured sufficient procedural safeguards and that it did not create additional criminal proceedings and thus could not be considered punitive and in violation of the Constitution. In McKune v. Lile (2002), a convicted sex offender was admitted to a treatment program that required him to admit guilt for his offenses. He claimed that such an admission violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court held otherwise. Holding that the treatment approach served a “vital penological purpose,” the Court reasoned that the offender’s Fifth Amendment’s rights were not violated. In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe (2003), a convicted sex offender challenged a community notification law that required pictures of all sex offenders and their locations to be posted on a state website. John Doe claimed that the law violated his constitutional rights because the law did not allow him to demonstrate his low risk status, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected Doe’s claim, however,

907

and found that the law was not punitive in nature but merely served to protect the public. Thus, a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the law was invalid. Finally, in Smith v. Doe (2003), two sex offenders challenged an Alaska law requiring retroactive registration for offenders who committed sex crimes prior to the passage of the 1994 Act. Both were convicted of their sex crimes before the passage of the act, but they were forced to register anyway. The two men claimed that the law was retroactive and punitive and violated their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court took a different view of the matter, holding that the law served a regulatory, public safety purpose, and, therefore, it did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.

Criticism of Current Laws Critics of the current sex offender laws argue that they are frequently based on flawed assumptions and disregard personal liberties and privacy in the name of public safety. In terms of flawed assumptions, the severity of sex offender laws is often associated with a belief that rigorous monitoring and surveillance of known sex offenders is needed because of the high probability that they will offend again. But critics point out that data on recidivism rates of sex offenders do not support this conclusion. One major study showed that only 5.3% of sex offenders imprisoned for sex crimes were rearrested for a subsequent offense. Offenses involving children dropped the rearrest to 3.3%. Another study found that more than 87% of once-caught sex offenders do not commit another sex crime. Thus, the recidivism rate for sexual offenses is actually substantially lower than for other types of crimes, which can be as high as 74%. Moreover, when treatment for sex offenders is added into the mix, recidivism rates drop even further. Yet, despite these data, there remains an almost mythological belief in the inherent dangers posed by sex offenders and the impossibility of significantly reducing the risk of offending again. Critics also point out that monitoring sex offenders does very little to lessen the dangers posed to the public by sexual predators. The monitoring programs are based on the belief that

908

Sex Offender Registries

sex crimes are random and that sex offenders can strike anyone at any time. Most of the personal stories that the federal laws are based on reflect this mentality. Yet the truth stands in sharp contrast to these perceptions of reality. A study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that only 7% of crimes against children were perpetrated by strangers, meaning that 93% of abuse of children is being committed by people known and trusted by a family. This means, of course, that an overwhelming majority of the registration and residency restrictions being placed on sex offenders are missing the most likely offenders. Finally, critics of sex offender laws argue that sex offenders are treated unlike any other criminal in society and are subject to draconian laws that come perilously close to infringing on the right against cruel and unusual punishment. A normal felon goes to prison, completes his or her prison time, and then is released. The felon is not subject to additional monitoring, surveillance, or restrictions on where he or she can go and live, though the person may be stripped of certain other rights as a convicted felon. This follows the principle that a person who does the crime must do the time, but once that time is done, that person is free. The sex offender faces a very different playing field. Once completing his prison time, the sex offender must then register with state and federal sex offender registries. The person is not allowed near certain locations that are deemed high risk for sex offenders and may experience extraordinary difficulty finding housing that complies with the terms of the registry. Moreover, everyone who wishes may look up the offender on state databases and gain instant information about where the offender lives, the offender’s crimes, and often more. To critics, this represents a gross invasion of privacy and an attempt to continue punishing individuals after they have paid their debt to society. The argument that these measures are needed to protect society is, according to critics, undercut by the low recidivism rate of sex offenders and the overall need to balance society protection with fidelity to the Constitution. It has been said that the measure of a society’s commitment to the protection of liberty can be assessed by its treatment of the undesirables in its midst. Nowhere may that be more true than with sex offenders. Eric C. Sands

See also Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act; Parole; Sex Offender Registries; Wrist and Ankle Monitoring Devices

Further Readings Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002). Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). Terry, Karen J. Sexual Offenses and Offenders. Independence, KY: Cengage Learning, 2005. Wright, Richard G. Sex Offender Laws: Failed Policies, New Directions. New York, NY: Springer, 2014.

Sex Offender Registries Sex offender registries are databases that contain publicly available information about convicted sex offenders. The goal of these registries is to alert the public about the whereabouts of sex offenders, with the intention of providing protection to the community, particularly children. In general, convicted sex offenders are required to register their personal information with local law enforcement for a period of time predetermined by the registry laws. Some critics maintain that the registries have had unintended consequences that render them ineffective and that surveillance of sex offenders misconstrues the reality of sexual assault. This entry discusses the history, use, and criticism of sex offender registries in the United States.

History and Use While laws focused on sex offenders have existed for decades, federally mandated laws requiring community monitoring of sex offenders are a relatively recent development. Several high-profile kidnappings and murders of children contributed to the public sense of urgency to track people who were believed to be at a high risk of committing these types of crimes. The first of the federal laws was passed in 1994. The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act was named after 11-year-old Jacob Wetterling, who

Sex Offender Registries

was kidnapped by a stranger in 1989. This law required states to maintain information about the whereabouts of convicted sex offenders. However, this information was not mandated to be released to the public until the passing of Megan’s Law in 1997. Megan’s Law is named after 7-year-old Megan Kanka, who in 1994 was raped and murdered by a neighbor who was a convicted sex offender. Kanka’s parents were unaware that their neighbor was a sex offender, and as advocates for the law, they proposed that notifying citizens about sex offenders living and working in their communities would prevent children from being victimized. A national sex offender registry was created in 1996 with the Pam Lychner Sex Offender Trafficking and Identification Act. This registry is used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to monitor sex offenders who live in states with sex offender registries that are inadequate according to federal requirements. Major changes to federal sex offender laws occurred in 2006. The Adam Walsh Child Protec­ tion and Safety Act created a tiered system for classifying offenders and requires all offenders to register for a minimum of 10 years. It is of key importance that this act added several crimes to the registry requirement that do not involve the commission of sexual acts. For example, a nonparent who is convicted of kidnapping a child is required to be listed on the registry as a sex offender. The act also reflects advances in technology (e.g., the Internet), addresses the possession and dissemination of child pornography, and created a website with links to all state sex offender registries.

Criticism and Unintended Consequences of Monitoring Sex Offenders There are several criticisms about sex offender registries. One criticism is that the content of the registries does not accurately reflect the reality. While federal law mandates that all states maintain a sex offender registry and make it available to the public, states are free to do so based on their individual needs. This results in variation in the information available on the registries. Some states provide only very basic information about the offender, such as a picture and a place of residence, while other states include personal identifying characteristics such as scars and tattoos. The majority of states provide the statute for the

909

crime of which the offender was convicted, but information about the offender’s sentence is omitted in many states. States do not always include information about the sex offender’s victims. This leaves the public to imagine who the victims may be, which can lead to an inaccurate perception of the nature of the sex crime. Most sex crimes occur between two people who know each other, but because the relationship between the offender and the victim is not included in some registries, the public is left to believe that the offender committed the crime against a stranger. Parents may then focus their protective efforts on strangers despite clear evidence that most children are victimized by a relative, neighbor, or friend of ­ the family. Another criticism is that people convicted of nonsexual offenses are now required to be placed on the sex offender registry. As a result, people who are convicted of nonparental child abduction are required to register even if no sex crime was committed or intended to be committed. In some states, people who are convicted of child pornography for sexting nude pictures are required to register as well. One result of the increase in the number of crimes that must be included in the registry is a large increase in the number of sex offenders on the registry. A specific result of the inclusion of sexting under child pornography is that juveniles who have committed no other acts are required to register as sex offenders. The registry system is not foolproof; its data collection is dependent on sex offenders doing what they are supposed to do and providing their information to the law enforcement department responsible for the jurisdiction in which they live. One factor that makes it difficult for sex offenders to maintain their registration is the frequency with which they may have to relocate. Residence restrictions prohibit some sex offenders from living near playgrounds, parks, and schools. Some landlords may choose not to rent houses or apartments to sex offenders. These circumstances make it difficult for sex offenders to find a home and to maintain a steady residence. Some research has demonstrated that offenders who are the most dangerous are the most likely to fail to register, reducing the usefulness of the monitoring system. In addition, if a person is found not guilty or the charges are dropped, but they have committed a sex crime, they will not be included on the registry.

910

Sexting

Sex offender registries have been characterized as a one-size-fits-all solution to a problem that requires a tailored response. For example, juveniles who are placed on the registry are subject to the same monitoring requirement as the adults. Some juveniles who are placed on the registry are there because they had consensual sex with a girlfriend or boyfriend who was not of legal age to consent to such activity. While this is technically illegal, this behavior is different from that of offenders who target young children for sex. Other juveniles are placed on the registry because they were convicted of child pornography for sexting. Placing juveniles on the registry for crimes such as these puts limits on their future and may impede them from obtaining good employment or having children of their own if they are subject to the requirement that they not live with children. Another concern is the impact of the registry on those who are required to be included on it. While sex offender registries clearly have the goal of protecting the public, the registries do have an impact on the people on the list. While use of the registry strictly prohibits its misuse, determining how people who access the registry are using the information is difficult. An extreme example of the misuse of the registry is the murders of several sex offenders whose addresses were listed on the registries in their states. They may have difficulty finding a place to live due to restrictions, and they may have trouble finding or keeping employment. Their family members may also face pressure from the community to relocate or not permit the offender to live at their residence. Given the concerns about sex offender registries and the impact of registries on offenders, it is of note that the effectiveness of registries is unclear. Difficulty in tracking recidivism and underreporting of sex crimes to the police contribute to the problem in determining whether or not registries are reducing the incidence of rape. There is also evidence that the majority of new sex crimes are committed by first-time offenders rather than people who are already on the registry. The consequence of this is that even though the people on the registry may not be reoffending, there are many people in the community who do commit sex crimes but who cannot be tracked until they are convicted by the criminal justice system. This calls the effectiveness of registries

into question and supports the argument for continued evaluation of the ability of registries to prevent sex crimes. Wendy Perkins See also Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006; Crime Control; Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act; Sex Offender Laws

Further Readings Bonnar-Kidd, Kelly K. “Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism.” American Journal of Public Health, v.100/3 (2010). doi:10.2105/AJPH.2008.153254 Center for Sex Offender Management. Fifty State Survey of Adult Sex Offender Registration Requirements (NIC/WCL Project on Addressing Prison Rape). http:// www.csom.org/pubs/50%20state%20survey%20 adult%20registries.pdf (Accessed October 2017). Costigliacci, Steven. “Protecting Our Children From Sex Offenders: Have We Gone Too Far?” Family Court Review, v.46/1 (2008). Ferrandino, Joseph. “Beyond the Perception and the Obvious: What Sex Offender Registries Really Tell Us and Why.” Social Work in Public Health, v.27 (2012). doi:10.1080/19371910903126663 Legislative History (U.S. Office of Justice Programs, Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking). http://ojp .gov/smart/legislation.htm (Accessed January 2015). Olson, Jeremy J. ALERT: Serial Killer Targeting Registered Sex Offenders in New Hampshire (Citizens for Criminal Justice Reform) (January 1, 2014). https://www.ccjrnh.org/sex_offender_laws_treatment/ alert%3A_serial_killer_targeting_registered_sex_ offenders_new_hampshire (Accessed October 2017). Raftery, Isolde. “Man Sentenced to Life for Killing Sex Offender; Judge Chastises Supporters” (September 18, 2012). http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/ 09/18/13943695-man-sentenced-to-life-for-killing-sexoffenders-judge-chastises-supporters?lite (Accessed October 2017).

Sexting Sexting refers to sexually based phone activities, including activities such as sending or receiving explicit messages, images, or video through

Sexting

electronic means between cell phones. Individuals who engage in sexting usually do so to start or maintain a romantic or sexual relationship with another individual. Sexting is expected to increase among the general population as more individuals gain access to cell phones and the cost of text messaging plans decrease. Although explicit images or photographs existed long before cell phones, sexting provides new problems for privacy and security because of the ease with which a text message can be shared without the sender’s consent. Specifically, what makes sexting more dangerous in comparison with sharing physical copies of explicit images is the ability to instantly duplicate the image and forward to numerous others, including friends, family members, employers, and strangers. It is nearly impossible for all copies of an individual piece of content to be permanently removed once electronic images or videos are shared via the Internet. Thus, current security and privacy issues surrounding sexting tend to focus on the legality of distribution of explicit content, content ownership, and the involvement of minors in sexting.

Distribution and Ownership Sending explicit text messages between two consenting adults is legal in most states, though there are still privacy concerns and security issues. Many adults are aware of the potential negative consequences of sexting, such as future distribution to unintended parties. Thus, such possible negative consequences may play heavily into a person’s willingness to engage in sexting behaviors. Related to this, legal discussions surrounding adult sexting often focus on ownership of an image or video because it is not always clear who owns a particular image or video that was consensually created by two participants. When an individual’s computer or cell phone is hacked or stolen and the explicit content is shared, other case law, not related to content ownership, is applicable. As of 2015, a majority of states did not have criminal laws that prevent individuals from posting or sharing explicit images of legal adults without their consent (sometimes referred to as revenge porn). Some states are working to change this by criminalizing revenge porn. Such laws can help victims reduce the likelihood of

911

personal information being shared with unintended others. In addition, depending on the state, individuals who share explicit images of others without their consent may be held liable in civil court, so some websites and/or individuals living outside of states with criminal revenge porn laws may be willing to remove or cease distribution of explicit content at an individual’s request.

Involvement of Minors Another major privacy and security concern with sexting involves minors, primarily teenagers, who engage in the distribution of explicit materials. Because of the disparity between states’ age of consent (16 or 17 years in many states) and child pornography laws, teenagers can be prosecuted for child pornography based on the images they create while sexting, even though they cannot be prosecuted for having sexual relations with another teenager. In addition, some states such as Florida have “Romeo and Juliet” statues, which allow minors to give consent to engage in sexual activity with adults close in age. Even with consensual sexual activity between two minors, or a minor and adult close in age, child pornography laws ban sexually explicit images or photographs of individuals under the age of 18. Thus, individuals, including those who may be above the legal age of consent but under the age of 18, can be prosecuted for owning and distributing child pornography if they engage in any form of sexting. Some minors may also face an additional charge of manufacturing child pornography if there is evidence that they participated in making the explicit image or video. In 2014, a prosecutor in Virginia requested a search warrant for a 17-yearold accused of sexting that would entail officers’ taking a photograph of the accused’s erect penis to compare it with the genitalia in videos the accused allegedly sent to his then girlfriend. Advocates of sexting law reform argue that allowing authorities to force minors to have pictures taken of their genitals is potentially as psychologically damaging as any child pornography created by individuals willing to exploit others for their own pleasure. Arguably, child pornography laws were created to protect children from being sexually exploited, rather than to criminalize sexual behavior between consenting young adults. However, because of the

912

Shopping Mall Security

psychological and physical harm that can result from the sexual exploitation of children and teens who are coerced into participating in child pornography, convicted offenders typically are added to a publicly available sex offender list. Because child pornography laws can be applied to minors who are accused of sexting, this means that a teenager convicted of sending explicit images of himself or herself may have to register as a sex offender. Common consequences of being a registered sex offender include limits on the type of employment and neighborhood in which an individual can live and social stigma. Although created with the best of intentions, child pornography laws were created prior to a time when mass electronic communication and sharing of images was possible. Recognizing the change in technology, some states have begun to create sexting exception statues for minors. More specifically, sexting exception statues are being used to address the disparity between age of consent and child pornography laws. For example, in Florida and Arizona, teens who receive explicit communications but did not solicit them and attempt to destroy them will not be prosecuted for child pornography. Other states such as Vermont do not try minors as adults for sexting, and if convicted, they do not have to register as a sex offender. To manage the change in technology that continues to become a more significant part of our everyday lives, the legal system in the United States needs to update decades-old statues. As our world shifts from wired connections to cell phones as a means of primary communication, younger groups will begin to have access to technology that can affect the rest of their lives. Learning how to reduce the damage that can occur from sharing explicit content and how to protect children, teens, and adults will continue to be a challenge in our changing world. Chastity Blankenship See also Cell Phone Tracking; Internet Pornography; Privacy, Internet; Smartphones; Texting

Further Readings Coffman, Keith. “Colorado Lawmakers Advance Bill to Crack Down on ‘Revenge Porn.’” The Huffington

Post (April 24, 2014). http://www.huffingtonpost .com/2014/04/25/colorado-revenge-porn_n_5209615. html?view=screen (Accessed July 2014). Klettke, Bianca, et al. “Sexting Prevalence and Correlates: A Systematic Literature Review.” Clinical Psychology Review, v.34 (2014). Korenis, Panagiota, and Stephen Bates Billick. “Forensic Implications: Adolescent Sexting and Cyberbullying.” Psychiatry Quarterly, v.85 (2014). Krupa, Shah. “Sexting: Risky or [F]risky? An Examination of the Current and Future Legal Treatment of Sexting in the United States.” Faulkner Law Review, v.2/1 (2010). Skinner, Curtis, et al. “Virginia Police Won’t Seek Nude Photo of Teenager in Sexting Case.” Chicago Tribune (July 10, 2014). http://articles.chicagotribune. com/2014-07-10/news/sns-rt-us-usa-virginiasexting-20140710_1_sexting-case-virginia-policesearch-warrant (Accessed July 2014). Sweeny, Joanne. “Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?” San Diego Law Review, v.48 (2011).

Shopping Mall Security The term shopping mall typically refers to an enclosed and climate-controlled structure consisting of one or more central pathways, on either side of which is an array of individually owned and operated retail stores, fast-food restaurants, entertainment venues such as movie theatres, and similar enterprises. Some malls are general service, offering an array of different types of stores; some specialize in outlet stores, in which discounted or excess merchandise is sold; and some, such as the famed Mall of America, are tourist destinations in their own right. In the United States, shopping malls are an invention of the latter half of the 20th century. Evolving from their nonenclosed shopping center cousins, malls are promoted as one-stop shopping destinations in urban and suburban areas and, today, primarily consist of chain stores. While they provide convenience to consumers through a consolidation of goods and services, they also provide convenience to potential offenders by offering a target-rich environment. Security measures attempt to mitigate possible losses and draw heavily on surveillance strategies to do so.

Shopping Mall Security

Security There are a number of potential security concerns that malls face. One is the potential for merchandise or cash loss, also known as shrinkage. The annual National Retail Security Survey (NRSS) presents information about shrinkage figures. For instance, in 2016, the two largest sources of shrinkage were shoplifting (committed by nonemployees) and internal theft (committed by employees), which historically tend to be approximately equivalent in frequency. While less frequent, robberies are another source of potential loss. While not reported in recent NRSS analyses, the 2010 NRSS found that shopping malls have the highest shrinkage rate, when compared with individual stores and nonenclosed shopping centers. Of course, any crime, such as assault, property damage, traffic offenses, abduction, and more, that can occur in any other public venue can also occur at a mall. Increasingly, shopping malls are turning attention to concerns about terrorism, as they may be viewed as proverbial “soft targets,” which are not protected by high levels of security such as limited access, blast standoffs, entry screening, and so on. Paradoxically, another security concern is posed when shopping malls close, a trend that some predict will continue due to increases in online shopping, decreases in mall usage, and financial considerations related to ownership. In such cases, the security of the abandoned buildings and surrounding property (e.g., parking lots), whether from vandals, homeless persons, urban explorers, or others, becomes a point of concern, as does the presence of a large abandoned property and its implications for broken windows theory (associating disorder with crime) or its role as a potential crime attractor (as an unsupervised venue where offending is more likely to occur). Security at shopping malls is typically provided through a combination of four sources. The first is via public law enforcement officers who may periodically patrol the mall or sometimes have a substation in the mall, and respond to calls for service or when an arrest or investigation is required. The second is via the mall’s own private security officers, who engage in patrol and oversight of the mall property as a whole (both interior and exterior) and who may be employed directly by the

913

mall or by a private security provider contracting its services to the mall. The third is via private security officers who may be directly employed by one of the stores in the mall. Private security staff, also known as loss prevention staff in a retail context, may be uniformed or in plainclothes. It is also important to note that private security staff have very limited authority; while they can generally detail suspected shoplifters, they usually do not have other detention, search, and arrest powers, which is why local law enforcement play an important role in supplementing the mall security function. The fourth is via other mall staff, who play an important security function by maintaining an awareness of their spaces and reporting issues that are of concern—in fact, the simple act of greeting customers as they enter promotes security and can deter offending. Security personnel are supplemented by an array of technologies. The NRSS indicates that leading technologies used in retail security include alarm systems, recording devices, monitoring of sales data, and making cash pickups with armed security couriers. There are numerous variations in these types of systems. Alarms can be designed to detect entry when a business is closed, to detect unauthorized removal of items when a business is open, to restrict access to certain areas, or to indicate an ongoing emergency situation (e.g., “panic” alarms). “Code Adam” and similar notifications can be utilized among employees as an alert and lookout protocol when a child is reported missing. Recording devices can utilize closed-circuit television surveillance technologies, which may be actively monitored by operators or can be simply archived and referred to when needed. Cameras may be placed to specifically monitor key locations, such as points of entry and exit, points of sale, and locations of high-value items, in addition to providing general coverage of the mall as a whole; cameras may be visible (to provide a deterrent) or concealed (to provide unobtrusive monitoring of locations). Facial recognition technologies can also be included in camera systems. Other security systems may include the use of locks and gates to separate stores from the mall as a whole; the use of vaults or safes for merchandise or to deposit cash receipts, which may be time-controlled or provide limited access to clerks on duty; the use of effective lighting systems; the use of access

914

Situationists

control cards to allow and monitor staff access to secure locations within the store; maintenance of key control data to record which employees were issued keys to doors or secured display cases; and more. One important observation is that there is generally not one single mall security solution. Each store maintains its own security hardware, based on its own risk analysis, and determines which of its employees have access to install, monitor, control, operate, or override systems. Likewise, the mall as a whole maintains its own security process, focusing on the public areas within and surrounding the facility.

Surveillance Broadly speaking, shopping mall security is surveillance, and surveillance is shopping mall security. A  basic premise of security is to watch an environment and its occupants, and such observations—whether personal, electronic, of data, or otherwise—are ongoing in large-scale retail operations and are conducted by a variety of staff representing different interests. Surveillance includes that of customers and staff, given that losses may occur from the actions of either. Whether in a public area at the interior or the exterior of the mall, a store, a backroom storage area, or even sensitive areas such as fitting rooms (although permissibility varies by jurisdiction), surveillance may occur, and potential offenders work to develop strategies to circumvent visual observation, electronic monitoring of merchandise tags, and other security measures. Employees and customers may take for granted that they are subject to these security protocols, or it may not even enter their awareness on a regular basis, given that many practices are deliberately designed to be unobtrusive—to better detect wrongdoing and to minimize perceived interference in the shopping experience. Concerns emerge when a particular group is targeted as “suspicious” and a focus of additional observation. This may be on the basis of race, gender, social status, attire, age, behavior, or other factors. While security professionals may develop their own profiles (which vary by context) of likely offenders, it is important that they do not unfairly target entire classes of persons. Security and surveillance are

unavoidably and inextricably linked, but those who utilize them bear responsibility for ensuring that systems are designed and utilized effectively and without bias. Stephen S. Owen See also Biosurveillance; Closed-Circuit Television; Computer Surveillance; Crime; Crime Control; Online Shopping; Surveillance, Culture of

Further Readings Davis, Robert C., et al. An Assessment of the Preparedness of Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terrorist Attack. Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2006. Farrell, James J. One Nation Under Goods: Malls and the Seductions of American Shopping. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003. Fennelly, Lawrence J., ed. Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention (5th ed.). Waltham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2012. Hollinger, Richard C. and Amanda Adams. 2010 National Retail Security Survey. Gainesville: University of Florida, 2011. Moraca, B., et al. The 2016 National Retail Security Survey. Washington, DC: National Retail Federation, 2016. O’Malley, Sharon. “Shopping Malls: Can They Survive in the 21st Century?” Sage Business Researcher (August 29, 2016). http://businessresearcher.sagepub.com/sbr1775-100682-2747282/20160829/shopping-malls (Accessed October 2017).

Situationists The organization Situationist International (1957– 1972) and the groups that preceded it, such as the Lettrist International (1952–1957), understood control and surveillance as a principle of organization in the modern world. Their social and spatial theory is most fully developed in The Society of the Spectacle (1967), by Guy Debord, their selfproclaimed leader, and in his subsequent Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (1988). Debord argued that everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation, encapsulated by the spectacle, which mediates social relationships through images. The Situationists conceived

Situationists

915

of two practices, dérive and détournement, which serve to recognize the spectacle, and resist the control it exerts. More recently, the pervasive electronic gathering of personal data by companies and intelligence services has brought renewed attention to the linkage between commodifi­ cation  and surveillance that was theorized by the Situationists.

surveillance and recognizes the topicality of Debord’s conception of the spectacle as a set of techniques for the management of attention, using procedures of partitioning and cellularity in which the individual is reduced as a political force. Television and the Internet constitute a further perfecting of panoptic technology, convergent with Debord’s notion of the spectacle.

Spatial Surveillance

The Society of the Spectacle

In 1954, the Lettrist International, which later evolved into the Situationist International, explained surveillance in spatial terms. Its Potlatch #5 thus invoked the boulevards cut through Paris’ dense urban fabric by Baron Haussmann as means to facilitate military transport and police control. Simultaneously, if somewhat contradictorily, the Lettrists accused architect Le Corbusier of wanting to abolish streets altogether, to divide life into closed, isolated units, into societies under perpetual surveillance, thereby abolishing any opportunities for uprisings or even for meaningful encounters and imposing automatic resignation. Both conceptions—the street as a means of state control and the absence of streets as a means of isolation and perpetual surveillance—are diagrammatic; they recur throughout the writings of both the Lettrists and the Situationists and anticipate another diagram of control, that of the panopticon. This diagram is embodied in a prison building designed by English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century. The circular design of Bentham’s panopticon separates each of its inmates by walls but renders them visible to an official invisibly positioned in a central tower. French philosopher Michel Foucault, in his book Discipline and Punish (1975), extended this diagram into the social theory of panopticism. Foucault argued that contemporary society individualizes its subjects, and by placing them in a state of constant visibility, inscribes power relations that continue to operate even without surveillance actually taking place. While Foucault famously remarked that our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance, and that modern social relations are the exact reverse of the spectacle, more recent debate has questioned the Foucauldian antinomy between spectacle and

In The Society of the Spectacle, Debord described a modern society in which social life has been replaced with its representation. Social life ceases to be about living; instead, it comes to be about having: The spectacle uses images to convey what people need and must have. Debord draws on the first section of Karl Marx’s Capital, titled “The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof,” which is further developed by György Lukács in his book History and Class Consciousness (1923). Marx had observed that in the capitalist mode of production, things are no longer valued according to their intended use (use value) but, instead, are appraised by the market (exchange value). In analogy, Debord observed that things that were once directly lived are now lived by proxy; and he argued that once an experience is taken out of the real world, it becomes a commodity. The society of the spectacle expands commodification beyond the material world to experience and to perception. To survive, the spectacle must maintain control over society and defuse threats to the social order. It does so through an automatic process of surveillance and control that Debord termed recuperation. Recuperation intercepts socially and politically threatening ideas and images, which it appropriates and commodifies to then restore them to mainstream society and everyday life. The society of the spectacle distinguished between two types of spectacle, concentrated and diffuse, which differ in their exercise of surveillance and control. Debord identified Stalinist bureaucracy and fascist totalitarianism with a concentrated spectacle, in which the bureaucracy holds on to the totality of social labor; it cannot leave the exploited masses any significant margin of choice. The concentrated spectacle usually is concentrated in a singular leader and must be accompanied by permanent violence. In the

916

Situationists

advanced capitalism of the Western countries, Debord recognized a diffuse spectacle, which is accompanied by the abundance of commodities. Every given commodity fights for itself and attempts to impose itself everywhere as if it were the only one. While the concentrated spectacle operates mostly through violence, the diffuse spectacle relies on seduction. Debord concluded that the diffuse spectacle is more effective at suppressing challenges. Later, in Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (1988), Debord surmised that in modern capitalist countries and liberal democracies, pioneered by France and Italy, the diffuse and concentrated spectacle form a new synthesis, the integrated spectacle, which is characterized by incessant technological renewal and the fusion of state and economy.

to Chombart’s earlier visualization. However, when Chombart included aerial images among the methods, allowing a better understanding of the different kinds of urban textures that characterize urban quarters, the Situationists countered that the use of aerial views transforms sociologists into disengaged and omniscient observers; they protested this voyeuristic position of disentanglement from the immediate urban experience at ground level. In this vein, Gilles Ivain’s Formulary for a New Urbanism labeled an aerial photograph New Theater of Operations in Culture, the military term purposefully chosen to discredit the disengaged position of surveillance endorsed by Chombart. By contrast, the dérive reflects on pedestrian experience and purports to identify with the everyday user of the city.

The Dérive and Its Diagram

Détournement

The dérive is a technique of exploring the city through walking, passing through varied ambiences in rapid succession. In a dérive, one or several persons drop their usual activities and habits to let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there. The dérive is devised to free its practitioner from the increasingly predictable and monotonous experience of everyday life in advanced capitalism, but simultaneously, it provides a critical tool for the ecological analysis of fissures in the urban network, for psychogeographical mapping of microclimates and centers of attraction, independent of administrative boundaries. As such, it proposes an alternative format of mapping that replaces physical distance with maps of influences and measurable boundaries with unities of ambience and, thereby, resists reification, commodification, and the control these exert. In The Theory of the Dérive (1958), Debord cited sociologist Chombart de Lauwe, who in 1952 had diagramed the journeys undertaken by a student living in the 16th Arrondissement during the course of 1 year, forming a triangle between her place of study, her home, and that of her piano teacher. Debord proclaimed that such examples capable of provoking sharp emotional reactions, outrage at the fact that anyone’s life can be so pathetically limited, will prove useful in developing dérives. Indeed, Debord’s and Asger Jorn’s diagram of Parisian dérive, The Naked City (1957), alluded

The second oppositional technique of the Situation­ ists, détournement, is a strategy of diversion originally borrowed from the Surrealists. Détournement alters the meaning of a found element by combining it with a new element in a new ensemble. Prominent examples are Constant Nieuwenhuys’s projects for détourned sculptures and Debord’s détourned documentary film, On the Passage of a Few Persons Through a Rather Brief Period of Time. In 1967, Situationist René Viénet established what has since become a prototypical example of détournement; he explained how it is possible to détourn advertising billboards by pasting pre-prepared placards onto them. Strategies of détournement have since been adopted and extended by numerous oppositional groups and individuals. The Surveillance Camera Players, a group of activists from New York City, perform skits in front of the ubiquitous surveillance cameras in the subway system and on the street corners. Unlike other theories of surveillance, the Situationists’ practices amalgamated analysis with resistance, theory with action, and it is their refusal to assume a disengaged stance that ensures their continuing relevance in a digital society of the spectacle. Christoph Lueder See also Bentham, Jeremy; Corporate Surveillance; Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari; Foucault, Michel; Marxism; Panopticon, The

Slave Trade

Further Readings Debord, Guy. “Theory of the Derive.” Internationale Situationniste, v.2 (1958). Debord, Guy. “The Society of the Spectacle” (1967). https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/debord/ society.htm (Accessed September 2014). Debord, Guy. “Comments on the Society of the Spectacle” (1988). http://www.notbored.org/ commentaires.html (Accessed September 2014). Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Random House, 1975. McDonough, Thomas. “Situationist Space.” October, v.67 (1994). “Surveillance Camera Players.” Not Bored (n.d.). http:// www.notbored.org/scp.html (Accessed September 2014).

Slave Trade The slave trade, particularly as it pertains to the United States, is often depicted through images of African captives being carried across the Atlantic Ocean in squalid ships to be bought, sold, and abused by “civilized” Americans for the purposes of manual plantation labor and domestic duties in a Southern economy. However, slavery extends far beyond the Middle Passage, Confederate states, and the ownership of human people presented in many historical texts. Today, millions of people remain under similar levels of surveillance and control, not at the hands of slave masters but under the supervision of the criminal justice system. In her evaluation of mass incarceration and the racialization of contemporary penal policy, legal scholar and civil rights advocate Michelle Alexander argues that the U.S. criminal justice system functions as a new racial caste system akin to slave codes and the postemancipation Jim Crow laws that stemmed from them. According to this perspective, the slave trade is not a historical phenomenon of the past but an evolving process that continues to hold people of color in institutionalized captivity.

Triangle Trade and the Middle Passage The first slaves were trafficked into the Western Hemisphere in the early 1500s, but the largest forcible transportation of Africans across the Atlantic Ocean occurred from 1619 to 1850. Roughly 12

917

million slaves were imported during this time, mostly to colonies under the rule of the British Empire. Portugal was the first country to engage in the transatlantic transportation of slaves, opening the European empire overseas. The other primary participants in the slave trade were Spanish, then the French and English, followed by the Dutch. The United States entered into the slave trade during its second century in the 1700s. Slave trading occurred as part of a commodities exchange between European traders and African intermediaries who would deliver young, healthy African people to use as currency for manufactured goods from Europe. This process was part of the triangle trade, a three-leg transportation cycle of traded merchandise, including the Middle Passage for slave trafficking. On the first leg of the trip, European trading ships would bring their commodities, primarily guns, ammunition, and factory-made products and exchange them for human capital. The captive slaves were then transported across the Atlantic Ocean to North and South America and the Caribbean where they were traded for agricultural products, mainly sugar, cotton, coffee, tobacco, and rice. The European trading ships would then transport these goods back home, completing the third leg of the triangle trade. The entire cycle of the triangle trade lasted approximately 18 months, with the Middle Passage occupying between 1 and 6 months of the voyage, depending on travel conditions and the precise location of the final destination. The conditions of the transatlantic slave trade were notoriously abysmal: small, cramped cargo holds rife with squalor, disease, and high mortality rates. Indeed, there were many contagious illnesses that flourished during slave trafficking. Of the most prevalent diseases common among such transports were ophthalmia, a contagious inflammation of the eye leading to blindness; intestinal worms; and the yaws, a chronic and contagious tropical disease that caused swelling, ulcers, and infected pimple-like growths. However, contrary to many popular notions that slave traders exhibited total disregard for the well-being of their human cargo, primary documents from the Middle Passage reveal that at least some medical and hygienic care was available to slaves aboard a number of the transport vessels. Doctors were present to examine slaves daily,

918

Slave Trade

primarily to ensure healthiness for sale on arrival at their destination.

Slavery in the United States The exact number of slaves delivered to the United States is debated, but historians estimate, based on data from the documentation of transatlantic voyages, that there were roughly 503,000 captives forcibly migrated to the United States. Of these half a million people, it is suggested that 390,000 slaves were brought directly from Africa and the rest arrived via intra-American trafficking. Slaves and their offspring, including those infants born while their mothers were in servitude, legally belonged to their owners. As property, enslaved people were treated as commodities or units of labor, and they were sold or traded at markets with other goods and services. There was a large need for labor on Southern plantations and other venues, and powerless enslaved people with no legal right to challenge their captors supplied a cheap workforce to meet this demand. Indentured servitude, a system by which European immigrants could work off the cost of their voyage to the New World by serving plantation owners who sponsored them, was still practiced at this time; however, in an attempt to reduce the possibility that poor whites would align themselves with black slaves, planters gradually relied less and less on indentured servants for their workforce, requesting instead that more Africans be imported. The theory behind this demand for African slaves is that they would be less familiar with the language and landscape than voluntary immigrants and, thus, would be easier to control. The oppression and subordination of the slave population, and an increasing preference for imported black slaves over domestic indentured servants, ensured that the dominant white population could protect their own economic, political, and social interests. In this way, slavery had solidified into a formal racial caste system in the United States.

The “End” of Slavery Slavery in the United States, however, lasted only until the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, ordering all currently held slaves to be freed. In

1865, after the war, Congress ratified the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, abolishing slavery and other forms of involuntary servitude. The ruling white class was no longer able to maintain its position of power through the constant contact, supervision, and discipline of African Americans the slave system had afforded them. However, the Thirteenth Amendment preserved the use of slavery as punishment for criminal wrongdoing. As a result, there was much backlash against the black population during the time immediately following emancipation. Many African Americans were arbitrarily arrested and sanctioned with fees and fines they were unable to pay, forcing them to work off their debt to the state, effectively remaining legally enslaved. In addition, “black codes” were devised to maintain control over the newly freed black population. For example, African Americans were precluded from serving on juries, riding in the same train cars as white people, or even using the same drinking fountains as their white counterparts. These conduct regulations, in conjunction with required racial segregation in all public places as well as informally enforced social etiquette for black people when interacting with whites, were known as Jim Crow laws. Jim Crow was more than simply a set of laws in the postslavery South; it was a way of life relegating African Americans to a position of social inferiority.

The New Jim Crow The formal Jim Crow system ended with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the War on Drugs beginning in the 1980s renewed the emphasis on racialized aspects of crime, serving to target and imprison populations of color while reportedly seeking to keep drugs off the streets. The social control of racial minorities under the guise of proactive efforts to reduce drug use and sales was so strong that Michelle Alexander characterized the exponentially increasing movement to incarcerate as a new racial caste system, much like the Jim Crow laws of the past. She argued that this entrapment, literally and figuratively, of black and brown people, occurs in three stages throughout the criminal justice system. First, vast numbers of people are swept up by law enforcement officers who disproportionately

Smart Borders

monitor urban areas where the illicit drug trade is concentrated. Due to past segregation practices, these areas often have large racial and ethnic minority populations. Next, arrested individuals, predominantly of color, are placed under the formal control of the criminal justice system. Because many of these people come from disadvantaged neighborhoods and have low socioeconomic status, they are often unable to obtain adequate legal assistance, left impotent to challenge prosecution for racial bias. Last, on conviction, offenders are subjected to a sometimes lifelong process of invisible punishment. Even after their release from prison, ex-offenders are trapped in a position of marginality due to the collateral consequences of felony convictions. These individuals can be legally discriminated against for their ex-felon status in many sectors of society like housing, employment, and government assistance, often for the rest of their lives. In this way, hyperselected segments of the U.S. population remain in captivity under both the formal control of the state and the informal social control of society, a new manifestation of modern-day slavery. Elle Gray Teshima and George Burruss See also Mass Incarceration; Profiling, Racial; War on Drugs

Further Readings Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarce­ ration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York, NY: New Press, 2010. Blackmon, Douglas A. Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black People in America From the Civil War to World War II. New York, NY: Doubleday, 2008. Rawley, James. The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History (Rev. ed.). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005.

Smart Borders Smart borders are political borders that, with the growth of digital processing and information sharing, rely fully or in part on the technologically assisted and/or automated collection and processing of knowledge to make decisions about inclusion

919

and exclusion of people and goods. They are borders that depend on data processing and expand the geographical and temporal extent of the border, as legal admission may take place before crossing the geographical border and far from it. Smart borders share with “analog” borders the legal power of inclusion and exclusion but highlight the growing use of surveillance and monitoring for decision making. Smart borders also reflect globalization trends toward a speedy processing of people and trade and a globally accepted definition of what constitutes a secured territory. In addition, they represent a change in the border itself: away from a single line on a map, or a barrier in the dirt, toward a multilayered and digital filter. The consensus across a range of disciplines, from international relations to geography and sociology, is that borders are more complex than simply lines at the edge of a state. While borders do continue to act as barriers (separation walls or fences against migrants) or rigid lines (on maps) in some cases, the progression of information technology has seen the increase in automation or technological assistance of all or part of decision making at the border. Smart borders are therefore a new phenomenon rooted in long-standing practice: old technologies such as passports meet new methods of deploying their potential such as preclearance and automated, biometrics-enabled border control kiosks. What has made borders “smart” is not their premise but rather the technologies applied there. Smart borders rely on automation and often depend on digital processes unseen to their users. Automated border control is one example of smart borders in action. By automating the process of identity verification, the border is made “smart” through the use of biometrics (e.g., fingerprints, facial recognition, or other bodily characteristic) and the instantaneous verification of large-scale databases. Other examples of smart borders are almost completely opaque to the user. The increasing use of risk scoring based on where a person is arriving from, how long he or she is staying, or how much the person paid for a ticket to travel can all be applied to create passenger profiles. While the profiling of travelers is not new, the ability to quickly profile and sort them into incredibly precise categories is unique to the era of smart borders. The defensive posture of borders, as

920

Smartphones

would have been the case in 17th-century Europe where modern state boundaries began to emerge, has given way to an emphasis, in smart borders, on collaboration, cross-border information sharing, and the selective facilitation of mobility. The geographical dislocation of borders is one of the main consequences of their “smartening.” Through the use of databases, the border decision can be completely displaced. For example, a Kenyan citizen applying for a French visa will have her fingerprints taken and stored in a European Union database, not only to facilitate verification on her arrival but also to create an individualized travel record shared with other embassies. A number of peculiar situations arise from this dislocation of the border. For instance, a traveler may be checked and allowed to legally enter a country before having crossed into its actual territory. For example, a passenger boarding a flight from Paris to New York may technically be admitted to the United States before even taking off, due to the U.S. practice of customs preclearance. The turn toward smart borders is not only the result of the ability to automate, but it is also engendered by a quickening globalization. As international flows of people and goods grow, so do the pressures for speedy processing of travelers and the quickening of trade. Contemporary practices, such as traveler preregistration and risk screening for trucking companies to expedite shipping, point to this trend. There is also a globalization of the smart border concept itself, as globally accepted norms about how to secure territory now dictate that borders should be selectively permeable and founded on “smart” assessment of risks. South Sudan, independent since 2011, made the installation of new border posts with computerized immigration processing one of the main elements of its drive toward recognition as a legitimate state. The global adoption of smart border features across the world is driven in part by the governance arrangements on which these rely. With global standard-setting organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization setting norms on passport format and airport security, smart borders have taken on a similar look and feel across the world, as countries strive to be considered secure and compliant. The spread of smart borders has largely been the product of technological advance, which has

made the automation of decision making possible on a large scale. The nature of borders as spaces of discrimination and categorization means that the smart border is subject to critiques on the grounds of social sorting and lack of redress that any large-scale data processing system faces. As smart borders increase the state’s ability (over space and time) to know who or what is crossing, and speed up the process of admission or nonadmission, they make the border more than simply a line on the map. Gemma Galdon Clavell See also Airport Security; Border Patrol Checkpoints; Dataveillance

Further Readings Amoore, Louise. “Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror.” Political Geography, v.25/3 (2006). Andreas, Peter. “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century.” International Security, v.28/2 (2003). Côté-Boucher, Karine. “The Diffuse Border: IntelligenceSharing, Control and Confinement Along Canada’s Smart Border.” Surveillance & Society, v.5/2 (2008). Lyon, David. “Airports as Data Filters: Converging Surveillance Systems After September 11th.” Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, v.1/1 (2003). Salter, Mark B. “Passports, Mobility, and Security: How Smart Can the Border Be?” International Studies Perspectives, v.5/1 (2004).

Smartphones Smartphones are mobile devices featuring an operating system (OS) with telecommunication capabilities. Since the introduction of the Apple iPhone in 2007, smartphones have been sold worldwide, replacing most noncomputerized mobile phones. Comparable with mobile computers such as tablets, smartphones are often used as personal digital assistants. Storing a variety of personal and realtime data, they have also become objects of targeted surveillance by national security and law enforcement agencies as well as by private commercial actors.

Smartphones

Comparison of Mobile and Smartphones A mobile telephone (also known as a mobile, a cellular phone, or a cell phone) is a portable device that enables its user to connect to a telecommunications network over a wireless radio link. Mobile phones are mainly used to transmit and receive spoken (voice) as well as written messages (short message service, or SMS). Typically, mobile phones connect to the public telephone network either through terrestrial infrastructure (cellular system of fixed-location transceivers) or through a system of communication satellites. A smartphone can be considered as a mobile phone integrated into a handheld computer. Typically, a smartphone features a (touchable) display screen and an OS that allows other software to be installed and run on the device, such as personal information management programs (e.g., an email client, a web browser, an address book, an electronic calendar) and other applications. Further typical components are one or more digital cameras, a Global Positioning System navigation unit, motion sensors, miniaturized loudspeakers, as well as units for short-range wireless communications (e.g., infrared, Bluetooth). Consequently, even though mobile and smartphones are physically detached objects, technologically they are nodes within a larger, encompassing network that is normally invisible in the normal use of the device.

Location-Based Services Like any (oral, written, analogue, electronic, digital) communication, any exchange via smartphone can be intercepted. In contrast to mobile phones, smartphones are transmitters not only of voice and SMS but also of a great variety of personal digital data. Depending on the installed software (apps), smartphones can generate and store data on consumer behavior, personal mail communication, images, movement, and more. In a privacy context, data on past and current position are among the most sensitive information. By using one or more methods of localization (e.g., cell tower identification, Wi-Fi, Global Positioning System) smartphones can give access to locationbased services, such as constant updates on the traffic in a given region, location-based mobile advertising, contextualized information on places

921

and buildings, or recommendations on nearby businesses or services. While location-based services can be seen as beneficial, such systems also mean that the location of the phone and its holder is continuously traceable in real time. David Lyon points out the paradox that mobility, once seen by modern sociologists as liberating, becomes entangled with surveillance technologies and practices. With the accumulation and analysis of huge amounts of location data, the surveillance of mobile devices ceases to be a matter of individual privacy and instead becomes a form of governing populations. This becomes especially significant when telecommunication service providers are required by law to store metadata of communication acts (email and telephone contact data) for an extended period of time. Under the European Union Directive on data retention (2006/24/EC), member states are obliged to compel providers of telecommunications services to retain traffic and location data between 6 and 24 months. The United States does not have any mandatory data retention law comparable to the EU directive.

Mobile Citizens, Social Movements, and the State In the context of social and protest movements, activism, and citizens’ rights movements, especially in nondemocratic societies, smartphones are ambivalent devices: They can be instruments of resistance and empowerment as well as tools of state oppression and surveillance. In the Arab Spring of 2011, demonstrations and protests were often initiated and coordinated by using smartphones and social media apps, which provided activists with the possibility to communicate messages, images, and frequent news updates among protestors as well as sharing this information in real time with the global media. On the other hand, the nondemocratic governments were in many cases able to record the communications and track the movements of individual activists by using commercial surveillance and monitoring tools, often designed to specifically target social media and smartphone usage. Many human rights activists and journalists who were put in jail during the Arab Spring were confronted with personal SMS messages, lists of telephone contacts,

922

Smuggling

and other information relating to their communication activities. In December 2012, leaked documents confirmed that many of these monitoring tools were developed and sold to authoritarian regimes by Western companies, such as Amesys (France), Gamma International (the United Kingdom/Germany), Hacking Team (Italy), and Trovicor (Germany).

Surveillance and the iPhone Since its introduction in 2007, Apple’s iPhone has become one of the most prominent and commercially successful lines of smartphones. Therefore, the following gives an exemplary overview of surveillance-related issues exclusively with respect to the Apple product, even though these and similar issues could also be discussed for those using other brands of smartphones. In April 2011, it became known that the OS on the iPhone 4 generated and stored an unencrypted and hidden file containing an extensive list of locations and time stamps. This file was regularly transmitted to Apple, without the user’s consent or knowledge. In reaction to critical media coverage, Apple reduced the size of the file and enabled the option to delete it entirely. In September 2013, journalists published several internal National Security Agency (NSA) documents leaked by government contractor and whistle-blower Edward Snowden, which made it clear that the NSA was heavily targeting smartphones, setting up several special task forces for the leading manufacturers and OSs. One presentation focused exclusively on the iPhone location services, comparing Apple founder Steve Jobs with the fictional Big Brother of George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. In January 2014, further leaked NSA documents revealed the existence of a software implant (“Dropoutjeep”), which allegedly enables the security agency to remotely push or pull files from the iPhone, including SMSs, contact list, geolocation, and camera images. Answering its critics, Apple denied any cooperation with government agencies in installing secret backdoors to its OS on the iPhone. In September 2014, Apple published a revised privacy policy, announcing that starting with the iPhone 6, the OS would allow the encryption of all personal data stored on the device with a code that Apple does not possess, thereby

effectively prohibiting the company from providing law enforcement agencies with (readable) personal data of the phone user when legally asked to do so. Dietmar Kammerer See also Apple; Arab Spring; Cell Phone Tracking; Paparazzi; United States v. Jones (2012)

Further Readings Andrejevic, M. iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2007. Leistert, Oliver. From Protest to Surveillance: The Political Rationality of Mobile Media. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang, 2013. Lyon, David: “Why Where You Are Matters: Mundane Mobilities, Transparent Technologies, and Digital Discrimination.” In T. Monahan (ed.), Surveillance and Security: Technological Politics and Power in Everyday Life. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006. Snickars, Pelle and Patrick Vonderau, ed. Moving Data. The iPhone and the Future of Media. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Smuggling Smuggling is the illegal transport of goods or individuals, typically for economic gain, and is a threat to domestic and international security. As a security concern, smuggling is a dangerous activity that results in illegal goods (e.g., drugs, weaponry, fraudulent documents, explosives, animals and animal products, counterfeit luxury items, art, antiquities, human organs, cigarettes, alcohol, baby formula) and people entering a country undocumented, unevaluated, and/or untaxed, for a variety of reasons and purposes. In the cases of dangerous and illegal items, their illegal entry into a country or a territory can result in further criminal or terrorist activity. Near-constant surveillance is needed to interdict smuggling on borders, at ports, and throughout a country. This entry first discusses smuggling modes and methods and then focuses on particular types of smuggling, including the illegal drug trade and human smuggling; the entry concludes with a look at increased concerns regarding terrorism.

Smuggling

Modes and Methods Most smuggling requires consumers at the destination point to purchase or consume the smuggled goods—though in some cases, items are smuggled for personal use or as gifts among friends and family. Individuals are smuggled into a country or a territory for a variety of reasons: They may be human trafficking victims, they may be seeking to avoid immigration proceedings, they may be attempting to escape a dangerous situation in their country of origin, they may be ill, or they may be involved in illegal activities, willingly or unwillingly. Smuggling is not a recent phenomenon. As long as countries have had borders and regulations on commerce, smuggling has occurred. Early smuggling involved the luxuries of the day: spices, tea, alcohol, gold, and jewels, anything that individuals wanted for which they did not want to pay taxes. In many of these cases, items were smuggled among legal items or personal belongings, much as in modern smuggling. In some cases, historical smuggling routes are still in use today, though the items smuggled change with the needs and desires of the end consumers. Smuggled goods are transported by any form of vehicle and through a variety of official and unofficial entry points. In some cases, such as the smuggling of drugs and human beings, smugglers have even constructed underground tunnels beneath known borders to avoid interdiction. In the case of large items such as cars, smuggling may be based purely on the paperwork associated with the items, while the items themselves are harder to hide or disguise. Altered or counterfeit paperwork may state that taxes or tariffs have already been paid on these items or that they are personal property rather than salable goods, to ease their entry into their destination. Items can be smuggled by being disguised as something else, hidden among legal imports; hidden beneath clothing or in pockets; hidden in the body, by implantation or consumption; or hidden within the components of a vehicle, such as in side panels, dashboards, or even tires to avoid detection. Sometimes, vehicles—from cars, trucks, and vans to boats, airplanes, and submarines—are designed or refitted solely for the purpose of smuggling. In some cases, the illegal aspect of the process is solely the smuggling of the items; in

923

other cases, the smuggled items may be illegal to purchase, sell, possess, or distribute. Smugglers may also engage in the corruption of government and law enforcement officials to ease the passage of their smuggled goods into a country or a territory. This may be through providing monetary or in-kind compensation for ignoring shipments or fraudulent paperwork. Smuggling is limited not only to individuals who are seeking to engage in outright illegal activity. Occasionally, law-abiding citizens also may engage in smuggling, either knowingly or unknowingly, at the behest of either a friend or an acquaintance, under duress, for the amusement or adventure, or simply to avoid paying taxes or tariffs on a particular item.

Drug Trade The drug trade is a specific form of smuggling that has the added threat of endangering the health as well as the safety of individuals involved in the practice. It is a profitable enterprise around the world and calls for the smuggling of both raw materials and finished products. Drug smuggling, like nearly all other forms of smuggling, is performed by individuals as well as groups. Formal and informal networks exist allowing for the raw materials to be transported to locations where they will be processed into variants of the final product needed for the drug trade, and this final product will then be smuggled to various locations and adulterated further as the market of the area dictates. Because of the increased potential for serious punishment around the world for involvement in the drug trade, drug smugglers have been some of the most innovative smugglers of recent history, pressing drugs into molds to make them appear to be other items, such as children’s toys. The drug trade is a threat to national and individual security, as the value of the smuggled goods can draw violence, terrorist interest, and threats, injury, and death to law enforcement officers seeking to interdict the process. The drug trade provides financial support for a wide range of criminal organizations, and those involved do not shy away from violent action against anyone attempting to or perceived to be attempting to interfere, including government officials, media personnel, and law enforcement at all domestic

924

Smuggling

and international levels. In some areas, the drug trade influences rampant corruption, making it a continuous threat to the safety and security of all  citizens living in drug-influenced territories worldwide.

Precious Metals Precious metals, stones, and minerals can be smuggled in raw form as well as in more finished versions, such as jewelry. The value of these items increases their desirability as smuggled goods. For some, they are smuggled for personal use, enjoyment, or sale; however, for others, they are smuggled as part of a larger criminal network, whereby such items will then be traded for drugs, weaponry, or services rendered, such as terrorism.

Animals and Plants The smuggling of animals, live or dead, is a security concern due to infectious disease outbreak and the introduction of invasive or predatory species to regions where they are not native. The same can be said for the smuggling of plants, which can endanger domestic crops and flora, which causes concerns for the security of the food supply. Smuggling of certain plants, especially as foodstuffs, is completely benign, with an individual not wanting to alert customs to his or her possession of fruit, nuts, or seeds for personal or familial consumption. However, in other cases, the smuggling of plants and animals includes smuggling in whole or in part endangered species. Many countries have outlawed the importation of goods created from the pelt, skin, or other body parts of endangered species; however, due to the desire for these items, smuggling becomes the only means of importation. Smuggling of animal parts for consumption has its own risks, as smuggled meat and animal products are not evaluated for diseases, freshness, or parasites, and their consumption can result in serious illness or death.

Art and Antiquities The smuggling of art and antiquities has added concerns as many of these items are first stolen or looted before being smuggled. Antiquities may be

looted from archaeological sites without being documented or properly retrieved from the site, resulting in irreparable damage to historic and archaeologically significant areas. The interest in smuggled artifacts endangers the security of a nation’s cultural heritage. In many cases, the smuggling of these items results in the destruction of many art objects,thus preventing resale, such as paintings stolen from an art museum. In such cases, smugglers may destroy the art or antiquities to avoid capture.

Human Smuggling Human smuggling, or human trafficking, is the illegal transport of human beings into a country or a territory, either willingly or not. Individuals can be smuggled at any age, from newborns to the elderly and for a variety of purposes. Some individuals choose this means of entering a country or a territory; others do not. Even those who do choose to be smuggled into a country or a territory may be forced on entry to work in either illegal or legal enterprises, without or with minimal pay, in order to remit their debt to their smugglers. Their illegal status marginalizes them and makes interaction with law enforcement difficult. Very young children may be smuggled into a country for purposes of adoption and never be fully aware of their illegal status.

Medical Smuggling Medical smuggling, including the illegal transport of patients, medical supplies, diseases, and human organs for transplantation, is a rarer form of smuggling. This is partly due to the need for a certain level of specific medical knowledge to participate. While any smuggler can illegally transport medical supplies, patients and biological matter are more difficult to smuggle without medical knowledge. The smuggling of biological matter for the assistance of disease proliferation or biological warfare is complicated by the limited access most individuals have to this material. For patients or for human organs for transplantation, medical professionals must be involved. Even with their involvement, all procedures are suspect as few safeguards are in place due to the illegal nature of the organs or status of the patients.

Social Contract Theory

Terrorism Concerns The increased threat of terrorism in recent history has resulted in new concerns regarding smuggling. Some smuggling operations have been designed to  assist terrorists, either by providing economic ­benefit—as seen in some smuggling of antiquities; drugs; and precious metals, stones, and minerals— or in the preparation for attacks—through the smuggling of explosives, weaponry, or individuals needed for the attack. Terrorists engaging in smuggling employ the same tactics, routes, and ruses that all other smugglers use. This increases the need for careful surveillance of known smuggling routes to maintain national security. Clairissa D. Breen See also Drug Trafficking; Human Trafficking; Terrorism

Further Readings Basu, G. “The Strategic Attributes of Transnational Smuggling: Logistics Flexibility and Operational Stealth in the Facilitation of Illicit Trade.” Journal of Transportation Security, v.7/2 (2014). Feinberg, R. and P. Andreas. Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Kyle, D. and R. Koslowski, eds. Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. London, England: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011. May, T. Smugglers and Smuggling (Vol. 713). London, England: Shire, 2014. Ulph, J. and I. Smith. The Illicit Trade in Art and Antiquities: International Recovery and Criminal and Civil Liability. New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2012.

Social Contract Theory The social contract theory is an Enlightenment era moral and political philosophy that posits that political authority and legitimacy derives from the people, as opposed to having a divine origin. The social contract theory challenged the European monarchs’ claim that their power and authority to govern had divine origin and, therefore, their accountability was to God. The proponents of the social contract theory insisted that the power and

925

authority of the monarchs, and later of the state, derive from the people—and that the social contract is formed through free citizens entering into contract with one another to form a sovereign. Thus, the sovereign requires the people’s mandate to govern, and the sovereign in return is accountable to the people. As part of the social contract, citizens agree to surrender some of their freedoms to the sovereign, and the sovereign is obligated to protect the citizens’ remaining rights. The underlying reason for the social contract, according to one of its major proponents, Thomas Hobbes, is that without it, life would be short and nasty, because human beings are by nature egoistic, such that without an overarching authority, the strong will likely trample on the rights of the weak. The social contract is central to the liberal idea of policing by consent and the practice of liberal democratic government. The social contract is the foundational idea underpinning the U.S. Decla­ ration of Independence, the Articles of Confe­ deration, and the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, the social contract is the justification for political authority and informs the structure and content of a just political authority. The social contract theory guides against the dominance of one state over others in a federal system like that of the United States. The theory promotes equality such that no state, region, or group should wield power over others without their consent. The prominent Enlightenment theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries who developed the social contract theory include Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, JeanJacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and PierreJoseph Proudhon. The social contract theory has evolved over the years and has been interpreted differently by different political players. However, many have raised concerns about the social contract theory as presented by the Enlightenment philosophers. For example, the social contract theory reveals weaknesses when addressing international relations and/or globalization issues (e.g., surveillance regarding how information should flow, global corporate power in a neoliberal social order, warfare, commerce, policing, governing, gamming, media). Consequently, in the 21st century, there is a need for a social contract theory that addresses global principles pertaining to surveillance in contemporary life with regard to

926

Social Control

technologies and social media, institutional practices, capitalist market forces, governments’ activities related to national security, and the privacy of citizens. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a proliferation of the use of communications and surveillance technologies in democratic countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Such surveillance technologies jeopardized the privacy rights of the people. New surveillance technologies, many implemented after the 9/11 and the 7/11 bombing attacks in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, have now afforded the governments unlimited power to encroach into the liberty of the people, often without the people even knowing about it. In response, governments and corporations have acquired numerous new communication technologies to detect and observe communications among their people without their consent or court authorization. Since 2013, when U.S. government contract employee Edward Snowden released classified information that the U.S. government was monitoring citizens’ and foreign government officials’ communication without their consent, there has been intense political and public debate concerning surveillance in the United States and globally. The U.S. National Security Agency had implemented a PRISM surveillance program that engaged in circumventing and cracking encryption that guards commerce and banking systems information. In addition, the National Security Agency has been collecting and recording information (e.g., phone calls, Internet use, instant messages, and email activities) of U.S. citizens and others globally, including political dissidents, journalists, and human rights advocates without their knowledge and/or prior consent. The U.S. government justifies such surveillance activities by noting that these activities have helped prevent more than 50 possible terrorist attacks since 2001. The ongoing debate concerning the government’s surveillance policies and practices concerns whether the government is justified in circumventing the law in the interest of national security and whether the security of the homeland overrides the privacy rights of the people. According to the social contract theory, free citizens have consented to enter into a contract

with one another and to concede some of their rights to a sovereign in return for the protection of their other rights. The state, therefore, exists to serve the will of the people, and the power to rule, therefore, belongs to the people. Because the people themselves create the social contract, the people can withdraw the mandate to rule that they provide to the state whenever they please. Thus, it is argued, the people’s privacy cannot be invaded at will by the government, no matter what the reason, without the people’s consent. Rochelle E. M. Cobbs and O. Oko Elechi See also Privacy, Right to; Social Contract Theory

Further Readings Ankerl, Guy. Towards a Social Contract on a WorldWide Scale: Solidarity Contracts. Geneva, Switzerland: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1980. Bernard, Thomas, et al. Vold’s Theoretical Criminology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010. Bowling, Benard and James Sheptycki. Theorising Global Policing. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Sage. Chesterman, Simon. “One nation Under Surveillance: A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom Without Sacrificing Liberty.” Journal of Law, Information and Science, v.21/1 (2011). Sundquist, Matthew. “Online Privacy Protection: Protecting Privacy, the Social Contract, and the Rule of Law in the Virtual World.” https://www.regent.edu/ acad/schlaw/student_life/studentorgs/lawreview/docs/ issues/v25n1/05Sundquistvol.25.1.pdf (Accessed July 2014).

Social Control There are various interpretations of the concept of social control. This entry discusses several of these perspectives, concluding with a general definition that incorporates elements from each of the views discussed. Based on a sociological perspective, social control refers to the way in which societies are organized and remain cohesive—that is, the means by which life in common is founded. It is noteworthy that such means are constituted jointly by the individuals themselves and by society. In this

Social Control

sense, as pointed out by Edward A. Ross in 1939, social control is primarily socially built, not something natural or preexisting to the organization of society. Following a pragmatic view of the concept, “social order” is a product of social control. The concept of social control is associated not only with the maintenance of order, consensus, or mere collective problem solving. It is also used as a constitutive element of order itself, which is understood not as the absence of conflict or opposition but as something structured and assimilated by social actors, either by consensus or by conflictive ways. Considering that social control is the effect of the socialization process, a key reference is Émile Durkheim. One issue that permeates Durkheim’s entire oeuvre is that social control is the process that holds society together but that there are difficulties in maintaining social cohesion. Included in this entry are the forms of regulation that maintain and produce social control: internalization of rules, norms, and social values, as well as sanctions implemented for deviations from such rules. The overall result of such social control would be to create a peaceful, integrated, and cohesive social space that controls and regulates the relations among individuals, permitting the emergence of a certain morality that permeates all social space. Individuals socialized in this system, by the very process of socialization, would be committed to the continuity of the values they internalize. The result of such an integrated and cohesive society would be the well-being and safety of all members of society. Not every deviation, however, is harmful to social cohesion; examples of beneficial change and transformation include developing values that go against prejudices and advocating innovative positions. Social control arises as a mechanism that aims to protect and preserve conformity to standards and social norms as well as relations and institutions that are valued by the existing order. Moreover, the mechanisms of social change, such as new values, adapt and transform the organization and structure of society. Another issue that is tied to the notion of social control is what is called perverse social control. Perverse social control assumes a form of control that seeks to eliminate or deny difference and

927

inequality, erasing its perception instead of seeking social balance. Perverse social control is part of the dynamics of stigmatization, marginalization, and exclusion of particular social groups, and the criminalization of certain social groups, especially young, black, and poor people (Berlatto, 2008). Such dynamics reinforce patterns of social exclusion and marginalization of groups considered “undesirable.” This type of social control works to produce fear, inciting certain categories of individuals to violence, which, in turn, intensifies their repression, notably through the state police. As discussed by Pedro R. B. Moraes, blacks are a primary target of this repression, which occurs every day, especially in large cities or where youth try to access services (e.g., leisure and work) or congregate in areas where there is not a designated space for them to do so. The discussion of social control thus far has reflected the commonly accepted control functionalist and instrumentalist view. However, there are other ways of thinking about this issue. Some multidimensional approaches understand and explain the complex mechanisms that do not properly control but rather produce behaviors considered appropriate or inappropriate to certain social norms and institutions. To understand better other approaches, it can be useful to analyze the thought of Michel Foucault. Although Foucault is known for studies on the mechanisms of social control in modernity, he actually does not use this expression significantly, but seeks another perspective, a look that is aimed at practices of power that cannot be reduced to instrumental and functional forms of social control but as producers of behavior, forms of knowledge, and forms of subjectivity. Foucault emphasized that his analysis implies a methodological approach that moves away from the traditional ways of thinking about power and social control. From Foucault’s work, it is evident that Foucault believed that the notion of power cannot be reduced either to a simple diagnosis of the intensification of social control or to a vision of power as repressive and unidimensional. Although certainly power produces control, it also produces other things (Lacombe, 1996). By emphasizing power relations as a network or a mechanism that obliges as much as it enables action, while placing resistance at the heart of the practices of power, and

928

Social Justice

by denying that power’s effects are uniform or unitarian, Foucault distances himself from the simplistic thesis regarding the intensification of social control. Thus, taking into account these perspectives, social control can be described as a set of practices, discourses, and power relations that not only work toward the maintenance of social order, norms, and existing institutions but also act in the production of new knowledge, values, and norms that will transform and update such social order. Diego Coletti Oliva See also Fear, Culture of; Securitization

Further Readings Berlatto, Fábia. Controle social perverso: análise de uma política de segurança pública [Perverse social control: An analysis on a public security policy]. Curitiba, Brazil: Universidade Federal do Paraná, 2008. Foucault, Michel. Vigiar e Punir: Nascimento da prisão [Discipline and punish: The birth of prison]. Petrópolis, Brazil: Vozes, 2004. Lacombe, Dany. “Reforming Foucault: A Critique of the Social Control Thesis.” The British Journal of Sociology, v.47/2 (1996). Moraes, Pedro R. B. Juventude, medo e violência [Youth, fear and violence]. Curitiba, Brazil: Centro de Estudos em Segurança Pública e Direitos Humanos, 2008. http://www.ipardes.gov.br/pdf/cursos_eventos/ governanca_2006/gover_2006_01_juventude_medo_ pedro_bode.pdf (Accessed March 2014). Ross, Edward A. Social Control: A Survey of the Founda­ tions of Order. London, England: Macmillan, 1939.

Social Justice Social justice is defined as the equitable processes and outcomes that result from efforts to close the gap between what we as a society espouse in our social contract and how we actually enact that mission. The term social justice implies both a goal and a process. The goal is articulated as the full and equal participation of all groups in a society that is shaped to meet mutual needs. Social justice includes a vision of a society in which the distribution of

resources is equitable, all members are physically and psychologically safe and secure, and individuals are allowed self-determination and independent agency. The process for attaining the goal of social justice should be democratic and participatory, inclusive, and affirming of human agency and human capacities for working collaboratively to create change. Thus, social justice is an attempt to establish integrity between mission and action. Social justice actions are designed to remove hurdles to equal opportunity, equal rights, and human liberty. In addition, the concept of social justice is important to surveillance, security, and privacy in that security and social justice are symbiotic elements of the United Nations’ Sustainable Develop­ ment Goals, which focus on the creation of a safe, sustainable, and just society.

Distributive Justice Social justice is also typically taken to mean distributive justice. The terms are generally understood to be synonymous and interchangeable in both common idiom and the language of international relations. Similar to social justice, distributive justice is concerned with identifying the principles by which anything of value (e.g., money, good, privileges) can be fairly and equitably allocated among persons or groups. The concept of social/distributive justice is implied in various academic and theoretical works and in many international, legal or quasi-legal texts that may only include broad references to “justice.” The notion of social justice is arguably a relatively new concept, which first appeared in Western thinking and political language in the midst of the Industrial Revolution and the corresponding development of the socialist doctrine. It emerged as an expression of protest against what was perceived as the capitalist exploitation of labor and as a vital point for the development of measures to improve the human condition. Subsequent to the revolutions in Europe in the mid-1800s, social justice became a rallying cry for progressive thinkers and political activists. By the mid-20th century, the concept of social justice had become intrinsic to the ideologies and programs of virtually all leftist and centrist political parties. The legitimization of the concept of social justice is connected to the

Social Justice

emergence of the social sciences as distinct areas of activity and the creation of economics and sociology as separate disciplines. Social justice was further defined when a distinction was made between the social and economic spheres. It made its way into mainstream discourse when a number of economists undertook the responsibility of describing the concept and proposed criteria for the distribution of the gains of labor.

Dimensions of Social Justice There are two dimensions of social justice. In the first instance, the application of social justice requires a geographical, sociological, political, and  cultural framework within which relations between individuals and groups can be understood, assessed, and characterized as just or unjust. In this dimension, the framework used has been identified as the nationstate. The country typically represents the context in which the various aspects of social justice, such as the distribution of income in a population, are observed and measured. This standard is used not only by national governments but also by international organizations and global entities such as the European Union. Second, there is a universal dimension to social justice with humanity as the shared element. Slaves, exploited workers, and oppressed women are universally identified as victims whose locations matter less than their circumstances. This universality has taken on added depth and relevance as the cultural distance between countries has been greatly reduced with the advent of information technology and globalization. To give social justice a more tangible character and current relevance, the language of rights, equality, and equity is used in reference to both positive objectives to be pursued and negative situations to be corrected. The concept of equality suggests that everyone should be treated the same regardless of background, history, or need, whereas equity takes into account historical disadvantages, human diversities, and potentially unique needs in determining what is just. In the application of social justice, the United Nations identified three areas of priority with regard to equality and equity, as highlighted in the

929

Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenants on Human Rights: 1. Equality of rights, which implies the elimination of all forms of discrimination and respect for the fundamental freedoms and civil and political rights of all individuals. This represents the most fundamental form of equality. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Article 2 states, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 2. Equality of opportunities, which necessitates stable social, economic, cultural, and political conditions that allow all individuals to fulfill their potential and contribute to the economy and to society. This form of equality is similar to equality of rights and simply means that societies and governments refrain from discrimination and allow individuals to freely pursue their aspirations and develop and apply their talents within the moral and legal limits imposed by respect for the freedom of others. 3. Equity in living conditions for all individuals and households. This concept is understood to reflect a contextually determined “acceptable” range of inequalities in income, wealth, and other aspects of life in society, with the presumption of general agreement with regard to what is just or fair (or “equitable”) at any given time in any particular community, or in the world as a whole if universal norms are applied. This shift in terms from equality to equity is derived from the fact that equality in living conditions has never been achieved in practice, has never been seriously envisaged by political theorists or moralists, and is today commonly perceived as incompatible with freedom. Every society has engaged in the distribution and redistribution of income and wealth in some form, with policies generally favoring the poorest but sometimes benefiting the richest, and it is for this reason that issues of equity in living conditions remain integral to the dialogue and debate on social justice.

930

Social Justice

The debate on the application of social justice has primarily focused on six areas of inequalities requiring correction: 1. Inequalities in the distribution of income: The distribution of income among individuals or households at the local or national level, based on classifications such as socioeconomic status, profession, gender, location, and income percentiles, is the most commonly used measure of the degree of equality or inequality existing in a society. With the convenience of an income, individuals and households acquire the ability to make choices and gain immediate access to a number of amenities. For most modern societies, income distribution remains the most legitimate indicator of overall levels of equality and inequality. 2. Inequalities in the distribution of assets: The distribution of assets includes not only capital but also physical assets such as land and buildings. There is normally a strong positive correlation between the distribution of income and the distribution of assets. The possession of assets is a key determinant of social status and political power. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others” and “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” 3. Inequalities in the distribution of opportunities for work and remunerated employment: In most societies today, the distribution of work and employment opportunities is the main determinant of income distribution and a key to economic and social justice. 4. Inequalities in the distribution of access to knowledge: Concerns relating to levels of enrollment in schools and universities among children from different socioeconomic groups, as well as issues linked to the quality of educational delivery in various institutions and regions are measured under this area. The scope of this area is wide in that education includes technical training and adult education. In most societies, education is critical for ensuring access to decent work and for social mobility and is a strong determinant of social status and an important source of selfrespect. The advent of online access to education has broadened the access to learning and is now

also considered in assessing education-related inequalities. 5. Inequalities in the distribution of health services, Social Security, and the provision of a safe environment: Basic indicators of well-being such as life expectancy and child mortality rates, broken down by gender, socioeconomic status, and area of residence, are normally used along with other data to identify and measure inequalities in the distribution of amenities that all countries endeavor to provide for their citizens. Research has shown that issues relating to the availability, quality, and accessibility of health and social services and facilities are critical but are difficult to analyze and measure. 6. Inequalities in the distribution of opportunities for civic and political participation: The way power is organized and distributed among society’s various institutions and the manner in which political processes are carried out have a profound influence on the allocation of social status in society. This does not mean that the unequal distribution of political power is always the direct cause of other forms of inequality. Simple cause-effect relationships do not explain this highly complex phenomenon, in which personal and social factors are intertwined. It is generally accepted, however, that the distribution of power, and how it is exercised by those who have it, is at the core of the different forms and manifestations of inequality and inequity. In the final analysis, the relationship between social justice and security, surveillance, and privacy is inextricably tied to sustainable efforts to fight inequality and injustice. Dianne Williams See also Equality; Global Justice; United Nations

Further Readings Allouche, J. Sustainable Development Goals Must Consider Security, Justice and Inequality to Achieve Social Justice (Policy Briefing 88). Brighton, England: Institute of Development Studies, 2015. Davis, Tracey and Laura M. Harrison. Advancing Social Justice: Tools, Pedagogies and Strategies to Transform Your Campus. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2013.

Social Media Greenberg, Jerald and Jason A. Calquitt. Handbook of Organizational Justice. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2013. Lister, Andrew. The “Mirage” of Social Justice: Hayek Against (and For) Rawls (CSSJ Working Papers Series, SJ017) (June 2011). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/ materials/centres/social-justice/working-papers/SJ017_ Lister_MirageofSocialJustice.pdf (Accessed October 2017). National Pro Bono Resource Centre. What Is Social Justice? (Occasional Paper 1). Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales, National Pro Bono Resource Centre, 2011. Novak, M. “Defining Social Justice.” First Things (December 2000). https://www.firstthings.com/ article/2000/12/defining-social-justice (Accessed October 2017). Reisch, Michael. “Defining Social Justice in a Socially Unjust World.” Families in Society, v.83/4 (2002). Sriraman, Bharath. “On the Origins of Social Justice: Darwin, Freire, Marx and Vivekananda.” The Montana Mathematics Enthusiast, Monograph 1 (2007). http://www.math.umt.edu/TMME/ Monograph1/Sriraman_FINAL_pp1_6.pdf United Nations. Declaration of Human Rights (1948). http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-humanrights (Accessed October 2017). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Social Justice in an Open World: The Role of the United Nations. New York, NY: Author, 2006. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ifsd/ SocialJustice.pdf (Accessed October 2017).

Social Media Social media are online tools and services that support creation and sharing of information (text, pictures, sounds, and videos) in virtual communities and networks. Social networking is the most widely used service of social media. Social media belong to Web 2.0; typical examples are blogs, wikis, social networking, and microblogging. Social media are closely related to user-generated content since they constitute the tools through which users create, collaborate, discuss, and share content. They represent significant changes in communications between individuals, communities, and organizations. Initially, social media included

931

tools and services accessible through personal computers, but gradually a shift to mobile devices occurred, and today, the majority of the user-generated content created on social media is generated through smartphones, tablets, and other mobile devices. There is a considerable debate concerning the personal information that users make available through the use of social media. Such information includes current geographical location, date of birth, habits, and beliefs. Usually people are unwilling to disclose such information to strangers, but many Internet users make them publicly available through social media, thus compromising their privacy. This entry first defines social media and then looks at its early history, categorization, mobile social media, and finally risks of social media and prevention of its use.

Definition The term social media was proposed by Chris Shipley, cofounder of the Guidewire Group, which is based in San Francisco, CA. With this term Shipley attempted to describe online tools and utilities that support online communication of information and also participation and collaboration. Social media can be defined as various types of Internet tools and services through which Internet users are able to produce and distribute content (in various forms); share information, ideas, and personal messages; and create online communities.

History The first computer service that relates to social media was CompuServe, which was introduced in the 1960s. In 1979, UseNet gave users the opportunity to exchange messages with the help of a virtual newsletter. Next, Internet Relay Chat was introduced in 1988 and gradually became very popular in the 1990s. Six Degrees, which was the first service that had many of the characteristics of today’s social media (e.g., user profile, friends), appeared in 1997. Two years later, blogging services started gaining popularity. Soon after 2000, many of the current social media appeared, like Myspace, LinkedIn, Flickr, and Wikipedia. YouTube was introduced in 2005, thus creating a new way

932

Social Media

for communicating and sharing videos. In 2006, two of the most popular social media services, Facebook and Twitter, became available. In the following years, smartphones and computer tablets were introduced, and many other social media emerged, many of them specifically targeting mobile users.

Categorization Social media can be categorized as follows: Blogs

A blog is a website where entries are written in chronological order and displayed in reverse chronological order. An important feature of blogs is the ability for readers to leave comments. When blogs were introduced, they quickly became very popular since they gave the ability to every Internet user to create a web presence without the need to be able to program in HTML. It is worth noting that some bloggers use blogs as a means of publishing their daily routine, thus revealing in some cases sensitive and private information to potential criminals. Forums

Forums are websites that support online discussions between Internet users on various subjects. Forums employ a hierarchical structure. Each discussion subject can have a number of subdiscussions called “threads” that involve only a specific part of the initial subjects. Depending on the forum’s policy, users can be anonymous or registered, and posts may need to be approved by a moderator in order to appear in the forum. Frequently in forums, users have to deal with “trolling,” which is an intentional disruption of the conducted discussions by causing offense or starting an argument.

creation of webpages. The most widely known example of a wiki is Wikipedia. Social Networking

Social networking can be defined as services that allow users to build online social relations with other users who have similar interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections by constructing a public or semipublic profile within a bounded system. Users can articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system. Facebook and Google+ are the most widely used social networking sites. There have been many cases ­ of  cyberbullying, extortion, and other criminal ­activities—usually directed toward minors—that have taken place via social networking services. There is also the phenomenon of “virtual mobbing” in which a number of users make comments to or about another user, usually because they are opposed to his or her opinions. In some cases, these online attacks have played a role in people committing suicide. On the other hand, some suicide attempts have been prevented by the police because the potential victims posted their intentions on social networks. Microblogging

Microblogging is an online service that supports the exchange of short sentences, images, and video links between Internet users. The topics of the posts may vary and can also be used for commercial purposes to promote websites, services, and products. Some microblogging services include privacy settings that allow users to customize the audience of their posts, and also alternative means of publishing entries (text, email, instant messaging, audio, and video). The most widely used microblogging service is Twitter.

Wikis

Media-Sharing Sites

A wiki is a web application that supports collaborative production of its webpages from a number of registered or unregistered users. It is a type of content management system with specific characteristics that allow for easy collaborative

Media-sharing (or hosting) services allow Internet users to upload media content (usually in the form of images, sounds, and videos) and share or place it on a webpage. This can be accomplished through the use of a personal computer, a

Social Media

tablet, or a smartphone. Media-sharing services can be categorized by video sharing, audio sharing (or distribution), and image sharing (or hosting). They support multiple media formats. YouTube, Flickr, and SoundCloud are some of the most widely known media-sharing sites. Media-sharing sites have also been employed as platforms for publishing and advertising criminal actions. It is worth mentioning that some have used video- and photo-sharing services for revenge following the breakup with a romantic partner. Such actions involve the publication or distribution of sexually explicit material that was originally provided consensually for private use to embarrass or humiliate the other party. Social Bookmarking

This is a centralized online service that enables users to add, annotate, edit, and share bookmarks of web documents. Bookmarks can be public, private, shared only with specified users or groups, shared only inside certain networks, or another combination of public and private domains. Users can add descriptions to each bookmark in the form of metadata (free text comments, votes in favor of or against the bookmark’s quality, or tags). Thus, other users may form an idea about the content of the resource without needing to download it. This can speed up the process of finding useful web documents on a specific subject. “Delicious” is one of the most widely used social bookmarking services. Social News

Social news are online services that allow Internet users to post various news items and links to outside articles. Usually they link news, humor, support, and discussion. The posted stories are ranked based on popularity (users vote on the posted stories). These services also allow users to comment on these posts, and these comments may also be ranked. The voting process is the most significant part of social news, since by this method, users (that form a community) decide which news items are most prominently displayed. Reddit, Slashdot, and Digg are some of the most popular social news services. These services are considered to be supporting the democratic participation on the web.

933

Mobile Social Media The rapid expansion of the smartphone, tablet, and other mobile device users has led to the introduction of social media applications that allow mobile users to connect with existing social media services or to new social media that was built only for mobile users. These applications allow for the creation and exchange of user-generated content and have included new features such as the current location of the user (location sensitivity) or the time delay between sending and receiving messages (time sensitivity). Social media scholar Andreas Kaplan has proposed four types of mobile social media: 1. Space-timers: They support the exchange of messages with relevance for one specific location at one specific point in time (e.g., Facebook Places, Foursquare). 2. Space-locators: They allow for the exchange of messages, with relevance for one specific location, which are tagged to a certain place and read later by others (e.g., Yelp, Qype). 3. Quick-timers: In this case, traditional social media applications are used by mobile devices to increase immediacy (e.g., tweets on Twitter, Facebook status updates, blog postings). 4. Slow-timers: They support accessing traditional social media applications through mobile devices (e.g., watching a YouTube video or reading a Wikipedia entry).

Risks and Prevention Social media has changed the way in which people communicate and conduct business. Social media, however, are also employed for illegal activities. For example, soon after the Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013, multiple fake charities were created on social networking websites claiming to collect funds for victims. Other examples include the hack of the Associated Press Twitter account and the dispatch of a bogus tweet, falsely claiming that President Obama was injured in a bombing of the White House. That claim resulted in a temporary sudden drop of the stock market, which demonstrated the power of social media and how easily a single incident can have immediate and severe consequences.

934

Social Network Analysis

It is only logical that social media users understand the risks that the use of social media involves and the actions they must take to alleviate their exposure to these risks. These actions are mainly related to security and privacy issues during the utilization of social media. The incorporation of strong passwords and the use of different passwords for the accounts of different social media decrease the possibility of being compromised. Users must be careful in selecting personal information they publish on social media and post only the information they feel comfortable revealing to strangers. Users must also be cautious about what they download through social media sites, especially third-party applications that may be malicious and steal personal information. If such applications are not needed, users can uninstall them if they have already been downloaded. The introduction of social media has created new opportunities for not only communicating but also significant risks. But by taking some fundamental precautions users can significantly minimize such risks. It is difficult to predict how social media will continue to evolve in the near future, but it is quite certain that social media will exist since people have always expressed a desire to connect and share. Andreas Veglis See also Cyberbullying; Facebook; Privacy, Internet; Privacy, Types of; Social Media; YouTube

Further Readings Digital Trends Staff. “The history of Social Networking.” Digital Trends (May 14, 2016). http://www .digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-socialnetworking/ (Accessed October 2017). Joosten, Tanya. Social Media for Educators: Strategies and Best Practices. San Francisco, CA: Wiley, 2012. Kaplan, Andreas M. “If You Love Something, Let It Go Mobile: Mobile Marketing and Mobile Social Media 4x4.” Business Horizons, v.55/2 (2012). Newson, Alex, et al. Blogging and Other Social Media. Farnham, England: Gower, 2009. Noor Al-Deen, et al. Social Media: Usage and Impact. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012. Pelgrin, William. “3 Reasons Why Criminals Exploit Social Networks (and tips to avoid getting scammed).” CSO (June 5, 2013). http://www.csoonline.com/

article/2133563/social-engineering/3-reasons-whycriminals-exploit-social-networks--and-tips-to-avoidgetting-scamme.html (Accessed October 2017). Press Association. “Social Media-Related Crime Reports Up 780% in Four Years.” The Guardian (December 27, 2012). http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/ dec/27/social-media-crime-facebook-twitter (Accessed October 2017). Siapera, Eugenia, and Andreas Veglis. The WileyBlackwell Handbook of Online Journalism. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2012. Statista. “Social Media Statistics & Facts.” New York, NY: Satista, 2014. http://www.statista.com/ topics/1164/social-networks/ (Accessed October 2017).

Social Network Analysis Social network analysis (SNA) is an analytical tool used in the social and behavioral sciences that examines the relationships (or ties) between a given set of actors. Actors can be individuals, groups, or organizations, for example. Relation­ ships can be of any type, and each type can define a different network. SNA has been applied to a range of crime and terror networks (often referred to as “dark” networks). It is argued that SNA can provide substantial insight into the ways in which crime and terror groups operate and behave and contribute to the development of effective strategies designed to disrupt such groups. For example, some argue that SNA is able to identify vulnerabilities within dark networks, such as an individual who is the only point of connection between what would otherwise be two disconnected groups, which could then be exploited by law enforcement and security agencies. It is, therefore, not surprising that SNA has become quite popular among researchers and practitioners across the field of security. SNA is unique because of its focus on the relationships between actors, rather than on the actors themselves, and its sophisticated mathematical techniques. The strengths of SNA come from these techniques, which can determine the overall structure of a network, how information flows in the network, and the level of influence or importance of each actor in the network. It is believed that such information can contribute to the

Social Network Analysis

development of strategies that law enforcement and security agencies can use to disrupt dark networks. For example, identifying and removing from a network an individual who is determined to have a high level of influence may substantially affect that group’s ability to function. Conducting SNA involves collecting and analyzing relational data. Relational data refer to the connections between actors, including face-to-face meetings, emails, and phone calls, among others. Once these data are collected, an adjacency matrix is created whereby an analyst “codifies” these data. This can be done in binary form (e.g., does Actor A have a connection to Actor B?), or it can be based on some form of interactional criteria. For example, one such criterion is the frequency of interactions, whereby it is assumed that the more interactions there are between actors, the stronger their connection or relationship. Once these data are coded, a large variety of mathematical techniques can be applied. The choice of which of these techniques to use will depend on the data that are available and on the aim underlying the particular analysis in question. Two of the more commonly used techniques are (1) degree centrality, which is a measure of the number of connections an actor has with other individuals in the network, and (2) betweenness centrality, which determines the extent to which an actor falls between other individuals in the network. An individual with a high betweenness score can indicate a level of “brokerage,” such as the ability to control the flow of information and/ or materials in a network. Its reported capabilities are considerable; however, as with any analytical tool, it has some methodological and practical limitations, several of which are perhaps exacerbated within a surveillance and security context. For example, the data necessary for SNA can be very difficult to obtain on dark networks. Such information is likely to be incomplete and inaccurate as actors not only try to withhold information from the public gaze but may even deliberately supply misinformation to mislead law enforcement and security agencies. Another methodological limitation of SNA concerns the difficulty in determining which actors and connections should be included and/or excluded from an analysis (referred to as boundary specification). Some networks seemingly go on

935

forever, and determining where the boundaries lie can potentially affect the findings of SNA. Dark networks are also constantly changing, so while SNA may reveal important insights into a network at one point in time, such findings may not necessarily apply in another. However, many of these limitations have been the subject of academic research, and advances in SNA continue to enter the field. The application of SNA to dark networks has been extensive and has included terror networks, a large number of drug networks, groups involved in arms trafficking, fraudulent groups (e.g., those involved in Ponzi schemes), and, increasingly, cybercrime networks. The findings on terror networks have reinforced the notion that such groups are loosely connected, with the typical terror network consisting of small cohesive groups or cells that are in turn connected by relatively few ties. The use of SNA has identified that similar loosely connected networks are commonplace in what might be considered traditional criminal groups, such as those involved in illicit drugs. In contrast, it has been found that some cybercrime networks actually have a clear hierarchy, such as those involved in “carding” (online fraud involving credit cards). A primary focus of those exploring the application of SNA within a surveillance and security context concerns its ability to identify vulnerabilities within crime and terror networks, such as individuals with high brokerage capabilities. It is argued that identifying and removing those individuals (through arrest or, in the case of military operations, perhaps assassination) will potentially disrupt the effectiveness of the group by removing leadership or by breaking the flow of information and/or resources of the group. However, it has been found that many crime and terror groups using a network structure can often recover relatively quickly after such disruption efforts (referred to as the resilience of the network structure). This has led to an increasing number of analysts suggesting that, as valuable as SNA may be, it is critical that it be used in conjunction with other analytical techniques and intelligence and that the context in which it is applied be taken into consideration. Chad Whelan and Morgan Burcher

936

Social Sorting

See also Crime Mapping; Data Mining and Profiling in Social Network Analysis; Network Security

Further Readings Borgatti, Stephen P., et al. Analyzing Dark Networks. London, England: Sage, 2013. Carrington, Peter J. and John Scott, eds. The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis. London, England: Sage, 2011. Carrington, Peter, J., et al., eds. Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Everton, Sean F. Disrupting Dark Networks. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Morselli, Carlo, ed. Crime and Networks. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Wasserman, Stanley and Katherine Faust. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Social Sorting Social sorting refers to the discriminatory effects of surveillance, and particularly to the ways in which large-scale practices of observation and monitoring facilitate profiling and screening of social groups. The term social sorting was coined and developed by David Lyon in response to what he identified as the increasingly totalizing nature of surveillance, particularly evidenced by heightened security measures and racial discrimination in the immediate wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001. Social sorting generally refers to practices of discrimination and filtering enabled by new technologies. Such sorting is an ethically ambiguous practice: Even when functional, its benefits, risks, and further social implications must be considered.

Evolution of the Concept Although the term social sorting is a phrase of Lyon’s, the discriminatory effects of surveillance (e.g., profiling) have long been noted across surveillance studies. In the early 1990s, Oscar Gandy wrote about the “panoptic sort” to describe the

role of large-scale information gathering in classifying individuals. Gandy focused on marketing, whereby companies classify consumers by their perceived level of worth. Lyon’s contribution, however, focuses on surveillance practices, with the assumption that large-scale surveillance has become quotidian and routine. Without assuming that surveillance is necessarily pernicious, social sorting refers simply to the fact that surveillance, especially since the advent of new information and communication technologies, has enabled new forms of profiling, which permeate everyday life. Social sorting in surveillance studies is fundamentally related to inequality. It illustrates the effects on individual life chances brought about by the interaction of technological systems and social categories. As the capacity for gathering personal data from individuals becomes increasingly rapid and efficient, groups and/or individuals can be differentiated and categorized to treat them differently. Social sorting is therefore inextricable from the application of risk mentalities to surveillance, whereby aggregated data or group traits (real or imagined) are used to profile individuals, often through automated processing. This approach has the effect of placing individuals or groups on various scales of threat, of insurability, or of priority. Social sorting is perhaps most strikingly apparent at international borders, where individuals are profiled on bases that are as much social as technical: not only passport validity but also perceived risks associated with the traveler’s name or ethnicity. For instance, after the 9/11 attacks, identifiable or imagined traits associated with “Arab” or “Muslim” identities were particularly salient for security agencies, which in turn applied greater scrutiny and discrimination to these citizens in spaces of mobility such as airports. Social sorting can also be future oriented. This is particularly visible in the growth of predictive policing, which uses aggregated geographic and crime data to shape patrol levels in anticipation of crime. Another example is insurance, which brings together risk profiling, observation, and the differential benefits derived from these. Insurance companies may use medical surveillance (e.g., medical screenings) to determine a person’s level of insurance protection.

Sociality

Risks and Benefits Classification is a human act for understanding the world; however, it is fundamentally ambiguous, and it enables as well as constrains rights. Surveillance is essential to the functioning of modern welfare programs, providing a means of identifying citizens’ eligibility to claim rights. However, surveillance systems that might generally be beneficial can reinforce societal differentials or create problematic classifications. Even when data collection meets basic principles (e.g., transparency, legitimate purpose, and proportionality), processes of analysis and interpretation might lead to potential bias or oversimplification. For instance, the use of algorithms may reflect and maintain unintentional prejudices and constructs (often referred to as data doubles). In its most extreme forms, social sorting is a fear-based classification system organizing groups along a perceived level of threat. One of the greatest perils of social sorting is that, due to new technologies that enable remote surveillance and screening, it is often an invisible or barely noticeable mechanism. It can reproduce inequalities or create new forms of discrimination, with a direct social consequence of raising suspicion among citizens and potentially generating conflicts among differentiated groups. This is known as marginalizing surveillance, which can be performed either by using the same surveillance system differently for each group or by using different surveillance systems for each.

Implications Social sorting is a function of surveillance systems that enable differentiation of outcomes and life chances based on existing data gathered through those systems. The data are not always objective, and they may be driven by prejudices, which end up being perpetuated by surveillance technologies. While surveillance is not always an unjust practice, social sorting often challenges equal citizenship and the equality of life chances. Liliana Arroyo Moliner and Philippe M. Frowd See also Dataveillance; Global Surveillance; Passenger Profiling; Profiling, Racial; Smart Borders; War on Terror

937

Further Readings Adey, P. “Secured and Sorted Mobilities: Examples From the Airport.” Surveillance & Society, v.1/4 (2003). Gandy, O. The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Gilliom, J. Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Haggerty, Kevin D. and Richard V. Ericson, eds. The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2006. Lyon, D. Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination. London, England: Routledge, 2003. Lyon, D. Identifying Citizens: ID Cards as Surveillance. Oxford, England: Polity Press, 2009. Monahan, T. “Editorial: Surveillance and Inequality.” Surveillance and Society, v.5/3 (2008).

Sociality Surveillance is typically conceived in public discourse as something that is imposed on individuals. Consider, for example, government-led monitoring of citizens or closed-circuit television cameras watching over a city center. Yet surveillance is also embedded in social relations. These include microlevel social interactions between family members, citizens, or coworkers. These relations can support conventional surveillance regimes, such as when citizens are encouraged to report their neighbors to the authorities. They can also undermine these regimes, such as when social ties between coworkers enable a culture of solidarity that resists workplace surveillance. As discussed in this entry, contemporary sociality is often performed through social media platforms, which further complicate the scope and consequences of surveillance.

Sociality as Social Interactions Long before social media or the panoptic guard tower, the practice of gathering and utilizing personal information was a determinate feature for social life in small villages. Not only did citizens possess intimate details about their peers, but this

938

Sociality

knowledge also informed conventional top-down monitoring practices, as Le Roy Ladurie highlights in his study of the Inquisition. Surveillant regimes depend on citizens, not just to tolerate intrusions into their personal lives but also to volunteer information about themselves or others. In other words, big brothers and little sisters can functionally coexist. Surveillance is part of everyday interactions, and macrolevel surveillance led by states or corporations determines and is in turn determined by microlevel interpersonal interactions. Indeed, Erving Goffman notes how relations between social actors are based on the careful management of the information they disclose, making a distinction between front stages where individuals perform roles (including official duties) and back stages where they manage these performances as well as conceal information that is deemed inappropriate to share elsewhere. This is both an architectural distinction (e.g., the theatre, the workspace, and the home can be mapped in these terms) as well as one that is embedded in social relations. Social relations between any permutations of social actors are governed by a desire to disclose some types of information, as well as to withhold discrediting forms of information. In other words, sociality at its core involves the evasion of unwanted scrutiny. Social actors as a general condition typically fail to live up to some social expectations, and therefore, they actively struggle to conceal stigmatizing personal information. These may include unflattering biographical details, a physical trait, or a social attribute. Because any social actor engages with multiple social contexts, it stands to reason that his or her standing in any or all the contexts could be compromised if discrediting information about the individual was made public. Preventing unwanted secrets from being exposed matters not only for an individual’s privacy rights but also for the individual’s reputation and integrity.

Sociality on Social Media Social media are platforms where individuals author information linked to a unique and consistent profile that is visible to other users. Along with mobile devices, they make up the pervasive

infrastructure in which contemporary sociality unfolds. Social networking platforms such as Facebook have originated in the context of university students’ social coordination and have since expanded to other contexts of routine information sharing, along with more exceptional moments such as presidential campaigns or the aftermath of a terrorist event. Social media sociality enables surveillance through the gradual accumulation of personal information. As membership to platforms is often a prerequisite to accessing platform content, users typically disclose as well as collect personal information. Watching and being watched are mutual— though not necessarily symmetrical—processes on social media. Sociality on social media also facilitates context collapse. Users turn to platforms such as Twitter and Instagram with specific purposes and intentions. Yet these platforms are marketed as being broadly applicable in any number of contexts. For example, in 2015, Facebook’s designers claimed that Facebook allows users “to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them” (Facebook, 2015). Social media use is delineated through wide-ranging terms. Sharing with friends now implies sharing with family, along with coworkers, marketers, and law enforcement. In design and in practice, contemporary sociality transcends any single context, which greatly facilitates surveillance practices and privacy violations. Leaking an opponent’s interpersonal comments into professional and public contexts is a common tactic in contemporary political campaigns. Such incidents are not the first time that a public figure’s personal remarks have been subject to public scrutiny. Yet the extent to which this information is provided, and the ease with which it can be retrieved, means that sociality bears consequences far beyond the context in which any conversation occurs. Social media is treated as a kind of public record. Individuals can only assert partial control over their social interactions and, as a consequence, their self-presentation. Consider negative opinions of a small business on reviewbased platforms like Yelp or peer comments on a photo posted on Instagram. The identities that social actors nurture through social platforms are

Society of Captives Thesis

collaborative endeavors, and these efforts are both supported and contested through routine sociality. Even if any single platform stagnates or declines in membership, the broader practice of socializing through social media is likely to be maintained for years to come. As users come to terms with surveillance and exposure, they may employ tactics to minimize harm and preserve their own reputations. Yet a focus on everyday sociality overlooks the potential consequences of a prolonged engagement on these platforms, notably in terms of the accumulation of digital traces and how they might be repurposed beyond acceptable contexts. The enactment of sociality on digital platforms matters for the sake of interpersonal well-being. It also matters for an individual’s standing in other contexts, as it has never been easier to repurpose everyday sociality toward assessing a job candidate’s “fit” with a corporate brand, or for screening his or her political or religious tendencies when crossing a border. Daniel Trottier See also Information Security; Social Media; Surveillance, Culture of

Further Readings Facebook. About (2015). https://www.facebook.com/ facebook/info/?tab=page_info Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1959. Goffman, Erving. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1963. Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel. Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1978. Marwick, Alice and Danah Boyd. “I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience.” New Media & Society, v.13/1 (2011). Schneider, Christopher and Daniel Trottier. “Social Media and the 2011 Vancouver Riot.” In Norman K. Denzin (ed.), 40th Anniversary of Studies in Symbolic Interaction. Bingley, England: Emerald Group, 2013. Steeves, Valerie and Owain Jones. “Surveillance, Children and Childhood.” Surveillance & Society, v.7/3–4 (2010). Trottier, Daniel. Social Media as Surveillance: Rethinking Visibility in a Converging World. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012.

Society

of

939

Captives Thesis

The society of captives thesis refers to how closed, total institutions such as prisons have been extended to entire societies with significant and widespread consequences, including excessive controls, dehumanization, removal of agency, stripping of common identities, and, most notably, reproduction of our captivity. Total institutions are generally closed, fixed, and significantly isolated externally and tend to develop their own subcultures or societies. The works of Erving Goffman and Gresham Sykes provide examples of asylums, the military, prisons, training academies, nursing homes, and other segregated facilities with their own rules, structures (formal and informal), and systems of values. Populated by captives, a society forms and crystallizes with a distinct formal hierarchy, with a distribution of formal statuses in conjunction with informally created and maintained status hierarchies. Total power is characteristic of these societies, so that the keepers and watchers are in complete control of these isolated institutions and the kept are deprived of liberties and other basic human needs, marginalized, and homogenized. While total institutions are powerful (formal powers allowing for full captivity) and regimented (activities are completely determined by the authorities), the removal of autonomy, individuality, and dignity are the ultimate harms felt disproportionately by inmates or captives. Basic human needs and their provision are determined by those in authority, and the loss of what it means to be human is prominent in the extreme types of society of captives. Adaptations by captives exist but are reflective of power differentials, with the result that submission to the powerful persons in authority and the select higher-status and powerful members among the captives is not absolute but is maintained and reproduced through a subculture of imprisonment. This subculture is just as harmful to its members, especially through reification or treating the members as objects, not as humans. Personi­ fication of abstract conceptions of deviance is imposed by authorities on inmates and inmates on one another with dehumanization as the main product. Deprivations are considered

940

Society of Captives Thesis

legitimate and necessary for conformity, selfcontrol, and passivity. Characterized as stifling, controlling, and manipula­ tive of their members, these total institutions strip the identities and individualized, group, or otherwise circumscribed conceptions of self that human beings inherently possess. The harms to individuals, groups, and populations are numerous and significant, ranging from labeling to stigmatization, to isolation, to banishment, to execution. Underpinning these societies with captive populations is the need for maintaining custody and control so as to manage the risks to society from dangerous populations, assist in garnering the efficiencies and organization required for achieving specific goals, and provide for unity and shared values and goals among members of the total institutions. Surveillance is common across these institutions and societies and is generally extensive and intensive, but it varies in terms of form, range, and scope (locationally and substantively). The bases of surveillance in these societies are culturally centered and essentialistic concepts of deviance, abnormality, and criminality that are applied to and adopted by the captives (internalization of their subordinate statuses) and lead to destructive behaviors. Fear, anxiety, and uncertainty are pervasive and feed conformity to the formal and informal norms and rules that maintain these societies. The normalization of violence and inhumaneness exhibited in these settings makes these institutions ultimately failures in rehabilitation and reintegration and perpetuates a cycle of imprisonment and significant harms to their captives and their external networks. Transforming these conditions is extremely difficult if not impossible, so that improvements become an exercise in futility for most captives. The scale and scope of the harms created and maintained by total institutions have become significantly larger and encompass the entire society. No longer isolated, the society of captives leads to the captivity of society with the systemic creation and maintenance of harms culturally, linguistically, symbolically, and materially. Noncaptive individuals and populations are involved and vested in the maintenance and reproduction of reified (objectified) notions of deviance, criminality, and abnormality and repressive views of reform

and humanity. With reification and repression being scaled up considerably, the presence of a complex of industries and networks in modern societies that manage risky populations and groups magnifies the constructed, accepted, and all-powerful conditions of captivity. Technological advancements and the waging of wars (e.g., on drugs, on crime, and on terror) through overreliance on incapacitation have seen exponential growth in wider nets and circuits of control. Total institutions are more widespread and are considered normal, necessary, and effective. Agency is largely absent, and the self is repressed and reduced to imposed labels and views that are narrow and parochial. We are all imprisoned when total or complete harms reduce us to labels and repress our ability to overcome these labels. Confinement is widespread and systemically manifested culturally and cognitively—“criminals” accept their confinement and deprivations; correctional professionals see risk management as critical for the protection of society; and regulators and overseers of these systems of control view the warehousing of criminals as necessary for society’s protection. Metaphorically, all of us are reduced to phony statuses and perform roles associated with these statuses that repress our ability to express our individuality and retain our autonomy in self-conceptions. Society has figuratively gone mad in that we fear one another, legitimate confinement and extensive surveillance, and reproduce our confinement. Materially, the cultural political economy sustaining the captivity of society can be changed when judgments of behaviors and dispositions leading to consequences are based on our common humanity. Reigniting our human social capital is the foundation for a new ethics minimizing harms. Spaces for reflection, mindfulness, compassion, and being human minimize stigmatization and marginalization. Sanjay Marwah See also Autonomy; Constructivism; Fear, Culture of; Goffman, Erving; Governmentality; Moral Panic; Prisons and Jails; Risk Society Thesis; Stigma

Further Readings Arrigo, Bruce. “Managing Risk and Marginalizing Identities: On the Society-of-Captives Thesis and the

Solitary Confinement Harm of Social Dis-Ease.” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, v.57/6 (2013). Arrigo, Bruce and Dragan Milovanovic, eds. Postmodernist and Post-Structuralist Theories of Crime. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. Arrigo, Bruce and Dragan Milovanovic. Revolution in Penology: Rethinking the Society of Captives. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010. Goffman, Erving. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961. Sykes, Gresham. Sociology of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958.

Solitary Confinement The use of solitary confinement has been a constant strategy of institutional corrections used to implement security and control throughout modern prison systems. This practice was characteristic of the operations of Eastern State Penitentiary, one of the earliest modern prisons in the United States. Eastern Pennsylvania Prison opened in 1821 near Philadelphia. The prison was constructed to incarcerate inmates in an isolated and solitary environment. The primary philosophy of this type of system was to provide inmates with the opportunity and environment to reflect on their crimes, seek penance for those acts, and develop a stronger sense of morality while placed under supervision of correctional staff. All daily activities, including work, if permitted by the administration, were conducted in the inmates’ cells, in (nearly) complete isolation. While serving sentences under the solitary nature of the Pennsylvania prison model, many inmates who were isolated suffered serious physical disabilities and psychological disorders. As a result, prison reformers and administrators began to realize that the use of solitary confinement was problematic. Eventually, the use of such extreme conditions of confinement was discontinued by Pennsylvania and other prison systems as a primary means of incarcerating offenders. This entry explores the use of solitary confinement in the context of security—the security of

941

the institution, of the individual incarcerated in solitary confinement, and of the society at large.

Institutional Practices: Security Versus Constitutional and Civil Rights Violations Prisoners are routinely placed under surveillance in secure housing units if they are viewed by correctional staff and administration to pose a security threat to the institution. These determinations may be based on whether the inmates are connected to gang activity, have exhibited violent conduct while incarcerated, and/or have committed other forms of institutional infractions. This punishment may act as a means to ensure the security of correctional staff, as well as other inmates serving sentences. Correctional institutions are required to secure the facility’s environment in order to keep administrators, staff, and inmates safe from harm. Segregation units may be viewed by corrections officials as the only alternative to incarcerating the most dangerous, unruly inmates while instilling the mission of the institution’s goals and requirements regarding safety. While living in solitary units, inmates experience isolated and sparse living conditions with very few privileges granted by the administration. Inmates who are housed in solitary confinement spend as much as 22 to 24 hours each day confined to their small cells. An inmate living in segregation is regularly under constant surveillance. All movement, from cells to showers, the yard, among other areas, occurs while shackled, with correctional officers acting as escorts. Most are not allowed to participate in any type of vocational, educational, or recreational programming. Even religious programs and ceremonies are required to be practiced in one’s cell. Contact visits are also denied to inmates placed in solitary confinement. Even phone calls are often denied, and mail going in and out of segregation units is strictly monitored and controlled utilizing regulations beyond those implemented for inmates serving time in prisons’ general population units. Physical abuse such as violent cell extractions, at times for minor offenses; physical torture; and verbal threats have been reported by inmates serving time in segregation units. Some criminologists, prisoners, and their advocates argue that conditions and methods of control implemented under

942

Sousveillance

the use of solitary confinement violate the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Such individuals maintain that the brutal and inhumane conditions of solitary confinement are a form of cruel and unusual punishment. Such conditions have been increasingly applied as a constant strategy with the advent of supermax prisons and shifts in philosophies from rehabilitation to incapacitation as means of preventing and combating crime. Supermax prisons are now marketed as a “get tough” strategy to combat crime, reduce violence, and appease the sentiments of the American public. These prisons are characterized as institutions implementing total incapacitation of those deemed too dangerous and incorrigible to be housed in less secure correctional facilities.

Individuals’ Societal Threats to Safety and Security Individuals incarnated in solitary confinement for prolonged periods of time are at risk of experiencing severe physical, psychological, and social consequences. Physical effects may include sensitivity to light, joint pain, and feeling lethargic, as well as furthering any preexisting medical conditions, while psychological effects may include paranoia, depression, anxiety, and, in the worst of cases, disorders as severe as psychosis. Not only do the practices of solitary confinement affect those who have served time under those conditions, but there also are unintended consequences that may put society at risk. The deprivation of human contact and social interactions during isolation may create deficiencies in a person’s socialization and communication skills. Anger and rage are common emotions in a person who has experienced long-term exposure to isolation. An overload of these emotions may be cause for volatile outbursts, enhanced criminal tendencies, and other negative behaviors that may affect one’s adjustment during the reentry process. These security risks posed to society by those who served time in solitary confinement may be greater than prior to their incarceration due to inadequate coping skills and cognitive deficiencies brought on by long periods of time spent in isolation. Lisa M. Carter See also Supermax Prisons

Further Readings Arrigo, Bruce A. and Jennifer Leslie Bullock. “The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know and Recommending What Should Change.” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, v.52/6 (2008). Gordon, Shira E. “Solitary Confinement, Public Safety, and Recidivism.” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, v.47/2 (2014). Haney, Craig. “Infamous Punishment: The Psychological Consequences of Isolation.” In E. J. Latessa and A. M. Holsinger (eds.), Correctional Contexts: Contemporary and Classical Readings (3rd ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury, 2006. Henningsen, Rodney J., et al. “Supermax Prisons: Pancea or Desperation?” In E. J. Latessa and A. M. Holsinger (eds.), Correctional Contexts: Contemporary and Classical Readings (4th ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. Shalev, Sharon. “Solitary Confinement and Supermax Prisons: A Human Rights and Ethical Analysis.” Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, v.11/2–3 (2011).

Sousveillance Sousveillance, from the French words sous (below) and veiller (watch), means “to watch from below.” Conceptually, it is positioned as a resistive force that challenges surveillance societies. A nuanced term sousveillance must be discussed both as a technology and as a social practice, and the various ways its conceptualization has changed as technologies and social practices have evolved. As sousveillance has moved from the avant-garde to the mainstream since the mid-1980s, it is helpful to reflect on the relationship between ubiquitous sousveillance and ubiquitous surveillance—a condition that our society is fast approaching—and to consider the implications for sousveillance’s contemporary resistive potential.

Origins The concept of sousveillance was developed by Steve Mann, a Canadian inventor and academic recognized for his pioneering research on wearable computing. Since the 1970s, in an attempt to

Sousveillance

create new ways of experiencing the perceptual world, Mann explored electronically mediated environments using a variety of sensors, transducers, and other body-worn devices controlled by a wearable computer. While supervised for his PhD at Massachusetts Institute of Technology by sociologist Gary T. Marx (who coined the term surveillance society in 1985), Mann developed what he called sousveillant technologies. He designed these to reflect or counter surveillance, to facilitate social practices oriented toward civic freedom, and to promote personal empowerment in humantechnology interactions. Examples of avant-garde sousveillant technologies include Mann’s WearComp, a voice-activated wearable multimedia computer; and WearCam, a wearable device equivalent to putting both a ­camera and a display inside the eye. Developed in an era before handheld computers and digital cameras were commonplace, Mann’s wearable cameras came in various guises. For instance, one involved a camera mounted on the front of an individual. This was connected to a large separate screen displaying what the camera viewed, mounted on the individual’s back or projected on the floor. This version was designed to be deliberately provocative, engaging frontline officials like security personnel in dialogue about the unstated rules of surveillance and who is allowed to be surveilled. Other examples of avant-garde sousveillant technologies include CyborgLogs, whereby an individual can use technology to effortlessly and unconsciously capture information that is automatically stored in a timestamped logfile. If placed on the Web, this can make recordings of serendipitous personal experience available to the world. In such cases, the individual becomes a cyborg, experiencing technological synergy without requiring conscious thought or effort. Indeed, from 1994 to 1996, while a student at Massachu­ setts Institute of Technology, Mann continuously transmitted every waking moment of his life’s experiences, in real time, to his website for others to experience, interact with, and respond to. His CyborgLogs were an early predecessor of blogs: Japan’s Joi Ito (who continuously sends pictures to his website from a portable phone) puts Mann’s CybergLog of February 1995 (titled wearcam.org as roving reporter) as the first example of moblogging (blogging with mobile phones).

943

Sousveillant technologies, then, allow the wearers to watch, record, and perhaps broadcast their surroundings. Mann coined the sociological construct of sousveillance to describe the effect a wearer of his device has on others—especially proponents of the surveillance society. Through his sousveillant inventions and subsequent experiments to gauge their effects on social norms, Mann has advanced various definitions of sousveillance.

Definitions Some of Mann’s definitions of souveillance stress its political and legal nature, whereas others stress its contribution to self-knowledge. Many of these definitions contrast sousveillance with surveillance. For instance, Mann sees surveillance as the capture of multimedia content by a higher entity that is not a peer of, or a party to, the activity being recorded. By contrast, he sees sousveillance as human-centered capture, processing, storage, recall, and transmission of sensory information. Across Mann’s writings, sousveillance comes in two main forms: (1) hierarchical and (2) personal. Hierarchical Sousveillance

The political or legal nature of sousveillance is expressed in the term hierarchical sousveillance. Hierarchical sousveillance is an activity undertaken by those who are generally the subject of surveillance and involves recording surveillance systems, proponents of surveillance, authority figures, and their actions. It involves sousveillant individuals using tools (e.g., wearable or portable cameras) to observe the organizational observer, enhancing the ability of people to access and collect data about their surveillance in order to neutralize it, and violating prohibitions stating that ordinary people should not use recording devices to record official acts. Mann sees hierarchical sousveillance as a form of detournement—the tactic of appropriating tools of social controllers and resituating these tools in a disorienting manner. Mann’s term for sousveillant detournement is reflectionism, referring to the philosophy and procedures of using technology to mirror and confront bureaucracies. It is a technique for taking a

944

Sousveillance

stance against the surveillance society, enabling the surveillee to surveil the surveiller, and helping redress the power imbalances that characterize surveillant societies. Mann’s examples of hierarchical sousveillance include taxi passengers videotaping the driver to document illegal driving habits, customers photographing unsafe fire exits in department stores and reporting to the fire marshal, and citizens videotaping police brutality and sending copies to the press. An early example of hierarchical sousveillance through consumer technologies is the video camcorder footage from George Holliday, serendipitously recorded from his balcony on March 3, 1991. The footage, some of this later televised, showed Rodney King, a black man, being repeatedly beaten by four Los Angeles Police Department officers. On going to trial, these officers’ subsequent acquittal in the face of such video evidence is considered to have triggered the 1992 Los Angeles race riots. Personal Sousveillance

Mann’s discussion of sousveillance also includes what he terms personal sousveillance. This typically involves community-based recordings from first-person perspectives without necessarily involving a political or legal agenda. It involves bringing surveillant cameras down from their architectural mountings (typically, lamp posts and ceilings) to eye level for human-centered recording of personal experience. Contrasting sousveillance with Jeremy Bentham’s surveillant panopticon (a building designed to regulate people’s behavior by isolating individuals from one another while making them visible to authority figures), Mann’s personal sousveillance tends to bring individuals together—as when personal electronic diaries are made public on the Web. Mann sees the social and humanistic value of personal sousveillance as allowing people to become creators of their own data with control over the recorded moment, thereby achieving greater insight into their own personal epistemology rather than being mere subjects of surveillance, or suspects under scrutiny.

Mainstreaming While Mann’s sousveillant technologies were experimental, the rise of mobile communications

technologies and social networking sites in the 21st century has arguably mainstreamed sousveillance. For instance, in March 2006, Samsung released a camera phone in Korea that had sharing built into its logic, incorporating quick functions such as multimedia messaging service, Bluetooth, and uploading to a blog almost instantly (compared with a digital camera that would need to be taken to an often-stationary computer and then uploaded). The promised coming era of wearable media may make sousveillance not just mainstream but ubiquitous. By 2015, a range of wearable cameras were on the market, although uptake was limited to niche audiences and early adopters. For instance, Narrative Clip, a tiny always-on, wearable camera takes photos twice a minute from the point of view of wherever the camera is clipped to, automatically geolocationally tagging these and uploading them to the cloud, to be accessed via an app on the wearer’s smartphone. Multifunctional smart glasses like Google Glass take photos and video when instructed to do so by the wearer; these are also readily sharable within the wider Google media ecology. Thus, Mann’s focus on the science and technology (if not art, or related philosophical and techno-social issues) of capturing, storing, and transmitting personal experiences has been capitalized on by commercial organizations, making sousveillance both effortless and popular. Such mainstreaming is welcomed by Mann who suggests that the purest form of sousveillance involves not just carrying around handheld cameras but should also include elements of incidentalist imaging. He gives examples of mobile phones containing cameras and suggests that this backgrounding of technology by another socially justifiable function is essential for sousveillance to take root in most societies. With the spread of digital cameras and the mass take-up of social media globally across the first two decades of the 21st century, personal sousveillance is rife, involving people creating, curating, and sharing all manner of personal content, thereby revealing their lives, thoughts, and feelings. Hierarchical sousveillance, while less common, has also benefited from mainstreaming of sousveillant technologies. A prominent example is when U.S. Military Police at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq took multiple

Sousveillance

photos on their personal digital cameras of their involvement in prisoner torture in 2003; these photos were shared within their in-crowd and later leaked to the press. Some of the sousveillers later said that they took the photos to provide evidence of the torture to facilitate whistle-blowing. Donald Rumsfeld, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, was reportedly taken aback by the ready availability of digital cameras in U.S. prisons. Publication of some of these photos in 2004, led to the exposure and unraveling of the George W. Bush administration’s secret torture-intelligence program. Many other examples of seemingly serendipitous sousveillant recordings have since led to exposure of official misdeeds and corruption. These include citizen footage of British police brutality at the 2009 G20 protests in London that led to the death of homeless bystander Ian Tomlinson. The footage surfaced after a Guardian journalist called on those present at the protest to send him their own recordings.

Beyond the Visual Metaphor In its original formulation, sousveillance, as a metaphor, is highly visually oriented. However, retaining its key principles of human-centered capture, processing, storage, recall, and transmission of sensory information, and peer participation in the activity being recorded, it has since been applied to nonvisual contexts, including audio or written eyewitness accounts. In such contexts, hierarchical sousveillance could include ordinary people choosing to host on their own personal website incriminating documents leaked by whistle-blowers, but it would not include the activity of WikiLeaks, as WikiLeaks’ choice of what to host is taken by its staff rather than by the lay individual. In a similar vein, personal sousveillance could include a blog where one’s own testimonial, eyewitnessing of one’s lifeworld, presents a record of personal experience, but it would not extend to user-generated content hosted by an online news outlet, as the choice of what to present and how it is framed is determined by the media organization. Also extending the concept of sousveillance to the coming era of wearable media, as sensors start to become ubiquitous in body-worn technologies, Mann’s more recent work discusses “watching”

945

more metaphorically, using the term sensing. Wearable media can sense all sorts of bodily processes. For instance, by 2015, networked wrist watches or activity bands equipped with biosensors (e.g., Garmin’s Vivofit) delivered real-time heart rate data and also measured the wearer’s number of steps taken, distance covered, and calories burned. Chronic respiratory disease sensors, such as Propeller Health, keep track of the wearers’ medication use for them, with a record of the time and place that they have used their inhaler. Across a wide range of wearables, cues perceived may include various physiological states, such as pulse, body temperature, heart rate, and respiration. This enables processing of behavioral and physical patterns and can enable better self-understanding.

Toward Ubiquitous Sousveillance and Surveillance In the early 2000s, Mann reflected on a future scenario of universal surveillance and universal sousveillance. He observed that such a scenario might, in the final analysis, only serve the ends of dominant power structures by fostering broad accessibility of monitoring and ubiquitous data collection. By the second decade of the 21st century, both sousveillance and surveillance have become ubiquitous in societies where digital communications are central to everyday life. While increased personal sousveillance achieved via social and wearable media may lead to greater self-knowledge, when this sousveillance is conducted through commercial telecommunications devices and channels, it can also lead to greater state surveillance. This was confirmed in 2013 by whistle-blower Edward Snowden, a U.S. government contractor who revealed that intelligence agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other liberal democracies engage in mass surveillance of their citizens’ digital communications, with (seemingly unwilling) complicity from the global telecommunications industry. While this has bleak implications for sousveillance’s capacity to resist the surveillance society, it highlights the importance of other types of “veillant” resistance identified by Mann. This includes counterveillance (measures taken to block both surveillance and sousveillance, e.g., going off grid) and univeillance (whereby surveillance is blocked

946

South Africa

but sousveillance enabled, e.g., when using end-toend encryption). If sousveillance is to recover its resistive potential, and resist reincorporation by surveillant telecommunications industries and state intelligence agencies, then sousveillant technologies must carefully adhere to all parts of Mann’s principles of sousveillance—ensuring that individuals (and not states or telecommunications corporations) retain control over all elements of data flow. This means control over not just the moment of data capture of sensory information but also its processing, storage, recall, and transmission. Only then might sousveillance retain its resistive potential. Vian Bakir See also Abu Ghraib; Google; Marx, Gary T.; National Security Agency Leaks; Panopticon, The; Surveillant Assemblage; Whistle-Blowers

Further Readings Bakir, Vian. Sousveillance, Media and Strategic Political Communication: Iraq, USA, UK. New York, NY: Continuum, 2010. Bakir, Vian. Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror: Agenda-Building Struggles. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2013. Bakir, Vian. “‘Veillant Panoptic Assemblage’: Mutual Watching and Resistance to Mass Surveillance After Snowden.” Media and Communication, v.3/3 (2015). Mann, Steve. “Cyborg Logs and Collective Stream of (De)consciousness Capture for Producing Attributionfree Informatic Content such as Cyborglogs.” First Monday, v.8/2 (2003). Mann, Steve. “Sousveillance and Cyberglogs: A 30-Year Empirical Voyage Through Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues.” Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, v.14/6 (2005). Mann, Steve. Veillance and Reciprocal Transparency: Surveillance Versus Sousveillance, AR Glass, Lifeglogging, and Wearable Computing. Paper presented at IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society conference, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, June 27–29, 2013. http://wearcam.org/ veillance/veillance.pdf (Accessed November 2015). Mann, Steve, et al. “Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments.” Surveillance & Society, v.1/3 (2003).

Mann, Steve, et al. Declaration of Veillance (Surveillance Is Half-Truth). Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Veillance Foundation, 2015.

South Africa Since South Africa’s founding in 1910 after the union of two British and two Afrikaner (Dutch settlers) colonies following the South African War, security and surveillance have been constant preoccupations for both the South African state and its citizens. Under apartheid—a form of enforced racial separation that began in 1948 with the election of the Afrikaner nationalist National Party— much of the state’s surveillance activity was geared toward suppressing African political mobilization. Following the country’s democratization in 1994, surveillance efforts have been primarily geared toward crime fighting instead. During both eras, however, the formal state security apparatus has existed side by side with extra-state security and surveillance providers like vigilante groups, community crime patrols, and private security companies.

Security and Surveillance Under Apartheid Under apartheid, the vast majority of the state’s security efforts were directed toward enforcing racial separation and suppressing political dissent. Apartheid was gradually enacted during the course of the late 1940s through the 1960s via a series of increasingly repressive laws that separated the population into four distinct racial groups (Europeans, Africans, Indians, and Colored [mixed race]), forced each group to live in racially defined areas to prevent racial mixing, and banned any political party promoting a communist ideology—a distinction that in practice included any party seeking an end to white rule. These laws were premised on the idea that the presence of Africans in urban areas was a temporary phenomenon, which meant that African urbanization was viewed by the state as a security threat in need of constant monitoring. For example, the acts establishing apartheid were combined with pass laws that required Africans to carry pass books showing that they could legally reside in

South Africa

urban areas. The pass laws enabled mass arrests of African people, a practice that was so common that by the 1960s the South African Police were recording 700,000 arrests for pass offenses every year. Given the sheer scale of arrests, virtually no black household in an urban area was untouched, often quite literally as police would conduct raids on homes in the early hours of the morning to catch pass violators unaware. As a result, the laws engendered massive resentment and frequent resistance among African people. These repressive laws and the resistance they produced enabled the expansion of the South African state’s security apparatus. Eventually it would become one of the biggest and most efficient security establishments on the African continent. Two arms of the government were primarily responsible for maintaining state security: (1) the armed forces and (2) the police. Broadly, the military was involved with external security, involving itself in places like Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, where there were ongoing civil wars involving pro-Communist and antiapartheid forces. The South African Police, by contrast, were primarily concerned with internal security. Despite being a highly developed security bureaucracy, the police often relied on informal mechanisms through which to monitor opponents of the regime and maintain order. This included clandestine intelligence-gathering techniques like the torture of regime opponents to collect information and the use of undercover askaris—African collaborators with the regime—to infiltrate antiapartheid organizations and spy on or assassinate political opponents. The complex relationship between formal organizational structures and informal security measures were reproduced by opponents of the regime. Because the state’s security bureaucracy was largely concerned with political repression, crime in nonwhite areas was generally ignored by the regime. One effect was that residents of nonwhite areas often established security systems outside of the state, including street committees and people’s courts. Although these informal security systems are sometimes described as being directed toward community reconciliation, they also engaged in violent punishments like public humiliation, beatings, and lynchings. The result was to create a parallel system of justice, security, and surveillance.

947

Security and Surveillance Since Democratization Since South Africa democratized in 1994, this dual system of security has persisted as the state’s security services have continued to exist alongside a robust extra-state security sector. The primary difference across the two eras is that the democratic state’s security apparatus is increasingly concerned with crime control than its apartheid predecessor, a focus made politically necessary by the high rates of crime that engulfed South Africa at its transition to democracy. One of the primary security trends since democratization has been the rapid growth of South Africa’s security sector in both its state and extrastate forms. The overall budget for the criminal justice system has grown massively since democratization, from R14 billion in 1995 to R71 billion by 2009. The financial growth was accompanied by similarly dramatic growth in the numbers of police officers in the country, going from 127,000 officers in 2002 to 183,000 in 2009. The increase in the size of the state’s security bureaucracies has been complemented by expansion in the size of the private security industry such that by 2009 there were more than 5,000 private security companies employing 300,000 security guards. This explosion in the size of the formal policing apparatus coincided with new ideas about how policing should be performed, which were largely brought in from the outside but transformed through the local history of apartheid policing. For example, the police adopted a crime prevention model of policing that relied on sophisticated crime mapping techniques, first pioneered in the United States, to drive police deployments. They also began to utilize community policing practices wherein they would rely on local residents to patrol their neighborhoods in cooperation with the police. In practice, however, because much crime takes place on weekends in poor areas near drinking establishments, these two techniques have led the police and community patrollers to concentrate on interdicting poor, young, and urban men in ways some observers argue is reminiscent of apartheid policing. Standing side by side with this expanded formal security apparatus has been a blossoming informal security sector, which also overwhelmingly targets

948

Sovereignty

poor, young, and urban men. On the more anodyne side, in city centers and suburbs, self-appointed car guards have taken to policing city streets for a nominal fee from car owners parked in their territory. More seriously, certain wealthy suburbs have privatized public roads by setting up security booms to prevent nonresidents from entering communities. In poorer neighborhoods, other informal measures are used to provide security, including street committees, neighborhood patrols, and vigilante violence. The effect of these trends seems to be that the copresence of state and extra-state security provisions has become a permanent feature of South African society. Nicholas Rush Smith See also Apartheid; Crime Mapping; Policing and Society

Further Readings Brogden, Mike and Clifford D. Shearing. Policing for a New South Africa. New York, NY: Routledge, 1993. Buur, Lars and Steffen Jensen. “Introduction: Vigilantism and the Policing of Everyday Life in South Africa.” African Studies, v.63/2 (2004). Samara, Tony Roshan. Cape Town After Apartheid: Crime and Governance in the Divided City. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. Steinberg, Jonny. “Crime Prevention Goes Abroad: Policy Transfer and Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa.” Theoretical Criminology, v.15/4 (2011).

Sovereignty In political theory, sovereignty is qualified as having ultimate authority over a domain. More specifically, the modern notion of sovereignty as it was born out of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) links together several constituting elements: Sovereignty can therefore be defined as having ultimate authority over a population, within a given territory, and having this authority recognized by other sovereign entities. This basic definition highlights the internal and external character of sovereignty, as the exercise of authority over a given domain must necessarily be coupled with the recognition of the validity of said authority by others; because of this double nature, sovereignty can work as a basic

principle for coexistence within a system of nationstates. Sovereignty is inextricably linked to the process of state-building, and it is in this light that the notion bears the most significance for surveillance and security.

State Building The process of the formation of nation-states in Europe was far from smooth and was fraught with failure. On the one hand, creating a sovereign state meant facing, and defeating, the opposition of other competing entities, such as free cities or principalities, that had been already exercising their authority over a more limited domain. This is what gave the political map of 16th-century Europe its highly fragmented character, with the area divided into 500 independent political units. On the other hand, resistance also came from the population that generally opposed military draft and the imposition of taxes, both activities that were central to the successful creation of strong states. Those that managed to counter successfully both forms of resistance did so due to a combination of extractive, coordinative, and repressive activities, with military force and taxation playing a key role in all three. While armies were instrumental in defending borders, quashing opposition, and extracting resources from riotous populations, their very existence encouraged the establishment of institutional configurations that worked effectively toward the stabilization of nascent states. Taken together, the need to maintain a regular army and the establishment of a formal system of taxation were central to the successful creation of strong states, and it was as a result of these efforts that by the 18th century nation-states had become the predominant political form in Europe. These states were characterized by four components: (1) territorial consolidation, (2) the monopoly over the means of coercion, (3) a degree of centralization, and (4) the internal differentiation of the means of government.

State Surveillance While each nation-state followed a different path to consolidation, by the 19th century, the differences in institutional configurations had for the

Sovereignty

most part disappeared, and as a result of this convergence, the same tasks came to be performed with comparable structures of government in different countries. Common to the tasks to be performed by these states was the establishment of formalized and centralized methods for the collection and processing of data. Such instruments evolved out of necessity—to increase administrative coordination between different agencies and departments, to enable and facilitate the provision of services, and to maintain efficient electoral lists—and became such an inherent part of the architecture of the state that Anthony Giddens argued that surveillance is a defining characteristic of modernity, inextricably connected to the rise of modern nation-states. In contrast to Giddens’s account, others have argued that in terms of data collection there is a stronger continuity between preindustrial and industrial societies than was previously acknowledged. Edward Higgs’s work on the rise of the information state in England showed how a shift from local to national data collection took place between 1500 and 2000, while historians have correctly pointed out that bureaucratic organizations and forms of state surveillance have long existed. The Roman Empire developed a complex system of bureaucracy to collect taxes and maintain lists of all the citizens fit for active military service, and another famous, often-cited, example is the Domesday Book, compiled in 1086 for William the Conqueror, with information on land property in England and Wales. However, there are substantial differences between these early cases and the kind of surveillance that modern nation-states engaged in, as this was a far more organized, formalized, centralized, and regular occurrence. Surveillance developed hand in hand with the expansion of state bureaucracy, as the gathering of information on citizens and properties was a necessary prerequisite for the provision of services on the part of the state itself. Crucially, this makes it possible to highlight the strong connections that exist between state surveillance and the welfare state; this also ties in with David Lyon’s claims on the ambiguous, Janus-faced nature of surveillance. While much scholarly and nonscholarly literature has focused on the negative impact that surveillance can have, particularly for the life opportunities of disadvantaged constituencies,

949

surveillance also has enabling features that come to light when considering how the collecting and processing of data on citizens is necessary to provide services such as health care, benefits, pensions, and education, among others, to see who is entitled to what, and to tailor provisions to the needs of different recipients.

State Security The inclusion of an increasingly wider array of functions that were once discharged by other institutions did not proceed smoothly, though. Rather, it has been instrumental in precipitating the relationship between the state and the wider society in a state of crisis, as the increased expectations of people made it harder to satisfy the growing demand for advanced provisions. Politically, these processes reverberated in the loss of centrality of the national scale, and the corresponding shift of powers, both downward and upward. The notion of glocalization has been introduced to describe this twofold process of downscaling and upscaling, triggered by the national scale no longer being the hegemonic scale of power. As for the former, downscaling is crystallized into the shift of powers and the devolution of authority from the nationstate to lower levels of government. Because of this transfer, state-level policies for the redistribution of wealth are substantially weakened, thus exposing vulnerable regions to tighter competition, both intra- and internationally. In the opposite direction, upscaling is exemplified by the shift of prerogatives from the state to international or supranational organizations; in this regard, the process of European integration is an interesting attempt at the dissolution of national sovereignties into a new supranational state. This redistribution of tasks and competences is evident in areas that were previously under the strict control of the state and that, today, are regulated by other institutions, either public or private. The restructuring of welfare state processes that ensued is marked by two distinctive features: (1) the increased reliance on practices for the governing of individuals from a distance and (2) the responsibilization of subjects who have to take on themselves those duties that were previously discharged by the state. The field of crime control is another case in point.

950

Spain

In his work, David Garland links what he believes has proven to be an unsustainable notion of sovereignty to the failure of the late modern state to guarantee adequate standards in the field of crime control. Among the key trends in the institutional answers elaborated to face this problem, Garland identifies the alienation of state responsibility, as mirrored in the creation of public–private partnerships with other relevant actors—whether groups of citizens, business associations, or economic firms. Essentially, what is attempted is the prevention and fight against crime through the redistribution of the task of crime control itself. For Garland, the end of the monopoly of the state on crime control—and consequently, on the provision of policing—leads to the realization that the sovereign state asserting its power within the nation was nothing more than a myth, albeit a very powerful one. This is directly related to the drive toward the dispersion and fragmentation of control identified by governmentality scholars, and the concurrent articulation of new types of relationships among the state, local authorities, the civil society, and the market. The loss of centrality of the nation-state has had an impact on scholarly work, too, with the abandonment of the nation-state as the default scale of analytical inquiry. Within criminology, this has resulted in more attention being paid to the role played by other parties in the field of crime control and to the networks that are established between state, nonstate, and nonpublic actors for the governance of security. Francesca Menichelli See also Crime Control; Garland, David

Further Readings Garland, David. The Culture of Control. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001. Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1990. Higgs, Edward. The Information State in England: The Central Collection of Information on Citizens Since 1500. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Lyon, David. The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1994.

Tilly, Charles, ed. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Spain Authoritarian surveillance and social control, as well as authoritarian rule, have been more the norm than the exception in modern Spain. In the 20th century, there were almost 35 years of military rule (General Primo de Rivera between 1923 and 1930 and Francisco Franco Bahamonde, El Generalísimo, between 1939 and 1975), a civil war (1936–1939), and several episodes of military upheaval. The recent history of Spain shows a stubborn continuity of surveillance, control, domination, and revanchism as a political strategy and social dynamic, as well as a continued interest in the classification of its citizens. Therefore, while the first few years of Franco’s military dictatorship can be identified as one of the most vicious periods in terms of control and surveillance, some of the social and political infrastructure that made it possible can be found in the political authoritarianism and religious bigotry of early modern Spain; the clientelistic structures organized around political, military, and religious power; and even the telltale social dynamics organized around the infamous Inquisition until the early 19th century. This entry reviews surveillance and social control in Spain from the 16th century to today.

Early Forms of Surveillance Early forms of surveillance linked to identification in Spain can be traced back to the 16th century. After the end of the eight-century-long Islamic “occupation,” King Felipe II resorted to the myth of a pure Christianity to exclude the descendants of Moors and Jews from positions of power in civil and religious institutions, through estatutos de limpieza de sange (blood purity certificates). This culminated with the expulsion of the Moriscos between 1609 and 1614 and the creation of the first identity documents—cédulas—which were given only to Christian descendants with at least four generations of “clean blood.” These documents

Spain

served as both identifiers and controllers of movement, much like contemporary passports. A document solely to establish identity within Spain, however, only emerged 200 years later, parallel with the development of the national police force (Policía General del Reino) in 1824 and the creation of a registry of citizens, which included data such as age, sex, status, and profession of the person. This identity card was not compulsory and provided little value in terms of identification, as it did not include a picture.

Surveillance and Security Under Franco In the immediate postwar years, Francoism had to consolidate its victory in a country where elections in early 1936 had given the majority to the progressive and revolutionary forces of the Popular Front. Even though more than half a million people were killed during the war, and approximately 400,000 Popular Front supporters were forced into exile, purging the country of communists, separatists, and freemasons was seen as the main task of the new regime. In a country where most of the population lived in rural areas and power was organized locally, this meant establishing local networks of power and control, structured around the institutions controlled by or aligned with the regime: the Church, the unelected city councils, the Falange, and the Guardia Civil (a military force with police duties). From as early as 1937, activities of “enemies of the homeland” were documented and catalogued. A Delegación Nacional de Asuntos Especiales was set up to “compile all documents related to the sects and their activities (. . .) in order to organize and classify them in an Archive that should allow us to know, expose and punish the enemies of the Homeland” (Archivo Histórico Nacional, Leg 1 Expte 20). These documents and the dossiers on individuals were used in the many special courts set up under the dictatorship, pursuing the objectives of the Causa General (the General Cause)— to process “all criminal activity committed in the national territory during the red domination,” as noted in a the Decree of April 26, 1940. This was also the period when the idea to develop a compulsory national identification document (Documento Nacional de Identidad), which several governments had been attempting since

951

the mid-19th century, was rescued as an attempt to create a “card of cards” that could be issued at the national level and include personal data such as fingerprints, “military situation, ability to drive, membership in associations of public interest, whether one was a civil servant and the like” (Marín Corbera, 2008). In a departure from state-centered understandings of the dynamics of social control, which tend to understand control as a phenomenon linked to some kind of (political or criminal) violation of the establishment, the relationship between the Catholic Church and Francoism meant that in Spain deviance was not only political, ideological, and criminal but also moral. Local priests, councilors, Falange members, and, later, members of the Guardia Civil were asked by the courts to send reports and answer queries for information on the activities of virtually everyone. In this daily surveillance, the everyday presence of Catholic liturgy, as well as the special role of the Church in a “National-Catholic” regime, meant that local priests, especially in rural areas, played an essential role. Oftentimes, they were the ones who issued the certificates of adherence to the national movement that were necessary for a myriad of daily tasks and were based on good behavior (e.g., following Catholic rituals and principles). Going to church, and having gone to church before 1939, was one of the best defense arguments one could have when faced with an investigation. Once consolidated, Francoism institutionalized repression, social control, and surveillance through the Court on Public Order (Tribunal de Orden Público, or TOP), which took charge of all the special courts and jurisdictions of the war and postwar period and the Socio-Political Brigade, which, together with the Guardia Civil, was responsible for political repression until the 1970s. Torture and illegal detention were the norm, as were wiretapping, tracking, postal interception, tailing, and surveillance, with or without legal authorization. To gather and store information on people’s political past, military, and social situation, and any secret affiliation they might have, the regime created the Delegación Nacional de Servicios Documentales (the National Delegation of Documentation Services) in 1944. In the 1960s, things began to change, and students and trade unionists replaced communists and

952

Spain

freemasons as the main public enemy. Inter­nati­onal developments, local social and economic processes, and a new generation of political actors linked to workplace struggles, neighborhood associations, and universities, as well as the birth of Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in 1968 as an armed opposition to the regime, gave rise to a new landscape, in which the TOP was to prosecute not only political activities but also social activism. Even the churches that, for so long, had been a daily reminder of the power of the regime, now started to become spaces that hosted clandestine meetings. In this new period, priests themselves became the object of surveillance (Barrachina Lisón, 2001). To suppress the emerging and illegal protests of workers, journalists, feminist, gays, and other groups, the police’s presence in the streets was increased and a special intelligence unit, the Servicio Central de Documentación, was created in 1972 to deal initially with the crisis in the universities, but later becoming the current National Intelligence Centre (Centro Nacional de Inteli­ gencia). The Servicio Central de Documentación became the first computerized registry of people and their activities, extending control, for the first time, to areas and activities not only strictly political but also related to workplace activism, student activism, and “religious and intellectual” deviance (Alcalde, 2008).

sections were redistributed in the new departments, and the institutions were expected to follow a process of self-democratization whereby they would align with the broader changes taking place at the heart of the social and political system. Spain’s entry into the European Union coincided with the first law regulating the police forces—in 1986, the Organic Law 2/86 on the Police and Security Forces (Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad) merged the Policía Nacional (a police corps of military character) and the Cuerpo Superior de Policía (a police corps of civilian character) to create the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía (a civilian police force). This was an important stepping-stone in Spain’s democratization process because it destroyed the military character of the police. However, the process of police democratization was still far from complete, as the Guardia Civil remained a military force and was granted custody of rural areas and border crossings. In this new period, the normalization of control and surveillance found a new argument: terrorism. The presence and activities of the ETA justified the creation of a double legal process—one for common criminal activities and another one for terrorism—which some see as the origin of Spanish “exceptionalism.”

Surveillance and Security After Franco

Two recent events have shaped the surveillance and security landscape in contemporary Spain: (1) the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which shifted security focus from internal to external activities and Islamic terrorism, and (2) the ETA’s declaration of a ceasefire and cessation of armed activity in 2011. These events have marked the end of Spanish exceptionalism and Spain’s convergence with the European Union and global security and surveillance trends, characterized by an increased demand for community safety at the local level and a resort to video surveillance in public areas, a larger role for private security forces in the provision of security, and a proliferation of surveillance-enabled security technologies in the form of smart-city solutions. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in the United States also led to an increased militancy and public order issues in Spain, which were met

When Franco died in 1975, Spain began a transition to democracy, which lasted 8 years, until the 1982 elections were won by the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español). Some of the reforms implemented during this period like the abolition of the TOP, the legal reform, and the reform of the police system started the process to normalize the state response to dissent and criminal activities. Moreover, the 1978 Constitution proclaimed Spain to be a nondenominational state. In Spain, the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy was the product of a series of pacts and negotiations, and the outcome was a break with the dictatorship in exchange for a “high degree of formal respect for the legality of Franco’s political system” (Maravall & Santamaria, 2008, p. 116). The police system and the judiciary were reformed, but the members of the abolished

Security and Surveillance Today

Special Operation Forces

with a new community safety law. This law, passed in 2014, limits the use of public spaces for political activities, increases the discretion of the police in conducting stop-and-search and dispersing public demonstrations and protest events, and allows private security services to assume tasks formerly limited to public bodies. As occurred elsewhere, the impact of the revelations by Edward Snowden regarding the surveillance activities of the National Security Agency in the United States in the public or political debate has been scarce in Spain. However, some trends can be observed, pointing to the emergence of a general debate on online privacy and the commercialization of data. While people’s expressed concerns continue to focus on unemployment, the financial crisis, and government corruption, Spain has seen remarkable instances of resistance to the proliferation of closed-circuit television in public, and a recent outcry over WhatsApp’s data breach allegedly led to 2 million people shifting to alternative instant messaging providers. Gemma Galdon Clavell See also Domestic Terrorist Groups; Fascism; National Security Agency Leaks; Social Control

Further Readings Alcalde, Juan J. Los Servicios Secretos en España [The secret services in Spain]. Madrid, Spain: E-books UCM, 2008. http://www.ucm.es/info/eurotheo/e_ books/jjalcalde/servicios_secretos/index.html (Accessed October 2017). Archivo Histórico Nacional. Sección Guerra Civil (Leg 1 Expte 20) [Civil War Section]. Salamanca, Spain: National Historical Archive. Barrachina Lisón, Carlos. El regreso a los cuarteles militares y cambio político en España (1976–1981) [Back to the barracks: the military and political change in Spain (1976–1981)]. Barcelona, Spain: UPF, 2001. http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/d0000195.htm (Accessed October 2017). Caballero, Javier and Daniel Izeddin. “60 años de Carné de Indentidad” [60 years of the identity card]. El Mundo Crónica, v.7/438 (2004). http://www.elmundo. es/cronica/2004/438/1078755910.html (Accessed October 2017). Casanova, Julián. “República y guerra civil” [The Republic and the Civil War]. In J. Fontana and R. Villares (eds.),

953

Historia de España [History of Spain]. Barcelona, Spain: Crítica-Marcial Pons, 2007. Galdon-Clavell, Gemma and Pablo Ouziel. “Spain’s Docu­mento Nacional de Identidad: An e-ID for the 21st Century With a Controversial Past.” In K. Boersma, et al. (eds.), The History of Surveillance in Europe and Beyond. London, England: Routledge, 2014. Maravall, José M., and Julián Santamaria. (1988). “El cambio político en España y las perspectivas de la democracia” [Political change and democratic prospects in Spain]. In G. O’Donnell, et al. (eds.), Transiciones desde un gobierno autoritario [Transitions from an authoritarian government]. Bueno