The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century 1138211877, 9781138211872

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea
3 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War
4 The road to revolution
5 Portsmouth: the first step towards Pearl Harbor
6 Björkö, the Schlieffen Plan, and offensive strategies
7 Conclusion
Sources and bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century

The Russo-Japanese War was in essence a colonial conflict between the expanding interests of Russia and Japan in East Asia. However, while appearing regional, the war itself in fact had a major global impact. The conflict and Japanese victory stimulated the Russian revolutionary movement in 1905 and hence the Russian Revolution of 1917. In addition, the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth created a tension between the United States and Japan that would establish the starting point for the road directly leading to Pearl Harbor in 1941. Eventually the war had a major impact on Germany, whose diplomats wanted to use the war to bind St Petersburg to Berlin, and whose military planners closely observed the events to prepare themselves for the next possible conflict. This book makes a strong argument for the consideration of initially minor events in the analysis of global history. By describing and analyzing the interrelationship between the events in East Asia and the major developments in Europe and the United States, it shows the significance of the Russo-Japanese War as a key factor in determining the most momentous historical events of the twentieth century: The First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War. Frank Jacob is Assistant Professor of World History at Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York, USA.

Routledge Studies in Modern History

https://www.routledge.com/history/series/MODHIST 23 War, Peace and International Order? The Legacies of The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 Edited by Maartje Abbenhuis, Christopher Ernest Barber and Annalise R. Higgins 24 Black Cosmopolitanism and Anticolonialism Pivotal Moments Babacar M’Baye 25 Constructing Nationalism in Iran From the Qajars to the Islamic Republic Meir Litvak 26 War and Diplomacy in East and West A Biography of Józef Retinger M. B. B. Biskupski 27 Museums in the Second World War Curators, Culture and Change Catherine Pearson and edited by Suzanne Keene 28 The Chronicle of a People’s War: The Military and Strategic History of the Cambodian Civil War, 1979–1991 Boraden Nhem 29 The Assyrian Genocide Cultural and Political Legacies Edited by Hannibal Travis 30 The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century Frank Jacob 31 Understanding the City through its Margins Pluridisciplinary Perspectives from Case Studies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East Edited by André Chappatte, Ulrike Freitag and Nora Lafi

The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century

Frank Jacob

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Frank Jacob The right of Frank Jacob to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-21187-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-45193-0 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Book Now Ltd, London

Contents

1

Introduction

1

2

The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea

15

3

Asia and the Russo-Japanese War

46

4

The road to revolution

74

5

Portsmouth: the first step towards Pearl Harbor

90

6

Björkö, the Schlieffen Plan, and offensive strategies

114

7

Conclusion

145

Sources and bibliography Index

149 166

1

Introduction

The Russo-Japanese War now gives us all an awareness that even war and peace in Europe (…) isn’t decided between the four walls of the European concert, but outside it, in the gigantic maelstrom of world and colonial politics. Rosa Luxemburg, May Day 19041

The Russo-Japanese War was a crucial event in world history, a major determinant of global developments in the twentieth century.2 It paved the way for the wars and revolutions which would determine the fate of billions of people. However, the war between Russia and Japan has been called many other things: “a war of expansion,”3 “the fight for East Asia,”4 and even “World War Zero.”5 It was, as John W. Steinberg stated, definitely “no simple short Imperial war,”6 but a military quarrel that was also impacted by global financial and political interests. While it marked, to quote Rotem Kowner, “the long-anticipated flashpoint of the enmity between two expanding powers,”7 the war’s impact was not limited to Japan and Russia.8 Although the Japanese and the Russian empires were greatly affected by the war in Manchuria, where most of the battles took place,9 East Asian countries, European countries, and the United States were also strongly impacted by the events of 1904–5, even though this impact would not become manifest immediately. At the time, the fate of the Japanese and Russian soldiers spurred international interest, making the war a public event, described and discussed in countless newspapers around the globe.10 The fact that Japan was able to slaughter the mighty “Russian bear” was transformed from a local event in East Asia to an impetus for change in world history. The first victory of an Asian power against a “modern” Western army was therefore welcomed, especially in the colonial setting of Asia and the Middle East. However, it was not only the suppressed who reflected on the events of the Manchurian battlefields and their political impact. Western audiences longed for the latest information about this biblical fight between the Japanese David and the Russian Goliath.11 A large number of stories by correspondents, eyewitness

2

Introduction

accounts, and general works on Russia and Japan were written and sold, while cartoons presented national stereotypes as war propaganda for both sides. One German entrepreneur even tried to use the “war boom” to increase his postcard sales.12 The flood of works on the Russo-Japanese War continued13 in the immediate years after the war, when official histories were published in several languages.14 The official publications from the various governments were complemented by the countless publications from observers of the war – nearly all the great powers had sent their military observers to the battlefields of Manchuria, since “the confrontation promised to be of special interest.”15 They were interested to see how the modernized Japanese army would perform against a “real enemy,” and the war also promised insights into the use of new tactics and weapons. The British military in particular hoped for a close examination of modernized warfare methods by sending a large number of observers to their Japanese ally in East Asia.16 One British officer noted that “an armed contest of state against state must be recognized by reason of its political, racial, or military results, as a real landmark in history, perhaps even a watershed the elevation of which forces into fresh directions the rivers and streams of international life,”17 a view shared by the military correspondent for The Times: No great campaign fought out within the memory of this generation offers such a vast and fruitful field for study by men of the British race as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. For the first time for nearly a hundred years we have seen an island Empire at grips with a first-rate continental Power. For the first time the new machinery with which science and modern invention have endowed the navies of the world has been put to the practical test of serious war. For the first time, almost in the history of the world, we have seen naval and military forces, directed by master hands, co-operating in close and cordial fashion to impose, by their united efforts, the national will upon the enemy.18 In Britain, the victorious Japanese had finally created an “absolute euphoria,”19 because the Japanese soldiers were beating the archenemy of British interests in Central Asia.20 Despite this large public and governmental interest in the Russo-Japanese War, the following decade would lead to another war that should overshadow everything else: the Great War.21 This “seminal catastrophe”22 overshadowed the events of the war in East Asia, a war which was conducted on the global periphery by “culturally different” powers and therefore did not remain a part of a collective memory in Europe.23 The war became distant, just a “small episode”24 in the course of global history, and this distance made it hard to remember. In Japan, the Russo-Japanese War remains an important factor in national history and many studies25 – even on very specific topics26 – related to

Introduction

3

the war are published on a regular basis. In contrast, monographs in Western languages remain rare.27 Some national perspectives, especially the German perspective, remain majorly understudied,28 a fact that has unfortunately not changed, even after the centennial which produced “a resurgence in RussoJapanese War studies.”29 Several international conferences have highlighted the importance of Russo-Japanese War for global history,30 and numerous publications have tried to underline the need for multinational approaches to the many still unsettled questions which surround the conflict.31 The RussoJapanese War was the first technological war of the twentieth century and therefore provided an insight into the changes this new method of warfare would entail. There were major battles and, as Sakurai Tadayoshi declared, “the siege of Port Arthur was one of the bloodiest contests that the world has known.”32 Its surrender “was an event that marked an epoch in the history of the world! Do not forget, however, that this result was achieved only through the shedding of rivers of blood [as] the bodies of our soldiers became hills and their blood rivulets.”33 These impressions of the Russo-Japanese War foreshadowed the major battles and trench warfare of the First World War.34 A look at the Japanese losses during the war highlights the increasing number of injuries and deaths:

Japanese losses: Killed in battle Died of wounds Wounded but recovered Total killed and wounded

47,387 11,500 161,925 220,81235

What politically resembled a classical Kabinettskrieg (Cabinet War), already provided an insight into the slaughter that would envelop Europe a decade later.36 Modern weapons reigned on the battlefields, which no longer provided heroic spaces for cavalry attacks with the arme blanche.37 Now, “smokeless powder, machine guns, indirectly laid field artillery”38 were beginning to determine victory or defeat. Sakurai describes this new deadly technology in cruel detail: After this battle we captured some machine-guns; this was the weapon we most dreaded. A large iron plate serves as a shield, through which aim is taken, and the trigger can be pulled while the gun moves upward, downward, to the left, or to the right. More than six hundred bullets are pushed out automatically in one minute, as if a long, continuous rod of balls was being thrown out of the gun. It can also be made to sprinkle its shot as roads are watered with a hose. It can cover a larger or smaller area, or fire at a greater or lesser distance as the gunner wills.

4

Introduction (…) They were wonderfully clever in the use of this machine. They would wait till our men came very near them (…) and just when we proposed to shout a triumphant “Banzai”, this dreadful machine would begin to sweep over us as if with the broom of destruction, the result being hills and mounds of dead.39

After such a scene, the Japanese would find soldiers whose bodies were studded by up to 70 bullets.40 Those who watched carefully already recognized that warfare would never be the same again. Battles had turned into whole campaigns, particularly the Battle of Mukden, where 600,000 combatants fought over a period of 18 days. Even if the supporters of war maintained their opinion of the justice and heroism of battle, the countless anonymous bodies that were the remains of the battle itself would prove them wrong. When Rotem Kowner states that “the study of the impact of wars seems more like an intellectual exercise”41 he wants to emphasize that most research on warfare deals with battles, tactics, and weapons, rather than the impact of a war. However, he also makes clear that the Russo-Japanese War with its manifold consequences is worth detailed study, because it changed not only Japanese and Asian, but Russian, French, British, American, and German history alike.42 These “global ramifications,”43 as Thomas G. Otte calls them, are of great interest and must be considered when determining the importance of the Russo-Japanese War. Historical studies have underlined the role of the war as a watershed in Japanese politics, even the “takeoff point” of Japanese imperialism, as Peter Duus framed it.44 For Japan the war would decide its future role in East Asia, while Russia was solely fighting for its image as a great power. The successful modernization of Japan during the previous few decades would now be crowned by foreign expansion. Having recovered national sovereignty in 1894, the Japanese Empire longed for respect as an equal great power and a buffer zone in Korea.45 Mary Wilgus identified the irony of Japan’s position in East Asia, saying: “It is significant of the world’s attitude to war that a little more than a year’s successful war has done for Japan what a quarter of a century of the success of peace has failed to do, – raised her to a recognized position among the powers of the world.”46 Japan won the war and established itself as a great power, one which was able to compete with Western powers on a military level. However, its soldiers still appeared strange or exotic, and “some of the strongest myths and images about Japan”47 were created and transported to European spectators during the 18 months of war in Manchuria. Although Japan won its war against China in 1894–95, none of the Western powers believed that the Japanese army and navy were able to beat Russia in a serious war.48 However, Japan not just only started (and later declared49) the war and showed great skill in planning the mobilization,50

Introduction

5

it also won battle after battle. These victories disproved the notion of Western superiority and stimulated the spread of the discussion of the “Yellow Peril” in Europe and North America.51 The German colonial advocate and writer Carl Peters (1856–1918)52 realized this: Whatever the result of the bloody dice in East Asia: something is already clear today. Namely that the white race has found at least one worthy enemy on earth. (…) The Japanese have shown that they are equal to the martial nations of the Indo-Aryan race in terms of bravery, discipline, and organization. With keen interest, the whole globe is watching this unexpected phenomenon. It is the same surprise which Europe might have experienced when the Prussia of Frederick the Great started to earn its rank among the strongest in the world.53 Amazement at Japanese success was not confined to the West. In Asia, the Japanese victories created “new forces in world history.”54 Indian nationalism was stimulated while Japan became a model of success in South East Asia.55 Whereas the nineteenth century had been determined by increasing political weakness in China, Japan’s advance to great power status and the consolidation of a Russian sphere of influence in East Asia56 after the RussoJapanese War let the Asian island nation arose as the “star of Asia.” The political, social, economic, and cultural impacts of the RussoJapanese War offer numerous features to enlighten our perspective on the consequences of such global events, even if they appeared to be peripheral at first glance.57 I have already examined the end of national historiographies,58 and the current study will reveal just far the Russo-Japanese War shaped not only East Asia but the world as a whole during the twentieth century. The war was not just a watershed for Japan, but also for Russia, whose Far Eastern policy switched to a Balkan-oriented one after the events in 1904–5.59 As well as upsetting global geostrategic balances, the Russo-Japanese War also exposed Russia’s military and political weaknesses. The war was not a surprise for the rest of the world – German newspapers had already sent their war correspondents to East Asia three weeks before it began60 – but the Russian population and government were surprised by the outbreak, even though Japan had broken off its diplomatic relations with the Czarist Empire.61 Ordinary Russians had no interest in a war so far from home, and the repeated news of defeats in East Asia stimulated revolutionary movements. In 1909, Wilkinson D. Bird easily explained the interrelationship between the Japanese successes and this Russian discord: The great northern power paid the usual penalty for unpreparedness, bad organisation, and unsound distribution of force. She lost the initiative, was obliged to conform to the operations of the enemy, and to push into the front line, as they arrived in the theatre of war,

6

Introduction a heterogenous collection of units, who were without cohesion. As always happens in such circumstances, councils were divides, plans hastily arranged, and as hastily abandoned, generals had no confidence in one another, nor in their men, and the troops, sharing this feeling, mistrusted their leaders.62

The Japanese also tried to foment these feelings of mistrust and disagreement within the Russian population, particularly with the minorities living inside the borders of the multi-ethnic Czarist autocracy. The Japanese military attaché Akashi Motojirǀ (1864–1919) was transferred from St. Petersburg to Stockholm at the beginning of the war and ordered to promote unrest within the Russian Empire.63 His actions are evidence of the interrelationship between the war and the revolution in Russia, already highlighting one aspect of the global impact of the war. The increasing imperial ambitions of the United States were also influenced by the outcome of the war years. American president Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919) now recognized the danger of Japan as one of the competitors for U.S. interests in the Far East.64 The Pacific Rim became a sphere of dualism for Japanese and American interests. The antagonism between the two increasingly expanding nation states became obvious after the Treaty of Portsmouth, which was not only a “turning point in JapaneseAmerican relations”65 but, as many have already argued, paved the way to Pearl Harbor.66 While the U.S. feared a new competitor in the colonial sphere of East Asia, Britain was cheering for the Japanese victories which ended the Russian menace in Asia: Russia for the last fifty years has been the terror of our statesmen and the nightmare of India. She has imposed upon us, as she has imposed upon Europe, by the menace of her weight. Her steady, stealthy advance across the wide continent of Asia has resembled the onward march of destiny, while the numbers of her population and the size and general inaccessibility of her territory to the blows of an enemy have impressed the imagination and dominated the intelligence of rulers and people of other lands.67 The Russian armies were no longer frightening and the Japanese naval victories, especially Tsushima, “the most important naval engagement since Trafalgar,”68 stimulated British self-confidence, particularly because these victories were achieved using battleships constructed in British dockyards. The outcome of the war also influenced the British discussion on the future of the battleship and provided First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher (1841–1920) with the necessary arguments to introduce his dreadnought battleships.69 In fact, it was the British position as a Japanese ally which made the war possible, since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 190270 had kept other powers from entering the war. In addition, the political possibility of

Introduction

7

a major war in Europe as a consequence of a local conflict on the periphery stimulated the political rapprochement between the British and French governments, whose representatives settled colonial disputes and completed the Entente Cordiale in April 1904.71 The European power that suffered most from these political shifts was Germany, because it now had to face not only the Franco-Russian alliance, which had existed since 1892, but also the threat of encirclement by France, Russia, and now Britain as a third power. The cauchemar des coalitions feared by Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898)72 had become a reality; therefore, the German government tried to drive a wedge into the Russo-French relationship during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite its impact on German political and military planning, the war never entered the German collective memory.73 However, Otte is correct when he says: “Under the blows of Mukden and Tsushima, the accepted norms of the old world order had begun to disintegrate as well. Europe had begun its descent on the road to Sarajevo.”74 This is clearly demonstrated by the German strategic plans after 1905. The Schlieffen Plan75 – yes, there was one – was a product of the Russo-Japanese War and therefore the battle in East Asia tremendously influenced German history until the outbreak of the First World War. This book will closely analyze the global impact of the Russo-Japanese War. To that end, I will first provide a survey of the war, as not everyone will be familiar with its battles and events. After describing the reasons for the outbreak, a survey of the major campaigns will be given. The individual stations of the war, from the surprise attack against the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and the first battle of the war at the Yalu river, to the major encounters of Liaoyang, Mukden, and Tsushima will be described. However, instead of proceeding strictly chronologically, I will first describe the land operations in detail, before focusing on the naval campaigns from February 1904 to May 1905. Chapter 3 will provide a discussion of the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Asia as a whole. Therefore, the impact of the war on the Japanese society, on the “neutral” observer of the war, China, as well as on Korea as a victim of the events in 1904 and 1905 will be analyzed in more detail. Eventually, the consequences of Japan’s victory for the Asian colonial world shall be discussed, while a special focus is put on India, where Indian nationalism and the people like Gandhi and Nehru, who would later lead the nationalist movement, were inspired by the defeat of a European power by a recently modernized Asian nation. The defeat also had a tremendous impact on Russia as well. In Chapter 4, I will focus on Akashi’s activities in Sweden to show the impact of the war on the Russian revolutionary movements. The interrelationship between the revolution of 1905 and the war will also be examined, from Bloody Sunday on 22 January 1905 to the October Manifesto of the same year. Russia was not the only country influenced by the war,

8

Introduction

but the revolutionary eruption in 1905 marks the Russo-Japanese War as the starting point for developments which not only led to the revolutions of 1917, but also to the division of the world during the Cold War. The war is thus a crucial event in Russian history that also determined the global history of the twentieth century. A similar interrelationship can be seen between the war and the United States. Roosevelt put himself forward as a broker for peace and the Japanese diplomats hoped for strong U.S. support, as expressed by the American newspapers. However, imperial ambitions and fears of a growing Japanese influence in the Pacific led to a peace that would keep Russia in the game in East Asia. Portsmouth was Japan’s only defeat of the war, and Roosevelt became the scapegoat for this. In addition to the Treaty of Portsmouth, immigration riots in the United States and a struggle for the “Open Door” in Manchuria cooled American-Japanese relations. Consequently, the Russo-Japanese War was the starting point that determined the course of this relationship until 1941. The major focus of this book will be the effects the war had on Germany. Like the other great powers, Germany also sent military and naval attachés to the Far East as observers.76 The politicians, led by Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow (1849–1929) and Emperor Wilhelm II (1888–1918), recognized the threat of German encirclement by the new Entente Cordiale and were eager to force Russia into an alliance with Germany. The Japanese victories also left vivid impressions on the military planners. While the general assault was discussed as a sign of male virtue and honor, the Russian weakness seemed clear and became an essential part of the Schlieffen Plan. Both the political and military implications of the Russo-Japanese War will be analyzed in detail, using mainly unpublished archival materials from the Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) in Berlin, the Military Archive (Militärarchiv) in Freiburg, and political documents and letters from the German Department for Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt).77 When the Great War broke out in 1914, the results of their earlier observation lured Germany to destruction. Russia might not have been as weak as they were in 1905, but the Deutsche Zeitung reminded their readers on 4 November 1914 of the possibility of victory against the Russian steamroller, stating: “more than ever the events of the Russo-Japanese War must be of interest for us, especially since both states have thrown down the gauntlet to us.”78 The Russo-Japanese War therefore had a tremendous impact on German history in the twentieth century as well. The present book will consequently provide a global evaluation of the impact of the Russo-Japanese War with foci on the region where it took place, i.e. East Asia, the colonial world, i.e. India, on the European enemy party of Czarist Russia, the mediator’s position of the United States and Theodore Roosevelt in particular and the neutral observers in Berlin, who would be politically and militarily tremendously influenced by an event on the global periphery.

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Notes 1 www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1904/05/01.htm (Last access, 27 June 2015). 2 Rotem Kowner, “Between a Colonial Clash and World War Zero: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in a Global Perspective,” in The Impact of the RussoJapanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 4. 3 Ian Nish, “The Russo-Japanese War: Planning, Performance and Peace-Making,” in Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg (1904/05), ed. Josef Kreiner (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2005), 12. 4 Klaus Hildebrand, “‘Eine neue Ära der Weltgeschichte’. Der historische Ort des Russisch-Japanischen Krieges 1904/05,” in Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg (1904/05), ed. Josef Kreiner (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2005), 28. 5 While the term “World War Zero” was favored by many historians (see: The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), Rotem Kowner did not agree on its use. For both positions, see: John W. Steinberg, “Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?” Russian Review 67:1 (2008), 2; Kowner, Colonial Clash, 4. The Japanese historian Kurobane Shigeru had pointed to the global impact and interrelations long before the Western discussion started: Kurobane Shigeru, Sekaishijǀ yori mitaru Nichi-Ro Sensǀ (The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective) (Tokyo: Shibundǀ, 1960). 6 Steinberg, World War Zero?, 3. 7 Kowner, Colonial Clash, 1. Similar thoughts were expressed in Rotem Kowner, “Becoming an Honorary Civilized Nation: Remaking Japan’s Military Image During the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905,” www.mconway.net/page1/page14/ files/Russo%20Japanese%20War.pdf (Last Access, 24 June 2015), 20. 8 Winston B. Thorson, “Pacific Northwest Opinion on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 35:4 (1944), 305. 9 While the war itself seems to be regionally limited, the long journey of the Second Pacific Squadron from the Baltic Sea to East Asia provides a global perspective for the military campaigns, see: Nish, Planning, Performance and Peace Making, 11. Due to the centennial the Japanese historian Yamamura Shin’ichi also tried to emphasize the global aspects again: Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Nichi-Ro Sensǀ no seiki: rensa shiten kara miru Nihon to sekai (The Century of the Russo-Japanese War: Interrelationships between Japan and the World) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005). The most recent, extensive, and valuable study in Japanese language is Wada Haruki, Nichi-Ro Sensǀ: Kigen to kaisen, 2 Vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009–2010). 10 Kowner, Colonial Clash, 2; Thorson, Pacific Northwest Opinion, 306. 11 David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “Rewriting the Russo-Japanese War: A Centenary Retrospective,” Russian Review 67:1 (2008), 82; Shimazu Naoko, “Patriotic and Despondent: Japanese Society at War, 1904–5,” Russian Review 67:1 (2008), 34. 12 Adolph Engel to Chief of the admiral staff of the navy, Vice-Admiral Büchsel, Berlin, 15 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777. See also: Shimazu, Patriotic and Despondent, 34; David Wolff, “Cultural and Social History on Total War’s Global Battlefield,” Russian Review 67:1 (2008), 73. 13 A British Officer, “The Literature of the Russo-Japanese War, I,” The American Historical Review 16:3 (1911), 508–528; James Martin Miller, Thrilling Stories of the Russo-Japanese War: A Vivid Panorama of Land and Naval Battles (Chicago: James Miller, 1904), Wilkinson D. Bird, Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (London: Hugh Rees, 1909) and Francࡣois Oscar de Negrier, Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War (London: Hugh Rees, 1906) are just a few examples.

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14 Istoricheskaia Komissiia pri Morskom General’nom Shtabe, Russko-iaponskaia voina 1904–1905 gg.: Deistviia flota, ed. A. F. Heiden et al., 19 vols. (Petrograd, 1907–18); Voenno-istoricheskaia komissiia po opisaniiu Russko-iaponskoi voiny, Russko-iaponskaia voina 1904 1905 gg., 9 vols. [in 16 books] (St. Petersburg, 1910–13). 15 J. Mackay Hitsman and Desmond Morton, “Canada’s First Military Attaché: Capt. H. C. Thacker in the Russo-Japanese War,” Military Affairs 34:3 (1970), 82. 16 Philip Towle, “British Observers of the Russo-Japanese War,” Aspects of the Russo-Japanese War, Suntory Center Discussion Paper No. IS/98/351 (July 1998), 19. The author further expressed the need for this insight from a British perspective: “If the British army could be held at bay by a group of amateur Boer farmers, then it was in serious trouble and had to improve dramatically before it could face a European enemy.” Ibid., 20. 17 A British Officer, Literature, 509. 18 Military Correspondent of The Times, The War in the Far East 1904–1905 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1905), 1. 19 Towle, British Observers, 19. 20 On the Great Game between Russia and Britain in that area see: Evgeny Sergeev, The Great Game, 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia (Baltimore, MD: John Kopkins University Press, 2013). 21 In Japan, the Russo-Japanese War remained the more important event and was memorized, especially in the 1930s as an event of national greatness. Miscellaneous documents relating to Japanese exhibitions: Vol. 1/23. Exhibition of 30th Anniversary of Russo-Japanese War Memorial at Yushukan of Yasukuni Jinja, January 27, 1935, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, B04012288800. Miscellaneous documents relating to Japanese exhibitions: Vol. 1/13. Exhibition of 30th Anniversary of Russo-Japanese War: sponsored by Yomiuri Shimbun, May 15, 1935, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, B04012287800. 22 George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875–1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3. 23 Kowner, Colonial Clash, 3; Jan Kusber, “Der russisch-japanische Krieg 1904–1905 in Publizistik und Historiographie: Anmerkungen zur Literatur über den ‘kleinen siegreichen Krieg’,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 42:2 (1994), 220. 24 Aaron J. Cohen, “Long Ago and Far Away: War Monuments, Public Relations, and the Memory of the Russo-Japanese War in Russia, 1907–14,” The Russian Review 69 (2010), 388. 25 Nichi-Ro Sensǀ to Higashi Ajia sekai (The Russo-Japanese War and the East Asian World), ed. Higashi Ajia Kindaishi Gakkai (The Academic Society for the Modern History of East Asia) (Tokyo: Yumani Shobǀ, 2008); Numata Takazǀ, Nichi-Ro rikusen shinshi (A New History of the Land Battles of the RussoJapanese War) (Tokyo: Fuyǀ Shobǀ, 2004); Tsuchiya Yoshifuru, Teikoku no tasogare, mikan no kokumin: Nichi-Ro Sensǀ, Daiichiji kakumei to roshia no shakai (The Twilight of the Empire, the Unfinished Nation: The Russo-Japanese War, the First Revolution and Russian Society) (Tokyo: Seibunsha, 2012); Yomiura Shinbun Shuzaihan, Kenshǀ Nichi-Ro Sensǀ (Analysis of the RussoJapanese War) (Tokyo: Chnjǀ Kǀron Shinsha, 2005). Despite these rather recent publications, which are just a few examples, there are also very good earlier studies. Shimomura Fujio, Nichi-Ro Sensǀ (The Russo-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Jinbutsu ƿraisha, 1966) is just one example. 26 Hǀga Shǀko, “Nichi-Ro Sensǀ imƝji no saiseisa: Josei zasshi wo chnjshin ni (The Image of the Russo-Japanese War: With a Focus on Womens’ Magazines),” Ochanomizu Joshi Daigaku Hikaku Nihongaku Kyǀiku Kenkynj SentƗ kenkynj nenpǀ 11 (2015), 143–147, Matsuo Masato, “Nichi-Ro Sensǀ to chiiki shakai:

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28

29 30

31

32 33 34

11

Kitatama-gun Murayama chiiki wo chnjshin ni (The Russo-Japanese War and the rural society: A study focused on the Murayama region in the province of Kitatama),” Chnjǀ Daigaku bungakubu kiyǀ 256 (2015), 1–38 and Muraoka Mina, “Nichi-Ro Sensǀ-ki no Amerika Yudayajin: Dabide ni tatoerareta Nihon (The American Jews during the Russo-Japanese War: Japan’s comparison with David),” Chiiki Kenkynj 14,2 (2014), 140–161 are just some recent examples. Shimazu Naoko, Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory, and the RussoJapanese War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) to name one of the best example. For a very good survey of the war Dennis and Peggy Warner, The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 (London/New York: Routledge, 2004) is still the best recommendation. For a shorter introduction, Geoffrey Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905 (Wellingborough: Osprey, 2002) is suitable as well. Kusber, Publizistik und Historiographie, 217. Matthew S. Seligmann, “Germany, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Road to the Great War,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 109–123 tried to outline the impact, a major monograph, however, was missing so far. Itǀ Masayuki, “Bnjrǀ gaikǀto Nichi-Ro Sensǀ ni kansuru ikkǀsatsu (A Consideration of Bülow’s Foreign Policy During the Russo-Japanese War),” Seiji Keizai Shigaku 569 (2014), 1–30 already analysed Bülow’s position and diplomatic considerations during the war, however this was also just a first attempt to highlight the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Germany. Steinberg, World War Zero?, 1. Douglas Howland, “Sovereignty and the Laws of War: International Consequences of Japan’s 1905 Victory over Russia,” Law and History Review 29:1 (2011), 53; Katǀ Yǀkǀ, “What Caused the Russo-Japanese War – Korea or Manchuria,” Social Science Japan Journal 10:1 (2007), 95–96. Nichi-Ro Sensǀ, ed. Yomiuri Shinbunsha Shuzaidan (Tokyo: Chnjǀkǀron shinsha, 2005); Nichi-Ro Sensǀ, ed. Gunjishi Gakkai, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Kinseisha, 2004–2005); Nakanishi Hiroshi and Naraoka Sǀchi, “Nihon ni okeru Nichiro Sensǀ Kenkynj no Dǀkǀ (Japanese Research Trends with Regard to the RussoJapanese War),” in Nichi-Ro Sensǀ Kenkynj no shin-shiten (New Research Perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War), ed. Nichi-Ro Sensǀ Kenkynjkai (Yokohama: Seibunsha, 2005), 408–428; Yokote Shinji, Nichi-Ro Sensǀshi: 20-seiki saishǀ no taikokukan sensǀ (The History of the Russo-Japanese War: The First War Between Great Powers in the Twentieth Century) (Tokyo: Chnjǀ Kǀron Shinsha, 2005). Several edited volumes in Western languages were also published due to the centennial: Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg (1904/05), ed. Josef Kreiner (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2005); Der Russisch-Japanische Krige 1904/05: Anbruch einer neuen Zeit? ed. Maik Hendrik Sprotte, Wolfgang Seifert, Heinz-Dietrich Löwe (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007); Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05 im Spiegel deutscher Bilderbogen/Yǀroppa kara mita Nichi-Ro sensǀ: Hangashinbun, ehagaki, nishikie, ed. Inaba Chiharu and Sven Saaler (Tokyo: Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien, 2005); The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero, 2 vols. ed. John W. Steinberg et al. (Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2005); Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5, 2 vols, ed. Rotem Kowner (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007). Sakurai Tadayoshi, Human Bullets. A Soldier’s Story of Port Arthur (Boston/New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1907), 41. Ibid., 37. Hitsman, First Military Attaché, 83 153. This is also true for injuries caused by artillery and bullets, see: Suzuki S., “Notes On Experiences During The RussoJapanese Naval War, 1904–5,” The British Medical Journal 2:2339 (1905), 1127–1128.

12

Introduction

35 “Japanese Losses In The War,” The British Medical Journal, 1:2371 (1906), 1360–1361. 36 Hildebrand, Ära der Weltgeschichte, 34. 37 Towle, British Observers, 25. 38 Hitsman, First Military Attaché, 82. 39 Sakurai, Human Bullets, 152–153. 40 Ibid., 153. 41 Kowner, Colonial Clash, 21. 42 Ibid., 5. 43 Thomas G. Otte, “The Fragmenting of the Old World Order: Britain, the Great Powers, and the War,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 91. 44 Bert Edström, Japan’s Fight for Great Power Status in the Meiji Period (Stockholm: Center for Pacific Asia Studies, 1989), 8–9; Akira Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great Power Status,” Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 5, The Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 768; Thomas G. Otte, Fragmenting, 91–108; Peter Duus, “If Japan had Lost the War,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 47–58; Peter Duus, “The Takeoff Point in Japanese Imperialism,” in Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History, ed. H. Wray and H. Convoy (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press 1983), 154. A similar evaluation like the one by Duus was achieved by Nakayama Jiichi, Nichi-Ro Sensǀ igo: Higashi Ajia o meguru teikokushugi no kokusai kankei (Beyond the RussoJapanese War: International Relations and Imperialism in East Asia), (Osaka: Sǀgensha, 1957). See also: Rotem Kowner, “The War as a Turning Point in Modern Japanese History,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 43. 45 Howland, Sovereignty, 54; Kowner, Honorary Civilized Nation, 19; George Alexander Lensen, “Japan and Tsarist Russia – the Changing Relationships, 1875–1917,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 10:3 (1962), 337. 46 David Wolff, “Cultural and Social History on Total War’s Global Battlefield,” Russian Review 67:1 (2008), 440. 47 Stewart Lone, “The Japanese Military during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–05: A Reconsideration of Command Politics and Public Images,” Aspects of the RussoJapanese War, Suntory Center Discussion Paper No. IS/98/351 (July 1998), 7. 48 Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, 1895–1904: The Observations of Sir Ernest Satow, ed. Geroge Alexander Lensen (Tokyo, 1966), 245. 49 In the Declaration of War on 10 February 1904, Japan underlined that it was forced to act in such a manner: “The guarantees for the future which We have failed to secure by peaceful negotiations We can only now seek by an appeal to arms. It is Our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of Our faithful subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the glory of Our Empire preserved.” Imperial Edict on Declaration of War Against Russia, National Archives of Japan, www. jacar.go.jp/english/nichiro/sensen_syousyo_05.htm (Last access, 20 June 2015). 50 Nish, Planning, Performance and Peace Making, 13; Frederick Treves, “Medical Aspects Of The Russo-Japanese War,” The British Medical Journal 1:2267 (1904), 1396. 51 Hildebrand, Ära der Weltgeschichte, 36. On the concept of the Yellow Peril see: Sepp Linhart, “Niedliche Japaner” oder Gelbe Gefahr?: Westliche Kriegspostkarten, 1900–1945 (Vienna: LIT, 2005); John Kuo Wei Tchen and Dylan Yeats, Yellow Peril! An Archive of Anti-Asian Fear (London/New York: Verso, 2014); Richard Austin Thompson, The Yellow Peril, 1890–1924 (New York: Arno Press, 1978); William F. Wu, The Yellow Peril: Chinese Americans in American fiction, 1850–1940 (Hamden: Archon Books, 1982).

Introduction

13

52 On Peters see: Arne Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 1856–1918: A Political Biography (Oxford/New York: Clarendon Press, 2004). 53 Carl Peters, “Der Ostasiatische Krieg und Europa,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3 (Munich/Berlin: C.H. Beck, 1944), 345–346. 54 T. R. Sareen, “India and the War,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 239. 55 Michael Laffan, “Tokyo as a Shared Mecca of Modernity: War Echoes in the Colonial Malay World,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 220–221. 56 Percy M. Roxby, “The Far Eastern Question in its Geographical Setting. II.—Outlines of the Historical Geography of the Far East from 1850 to the Russo-Japanese War (Continued),” The Geographical Teacher 10:4 (1920), 142. 57 Rosamund Bartlett, “Japonisme and Japanophobia: The Russo-Japanese War in Russian Cultural Consciousness,” Russian Review 67:1 (2008), 9. 58 Frank Jacob, “Global History – The End or Change of Traditional Historiography?” Middle Ground Journal 8 (2014), http://resources.css.edu/ academics/HIS/MiddleGround/articles/frankjacob.pdf (Last access, 20 June 2015). 59 Sung-Hwan Chang, “Russian Designs on the Far East,” in Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution, ed. Taras Hunczak (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 321. 60 State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, von Tirpitz, to Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy, Büchsel, Berlin, 18 January 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777. 61 Bartlett, Japonisme, 8; Nish, Planning, Performance and Peace Making, 13. The telegram instructing the delivery of official note to sever diplomatic relations February 5, 1904, From Foreign Minister Komura to Minister Kurino in Russia, official telegram No.54, Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichiro/komura_telegram_txt.htm (Last access, 20 June 2015). Theodore Roosevelt also did not understand, how the Russians could be so surprised by the Japanese attack. To Whitelaw Reid he wrote on February 11, 1904, “I cannot understand Russia having been caught so unprepared and supine after a course of four years or longer of aggression. 62 Bird, Lectures, 64. 63 Hildebrand, Ära der Weltgeschichte, 43. 64 Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle/London: University of Washington Press, 1966), 38–41. 65 Ibid., 3. 66 Steinberg, World War Zero?, 5–6; Togo Kazuhiko, “The Contemporary Implications of the Russo-Japanese War: A Japanese Perspective,” in The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies, ed. Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2008), 158. 67 Military Correspondent of The Times, The War, 2. 68 Kowner, Colonial Clash, 13. 69 Towle, British Observers, 24–25. 70 Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907 (London: Athlone Press, 1966). 71 Hildebrand, Ära der Weltgeschichte, 29, 40. 72 One of the best Bismarck biographies, also describing this essential fear of the Chancellor of the German Kaiserreich is Rainer F. Schmidt, Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898): Realpolitik und Revolution (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004). 73 Cord Eberspaecher, “The Road to Jutland? The War and the Imperial German Navy,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/ New York: Routledge, 2007), 290. 74 Otte, The Fragmenting, 105.

14

Introduction

75 The full discussion about the existence of this war plan will be outlined in Chapter 5. 76 On the role of military attachés during the war: Hitsman, First Military Attaché, 82. 77 Die Große Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, ed. Johannes Lepsius et al., 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922–1927), henceforth GP. As usual I will identify the specific documents by their No., while the documents could all be found in vol. 19.1 and 19.2 on the Russo-Japanese War. 78 Deutsche Zeitung 561, 4 November 1914, BArch R8034-II/8171.

2

The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea

Ian Nish perfectly identified the reason for the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War: “[it] had its origins in two weak countries – China and Korea.”1 It was nothing more than an “imperialist war par excellence,”2 as it were mainly expansionist aims that led to the clash between the two powers in East Asia. That the war would have such intense international consequences was far from apparent when the battle for the influence in Korea and Manchuria began.3 However, the long-term reasons for the war go far back in the history of the interrelationship between the two countries. Michael R. Auslin even went back as far as 1792 to identify the geopolitical and strategic roots of the growing conflict between Russia and Japan.4 At the end of the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire tried to establish trade relations with the Tokugawa shogunate for the first time. As a reaction to the ambitions of the Czarist government, Japan strengthened its rule over Hokkaido in 1802. This led to further Russian attempts to establish trade relations in 1804 and 1813–1821.5 In the second half of the nineteenth century, especially after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856) the Czars – primarily Nicholas II (1868–1918) after 1894 – changed their foreign policy goals, now engaging more than ever in the Far East.6 In 1853 Sakhalin was conquered by Russian troops, and Russian navigator and diplomat Efim Vasilevich Putiatin (1804–1883) reached the shores of Japan just a month after Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858). On 2 February 1855, the first treaty between the two countries was completed. Naturally it was an unequal treaty. Russian ambitions in Asia were also expressed via Nicholas Muravev’s (1809–1881) expansion in the Amur region. And in 1861 the Russians also attempted to annex Tsushima, an act that was barely stopped after British intervention, but which clearly expressed the threat to Japanese vital interests in the region.7 In 1875, Japan and Russia exchanged claims over Sakhalin, which became Russian, and the Kuril Islands, which were granted to the Japanese Empire. While an invasion of Korea was already being discussed by the Japanese government in 1873,8 no action was taken against their Asian neighbor until 1876, when the Treaty of Kanghwa opened the Hermit Kingdom for Japanese trade. Japan

16 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea had recognized and adopted the ways of Western imperialism very quickly and forced another Asian country to sign an unequal treaty. However, the Russian threat did not vanish. The late 1880s saw plans to construct the Trans-Siberian Railway discussed in Russia, and the beginning of the construction works in 1891 posed a direct menace to Japanese interests on the Asian mainland, as the connection would allow men and materials to be transferred to Asian Russia.9 In the meantime Japan underwent a speedy modernization process, and the Meiji Restoration10 also provided the needed resources for expansion. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, another “watershed in Asian and world history”11 proved Japan’s military supremacy over the Middle Kingdom of China. The Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 granted Japan the cession of Japan, the Liaodong Peninsula and a large indemnity from China. The acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula would have provided the Japanese with a stronghold on the Asian mainland, from which it could easily threaten the Chinese Empire in the future. Russia was not willing to let that happen and intervened, supported by France and Germany, in the Triple Intervention on 23 April 1895.12 Japan tried to retain possession of Port Arthur,13 but it had to concede to international pressure after internal debates concluded the Japanese military was unable to counter an alliance of several Western great powers. Japan was isolated and recognized this fact; however, the experience of the Triple Intervention marked the beginning of the future confrontation with Russia.14 The money the Japanese government received from China was invested in military armament, the costs of which increased from 49.2% of the national budget to 81.8% in 1904.15 Russia, in contrast, used the Triple Intervention and the defeat of the Middle Kingdom to strengthen its own influence in the region. Finance Minister Sergei Witte (1849–1915)16 surmised that supporting China against Japan would stimulate friendly ties between the Middle Kingdom and the Czarist Empire.17 Russia conveyed French loans to China, and the Russo-Chinese Bank was established to pay the indemnities to Japan. In exchange, the Trans-Siberian Railway was allowed to take a shortcut through Chinese territory in Manchuria. In 1896, China also signed a secret agreement with Russia against future Japanese aggression. In addition to the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) connected Harbin with Vladivostok, while the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) connected Harbin with Port Arthur. Czar Nicholas II was willing to establish a Far Eastern empire in Asia, which would cover the territory from the Dardanelles to Korea. When Germany started the scramble for China by taking Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong province and demanding special rights in that province, Russia joined these imperialist ambitions by leasing Port Arthur from the Chinese government in 1898. It thereby gained the fruits of victory it had stolen from Japan three years earlier. In addition, the Czarist Empire could use the harbor at Port Arthur, despite its strategic disadvantages, for further expansion in the region.18

The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea

17

A chance for such a venture was soon provided. The Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) forced the intervention of international troops, and Russia used this opportunity to conquer Manchuria from the North. While the Russian government was initially reluctant, it later seized the chance to extend its possessions in China by using the fight against the Boxer movement as an excuse. In the Treaty of Beijing on 8 April 1902, Russia agreed to withdraw its troops in three phases during the next 18 months. However, only the first phase was completed, when Mukden was evacuated on 8 October 1902, but occupied again the following year. The second phase, due in April 1903, and the third, due in October 1903, were never initiated. The Czarist government answered international protests by asserting that Russia considered its relations with China as bilateral and exclusive. The further fate of Manchuria would be solely discussed with Chinese representatives.19 The Russian Empire consequently isolated itself, while Japan had already taken diplomatic steps to avoid another international intervention against its future ambitions in East Asia: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 aimed to prevent international interference and make future war against Russia feasible.20 The British military, including men like Ian Hamilton (1853–1947), was well aware that the alliance with Japan could prove dangerous by pulling Britain into a war against Russia, which had been secured by the Franco-Russian Alliance since 1892.21 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was consequently signed at “a time of considerable unease.”22 But there were also men like Claude MacDonald (1852–1915), who had seen the expertise of Japanese soldiers during the Boxer Rebellion23 and were in favor of joint operations with a new ally. Regardless of the reactions in Britain, the Russo-Japanese War and Japan’s success in it “was made possible in part by Britain.”24 Japan’s battleships were built in Britain and the British also provided many of the loans that helped finance its campaigns. Despite Britain’s support, few had hopes for a Japanese victory when the war broke out in 1904, including the Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour (1848–1930).25 He was not alone in his estimation, as many people, including the Russian government, did not believe the Russian steamroller could lose a war, especially against a minor power like Japan.26 However, there were also voices that pointed to advances in the Japanese military, whose officers and soldiers were increasingly meeting Western standards.27 Hamilton compared the Japanese soldiers with the Gurkhas in the British Indian Army, but the Japanese were “better educated, more civilised.”28 The war would ultimately prove that the officers of the Japanese Imperial Army were better trained and educated than their Russian counterparts;29 however, before the war cultural arrogance as well as racist ignorance seemed to dominate the Western world. The British Foreign Office was in support of Japan during the war and tried to localize the conflict in East Asia, preventing the outbreak of a worldwide conflict between Russia and France on one side and Japan, Britain,

18 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea and the United States on the other.30 The Japanese government knew about these intentions, which is why Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Tarǀ (1848–1913) favored a rapprochement with London.31 The elder statesman (genrǀ) Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) was also supportive of this alliance, as it would secure the localization of a conflict between Russia and Japan in Manchuria.32 Former Prime Minister Itǀ Hirobumi (1841–1909), who favored a peaceful settlement with Russia, seemed to be a lone holdout.33 The clash seemed inevitable when the Japanese tried to negotiate with the Russian government, since Japan needed security in Korea, which had become more demanding than ever due to the increase of Czarist control in Manchuria, even if the military and the government in St. Petersburg were not in full agreement about plans for these north eastern parts of China.34 When Admiral Yevgeni Alekseev (1843–1917) was nominated as Viceroy of the Far East on 12 August 1903, the Czar “placed all authority for this empire’s military and diplomatic policy on the Pacific in the hands of his leading hard-liner.”35 Despite this aggressive signal, the Japanese tried to negotiate with the Russia again in 1903. But the Russian Czar and his government were unwilling to accept the Japanese as equal in these proceedings, delayed answers to requests and notes from Japan, and simply ignored the threat of a war; therefore, on 4 February 1904, the government in Tokyo formally decided to go to war with Russia.36 This decision was strengthened by a growing fear of Russian imperialism with regard to Korea, stimulated by a group of hardliners and adventurers, the Bezobrazovski. Since 1898, on the border of Korea, marked by the Yalu River, the group, led by the personal friend of the Czar, Alexander Bezobrazov (1855–1931)37 had been buying wood concessions for a territory of 5,000 square kilometers. Within five years Bezobrazov started to harvest the wood. He also wanted to build a railway to Seoul. These actions took place simultaneous to the increasing antagonism between Japan and Russia, and this local dispute on the northern border of Korea stimulated the growing war party in Japan.38 In December 1903, a military report by the German delegation to China reported on the Russian bridgehead in Korea, stating that the “Russians are said to be expanding their leased territory with new purchases of land while acting rather aggressively. They act on the left bank of the Yalu as if they are rulers.”39 While Witte and Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorf (1845–1907) tried to prevent hostilities in Korea, the Czar supported Bezobrazov and his ambitious plans. This lasted until March 1903, when the two ministers were able to persuade Nicholas II to remove the adventurer from the Korean border. But the damage was irreversible.40 Korea had refused the Russian requests for territory, but the “Russians took law into their own hands and crossed the border and began erecting buildings, fortresses, barracks and military facilities, including telegraph lines,”41 actions that threatened Japan directly. However, the Czar and Alekseev were unable or unwilling to acknowledge the damage; they did not even try to use the negotiations with Japan

The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea

19

to appease the increasing hostilities. The Japanese idea of an exchange of spheres of influence in Korea and Manchuria (Man-Kan kǀkan), proposed numerous times since 1896, was not even considered.42 While Korea was seen as a possible entrance to warmer waters for the Russians, the Japanese considered the Korean Peninsula their exclusive sphere of influence, one which would provide geostrategic security, economic growth in terms of future exports, and space for emigrants heading to the Asian mainland.43 The Russians entirely ignored the exchange proposal in 1901, when Itǀ negotiated in St. Petersburg, and remained stubborn until the outbreak of the war in 1904.44 The situation in Manchuria provoked the United States, who favored an Open Door policy in the region. Therefore Japan could be sure the U.S. would at least not interfere in any war against Russia. The German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Friedrich Johann von Alvensleben (1836–1913), had already been informed by the Japanese military attaché in December that Japan would have to manage troop transports to Korea to counter the Russian army on the continent,45 but the Czar and viceroy Alekseev did not recognize the threat, even though the Japanese cabinet had unofficially decided a resolution to the Korean question would be sufficient to prevent Japan going to war.46 If Russia was unwilling to agree on this issue, Japan would go to war soon, especially since spring was considered the best time for a campaign.47 The German military attaché in Tokyo, Günther von Etzel (1862–1948), also reported in November 1903 that time was running out and that the Japanese military were growing nervous: “The mood is understandable, as the Japanese Officer Corps knows that the balance of military power might shift to Japan’s disadvantage if negotiations last too long. Russia has greatly increased her military standing during the eight months of the crisis.”48 On 6 February 1904, Japan finally broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and its ambassador had to leave St. Petersburg. On the same day, Admiral Tǀgǀ Heihachirǀ (1848–1934) left Sasebo with his fleet to start a war that seemed inevitable for Japan. The Japanese attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur was a shock for the government and public in Russia and a blow to the morale of the soldiers and sailors of the Czarist Imperial military and naval services. It was the beginning of a war in which “Russian dreams of an Asian destiny had metamorphosed into a nightmare of military defeat and revolution.”49 It was clear from the beginning that the war would entail joint operations on land and sea, especially since Japan had to transport her troops and supplies from Japan to the battlefields on the mainland. Military strategists from the East Asian countries focused on the idea of a preventive attack, which would provide an advantage for the initial phase of the war.50 The attack on Port Arthur was internationally seen as “a matter of tactical smartness,”51 especially since the Russians were so reluctant to accept Japanese proposals for a peaceful solution and not willing to reconsider the Open Door in

20 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea Manchuria. The outbreak of the war created patriotic support and waves of nationalism in both countries, where pro-war lobbies encouraged the common people toward positive feelings for a glorious war.52 Sakurai Tadayoshi explains the feelings of the common soldiers at the moment of mobilization: “At this moment we, the soldiers of Japan, all felt our bones crackle and our blood boil up, ready to give vent to a long-stored energy. (…) How eagerly we watched for that single word, for that order of mobilization, as droughtsuffering farmers watch for a rain-cloud in the sky!”53 Although the Japanese had acted against existing international law by using a surprise attack to open hostilities and disregarding Korean neutrality, it was ignored by the international community, especially since Britain and the United States were highly in favor of the Japanese underdog.54 Japanese intellectuals declared these actions reasonable, because Russia had refused to follow international law by withdrawing troops from Manchuria and thereby not acknowledging the Open Door in the region, which had been agreed on by the global community led by the U.S. and Britain.55 This view was ultimately accepted by the major powers, which officially legitimized Japanese actions.56 Critical comments, as expressed by the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten in Bavaria (Germany), were unpersuasive: “In starting the war, Japan regarded herself as forced to use a lot of illegal acts. But the blame for the outbreak of the war is hers alone, and especially as a consequence of these acts, Russia must not lay down her weapons until Japan has atoned for her – in our view – outrageous acts.”57 No matter which view was more persuasive for the spectators, the weeks after the surprise attack remained rather quiet. Günther von Etzel reported on the Japanese mobilization and further war preparations in mid-March 1904: The mobilization and transport by train and sea make their uninterrupted but strikingly slow progress (…) Perhaps the Japanese still do not believe they possess the absolute domination of the sea; in addition the ice conditions on the coast of Manchuria do not yet allow landing operations at the points selected for these operations; finally, large amounts of supplies and munitions must be brought to the mainland before the troops can be transferred. At the same time the German attaché added: The Japanese look forward to the events with an external calm and the strong belief in the supremacy of their weapons on land. They definitely know the current situation of the Russian side and seem to be certain of irredeemable failures by the Russians. (…) The Japanese will benefit from a large advantage over the Russians, namely the impeccable organization of their supply lines. Everything is clearly perfectly prepared.58

The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea

21

China had meanwhile declared its neutrality,59 and later resisted the Japanese attempt to use Amoy as a naval base against the Russians, which Japan needed to secure naval domination before establishing a secure supply line via sea.60 Despite Chinese neutrality – obviously excluding Manchuria where the land battles took place – the Chinese population was heavily involved in the war, since Japan and Russia were using Chinese people as spies in the war theater.61 The war itself combined land and sea battles and therefore created several problems for the two warring nations. However, Russia’s political and military leaders seemed to ignore the importance of the conflict and underestimate the amount of preparation needed, leading to claims of arrogance.62 General Alexei Kuropatkin (1848–1925), who had opposed the Bezobrazov party before the war, took over command in Manchuria, but wanted to use a rather defensive strategy against the Japanese, while Alekseev wanted to protect Port Arthur while remaining defensive at sea.63 However, Kuropatkin had remembered that the Russian army would need 5–7 months to reach its full strength on the East Asian battlefield, since the Trans-Siberian Railway could only provide one track for transports, and the troops still had to cross Lake Baikal on foot.64 A Russian admiral later expressed the same concerns to naval attaché Paul von Hintze (1864–1941): Think of the problems of an army in Manchuria that has to feed more than 300,000 men using a single track railway. Calculating one wagon per 1,000 men per day for food supplies, you will need 300 wagons or ten trains per day. And that does not include fodder for the horses, munitions or other requirements.65 As a result, the Russian army had to interrupt the troop transports to send supplies to the Far East.66 Flour had to be bought in European Russia, while cattle were procured in Mongolia.67 The number of Russian troops grew week by week, thus supplies continued to be a severe problem during the war. However, the provision of food was not the only problem for the Russian army. Its military leaders often lacked sufficient information about their enemy or the battlefield geography. The Russian press also published secret information, which was used by the Japanese general staff to plan further campaigns.68 In contrast, the Japanese army was eager to keep international correspondents and military observers as uninformed as possible. Those who were transported to Manchuria in June 1904 were instructed to keep military information secret69 and “everyone on the journey was allowed to send a maximum of ten telegrams per day. Each telegram could have no more than 100 Japanese characters or 50 words if written in a European language.”70 And those who were allowed to participate had to follow more rules and restrictions:

22 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea It must be ensured that Japanese military secrets are not communicated in private letters to a third party. Messages to newspapers, journals, and institutions which are open to visits from the wider public must go through the censorship of the accompanying officers. Anyone taking photographic devices with them is advised that taking photographs might be prohibited in specific cases.71 The German naval attaché in Japan, Konrad Trummler, used a secret informant to get information about the mobilization of the Japanese cruisers in early 1905, since he was no longer provided with official news.72 In August 1904, he complained: “The news is now more scarce and incomplete than ever. The Japanese do not want to communicate anything about the events at Port Arthur before the fortress has surrendered. One cannot deny that many heavy fights have taken place on land and sea and that those proceeded to be very bloody.”73 The Russians also developed better secret activities during the war,74 and transformed their military intelligence so that “a level of professionalism had emerged that sought to address the challenge of the war.”75 However, the Russian army initially had just eleven men who could translate Japanese and only two were able to read handwritten messages.76 These differences with regard to the training and preparation of both armies should become obvious very fast during the war. In the following section I will therefore at first provide a survey of the principal battles of the war on land and sea, separated into army and navy campaigns.

The war on land In the first land battle, the army of General Kuroki Tamemoto (1844– 1923), numbering 42,000 men, met around 19,000 Russians at the Yalu river.77 This battle ended in shocking defeat for the Russian army and it was immediately clear that the Japanese army was unlike any enemy faced by a Western great power in past colonial campaigns.78 The Russian commander, Mikhail Zasulich (1843–1910), was tasked with preventing the Japanese from crossing the river for as long as possible, to later withdraw to Liaoyang. However, the Imperial Japanese Army crossed the river in just one night, and on 1 May 1904 attacked the Russian troops in a largescale attack. More than “120 Japanese guns fired at the same time (…). The few Russian guns tried to return fire, but were immediately silenced.”79 The Japanese suffered casualties in driving the Russians back from their positions, but the success in crossing the river, outgunning the Russian artillery, and moving forward so quickly immediately dispelled the image of Russian superiority. Coordination within the Czarist army was so bad that friendly fire caused around hundred casualties. The Japanese troops were better trained and equipped than their enemy, but it was clear to observers that this battle also ushered in a new era of warfare, as the amount of

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munition fired exceeded every expectation.80 The Russians’ casualties numbered more than 2,000, while the Japanese lost almost 900 men. This would foreshadow the heavy losses of the forthcoming campaigns.81 The war was a modern one, overturning the tactics and heroic images of the past. The Battle of the Yalu had already shown that the classical use of cavalry in a direct attack was outdated. Instead, horses were used to move the more important artillery, to gather information, to secure strategic positions, or to pursue the enemy after a successful battle.82 Beyond this, there was nothing impressive to report,83 even though supporters of the fight on horseback described the success of the Japanese war horses.84 The Japanese used a 6.5 mm cartridge for their Meiji rifle which caused smaller wounds. While this was described as “visible evidence for the humanity of this rather terrible bullet,”85 because minor injuries seemed to heal faster than before, this overlooked the greater internal damage caused by smaller bullets, which hit with a larger amount of kinetic energy, enough to destroy whole organs. At the end of May, General Oku Yasukata (1847–1930) led the Japanese army against Nanshan and continued the Japanese northern advance. The Imperial army then took the port of Dalny and thereby severed any direct connection between the northern Russian troops and Port Arthur.86 Kuropatkin, however, was not willing to attack to help the defenders of Port Arthur, even though Alekseev demanded it. This was a decisive action, since a Second Pacific Squadron had been established in the Baltic and could sail to the Far East to free the strategically important harbor. While the first, second, and forth Japanese armies marched further north, General Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912) and the third Japanese army were ordered to Port Arthur to occupy it. Between 24 August and 4 September 1904, the armies of Japan and Russia met in a large and bloody battle at Liaoyang.87 Kuropatkin, who was reported as unwilling to start an offensive before October,88 still followed his defensive strategy, even though the Russian soldiers were in the majority – around 140,000 Russians to 120,000 Japanese. The Japanese had an artillery advantage, with 520 guns and a large number of mortars and 6-inch howitzers.89 In addition, the Japanese were the more agile force: “Despite their numerical disadvantage, the Japanese decided not only to attack the strong Russian position, they also made the brave decision to hold back parts of their force to bypass the Russian positions” in the north. It was shown that the “Japanese generalship (was) over-cautious in conception but determined in execution,”90 a fact that sealed the victory for the Imperial Japanese troops. These soldiers were praised in later publications for their spirit and abilities alike.91 In contrast, the Russian army seemed doomed,92 and more and more observers began to realize the possibility that the Czarist Empire would suffer a defeat. However, the Japanese army, which had suffered 23,000 casualties, was also starting to be exhausted. Thus the soldiers were not able to pursue the Russians, who retreated first to Sha-ho93 and

24 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea then to Mukden after another defeat to establish a new defensive position. In the meantime, the Japanese had already lost many lives at the siege of Port Arthur, which was still not finished and made unification of all four Japanese armies impossible. Port Arthur was known as “Russia’s stronghold in East Asia”94 or the “oriental Gibraltar,”95 and everyone who was interested in the conflict seemed to understand the strategic value of the fortress.96 As the Kokumin Shimbun reminded the Japanese public when it described the stronghold in October 1906: General Kuropatkin once said, “Port Arthur could be easily defended for about three years, even against the strongest enemy in the world. Our army wanted to advance against this incomparably strong fortress in just three days to force its capitulation (…). There were five land divisions available (…) against the enemy garrison, who waited behind a close wreath of 57 larger and smaller batteries. Just the heavy guns of the fortress numbered 200 – the number of other guns, machine guns, etc. numbered some hundreds more. (…) Our besieging army was willing to conquer the fortress even at the cost of the soldiers’ lives.”97 Our companion through the war, Sakurai Tadayoshi, also faced the fortress: Every hill, every eminence had every variety of fortification, with countless cannon, machine-guns, and rifles, so that an attack either from the front or from the side could easily be met. Each spot was made still more unapproachable by ground-mines, pitfalls, wire-entanglements, etc. (…) our position was extremely disadvantageous. We had to climb a steep hill, or go down into a deep valley, or up an exposed slope to attack any Russian fort.98 The problems faced by the Japanese soldiers during the siege were clear: the Japanese had no information about the changes the Russians had installed since 1898; they had to follow a strict schedule to prevent the Second Pacific Squadron from landing at Port Arthur with support and to unite with the other three armies in the north; and munitions were limited since the calculations by the Japanese planners were tight.99 Their solution was to focus on the superior Japanese spirit. The soldiers’ mass assaults as human bullets (nikudan kǀgeki) would bring victory. This tactic, which “reflected incompetence more than ruthless brilliance,”100 ultimately cost thousands of lives and simultaneously stimulated the Western interest in Japanese bushidǀ.101 The German Vice Admiral Curt von Prittwitz (1849–1922) had informed Wilhelm II about the situation in August and pointed out that the fate of Port Arthur would determine the outcome of the whole war.102 In three general assaults – 19 August, 19 September to 22 September, and 30 October to 2 November 1904 – Nogi tried to force the Russians to capitulate.

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However, despite an incredibly high number of casualties – 14,000 during the first assault alone – he did not weaken the Russian position sufficiently. Sakurai also described the bloodshed: Our desperate attack was responded to by as desperate a defense, and our army paid an immense price for its victory, turning the mountains and valleys of Port Arthur into scorched earth honeycombed by shells, butchering men and capturing the fortress at last with bullets of human flesh shot out by the Yamato-Damashii itself. (…) The bodies of the brave dead built hill upon hill, their blood made streams in the valleys. (…) In spite of the great quantity of projectiles and the large number of human bullets expended, the storming of the forts which the Russian called invincible ended in utter failure. Indeed, several great assaults after this one drained the blood of patriotic warriors and shattered their bones in vain. Ultimately, however, this apparently useless sacrifice of a large number of lives was not without its effect. Strategically we needed to reduce the great fortress as quickly as possible, however great the damage to our army might be; so, therefore, the commanding general resolved with tears to offer the necessary sacrifice, and his subordinates willingly offered their lives and stormed the enemy with bullets of their own flesh.103 The will and stoicism of the Japanese men prompted histories of bravery and heroism around the globe, but the “hill of corpses” and the “stream of blood”104 were rarely brought to a broader audience. It was another decade before Europe faced similar images of violence and destruction on the battlefields of the Western Front during the First World War. Despite the Japanese losses, the situation within the garrison at Port Arthur became desperate.105 The Japanese general staff needed the artillery that was bound up by the siege in the north and decided to change Nogi’s tactics without humiliating him. Kodama Gentarǀ (1852–1906) was sent to the battlefield and he quickly recognized the importance of 203 Meter Hill, from which the harbor and the city of Port Arthur could be bombarded easily. Since the blockade of the harbor side of the city was never completely finished, the garrison received repeated supplies, and even in December 1904 the Russians tried to send munitions to the fortress by sea.106 Consequently, the siege lasted longer than the expected two and a half months, and the Japanese military leaders desperately needed results.107 Facing heavy losses, the Japanese stormed the hill and could finally fire shells against the Russian positions.108 This forced General Anatoly Stessel (1848–1915) to hand over the fortress to the Japanese in January 1905. For the defenders this was a relief. In the final days they had been forced to eat horses and mules, and the lack of munitions compelled them to innovate. The soldiers later reported to Naval Lieutenant Heyne that the soldiers had to produce their own grenades in the dockyard. Expended torpedoes

26 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea which had washed ashore were used to fill self-made grenades, with cases made from the remains of 2.5 inch grenades. Then a fuse was added and the new grenades were used against the Japanese.109 The Russians also told Heyne that they had taken unexploded Japanese shells and fired them back at the Japanese using artillery guns of the same caliber – around 50 per day.110 The capture of 203 Meter Hill on 5 December 1905 rapidly brought the inventiveness of the Russians to its limits. The town and the harbor was bombarded by 11-inch guns and the remaining ships were sunk. In less than a month the Russian garrison surrendered.111 The Japanese victory came at the cost of more than 60,000 casualties, and the siege had thereby “demonstrated the lethality of weapons that later became prevalent in the battles of World War I.”112 The fortress had been captured within 24 hours in 1894, but it took much more to achieve the same in 1904. Modern technologies had totally changed the battlefield and the life of a soldier at the front, something that was sometimes described as “pure slaughter.”113 Despite the losses, the siege was ultimately successful and Nogi was able to march north to support the other three armies. Nogi himself would later be stylized as a national hero – particularly because he committed ritual suicide after the death of the Meiji emperor in 1912. Even Ian Hamilton later described Nogi in generally positive terms, something he might have wished for himself after the Gallipoli campaign: He is, I feel sure, a man of great nobility of character, endowed with a philosophic heroism which penetrates through the mild dignity of his manners and appearance. He seems utterly simple and unspoilt by success. Although the date of his birth places him amongst the warriors of the old school, yet he has never spared time or labour in his efforts to keep himself abreast of the times. He has read a very large proportion of modern military works. If I were a Japanese, I would venerate Nogi. Happy is the army which possesses such a general, and fortunate the nation.114 The long siege of Port Arthur was one of the few events of the war where the Russian soldiers were not condemned as cowards or lacking morale. However, it did not change the outcome of the war since the Russian army and navy were unable to leverage the length of the siege, especially since the remaining fleet in Port Arthur did not try to act in combination with the ships in Vladivostok. In addition, the Second Pacific Squadron was still on its way around the world to meet its fate at Tsushima. The Japanese army was now able to move to the north for what they hoped would be the battle to win the war. Liaoyang, Sha-ho, and Port Arthur were all tremendously costly battles for the Japanese army. The military planners in Tokyo recognized that a final battle was needed, a victory like the Battle of Sedan that would end the war and force Russia to the negotiation table. Kuropatkin also had lost

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men, but he was still receiving troops and had built a strong defensive position in Mukden. The Japanese had no choice but to bet everything on the final stage of the land war. In one of the largest battles in world history,115 around 275,000 Russians awaited 200,000 Japanese. After the battle, which lasted from 20 February to 10 March 1905, the Japanese casualties numbered 70,000, the Russians’ 90,000.116 However, it was not the Sedan Japan had hoped for, as the Czarist army was not totally defeated and could still threaten the Japanese troops, even though revolutionary dangers on the home front had stopped further mobilization in Russia. At the same time, Russia was not able to employ its final offensive117 in Manchuria and remained in a defensive coma. In 1904 it might not have made sense to hope for a speedy end of the Japanese financial and military engagement,118 but in 1905 the effects of the war ended further attacks. Russia had not won a single battle on land. However, since the Czarist Empire had brought more troops to Manchuria than anyone could have believed in early 1904, the troops there still remained a threat, as long as the army remained undefeated.119 Japan was also not able to establish a blockade against Russia.120 On land, as Wilkinson D. Bird described in 1909, the larger European Goliath “was therefore obliged to accept defeat from a weaker nation, who, through careful preparation, and sound organization, which go far to ensure success in war; and with the help of judicious alliances, was able to beat a more powerful rival.”121 Observers attempted to explain this through various factors. The Russian ambitions in the Far East were not national, but instead expressed the personal aims of various leading and conniving figures.122 Another reason was the defensive nature of Russia’s warfare: “The whole course of the operations, in fact, again proves that it is not so much ability to plan, as resolution to carry through, that is required to make successful war; though, naturally, a good plan, well executed, is the ideal to be attained. (…) The value and importance of the initiative is another lesson of the war.”123 Bird also ascribed Russia failure to Kuropatkin’s hesitation: Kuropatkin was no fool as judged by ordinary standards. To those who knew him he appeared a clever, cultured man, well read in military literature. He was reckoned resolute, he possessed much of that war experience which is related so high, and had distinguished himself on service. He seemed, therefore, to possess the qualifications required in a general. Yet he failed. The weight of responsibility was too great for him, and, in reality, he lacked the character to carry through his plans, and to dominate the will of his opponent.124 Bird was not alone. The German Eberhard von Tettau (1857–1922) who had accompanied and observed the Russian army shared his negative impression of Russian morale and effectiveness. He also blamed the officers, not the ordinary soldiers, for the losses:

28 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea Loyal, self-denying, totally trusting his officer, the Russian soldier provides solid material in the hand of good capable leaders, which is almost incomparable among other armies of the world. (…) The fact that this excellent material failed anyway had multiple reasons; they were due to the way of preparation and the use of the material.125 The Russian soldiers were described as having far worse morale than their Japanese enemies. In addition, support from the Russian home front was not as strong as from Japan, although this was definitely a result of geographical factors. Still, while the operations on land must ultimately be regarded as a failure, the naval campaigns were nothing short of a disaster for the Russian navy.

The war at sea The Japanese navy had secured incredibly fast victories over the Chinese fleet during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, something even the government and the commanders of the modernized Japanese fleet had not expected.126 The Chinese fleet was too separated and their admirals spent more time arguing against themselves than fighting the Japanese.127 During the war, as Benjamin Elman concluded, “Japan proved to be superior in naval leadership, ship manoeuverability, and the availability of explosive shells.”128 In 1904, however, Japan had to face a Western great power and a navy with superior numbers, one which had undergone serious development during the nineteenth century.129 At the same time as the Russians leased Port Arthur, the fleet underwent a large expansion program in an attempt to match Japan’s naval strength.130 War games at the Russian Naval Academy had proven in 1896 that their fleet was inferior to the Japanese, something they intended to change by 1905. When the war finally broke out in 1904 the fleets were matched in terms of numbers,131 but the Japanese ships were newer, faster, and better equipped.132 In addition, the Russians had no coordinated strategy, because Alekseev was not willing to coordinate his actions with the Naval Ministry in St. Petersburg.133 Russian officers also complained about his character: Alekseev was a man who only pursued his own advantages; the general good did not matter for him. He did not tolerate those who came to him with grievances or expressed their own opinion. He favored those of a subordinate nature and those who shared his luxurious lifestyle. As a consequence, the Eastern Siberian Army and the Far Eastern Fleet did not contain a single capable admiral or general.134 In 1903 the Russian leaders set the role of the Russian fleet in the case of war. The battleships would try to disrupt the Japanese troop transports but were not to seek direct confrontation with the enemy fleet. The commanders were supposed to wait for reinforcements from Europe to gain numerical

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superiority before attacking Japan’s battleships. Both countries began to buy coal abroad in late 1903,135 but Russia, as on land, faced a logistical problem. The Japanese also had the clear advantage of shorter supply lines, especially in terms of dockyards, shipyards, and closer coaling stations.136 Consequently, Admiral Tǀgǀ was able to act much more freely than the Russian commanders. Overall the naval campaigns underlined two things: a large navy alone is not sufficient to win a war at sea, and to quote William R. Spance, “it is easier to succeed when your opponent suffers strategic and tactical myopia.”137 Despite the focus on the surprise attack on Port Arthur on the night of 8 February 1904, the first naval battle took place on 8 February near Chemulpo.138 Russian sailors later reported that the Japanese shots during these first campaigns were not well aimed, but the grenades caused major suffering since they were filled with Lyddite (picric acid), and sailors were bombarded with countless small shell splinters.139 The attack in the north was necessary to secure the first troop transports, which were due to start simultaneously with the attack on Port Arthur in the south. The Japanese torpedoes only damaged three Russian ships – the Pallada, the Retvizan, and the Tsesarevich – but the psychological shock for the Russian sailors must have been more damaging. Lyditte gas caused numerous casualties and already gave a clear impression of the use of new technologies available in naval wars.140 One of the crew members of the Tsesarevich later described the moment of the attack: At 11.38 p.m. the commander heard the order “torpedo defense” in the cabin. To get dressed and on deck was a matter of two minutes. During this time they opened fire (…). Barely on deck, the commander recognized two Japanese torpedo boats at the rear (…) and a torpedo aiming at the ship from port. A second later the explosion occurred.141 The news that the Russians were totally surprised and that the officers had not been aboard was later denied, and Admiral Oskar Stark (1846–1928) claimed to have been well aware of the possible threat. The issue was once again Alekseev, who did not believe in a Japanese declaration of war and seemed to be totally unworried about the threat of an upcoming attack.142 However, the German embassy in Moscow also sent a report, according to which the “Russian fleet was totally unprepared for an attack, and the Japanese torpedo boats (…) could have destroyed all the Russian ships if they had continued their attack.”143 According to Russian reports it was only the initiative of commanders in starting the engines and moving the ships that prevented even greater damages, since the Japanese torpedo boats would have gained sufficient time to adjust their aim.144 In the following weeks the Japanese fleet regularly returned to Port Arthur, but were driven back by the combined attacks of the Russian battleships and the major guns at the fortress.145 The Japanese leaders and

30 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea Admiral Tǀgǀ knew that the success of the surprise attack was relatively meaningless in the grand scale of the war.146 As long as the Russian fleet at Port Arthur existed, there was no guarantee of security for troop transports. Tǀgǀ was also well aware that he was not in a position to replace a lost battleship easily. Thus the Japanese tried to keep the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, but also feared a more aggressive tactic from their commanders. The Japanese therefore tried several times to block the entrance to the harbor by sinking older ships and trade steamers.147 The German Marine Rundschau (Naval Review) described the impressions created by these numerous Japanese attempts: The many artificial ventures by the Japanese against Port Arthur show that they do not yet feel secure enough to wage a decisive attack. On the other hand, the desperate attempts to block the entrance of the harbor indicate that the Russian fleet still poses a threat and that the Japanese, despite their initial success at sea, are trying to paralyze it at any cost.148 Tǀgǀ was not able to tie down the Russian fleet, especially since the ships at Vladivostok also remained active during the war months, but he cabled to Japan that the transports could begin without interference.149 The Marine Rundschau commented on this action rather appreciatively: It is doubtless that one needs a specific venturesomeness to build upon a foundation that has yet to be established. And if the Russian squadron, based on good intelligence, circumvented the major Japanese forces at sea to attack one of the troop transports, it could have destroyed this transport despite the securing naval forces, which would have harmed both the enemy’s land and sea campaigns.150 That this would have happened if there had been stronger Russian naval engagements seems obvious when reading Lieutenant-Colonel Akita’s report on the Japanese supply chain and its capabilities, which regularly stagnated due to the naval campaigns and the possible danger of Russian attacks.151 But the Japanese were lucky, since Admiral Wilhelm Vitgeft (1847–1904) kept all the Russian battleships in Port Arthur, because he doubted his chances of breaking through the Japanese forces or severely damaging them.152 With the ships in the harbor, many guns were never used where they would have stood a chance at changing the course of the war.153 The Russian leadership did not realize that the Japanese could not afford to lose a single ship, which made Tǀgǀ hyper-cautious. It was Admiral Stepan Makarov (1849–1904), a veteran of the successful war against the Ottoman Empire, who was supposed to change the course of the naval war in East Asia. He arrived in Port Arthur on 7 March 1904,154 and naval attaché Hintze reported from St. Petersburg that he would restore the spirit of victory to the Russian troops, especially since

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he had “21 torpedo boats at Port Arthur now, which are all fit for action.”155 And Hintze repeatedly emphasized that the experienced Makarov would be willing to use his favorite weapon more effectively than ever before. Despite all the Russian failures in the war it is impossible to deny that Russia was also hit by bad luck. On 13 April 1904, during a battle against the Japanese fleet, Makarov’s ship the Petropavlovsk hit a mine and the man due to beat the Japanese died in a large explosion, along with his crew. The naval officers sent to Port Arthur by the German Imperial Naval Office dispatched a report on 22 April 1904 which described the events of Makarov’s tragic death in detail: About 2.5 to 3 nautical miles in front of the entrance, an explosion occurred beneath the front of the ship at the position of the first tower, but was not felt very much. This was immediately followed by a second explosion, which was so heavy that the whole gun tower at the front and the bridge and all its superstructures were thrown to the sky. Just a second later the boilers exploded, the first funnel and the mast collapsed and the ship sank (…). The whole process from the first explosion to the total disappearance of the ship took between 1 and 1.5 minutes.156 Makarov, who was the figurehead of Russian morale at Port Arthur, who was liked by his men and fellow officers, lost his life before he was able to participate decisively in the war at all. His loss was a severe blow to the heart and soul of the Russian fleet.157 It is hard to speculate as a historian, but I assume that further actions by Makarov would have at least provided a more active naval enemy for the Japanese fleet. However, history is determined by facts, not by counterfactuals or wishful thinking. Regardless of the loss to the Russian navy, the episode also highlighted the danger of sea mines. Some never exploded and were washed ashore. Some Czarist soldiers who examined a similar mine were killed when it exploded, and of 12 men nothing besides a head, an arms and some small human remnants remained.158 The mines stayed active after the war – especially in the waters near Vladivostok159 – and created a dangerous environment for trade ships in East Asia.160 Fishing boats were also victims of active mines in the waters near the Japanese coast,161 but there has not been a detailed study into the mine incidents that occurred due to the Russo-Japanese War. As a consequence of Makarov’s death, the torpedo boats were not used to their full effectiveness, and mostly remained in the harbor,162 despite the fact that the Vladivostok squadron had demonstrated that Russian surprise attacks were the best way to harm the Japanese naval forces and to remind Tǀgǀ that he was not yet in total control of East Asian waters.163 While the German Imperial Naval Office reported that the Japanese fleet was exhausted by the previous months of battles in the East Asian waters,164 no major operations were undertaken by the Russian commanders. Occasional minor torpedo boat attacks were conducted; however, the Russians never

32 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea used their full potential by combining forces for a general assault.165 Night attacks were also never given serious consideration.166 The potential of the fast and agile torpedo boats, which would have severely harmed the Second Pacific Squadron during the Battle of Tsushima, was completely overlooked by the naval commanders of the Czarist fleet. After a final attempt to leave the naval siege of Port Arthur on 10 August 1904 to unite with the Vladivostok Squadron, the remains of the Russian First Pacific Squadron remained in the harbor and supported the defenders in the siege by the Japanese army.167 All Russian hopes now rested on the shoulders of Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky (1848–1909), who was making his long way around the globe. The journey of the Second Pacific Squadron168 highlights one of Russia’s general problems during the war: the distance from the capital and the economic centers of the empire to the theater of war.169 The most urgent question was the coal supply to the theater of war,170 since the ships had to go around Africa and though the Indian Ocean, only to meet the Japanese fleet, since the possible safe harbor at Port Arthur no longer existed when the Russian reinforcements reached the Yellow Sea. Thus the journey Second Pacific Squadron played out like an ancient tragedy, since its hero, Rozhestvensky, must have at least suspected the fate of his fleet. Hintze reported from St. Petersburg that “according to a Russian announcement the journey to East Asia will be fast (…). We will see how far the famous squadron is able to last.”171 The German naval attaché had already expressed doubts about the Russian admiral’s task, and it was far too long before his fleet was ready to leave the harbor at all. In July 1904, Rozhestvensky already expressed his opinion that there was no hope Port Arthur would still be in Russian hands by the time his forces arrived there.172 Hintze, in another report to Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), gave a detailed description of the Czarist admiral’s behavior:173 His attitude conflicts with the relaxed demeanour of most of the other high sea officers and is in sharp contrast to the confident mood which seems to be common here. I believe the admiral feels more attached to the fate of the fleet in the Far East than most of his comrades. He also has too critical a mind to believe in a sudden turn in the fortunes of war, something Russian society likes to do. Hintze also described the delays in the formation of the Second Pacific Squadron, whose departure was postponed to September, from when it would take another four to five months for the reinforcements to reach the theater of war.174 The German attaché, like Rozhestvensky himself, was well aware that the long journey would be a harsh test for the fleet. In addition, the Russian admiral had to deal with political problems that influenced his route to the Far East. The United States, Britain – including its empire – and other European colonial powers all declared they would not grant

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a stay at their harbors longer than 24 hours.175 In the British colonies, e.g. Natal, the port administrations had also clear orders with regard to the coal supplies: 1

2

During the continuation of hostilities no coal shall be supplied to warships of either belligerent Power except on the written authorization of the port Captain, specifying the amount of coal which may be supplied. Before issuing any authorization for the supply of coal to any belligerent warship, the Port Captain shall obtain written declarations, signed by the officer commanding such warship, of the destination to which he is proceeding, and the amount of coal already on board.176

The Portuguese authorities also prohibited the use of the ports if the Russians had prisoners of war on board. It was also forbidden to recruit personnel in the harbor towns or to upgrade the armory of the ships.177 Rozhestvensky therefore faced several problems which worsened his situation, especially since the long journey would see many damages, desertion, and revolutionary tendencies among the crews, an image that would later be brought to the screen by Sergei Eisenstein (1898–1948) in his famous Battleship Potemkin (1925). The admiral thus left for his journey far too late, with a ramshackle fleet comprised of older and newer ships and inexperienced crews. He was also reliant on coal supplies that had to be provided by transports from the German Hamburg America Line.178 In the North Sea during the night of 21/22 October 1904, the fleet sparked a severe diplomatic crisis which could have led to war against Britain: the so-called Dogger Bank Incident.179 The Russian crews were paranoid that Japanese torpedo boats might attack in European waters. When the fleet met British fishing boats it mistakenly attacked them and several British citizens were killed. An International Commission of Inquiry was called to investigate the event, ultimately concluding: It appears, from the depositions made, that, from the time of the departure of the squadron from the roads of Réval, Admiral Rojdestvensky had had extreme precautions taken by the vessels placed under his orders, in order that they might be fully prepared to meet a night attack by torpedo-boats, either at sea or at anchor. (…) Towards 1 o’clock in the morning of the 9th–22nd October, 1904, the night was rather dark, a slight, low fog partly clouding the air. The moon only showed intermittently between the clouds. A moderate wind blew from the south-east, raising a long swell, which gave the ships a roll of 5 degrees on each side. The course followed by the squadron towards south-west would have taken the two last divisions, as the event proved, close past the usual fishing-ground for the fleet of Hull trawlers, which was composed of some thirty of these small steamboats, and was spread over an area of several miles. It appears from

34 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea the concordant testimony of the British witnesses that all these boats carried their proper lights, and were trawling in accordance with their usual rules, under the direction of their “Admiral,” and in obedience to the signals given by the conventional rockets.180 Only the mediations of France avoided a military conflict; Russia had to apologize and to pay indemnities to the families of the dead men. The damage had to be fixed in British harbors, and the first sailors deserted. The fleet then sailed to Africa, where it was separated at Morocco. The smaller ships could use the Suez Canal, while the larger battleships took the long way around the African continent. On 9 January 1905, Port Arthur having already capitulated, the two parties met at Madagascar. With the news of the surrender of their destination in the Far East, the mood of the sailors further declined. But the disasters were not over. During the 4,500 nautical miles from Madagascar to Singapore, the fleet recorded 70 machine breakdowns.181 Having arrived in Indochina, Rozhestvensky was ordered to wait for a Third Pacific Squadron, because the Russian leaders had decided to send more naval reinforcements, even though the ships were old and this gave the Japanese more time to prepare their battleships for the final naval battle against the exhausted Russian enemy. Rozhestvensky therefore had to leave the French colonial harbors every 24 hours and return again to wait until the other ships would arrive. From Saigon onwards there would also be no further supply of coal, since the ship owners feared their cargo would be confiscated by the Japanese under the rules of engagement.182 With its new destination of Vladivostok, the Russian fleet had to travel much further, and to transport its own coal. This made the ships heavier, less maneuverable, slower and extremely dirty, something that not only impacted on the morale of the crew, but was explicitly visible in the appearance of the ships. as it was presented due to a visit to the Russian ship Orel after the Japanese had captured it by Trummler in June 1905: The filthy condition of the ship was entirely due to the fact that there was coal stored in every imaginable space. Coal was stockpiled against the walls of the cabins for protection, in some rooms, the mess, and every hammock on deck had been filled with coal. It seemed like they had freighted the ships up to the limit of combat readiness. The ship sailed three foot deeper than usual.183 Overloaded, exhausted, and facing their physical and morale limit, the Russian battleships finally arrived in the Far East, only to be blown away by Japanese guns in the Battle of Tsushima, the event that ended the tragedy of Rozhestvensky and his fleet.184 What became known as the “Trafalgar of the East” finally “convinced the Russians of the need to seek peace”185 and was definitely another blow for the image of Russian military power. The Japanese ships were superior,

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their crews trained, and Admiral Tǀgǀ smart enough to be well-prepared for the possibilities of any interference from the Second Pacific Squadron.186 The Japanese sailors were not only described as superior, they were also seen as honorable men, especially since they did everything they could to rescue their Russian counterparts after their ships began to sink.187 It is only fair to follow Pertti Luntinen and Bruce W. Menning in their evaluation of Rozhestvensky’s final tragedy: “[he] was simply outmatched by superior Japanese tactics, battle experience, gunnery, and, to some extent, technology.”188 As well as forcing the Russians to seek peace, the Battle of Tsushima also destroyed 22 of their battleships, which eliminated the Czarist Empire as a naval force for many years to come.189 Tsushima marked the end of a series of Japanese victories on land and sea and a war effort that had cost 1.7 billion yen, involved more than a million soldiers and sailors and killed more than 80,000 of them.190 The war mobilized the economic power of the villages, strengthened Japanese nationalism, and unified the country through the military services of the population.191 The war that had started in China with the attack on Port Arthur was ended by a peace treaty signed in the United States. While the war had seen famous Japanese victories, many of which were presented as woodblock prints to a wider public at home,192 the peace was Japan’s sole defeat.193 Despite the rise in fear of a “Yellow Peril” in Asia,194 Japan was finally accepted as one of the great powers in East Asia.195 In Japan itself, the victory strengthened nationalist feelings, including the rise of the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. However, there were also trends of internationalization during the years immediately after the war.196 It is also incorrect to claim the Japanese population was entirely in favor of the war. The Japanese socialists, even though a minority, used their publication organ, Heimin Shimbun, to criticize the war and express sympathy with the Russian population.197 However, their activities were well-observed by the police and the newspaper was banned as a consequence of the announcement of martial law in the aftermath of the Hibiya Park riots in 1905.198 The riots there occurred in the aftermath of the signing of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth, since many Japanese regarded the denial of indemnity and the acquisition of Sakhalin as a war trophy as shameful, especially since more than 80,000 Japanese had died. Compared to the Sino-Japanese War a decade before, where the Japanese government received an indemnity and territorial gains, the new peace treaty was regarded as disrespectful of Japan’s just demands.199 The riots were suppressed, but a bitter taste remained. In the aftermath of the war its heroes were praised as living examples of Japanese superiority, and the Russo-Japanese War therefore “served as a cause and trigger for the emergence of a new national selfimage,”200 which was transmitted via popular novels and other media.201 The successful war experiences also stimulated demand for further militarization and started the struggle between the army and navy for the influence of further expansionist planning up to the outbreak of the Second World War in Asia in 1937.202

36 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea In Asia the war had a large impact. China started to send more students to Japan, even though not all Chinese intellectuals regarded the war as an Asian success, especially since the Japanese did not wait long to claim the exchange of Western for Japanese rule in the region. Korea was definitely a victim of the Russo-Japanese War, since the events of 1904 and 1905 culminated in the final annexation of the country by Japan in 1910.203 However, in other colonial spheres the war promised hope for modernization, strength, and independence in the future.204 The Japanese victories also cleared the ground for radical revolutionary movements in Vietnam,205 and stimulated further nationalist movements in South East Asia, like the Philippines.206 Sun Yat-sen (1868–1925) described what many people in Asia felt while observing the Japanese victories: When Japan began her reforms, she was a very weak country [...]. And yet now Japan is one of the strongest Powers in the world. Her people have given up their old prejudices, they have learned the lessons of the West, reformed their administration, created an army and fleet, organized their finances, and have done all this in the space of fifty years. [...] Consequently, if we base ourselves on these standards and relationships China can become a very powerful State.207 In contrast, in Germany Carl Peters expressed European fears about an Asian awakening: “‘Asia for the Asians’ would be the outcry that gained practical importance and Britain, which today smilingly rubbed its hands over the Russian defeats, would have to feel a wave of this yellow flood in East India, where we actually already face the first movements.”208 So the impact of the war for Asia was already visible during the war itself. However, it also had a tremendous impact on the history of the twentieth century as a whole. Therefore I am going to focus on the Russo-Japanese War as an influencing factor on three major topics that dominated the following decades: the Russian Revolution; future Japanese-American relations; and German political and military developments. Since the war had shone a spotlight on both Russia’s military shortcoming and its political problems, it is reasonable – after a discussion of the Asian perspectives on the war – to look at the revolutionary movement in the Czarist Empire in 1904 and 1905.

Notes 1 Ian Nish, “Stretching out the Yalu: A Contested Frontier, 1900–1903,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 45. 2 David Goldfrank, “Crimea Redux? On the Origins of the War,” in The RussoJapanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 88. 3 John W. Steinberg, “The Operational Overview,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 105.

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4 Michael R. Auslin, “Japanese Strategy, Geopolitics and the Origins of the War, 1792–1895,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2005), 3. 5 A very extensive survey of the Russian attempts to establish trade relations with Japan is provided by Nikolai Pavlovich Zadornov and Nishimoto Shǀji, Kita kara kita kurofune (The Black Ships from the North) (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1977–1982). 6 Karen A. Snow, “Russian Commercial Shipping and Singapore, 1905–1916,” Journal of South-east Asian Studies 29:1 (1998), 44. 7 Auslin, Japanese Strategy, 13–14. 8 Frank Jacob, Japanism, Pan-Asianism, Terrorism: A Short History of the Amur Society (the Black Dragons), 1901–1945 (Bethesda: Academica Press, 2014), 17–24. 9 Sydney Cloman, “The Circum-Baikal Railroad,” Journal of the United States Infantry Association 2 (1906), 53. 10 Wieland Wagner, Japans Außenpolitik in der frühen Meiji-Zeit (1868–1894): Die ideologische und politisce Grundlegung des japanischen Führungsanspruchs in Ostasien (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990) analyzes the foreign policy of the Meiji period in detail. 11 Auslin, Japanese Strategy, 20. 12 The Triple Intervention is generally characterized as the starting point of a development which would lead to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, see: Kurosawa Fumitaka, “Nichi-Ro Sensǀ he no michi: Sangoku kanshǀ kara Itǀ no gaiynj made (The Way to the Russo-Japanese War: From the Triple Intervention to Itǀ’s Foreign Journey),” Gaikǀ Shiryǀ-kan 28 (2014), 33–57. 13 Stewart Lone, Japan’s First Modern War. Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894–95 (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 173–175. 14 Auslin, Japanese Strategy, 21; Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1904), 2; Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London, Longman, 1985), 28; David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “The Immediate Origins of the War,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005); 26 233. 15 Josef Kreiner, “Der Ort des Russisch-Japanischen Krieges in der japanischen Geschichte,” in Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg (1904/05), ed. Josef Kreiner (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2005), 57. See also: Rene Pinon, “The Struggle for the Pacific,” The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 325 (1905), 295. Japan invested in new battlecruisers and six of them were bought in Britain, see: James D. Sisemore, “The Russo-Japanese War, Lessons not Learned” (M.A. thesis U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2003), 9. 16 Francis W. Wcislo, Tales of Imperial Russia: The Life and Times of Sergei Witte, 1849–1915. (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 17 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Immediate Origins, 29. 18 Ibid., 23–32; Sisemore, Lessons, 5–6. On the strategic disadvantages, see: Bruce W. Menning, “Neither Mahan nor Moltke: Strategy in the Russo-Japanese War,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 138. 19 Goldfrank, Crimea Redux, 91; Nish, Frontier, 51; Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Immediate Origins, 38. 20 M. Kennedy, The Military Side of Japanese Life (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1924), 300–301. Lansdowne to Edward VII, April 18, 1904, Lansdowne Mss, FO 800/134, quoted in Otte, The Fragmenting, 94.

38 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea 21 John Chapman, “British Naval Estimation of Japan and Russia, 1894–1905,” On the Periphery of the Russo-Japanese War, Part I, Suntory Center Discussion Paper No. IS/04/475 (April 2004), 20–21; Duncan Stuart Ferguson, “‘Splendid allies’ or ‘No more deadly enemies in the world?’ General Sir Ian Hamilton, the British Military and Japan 1902–1914,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland 20:4 (2010), 523. 22 Ibid., 524. 23 Sir Claude MacDonald, “The Japanese Detachment during the Defence of the Peking Legations 1900,” Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society, Vol. 12, 2–20. 24 “British Assistance to the Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5,” The Great Circle 2:1 (1980), 44. 25 Chapman, Naval Estimation, 21–22. 26 Leopold Brooke, An Eye-Witness in Manchuria (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1905), 36; Cyril Falls, A Hundred Years of War, 1850–1950 (New York: Collier Books, 3 1967), 172; Ferguson, Ian Hamilton, 525. 27 Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Beijing, to Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Commander-in-Chief, China Station, 25 February 1904, Bridge Papers BRI/17, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, cited in Ferguson, Ian Hamilton, 525. Captain WC Black, ‘Comments on Colonel Churchill’s Report’, 2 June 1903, DAQMG, WO 106/48, The National Archive, cited in Ferguson, Ian Hamilton, 526; Hamilton to Lady Hamilton, 28 March 1904, Hamilton Papers 3/2/3, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, cited in Ferguson, Ian Hamilton, 527. 28 Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book, Vol. 1 (London, 1905), 10. 29 “Russische Konserven,” Schlesische Zeitung 813, 18 November 1904, BArch R 8034–II/8170, 11. 30 Otte, The Fragmenting, 96. 31 Kǀshaku Katsura Tarǀ den (Biography of Prince of Katsura Tarǀ, annotated by Tokutomi Ichirǀ (Tokyo: Ko Katsura-kǀ shaku Kinen Jigyǀkai, 1917), Vol.1, 1055–1057. 32 Yamagata Aritomo ikensho (The Written Opinions of Yamagata Aritomo), ed. ƿyama Azusa (Tokyo: Harz Shobǀ, 1966), 196–197. Foreign Minister Komura Jutarǀ (1855–1911) also shared this view, see: Honda Kumatarǀ, Tamashii no gaikǀ (The Diplomacy of Komura Jutarǀ) (Tokyo: Chikura Shobǀ, 1941), 246–263. 33 Hara Takashi nikki (The Diary of Hara Takashi), ed. Hara Keiichirǀ (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1981), Vol. 2, 6; Matsumoto Uhei, Shizen no hito Komura Jutarǀ (Tokyo: Rakuyǀdo, 1914), 657. 34 Nish, Frontier, 55; Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Immediate Origins, 34–37. 35 Ibid., 39. 36 For a detailed account on the negotiations see: Teramoto Yasutoshi, “Japanese Diplomacy Before and After the War: The Turning Point on the Road to the Pacific War,” in The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies, ed. Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2008), 33–34. 37 For his biography, see: Igor V. Lukoianov, “The Bezobrazovtsky,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 67–68. 38 Ibid., 70–71; Nish, Frontier, 46, 57; Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Immediate Origins, 38; Teramoto, Japanese Diplomacy, 30. 39 Military Report No. 45 of the German Embassy in China, Beijing, 11 December 1903, BArch MArch RM 5/5763. 40 Lukoianov, Bezobrazovtsky, 79–83. 41 Nish, Frontier, 57.

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42 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Immediate Origins, 39–40. 43 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 1. 44 A survey of the negotiations from a contemporary Japanese perspective is provided in: Asakawa Kan’ichi, The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues (Boston/New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904), 298–348. Modern Japanese works on the negotiations and the idea of the exchange in general include: Chiba Isao, “Nichiro Kǀshǀ – Nichiro Kaisen Gen’in no Saikentǀ (Russo-Japanese Negotiations: A Reevaluation of the Reasons for the Outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War),” in Hikaku no naka no kindai Nihon shisǀ, ed. Kindai Nihon Kenkynjkai (Tokyo: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1996), 289–321. 45 Ambassador to Russia, von Alvensleben, to Chancellor von Bülow, St. Petersburg, 24 December 1903, BArch MArch RM 5/5763. 46 Katǀ, Korea or Manchuria, 101. 47 Military attaché in Tokyo, von Etzel, Military Report No. 69/03, Tokyo, 26 November 1903, BArch MArch RM 5/5763 and For Immediate Report: Would an Outbreak of the War in Winter Cause Japanese Advantages, Berlin, 5 December 1903, BArch MArch RM 5/5763. 48 Von Etzel, Military Report No. 69/03. 49 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Immediate Origins, 26. 50 William R. Spance, “The Russo-Japanese War: The Emergence of Japanese Imperial Power,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 6:3 (2004), 9–10. 51 Patrick Beillevaire, “The Impact of the War on the French Political Scene,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 129. 52 Bartlett, Japonisme, 8; Shimazu, Patriotic and Despondent, 36–37. 53 Sakurai, Human Bullets, 3–4. 54 Howland, Sovereignty, 59–65. On the problem of Korean neutrality during the war, see: Yi Sunhan, “Kankoku no Chnjritsu Seisaku to Nichiro Sensǀ (Korea’s Policy of Neutrality and the Russo-Japanese War),” in Nichiro Sensǀ Kenkynj no shin-shiten (New Research Perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War), ed. Nichiro Sensǀ Kenkynjkai (Yokohama: Seibunsha, 2005), 278–291. 55 Katǀ Yǀko, Sensǀ no ronri: Nichi-Ro Sensǀ kara Taiheiyǀ Sensǀ made (The Logic of War: From the Russo-Japanese War to the Pacific War) (Tokyo: Keisǀ shobǀ, 2005), 34–75; Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 63–67. 56 Francis Rey, “Japon et Russie – guerre [Part 3],” Révue générale de droit international public 13 (1906): 612–627. 57 “Der japanisch-russische Krieg,” Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 23 October 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 58 Military attaché von Etzel to the Imperial Prussian War Ministry, Berlin, Report No. 23./04., Tokio, 17 March 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5766. 59 Yang Guodong, “Nichi-Ro Sensǀ ni okeru Shinkoku no chnjritsu seikaku no seiritsu katei (The Development of China’s Neutral Policy during the RussoJapanese War),” Jinbun Gakuhǀ 490 (2014), 15–36. 60 Chinese ambassador in Berlin, Yintchang, to the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Freiherr von Richthofen, Berlin, 13 February 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5774; Imperial German Embassy in Beijing to Chancellor von Bülow, Beijing, 31 May 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5774. 61 David Wolff, “Intelligence Intermediaries: The Competition for Chinese Spies,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 327–328. 62 Tägliche Rundschau 393, 23 August 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170.

40 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea 63 Vladimir Semenoff, The Russo-Japanese War at Sea 1904–5, 2 vols. (Driffield: Leonaur, 2014 (Rasplata, 1909)), 37; Steinberg, Overview, 110. 64 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 64; Hauptmann Frhr. v. der Goltz, “Rußlands mittelasiatische Stellung,” Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde 3:2 (1906), 192; Menning, Neither Mahan nor Moltke, 145; Military Correspondent of The Times, The War, 89–90. 65 Navy attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, 20 June 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5766. 66 “Die Verpflegung des russischen Mandschureiheeres,” Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde 3:4 (1906), 657. 67 Ibid., 658–659. 68 Evgeni Yurievich Sergeev, “Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904–1905,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2005), 293–294. 69 Komura Jutaro to Count von Arco Valley, Tokyo, 6 June 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5772. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Naval attaché, Trummler, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Tokyo, 20 February 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5772. 73 Naval Attaché, Trummler, to His Majesty Emperor and King Wilhelm II, Report No. 10, Tokyo, 9 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5767, 1. 74 See Evgeny Sergeev, Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904–05: Secret Operations on Land and at Sea (London/New York: Routledge, 2007). 75 Sergeev, Russian Military Intelligence, 303. 76 Wolff, Intelligence Intermediaries, 318. 77 The numbers are taken from Steinberg, Overview, 111. Freiherr Eberhard von Tettau, Achtzehn Monate beim Heere Russlands, (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1907), Vol. 1, 89, however, gives 5,600 Russians and 36,000 Japanese. For a detailed account of the battle, see: Ibid., 85–106. 78 “Buren- und japanische Taktik,” Der Tag 445, 22 September 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 79 Tettau, Achtzehn Monate, 90. 80 A. L. Haldane, “Fourth Japanese Army. Operations from the Date of its Disembarkation in Manchuria to the 31st July 1904,” in The Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers Attached to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field, vol. 1 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1908), 129; C. V. Hume, “First Japanese Army. The Battle of the Ya-Lu; lecture given by a Japanese General Staff Officer, with remarks by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton,” in The Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers Attached to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field, vol. 1 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1908), 15–18; Steinberg, Overview, 112. 81 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 100; Hume, First Japanese Army, 19. 82 Haldane, “Fourth Japanese Army, 112–116; Hume, First Japanese Army, 16–17. 83 Berliner Börsen Zeitung 123, 14 March 1905, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 84 “Das japanische Pferd, der Besieger Rußlands,” Rheinische Volkszeitung 200, 30 August 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 85 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 202, 28 August1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 86 Steinberg, Overview, 112–113. 87 Tettau, Achtzehn Monate, 295–348.

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88 “Vom Kriegsschauplatz in Ostasien,” Berliner Lokal Anzeiger 468, 5 October 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 89 Tettau, Achtzehn Monate, 297. 90 Ferguson, Ian Hamilton, 529. 91 The Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (London: HMSO, 1910), Vol. I, 16; The Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official History of the RussoJapanese War (London: HMSO, 1912), Vol. II, 695. 92 “Völlige Niederlage des Generals Kuropatkin,” Berliner Lokal Anzeiger 415, 4 September 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 93 Jukes, Russo-Japanese War, 53–57. 94 Peters, Der Ostasiatische Krieg, 350. 95 Benjamin Elman, “The ‘Rise’ of Japan and the ‘Fall’ of China after 1895,” in The Chinese Chameleon Revisited: From the Jesuits to Zahng Yimou, ed Zheng Yangwen (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 144. 96 Ambassador in St. Petersburg, von Alvensleben, to Chancellor von Bülow, St. Petersburg, 15 December 1903, BArch MArch RM 5/5763. 97 Memorandum: “Die Verwendung der Landungsbateilung der schweren Schiffsartillerie beim Angriff auf Port Arthur,” Kokumin Shimbun, 6–30 October 1906, BArch MArch RM 5/5771. 98 Sakurai, Human Bullets, 38–39. 99 Matsukata Yoshihisa Tak, “Human Bullets, General Nogi, and the Myth of Port Arthur,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 184. 100 Ibid., 180. 101 Bushidǀ became a well-known emblem of Japaneseness in the Western world as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. 102 Vice Admiral Curt von Prittwitz to Wilhelm II., Tschifu, 10 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5774. 103 Sakurai, Human Bullets, 205, 214–215. 104 Ibid. 217–218. 105 “Die Lage Port Arthurs verzweifelt,” Berliner Tageblatt 431, 25 August 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 106 Naval attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, 11 January 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5769. 107 Die Verpflegung des russischen Mandschureiheeres, 664–665. 108 “Erstürmung des 203-Meter-Hügels vor Port Arthur,” Berliner Lokal Anzeiger 564, 1 December 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 109 Lieutenant-Colonel at Sea Heyne, “Reports of Officers about the Last Days of Port Arthur,” Tokyo, 9 January 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5769, 2–3. 110 Ibid., 3. 111 Pertti Luntinen and Bruce W. Menning, “The Russian Navy at War, 1904–05,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 244; Matsukata, Human Bullets, 194–195. 112 Sisemore, Lessons, 2. 113 “Das Elend der russischen Offiziere,” Kleines Journal 336, 3 December 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 114 Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book (London, 1907), Vol. II, 317. 115 “Die größte Schlacht der Weltgeschichte,” Vossische Zeitung, 11 March 1905, BArch R 8034-II/8170; Steinberg, Overview, 126.

42 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea 116 For a short survey of the battle, see Jukes, Russo-Japanese War, 66–68. 117 Berliner Tageblatt, 4 February 1905, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 118 “Der japanische Bauer und der Krieg,” Bayrische Rundschau 208, 6 September 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 119 Nish, Planning, Performance and Peace Making, 17; Philip Towle, “The RussoJapanese War and the Defence of India,” Military Affairs 44:3 (1980), 111. 120 T. J. Betts, “The Strategy of Another Russo-Japanese War,” Foreign Affairs 12:4 (1934), 593. 121 Bird, Lectures, 65. 122 Ibid., 65. 123 Ibid., 66. 124 Ibid., 69. 125 Tettau, Achtzehn Monate, IV. 126 The Japan Weekly Mail, 4 August 1894. On the development of the Chinese fleet during the nineteenth century, see: John L. Rawlinson, China’s Struggle for Naval Development, 1839–1895 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). 127 Elman, The ‘Rise’, 157. 128 Ibid., 159. 129 Nicholas Papastratagakis, Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-Japanese War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 130 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 6–7; Dominic Lieven and Nicholas Papastratigakis, “The Russian Far Eastern Squadron’s Operational Plan,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2005), 209; Luntinen, Russian Navy, 229. 131 Lieven, Operational Plan, 223. 132 Luntinen, Russian Navy, 232. 133 Lieven, Operational Plan, 206–216. 134 Corvette Captain Funke, Notes from Reports of Russian Officers, Tsingtau, 31 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5768, 1. 135 Copy of the Naval Attaché in England, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, London, 26 October 1903, BArch MArch RM 5/5763. 136 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 5. 137 Gerhard P. Gross, “There Was a Schlieffen Plan: New Sources on the History of German Military Planning,” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2014), 20. 138 Lieutenant-Colonel von Förster and Captain Hoffmann, Report on the Sea Battle of Chempulpo, Berlin, 14 April 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5765. 139 Ibid. 140 Ambassador in St. Petersburg, von Alvensleben, to the Foreign Office, St. Petersburg, 11 February 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5763. 141 Transcript of the Report about the Attack on Port Arthur, Berlin, 21 March 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777. 142 Secret Report by Naval Attaché in Port Arthur, Hepman, to His Majesty and King Wilhelm II, Port Arthur, 22 April 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777, 7; German Imperial Consulate in Moscow, Rechtenberg, to Chancellor von Bülow, Moskau 10 March 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5765. 143 Ibid. 144 “Die Seeschlacht vom 27. Januar (9.Februar),” Nowoje Wremja, 26 February/10 March 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5765.

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145 Telegram of Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Alvensleben, to Foreign Office, 25 February 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777. 146 Imperial German General Consulate for Egypt, Jenitsch to Chancellor von Bülow, Cairo, 3 March 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5774. 147 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 48–50, 69–70. 148 Ibid., 70. 149 Steinberg, Overview, 108. 150 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 10. 151 Lecture by Lieutenant-Colonel Arita, Chief of the General Staff of the of the Second Back Area of the Second Army, Liaoyang, 15–29 November 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5771. 152 “Der Krieg in Ostasien,” Deutsche Tageszeitung 391, 20 August 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 153 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 9. 154 Steinberg, Overview, 108–109. 155 Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, 6 April 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5766, 10. 156 Secret Report by Naval Attaché in Port Arthur, Hepman, to His Majesty and King Wilhelm II, Port Arthur, 22 April 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777, 5. 157 Ibid., 4; Julian S. Corbett, Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015 (1914/15)), vol.1, 184. 158 Secret Report by Naval Attaché in Port Arthur, Hepman, to His Majesty and King Wilhelm II, Port Arthur, 22 April 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777, 7. For a description of the mechanism inside the mines, see ibid., 12. 159 Inspector of the North German Lloyd, Meissel, “Das Ansteuern von Wladiwostock und die Minengefahr,” Hongkong, 20 February 1906, BArch MArch RM 5/5771. 160 Report No. 35 of the Naval Attaché of the German Embassy in Tokyo, to the Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy, Tokyo, 17 June 1907, BArch MArch RM 5/5771 and E. Schipper to the German Consul in China, Mororan, 1 February 1906, BArch MArch RM 5/5771. 161 Appendix to A. 180: List of Mine Accidents and Sightings, BArch MArch RM 5/5771. 162 Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, 15 June 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5766. 163 Immediate Lecture: “The Russo-Japanese War,” Berlin, 21 June 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5766. See also: Luntinen, Russian Navy, 239–240. 164 State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office to the Imperial Vice Admiral, Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy, Büchsel, Berlin, 26 July 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5772. 165 Naval Attaché, Trummler, to His Majesty Emperor and King Wilhelm II, Report No. 10, Tokyo, 9 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5767. 166 Corvette Captain Funke, Notes from Reports of Russian Officers, Tsingtau, 31 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5768, 3. 167 Luntinen, Russian Navy, 241–242. 168 The Russian plans to send this reinforcement could not be kept secret. The Japanese therefore had sufficient time to prepare their actions against the second squadron. 169 Spance, Russo-Japanese War, 6. 170 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 44–45. 171 “Die Ausfahrt der baltischen Flotte,” Vorwärts 215, 13 September 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170.

44 The Russo-Japanese War on land and sea 172 State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office to the Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy, Berlin, 5 July 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5766. 173 Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to His Excellence the Imperial Admiral, State Minister and State Secretary, von Tirpitz, St. Petersburg, 19 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5766, 1. 174 Ibid., 1–3. 175 “Der Seekrieg und die Neutralen,” Deutsche Tageszeitung 392, 22 August 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 176 Imperial German Consulate in Durban, Lettenbauer, to Chancellor von Bülow, Durban, 22 February 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5774. 177 Diario do Governo No. 38, 19 February 1904, Lisbon, 20 February 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5774. 178 Luntinen, Russian Navy, 246–247. 179 Corbett, Maritime Operations, vol.2, 27–40. 180 North Sea Incident: International Commission of Inquiry: Despatch from the British Agent Forwarding the Report of the Commissioners, February 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5778, 4–5. 181 Luntinen, Russian Navy, 251. 182 Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, 25 May 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5769. 183 Naval Attaché, Trummler, to His Majesty Emperor and King Wilhelm II, Report No. 35, Tokyo, 17 June 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5770. 184 Corbett, Maritime Operations, vol. 2, 240–311; Luntinen, Russian Navy, 254–257. 185 Chapman, Naval Estimation, 42. 186 Michael Berry, “The Russo-Japanese War: How Russia Created the Instrument of their Defeat” (M.A. Thesis United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia 2008), 15. This image of the Japanese admiral was later globally spread by English publications as well: Seppings H. C. Wright, With Togo: The Story of Seven Months’ Active Service under His Command (London, 1905). See also: Frederic Villiers, Port Arthur: Three Months with the Besiegers (London, 1905), 68. 187 Newton A. McCully, The McCully Report: The Russo Japanese War, 1904–05 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 186. 188 Luntinen, Russian Navy, 255. 189 Berry, Russo-Japanese War, 1; Nish, Planning, Performance and Peace Making, 18; Otte, The Fragmenting, 99. 190 Simon Partner, “Peasants into Citizens? The Meiji Village in the Russo-Japanese War,” Monumenta Nipponica 62:2 (2007), 179. 191 Women were also integrated into Japan’s nationalism due to the war, see: Yamada Junko, “Nichi-Ro Sensǀ josei no kokuminka: Oguri Fnjyǀ ‘Seishun’ no sekai (The Russo-Japanese War and the Nationalization of Women: The World of Oguri Fnjyǀ’s ‘Seishun’),” Hikaku Nihingaku Kyǀiku Kenkynj SentƗ kenkynj nenpǀ 11 (2015), 124–127. Many were especially used as nurses, because numerous women volunteered to support the war effort, Japanese volunteer for nursing during Russo-Japanese War, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, B07090568600. 192 James Ulak, “Battling Blocks: Representations of the War in Woodblock Art,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 386. 193 For a detailed analysis of the events in Portsmouth and its consequences see Chapter 4.

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194 Léo Byram, Petit Jap deviendra grand! (Paris/Nancy, 1908) is just one example from France. 195 Frederick R. Dickinson, “Commemorating the War in Post-Versailles Japan,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 523–524. 196 See Konishi Sho, “Translingual World Order: Language without Culture in Post-Russo-Japanese War Japan,” The Journal of Asian Studies 72,1 (2013), 92 for the Esperanto boom after the war, to mention just one example. 197 Heimin Shinbun, No.18, 14 March 1904. quoted in Hyman Kublin, “The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War,” The Journal of Modern History 22:4 (1950), 330. 198 Ibid., 331; Shimazu, Patriotic and Despondent, 38. 199 Kowner, Turning Point, 22–23. 200 Ibid., 38. 201 Kathryn Ragsdale, “Marriage, the Newspaper Business, and the Nation-State: Ideology in the Late Meiji Serialized Katei Shǀsetsu,” Journal of Japanese Studies 24:2 (1998), 229. 202 Dickinson, Commemorating the War, 543; J. Charles Schencking, “Interservice Rivalry and Politics in Post-War Japan,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 566. 203 Guy Podoler and Michael Robinson, “On the Confluence of History and Memory: The Significance of the War for Korea,” in The Impact of the RussoJapanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 183–198 and Harold Z. Schiffrin, “The Impact of the War on China,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 169–182 The Japanese began some kind of cultural imperialism in Korea and Manchuria already in the direct aftermath of the war. For one example of such measures, see Jon Davidann, “Japanese YMCA Cultural Imperialism in Korea and Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 5:3/4, (1996), 255–276. 204 Steven G. Marks, “‘Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East!’. The Russo-Japanese War and the Rise of Nationalism in British Egypt and India,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 609–627. 205 Yitzhak Shichor, “Ironies of History: The War and the Origins of East Asian Radicalism,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 211–213. 206 Paul A. Rodell, “Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations? Southeast Asia and the 1905 Japanese Victory,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 636–643. 207 Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary. A Programme of a National Reconstruction for China (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 65. 208 Peters, Der Ostasiatische Krieg, 347.

3

Asia and the Russo-Japanese War

The Russo-Japanese War marked a watershed in Asian history. It altered certain power constellations and Japan eventually reached a hegemonic position in East Asia, while the ambitions of those living under colonial rule in South and Southeast Asia were stimulated by the victories of an Asian power against a Western imperialist army. If one considers the transnational consequences of the events between 1904 and 1905, it is natural to examine Asia before focusing on other parts of the world. The developments that led to the war between the Japanese and Czarist empires were also determined by three important factors within East Asia: China’s weakness and other military powers’ imperialist ambitions, the opening of Japan and its rapid industrialization due to the Meiji Restoration, and Russian expansion towards East Asia leading to a conflict of interest with Japan.1 Once the war broke out, it spurred the public’s hope for an end to Western oppression, and Japan was often considered the first Asian power to fight for Asian citizens’ freedom.2 As Yitzhak Shichor claims, the conflict “paved the way for radical and revolutionary modes of thinking and acting.”3 The success of a modernized Asian army was considered the beginning of the end of colonial rule; “Japan was regarded as an ally, a model, a means.”4 In South and Southeast Asia, many intellectuals were inspired by Japan’s path, hoping that they themselves would be able to imitate the course Japan had taken over the previous five decades.5 However, the war also impacted Japanese society and demonstrated that the Japanese Empire did not wage war on behalf of the oppressed, but had become an imperial expansionist power. The end of Korean independence was directly related to the Russo-Japanese War, and Chinese intellectuals even came to the conclusion that Japan could no longer be seen as an advocate for Asian interests. The following chapter analyzes the impact of the war on Japan, Korea, China, and India to underscore how the events between 1904-5 influenced the history of these regions.

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Japan For Japan, the war against the Czarist Empire was “a colossal enterprise [...] in many ways.”6 With costs of more than 1.7 billion yen, the RussoJapanese War would put a financial burden on Japanese society for years to come, and since more than one million men were recruited for Japan’s army and navy, a large part of the population directly participated in the war. The conflict claimed many among the island nation’s population, causing approximately 80,000 Japanese deaths. Considering the war’s scale, significant mobilization of economic and human resources had to be undertaken to secure success in the violent conflict with Russia, which is why so many people were either directly or indirectly impacted by the events. It is therefore no surprise that Japanese nationalism increased concurrently with a war against a foreign power that threatened Japan’s interests in the region. It was also success on the battlefield that emphasized Japan’s purported claim to power7 and supremacy in Korea.8 The Japanese could stand in solidarity with their nation by supporting the war, and the concepts of kokka (state)9 and kokumin (nation)10 would become important to serving soldiers and supporters on the homefront alike.11 However, regardless of the nationalist waves of support for the conflict, a closer analysis of Japanese society during and after the Russo-Japanese War not only shows that different interest groups competed against each other, but also that many in contemporary Japanese society felt a certain disdain for the war (ensen). Naoko Shimazu accurately explains the coexistence of these contrasting sentiments: “Admittedly, patriotic fervor was prominent in the public sphere but, beneath its veneer, war-weariness prevailed among the majority.”12 She also emphasizes that Japan’s wartime society was “pluralistic and dynamic,”13 meaning that observing Japanese wartime society more intently can yield a better understanding of the conflicts between the era’s core interest groups. These conflicts existed prior to the war when the country’s leaders were divided into factions – pro-war and anti-war – which both tried to influence Japan’s political course.14 It seems only natural, then, that a propaganda battle between the two lobby groups would ensue and continue throughout the war. While right-wing pressure groups like the Black Ocean Society (Gen’yǀsha), the Amur Society (Kokurynjkai), and the Society for a Strong Foreign Policy (Taigai Kǀdǀshikai) – which later became the Society of Comrades against Russia (Tai-Ro Dǀshikai) – demanded to maintain Japan’s national pride by fighting the Czarist Empire to secure influence in Korea and force the government to act on behalf of Japan’s national interests,15 certain antiwar voices wanted to persuade the Japanese public of the conflict’s negative consequences. Japanese society was consequently not ideologically homogenous at all, even if the conditions of such discord were less than favorable. It was “a small but vociferous anti-war lobby”16 that criticized the conflict,

48 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War mainly based on Christian, humanitarian, and socialist ideals. The Heimin Shinbun (The Commoner) would become the main medium of protest during the war years in which journalists criticized not only the war itself, but also its capitalist roots, demanding the global unification of those believing in socialist ideas to fight international capitalism. While the Heimin Shinbun circulated in moderate numbers, starting with 3,500 copies and later selling up to 8,000 copies, its demands – i.e. the unification of the Japanese and Russian proletariat to end the war – were considered dangerous enough to arouse state surveillance and countermeasures. Japanese socialism had emerged after the Sino-Japanese War (1894/95), but the movement never fully developed in Japan since the government sought to prevent criticism from a possibly dangerous political left.17 The establishment of a politically left movement in Japan was mainly influenced by industrialization during the Meiji Restoration, particularly after the war against China and the import of foreign ideas from the West. These ideas included the works of Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), whose published translations in Japan – namely of the Communist Manifesto, translated by Kǀtoku Shnjsui (1871–1911) and Sakai Toshihiko (1871–1933) – coincide with the beginning of the RussoJapanese War in 1904.18 While the socialist movement gained traction in Japan in response to altered socioeconomic conditions resulting from the opening of Japan, the Meiji Restoration, and a wave of industrialization after the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War marked a period of protest against a global conflict based on and created by the forces of capitalism. As Hyman Kublin observes, the few pioneers of socialism in Japan “revealed the principal emotional, pragmatic, and philosophical motivations which had characterized the socialist movement in the West” and “Christian humanitarianism, sentimental utopianism, radical liberalism, union and labor consciousness, and sheer intellectual dilettantism were blended into a mosaic of idealism and good will.”19 It was the Russo-Japanese War that changed Japanese socialism’s character by introducing a militant and radical form of Marxism, which was a byproduct of the anti-war criticism expressed by the socialists of the wartime era. While the “founding fathers” of Japanese socialism had been of middle class origin like their counterparts in the West, the Russo-Japanese War and the economic hardships it created for large parts of society created more socialist followers and sympathizers in Japan. In 1898, the Society for the Study of Socialism (Shakaishugi Kenkynjkai) was organized to discuss and uncover if socialism was compatible with Japanese society. Ironically, the group’s few members met in a Unitarian Church in Shiba, Tokyo. Kublin categorizes the study group as “little more than a genteel debating society, functioning along Fabian lines, meeting monthly to hear lectures and hold discussions on the lives and writings of Western socialists, both utopian and scientific.”20 Katayama Sen (1859–1933), who would later become the leading figure in the communist party,

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established the worker’s journal Rǀdǀ Sekai (Labor World), which would question class division in modern Japanese society.21 He also advocated for workers’ rights to strike;22 some trade unions were founded in the following years and organized the first small iron and railroad worker strikes. The government responded to these attempts with the 1900 Peace Preservation Law, which prevented further strikes. This is why the majority of Japanese socialists favored a political party that would accommodate protest and achieve social change in a legal manner, i.e. through parliamentary means. In May 1901, the Shakai Minshutǀ (Social Democratic Party) was founded and its platform published in the Rǀdǀ Sekai.23 However, immediately after its establishment, the government banned the party and its publications, prosecuting the editorial staff of the party’s related journals. With the party effectively censored, the era’s leading socialists continued their educational work by founding the Shakaishugi Kyǀkai (Socialist Association) as well as numerous newspapers and periodicals, which would continue to publish works of social criticism.24 Regardless of their criticism towards social and labor issues, most of the socialists, even Katayama, felt some nationalist pride when Japan won the war against China in 1895. However, with increasing support for socialism and its peace-related values, the potential for socialist criticism of Japan’s aggression in East Asia grew as well. Two of the eight core ideas the Shakai Minshutǀ expressed in 1901 demanded a universal fraternity of human beings and the abolishment of violent conflict and armaments.25 Kǀtoku and Sakai also wanted to promote and raise awareness of politically left ideas, which is why they translated Marx and Engels’ work in the first place. In addition, the Heiminsha (Commoners’ Society) was established to spread the values of socialism and demand peace. To ensure the transparency of the Society’s ideals, the Heimin Shinbun (Commoners’ Newspaper) was founded with Sakai acting as editor and publisher. The newspaper’s self-proclaimed goal was to “arouse the sentiments of the masses.”26 During the war, the Heimin Shinbun criticized the exploitation of the Japanese people for the sake of war27 and demanded improved behavior among the army, which included transgressions like captains refusing to pay for food or hundreds of soldiers destroying a brothel in Hiroshima.28 In other articles, the newspaper stated that the Japanese soldiers were delusional and that patriotism was a burden for the common people.29 However, when the newspaper criticized rising taxes in an article from March 28, 1904, the authorities intervened and prohibited its sale and circulation. Sakai was confronted with charges and sentenced to three months in prison. An official order for the Heimin Shinbun’s discontinuation was subsequently released,30 but an appeal against this order was successful. As a result, Sakai only spent two months in jail and the newspaper carried on, but its writers and readers alike were harassed by the police in the aftermath of these events. The newspaper’s circulation thus dropped once again.31

50 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War Regardless of Sakai’s imprisonment, the newspaper continued to criticize the war against Russia; as Naoko Shimazu states, the “newspaper company coped with each and every obstacle imposed by the state, as well as the persistent financial crisis, let alone personal hardships and deprivation.”32 The newspaper only survived because its editors did not officially act on behalf of a political party, but rather ran it as a private company. However, since the government feared the spread of socialism among troops, they had police monitor any journalists writing for the Heimin Shinbun. Despite this, socialist activists were able to organize more than 100 assemblies against the war in 1904,33 and some even toured Japan’s rural areas to circulate pamphlets and inform residents in these regions of the war’s negative consequences. Concurrently, however, those subscribed to the Heimin Shinbun were harassed by police officers who demanded that they terminate their subscriptions – news dealers, on the other hand, were advised to stop selling the paper. On June 12, 1904, the Heimei Shinbun addressed these threats: When one thinks that there are not more than two hundred professed Socialists in Japan, it seems strange that the Government is nervous over their propagandism (...) If Socialists were reckless enough to resort to violent actions, it would be quite proper for the Government to use police force for the sake of social peace, but not one accusation of this kind can be brought against them. Are they not denouncing war all the time, because they believe that no violent action is justifiable at any time? We may say, without much exaggeration, that all Japanese socialists are peace-lovers in the extreme sense, and they are exactly the people for whom no police authority is required. Publicity is our motto, and nothing is kept secret among us.34 However, in the government’s eyes, socialists remained a threat to Japan’s purportedly homogenous support for the war, especially since prominent members of socialist circles sympathized with Russian workers, emphasizing that they were “comrades, brothers and sisters, and [had] no reason to fight.” Japanese socialists advocated for blaming Japanese “militarism and so-called patriotism” rather than participating in war.35 However, with Japanese casualties at Port Arthur increasing along with incentive to combat the enemy, the government’s harsh measures against the newspaper’s anti-war messages seemed only logical. When the paper published a translation of the Communist Manifesto, together with portraits of Marx, Engels, and other important figures of the global political left like August Bebel (1840–1913) and Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864) in the anniversary issue on November 13, 1904, the police intervened by prohibiting the circulation of the Communist Manifesto.36 In the end, the newspaper had to announce its voluntary discontinuation and was replaced by Chokugen (Plain Talk), which became the new official voice of the Japanese socialist movement. With Sakai and Kǀtoku in prison,

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however, the movement lost its influential leaders and the anti-war movement lost its energy. Chokugen might have been published until the end of the war, but it was never as successful in attracting readers as the Heimin Shinbun was. Although the Japanese government vehemently oppressed its nation’s socialists, the war did have some positive outcomes, especially since it intensified and strengthened the internationalization of the Japanese left. While Katayama “was carrying the banner of international socialism to America and Europe,”37 the war also spurred increasing interest in international leftist organizations in Japan. For some anti-war leftists, governmental suppression led to even greater radicalization. The best example of such transformation might be in the case of Kǀtoku Shnjsui. Since he was sentenced to spend several months in prison, he was transformed from a Marxian socialist into a radical anarchist who repudiated Japan’s contemporary political and social order. In addition, he contended that criticizing government and changing society must be prepared and undertaken in secret.38 The government’s suppression of the Japanese left consequently increased the radical potential within this particular political spectrum and paved the way for more aggressive antagonism in the future. When the Heimin Shinbun officially closed in October 1905, it was because its organizers had been forced to do so under the martial law declaration following extreme riots protesting the Portsmouth Peace Treaty’s terms. As Naoko Shimazu correctly remarks, regardless of its limited span of action, “the antiwar campaign led by the Heimin Shinbun provided the most rigorous social critique of the war, exposing the untold hardship caused by the war.”39 This same newspaper would criticize other media publications for increasing the population’s hopes for large indemnities and territorial gains from the war, and since these hopes were ultimately unrealized, the public was irate about the peace treaty. However, the publishing houses had already made their money from increased newspaper sales and special issues on the war, profiting from marketing heroic Japanese nationalism. Overall, the Russo-Japanese War was accompanied by a high grade of media visualization of the events on the Asian mainland. Because of the war’s depiction in newspapers, woodblock prints,40 and Japanese cinema, Japanese people became emotionally and patriotically attached to the war’s events, battles, and “heroes.” Of course, such depictions were orchestrated by state authorities and delivered by the media corporations, who would economically profit from such content. These products, however, were artificial, especially since “the combined agency of the state and the commercial sector created war images that were uncritical, thereby widening the gap between the artificially created world of a ‘good war’ and the tragic reality of the war experience as lived by the people.”41 The war with Russia marked “a god-send for the [printing] industry, and no publishing house would miss [such a] major commercial opportunity,”42 and newspapers and

52 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War magazines alike capitalized on patriotism to increase their sales. Popular demand, however, not only encouraged intent news coverage of the events, but also the use of photography to deliver images from the battlefield to audiences at home. In January 1905, the first news photographs were presented in the ƿsaka Mainichi Shinbun, and an exhibition in the capital provided the public with war photography in the same year. The war consequently became something immediate, and its events, while geographically far away, were integrated into many citizens’ daily lives and information streams. Traditional woodblock prints were also revived during the RussoJapanese War, since popular demand for visual media – specifically dynamic visualization of the battles – stimulated their production.43 Regardless of the fact that 2,000 to 5,000 woodblock prints were sold, new forms of media like the journal The Japanese Graphic were sold in high numbers (40–50,000 copies per issue), offering 20 to 50 of the newest photographs or illustrations that would help citizens visualize wartime events. This is why, as Andrew Gordon puts it, “these illustrated publications were the most important sources to imprint the war and its aftermath in Japanese popular imagination.”44 Regardless of these success stories in the printing sector, Japanese cinema also economically gained from the war against the Czarist Empire. With ticket sales skyrocketing, the movies played during the Russo-Japanese War also delivered messages of patriotism to the people of Japan. Documentaries outlined wartime events in China and artificially transported audiences to the battlefield, allowing them to better understand the lives of the soldiers abroad. To become more informed of and connected with the war, more and more Japanese people visited cinemas or travelling shows, which reached even the most peripheral regions of the nation state. Companies like Yoshizawa Shǀten and Yokota Shǀten even sent teams45 to the battlefront to shoot original material directly where wartime events had been taking place. Such media coverage catered to the public’s demand for substance and would influence the news coverage of future events. Cinema was thus an important factor in the war’s history “as the technological revolution had allowed the audience to experience the war as if it were in action before them.”46 That being said, cinema was not the only thing to mobilize the Japanese people. The war not only stimulated political radicalization and the intensification of media coverage of events far away from home, it also transformed the social structure of the country by dissolving traditional order, particularly that in villages, whose people needed to be mobilized and even nationalized to participate in the Japanese Empire’s war effort. The soldiers’ food supply abroad and the population at home were of utmost importance to the government, which is why Japan’s remote villages had to be assimilated into the rest of Japanese society to mobilize national resources for the war against Russia. However, as Simon Partner so vividly described it, most villages were not ready for such a role:

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Villages were the fountainhead of male conscripts for the army and navy. (…) They provided the horses on which the army depended so heavily (…) they contained reserves of savings, which the government sought to tap to help finance the war effort. Yet in 1904, most Japanese villages were still fairly remote places. The railway network had barely penetrated beyond the major cities. Roads connecting village to town and city were mostly narrow, muddy, and unpaved. The telegraph linked towns, but few villages were on the network. The telephone was still an exotic novelty. Most villagers had never seen electric lights, mechanized factories, streetcars, automobiles, moving pictures, or many of the other symbols of modernity that were rapidly transforming Japan’s major cities.47 It was the government’s imperialist agenda in the war against Russia that would largely integrate villages into the nation state, since a more developed infrastructure was required to guarantee the functioning of the war machine.48 However, regardless of these official attempts to mobilize the countryside, the villagers were often more concerned about their daily lives than possible Japanese victories on the Asian mainland.49 The lower classes worried more about losing their labor force – chiefly through husbands and sons being drafted into the military – than about possible loss of face and honor in a war with Russia. With the absence of their “principal breadwinners,”50 many families in the villages suffered even greater than before. Consequently, “the war-weariness prevailing in society derived from practical socioeconomic problems that the war engendered.”51 Conscripts often committed crimes in an attempt to escape military service not only to support their families, but to avoid death on the battlefield. Some men deserted the army altogether because they were worried that their families’ food supplies would suffer without them. While those in poverty thereby suffered from the ongoing war, the newspapers further demanded public support in the name of honor and glory. In the meantime, suicide rates on the Homefront increased because women were unable to compensate for the income lost from their conscripted husbands’ and sons’ absences; in addition, the elderly no longer wanted to be burdens on the soldiers at war.52 In addition to these hardships, the war also tore apart many households. When a woman and her children could no longer act as an independent family unit alone, the man would divorce his wife, whereby the woman could return to her family for support. The state thus exploited its citizens and forced them to abandon marriage – many Japanese families were too poor to maintain their lifestyles once the men were conscripted into the army, an act for which the state would never sufficiently compensate families. Japanese society was consequently not overly supportive of the war; many people suffered by the hands of this conflict, but they were not influential or powerful enough to resist it. To better understand the majority of the contemporary

54 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War Japanese population’s hardships in future studies, researchers will have to take a closer look at Japanese ego-documents instead of newspapers, which, with the exception of the Heimin Shinbun, supported the state’s agenda. It is ironic that the newspapers projected that Japan would benefit tremendously from the war when the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty prevented any gains for the nation state. The territory that could have been gained was not of real importance; the islands to the north of Japan had always been of interest to Russia, and even if former treaties were able to clearly determine which of the two powers possessed them, the RussoJapanese War introduced a possibility for Japan to expand in that direction regardless.53 When Japan was granted half of Sakhalin as a result of the treaty, many Japanese were frustrated because the Russian Empire declined to provide any indemnities. A war with no defeats on the battlefield was therefore considered lost because of the negotiations at Portsmouth. The eruption of anger that followed, which started with the so-called Hibiya Park riots, marked the beginning of a long line of popular protests that would lead to the Taishǀ and early Shǀwa period.54 A number of politicians, professors, and journalists expressed their anger about the peace terms, and extreme right-wing societies like the Amur Society and the Black Ocean Society demanded more territorial gains and an indemnity. To foreground such demands, the members of these organizations, together with other right-wing groups, organized a meeting at Hibiya Park in Tokyo to protest the Treaty of Portsmouth.55 On September 5, 1905, under the tutelage of the Association of People against Peace (Kǀwa Hantai Kokumin Taikai), a large number of people met at the aforementioned park to demonstrate against the terms that had been negotiated through the mediation of U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt. Under the umbrella of this organization, several chauvinistic and nationalist groups assembled their members to turn public opinion against peace with Russia. Protest was also directed at the Japanese government, whose representatives were made responsible for Japan’s losses at the negotiation table. Eventually, the meeting “turned into the largest episode of mob violence in the history of modern Japan,”56 with turmoil spreading throughout the city and the rest of the country alike. The situation escalated so intensely that martial law was declared the following day and would not be lifted until the end of November. Almost 40 newspapers and journals were banned from publication after the rioters wrought chaos in Japan’s capital. More than 70% of the city’s police bases were attacked and torched by the rioting crowds, and more than 300 people were arrested as a result of this conflict. The rioters were proportionally representative of Japan’s entire society, with 41.2% being workers, 34.8% coolies or rickshaw pullers, 10.3% merchants, 8% businessmen, and 5.7% intellectuals (lawyers, students, journalists, etc.).57 The rioting groups, however, were often led by small numbers of extreme activists who further aroused the masses and demanded

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them to act aggressively. Of the men who were arrested, two thirds were younger than 30 years old, and more than 500 casualties – including 17 deaths – were counted among the rioters in Tokyo. The government counted similarly high casualties among its police forces. This violence had spread from abroad to Japan and, as Andrew Gordon states, “It almost seemed as if the war had come home.”58 Riots and demonstrations not only took place in the Japanese capital, but more than 250 assemblies across the country were also organized. A total of 230 resolutions were signed that demanded a renegotiated treaty based on terms that better suited Japan. It must be emphasized that even if the Russo-Japanese War was glorified in the years after its end – whether by the government itself or in school textbooks59 – it was not unanimously supported by Japanese society during the war. Of course, several people had been persuaded by wartime propaganda, but many Japanese citizens also directly suffered from its consequences. Japanese wartime society therefore bears a far more complex image than is usually taken into consideration. Regardless, Japan’s future would be heavily impacted by the Russo-Japanese War; the conflict forced the island nation to further expand into the Asian mainland to cover its financial losses – especially since Russia paid no indemnities – and it also stimulated desires for military greatness in the following generation’s radical young officers. However, Japan was not the only nation state whose fate would be tremendously impacted by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Korea, in contrast to its Japanese neighbor, was the primary victim of Russia’s defeat.60

Korea For Japan, the Korean Peninsula was the most important security issue in the East Asian region. Japan feared that any invasions of their country might be launched from Korea; in a way, they thought of it as a dagger directed towards the Japanese Isles. Keeping Korea under Japanese control had thus been one of Japan’s main foreign policy goals since the Meiji Restoration.61 The government in Tokyo’s political penetration of the peninsula was a consequence of the British fear that Russia might expand its territorial possessions in the region, and since London needed an ally to avoid overstretching its own military capacities, Japan was a natural choice. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 not only strengthened both countries’ interests, but also made the Russo-Japanese War possible.62 While the fight over a hegemonic position in Korea had already led to a war against China in 1894, Japan could not secure it in the Russo-Japanese war, especially since the Czarist Empire contested Japan’s territorial gains with the socalled Triple Intervention.63 Uncontested Japanese control over Korea might have limited the Russians’ access to the Pacific, so Russia initiated the intervention to maintain its expansionist options in the region.64 The Czarists believed that by holding Japan back from its imperial course, Russia could

56 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War strengthen its own prestige and gain more influence in China. However, the decision to intervene also created antagonism between the Russians and Japanese that would eventually stimulate further conflict. Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the Japanese government feared Russian intervention in Korea, which is why the pro-Russian Queen Myeongseong (1851–1895) was murdered by Japanese agents. However, in 1896, King Gojong’s flight to the Russian legation in the aftermath of these events gave the Czarist Empire another chance to intervene in the Korean Peninsula. As negotiations between Russia and Japan – specifically the Weber-Komura Seoul Protocol and the Lobanov-Yamagata Moscow Protocol – failed to consolidate a clear agreement about Korea’s status, the tensions between the two governments grew.65 Tokyo decided to go to war when Russia was unwilling to negotiate that the Czarist Empire would have exclusive control over Manchuria while Japan would have the same rights over Korea. It was only a matter of time before war would break out, and once it did, it marked the beginning of a “fatal blow to Korea’s sovereignty.”66 In the aftermath of the war, Japan forced the government in Seoul to accept several treaties that forced Korea to give up its independence. During the months of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had already taken control of Korean communications (including the post system, telegraph networks, and telephone providers). After the treaty of November 17, 1905, Japan even obtained the right to control Korea’s foreign relations. With the Japanese Empire acting as an intermediary for international matters, the Korean government had de facto lost its sovereignty. In December, Japanese Imperial Ordinance No. 267 established a Residency-General on the Korean Peninsula, a measure that led to Japan’s colonial penetration of Korea by basing its own officials in the country.67 Not only was it that “in establishing herself as Korea’s ‘protector’ in 1905, Japan violated (...) Korean national integrity,”68 but such acts also aroused Korean nationalism and disdain for Japan’s imperialist ambitions.69 However, Korean protests against the Japanese met no sympathy from abroad, especially since Japan and the United States were serving one another’s interest spheres through the 1905 Taft-Katsura Agreement, which decreed that Japan would receive a “free hand” in Korea for respecting U.S. interests in the Philippines.70 Furthermore, Western observers were convinced that the Korean Peninsula should rightfully be ruled by Japan, since the Korean government seemed incapable of modernizing. The colonial narrative consequently favored Japan’s expansionist ambitions, particularly because it was considered an equal imperial power upon its victory over Russia. While the agreement that Korea was forced to sign in 1905 caused “virtual annexation,”71 the treaty of August 29, 1910 would officially annex the Korean Peninsula and integrate it into Japan’s East Asian Empire. The Japanese government explained that the act of annexation was supposed to create peace and stability in Korea – Japanese rule would, as per the official narrative, encourage prosperity throughout the

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nation and modernize a backward region whose leaders had been unable to become part of a “civilized” world community. Iyenaga Toyokichi (1862–1936), a professor of political science, apologetically explained in 1912 what had happened and why: Japan was prompted to take the decisive step of annexing Korea for reasons that are easily understood. They are: (1) to insure her own national safety; (2) to assure enduring peace in the Far East by eliminating one of the most fruitful sources of disturbance; (3) to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Koreans; (4) to do away with the disadvantages, administrative and financial, of a dual system of government – the residency general and the Korean government; (5) to consolidate the identical interests of Japan and Korea in the Far East by the amalgamation of two peoples whose similarity in race and past culture makes such a task possible.72 He also emphasized the Japanese government’s security concerns, since “from a strategic standpoint, Korea [was] to the Japanese Empire as a spear [is to a] heart.”73 To prevent a foreign power from using the peninsula to threaten Japan, an annexation “to eliminate from Korea the danger of any foreign complications that might again invite foreign intervention”74 seemed inevitable. In 1907, Iyenaga also argued for strengthening the Governor General and his powers: [A] resident general, representing the Japanese government, should reside at Seoul. At first his power was purely advisory. But it was soon found that the optional method was doomed to failure, for the Korean government, free to adopt or reject at will the advice of the resident general, usually chose the latter alternative (...) by the agreement of 1907 the power of the resident general was vastly increased. He was given the power to initiate as well as to direct measures of administration, to enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to appoint and dismiss high Korean officials, and to appoint to any public posts.75 The official Japanese narrative consequently blamed the Koreans for the events that led to their annexation; their unwillingness to follow modern standards and accept Japanese “advice” purportedly left the government in Tokyo no other choice but to intervene. In reality, the circumstances were far more complicated, and Korean positions towards Japan were not homogenous at all. The events between 1905 and 1910 will thus be analyzed here in more detail. Japan planned to gain Korean support by acting as a model for modernization. However, as Stewart Lone emphasizes, Korean elites disapproved of such a narrative, especially since “Japanese technological superiority was seen as a hand-me-down from the West” – to persuade the majority of the

58 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War peninsula’s population of the nation’s righteousness, “Japan had to introduce rapid, visible improvement.”76 The government in Tokyo consequently sent one of its most experienced members, Itǀ Hirobumi (1841–1909),77 to fulfill Japan’s ambitious plan. The Koreans were unable to discern whether Itǀ was acting on behalf of their country’s modernization or if he was making way for their annexation.78 The Governor General of Korea would rule under the Korean Emperor – who was used as a puppet to act on behalf of Japan’s interests – but as was clear from the beginning, annexation would cause uproar among Koreans against the colonial government. When Emperor Gojong abdicated in July 1907 and Korea moved another step towards total Japanese control, Itǀ emphasized that Japan did not intend to annex Korea: “Annexation is very troublesome and Korea needs selfrule. (...) We will be satisfied to see our two flags flying side by side.”79 The Governor General’s true intentions were obviously unclear. On the one hand, he assured Japan’s best interests in Korea, but on the other he used force to suppress resistance against Japanese rule. This ambivalence and lack of clarity was not limited to merely Itǀ’s acts and declarations. In Korea there existed not only anti-Japanese forces, but also interest groups that favored Japanese rule and their swift annexation of Korea. The members of the Iljinhoe, a pro-Japanese organization with 50,000–100,000 members, “not only accepted Japanese domination but welcomed it as the only force available effecting real structural changes in Korea’s political system.”80 The members of the Iljinhoe were Koreans who had been prevented from gaining influence in society by the oligarchy of noble families; this is why they supported Japan’s reformist claim to lead Korea back to independence as a strong, modernized nation state. Song Byung-jun (1857–1925), the political leader of the Iljinhoe, expressed this demand often, criticizing Japan for not doing enough to modernize Korea. While the organization approved of annexation, it was also anti-monarchist, so it was too radical to accommodate Itǀ’s plan to slowly amalgamate Korea with Japan. Regardless of such concerns, the members of the Iljinhoe were a counterweight to anti-Japanese resistance groups like the Korean “patriotic troops.”81 Guerilla activities spread throughout the peninsula, particularly when more and more Japanese farmers began to arrive in Korea to colonize the new sphere of influence on the Asian mainland after the Russo-Japanese War. Uchida Ryǀhei, the leader of the Amur Society Itǀ’s unofficial advisor, favored a closer collaboration with the Iljinhoe to achieve efficient annexation, criticizing the Governor General for his weak policies towards the Korean population. He collected material and sent it to the government in Tokyo to discredit Itǀ’s position, urging Korea’s annexation to occur quickly.82 One could argue that the Amur Society, whose members already supported the Japanese Army’s war effort during the Russo-Japanese War,83 now had a vital interest in expanding to the Korean Peninsula to partially revert the outcome of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. Using his contacts in

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the Iljinhoe who favored a swift annexation, Uchida pressured Itǀ to act. The latter tried to outmaneuver Uchida’s radical position but agreed to it when the Amur Society’s leading figure received 100,000 yen through military channels to further influence the Iljinhoe and prepare the grounds for annexation. Seemingly against his original plans, the Governor General consequently supported a policy to avoid conflict with the pro-Japanese Korean population and the pro-annexation members of his own staff.84 Itǀ preferred slow reform, but his civilization policy (bunmei seisaku) based on democracy (minpon-shugi), constitutionalism (hǀchi-shugi), and slow but steady measures (zenshin-shugi) had failed.85 While the Governor General may have been able to counter Uchida’s attempts to politically discredit him, he failed to persuade the Korean population of his ideas. The abdication of the Korean Emperor in July 1907 and the dissolving of the Korean Army forced him to employ stricter measures against the population’s political uprisings and guerilla attacks. To regain public support for his platform, Itǀ proposed a nationwide tour with Emperor Sunjong in January 1909, stating that he “repeatedly addressed groups of Korean notables on the need to put aside past grievances and work together.”86 Regardless of such attempts, the leading statesmen of Japan – Katsura, Komura, and Itǀ – eventually agreed on Korea’s annexation, although its exact timing was still in question. Since the matter was also of importance to other imperialist nations, Japan required major European powers to agree to the process, and the island nation was anxious to adhere to international law in its annexation procedure.87 A meeting was arranged with Russian Finance Minister Kokovtsov in Manchuria to discuss Korea’s fate, but Itǀ was killed in Harbin on October 26, 1909, before he was able to settle the issue.88 Because of this, international sympathy rested with Japan when the government in Tokyo officially decided to annex the Korean peninsula. Once this occurred, the Iljinhoe was dissolved to prevent further criticism of the Japanese colonial government, which was not so much interested in modernizing Korea as it was with having a free and equal Japanese neighbor.89 Regardless of the fact that annexation was favored and agreed upon by leading Japanese politicians, it was ultimately an ad hoc reaction to an incident in Korea itself. The declaration of annexation announced: Art. 6. In consequence of the aforesaid annexation, the government of Japan assumes the entire government and administration of Korea, and undertakes to afford full protection for the persons and property of Koreans obeying the laws there in force, and to promote the welfare of all such Koreans. Art. 7. The government of Japan will, so far as circumstances permit, employ in the public service of Japan in Korea those Koreans who accept the new regime loyally and in good faith and who are duly qualified for such service.90

60 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War Regardless of its population’s different political positions towards Korea,91 Japan achieved an annexation that had been regarded as one of the most vital security issues since the Meiji Restoration. It also created “an empire that was now 15 million people more populous and almost a third larger than it had been prior to annexation”92 and established possibilities for further expansion towards Manchuria, where Koreans in exile were considered Japanese citizens.93 The Japanese interest in this particular part of China would also determine its policy towards the Middle Kingdom in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, especially since the war – being the nadir of the past decade’s historical developments – had shown that China was no longer a great or respectable power in East Asia.

China China was also a victim of the Russo-Japanese War, especially since, as Gotelind Müller states, “foreigners decided and fought over and in China, which was nominally sovereign but de facto had no say, and she, in turn, was mainly concerned about cutting her losses. In those days, hardly anyone from outside China felt pity for her.”94 While from a Chinese perspective the war was considered an isolated catastrophe since the times of the Opium Wars, it must be acknowledged as one of the crucial events leading to the Chinese Revolution in 1911. Manchuria may have been a mere peripheral region in Northeast China, but the fact that the war was fought there – and that Japan’s financial needs following the war would lead to further penetration of that region – must be accounted for when one evaluates the war’s consequences in the Middle Kingdom. For China, the Russian threat from the north95 was thus effectively replaced by a Japanese threat from the East. Despite the fact that China and Japan had taken different paths towards modernization, the countries shared a traditional heritage, and numerous intellectuals in both nations argued for cooperation against the Western world’s possible domination of Asia.96 Japan, however, recognized the danger the West posed to its national sovereignty and swiftly industrialized to close the technological and economical gap that existed between them in the middle of the nineteenth century. While Japan had already adopted military technologies, strategies, and tactical norms from Western countries, China was reluctant to do so. This was because, from a traditional perspective, the Middle Kingdom and its government refused to rely on the help of “barbarians.”97 China might have initially been able to resist imperialist powers and their expansionist ambitions, but the once-hegemonic nation’s war against Japan in 1894–95 ended in its humiliating defeat.98 In the aftermath of the events, as Barton C. Hacker correctly points out, “some Chinese officials came to see, reluctantly, the unbreakable chain that led from firearms and ships to coal mines, iron foundries, and railroads; from

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military technology to industrialization; from the weapons of the West to Westernization.”99 China’s division among the Western powers, the Boxer Rebellion, and eventually the Russo-Japanese War would not only influence the Sino-Japanese War’s aftermath, but disclose the Chinese Empire’s weakness to Japan, who had believed in the Middle Kingdom’s superiority. Since the antagonism between Russia and Japan grew as a consequence of China’s weakened position, the relationship between the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War is easy to trace. Furthermore, China’s weakened state might have been a counterweight to Russia and Japan’s expansionist ambitions in the region.100 With hostilities brewing, the United States and other foreign powers urged China to declare its neutrality because Chinese intervention – by virtue of the Anglo-Japanese and Franco-Russian alliances’ terms – might have spread the war further. The war needed to be limited to Manchuria, and the government in Beijing simply had to agree to Washington and other Western capitals’ terms. The Japanese minister to Beijing, Uchida Kǀsai (1865–1936), advised the Chinese government to keep its neutrality as well: It must be added that neutrality itself imposes upon the state assuming that attitude a positive obligation to see whether her neutrality is respected by the belligerents and therefore China should take effective measures to repel any possible attempt on the part of the belligerents at the violation of neutrality, China should prevent her territory except Manchuria from being made the place of actual operations or as harbors of refuge, repair or daily supply for belligerent ships.101 Although Japan might have been regarded as a model nation by many Chinese intellectuals, many officials in Beijing were unsure if Japan could best the Russian Bear in an open conflict once the war began. The court therefore tried to avoid conflict, especially because China was incapable of preventing belligerent powers from fighting in Manchuria. Any alliances were considered dangerous, so China was willing to accept the West’s “advice” to remain neutral – at least in the main parts of the country. The Middle Kingdom’s goal, then, was non-involvement and the preservation of Chinese independence and sovereignty. To maintain supremacy in Manchuria, China favored neither Russia’s nor Japan’s victory, as doing so would have threatened Chinese territorial integrity. When it became clear that Japan would win the war against Russia, its victories on the battlefield were perceived as those of the “yellow race” on a whole. In contrast to the European idea of “yellow peril,”102 China would evaluate Japan’s military successes as a chance for “yellow solidarity” against Asia’s oppression by Western powers. The revolutionary developments in Russia – which will be discussed in more detail later – were

62 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War considered as not only a sign that Czarism was dying out, but a warning against Russia’s contemporary political system, which seemed to be more antiquated and inadequate than ever. More and more Chinese citizens wanted to choose the ruling dynasty, since China’s government seemed inferior when compared to Japan’s and its successes. Several Chinese students travelled to Japan to find inspiration there, since the island nation “had turned into a role model of how to become successful in the modern world.”103 While the Japanese soldiers’ victories were admired and perceived as Asian victories, Russia became known as a symbol of failure, backwardness and corruption; for this reason, it was also perceived as the Beijing government’s “mirror image.” Radical intellectuals and former students who had lived in Japan planned anti-Russia campaigns and criticized China’s neutral position towards the Czarist Empire. The newspaper Eshi Jingwen (Plea Against Russia), which began in February 1904, demanded an intervention on behalf of the Chinese lives that were taken by the war in Manchuria.104 The Russian Army in particular was accused of using violence against civilians in the region, and newspaper editors demanded the Beijing government’s active intervention. Furthermore, the paper criticized the Chinese population who relied on a weak and corrupt government instead of acting in their own interests. Liang Qichao (1873–1929), who lived in exile in Japan since the failed Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898, published the journal Xinmin Congbao (New Citizen). Since it was published in Japan, the journal’s editor relied on Japanese reports for information and was thus able to point to Japan’s true motives since the beginning of the war. He emphasized that the Japanese Empire did not act out of solidarity for the Chinese people or the Chinese Empire, but rather to expand its influence in Korea and Manchuria, the latter of which was considered a war token in 1895. He warned his readers that Japan would simply replace Russia as an expansionist superpower if successful in its military goals, but Liang still favored Japan; since the two nations had much in common due to their traditional heritage, he believed in their potential cooperation. Another journal that reached many Chinese readers was the monthly Dongfang Zazhi (Eastern Miscellany), which amalgamated various publications and therefore offered a wider perspective on events. Initially, the journal warned against sympathizing with Japan, stating that it would stand no chance in the war because the Western world would never allow an Asian country to win against one of their own. However, the journal also provided pro-Japanese and anti-neutral voices, making it among the more liberal publications that let readers come to their own political conclusions. It could, however, be criticized for propagating naïve ideas about the war: The editors of Dongfang Zazhi argued that a Japanese victory would cause changes in Russia which would eventually lead to a Russian

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reduction of arms. This, in turn, would be followed by a reduction of arms of the other powers. Hence, China would be able to continue its reform policy and finally, an end would be put to all discussions about the splitting-up of China, since no one would then be in need of troops any longer.105 Nevertheless, China was encouraged to follow suit in Japan’s modernization so as to gain more power and stature. Although such notions were widespread, Japan’s victory and the events after 1905 brought to light Japanese imperialism in China, which was next on Tokyo’s military bucket list. While the Chinese government was officially able to uphold its sovereignty in Manchuria, the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth had also given Japan the right to send its troops to the region to protect the South Manchurian Railway. Furthermore – and regardless of the fact that China was directly impacted by the peace negotiations – no Chinese diplomats were invited to participate in the talks at Portsmouth. The government in Beijing’s political weakness at that time was as obvious as when foreign diplomats demanded it to be neutral about one-and-a-half years prior. The war had proven the internal weaknesses of China and its government, which was accused by its own people for being like Russia. Reformers and revolutionaries alike were well aware that the end of the Chinese Empire was near, even if the courses of the two factions split after the Russo-Japanese War: “while the reformers were hoping for cooperation with the government that supposedly had ‘woken up’ now, and were hoping for a revolution ‘from above’ with Japan in mind, for the revolutionaries it was more than clear that with the existing government there was no way to future [sic].”106 Chinese revolutionaries, however, initially leaned towards Japan where more and more students travelled to learn from and study the Asian role model. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), as quoted above, was also impressed by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.107 In Tokyo, he founded the Tongmenghui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905 and contacted leading pan-Asian circles in Japan.108 The Amur Society and the Black Ocean Society supported him financially, but he had no chance of gaining support from Japan itself, which had become a great power and had no interest in Chinese revolution. While the members of the Amur Society had organized weapon transports to China to support the revolutionary cause to gain greater influence on a post-revolutionary Chinese government, the transport plan was prevented by Japanese police. China demanded the expulsion of Sun Yat-sen from Japan in 1907, but although the Foreign Ministry sponsored a farewell party for the revolutionary, he received no further support after that. It was therefore obvious that the Tokyo government cared not for Chinese revolution and did not support the Chinese people in their fight against an antiquated and corrupt political system.109 A chance for closer cooperation between China and Japan in East Asia

64 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War was consequently missed, and with the rise of nationalist feelings in the larger Chinese cities, the Japanese became perceived as enemies.110 The most direct impact on China, however, was caused by the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria.

Manchuria Since its political status contrasted that of other Chinese provinces, Manchuria became integrated into the provincial system after the RussoJapanese War. Regardless of its official status as a province of China, Japan began to heavily invest in Manchuria, which is where the island nation planned to expand next. This was a direct consequence of the war, which, for Japan, ended in economic exhaustion rather than relief in the form of Russian indemnities. In Japan’s eyes, expansion into the Manchurian region was essential for economic recovery, but doing so would lead to conflict with the United States about the “open door” policy in this particular region.111 Japan’s economic and strategic safety demanded increasing control in Manchuria and preventing competition that would endanger the island nation’s security or hegemonic position.112 Since Manchuria had been in Russian possession after the Boxer Rebellion until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the Beijing government hoped to recover the region, which was obviously not favored by Japan after the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. America’s economic interest in Manchuria would create further tension between the two new rivals in East Asia, or, as Masujiro Honda describes it, “The gallant American now found an upper-dog in Japan, who had been an underdog with regard to China and Russia.”113 If one considers Manchuria as a typical borderland region whose modern economic development took place between 1860 and 1930 – which is also when its borders became clearer as determined by China, Japan, and Russia’s increase in settlements and political penetrations in the area – it becomes obvious that the events in 1905 led to greater international rivalry to control this area of increasing economic interest.114 Industrialization within Manchuria’s borders attracted foreign capital, but because Tokyo thought of Manchuria as another Korea that would fuel the island nation’s resources, the Japanese government disliked this foreign interest. However, the Qing Dynasty’s policies prevented Chinese settlement in the region for a long time, so those from Russia, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan had moved there instead. With relaxed settlement prohibitions in the second half of the nineteenth century, Manchuria became a veritable melting pot with a wave of Korean settlers arriving after the Russo-Japanese War. Those traveling to Manchuria often did so to avoid their governments at home, like Siberian exiles from Russia, Korean settlers who wanted to escape Japanese colonial rule, or the Chinese seeking lives far from corrupt officials. However, Qing officials – who needed more money – gradually lifted

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settlement bans on additional parts of Manchuria, which became a “land of hope and dreams” for many people.115 This would not change even after the war ended between Russia and Japan, but the latter would use this circumstance to establish the puppet state of Manchukuo116 in the 1930s. As Asada Masafumi justly states, “Manchuria remained the powder keg of East Asia,”117 even after the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian, Chinese, and Japanese empires, all of which sought supremacy in China’s northeastern province, had stationed troops in the region. To Russia, Japan, and even the United States, Manchuria was not a natural part of China but rather an extension that could easily be assimilated into their own empires.118 Consequently, the empires did all they could to maintain the upper hand in the struggle for influence. One symptom of imperialism in Manchuria was railway surveillance. The Japanese received not only the South Manchurian Railway, but also the Dairen-Changchun line (which was part of the Chinese Eastern Railway) after the war with Russia. In addition, the Japanese military had built the Antung-Mukden line during the conflict, which was later used for transportation, as well.119 These railways were used to justify stationing troops in Manchuria, which would later fuel the incidents leading to Manchukuo’s establishment and to the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). The Russo-Japanese War thus tremendously impacted Manchuria’s history, triggering many of the events that would determine the course of future decades. Having focused on the East Asian region up until this point, I would like to discuss another Asian country that the war indirectly yet tangibly affected: India.

India Japan’s victories stimulated the imaginations of numerous intellectuals worldwide, especially those living in colonies ruled by major Western powers; Japan had proven that it was possible for non-white and non-Western powers to not only modernize, but to defeat one of those powers on the battlefield. Japan’s victories foregrounded that a peripheral Asian nation was able to achieve what many colonized people dreamt of: fighting back and winning.120 Therefore, as T. R. Sareen puts it, the Russo-Japanese War not only “ushered in new forces in world history,”121 but “[Japan’s] success had a tremendous psychological impact on India.”122 However, India’s British rulers and military planners feared that Russia might attack India or Afghanistan after their defeat against Japan to reinstate its military power. The Russian army’s weakness “did not make Britain any less nervous about the defence of the North-West Frontier of India.”123 In 1902, Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850–1916) was appointed as the Indian army’s Commander-in-Chief and prepared the military’s deployment into Afghanistan in case the Russians were to attack. Due to the

66 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War British’s nervousness over the Russo-Japanese War, the new commander transformed the army from one that secured internal policies into one that would counter foreign attacks on the northern borders. Additionally, the war spread certain ideas that were even more dangerous than the prospect of losing Afghanistan; it inspired the Indian people to think of times without British rule. The irony of this is that the British themselves had prepared the means to spread such ideas. To control the extensive British Empire, colonial authorities had established a telegraph network that connected the Empire’s territories around the globe. However, as Daniel Headrick emphasizes, “this network was the means of challenging and undermining the very empire that created it.”124 While the telegraph network could have been used to crush uprisings in the past (like in 1857), the network also established a sphere of communication, which Karl W. Deutsch (1912–1992) thought of as essential in fostering nationalism.125 The Indian people were consequently able to exchange ideas at will, and more and more peripheral parts of the country were integrated into the system. This network covered 28,000 kilometers in 1865 and had tripled in length by 1900. Almost 5,000 telegraph offices were connected throughout India, indicating an increase in communication between different regions.126 This freedom to communicate was critical during the years of the Russo-Japanese War, which “were key years in the history of the Indian independence movement.”127 When Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, divided the rich province of Bengal into two smaller provinces, the Indian population resisted and local newspapers launched press campaigns in protest against this colonial act. The Swadeshi movement (“our land”) was established in Calcutta and demanded that the Indian population boycott British goods to protest foreign rule. Low telegram costs also made it possible for the protest leaders to reach people all over India and thereby transform a local movement into a national one. As this crisis intensified, news of Japan’s victories reached the Indian subcontinent. While the British government was pleased to see the Russian enemy defeated and humiliated by Japan – whose navy was trained by British officers – the Indian independence movement was also inspired by Japan’s military success. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) was among those observing and celebrating the events in East Asia, stating in his autobiography that Japan’s success “stirred up [his] enthusiasm (...) [and he] waited eagerly for the papers for fresh news daily.”128 The public’s desire for India’s freedom thus spread once an Asian nation had demonstrated its power and military prowess. Another leader of the Indian independence movement, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), also observed these events with joy.129 Japan’s conquering of large parts of the world – including the Eastern regions of Russia – naturally affected men like Nehru, who dreamt of greatness for India as well.130 Indian newspapers also covered the events in East Asia closely and informed much of the public about them. Calcutta’s Daily Hitavadi, for instance, commented on Japan’s victory at Mukden on March 28, 1905:

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“With the victory of Japan, signs are visible of the awakening of a new life (…) [and] enjoying equal rights with the white subjects of Britain.” The Bengalee of Banerjea made a similar comment on June 14, 1905: “We feel that we are not the same people as we were before the Japanese successes (…) for the first time in modern history Asia has triumphed over Europe and has vindicated its equality in the knowledge of those arts which have their cradle in Europe and which have made Europe what she is.”131 Some Indians were inspired by reports of Japan’s success and by events taking place in Russia, and this inspiration led to the first phase of Indian revolution. However, some Indian radicals advocated using violence against colonial rule, including bomb attacks and assassinations. On August 12, 1907, the radical paper Yugantar (New Era) stated that “there is another good means of acquiring strength of arms. Many people have observed in the Russian revolution that there are many partizans of the revolutionaries among the Czar’s troops. These troops will join the revolutionists with various arms.”132 It is therefore unsurprising that radical Indian revolutionaries like Rash Behari Bose (1886–1945) would seek shelter and support in Japan after an attempt at revolution failed in 1915.133 In contrast to the joy Asia felt about one of their own succeeding in war, Carl Peters describes the Europeans’ fears of an Asian uprising: “‘Asia for the Asians’ would be the outcry that gained practical importance and Britain, which today smilingly rubbed its hands over the Russian defeats, would have to feel a wave of this yellow flood in East India, where we actually already face the first movements.”134 Such fears were not unfounded, since the war led to hopes for modernization, strength, and independence in other colonial spheres.135 The Japanese victories also cleared the ground for radical revolutionary movements in Vietnam136 and stimulated further nationalist movements in other parts of Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines.137 However, one of the most observed revolutionary movements stimulated by the events in East Asia was the one in Russia, which must be analyzed in detail to further underscore the global impact of the Russo-Japanese War.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Roxby, “The Far Eastern Question,” 142. Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 34. Shichor, “Ironies of History,” 199. Ibid., 217. Laffan, “Shared Mecca,” 220–221. Partner, “Peasants into Citizens?,” 179. Frederick R. Dickinson, “Commemorating the War in Post-Versailles Japan,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al. (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 523–524. 8 Kokaze Hidemasa, “Ajia no teikokukokka,” in Ajia no teikokukokka, ed. Kokaze Hidemasa (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kǀbunkan, 2004), 10–12. 9 On the term kokka, see Kevin M. Doak, “National Identity and Nationalism,” in A Companion to Japanese History, ed. William M. Tsutsui (Malden,

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10 11

12 13 14 15

16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27

MA: Blackwell, 2007), 530–533. See also Kathryn Ragsdale, “Marriage, the Newspaper Business, and the Nation-State: Ideology in the Late Meiji Serialized Katei Shǀsetsu,” Journal of Japanese Studies 24:2 (1998), 229. On the term kokumin, see Kevin Doak, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 164–177. Naoko Shimazu, “Reading the Diaries of Japanese Conscripts: Forging National Consciousness during the Russo-Japanese War,” in Nationalisms in Japan, ed. Naoko Shimazu (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), 41. For a detailed analysis, see Naoko Shimazu, Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). The war also had a major cultural impact on Japanese society. For studies of this impact, see Komori Yǀichi, Narita Rynjichi, and Kinoshita Naoyuki, eds. Nichi-Ro Sensǀ sutadƯzu (Tǀkyǀ : Kinokuniya Shoten, 2004) and Matsuyama Daigaku, ed. Matsuyama no kioku: Nichi-Ro Sensǀ 100-nen to Roshiahei horyo (Yokohama: Seibunsha, 2004). Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 35. Ibid. See Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 36. On the Black Ocean Society (Gen’yǀsha) and the Amur Society (Kokurynjkai), see Frank Jacob, Japanism, Pan-Asianism and Terrorism: A Short History of the Amur Society (the Black Dragons) 1901–1945 (Bethesda: Academica Press, 2014). On the societies’ preparation for the Russo-Japanese War, see Frank Jacob, “Secret Societies and Preparation of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905),” Diacronie: Studi di Storia Contemporanea 28, 4 (2016), www.studistorici.com/2016/12/29/jacob_ numero_28/ (Last access, January 30, 2017). Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 37. Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 323. Hiroshi Uchida, “Marx in Japan,” Socialism and Democracy 24, 3 (2010), 205. On Kǀtoku, see Frederick G. Notehelfer, Kǀtoku Shnjsui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). On Sakai, see his autobiography Sakai Toshihiko den (Tokyoo: Kaizǀsha, 1926) and Kawaguchi Takehiko, Nihon Marukusu shugi no genrynj: Sakai Toshihiko to Yamakawa Hitoshi (Tokyo: Ariesu Shobǀ, 1983). On early Japanese socialism in general, see Maik Hendrik Sprotte, Konfliktaustragung in autoritären Herrschaftssystemen: Eine historische Fallstudie zur frühsozialistischen Bewegung im Japan der Meiji-Zeit (Marburg: Tectum, 2001). Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 324. Ibid., 325. E.g. Rǀdǀ Sekai, 2 (December 1, 1897). Rǀdǀ Sekai, 8 (March 10, 1898), 73–74; Rǀdǀ Sekai, 11 (May 11, 1898), 104. Katayama would later describe his activities and the Japanese labor movement in his work The Labor Movement in Japan (Chicago: C. H. Kerr, 1918). The program was reprinted in Asahi Shinbunsha, Meiji Taishǀ shi, Vol.1 (Tǀkyǀ: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1930), 211–213. Shimoide Junkichi, “Shakai bunken nempyǀ,” in Meiji bunka zenshnj, ed. Yoshino Sakuzǀ (Tǀkyǀ: Nippon Hyǀronsha, 1928–1930), vol. 21, 602–622 provides a list of publications related to the social issues of Japan in that time period. Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 328. Heimin Shinbun, November 15, 1903. Heimin Shinbun, March 27, 1904.

Asia and the Russo-Japanese War 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48

49 50 51 52 53

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Heimin Shinbun, February 14, March 13, March 23, and April 17, 1904. Heimin Shinbun, February 21, and March 7, 1904. Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 329. The number dropped to 4,500 copies, of which around 1,000 were ordered by direct subscribers. Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 37. Ibid., 37–38. Heimin Shinbun, June 12, 1904, cited in Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 330. Heimin Shinbun, March 14, 1904. Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 332. Ibid., 333. See also ibid., 334–337 for the activities of Katayama in the United States. For a more detailed survey of his life and works, see Hyman Kublin, Asian Revolutionary: The Life of Sen Katayama (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 338. Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 38. James Ulak, “Battling Blocks: Representations of the War in Woodblock Art,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al. (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 386. Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 38. Ibid., 39. Kaneko Rynjichi, “Realism and Propaganda: The Photographer’s Eye Trained on Society,” in The History of Japanese Photography, ed. Anne Wilkes Tucker, Dana Friis-Hansen, and Kaneko Rynjichi (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 187. For a selection of these prints, see Japanese Prints of the RussoJapanese War (Japan: 1903–1904) Sp Coll e159, Glasgow University Library. For a more detailed analysis, see Juhani Lompolo, Japanese Woodblock Prints from the Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905 (Helsinki: Lompolo, 1996); Rosanna Sheffield Parrella, Hybrid Visuality in Woodblock Prints of the Russo-Japanese War (M.A. Thesis, University of Oregon, 2006). For a broader discussion of caricature and satire during the war years see Sonja Margaretha Hotwagner, Karikatur und Satire zur Zeit des Russisch-Japanischen Krieges 1904–1905 (PhD Thesis, University of Heidelberg, 2012). Andrew Gordon, “Social Protest in Imperial Japan: The Hibiya Riot of 1905,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 12, 29:3 (2014), http://apjjf.org/-Andrew-Gordon/ 4150/article.pdf (Last access, January 2, 2017), 6. Some cinematographers from the two companies were even captured by the Russian Army. See Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 40. Ibid. Partner, “Peasants into Citizens?,” 179–180. Stewart Lone, Provincial Life and the Military in Imperial Japan: The Phantom Samurai (London/New York: Routledge, 2010) is analyzing this interrelationship in detail for the province of Gifu. See also, particularly regarding the Russo-Japanese War, Stewart Lone, “Remapping Japanese Militarism: Provincial Society at War 1904–5,” Japanese Studies 25 (2005), 53–63. Partner, “Peasants into Citizens?,” 186. Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 41. Ibid. Ibid., 43. Duckjoon Chang, “Breaking Through a Stalemate? A Study Focusing on the Kuril Islands Issue in Russo-Japanese Relations,” Asian Perspective 22, 3 (1998), 171. The diplomatic struggles about the northern islands continues to this day. See Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Lines in the Snow: Imagining the RussoJapanese Frontier,” Pacific Affairs 72, 1 (1999), 57.

70 Asia and the Russo-Japanese War 54 Michael Lewis, Rioters and Citizens: Mass Protest in Imperial Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 55 Gordon, “Social Protest,” 7; John W. Sabey, The Gen’yǀsha, the Kokurynjkai, and Japanese Expansionism (PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 1972), 226–228. 56 Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 47. 57 Gordon, “Social Protest,” 3; Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 47. 58 Gordon, “Social Protest,” 3. 59 Saburo Ienaga, “The Glorification of War in Japanese Education,” International Security 18, 3 (1993–1994), 120. 60 Guy Podoler and Michael Robinson, “On the Confluence of History and Memory: The Significance of the War for Korea,” in The Impact of the RussoJapanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 183–198 and Harold Z. Schiffrin, “The Impact of the War on China,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 169–182 The Japanese began some kind of cultural imperialism in Korea and Manchuria in the direct aftermath of the war. For one example of such measures, see Jon Davidann, “Japanese YMCA Cultural Imperialism in Korea and Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War,” The Journal of AmericanEast Asian Relations 5:3/4, (1996), 255–276. 61 Hilary Conroy, “Lessons from Japanese Imperialism,” Monumenta Nipponica 21, 3–4 (1966), 338. 62 B.S. Agarwal, “Korea as an Epicentre of Northeast Asian Power Politics: A Historical and Geopolitical Perspective,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 67, 2 (2006), 267. 63 On the Triple Intervention and its impact, see William G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 69–84. 64 George Alexander Lensen, “Japan and Tsarist Russia – the Changing Relationships, 1875–1917,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge 10, 3 (1962), 338. 65 Ibid., 340. 66 Podoler and Robinson, “Confluence of History,” 185. 67 “The Annexation of Korea to Japan,” The American Journal of International Law 4, 4 (1910), 923. 68 David Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” Monumenta Nipponica 25, 1–2 (1970), 157. 69 Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 275. 70 Raymond A. Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement: Reality or Myth?” Journal of Modern History 31, 1 (1959), 46–51. 71 “The Annexation of Korea to Japan,” 923. 72 Toyokichi Iyenaga, “Japan’s Annexation of Korea,” The Journal of Race Development 3, 2 (1912), 201. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid., 202. 75 Ibid. 76 Stewart Lone, “The Japanese Annexation of Korea 1910: The Failure of East Asian Co-Prosperity,” Modern Asian Studies 25, 1 (1991), 143. 77 For Itǀ’s vita, see Takii Kazuhiro, Itǀ Hirobumi: Chi no seijika (Tǀkyǀ: Chnjǀ Kǀron Shinsha, 2010), 372–376. 78 Itǀ Yukio, Itǀ Hirobumi: Kindai Nihon wo tsukutta otoko (Tokyo: Kǀdansha, 2009), 538–542; Kurokawa Hidenori, “Nihon no daiseijika: Itô Hirobumi mo, Chôsenjin ni totte wa gokuakunin datta!!,” in Nihonshi jinbutsu “sono

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79 80 81 82

83

84 85 86 87

88 89

90 91 92 93

94

95

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go no hanashi,” ed. Kaku Kǀzǀ, 4th edition (Tokyo: Kǀdansha, 1996), Vol. 4, 312–313; Unno Fukuju, Kankoku heigǀshi no kenkynj (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), 347. Komatsu Midori, ed. Itǀ-kǀ Zenshnj (Tokyo: Itǀ-kǀ Zenshnj Kankǀkai,1927), vol. 2, 455–459. Lone, “Japanese Annexation,” 147. Ibid., 148. Hiraoka Masa’aki, “Sugiyama Shigemaru to Uchida Ryǀhei: Kindai Nihon to Chnjgoku (3),” Asahi JƗnaru 14, 4 (1972), 42–43; Kan Jeon, “Chǀsenmondai ni ukeru Uchida Ryǀhei no shisǀ to kǀdǀ: Tairiku rǀnin ni okeru ‘Ajia shugi’ no ittenkai toshite,” Rekishigaku Kenkynj 307, 12 (1965), 17–22; Uchida Ryǀhei, “Nikkan heigǀ omoidebanashi: Kikigaki yumeno kynjsaku, in Ajiashugishatachi no koe, vol.1: Gen’yǀsha to Kokurynjkai, aruiwa kǀdǀteki Ajiashugi no genten (Tǀkyǀ: Shoshi Shinsui, 2008), 226–227. On the relation between Uchida and the Iljinhoe, see Kokurynjkai, Nikkan gappǀ hishi (Tǀkyǀ: Hara Shobǀ, 1966), vol. 1, 12–53. See Iwakura Yoshihisa, Report, February 24, 1909, Gaimushǀ gaikǀshiryǀkan B-5-2-17-21_001 and Rikugun tsûyaku Takai Yoshiki, Ryuishun ǀshnj ynjbinbutsu kǀshin, 29. April 1905, Bǀeishǀ bǀeikenkynjjo, Daihonei-NichirosenekiM38-34-147. Sabey, Gen‘yǀsha, 220–244. Frank Jacob, Die Thule-Gesellschaft und die Kokurynjkai: Geheimgesellschaften im global-historischen Vergleich (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2013), 187. Lone, “Japanese Annexation,” 156. Akexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 2. See also for a more detailed analysis of the Korean position between the expanding empires in East Asia Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895–1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Lone, “Japanese Annexation,” 161. American scholars up to the 1930s, however, described the act of annexation as favorable for Korea. See G. Trumbull Ladd, “The Annexation of Korea: An Essay in Benevolent Assimilation,” Yale Review, New Series, 1 (1912), 639–656 and Payson J. Treat, “China and Korea, 1885–1895,” Political Science Quarterly 49 (1934), 514, 542–543. “Text of the Treaty of Annexation between Korea and Japan, signed August 22, 1910,” The Advocate of Peace 72, 10 (1910), 247. For a detailed analysis, see Hilary Conroy, “Chǀsen Mondai: The Korean Problem in Meiji Japan,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 100, 5 (1956), 445. Andre Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, 4 (2000), 951. Kitano Tsuyoshi, “Manshnj ni okeru naichi kyojnj mondai: Nijnjichi kajǀ yǀkynj keisei katei no ichisokumen,” Nihon Rekishi 676, 9 (2004), 54. See also Frank Jacob, “Reflections on the Korean Diaspora in Manchuria,” in Diasporic Constructions of Home and Belonging, ed. Florian Kläger and Klaus Stierstorfer (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2015), 111–122. Gotelind Müller, “Chinese Perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War,” Heidelberg University 2013, http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/15406/1/china %20and%20the%20russo-japanese%20war%20english.pdf (Last access, January 2, 2017), 3. The discussion about China, if not mentioned otherwise, follows the analysis of Gotelind Müller. For a survey of the Russo-Chinese relations, see Sarah C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, NY/London:

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96 97 98

99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116

117 118

Sharpe 1996) and Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century (London/New York: Routledge 2002). Miyazaki Tǀten, Sanjnjsannen no yume (Tǀkyǀ: Kokkǀ Shobǀ, 1902) is only one example for such a view. Barton C. Hacker, “The Weapons of the West: Military Technology and Modernization in 19th-Century China and Japan,” Technology and Culture 18, 1 (1977), 49–50. For a detailed and extraordinary discussion of China’s military development since the gunpowder age, see Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). Hacker, “Weapons of the West,” 52. Fujimura Michio, Nisshin sensǀ zengo no Ajia seisaku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1995), 269. Cited in: Gilbert Reid, “Some of China’s War Problems,” The Journal of Race Development 6, 1 (1915), 48. For a recent discussion of this concept as well as a collection of primary source readings, see John Kuo Wei Tchen and Dylan Yeats, Yellow Peril! An Archive of Anti-Asian Fear (London/New York: Verso, 2014). Müller, “Chinese Perspectives,” 12. Eshi Jingwen, February 20 and February 23, 1904. Later, the newspaper changed its name to Jingzhong Ribao (Alarm Bell) and lost its obvious antiRussian stance, but in contrast highlighted the danger of the war for China. Ibid., 27. Ibid., 34. Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary: A Programme of a National Reconstruction for China (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 65. Schiffrin, “Impact,” 169. For a more detailed analysis of Sun’s relationship to Japanese pan-Asianists see Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Berkeley: Stanford University Press, 1970). Sabey, Gen’yǀsha, 229–233. Hando Kazutoshi, Shǀwashi, vol. 1: 1926–1945, 2nd edition (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2010), 22. Müller, “Chinese Perspectives,” 35. Masujiro Honda, “American and Japanese Diplomacy in China,” The Journal of Race Development 4, 2 (1913), 129. Ibid., 131–132. Alexander Eckstein, Kang Chao and John Chang, “The Economic Development of Manchuria: The Rise of a Frontier Economy,” The Journal of Economic History 34, 1 (1974): The Tasks of Economic History, 239. Ibid., 241. Just a few years before the Russo-Japanese War, settlement restrictions were abolished for Kirin (1902) and Heilungkiang (1904). On Manchukuo, see Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). A contemporary report about Manchukuo is provided by Henry G. W. Woodhead, A Visit to Manchukuo (Shanghai: Mercury Press, 1932). Asada Masafumi, “The China-Russia-Japan Military Balance in Manchuria, 1906–1918,” Modern Asian Studies 44, 6 (2010), 1283. Li Narangoa, “The Power of Imagination: Whose Northeast and Whose Manchuria?” Inner Asia 4, 1 (2002): Travelling Cultures and Histories: NationBuilding and Frontier Politics in Twentieth Century China, 5.

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119 Shu-hsi Hsu, “Manchurian Backgrounds II,” Pacific Affairs 5, 2 (1932), 133. 120 Claudio Coloma, “La Guerra Ruso-Japonesa y su effecto sobre el mundo periférico,” Estudios de Asia y Africa 49, 1 (153) (2014), 72. 121 T. R. Sareen, “India and the War,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 239. 122 Ibid., 241. 123 Philip Towle, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Defence of India,” Military Affairs 44, 3 (1980), 111. 124 Daniel Headrick, “A Double-Edged Sword: Communications and Imperial Control in British India,” Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 35, 1 (131) (2010): Global Communication: Telecommunication and Global Flows of Information in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century / Globale Kommunikation: Telekommunikation und globaleInformationsflüsse im späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert, 52. The telegraph network had already been important during the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857. See Krishnalal Shridharani, Story of the Indian Telegraphs: A Century of Progress (New Delhi: Posts and Telegraphs Dept., 1953), 21 and Mohini Lai Majumdar, Early History and Growth of Postal System in India (Calcutta: Rddhi-India, 1995), 252. 125 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953). 126 Headrick, “Double-Edged Sword,” 53. 127 Ibid., 59. 128 Cited in Anirudh Deshpande, “Revisiting Nehruvian Idealism in the Context of Contemporary Imperialism,” Economic and Political Weekly 41, 52 (2006/2007), 5408. 129 Gandhi and Nehru, as different as their views might have been in the later years, consequently shared the perception of the Russo-Japanese War. See Dietmar Rothermund, “Gandhi und Nehru: Kontrastierende Visionen Indiens,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 31, 3 (2005): Südasien in der Welt, 354–372. Gandhi himself is supposed to have called the Russian Revolution of 1905 in the aftermath of the war “the greatest event of the present century” and “a great lesson to us all.” Headrick, “Double-Edged Sword,” 60. 130 Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 29. 131 Both newspapers cited in Headrick, “Double-Edged Sword,” 60. 132 Ibid. 133 For his time and contacts in Japan, see Rash Behari Bose, “Tǀyama sensei ni tasukerareta hanashi,” in Tǀyama seishin, ed. Fujimoto Hisanori (Tǀkyǀ: DaiNippon Tǀyama Seishinkai, 1940, Reprint 1993), 228–240. 134 Peters, Der Ostasiatische Krieg, 347. 135 Steven G. Marks, “‘Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East!’. The Russo-Japanese War and the Rise of Nationalism in British Egypt and India,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al. (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 609–627. 136 Yitzhak Shichor, “Ironies of History: The War and the Origins of East Asian Radicalism,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 211–213. 137 Paul A. Rodell, “Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations? Southeast Asia and the 1905 Japanese Victory,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al. (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 636–643.

4

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It was always clear that Russian ambitions in East Asia had to lead to interactions with Japan. However it was uncertain what these interactions would look like, since friendship might have been an option1 provided Russia accepted the Japanese need for security, something that would be achieved in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. However, the war not only led to mutual and equal relationships after the battle between the two armies, it also marked serious changes in Russia, clearing the way to revolution. To understand the events of 1917, it is impossible to avoid focusing on 1905 as well, since the Russian revolution must be seen as a historical process, rather than a single event. The success of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution changed the world for decades, with the conflict between the ideologies of Western liberal capitalism and Soviet communism only ending in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. The starting point can be traced back to 1905, when revolutionary movements recognized the Russo-Japanese War as a factor which could be used to force political changes on the Czarist government.2 This was also supported by the Japanese military, whose planners had a clear sense of the interrelationship between war and revolutionary tendencies in Russia. As a consequence, we have to take a closer look at this particular link between the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian revolutionary development that would dramatically change the historical course of the twentieth century. The battle between Imperial Japan and Czarist Russia had various impacts on cultural aspects of Russian history,3 especially because it changed the Russian concept of Japan, which before the war had been viewed as an unimportant power.4 The Eurasian great power had to accept that the situation in East Asia had changed and that it had to deal with the Japanese government to prevent further clashes over territory in this region. The island empire, which had come to the attention of Russian intellectuals rather late,5 has not previously been viewed as important, thus few people had studied Japanese before the struggle over Manchuria and Korea. However, in 1904 and 1905 interest in Japan grew, especially since criticism of the regime and the continuing defeats also demanded a description of

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the enemy. Anti-war writings like Leonid Andreev’s Red Laugh (1905) or Lev Tolstoy’s Bethink Yourselves (1904) are evidence of this impact. While the morale of the Japanese soldiers was depicted as bad in Russia’s satirical press during the conflict, and other newspapers initially tended to downplay the Japanese successes, literature of the time was highly influenced by the events in Manchuria, even throughout the later Stalinist era.6 Russian political leaders “seemed utterly unconcerned or ignorant of the great trouble in their own country.”7 This trouble was produced by the continuing defeats in a war most common people in the Czarist Empire could not identify with. In addition, Russia’s financial situation worsened, because the expected victories never materialized and therefore had a negative impact on Russia’s financial credibility on the floors of the international stock markets. Russia had to pay more than 6.5 billion rubles for the war, a sum that caused severe financial trouble both during and after the conflict.8 If Russia had been victorious, financing the war effort might have been possible without larger loans from abroad, but even in April 1904 Finance Minister Kokovtsov tried to get money from the Banque Paribas and other financial institutions in France.9 800 million francs were granted, of which 400 million were paid immediately. Witte also demanded additional cooperation with German banks to secure Russian freedom, because an overreliance on French money might cause political pressure in the future. In December 1904, 500 million marks were finally provided by the Mendelssohn Bank, which had channeled the money from several German and Dutch bank houses. Initially, the banks had no problem with the loan requests from Russia, since everyone believed it would win the war. Hence, the continuing defeats soon put an end to this attitude, and another loan request by the Russian government in France in March 1905 was denied. The credibility of the Czarist Empire was eroded by the increasing number of Japanese victories, including the fall of Port Arthur in January 1905, and in March Lucien Wolf, a correspondent for The Times, asked the question on everyone’s lips: “Is Russia solvent?”10 Witte had already recognized the international implications of the financial burden of the war, which is why he warned the government against continuing the war, instead favoring mediation to broker a speedy peace. He was right about this issue, but his position was not favored by the Czar and other leading politicians, who still believed in a Russian victory. The revolutionary movement of 1905 grew and worsened the financial situation through general strikes and the costs of Russian measures to suppress the revolutionaries. Even though the revolution did not erupt as in 1917, and the Czar was able to politically survive by granting political reforms, the financial damage could no longer be ignored. The French government granted another loan in 1906, which Russia needed to recover from the outcome of the war, but in return Russia was obliged to support the French position at the Conference of Algeciras, which dealt with the future of Morocco. The subsequent years were colored by the Russian need to repay the loans, and by 1909 the government in St. Petersburg had

76 The road to revolution paid 6.1 billion rubles for the 1.9 billion it had received as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. The war was therefore responsible for a financial loss of around 4 billion rubles.11 The financial weakness of the state stimulated an increase in the number of private enterprises, who were able to acquire sufficient capital for investments, e.g., in new naval and military technology. The state was not in favor of losing its dominant position in these areas, but had no way to maintain its monopoly in these economically expensive sectors, especially since the government had to focus on repaying its debt abroad.12 The war, however, had simultaneously created the need for investments, primarily in the military sector. The Battle of Tsushima cost the Czarist fleet almost all of its battleships, with a net worth of around 230 million rubles, double the yearly naval budget.13 Peter Gatrell contextualized this, stating that “Tsushima had a traumatic effect, and not just on those involved in the planning and execution of Russian naval strategy. To the majority of the informed public, the defeat at Tsushima was a catastrophe that necessitated a thorough re-examination of the tsarist system of government.”14 Russian naval officers did not see it as a tragedy, especially since they thought the old ships were no longer of use anyway. The navy demanded 900 million rubles to recover from the losses of the war and to modernize, the army 2.5 billion. But Russia could not afford this rapid modernization, as by 1908 its debts on the foreign markets had increased to 8.5 billion rubles. The financial situation was not the only problem facing military leaders after the war; the fight against Japan had prompted serious discussions about the modernization of the Russian army and navy.15 To quote Bruce Menning and John W. Steinberg, experts on the Czarist military development during and after the war, “the disasters at Mukden and Tsushima were horrifying in themselves, but they were only the messiest blotches in the larger picture of military failure.”16 Publications by prominent officers pointed to the weaknesses in Russia’s military structure,17 and poor leadership was identified as the main reason for defeat against a seemingly inferior enemy.18 While the officers demanded money for reforms, the Finance Minister, Kokovtsov, was able to block these claims until 1912, when Russia started a large program to modernize its military. The economy grew steadily and rapidly between 1905 and 1914, showing the world that “the Russian engine had not run out of steam”19 and that the Czarist military steamroller was still something to fear. Although Russia recovered relatively quickly, the relationship between the Russo-Japanese War and the growing revolutionary feelings in the country could not be totally reversed.20 Next to critical depictions of the Russian political system during the war,21 the reception of Japan changed.22 In addition 1905 should later become the starting point of the revolutions in Soviet historiography.23 The war was a “total bloody nightmare,”24 propelled by incompetent leaders that encapsulated the worst of autocratic tradition. In addition, the defeat created a black spot in the country’s past

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that was not erased until Soviet victory over Japan in 1945.25 In the Russian and Soviet historiography Japan became the aggressor in the war, but the political consequences were important for the national context, where the seed of revolution was planted and grew to maturity by 1917.26 The RussoJapanese War became a “metaphor for the shortcomings of the Romanov autocracy”27 and an emblem of the weakness of the bond between the Czar and his people. Japan recognized these events as a chance to influence the final outcome of the war and developed a growing interest in the revolutionary tendencies in Russia.

Akashi Motojirǀ and Japan’s strategy for Russia’s revolution Akashi Motojirǀ (1864–1919)28 had been military attaché in Russia and was sent to Sweden when the war broke out. The Japanese officer was a graduate of Japan’s Military Academy (1881) and the Military Staff College (1887). In 1889 he was ordered to the general staff, before being sent as military attaché to Paris in 1901 and St. Petersburg in 1902.29 Akashi, who was “trained as an expert in foreign affairs”30 seemed suited to keeping as close to the enemy as possible, since he was directly subordinated to the general staff in Japan and also chosen to connect with the revolutionary movements throughout the Russian Empire to possibly sabotage the Trans-Siberian Railway. Stockholm was the best place for such ventures, and immediately after his arrival Akashi contacted his Swedish colleague Nils David Edlund and asked for recommendations of potential and capable spies.31 The establishment of a spying and sabotage network allowed the general staff to directly use the revolutionaries as a fifth column in Russia, if the military situation necessitated other means to weaken the Czarist position during the war.32 Akashi initially established a network of seven spies and five assistants, who kept in contact with the revolutionary movements in different parts of the Russian Empire.33 They were all Swedish at first, but later members of the Russian opposition joined the espionage circle. However, Akashi believed that the best quality information would be gathered by spies who simply worked for money. He did not limit himself to financing one organization, spreading the money as widely as possible.34 Their members could make a difference, since initially Japan was unsure of victory. For decades, these connections between the Japanese military and the leaders of several opposition groups in Russia were not widely known, because most of it was described in Finnish or Polish memoirs. Akashi produced a report in Japanese; however, the document35 was just a partial copy of the original reports. Presumably he was later eager to highlight his personal importance by adding or omitting details.36 Initially Akashi established contacts with the Finnish opposition, which seemed a useful way to weaken Russia from the inside. The Finnish Constitutionalist Party was active in Sweden, trying to coordinate the

78 The road to revolution resistance against Russian rule at home.37 His main contact was Konni Zilliacus (1855–1924), whose life is definitely “worthy of a film.”38 Zilliacus provided a concept that pleased the Russian revolutionaries, Finnish constitutionalists and Japanese military alike. Even though his activities, to quote Antti Kujala, “brought him close to being a Japanese agent,”39 Zilliacus recognized that Japan could make financing revolutionary actions possible, especially since the movement needed money to become active on an effective level. Akashi requested 100,000 yen to finance the activities of the different movements, and the general staff in Tokyo agreed to this sum in late August 1904.40 Even though Zilliacus took the Japanese money he was not willing to sell out his own ideas; he tried to use Akashi and especially his money for his personal targets. Perhaps to sweeten Akashi for further investments, he also introduced the Japanese to emigrated Russian revolutionaries.41 The Russian government was not totally unaware of the happenings in Sweden, but the Japanese agent in Stockholm was not deemed a serious threat to the Czarist Empire. However, the espionage and sabotage network grew, because Zilliacus had also introduced his new Japanese ally to the representatives of the Polish independence movement. Akashi was well aware that he needed the help of his Finnish contact, as all of the so-called opposition parties are secret societies, where no one can distinguish opponents of the regime from Russian agents, or even find out the names and addresses of the opposition’s leaders. It is difficult for us to identify the real opposition activists, because they have a series of false names which they often change for yet other names.42 He also recognized that Poland could be of special interest for Japanese plans due to the Polish desire to be an independent and sovereign nation state and their aggressive feelings against the Russian occupiers.43 While the Polish Nationalist Party (Polish National League) was not willing to favor a violent path to achieve this end, the Polish Socialist Party was more radical and wanted to establish a Polish nation state at any cost.44 Akashi had contacts within both parties, namely Witold JodkoNarkiewicz, Aleksander Malinowski, Roman Dmowski, and Zygmund Balicki.45 Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski both tried to convince the Japanese government of the need for closer cooperation with the Polish. The first proposed to convince the Polish soldiers fighting in the Russian army in Manchuria to lay down their weapons and even traveled to Japan to promote his plan to the general staff. Piłsudski also traveled to Japan, but he went further by proposing a rebellion in Poland. The Japanese military favored the second proposal, unlike the Foreign Ministry. Piłsudski even went as far as demanding a memorandum from the Foreign Ministry that would declare an official alliance between the Polish socialists and the Japanese government.46

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One problem became obvious during the two Poles’ stay in Japan. The Polish were not unified, and nor was the revolutionary movement throughout the Czarist Empire, where many different parties struggled for influence and disagreed over the best future political course. In Japan, Dmowski worked against Piłsudski, but it is unclear how far he was able to influence the final decision to deny support for the socialist plan. Antti Kujala explained it simply: “Rather than an all out uprising, the Japanese hoped instead that the Poles would restrict themselves to organising sabotage operations to disrupt the troop and military equipment traffic moving along the Trans-Siberian railway.”47 The Poles were interested in a long war that would weaken Russia, while Japan did not want an overlong battle that would decrease its military and financial capabilities. In addition, Poland did not yet exist, so it was unclear who would constitute something like a reliable government. More importantly, Japan needed a small uprising but not a full-scale revolution, as it had to negotiate with the Russians at the end of a successful war.48 Consequently, Akashi organized courses in sabotage for the Polish Socialist Party in Paris, hoping that the men could damage the tracks of the Trans-Siberian Railway in the future.49 However, the results proved inadequate, because the tracks could be easily repaired or replaced within a day. The courses were therefore quickly stopped.50 Zilliacus meanwhile developed a plan for a conference of all opposition groups, to take place in October 1904. During the first five days of October representatives of the Russian liberals, socialist revolutionaries, the Finnish constitutionalists, the Polish Nationalists, and the Polish Socialists met in the French capital to discuss options to unite their actions to inflict the greatest possible damage on the Czarist autocracy.51 It was concluded that they should: x x x

overthrow the autocracy and re-establish the constitutional rights of Finland replace the autocratic regime of the Czar with a democratic government elected via elections based on a universal suffrage, and accept the idea of national self-determination.52

The Polish Socialists expressed their wish for Polish independence, in contrast to the Polish National League, whose members just demanded political autonomy. The conference of Paris was a success for Zilliacus, but the jealousy and competition between the individual opposition groups for national representation and influence made coordinated action impossible.

Bloody Sunday The continuing war highlighted the weak state of the Russian military and navy and also increased economic pressure on the Russian population. Workers at the Putilov Plant were suffering under the poor working

80 The road to revolution conditions and the priest Gregori Appolonovich Gapon (1870–1906) had begun to organize the poor men. The workers discussed the war and started to think about their personal misery, which seemed to directly result of a government that spent more on a distant war than its own people. Gapon described this situation clearly: “How little is necessary to bring comfort to the suffering souls! One kind word, and their faces will shine with thankfulness and hope. (…) What increases the bitterness of the men is their complete lack of any rights, personal or public.”53 The problem was obvious for the workers: “Every person in a superior position has a power of limitless oppression.”54 When four men, members of the union, were dismissed in December 1904, the workers at the Putilov Plant started a strike to demand more rights.55 Gapon hoped this kind of pressure would work, especially since the directors needed the production to meet a government order for supplies for the front in Manchuria. It was symbolic that the strike began at the same time as the Russian army capitulated in Port Arthur. After the fall of the stronghold in the Far East, the industrial epicenter of Russia’s industrialization stopped its heartbeat. Gapon knew that the strike could be used to place severe pressure on the government, and the fall of Port Arthur presented his movement with a pretext to start their action. Thus the priest decided to direct the demands of the workers to the Czar himself. He also invited revolutionary parties to join the petitioners, and on 22 January 1905 a march to the palace of Russia’s autocrat was designed to bring about peaceful change. Gapon ordered the participants to take a portrait of the ruler with them, which would “emphasize the peaceful and orderly character”56 of the demonstrating people. What happened next was a nightmare.57 Cossacks attacked the crowd and soldiers opened fire against their own people. In the history of the Russian revolutions this event would prove a point of no return. The Czar lost his image of the caring leader of his people. He became a terrorist ruler, one who would kill his own subjects. When Russian foreign policy returned to focus on European affairs in 1905 from East Asia,58 the war itself had produced a revolutionary movement that no longer trusted the Czar and was therefore willing to not only change the political situation in Russia, but also to eradicate the former symbol of Russia’s special relationship between ruler and ruled. Bloody Sunday, as it was later called, showed Akashi and Zilliacus the increasing possibilities of a Russian revolutionary eruption in the near future. The Japanese officer recognized this opportunity and demanded 450,000 yen from Japan, to finance the final blow to the Russian Empire. However, the Foreign Ministry hesitated, because they feared that the other powers, who also had interests in Poland or in a stable Russian state, might learn of Japanese plans and use this as a pretext to intervene in the war.59 This hesitation dissipated when the Japanese army was unable to secure a final victory at Mukden. With the Russian troops still active in Manchuria and the nearing economic limits for the Japanese

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war machine, the leaders in Tokyo had to think about different approaches to end the conflict and to force the Czarist Empire to the negotiation table. At the same time, the Japanese government had been informed through various channels on the negative features of such a plan, especially the lack of unity among the Polish revolutionary parties. The Minister to Austria, Makino Nobuaki, reported: My agent living in Cracow informed me as follows: Though the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist Revolutionaries are endlessly instigating revolution, their activities have suffered chronic setbacks. The Socialist Revolutionary Party, which is the most organized of all opposition parties, is the leading force within the opposition movement. Other opposition groups are satisfied to follow the lead of the party. The plan for mobilizing reservists in ŁódĨ and Warsaw was postponed. Commerce and industries are completely stagnant all over Russia and economic problems are almost inevitable. All troops are busily occupied guarding railways and cities under martial law. It is quite unlikely that the Russian government will continue the war. I think domestic disturbances ought to be continued despite government retaliation and doubt whether the people will much value the ‘political reform’ of the government.60 In mid-March, however, Akashi’s request for money was granted. It was speculated that the final decision was made by Katsura and Kodama, who acknowledged the limits of the Japanese army in Manchuria.61 In early April 1905, a second conference of opposition parties was held in Geneva.62 Seventeen organizations were invited, but just twelve appeared. The Mensheviks did not participate at all, because they assumed that the Japanese were financing the event, while the Bolsheviks left on the second day because they were not granted influence on weapon supplies for the Russian groups. In contrast to the Paris conference, the remaining participants agreed on the need for an armed uprising. In addition, Finland and Poland demanded the establishment of national assemblies, so they and Southern Russia could become independent and sovereign states.63 The armed uprisings would be successful, as Russian morale was deemed totally destroyed, especially after the numerous defeats in the Russo Japanese War.64 Japan however decided to revoke its support for these movements in August, because further support might have damaged the peace negotiations in Portsmouth. Since the money had already been received, the preparations for the uprising continued, albeit without Japanese direction.65 A ship, the John Grafton, was chartered and weapons were bought using the money Zilliacus had received through Japanese channels – in the end he received 1 million yen. These rifles and pistols were meant to be smuggled

82 The road to revolution to St. Petersburg, where the revolution was intended to start. Abraham Asher called this plan “the most ambitious attempt to smuggle weapons into Russia during the Revolution of 1905.”66 However, bad luck ended the journey of the John Grafton. The ship became stranded on the Finnish coast and was blown up by the crew members.67 Despite the failed weapon transport, “the Poles organized revolts and endless series of extreme actions and demonstrations in various places.”68 These revolts failed, and Poland had to wait for its independence. The Japanese general staff treated the revolutionaries like “mercenaries.”69 Akashi left Europe after the war, mainly because the Russian government published a pamphlet in which the former Japanese military attaché was blamed for his work during the war.70 The unholy alliance of the Japanese and the revolutionaries was also condemned: “One soiled the glory of arms with the dirt of bribery, the other defiled the great word freedom by selling their motherland.”71 Akashi was transferred to Korea in 1907, where he became the chief of the Japanese military police. After the First World War he was appointed Governor General of Taiwan.72 It seems reasonable to say that Akashi’s work did not influence the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, but it did unwittingly encourage and coalesce the revolutionary movement throughout the Russian Empire. While the “revolutionary parties ultimately proved incapable of dealing Czarism the fatal blow,”73 the wheel which would roll directly to 1917 started to turn. It was also bad luck for the revolutionaries that the different parties were unable to unify their efforts, as the Czarist autocratic system was very vulnerable during the war years, especially in 1905. The soldiers who were sent to Manchuria had no way to suppress the revolution in continental Russia and the government recognized the danger in further recruitment. After Bloody Sunday it seemed impossible to establish further regiments for the war in East Asia.74 In addition, the reservists were hardly the most loyal troops in the Czarist army. Between September and December 1904 the recruitment drive was interrupted by 123 violent incidents, through which the Russian population channeled its anger against the Jewish population. In 1905 no further recruitment was announced.75 By the time of the Battle of Mukden, around 1 million soldiers had been sent to the Far East, stretching the Russian military might very thin. As a result, the growing revolutionary movement posed a real threat to the political leadership. The Czarist government therefore had no choice but to negotiate with Japan and hope their enemy wanted to end the war more than they did. While the Treaty of Portsmouth and the October Manifesto ended Nicholas’ II ambition for expansion in East Asia, he was not easily persuaded to think about peace.76 Despite his advisors pleading for peace and the creation of a constitution after the outbreak of general strikes, the Czar was unwilling to change his attitude to ruling. His “enigmatic personality”77 and his general reluctance to make strong decisions78 made things harder for all those who recognized

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the danger posed by simultaneous strikes, revolutionary movement, and a war. Witte described the Czar as a childish man, whose actions were the sole expressions of the influence of his bad advisors. The episode with Alekseev and Bezobrazov in East Asia described in one of the previous chapters makes it easy to agree with Witte’s conclusion.79 Nicholas really believed in his status as divine ruler, one who was only responsible to the highest authority. He believed the war would not break out simply because he did not want it to. Naturally he was proved wrong. He maintained his belief in an ultimate triumph for the Russian army, even after the fall of Port Arthur. He was a poor military thinker; he did not understand the importance of time, logistics, or planning, and he let the Second Pacific Squadron wait far too long for unneeded reinforcements from old ships, giving the Japanese sufficient time for repairs and training in preparation. But even when deciding to send the Baltic fleet to the theater of war in East Asia, the Czar changed his opinion more than once, and the “hope Nicholas had for victory was probably based more on his belief in God than on confidence”80 in the Russian navy. But despite this experience he did not acknowledge a revolutionary danger in 1905 either and wanted to keep the autocratic system exactly as it was. Political change seemed impossible, at least with this man as a figurehead of antiquated Russian autocracy. It was only when his uncle, the Grand Duke Sergei Alksandrovich, died in a bomb attack on 17 February 1905 that the Czar began to change his mind and think about reforms. Witte tried to remind Nicholas of the reality of the situation and the hopelessness of the Russian army in Manchuria by sending long letters to the autocrat, in which he urged peace and political change. The Battle of Mukden changed the situation in the former Finance Minister’s favor, since the world had recognized that the Russian army posed no serious threat to Japanese victories and other leaders’ support for Nicholas’ decision to continue the war evaporated. Maria Fedorovna, the mother of the Czar, also supported the call for peace and tried to influence Nicholas. Since her son refused to listen, she tried to contact the French government to put political – or better financial – pressure on her son. But the French ambassador Maurice Bompard and Théophile Delcassé in France were unwilling to interfere, in case Nicholas later blamed them for an unfavorable peace as a consequence of such diplomatic interference.81 Unlike the French government, French bankers had already recognized the beginning of the end of the war and broke off loan negotiations with the Russians on 13 March 1905. This increased the financial pressure on the Czarist government, since it would not be able to continue the war for long without sufficient French money.82 After the Battle of Tsushima President Roosevelt finally started his work as a mediator to reestablish a balance of power in East Asia. Ultimately, both sides were forced to the negotiation table by internal economic or political problems. However, Japan accepted this situation sooner than the Czar, whom the U.S. president disliked due to his attitude to possible peace talks,

84 The road to revolution saying: “The Czar is a preposterous little creature as the absolute autocrat of 150,000,000 people. He has been unable to make war, and he is now unable to make peace.”83 After the Battle of Mukden, the Japanese military asked the political leaders in Tokyo to start the peace process, because in the general headquarters the military leaders had realized total victory for Japan was impossible now their military power was overstretched. While they knew it would be hard to achieve any indemnities in such a situation, they tried to keep on that point for peace.84 However, the Czar in an equivalent situation after losing the last battle in Manchuria still maintained his hope for the success of the Second Pacific Squadron.85 It were the events of Tsushima that finally led to the start of peace talks. Russian prestige dropped to its lowest point as a consequence of the severe defeat and almost total destruction of the fleet. The Japanese government asked Roosevelt if he would begin his mediation. However, he was urged to do it “on his own motion and initiative,” because Japanese leaders feared being in a weak position during the peace talks if they were the first to request them.86 Roosevelt used his contacts, especially with the German Emperor, to start to put pressure on the Czar and urge peace talks. In September, the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War. However, the revolutionary wheel that had been put in motion would not stop before 1917. Some observers, like the German Freiherr v. d. Goltz, who was sure that “despite many prophecies, the Czarist Empire will survive the crisis without any deep tremors but strengthened by reforms in some regards,”87 did not recognize the tremendous impact of the war on the revolutionary movement. Of course, in 1905 it was suppressed, but that was due to the disunity of the revolutionaries rather than a lack of potential for political change within the revolution itself. It is impossible to address the events of 1917 without looking back to 1905. The revolutionary circle continued until the full potential of the popular will for change erupted, triggered by an even larger and closer war. The Japanese had established mutual relations to different opposition movements throughout Russia,88 and trained future politicians and saboteurs alike. To a certain degree, the entire world would change as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. In the Russian case the effect was substantial. Witte was one of those who recognized the interrelationship between the war and the Russian Revolution.89 He observed that “Russia has outgrown the existing regime and is striving for an order based on civic liberty.”90 Rotem Kowner agreed by calling the war the “main catalyst”91 for the revolution. Consequently, the Russo-Japanese War must be regarded as the trigger that started the revolutionary cycle in Russia. Even though the Czar announced the October Manifesto and granted a constitution and a parliamentary representation, the Duma, the reforms were halfhearted, and Nicholas quickly tried to return to his autocratic ruling style. The revolutions of 1917 were therefore just a matter of time and needed only another trigger, one which was eventually provided by the First World War and

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another string of Russian defeats. Since the Russian Revolution can be seen as the starting point of Soviet history, and thereby as the initial moment that would lead to the Cold War in the latter half of the twentieth century, the Russo-Japanese War must be seen as the starting point for the Russian revolutions and thereby a development that would change the whole twentieth century, even if this was not clear at the time. In this way, we can trace the first major impact of the Russo-Japanese War, since the aftermath for one side would eventually affect almost the entire population of the twentieth century. However, this is just one reason to call the war an event that shaped the world in the following decades. A close look at JapaneseAmerican relations since the peace negotiations at Portsmouth provides another interesting perspective, one which also supports this argument.

Notes 1 Lensen, Japan, 347. 2 Kusber, Publizistik und Historiographie, 217. 3 Bartlett, Japonisme, 9. This is also true for the impact on ethnic minorities, whose representatives were impacted by the events in East Asia as well, see: David Crowley, “Seeing Japan, Imagining Poland: Polish Art and the Russo-Japanese War,” Russian Review 67:1 (2008), 50–69. 4 Bartlett, Japonisme, 11. 5 Paul Bushkovitch, “The Far East in the Eyes of the Russian Intelligentsia, 1830–1890,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 352–356. 6 Tatiana Filippova, “Images of the Foe in the Russian Satirical Press,” in The RussoJapanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 414–425; Barry P. Scherr, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Literary Imagination,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 427. 7 Sakurai, Human Bullets, 35. 8 Boris Ananich, “Russian Military Expenditures in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 450. 9 Ibid., 452. 10 The Times, 11.3.1905 11 Ananich, Russian Military Expenditures, 462. 12 Peter Gatrell, “After Tsushima: Economic and Administrative Aspects of Russian Naval Rearmament, 1905–1913,” The Economic History Review, New Series, 43, 2 (1990), 256. 13 Ibid., 257. 14 Ibid. 15 Carl van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832–1914 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 131–154. 16 Bruce W. Menning and John W. Steinberg, “Lessons Lessened: The Near-Term Military Legacy of 1904–5 in Imperial Russia,” in The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies, ed. Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2008), 77.

86 The road to revolution 17 It in a way seemed to be more like a witch hunt for someone who could be made responsible of the Russian defeats. 18 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Rewriting, 80. 19 Gatrell, After Tsushima, 268. 20 John Bushnell, “The Specter of Mutinous Reserves: How the War Produced the October Manifesto,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2005), 334. 21 “Tolstoy’s Letter on the Russo-Japanese War,” The Advocate of Peace 66:9 (1904), 158–159. 22 Yuan Tung-Li, “Russian Works on Japan: A Selected Bibliography,” Monumenta Serica 19 (1960), 403–436. 23 Dmitrii Oleinikov, “The War in Russian Historical Memory,” in The RussoJapanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 509–522. 24 Rech’, February 25, 1911 cited in Cohen, “Long Ago and Far Away, 388. 25 Lecture on Stalin on 22 September 1945, in Über den Großen Vaterländischen Krieg der Sowjetunion (Moskau: Verlag für fremdsprachige Literatur, 1946), 230–232. 26 Kusber, Publizistik und Historiographie, 234. 27 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Rewriting, 79. 28 Komori Tokuji, Akashi Motojirô, 2 vols., (Taihoku: Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpǀsha, 1928). For a survey of his activities during the Russo-Japanese War, see Futrell, Michael: Colonel Akashi and Japanese Contacts with Russian Revolutionaries in 1904–5, in: Far East Asian Affairs, Vol. 4 (1967), S.7–22. 29 Inaba Chiharu, “Akashi’s Career,” in Akashi Motojirô, Rakka ryûsui. Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War, selected chapters translated by Inaba Chiharu edited by Olavi K. Fält und Antti Kujala (Helsinki, Studia Historica, 1988), 17. 30 Ibid., 18. 31 Antti Kujala, “The Letters of Colonel Akashi and His Aide Major Nagao Preserved in Finland and Sweden,” in Akashi Motojirô, Rakka ryûsui. Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War, selected chapters translated by Inaba Chiharu edited by Olavi K. Fält und Antti Kujala (Helsinki, Studia Historica, 1988), 170–171. 32 Antti Kujala, “The Japanese General Staff and the Issue of Concerted AntiGovernment Action in the Russian Empire,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 261. 33 Inaba Chiharu, “An Explanatory Note on Rakka ryûsui,” in Akashi Motojirô, Rakka ryûsui. Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War, selected chapters translated by Inaba Chiharu edited by Olavi K. Fält und Antti Kujala (Helsinki, Studia Historica, 1988), 13–14. 34 Olavi K. Fält and Antti Kujala, “Preface,” in Akashi Motojirô, Rakka ryûsui. Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War, selected chapters translated by Inaba Chiharu edited by Olavi K. Fält und Antti Kujala (Helsinki, Studia Historica, 1988), 5. 35 Akashi Motojirǀ, “Falling Flowers and Flowing Water,” May, 1938, B12080958600. 36 Inaba, Explanatory Note, 11–15.

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37 Akashi Motojirǀ, “Rakka rynjsui,” in Akashi Motojirǀ, Rakka rynjsui. Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War, selected chapters translated by Inaba Chiharu edited by Olavi K. Fält und Antti Kujala (Helsinki, Studia Historica, 1988), 35; Kujala, Japanese General Staff, 264. Akashi’s work stimulated the positive image of Japan in Finland in the following years, Olavi K. Fält, “The Influence of Finnish-Japanese Cooperation during the Russo-Japanese War on Relations between Finland and Japan in 1917–1944,” in Akashi Motojirǀ, Rakka rynjsui. Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War, selected chapters translated by Inaba Chiharu edited by Olavi K. Fält und Antti Kujala (Helsinki, Studia Historica, 1988), 180. 38 David Kirby, “‘En munsbit, hvilken af Ryssen utslukades.’ Independence as Ideal and Reality in Finland,” in 1809 und die Folgen. Finnland zwischen Schweden, Russland und Deutschland, ed. Jan Hecker-Stampehl, Bernd Henningsen, AnnaMaija Mertens, and Stephan Michael Schröder (Berlin: BWV, 2011), 152. For a biographical survey of the Finnish politician, see: Antti Kujala, “March Separately – Strike Together. The Paris and Geneva Conferences Held by the Russian and Minority Nationalities’ Revolutionary and Opposition Parties, 1904–1905,” in Akashi Motojirô, Rakka ryûsui. Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the RussoJapanese War, selected chapters translated by Inaba Chiharu edited by Olavi K. Fält und Antti Kujala (Helsinki, Studia Historica, 1988), 88–91. Konni Zilliacus, Sortovuosilta, Poliittisia muistelmia (Porvoo: WSOY, 1920), 97 describes the first meeting of the two men. 39 Kujala, March Separately, 99. 40 Akashi, Rakka ryûsui, 57; Kujala, Japanese General Staff, 265. 41 Dimitrii B. Pavlov, “Japanese Money and the Russian Revolution, 1904–1905,” Acta Slavica Iaponica 11 (1993), 80. 42 Akashi, Rakka ryûsui, 33. In East Asia Japanese spies had started to attack the railways immediately after the outbreak of the war, see: Report Inoue to Komura, Berlin, March 15, 1904, Withdrew of Japanese Embassy and Consulates and the Japanese from Russia during the Russo-Japanese War, and protection of the U.S. government Vol. 1, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, B07090545400. 43 Inaba Chiharu, “The Politics of Subversion. Japanese Aid to Opposition Groups in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War,” in Akashi Motojirô, Rakka ryûsui. Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War, selected chapters translated by Inaba Chiharu edited by Olavi K. Fält und Antti Kujala (Helsinki, Studia Historica, 1988), 71. 44 Akashi, Rakka ryûsui, 27. 45 For a detailed survey of the Japanese-Polish relations during the war, see: Bandǀ Hiroshi, Porandojin to Nichi-Ro Sensǀ (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1995). 46 Akashi, Rakka ryûsui, 38; Inaba, Politics of Subversion, 71–72; Kujala, Japanese General Staff, 266. 47 Kujala, March Separately, 101. 48 Inaba, Politics of Subversion, 74; Kujala, March Separately, 102. 49 Kujala, Japanese General Staff, 267–268. 50 Akashi, Rakka ryûsui, 38. 51 Ibid., 39–41. For a list of participating organizations and their members, see Kujala, March Separately, 125; Kujala, Japanese General Staff, 268. 52 Kujala, March Separately, 126.

88 The road to revolution 53 George Gapon, The Story of My Life (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1906), 141–142. 54 Ibid., 142. 55 Ibid., 148. For a detailed account of the developments in January 1905, see: Walter Sablinsky, The Road to Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Petersburg Massacre of 1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 56 Gapon, Story of My Life, 178. 57 Ibid., 174–185. 58 Carl Peters, “Der Friede zwischen Japan und Rußland,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3 (Munich/Berlin: C.H. Beck, 1944), 369. 59 Inaba, Politics of Subversion, 77–78. 60 Akashi, Rakka ryûsui, 63. 61 Inaba, Politics of Subversion, 80–81. 62 Kujala, March Separately, 150. 63 Akashi, Rakka ryûsui, 65; Kujala, March Separately, 155; Pavlov, “Japanese Money, 84–85. 64 Kujala, March Separately, 161. 65 Inaba Chiharu, Politics of Subversion, 82. 66 Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905. Russia in Disarray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 367. 67 Michael Futrell, Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland 1863–1917, (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), 77; Kujala, Japanese General Staff, 275–277; Pavlov, Japanese Money, 84. 68 Akashi, Rakka ryûsui, 52. 69 Kujala, Japanese General Staff, 277. 70 Iznanka revolutsii, Vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Rossii na yaponskie sredstva (St. Petersburg, 1906). 71 Ibid., 3. 72 Inaba, Career, 19–20. 73 Kujala, March Separately, 85. 74 Bushnell, Specter of Mutinous Reserves, 334. 75 Ibid., 335–340. 76 Ibid., 344; Jonathan Frankel, “The War and the Fate of the Tsarist Autocracy,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 64; David McDonald, “Tsushima’s Echoes: Asian Defeat and Tsarist Foreign Policy,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2005), 545. 77 Raymond A. Esthus, “Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War,” Russian Review 40:4 (1981), 396. 78 A. A. Mosolov, At the Court of the Last Tsar: Being the Memoirs of A. A. Mossolov (London: Methuen, 1935), 6–10 79 Esthus, Nicholas II, 396. 80 Ibid., 398. 81 Delcassé to Bompard, Telegram, 12 March 1905, and Bompard to Delcassé, Telegram, 13 March 1905, France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangeres, Documents diplomatiques français (1871–1914), 2nd series, 1901–1911 (Paris, 1930–55), 6:192–93. 82 Esthus, Nicholas II, 400 130 83 Roosevelt to Hay, 2 April 1905, in The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting E. Morison, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1951–1954). 4:1, 156–158. 84 Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War (New York. Columbia University Press, 1970), 111–118.

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85 Bernhard Bülow, Memoirs of Prince von Bülow, 4 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1931–1932), 2:147. 86 Esthus, Nicholas II, 404. 87 Goltz, Rußlands mittelasiatische Stellung, 191. 88 Kuromiya Hiroaki and Georges Mamoulia, “Anti-Russian and Anti-Soviet Subversion: The Caucasian-Japanese Nexus, 1904–1945,” Europe-Asia Studies 61:8 (2009), 1415–1416. 89 Frankel, The War and the Fate, 57. 90 A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917, ed. G. Vernadsky (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 3: 704. 91 Kowner, “Colonial Clash,” 7.

5

Portsmouth: the first step towards Pearl Harbor

The Portsmouth peace treaty is a marvelous and epoch making event, nothing short of stupendous in its consequences, not only to the two countries immediately concerned, BUT TO THE WORLD AT LARGE, consequences which will be felt directly or indirectly through the whole of Asia and Europe and which may profoundly influence great diplomatic victory for Russia, a greater moral victory for Japan, a personal triumph for the president of the United States such as few men have achieved in history, a victory for THE POLITICAL IDEALS OF AMERICA, which will greatly enhance her prestige in the world at large.1 Josiah Quincy, 1905

Reporter Josiah Quincy was right in his estimation of the importance of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 5 September 1905. However, his evaluation omitted the negative consequences of the peace negotiations, especially on Japanese-American relations between the signing of the treaty and the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. This chapter will show the extent to which the events of the peace negotiations and the final treaty itself worsened the relations between the two powers that would later determine the fate of the Pacific Rim. What has been interpreted as a personal victory of Theodore Roosevelt in fact marked the beginning of a decreasing trend of friendly relations. The friendly feelings between Japan and the United States that grew during the war against Russia were slowly replaced by suspicion and aggressive jealousy on both sides, as a growing number of potential conflicts hardened the relationship between the emerging imperial powers of the early twentieth century. After the Battle of Mukden, the war basically stopped. No large maneuvers were planned or conducted by either of the two powers. The monthly report from the German observers in China only mentioned minor skirmishes between the Russian and Japanese cavalry, as a result of which the Czarist troops were pressed back to the north and Japanese troops began the invasion of Sakhalin.2 But other than these unimportant military clashes, nothing seemed to happen in Manchuria. The unwillingness to continue fighting was explained by Rotem Kowner as a consequence of “the fact that

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neither side fought on its own territory, and that each had much to lose at home.”3 The time was therefore ripe for peace negotiations, and to quote Bruce W. Menning, “Theodore Roosevelt was perfectly willing to serve as the arm-twisting apostle of compromise.”4 The Japanese government had been unwilling to accept negotiations or a U.S. mediation before the war broke out5, but now was more than aware that it needed a mediator to get into peace talks with the Russians. The president of the United States, as outlined in a letter to the British statesman Sir George Otto Trevelyan (1838–1928), on March 9, 1905, had already contacted the Czarist government in January to persuade it to accept the need for peace negotiations: Six weeks ago I privately and unofficially advised the Russian Government, and afterwards repeated the advice indirectly through the French Government, to make peace, telling them that of course if they were sure their fleet could now beat the Japanese, and if they were sure they could put and keep six hundred thousand men in Manchuria, I had nothing to say; but that in my own belief the measure of their mistaken judgment for the last year would be the measure of their mistaken judgment for the next if they continued the war, and that they could not count upon as favorable terms of peace as the Japanese were still willing to offer if they refused to come to terms until the Japanese armies were north of Harbin.6 However, the path to a peace treaty, which would later be described as an “Epoch-Making Event in World’s History,”7 was a hard one, and on more than one occasion it seemed the U.S. president’s abilities would be insufficient to persuade Russian and Japanese delegations to end hostilities. Rossevelt was rather frustrated about the situation, since both parties seemed to be not only unwilling to make peace, but also resistant listen to the advice of the U.S. president. Furthermore, the European powers distrusted each other and were fearing a plot from each other. In a confidential letter to Secretary of State John Hay (1838–1905) on April 2, 1905, Roosevelt declared the frustrating situation in detail. I have seen Cassini (Russian Ambassador) twice, Takahira (Japanese Minister), Durand (British Ambassador) and Jusserand (French Ambassador) each once, and Speck (von Sternburg, German Ambassador) three or four times during the past week. The Kaiser has become a monomaniac about getting into communication with me every time he drinks three pen’orth of conspiracy against his life and power; but as has been so often the case for the last year, he at the moment is playing our game or, as I should more politely put it, his interests and ours, together with those of humanity in general, are identical. He does not wish a congress of the powers to settle the Japanese-Russian business. As things are at present I cordially agree with him, and I find that the

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Portsmouth: first step towards Pearl Harbor British and Japanese governments take the same view. The Kaiser is relieved and surprised to find that this is true of the English government. He sincerely believes that the English are planning to attack him and smash his fleet, and perhaps join with France in a war to the death against him. As a matter of fact the English harbor no such intentions, but are themselves in a condition of panic terror lest the Kaiser secretly intend to form an alliance against them with France or Russia, or both, to destroy their fleet and blot out the British Empire from the map! It is as funny a case as I have ever seen of mutual distrust and fear bringing two peoples to the verge of war.8

In addition, the clear support for the Japanese side was no longer as strong as it had been during the war. Roosevelt was willing “to welcome [the Japanese] as a valuable factor in the civilization of the future,” however, at the same time, the president was concerned for the fact that “is not to be expected that they should be free from prejudice against and distrust of the white race.”9 The longer it took to set up the preliminaries for the peace talks between Russia and Japan, the more antagonistic Roosevelt got towards the parties involved. He felt unease with regard to the negotiations and did not believe, that the plenipotentiaries and governments in St Petersburg or Tokyo would believe that he was solely acting on behalf of a just peace. He complained about this in a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. on June 16, 1905: The more I see of the Czar, the Kaiser, and the Mikado, the better I am content with democracy, even if we have to include the American newspaper as one of its assets liability would be a better term. Russia is so corrupt, so treacherous and shifty, and so incompetent, that I am utterly unable to say whether or not it will make peace, or break off the negotiations at any moment. Japan is, of course, entirely selfish, though with a veneer of courtesy, and with infinitely more knowledge of what it wants and capacity to get it. I should not be surprised if the peace negotiations broke off at any moment. Russia, of course, does not believe in the genuineness of my motives and words, and I sometimes doubt whether Japan does.10 While the war was ongoing in Manchuria, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Roosevelt’s intervention prevented the European great powers, especially Germany, prevented them from interfering in the fight between Japan and Russia.11 On 24 July 1905, Roosevelt wrote a letter to the British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring Rice (1859–1918) in which he again explained his reasons for non-intervention in detail: As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France, in the most polite and discreet fashion, that in the event of a combination against Japan to try to do what Russia, Germany, and France did to

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her in 1894 [sic] I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf. I, of course, knew that your government would act in the same way, and I thought it best that I should have no consultation with your people before announcing my own purpose.12 For Roosevelt a combined intervention of European powers, as had taken place in 1895, would have weakened the U.S. position in China and Manchuria, especially since the main interest in this region was the Open Door in Manchuria, which he hoped to assure without too many costs by relying on British support and his own fleet.13 Since Japan had promised the same economic rights for all powers in this region after a successful campaign against the Czarist Empire, it was just natural for the president to support them.14 In contrast, a Russian victory symbolized a threat to American economic interests in East Asia and Roosevelt initially feared a Czarist victory, which is why he ordered naval leaders to prepare a possible plan for U.S. actions against Vladivostok.15 Joint military operations by Britain and the U.S. against a possible alliance of Russia’s European supporters were considered; however, the Japanese victories showed that such plans were unnecessary. Japan quickly surprised everyone who doubted her military capabilities. While Roosevelt had not signed an official agreement of support with the Japanese government, the leaders in Tokyo knew that they could at least rely on positive neutrality from the United States. However, the outcome of the Russo-Japanese made it clear that Roosevelt needed to balance the danger of Russian expansion in Manchuria against a future possible threat by the growing influence of Japan in East Asia. Initially, he decided to act against the real menace, especially since the Russian occupation of Manchuria posed a greater danger to U.S. interests in Manchuria than Japan at that time. Consequently, Roosevelt had to favor the Japanese until a military balance of power could be achieved.16 Like the British, the U.S. president favored Japanese expansion to the north. A protectorate in Korea under Japanese rule promised greater economic possibilities for an Open Door in the region than a Russian occupation, Russia having already shown its exclusive ambitions in China in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion. In July 1905, the U.S. and Japan signed the Taft-Katsura Agreement, securing this scenario by exchanging Korea and the Philippines as exclusive spheres of interest for Japan and the United States.17 On these grounds it is not surprising that public opinion in Great Britain and the United States favored Japan during the war. Japanese politicians and statesmen tried to paint the struggle as that of a civilized nation against a barbaric autocracy, and the press in both Western countries quickly adopted this position. The war was described as an epic fight between constitutionalism and absolutism, which is why it was stated that Japan would rather fight for Western ideals than her own expansionist ambitions.18 George Kennan

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(1845–1924) was the figurehead of anti-Russian sentiments, not only due to his book on Siberia and the Exile System (1891),19 but because he published 26 articles during the Russo-Japanese War that painted Japan in a positive light20 and the Czarist Empire a negative one, where “arrogance, miscalculation, and sloth inevitably led to disaster.”21 He emphasized that “Japan treats her enemies better than Russia does her subjects,”22 something he also propagated in the POW camps in Japan to stimulate revolutionary thoughts in Russia.23 The sympathies were definitely with Japan, which helped secured the Japanese finances during the war, as the government in Tokyo was in need of foreign money to finance its large campaigns as well. Japan had not been a financial global player before the Russo-Japanese War, even though two loans had previously been granted to the developing East Asian nation state, which were needed for the first railway constructions and to pay samurai stipends after the country started its social transformation in 1868.24 The war was expensive, and the 1 billion U.S. dollars needed to finance the victories of Mukden and Tsushima made Japan an accepted nation state on the world’s financial markets.25 However, it was hard to secure the first loan, since almost nobody believed in a Japanese victory. The first money – a 50 million dollar loan – was granted by the banking house Kuhn, Loeb and Co. in New York, where Jacob H. Schiff (1847–1920)26 had promoted the Japanese case, especially since he hoped to punish the Czarist Empire for its anti-Jewish policies. Subsequent victories bolstered Japan’s position, and more loans were granted at the international finance center in London. In all, 350 million dollars for continued improvements were granted by July 1905.27 Despite Japan’s increasing credibility, the financial limits seemed to be reached after the Battle of Mukden, when the Japanese were no longer able to pursue the Russian troops to the north due to a shortage of munitions and the financial implications of continuing the war on a large scale. The remaining money would only last six months, thus peace negotiations were inevitable for the Japanese.28 Speculations about the Japanese demands, which had already begun in late 1904, led Deutsche Tageszeitung (German Daily News) to sarcastically comment: Poor Japan! It has not yet killed the bear, but it has already started to cut its fur. The friends of Japan would assist her immensely by pulling the rowdy, belligerent, but promising, nation out of the clouds of victorious excitement to the cold and unemotional earth. Japan has to recognize the real situation and balance of power.29 This kind of prophetic statement was more urgent than ever in 1905. Japan needed peace, but Russia seemed unwilling to end the war. The Czar repeated his decision to continue the war until his government could achieve a suitable outcome.30 Regardless of this attitude, the defeat at Mukden in combination with the revolutionary tendencies at home forced Russia into peace negotiations. Roosevelt increasingly wanted to keep Russia in the game in East Asia to block

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future Japanese ambitions, so the Russian ambassador to Washington, Arthur Cassini (1836–1913), also tried to convince the government in St. Petersburg to start negotiations.31 The Czar, however, remained adamant, and Roosevelt started to develop a personal animosity against him. He wrote to Secretary of State John Hay (1838–1905): “[The Czar] has been unable to make war, and he is now unable to make peace.”32 When the Japanese bombarded the Russian fleet out of history during the Battle of Tsushima, Roosevelt was shocked at this epic “event in world history”33 and now had the chance to offer his mediation. Russia was no longer able to threaten Japan, while Japan itself was financially and militarily exhausted.34 The Japanese government wanted direct negotiations between the two belligerents, but they made clear that any mediation must be a consequence of Roosevelt’s own wish and initiative.35 The negotiations would not only end the war, it was also a question “of rank and image of two empires”36 that had to be decided. Roosevelt used his ambassador to St. Petersburg, George von Lengerke Meyer (1858–1918), to stay in direct contact with the Czar during the days in Portsmouth and to put occasional pressure on the autocrat.37 The U.S. president also made clear that the delegates needed to be plenipotentiaries who could really make peace and draft an eventual treaty.38 During the organizational period for the peace conference several problems occurred and the president, according to Eugene P. Trani, “resembled a circus juggler.”39 First it was necessary to find a place to negotiate. The Russians favored The Hague, the Japanese Washington. But Washington was too hot in the summer, which is why a location on the northern coast was preferred40 and Portsmouth, New Hampshire finally chosen. Another problem was the nomination of the delegations, since the Japanese did not want to name anyone before knowing the name of the Russian counterpart, since the people sent to negotiate needed to be of equal rank.41 The Czarist government had severe difficulties in naming a leading delegate, especially since the autocrat Nicholas was unwilling to send Witte.42 Many other alternatives were unavailable, and when the supposed diplomats denied the task of leading the Russian peace talks, the Czar had choice but to send Witte, accompanied by several specialists.43 Witte himself is said to have commented on his choice as follows: “when a sewer has to be cleaned, they send Witte; but as soon as work of a cleaner and nicer kind appears, plenty of other candidates spring up.”44 His selection, however, may have been Nicholas’ only strong decision during the entire war. The Russian plenipotentiary had developed a strategy to help him secure a strong position during the peace talks in Portsmouth. He would: 1 2 3 4 5

not signal any wish for peace pretend the great power status of Russia, whose defeats were just a consequence of bad luck please the American press convince the American public opinion of Russia’s good will, and signal a pro-Jewish attitude.45

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When he traveled through the United States he always tried to be extremely friendly to ordinary people to underline his democratic and liberal nature, something which ultimately secured him the support of the public and the American press.46 He talked very frankly with journalists and newspaper men, which the Japanese delegation47 did not like at all. Witte was a selfmade man, whose body language and emotional way of speaking made him an outsider in Russia. In the United States of the early twentieth century, it was this attitude that made him more human and likable than his Japanese counterpart, Komura, who in comparison seemed too distant and serious. The Russian was an attraction for the journalists.48 Komura, who had studied law with Roosevelt in the United States, instead seemed every inch the classical diplomat, representing Western habits of diplomacy to perfection. He was eager to keep the talks secret, but the U.S. public did not like this.49 The Japanese were not ignorant of the importance of the public opinion in the United States. Before and especially during the hostilities, Japanese intellectuals, politicians, and other “celebrities” were sent to Europe and America to spread a positive image of Japan via numerous talks and English publications.50 Viscount Suematsu Kenchǀ (1855–1920) toured Europe to do the same there, and the crown prince and his wife visited Great Britain and Germany in May 1905. The Japanese government definitely wanted to prevent a repeat of the events of 1895, when Russia, France, and Germany had intervened against the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki and thereby quashed Japanese expansionist gains.51 However, it was Roosevelt who seemed worried about the possible demands of the victorious government in Tokyo.52 The Japanese needed an indemnity to cover the costs of the war without weakening the Japanese economy for years, and the U.S. president was unable to change this attitude during June and July, no matter how often he tried to persuade both parties to find a more suitable solution for Russia and Japan.53 In July, the leaders in Tokyo finally decided on their demands: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

full control of Korea Russian withdrawal from Manchuria the rights on the Liaodong Peninsula should be transferred to Japan the railway rights south of Harbin should be transferred to Japan Russia had to pay an indemnity the Russian war vessels in neutral ports should be transferred to Japan Sakhalin should be transferred to Japan Japan would be granted fishing rights in Russian waters Russian naval strength in the Far East should be limited Vladivostok should be limited to be just a commercial harbor in the future.54

The negotiations seemed set to become another battle in the war. While the Japanese had every right to claim the fruits of victory, international policies had changed since the outbreak of the war, and Japan would suffer its first and only defeat at the negotiation table in Portsmouth.

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But the Japanese delegates did not yet know this. James J. Hill (1838–1916), a U.S. railway magnate, organized transport to the American West Coast on the Minnesota, one of the Great Northern Steamship Company’s liners, as well as the railway transport to the East Coast, and when Komura arrived in Seattle on 19 July 1905, over a thousand people cheered for his arrival and the mayor accompanied him on a tour through the city.55 The situation, as described by Trani, seemed paradoxical, because the “Americans did not wish to live with the Japanese but hoped that Komura would gain victories at the conference.”56 When the negotiations began the Russian army in Manchuria was confused and demoralized,57 but the Czar was unwilling to recognize this. Conversely, the Japanese felt they were undisputed victors, and when the delegates met with Roosevelt in late July they repeatedly demanded an indemnity.58 Although the Russians seemed willing to pay for the treatment of their POWs, the delegates from St. Petersburg refused to give up Sakhalin, pay any indemnity, transfer vessels in neutral ports or limit Russia’s naval power in the Pacific.59 On 10 August 1905, Komura presented the Japanese demands.60 The demand for Vladivostok to become a solely commercial harbor had vanished, and Roosevelt believed Japan’s position was negotiable. Seven days later, the Czar reiterated that there would be no indemnity and no territorial gains for Japan. On 18 August Komura again talked with Witte about Sakhalin. Japan would withdraw its troops from the northern region for 1.2 billion yen and would no longer demand the transfer of Russian ships nor the limitation of Russian naval power. Thus, the Japanese started to move their position towards the Czarist one.61 Roosevelt also tried to push the Russians over Sakhalin, but in St. Petersburg the attitude remained aggressive, since Nicholas was completely unwilling to cede territory or pay any money. The San Francisco Call reported on Witte’s opinion the same day: (He) is telling his friends that the outlook is hopeless. He sees not the slightest chance for an understanding. The Japanese to-day were obdurate, exhibiting an uncompromising attitude and to this more than to anything else is attributed the confident feeling among the Russians that negotiations have practically come to a futile end. “We might as well have talked to stone walls as to the Japanese,” said one prominent member of the Russian mission to-night.”62 The Sunday Star in Washington, D.C. went even further by concluding that: The developments of the past few days have demonstrated that if anybody is to make further concessions it will not be the Russians, and the Japanese have become aware of that. They know now that the breaking of the deadlock must be done by them or it will not be done at all. The true ground for the Russian pessimism of the past week has been that they knew they would not give in, and they did not believe Japan would. (…) Russia is not, however, in the position of having made no concessions. She has submitted

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Portsmouth: first step towards Pearl Harbor to the Japanese position on eight points out of the twelve. There she has taken her stand and refused to yield another point. (…) The game was played to the very end, and when the fact was definitely established that the Russians would let the conference go to pieces sooner than yield another point then the Japanese began to think of concessions.63

In the meantime, Roosevelt had contacted Wilhelm II to put further pressure on Nicholas in St. Petersburg. However, the Czar ordered Witte to break off negotiations on 22 August 1905 for the first time, increasing pressure all round. Meyer was able to persuade Nicholas to agree on the loss of half of Sakhalin, but an indemnity was impossible. Roosevelt warned the Japanese that a further demand for indemnity could lead to a breakdown in negotiations and would change the balance of public opinion.64 On 23 August 1905, Komura proposed Roosevelt’s compromise, as reported a day later by The Semi-Weekly Messenger in Wilmington, North Carolina in vivid terms: It was the dramatic moment – the moment to which all the previous proceedings of the conference had led. The protocols involving agreement upon eight of the twelve conditions originally presented by Japan had been signed. One side or the other must make a move, or the plenipotentiaries had reached the parting of the ways. The adversaries faced each other across the table. Of course it was well understood what would happen, but that in a way only made it more dramatic. Figuratively, President Roosevelt suddenly entered the conference room. M. Witte sat silent, and the move in the great diplomatic game passed to Japan. Baron Komura in a few words explained that Japan in her great desire for peace was ready to make certain “modifications” of the original articles in the hope that Russia could find it proper to accept them. He then presented in writing to M. Witte the compromise proposition which President Roosevelt has suggested. (…) It was President Roosevelt’s compromise and M. Witte knew its contents as well as Baron Komura. The question of whether he had been “bluffing” was put to the test.65 Witte once again reiterated that Russia “would not pay, not a copeck.” Consequently, the newspaper concluded that the “outlook is black, many believe it was never so black as tonight.”66 Roosevelt’s solution was not accepted, even though it would, as reported by the Daily Press in Newport, Virginia, “ingeniously permit the satisfaction of the Japanese demands for reimbursement for the cost of the war [and] at the same time enable Russia to face the world with the declaration that she had not ceded a foot of territory or paid a kopeck of war tribute.”67 It was now Japan’s turn to either break off peace talks or try to come up with a proposal that was agreeable for the Russians. Komura reported the situation to Tokyo,68 while in Russia war hawks seemed to gain the support of the Czar

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again. On 28 August 1905, Witte was once again ordered to end the peace talks and return to Russia, but he refused to follow this order. The Japanese, who seemed more willing to accept Roosevelt’s advice than the Russians’, finally decided to revoke their claim for an indemnity for the sake of peace.69 In the last session of 28 August 1905, Komura agreed to divide Sakhalin without indemnity. He thereby paved the way for what was “clearly a Roosevelt-managed peace” that secured the Nobel Peace Prize for Roosevelt a year later and made Witte known as “Count Half-Sakhalin.”70 Russia soon began to withdraw its troops from Manchuria, while leaving some to protect their railways in the northern part of the Chinese territory.71 Despite the Russian retreat, their ambitions to pursue special rights in this region remained, and were in fact increased thanks to the Japanese, who could now claim the same rights in the south.72 The final peace terms were reported around the world:73 1 The recognition of the preponderating interest of Japan in Korea. This was agreed to by the Russians. 2 The evacuation of Manchuria by the Russian and Japanese forces. This was agreed to by the Russians, who occupy two-thirds of the territory. 3 Transfer by Russia to Japan of the leasehold of Liaotung peninsula, which includes Port Arthur and Dalny. This was agreed to by the Russians. 4 The return to China of the civil administration of Manchura [sic]. This was agreed to by the Russians. 5 The concession of Sakhalin island by the Russians, the Japanese military forces occupying it by force of arms. Russia refused and compelled the Japanese to return to them onehalf of the island. 6 Transfer to the Japanese by Russia, without compensation, of all docks, magazines and military works at Port Arthur and Dalny. Agreed to by the Russians. 7 Transfer of the railroad between Port Arthur and Kunshlen. Agreed to by the Russians. 8 Retention by Russia of main line of railroad from Kunshlen to Vladivostock. Agreed to by the Japanese. 9 Russia to reimburse Japan for the cost of the war. Rejected by the Russians. 10 Russian warships interned at various neutral ports to be turned over to the Japanese. Rejected by the Russians. 11 The limitation of Russian naval strength in the Far East. Rejected by the Russians. 12 Granting to the Japanese certain fishing rights on the Siberian coast. Rejected by the Russians.

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It was clear that Russia had lost every battle in the war apart from the one at the negotiation table. Unlike the U.S. newspapers, the Japanese press did not like the peace terms and ascribed this defeat to the personal weakness of the Japanese diplomats.74 Russia was described as “[getting] off very cheap.”75 Witte made it clear how close the final decision had been as well as how weak the Russian position really was: After his return from the conference Witte said: “I have kept my word for that which I have maintained all through the deliberations of the peace conference. I told the Japanese that I would not recede one inch and have not done so. I refused to concede the clause relating to naval limitations; refused to make money payments and refused to grant any territory and gave half of Saghalien [sic], at the command of the emperor.”76 The Russian plenipotentiary stated to another reporter that “he fooled the Japanese.” He explained in more detail: “President Roosevelt appealed to my patriotism, humanity and good sense. Fortunately I succeeded in holding out to the end. The Japanese could not read in my face what was passing in my heart. From the outset I assumed that I eventually carried conviction.”77 Witte later described his success as “a victory of the feather over the sword.”78 While the Russian historiography would later emphasize his role, the U.S. historiography claimed the triumph for the president. However, I would suggest, as others have, that it was Japan’s financial needs that ended the war.79 However, Roosevelt became the hero of the hour and received the thanks and congratulations of the Russian Czar.80 Unlike the peace talks, the armistice was signed comparatively quickly,81 and on 5 September 1905 the war was officially ended by the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth,82 which was reported in The Seattle Republican along with a piece of advice for the future: “To the belligerents permit us to suggest, Go in peace and sin no more.”83 The “Final Chapter of the Bloody War”84 was written, and even though Japan seemed to have lost, The Calumet News in Michigan a decade later again tried to underline the importance of the treaty for international peace: In the peace treaty at Portsmouth it was alleged that Japan, victorious in battle, was worsted; but, considering the cost in blood and treasure, it is difficult to conceive of any nation being worsted in ending a war at any cost save national honor. (…) In the quaint and quiet little city of Portsmouth the great battle of wits between the diplomats of Russia and Japan was fought to a conclusion.85 Despite the positive international reception, the Japanese public was not pleased by the treaty. When it arrived in Japan, the public attitude was one of general disinterest:

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Mr. Yamaza, director of political affairs of the Japanese foreign office, arrived at Yokohama during the day on board the steamer Dakota, bringing the peace treaty signed at Portsmouth Sept. 5, and left immediately for Tokio. They arrived here during the evening, but found few people to meet them at the railroad station, owing to the strict examination made of all persons by the military and police who guarded the station.86 Witte’s image in the West remained positive, since he seemed the only Russian politician capable of dealing with the cholera crisis in late 1905: There is but one statesman in all Russia capable of coping with this crisis that confronts Russia, a crisis far more acute than that which has just been solved by the treaty of peace at Portsmouth, namely, Count Witte, and the success which he has achieved in connection with his mission here has developed his prestige to such an extent both at home and abroad that his numerous enemies in official life and at court will no longer be able to stand between him and his sovereign or to keep them apart.87 But in Russia, like Komura in Japan, Witte provided a welcome scapegoat for a peace seen as humiliating for the Russian population: A strong sentiment developed against Count Witte at a recent caucus of the St. Petersburg municipality, called to discuss civic action in recognition of his services at Portsmouth. Suggestions that a banquet be given in his honor and that he presented with the freedom of the city or an address were rejected and a resolution was adopted declaring that he is not worthy of any special honor because his services at Portsmouth “were only a redeeming sacrifice for the political mistakes in which he has acquiesced and which were responsible for the war.”88 The only person who profited from the peace treaty both at home and abroad was Theodore Roosevelt. His role in the negotiations will now be analyzed in more detail.

Theodore Roosevelt and the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth Norman E. Saul named Roosevelt the “master of ceremonies in any event”89 during the days at Portsmouth; Tyler Bennet even called him the “dictator”90 of the peace talks. Although the president may have deserved the Nobel Prize in 1906,91 it must be remembered that Roosevelt also tried to achieve the national aims of the United States, which feared the growing influence of Japan on the other side of the Pacific. If the treaty was “a substantial achievement,”92 this was especially true from an American perspective. Poems were written about peace,93 and bronze tablets commemorate the events of Portsmouth,94 but the Japanese remembered what happened there. The treaty, I argue, was the

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starting point on the path that led to Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War 36 years later. The Portsmouth Peace Conference was therefore not, to disagree with Allen Hockley and Steven Ericson, an example of “successful RussoJapanese diplomacy.” And the U.S. was not an “active mediator”95 but a nation state that gained from the mediation by keeping Russian and Japanese ambitions in check, at least temporarily. For Roosevelt it was essential to keep both powers in check in East Asia, because like his colleagues in London, he hoped this balance of power in the region would secure the Open Door in Manchuria. It was essential, therefore, that neither side should achieve supremacy after the war. He consequently acted in the national interests of the United States, and not solely for peace in general.96 The president recognized the ambitions of the so-called “latecomers”, Germany and Japan, but he disliked Russia even more, due to the occupation of Manchuria by Czarist troops and the Kishinev pogrom.97 Roosevelt applauded the Japanese soldiers and their achievements during the war,98 but his attitude swung between adoration and fear of future problems in East Asia. “The Japs have played our game,” he wrote to Hay in July 1904.99 The United States were unprepared to stop a Russian advance, which is why the Japanese were willingly accepted as a geographical barrier and active supporter of the Open Door ideal in the region.100 In addition, Roosevelt did not like the Russian diplomat in Washington, Cassini, whom he described as a liar. His relationship to with Japanese ambassador was better from the start, which was key to their good relations.101 With the increasing number of Japanese victories during the war, however, Roosevelt changed his opinion tremendously. Like many others who feared a “Yellow Peril” in Asia, the president recognized the possible threat of growing Japanese imperial ambition in East Asia. He wrote to Spring Rice that the war in Manchuria might lead to future conflict between Japan and the United States.102 Total victory for his Japanese friends would make them too powerful. The U.S. president therefore adopted a more pragmatic hope: “It may be that the two powers will fight until both are fairly well exhausted, and that then peace will come on terms which will not mean the creation of either a yellow peril or a Slav peril.”103 He repeatedly talked about his fear that the Japanese might become peerless as a consequence of their military successes, telling the French ambassador Jules Jusserand that, “the best would be that the Russians and the Japanese should remain face to face balancing each other, both weakened.”104 During the war the president disliked the Japanese strategy to keep newspaper correspondents and military observers alike away from the events of the war, and when Japan’s navy did not accept Chinese neutrality while following a Russian battleship into a neutral harbor. But he remained friendly, even though the Japanese government did not accept his advice at all.105 When the Japanese demanded he start mediation “directly and entirely on his own motion and initiative,”106 Roosevelt acted, even if he was no longer

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willing to act only for Japan’s sake, but rather for the balance of power which favored the United States. Roosevelt was not the only American who recognized the possible menace of Japan’s military successes. In his article “Japanese Victories: Are They a Menace or a Blessing,”107 William Elliot Griffis (1843–1928) expressed the same opinion: An inevitable revulsion from unreasoning admiration of the Japanese seems more than probable. By a long course of literary transfiguration, Japan has stood in the American mind as an Oriental Paradise with all the modern improvements. Esthetic and semi-poetical writers of prose, ignoring defects, have shed moonlight on garbage-heaps. The victory not of an “Oriental,” but of a public-school army and navy close to their base of supplies, strictly temperate and cut off from licentiousness, against an ignorant horse at the tail end of an attenuated empire, weakened by alcoholic and sensual indulgences, has titles the world’s judgment. (…) What we have seen is the victory of a minority of intelligent men of modern mind, after forty years of preparation and ten of definite resolve, making full use of the science of the ages gathered from many civilizations, rather than the normal fruit of fifty millions of islanders, the reality of whose condition, morally, socially and physically, is yet to be revealed. The Americans, who only in recent years have emerged from their provincial limits, have not been fooled by the Japanese, but rather voluntarily fooled themselves; for on the whole such a process, before completion, is great fun. (…) In my view, the victory of Japan over Russia will work for the peace and brotherhood of the nations, the increase of mutual respect between Occident and Orient, and hence the advancement of humanity, the improvement of our own morals and religion, enrichment of our civilization, and the reinforcement of American progress in Asia. The mission of the United States and Japan is one. It is to unite Asiatic wisdom with Anglo-Saxon freedom and enterprise, to make obsolete and abolish the traditional “Orient” and “Occident” (…) thus making one type of civilization for the whole world.108 The tensions between the United States and Japan, ending in the outbreak of the Pacific War had its origins in the Russo-Japanese War in general, and the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth in particular. The Russo-Japanese Agreement in July 1907 ended the conflict between the two belligerents just two years after the war, and there was no longer a checking power against Japan.109 Russia had shifted its foreign policy aims to Europe and Japan had developed an increasing interest in Manchuria. The Czarist Empire finally recognized Japanese claims in Korea and Southern Manchuria in exchange for a similar position in the Northern part and Outer Mongolia. This also allowed Russia to enter the Triple Entente in August 1907, since it had also ended its quarrel with Britain, the so-called “Great Game in Central Asia”. Russia could

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not afford another war against Japan, but Japan also needed to recover from the war, which is why it tried to gradually increase its economic engagement in Manchuria. Since the U.S. could not allow Japan to have an exclusive position in that region, the future development seemed already clear in 1905/1907, when the necessary balance could not be maintained for long.110 One of the countries to suffer the most from the new situation in East Asia was China. It was not allowed to participate in the war by Japan and the United States, even though it was fought on Chinese territory, since Chinese intervention might have provoked a world war. Instead – like Korea – it became a victim of the hostilities.111 The treaties between Japan and Russia in the aftermath of the war did not seek the Chinese opinion. This was also the case in Portsmouth, where nobody seemed to be interested in the political demands of the Middle Kingdom.112 Komura, on his way back to Japan, visited China to listen to the objections against the stationing of Russian and Japanese troops as a consequence of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth: China will push the protest she made several weeks ago to Russia and Japan concerning certain provisions of the treaty of peace. The document provides that the province of Manchuria shall be evacuated within eighteen months. China objected vigorously to this, maintaining that the time limit was altogether too great. The Chinese suggested that it be reduced to nine months. Another point in the treaty China objects to is the provision that an armed guard shall be maintained in Manchuria by both Russia and Japan to watch over the railway lines owned in the province by the two countries. The agreement made provides for fifteen guards for every kilometre [sic] of railway. According to China this would mean a standing guard of perhaps 20,000 Russian and Japanese troops in Chinese territory. China’s protest, which was sent to both St. Petersburg and Tokio, said that China was perfectly able to afford protection for the property of Russia and Japan in China.113 However, the objections were not taken seriously in Russia or Japan. Sino-Japanese relations worsened, particularly during the First World War, when the 21 demands strengthened Japan’s position in the region, and the United States intervened to save the Open Door and thereby its economic interests. The development of Japanese-American relations after the end of the Russo-Japanese War were even worse. Despite liberal politician Ozaki Yukio (1858–1954) sending cherry trees to Washington in 1910 to thank the United States for their mediation in the war,114 the Treaty of Portsmouth had negative consequences for the relationship of the two countries.115 America started its more ambitious policy in the Pacific to become a naval world power, and to secure its position against the growing Japanese might on the other side of the Pacific.116 The fact that Roosevelt had increasingly supported the Russian position led to anti-American feelings among the

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Japanese public. The people regarded the United States as a traitor and even though Japan achieved its original war aims, the peace itself was described as humiliating. On the day after the peace treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries, a riot in Hibiya Park in Tokyo expressed the public anger and was only ended when the Japanese emperor announced martial law. The Topeka State Journal in Kansas described the events in the Japanese capital in detail: The first turbulence attendant upon the popular anger over the terms of peace arranged with Russia has taken place. A mass meeting to protest against the action of the government was called to take place at Hibiya park but the metropolitan police closed the gates and attempted to prevent the assemblage of the people. The municipality protested against the action of the police and finally the gates were thrown open and a large crowd gathered and voted in favor of resolutions declaring the nation humiliated and denouncing the terms upon which the treaty of peace was arranged. The crowd was serious in its conduct, rather than angry, and the police handled it discreetly. The gathering eventually dispersed in an orderly manner. Later on, however, a crowd attempted to hold a meeting in the Shintomi theater and the police dispersed it. A portion of the crowd then proceeded to the office of the Kokumin Shinbun, the government organ, and began hooting. Three employes [sic] of the paper armed with swords appeared at the door of the building and checked the attack and the police dispersed the crowd. It was thought the trouble had passed when suddenly a portion of the crowd made a rush for the building, hurled stones and damaged some of the machinery. (…) Similar meetings have been held at Osaka and Nagoya, which in round terms, denounced the government and asked them to resign. General sentiment throughout the country seems to favor reactionary measures but it appears clear that the majority of the people will eventually accept the result of the peace conference, however disappointing it may be.117 Henry Willard Denison (1846–1914), an American diplomat who had advised the Japanese delegation at Portsmouth clearly explained the Japanese position on the final agreements that had been granted: Mr. Dennison [sic] said: “If you have failed to pay a debt which your creditor is not in a position to collect that’s no reason you should feel specially proud of your self. But the Russians are taking great credit to themselves because they have got out of paying an indemnity to Japan. We didn’t insist upon an indemnity for the simple reason that our position didn’t permit of insistence. If we’d had a fleet in the Baltic sea or an army before St. Petersburg or at the gates of Moscow we might

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Portsmouth: first step towards Pearl Harbor have enjoyed the same advantage that the Germans possessed when the occupied Paris, They got a big indemnity from France merely as an inducement to go away. An indemnity in international affairs, you know, is not so much payment for past losses as a guarantee that future losses will be prevented. But our fleets and armies were many thousands of miles from European Russia. We could, it’s true have renewed the war an captured Vladivostok and got, perhaps, in a position to collect an indemnity, but it would have cost us some millions of yen – as much as the indemnity itself was worth, not to speak of loss of men.”118

However, even when the politicians accepted the facts, the Japanese public, who were hoping for large gains like 1895 and were also anticipating large indemnity sums thanks to the press, were furious and did not accept the diplomatic defeat at Portsmouth. Once the treaty reached Japan the initial anger had subsided,119 and the population directed its anger against the government,120 but the U.S. image in Japan suffered tremendously from the feeling of being cheated. Since the end of the Russo-Japanese War, “mutual suspicion”121 grew and marked a period of Japanese-American relations which Tal Tovy and Sharon Halevi have even called a “cold war.”122 This dominated the time between 1905 and 1941. The former support for Japan’s actions in East Asia was abandoned and redirected to a growing antagonism over Manchuria. U.S. support was consequently never more than an expression of its own interests in the region, using Japan as an anti-Russian bulwark until Japan itself became too dangerous.123 However, Japanese financial exhaustion led to an increasing need for money. As a consequence, Japan not only rejected a U.S. offer to take over parts of the railways in Manchuria, but also increasingly restricted the American Open Door policy, something that was also made possible by the agreement with Russia in 1907.124 The “Americans were shut out of Manchuria in both trade and investment,”125 and the conflict peaked in the Manchurian Incident in 1931, which must also be seen as a direct consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. In addition to these economic struggles, Japanese-American relations were worsened by the immigration of Japanese citizens to the American west coast, as well as the school segregation crisis in California in October 1906.126 To quote Tovy and Halevi again, the “Japanese victory over Russia resulted in the United States’ ‘discovery’ of a new enemy.”127 Whereas it was Russia that was described as dangerous and uncivilized during the war,128 this trend shifted to Japan, which was increasingly described as a military threat as well.129 The war in East Asia not only allowed a reevaluation of the naval theories of Mahan and Julian S. Corbett (1854–1922), but also sparked the view of an increasing need for more battleships.130 Roosevelt himself clearly described this need in a letter to Spring Rice in June 1905:

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I wish to see our navy constantly built up and each ship at the highest point of efficiency as a fighting unit. If we follow this course we shall have no trouble with the Japanese or any one else. But if we bluster, if we behave badly to other nations; if we show that we regard the Japanese as an inferior and alien race, and try to treat them as we have treated the Chinese; and if at the same time we fail to keep our navy at the highest point of efficiency and size – then we shall invite disaster.131 When Roosevelt’s administration ended, the U.S. navy ranked as the second largest in the world behind Britain. The president had also ordered a study on the Japanese navy immediately after the war, and in 1907, America’s War Plan Orange for the first time listed Japan as a possible enemy in a war in the Pacific.132 In Japan, the United States was also listed as a possible enemy in the same year.133 To complete the thread to the events of 1941, it is important to mention that the attack of 1941 was considered to be in the tradition of the Russo-Japanese War, because victory in the Pacific War was supposed to be secured by a surprise attack.134 Japan faced an almighty enemy, as it had done in 1904. However, the military planners believed in the idea of a preventive war, a fast surprise attack, and a similarly fast campaign that would ultimately allow them to negotiate a favorable peace. The Japanese were not the only military planners to have been influenced by such thoughts in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, as will be shown by looking closely at Germany and the impact of the war. However, Japanese-American relations were definitely worsened by the war between Russia and Japan in general, and the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in particular. The new order in East Asia increased Japanese territorial and economic ambitions as well as American fears over a new enemy in the Pacific Rim.

Notes 1 Josiah Quincy, “Japan’s Magnanimity Challenges the World’s Admiration,” The San Juan Islander, December 16, 1905, 4. The Russo-Japanese War was widely covered by the U.S. press and even small newspapers like The San Juan Islander always provided the latest news from the battlefields, and later the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Since news agencies delivered the messages to the United States, any interested press could be able to inform its readers about the events in East Asia. To provide an insight into the wide range of newspapers that covered the events, the author decided to use a variety of newspapers in the United States as sources. Very often, the same messages or reports could be found in the daily papers of the metropoles on the East and West coast of the United States. 2 Attachment C. to the Monthly Report for July 1905: The Events of the RussoJapanese Theater of War in the Month of July, Tsingtau, 4 July 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5770. 3 Kowner, Colonial Clash, 12. 4 Menning, Neither Mahan nor Moltke, 155.

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5 Confidential Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Oscar S. Straus, February 9, 1904. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID= o187353. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. (Last access, January 2, 2017). 6 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, ed. Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown in His Own Letters, Vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 376. 7 “Treaty of Peace Has Been Signed,” The Herald and News, September 8, 1905, 1. For a similar evaluation, see: Peters, Friede, 369. 8 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, 378–379. 9 Roosevelt to Trevelyan, May 13, 1905, cited in ibid., 381. 10 Ibid., 394. 11 Edward B. Parsons, “Roosevelt’s Containment of the Russo-Japanese War,” Pacific Historical Review 38:1 (1969), 24. 12 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, 24 July 1905, cited in Parsons, Roosevelt’s Containment, 21. 13 Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (Garden City, N. J.,1925), 143. 14 Parsons, Roosevelt’s Containment, 25–26. 15 Ibid., 27–28. 16 Ibid., 34. 17 B. S. Agarwal, “Korea as an Epicentre of Northeast Asian Power Politics: A Historical and Geopolitical Perspective,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 67:2 (2006), 267–268. 18 Military Correspondent of The Times, The War, 4; Shimazu Naoko, “’Love Thy Enemy’: Japanese Perceptions of Russia,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 365–369; David Wolff, “Riding Rough: Portsmouth, Regionalism, and the Birth of Anti-Americanism in Northeast Asia,” in The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies, ed. Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2008), 125. The position of the U.S. press should not change, even during the peace negotiations in Portsmouth, see: Winston B. Thorson, “American Public Opinion and the Portsmouth Peace Conference,” The American Historical Review 53:3 (1948), 439–464. 19 George Kennan, Siberia and the Exile System, 2 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1891). 20 George Kennan, “War by Prearrangement,” Outlook 77 (13. August 1904) und George Kennan, “A Japanese Naval School,” Outlook 77 (August 27, 1904). 21 Carl Peters, Gesammelte Schriften, (Munich/Berlin: C.H. Beck, 1944), vol. 3, 73. 22 George Kennan, “Japanese Tea-Houses and Russian Prisoners,” Outlook 78 (September 10, 1904), 126. For the good treatment of the Russian POWs, see also: Kita Yoshito, “Nichi-Ro Sensǀ to jindǀshugi: Matsuyama furyo shnjyǀjo ni okeru Roshia shǀbyǀsha kynjgo no kentǀ (The Russo-Japanese War and Humanitarianism: A study of the measures for relief for Russian wounded and sick in the Matsuyama POW camp),” Nihon Hǀgaku 80,2 (2014), 591–627; Mǀri Yoshihiko, “‘Roshiajin horyu shashin korekushon’ ni miru ‘hakuai no kokoro’ shozai (The Existence of ‘Philantropy’ as seen in the ‘photograph collection of Russian POWs),” Ynjrashia Kenkynj 49 (2013), 24-30. For numbers of the officers that became POWs during the war, see: Examination on number and rank of Japanese and Russian prisoners of war during Russo-Japanese War, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, B07090897000. For photographs, see: Photographs of Russian POWs, National Institute for Defense Studies,

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23 24

25

26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

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Ministry of Defense, www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichiro/pow.htm (Last access, 20 June 2015). Frederick F. Travis, “The Kennan-Russel Anti-Tsarist Propaganda Campaign among Russian Prisoners of War in Japan, 1904–1905,” Russian Review 40:3 (1981), 263–277. Edward S. Miller, “Japan’s other Victory: Overseas Financing of the RussoJapanese War,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2005), 465–466. Ono Masataka, “Senpi chǀtatsu wo meguru kǀbǀ: Kin’ynj shijǀ de no funtǀ to shǀri (The Japanese Government’s Struggle to Procure War Expenditure: Efforts and Victory in the Financial Market),” Ynjrashia Kenkynj 49 (2013), 44–49. Cohen, Naomi Wiener. (1999). Jacob H. Schiff: a Study in American Jewish Leadership. Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England S.473 199. For the process that led to the final decision for peace, se: Kenrǀ Nagoshi, “Katsura Tarǀ to Nichi-Ro Sensǀ: Kokunan sukutta kǀwa no ketsudan (Katsura Tarǀ and the Russo-Japanese War: The Decision for Peace and the Prevention of a National Crisis),” Kaigai Jijǀ 61,10 (2013), 63–76. On the economic impact of the war on Japan, see: Ishii Kanji, Nihon no sangyǀ kakumei: Nisshin Nichi-Ro Sensǀ kara kangaeru (Japan’s Industrial Revolution: Thoughts with regard to the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1997). “Aussichtslose Bemühungen,” Deutsche Tageszeitung 415, 4 September 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. “Rußlands Entschluss zur Durchführung des Krieges,” Berliner Lokal Anzeiger 430, 13 September 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. Ernest R. May, “The Far Eastern Policy of the United States in the Period of the Russo-Japanese War: A Russian View,” The American Historical Review 62:2 (1957), 349. Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, April 2, 1905, cited in Eugene P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 53. Ibid., 56. Norman E. Saul, “The Kittery Peace,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 493. Trani, Treaty, 56. Susanne Schattenberg, “Die Sprache der Diplomatie oder Das Wunder von Portsmouth. Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Außenpolitik,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 56:1 (2008), 11. Saul, Kittery Peace, 488; Trani, Treaty, 57–58. Theodore Roosevelt to George von Lengerke Meyer, June 5, 1905, cited in Trani, Treaty, 58. Ibid., 62. Portsmouth Herald, July 7, 1905; Schattenberg, Sprache, 12. Trani, Treaty, 70–73. On Witte, see: Sidney Harcave, Count Sergei Witte and the Twilight of Imperial Russia: A Biography (Armonk/New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). Igor V. Lukoianov, “The Portsmouth Peace,” in The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies, ed. Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2008), 46–47; Trani, Treaty, 74–75.

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44 Vladimir N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past: The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), 52–53. 45 Lukoianov, Portsmouth Peace, 52. On Witte’s strategy for a positive public image also see: John Norton Westwood, Russia Against Japan, 1904–05: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (Albany: State University of New York Press 1986),158–159. 46 Sergej Witte, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Ullstein, 1923), 239. 47 For a list of the members of the Japanese delegation, see: Schattenberg, Sprache, 14–15. 48 Ibid., 15–17. 49 Ibid., 18–20. 50 Matsumura Masayoshi, Nichi-Ro sensǀ to Kaneko Kentarǀ: kǀhǀ gaikǀ no kenkynj, rev. and enlarged ed. (Tokyo: Shin’ynjdǀ, 1987), 13–15, 40, 140–141; Matsumura Masayoshi, “Yǀroppa ni okeru ‘kǀhǀ dantǀ daishi’ toshite no Suematsu Kenchǀ,” in Nichi-Ro Sensǀ, ed. Gunji shigakkai, 125–140 Robert B. Valliant, “The Selling of Japan: Japanese Manipulation of Western Opinion, 1900–1905,” Monumenta Nipponica 29:4 (1974): 415–438; Howland, Sovereignty, 62. Some of these works are: Asakawa, Causes; Kentaro Kaneko, “The Yellow Peril is the Golden Opportunity for Japan,” North American Review 179 (November 1904), 641–648; Shigenobu Okuma, “Japanese Problems,” North American Review 180 (February 1905), 161–165. 51 Nish, Planning, Performance and Peace Making, 14–15. 52 Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, June 11, 1905, cited in Trani, Treaty, 80 53 Ibid., 82–95. 54 Ibid., 95–95. 55 New York Times, July 21, 1905. 56 Trani, Treaty, 99 262. 57 Meyer to Theodore Roosevelt, April 24, 1905, cited in Trani, Treaty, 105. 58 Gaimusho, Komura Gaikoshi (A History of Komura’s Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Shinbun Gekkansha, 1953), vol. 2, 42–44. 59 Saul, Norman E., “The Kittery Peace,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 502. 60 Komura Gaikoshi, II, 61–62. 61 Lukoianov, Igor V., “The Portsmouth Peace,” in The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies, ed. Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2008), 57. 62 “No Progress is Made by Plenipotentiaries at Peace Conference,” The San Francisco Call, August 18, 1905, 3. 63 “Russians Stand Pat,” The Sunday Star, August 20, 1905, 1. 64 Lukoianoy, Portsmouth Peace,. 58–59 188; Trani, Treaty, 144–148. 65 “Depends on Czar,” The Semi-Weekly Messenger, August 25, 1905, 1. 66 Ibid. 67 “President Tries to Save Conference,” Daily Press, August 23, 1905, 1. See also: “Russia’s Last Word,” The Semi-Weekly Messenger, August 29, 1905, 1. 68 Komura Gaikoshi, vol.2, 107–108. 69 Ibid., 125–127. 70 Trani, Treaty, 156. 71 Asada Masafumi, “The China-Russia-Japan Military Balance in Manchuria, 1906–1918,” Modern Asian Studies 44:6 (2010), 1285. 72 Li Narangoa, “The Power of Imagination: Whose Northeast and Whose Manchuria?,” Inner Asia 4:1 (2002), 5. 73 “This is Basis of Peace Treaty,” Bismarck Daily Tribune, August 31, 1905, 1. See also: “Synopsis of Russo-Japanese Treaty,” Rock Island Argus, September 5, 1905, 1. For the final treaty, see: Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichiro/ russo-japanese.htm (Last access, 20 June 2015).

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81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106

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Lukoianov, Portsmouth Peace, 61. “Peace Now Assured,” The Billings Gazette, September 1, 1905, 2. Ibid. “To Arrange Terms of Armistice Today,” Bisbee Daily Review, September 1, 1905, 1. Schattenberg, Sprache, 10. Helfferich, Das Geld im russisch-japanischen Kriege (Berlin: Mittler 1906), 238; Hauptmann Frhr. v. der Goltz, “Rußlands mittelasiatische Stellung,” Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde 3:2 (1906), 192–193. “President Roosevelt today received the following cablegram from the emperor of Russia: Accept my congratulations and earnest thanks for having brought the peace negotiations to a successful conclusion; owing to your personal, energetic efforts. My country will gratefully recognize the great part you have played in the Portsmouth peace conference.” In: “Czar Thanks Roosevelt,” Bismarck Daily Tribune, August 31, 1905, 1. See also: The Hawaiian Star, August 31, 1905, 1. “Armistice is Signed,” The Citizen, September 7, 1905, 4. “Peace Treaty Signed,” The Roswell Daily Record, September 5, 1905, 1. The Seattle Republican, September 8, 1905, 4. “Final Chapter of Bloody War,” The Cairo Bulletin, November 26, 1905, 1. “Russia and Japan,” The Calumet News, September 11, 1914, 4. “Peace Treaty at Tokio,” The Bemidji Daily Pioneer, October 6, 1905, 1. “Pestilence and Famine,” New-York Tribune, December 10, 1905, 8. “Against Count Witte,” Evening Star, October 5, 1905, 1. The same report was printed in “Sentiment Against Witte,” The Bemidji Daily Pioneer, October 6, 1905, 1. Saul, Kittery Peace, 498. Tyler Rennet, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War: A Critical Study of American Policy in Eastern Asia in 1902-5, Based Primarily upon the Private Papers of Theodore Roosevelt (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1925), 243. Wolff, Riding Rough, 126. “Roosevelt Has Notable Record,” The Newport Miner, March 4, 1909, 3. Richard L. Metcalfe, “Who Feel Great Truths and Tell Them,” The Commoner, November 10, 1905. “To Commemorate the Signing of the Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty,” Palestine Daily Herald, September 5, 1906, 7. Allen Hockley and Steven Ericson, “Introduction,” in The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies, ed. Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2008), 1. Lukoianov, Portsmouth Peace, 42; Trani, Treaty, 1. “Our people have become suspicious of Russia; and I personally share this view.”Theodore Roosevelt to Spring Rice, February 2, 1904, cited in Trani, Treaty, 8. George Sinkler, The Racial Attitudes of American Presidents: From Abraham Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1971), 395–396. Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, July 26, 1904, cited in Trani, Treaty, 31. Ibid., 9. Roosevelt auch ein durchaus freundschaftliches Verhältnis zum deutschen Botschafter Speck von Sternburg Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 31. Theodore Roosevelt to Spring Rice, June 13, 1904, cited in Trani, Treaty, 34. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, March 19, 1904, in Morison, Roosevelt Letters, vol.4, 759–761. Jean Jules Jusserand, What Me Befell: The Reminiscences of J.J. Jusserand (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1933), 300–301. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt, 48–51. Komura to Takahira, telegram, May 31, 1905, in Morison, Roosevelt Letters, vol.4, 1221–1222.

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107 William Elliot Griffis, “Japanese Victories: Are They a Menace or a Blessing,” Evening Star, October 29, 1905, 5–6. 108 Ibid., 5. 109 Matsui Masato, “The Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907: Its Causes and the Progress of Negotiations,” Modern Asian Studies 6:1 (1972), 33. 110 Carl Peters, Friede, 367. 111 Ian Nish, “China and the Russo-Japanese War,” On the Periphery of the RussoJapanese War, Part I, Suntory Center Discussion Paper No. IS/04/475 (April 2004), 3; Nish, Planning, Performance and Peace Making, 22. 112 Kawashima Shin, “Nichiro Sensǀ to Chnjgoku no Chnjritsu Mondai (The RussoJapanese War and the Question of Chinese Neutrality),” in Nichiro Sensǀ, (The Russo-Japanese War) Vol.1, ed. Gunjishi Gakkai (Tokyo: Kinseisha, 2004), 79–96. 113 “Will Hear China’s Protests,” The Sun, November 12, 1905, 10. 114 Daniel C. Buchanan, “Washington’s Cherry Blossoms,” The Far Eastern Quarterly 10:1 (1950), 68. 115 Wolff, Riding Rough, 131–133. 116 A. W. A. Pollock, “The Russo-Japanese War: Its Lessons for Great Britain and the United States,” The North American Review 180:579 (1905), 244–245. 117 “Don’t Like It,” The Topeka State Journal, September 6, 1905, 1. 118 “Not in Shape to Insist,” The Bemidji Daily Pioneer, September 18, 1905, 1. 119 “No Demonstration When Treaty Reached Japan,” The Times Dispatch, October 6, 1905, 1. 120 “Peace Treaty Reaches Japan,” Albuquerque Evening Citizen, October 5, 1905, 1. See also: Okamoto S., “The Emperor and the Crowd: The Historical Significance of the Hibiya Riots,” in Conflict in Modern Japanese History: The Neglected Tradition, ed. T. Najita and J. V. Koschmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 262–270, zur Rolle des Kaisers im Krieg, Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 89–90. 121 Kowner, Colonial Clash, 14. 122 Tal Tovy and Sharon Halevi, “America’s First Cold War: The Emergence of a New Rivalry,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 137. 123 Ibid., 139. See also: Hay to Roosevelt, April 28, 1903, cited in Esthus, Roosevelt, 9. 124 Peter Berton, “From Enemies to Allies: The War and the Russo-Japanese Relations,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 79; Matsui, Agreement, 36–37; Trani, Treaty, 159. 125 Matsui, Agreement, 36. 126 Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt, 128–145 131; Matsui, Agreement, 36; Tovy and Halevi, First Cold War, 146–148. Tanaka has shown that the Anti-Japanese resentments were not shared in all U.S. states, Tanaka Kenji, “A War Scare and Japanese Immigrants in the State of Montana in 1907: News Coverage of a Possible Japan-U.S.War,” Setsudai Jinbun Kagaku 22 (2015), 123–139. 127 Tovy and Halevi, First Cold War, 150. 128 See Jospeh M. Henning, “White Mongols? The War and American Discourses on Race and Religion,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 153–166. 129 Lone, Japanese Military, 8.

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130 John Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Taylor Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 45–46. The major works of the two naval strategists are Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (Boston: Little Brown, 1918) and Julian Corbett, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972). 131 Roosevelt to Spring-Rice, 16 June 1905, cited in Chapman, Naval Estimation, 44. 132 Tovy and Halevi, First Cold War, 139–145. 133 Kowner, Colonial Clash, 15. 134 Ikeda K., “Japanese Strategy and the Pacific War, 1941–5,” in The Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919–1952, ed. Ian Nish (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 144; Kowner, Turning Point, 34–35; Wolff, Riding Rough, 129.

6

Björkö, the Schlieffen Plan, and offensive strategies

The Russo-Japanese War had global impact. As well as the participating nation states, the colonial admirers of Japan, the Russian revolutionaries, and the U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, the German observers of the war within the government and military recognized the opportunity provided by the events in East Asia. The diplomatic context of the war has already been researched by John White;1 however, the perspective of the German Kaiserreich on the Russo-Japanese War seems underinvestigated, even though some researchers have tried to highlight the importance of the interrelationship between the war on the global periphery and its impact in Germany.2 The Russian military engagement against Japan first and foremost relieved the German and Austrian defensive lines on their Eastern front. The ongoing war against the Japanese also gave the German government and military a higher degree of freedom for European calculations.3 However, they also recognized the danger of German isolation if Russia lost the war and therefore became willing to join the Entente Cordiale of 1904. This would isolate the German Kaiserreich and threaten a European encirclement.4 Matthew S. Seligmann has already pointed out this situation and made clear that for “Germany’s international relations the Russo-Japanese War was a significant watershed.”5 The Japanese victories not only stimulated the fear of a Yellow Peril in Asia,6 it also disrupted the balance of power in Europe, particularly by removing the Russian threat of the unbeatable steamroller for several years.7 The German nightmare of a two fronted war against Russia and France disappeared, since the war “had a dramatic effect upon the international reputation of the Russian armed forces and upon assessments of the military potential of the Romanov state”8 by highlighting the weaknesses of the Czarist army and navy. The “newly proved military incompetence” of the possible enemy in the East ended the possibility of a Russian offensive for some years and left the Czarist army a “broken tool” in the hands of incapable leaders.9 This chapter will analyze these developments in detail to show the extent to which the political strategy of the Kaiserreich was influenced by the events in Manchuria, and demonstrate that the Schlieffen Plan was a direct consequence of the Russo-Japanese War as a transnational factor of global history.

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The German foreign policy 1904–5 In retrospect, it seems easy to show that the German political position in Europe was weakened from 1904 to 1906. The Kaiserreich not only alienated Russia and Japan, it also became isolated in the European theater, after a conflict with the French and the British over Morocco in 1905, leading to an isolated position due to the Conference of Algeciras.10 The German political situation seemed to be threatened by an anti-Berlin coalition; however, Russo-Japanese War provided the government and emperor alike with hope of a rapprochement. With Bismarck in the role of an honest broker, the political leadership tried to increase Russian favor with Germany by helping the Czarist Empire to secure its rights and needs internationally. It was also eager to divide Russia and France, to possibly replace the latter as an ally in a reciprocal agreement between St. Petersburg and Berlin. The French did not support the war, and “disillusioned with their incompetent ally and the unsatisfactory trade relations with Russia, more and more Frenchmen began to question the feasibility of endless loans to her.”11 The Russian Finance Minister Kokovtsov, however, needed to finance the war, which by the end of 1904 had already cost 803 million rubles.12 The French banks provided the loans needed for the war, even though Russia had lost the first battles, since everyone believed the Czarist army would ultimately win against the tiny Asian island empire. Due to the loan, French industry demanded more Russian orders in exchange, especially since Russian developments had cut the gains of the French metallurgical industry, which would be readjusted by the events in Manchuria and the consequent demands of the Czarist army. The loans from France were therefore not free from conditions. Thus, in July 1904 Witte was sent to Germany to negotiate a new commercial treaty with the Kaiserreich, because Russia could not afford a tariff war with its neighbor during the war against Japan. Witte recognized the military and economic implications of the war and made clear that Russia would “need twenty to twenty-five years in which we will be occupied only with ourselves and must have peace in our foreign relations.”13 When Mukden and Tsushima shocked the world and especially the French stock market and bank houses, “a state of nervousness in Paris concerning the future of France, Russia and the alliance”14 descended. It became harder for Russia to get a loan from French investors, even though some were highly in favor of such a transaction for both political and economic reasons. James Long astutely describes the impact of the war on Russo-French relations: “The Russo-Japanese War ended the honeymoon of the Franco-Russian alliance. (…) From France’s viewpoint the war crippled her only ally, revealed Russia’s precarious financial situation and threatened to ruin thousands of French rentiers.”15 It was in this situation that the German Emperor Wilhelm II tried to divide Russia and France to replace the latter as a more reliable and honest ally. He wanted to convince his Russian cousin to sign a Russo-German treaty, which France would

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join later. This would end German isolation, keeping the British threat in check via a strong continental group, and the favorable Russian position might also be used to put pressure on France over colonial questions.16 The pro-Russian position of the German government during the war years was therefore pragmatic rather than an altruistic expression of solidarity between the two royal cousins. By 1902 it was clear that a conflict between Russia and Japan would be localized by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.17 It was also only natural that Germany would not be willing to interfere in a war that was solely fought for influence in Korea and Manchuria, especially since the Czarist army would definitely not need military help to deal with Japan.18 The conflict with Japan would simply replace the Russo-Turkish conflict of the last century.19 The German ambassador in Tokyo, Emmerich von Arco auf Valley (1852–1909), was ordered to tell the Japanese that: There are good relations between Russia and Germany, because there is no political conflict of interests. But an alliance is impossible as long as the Franco-Russian alliance holds, because a reciprocal guarantee of the vested rights would have to be the basis for an alliance. However, the Franco-Russian dual agreement would not last for 24 hours if Russia became a guaranteeing power for the Peace of Frankfurt.20 The German Foreign Ministry underlined its position: “Manchuria and Korea do not interest us at all.”21 However, unlike Russia, the German ambassador had recognized the importance of Korea for the Japanese and reported it to Bülow: The Korean question (…) is of the most vital interest for Japan. Russia cannot allow Japan to consolidate its power in Korea and thereby place herself between Port Arthur and Vladivostok; Japan on the other hand has to acknowledge that the granting of a military outpost on the Korean coast to Russia would cause a final retreat of Japan over her policy to annex Korea.22 The threat of a war was therefore recognized in Berlin and it was also clear in the German Foreign Office that the Czar’s ambitions could provoke Japan. Nicholas’ failure to recognize the vital Japanese interests in the region would lead to war.23 Emperor Wilhelm II was consequently, like France and England, interested in localizing the future war.24 Even before the outbreak of the war, the French claimed the alliance with Russia would not be effective outside of Europe.25 The German Foreign Office estimated that the early period of the war would be determined by Japanese victories, since the main forces of the Czarist Empire were not stationed in the region.26 Reich Chancellor Bülow recognized the chances of an absent strong Russia in Europe but emphasized that Germany had to foster the

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impression that it was not interested in a Czarist involvement in a war in the Far East. The Kaiserreich had to show the Russians an image which would leave them no doubt about the German Empire and its status as a loyal and safe neighbor.27 Hence, the possible war would provide a chance for a rapprochement with Russia, since the Czarist Empire had no other choice for help but Germany.28 Nicholas, in contrast, still believed that he could prevent the outbreak of hostilities, something that was commented on rather cynically by his cousin in Germany: “You naive angel!”29 Japan broke off diplomatic relations just around three weeks later, accusing Russia of an arrogant attitude during the recent negotiations: The Japanese Government tried, without success, every honorable effort to obtain the consent of Russia to Japan’s just and reasonable proposals. But as there is no prospect of arriving at a satisfactory result, the Japanese Government are, reluctantly, compelled to break off their negociations (sic) with the Russian Government in order to protect their menaced position. The responsibility for the present situation and the consequences which may ensue from it will rest on Russia.30 When the war finally broke out, Wilhelm definitely hoped to exploit Nicholas as a tool to fight the Yellow Peril in East Asia. He hoped that the warmth of his personal letter to the Czar would induce him to use his full force against Japan. In contrast, the attitude of Emperor Nicholas remains halfhearted; he does not seem willing to fight, and it is not impossible that without striking or blow or simply after weak resistance he will hand over Manchuria to the Japanese. Such an outcome must be prevented at any cost.31 While Bülow had advised Wilhelm not to demand Russian engagement in the Far East too aggressively, the German emperor again pointed to the necessity that the Czarist Empire fight the Yellow Peril in Manchuria. For Wilhelm it was a shame that France did not support the fight of the white race in Asia, while England and the United States supported the Japanese. He acted apolitically here, since Bülow knew that the first and foremost need for international relations was to localize the war in the Far East.32 In cooperation with the United States, German politicians worked to neutralize China to prevent the war escalating to a global scale.33 President Roosevelt, as described in the previous chapter, also shared Chancellor Bülow’s opinion that a long war might be best for the non-participating powers. The ambassador in Washington, Freiherr Speck von Sternburg, reported: President Roosevelt said the following: “It is in our interest, that the war between Russia and Japan drags on, that both powers possibly weaken each other and that after a peace the possible sphere of conflict

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Björkö, Schlieffen, and offensive strategies does not vanish to secure that both powers, with regard to borders and geographical interests, will face the same situation as before the war. Japan would then not threat the German ambitions in Kiautschou and ours in the Philippines. Russia’s interest will be driven away from its Western boarders and remain focused in the East.”34

While the United States and Germany tried to emphasize their neutral position,35 both powers were hoping for a long and exhausting war in the Far East. The German tactic seemed to work out soon, as the ambassador in London, Paul Graf von Metternich (1853–1934), reported to Bülow on 14 March 1904: There was a total reversal in political opinion in favor of Germany. The former antagonistic tendencies were totally pushed back and replaced by a feeling of trust. (…) One cannot believe that the trusting relationship could ever be interrupted again. The attitude of the German government and population since the outbreak of the war has made such a deep impression in all Russian circles, that there is now a friendly feeling for Germany everywhere.36 In military terms, the situation did not change remarkably for Germany, as reported by Schlieffen himself.37 The gains from Russian troop deferrals to East Asia were mainly felt in Austria, but on the German border the number of enemy forces did not change. However, the quality of these forces was reduced, since the best soldiers and officers had been sent to the Far East. In the case of a war between Germany and Russia, the mobilization would be slowed down by the interference of the needs of the Eastern front against Japan. However Schlieffen also made it clear that a war in Europe was unlikely, since the Czarist Empire would not be willing to wage a two-fronted war, especially on two fronts so tremendously far from each other. In addition, the Russian army had hardly seen glorious victories in Manchuria thus far. Nicholas apologetically tried to explain to Wilhelm the reasons for the weak Russian image during the first weeks of the war: Certainly Kuropatkin is in a very difficult position, but that has happened half through his own fault. Ever since the last two years I have been preaching to him the absolute necessity for Russia to strengthen its position in the Far East. He was obstinately against that, until last autumn when it became nearly too late to augment there the number of troops! And now that he commands the army he sees his mistake and bitterly reproaches himself for his obstinacy and he wishes (as everybody does) he has double the quantity now under him. (…) (In addition the Japanese) are remarkably persevering in their efforts, that is why the time during which they besiege Port Arthur – will be the most trying

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and hard days for us in the whole war. When they have set themselves a serious task they won’t stop in their dashes to attain it before enormous sacrifice of life – and in that lies the secret of success.38 With the growing pressure due to the military defeats, Wilhelm repeatedly tried to drive a wedge into the Franco-Russian relationship.39 It was clear that England was supporting Japan, since “the Russians were responsible for their own misfortune,”40 and Japan “was legitimately occupying the moral high ground.”41 Since England had signed the Entente Cordiale with France on 8 April 1904, the latter seemed even less able to assist Russia, due to potential English political pressure. More than ever Germany seemed a suitable partner for the Russians, and Bülow even tried to circumvent the neutral position when it promised an advantage with regard to a rapprochement with St. Petersburg. In September 1904, he pleased the Foreign Office by informing the Russians about their bad naval tactics: If they (the Russian battleships) remain defensive, they will definitely be lost sooner or later, without producing any Russian advantage. However, if the Russian battleships risk, even at the price of their own destruction, attacking and destroying Japanese battleships and cruisers, Russia will thereby, and solely thereby, win the possibility to achieve something with its Baltic fleet when it arrives. (…) (I)t would be good for us if Japan’s navy was weakened as a consequence of the war.42 Bülow expressed similar thoughts in a letter to the Foreign Office later that month: Hopefully the Russian ships in Port Arthur and Vladivostok will decide to finally start an offensive, so that the Baltic Fleet will meet a weakened enemy on its arrival. In my opinion a brisk Russian admiral must say now: Rather two ships lost, if at least one Japanese sinks as well.43 Bülow’s wishes would not come true. The East Asian Squadron waited far too long and the death of Admiral Makarov, as described in Chapter 2, ended any Russian offensive strategy in the Yellow Sea. The Russian naval leadership instead decided to send a Second Pacific Squadron from the Baltic Sea around the globe to change the course of war. However, Russia needed coal supplies to achieve this, a situation in which German businessmen and Wilhelm recognized another possibility to gain something from the war in East Asia. The Hamburg-Amerika Line (HAPAG) had already signed an agreement to deliver coal for the Russian fleet on its way to the Far East. The HAPAG owners had not consulted the Foreign Office before signing the agreement, under which they sold the transport of 338,000 tons of coal to six anchor points for the Russian fleet between Denmark and China.44

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However, Nicholas had previously asked Wilhelm to sanction the actions of the HAPAG.45 Wilhelm sanctioned the agreement,46 even though this led to a Japanese resentment. Arco reported from Tokyo: Even if the Japanese government remains calm on the outside, the coal supply will be disastrous for the Japanese mood against Germany and resentment, distrust, and hate will be aroused for a long time. I do not have to investigate what our government could do against the threatening circumvention of our neutrality by direct coal supplies for battleships, but in the interest of the existing German relations with Japan, one has to complain about the business of the shipping company.47 The company complained about such accusations, especially since it was English coal that would be shipped, and also by English companies. The HAPAG leaders claimed they would continue the deliveries according to their agreement with the Russians and that only a state veto would end their engagement.48 While the struggle for coal continued, the Czarist Empire further weakened its Western border with Germany, because more and more troops were sent to the Far East, where the Japanese had secured one victory after another. Bülow recognized this as a success of the German policy during the war: This is an event which the older Moltke and old Bismarck have wished for with longing and hope, and which I had almost stopped believing could happen. Now, your excellence might imagine what impression a sudden refusal to deliver English coals on partly English transporters would have created for his majesty in Russia. His majesty is degarnishing our Western border and we block the departure of his fleet, hindering him in regaining his lost seapower (…) This would have immediately caused Russia to answer by signing a Russo-English agreement and starting a war against us.49 Bülow went even further.50 He proposed informing Russia that it could repay the German favors by taking the side of the Kaiserreich if there was any aggression as a result of the coal supplies.51 He sent Wilhelm a report with a proposal for a letter to the Czar and a Russo-German agreement that was created immediately after the Dogger Bank Incident, when Russia needed international support. The proposed agreement would have strengthened Germany’s position in Europe by securing Russian support for its policy: Be it as you say. Let us stand together. Of course the alliance must be purely defensive and exclusively directed against the European aggressor or aggressors in the form of a mutual fire insurance company against incendiarism. It is very essential, that America should not feel threatened by our agreement. (…) I enclose the draft of an agreement that you desired.52

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If war broke out against a third power a neutral position was demanded, while in a war against more than one enemy, Russia or Germany were forced to intervene in the war. Nicholas and the Foreign Ministry in St. Petersburg answered the proposal by stating that the paragraph that described the casus belli should remain secret.53 The Russians also tried to limit the agreement to the specific situation of a war against Japan. Bülow emphasized the German interest to reach a general agreement in a letter to Wilhelm.54 The Czar’s answer was not in favor of this idea, and the German Emperor commented sarcastically: His nibs starts to get cold feet with regard to the Gaules and is so weak that he is not even able to sign such an agreement with us (…) without their permission. From my perspective it is impossible that Paris will not be informed before we get Papa Czar’s signature. (…) Due to the loans his back is too weak against the Gaules and it would not surprise me if Witte and the flabby Lamsdorf spilled in our slop together.55 Due to the reluctance of the Czar to sign an agreement, the German answer needed to secure the following points, because otherwise reports on the negotiations could have a negative impact for Germany. Bülow made clear that it was essential to: 1 2

3 4

keep the pourparlers secret and demand loyalty from the Czar show no bad temper so as not to drive the Czar into the arms of England. Therefore we do not want to point to the fact that Russia started the thoughts about an alliance. keep watch over England, but not show nervousness, and give the Czar a future perspective for a Russo-German agreement, even if he turns away now.56

Wilhelm, in contrast, was not willing to give up that easily. He wrote to his cousin: you will, I am sure, be fully alive to the fact, that I must now have absolutely positive guarantees from you, whether you intend leaving me unaided or not in case of war, which England and Japan would declare against me on account of the coaling of the Russian Fleet by Germany. Should you be unable to absolutely guarantee me, that in such a war you will fight loyally with me shoulder to shoulder, then I regret to be under the necessity of immediately forbidding German steamers continuing to coal your fleet.57 However, the Czar was not willing to sign an agreement without RussoFrench talks about it in advance.58 Wilhelm seemed depressed that his cousin was not willing to sign an agreement, especially since the German side has

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worked on this issue so hard for two months.59 Bülow, in contrast, tried to remain optimistic, pointing to future possibilities and the importance of maintaining good relations with the Russians.60 Despite the failure of the German approaches, the diplomats and the emperor of the Kaiserreich played an important role during the preparation for peace, ultimately allowing a second chance at a Russo-German agreement. In October 1904, Wilhelm had already warned his cousin of a Japanese approach in Europe to prepare a strong diplomatic position for peace negotiations in the future: [The] former Japanese Minister at Petersburg Kurino has reappeared in Europe (…) and seems to be authorized to try to get France and England (…) to mediate in favor of Japan for peace. (…) This shows that Japan is nearing the limits of its strength in men and money and now that they have gained advantages over the Manchurian army, they fancy that they can stop now and try to reap the fruit of their efforts by enticing other Powers to mix themselves in the matter and to get at Manchuria, by a Peace Conference.61 The Czar was adamant: “You may be sure that Russia shall fight this war to the end, until the last Jap is driven out of Mandchuria [sic], only then can come the talk about peace negotiations and that solely between the two belligerents.”62 While Nicholas still believed in the final victory of his army, other leading figures in St. Petersburg, especially the banks, were longing for peace, and for Witte it seemed clear that Russia would lose Manchuria: “The Russian population would swallow this dish if it was served with the right sauce. This sauce would be an internal liberal reorganization.”63 That Nicholas did not want to listen to these voices of the Russian capital might have been due to the encouragement he was still receiving from Wilhelm in his private letters: I [Wilhelm] hear from trustworthy private source, that authorities in Tokio are getting anxious at the future outlook of the war. They have expressed their mortification at not having gained a real success at LiaoYang considering enormous loss of men, because they were without any fresh reserves. The steady pouring in of fresh battalions from Russia is quite far beyond their expectations, as they never thought the Siberian Railway capable of keeping up the transports unremittingly. They begin to see in consequence, that though they are at an end with their cadres, and especially officers, your army is daily increasing in strength, men and striking power, and that the scales of war are slowly but surely turning against them.64 It wasn’t until after the surrender of Port Arthur that Wilhelm changed his tone and started to vote for peace negotiations with Japan:

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The news of the fall of Port Arthur was received here yesterday evening and created a great commotion. We all here feel deepest sympathy for the valiant Generals and the brave, diminishing band of heroes under their order, who strove to the utmost to do their duty to the last for the Emperor and Country. Their defense of Port Arthur will become proverbial for all ages and be upheld as an example to be imitated as long as a soldier will exist, honour to them for ever! The imminent of the fall of the doomed fortress had for some time already set the diplomatically tongues wagging in the different capitals of the World. Many and different are the rumours and news of armistice and over peace arrangements, which reached me from everywhere.65 When the Russian army lost the major Battle of Mukden and the Russian navy was blown to pieces at Tsushima, the German Emperor used even clearer words to open the eyes of his stubborn autocratic cousin: From the purely military point of view the defeat in the Straits of Corea tec(h)nically spoken ends the chances for a decided turn of the scales of the war in your favour. The Japs now being free to pour any amount of reserves, recruits, ammunition etc. into Korea and Manchuria, for the siege of Wladiwostok, which will hardly be able long to resist a siege, without a fleet to assist it. In Mandschuria (sic!) the Army of Lenewitsch will need at least 3 or 4 new army corps to bring it up to full efficiency and even then, it is difficult to foretell what the consequences will be, and whether another great battle will promise more success than the last ones? It is of course formally spoken possible even under these adverse circumstances to continue the war military for any amount of time. But on the other hand the human part must not be overlooked. (…) I may turn your attention to the fact that undoubtedly the Japanese have the highest regard for America before all other nations, because this mighty rising Power with its tremendous fleet is next to them. If anybody in the world is able to influence the Japanese or to induce them to be reasonable in their proposals, it is President Roosevelt.66 The Czar finally decided to negotiate for peace, but he was still not willing to grant any money or territory to the Japanese.67 Wilhelm was asked by Roosevelt, as described in Chapter 4, to put pressure on his cousin in St. Petersburg. The Russian defeats had disappointed Wilhelm, who had hoped for a victory of the white race in East Asia, but at least the Czar now seemed to be willing to talk about a Russo-German agreement again. The German Emperor was invited to the Swedish Björkö, where he was supposed to secretly meet his cousin in person.68 The proposed meeting caused uproar in the Foreign Office. Should France be informed if there was a possibility to sign an agreement? What about Japan, who might fear the preparation of another intervention like in 1895?

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These questions had to be answered in advance to provide his majesty with clear orders for his mission to get a clear statement, or even better a written agreement, from the Czar. It was decided to keep everything secret; France could be integrated later, if it wanted to.69 On 24 July 1905, Bülow received a telegram from Wilhelm which stated that the emperor and the Czar had signed an agreement in Björkö, which should be kept secret until the peace between Russia and Japan was negotiated.70 The agreement was a defensive alliance consisting of the following four articles: Article I If one of the two empires should be attacked by a European power, the allied party will engage to aid the other contracting party with all his military and naval forces. Article II Both parties agree not to close separate peace treaties with a common enemy. Article III The present treaty will become effective with the end of the RussoJapanese War and will remain in force as long as it is not denounced with a year’s prior notification. Article IV His Majesty, the Emperor of all Russia, with the ratifying of this treaty will undertake the necessary steps to inform France of it and to propose to the latter to adhere to it as an ally.71 Wilhelm was simply euphoric about his achievement: And now it has happened like this one wonders and asks, how is that possible? For me the answer is clear! God has made it possible and wanted it, in defiance of all human esprit, in derision of all human acts, he brought together what belonged together! Now his ways are other than ours and his thoughts are higher than ours! What resulted in Russian arrogance last winter, and in intrigues against us, Russia, pushed down through the terrible, hard, and humiliating hand of the lord, now has accepted with happy thanks as a nice gift. When Wilhelm put the proposal of an agreement in front of the Czar It was deadly silent; just the ocean whooshed and the sun shone happily and bright into the cabin (…) I just read the letters “God with us” on the black cross of Hohenzollern’s flag when the Czar’s voice next to me said:

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“that is quite excellent. I quite agree!” My heart beat so loud that I could hear it; I got back hold of myself and said, rather uninterested: “Would you care to sign it? It would be a very nice souvenir of our entrevue?” He scanned the paper once again. Then he said: “Yes I will.”72 For the German Emperor, God had made the agreement possible. Despite the signature of the Czar, the agreement seemed of little worth to the Foreign Office. The limitation to Europe would make a possible Russian support unavailable if Germany fought against Britain, because Russia would not be obliged to attack India.73 The only advantage was seen in an end to Germany’s isolation, since the Czar was persuaded to favor his Western neighbor. It was Wilhelm himself who had integrated the European limitation, and recognized the end of the threat of a two-fronted war as a sufficient advantage of the treaty.74 Bülow as a consequence wanted to resign as Chancellor, because the emperor had demonstrated his will to make his own policy without counseling him or the Foreign Office.75 Wilhelm was really upset. He was not willing to accept that the treaty could have been a failure, and in a very personal letter prohibited Bülow from resigning: I appeal to your friendship to me, and let me never again hear something about your intention to retire. Send me a telegram stating “all right” to answer this letter; then I will know that you are staying. Because the morning after the arrival of your demand to resign would not meet the emperor alive! Think of my poor wife and children!76 However, the discussion was moot, especially since Foreign Minister Lamsdorf was totally against a rapprochement with Germany. Any possible change in the treaty could have been used as an excuse to not ratify the Treaty of Björkö at all.77 In addition, Nicholas seemed neither capable nor willing to press the treaty through, especially not against the combined resistance of his own Foreign Minister and French ally, who could threaten Russia’s financial needs in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. Rather apologetically, he wrote to his cousin in Berlin: You know of course that in a few days the ratification of the Portsmouth peace treaty will be signed. Then our Bjorkoe [sic] understanding is supposed to come into existence. This document, of immense valor, ought to be strengthened, or made clearer, so as to enable all parties concerned to fulfill their duties honestly and frankly. The great question is to draw France into our new defensive Alliance, according to art. IV of Björkoe [sic] treaty – to build up a powerful “Continental League,” as you rightly call this future combination. But if France were to refuse to join us, then, not only would art. IV drop away, but also the meaning of art. I would change radically, because its obligations in the present wording point at any European Power and France too – Russia’s ally. During your stay at

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Björkö, Schlieffen, and offensive strategies Bjorkoe [sic] I did not have with me the documents signed by my Father, which clearly define the principles of the Franco-Russian Alliance and which naturally exclude every chance of an possible collision between them. […] Therefore I think that the coming into force of Bjorkoe treaty ought to be put off until we know how France will look upon it.78

Neither the Foreign Office nor Wilhelm himself were able to use the political potential granted by the Russo-Japanese War. Russia was tied, especially due to its financial needs, to France, and Germany was not able to interfere in this relationship, which had been cultivated since the 1890s. As Jennifer Siegel has emphasized in her book, For Peace and Money, 80 percent of Russia’s pre-World War I debts were held by France,79 why the Czar, even if he had wanted to, was not able to turn to Germany. The German rapprochement seemed clear and omitted a discussion of the situation in Austria with regard to the wishful treaty with Russia. How would the Treaty of Björkö overcome the conflict between the Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans? All these questions remained, and the gain of the treaty itself did not seem worth a fraction of the good relationship with France. Politically, therefore, Germany was unable to use the events in East Asia to her own advantage. Regardless of this fact, the events had a tremendous impact on future German military planning, a point that will be closely analyzed in the following section.

The German military and the Russo-Japanese War Like the military experts of other nations, the German general staff and naval specialists did not believe in a Japanese victory. The Russian steamroller would take its time to get active, but in the end the war would be a success for the Czarist ambitions in the Far East.80 The commander of the naval station in the North Sea, however, also demanded sending more German observers to Manchuria to get detailed information about Russia’s naval prowess.81 Wilhelm thus sent naval officers to East Asia, who were ordered to report immediately to him, “Admiral Berlin.” The officers’ main goals were: 1 2 3

4

to gather experience of the impact of modern armory against modern targets to form an opinion about the tactics and use of modern squadrons, ships and torpedo boats at day and night to gather experience of the execution of larger troop transports and landing operations, on the necessary and suitable food supplies and facilities, on the method of joint ventures between army and naval administration to closely study the material and personnel capabilities of the participating naval force.82

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German relations with Russia allowed its naval officers access to the war from a Russian perspective, something that was unusual for international observers. For a long time, Germany was the only power that allowed to send its observers to Port Arthur, until they had to leave in August 1904.83 The reports from the Far East were very negative concerning the tactics of the officers, the material situation of the fleet, and the morale of the ordinary sailors. “The experts of the Russian affairs had tremendously overestimated the Russian forces before the war,”84 and a report on the battle cruiser Gromoboi underlined this impression with a vivid report on the damage sustained from the Japanese grenades.85 Now, armored protection, protection and again protection is necessary. This battle answered many questions. (…) The nearest ship to the enemy has to be the strongest in the squadron. In battles that are fought over a great distance the space between the ships must be wide (up to 5 cable lengths); if the distance decreases, the interspace has to decrease as well.86 The Russian experiences were also confirmed by the reports of Japanese captain Asama, who was commander of the armored cruiser Asama during the war. He also “considered that heavy guns were decisive in naval battles,” and it was “luck for the Japanese that the Russians provided the needed time, otherwise the Battle of Tsushima might have been lost.”87 The Japanese naval officer continued his lecture on the new war at sea, where heavy armory was needed as well as heavy guns that must be spread on board to secure some of them in the case of a heavy hit.88 It was emphasized that torpedo boats were a deadly weapon during the war, especially if they were used at night.89 Torpedo nets were practically useless, but provided a feeling of security to the sailors, who could not sleep without them for fear of an attack.90 Submarines had been sent to the Far East, but the 10 boats were not able to influence the conflict.91 It would be another decade until this weapon could be used to its most deadly potential. The continued Russian defeats were also reported in the German press, where many newspapers echoed the international euphoria for the Japanese victories.92 No matter how the press had reported during the war, it seemed clear to all observers that the Russian navy was in a bad condition. The Russians lack dockyards in the East Asian region, which provided a significant advantage for the Japanese navy, which was able to repair its battleships while the Russians had to fight hesitant to not lose their own ships. More important however, was the lack of training for the Russian crews, a fact which tremendously influenced the outcome of the war at sea.93 And on land it was the same story: the Russian army was inferior throughout the whole war. Like the navy, the Russian army showed no sign of superiority during the first battle against the Japanese troops at the Yalu River in North Korea. While one German newspaper claimed it was only the “misfortune of the

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Russians,”94 others sought more radical answers to why the Czarist troops lost. Racist arguments were proposed, stating that the Russians were not Aryans, but partly Mongols, and Russia was described as the “Half-Asia of Europe.”95 Military observers, however, recognized the weaknesses. Russia had too few troops and their goal was merely to halt the Japanese advance long enough to receive reinforcements via the Trans-Siberian Railway.96 However, the military observers disputed whether this strategic aim was worth the material and human losses of this battle.97 With the continuing losses of Russian troops during the following months, the image established by several German newspapers would not improve. The slow mobilization made a Russian offensive impossible,98 but the Russian soldiers were in poor condition and the supplies sent by the army contained expired food.99 The life of the officers was hard in Manchuria,100 where “poor rations and munitions supply and a command expectation of reinforcements, which explained the inactivity that had such a debilitating effect on morale.”101 Morale was generally bad, and descriptions by sailors, who were interned after the lost naval battles, were extremely negative. The General Consulate in China reported an incident in Shanghai on 17 December 1904: The commanders of the disarmed battleships have not stuck to (…) the agreement (…), under which their crews are only allowed to enter the city under official leadership and in strictest order. More than once per day larger troops come on land, whose members spread in full freedom to the taverns and amusement clubs102 where they would start to get drunk. Two days before the report was sent, two drunk sailors argued and one killed a Chinese civilian with an axe. This incident further increased the anti-Russian tension of the English community in the city and was used by the press as an example of typical Russian violent behavior. The international press criticized the poor education and training of the Russian army.103 The lower ranking officers tended to rely on luck during the battles,104 and the reservists in the Czarist army were not well trained in the use of modern weapons.105 The general standard of education was low compared to other armies, especially the Japanese. This antagonism was not only visible in terms of education or morale,106 it also resembled the war itself: “The Russian soldiers are masterly in retreat, whilst the Japanese are very unskilled in it.”107 Kuropatkin had already recognized this discrepancy before the war, something that he later reiterated.108 Especially after the heavy defeats of late 1904 and early 1905, Kuropatkin was criticized for his maneuvers, which solely consisted of retreat.109 However, in the beginning the Russian calculations were based on defeats during the initial phase of the war. Hintze reported from St. Petersburg on 1 April 1904:110 “The Russians, with regard to their own announcements,

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were totally bargained for their check back after 9 February and for being driven back beyond Manchuria and losing control of the sea.” The Russian plan was simple: to let as many Japanese troops as possible arrive on the Asian mainland and then cut their supply chains through war at sea.111 The main attack was therefore to be executed by the fleet, but the Japanese victories made this plan impossible. Regardless of the early Japanese victories, the planners, officers, and high officials in St. Petersburg believed in a speedy victory for the Czarist Empire.112 They were counting on the impact of the naval reinforcements of the Second Pacific Squadron, which was to be sent to the Far East. But Hintze doubted the effect of these ships, because a

b

the famous reinforcements won’t – as is well-known – be able to depart in July, nor will they arrive in East Asia in September; as a result there is an unknown length of time to destroy the fleet in the Pacific if [the ships] actually reach the theater of war, they will (…) have lost tremendous speed, and almost certainly face (…) disasters, in others words: not be fully effective.113

Rozhestvenski’s fleet became an easy target for the Japanese, especially since their plans were better prepared.114 Even though Japan did not allow many observers to visit the battlefields or the front lines,115 the foreigners who were able to watch the actions of the Japanese soldiers were impressed and recognized another difference between the two armies: The patriotism of Japan’s soldiers was not shared by their Russian enemies.116 The same was true for the general public, as discussed in Chapter 3. While the Japanese were able to mobilize further troops for the battles in Manchuria, the Russians, with an increasing number of defeats, faced trouble on the home front as a result of further recruitment. The only positive echoes for Russian soldiers came from the defense of Port Arthur.117 There the people got used to grenades and heavy artillery fire very quickly, which caused heavy injuries. Hit by the new artillery bullets soldiers could easily lose an arm, a leg, or even their head. Broken bones and previously unseen injuries were the result.118 Many of them were also poisoned by gas. Some had believed that smaller rifle bullets would make the war more humane; however, they did not realize the damage kinetic energy was able to produce inside a wounded body.119 The Japanese also suffered an unimaginable number of casualties at the siege of Port Arthur. However, they never stopped their assault, which was another source of admiration in the Western world.120 Von Etzel summarized the Japanese image of the hills of corpses in front of Port Arthur very well: “Both officer and ordinary man knew what he was fighting for and invested his highest ambition to lose his life for his godlike ruler and ‘Dai Nippon’ on the battlefield.”121 For the Japanese soldier it was shameful to be captured alive, something that should not change until the Pacific War.

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Many observers were impressed by the events in Manchuria, including Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), who in addition recognized the role of military discipline.122 Sakurai Tadayoshi expressed what every military leader watched with a mix of admiration and aversion: The Japanese “have inherited a temperament which knows no retreating even before sure death, and that inheritance has been made stronger by discipline.”123 Despite the large number of deaths before Port Arthur fell and detailed reports about the cruel scene discovered after the fortress had surrendered,124 military lessons barely changed after the war, mainly focusing on offensive strategies and the power of morale and will. Ludwig Freiherr von Falkenhausen (1844–1936), in an article on “Attack and Defense” in the Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde (Quarterly Journal of Troop Leadership and Military Art), was convinced that a focus on offense was the lesson to be learned from the war in Manchuria.125 Greater cooperation was needed between artillery and infantry,126 while cavalry should be solely used for intelligence or pursuing a retreating enemy.127 He concluded that the Russians had only lost because their military leaders had adopted a defensive and retreating strategy instead of pushing forward for an offensive attack.128 The lesson seemed clear and easy: “In my opinion the Russo-Japanese War provides us after a longer break with another example to conclude that attack is the stronger form – or better expressed – the more effective means of warfare, something one however must well know and be capable of.”129 Gary P. Cox concluded that several factors were ignored by the armies of Europe, and a decade later the soldiers would have to wage offensive assaults against machine guns again, hoping or believing that they were able to repeat the Japanese victory, even against a well-defended enemy.130 Many other military strategists and officers emphasized the role of morale and the offensive as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War,131 a fact that would become fateful for the even larger number of deaths in the First World War. Another strong leitmotiv in the writings of military thinkers after the war between Russia and Japan was poor leadership. Kuropatkin, as mentioned above, became a figurehead of such criticism, as the observers believed a strong offensive, led by a capable military leader could even tip the balance when outnumbered.132 The official German history of the war repeatedly emphasized the passivity of the Russian officers and commanders, and the activities of the Japanese were stylized as the element that secured victory over Russian passiveness and indecisiveness.133 When the First World War broke out, the European powers followed offensive war plans,134 and since most countries had sent military observers to the battlefields in Manchuria,135 we can trace the influence of the experiences formed on this “testing ground for modern warfare.”136 Alfred von Schlieffen, the chief of the German general staff, was particularly influenced by the events in Manchuria, especially since he had voted for a tactic whereby “it was impossible to defeat an enemy without attacking and annihilating him.”137

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Much was written in Germany after the war about the naval changes and impacts of the war.138 The Marine Rundschau also announced a competition for an article comparing the Battle of Tsushima with the Battle of Trafalgar.139 The war also marked “an important watershed in shipbuilding,”140 and the new dreadnought class would rule the ocean in the aftermath of the war. The Russian navy was heavily criticized, since the Czarist sailors did neither know how to maneuver nor how to shoot.141 The German observers concluded, that “Russia (…) would never be a great seapower.”142 The Russian Admiral and former Navy Minister Fyodor Avelan (1839–1916) confessed in July 1905 after a talk with Hintze that the Russian navy was weak: a

b

c

We knew that personnel reforms were needed. But the war prevented us from starting them. However we did not guess that the revolutionary movement would win so much ground within a year, as was shown by the riots in the navy. Propaganda was introduced to the ranks by the reservists. The recuperation of the material losses will be the next step in personnel reforms; new orders will only be issued when they are necessary to keep the Russian dockyards busy. This will only happen to provide the workers with tasks. Ships will be ordered later, as soon as the personnel question is solved. The navy would prefer to hold off on internal orders until the experiences of the Battle of Tsushima have been processed. However, this information is not available yet, because the Japanese do not allow captured Russian officers to send messages other than about their condition.143

The Russian navy had pledged to focus on the defense of Russian shores and needed years to recover from the material losses,144 so it was no longer able to pose a threat to German naval interests in Europe. However, lessons were not only incorporated within the navy.

The Schlieffen Plan and the Russo-Japanese War German war plans, on the other hand, underwent particular change as a consequence of the Russian defeats. Schlieffen was well-informed about the strength of the Japanese army.145 The chief of the general staff also recognized the delay in Russian mobilization, since the Trans-Siberian Railway was able to transporting many troops to Manchuria at once.146 Initially, Schlieffen, like many others, might have believed in ultimate Russian victory,147 but he was also forced to change his mind as a consequence of the steady Japanese military successes.148 In June 1905, Bülow requested Schlieffen’s thoughts on Russia’s military capabilities less than a year after the peace treaty in a European theater of war like the Balkans.149 He was dismissive of a possible military threat from Russia. His answer will be quoted almost

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in full to underline the impact the war had on Schlieffen’s further military thoughts:150 Russia will, as soon as it signs peace with Japan, withdraw its army corps and divisions from East Asia. After around six months there will probably be the same number of troops in European Russia as there were at the beginning of 1904. It will be a bit longer before weapon and munition supplies are recovered and the artillery material is renewed. After a while the old army could be externally recovered. Internally, however, there will be many differences. We have known for a long time that the Russian army has no important leaders, and it was known that the majority of officers had little worth, and that the training of the troops could only be described as insufficient. In contrast, the Russian soldier was regarded as one of the best in the world. His unasked for loyalty, his patient perseverance, his calm defiance of death were recognized as invaluable qualities. Now the faith in these qualities has been badly shaken. The loyalty was not always truly blind. Many cases have been reported in which the officers did not order, but beg, persuade, or negotiate. (…) Troops rarely fought to their last (during the Manchurian campaigns). (…) Most notably, the Russian soldier is not trained. He does not know how to shoot or to maneuver in battle. (…) The perfection of the armory now demands very careful training. Since the Russians did not receive it, they are no match for another army, and not useful in any attack. The East Asian war has shown that the Russian army was even worse than estimated by common sense, and the war did not improve it but made it worse. (…) It is doubtful there will be an improvement, since self-awareness is lacking. The Russians do not seek the reason for their defeat in their own general incapabilities, but in the superior numbers of their enemy and the inability of individual leaders. (…) It will therefore just match the natural development of things when the Russian army does not get better but worse. However, Schlieffen still counted on the Russian army in the long-term, believing “its sheer mass would carry weight” in a war, even if the quality of that mass could be ignored for a while. The later official German history of the war repeated similar judgments of the Russian army.151 Offensive operations, as demanded by Flakenhausen, remained a key element and would greatly influence the Schlieffen Plan. His Denkschrift für einen Krieg gegen Frankreich (Memorandum for a War against France), written in the winter of 1905/06 not only consisted of “important elements of the cultural memory that explain the outbreak of the First World War,”152 it was also an expression of the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. Schlieffen had observed the events in the Far East very closely and recognized that Japan’s victory demolished the Russian threat on Germany’s Eastern front for at least a few years. Due to this, Schlieffen

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could design a much more aggressive plan, which would be directed towards France during this particular window of opportunity of Russian absence. His Memorandum must consequently be read as a war plan for a limited time span, when the weakness of the Czarist Empire could be used to fight a war against the isolated French enemy. The plan was based on the idea that Germany would have a free hand against the Western “arch enemy” and be victorious in a fast war of four to six weeks. After the victory on the Western front, all troops would then turn towards the East to fight against the Russian steamroller.153 Since the early 1890s Schlieffen was well aware that a future war in Europe would be a war on two fronts for the German Empire. In 1901, due to his final remarks of the Generalstabsreise Ost, Schlieffen declared to his officers that Germany can only use its strategic position between France and Russia in an advantageous way, if the German Army was able you prevent the two enemies from combining their troops. Following the idea that the troops had to use the train networks to move the troops as fast as possible to fight the enemies separately, one after another, Schlieffen argued for a hard first strike and battle of annihilation, before relocating the troops to fight the remaining enemy.154 Since he started leading the German General Staff, Schlieffen had argued for an offensive plan and the war between Japan and Russia would naturally not only support this idea, but also determine the target of the first strike for a battle of annihilation, a modern Cannae.155 Schlieffen assumes, that “France, in a war against Germany, would not be able to count on Russian support, and therefore take a defensive position.”156 To circumvent the strong forts in Germany’s West, he consequently argued for this famous maneuver, which by violating the neutrality of the Benelux states would lead to the attempted battle of annihilation with the French Army, just a few weeks after the operations had begun. This battle, so the later interpretation argues would also have prevented the battles of materials that would characterize the First World War.157 What emphasizes the importance of the events in the Far East in 1904 and 1905 for this plan seems to be obvious. Russia, the military power, whose role in a two-front war, which was considered to be the “Sword of Damocles”158 hanging above Germany’s future, was feared by former military planners, is totally absent and unimportant for Schlieffen’s considerations. It therefore must be argued, that the observation of the Russo-Japanese War and the defeat of the Russian steamroller in the East allowed Schlieffen to come up with a plan that would temporarily provide a chance for a German victory in a war scenario against France, fortunately not backed by a strong Russian army. It is actually without doubt “that the 1905 Denkschrift (…) envisioned a one-front war where almost all of the German forces would be launched in a hammer”159 against France. The existence of a Schlieffen Plan was, however, questioned by Terence Zuber160 “in an increasingly aggressive approach towards that traditional and generally acknowledged interpretation,”161 however, Zuber’s critical analysis did not even mention the impact of the war in East Asia. Since the

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early 1890s and the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance, the general staff with Schlieffen as its chief had to plan for a two-fronted war against Russia and France. The German general was well aware that only a “short, rapid war” was feasible.162 Schlieffen thereby had a concept of dividing his forces to counter the Russian and the French forces. Since the Reichsarchiv prevented access to relevant files in the years after the Great War, some files have needed recent reinterpretation; however, Zuber’s explanation that there was no Schlieffen Plan at all was a rather apologetic revision of the German position at the beginning of the First World War. In contrast to Zuber’s argument, Moltke adopted elements of Schlieffen’s Denkschrift; however, the operations of 1914 resembled a Moltke Plan more than the original version of 1905.163 Moltke faced a stronger anti-German alliance system and totally different political and military preconditions, so he was not able to use the Schlieffen Plan in 1914. Russia was also more willing to accept the outbreak of a war than risk a political defeat that might revitalize the anti-autocratic movement.164 The situation had changed, and Schlieffen’s plan was based on the experiences of the Russo-Japanese War, which is why it could not be used in 1914. When Moltke decided to circumvent the fortresses on the Western front, he acted as Schlieffen had intended, but what general would have sent his troops directly into a siege warfare at the Western front if he could have avoided it?165 Like Annika Mombauer, one has to conclude that “Moltke’s plan demonstrated a number of characteristics that largely correspond to what is usually referred to as the Schlieffen Plan.”166 Russia had regained military strength in the years before the First World War and it was not feasible to leave the Eastern front open without protection. In 1905, Schlieffen could ignore Russia, since the war against Japan had weakened it exactly as he had described to Bülow. Consequently, his plan was perfect for a scenario in 1905 and 1906, but not for 1914.167 After 1913 an Ostaufmarsch (deployment in the East) seemed senseless, especially since everyone knew that France would not remain neutral in a war. Therefore Moltke, following the basic ideas of Schlieffen, hoped for a speedy victory against France, facing Russia in the East after the first successful campaign that would neutralize one of the two enemies. While the Schlieffen Plan had the sole intent of annihilating the French army in a battle like Cannae (216 bc), Moltke later adopted this as the first step in a major confrontation with several European powers, which would later be named the First World War. Zuber’s interpretation of the impact of the Russo-Japanese War is simply nonsense: In any case, the Schlieffen plan was written in January and February 1906, two years too late. It should have been written in February 1904, when the Japanese attacked Port Arthur. Peace talks between Russia and Japan began on 9 August 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on 5 September 1905 and the Russians immediately began to

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redeploy their army to European Russia. By February 1906 the RussoJapanese war had been over for six months and Russia’s internal situation was rapidly stabilizing.168 First of all, Schlieffen could not write a war plan based on a war that was not yet decided. Second, Russia was redeploying its troops, but Schlieffen, as quoted above, had definitely recognized Russia’s weaknesses and the political developments in the country, which was shaken by revolutionary tendencies. While Zuber intended “to prove that there never was a Schlieffen plan”169 and that it “was invented by the General Staff to explain away their failure to win the 1914 Marne campaign,”170 he simply proved that his perspective was too Euro-centric to understand the impacts of the Russo-Japanese War. Schlieffen’s plan was certainly also an argument for enlarging the German army,171 but these armies were solely to be sent against the French, not the Russians, who seemed to pose no threat against Germany in its weakened position in 1905. Zuber’s statement that the “idea that the Russian army had collapsed in 1905 finds no support in the German 1905 intelligence summary”172 is simply not true; as this book has shown, the army and navy of the German Kaiserreich had a vital interest in reports on the events in East Asia and almost all came to the same conclusion, namely that the Russian military was far from dangerous. Although Zuber received a PhD from a German university,173 the use of sources in his works is far removed from the source criticism usually practiced in the academic field, not exclusively but especially in Germany.174 Zuber simply focusses on the sources that support his thesis; however, even a single look at other reports about the war175 could have enlightened him. The Russo-Japanese War seemed too far away for his considerations, and the geographical isolation of the events seems to have produced intellectual isolation as well. Zuber provides a “radical reinterpretation of German war planning before 1914”176 that cannot stand up against a global interpretation of the Russo-Japanese War. Zuber’s Schlieffen is “uninformed and uninterested in foreign affairs,”177 perhaps in the same way as the apologetic writer himself. To fully understand Schlieffen’s concept behind the Denkschrift, one has to take a global view of the events in 1905, which definitely include the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War and the connected decline of Russian military might and potential as a severe menace to the European great powers. Zuber consequently underestimates Schlieffen, since he tends to describe him as “an apolitical military technocrat whose operational planning developed in a political (and international) vacuum.”178 Jan Kusber, a specialist on Russian history, underlined the impact of the war for military planning in Europe, since the “Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 clearly exposed the infrastructure and logistical deficiencies of the Czarist Empire’s military to its army and navy leaders.”179 It also led to postwar debates in Russia, concerning how to reorganize the army and strengthen the steamroller.180 For the Germans, in contrast, the discussion

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was no longer focused on Russia, since the war had opened a “window of opportunity”181 during which the Czarist army would not interfere, and Germany and France could fight against each other. Thus the strategists could plan both an offensive and preventative war in the West.182 The AngloFrench Entente, however, prevent the imminent application of this plan, and it was finally changed to a Moltke Plan that used parts of Schlieffen’s original ideas in 1914. I disagree with Zuber, and would instead like to strengthen Matthew S. Seligmann’s evaluation that the war in East Asia “had a major impact on the thinking of Germany’s military leadership.”183 It cannot be any clearer: the Schlieffen Plan was a direct consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. Without the experiences in East Asia and the German observations, Schlieffen would not have considered a full-scale war against France while leaving the Eastern front unprotected. This leaves a final question concerning the impact of the war in Manchuria on Germany. To what extent did it influence the outbreak of the First World War? This is hard to answer. Russia’s military had recovered and 1914 did not resemble 1905. However, it did resemble 1904. The Germans were facing a growing threat from Russia, knowing there was a limited period in which they could still implement a rapid campaign against France to stop the steamroller in the east and sue for peace negotiations. They counted on a slow Russian mobilization, providing sufficient time to finish business on the Western front. This situation was more comparable to Japan’s situation in 1904. The idea of a preventive and more than anything else offensive war finally prompted the decision to go to war. But unlike Japan, Germany had no international backing, was politically isolated, and was tied to its only ally, Austria-Hungary. The lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were misinterpreted and Germany dared to be as successful as Japan had been in 1905. For sure, the Great War, “was not the inevitable consequence of this earlier conflict, but it was partly inspired by it,”184 which is why it is definitely a decisive event whose full global relevance can only be determined through study from different national and international perspectives.

Notes 1 John White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). 2 Matthew S. Seligmann, “Germany, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Road to the Great War,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 109–123 as well as Jonathan Steinberg, “Germany and the Russo-Japanese War,” The American Historical Review 75:7 (1970), 1965–1986 are good examples. 3 Peters, Carl, “Deutschland und die Mächte,” in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 3 (Munich/Berlin: C.H. Beck, 1944), 340. 4 Ibid., 342. 5 Seligmann, Germany, 109. 6 Wilhelm II expressed his fear of a Yellow Peril already before the war in comments to a report from the German ambassador in Tokyo about the Japanese

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situation in mid-January, see: Graf von Arco to the Foreign Office, Tokyo, 13 January 1904, GP No. 5937. Seligmann, Germany, 110–116. Ibid., 116–117 Ibid., 177. Steinberg, Germany,1965. James Long, “Franco-Russian Relations during the Russo-Japanese War,” The Slavonic and East European Review 52:127 (1974), 214. Ibid., 215. Witte to Kuropatkin, cited in ibid., 222. Ibid., 227. Ibid., 233. Pascal Venier, “The Geographical Pivot of History and Early Twentieth Century Geopolitical Culture,” The Geographical Journal 170, 4 (2004), 332. Notes of the Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office von Holstein, Berlin, 24 March 1902, GP No. 5920. Notes of the Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office von Holstein, Berlin, 12 July 1902, GP No. 5921. Notes of the Vice State Secretary in the Foreign Office von Mühlberg, Berlin, 15 July 1903, GP No. 5924. Notes of the Vice State Secretary in the Foreign Office von Mühlberg an den Gesandten in Tokio Grafen von Arco, Berlin, 26 October 1903, GP No. 5927. The Vice State Secretary in the Foreign Office von Mühlberg to Count von Arco in Tokyo, Berlin, 27 October 1903, GP No. 5928. Ambassodor in St. Petersburg, Count von Alvensleben to Chancellor Count von Bülow, St. Petersburg, 20 December 1903, GP No. 5929. Notes of the Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office, von Lichnowsky, Berlin, 8 January 1904, GP No. 5930. Ambassador in London Count von Metternich to the Foreign Office, London, 8 January 1904, No. 5931. Wilhelm II noted in a comment that Germany would definitely stay neutral as well. Chancellor Count von Bülow to Emperor Wilhelm II, Berlin, 12 January 1904, GP No. 5936. Notes of the Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office, von Lichnowsky, Berlin, 15 January 1904, No. 5939. Note of Chancellor Count von Bülow, Berlin, 16 January 1904, GP No. 5943. Notes of the Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office, von Holstein, Berlin, 16 January 1904, GP No. 5944. Nicholas II to Wilhelm II., St. Petersburg, 21 January 1904, GP No. 5947. Notes of the State Secretary in the Foreign Office, Freiherr von Richthofen, Berlin, den 7 February 1904, GP No. 5956. Note of Chancellor Count von Bülow, Berlin, 14 February 1904, GP No. 5961. Roosevelt had stated before, that the U.S. position would be strictly neutral, even if the sympathies of the United States were with Japan, see: Ambassador in Washington Freiherr Speck von Sternburg to the Foreign Office, Washington, 6 February 1904, GP No. 5978. Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Ambassador in Beijing Freiherrn Mumm von Schwarzenstein, Berlin, 5 February 1904, GP No. 5977. Chancellor Count von Bülow to Emperor Wilhelm II., Berlin, den 18 February 1904, GP No. 5990. Ambassador in Washington Freiherr Speck von Sternburg to the Foreign Office, Washington, 21 March 1904, GP No. 5992. Note of Chancellor Count von Bülow, Berlin, 7 February 1904, GP No. 6027.

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36 Ambassador in London Count von Metternich to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Linden, 14 March 1904, GP No. 6029. A similar report was received from Paris, see: Ambassador in Paris Count von Radolin to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Paris, 28 February 1904, GP No. 6028. 37 Chief of the General Staff of the Army and General of the Cavalry Count von Schlieffen to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Berlin, 20 April 1904, GP No. 6032. 38 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Tsarskoe Selo, 1 June 1904, GP No. 6034. Witte reported, that Kuropatkin was waiting for reinforcements before he would start an offensive in Manchuria, see: Chancellor von Bülow to Wilhelm II, Norderney, 15 July 1904, GP No. 6043. 39 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, Neues Palais, 12 June 1904, GP No. 6037. 40 Note of Chancellor Count von Bülow, Kiel, 26 June 1904, GP No. 6038. 41 Ibid. 42 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Norderney, 9 September 1904, GP No. 6053. 43 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Homburg, 27 September 1904, GP No. 6055. 44 Steinberg, Germany,1974–1975. 45 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Peterhof, 28 September 1904, GP No. 6056. 46 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, Jagdschloß Hubertusstock, 8. Oktober 1904, GP No. 6057. 47 Ambassador in Tokyo Count von Arco to the Foreign Office, Tokyo, 20 September 1904, GP No. 6079. 48 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Homburg v.d.H., 23 September 1904, GP No. 6080. 49 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Homburg v.d.H., 25 September 1904, GP No. 6081. 50 For a more detailed analysis of Bülow’s policy towards Russia see Barbara Vogel, Deutsche Russlandpolitik: Das Scheitern der deutschen Weltpolitik unter Bülow 1900–1906 (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1975). Bülow, as an agent of German “Weltmachtspolitik” was willing to use the conflict in East Asia for his own political agenda. See Peter Winzen, “Prince Bulow’s Weltmachtpolitik,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 22, 2 (1976), 227–242. 51 Chancellor Count von Bülow to Wilhelm II, Berlin, den 6. December 1904, GP No. 6088. 52 Chancellor Count von Bülow to Wilhelm II, Berlin, den 30. Oktober 1904, GP No. 6120. 53 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Tyarskoe Selo, Nov. 7, 1904, GP No. 6124. 54 Chancellor Count von Bülow to Wilhelm II, Berlin, den 16. November 1904, GP No. 6125. 55 Wilhelm II to Chancellor Count von Bühlow, Gr. Strehlitz, 23. November 1904, GP No. 6126. 56 Chancellor Count von Bülow to Wilhelm II, Berlin, 24 November 1904, GP No. 6127. 57 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, Wernigerode, 7 December 1904, GP No. 6130. 58 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Zarskoe Selo, 7 December 1904, GP No. 6131. 59 Wilhelm II to Chancellor Count von Bülow, 28 December 1904, GP No. 6146. 60 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg Count von Alvensleben, Berlin, 1 January 1905, GP No. 6147. 61 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, Neues Palais, 19 October 1904, GP No. 6163. 62 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Zarskoe Selo, 30 October 1904, GP No. 6164. 63 Note of Chancellor Count von Bülow, Berlin, 2 November 1904, GP No. 6167. 64 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, Potsdam, 19 November 1904, GP No. 6174.

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65 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, Berlin, 2 January 1905, GP No. 6180. 66 Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, 3 June 1905, GP No. 6193. 67 Ambassador in Paris Count Radolin to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Paris, 25 July 1905, GP No. 6198; Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Peterhof, 23 August 1905, GP No. 6201. 68 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Norderney, 20 Juli 1905, GP No. 6202. On the negotiations, see: Sidney B. Fay, The Kaiser’s Secret Negotiations with the Tsar, 1904–1905. The American Historical Review, 24:1 (1918), 48–72. 69 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Norderney, 22 July 1905, GP No. 6206; Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office von Holstein to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Berlin, 22 July 1905, GP No. 6207; Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office von Holstein to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Berlin, 23 July 1905, GP No. 6209. 70 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Norderney, 24 July 1905, GP No. 6215. 71 Secretary in the Imperial Legation von Tschirschky to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Björkoe, on Board S.M.Y. Hohenzollern, 24 July 1905, GP No. 6218. 72 Wilhelm II to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Wisby, 25 July 1905, GP No. 6220. 73 Note of the Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office von Holstein, Berlin, 28 July 1905, GP No. 6227. 74 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Norderney, 30 July 1905, GP No. 6229. 75 Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Foreign Office, Norderney, 9 August 1905, GP No. 6235. 76 Wilhelm II to Chancellor Count von Bülow, 11 August 1905, GP No. 6237. 77 Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office von Holstein to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Berlin, 14 August 1905, GP No. 6239. 78 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Peterhof, 7 Oktober 1905, GP No. 6247. 79 Jennifer Siegel, For Peace and Money: French and British Finance in the Service of Tsars and Commissars (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2. Siegel, in great detail describes the development of the financial alliance between Russia and France (pp. 12–49) and the intensification of it due to the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905 (pp. 50–85). 80 Philip Towle, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Defence of India,” Military Affairs 44:3 (1980), 113. 81 Commander of the Naval Station of the North Sea to the Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy, Wilhelmshaven, 28 February 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777 82 Wilhelm II, Order for the Naval Officers Sent to the Russian or Japanese Forces, Berlin, 13 February 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5772. 83 Steinberg, Germany, 1969; Telegram to Admiral Berlin, 20 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5772. 84 Report of Bonsart von Schellendorfs, Major in the General Staff, Schettnienen, 14 July 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5773. 85 Battle Report of Captain Finograzky, Commander of the Cruiser Gromoboi, Wladiwostok, 14 August 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5773. On the battle of the Gromoboi at Ulsan on 14 August 1904, see Peter Brook: Armoured Cruiser vs. Armoured Cruiser: Ulsan 14 August 1904 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2000). 86 Battle Report of Captain Finograzky. 87 Secret Report of the Imperial Dockyard Kiel, Scheibe, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, Kiel, 28 Juni 1906, BArch MArch RM 5/5771, 1.

140 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106

107 108

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Björkö, Schlieffen, and offensive strategies Ibid., 2–3. Ibid., 4–5. Ibid. Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, 17 November 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5769. “Der Japanismus im Schwinden,” Hamburger Nachrichten, 710, 8 October 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, 29 December 1903, BArch MArch RM 5/5763, 1–2. “Die Niederlage der Russen,” Frankfurter Zeitung, 6 May 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8169. “Die gelbe Gefahr,” Deutsche Tageszeitung 115, 18 May 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8169. Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 94. Ibid., 95. Berliner Lokal Anzeiger 400, 26 August 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. “Das Aussehen des russischen Soldaten,” Hamburger Courier 500, 4 November 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170.; “Russische Konserven,” Schlesische Zeitung 813, 18 November 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. “Das Elend der russischen Offiziere,” Kleines Journal 336, 3 December 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. Oleg R. Airapetov, “The Russian Army’s Fatal Flaws,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 163. Imperial German General Consulate in China, Dr. Knappe, to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Shanghai, 17 December 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5775. “Die Zustände in der russischen Armee,” Vossische Zeitung 248, 27 May 1905, BArch R 8034-II/8170. “Russische Zustände,” Berliner Blatt, 25 May 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8169. Airapetov, Fatal Flaws, 164. Donald Wright, “‘That Vital Spark’: Japanese Patriotism, the Russian Officer Corps and the Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 591. Sakurai, Human Bullets, 48. Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol.1, 241. For a detailed analysis of Kuropatkin’s war diary, see: Hirono Yoshihiko “Kuropatokin Nihon Nikki ni tsuite (Thoughts on Kuropatkin’s Japan Diary),” in Nichiro Sensǀ Kenkynj no shin-shiten (New Research Perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War), ed. Nichiro Sensǀ Kenkynjkai (Yokohama: Seibunsha, 2005), 31–45. Wright, Japanese Patriotism, 591. Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg 1 April 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5766, 3. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 5. Ibid., 6. The Japanese Navy had long been advised by foreign experts to know how to fight in a favorable way, see: Shinohara Hiroshi, Nihon Kaigun oyatoi gaijin: Bakumatsu kata Nichi-Ro Sensǀ made (The Foreign Specialists of the Japanese Navy: From the Bakumatsu until the Russo-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Chnjǀ Kǀronsha, 1988).

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115 Jack London, “Japanese Officers Consider Everything a Military Secret,” San Francisco Examiner, 26 June 1904; Memorandum: “Die Verwendung der Landungsbateilung der schweren Schiffsartillerie beim Angriff auf Port Arthur,” Kokumin Shimbun, 6–30 October 1906, BArch MArch RM 5/5771. See also: “The Wisdom of the East,” Punch, 16 March 1904. 116 Wright, Japanese Patriotism, 598. On the Japanese image of the Russian enemy, see: Kǀgo Eriko, “Rusuke no hyǀshǀ: Nichi-Ro Sensǀ-ki ni okeru teki toshite no Roshia hei no imêji wo megutte (The Representation of the ‘Russky’: The image of the Russian soldiers with regard to the Russo-Japanese War),” Meisei Daigaku kenkynj kiyǀ 23 (2015), 310(51)–301(60). 117 “Der Japanismus im Schwinden,” Hamburger Nachrichten, 710, 8 October 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. 118 Lecture of Kollegienrats Dr. Splett in a Meeting of the Military Doctor’s Club, 25 October 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5769, S.3. 119 Ibid., 8, 11. See also Naval Attaché at the Japanese Embassy, Trummler, to His Majesty Emperor and King Wilhelm II, Tokyo, 28 December 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5769, 11. Japanese physicians made similar experiences: Isonaga Kazuki and Yamamoto Takao, “Rikugun kangohei ‘Ogata Tadayoshi’ no Nichi-Ro Sensǀ (The Russo-Japanese War of the Medical Corps soldier Ogata Tadayoshi),” Tǀa Daigaku kiyǀ 20 (2014), 33–61. 120 Naval Attaché at the Japanese Embassy, Trummler, to His Majesty Emperor and King Wilhelm II, Tokyo, 29 December 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5769. 121 Military Report No. 18/06 of the Military Attaché in Tokyo, Major v. Etzel, to the Royal Prussian Ministry of War, Berlin, Tokio, den 25. Februar 1906, BArch MArch RM 5/5771. 122 Neil M. Heyman, “Leon Trotsky’s Military Education: From the Russo-Japanese War to 1917,” The Journal of Modern History 48:2 (1976), 77. 123 Sakurai, Human Bullets, 48. 124 Naval Attaché at the Japanese Embassy, Trummler, to His Majesty Emperor and King Wilhelm II, Report No. 25, Tokyo, 24 January 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5769. 125 General der Infanterie z.D. Frhr. v. Falkenhausen, “Angriff und Verteidigung,” Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde 3:2 (1906), 390. The Japanese army had made similar experiences with regard to the new combination of infantry and artillery, see: Kosuga Ryǀji, “Nichi-Ro Sensǀ senkun to sono katsuyǀ: hohǀkyǀdǀ shisǀ no hǀga (The Battle Experiences and the Impact of the Russo-Japanese War: The Origin of Concepts on the Combination of Infantry and Artillery),” Bǀeigaku Kenkynj 50 (2014), 27–46. For a broader survey on the tactics during the war, see: Shimanuki Shigeyoshi, Senryaku: Nichi-Ro Sensǀ (Strategy: The Russo-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Hara Shobǀ, 1980). 126 Falkenhausen, Angriff, 398. 127 Ibid., 403. On the role of the cavalry during the war, see: Gustav Wrangel, The Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War; Lessons and Critical Considerations (London: Hugh Rees, 1907). 128 Falkenhausen, Angriff, 411–412. 129 Ibid., 413. 130 Gary P. Cox, “Of Aphorisms, Lessons, and Paradigms: Comparing the British and German Official Histories of the Russo-Japanese War,” The Journal of Military History 56, 3 (1992), 392. 131 Also official histories, like United States War Department. General Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff (Military Information) Division, Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria, 5 vols. (Washington: GPO,

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139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148

149 150 151

Björkö, Schlieffen, and offensive strategies 1906–7), emphasized this trend. For a detailed study of these developments, see: Jack K. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Rewriting, 80. Cox, Aphorisms, 396–397. M. Christian Ortner, “Die Kriegs- und Aufmarschpläne Österreich-Ungarns, Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Russlands im Juli 1914, ” in Erster Weltkrieg: Globaler Konflikt – Lokale Folgen – Neue Perspektiven, ed. Stefan Karner and Philipp Lesiak (Innsbruck/Wien/Bozen: StudienVerlag, 2014), 45–61. Yigal Sheffy, “A Model not to Follow: The European Armies and the Lessons of the War,” in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), 256. Ibid. Ibid., 265. A. Janson, Das Zusammenwirken von Heer und Flotte im russisch-japanischen Kriege 1904/5 (Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1905), Hauptmann Lothes, “Befestigte Flottenstützpunkte am Beispiel der Kwantung-Halbinsel (Port Arthur 1898–1904),” Vierteljahreshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde 7 (1905), 556–577, H. Polmann, Der Küstenkrieg und das strategische Zusammenwirken von Heer und Flotte im russisch-japanischen Kriege 1904/05 (Berlin: Mittler, 1912), E. Reventlow, Der russisch-japanische Krieg: Armeeausgabe (Berlin: C.A. Weller, 1906). Those who had observed the war also published their experiences: Albert Hopman, Das Logbuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers (Berlin: August Scheel, 1924). On Hopman’s unpublished experiences, which were just edited 100 years after the war, see: Alfred Hopman, Das ereignisreiche Leben eines “Wilhelminers”: Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen, ed. M. Epkenhans (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004). Eberspaecher, Road to Jutland?, 298. Ibid. 304. German Embassy, von Mumm, to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Peiteiho, 20 August 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5768. “Der Kampf um die Seeherrschaft, ” Sonderabdruck aus Marine-Rundschau, First Issue, 1906, BArch MArch RM 5/5771, 513. Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, 14 July 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5769. Naval Losses in the Russo-Japanese War, Attachment to the Delivery Formular for Battleships in East Asia, 23 June 1905, BArch MArch RM 5/5770. Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Schlieffen, to the Imperial Vice Admiral and Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy, Büchsel, Berlin, 28 January 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5777. Notes of the Reporting Secretary in the Foreign Office, Count von Lichnowsky, Berlin 19 April 1904, GP No. 6031. Ibid. It must be noted here, that the French military thinkers and planers also observed the events in the Far East and incorporated them into their strategy for a future war. For a detailed analysis of the French side see Olivier Cosson, Préparer la Grande Guerre – L’armée française et la guerre russo-japonaise (1899–1914) (Paris: Les Indes savantes, 2013), especially chapters 3–6. Chancellor Count von Bülow to the Chief of the General Staff, Schlieffen, Berlin, 4 June 1905, GP No. 6194. Schlieffen to Bülow, Berlin, 10 June 1905, GP No. 6195. Cox, Aphorisms, 397; See also: Yehuda L. Wallach, The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of the Two World Wars (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), 36–37.

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152 Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross, “Introduction: The Historiography of Schlieffen and the Schlieffen Plan,” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2014), 1. 153 Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, “Denkschrift: Krieg gegen Frankreich” [SchlieffenPlan], Dezember 1905, www.1000dokumente.de/pdf/dok_0097_spl_de.pdf (Last access, January 5, 2017). 154 His explanation is cited in Gerhard P. Groß, “There was a Schlieffen Plan,” in Der Schlieffenplan: Analysen und Dokumente, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans and Gerhard P. Groß (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 155. 155 Alfred von Schlieffen, Cannae, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/ csipubs/cannae.pdf (Last access, January 2, 2017). 156 Schlieffen, “Denkschrift.” 157 Wolfgang Foerster, Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg, Erster Teil: Die deutsche Westoffensive 1914 bis zur Marneschlacht (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1921), 3. 158 On the danger of a war on two fronts and its discussion within the German military see Gerhard P. Gross, The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2016), 57–98. 159 Janet and Joe Robinson, Handbook of Imperial Germany (Bloomington: Author House, 2009), 193. 160 For Zuber’s Thesis: Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History 6:3 (1999), 262–305. Terence Holmes answered by a detailed analysis of the plan, which opened a debate between Zuber and Holmes in War in History. Terence Holmes, “The Reluctant March on Paris: A Reply to Terence Zuber’s ‘The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,’” War in History 8:2 (2001), 208–232; Terence Zuber, “Terence Holmes Reinvents the Schlieffen Plan,” War in History 8:4 (2001), 468–476; Terence Holmes, “The Real Thing: A Reply to Terence Zuber’s ‘Terence Holmes Reinvents the Schlieffen Plan,’” War in History 9:1 (2002), 111–120; Terence Zuber, “Terence Holmes Reinvents the Schlieffen Plan – Again,” War in History 10:1 (2003), 222–232; Terence Holmes, “Asking Schlieffen: A Further Reply to Terence Zuber,” War in History 10:4 (2003), 464–479; Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Was an Oprhan,” War in History 11:2 (2004), 220–225. Zuber expressed his view in several books as well: Terence Zuber, German War Planning, 1891–1914: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge/Rochester: Boydell Press, 2004); Terence Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871–1914 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Terence Zuber, The Real German War Plan 1904–14 (Stroud: History Press, 2011). 161 Ehlert, Introduction, 2. 162 Ibid., 4. 163 Annika Mombauer, “The Moltke Plan: A Modified Schlieffen Plan with Identical Aims?” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2014), 43. 164 Klaus Hildebrand, “The Sword and the Scepter: The Powers and the European System before 1914,” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2014), 20. 165 Mombauer, The Moltke Plan, 48. 166 Ibid., 47. 167 Ibid., 54. 168 S.213 274. 169 Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan, 5.

144 170 171 172 173 174

175

176 177 178 179

180

181 182 183 184

Björkö, Schlieffen, and offensive strategies Ibid. Zuber, The Real German War Plan, 7. Ibid., 27. One has to ask if the supervisor of his PhD thesis was aware or just unwilling to recognize the existence of the sources Zuber refused to use to strengthen his own argument. Robert T. Foley, “The Schlieffen Plan – A War Plan,” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2014), 68. “Das Elend der russischen Offiziere,” Kleines Journal 336, 3 December 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170. “Reports on the Russo-Japanese War,” BArch MArch, PH3/653; Otto von Lauenstein, Report, 10 December 1905, BArch MArch, PH3/653. Foley, The Schlieffen Plan, 73. Gross, There Was a Schlieffen Plan, 86. Ibid., 111. Jan Kusber, “Russian Forces and the German Buildup at the Outbreak of World War I,” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2014), 248. Carl van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832–1914 (New York, 1990), 131–154; There were also very early debates about the psychological impact of modern warfare on Russian soldiers, see: Jan Plamper, “Fear: Soldiers and Emotion in Early Twentieth-Century Russian Military Psychology,” Slavic Review 68:2 (2009), 261. Kowner, Colonial Clash, 7. Ibid., 6–7. Seligmann, Germany, 118. Ibid.,123.

7

Conclusion

The Russo-Japanese War provided a preview of the things to come until 1914. It was the first modern war, providing an insight into the destruction that would destroy Europe a decade later. It was an event of global importance, but since it took place at the periphery its full implications were not recognized. In contrast to other major wars of the twentieth century, the Russo-Japanese War remains underinvestigated. However, it had national and international consequences that shaped the course of history during the entire last century. The world recognized Japan as an equal power, both in the Far East and globally. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had already accepted the Japanese Empire as an equal partner; however, it was the successful war against the Russian army in Manchuria that proved the British decision right to the other European powers. The war consequently was a watershed in Japanese history, since it promoted national feelings along with political and military self-consciousness, and, as has been shown in the third chapter transformed Japan’s society, particularly with regard to the political emancipation of the masses who suffered from the conflict at the Homefront. It also produced an admiration for Japan throughout the Asian and Middle Eastern colonies, where the Japanese victories were reinterpreted in terms of the greatness of the non-European world. People in the colonized regions of the globe began to recognize that the existing order was not the only alternative. The war also had tremendous consequences for Europe and the United States, determining historical developments which would lead to the further conflicts of the twentieth century. In Russia, the continued defeats of the Czarist army caused revolutionary troubles, which were further stimulated by Akashi from Stockholm, who had recognized the possibilities for a fifth column in the enemy’s territory. After establishing a connection to Zilliacus and the Finnish opposition, Akashi received money from Japan to finance the Polish and Russian opposition groups, which were trained in sabotage in Paris. Two conferences were organized to combine the power of the various revolutionary movements, but the Japanese financing alienated the most influential ones. Despite the inefficiency of the actions of the individual organizations,

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Akashi received another considerable amount of funding after the Japanese military seemed unable to secure total victory in Manchuria in the first half of 1905. He then paid for weapons for the revolutionaries, which were to be smuggled to the Russian Empire to start a rebellion and tremendously weaken Russia at home. The attempt failed and the ship, stranded near the Finnish coast, was destroyed. Russia and Japan finally negotiated peace and Akashi left again. However, the impact remained and the revolutions of 1917 cannot be understood without the events of 1905. The Czar was finally forced to grant rights to the population and a parliament, as promised in the October Manifesto. Without the public unrest caused by the war in the Far East and the growing influence of the revolutionary groups, backed by Japanese money, these events would probably not have led to a further fomenting of revolutionary potential in Russia. The inciting event that determined the Russian and global history of the twentieth century was therefore the Russo-Japanese War. The war also influenced Japanese-American relations for the subsequent decades, until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Initially the sympathies of the American public and the U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt were with Japan. Japan’s victories were applauded and stylized as victories of Western culture and democracy over Russian barbarism. However, Roosevelt’s position changed as the danger of the disrupted balance of power in Asia grew. The president needed Russia as a counterweight to Japanese ambitions. His main interest was to secure the U.S. interest in the region, especially an Open Door in Manchuria. The Japanese now seemed strong enough to interfere and transform East Asia into an exclusive sphere of their own influence. During the peace negotiations at Portsmouth, the president consequently tried to keep Russia in the game. He advised Japan to not overstretch its demands. Finally, Komura had to agree to a peace treaty that fulfilled the initial Japanese war aims but omitted any indemnity or major territorial gains. The Japanese public were not satisfied and reacted violently in many cities, mainly symbolized by the Hibiya Park riots in Tokyo during the early days of September 1905. Japan was humiliated and Roosevelt was the scapegoat. In addition, Japan now needed to gain money, which is why the South Manchurian Railway was not shared with international investors and the Japanese government and military tried to close the Open Door, since both required the northern Chinese provinces as an exclusive economic zone, for the financial interests of the Japanese Empire. The relationship between the United States and Japan was further worsened by the immigration problem on the U.S. west coast and the segregation crisis that followed the Russo-Japanese War. Relations became more aggressive, and both countries accepted the possibly of a war against each other in 1907, when war planners from both sides integrated the other power as a potential enemy in a future war. Political and economic relations worsened, and Japan felt humiliated by the naval agreements – mainly determining fleet ratios – set out in naval conferences

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in Washington (1921–1922) and London (1930). In 1931, the Manchurian Incident ended the struggle for influence in this region, and tensions grew until 1941, when the Japanese, in the tradition of 1904, attacked the United States to gain an advantage in a war which could not be won but could at least potentially end with a favorable peace. The Russo-Japanese War was consequently also a watershed for Japanese–American relations and the starting point for the developments leading to Pearl Harbor. However, the most severe impact was felt in Germany. The navy and army of the Kaiserreich were highly interested in the events in the Far East and sent their observers. They sent back regular reports, which made the poor performance of the Russian sailors and soldiers clear. Russia was fighting on its own in Manchuria, unsupported by its French ally. For the German government and Wilhelm, this seemed to provide a political opportunity to intervene in the Franco-Russian Alliance and sign a treaty with the Czarist Empire, whose ships were supplied by German coal transporters from the Hamburg-Amerika Line (HAPAG). Although the negotiations of 1904 brought no result, after the final defeats at Mukden on land and Tsushima at sea, Czar Nicholas requested a meeting with Wilhelm at the Swedish Björkö. The two monarchs met, and Wilhelm was able to persuade his Russian cousin to sign a mutual agreement, one which might also incorporate France in the future. However, this ambitious plan failed, since the Czar was not willing to ratify it without informing the French in advance, something that would have ended any chance of an agreement at all. In addition, politicians in Russia and Germany were not in favor of the agreement and criticized their monarchs for their hasty political wrangling. Politically, Germany was not able to use the Russo-Japanese War to improve its position in Europe. However, the military implications had tremendous consequences. General Schlieffen, the chief of the general staff, had also observed the events in Manchuria and came to the conclusion that the Czarist army was no longer a dangerous steamroller, at least for the next few years. It was weakened, ill-led and not well-trained, which is why he thought and wrote about a war against France in the West. The so-called Schlieffen Plan left East Prussia unprotected to fight a battle of annihilation against the French army on the Western front before turning back to Russia, whose power was limited anyway. Despite the fact that the existence of this plan had been neglected by Terence Zuber, this book has shown that it was a direct consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. The general ideas were based on the results of the Manchurian campaigns, where Kuropatkin, acting too defensively, was repeatedly defeated by a smaller but better trained and organized army. It is true the plan did not remain in action until 1914 – what army could afford to keep a battle plan unchanged for almost a decade? – but the Moltke Plan, under which Germany mobilized and acted when the First World War broke out, was based on Schlieffen’s ideas, including a first strike against France. Despite Moltke’s reluctance to go to war in 1914, he knew that there was a greater chance of surviving the war by fighting

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the two enemies separately. The Russian menace was growing again as the Czarist army recovered from the war against Japan, which is why the idea of a preventative war was ultimately favored, just as the Japanese had favored it in 1904. It would go too far to claim that the Russo-Japanese War caused the First World War, but it definitely had an impact on the military planning underpinning German strategies and I would suggest it had at least a partial bearing on the final decision to wage war in 1914. Many aspects of the Russo-Japanese war languished unstudied until the centennial, and a lot of work must be done to do the Russo-Japanese War justice. It was a tremendously important event in world history and both national and international studies, even in years without a special memorial event like a centennial, are needed to complete our understanding of the Russo-Japanese War. The present study has shown how the war in East Asia shaped the twentieth century by greatly influencing Russian history, the history of Japanese-American relations, and political and military perspectives within Germany. If the concept of the Russo-Japanese War as a World War Zero finds favor, it will definitely need to be called a Global War in terms of its impact, not solely in the belligerent nation states, but all around the world. It is the task of global historians and cooperative approaches between Western and Asian researchers alike to bring the events of 1904–5 and its consequences back to a wider public. History is, inter alia, explained by the determination of various interrelationships between events. This is something that could be done for the whole twentieth century, starting with the peripheral events at Port Arthur on 8 February 1904.

Sources and bibliography

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Index

203 Meter Hill 25, 26 Afghanistan 65 Akashi Motojiro 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 145, 146 Akita, Lieutenant-Colonel 30 Algeciras, conference 115 Alksandrovich, Grand Duke Sergei 83 Alvensleben, Friedrich Johann von 19 Amoy 21 Amur region 15 Amur Society 47, 54, 58, 59, 63 Andreev, Leonid 75 Anglo-Japanese Alliance 6, 17, 55, 92, 116, 145 anti-war movement 47–8, 50, 51 Antung-Mukden line 65 Arco, Count von 120 army 127–30; Japanese 5, 17, 21–2, 23, 24–5, 26, 27, 46; Russian 21, 22, 23–7, 76, 132, 136 Asada Masafumi 65 Asama 127 Asher, Abraham 82 Association of People against Peace 54 “Attack and Defense” (von Falkenhausen) 130 Auslin, Michael R. 15 Avelan, Fyodor 131 Balfour, Arthur James 17 Balicki, Zygmund 78 battles: land 22–8; Tsushima 34–5, 76, 83, 84, 94, 95, 123, 147; Yalu 22–3, 127–8; see also Mukden, Battle of Battleship Potemkin 33 battleships 6, 17, 106–7 Bebel, August 50 Beijing, treaty 17

Bengal 66 The Bengalee 67 Bennet, Tyler 101 Bethink Yourselves (Tolstoy) 75 Bezobrazov, Alexander 18, 83 the Bezobrazovski 18 Bird, Wilkinson D. 5–6, 27 Bismarck, Otto von 7, 115 Björkö, treaty 125–6, 147 Black Ocean Society 47, 54, 63 Bloody Sunday 80 Bolsheviks 81 Bompard, Maurice 83 Bose, Rash Behari 67 Boxer Rebellion 17, 60–1, 93 Britain: and Anglo-Japanese Alliance 17–18; and Dogger Bank Incident 32–4; and Entente Cordiale 7, 119; favored Japan 2, 6, 93; and Germany 115; military interest in modern warfare 2; and peace negotiations 92; and Russia 65–6, 67, 103 bullets 23 Bülow, Chancellor Bernhard von 116–17, 118, 119, 131; wanted alliance with Russia 8, 120, 121, 122, 124; wanted to resign 125 bushido 24 The Calumet News 100 Cassini, Arthur 95, 102 cavalry 23 China 17, 52, 56, 60–4; and Germany 117; and Manchuria 65; neutrality 21; after Portsmouth treaty 104; sent more students to Japan 36; and Sino-Japanese War 4, 16 Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) 16 Chinese fleet 28

Index Chinese Revolution 60 Chokugen 50, 51 cinema 51, 52 civilization policy 59 coal 33, 34, 119–20, 147 Cold War 85 colonized regions: influence of Japan’s victory on 46, 145 Communist Manifesto 48, 50 Conference of Algeciras 75, 115 conscription 53 Corbett, Julian S. 106 Cox, Gary P. 130 Crimean War 15 Curzon, Lord 66 Daily Hitavadi 66–7 Daily Press 98 Dairen-Changchun line 65 Delcassé, Théophile 83 Denison, Henry Willard 105–6 Denkschrift für einen Krieg gegen Frankreich (Memorandum for a War against France)/Schlieffen 132–3 desertion 53 Deutsche Tageszeitung 94 Deutsche Zeitung 8 Deutsch, Karl W. 66 Dmowski, Roman 78, 79 documentaries 52 Dogger Bank Incident 33–4, 120 Dongfang Zazhi 62 dreadnought battleships 6, 130 Duma 84 Duus, Peter 4

167

Finnish Constitutionalist Party 77–8 First Pacific Squadron 32 First World War 84–5, 104, 130, 136, 147 food, provision of in Russian army 21 Foreign Office, British 17–18 foreign policy goals, Russia 15 France: and Britain 7; and Dogger Bank Incident 34; and Germany 115–16, 133, 134; loans to Russia 75, 83 Franco-Russian Alliance 17, 126, 147 friendly fire 22 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 66 Gapon, Gregori Appolonovich 80 Gatrell, Peter 76 German banks 75 German embassy, Moscow 29 Germany 7, 8, 91–2, 102, 114–36, 147, 148; and China 16; and fears about Asian awakening 36 Gojong, emperor 56, 58, 59 Goltz, Freiherr v. d. 84 Gordon, Andrew 52, 55 Great War 2; see also First World War grenades 25–6 Griffis, William Elliot 103 Gromoboi 127

East Asian Squadron 119 East Prussia 147 Edlund, Nils David 77 Eisenstein, Sergei 33 Elman, Benjamin 28 Engels, Friedrich 48, 50 England see Britain Entente Cordiale 7, 8, 119, 136 Ericson, Steven 102 Eshi Jingwen 62 Etzel, Günther von 19, 20, 129

Hacker, Barton C. 60 Halevi, Sharon 106, 146 Hamburg-Amerika Line (HAPAG) 119–20, 147 Hamilton, Ian 17, 26 Harbin 16 harbors 32–3 Hay, John 91–2, 95 Headrick, Daniel 66 Heiminsha 49 Heimin Shinbun 35, 48, 49–50, 51, 54 Heyne, Naval Lieutenant 25, 26 Hibiya Park riots 35, 54–5, 105, 146 Hill, James J. 97 Hintze, Paul von 21, 30–1, 32, 128–9, 131 Hockley, Allen 102 horses 23

Falkenhausen, Ludwig Freiherr von 130 Fedorovna, Maria 83 fifth column 77, 145 Finland 81, 145

Iljinhoe 58, 59 immigration, Japanese, on U.S. west coast 106, 146 Imperial Japanese Army 17, 22–3; see also army

168

Index

indemnity, demanded by Japan 96, 97, 98, 99, 146 India 5, 65–7 industrialization 48 intelligence, military 21–2 international leftist organizations 51 Ito Hirobumi 18, 19, 58, 59 Iyenaga Toyokichi 57 Japan 46, 47–55, 145, 146–7; army 129–30; attitude to Portsmouth treaty 100–1; attitude to United States 8, 104–5, 106, 107; and Britain 2, 17–18, 93; broke off diplomatic relations with Russia 117; and China 61–4; and Germany 116; influence on Indian independence movement 66–7; and Korea 15–16, 36, 55–60; and Kuril Islands 15; loans granted to 94; losses during the war 3; and Manchuria 64, 65, 103, 104; military intelligence 22; navy 6, 19, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34–5; and peace negotiations 83, 84, 95, 96–8, 99; promised same economic rights for all powers in East Asia 93; recognized as an equal power 145; Roosevelt’s attitude to 92, 102–3, 107; Russian interest in 74–5; seen as aggressor 77; and Sino-Japanese War 16; spying on Russia 77–8, 80–1, 82; war would decide future role in East Asia 4; Western amazement at Japanese success 4–5; see also army The Japanese Graphic 52 “Japanese Victories: Are They a Menace or a Blessing” (Griffis) 103 Jiaozhou Bay 16 Jodko-Narkiewicz, Witold 78 John Grafton 81, 82 Jusserand, Jules 102 Kabinettskrieg 3 Kanghwa, treaty 15 Katayama Sen 48–9, 51 Katsura Taro 18, 81 Kennan, George 93–4 Kishinev pogrom 102 Kitchener, Horatio Herbert 65–6 Kodama Gentaro 25, 81 kokka 47 Kokovtsov, Vladimir 59, 75, 76, 115 kokumin 47 Kokumin Shimbun 24

Komura 96, 97, 98, 99, 104, 146 Korea 15, 18–19, 47, 55–60, 62, 93, 103, 116; annexed by Japan 36; and independence 46; and Manchuria 64 Kotoku Shusui 48, 49, 50–1 Kowner, Rotem 1, 4, 84, 90–1 Kublin, Hyman 48 Kuhn, Loeb and Co. 94 Kujala, Antti 78, 79 Kuril Islands 15 Kuroki Tamemoto, General 22 Kuropatkin, General Alexei 21, 23, 26–7, 128, 130, 147 Kusber, Jan 135 Lamsdorf, Vladimir 18, 125 land battles 21–2 Lassalle, Ferdinand 50 left movement 48, 51 Liang Qichao 62 Liaodong Peninsula 16 Liaoyang, battle 23, 26 loans: to Japan 94; to Russia 75–6, 83, 115 Lobanov-Yamagata Moscow Protocol 56 Lodge Sr., Henry Cabot 92 Lone, Stewart 57–8 Long, James 115 Luntinen, Pertti 35 Luxemburg, Rosa 1 Lyditte gas 29 MacDonald, Claude 17 Madagascar 34 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 106 Makarov, Admiral Stepan 30–1, 119 Malinowski, Aleksander 78 Manchukuo 65 Manchuria 17, 18, 19, 21, 27, 56, 60, 61, 64–5, 80, 82, 90; and Germany 117, 136, 147; influence of battlefields on First World War 130; and Japan 62, 103, 104; Open Door in 20, 93, 102, 106, 146; and Portsmouth treaty 63; Russia withdraws troops 99; and Witte 122 Manchurian Incident 106, 147 Marine Rundschau 30, 130 Marxism 48 Marx, Karl 48, 50 Masujiro Honda 64 media coverage of war 51–2 Meiji Restoration 16, 48

Index Meiji rifle 23 Mendelssohn Bank 75 Menning, Bruce W. 35, 76, 91 Mensheviks 81 Metternich, Paul Graf von 118 Meyer, George von Lengerke 95, 98 Middle Kingdom of China 16; see also China military intelligence 21–2 military structure, Russia 76 mines 31 Moltke, Helmuth von 134, 147–8 Moltke Plan 134, 136, 147 Mombauer, Annika 134 Morocco 115 Motojiro, Akashi 6 movies 52 Mukden 17 Mukden, Battle of 4, 27, 80, 82, 83, 90, 123, 147; Japanese military wanted peace 84; Russia forced to make peace 94 Müller, Gotelind 60 Münchner Neueste Nachrichten 20 Muravev, Nicholas 15 Myeongseong, queen 56 Nanshan 23 Naoko Shimazu 47, 50, 51 nationalism: Indian 5, 66; Japanese 47 naval agreements 146–7 naval victories, Japanese 6 navy 6, 28–35, 76, 106–7, 126–7, 131 Nehru, Jawaharlal 66 Nicholas II 15, 18–19, 82–3, 84, 95, 97, 98; and October Manifesto 146; wanted empire in East Asia 16; and Wilhelm II 117, 118–19, 120, 122, 123–6, 147 Nish, Ian 15 Nobuaki, Makino 81 Nogi Maresuke, General 23, 24–5, 26 October Manifesto 82, 84, 146 Open Door policy in Manchuria 8, 19–20, 93, 102, 106, 146 Orel 34 Osaka Mainichi Shinbun 52 Otte, Thomas G. 4 Outer Mongolia 103 Partner, Simon 52–3 patriotism 51–2

169

For Peace and Money (Siegel) 126 Peace Preservation Law (Japan) 49 Peace Treaty of Portsmouth see Portsmouth Peace Treaty Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki 16, 96 Pearl Harbor 6, 146, 147 Perry, Commodore Matthew C. 15 Peters, Carl 5, 36, 67 the Petropavlovsk 31 Philippines 67, 93 photography, use of 52 Pilsudski, Józef 78, 79 Poland 78–9, 81, 82, 145 Polish Nationalist Party 78 Polish National League 79 Polish Socialist Party 78, 79 political emancipation of the masses 145 Port Arthur 16, 21, 23, 127; fall of 75, 80, 83; Japanese attack 19, 29; siege of 24–6, 129, 130 Portsmouth Peace Treaty 35, 54, 58, 64, 82, 84, 107; and China 104; influence on American-Japanese relations 6, 8, 100–2, 103; and Josiah Quincy 90; and Manchuria 63; and South Manchurian Railway 63 Portugal 33 poverty of families due to conscription 53–4 Prittwitz, Curt von 24 Prussia, East 147 Putiatin, Efim Vasilevich 15 Putilov Plant 79–80 Quincy, Josiah 90 railways 16, 65 Red Laugh (Andreev) 74 revolutionary movement, Russia 75, 76, 77–9, 80, 81–2, 84–5, 145–6 Rice, Sir Cecil Spring 92, 102, 106–7 right-wing pressure groups 47 Rodo Sekai 49 Roosevelt, Theodore 8, 54, 90, 91–3, 96, 97, 101; asked the Kaiser to put pressure on his cousin 98, 123; awarded Nobel Peace Prize 99; believed in long war 117–18; disliked the czar 83–4, 94–5; and Japan 6, 102–3, 104–5, 106–7, 146 Rozhestvensky, Admiral Zinovy 32, 33, 34, 35

170

Index

Russia 4, 75–8, 79–85, 103–4; army 22–4, 127–9, 132, 136; and China 16, 61, 62; foreign policy goals 15; and Germany 7, 115–17, 118–22, 123–7, 134, 147, 148; influence on Indian independence 67; interest in Japan 74–5; and Korea 18–19, 59; and Manchuria 17, 64, 65; military and political weaknesses 5–6, 114; military intelligence 22; navy 28–9, 30–5, 126–7, 131; at peace negotiations 97–100; revolutionary movement 145; Roosevelt’s attitude to 93, 102, 146; and Triple Intervention 55–6; urged to start negotiations 94–6; see also army Russian Revolution 74, 80, 84–5 Russo-Chinese Bank 16 Russo-German agreement 123–6 Russo-Japanese Agreement, 1907 103 Sakai Toshihiko 48, 49–51 Sakhalin 15, 35, 54, 90, 97, 98, 99 Sakurai Tadayoshi 3–4, 20, 24, 25, 130 The San Francisco Call 97 Sareen, T. R. 65 Saul, Norman E. 101 Schiff, Jacob H. 94 Schlieffen, Alfred von 118, 130, 131–3, 134, 135, 136, 147 Schlieffen Plan 7, 8, 132, 133–4, 136, 147 sea mines 31 The Seattle Republican 100 Second Pacific Squadron 32, 35, 83, 84, 119, 129 Second Sino-Japanese War 65 secrets, military 21–2 segregation school crisis, California 106, 146 Seligmann, Matthew S. 114, 136 The Semi-Weekly Messenger 98 Sha-ho battle 23, 26 Shakai Minshuto 49 Shakaishugi Kyokai 49 Shichor, Yitzhak 46 Shimonoseki, treaty 16, 96 Siberia and the Exile System (Kennan) 94 Siegel, Jennifer 126 Sino-Japanese War 4, 16, 28, 48, 56, 60, 61 socialism 48–51

Society for a Strong Foreign Policy 47 Society for the Study of Socialism 48 Society of Comrades against Russia 47 Song Byung-jun 58, 59 South Manchurian Railway (SMR) 16, 63, 65, 146 Spance, William R. 29 spheres of interest 93 Stark, Admiral Oskar 29 Steinberg, John W. 1, 76 Sternburg, Freiherr Speck von 117–18 Stessel, General Anatoly 25 strikes 49, 80 submarines 127 Suematsu Kencho, Viscount 96 suicide 53 The Sunday Star 97–8 Sunjong, emperor 59 Sun Yat-sen 36, 63 Swadeshi movement 66 Sweden 77, 78, 145 Taft-Katsura Agreement 56, 93 telegraph network 66 Tettau, Eberhard von 27–8 Third Pacific Squadron 34 The Times 2, 75 Tirpitz, Admiral Alfred von 32 Togo Heihachiro, Admiral 19, 29–30, 35 Tokugawa shogunate 15 Tolstoy, Lev 75 Tongmenghui 63 The Topeka State Journal 105 torpedo boats 31–2, 127 Tovy, Tal 106, 146 trade relations, Russia tried to establish with Japan 15 trade unions 49 “Trafalgar of the East” 34 Trani, Eugene P. 95, 97 Trans-Siberian Railway 16, 21, 77, 79 Treaty of Beijing 17 Treaty of Björkö 125–6 Treaty of Kanghwa 15 Treaty of Portsmouth see Portsmouth Peace Treaty Treaty of Shimonoseki 16, 96 Trevelyan, Sir George Otto 91 Triple Entente 103 Triple Intervention 16, 55 Trotsky, Leon 130 Trummler, Konrad 22, 34

Index the Tsesarevich 29 Tsushima 15; Battle of 34–5, 76, 83, 84, 94, 95, 123, 147 Uchida Kosai 61 Uchida Ryohei 58–9 United States: believed in long war 117–18; and Japan 6, 90, 104–6, 107, 146–7; and Manchuria 19, 64; and mediation of Theodore Roosevelt 8, 91–3, 94–5; and Portsmouth treaty 101–2, 103; and Russian use of harbors 32–3; and Taft-Katsura Agreement 56 Valley, Emmerich von Arco auf 116 Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde 130 Vietnam 36, 67 villages, Japan, integrating into nation state 52–3 Vitgeft, Admiral Wilhelm 30 Vladivostok 16 warfare methods, modern 2, 3–4 war photography 52 War Plan Orange 107 Weber-Komura Seoul Protocol 56 White, John 114

171

Wilgus, Mary 4 Wilhelm II 8, 24, 92, 98, 119; wants to sign treaty with Russia 115–16, 120, 121–6, 147 Witte, Sergei 75, 83, 95–6, 97, 98, 99, 100; and cholera crisis 101; on Manchuria 122; on the Russian Revolution 84; sent to Germany to negotiate commercial treaty 115; supports China against Japan 16 Wolf, Lucien 75 woodblock prints 51, 52 Xinmin Congbao 62 Yalu, battle of 22–3, 127–8 Yalu river 22 Yamagata Aritomo 18 Yasukata, General Oku 23 “Yellow Peril” 5, 35, 61, 102, 114, 117 Yevgeni Alekseev, Admiral 18–19, 21, 23, 28, 29, 83 Yokota Shoten 52 Yoshizawa Shoten 52 Yugantar (New Era) 67 Zasulich, Mikhail 22 Zilliacus, Konni 78, 79, 80, 81, 145 Zuber, Terence 133, 134–5, 147